Utrecht University

Conflicting Global Economic Imaginaries

US Foreign Policy towards Mexico & the New International Economic Order, 1977–81

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Title

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Abstract

The North-South Dialogue was a series of international deliberations from 1973-82 in which Northern and Southern states debated the rearrangement of global economic governance. The Dialogue has recently been rediscovered by historians as a crucial moment during the present neoliberal order's creation, a time when imagining new ways of global organisation appeared possible. The historical literature has just now begun dealing with how this possibility became scuttled between 1975 and 1981. This scholarship has however largely neglected to assess how bilateral relations between Northern and Southern states were affected by this process, thereby not depicting the Dialogue's true significance. The following thesis begins to do this by examining how the North-South Dialogue shaped the Carter administration's foreign policy towards Mexico. This is done through a digital archival research method and the application of the antipreneur theory. It is found that the Dialogue moulded the Carter administration's foreign policy towards Mexico by pushing Washington to offer monetary services and technological goods to Mexico City, by driving it to directly convince its southern neighbour of its global economic governance norms, and by propelling it to attempt to move Mexico into particular enterprises to shift the terms of the North-South Dialogue as a whole. However, it is also shown that Mexico's tremendous size and proximity created other extraneous interests in the White House which simultaneously also motivated much of the above to different extents. This signifies that although the Dialogue was important to bilateral policy in this instance, its importance varied from measure to measure.

Keywords: United States, Mexico, New International Economic Order, Basic Human Needs, Jimmy Carter, José López Portillo

Contents

Abbreviations

BHN	Basic Human Needs
CERDS	Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
CIEC	Conference on International Economic Cooperation
ESRs	Economic and Social Rights
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
G77	Group of 77
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MTN	Multilateral Trade Negotiations
NSC	National Security Council
NSD	North-South Dialogue
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PD	Presidential Directive
PRM	Presidential Review Memorandum
S&T	Science and Technology
UNCSTD	UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly

Introduction

The present moment often appears as if it portends the coming transformation of the world order. We have recently seen a disastrous US retreat from a ruinous forever war in Afghanistan, a quagmire of terror unleashed by the unjust Russian invasion of Ukraine, and a rapidly escalating global economic emergency which threatens to send much of the Global South into a debt crisis and much of the Global North into an inflationary spiral, amongst so much more. Various scholars have tried to contextualise the current period as the product of a particular phase in the existing global political-economy, described as "zombie neoliberalism," "mutant neoliberalism," and so on.[1] Though it is worth noting that similar systemic arguments have been made through previous ostensible crisis periods, they feel more prescient than ever coming off the recent mainstreaming of the far-right worldwide and a global pandemic. A period in which such a transformative crisis definitively did occur however – one where the fundamental global economic order was rewritten – was the long 1970s. During these years, the world also faced the end of a catastrophic US war and the beginning of a horrendous Soviet one. It too saw a global inflationary spiral and a growing Southern debt crisis fuelled partly by soaring energy prices. In anticipating the possible systemic transformation of the present order then, the following paper examines an aspect of the past order's attempted negotiated overturning.

This Dialogue came about at a period which saw the US-dominated global economy experience several seemingly existential shocks to its very architecture, namely two oil embargoes and the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system. Aiming to forestall its deposition as the world's hegemon, Washington frantically sought a substantive

[1] William Davies and Nicholas Gane, "Post-Neoliberalism? An Introduction," *Theory, Culture and Society* 38, no. 6 (2021): 4.

response to these changing sands, eventually firmly settling on a programme of neoliberal reformation under Ronald Reagan. Concurrently, many states within the Global South became increasingly proactive in shaping the structure of the global economy as international commodity prices initially rose and especially those of hydrocarbons surged. This came to a head when these states began formally promoting the concept of the NIEO in 1974, a proposed international economic system which was to overturn the core-periphery dynamics of North-South economic relations. While the NIEO's supporters varied in their interpretations of what specific elements of such a system would look like, this fundamental understanding remained. The US's initial responses to this were governed by the Nixon and then Ford administrations. The bulk of its negotiation however was to be carried out by the administration of Jimmy Carter in the form of the NSD, a series of multilateral meetings between Northern and Southern states regarding the then future of the global economy.

Emerging out of another crisis, the Great Recession, the last decade and a half has seen a steady increase in historical scholarship on the NIEO, especially since the editorial team at the journal *Humanity* decided to revive discussions around the subject.[2] Having been nearly dormant before, the current modest flurry of scholarship has opened up our understanding of how the NIEO came to be and the position it occupied within international debates early on. Given its relatively recent historical treatment though, the NIEO's negotiation period between 1975-81 has only very recently been subject to academic scrutiny, with Michael Franczak's recently published monograph *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy during the 1970s* primarily blazing the trail.[3] In it, Franczak laid the groundwork for how "the

[2] Nils Gilman, "The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, no. 1 (2015): 11. The literature that emerged following this moment is discussed in the historiography section of this chapter.
[3] Michael Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2022), 152.

NIEO changed the character of US foreign policy."[4] With respect to the Carter presidency specifically, he showed in hitherto unseen detail how it propelled Washington to embrace, amongst other ideas and practices, the developmental vision of BHN as a counter to the NIEO during the NSD until it eventually gave up amidst stagnant negotiations and a worsened global security climate. He further demonstrated how this 'character change' also manifested in bilateral relations, especially with regard to Venezuela, leaving the door open for further studies into how the Dialogue affected the Carter administration's foreign policy towards other states bilaterally. Ultimately, such research is crucial because only then can the actual significance of the NSD in policymaking begin to be observed in its totality. Moreover, as North-South issues are thereby brought to the centre of the historical analysis, doing so will allow us to continue to build on a new history of the late twentieth-century in which contemporaneous historical developments are disentangled from the Cold War.[5]

Though there are numerous noteworthy candidates, Mexico stands out for several reasons. As Christy Thornton has recently discussed, the Mexican government under President Luis Echeverría had a critical role in the NIEO's inception, having been the primary author to one of its founding documents.[6] Though not the main subject of her inquiry, she also briefly described how Mexico continued to promote the NIEO in the UN and directly to countries such as the US under Echeverría's successor, José López Portillo, until the calamitous 1982 Mexican Debt Crisis caused Mexico to look inward. Moreover, by the mid-1970s, Mexico's importance on the world stage seemed on the rise, most crucially so to US

[4] Franczak, 3.
[5] Federico Romero, "Cold War Historiography at the Crossroads," *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (2014): 692–3.
[6] Christy Thornton, *Revolution in Development: Mexico and the Governance of the Global Economy* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2021), 166–92.

officials.[7] The high fertility rates earlier in the twentieth century were beginning to produce its demographic dividend by the beginning of the 1970s when Mexico City became the third largest city in the world. This caused a considerable amount of social instability early on as a less steady rate of economic growth meant the Mexican economy could not provide adequate levels of employment, though Mexican GDP growth was still at over 5% for most of the decade. However, this appeared to change following the discovery of major new oil reserves in 1976, eventually making Mexico the fourth largest petroleum producer by 1981. Although this moment for Mexico was ultimately ephemeral in hindsight, it did for a time appear as if the country was on the way upwards during the latter 1970s. Moreover, with such a dynamically changing country that the US shared the tenth largest border in the world with, this work's *research question* is therefore: *how did the North-South Dialogue shape the Carter administration's foreign policy towards Mexico?*

This question entails an investigation into how a conflict between two states over global economic governance affects one of those states' perceptions and consequently foreign policy towards the other. Foreign policy is conceived as representing both of the main definitions for the concept from the Foreign Policy Analysis literature: the strategies for actions, as well as the consequent actions themselves, which are targeted at shaping the behaviour of a foreign entity according to the targeter state's interests as defined by its decisionmakers.[8] To help further define what this conflict was, this work embraces an ideational, as opposed to a materialist, approach to global politics, namely the critical constructivist theory of the antipreneur. Given that there was a normative contrariety

[7] Abraham F. Lowethal, *Partners in Conflict: The US and Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 69–71.
[8] Walter Carlsnaes, "Foreign Policy," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2013), 305.

between the US's normative status-quo position and Mexico's NIEO, the antipreneur theory was specifically chosen because it models normatively conservative actors in international relations, outlining how they oppose the acceptance of a new norm in favour of their established norm.[9] Moreover, in addition to the major historiographical lacuna this work aims to fill, it therefore also seeks to verify the specific aspect of the antipreneur theory which can hypothetically conceptualise part of the answer to the above question. In doing so, this work also seeks to add a layer of theoretical depth which has been largely missing from the NSD literature and has thereby prevented its findings from being more universalizable. A further explanation of the theory and the methodology for its application to this study, including its subquestions, is provided in chapter one.

Historiography

On top of its theoretical offerings, this work also makes a historiographical contribution to the historical literature on the NIEO as stated earlier and this is worth delving into further to fully render this matter clear. Firstly, it is again worth emphasising how nascent literature on the Order still is. Indeed, prior to the Great Recession, there were very few historical works which placed any significant focus on the subject.[10] Following the 2008 Crash and especially *Humanity*'s Spring 2015 issue however, this changed somewhat. There arose literature which began to define what the NIEO was in history,[11] or alternatively started to weave it into larger

[9] Alan Bloomfield, "Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change," *Review of International Studies* 42, no. 2 (2015): 310–33.
[10] For the exceptions, see John Toye and Richard Toye, *The UN and Global Political Economy: Trade, Finance, and Development* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Jennifer Bair, "From the Politics of Development to the Challenges of Globalization," *Globalizations* 4, no. 4 (2007): 486–99.
[11] For example, it is defined as a debate about "interdependence" in Victor McFarland, "The New International Economic Order, Interdependence, and Globalization," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, no. 1 (2015): 217–33; and characterised as a debate over "state's rights" in Antony Anghie, "Inequality, Human Rights, and the New International Economic Order," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 10, no. 3 (2019): 429–42.

historical narratives regarding the evolution of ideological movements[12] or political entities.[13] Yet, none of these works spoke in any substantial detail about the 1977-81 period, or when they did, they tended to briefly examine it without covering what had occurred in the NSD forums themselves.[14] The few that did concentrate on this period generally centred their analysis on smaller sectoral debates,[15] or on the roles of international institutions or nonstate actors, rather than on those aforementioned forums.[16] Despite the analysis being left incomplete by the scholarship cited above though, the state of the field nevertheless managed to articulate the enormous scope of the NIEO's importance to numerous intersecting historical trends, as well as to express the profound breadth of this project's influence on all levels of international society. It is no wonder then that the celebrated historian Mark Mazower was able to designate the NIEO as "the most serious challenge to global leadership since the end of the Second World War."[17] Given this importance, it is therefore worth wholistically interrogating how deeply the NIEO's influence over international affairs exactly was during the 1970s.

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[12] Christopher R.W. Dietrich addressed the NIEO's place in the evolution of the "sovereign rights program" in *Oil Revolution: Anticolonial Elites, Sovereign Rights, and the Economic Culture of Decolonization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); and Adom Getachew similarly does so in the broader context of postcolonial worldmaking in *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).

[13] Daniel J. Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: EU Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957–1986* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Giuliano Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

[14] For example, Vanessa Ogle entirely disregards the NSD conferences in favour of discussing the Brandt Commission in her article "State Rights against Private Capital: The 'New International Economic Order' and the Struggle over Aid, Trade, and Foreign Investment, 1962–1981," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 5, no. 2 (2014): 211–34.

[15] Jennifer Bair examines the Code of Conduct on Transnational Enterprises in "Corporations at the United Nations: Echoes of the New International Economic Order?," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, no. 1 (2015): 159–71.

[16] Patrick Sharma, "Between North and South: The World Bank and the New International Economic Order," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, no. 1 (2015): 189–200; Paul Adler, "'The Basis of a New Internationalism?': The Institute for Policy Studies and North-South Politics from the NIEO to Neoliberalism," *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 4 (2017): 665–93.

[17] Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: Penguin, 2012), 304.

Since Franczak's monograph recently opened up the understanding of how the NSD transpired in its own forums, this effort has significantly advanced. Furthermore, although there were works which detailed the period prior from the US's perspective, his work has also been tremendously valuable in showing how the only global superpower involved in the NSD had operated within it.[18] With Courtney Hercus's earlier volume illuminating how the Carter administration attempted to undermine the NIEO by campaigning within the IFIs, there has thus emerged a progressively clearer picture of how the NSD's latter period had taken place and the US's role in that transpiration.[19] However, numerous gaps still remain unaccounted for, not least of which are the exact roles of other states. Within the realm of the history of US foreign relations though, there too are yet still stones left unturned in the analysis of the NSD, with a major frontier being whether the Dialogue had affected US policymaking to the extent that it had affected its bilateral policies. With this work then, this lacuna is addressed through a case-study of US Mexico policy during the Carter administration.

In undertaking this study, this thesis contributes to two parts of the broader historiography regarding the NSD, namely its intellectual and diplomatic history. Regarding the intellectual history related to the NSD, this piece firstly recovers the normative character of the NIEO through an analysis of its Charter, thereby refuting Daniel Whelan's assertion that this character had faded away by the mid-1970s while still sharing his understanding of the NIEO as having been about economic justice.[20] It also refines the conception of BHN as a subject of

[18] For the prior period, see Daniel J. Sargent, "North/South: The United States Responds to the New International Economic Order," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, no. 1 (2015): 201–16; Orfeo Fioretos, "Rhetorical Appeals and Strategic Cooptation in the Rise and Fall of The New International Economic Order," *Global Policy* 11, no. 3 (2020): 73–82.

[19] Courtney Hercus, *The Struggle over Human Rights: The Non-Aligned Movement, Jimmy Carter, and Neoliberalism* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2019).

[20] "'Under the Aegis of Man': The Right to Development and the Origins of the New International Economic Order," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, no. 1 (2015): 105.

inquiry by distilling it into its most essential normative claims, making possible to study its significance with more rigour than could be done by BHN's earlier studies which descend from Samuel Moyn's ground-breaking research on the subject.[21] Using this notion of BHN, this work identifies several BHN programmes and thereby provides further evidence for the developmental doctrine's predominance during this period, though it also shows that such programmes were often made for reasons of national security rather than concerns for human welfare.

Concerning the diplomatic history of the NSD, it firstly expands understandings of how deep the NSD's influence was on the construction of the Carter administration's Latin America policy by showing how it played a key role even in the think tank work that inspired it and that this influence carried through all the way into official policy positions on Mexico. This is in contrast to the literature on the Carter administration's construction of its Latin America policy which does not sufficiently emphasise the North-South connection.[22] Furthermore, this thesis also refutes Franczak's claim that the NSD vanished from US Latin America policy by 1979 by showing how it played a role throughout that year in Washington's strategy for Mexico City, though this work does confirm the NSD's relevance in US policy vis-à-vis Mexico overall.[23] This is demonstrated to have been so even when the NSD was not directly publicly addressed by the US. Aside from the earlier mentioned BHN programmes, this is shown by depicting when the US attempted to use Mexico's participation in the GATT to legitimise it as the rightful forum for discussing trade within the Dialogue, consequently bestowing further

[21] *Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), Chapter 5.
[22] Henry Raymont, *Troubled Neighbors: The Story of US-Latin American Relations, from FDR to the Present*, 2nd ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), Chapter 10; Vanessa Walker, *Principles in Power: Latin America & the Politics of US Human Rights Diplomacy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020), Chapter 2; Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 128–32. Franczak comes closest to sufficiency here, though this paper finds that there was more influence to be recounted.
[23] Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 141.

proof to the small amount of literature which claims that the GATT was used for this purpose more generally.[24] Additionally, this indirect addressal is also revealed when portraying the role Mexican fossil fuels played in the US's North-South strategy wherein OPEC's power was to be weakened to lessen its influence over the rest of the G77, accordingly buttressing the scholarship which has detailed the other parts of this stratagem elsewhere.[25] Lastly, this work provides the diplomatic history of the NSD a new episode in its story through this thesis's portrayal of US-Mexican relations concerning the WEP, a brief saga which has been scantly mentioned in the historiography thus far.[26] Overall then, the following reaffirms the importance of the NIEO in the history of US diplomacy and the Global 1970s more broadly.

Methodology

To conduct the planned analysis, this study employed the historical method. This firstly involved a multi-track archival approach wherein primary documents were tracked down from multiple digital collections which have amassed materials from crucial institutional archives such as the Jimmy Carter Library and the National Archives and Records Administration, and then those sources were examined together side-by-side chronologically. Although this exclusive use of online sources was inherently limiting, the relevant physical materials were simply inaccessible for this study. To minimise the effects of this issue, this paper relied on as many digital pools as possible, namely the Digital National Security Archive, FRUS, Jimmy Carter Digital Library, UN Digital Library, US Declassified Documents Online, and

[24] Lucia Coppolaro, "In the Shadow of Globalization: The European Community and the United States in the GATT Negotiations of the Tokyo Round (1973–1979)," *International History Review* 40, no. 4 (2018): 763; Francine McKenzie, *GATT and Global Order in the Postwar Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 214–22.
[25] Dietrich, *Oil Revolution: Anticolonial Elites, Sovereign Rights, and the Economic Culture of Decolonization*; Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*.
[26] Claudia Jezabel Piña Navarro, "Between the Superpower and Third Worldism: Mexico and OPEC (1974–1982)," in *Handbook of OPEC and the Global Energy Order: Past, Present and Future Challenges*, ed. Dag Harald Claes and Giuliano Garavini (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020), 204.

WikiLeaks. FRUS Volume XXIII of the 1977-1980 series on Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean delivered the primary corpus for this work. This provided numerous cables, letters, memorandums, reports, and telegrams from across the governmental institutions. These documents were the most meaningful to answering the central question as they showed the exchanges between the Carter and López Portillo governments, as well as what the former wanted out of this relationship and how it perceived these relations to be.

To buttress this, the other collections delivered additional documents not present in said FRUS, providing access to materials which were made at lower levels of government such as diplomatic cables. This was important as not all activities relevant to answering the main research question took place at the highest rungs of administration. Additionally, FRUS 1977-1980 Volumes I, II, III, and XXVI on the Foundations of Foreign Policy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, and Latin America Region respectively, as well as FRUS 1969-76 Volume XXXVII on the Energy Crisis, mostly contributed documents which had significance to policy concerns broader than Mexico. This allowed for the contextualisation of US Mexico policy within more general trends in the Carter administration's overall global strategies. Lastly, though understanding the Mexican government's motivations were not necessary for answering this work's main research question, the UN Digital Library afforded materials from outside the US government which provided some awareness as to Mexican actions and motivations. Such documents therefore helped to round out the historical narrative without the use of genuine Mexican archival materials. They also lent insight into the relevant UN conferences without the filter of the US's perspective as experienced through the other collections. Moreover, excluding the FRUS collections, materials from these digital databases were found using advanced search options and Boolean code with this thesis's key words and date range.

This work's arguments were thusly built upon the evidence that was observed in the documents of the above collections. This evidence was extracted and weighed up against each other by employing the final two components of the historical method: source criticism and historicist synoptic judgement.[27] In doing so, this methodology permitted the revealing of the competing influences on US Mexico policy during the Carter administration, allowing ultimately for the accounting of extraneous influences and therefore enabling the precise impact of the NSD to be situated. Additionally, as outlined further in the next chapter, the normative contents of the Mexican and US documents representing the NIEO and BHN respectively are drawn out using a close-reading approach. This permitted the adoption of a particular aspect of the aforesaid antipreneur theory, giving a lens to analyse certain intergovernmental communications and thereby offering an innovative additional manner in which to answer the main research question. This paper therefore also verifies this element of the framework by employing it alongside a specific social scientific methodology – the theory-testing single case-study method – covered in the following chapter.

Structure

The thesis of this work is as follows: the NSD shaped the Carter administration's foreign policy towards Mexico by propelling the White House to extend numerous offers of monetary and technological value to the Palacio Nacional with respect to a variety of policy domains. However, given Mexico's massive size and proximity to the US, the motivations behind these offerings often went beyond concerns about the Dialogue. The NSD also fashioned US Mexico policy during this period by pushing Washington to attempt to directly convince its southern

[27] Though source criticism is a widely understood practice, historicist synoptic judgement is used here as defined by Paul W. Schroeder in "History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (1997): 68–69.

neighbour of its global economic governance norms, as well as to attempt to push it into certain endeavours to mostly indirectly shift the terms of the Dialogue. These actions tended to have motivations more clearly rooted in desires to shift the NSD towards American interests. Moreover, such wants were foundational to Carter's Mexico policy, though the prevalence of the above measures tended to vary a lot based on circumstances endogenous and exogenous to the US-Mexican relationship. Lastly, in terms of the antipreneur theory, although the model was useful in conceptualising a few intergovernmental communications, it is clear that the NSD stimulated many more American activities outside of normative appealing despite the normative nature of the Dialogue. Overall then, it is found that the NSD changed the character of the US Mexico policy, though with the stipulation that the degree of affectation was variable between different measures depending generally on how important they were to the US for reasons beyond the Dialogue.

The first chapter supports this argument by determining the context and ideological features of the US-Mexican normative conflict over global economic governance. Through the analysis of the key documents CERDS and PRM-28, it is found that both governments held opposing constitutive and regulative norms inspired by differing conceptions of development which had evolved out of a reaction to the 1960s 'Decade of Disappointment' for developmentalism. This chapter subsequently establishes the theoretical framework of the antipreneur, where its concept of antipreneurial tactics are used to conceptualise how an actor's foreign policy is shaped when in normative contestation. This provides a lens through which to analyse intergovernmental communications in the subsequent chapters for the purposes of upholding the central thesis. This chapter lastly also defines the theory-testing single case-study method so that the ensuing findings of antipreneurial tactics can be used to

also verify this aspect of theory and thus make this research relevant to constructivist scholarship.

The next four chapters move on to analysing Carter's US Mexico policy. The second chapter shows that the motivation to use Latin American states to facilitate the moving of the NSD in the US's desired direction was at the foundation of US Mexico policy by tracing this policy genealogically through three successive texts which produced Carter's initial strategy for the whole Latin American region. Taken from the literature on the period, these texts are the 1976 Linowitz Report, Pastor's speech memorandum, and Carter's Pan-America Day speech. This speech in particular is also shown to have exhibited antipreneurial tactics. Having established this, this chapter then traces the policy ideas relevant to Mexico that emerged out of NSD concerns through the same genealogy. It also presents the policy ideas from outside this lineage which were pertinent to US Mexico policy and which were designed to allow the US to mould the Dialogue in its image. Together, these policy proposals are held to form three core groups relating to the NSD itself, economics, and energy. This creates the thematic framework which structures the final three chapters, where each chapter examines the presence of one of these policy groupings in US Mexico policy over Carter's term.

The third chapter therefore analyses the place occupied by NSD policy ideas in the Carter administration's foreign policy towards Mexico, finding that Washington's desire for cooperation with Mexico City in the Dialogue drove the White House to consult with the Palacio Nacional on the subject of the NSD and to offer it S&T initiatives that could serve the BHN for food in Mexico. Regarding the former, it is shown that Carter valued these consultations through till the 1979 megaconferences, though external events in 1978 had prevented the presidential exchanges. Furthermore, this chapter reveals that antipreneurial

tactics were a relevant feature of these deliberations, verifying this aspect further. However, López Portillo's entrepreneurial tactics are depicted as having been more prevalent, indicating the role personal agency plays in the deployment of normative actions. Concerning the S&T initiatives, it is shown that although they reflected a BHN rationale, they were equally instigated because they could have positive effects for Mexican social stability and thereby US stability. Lastly, it is demonstrated that these efforts ultimately had no discernible impact on Mexico to the White House, leading to no satisfying results by the end of the megaconferences and the fading of these policies from US-Mexican relations with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

In the fourth chapter, the economic policies that were in the US's Mexico policy and relevant to the NSD are examined. These policies fell under three categories: financial stabilisation, bilateral assistance, and multilateral trade. For the first policy, the financial stabilisation policies are shown as they were recommended partially over NSD concerns in the aforementioned general approach formation process, though it is argued that the health of the US economy was ultimately the most significant motivator. The bilateral assistance programmes, namely those relating to migration and narcotics, are also found to have been partly initiated on NSD grounds. Though reducing migration and narcotics production were more significant stimuli, it is contented that the clear BHN components of these programmes did make their design inseparable from that of the Dialogue. Lastly, this chapter shows that the NSD drove Washington to pursue trade negotiations with Mexico City through the GATT and encourage Mexican accession into this organisation because it wanted to elevate the GATT above UNCTAD and simultaneously shape the former's multilateral agreements along US lines, thereby sidestepping trade discussions in UNCTAD. It is argued that not only did

these policies not affect Mexico's position in the NSD, the trade policies also failed to move the Dialogue to the GATT.

The final chapter maintains that the Carter administration's Mexican energy policies, namely the stimulation of Mexican energy production, the pursual of the natural gas agreement, and the supporting of the World Energy Plan, were influenced by the NSD. Concerning the first policy, it is asserted that the US extended offerings for capital and equipment to Mexico in order to drive up world oil supplies which was to, amongst other things, reduce OPEC's power in the Dialogue. Relating to the second policy, it is claimed that the initial impetus for the Washington's support for the natural gas agreement was partly driven by a desire to lower global demand for oil, thereby also reducing the Cartel's power. Furthermore, it is contended that concerns after the 1979 Iranian oil workers strike regarding OPEC, including about their position in the Dialogue, were responsible for reviving and concluding the natural gas agreement. The final policy, the supporting of the World Energy Plan, is argued to have again been the product of US desires to reign in OPEC, but also the result of American aspirations to pause possible forthcoming NSD debates about the governance of non-energy commodities as well as the outcome of a sincere interest in Washington.

I. Chapter 1 – The Normative Opposition

This chapter establishes the precise contents of the US-Mexican normative conflict over global economic governance to identify the presence and influence of said conflict on the Carter administration's Mexico policy in the primary materials. In doing so, this chapter then establishes the relevance of Alan Bloomfield's antipreneur model and subsequently explains it so that the research can be guided partially by said model in the subsequent chapters. To perform this task, this chapter derives the US's and Mexico's normative proposals regarding respectively ESRs and NIEO through an analysis of PRM-28 and CERDS correspondingly. The significance of these documents is first addressed, justifying their choice by referring to the historiography on developmentalism during the 1970s which relate to the Carter and López Portillo governments, consequently allowing also for their contextualisation. Having done this, the norms propagated by each are extrapolated through a close reading of the texts, involving the application of the appropriate analytical tools from the constructivist literature. This contextualisation and extrapolation establishes the normative character, and thereby the opposing nature, of the two documents and so the US-Mexican normative conflict is connected to Bloomfield's antipreneur theory. In expounding this framework, this chapter finally concludes with this study's sub-questions, deriving them from the model's typology of antipreneurial tactics and establishing thereby some of the potential answers to the main research question. Moreover, by finding the answers to the sub-questions, it is possible to begin to support the main thesis and, in accordance with the theory-testing single case-study method described at the end of this chapter, verify the aspect of Bloomfield's theory used here as well. Additionally, by formally defining the norms at play, it is possible to show how they ideologically underpinned certain policies.

With regard to historiography, this chapter contributes to the historiography on the NIEO insofar as the recent literature has only occasionally referenced the normative character of the NSD, whilst this quality of the Dialogue is taken to at least one of its theoretical conclusions here.[28] This analysis therefore also rejects Daniel Whelan's interpretation of the NIEO, which argues it lacks a normative dimension due to its omission of the "right to development" as a human right, as the Charter contains norms which advocate for the rights of states on behalf of subaltern peoples; though Whelan's framing of the norms underpinning the NIEO as encompassing economic justice is accepted here.[29] The same applies to the theoretical treatment of BHN here as although historians such as Samuel Moyn have gone further with BHN as a subject of analysis by accounting for the topic's intellectual underpinnings, BHN's treatment here is more formalised, providing thereby the potential for more intellectual precision when it comes to analysing the approach's historical significance.[30] Overall then, this chapter establishes the link to a modern theoretical lens through which historians can contend in novel ways with the history of international political economy during the latter twentieth century and beyond.

From Dependency Theory to the NIEO and its Charter

To justify the significance of CERDS and PRM-28 then, their intellectual backgrounds must first be explained. Firstly, the ideas that formed them share a common inflection point as responses to a widespread disappointment with the 1960s' 'Decade of Development', though they entailed vastly different answers to this frustration. Launched initially with UNGA resolution 1710 in 1961, this Decade of Development comprised a series of international

[28] See for example Bair, "From the Politics of Development to the Challenges of Globalization": 491.
[29] "'Under the Aegis of Man': The Right to Development and the Origins of the New International Economic Order": 105.
[30] *Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World*, Chapter 5.

economic initiatives aimed at promulgating economic growth and social progress in the Global South.[31] By the end of the 1960s as these development efforts appeared to have floundered, there occurred a seismic rethinking of the field across academic and policymaking circles.[32] Though there had already been scholars who had challenged the developmentalism of the post-1945 era, this situation provoked a much broader swath of academics and policymakers to begin to seriously reconsider their assumptions about what development should mean and how to best achieve it. Amongst other conceptions, dependency theory and the BHN approach were embraced by differing elites as the clarion calls for the coming Second Development Decade.

Originating out of papers written in the late 1940s by economist Raúl Prebisch and economist Hans W. Singer, dependency theory is a theoretical framework within structural economics which developed out of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis.[33] This hypothesis argued that primary good prices decline relative to manufactured good prices over the long-run, leading eventually to the collapse in primary producers' terms of trade. Though this idea travelled beyond its original authors, Prebisch further developed his thesis into dependency theory, as well as promoted it within elite circles of the Global South and Western Left, through his role in UN Economic Commission for Latin America as its Executive Director from 1950-63 and in UNCTAD as its founding Secretary-General from 1964-69.[34] This more elaborated conception of international trade contended global poverty to be a product of the

[31] Toye and Toye, *The UN and Global Political Economy: Trade, Finance, and Development*, 176–83.
[32] Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 159–68.
[33] See John Toye and Richard Toye, "The Origins and Interpretation of the Prebisch-Singer Thesis," *History of Political Economy* 35, no. 3 (2003): 437–67.
[34] Johanna Bockman, "Socialist Globalization against Capitalist Neocolonialism: The Economic Ideas behind the New International Economic Order," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, no. 1 (2015): 112–118.

structural composition of the neo-colonial world system rather than simply an affect of being at a lower stage of development as modernisation theory portended. In this system, developing states are generally unable to accumulate capital because its two main industries, agriculture and basic manufacturing, are dominated by a narrow group of local private interests, who spend their profits on foreign luxury goods, and foreign investors from developed states, who expect to retain the majority of the peripheral company's profits as returns on their investments. With most of the profits therefore vacating the developing country, this then forestalls the investment of capital for indigenous technological innovation which is required to become and remain developed.

With the failure of the Development Decade, this theory transformed into a full-blown international political programme supported by a majority of Southern nations under the moniker of the NIEO. This transformation occurred chiefly within the halls of the Prebisch-led intergovernmental body of UNCTAD, a forum founded in 1964 within the UN to set its agenda on international trade and development.[35] There, representatives of the non-aligned Global South formed the G77, a voting coalition which aimed to promote Southern interests at the UN. Through the influence of Prebisch as UNCTAD's head, the G77 steadily adopted dependency theory as the conceptual throughline for their bloc's collective approach. This association came quite naturally as dependency theory provided a clear and concrete narrative for explaining how colonialism was persisting post-decolonisation and therefore why attempts at development were generally failing – points Southern leaders had been propagating since decolonisation.[36] Increasingly emboldened by Western economic decline

[35] Nils Gilman, "The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, no. 1 (2015): 2–5.
[36] See for example Nigeria's first speech to the UNGA in 1960 in Sara Lorenzini, *Global Development: A Cold War History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 89.

and the related success of the first OPEC oil embargo, the G77 developed over the course of UNCTAD meetings I, II, and III tangible proposals on a smattering of international trade issues including natural resource sovereignty, transnational corporate regulation, nondiscriminatory and nonreciprocal trade arrangments, and technology transfers, principally culminating in two UNGA resolutions in 1974: *the Declaration for the Establishment of a NIEO* and *the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States*.

Although the Declaration was the first NIEO resolution put through the UNGA, only the Charter is immediately relevant to this work as it was originally authored by Mexico and so just its specific background is directly addressed in this work. As regards this background, the Mexican president Luis Echeverría proposed the Charter in 1972 at UNCTAD III, predating the announcement of the Declaration.[37] Its aim was to resolve global inequalities within the parameters of embedded liberalism, thereby overcoming the legacies of colonialism without entirely overturning the liberal capitalist order in line with Prebisch's own reformist tendencies. As Echeverría's pronouncement first went on to inspire the creation of the Declaration, the Mexican proposal started to change form, now becoming the first attempt to codify the NIEO into international law. It further changed form as it entered into the UN working group stage due to opposition from Northern countries. By the time the resolution was put to a vote in the UNGA, CERDS had acquired several authors, all with individual motivations, resulting in a North-South corporatist compromise, though without the US's approval in the end. Despite this shared creation though, CERDS still forms the basis of defining the Mexican norm presented in this study as the López Portillo government continued to promote the Charter internationally until the Cancún Summit in 1981.

[37] Thornton, *Revolution in Development: Mexico and the Governance of the Global Economy*, 170–88, 191–2.

Basic Human Needs: from Development Paradigm to ESRs

Also known as PRM/NSC-28: Human Rights, the contents of PRM-28 regarding ESRs can be traced back to a particular set of ideas about development that gained initial traction as a response to the failure of modernisation, namely the ideas of BHN. However, this approach's intellectual origins are far less discreet than dependency theory. To start with, BHN in this context refers to an approach to development which privileges the provision of a set of goods and services at a certain minimum level to those who cannot obtain such goods at such a level. What goods would be included in this set and to what degree they would be provided varied between scholars over time, but as historian Joanne Meyerowitz has asserted, "most agreed though… basic needs should target food, clean water, shelter, health care, and primary education."[38] This view on development held distinct appeal at a time when the targeting of abstract figures like GNP had brought so little to the majority of the world's poor.[39] Additionally, while modernisation as a whole appeared to have failed, the success of the Green Revolution with its specific focus on increasing agricultural yields to solve global hunger had whet the appetite for the type of development model BHN represented.[40] Nevertheless, as with any idea, it took a network of powerful institutional actors to operationalise this proclivity into decision-making apparatuses.

Though thinking about the basic necessities of human beings can be traced back centuries, the origins of BHN thinking for the period in question has several different roots that were within a common interconnected network of intellectuals and policymakers in the 1960s and

[38] Joanne Meyerowitz, *A War on Global Poverty: The Lost Promise of Redistribution and the Rise of Microcredit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021), 67.
[39] Thomas G. Weiss et al., *UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 245.
[40] Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 236.

1970s. Its initial revival in this period for example ranges from diplomat Margaret Anstee's work on Bolivia's first 'National Economic and Social Development Plan' to a speech by economist Barbara Ward during a 1965 economics conference.[41] As the failure of modernisation became clear, this network began to consolidate within major international bodies which refined the BHN approach and disseminated it at large. Under the sway of economists Amartya Sen and Dharam Ghai, the International Labour Organisation was able to get their more developed version of BHN widely publicised through the successful marketing of its World Employment Programme and Conference in 1976. The UN proved the approach's applicability in the policy space through ECOSOC's education campaigns, the FAO's Campaign Against Hunger, and the WHO's health care access campaign.[42] Lastly, despite some resistance within the organisation, the World Bank, transformed by the petrodollars earned during the oil embargoes of the 1970s, eventually pioneered loan programmes to Global South on the basis of poverty eradication – a concept closely related to BHN.[43] Through this power, the World Bank shifted the discourse around BHN, framing it as the regrettable but necessary abandonment of international egalitarianism and popularising the minimising of the approach's provisions down to its most essential parts.[44] The chief architect of this transformation, economist Mahbub ul Haq, himself even contributed to the think tank which shifted Carter administration officials towards BHN, a process that will be described in greater detail shortly.[45] For now however, it can be said that

[41] Weiss et al., *UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice*, 242–244.
[42] Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present*, 169.
[43] Sharma, "Between North and South: The World Bank and the New International Economic Order": 190–191.
[44] Moyn, *Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World*, 127–33.
[45] Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 160.

by the mid-1970s, BHN had achieved hegemony over development thinking in much of the West.

From here, as with dependency theory, BHN became the underlying theory of particular political programmes, in this case ESRs in the human rights doctrine of the Carter administration and this was the result of the concurrent human rights revolution in the US during which the approach became deliberately entangled with human rights to countenance the NIEO. This revolution was the product of the same crises which discredited modernization theory abroad and caused Americans themselves to experience a sense of moral driftlessness going into the 1970s. Attempting to reclaim American virtue, US politicians and civil society organisations began to nascently mobilise around the concept of human rights – the idea that all people had the right to a set of fundamental freedoms without infringement.[46] Included in this cohort was Carter himself who intended to use the bully pulpit to further popularise the idea of human rights, transmitting it as the concept which could ideologically unify an increasingly interdependent world.[47] Human rights were initially mostly defined in terms of political and moral rights, though there were some early attempts in US government to expand human rights to include an economic component.[48] This changed as BHN became hegemonic within developmental thought however, leading to it and human rights becoming discursively entangled.

[46] See the Church Committee, as well as the Clark and Harkin Amendments, in David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, "Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 1 (2004): 118–9.
[47] Mary E. Stuckey, *Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and the National Agends* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), xxiv–xxv.
[48] See the 1973 'New Directions' revision to the Foreign Assistance Act in Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 110.

Though this happened independently within various spaces due simply to the natural compatibility of the two constructs with their notions of a minimum floor for governmental policy, the framing of BHN in terms of human rights through ESRs within the Carter administration occurred because of particular think tanks and their associated politicians who wanted, amongst other things, to challenge the NIEO in the NSD by authorising a counter-narrative. Alarmed by, in their minds, the NIEO's illiberal essence, organisations such as the Aspen Institute began agitating for a "a new international economic order to meet human needs" to future Carter officials, branding BHN in the same language as the NIEO whilst also conferring onto the approach a moralistic and obligatory character by connecting it to human rights.[49] Though also involved in international institutions through ul Haq, the most transformative policy institute in this regard was the ODC. Utilising its board chairman and celebrated theologist Theodore Hesburgh, the Council formed a close friendship with Jimmy Carter himself and imparted on to him the notion of BHN as a human right in their collaborations on many of the Carter campaign's speeches.[50] Following the president's inauguration, the ODC became entrenched within the administration as its members Guy F. Erb and Roger Hansen migrated to the NSC whilst officials such as National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski attended Council seminars. Moreover, under the ODC's influence, officials across the executive branch, including Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and his deputy Warren Christopher, publicly embraced BHN as the new development model of the US.[51]

[49] Moyn, *Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World*, 135–6. In the case of the Aspen Institute, Brzezinski and ODC founder James P. Grant were brought on for the paper referred to here.
[50] Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 111–113.
[51] Moyn, *Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World*, 143–144.

Thus, the stage was set for the institutional enshrinement of ESRs under PRM-28, the other documentary basis for this paper's theorised normative conflict. This foundational status is conferred by the document belonging to the PRM class of memorandums which set the agenda for a particular topic of interest to the Carter White House and defined the issues that its authors believed worth addressing.[52] With PDs then being the document class which summarises and operationalises their associated PRMs, the subsequent PD/NSC-30 endorsed the key points of the PRM-28, including the framing of ESRs in terms of BHN, confirming the initial significance of the memorandum and its relevance to the topic at hand.[53] As Hansen proposed to Brzezinski, "BHN would not only be a natural complement but also an integral part of a global stress on human rights… The US can take a major step toward closing this 'values gap' [between the North and South] by embracing jointly the concepts of human rights and basic human needs."[54] Hence, the document institutionalised the Carter administration's BHN policy and so defined the basis upon which the US would discuss ESRs and therefore the NIEO.

Norming the Charter and Memorandum

Having established the origins and significance of CERDS and PRM-28, the relevant norms of these documents are extrapolated to lay their precise normative contents bear so that the antipreneur theory can justifiably be applied to this work. This is done via a close reading of the texts through the lens of two different formulae which model the norm categories from

[52] "Research: Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM)," The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, accessed May 29, 2022, https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/presidential_memoranda.
[53] Jimmy Carter, "Presidential Directive/NSC-30: Human Rights," February 17, 1978, Office of Staff Secretary, Presidential Files, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/directives/pd30.pdf.
[54] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume III: Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 271 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 832.

the constructivist literature. Broadly speaking then, norms are intersubjective conceptions of suitable conduct for actors of a particular category or in a specific setting.[55] Different typologies have been constructed to differentiate norms, though for this study Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein's categorisation of constitutive and regulative norms is used.[56] Constitutive norms are collective ideas about the appropriate definition of a situation's or actor's profile in a certain setting. Created by John Searl, the formula used here to delineate these norms is: [X] is [Y] in [Z], where X represents the phenomenon to be defined, Y is the definition, and Z refers to the context in which the definition should be applied to the phenomenon.[57] Meanwhile, regulative norms are rules for the correct implementation of a defined identity in a given context.[58] These are specified here using Carla Winston's formulation: if [A], then [B] suggests [C], where A refers to the issue at hand, B represents a normative value, and C is the proscribed parameter of behaviour.[59] Using these formulae, the constitutive and regulative norms offered by CERDS and PRM-28 can be derived. This is mostly done out of order because often not all variables are immediately apparent, but rather surmisable based on the variables that are more readily apparent.

Regarding then the constitutive and regulative norms promoted in CERDS, the former is derived first. As the document is about establishing a "new system of international economic relations [between]… developed and developing countries," it is about regulating state

[55] Annika Björkdahl, "Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 15, no. 1 (2002): 15.
[56] Ronald L Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 54.
[57] John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 5.
[58] Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," 54.
[59] Carla Winston, "Norm Structure, Diffusion, and Evolution: A Conceptual Approach," *European Journal of International Relations* 24, no. 3 (2018): 641.

behaviour and therefore X represents said developed and developing countries.[60] Given CERDS only refers to this behaviour with respect to international economic affairs, the Z variable is then the politics of global economic governance, and this can range from bilateral diplomatic initiatives to multilateral treaty negotiations. Lastly, to determine the definition of the actors, Article 16 must be considered in its claim that "it is the right and duty of all States… to eliminate colonialism… and the economic and social consequences thereof." In a context such as the Charter where there is for example a duty for developed countries to offer "non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory tariff preferences to the developing countries" in Article 18, it is therefore inferable that CERDS defines actors in terms of differentiated responsibility for eliminating colonialism. Hence, Y is the party responsible for colonialism and its legacies with respect to developed countries and the party affected by colonialism and it legacies in regard to developing countries.

Relating to CERDS's regulative norms, the C variable is identifiable by stock of what the measures, resource sovereignty, transnational corporate regulation, etc., proposed constitute in sum. Recalling dependency theory, this value is therefore that global economic governance should be reordered to prevent the deterioration of the terms of trade for the developing world. Considering the focus on responsibility for colonialism in the Charter's discourse as described above, B must be the principles of historical economic justice. For this principle to apply though, one must recognise that colonialism and its economic legacies exist and therefore this is the A variable. Moreover, CERDS's constitutive and regulative norms are:

[60] UNGA, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res 3281 (XXIX), UNGAOR, 29th Sess, Supp No 31, UN Doc A/9631, 12 December 1974, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/190150?ln=en.

Developed and developing countries are respectively the party responsible for colonialism and its legacies and the party affected by colonialism and it legacies in the politics of global economic governance

If colonialism and its economic legacies exist, the principles of historical economic justice suggest that global economic governance should be reordered to prevent the deterioration of the terms of trade for the developing world

Concerning PRM-28's constitutive and regulative norms as it pertains to ESRs, the former is illuminated by examining first the definition for ESRs by the document, which is "the right to be free from government action or inaction which either obstructs an individual's efforts to fulfil his vital needs for food, shelter, health care and education or fails adequately to support the individual in meeting basic needs."[61] Thus, X is all states as the ESRs are framed as universally obligatory for all states to protect. The Y variable is therefore the party responsible for meeting their own ESRs. Lastly, given that the memorandum advises that the areas for the promotion of ESRs consists of various international forums, initiatives, and programmes that would related in this case to economic matters considering the economic nature of BHN, the Z is again the broad space of the politics of global economic governance.[62]

Relating to PRM-28's regulative norm, this can be gleaned first from the manner in which it defines the parameter of behaviour in relation to compliance of states with the fulfilment of the ESRs. Specifically, whereas compliant actors should be rewarded through economic assistance and scientific exchanges,[63] non-compliant ones should be discouraged by

[61] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, doc. 73 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 225.
[62] FRUS, 234–47.
[63] FRUS, 230.

communicating to them the loss international stature.[64] In the event of non-compliance, the memorandum does however recommend non-intervention, including not sanctioning, to ensure the fulfilment of BHN.[65] Thus, the C variable is that countries provide support to the state if it is not fulfilling its citizenry's BHN regardless of willingness and pressure the state to comply with providing for their citizenry's BHN and economic and social freedoms if it is unwilling. Therefore, the A variable must be a state that is not meeting its citizenry's ESRs. As for B, linking the two variables here is the underlying principle of human rights, with its liberal interpretation of basic rights as freedoms and limited obligations holding sway here over the welfarist vision epitomised in for example the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[66] Thus, these are correspondingly the constitutive and regulative norms:

> ***All states are the party responsible for meeting their own ESRs in the politics of global economic governance***
>
> ***If a state is not meeting its citizenry's ESRs, the principle of human rights suggest countries provide support to the state if it is not fulfilling its citizenry's BHN regardless of willingness, and pressure this state to comply with providing for their citizenry's ESRs if it is unwilling.***

The Theory of the Antipreneur

Given this normative nature then and the oppositional lens through which these norms were seen in, the model of the antipreneur is therefore suited to the study of the proposed work's historical phenomena. This framework is rooted in the second wave norm dynamics

[64] FRUS, 227.
[65] FRUS, 226, 238.
[66] Hercus, *The Struggle over Human Rights: The Non-Aligned Movement, Jimmy Carter, and Neoliberalism*, 146.

literature of constructivism which emerged in the 2000s as a reaction to particular issues with the first wave of the 1990s. In particular, the initial wave had a tendency to focus only on the successful diffusion of Western liberal norms onto a passive South.[67] It therefore fostered a problematic discourse of norm dynamics in which only Western actors could promote normative change and said change was always positive.[68] These accounts also tended to reify norms by treating them as agents onto themselves, thereby creating a substantialist account of said phenomenon.[69] The critical constructivists of the second wave endeavoured to correct this by creating models of normative contestation which accounted for a far greater variety of agents and norms.[70] They also de-reified norms by considering them relationally; that is, as an abstract category dependent on a given set of interactions between particular actors. Thus, these constructivists had solved the main issues of their predecessors. Yet their models still tended to lack scope in that they only described specific contestation processes which each restricted themselves to explaining a discreet number of outcomes. Hence, in order to account for all contestation processes in one model whilst maintaining the innovations of earlier critical constructivists, Bloomfield designed a model which placed the conceptualisation of the actors in said processes at its centre, thereby broadening the theoretical horizons of norms theory.

More specifically then, the antipreneur model is a micro-level theory within the norm contestation literature of constructivism which models actors in this contestation process

[67] Anton Peez, "Contributions and Blind Spots of Constructivist Norms Research in International Relations, 1980-2018: A Systematic Evidence and Gap Analysis," *International Studies Review* 24, no. 1 (2022): 14–5.
[68] Charlotte Epstein, "Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization?," *International Studies Perspectives* 13, no. 2 (2012): 135–45.
[69] I use the terms 'substantialist' and 'relationally' as defined by Mustafa Emirbayer, "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 2 (1997): 281–317.
[70] See for example Antje Wiener, "Contested Compliance: Interventions on the Normative Structure of World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 10, no. 2 (2004): 189–234.

who resist the adoption of a new norm in defence of the established norm which the norm entrepreneur seeks to replace.[71] In this case, the titular antipreneur and entrepreneur are respectively the US and Mexico given the latter's promotion of a new set of norms and the former's opposition through its own piecemeal norms. Though Bloomfield's framework has several facets such as predicting the success of resistance, the relevant aspects here are the theorised antipreneurial spectrum and resistance strategies. As the pure antipreneur is an ideal type, Bloomfield developed a spectrum of roles which principally includes the categories of creative resister and pure antipreneur, where the degree of concession to change determines the degree of antipreneurialism.[72] As the proposed norms of the Carter administration were novel for the US in their incorporation of BHN as ESRs and were formed in opposition to the NIEO as shown earlier in this chapter, the category of creative resistor is therefore used.

The antipreneur model predicts particular strategies then for creative resistors which are tested in this study. In an edited volume elaborating on his theory, Bloomfield and his co-author Shirley Scott provide a typology which divides these strategies into two different types: conceptual and institutional manoeuvring.[73] Though the former is relevant to this work, the latter is not as it entails tactics which involves the interaction between normative actors and institutions rather than other actors. Accordingly, conceptual manoeuvring involves discursive interventions aimed at either dissuading actors from adopting a new norm or persuading actors to adopt the concessionary norm. Dissuasion tactics include counter-framing and ungrafting, while persuasion ones consist of framing and grafting. Framing here

[71] Bloomfield, "Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change": 321.
[72] Bloomfield: 331.
[73] Alan Bloomfield and Shirley V. Scott, "Norm Entrepreneurs and Antipreneurs: Chalk and Cheese, or Two Faces of the Same Coin?," in *Norm Antipreneurs and the Politics of Resistance to Global Normative Change*, ed. Alan Bloomfield and Shirley V. Scott (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 239–43.

means connecting a new norm with an established global norm, while grafting refers to the same but with respect to a local norm. Counter-framing and ungrafting thus refer to disconnecting from a global and local norm respectively.

There are also fact-based reasoning and moral appealing which can be utilised in both contexts and are therefore referred to here as bidirectional tactics. Such reasoning and appealing are tactics via logical argumentation based on correspondingly facts and ethics. PRM-28 additionally provides vectors through which such strategies could be conducted, namely in actions of public and private diplomacy such as informal governmental talks, formal demarches, presidential letters, etc., but also in other vectors outside traditional diplomacy including bilateral economic programs, overseas media institutions, as well as cultural, educational and scientific exchanges.[74] The documents pertaining to these vectors are where these strategies are searched in. Thus, to guide the research towards answering its primary question, the theoretical elements detailed here will yield three sub-questions and these are as follows:

1. Were persuasion tactics for ESRs formulated and practiced in the Carter administration foreign policy towards Mexico?

2. Were dissuasion tactics against CERDS formulated and practiced in the Carter administration foreign policy towards Mexico?

3. Were the bidirectional tactics formulated and practiced for ESRs and against CERDS in the Carter administration foreign policy towards Mexico?

[74] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, doc. 73 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 230–43.

In order to also verify the aspects of Bloomfield's theory detailed above, a formal theory-testing single case-study method has to be employed. This means that this paper studies a necessary condition, rather than a sufficient condition, proposition, and therefore the independent and dependent variables for this are discrete dichotomous; in this case, present or absent.[75] As the aspect of the theory used here theorises a set of behaviours for antipreneurs, this study's independent variable is the above mentioned typology, which is understood as present given the necessary assumption for this work being that Bloomfield's model is true and this has been borne out in a few earlier studies.[76] The dependent variable is the absence or presence of the applicability of the typology towards the US, signifying that this variable represents an aggregated sum of all the elements of the typology. For this presence to be validated, only one of the theorised tactics needs to be observed as the theory itself does not presume that all tactics are used in every instance studied. Moreover, with the independent variable assumed as true, if the dependent variable is proven to be present, the hypothesis is therefore confirmed. The qualitative data needed to determine this applicability is drawn via the historical method from the primary sources used in the following four chapters.

[75] Albert Mills, Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wiebe, eds., *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2010), 938.

[76] See the other contributions to the Bloomfield and Scott volume such as Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn, "Additional Categories of Agency: 'Creative Resisters' to Normative Change in Post-Crisis Global Financial Governance," in *Norm Antipreneurs and the Politics of Resistance to Global Normative Change*, ed. Alan Bloomfield and Shirley V. Scott (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 140–58. For further studies, see also Jeffrey S. Lantis and Daniel J. Bloomberg, "Changing the Code? Norm Contestation and US Antipreneurism in Cyberspace," *International Relations* 32, no. 2 (2018): 149–72; Jean-Michel Marcoux and Julien Sylvestre-Fleury, "China's Contestation of International Norms on State-Owned Enterprises and Government Procurement through the Belt and Road Initiative," *Asia Pacific Law Review*, June 22, 2022, 1–23.

Conclusion

This first chapter has therefore established the precise background to and doctrinal characteristics of the US-Mexican normative conflict over global economic governance during the late 70s, thereby providing the necessary context for the arguments presented in the subsequent chapters. Moreover, it was shown that the Carter and López Portillo administrations represented opposing constitutive and regulative norms which conceived of the problem of development and the state's responsibility for that development differently. By introducing the model of the antipreneur, this contrariety was then conceptualised to produce a framework for the analysis of intergovernmental communications. In doing so, this chapter imported the theory-testing single case-study method to make sure that the coming findings of antipreneurial tactics can verify this part of the theory, consequently allowing for this research to contribute to the constructivist literature. Finally, this chapter has offered to the historiography of the NIEO and BHN a formal theoretical treatment of both subjects and through their integration into Bloomfield's model, provides a fresh lens through which historians can examine the history of the NSD and any other ideational historical process.

II. Chapter 2 – The North-South Foundations of US Mexico Policy

Having established the normative opposition between the US and Mexican governments concerning the NSD and the framework which theorises how this contrariety may have affected US foreign policy towards Mexico within this context, the remaining chapters provide the evidence for the central thesis through a critical examination of the collected archival materials. In this chapter, the underlying argument is maintained by arguing that the foundations of the Carter administration's Mexico policy had shaping the NSD in the US interest amongst its central motivators, inspiring not only the fundamental conception of US-Mexico relations in the eyes of the administration, but also stimulating the creation of a set of policy ideas that the White House was to conduct vis-à-vis Mexico for the coming four years. It is therefore shown that the NSD did far more than lead the Carter administration to craft and deploy forms of conceptual manoeuvring, though this is shown to have also come to pass, specifically in Carter's address to the Permanent Council of the Organisation of American States which all Latin American governments had been privy to. Hence, this chapter also begins to verify the conceptual manoeuvring aspect of the antipreneur theory as disaggregated elements of the dependent variable are shown to have been present.

This chapter begins with a genealogy of Carter's Mexico policy, revealing it as the product of the Linowitz Commission's policy prescriptions for US relations with every Latin American state and these prescriptions were rooted partly in a desire to reorient the NSD along US interests. While historians have identified the role of this think tank before with Franczak especially demonstrating the report's North-South dimensions, this section goes further by genealogically identifying its influence from the broad approach to specific governmental

policy proposals.[77] Having demonstrated that the NSD was foundational to the Carter administration's general approach towards Mexico, this chapter then depicts how three sets of specific policy ideas were embraced based on the Commission's recommendations or otherwise influenced by concerns related to the NSD. These three sets related to three interconnected themes, namely the Dialogue itself, economics, and energy. In drawing out these sets and establishing their North-South origins, this chapter outlines the paths through which the Carter administration acted under the motivation to influence the outcomes of the NSD. These paths therefore each form the basis of one of the remaining chapters, creating the thematic framework for the rest of this work and thereby allowing for the subsequent upholding of the main thesis in the later chapters. This section therefore also lays the groundwork for the historiographical contributions made in those chapters to the histories of the NSD, US foreign economic policy, and American international energy policy during the latter 1970s.

The Linowitz Approach

In the development of the Carter administration's Mexico policy, the NSD had been at its centre since its inception within the building of a more general Latin America strategy by the Linowitz Commission and in particular, its executive director Robert A. Pastor. Also know as the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, the Linowitz Commission was a founded by the Centre for Inter-American Relations, a policy institute of the then CEO of Chase Manhattan Bank David Rockefeller, with the aim of shaping the coming Carter White

[77] Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 128–32; See also Vanessa Walker, *Principles in Power: Latin America & the Politics of US Human Rights Diplomacy*, Chapter 2; Henry Raymont, *Troubled Neighbors: The Story of US-Latin American Relations, from FDR to the Present*, 2nd ed., Chapter 10.

House's Latin America policy.[78] The Linowitz Commission evidently had a large impact on the Carter administration, sharing with other Carter-affiliated think tanks such as the Trilateral Commission and the aforementioned ODC a bevy of future Washington officials including Carter's Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal, NSC members Abraham F. Lowenthal and Pastor, as well as the aforesaid Theodore Hesburgh and Samuel Huntington.[79] Through its position in this network, this Commission under the stewardship of Sol M. Linowitz, the former chair of Xerox and Carter's impending ambassador to the Organisation of American States, produced its second report in December 1976 to expressly shape the incoming Carter administration's Latin America policy, which the new President himself read in early February 1977.[80]

The second Linowitz report, *the United States and Latin America: Next Steps*, contains the birthplace of the Carter administration's strategy for Latin America, showing how the proposed general framework for the approach to the region was then already deeply tied to concerns about the NSD. The fundamental argument that was put forth here is that the regional approach to Latin America, that of the "special relationship," had to be abandoned given the increasing independence of the region's states.[81] In its place, the report proposed that the US should approach its discussions with Latin American governments within a global framework. The Commission asserted thereby that US relations with Latin America presented

[78] Letter, David Rockefeller to Jimmy Carter, May 18, 1978, Folder 6/5/78 [1], Container 79, Office of Staff Secretary, Presidential Files, Jimmy Carter Library. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/79/ SSO_148878_079_03.pdf

[79] "The United States and Latin America: Next Steps," December, 20 1976, in Commission on US-Latin American Affairs (3), December 17, 1976 - December 20, 1976, MS, Ford Administration and Foreign Affairs: Part 0001: National Security Adviser's Files, Section 0005: Presidential and Staff Country Files for Latin America, 1974-1977, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Archives Unbound. https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5113170866/GDSC?u=utrecht&sid=bookmark-%20GDSC&xid=7c193611&pg =3, Members of the Commission pages.

[80] Walker, *Principles in Power: Latin America & the Politics of US Human Rights Diplomacy*, 54.

[81] The US and Latin America, 1–2.

a number of unique opportunities, namely in this case a testing ground from which to forge "a coherent and constructive approach to the fundamental issues of North-South relations generally."[82] Thus, in the text which was to act as the Rosetta stone principally through Robert Pastor joining Carter's team that same month as is shown below, the 1976 report was attempting to persuade the US government to take embrace a global approach with Latin American countries by asserting that tact's exceptional potentiality for addressing the NSD to the benefit of the US. Moreover, this global lens that will develop in Washington over the coming months was therefore explicitly designed to in part deal effectively with this Dialogue from the very beginning.

Appointed as the NSC staff director on Latin America, Pastor further developed upon the report's ideas and pushed them through the White House bureaucracy, maintaining the NSD's central position within the quickly emerging US Latin American strategy. The first documentary milestone in this series of events deals with PRM-17. Authored by Pastor and subsequently presented by the NSC to the various heads of the Carter administration on January 26, 1977, this memorandum defined the parameters from which a regional Latin America policy for the Carter administration was supposed to be defined.[83] It asked for a re-examination of the assumptions which underpinned US Latin American policy, laying the groundwork for the eventual global and individualist policy towards Latin American states detailed below. According to the memo, this was explicitly requested in order to better address a particular set of key issues vis-à-vis Latin American states, amongst which the NSD is highlighted and thereby drawing a direct connection back to the Linowitz Commission.

[82] The US and Latin America, 3.
[83] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV: South America; Latin America Region, doc. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 2–4.

Thus, at this early stage in the administration, the NSD was in part responsible for the global and individualist stance the Carter administration wanted to take towards Latin American countries and therefore Mexico as well. However, in regards to the US's Southern neighbour, it is also important to note here already that Pastor also included the particular problems solely with the country of Mexico as a reason for a reassessment of the assumptions shaping then US Latin America policy, as well as other issues ancillary to this work.

Based on these sets of parameters, Pastor subsequently began to sell his Linowitz vision internally in the White House, developing the additional idea of an individualist approach to Latin American countries in large part again on the basis it would allow the US to deal more effectively with the NSD. The White House's Latin America doctrine had been originally planned to be crafted within the confines of the designated Presidential Review Committee. However, according to Pastor in a memorandum for Brzezinski dated March 14, 1977, though the State Department chaired these meetings, the report they produced to study the issues raised in the PRM was to him "as a whole… unwieldy," with the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs being "the last place you should turn to for advice."[84] Consequently, he was proposing to effectively circumvent the State Department by recommending a speech be given which could "give the bureaucracy some guidance because they are moving in the other direction."[85]

This was more then some guidance however. It was rather full conceptual turn, answering the call for a re-examination of fundamental assumptions. In particular, Pastor's central recommendation was that Washington did "not need a Latin American policy" and it instead

[84] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV: South America; Latin America Region, doc. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 26.
[85] FRUS, 27.

needed to embrace "globalism and bilateralism."[86] Recalling PRM-17, such a fundamental conceptual turn in US policy was to be done in order to better deal with the NSD, amongst other issues, and so it is clear that under Pastor's direction, the individualistic approach that came to dominate the rest of the Carter administration's approach to Latin American states, including Mexico, was therefore partway in direct response to the NIEO. Moreover, as Pastor states in the very same memorandum to Brzezinski, "the policy that we should seek in this first review is one which will help us to move from a special policy for the region to a global North-South policy." Though he wanted a speech outlining this to come before in Carter's Pan-America Day speech to the Organisation of American States on April 14, 1977, his recommendations in this memorandum became the basis of that speech nonetheless while the designated Presidential Review Committee remained impotent, causing Pastor's vision to become the White House's official Latin America doctrine.[87]

Although no PD on Latin America was subsequently issued to cement Pastor's visage, it became de facto dogma with Carter's Pan-America Day speech once Carter instructed Brzezinski to ask the relevant high-level cabinet members to prepare plan based on the speech.[88] Therein the position of the globalist and individualist framework as the primary lens through which Washington would conduct its relations with Latin American countries was not only sealed, but BHN was finally also incorporated as the US's key ideational contribution to the NSD vis-à-vis Latin America. The former is most noticeable in Carter's pronouncement that "a single United States policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean makes little

[86] FRUS, 26.
[87] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV: South America; Latin America Region, doc. 7 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 35.
[88] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV: South America; Latin America Region, doc. 10 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 44–5.

sense."[89] This influence is further evident from Carter's declaration of the three basic elements, where the policy proposals that arose from it in the speech also reveal the underlying position his norms had in the administration's North-South policy. In the basic elements, this is apparent in last two elements, where the second one declares an obligation to combat "abuses of individual freedom, including those caused by… economic injustice," and the third a longing to solve the problems between developed and developing nations which he named as "global" in nature and singles out economic issues in particular. Though this could ostensibly represent an endorsement of the NIEO since there was a positive stance to a NIEO proposal – a 'common fund' to stabilise commodity prices – in the speech, overall Carter's subsequent proposals in fact colour his elements in BHN stripes in light of the norms discussed.

These proposals ringing BHN is apparent from the pledges for bilateral assistance and scientific exchange, ultimately reframing his elements as an act of grafting. The former entailed aid for LDCs and exploring with the other developing nations methods that can fulfil the BHN of their "needy." The latter involved educational programmes that train workers in Latin America to use "information gathered by [US] satellites" to manage Southern resources. Going back to Carter's elements, the declaration of his second element therefore also constituted grafting because the president depicted protection of individual freedom as a local norm rooted in the human rights traditions of the Americas. Hence, since the BHN proposals are meant to uphold such freedom from economic injustice, Carter was grafting his BHN norms onto the norm of protecting individual freedom. This is consequently an instance

[89] Jimmy Carter, "Organization of American States Address Before the Permanent Council," April 14, 1977, The American Presidency Project [hereafter APP], Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ documents/organization-american-states-address-before-the-permanent-council.

in which a persuasive tactic was used. Moreover, recalling the Carter's need to counter the dependency narratives of the NIEO including that of CERDS, a BHN position was thusly moved front and centre to the initial US doctrine for Latin American states. As Carter's Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terrence A. Todman would later clarify to the Linowitz Commission's parent organisation, "ultimately, the challenge is to develop a foreign policy that responds to… basic human needs."[90]

Lastly, as Pastor's approach was meant for US policy towards every Latin American country, the overall approach to US Mexico policy in this initial period was therefore also constituted by individualism and globalism, inspired by a desire to find better means of resolving the NSD. Although there was no PRM on Mexico until PRM-41 was issued on August 14, 1978, this connection can be confirmed by examining the conversations between President Carter and President López Portillo, as well as their accompanying representatives, during the latter's official state visit to the former on February 15, 1977, which, as the State Department described, generated the turn in US-Mexican relations for the new administration.[91] Despite being prior to the Pan-America Day speech, Carter told López Portillo that he wished to treat Latin American "countries on an *individual* basis in the years ahead."[92] Indicating further that Pastor's ideas were already being spread, Brzezinski clearly articulated subsequently that "the focus on Latin America should be in the *global* context rather than as a separate entity." Although the North-South reasons for these articulations should be plainly clear by now based on the previous documents, it is worth noting that here López Portillo himself communicated

[90] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV: South America; Latin America Region, doc. 26 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 105.
[91] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV: South America; Latin America Region, doc. 4 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 15–6.
[92] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 131 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2016), emphasis added.

to Carter that US-Mexican relations were an exaggerated reflection of US relations with Southern countries more generally and that consequently US-Mexican relations could lend itself as a "laboratory" for ideas which could contribute to the NSD. Though this point is not responded to here, Guy Erb of the NSC's North-South cluster recounted decades later that this marriage of bilateral relations and the NSD was indeed the intention vis-à-vis Mexico, especially concerning the MTN as is covered in chapter three.[93] Although this was undoubtably conceived due to Mexico's economic and security importance to the US as born out of the former's large population and close proximity to the latter, Carter officials also recognised Mexico City's "true influence" in the UN and so this had also played a role.[94] Moreover, it is apparent therefore that by examining its initial construction, the approach which guided how US Mexico policy was to be conducted was motivated by a deep concern for the NSD all the way through its manufacturing process.

The Substance of the Strategy

Given this indelible connectivity between the NSD and US Mexico policy then, the policy proposals born from this programmatic production process are elaborated upon here as they are a product of this connectivity. With the subsequent depiction of these policies in action in the following chapters, the NSD-laden genealogy of the Carter administration's foreign policy towards Mexico is thusly identified in its entirety, exposing the NSD to have been present from said policy's roots to many of its fruits. As mentioned in the introduction though, this is not to say that all the US's foreign relations with Mexico were fundamentally linked with the NSD. This was not the case with US-Mexican diplomacy over the Nicaraguan

[93] Guy F. Erb (National Security Council Staff Member for International Economics), interview by Michael Franczak, September 22, 2015: 4.
[94] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, doc. 74 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014), 362.

Revolution for example. The following concrete proposals were however linked to the Dialogue and this is first-and-foremost evidenced by most of their roots in the Linowitz Commission, with the other ideas having had their external foundations also steeped in part by US concerns over the NSD. Though these plans were specific in nature, they can be divided into three categories in terms of how they directly relate to wider global issues: the NSD itself, other economic matters, and energy. Despite this though, all the propositions discussed here ultimately concerned furthering US interests in the NSD as was shown earlier and is again demonstrated several more times in this work. Moreover, the following therefore examines the policy recommendations relating directly to the NSD, economics, and energy that were advised on the basis of the Linowitz approach or otherwise on the basis of a different source.

With regard to the NSD directly, the relevant concrete proposals that came out of the Carter administration's Latin America strategy were consultation with Latin American governments and the transferring of suitable technologies and associated expertise. Relating to the former, the Linowitz Commission suggested Washington consult with Latin American countries, especially on commodities trade, with a view of achieving agreement rather than argumentation.[95] Taking this further, Pastor in his aforementioned memorandum to Brzezinski advised Carter to encourage Latin American governments to take their ideas regarding the NSD to the relevant international conferences and therein occupy leading roles in their deliberations.[96] Recalling the US perception of Mexico's importance to the UN system, this was likely to have been partly motivated by the premise formed at the start of the Carter administration that the new Mexican president was to be a more agreeable figure.[97] Thus,

[95] The US and Latin America, 18, 24.
[96] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV: South America; Latin America Region, doc. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 28.
[97] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 128 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2016).

Carter's Pan-America Day speech incorporated Pastor's revisions by asking for both their guidance with and the contribution of their leadership to the NSD.[98]

In terms of the latter, the Commission expressed prominent deference towards the issue of technology transfers, promoting "the transfer of technological know-how and appropriate technologies" as opposed to labour intensive capital goods as many in the G77 were asking for.[99] Considering the small-scale nature of BHN, such technologies naturally complemented the fulfilment of these needs, whereas the transfer of industrial capital had thus far failed to do so through longer term development. Though these ideas were not addressed by Pastor, they were clearly incorporated into Carter's policy-defining April 14 speech. Therein Carter mirrored the Commission's emphasis on providing technical expertise, going so far as to stress the use of US information from technologies based in the US rather than the provision of technologies to developing countries.[100] These ideas were to become explicitly propagated as the US position during the S&T conference of the Dialogue, the UNCSTD, and it is for this reason that they are considered to be part of the NSD set. Moreover, these are the first set of specific policies that carry through to the US's conducting of its relations with Mexico as inspired by its concerns over the Dialogue.

Concerning the second set relating to the other economic issues then, the pertinent propositions were to first facilitate the stabilisation of Latin American economies, then increase the US's trade relations with said economies through the MTN in the GATT whilst offering bilateral assistance for the region's poorest. Firstly, it is worth first clarifying the Linowitz Commission's broader vision regarding MTN. Overall, the Linowitz Commission

[98] "Organization of American States Address Before the Permanent Council."
[99] The US and Latin America, 25.
[100] "Organization of American States Address Before the Permanent Council."

recognised that amongst the global issues the US will face vis-à-vis Latin America will be the searching for a "more fair and secure the terms of exchange between producers and consumers."[101] Though this may ostensibly appear as an implicit endorsement of the NIEO, the Commission went on to clarify that it believed that the present injustice included the lack of incorporation of the developed world's needs within the current debates around the future of the global economy.[102] To do so, the Linowitz Commission first recommended that the US enable the extension of credit to and imposition of fiscal austerity on heavily indebted Latin American countries, which included most of the region and especially Mexico, through the Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank.[103] Pastor translated this by advocating for "coordinated debt management" through IFIs.[104] Finally, this was crystallised in Carter's Pan-America Speech, where he notified Latin American leaders of his want to pursue the recapitalisation of said institutions in view of the region's debt problems.[105]

Regarding the notion of increasing the US's trade with Latin American states, the Commission advised Washington to pursue MTN with Latin American countries through the GATT where the US would work with these countries to delineate rules for export subsidies and preferential access, as well as to eliminate NTBs.[106] Though this was also encouraged simply on the premises that trade expansion was becoming an increasingly important factor in economic growth, another motive for this idea as it relates to the NSD was to come out of the Trilateral Commission.[107] Through their member C. Fred Bergsten who was to become

[101] The US and Latin America, 3.
[102] The US and Latin America, 17.
[103] The US and Latin America, 18–9.
[104] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV: South America; Latin America Region, doc. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 30.
[105] "Organization of American States Address Before the Permanent Council."
[106] The US and Latin America, 22–3.
[107] Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 101–2, 221.

Carter's Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at the Treasury, the idea of promoting the GATT was justified on the grounds that it could move the Dialogue away from the UNCTAD and towards a less polarised negotiating environment in which the West had more institutional power, resulting in more laissez-faire outcomes. Pastor inserted these ideas into his approach as well, stressing that the US should work to increase Latin American access to developed markets.[108] He however clarified that this should be on a non-discriminatory, rather than also on a non-reciprocal, basis since "an open global economy" was a core US aim. Moreover, Carter therefore pledged to reduce trade barriers whilst concurrently considering preferential treatment in specific discreet cases through the GATT.[109]

Beyond the Commission

As stated earlier, there were however two more ideas from beyond the Linowitz Commission which specifically concerned US Mexico policy and were motivated by promoting US interests in the NSD. Falling under the category of the other economic matters, the first was about the extension of bilateral assistance programmes to Mexico. While the Linowitz Commission was keen to shift the burdens of bilateral assistance towards IFIs save for bilateral aid to LDCs,[110] Pastor went further by emphasising that the strategy had to principally be based on the mantra "*trade, not aid*" for all but Latin America's LDCs.[111] Though trade through MTN in the GATT was clearly important to the Carter administration, the White House was ultimately flexible about extending assistance to middle-income countries, especially as it pertained to Mexico. In the speech, Carter stated that he would also investigate with other

[108] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV: South America; Latin America Region, doc. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 29–30.
[109] "Organization of American States Address Before the Permanent Council."
[110] The US and Latin America, 20.
[111] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV: South America; Latin America Region, doc. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 30, no emphasis added.

developing nations different means to "effectively" handle the problems of the world's poorest, including through "human development." As opposed to industrial development, human development refers to developing individuals and is therefore the BHN approach. Considering that Carter here framed human development as an effective means to affect global poverty, this is therefore an instance of fact-based reasoning to defend Carter's norms, a bidirectional tactic, since BHN's effectiveness is presented as a matter of fact and hence a reason to implement it.

To explain why the flexibility to provide aid to middle-income nations was anointed in the Pan-America speech despite the Commission, PRM-28 must be returned to and viewed in terms of how US officials perceived Mexican development specifically. It should be recalled here that under the motivation to conduct a normative struggle against the NIEO, bilateral economic programmes were considered by PRM-28 as a vector for the promotion of ESRs.[112] US government officials accordingly debated how best to orient bilateral support, taking into account constraints such as Congressional support and therewith mulling over whether to support just LDCs or the impoverished within all developing countries, as well as other options.[113] Specifically regarding Mexico, the poorest in Mexican society were particularly considered worth assisting along BHN lines. This was however not only because of Mexico's aforestated importance to the NSD, but also for the country's security implication to the US. This relates to how Mexico was undergoing one of the largest population increases in the world at the time, which was understood as posing a existential risk to the integrity of the

[112] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, doc. 73 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 238–9.
[113] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume III: Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 277 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 850–1.

US's southern border.[114] PRM-28 thereby also had special significance to US Mexico policy beyond North-South concerns.

As a category of its own, the last idea relating to US Mexico policy as motivated in part by North-South considerations was the proposition to foster the availability of Mexican oil for global consumption and Mexican natural gas for US consumption. As with bilateral assistance, this idea also had its roots from elsewhere, as the Linowitz Commission only briefly lists "energy… [and] using and conserving world resources" as amongst "the main issues US policy will face."[115] Additionally, the Pastor memorandum and the Pan-America speech do not contend with energy at all. This lack may be the result of the region only sporting three major oil producers, namely Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela. Rather than being mainly the product of a think tank as the previous policy ideas were then, this idea to stimulate the availability of Mexican energy was partly the result of widely held views about the potential of Mexican energy resources to arrest the power of NIEO-supporting OPEC members in the NSD. The origins of this power lay in the Cartel's 1973 embargo in which the price of oil was increased by 300% globally, transforming the West's already worsening inflationary crisis into stagflation while profoundly enriching OPEC's members.[116] Consequently, several of these members used their newly enhanced oil-derived power to form, in the mind of Henry Kissinger at least, an "unholy alliance" with oil-importing developing states to overturn the global economic order through the propagation of the NIEO.[117] Yet, as the commodity price boom earlier in the decade lost steam, this alliance came unto shakier ground, with price

[114] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume III: Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 277 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 829.
[115] The US and Latin America, 4.
[116] David S. Painter, "Oil and Geopolitics: The Oil Crises of the 1970s and the Cold War," *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung* 39, no. 4 (2017): 194.
[117] Dietrich, *Oil Revolution: Anticolonial Elites, Sovereign Rights, and the Economic Culture of Decolonization*, 15.

increase persisting amidst a sluggish rollout of the promised OPEC aid programmes.[118] Meanwhile, OPEC's production monopoly began to be nascently challenged when new oil discoveries emerged outside the bloc, most crucially for this work in Mexico, predicted to become a leading petroleum producer by the end of 1980s.[119]

Galvanised by these developments, the Carter administration came to view in Mexico's bountiful reserves a part of the answers to many of its energy-associated woes, including with respect to OPEC's influence over the NSD. Indeed, the First Oil Shock generated for the remainder of the decade a sizable accord across Washington's political elite as to what was to be done about the energy crisis.[120] This agreement included the idea to "assist [the US's allies] in the alternative development of energy resources," a strategy Jimmy Carter had advocated to the US Chamber of Commerce already in 1975.[121] Part of this meant stimulating oil production in alternative suppliers for more oil supplies, but it also meant, amongst other policies, doing so for increased natural gas quantities in the case of Mexico since gas was a by-product of oil production.[122] Given that gas is an efficient alternative fuel source for homes and businesses, it could therefore decrease oil demand. However, gas was prohibitively expensive to distribute unless there was geographical proximity to the source and this made Mexico therefore significant to the Carter's administration energy policy. Lastly, the accord in Washington also included prioritising the effecting of OPEC in connection to the NSD by convincing enough members to restrain oil prices or by weakening their alliance with the rest

[118] Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 156.
[119] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII: Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, doc. 170 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 543.
[120] Jay E. Hakes, "Conflict or Consensus? The Roots of Jimmy Carter's Energy Policies," in *American Energy Policy in the 1970s*, ed. Robert Lifset (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), 48.
[121] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, doc. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014), 6.
[122] Jesus Puente Leyva, "The Natural Gas Controversy," *The Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 34, no. 1 (1981): 158–9.

of the G77.[123] As with many of the ideas covered in this chapter though, it is crucial to note here that this was not only motivated by concerns over the NSD, but also wider anxieties about US economic strength as OPEC's price gouging was responsible for nearly half of the increase in the US's trade deficit in 1976 and 1977.[124] Such loss of strength could have theoretically threatened all US interests including its ability to affect the Dialogue. With these concerns, the idea to facilitate the production and distribution of Mexican petroleum became a part of US Mexico policy, in tandem with other policies such as persuading OPEC members to keep prices down and recycling their petrodollars in the Eurodollar markets to stimulate worldwide economic growth.

Conclusion

In sum, the above has validated the central thesis by demonstrating that the desire to mould the NSD according to US designs was at the heart of the Carter administration's approach to every Latin American country including Mexico. The NSD's centrality in US Mexico policy was further depicted through the showcase of specific NSD-related policy idea sets and their relevance to the US's approach to Mexico. This is subsequently further elaborated upon in the remaining chapters as the rest of the Carter presidency as it pertained to Mexico is examined. This chapter has therefore also provided the thematic framework which structures the rest of the thesis. Moreover, this chapter has challenged the present historiography on the construction of Jimmy Carter's Latin America policy by evidencing the sheer depth of its NSD influences. Lastly, this chapter was able to answer the first and third sub-questions by showing that Carter used both persuasive and bidirectional tactics. Consequently, the

[123] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, doc. 66 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014), 315.
[124] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume III: Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 37 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 137.

conceptual manoeuvring aspect of the antipreneur theory has begun to be verified since the dependent variable has been confirmed as present. Ultimately though, as is also shown in the following chapters, it is clear that the NSD inspired more than what the theoretical framework can predict as the Dialogue stimulated actions beyond direct normative appeals.

III. Chapter 3 – A Road to Nowhere: the North-South Dialogue

The following chapter examines the presence of the NSD set of policy ideas from the Linowitz Commission report in the US's foreign policy towards Mexico, supporting the central thesis by demonstrating that such ideas directly occupied the Carter administration's Mexico policy throughout much of its term out of a desire to assure its neighbour's cooperation in the Dialogue. US Mexico policy is first examined in the context of the first NSD conference of the Carter presidency, the CIEC, finding that Carter did consult with López Portillo about the NSD, though the former mostly offered opportunities for future contact whilst the latter was the one conceptually manoeuvring. The prevailing significance of the NSD was later proven after the US continued to favour consultation even after the US perceived Mexico as unsupportive at the CIEC. After this, the period between the start of 1978 till the NSD megaconferences in the summer of 1979 is considered. Here, it is revealed how 1978 featured the further growth of the divide between the developed and developing countries, including between the US and Mexico as Washington became strained by an unaccommodating Congress and preoccupied by crises external to the Dialogue. Additionally, their relationship also worsened during this period due to a dispute over gas, though this is covered in chapter five. When the NSD came back into view around the beginning of 1979 though, it is shown that North-South consultations had once again resumed, featuring a prominent place in Carter's February trip to Mexico wherein both Presidents conceptually manoeuvred and promised future collaboration. It is additionally shown that up to this point, the Carter administration had also been working on bilateral S&T initiatives with Mexico through appropriate technologies and knowledge. This was namely in field of agriculture and these activities were also done because they had synchronous benefits for Mexican social stability. In the end though, it is confirmed that the US's and Mexico's efforts had borne few fruits at

UNCTAD V and the UNCSTD for the two countries, and the NSD's direct bearing on US Mexico policy consequently markedly faded over the last year of Carter's presidency amidst a worsening global security environment.

Historiographically, this chapter reflects Michael Franczak's treatment of the Carter administration's dealings with the Dialogue, helping to further complete the account of Carter's participation in the Dialogue through an examination of US Mexico policy. However, it also disputes his assertion that "North-South issues virtually disappeared from the United States' Latin America strategy by 1979" by showing how this was not the case with regard to Mexico.[125] Theoretically, this chapter identifies the use of additional conceptual manoeuvring tactics, meaning the presence of the dependent variable is again confirmed and the antipreneur theory is verified. However, it is also revealed that such tactics were more present in López Portillo's entrepreneurial rhetoric than Carter's, thereby testing the limits of the theory's utility and suggesting the relevance of personalised agency.

Trial Run at the CIEC

The first significant North-South conference of the Carter presidency was the CIEC in Paris and as per the pre-determined plan for the US's Mexico policy, Carter's meeting with López Portillo in February 1977 was shaped in part by the US's desire to pull Mexico closer at the CIEC. However, the meeting itself featured López Portillo conceptually manoeuvring instead of Carter, who offered collaboration instead. Furthermore, as Mexico turned out to be uncooperative at the CIEC, it is revealed that the perceived overriding importance of the NSD nevertheless kept consultations with Mexico in the US's agenda going forward. Started by the European Community in 1975 on the suggestion of France, the CIEC was designed to hold the

[125] Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 141.

NSD outside the UN system with a smaller collection of countries who would each represent the interests of their respect NSD bloc, i.e. developed states, developing states, and OPEC member states.[126] It was believed that by shrinking the number of participants down to such a group, the developed countries could more easily manage to contain the demands of the Global South that had erupted since the passing of the NIEO and CERDS resolutions a year prior. When Jimmy Carter was inaugurated, the CIEC had entered its final period of negotiations, eventually closing in June. During this period, the State Department had formalised the US's initial aim with regard to the NSD which it was to pursue during the final months of the conference. This aim was to guide discussions towards a "long-term and evolving North/South dialogue in ways that will improve rather than fundamentally change the international economic structure."[127] Whilst Northern and Southern negotiators faced painful discussions in Paris as participants from both sides proved immovable on issues concerning commodities and energy however, American diplomats also conducted consultations with the G77 governments represented at the CIEC.[128] Amongst this small group was Mexico, the leader of which visited Carter in mid-February 1977.

In terms of the planning, the NSD was present at the beginning, though it was displaced by other issues that were indirectly related to the Dialogue as is further shown in chapters four and five. Early on in the planning stage, the US embassy in Mexico advised the State Department on various topics, including a section exclusively for discussions relating to the

[126] Garavini, *After Empires: EU Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957–1986*, 220.
[127] Quoted in Dietrich, *Oil Revolution: Anticolonial Elites, Sovereign Rights, and the Economic Culture of Decolonization*, 307–8.
[128] This is not to say that the other CIEC participants did not also plan and conduct such consultations. I just did not pursue the evidence to prove that since it is not crucial to supporting this work's thesis.

NSD.[129] There, the embassy advised that although López Portillo was believed to be less combative, he would still vote ideologically. Despite this, the embassy maintained that "productive consultation" along with friendly bilateral measures could pull him closer to the US position. From this, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs incorporated the embassy's above thoughts, specifically the want to dampen US-Mexican hostility in the Dialogue, as part of the US's aims in its overall strategy for the meeting.[130] However, when this was revised as talking points for Vance to send to the President, the embassy's NSD recommendations were whittled down to only consist of an informal communications channel designed for multiple purposes.[131] Despite the reduction though, this was approximately the beginning of the development of the 'consultative mechanism' from the US side – a development which would result in multiple bilateral working groups including ones for trade and energy. Although the archival materials were not accessible for this work, there is a strong likelihood that the NSD had been discussed there given its presence throughout the Carter administration's deliberations on its Mexico policy.

Thus, as a consequence, Carter did not address the NSD out of his own volition, though he was compelled to on López Portillo's prompting through the latter's conceptual manoeuvring during the second day of his visit. The resulting exchange featured Carter offering collaboration instead of conceptual manoeuvres and yet it still raised the White House's hopes for progress in the CIEC afterwards. As referred to in the previous chapter, López

[129] United States Embassy, Mexico, Carter/López Portillo Meeting 1977, https://www-proquest-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/government-official-publications/carter-lópez-portillo-meeting/docview/1679113805/se-2, 3–4.
[130] United States, Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Tactics for the Visit of Mexican President José López Portillo, 1977, https://www-proquest-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/government-official-publications/tactics-visit-mexican-president-josé-lópez/docview/1679114270/se-2, 2.
[131] United States, Department of State, Secretary, State Visit of Mexican President José López Portillo 1977, https://www-proquest-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/government-official-publications/state-visit-mexican-president-josé-lópez-portillo/docview/1679114487/se-2, 8–9.

Portillo here proposed to treat US-Mexican relations as a testing ground for North-South relations generally.[132] He had accompanied this with conceptual manoeuvring of his own, using specifically fact-based reasoning and later counter-framing. First came the Mexican president's fact-based reasoning wherein he argued that the justification for reforming the present system laid upon its systemic inability to address political and economic problems in the developing world. Instead of prompting similar tactics, this led Carter to respond by offering joint preparation at the upcoming UNGA session. Later on, López Portillo came back to this concern again when he counter-framed the current order as incompatible with the international norm of national sovereignty. He did this by referring to the power he believed multinationals had over global trade whilst only representing private interests. Again, Carter did not challenge López Portillo, preferring to offer him private correspondence over specific company wrongdoings, thereby only implying that this was not a systemic issue.

Overall, this first consultative period bore few concrete dividends in terms of Mexico's cooperation with the US in the CIEC and, partially as a consequence, the outcome of said conference. However, Washington remained satisfied by its tone and therewith remained optimistic about Mexico's role in the NSD despite how it had transpired thus far. Initially though, the bilateral meeting had generally produced optimism in the administration. A few days after López Portillo's visit, Brzezinski reported to Carter that Mexico's national mood was in "high spirits" about the encounter.[133] Two months later, these warm feelings continued as

[132] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 131.
[133] United States Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Weekly National Security Report 1977, https://www-proquest-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/government-official-publications/weekly-national-security-report/docview/1967782239/se-2, 8.

Brzezinski conferred that a large Mexican newspaper responded to Carter's Pan-America speech by calling Carter "a profound thinker."[134]

Yet, these sentiments were tested at the outcome of the Paris Conference. Mexico proved uncooperative, with Mexican officials having been described as not "helpful to [the US] at the CIEC."[135] In a memorandum from Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Richard N. Cooper to Vance, it was noted that this was despite the hope that had been created by the bilateral meeting.[136] According to Cooper, the Mexican Foreign Secretary Santiago Roel Garcia attempted to console the US's feelings by explaining that the multilateral setting simply demanded a different approach, yet the Under Secretary was ultimately left questioning the effectiveness of bilateralism. Moreover, Mexico finished the CIEC unchanged from its public position, having joined the developing countries in "not[ing] with regret that most of the proposals for structural changes and for action on pressing problems were not agreed upon and that the conclusions of CIEC fell short of the objectives."[137] To illustrate how short the conference fell, it had only managed to agree to more economic assistance and an acceptance to negotiate the Common Fund, the process of which had already been sanctioned at UNCTAD IV in 1976.[138] This was all the more tragic as the purpose of the Common Fund to stabilise commodity prices was to lay largely unfulfilled since most of the commodity agreements made prior to the CIEC were scrapped before the Fund's ratification in 1988.

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[134] Zbigniew Brzezinski provides President Jimmy Carter with weekly national security report no. 9, White House, 16 Apr. 1977, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349522847/USDD?u=utrecht&sid=bookmark-USDD&xid=2e5947dc&pg=1, 5.

[135] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume III: Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 265 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 806.

[136] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume III: Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 266 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 808.

[137] Department of Public Information, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1977* (New York: United Nations, 1980), 396.

[138] Toye and Toye, *The UN and Global Political Economy: Trade, Finance, and Development*, 248–50.

In spite of this though, US officials were pleased with the Conference's results overall and continued to believe in US-Mexican consultations in the NSD. This satisfaction arose from the rejuvenated atmosphere the CIEC had produced in the eyes of Washington, with Cooper having praised it for its "tone" which was capable of applying "a calming influence on North-South relations."[139] This optimism carried over to the State Department's overall prospective view of Mexico in the NSD when it laid out its plans for the upcoming 32nd session of the UNGA to the President in September. In it, State officials communicated that the potential for "the most productive exchange on North/South issues" lay with a small handful of six countries including Mexico.[140] This can be partially explained by the still relatively prosperous relations the countries had outside of the immediate Dialogue with the gas negotiations covered in chapter five still going well at this stage. However, as addressed in the next chapter, relations were not wholly sanguine at summer's end in 1977 either as the Palacio Nacional had become significantly troubled by Carter's proposed immigration bill. Taking these mixed perceptions into account then, the best explanation appears to have simply been that the ultimate aims the administration had for the NSD had a greater effect in shaping US foreign policy towards Mexico vis-à-vis the Dialogue compared to the real negativity of the events that comprised the NSD thus far. As Brzezinski had communicated to Carter in late August, the "basic objective" was "maintaining Mexican cooperation on… international issues."[141] Moreover, as the prospects of the Dialogue remained optimistic and relations with the US's southern

[139] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume III: Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 266 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 808.
[140] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume III: Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 275 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 846.
[141] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 135 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).

neighbour were not completely downcast, it made sense to continue to view North-South consultations with Mexico positively.

The Route to UNCTAD and UNCSTD

In the time period between the start of the UNGA's 32nd session and the NSD megaconferences, UNCTAD V and UNCSTD, nearly two years passed. During this phase of the Dialogue, the US further narrowed its approach to the NSD under Congressional strain while the G77 continued their agitation. Washington also became increasingly preoccupied by more distantly related US-Mexican bilateral issues and extraneous international crises, all the while Mexico was becoming more radical in the Dialogue. When the megaconferences came closer into view in early 1979 however, consultations on the NSD came back to the centre of Washington's foreign policy towards Mexico for its visit to Mexico City in February 1979, involving attempts at conceptual manoeuvring by both Carter and López Portillo, though also ending in the planning of future collaboration.

Concerning the development of the US's approach to the NSD, the Carter administration had authorised a review of the US's NSD strategy in the autumn of 1977. Through the PD on 'U.S. Policies toward Developing Countries' published in October 1977, this process initially configured policies relating to trade, access to capital, and foreign aid as constituting the best incentives the White House could use in pursuing its interests in the upcoming North-South negotiations.[142] However, as it became increasingly clear that Carter was not going to be able to affect the recalcitrant mood Congress had developed towards foreign assistance since the end of the Vietnam War, the NSC began changing tact. In February 1978, Guy Erb proposed an approach that communicated to developing countries that "the US faced hard choices that

[142] Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 145–54.

constrain [its] ability" and that therefore the US was embracing a foreign assistance programme that would from then on only focus on meeting BHN through cooperation "on food and energy… and on science and technology."[143] This new approach was endorsed later that year by the State Department. In the meantime, although the persistence of high global oil prices since the 1973 embargo had created fissures in the G77, especially following the Second Oil Shock that began in early 1979, the countries of the Global South redoubled their original attempts to overturn the terms of trade with fierce indignation, summiting in Havana at the Non-Aligned conference and in Arusha at the G77 ministerial conference.[144] Thus, at this juncture, the US and G77 had grown more distant since the CIEC.

Concurrently, despite an initial grace period, US-Mexican relations gradually decelerated due to the obstructive gas negotiations between the two governments, as well as from the increasing distractions provided by mounting international crisis. This resulted in increasing distance between the US and Mexico over North-South issues in 1978, leading Carter to use his 1979 trip to Mexico to bolster their Nouth-South ties ahead of the summer mega conferences. Originally, in the second half of 1977, relations were still perceived as positive and there existed cooperation in the UNGA on the NSD as López Portillo's visit had portended, indicating that consultations may have paid off by then. In a cable from Carter's UN ambassador Andrew Young to Vance, the diplomat reported on the behaviour of the Latin American delegates, stating that they had generally been "a moderate influence in the negotiating process" with Mexico for example having attenuated a NIEO resolution by

[143] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume III: Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 295 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 921.
[144] Garavini, *After Empires: EU Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957–1986*, 242–5.

Cuba.[145] Young also relayed their "improved voting record" and the "great effort" the Mexican delegation had made to consult with their US counterparts.

However, this all began to change in late 1977 and early 1978. Though the impediments caused by the natural gas negotiations during this period are discussed in chapter five, the gradual side-tracking of the Carter administration by a snowballing of various crises during this period is noted here as they pulled focus away from many previous priorities including the NSD.[146] With the Nicaraguan crisis in particular, Mexico also became acutely aggrieved by the US's initial vacillation over the violence conducted by the Somoza government, and when Carter later backed a transitional government excluding any Sandinista participation, the mood worsened.[147] Correspondingly, as Mexico was beginning to "exert a leadership role" internationally, the US and Mexico's voting behaviour, as with many moderates in the G77, began to diverge at the UNGA 33rd session.[148] For example, the US was the only state to vote against the Mexico-backed resolution 33/136 on the acceleration of real resource transfers.[149]

Thus, a few weeks prior to Carter's trip to Mexico in 1979 and few months before the megaconferences, the White House had written in an earlier draft of the upcoming State of the Union address approved by the President that the visit was needed to "strengthen ties

[145] Cable from the U.S. UN Mission to Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance regarding Latin American and Caribbean positions and voting patterns at the UN, Department Of State, 27 Jan. 1978, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349146761/USDD?u=utrecht&sid=bookmark-USDD&xid=492a1a4f&pg=1, 1–4.
[146] See for example Scott Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 238-40.
[147] See Gerardo Sánchez Nateras, "The Sandinista Revolution and the Limits of the Cold War in Latin America: The Dilemma of Non-Intervention during the Nicaraguan Crisis, 1977–78," *Cold War History* 18, no. 2 (2018): 111–29; Gerardo Sánchez Nateras, "Mexico, the United States, and the Onset of the Nicaraguan Revolution," *Sources and Methods (Blog), The Wilson Center*, February 4, 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/mexico-the-united-states-and-the-onset-the-nicaraguan-revolution.
[148] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 146 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
[149] UN Department of Public Information, *The Yearbook of the United Nations 1978* (New York: United Nations, 1981), 439–40; See also resolutions 1978/6, 33/159, 33/155, and 33/85 on pages 435–46.

throughout the developing world" of which Mexico was a "leader."[150] The Mexican government for its part reciprocated, with their Foreign Secretary Roel having conveyed to Washington through the US embassy López Portillo's desire to include "global issues" on the agenda.[151] Hence, as UNCTAD V and the UNCSTD became close in view, the NSD had brought both leaders together once again for their final North-South consultation. As is detailed in chapter five, this was in part also facilitated by the easing of gas negotiations by this time, smoothed over by the Iranian Revolution compelling renewed American interest in Mexican oil.

With the intention therefore to refocus on preparing for the upcoming megaconferences by bringing the US and Mexico closer together, consultations on North-South issues were held between Carter and López Portillo during their February 14 conversation in Mexico City and given the radicalised context, the NSD now provoked both parties to conceptually manoeuvre for their respective norms, though cooperation was still sought in the end. López Portillo began by again repeating his fact-based reasoning on the inability of the current order to solve the dire problems of developing countries, referring to those of Central America here, and by reiterating his counter-framing point with the national sovereignty norm through the multinational corporation example.[152] López Portillo then made his normative aim explicit, explaining that "to cope with this, [Mexico had] proposed the Charter… but unfortunately no steps were taken to implement it" and that they "must establish a new economic order." In response, Carter shifted the conversation by framing the issue with global reform in terms of

[150] Memorandum, Stu Eizenstat to the President, January 24, 1979, Folder 1/24/79 [3], Container 104, Office of Staff Secretary, Presidential Files, Jimmy Carter Library, 70.
[151] United States Embassy, Mexico, Counselor Nimetz's Consultations with Secretariat of Foreign Relations Officials on President Carter's Visit 1979, https://www-proquest-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/government-official-publications/counselor-nimetzs-consultations-with-secretariat/docview/1679113395/se-2, 1–2.
[152] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 156 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).

simply “improving the quality of life,” thereby appealing to liberal norms of individualism. Later, Carter also directly acknowledged his normative goal, that being “to concentrate… in the poor sectors to meet basic needs.” Nonetheless, at the end of the consultation, the desire for cooperation on the NSD still compelled Carter to ask López Portillo to advise him for the fifth G7 summit in Tokyo, including on the Common Fund, and to tell him that he would brief him subsequently. Thus, during this meeting, the NSD had propounded the US to employ both conceptual manoeuvring and the offer of further cooperation to affect the Mexican posture in the Dialogue.

Science and Technology Interlude

Before discussing the final outcome of this effort at UNCTAD V and the UNCSTD, it is worth examining it in the context of an additional policy from this period that aimed at swaying Mexico in the NSD given that the White House assigned it importance. This was the measure to begin bilateral S&T initiatives with Mexico. Though the PRM covering science and technology, known as PRM-33, had only been published in August 1978, it had been an element of the Carter’s Mexico strategy since the Linowitz Commission had proposed, with BHN undertones, the advocacy and transfer of appropriate technologies and scientific knowledge to counter the NIEO proposals for high technological transfers during the NSD. This was seen as a significant aspect especially in US Mexico policy since Mexico, as a middle-income power, was not eligible for large concessional assistance and so could not be easily affected that way alone.[153] However, technologies and expertise related to increasing agricultural yields, the part of the US’s bilateral S&T policy regarding Mexico discussed here,

[153] Memorandum, Henry Owen to the President, November 14, 1978, Folder 11/16/78, Container 98, Office of Staff Secretary, Presidential Files, Jimmy Carter Library, 1-2.

were above all considered important for security reasons since Mexico's enormous population increase demanded a commensurate increase in food production.[154] Outside of directly consulting to Mexico about the Dialogue, many policies for the US-Mexican relationship therefore had significant synchronicities with shaping the NSD, but they often did have a different ultimate aim.

Under the desire then to maintain US security and shape the NSD, the Carter administration had been pushing bilateral initiatives with Mexico which propagated appropriate technologies and scientific collaboration, especially following PRM-33. Relating to said bilateral programmes, Secretary of Agriculture Robert A. Bergland opened discussions regarding appropriate technologies and knowledge in agriculture when he met with his Mexican equivalents in late January 1978.[155] Over the course of 1978, this aspect of the relationship further developed with the major focus going to arid land management under the leadership of Carter's chief Science Advisor Frank Press.[156] Before Carter's meeting with López Portillo, he met with a Mexican team to prepare the S&T section of the communiqué which was to be released after the President's visit and thereby commit the two to new S&T initiatives. Unfortunately though, these initiatives only included the aforementioned land management programme, as the proposed revival of the 1972 S&T agreement was not incorporated in the final communiqué.[157] Instead, a memorandum of understanding was

[154] FO 3-2 - 8/3/77-8/18/77, August 3, 1977 - August 18, 1977, MS Carter Administration and Foreign Affairs: Jimmy Carter and Foreign Affairs, Part 01: White House Central Files; Section 01: Foreign Affairs, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5113990229/GDSC?u=utrecht&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=5148e942&pg=1, 2.

[155] Memorandum. Carol Tucker Foreman to the President, January 27, 1978. Folder 1/30/78 [1], Container 61. Office of Staff Secretary. Presidential Files, Jimmy Carter Library, 1.

[156] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 152 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).

[157] Carter, Jimmy, "Mexico City, Mexico Joint Communiqué Issued at the Conclusion of Meetings Between President Carter and President Lopez Portillo," February 16, 1979, The APP, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/mexico-city-mexico-joint-communique-issued-the-conclusion-meetings-between-president.

included and this would eventually turn into an S&T pact.[158] The cancelling of this reinvigoration may have been caused by Press's cautious impressment upon his Mexican colleagues during the communiqué's drafting that hopes could not be high regarding funding. Indeed, at this juncture, it was becoming abundantly clear that Congress would not work with the administration on financially backing North-South initiatives. Nevertheless though, in addition to multilateral initiatives discussed in the historiography, the Carter administration did also initiate S&T programmes bilaterally with Mexico in connection to the Dialgoue.

The Megaconference Impasse

Despite these efforts, the Carter administration had neither changed its approach to the Dialogue as a result of its consultations with Mexico, nor did López Portillo's government, or most of the G77 for that matter, adjust its position at UNCTAD V and the UNCSTD, culminating in meaningless results and a near end to Dialogue-related activities by September 1979. Already in March after Carter's visit to Mexico, Secretary of State Vance announced the renewed BHN doctrine originally offered by Erb, firmly brushing aside any pretentions of supporting the NIEO in principle and declaring a singular commitment to meeting BHN.[159] Entering into UNCTAD V in Manila then, the US made good on its promises, rejecting together with most other Northern countries the developing countries' core demands such as their participation in the management of their debt.[160] For its part, Mexico consistently voted in favour of resolutions with its developing counterparts at the summit.[161] However, without

[158] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV: South America; Latin America Region, doc. 50 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 186.
[159] Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 154.
[160] Bertrand Badie, *Diplomacy of Connivance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 137.
[161] UNCTAD, Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 5th session, Manila, 7 May–3 June 1979, Volume I: report and annexes, UNGAOR, UN Doc TD/269 (Vol.I), 1981, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/36334?ln=en.

Northern support, the vast majority of this support was in vain. With Northern intransigence stubbornly upheld, the conference concluded with the few initiatives developed countries agreed to, namely a comprehensive programme of action for LDCs and an increase in multilateral aid for BHN.[162]

The UNCSTD followed a similar route a few months later. There, the G77 pursued its technology transfer demands and again, the Global North mostly rebuffed them.[163] The final compromise ended with an 'Action Plan' which entailed increasing the production and availability of relevant scientific research to LDCs, bolstering scientific education for the scientists of those countries, and so on. This plan was to be administered by a newly established body within ECOSOC, the Intergovernmental Committee on Science and Technology for Development, in which developing countries were to receive an equal say. However, the new committee was debilitated from the start, as it was not permitted to assemble the resources required to fulfil its mandate and its initial financing was entirely voluntary. As for the southern neighbour, despite the bilateral initiatives mentioned above, Mexico does not appear to have been satisfied with this either. Already in 1977, President López Portillo had made it clear that his interests were in "high technologies," which he had curiously depicted as the only way to meet the "basic needs" of his citizens.[164] Unconvinced by Carter's overtures, in its national paper submitted to the UNCSTD, Mexico had maintained its "desire to integrate S&T with the establishment of a new international order," advocating for measures such as the global exchange of patents.[165] For its part, the US was not content

[162] Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 155.
[163] Iris Borowy, "Science and Technology for Development in a Postcolonial World: Negotiations at the United Nations, 1960–1980," *NTM Journal of the History of Science, Technology and Medicine* 26, no. 1 (2018): 47–51.
[164] Letter, Gene E. Bradley to Stansfield Turner, September 19, 1977, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80M00165A002500040027-5.pdf, 7–8.
[165] UNCSTD. Summaries of national and regional papers, Vol. III. UNGAOR. UN Doc A/CONF.81/6 (Vol. III). 8 August 1979. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4185?ln=en, 68.

either, nor even particularly invested, having had its new USAID institute wholly ignored at the conference, though Congress had not authorised funding for it regardless, and never pursuing the domestic legislation to fund the new Intergovernmental Committee despite having some Congressional support for it in this case.[166]

By the end of UNCSTD, the Carter administration had effectively given up on the NSD for the time being, meaning it also stopped pursuing Mexico City about the Dialogue, especially as the normative disjuncture between the US and Mexico had widened. Aside from the general Congressional unsupportiveness mentioned earlier, the most obvious reason for this dip in interest was that there were no new major summits planned until some planning began well into 1980. However, there were smaller forums continuing on, but within them, meagre progress was being made. With respect to Mexico, this was apparent in third conference of the United Nations Law of the Sea, where the US and Mexico were at loggerheads over the right of multinationals to mine the deep seabed for precious minerals.[167] Additionally, in February 1980, Mexico had also left a foul taste in Washington's mouth after it had acted together with Algeria, Cuba, and Iran to intentionally force a spat with Northern countries at the conclusion of the third conference of the UN Industrial Development Organisation to compel concessions out of the North in future negotiations, as it had admitted privately.[168] Rather than moderating further then, the López Portillo government had again radicalised vis-a-vis the NSD, communicating to the Deputy Director of the CIA that the revolting people in

[166] Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 168-9.
[167] Briefing paper on the relationship of the Law of the Sea (LOS) negotiations to other North/South issues, Department Of State, 11 Jan. 1979, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349157850/USDD?u=utrecht&sid=bookmark-USDD&xid=9d978a63&pg=1, 2–5.
[168] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume III: Foreign Economic Policy, doc. 344 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 1087.

the developing world simply had "no alternative but to seek a radical leftist solution."[169] The last major factor explaining the US's retreat from the NSD was its rapid shift in focus towards the Soviet Union after it had finally laid détente out to pasture with its invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, mandating a privileging of security issues over economic ones.[170]

Consequently then, the Dialogue itself had nearly entirely vanished from the US-Mexican relationship. Days after the UNCSTD when López Portillo and Carter had their final visit, there was already no mention of the NSD from the US. Then, in 1980, when López Portillo proposed another smaller summit during August with Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and former German Chancellor Willy Brandt, Washington wanted to communicate that it did not think "a Summit Meeting in August… [was] feasible or desirable."[171] Nevertheless, NSD-related activities between the US and Mexico did not entirely disappear. This is especially shown in chapter five when examining US-Mexican cooperation over the World Energy Plan in late 1979. Aside from this though, there was also Secretary of Energy Charles Duncan who had in his trip to Mexico in early April organised with his Mexican counterparts Jose Andres De Oteyza and Pedro Ramírez Vázquez working groups on the installation of solar technologies in rural Mexico and technological exchange respectively, thereby continuing the promotion of appropriate technologies.[172] However, it becomes clear in the following two chapters that for these reasons and others shown later, the US's attempts to change the balance in the

[169] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 170 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
[170] Nancy Mitchell, "The Cold War and Jimmy Carter," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume III: Endings*, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 87.
[171] Briefing information for Secretary Vance's meetings with Austrian Chancellor Kriesky and Foreign Minister Pahr, Department Of State, 10 May 1980, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349323339/USDD?u=utrecht&sid=bookmark-USDD&xid=c664543c&pg=1, 8.
[172] Memorandum, Charles W. Duncan, Jr. to the President, April 22, 1980, The Papers of Jimmy Carter: Jimmy Carter and Foreign Affairs, Part 1: White House Central Files Section 1: Foreign Affairs Subject File, Microfilm edition, RIAS, Reel 2-10, 2–3.

Dialogue indirectly through its Mexican energy and trade policies also ended in early 1980 at the latest.

Conclusion

The above chapter has therefore supported the main thesis by proving that the NSD policy ideas of consulting, as well as promoting appropriate technologies and expertise, had a strong presence in Washington's Mexico policy throughout much of the Carter administration's first term. However, it was also revealed that its presence waxed and waned largely according to the occurrence of extraneous crises, despite S&T collaboration remaining in the background much of the time. Historiographically, this reflects Franczak's treatment of the Carter administration's dealings with the Dialogue while challenging his contention that Latin America had vanished from the US's North-South designs by 1979. In addition, it was also shown that both Carter and López Portillo had engaged in conceptual manoeuvring for their respective norms, though the Mexican president had done so more often. Although the presence of such tactics in López Portillo's entrepreneurial rhetoric does not uphold this work's central thesis, it does however further verify the antipreneur theory by confirming the presence of tactics yet unseen while also indicating the relevance of individual agency. Lastly, this chapter also depicted how the NSD part of the US-Mexican relationship broke down after UNCTAD V and the UNCSTD, thereby further providing a completer account of how Carter's participation in the Dialogue ended by relating it to US-Mexican relations.

IV. Chapter 4 – Trade, Sometimes Aid

This chapter deals with the Linowitz Commission's and ODC's economic policy proposals which were intended to indirectly address the NSD, namely financial stabilisation, bilateral assistance, and multilateral trade negotiation. Moreover, this chapter first argues that although it was demonstrated earlier that Washington's interest in the Dialogue played a role in encouraging it to stabilise the Mexican economy, it is ultimately revealed here that the US's stabilisation initiative was above all motivated by its fears of economic contagion. However, prompted by the unemployment caused by the stabilisation campaign, this chapter contends that the NSD was a part of the motivation behind the Carter administration's offering of BHN programmes to the López Portillo administration. Through this argumentation, specific programmes are depicted as a consequence of such North-South concerns, though it is addressed that they were simultaneously meant to have very important effects for other bilateral issues. Lastly, this chapter claims that the Dialogue helped push the Carter government to pursue trade negotiations with the López Portillo government through the GATT, and later its accession into said organisation. It is established that the US did this to elevate the GATT above UNCTAD, while also to shape the GATT's MTN along American parameters, though it is shown that such elevation ultimately failed.

Concerning historiography, this chapter provides further empirical evidence for the literature which alleges BHN's predominance in US developmentalism during the latter 1970s. However, it also asserts that BHN programmes could have also partially had separate undoctrinaire motives as well, as was the case with the initiatives for Mexico. Similarly, it also bequeaths to the present insufficient historiography on the relationship between the GATT and the NSD support for the claim that "Western countries wanted the developing nations to handle trade issues in the… unpoliticized GATT forum and not… UNCTAD" and showing how

this transpired with respect to the US and Mexico.[173] Regarding theory, it is argued that conceptual manoeuvring was entirely irrelevant from this chapter's subjects, therefore showing the theory's limitations in theorising state behaviour in these contexts.

Stabilisation

The most immediately pressing economic policy idea for helping to guarantee Mexico's support in the NSD along US lines consisted of helping along the stabilisation of the Mexican economy, though this was ultimately above all driven by immediate economic concerns and its implications across the US-Mexican relationship. As described in the introduction, by the start of López Portillo's term in office, Mexico had just narrowly avoided a substantial recession initiated by a growing trade deficit with the US.[174] Coupled with a massive public spending increase by the previous administration, Mexico's external debt had ballooned to nearly three times its size in 1960, forcing the government to devalue its currency for the first time in over two decades in August 1976. This consequently led to significant capital flight, leaving Mexico on the brink of a major downturn. In September, with fears of contagion due to the entanglement of the US financial system with the Mexican economy, Washington and the IMF negotiated with Mexico City the largest sovereign bailout package that was ever extended to a developing country at the time. As a result, a stabilisation programme was agreed, putting strict limits on public spending. Thus, by the start of the López Portillo and then Carter presidencies, Mexico had yet to emerge from its economic crisis.

[173] Lucia Coppolaro, "In the Shadow of Globalization: The European Community and the United States in the GATT Negotiations of the Tokyo Round (1973–1979)": 763; See also Francine McKenzie, *GATT and Global Order in the Postwar Era*, 214–22.
[174] Paul V. Kershaw, "Averting a Global Financial Crisis: The US, the IMF, and the Mexican Debt Crisis of 1976," *International History Review* 40, no. 2 (2018): 292–314.

In line with the Linowitz Commission's recommendations as shown in chapter two, the Carter administration was therefore firstly concerned with aiding Mexico's transition into its stabilisation programme, though the want to use this help to assure Mexican cooperation in the NSD was only one part of the motivation to assist Mexico. The immediate impetus arose from the US's concern about the implications of the Mexico's wavering attitude towards following the IMF programme. Though Mexico's financial system had somewhat stabilised by the time Carter was inaugurated, as López Portillo told Carter in their February meeting, "Mexico need[ed] to strike a balance with outside sources to solve its financial problems," referring to his country's struggle to function properly under the IMF conditions while its ability to borrow was significantly curtailed.[175] As a result, private financial institutions in the US were alarmed by the prospect of López Portillo deviating significantly from IMF conditions.[176] The administration was therewith concerned about avoiding "a serious situation," as investor panic could perilously throw the situation back to its 1976 lows. Aside from the Linowitz Commission's connection between the NSD and financial stability then, the NSD connection was apparent from the wish to have "a politically and economically stable neighbour" which could for example radicalise in its NIEO demands if it was not somehow assisted, though the implications of such radicalisation could go far beyond this.[177]

The White House accordingly sought a compromise whereby it would seek out some flexibility for Mexico amongst the relevant IFIs whilst securing López Portillo's assurance that he would follow the IMF conditions, though the latter was not communicated by Washington.

[175] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 130 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
[176] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 132 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
[177] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 135.

On the recommendation of Cyrus Vance,[178] as soon as Carter's first meeting with López Portillo, the former had already offered his "influence" in the main IFIs to obtain loans to get past the woes.[179] Then, a plan was outlined by Secretary Blumenthal in a memorandum to Carter a week later wherein the recommendation was made to organise short-term loans to stabilise the Mexican economy and convince the Mexican president to make a firm public statement to creditors that he was following IMF conditionality, amongst others.[180] However, in his follow-up letter to López Portillo, Carter avoided the latter topic, merely reiterating his offer to increase access to IFIs. Though this evidently did not help in the CIEC as was seen in the last chapter, Mexico was eventually able to come to a new accord with the IMF that summer.[181] In terms of economic set of policies, the focus thereby turned fully to aid and trade since stabilisation had taken firmer root and so unemployment became a larger area of concern. Eventually, this issue would completely pass as the Mexican oil boom of López Portillo period discussed in the next chapter steadily ramped up Mexico's foreign exchange to point that by the next year, the Palacio Nacional was no longer concerned with the implications of not adhering to the IMF's austerity programme.[182]

BHN for Migration and Narcotics

While this stabilisation episode rose and then quickly faded into the background, US assistance to Mexico, namely regarding immigration and narcotics, also briefly surfaced as an NSD-relevant topic in the relationship. Although these issues had for a very long time been some of the most salient issues for Americans regarding Mexico, their positions as objects of

[178] State Visit of Mexican President José López Portillo 1977, 1.
[179] FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 130.
[180] FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 132.
[181] FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 135.
[182] Navarro, "Between the Superpower and Third Worldism: Mexico and OPEC (1974–1982)," 204.

attention had inflated since the start of the 1970s as immigrants were beginning to be constructed as drug-trafficking invaders in US public discourse.[183] From the start of the Carter presidency therefore, Washington felt it had to act to stem the inflow of narcotics and immigrants. Amongst the policies proposed were financial measures aimed at directly creating employment in Mexico since those who produced the narcotics coming into the US and those who came to the US themselves to find work tended to struggle to find employment at home. Considering these policies were designed to create jobs rather than simply stimulate economic growth, they were therefore BHN programmes. After all, BHN was shown in chapter one to have become the dominant developmental doctrine of the Carter administration. However, the relevance of this dogma is also clear from the manner in which policymakers spoke about the programmes, as the State Department's Director of Policy Planning Anthony Lake for example shared with Vance his view that "rural development credits… [go] to the root of the problem and [serve] the human rights of unemployed Mexicans."[184] Hence, although meant to efficiently help solve the migration and narcotics issues, these programmes must be seen within the wider context of Washington's normative struggle to shape the NSD in its image and their construction is therefore worth discussing.

Although Mexico's economic stabilisation was the most urgent concern at the start of the administration, migration and narcotics had played a non-negligible role in US Mexico policy early on, producing significant BHN programmes. In the aforementioned 1977 presidential meeting planning documents, they received prominent billing, with the US embassy's recognition of "the validity of the Mexican point of view that the 'push-pull factor' is a basic

[183] Leo R. Chavez, *The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 28.
[184] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV: South America; Latin America Region, doc. 28 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 114–5.

part of the equation" demonstrating that the administration was accounting for development early on.[185] Though the subsequent planning documents would stress non-BHN measures in the fight against narcotics, the development approach remained relevant to what the White House wanted to discuss with López Portillo in the form of "long-range efforts" to handle immigration.[186] However, in neither of the two meetings did migration and narcotics play a prominent role. Rather, they would become topics of discussion in the aforesaid Consultative Mechanism created by the Presidential meeting.[187] In fact, as Brzezinski recalled, despite the existence of multiple subgroups under the Economic Working Group, the other Social Working Group "dominated" the Mechanism with the topic of migration since the IMF austerity programme has heightened Mexican unemployment. Thus, here began the proposals for aid, eliciting positive responses from Mexico. The Treasury Department subsequently began preparing a proposal for the 'US-Mexican Development Fund' which was designed specifically to "finance job opportunities" in deprived rural areas. Meanwhile, for narcotics, USAID was working on "crop and income substitution" measures for drug-producing farmers which the US was lobbying IFIs for additional funding.[188]

The idea to support BHN initiatives in order to stem the inflow of narcotics and migrants vanished fairly rapidly after this point however as non-BHN policies for the former issue appeared to have resolved the matter and mishandlings for the latter caused Mexico to back out of cooperating with the US on migration. Regarding narcotics, the resolution of the issue had been specifically taken over by plans to assist Mexico's Operation Condor in its

[185] Carter/López Portillo Meeting 1977, 4.
[186] State Visit of Mexican President José López Portillo 1977, 3.
[187] U.S. Department of State, Volume XXIII, doc. 135.
[188] Memorandum, Peter Bourne to the President, July 1, 1977, Folder: 8/2/77 [2], Container 35, Office of Staff Secretary, Presidential Files, Jimmy Carter Library, 5–6.

eradication and interdiction campaigns following the first presidential meeting.[189] These campaigns were quickly perceived as successful by the administration and so the BHN measures for narcotics became rather moot.[190] In retrospect, this perspective proved short-sighted as Condor had largely driven Mexican drug producers simply further south to more remote locations, eventually contributing to the narcotics boom which partly inspired Ronald Reagan War on Drugs.[191] Ultimately, perhaps partly due to the lack of Congressional willingness to increase concessional aid and administrative distraction spoken about previously, Washington ended up privileging the points earned for temporarily getting drugs off the streets over inching a little bit closer to winning over Mexico in the Dialogue.

As for migration, the proposed Development Fund was forced to be abandoned over US-Mexican disputes regarding Carter's 1977 immigration legislation. Prompted by a conflict between unions and producers, the White House sought a compromise by introducing a bill into Congress in August 1977 which was to give amnesty to long-term immigrants and reduce border staff while tightening existing legislation.[192] Mexico City quickly voiced their displeasure in the Consultative Mechanism however, stating it would threaten their "social stability."[193] As the bill made its way through the legislature over the course of months, a frustrated Mexican government decided it had had enough and abandoned the Development Fund out of protest in April 1978.[194] Carter himself though had never truly been behind the

[189] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 136 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
[190] United States Embassy, Mexico, Presidential Visit--Contingency Press Guidance 1979, https://www.proquest.com/government-official-publications/presidential-visit-contingency-press-guidance/docview/1679113361/se-2, 1.
[191] Jesus Bucardoa et al., "Historical Trends in the Production and Consumption of Illicit Drugs in Mexico: Implications for the Prevention of Blood Borne Infections," *Drug Alcohol Depend* 79, no. 3 (2005): 283.
[192] Scott Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration*, 112–3.
[193] FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 135.
[194] United States, National Security Council, Staff, Evening Report [Pages Missing] 1978, https://www.proquest.com/government-official-publications/evening-report-pages-missing/docview/1679093281/se-2.

Fund either. Already in May 1977, in reaction to a Task Force Report on Undocumented Aliens recommending developing employment, Carter wrote that the US "can't raise Mexico living standards up to ours – *impossible*."[195] Thus, when a Senator had proposed a fund similar to the Treasury's in September 1977, Carter refused to support it.[196] Hence, with little presidential backing, the Treasury's proposal withered until López Portillo finally ended the venture. Moreover, due to lack of real investment and mishandlings by the administration, the bilateral BHN programmes with Mexico largely went away before they could have perhaps had an impact on the Dialogue, signalling the limits of the NSD's prioritisation in the administration. Though smaller initiatives came afterwards, these came too late to impact the summer megaconference.[197]

Escape to the GATT

The final components of the economic set of policies relevant to pursuing US interest in the NSD with respect to Mexico were first the pursuing of trade negotiations with the country through the multilateral trade organisation of the GATT and later encouraging its accession into said organisation starting in late 1978. As this institution was a body primarily concerned with facilitating the liberalisation of global trade, this collection of policies naturally then served other goals as well, namely the securing of a multilaterally binding trade agreement with a massive trading partner. Moreover, given that the voting tradition of the GATT was consensus, it favoured the lowest common denominator – the Northern countries – and the

[195] Note, Jimmy Carter to Stu Eizenstat, May 2, 1977, Folder: 5/4/77 [1], Container 19, Office of Staff Secretary, Presidential Files, Jimmy Carter Library, 3.
[196] FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, 135.
[197] As was the case with the Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Housing and Urban Development which was first announced in the 1979 Mexico Joint Communiqué. Its implementation plan was only settled in early 1980: Memorandum, Moon Landrieu to the President, March 28, 1980, Folder: 4/8/80, Container 157, Office of Staff Secretary, Presidential Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

GATT was therefore generally useful to the US for pursuing its economic self-interest. Nonetheless, it is clear from the historical record that the Dialogue had played a crucial role in US trade policy towards Mexico as well because the US wanted to use Mexico's participation in the GATT to legitimise the organisation as the primary NSD forum and to set a precedent within the MTN regarding North-South trade on the US's more laissez-faire terms. Ultimately though, despite successfully negotiation trade agreement with Mexico through the MTN initially, these policies ended in failure as developing countries did not accept the Tokyo Round's final outcome, nor did Mexico accede to the GATT.

Firstly, it must be shown that the Trilateral Commission's conception of the GATT did indeed become reflected in the Carter administration's GATT policy. As mentioned in chapter two, Assistant Secretary Bergsten had advocated for promoting the GATT as the legitimate alternative to UNCTAD, saying that "politicization of issues is better avoided in functionally specific institutions" such as the GATT.[198] This discourse was exactly reflected in the PD referred to in chapter three on 'U.S. Policies towards Developing Countries' from October 1977 wherein it was stated that they would "make an effort to channel negotiations, particularly on technical issues, in more specialized, functionally specific institutions where the environment is less politicized."[199] Given this precise mirroring, there was therefore a clear influence coming from the Trilateral Commission into the heart of policy construction in the Carter administration on this matter. Despite this document having come out well into Carter's first year though, it is also evident that it had impacted the administration early on specifically with respect to his dealings with Mexican president. Already in the preparatory documents for Carter's first meeting with López Portillo, Vance had told the US president that

[198] Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 221.
[199] Quoted in Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 149.

"many trade problems require multilateral solutions" and that he therefore "encourages Mexican participation in MTN," disregarding thereby the trade problems specifically addressed in UNCTAD.[200] On that basis then, Carter told López Portillo that "that the broad economic policy issues that [he] mentioned should be dealt with on a multilateral basis rather than just on a bilateral basis."[201] Given the aforementioned context, 'multilateral basis' must thusly have referred to the GATT and with the assertion being thusly that 'economic policy issues should be dealt with' there, Carter was hence rhetorically legitimising the GATT to López Portillo.

Turning to the first policy of pursuing trade relations with Mexico then, the Carter administration first focused on negotiating sectoral trade agreements with Mexico in the MTN and this was to set a precedent in the GATT on how trade should be arranged between Northern and Southern countries within the MTN of the then ongoing Tokyo Round. Lasting from 1973-9, this round was a phase of the MTN in the GATT where the trade issues between Northern and Southern countries took central stage for the first time.[202] There, developing countries aimed to reduce trade barriers in a non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal fashion. In the throes of stagflation, Northern countries were focused on maintaining their right to discriminate against individual countries and retain as much reciprocity as they could despite initial friendly overtures. The category of 'tropical products' consequently became an important matter of these negotiations because such goods generally came solely from the developing world. Thus, when López Portillo confided to Carter in their first meeting that "the most important problem [for Mexico] is the large trade deficit" and that he wanted to solve

[200] State Visit of Mexican President José López Portillo 1977, 10.
[201] FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 131.
[202] McKenzie, *GATT and Global Order in the Postwar Era*, 215–7.

it through agreements on agricultural goods, an opportunity came about to set a precedent on tropical products within the MTN.[203]

The US and Mexico representatives consequently deliberated in Geneva from February 10 to September 23 to forge an agreement to set a precedent on how a North-South trade agreement could work.[204] The subsequent deal resulted in more tariff concessions by Mexico than the US, though the latter's concessions were nearly twice the dollar-value of the former's, meaning that the economic argument of reducing the US trade deficit was not the most prescient factor.[205] Moreover, as Carter's Special Trade representative stated, the agreement was important because "it establishe[d] the principle that developing countries [would] make at least some trade concessions," thereby setting "a precedent for many other agreements… with developing countries."[206] Within the Tokyo Round, this would become a part of the many concessions made during said Round on tropical products through the 'most favoured nation' principle.[207] Yet, most Southern countries were not swayed in the end. More significant issues such as the 'graduation clause' – a measure which allowed Northern states to revoke newly agreed to trade preferences for a Southern state once it reached an arbitrary level of development – caused the round's 'Final Act' to be left unsigned by most Southern countries, including Mexico, when it was finished being drafted in April 1979.[208]

[203] FRUS, doc. 131.
[204] Memorandum of Understanding, Mexico and the United States, September 24, 1977, Folder 11/7/77 [1], Container 49, Office of Staff Secretary, Presidential Files, Jimmy Carter Library.
[205] Memorandum, Robert S. Strauss to the President, October 4, 1977, Folder 11/7/77 [1], Container 49, Office of Staff Secretary, Presidential Files, Jimmy Carter Library, 1–2.
[206] Memorandum, Robert S. Strauss to the President, November 4, 1977, Folder 11/7/77 [1], Container 49, Office of Staff Secretary, Presidential Files, Jimmy Carter Library, 1.
[207] McKenzie, *GATT and Global Order in the Postwar Era*, 217.
[208] Coppolaro, "In the Shadow of Globalization: The European Community and the United States in the GATT Negotiations of the Tokyo Round (1973–1979)": 767–8.

As for the policy of encouraging Mexico's accession, though the economic argument did play a role in its rationale, the historical evidence also demonstrates that the US wanted facilitate Mexico's joining of the GATT to legitimise the organisation as the rightful vehicle for the NSD. For the economic argument, already by 1977, Mexico was already the US's fourth largest trading partner. Yet, what concerned Washington was that Mexico's non-membership in the GATT meant US-Mexican trade was potentially subject to more instability since GATT restricted its members' latitude for imposing protectionist measures.[209] This became especially salient in 1979 as Mexico City was deliberating its accession since an $850 million general trade agreement had been negotiated between the US and Mexico. However, this does not discount that the Dialogue had also been present in policymakers minds, as the aforementioned PD attested to. The influence of said PD is apparent when looking at Carter's February 1979 meeting with López Portillo where, to advocate for the GATT, he parroted Bergsten's discourse by speaking of needing a "reasonable forum for discussions between the developed countries and the G–77."[210] Moreover, when Mexican accession in late 1978 became a serious priority due to US concessions having to be withdrawn if Mexico did not announce the formal launching of its membership negotiation, Carter officials were more so worried about the political consequences of concession withdrawal than the economic ones.[211]

Thus, the Carter administration also spent a portion of 1979 trying to convince the López Portillo administration to make good on its accession intentions, featuring for example Carter telling his counterpart on the second day of his February 1979 visit that "any trade differences

[209] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 136 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
[210] FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 156.
[211] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 150 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).

could be resolved better within GATT than outside."[212] However, the US was again not successful in its aims as Mexico officially suspended accession negotiations in May 1980. Internal left-wing pressures have been cited to explain Mexico's decision.[213] An additional factor may be found in the February meeting discussed above, where López Portillo named the presence of non-reciprocal preferences in the Tokyo Round's final outcome as an accession condition. It is inferable then that despite Mexico's revocation of its accession occurring a year after this, the Tokyo Round's framework agreement had likely impacted the López Portillo government's decision.

Conclusion

This chapter has sustained this work's underlying thesis by demonstrating how the Carter administration's desire to move the NSD closer to its interests factored into some of its economic policies regarding Mexico, namely aiding Mexico's financial stabilisation, providing it bilateral assistance, pursuing a trade agreement through the MTN with Mexico, and persuading the country to enter into the GATT. With the first two policies, it was demonstrated that despite these policies coming from strategies that advised them based on the want to shape the NSD, Washington's immediate interest in Mexican stability, as well as reduced migration and narcotics production, ultimately were the most significant factors. Historiographically then, the found presence of the BHN programmes did contribute empirical evidence to the literature which claims BHN's then prevalence in developmental policy, though it does also somewhat rebuke this scholarship by showing the nonideological motives these development programmes could have. Lastly, despite being shown to have been

[212] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 157 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
[213] See for example Dale Story, "Trade Politics in the Third World: A Case Study of the Mexican GATT Decision," *International Organization* 36, no. 4 (1982): 781–9.

unsuccessful, this chapter has also proven that the GATT was positioned as an alternative to UNCTAD by the Carter administration in its Mexico policy, lending credence to the literature that has claimed this in other contexts.

V. Chapter 5 – The Energy Crucible

In accordance with the Carter administration's global energy concerns and plans that were established in chapter two, this final chapter justifies the main argument through an analysis of how the NSD helped govern the course of US policy regarding Mexican energy resources. It is contended first that the Carter administration's motivation to hem in OPEC's power in the Dialogue partly motivated its initial offerings of capital and equipment for the stimulation of the Mexican oil industry. It is also shown how increasing the US's energy supply did not factor into these overtures as Carter was trying to pursue a domestic policy of energy autarky at the start of his term. As the White House realised this was unrealistic though, it is shown that Washington opened up its energy market for Mexican hydrocarbons. However, in large part due to misperceptions concerning their natural gas agreement, the US-Mexican relationship, including its energy component, became significantly damaged and thereby obstructed. Only renewed concerns about changes in the world energy market, including OPEC's involvement in it, eventually drove the Carter administration to change its tact since the US needed to suppress the energy price rise to not just maintain global economic stability, but also to again arrest the growth of the Cartel's power in the Dialogue. Thus, this chapter demonstrates not only how the Dialogue affected other US policies, but how the consequences of those other policies shaped the US's NSD policy vis-à-vis Mexico. Lastly, this chapter shows how the NSD shaped the US's foreign policy towards Mexico for a final time by demonstrating how genuine American interest, as well as US desires to reign in OPEC and halt future discussions about commodity governance in the Dialogue's attempted relaunching at the UNGA's 34th session, propelled Washington to support Mexico's 'World Energy Plan', itself a NIEO idea in the eyes of Mexico City. Overall, it is therefore contended that the NSD played a role all along the contours of the US's Mexican energy policy.

Though this chapter also provides no further evidence towards the antipreneur theory, it offers a historiographical contribution, namely adding to the growing literature on the interplay between 1970s energy crises and the NSD which has so far not discussed the part US-Mexican relations had played in its dynamic.[214] Furthermore, in its discussion of the World Energy Plan, this chapter attempts to fill a gap in the NSD literature on a subject that has garnered very meagre attention.[215] Lastly, as with the previous chapter, the lack of the antipreneur theory's relevance to this portion of the normative contestation process denotes a necessity for further theorising on how states conduct their antipreneurialism.

Pressing Mexico for Energy

Taking into account the US's motivations regarding its Mexican energy policy concerns outlined in chapter two, including those related to the NSD, the Carter administration therefore pursued the López Portillo government for its oil, consistently making overtures with offers for funding and capital to increase production. To understand the immediate context of this pursual, one must go back to the month prior to Carter's inauguration. On December 17, 1976, an OPEC meeting in Doha had ended in most members agreeing to raise the oil price by 10% in January and another 5% in July. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates however rejected the decision, deciding to raise their price by only 5% and increasing their production to this effect.[216] This 'Doha Split' immediately galvanised the Carter administration to court the two dissenting members, whilst vigorously opposing OPEC in

[214] See Dietrich, *Oil Revolution: Anticolonial Elites, Sovereign Rights, and the Economic Culture of Decolonization*; Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*; Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*.
[215] In the English-language literature, there is a brief mentioning of the Plan in Navarro, "Between the Superpower and Third Worldism: Mexico and OPEC (1974–1982)," 206.
[216] David S. Painter, ""From the Nixon Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Iran and the Geopolitics of Oil in the 1970s," in *American Energy Policy in the 1970s*, ed. Robert Lifset (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), 75.

public. Ultimately, this was primarily out of a concern for the implications the price-hike would have on global economic recovery, though it is worth repeating that the aforesaid NSD connection was present. In the CIEC for example, US representatives spent much of the conference attempting to impress upon the other non-oil importing delegations the harsh effects of OPEC's price policies, thereby using the price increase to drive a wedge between OPEC and the rest of the developing world.[217]

Hence, when Mexico discovered significant quantities in the Bay of Campeche in 1976 after already making modest discoveries in 1972, Washington also took to Mexico City to gauge if it was willing to increase its hydrocarbons production and thereby render the Cartel's pricing policy unsustainable. However, this was mainly regarding oil initially since for the first half of 1977, the White House had adopted an energy conservation strategy, meaning it was trying to not import more hydrocarbons.[218] Hence, the interest in increasing oil production was motivated by a desire to lower global oil prices. Given that gas was rarely exported internationally at this time due to the exorbitantly expensive costs of liquification, the US therefore also did not seek to directly increase its production, though natural gas output was still increased due to it being a by-product of oil production. This was exemplified by Carter's refusal of Mexican Foreign Secretary Roel's offer for emergency oil supplies during the winter energy shortage at the start of the Carter administration, though the short-term gas shipment was accepted.[219] This was also an early indication of Mexico's willingness to play along. Indeed, already during the Ford administration, López Portillo assured Washington that he was replacing staff in Mexico's state-owned petroleum company Pemex who opposed

[217] Christopher R.W. Dietrich, "Oil Power and Economic Theologies: The United States and the Third World in the Wake of the Energy Crisis," *Diplomatic History* 40, no. 3 (2016): 528.
[218] Leyva, "The Natural Gas Controversy," 160–1.
[219] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 133 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).

expanding oil production to ensure the quantities of oil necessary for export.[220] Ultimately, despite having been interested in the NIEO's success and traditionally being averse to exporting its oil, Mexico's immediate priorities laid in amassing foreign currency to service its trade deficit and sovereign debt.

From the beginning of Carter's term then, Washington enthusiastically, yet cautiously at first, offered capital and expertise to improve Mexico's productive petroleum capacities. In the same preparation for the first presidential meeting covered in the previous chapters, Vance had advised Carter to merely advised that he should "express appreciation" for the emergency energy shipments and casually ask what Mexico's plans were.[221] Only if López Portillo himself inquired about US assistance was the president advised to offer capital, equipment, and expertise. Thankfully for the US president, the Mexican president made the first step and raised all the points which allowed for Carter to make his offer.[222] Consequently, the administration began to move quickly. The Treasury Department pressed their Mexican counterparts to obtain credits from the US Export-Import Bank to fund the purchasing of equipment for energy production.[223] Carter's Special Advisor on Energy James R. Schlesinger met with Pemex's director general Jorge Díaz Serrano and offered the IMF to extend loans for the development of oil production outside the stabilisation agreement.[224] For their part, in setting up the aforementioned Consultative Mechanism, the two Presidents exchanged letters in which the Energy Working Group was created, facilitating this energy partnership

[220] Navarro, "Between the Superpower and Third Worldism: Mexico and OPEC (1974–1982)," 204.
[221] State Visit of Mexican President José López Portillo 1977, 12.
[222] FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 130.
[223] FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 132.
[224] FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 150.

further.[225] Thus, buoyed by the new oil fields and capital, Mexican oil exportation consistently began to increase.

The Natural Gas Puzzle

By the summer of 1977, Washington's energy priorities with Mexico City had shifted focus on increasing the importation of Mexican natural gas to decrease US oil consumption, thereby decreasing global oil demand. However, negotiations on this ended up stalling and consequently held back discussions regarding oil production for a year and a half. Only in late 1978, once the November Iranian oil strike and subsequent OPEC Abu Dhabi summit raised crude prices, could the US compromise on natural gas and shift their focus back to oil. The 1977 priority change occurred off the heels of a reversal in national energy policy when the Carter administration realised it could not contain US energy consumption whilst relying on domestic energy resources alone.[226] It therefore now concentrated on finding alternative energy sources for the US market, both in terms of geographic origin and type. US attitudes regarding global energy supplies were also relatively more relaxed at this point after the CIEC. Though the Doha Split had been mended with an agreement between Riyadh and the rest of OPEC to raise Saudi prices to that of the rest of the bloc, the deal also mandated that the others would waive their earlier pledge to increase the crude oil further.[227] From that time after until 1978, the Saudis, as well as now the Iranians, steadfastly blocked the organisation from increasing the price any further to the displeasure of its radical members. Though they gradually began to waver throughout 1978, this only came to a head at the end of the year with the Iranian Revolution.

[225] FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 133.
[226] Leyva, "The Natural Gas Controversy,": 161–2.
[227] Giuliano Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*, 268–70.

Natural gas negotiations then had stalled further discussions on oil and had generally added much friction to the US-Mexican relationship because the López Portillo administration had perceived the rejection of Pemex's deal with a consortium of six US gas companies by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the US energy regulatory body, as offensive. This deal had originally been agreed to in August 1977 wherein the price was set at $2.50 per 1000 cubic feet.[228] Though the White House felt the price was too high, it maintained that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, an independent regulatory body within the newly created Department of Energy, had jurisdiction over approving the price. The Commission however did not agree with the pricing either. What followed was a back and forth between the various actors for four months until Pemex finally suspended negotiations and withdrew its agreement in December 1977. This had upset the Mexican government greatly. When speaking to the US ambassador, López Portillo had called the "USG refusal… an embarrassment" and said he would suspend talks on the matter until after Carter's new energy bill, a prospect months away.[229] The Carter administration for its part was confused. Robert Pastor later recounted that to the White House, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's rejection of the $2.50 figure was apolitical as the commission was independent and so there was no reason to blame the US government itself.[230] Nevertheless, as Schlesinger observed, if the US was to get any further along with facilitating additional oil production, the gas issue needed to be resolved.[231]

[228] Leyva, "The Natural Gas Controversy": 161.
[229] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 141 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
[230] Robert A. Pastor, *Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 51.
[231] FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 150.

With the pressure wrought by the Iranian Revolution and OPEC's price increase, the Carter administration eventually realised that if it was to get a deal now and move forward on oil, it had to restart negotiations within Mexico's statist rationale, that is to negotiate a price bilaterally before allowing private companies to finalise an agreement. Concerning this pressure, oil prices began to rapidly escalate again in October 1978 when the Iranian Revolution had produced a strike in Iran's petroleum sector.[232] With Tehran becoming embroiled in chaos, Riyadh had lost its then closest ally in OPEC and so when the organisation met two months later in Abu Dhabi, the membership agreed to raise prices again by 10%. Over the coming year, the price of oil would subsequently more than double. Carter's energy bill passed around the time of the Iranian strikes but the natural gas situation had initially hardly changed, perhaps due to Mexico not having been expected to be able to immediately help with the oil shortfall.[233] However, as the crisis worsened, Carter's staff began recommending change.[234] Consequently, on February 6 as part of the Presidential Review Committee meetings on Mexico, officials from across the administration agreed that gas negotiations should be concluded so that the US could "develop an extensive set of energy relationships with Mexico, designed to increase world energy supply, [and] enhance U.S. energy security."[235] Thus, at their 1979 meeting, Carter and López Portillo agreed to resume gas talks at the governmental level. From here, minor setbacks resurfaced occasionally, but a

[232] Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*, 270–1.
[233] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII: Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, doc. 166 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 532.
[234] See when Pastor insisted on "maximum flexibility" in U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 149 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013); see also when Defence Secretary Harold Brown demanded "more focus on oil" in U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 154 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
[235] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 155 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).

deal was concluded in September, laying another brick in the eventual oil glut which could douse OPEC's power in the NSD.

Ultimately though, the deal resulted in a maximum daily gas shipment less than 15% the size proposed in the 1977 agreement, significantly blunting its effect on oil demand.[236] Nevertheless, up to this point, Mexico had pursued an increasingly aggressive policy of oil production for export purposes in line with the North's interests, importing to the likes of Japan and soon Germany.[237] Consequently, by the end of the decade, this increased production in Mexico and other non-OPEC sources, together with conservation efforts and a recession in the developed world, was able to drop global demand for OPEC's oil by 10.2 million barrels per day.[238] American efforts therefore appeared to be paying off, though there was a catch. Pemex's ultimate production target of 6 million barrels per day, equivalent to the production of Iran before the revolution, had a condition given to it by López Portillo: if prices would start to decline, production would have to be decreased.[239] In such a scenario, exports would be culled first.

The World Energy Plan

With the US-Mexican energy relationship seemingly secured, López Portillo began to move Carter in a more ambitious direction. As described in chapter three, the NSD had mostly become peripheral to the US-Mexican relationship by September 1979. However, for one final period in the second half of 1979 during the UNGA's 34th session in which the relaunching of North-South negotiations was debated, it became relevant to their relations with Mexico's

[236] Leyva, "The Natural Gas Controversy,": 166.
[237] Navarro, "Between the Superpower and Third Worldism: Mexico and OPEC (1974–1982)," 206.
[238] Painter, "Oil and Geopolitics: The Oil Crises of the 1970s and the Cold War": 202.
[239] Juan Carlos Boué, "Abandoning Enforced Autarky for Re-Insertion in the World Petroleum Market: Mexican Oil Policy, 1976-86," in *Counter-Shock: The Oil Counter-Revolution of the 1980s*, ed. Duccio Basosi, Giuliano Garavini, and Massimiliano Trentin (London: I.B. Tauris, 2019), 169.

World Energy Plan. This was a proposal for a system that would regulate and facilitate the production and distribution of oil globally to ensure that all countries equally had reliable access to reasonably, yet fairly priced energy whilst respecting the sovereignty of producers over their own national resources.[240] Though energy had often been sidestepped earlier in the Dialogue, by UNCTAD V, many other Southern states had joined Colombia to demand that oil be included in the conference's agenda as well since the second oil shock was causing tremendous economic dislocation globally.[241] Although nothing was done then, López Portillo delivered his plan to the UNGA on September 27th to finally "link" the global energy issue with the "new world economic order."[242]

Despite the US-Mexican frictions from other NSD forums, the plan motivated Washington to support it and eventually modify it in order to suppress future debates over commodity governance in the Dialogue's relaunching while also reigning in OPEC's power multilaterally. This therefore demonstrated that the Dialogue still remained a significant motivator in US Mexico policy even after the megaconferences. Thus, the US enthusiastically supported the World Energy Plan from it early days, encouraging it to grow. Prior to any concrete announcement for plan, in response to the Mexican president arguing "all resources [must be] organised internationally for all mankind," Carter had already communicated that he believed Mexico's "proposal was an important one."[243] After López Portillo had finally presented his plan to the UNGA, Carter told him during their third presidential meeting that his address to the UN was "beautiful" and that his officials would study his idea that

[240] Telegram, US UN Mission to Secretary of State, September 27, 1979, WikiLeaks document 1979USUNN04012, search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979USUNN04012e.html, 9–10.
[241] Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, 156–7.
[242] Telegram, US UN Mission to the Secretary of State, 3.
[243] FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, doc. 156.

evening.[244] Carter came back to López Portillo the next morning to offer Vance to meet with Mexico's new Foreign Secretary Jorge Castañeda.[245]

As a result of this, Vance concluded that the US and Mexican attitudes towards the energy crisis were markedly congruous given that Washington wanted to hem in OPEC.[246] Furthermore, Mexico's plan would in theory mean that global energy governance would be first in the future leading NSD events before other commodities could be discussed. Such discussions could thereby be postponed for as long as it took to negotiate an international oil agreement. Thus, in his cable to the US's UN mission, Vance charged his representatives to join the working group for preparing the World Energy Plan resolution. There, they were tasked to address the minor issues it had with Mexico's working paper to bring the resolution closer to the US position. The most significant of these problems was that the paper still left the slight potential open for the Mexican plan's execution to be bound to alterations in the international governance regimes of other commodities à la NIEO during the NSD's relaunching. Thus, concerns about the Dialogue were here pushing the US to contain Mexico's initiative even while siding with it.

However, these efforts were ultimately frivolous as Mexico submitted to OPEC pressure and accepted to halt preparations for a World Energy Plan resolution. According to the State Department, Mexican representatives had faced much pushback from many G77 states over the above linkage issue. While OPEC members, supported by many developing countries, insisted that global energy reform had to happen simultaneously with reform in the

[244] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 164 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
[245] U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII: Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, doc. 165 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
[246] Telegram, Secretary of State to US UN Mission, October 22, 1979, WikiLeaks document 1979STATE275171, search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979STATE275171_e.html, 6–7.

governance of other commodities, Mexico, supported by some dissatisfied oil-importers, wanted energy to be in the front of the line when NSD negotiations were relaunched.[247] In this debate, Mexico ultimately caved, accepting instead a resolution which requested that a report to next year's Special Session include "recommendations regarding 'recent major proposals'," thereby containing UN action to next year.[248] Though Mexico would go on to pursue their plan through to the 1981 Cancun Summit, the Carter administration's engagement with it had withered just as it had with its interests in the rest of the NSD.

As for Mexico's energy exports, just as oil was about to hit its peak price in early 1980, López Portillo announced he would cap oil exports to 1.1 million barrels per day, only 10% more than what was then produced and a sixth of what was expected by this point, meaning Mexico would also not produce the maximum daily natural gas amount agreed to less than half a year earlier.[249] At least by November, natural gas deliveries were announced to meet the established maximum level again. Most significantly though, following its peak, the price of oil was to persistently decline regardless of the mixed results of Washinton's Mexican energy policy. This broke the power OPEC once had but also sent Mexico, and consequently much of the rest of the Global South, into a cataclysmic debt crisis, clearing the path for the global neoliberal revolution of Carter's successors to finally restructure global economic governance.

[247] Telegram, US UN Mission to Secretary of State, October 6, 1979, WikiLeaks document 1979USUNN04184, search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979USUNN04184_e.html, 2–3.
[248] Telegram, Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Posts, November 6, 1979, WikiLeaks document 1979STATE289887, search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979STATE289887_e.html, 2–3.
[249] Leyva, "The Natural Gas Controversy": 166–7.

Conclusion

This chapter has confirmed this paper's main thesis by displaying how the Carter administration's want to shift the NSD nearer to its objectives was significant to its foreign energy policies towards Mexico. These policies were facilitating Mexican energy production, securing a natural gas agreement with it, and supporting its World Energy Plan. Regarding the first two, it was demonstrated that although the Dialogue did ultimately factor into seeing these policies through, increasing global oil supplies and decreasing global oil demand had been the immediate motivations for Washington. These argumentations consequently fill a gap in the historiography of the interactions between 1970s energy crises and the Dialogue, exposing the place of US-Mexican relations in this narrative. Relating to the final energy policy, this chapter has illustrated how Mexico's World Energy Plan caused Carter administration to support it and attempt to modify it not only because it was interested in it ideologically or because it wanted to arrest OPEC's power, but also because it wanted to use it to halt the discussion of the governance of other commodities in the Dialogue's forthcoming reopening. This chapter thusly also contributes a near entirely new episode to the historiography of the NSD.

Conclusions

The NSD shaped the Carter administration's foreign policy towards Mexico in numerous ways. For different reasons related to the Dialogue, it drove Washington to give several monetary and technological offerings to Mexico City. These included appropriate technologies, bilateral aid programmes, loans for financial stabilisation, as well as finance and equipment for oil production. Nevertheless, the reasons for these offers always went further than merely seeking Mexican cooperation in the NSD. These reasons often related back to Mexico's large population and nearness to the US. This could be seen in for example the appropriate technology initiative, which was meant to increase agricultural yields to meet the BHN of food and thereby also increase Mexico's social stability, or the Development Fund, which was intended to deliver the BHN of employment to ultimately also decrease migration into the US.

The Dialogue also moulded US Mexico policy during the Carter administration by pushing it to try to expressly sway the López Portillo administration of its global economic governance norms, as well as to try to convince the López Portillo government to take on particular enterprises which could circuitously alter the terms of the NSD. These policies were inclined to generally have had motives more decidedly embedded in the US's wants to move the NSD towards its interests. Such policies included the pursuing of consultations, MTN, Mexico's GATT accession, and a natural gas deal, as well as supporting López Portillo's World Energy Plan. In all these areas, the Carter administration found creative, if generally unsuccessful, ways of going after its interests in the NSD vis-à-vis the López Portillo administration, whether this was to legitimise the GATT over UNCTAD or to decrease oil demand and increase oil supply via the natural gas deal.

Moreover, the desire to shape the Dialogue along US lines were foundational to Carter's Mexico policy as seen from its basis in the Linowitz Commission. However, the incidence of this hope was inclined to fluctuate greatly resulting from situations endogenic and exogenic to US-Mexican relations. This was found to have been especially the case with respect to the natural gas deal and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Finally, concerning the antipreneur theory, the framework was helpful in conceptualising a few communications, though Carter deployed surprisingly few conceptual manoeuvres. Overall, it is apparent that the Dialogue incited numerous more actions by the Carter administration that fell outside of normatively appealing regardless of the normative character of the NSD. This suggests the need for theorising normative contestation in the bilateral sphere which goes beyond normative appealing. Nevertheless, with the theory-testing single case-study methodology, the conceptual manoeuvring aspect of Bloomfield's model was nonetheless confirmed.

This then leads into a necessary discussion on limitations. The most significant of these was the restricted level of archival access, which hampered analysis on several fronts. Amongst these fronts was the Consultative Mechanism, the primary materials of which could have hypothetically delivered countless more examples of conceptual manoeuvring and thereby render the antipreneur theory much more relevant. The various multilateral events mentioned formed several missing documentary fronts, as although there existed enough online to complete this study, what is still mostly missing are recordings of the formal pronouncements made by US and Mexican representatives at these events. Lastly, though not essential, the personal inaccessibility of the relevant Mexican archives, in addition to a lack of Spanish-language skills, also obstructed the ability to fully understand Mexican motives at a few significant moments in this work.

Despite these limitations though, it was able to be determined that the NSD had indeed changed the character of the US Mexico policy in line with Michael Franczak's overarching thesis. However, this is ultimately with the caveat that many US policies towards Mexico would have likely still happened or have turned out similarly regardless of the Dialogue. Hence, there are gradients of character change which must be examined on a policy-by-policy basis. Thus, this work has attempted to move the historical scholarship on the NSD further forward into the Dialogue's era of negotiation by demonstrating its relevance to bilateral relations during the latter 1970s. In doing so, this paper has filled several gaps or otherwise corrected prior claims in the intellectual and diplomatic history of the NSD. This includes several historical subjects of inquiry which now warrant forthcoming investigations, including the World Energy Plan and Mexico's GATT accession process. This study also leaves ample room for future research on how the NSD shaped the Carter administration's foreign policy towards other major NIEO-supporting states such as Jamaica, Tanzania, and India. This could also lead to the investigation of additional bilateral aid programmes which would further test the significance of BHN.

There is certainly much work to be done on the NSD, work which ultimately contributes to the demystification of how the world arrived at its current hegemonic political economy. Only by doing this can it finally be revealed how said hegemony had in fact been built within a highly contested field in which it had to compete with alternatives that are now almost entirely erased from the public consciousness. Recovering these alternatives then may well alter our imaginary of the possible in the present and perhaps bring humanity closer to finally enabling the sustained overturning of the current global economic order. It is however our choice whether such a revolutionary politics brings with it economic justice or whether it simply continues to perpetuate the patterns of postcolonial violence today.

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