


Moving Speech

The Use of Live Spoken Language in Dance Performances



"For a moment, the morning stands still. No wind no word. A long, restless night in which figures of speech and image shapes have become folded, squeezed, stretched, unraveled and twisted like in a wild dream, dissolves in the light of approaching day."

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Jessie Eggers

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Author – Jessie Eggers

First reader and advice – Dr. Liesbeth Wildschut

Second reader and advice – Prof. Dr. Maaïke Bleeker

Front page design – Jessie Eggers

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München: Klaus Kieser Verlag, 2001, page 7.

Dance first. Think later. It's the natural order.

Samuel Beckett

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Preface

It begins with dance.

In the dark I close my eyes for some seconds. My body is active and responsive, while I am rethinking the movements of the dancers and am listening to the words they speak. Their words resonate within my ears, while their movements find resonance in my body. I am touched, I am moved and I am fascinated by this intrinsic connection between body and language, movement and speech. And, I am puzzled, for what does it all mean?

In daily life I can spend hours looking at people talking and moving, moving and talking. For most people among us it seems rather impossible not to move while speaking and even when we do keep our body still, it still speaks in its own right: I move when I speak and – in a different way – I speak when I move. At times we use our body, our movements consciously to enhance, support, nuance or contradict that what we are saying. Most often even, however, we move unconsciously while talking, or, we produce movements that are not connected to what we are speaking of: whilst talking about the encounters of my past day, my hands are making dinner; at the same time I am talking on something I read in the papers, I am petting my dog; while holding an argument in class, I am unconsciously tapping with my right foot; or as I am talking about the weather, I slightly move my fingers. Some of these movements are obviously goal-oriented (making dinner), while others appear to be meaningless (moving my fingers slightly). Still though, these apparent meaningless movements, just like the goal-oriented movements, are ‘saying’ something, they add something to what you are saying, to the total picture, to the way the other to whom you are speaking is making sense of you and that what you are speaking of. It is here that lies my interest: when language and movement go together, when they are related to each other, but are not hierarchically organized; when they do not function as the explanation, support or contradiction of one another. In fact, one could state, what I am concerned with are the relations between body and mind, movement and language after Cartesian dualism.

In contemporary dance performances in which language and speech are used this relation between apparently unrelated movements and language grows more intense as the choice for them going together was a conscious one in the construction of the performance. And with this intensity my fascination grows. Other than in daily life emphasis here is just to this relation between language and movement, between body and mind: while in daily life we might not consciously be aware of how body movements of the other person influence our understanding of the language he or she speaks or the reverse, how the words spoken influence our understanding of the movements of the other, when language is used in a dance performance it is exactly this where focus lies. The going together of dance and language says or means something: the combination of both creates the total picture of the performance and the way the viewer is able to make sense of it, understands it or interprets it.

In the dark, I open my eyes again. The dancer on stage extends, turns and then lifts her right leg, whilst simultaneously uttering language close to poetry. Something happens in this going together, in between the presence of dance and language. I am not searching for a fixed meaning, a set explanation, but I am trying to define what kind of impact it has on me, what the implications are, what it is that is being produced in this going together, this interrelation, what it produces inside me as a viewer in both my body and mind.

Throughout my studies I have been fascinated by theatre that reaches beyond borders, theatre that expands its own definitions, theatre that is in between. In my recent focus on the use of live spoken language in contemporary dance performances I am combining this fascination with my love and passion for both dance and (poetic) language. Dance here is no longer a silent art; it gains a voice, a bodily voice, another way of bodily expression, whilst language gains movement and corporeality.

Introduction

Whereas the bond between music and dance is so very strong, the connection between language and dance seems a lot less obvious to make, as dance is regularly said to go beyond words. On closer look, however, one might discover many relations varying in nature and intensity between dance and language, between the body and language and between movement and language. In daily life, for instance, people almost always move when they speak, to name but a very simple though apt example. Seen from this point it is not so very strange that in quite an amount of contemporary choreographies the viewer is not only confronted with dance, visuals and music, but also with language.

In many of these performances the language and the dance are not hierarchically organized: the disciplines are rendered equally important – which, however, does not mean they would have to occupy the same quantity of time and space – and they do not function as the explanation, support or contradiction of one another. Rather, the viewer is confronted with two seemingly autonomous disciplines that together create and carry the performance. Because of this non-hierarchical organization the relations between the language and dance material are often ambiguous; the viewer is left to manoeuvre between both disciplines in creating meaning himself or herself. In this paper I will research the implications of this going together of language and dance for the ways viewers are able to ascribe meaning to what they encounter in the performance as a whole.

This research is thus concerned with non-hierarchical relations between language and dance. With language being primarily a mental structure and dance above all being concerned with the body, the present research could therefore be related to the larger context of the debates and discussions on the relations between body and mind. I do not expect my research to exactly apply to daily life not in the least because of the purposeful creation of the going together and the presence of aesthetics. I do, however, think researching performances in which dance and language go together in a non-hierarchical structure could lead to insights and suggestions in how we make sense of the world in relation to language and movement and the role both body and mind play in this.

I will be explicitly concerned with dance performances in which language is included and not with, for example, performance theatre with a corporeal focus or mime. For it is in dance where my fascination and interests developed themselves and where they still reside: it begins with dance. The performances under research further contain non-hierarchical relations between the disciplines of dance and language. They will thus have at least this post-dramatic characteristic or are post-dramatic in their totality. To limit my investigations even more, I will solely focus on live spoken language. Live speech comes from within the body; it even starts with one of the most fundamental movements of the body: the breath. The relations between body and mind, movement and language here become thus most profound.

Attention goes to the construction and the implications of this for the ways in which viewers can make sense of the performance. Much has already been written on how we are able to understand dance and language separately. I will research how we can ascribe meaning to performances in which both happen simultaneously in a non-hierarchical way (thus a performance without one of the two being the explanation, support or contradiction of the other, but a performance in which language and dance are of equal importance as they offer independent perspectives and leave the viewer to manoeuvre between them). Considering this and the above I have formulated my main question as follows: *What are the implications of the use of live spoken language in a dance performance in which both disciplines are non-hierarchically organized for the process of meaning ascription?*

To support my ideas and arguments in this paper I will make use of two case studies: *Same Difference* by Lightfoot León (2007) and *íSA* by T.r.a.s.h. (2008). *íSA* is inspired by the Scandinavian myths of *Isa*, the ice queen whose cries cut through the mist foreshadowing death. The performance is concerned with the transiency of life and is constructed around that what determines us and what we

cannot get a hold of.¹ *ISA* is performed by seven dancers and three musicians (a cello player, a counter tenor and a violin player) in an all white and nearly empty set. *Same Difference* by choreographers Paul Lightfoot and Sol León is – as usual with this artistic duo – very rich in her material. The performance seems concerned with communication or rather with the impossibility of communication in language² and seems to possibly refer to the Spanish civil war (due to a soldier, his clothing and the use of the Spanish language and /or its melody). *Same Difference* is performed by seven dancers (with one of the male dancers performing a female stage character) who dance and play the role of characters, whose names can be found in the performance flyer. The set contains an arch bridge and a stair leading into the orchestra pit, but is especially dominated by the light design. The music (by Philip Glass) too has a dominant role in *Same Difference*.³

Of course, both dance performances include live spoken language which stands in a non-hierarchical relation to the movement material (or to any other performance element). Both could be said to belong to what one might call theatrical dance because more theatrical elements are included as in opposition with abstract or minimalistic dance. Both performances, however, are not narrative of structure. Further, they are both produced in The Netherlands, but have an international character as they tour around the world; they are both produced and presented as a dance performance and not as, for example, performance theatre. Lightfoot León can be considered as part of the so-called establishment in dance, while T.r.a.s.h. works most often in the smaller circuits; both Lightfoot León and T.r.a.s.h. have their own characteristic style and movement material which could be stated to greatly differ from each other. Both performances thus share some characteristics which will enable comparison, while they differ on other elements to ensure a wider validation of the arguments and suggestions posed. Throughout the research I will discuss characteristic and relevant elements of both these performances in relation to theories from both dance and theatre studies and linguistics.

In the following first chapter 'Mind – Body – Language' I will consider elements of the larger context of body and mind (inter)relations to position the present research within this discourse. The chapter will focus on a (far from complete) discussion on the roles body, mind, language and especially their interconnections play within processes of experience, sensation and perception in relation to the present research subject. After this more introductory section I will turn to the analysis of both case studies and literature. Chapter two 'Poetic Language' will be concerned with the kind of language that is used in the performances in question, for which I will make use of theories from – amongst others – Hans-Thies Lehmann's *Postdramatic Theatre* and Julia Kristeva's *Revolution in Poetic Language*. For both these theorists give useful insights in works of art that are non-hierarchically structured. In the third chapter 'A Foreign Body?' I will focus on the manner the body and the language used are related to each other on stage in the dance performances in question and that in relation to Hans-Thies Lehmann's ideas on the dramaturgy of language in the post-dramatic and his concept of language as a foreign body.

Chapter four 'Time, Space, Character and Potentiality' then will consist of a discussion on the effects of the inclusion of live spoken language for the content and presence of the dance performance related to characteristic features of dance and language /speech. At the end of this chapter I will refer to the notion of potentiality as described by Giorgio Agamben in the book *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*. I will discuss Agamben's ideas on the potentiality of language and will relate this to the potential of the dancers to speak or not and the influences this has on the experience of the appearance and content of the performance.

The fifth chapter 'In Between' will be firstly concerned with an outline of the characteristics of the process of meaning ascription for dance and language /speech separately, followed by a discussion on the characteristics of this process of ascribing meaning to dance in which live spoken language is included in a non-hierarchical manner. To support my ideas in this chapter I will make use of the works

¹ T.r.a.s.h., "iSA" [2008] *T.r.a.s.h. ISA*. Accessed on November 5th 2009 - <http://www.trashweb.nl/isa.htm>

² Mirjam van der Linden, "Kitscherig licht als pompeuze danspartner" [2007] *Kitscherig licht als pompeuze danspartner – Kunst – de Volkskrant*. Accessed on November 5th 2009 – http://www.volkskrant.nl/kunst/article479089.ece/Kitscherig_licht_als_pompeuze_danspartner

³ For more information on the production, the content and the characteristics of both performances see appendix I and II below.

of such theorists as Jacques Derrida, Agamben and Brian Massumi. Though using a different approach, both Derrida and Agamben focus on the importance of the context (the when, where and how) in the ascription of meaning to language which seems ultimately significant in relation to the present research question. Massumi is thought important for his analysis of and ideas on movement in relation to determination and meaning ascription. In addition, I will discuss in the sixth and last chapter (Rustle on Stage) the notion of the rustle of language as formulated by Roland Barthes in order to gain a further understanding of the processes at work in the ascription of meaning to the dance performances under research.

In the conclusion finally I will summarize the most important elements of the previous chapters to come to the formulation of a rewarding answer to the question of the implications of the use of live spoken language in dance performances in which both disciplines are organized in a non-hierarchical manner for the process of meaning ascription.

1 Mind – Body – Language

O matematici, fate lume a tale errore! Lo spirit non ha voce, perché dov'è voce è corpo.

(O mathematicians, shed light on error such as this! The spirit has no voice, because where there is voice there is body.)

Leonardo Da Vinci⁴

The query of how one ascribes meaning to something (to dance; to language; or to performances in which both these disciplines are simultaneously enacted for example) is closely related to processes of experience, sensation and perception. In view of the key issue of this research and the nature of both language and dance, this chapter is concerned with a (far from complete) discussion on the roles body, mind, language and their interconnections play within these processes. The question of the relations between body and mind and their role in experience, sensation and perception has been much researched and has also been approached from a great amount of different perspectives, which has led the discourse on this matter to become quite complex. Due to this complexity space does not suffice here to give a thorough overview of the debates. Instead I will here focus on only some features of the field in the specific context of the main query of the present paper. To this end, I will discuss some specific elements of the theories of René Descartes (1596-1650) – for Descartes and that what has become known as Cartesian dualism has been and still is of crucial importance within the field in question – in relation to some more recent theories. As indicated, special attention will go to the position language holds within these discussions. Emphasis will be on the interconnections between body, mind, movement and language rather than on their differences, for I hope to show that it is in these interconnections that our experience, sensation and perception are constituted and that the processes of meaning ascription are accordingly influenced.

Descartes stated body and mind to be distinct entities as he thought both to be able to exist all by themselves without any other substance, including each other. However, as Justin Skirry emphasizes, Descartes here did not mean that body and mind *are* existing separately and that there, therefore, cannot be any kind of interaction between them; rather, he stated that they *could* exist all on their own if God only chose to.⁵ Instead, so explicates Daniel Holbrook in his article *Descartes on Mind Body Interaction*, God according to Descartes created 'a union between these two wholly different substances, a union that constitutes human nature'⁶. This union of body and mind, Holbrook continues, for Descartes explained the interactions between both substances as he and his critics at the time observed them: because of this union, humans are able to move their body at will and to experience sensations in the mind that are initiated by the sense organs of the body.

Even though it is thus the union of body and mind that constitutes human nature, Descartes, so explains Holbrook, 'finds his personal identity as being tied to the thinking substance' in which 'psychological states inhere'⁷. In other words, for Descartes the self, the "I" is constituted in the mind alone. Hence, his famous statement: I think and, therefore, I am. Recent theories, however, shed a very different light on the self as emphasis is put on the cognitive perceptual practices of the body. In her article *Passages in Post-Modern Theory: Mapping the Apparatus* Maaïke Bleeker, for example, states:

⁴ As cited in: Giorgio Agamben, *Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience*, 1978. Trans. Liz Heron (London, New York: Verso, 2007): page 13.

⁵ Justin Skirry, "The Mind-Body Distinction" [2006] *Descartes: Mind-Body Distinction [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]*. Accessed on October 17th 2009 - <http://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/>

⁶ Daniel Holbrook, "Descartes on Mind Body Interaction" *Descartes on Mind Body Interaction*. Accessed on October 17th 2009 - <http://libarts.wsu.edu/philo/faculty-staff/holbrook/descartes-on-mind-body.html>

⁷ Holbrook.

The encounter of our bodies with the world is what, for us, produces the world (including a sense of self) while at the same time this encounter itself remains outside the realm of our experience for it is this encounter that sets the stage for experience to take place.⁸

It is in this sense that our body can be thought of as that what does the thinking, knowing and understanding as Bleeker suggested in another article.⁹ If this is true, it would mean that the Cartesian “I”, which is founded in the mind, itself would be constituted by the body and its encounter with the world. In other words, I am, not because I think, but rather, because I have a body that thinks and produces the world as I experience it, including my sense of myself. Thinking body and mind as separate and opposed substances hereby becomes quite problematic as the interrelations between them turn out to be far more complex and intense. For one might wonder thinking along with Bleeker's suggestions, if I would have a different body, would I not also think different thoughts?

It is especially this last idea that could prove to be of value in the research this paper is concerned with if one relates it to the idea of the “inner dancing along” as first formulated by John Martin and the later neurological discovery of the existence of mirror neurons¹⁰. Watching another body dance causes physical reactions in one's own body: it moves and affects our body and this in turn seems to consequently affect our mind, our thoughts and – as I hope to show – our language.

Although Descartes himself is not concerned with it explicitly, language – being the mental structure Roland Barthes claims it to be¹¹ and being that on which our thinking is so firmly based – seems intimately connected with his theory of the distinction between body and mind and the position of the self in this. Giorgio Agamben even goes so far as to claim that ‘in its original pure state, the Cartesian subject is nothing more than the subject of the verb, a purely linguistic-functional entity’¹², for:

... if we take up Hamann's suggestion and abandon the clearcut model of transcendental mathematics – to discover the fundamental and incontrovertible condition of any theory of knowledge in the elucidation of its relation to language, we then see that it is in language that the subject has its site and origin, and that only in and through language is it possible to shape transcendental apperception as an ‘I think’.¹³

This relation between knowledge, the mind and language implicates – if we consider the line of thinking above – that language is also closely connected to the body. Judith Butler with *Bodies That Matter* has, for example, shown how far reaching these connections actually are. Language, she shows, does not only have an incredible firm hold on our communication and our thoughts, but also influences the manner we perceive and treat our bodies – even on such a fundamental level as that of gender. She demonstrates that through naming and the linguistic repetition of norms in speech acts, norms concerning the body almost become like a part of it: when born (or earlier nowadays) an infant shifts from an “it” to a “she” or a “he” and that naming is the start of – in the case of a female infant – the “girling” as it will continue throughout the rest of her life.¹⁴ ‘The naming,’ says Butler, ‘is at once the setting of a boundary, and also the repeated inculcation of a norm’¹⁵. When concerned with body movement, one can observe an identical process taking place. Think, for example, of sports or dance classes in which we are explicitly told the right way to move, but also consider the norms regarding

⁸ Maaïke Bleeker, “Passages in Post-Modern Theory: Mapping the Apparatus” in *Parallax*, 14:1 (2008a): page 62.

⁹ Maaïke Bleeker, “Martin, Masumi and the Matrix” in *Anatomy Live: Performance and the Operating Theatre*. Ed. Maaïke Bleeker (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008b): page 151.

¹⁰ For a connection of both theories see: Liesbeth Wildschut (2003), *Bewogen door dans. De beleving van theaterdansvoorstellingen door kinderen*. PH.D. thesis, Utrecht University: page 37-51.

¹¹ Roland Barthes, “Reflections on a Manual” in *The Rustle of Language*. Ed. François Whal, trans. Ricard Howard (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989a): page 26.

¹² Agamben (2007) – page 25.

¹³ Agamben (2007) – page 51.

¹⁴ Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”* (New York, London: Routledge, 1993): page 7-8

¹⁵ Ibidem.

body movement behaviour in other public spaces such as the auditorium of a theatre, shopping malls or bars.

As a result language does not only influence our thinking and the way we think, but also our bodies, our movements and the way we perceive and experience them. In turn – and keeping in mind Bleeker and the cognitive perceptual practices of the body – one might consider the possibilities for the body and movement having their influence on language and our use of it. In this paper I will reflect on these possibilities and the influence of language on body and movement in the context of dance performances in which live spoken language is included.

Before starting with any such considerations and thought experiments, however, it is important to rethink the notion of language: talking of language, what are we actually concerned with? With all the preceding in mind, this paper will have at its base the broad notion of language as formulated by Agamben:

The only content of the *experimentum* is that *there is language*; we cannot represent this, by the dominant model, as a language, as a state or a patrimony of names and rules which each people transmit from generation to generation. It is, rather, the un presupposable non-latency in which men have always dwelt, and in which, speaking, they move and breathe.¹⁶

Language is not something we invented, language is, for us humans, here and now and it has always been.¹⁷ We live in the direct realm of language; we move and breathe within it. Language is in this manner indissolubly bound to what it means to be human, to live as a human being. In a way it becomes near to a part of human nature even, for, as Agamben emphasizes, ‘man does not merely know nor merely speak; he is neither *Homo sapiens* nor *Homo loquens*, but *Homo sapiens loquendi*’¹⁸. This entwinement of knowledge and speech /language, so continues Agamben, is constitutive for the way the West has understood itself. In this way, one could conclude, the entwinement also plays an important role in how we (in the West) ascribe meaning to what we experience. Furthermore, the notion of language used includes without doubt speech and is not limited to fixed words or meanings, but is something larger; a realm, one could say, in which the state or patrimony of names and rules can surface but does not necessarily so.

Considering the use of language, Agamben in *Infancy and History* pays much attention to the difference between Benveniste’s semiotic (the sign) and semantic (discourse). According to Agamben the notion of infancy could be said to explain the moat between the two, the reason why this difference in human language is there, for he states:

It is the fact of man’s infancy (in other words, in order to speak, he need to be constituted as a subject within language by removing himself from infancy) which breaks the closed world of the sign and transforms pure language into human discourse, the semiotic into the semantic. Because of his infancy, because he does not speak from the very start, man cannot enter into language as a system of signs without radically transforming it, without constituting it in discourse.¹⁹

Emphasis in this paper will be with the semantic – the ways the artists, the performers use language, the way they constitute it in discourse, the way they transform it – and the implications of this specific exercise of language for the manner in which viewers can ascribe meaning to what they encounter in the dance and in a larger context in and through their own body.

¹⁶ Agamben (2007) – page 10. Emphasis in original.

¹⁷ One cannot presuppose language for as soon as one tries to, language is already there: to state or even to think that there is or might be language already involves language. This does away with the myth or idea of the invention of language by the first two humans as a means of communication, because before being able to use language, to communicate through language, it must have already been there: ‘*Language is what must necessarily presuppose itself*,’ and is therefore un presupposable for human nature. Giorgio Agamben, “The Idea of Language” in *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*. Ed., trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999a): page 41. Original emphasis.

¹⁸ Agamben (2007) – page 8. Emphasis in original.

¹⁹ Agamben (2007) – page 63.

2 Poetic Language

The present chapter is concerned with an analysis of the kind of language used in the performances in question: what kind of language is used and in what way? Or, in other words, how is language transformed into discourse in the two dance performances under research? Even though focus in Hans-Thies Lehmann's treatise on the post-dramatic is mainly with theatre and less with dance, the work does form a good starting point for considerations such as these, for an important characteristic of the post-dramatic is the non-hierarchical organization of text /language and other disciplines or performance elements. In the new theatre Lehmann observes attempts towards a restitution of the Platonic chora, that is, the restitution 'of a space and speech/discourse without telos, hierarchy and causality, without fixable meaning and unity'²⁰. Language in the post-dramatic is no longer exclusively concerned with representation, as focus is rather with language's materiality:

The *principle of exposition* applied to body, gesture and voice also seizes the language material and attacks language's function of representation. Instead of a linguistic *re*-presentation of facts, there is a 'position' of tones, words, sentences, sounds that are hardly controlled by a 'meaning' but instead by the scenic composition, by a visual, not text oriented dramaturgy.²¹

Even though Lehmann does not seem to take into account the (possible) differences in the role or position of language and text oriented dramaturgies in between dance and theatre, the ways in which language is presented in the performances in question are similar to Lehmann's description. In *íSA* by the Dutch dance company T.r.a.s.h., for example, the performers-personae are indeed uttering intelligible words and sentences, but the manner in which these words and sentences are presented most often causes their meaning to blur or fade away: they are, for example, produced at too high or too low a speed, at too high or too low a tone, intonation is changed or they are expressed within a multitude of other sounds, music or voices. The language is here thus presented in such a way that focus is not with the meaning of the words or the sentences, but rather with their sound, their tone, their "feel", their form, their "body" and the time and space they occupy.

The simultaneous use of many different languages too, directs the language away from meaning and unity, as a viewer is unlikely to understand all. Through this, emphasis is put on both the materiality and musicality of the language spoken. The importance of the musicality of the language performed is even further highlighted through the close interrelations between music and language, as much of the text is actually sung (either by the classical singer or the performers-personae themselves) and there is no hierarchy to be found between language and music (or any other performance element for that matter). As a consequence of this exercise of language emphasis in general is with what is *produced* by it, rather than with what is represented through it: the live spoken language in *íSA* is concerned with a "position' of tones, words, sentences, sounds"²² as Lehmann calls it, with the physicality, musicality and materiality of language.

At times, though, emphasis is indeed with the communicative and representative character of the language spoken. This happens, for example, when one of the performers-personae, Guilherme Miotto, is positioned at the front of the stage and commences to tell his life story while making eye contact with the viewers in the auditorium. At this moment none to very little other sounds are audible and Miotto (in the beginning at least) articulates very clearly and calmly, while his movements (again in the beginning) seem to just enhance and support the text's meaning. The language used in *íSA* is thus not only characterized by its physicality (the time and space occupied (in and outside the speaker's body); the "body"; the form), materiality (the tone; the form; the "feel"; the sound) and musicality (the melody; the rhythm; the intonation), but also – be it less often though – by its signification.

²⁰ Hans-Thies Lehmann, *Postdramatic Theatre*, 1999. Trans. Karen Jürs-Munby. (London, New York: Routledge, 2006): page 145-146.

²¹ Lehmann – page 147. Emphasis in original.

²² Lehmann – page 147.

This alternation of a focus on the physical, musical and material aspects of language at the one hand and the communicative and representative on the other, closely relates to what Julia Kristeva in *Revolution in Poetic Language* calls respectively the “genotext” and the “phenotext”. Phenotext denotes language that serves communication and is governed, as Leon S. Roudiez in his introduction to Kristeva’s work states, by ‘societal, cultural, syntactical and other grammatical constraints’²³, by rules and names. Genotext on the other hand ‘moves through zones that have relative and transitory borders and constitutes a *path*’²⁴, so states Kristeva. It is a *process* that ‘tends to articulate structures that are ephemeral (unstable, threatened by drive charges, “quanta” rather than “marks”) and nonsignifying (devices that do not have a double articulation)’²⁵. In all signifying processes, such as a literary work or in this case a performance, according to Kristeva both genotext and phenotext are present, be it that in poetic language the genotext is most manifest.

Kristeva’s use of the term poetic language thus does not refer to a simple opposition of communicative language, but is rather a combination of both genotext and phenotext. Roudiez explicates this notion of poetic language further in his introduction when he states:

While agreeing with Jakobson that “poetic language” cannot be viewed as a “deviation from the norm” of language, she [Kristeva] does not see it as a sub-code of the linguistic code. Rather, it stands for the infinite possibilities of language, and all other language acts are merely partial realizations of the possibilities inherent in “poetic language”.²⁶

This seems to directly relate to the above mentioned notion of language as formulated by Agamben and the distinction he makes between a specific language and the idea of language in general. It shows that in poetic language the surfacing of communicative and representative language is viable, but also that it is just one of the infinite amounts of possibilities; the potential of language is endless. In *íSA*, one could state, several of these possibilities are proposed through the simultaneous use of genotext and phenotext and are researched in relation to music and dance.

In *Same Difference*, a choreography by the Nederlands Dans Theater’s house choreographers duo Lightfoot León, one can observe similar processes at work as in *íSA*, though in a different way. In *Same Difference* the seven dancers all individually seem to represent a certain type of person who is constructed through the respective dance material, clothing and speech of that specific dancer²⁷. Hence, every type /character does have a specific way of speaking that differ from each other by tone, speed, intonation, melody, rhythm and sound. At times the performers articulate solitary words or simple phrases in English, French and /or Spanish (the phenotext), but most of their utterances are made up of non-existing words and sounds (the genotext). These sounds and non-existing words seem to form sentences in their own right due to intonation, accentuation and the authority of the breath, but have no specific or fixed meaning. However, especially the longer cues and particularly those of the female stage characters do appear to resemble the melody of the Spanish language. By this most of the sounds spoken sound familiar, but are not representative in the sense that they signal something outside language as they have no real meaning.

Other vocal sounds, that occur somewhat less often, can be characterized either as the articulation of single letters – for example the sound of an “a” that is gradually lowered in tone – or as grunts, groans and hisses and they are often uttered alone, with no other vocal sounds following or preceding

²³ Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, 1941. Trans. Margaret Waller. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984): page 5.

²⁴ Kristeva – page 87. Emphasis in original.

²⁵ Kristeva – page 86.

²⁶ Kristeva – page 2.

²⁷ The constructed characters on stage can – in my opinion – be qualified as types, rather than individuals or personifications, for they all seem to represent a primitive form of a certain kind of person of which only some characteristics and /or qualities of character are emphasized. The names given to them as presented in the performance flyer (for example “el soldado”) emphasize this further. I will in the following, however, use the more general term “character” or “stage character” for reasons of clarity. I will return to the subject of the construction of the types more detailed in the chapter ‘Time, Space, Character and Potentiality’.

them directly. One could, therefore, wonder whether these sounds fall within the borders of language – as does the speech described above – or whether they are to be qualified as mere sound. I still perceive them as language indeed. For one because grunts, groans, hisses and single letters actually have a prominent position in our everyday speech and writing as well. Secondly and as Jacques Derrida explains in *Speech and Phenomena*, signification is not limited to knowledge, objectivity and reason, to logic: these utterances are indeed endowed with *sense*; they have ‘modes of sense which do not point to any possible objects’²⁸, but are indeed sensible: they are endowed with significance. As in *iSA* emphasis here too is hereby with the musicality, materiality and physicality of the language and less with its representative or communicative characteristics as Lehmann has indicated.

The specific exercise of language in *Same Difference* and in particular the cues in which sounds and non-existing words seem to form sentences in their own right bring to mind Kristeva’s comment on the “mysterious” functioning of literature as a rhythm made intelligible by syntax²⁹. Intelligible here does not refer to a specific meaning, something outside language, but rather to a signifying process as can be observed in music: ‘rhythmic, unfettered, irreducible to its intelligible verbal translation; it is musical, anterior to judgement, but restrained by a single guarantee: syntax’³⁰. Language here in that sense becomes like music: emphasis is with what the language *produces*, language’s *process*, and not with its possible representative characteristics. The musical syntax, however, differs from its linguistic equivalent, so that it remains important to research the nature of the syntax of the language here spoken.

In conclusion, the language used in both *iSA* and *Same Difference* can be characterized as poetic language that consists of both genotext and phenotext and which reaches beyond solely communicative language. With the notion of poetic language referring to the infinite possibilities of language, both performances can be said to research some of these possibilities in relation to music and dance. In *Same Difference* this research then is taken to another level as most of the utterances concern a (yet) non-existing language, whereas in *iSA* existing and fixed words (the rules and names of a specific language) lose their representative nature through the specific exercise of the language spoken in the performance; it is, in other words, transformed.

Instead of a focus on meaning, emphasis in both performances is rather with the materiality, physicality and musicality of the language spoken: ‘its significance,’ as Konstantina Georgelou puts it, ‘lies on what it *produces*’³¹, not on what it represents. The exercise of language has turned, as Lehmann formulates it, into a ‘*chora-graphy*: the deconstruction of a discourse oriented towards meaning and the invention of a space that eludes the laws of telos and unity’³². The utterances of the performers can, therefore, be perceived as constitutive elements within the respective performances: they constitute a path, as Kristeva puts it³³, throughout the performance. The live spoken language in both *iSA* and *Same Difference* should consequently be perceived of as signifying processes similar to that of music: ‘rhythmic, unfettered, irreducible to its intelligible verbal translation; it is musical, anterior to judgement, but restrained by a single guarantee: syntax’³⁴.

In the following focus will first be on the nature of the syntax, the single guarantee that restrains the spoken language, after which I will consider *what* the poetic language included in the dance performances in question produces in relation to the dance movements. Finally, this paper will then turn to the consequences of all this for the way a viewer is able to ascribe meaning to the performance as a whole.

²⁸ Jacques Derrida, “Speech and Phenomena: Introduction to the Problem of Signs in Husserl’s Phenomenology” in *Speech and Phenomena: and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs*. Ed. John Wild, Trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973a): page 99.

²⁹ Kristeva – page 30.

³⁰ Kristeva – page 29.

³¹ Konstantina Georgelou, “Base Materialism on Language” in *Danswetenschap in Nederland, deel 5*. Ed. Mirjam van der Linden et.al. (Amsterdam: Vereniging voor dansonderzoek, 2008): page 109. Emphasis in original.

³² Lehmann – page 146. Emphasis in original.

³³ Kristeva – page 87.

³⁴ Kristeva – page 29

3 A Foreign Body?

So, as soon a language takes on traces of corporeality, it changes profile – its stereotype raster of meaning blurs, ebbs and trickles away.

Helmuth Ploebst³⁵

As already indicated, this chapter will be concerned with the nature of the syntax which structures the language spoken in both *íSA* and *Same Difference*. It will, therefore, turn to a discussion of the relations between body, dance, movement and language on stage and will be concerned with the implications of this all for both the language uttered and the dance material.

Lehmann, as has already been mentioned above, states the language in the post-dramatic to be governed by a visual dramaturgy and not by a textual one.³⁶ It is at this point, however, that I believe him in his focus on theatre to disregard possible differences between dance and theatre and with that some crucial characteristics of dance and the interrelations between language and the body: instead of being mainly controlled by a visual dramaturgy or the scenic composition, I would like to argue live spoken language in the dance performances under investigation rather to be prominently governed by a corporeal dramaturgy: a corporeal syntax.³⁷

In the opening scene of *íSA* one of the female dancers, Tegest Pecht Guido, crawls, rolls and stretches herself across the floor and over a chair, her body contorts and convulses. Simultaneously she speaks of her loneliness, her love life and her African blood, but similar to the physical contortions and spasms, the words spoken are contorted too. It is not only that Guido, because of her arduous movements, has no breath left to speak, but rather that the words, the syllables she utters follow and initiate the movements of the body and the breath; in a way, they complete each other. This does not mean that if Guido, for example, performs a short, powerful and fast movement with her body, her speech at that moment has to know the same dynamics. Rather, it means that the dynamics of her language, of her speech are formed out of her body and its movements. It means that the corporeal focus that characterizes dance now presides over the language as well. As Lehmann himself considers possible, the words here become 'a dance of language gestures'³⁸.

In *Same Difference* one can observe similar interactions between the live spoken language and the dance material. At a specific moment during her first solo (somewhat in the middle), dancer Aurélie Cayla – being given the part of Remedios – turns, stands still (as in opposition with just before when she was moving her legs through the air or across the floor in a continuous flow) and produces the sound of an “a” gradually lowering in tone, while moving her upper body forwards down and keeping her hands at her sides. As soon as she closes her mouth again, Cayla moves her right lower leg sideways and continues moving as before though staying in one place. After a shake with her shoulders, she then moves her entire body downwards by bending her knees while she utters the sound of an “e”, again gradually lowering in tone, followed with a sharp “poh” sound when she reaches her lowest point. Following, she continues her path across the floor again.

Even though the moments of speech here might give the impression of a break in the movement material because of the little amount of dance movement in contrast with both before and after, the

³⁵ Helmuth Ploebst, *No Wind No Word: New Choreography in the Society of the Spectacle* (München: K. Kieser Verlag, 2001): page 9.

³⁶ Lehmann – page 147.

³⁷ Important to keep in mind when dismissing Lehmann's visual dramaturgy as most prominent is that Lehmann is not solely concerned with live spoken language, but instead pays much attention to the possibilities of technological reproduction and transformation of the voice of a performer. In these circumstances one could indeed speak of a visual dramaturgy as being most manifest and not of a corporeal one as the relation between voice and body is altered or even broken due to the intervention of technology. I, however, am exclusively concerned with live and direct speech without any interference of technologies and it is here that I hope to show that the language is prominently structured rather by or through corporeality. Instead of a complete dismissal of visual dramaturgy, my focus on a corporeal syntax is rather a change of perspectives due to the type of logic more prominently at work in dance.

³⁸ Lehmann – page 145.

body actions in fact do not stop at all, but find their continuation in language. The words – or perhaps “linguistic sounds” is a more appropriate term here – are dancing with and through the body. In correspondence with the observations in the previous chapter as well as with a statement of again Lehmann himself, it is the ‘breath, rhythm and the present actuality of the body’s visceral presence’ that ‘take precedence over the logos’³⁹. *Same Difference* is therefore not concerned with a dramaturgy based on logic or on visuality but has corporeality as its driving force.

Throughout both *iSA* and *Same Difference* the body movements produce language and the live spoken language produces movement: the dance movements both follow and initiate the language and vice versa. This does not mean that both disciplines lose their autonomy towards each other, that they lose their independent perspectives; it rather means that in the performances a linguistic body is created, a new dancer. Just as an extra human dancer, a human body would, the linguistic body of the words and sounds spoken dances independently through space and time, though always in connection with the other dancers and their bodies. A solo like those of Guido and Cayla could then perhaps also be described as a duet of a dancing body together with a linguistic body. Different than when another human dancer would be added though, the linguistic body and the dancing body are intensely intertwined: they share the same source for it is Guido and Cayla themselves who are speaking and dancing.

Consequently one could therefore wonder whether the linguistic body that is formed in the performance is another body in its totality or whether it is rather a part of the dancers’ bodies. According to Lehmann, the post-dramatic theatre shows that language is and has always been a foreign body for, he states, the word does not belong to the speaker:

Frequently we are made aware of the physical, motoric act of speaking or reading of text itself as an *unnatural, not self-evident* process. In this principle of understanding the *speech act as action*, a split emerges that is important for postdramatic theatre: it provokes by bringing to light that the word does not belong to the speaker. It does not organically reside in his/her body but remains a *foreign body*. Out of the gaps of language emerges its feared adversary and double: stuttering, failure, accent, flawed pronunciation mark the conflict between body and word.⁴⁰

One could indeed wonder whether we can call language ours: we dwell in it and while we speak through it, we move and breathe within it says Agamben, but does that make it ours? We did not invent or create language as it was already there; we are just living in its realm. It seems like asking if the earth is ours. On the other hand: without body there is no live voice, and in that sense our own speech might indeed belong to us. Lehmann claims the word to have no organic residence in the body, but what does organic here mean? Even though the live speech of both performances under investigation can be characterized by stuttering, accents and flawed or irregular pronunciation, the language spoken indeed seems to come organically from the body in my opinion. The language and the body’s movements in these performances influence each other, they both initiate and follow one another and so in a way complete each other. Instead of pointing to a conflict between body and word, to failure, do the stuttering, accents and irregular pronunciation not rather refer to the infinite linguistic possibilities? And does this then not indeed point to the interrelations, the interactions between the word and the body, to their shared source? The fact alone that Lehmann speaks of language as a foreign *body* in my opinion points as much to the similarities between body and word as to their differences. For how foreign the linguistic body might be, it is still a body, just as the dancing body of the performer. Instead of Lehmann’s observation of the whole body becoming voice in the post-dramatic theatre⁴¹, I would consequently like to argue that in dance performances in which live spoken language is included, it is rather the whole voice becoming body.

In the following I will investigate the consequences of this corporeal syntax and the nature of the language and dance material for the appearance and content of the performances as a whole and the implications it holds for the process of ascribing meaning.

³⁹ Lehmann – page 145.

⁴⁰ Lehmann – page 147.

⁴¹ Lehmann – page 149.

4 Time, Space, Character and Potentiality

After the more introductory chapter on the larger context of the relations between body, mind and language, I have so far been concerned with the kind of language used in the performances in question and the relations on stage between the language, the dance material and the body. Now I will turn to an examination of the effects of the specific exercise of language and the nature of the relations between language and dance for the appearance and content of the respective performances. This chapter is therefore divided in three parts concerning different structural elements of *iSA* and *Same Difference*: time and space, character and potentiality.

In *iSA* the focus in the dance is – similar to the emphasis observed in the language spoken – mainly with the material, physical and musical characteristics of the body and its movements and less with their representational features. This is not to say, however, that both the dance and language material do not refer to anything outside themselves or the theatrical situation as it is happening: there are different levels of representation and reference to be observed throughout the performance. Concerning the dance, for instance, some of the postures, positions and movements of the dancers seem to represent or refer to activities from daily life. At the moment in which all the performers-personae start singing together, to name an example, their positions in relation to each other, their body postures and their movements resemble those of choirs and with that bring all kinds of connotations regarding other places, spaces and times to mind.⁴² In the phenotext one can observe similar processes of reference and representation, though in a far more concrete manner: through his words one of the male performers, Grégory Kamoun, creates a tangible image of Israel in a way he would have never been able to with movement alone. Through his words he brings onto the stage precisely those spatial, cultural and historical elements of Israel he is talking about. Of course a viewer may have his or her own connotations, ideas and visual imagery in response to what he is saying, but the words themselves have their own more or less fixed meaning where movements are far more indefinite.

Through their words the performers-personae of *iSA* thus unlock to the viewers places and times that otherwise might never have been touched upon: doors are opened, as Julia Cima puts it, ‘which would otherwise remain ... closed off or forgotten’⁴³. Due to the inclusion of the language material in the performance there are more spatial and temporal dimensions added next to those which are incorporated in the dance. In turn, one could state the corporeal syntax that governs the language spoken to add spatial and temporal dimensions to the speech of the performers-personae. Derrida states that ‘what constitutes the originality of speech, what distinguishes it from every other element of signification, is that its substance seems to be purely temporal’⁴⁴. Even though the content of the speech might bring into being other spaces and times, the speech itself happens at that specific moment in that specific place. In *iSA*, as well as in *Same Difference* this temporal quality of speech is extended due to its nature and the interrelations with the dance material: it is because of the emphasis on the language’s physicality, musicality and materiality and its corporeal syntax that a linguistic path as mentioned by Kristeva⁴⁵ is constituted through both time and space. The language here acts similar to dance movements in that it constitutes time and space patterns, pathways that remain after the moment of speech has passed⁴⁶.

While the influence of the dance and the corporeal syntax on the spatial and temporal characteristics of the speech is thus the same for both performances under research, the addition of spatial and temporal dimensions through the use of language as observed above in *iSA*, knows a different quality,

⁴² Of course the other performance elements such as the lighting, the set and the clothing can either emphasize or contradict these kinds of resemblance. Here, however, I will solely focus on the dance and language material and their relations to each other and will therefore leave the influence of these other performance elements in abeyance for now.

⁴³ Julia Cima and Alexandra Baudelot, “Digestion and Infusion: Ways of Interpreting Dance” in *Knowledge in Motion: Perspectives of Artistic and Scientific Research in Dance*. Ed. Sabine Gehm et.al. (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2007): page 204.

⁴⁴ Derrida (1973a) – page 83.

⁴⁵ Kristeva – page 87.

⁴⁶ Concerning this characteristic of dance movement see: Jacqueline M. Autard, *Dance Composition: A Practical Guide to Creative Success in Dance Making*, 1976 (London: A & C Black Publishers LTD, 2004): page 41-45.

or a different level in *Same Difference*. Because almost all the speech in this performance by Lightfoot León consists of linguistic sounds and non-existing words and knows very little phenotext the representational feature of the language is far less concrete for these sounds and non-existing words have no fixed meaning. Like the dance movements the genotext suggests and resembles rather than directly represents other times and places. The resemblance of the speech of the character of Doña Amar-jura – performed by Fernando Hernando Magadan – with the melody of the Spanish language could bring to mind all kinds of connotations, ideas and images and leaves a lot of freedom to the viewer as the sounds' own imagery is far less tangible than the image of for example Israel created in *íSA*.

The different kinds of spatial and temporal dimensions in both performances in question exist next to one another, but also have reciprocal influence on each other: at times spatial aspects of the dance material reappear in some manner in the language spoken and vice versa, while at other times temporal facets of the language recur in the dance movements or the other way around. This brings to mind Derrida's theory of the "trace" when he states:

The use of language or the employment of any code which implies a play of forms – with no determined or invariable substratum – also presupposes a retention and protention of differences, a spacing and temporalizing, a play of traces.⁴⁷

The trace, according to Derrida, relates to both the past and the future and is constitutive of the present 'by this very relation to what is not, to what it absolutely is not; that is, not even to a past or future considered as a modified present'⁴⁸. Through the interaction, the play between the different kinds of spatial and temporal dimensions in the dance and language material these dimensions are tied together as a union. Both past and future are present in the here and now as a result of which every element of both *íSA* and *Same Difference* is related to the others and, therefore, constitutive of the performance as a whole; the play of traces binds the language and dance together.

Another binding element between the live spoken language and the dance concerns (of course) the performers: their being is constitutive of both these performance components. Thus originating in one source, the going together of movement and speech is itself constitutive of the nature and appearance of the characters in both *íSA* and *Same Difference*. Agamben, as already pointed at in the first chapter, states man to constitute himself as a subject in and through language:

... it is in and through language that the individual is constituted as a subject. Subjectivity is nothing other than the speaker's capacity to posit him or herself as an *ego*, and cannot in any way be defined through some wordless sense of being oneself, nor by deferral to some ineffable psychic experience of the *ego*, but only through a linguistic I transcending any possible experience.⁴⁹

The individual as we know it, so Agamben claims, is then constituted as an individual through language: 'it is a speaking man that we find in the world'⁵⁰. If one, however, brings back to mind the cognitive perceptual practices of the body⁵¹, matter seems far less unequivocal. We do live in the realm of language and we have never been without language, but I, my sense of myself and the world as I experience it are nothing without my body, its sensing, its practices and its movements. The *union* of body and mind, of body and language is not only constitutive of human nature as Descartes claimed⁵², but also of the individual subject.

⁴⁷ Jacques Derrida, "Differance" in *Speech and Phenomena: and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*. Ed. John Wild, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973b): page 146.

⁴⁸ Derrida (1973b)– page 142-143.

⁴⁹ Agamben (2007) – page 52. Emphasis in original.

⁵⁰ Agamben (2007) – page 56.

⁵¹ Bleeker (2008) – page 62.

⁵² Holbrook.

For the viewer of both *íSA* and *Same Difference* it means that he or she is confronted with different perspectives on the characters and performers. In *íSA* the performers through their speech turn from mere dancers into personae: through their speech one perceives glimpses of their personal lives outside the dance as well. They present their (theatrical) selves, both their body and their mind. In *Same Difference* what one perceives of the performers themselves remains limited to dance; one is not provided with the chance to see any other element of the performers' lives. The use of live spoken language, however, does add another dimension to the *characters* the performers play.⁵³ The speech uttered by Magadan as Doña Amar-jura adds a characteristic to the character that would be very difficult to achieve in movement alone. It broadens the character of the Doña and it gives an indication of how viewers can understand her movements, just as her movements give an indication of how to understand her language. Even though the characters depicted are only sketches of certain types of individuals (see footnote twenty-seven), viewers are confronted with both their body and their mind, both their movement and their voice; with the totality of bodily expression available. Viewers are thus simultaneously confronted with different perspectives on the performers-personae and the characters that give an indication in how both our language and the cognitive, perceptual, sensational and transitional practices of the body (inherent to dance as well) our constitutive for whom we are and how we experience ourselves.

The performers-personae and characters of *íSA* and *Same Difference* thus speak, but they do not speak the entire time. As soon as the first clause has been uttered, the viewer knows the performers and characters to be endowed with the *potential to speak or not*. This potential does not refer to generic potentiality, to, for example, the future potential of a child, but rather to a potentiality that exists, so explains Agamben.⁵⁴ It is the existing capacity to do something, which is simultaneously the capacity *not to do* something, the 'potential not to pass into actuality'⁵⁵. Were it otherwise, existing potentiality would not exist: the potential would no longer be potential; it would have already passed over into actuality.

This potential to speak or not in both performances in question has, I believe, a significant influence on the content and appearance of *íSA* and *Same Difference*. The existing potentiality emphasizes those moments in which the potential to speak indeed passes over into actuality and the moments when it does not: the choices of when to speak and when to silently dance gain importance. Because one knows the dancer has the potential to speak, one perceives and experiences the moments in which he or she is silent differently than when the potential would have not been there and vice versa one experiences and understands the moments of speech differently than when the performers would have been speaking the entire time.

The concept of potentiality is also present in the language material itself. The language in both performances has the *potential to signify or not*. Because both signification and non-signification are possible, emphasis is upon the choices when to present signifying language and when not. As a consequence of this emphasis, a viewer experiences and understands the moments of signification or non-signification differently than if the language material had only been signifying or only non-signifying. The same, one could state, goes for the dance material, even though signification in dance is far more equivocal than in language and the difference between signifying and non-signifying in dance is, therefore, less clear.

The notions of the play of traces and of potentiality do already refer to the process of ascribing meaning to what one encounters. In the following chapter I will continue to research the implications of the specific exercise and nature of the language included in the dance performances for this process.

⁵³ Of course again these dimensions are also constituted, contradicted or emphasized by the other performance elements such as the lighting, the set and in particular the clothing. Again, however, I will leave their influence in abeyance and focus solely on the effects of the inclusion of language.

⁵⁴ Giorgio Agamben, "On Potentiality" in *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*. Ed., trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999b): page 179.

⁵⁵ Agamben (1999b) – page 180.

Without movement, there can be no expression: No Wind No Word.

Helmut Ploebst⁵⁶

Much has been written on how we can understand and ascribe meaning to dance and language separately and it is very likely that there are many more writings to come. The present chapter will, therefore, in no way claim to give a thorough overview of these respective fields. Instead it will consist of an outline of some of the characteristics of how we are able to interpret and comprehend dance and language. On the basis of these outlines and with all the preceding chapters in mind, I will then consider how viewers will be able to ascribe meaning to performances in which both disciplines are non-hierarchically related to one another.

It might seem that one ascribes meaning to language on basis of the patrimony of names and rules of a specific language. You learn what name has been given to what substance and how sentences are to be properly constructed and accordingly you will be able to understand and interpret any text or linguistic utterance. Matter is, however, not that simple for there are many different elements that influence the process of meaning ascription. Agamben, for example and as already mentioned in the first chapter, stresses the difference between the semiotic and the semantic. Quoting Émile Benveniste he emphasizes that in the process of ascribing meaning to language two separate faculties of the mind are involved: 'the ability to perceive a correspondence between what is there and what has been there before' (the recognition of the sign) 'and the ability to perceive the meaning of a new enunciation' (the understanding of the discourse).⁵⁷ Meaning of linguistic expressions is thus, as Derrida explains in *Form and Meaning*, not only endowed through logic (through the iterability of the signs, through the rules and names), but also through rhetoric force (through the role the expressions play in human activities, the form and context in which they are presented).⁵⁸

This relation between the language itself and its discourse, its context is further exposed in the work of Kristeva. Roudiez in his introduction refers to a statement not included in the English translation that reveals text and context to go hand in hand, for as he states:

On the one hand, no text signifies without its context – its *total* context, be it conscious, unconscious, preconscious, linguistic, cultural, political, literary; on the other, it is the text alone that leads one to the various areas of that total context.⁵⁹

The language has thus no meaning without its total context, but one is able to understand the totality of the context only through the language. It seems that this does not only hold for entire texts but also for the relations and meaning between smaller parts of the text, for, as Derrida shows, it is the distance, the spacing and temporalizing between one particular sign and the system of other signs in linguistic use from which meaning surfaces: language is a play of differences.⁶⁰ A word is then endowed with meaning because of the nature of its relation to the other words and signs, because of its linguistic context.

In *íSA and Same Difference* most of the language concerns genotext: speech concerned with the physicality, materiality and musicality of the language; sentences, (yet non-existing) words and linguistic sounds that do not have a specific meaning and fall outside the patrimony of names and rules. Following Derrida, Agamben shows such (parts of) speech to first of all refer to itself: 'deprived

⁵⁶ Ploebst – page 8.

⁵⁷ Agamben (2007) – page 62.

⁵⁸ Jacques Derrida, "Form and Meaning" in *Speech and Phenomena: and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*. Ed. John Wild, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973c): page 107-128.

⁵⁹ Kristeva – page 9. Emphasis in original.

⁶⁰ Derrida (1973b) – page 139.

of its referential power and its univocal reference to an object,⁶¹ the genotext points in the first place to the act of speaking. Still though, there are also other levels of sense to be observed within this kind of language. According to Kristeva, the genotext transfers the energy of the Freudian drives and gains its importance, its meaningful weight through this process:

What we call *signifiance*, then, is precisely this unlimited and unbounded generating process, this unceasing operation of the drives toward, in, and through language; toward, in, and through the exchange system and its protagonists – the subject and its institutions. This heterogeneous process, neither anarchic, fragmented foundation nor schizophrenic blockage, is a structuring and de-structuring *practice*, a passage to the outer *boundaries* of the subject and society.⁶²

The rhythmic space without telos, the chora that is subsequently formed and is the underlying foundation of any linguistic act is not simply chaotic, but also knows an influential regulatory aspect: governed by natural or socio-historical constraints, such as the biological differences between the sexes or family structure, the chora, so stresses Kristeva, is subjected to an ordering.⁶³ It is in this sense that one could find him- or herself to agree with Derrida that speech is only able to somehow repeat a sense content that is constituted without it and before it.⁶⁴ However, one does have to keep in mind that Derrida here is not concerned with the intention of the speaker, but rather with the transmission; the way, the form and the context, in which the language is uttered.

As has already been stated several times before, dance movements know a great equivocal characteristic, for one because of the process of abstraction inherent to them as for example explained by both Smith-Autard and Liesbeth Wildschut.⁶⁵ As a result, dance's semiotic quality, the possibility for recognition of signs, is more ambiguous than in communicative language (phenotext): one specific movement may have infinite meaning possibilities, whereas the signification of a single word which is part of the patrimony of names and rules of a specific language is somewhat more clear-cut. Because of this, emphasis in the process of meaning ascription is more with the role the (musical, material and physical) form, the context (both in and outside the dance) and the interaction between them play.

Contextual meaning inside the dance obviously surfaces in close interrelation with the dance's form and quality. As in language, meaning arises from the spacing and temporalizing between constructive elements of the choreography and on a smaller scale of a specific movement sequence or a single movement. It is in the spatial and temporal differences between the short, tense and explosive movements of the character of *el soldado* (performed by Jorge Nozal) and the long, flowing movements of *le poète* (Medhi Walerski) that their relation, sense and meaning is indicated in *Same Difference*.

Contextual meaning outside the dance – which of course is also closely interrelated with the dance's form and quality – concerns not only the spatial and temporal context in which the dance is made and presented, but is also strongly related to the context of every individual viewer. As Bleeker explains, perceiving dance is not a matter of an unbiased view; instead our view of a dance performance is guided by our earlier experiences, our knowledge, our origin, our identity and our general vision on dance.⁶⁶ Even though there appears to be some general understanding of (dance) movements and bodies in Western society, the impact the address of the exercise of movements and the use of bodies in the performance makes upon viewers differs from person to person. As a result viewers' process of meaning ascription to the exercise of movements and the use of bodies in a dance performance can

⁶¹ Giorgio Agamben, "Pardes: The Writing of Potentiality" in *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*. Ed., trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999c): page 211.

⁶² Kristeva – page 17. Emphasis in original.

⁶³ Kristeva – page 26-27.

⁶⁴ Derrida (1973c) – page 114-115.

⁶⁵ Smith-Autard – page 27-28.

Wildschut – page 61.

⁶⁶ Maaïke Bleeker, "Dans. Waar gaat het eigenlijk over? Weet u het al?" in *TM 8* (2003): page 51.

greatly differ from each other especially because of the equivocal characteristic of dance movements.⁶⁷

Another influential feature in the process of meaning ascription to dance concerns the cognitive perceptual practices of the body and in particular the role they play in the perception of movement. Bleeker in her article *Martin, Massumi and The Matrix* stresses that an important feature of John Martin's theories on dance, movement and the body concerns his presentation of 'movement not only as a medium of expression but also as a medium of perception'⁶⁸. Our perception of dance movements originates too in the motor impulses (that are themselves the result of the mirror neurons that fire when one perceives another body move or dance (also see footnote 10)) for as Bleeker explains:

These motor responses connect what is seen to previous experiences and thus awaken earlier sense perceptions and the feelings, emotions, expectations, etc. related to current events.⁶⁹

This way our body influences the way we experience a dance performance and accordingly has its effects on the way we ascribe meaning to what we encounter in the performance, in thus the dance *and* the language, even if one is not consciously aware of these practices of the body.

In the dance performances under research, the language and dance material are intimately interwoven with one another even though they have not lost their independence toward each other. Both Roudiez (in his introduction to Kristeva) and Derrida call to mind the image of the weaving of a texture, a fabric.⁷⁰ The different threads of this texture are here then formed by the various modes of sense and signification observed within the specific manner in which the disciplines of dance and language in *iSA* and *Same Difference* are presented. As a result of the differences between the disciplines and the differences *within* the disciplines themselves varying levels of reception, so explains Georgelou, are simultaneously required: both a reception in which one tries to decipher the semiotic and semantic elements of the threads (the signs and the discourse included within them) and a reception that 'ignores the already 'known' significations of the words [and movements] and requires a focus (or contemplation) to the semiotic chora which is a field of musicality, pulse and flow'⁷¹. Considering the nature of the relations between the dance and language material in the performances in question here, one might add to this a reception on the basis of corporeality; a being open for the corporeal dimensions and effects of both the movements and the speech of the performers in and through space and time.

The binding element here, I think, is movement. For being concerned mainly with materiality, musicality and physicality instead of a sole focus on its own referential and communicative character, the language here literally dances along with the dancing bodies of the performers. The language and the dance both move, they both constitute a path and those two paths together create yet another path, a new movement; that of the performance as a whole. Brian Massumi in *Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* states that a moving body (of any nature whatsoever) cannot be pinned down; it has no meaning, no position, for it is in motion, in transition between them.

⁶⁷ All the contextual influential elements described here also have their role in the process of ascribing meaning to language, but because communicative language (phenotext) is somewhat less ambiguous in its signification, interpretations are less likely to greatly differ. The process of ascription of meaning to language that qualifies as genotext – because of its articulation of ephemeral and non-signifying structures – is very similar to that of dance. See for this similarity also: Kristeva – page 4.

⁶⁸ Bleeker (2008b) – page 158.

⁶⁹ Bleeker (2008b) – page 158.

⁷⁰ Kristeva – page 5.

Derrida (1973c) – page 111.

⁷¹ Georgelou – page 116.

When a body is in motion, it does not coincide with itself. It coincides with its own transition: its own variation. The range of variations it can be implicated in is not present in any given moment, much less in any position it passes through. In motion, a body is in an immediate, unfolding relation to its own nonpresent potential to vary.⁷²

Something in motion is indeterminate: a moving body never is *in* any point on its path, but is *in passage* across them all so Massumi shows when he refers to Henri Bergson's analysis of Zeno's paradoxes of movement. The path taken should consequently not be thought of as composed of positions, but should rather be conceived of as non-decomposable, a dynamic unity.⁷³

In relation to *íSA* and *Same Difference* this means that both the dancing bodies of the performers and their linguistic bodies have no fixable meaning, but do form a dynamic unity; they form the movement or path of the performances as a whole. The unity of logos has been left in abeyance for a moving unity has been constituted. The meaning of this whole dynamic unity, so states Massumi, can only be determined after the movement has stopped.⁷⁴ Only then is the unity, the respective performance, *in* a position and ready to be determined: as long as there is movement *íSA* and *Same Difference* never are in one position but in between them all. While still in motion, they are related to their infinite possibilities, their non-present potential to vary. When the curtain has fallen, 'it is,' as Massumi puts it, 'as if, in our thinking, we put targets all along the path'⁷⁵.

This does not mean, however, that all the thoughts, ideas, associations, sensations, feelings and emotions one experiences while the performances are still in motion, while they are still in between all the infinite possible meanings, play no role in the final ascription of meaning to what has been presented, in the placing of the targets along the path. On the contrary, it is on their basis that the positions one thinks in retrospection constitutive of the performance's meaning are determined. In the next chapter I will elucidate this matter further by putting into practice the notion of the rustle of language as formulated by Barthes.

⁷² Brian Massumi, *Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2002): page 4.

⁷³ Massumi – page 6.

⁷⁴ Massumi – page 6.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*.

6 Rustle on Stage

Before turning to some concluding words on the quest which is at the base of this paper I will here first discuss the notion of the rustle of language as formulated by Roland Barthes. This notion, I believe, will shed some clarifying light on the matter of this research and will thus help to obtain an understanding of the implications of the live spoken language non-hierarchically included in *ISA* and *Same Difference* for the process of ascribing meaning to these dance performances.

Opposed to the stammering sound of failing of machines or speech, 'the rustle,' states Barthes, 'denotes a limit-noise, an impossible noise, the noise of what, functioning to perfection, has no noise; to rustle is to make audible the very evaporation of noise'⁷⁶. When attributed to language, he follows, the rustle would be 'that meaning which reveals an exemption of meaning or – the same thing – that non-meaning which produces in the distance a meaning henceforth liberated from all the aggressions of which the sign, formed in the "sad and fierce history of men", is the Pandora's box'⁷⁷. Meaning is thus not brutally dismissed, but becomes a vanishing point: even though the meaning of the language is undivided, impenetrable and unnameable, still 'the music, the breath, the tension, the application, in short something like a *goal*'⁷⁸ is audible.

This directly relates to the throughout this paper observed and emphasized focus of the language spoken on its physical, musical and material characteristics. Furthermore, it confirms the idea posed in the previous two chapters that meaning arises in between the potential of the different elements of the language: the genotext of both *ISA* and *Same Difference* in itself has no specific meaning but produces a 'horizon of meaning'⁷⁹ because of the inclusion of phenotext, that is, because the language material of the performances does have the potential to signify. And vice versa the meaning of the phenotext reveals an exemption of meaning because of the inclusion of the logically unintelligible genotext, because the potential of the language material not to signify fixed meanings. In addition, the image Barthes in his explanation creates of landscapes 'furnished with a "background" of our messages'⁸⁰ seems to refer to Kristeva's spatial chora governed by natural and /or socio-historical constraints as mentioned in chapter five. Even though Barthes himself thinks the rustle of language to be a *utopia* of musical meaning, the poetic language included in *ISA* and *Same Difference* indeed thus seems to rustle.⁸¹

What is more, it seems that what is at issue in such dance performances in which live spoken language is used in a non-hierarchical relation to the dance movements could be conceived of as rustle as well. Firstly, because Barthes too in his explanation of the rustle of language refers to a texture, a fabric as mentioned above in the fifth chapter from which no element is ever detached⁸²:

For the rustle ... implies a community of bodies: in the sounds of the pleasure which is "working," no voice is raised, guides, or swerves, no voice is constituted; the rustle is the very sound of plural delectation – plural but never massive (the mass, quite the contrary, has a single voice, and terribly loud).⁸³

The different threads of the texture, the various bodies of the community, the dance and the language have their independent perspectives and their independent voices, spatial and temporal dimensions and movements, but are of equal importance within the performance, within the fabric as a whole. Secondly, the meaning of the rustle of language that reveals a lack of meaning or the non-meaning

⁷⁶ Roland Barthes, "The Rustle of Language" in *The Rustle of Language*. Ed. François Wahl, trans. Richard Howard (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989b): page 76-77.

⁷⁷ Barthes (1989b) – page 78.

⁷⁸ Barthes (1989b) – page 78-79. Emphasis in original.

⁷⁹ Barthes (1989b) – page 78.

⁸⁰ Ibidem.

⁸¹ Even though Barthes opposes the rustle, the noise of what is working well to stammering as an indication of failure, the stammering and stuttering of the performers in both *ISA* and *Same Difference* in my opinion – as has already been explained in chapter three – do not refer to failure, but rather to the corporeal syntax of the language and its infinite possibilities. These are constructive parts of the performances and equal to other performance parts and in that sense they are indeed working well.

⁸² Barthes (1989b) – page 77.

⁸³ Ibidem.

that produces a distant meaning as described by Barthes could further explicate the indeterminacy of the total moving body of the performance as mentioned above and vice versa. During the performance meaning is excluded from the meaningful threads for they are in transition through all possible meanings, they are in passage across them. The non-representational and non-communicative threads on the other hand already during the performance refer to a distant meaning which can be determined only after the movement has stopped and the curtain has fallen.

The notion of rustle thus emphasizes the interconnections and cooperation of the varied threads constitutive of the fabrics, the textures that are *íSA* and *Same Difference*. Moreover, it seems the rustle is the noise of what is working well, the noise of what has no noise, because of its motion, because the community of bodies is moving. The rustle is a vanishing point of meaning because the performances are in motion, in passage across all their inherent possibilities.

Conclusion

Here I will recapitulate what has been observed, argued, posed and suggested before on the basis of which I will accordingly formulate an answer to the main question of the research this paper is concerned with: *What are the implications of the use of live spoken language in a dance performance in which both disciplines are non-hierarchically organized for the process of meaning ascription?*

The first chapter showed the difficulty of thinking body and mind, body and language, and body movement and language to be opposed and separated substances because of their intense and far reaching reciprocal influence to one another. Man lives both in the realm of language and in the world as it is constituted for him by the cognitive perceptual practices of his body. The practices of the body (cognitive, perceptual, sensational and transitional) and language, therefore, both have their influence in the process of meaning ascription: it is in the entwinement of both that our experience of the world as we encounter it is constituted.

Chapter two indicated that in *iSA* and *Same Difference* one sees glimpses of the infinite possibilities inherent to poetic language⁸⁴: the performances could be said to research some of these options in relation to the dance and music. In general, the language in the performances in question is concerned with its own physical, material and musical features; emphasis is with what is produced in and through it, rather than with what is represented by it. Communicative language (phenotext) is included though (be it less in *Same Difference* in comparison to *iSA*) but because of the constant highlighting of the physicality, musicality and materiality, of language's process, the different kinds of reception required according to Georgelou⁸⁵ are constantly working together. As a result a viewer is likely to have a stronger awareness of the physical, musical and material aspects of the phenotext as well.

The third chapter concerned itself with the nature of the syntax that structures the poetic language in both performances. Instead of the visual dramaturgy Lehmann argues for, I proposed here a corporeal syntax on basis of the character of the interrelations between the dance and language material. Analysis showed that the language spoken and the body's movements in *iSA* and *Same Difference* influence each other; they both initiate and follow one another and so in a way complete each other. As a consequence of the corporeal dramaturgy that is the driving force of the performances as a whole as well as of the disciplines of dance and language separately, I changed Lehmann's statement of the whole body in the post-dramatic theatre becoming voice⁸⁶ into its reverse: in the dance performances in which *live spoken* language is non-hierarchically included it is rather the whole voice that becomes body. This corporeal emphasis then already indicates the importance and role of the body and corporeality in general in the process of meaning ascription; to the inner dancing along as a consequence of mirror neurons that constitute motor impulses and the role this plays in how we – in the end – assign meaning to what we encountered.

In the fourth chapter I considered the effects of the kind of language used and the nature of the interrelations with the dance movements for the appearance and content of the respective performances. The chapter showed various temporal and spatial dimensions incorporated in the dance and language material and in between these disciplines to exist simultaneous next to each other. It was furthermore observed that aspects of one temporal or spatial dimension could recur in another, as a result of which a spacing and temporalizing network, a play of traces is constituted. It is this play of traces that binds all the signs in the performance together due to the relations between past, present and future inherent to the play⁸⁷. Furthermore, due to the combination of dance and

⁸⁴ 'While agreeing with Jakobson that "poetic language" cannot be viewed as a "deviation from the norm" of language, she [Kristeva] does not see it as a sub-code of the linguistic code. Rather, it stands for the infinite possibilities of language, and all other language acts are merely partial realizations of the possibilities inherent in "poetic language".' Kristeva – page 2.

⁸⁵ As a result of the differences between the disciplines and the differences *within* the disciplines themselves varying levels of reception, so explains Georgelou, are simultaneously required: both a reception in which one tries to decipher the semiotic and semantic elements of the threads (the signs and the discourse included within them) and a reception that 'ignores the already 'known' significations of the words [and movements] and requires a focus (or contemplation) to the semiotic chora which is a field of musicality, pulse and flow'. Georgelou – page 116.

⁸⁶ Lehmann – page 149.

⁸⁷ Derrida (1973b) – page 142-143.

language, the viewers of *iSA* and *Same Difference* are simultaneously confronted with both the movement and the speech of the performers; both their body and their mind. These different perspectives on the performers-personae and the characters of the respective performances give an indication in how both our language and the practices of the body constitute who we are and how we experience ourselves. Finally, the chapter turned to the notion of potentiality to show that the potential of the performers to speak or not and likewise the potential of the language and dance to signify or not change the appearance of the individual elements.

Chapter five gave a very short and far from complete outline of the characteristics of processes of ascription of meaning in both dance and language. Important in language as well as in dance is that the meaning is determined not only by the sign's inherent qualities but also by the spatial and temporal distance, the differences between that specific sign and the system of other signs in use as Derrida showed.⁸⁸ Next, the context outside the sign system influences the significance of a particular sign or a body of signs as well: the discourse – the specific social, cultural and historical circumstances in which the sign or body of signs is created and presented – and the personal context, situation and identity of the interpreter play a noteworthy part. In the perception and interpretation of dance, moreover, the influence of the cognitive perceptual practices of the body has been emphasized. In combining everything that went before the chapter then turned to the process of meaning ascription to the dance performances under research. Referring to Georgelou⁸⁹, I showed the differences and the nature of the relations between and within the disciplines simultaneously to require various modes or levels of reception that work together in the deciphering of what one encounters. Movement was then determined as the binding element between and within these levels of reception for the language, the dance and the performances as a whole are in motion. This holds consequences for the ascription of meaning, for, as Massumi explains, a moving body is indeterminate⁹⁰: it is in passage across all positions on its path and thus in between the infinite possible meanings.

In the sixth and also last chapter I elaborated on these processes with reference to Barthes' notion of the rustle of language. The rustle, according to Barthes, indicates a meaning that reveals the exemption of meaning or a non-meaning which produces a meaning in the distance.⁹¹ As I showed the language included in *iSA* and *Same Difference* and the performances as a whole to rustle, the chapter emphasized the interrelations and working together of all the independent threads of the performances' textures. Moreover, the notion of rustle further highlights the importance of movement and the indeterminacy of the moving body or community of bodies.

Even though the process of meaning ascription in dance and in language as described in chapter five are on almost all levels very similar in their complexity, all this does indicate several implications of the specific use of live spoken language for the process of ascribing meaning to *iSA* and *Same Difference*. To first labour an obvious though crucial point: the respective performances would not have been the same performances and would thus not have meant the same for a certain viewer if there had been no language included. As is stressed several times before, it is all the autonomous and non-hierarchically structured threads and the differences within and between them that together constitute the texture that is the performance: if the linguistic thread would not have been there, the fabric would have gotten a different colour, shape or feel, a different content.

What is more, because of the observed and emphasized interactions between the phenotext and the genotext and between the language in general and the dance (chapter two, three and four), all the threads change when one of the threads is changed or left out: the threads are thus not so independent as they might seem at first sight, but rely on each other. Elucidating this is the observation made in chapter four of spatial and temporal aspects of one thread recurring in one or several other threads. The discussion on the notion of potentiality points in the same direction, for it is stated there, the fact a viewer knows the dancer to be endowed with the potential to speak, implicitly changes the manner he or she perceives the moments of the dancer's silent dancing.

⁸⁸ Derrida (1973b) – page 139.

⁸⁹ Georgelou – page 116.

⁹⁰ Massumi – page 4.

⁹¹ Barthes (1989b) – page 78.

As indicated throughout this paper, the combination of the dance and language material opens doors which would otherwise possibly remain closed off or forgotten⁹². This does not only happen in the spatial and temporal dimensions of the language and dance as described in the fourth chapter, but also holds true for and in the interpretation of the perspectives both disciplines offer on the topics the performances are concerned with. Moments of communication and representation or an emphasis on specific physical, musical or material characteristics in the language spoken might concretely lead a viewer in how to interpret a dance section preceding or following these moments. Just as well the dance material may in its place lead interpretations concerning the language material. While through the use of the live spoken language in the dance performances some interpretational doors may thus be opened, one has to realize that at the same time one of these doors opens, another one closes. The simultaneous offered perspective inherent to the language in the context of the performance renders some interpretations of the dance more likely, while others seem less likely. Of course the reverse – the dance that renders interpretations of the language less or more likely – applies as well.

The fact that the language in *íSA* and *Same Difference* is performed live by the same performers who are dancing has some implications of its own. First of all and as is shown in the third chapter, the live aspect of the language is crucial in the determination of the linguistic syntax and subsequently the ways in which it can be understood: had the speech not been live, but technologically uttered or reproduced the intense interrelation between voice and body would have been broken. If the speech had not been uttered live, it would, for that reason, have been indeed Lehmann's visual dramaturgy⁹³ that would have governed the language and not that of corporeality. Furthermore, if the dancers had not been speaking themselves, the interaction between the dance movements and the language would have lost some of its intensity. Had Cayla, in the fragment described in chapter three, not been speaking herself, the movement would still have continued, but it would no longer have been hers as a result of which the sense, the significance of that fragment would have been different.

To come to a final conclusion one could – with *all* the preceding in mind – thus state that what the specific use of the live spoken poetic language in *íSA* and *Same Difference* implicates for the process of meaning ascription is *movement*, in every sense one could think of: movement in between the different threads of the texture; movement within these threads themselves; movement in the dance; in the language; in the body and in the mind; movement in space and time; in the dancers, the personae and the characters; movement in between the infinitude of possible meanings and interpretations; and the movement from the indeterminacy of the moving texture that is the performance to the meaning one is able to ascribe to it after the movement has stopped. To paraphrase both Bleeker and Massumi⁹⁴: *the crucial issue here is movement. Both felt and unforeseen.*

⁹² Cima – page 204.

⁹³ Lehmann – page 147.

⁹⁴ Bleeker (2008b) – page 151.
Massumi – page 1.

Reflections

Every written work can be regarded as the prologue (or rather, the broken cast) of a work never penned

Giorgio Agamben⁹⁵

During the writing of this thesis I have simultaneously not been writing several others: so much material, theories, thoughts, possible beginnings and endings have been left out. Of course, one has to make choices and cannot research and /or discuss everything at once, but it is important to realize what may seem obvious: that the choices made influence the result. And perhaps it is even so that in a way that what has been left out has a stronger influence on the results than that what has been included. The material (both used and unused) is dense and rich, the matter is complex and my quest perhaps somewhat too ambitious to do all at once in its entirety. It means I could have written a thesis on each chapter separately. It means I left out thoughts, concepts, theories and ideas which I do indeed think important. It means that the answer I have formulated to my main question is far from finite. Here, I will turn to a discussion of some of what has been left out. Not to show what should have been written had time and space been sufficient, but to show what could also have been written. Not so much as to indicate what is missing here – although of course it does in fact exactly that – but rather to show possible future writings and research, to see to what (yet) unwritten work this prologue might – and perhaps should – lead.

As already indicated in the chapter itself, the outlines of the processes of ascribing meaning to dance and language in the fifth chapter are only sketches of what is inherent to the subject: the answers formulated to the questions at the base of the chapter are far from complete. Even the material I did use includes much more insights in these processes than reported here. The described processes are furthermore at the base of respectively linguistics and dance studies, so not only could the outlines of them included in this thesis be researched deeper and more elaborately, they deserve it as well. Looking ahead at this future research, the name of this fifth chapter (“In Between”) deliberately shows resemblance with the work of Deleuze and Guattari and especially with their notion of “becoming”. Although their work is not included here, I do think their theories to be of good use in further explorations of the suggestions and arguments posed in this thesis.

Although not touched upon in the present paper, the matter of research could additionally also be related to the theories on intermediality to investigate more into the relations in the interactions between the disciplines.

Further there are several concepts on which workings I hinted, but did not extensively deal with. The question of representation for example is more complex than I here reported. For further investigations on this matter in relation to the present research subject I would like to refer first to the essays of Derrida used here and to a book, which even though it did not make the final paper in any way, still in its own manner has been a leading feature within my thinking: *Exhausting Politics: Performance and the Politics of Movement* by André Lepecki⁹⁶. Besides Lepecki's concentrated dealing with representation he is also greatly concerned with the interrelations between dance and language, be it especially (though not exclusively) with writing.

Another concept that has been left out but is greatly related to the matter of the interrelations between dance, language and speech is that of gesture. Much has been written on this concept, but starting from the current research it seems worthwhile to begin at Agamben's dealing with the subject in the essay *Kommerell, or On Gesture*⁹⁷. For the idea of speech as 'originary gesture'⁹⁸ that Agamben here explores seems to directly relate to the emphasis on movement in this paper and could so

⁹⁵ Agamben (2007) – page 3.

⁹⁶ André Lepecki, *Exhausting Politics: Performance and the Politics of Movement* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

⁹⁷ Giorgio Agamben, “Kommerell, or On Gesture” in *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*. Ed., trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999d): page 77-85.

⁹⁸ Agamben (1999d) – page 78.

perhaps further explore the role the body, language and movement play in the constitution of our experience.

Finally I believe in the future study of the here posed subjects a thorough examination of perception and visuality; of meaning, sense, affect and signification; and of experience and the Subject to be of value in relation to the larger contexts of the interrelations between body, mind, movement and language and how they are constitutive in processes of meaning ascription. For all these concepts are already implicated in the current research question but have during the process been more or less left in abeyance; at least in the present *written* work that is.

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Appendix I – Performance Information *Same Difference*

<i>Same Difference</i>	Lightfoot León
Choreography	Paul Lightfoot and Sol León
Dance	Jorge Nozal – el soldado Medhi Walerski – le poète Georgi Milev – the one who is not Bastien Zorzetto – his shadow Fernando Hernando Magadan – Doña Amar-jura Aurélie Cayla – Remedios Valentina Scaglia – La Maria
Music	Philip Glass: <i>Movement III</i> from Symphony nr. 3 [1995]; <i>Movement IV</i> from String Quartet nr. 5 [1991]
Choreographic Assistant	Stefan Žeromski
Set design	Paul Lightfoot and Sol León
Costume design	Paul Lightfoot and Sol León
Light design	Tom Bevoort
Production	Nederlands Dans Theater
World Première	November eight 2007, Grand Theatre de la Ville – Luxembourg
Seen	December eighteen 2007, Muziektheater – Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Paul Lightfoot and Sol León form an artistic choreographic duo since 1989 and since 2002 they are appointed as house choreographers for the Nederlands Dans Theater. Their performances are characterized by a dynamic flow in which dance, music and stage design are intimately working together in the creation of the poetical substance. In more recent choreographies Lightfoot and León are often experimenting with the inclusion of theatrical elements, language and new technologies.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Nederlands Dans Theater, "Lightfoot León" *Nederlands Dans Theater – Mensen*. Accessed on November 24th 2009 - <http://www.nederlandsdanstheater.nl/artists/show/108>

Appendix II – Performance Information *íSA*

íSA by dance company T.r.a.s.h.

Choreography	Kristel van Issum
Dance	Guilherme Miotto Tegest Pecht Guido Lucie Petrušová Fiona Keenan O'Brien Grégory Kamoun Samir Calixto Jose Agudo
Music	Arthur van der Kuip, Jeroen Strijbos
Musicians	Jan Willem Troost (cello), Harm Huson (counter-tenor), Christina Knoll (violin)
Assistant choreography	Guilherme Miotto
Dramaturgy	Alexandre Tissotl, Ulrika Kinn-Svensson
Set Design	Paul van Weert
Light Design	Luc van Heijst
Production	T.r.a.s.h.
World Première	
Seen	September twenty-four 2008, Theater Kikker – Utrecht, The Netherlands.

The Dutch theatre dance company T.r.a.s.h. has its origins in the underground and punk scene of Tilburg. In their performances choreographer and artistic director Kristel van Issum, composer Arthur van der Kuip and set designer Paul van Weert search for a symbiosis of disciplines: the raw and energetic style of movement, the classical music and the often minimalistic and uncompromising set design develop in intense interrelations with one another and thus together constitute an alienating and fierce form of dance theatre.

Their performances are often characterized by the juxtaposing of opposites and concern the contemporary soul in search of a body in the progress of which the performers encounter decay, violence, isolation and estrangement. The choreographies of T.r.a.s.h. are highly personal documents in the quest of the artistic team to get grip on the intangibility and inevitability characteristic of human life.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ T.r.a.s.h., "Over T.r.a.s.h." [2008] *T.r.a.s.h.* Accessed on November 24th 2009 - <http://www.trashweb.nl/>