The Matthew effect in the Dutch cultural sector

Increased disparities between cultural institutions as an unintended

effect of Dutch cultural policy

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Abstract

In recent years, the presence of a Matthew effect in the Dutch cultural sector has been suggested, following budget cuts and increased focus on market values in Dutch cultural policy. Thus far, research on this topic has been scarce and inconclusive and no research has looked into the experiences of cultural institutions in the Netherlands following the budget cuts of 2012. This paper aims to assess the experiences of cultural institutions and to determine whether or not a Matthew effect is present for the size and location of cultural institutions between 2013 and 2016 using a mixed methods design. Data from 474 cultural institutions across the Netherlands were analysed and interviews were conducted with directors representing 11 museums and pop music venues within the province of Utrecht. There is no Matthew effect present for income trends or location. Gini coefficients for the distribution of income showed no significant change in (in)equality for an extended period. No significant trend differences could be found between institutions within or outside the Randstad metropolitan area. These findings were attested by the results of the interviews. Differences within the sector are very large, although stable. Small institutions are unable to close the gap because they lack the funds to innovate and grow. One-time investments can kickstart a positive spiral towards a more socially relevant and financially healthy position for these small institutions.

The Matthew effect in the Dutch cultural sector

The development of cultural policy has been closely linked to developments of the welfare state (Schrijvers, 2018). Since the 1980's, many welfare states operate under the strain of austerity, and retrenchments are widespread. In the Netherlands, there is an increased monetary pressure on the welfare state as a result of trends such as a greying population, decreasing birth rates, and internationalization of the market, which has led to budget cuts on various levels of policy and a shift of responsibility from the national government to elsewhere in society (Schrijvers, 2018). In 2011, following the financial crisis of 2008, the Dutch government announced to cut the national budget for the cultural sector by over 21% in the following years (Schrijvers, Keizer & Engbersen, 2015).

As a result, Dutch cultural policy has increasingly focused on encouraging cultural institutions and individual artists to become more entrepreneurial and to increase their own earning capacity (Schrijvers et al., 2015). Cultural institutions needed to become "less dependent on [government money] and thus become more flexible and powerful" (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap (OCW), 2011, p.2). Decreasing their dependence on subsidies would lead to strengthened ties between society and subsidized culture[1] and, above all, cut costs.

It has been suggested that this trend towards market values has resulted in increased disparities between cultural institutions in the Netherlands (Schrijvers et al., 2015; Franssen & Bekkers, 2016; De Nooij, Bekkers & Felix, 2017). Large cultural institutions have the capacity to invest in the acquisition of other forms of income such as private donations and sponsorships, and have proved more able to increase their earning capacity than smaller institutions (Schrijvers, 2018). Large institutions, in particular in favourable locations, with a reputation and specialization, have been able to increase their other revenues whilst medium sized, locally orientated institutions have had a hard time adjusting, further increasing the inequality between them (Schrijvers et al., 2015).

This self-reinforcing state of inequality has been coined the Matthew effect by sociologist Robert Merton (1968), after the gospel of Matthew: "For to every one who has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away" (Matthew 25:29). Merton's paper on the Matthew effect (1968) argued how certain psychosocial processes affect the allocation of rewards to scientists, and how the same amount of work leads to

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[1] An important criticism of cultural policy is that there is a gap between the supply and demand for art and culture. The excess of supply would be the reason the sector is so reliant on subsidies (Van den Hoogen & Jonker, 2018). Stricter and fewer subsidies should decrease this gap and thereby strengthen the ties with society, as demand would better fit the supply that is paid for by taxpayers.

different levels of reward or recognition for different scientists. Subsequently, the Matthew effect was observed in many other domains of social life.

Deleeck, Huybrechs and Cantillon (1983) found that the Belgian child benefit program, which allowed all families compensation for the costs of child rearing, was particularly beneficial to middle and higher income rather than low income families. Children up to the age of 18 were eligible to the benefit, but if they continued their education beyond this age, it was extended to 25. The Matthew effect occurred because higher income was correlated with having more children and a higher education. Deleeck et al. (1983) found similar processes in cultural participation, education, social housing and health care in Belgium, but it has also been found in the field of economics and social sciences in the Netherlands (Van den Besselaar & Leydesdorff, 2009; Bornmann, Leydesdorff & Van den Besselaar, 2010). In the cultural sector, a Matthew effect would mean small and rural cultural institutions are hit disproportionately hard by austerity measures (Schrijvers et al., 2015; Schrijvers, 2018).

The pressure to acquire sufficient own income, reach sufficient people, or meet other subsidy requirements can lead to impoverishment of the cultural sector, both in geographical distribution of supply, artistic quality and diversity. Rural, locally orientated, institutions can disappear of move away. Financial strains can push cultural institutions to opt for 'blockbuster programming', to ensure a large enough audience (Schrijvers, 2018). Blockbuster programming can lead to the disappearance of niches, or larger art expressions that are more dependent on subsidies, such as the performing arts[2]. The Council for Culture (2018, *Raad voor Cultuur*) noted that the pressure on museums to create frequent and large exhibitions can come at the expense of their conservation tasks.

Such an impoverishment is problematic for those who enjoy the art expressions that moved to more densely populated areas or disappeared and for the people working in the cultural sector. Moreover, the cultural sector also has a large, indirect and thus mostly unseen, economic impact on society. The International Film Festival Rotterdam, for example, had its financial impact to the city of Rotterdam calculated at between 9.8 and 16.1 million euros in income from tourism (Tezel, 2020). This outweighs the 1.2 million in subsidies it receives on a yearly basis heavily. Florida (2002) argues that the presence of cultural institutions in a city or region can attract a creative class that he sees as a

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[2] As wages rise, products in sectors with limited technological progress become relatively more expensive. This is known as Baumol's cost disease. Baumol and Bowen pointed out 60 years ago that it takes the same amount of musicians to perform a string quartet today as it did in the 19th century, but the production costs of most goods decreased due to automation in the same period. A recent study on German public theatres supports this theory still (Last & Wetzel, 2011).

driving force behind regional economic growth, another indirect economic impact of the cultural sector.

Retrenchments in the cultural sector, the most drastic implemented in 2011, are the effect of both the increased costs of the welfare state and of political values placed on culture (Schrijvers, 2018). Politicians are distanced from allocating funds in the Cultural Policy Act (*Wet op het specifiek cultuurbeleid*, CPA) of 1993. The CPA regulates this role to professional advisors in the form of the Council for Culture. Although politicians are to follow the advice of the Council for Culture in subsidy allocation, political ideologies can still be seen in the focus and budget of every four-year policy plan. Dutch right-wing populist parties, on the rise since 2002, have strongly opposed the role of the state in artistic measures (Van den Hoogen & Jonker, 2018). Van den Hoogen and Jonker (2018) found that the importance of market values rose in this period, peaking in the policy cycle of 2013-2016.

Political values and retrenchments, together with location and size of a cultural institution described by Schrijvers and colleagues (2015) that affect the ability of a cultural institution to adapt to subsidy requirements and increase their own income, can lead to an increase in disparities between cultural institutions: a Matthew effect. A visualisation of this conceptual framework is presented in Figure 1. If a Matthew effect is found in the Dutch cultural sector, it could partly be negated by ensuring the size and location of cultural institutions do not affect their ability to adhere to subsidy requirements.

Figure 1

Conceptual framework of the Matthew effect in the Dutch cultural sector

The Dutch government sees the ability to participate in cultural activities as an important right for its citizens. Culture stimulates thought, relieves, and connects people (Van Engelshoven, 2019). Minister for cultural affairs Van Engelshoven stated in her plans for cultural policy for the period 2021-2024 that she "wish[es] everyone to enjoy the richness of culture. Those too, who don't come to that on their own accord" (Van Engelshoven, 2019, p.3).

The presence of a Mathew effect can result in a decrease in the geographical distribution of cultural activities and increased ticket fees, for which institutions can opt in order to keep their heads above water. This directly opposes the goal set by the minister. Participation in cultural activities will be harder especially for those in rural areas, those with decreased mobility, or low income. It is thus imperative to lay bare any unintended effects of cultural policy that undermine the accessibility of cultural activities and thereby increase disparities between individuals. This study aims to do this by ascertaining if a Matthew effect is present in the Dutch cultural sector and how the sector itself experienced the increased focus on market values in recent years.

Existing research

As of yet, research on the Matthew effect as a result of recent cultural policy trends in the Netherlands has been scarce and inconclusive. Though multiple researchers have pointed out that trends suggest the presence of a Matthew effect caused by the current cultural policy trend (Schrijvers et al., 2015; Franssen & Bekkers, 2016; De Nooij et al., 2017), only one exploratory report, commissioned by the ministry of cultural affairs, has tried to determine its presence (Gielen & Van Asselt, 2015).

De Nooij and colleagues (2017) concluded the presence of a Matthew effect for private donations, but not for other forms of income. To compensate for the austerity measures of 2011, the Gift and Inheritance Tax Act (*Geefwet*) was initiated to help cultural institutions increase their income. This act made donations to certain cultural institutions more financially (Schrijvers, 2018). As a result, private donations increased, but only for institutions that were already successful in raising private funds (De Nooij et al., 2017).

Gielen and Van Asselt (2015) looked at festivals, museums and performing arts companies that received government funding (local and/or national). They categorised these institutions as 'large' and 'small' institutions. They compared these two categories and cultural institutions situated within and outside of the Randstad metropolitan area on trends for total profits, structural subsidies, public revenue, and other revenue to see if differences in income trends changed. No clear cut conclusions about the presence of a Matthew effect could be made.

Gielen and Van Asselt (2015) advise for further research to be done as their report is subject to a number of limitations. Firstly, their report covers the years 2012-2014. Large budget cuts and reforms that started in 2011 (OCW, 2012) possibly distorted their results, as the 2012-2013 trends were often opposite of the 2013-2014 trends. Furthermore, as many of the national subsidies as well as the national cultural policy goals are set for a period of four years, the timeframe of their research spanned the two different policy and subsidy cycles of 2009-2012 and 2013-2016. This meant some institutions that only received funding in one of these two cycles were excluded from the results, reducing the sample size. Gielen and Van Asselt (2015) call for research spanning a longer period covered by only one policy cycle, such as 2013-2016.

Secondly, the way the cultural institutions were categorized by Gielen and Van Asselt (2015) into a dichotomous variable as 'large' or 'small' using visitor and income numbers, meant that there were large within-group differences. They suggest that by using regression analyses a size scale can be made that retains this extra information, allowing for a more detailed analysis.

Lastly, Gielen and Van Asselt (2015) note that differences within their variable 'other own revenue' were large. Dividing this variable into more specific ones would allow for more detailed results. This might have allowed them to explain the unexpected rise in other own revenue for 'small' performing arts companies in comparison to 'large' ones.

Aim of this research

Further research is needed to reach a more definitive answer to the question whether or not the Dutch cultural sector is subject to a Matthew effect. Furthermore, even if a Matthew effect is not present, the increased focus on market values that can be seen since 2002 and especially following the budget cuts announced in 2011 will likely have had an effect on cultural institutions. Therefore, this paper aims to answer the following research question:

> *RQ: How have different Dutch cultural institutions experienced the increased focus on market values since 2012?*

This research question is split into a quantitative and a qualitative question. Building on the research by Gielen and Van Asselt (2015), the quantitative research question is as follows:

> *RQ1: Is there a Matthew effect in income trends for cultural institutions in the Netherlands for the period 2013-2016?*

If a Matthew effect is present, the expectation is that large cultural institutions are more able to generate own income and are better able to meet subsidy requirements, therefore receiving more governmental funding, than smaller institutions. Furthermore, cultural institutions that are situated in

more densely populated areas, such as the Randstad[3], are expected to perform better in these aspects than companies situated in more rural areas (Schrijvers et al., 2015; Schrijvers, 2018). This leads to the following hypotheses:

> **H1:** *Differences in income trends between large and small cultural institutions in the Netherlands increase over the period 2013-2016.*
>
> **H2:** *Differences in income trends between cultural institutions within the Randstad and elsewhere in the Netherlands increase over the period 2013-2016.*

How cultural institutions in the Netherlands have experienced the increased focus on market values has not yet been studied. Did they need to adapt their business models in any way? Were they able to increase their own income or did they not experience any need to do so? Therefore, in addition to the quantitative aspect of this study, interviews are conducted with professionals in the cultural sector to answer the following qualitative research question:

> **RQ2:** *How do cultural institutions experience the increased focus on market values and what is the effect of that on their operations?*

The expectation is that large cultural institutions and those situated in the Randstad have different experiences with the increased focus on market values than small and rurally located cultural institutions.

Method

Design

The presence of a Matthew effect on cultural institutions as a result of recent cultural policy trends in the Netherlands has not yet conclusively been studied, although it has often been suggested. Furthermore, the experience of cultural institutions after the retrenchments after 2011 has not been studied at all. This exploratory study aims to fill this knowledge gap with both qualitative and quantitative analysis, using a parallel mixed methods design (Tashakkori, Johnson & Teddlie, 2020, pp.113).

A mixed methods design was chosen for this study as it is well suited for answering confirmatory and exploratory questions simultaneously, the quantitative and qualitative research questions respectively for this study, as well as allowing for multiple perspectives. The combination

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[3] I.e., the Randstad metropolitan area, encompassing the four largest cities in the Netherlands: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. In this paper, the Randstad is defined as the following municipalities: Amsterdam, Almere, Alkmaar, Utrecht, Rotterdam, Leiden, Den Haag, Amersfoort, Dordrecht, Hilversum, Haarlem and Zaanstad.

of qualitative and quantitative design can help increase understanding. The qualitative analysis can confirm or disconfirm the results of the quantitative study and provide insight into why this is the case (Tashakkori et al., 2020, pp.49-50).

The qualitative part of this study will focus on what the effects are of the indicators that led to the idea a Matthew effect may be present in the Dutch cultural sector. The quantitative part focusses on ascertaining the presence of the Matthew effect. Together, both parts of the study help to answer the overall aim of the research, which is to understand what effect recent budget cuts and increased focus on market values in Dutch cultural policy have had on cultural institutions.

Sample

Quantitative data on income streams of cultural institutions in the Netherlands is collected from existing data. This paper uses the ministry of OCW's data warehouse, also used by Gielen and Van Asselt (2015). All cultural institutions that received funding from OCW (from the BIS or one of the six national culture funds) or from the G9[4] are included. The data covers income from subsidies divided into national, municipal and provincial funding, private funds, public revenue, sponsor, private and other revenue.

The 2013-2016 period covers the complete policy and subsidy cycle of 2013-2016, as commended by Gielen and Van Asselt (2015). Analysing a single policy cycle minimizes external effects caused by new policies or austerity measures. Data for 2020 is not yet fully available, and is distorted by the effects of the closure of the cultural sector as a result of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Including the full policy cycle of 2017-2020 would therefore be of no benefit to the analysis. After 2016, OCW stopped collecting data from the G9, meaning that the addition of the years 2017-2019 would reduce the sample to mostly large institutions, as these are overrepresented in the BIS.

When an institution received funding from both a municipality and OCW in a given year, the data supplied to the municipality and the national fund were both present in the dataset. If the data for the same year were not identical for both these sources, the source with the most specific and disaggregated data was deemed most reliable and used, the other was deleted. For instance, if both sources stated a different amount for total subsidies received in a year and only one source specified how that total was build up from municipal, regional and national subsidies, that source was used.

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[4] The nine municipalities that house the majority of the institutions included in the Basic Infrastructure (*Culturele Basisinfrastructuur*, BIS): Amsterdam, Arnhem, Den Haag, Eindhoven, Enschede, Groningen, Maastricht, Rotterdam and Utrecht.

Cultural institutions that were missing data for one or more of the years 2013-2016 were excluded from the analysis. When data for either total subsidies or total own income was missing and could not be aggregated from the other cells, the institution was omitted.

Based on these exclusion criteria, the data of 183 cultural institutions were excluded from the analysis. For 474 institutions data for all four years could be used. A visual representation of the cumulative income and size of the cultural institutions is depicted in Figure 2. For the sample, yearly income ranged from 21 thousand to 111 million euros in 2013 ($M = 3.044.943,55$, $SD = 7.462.765,84$).

Figure 2

Distribution of cumulative size and income for cultural institutions

Of these 474 institutions, 365 reside in the Randstad and only 109 outside of the Randstad. Although a more even distribution would be welcome, it represents the reality of the sector quite well. The amount of cultural institutions and institutions financed via the BIS and the national culture funds are much higher within the Randstad (Boekmanstichting, 2020).

The qualitative data consists of semi-structured interviews that were held in Dutch, with directors of museum and pop music venues within the province of Utrecht. At the time of participant recruitment, it seemed likely that quantitative data that could be used for this study would be limited

to data from museums and pop music venues. The research population for the qualitative data was adapted to fit this prospect. When it became clear that these data would not be provided, the choice was made for the OCW data warehouse. It was however too late to change the selection of interview candidates. A selection of museums and pop music venues of different sizes within the province of Utrecht was made and then asked to participate per email.

As of 2019, there are 34 museums in the province of Utrecht registered at the Museum Association, of which five directors, representing eight museums, were interviewed. Of these eight, three were situated in the Randstad (i.e. the municipality of Utrecht) and five were not. Three can be classified as large, three as medium sized and two as small museums. Of the six pop music venues in the province, three medium sized venues were interviewed of which two were in the Randstad.

Procedure

Rather than using a dichotomous variable of 'large' and 'small' to distinguish differences in size between cultural institutions, this paper will assess if differences in income trends increase over time using a Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality in a distribution, first introduced by Corrado Gini, commonly used to represent inequality of income within a nation or group (Ceriani & Verme, 2012).

Using the Gini coefficient to assess inequality provides an alternative to a dichotomous distinction of size between 'large' and 'small' and retains more information. The dichotomous distinction by Gielen and Van Asselt (2015) had large withing group differences that affected the results. The Gini coefficient does not suffer from this problem.

The Gini coefficient, a number between zero and one, is calculated by the difference between a hypothetical straight line depicting perfect equality, and the line depicting the actual situation. A Gini score of one represents maximum inequality, where one actor possesses all means, and zero maximum equality, with everyone owning exactly the same. It can be formulated as Gini=A/(A+B), depicted by Figure 3.

Figure 3

Representation of the Gini coefficient

Looking at inequality of income between different sized cultural institutions, the institutions are ranked from smallest to largest on the X-axis. The size of the cultural institutions is established using the total income from the first year of the period that is tested, 2013. On the Y-axis is their corresponding total income.

As a lot of the disaggregated data is missing from the dataset, only the coefficients for total subsidies, own income and total income (being total subsidies plus own income) can be analysed. For all four years, the separate income numbers are put into the equation, resulting in three Gini coefficients for the distribution as a whole for each year. If the Gini coefficient increases for these years, inequality has increased. Though there is no agreement in the literature when a change in Gini coefficient value can be deemed as significant (Förster & Tóth, 2015), Atkinson (2008) proposes a 10% difference to be registered as significant.

Differences in income trends between cultural institutions within and outside of the Randstad are tested using a two way repeated measures ANOVA using SPSS for the total income, total subsidies and total own income. Here, income is the dependent variable and time (in years) and Randstad (inside or outside) are independent variables. Time is a within subject factor, Randstad a between subject factor. The expectation is that the effect of time is higher for institutions within the Randstad than for those outside of the Randstad. An interaction effect between the variables time and Randstad would indicate a Matthew effect of location.

The interviews were held between September and August of 2021. They took between 25 and 50 minutes and were done via Microsoft Teams so as to reduce travelling because of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. At the start of all interviews, the topic was introduced and the concept of the Matthew effect explained. The interviews were transcribed and anonymized from audio recordings and coded

in NVIVO following the grounded theory process of open, axial and selective coding (Boeije, 2010, pp.93-121). The topic list and structured code tree can be found in Appendix A.

Prior to conducting the interviews, the study was approved by the ethics review board of the faculty of behavioural sciences of the University of Utrecht. The audio recordings and anonymized transcriptions of the interviews are stored on a secure server of the Utrecht University. Contact information is stored on a separate secure server. Participants were informed on their right to stop at any point in time, their privacy and data storage. Written and verbal informed consent was obtained from all participants before the interview.

Results

Quantitative results

The Gini coefficient was calculated as Gini = 1 - *sum of scores*. With each institutions score calculated as *score = fraction of total income * (fraction of total population + 2 * fraction richer part op population*) (Thakur, n.d.). The Gini coefficient scores are depicted in Table 1 and a visualisation of the scores is depicted in Figure 4.

Table 1

Gini scores

	Year			
	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total subsidies				
Gini score	0,845	0,772	0,782	0,777
Difference previous year	-	0,073	-0,009	0,005
Difference 2013	-	0,073	0,064	0,068
Total own income				
Gini score	0,902	0,854	0,857	0,849
Difference previous year	-	0,049	-0,004	0,008
Difference 2013	-	0,049	0,045	0,053
Total income				
Gini score	0,724	0,615	0,629	0,615
Difference previous year	-	0,109*	-0,014	0,013
Difference 2013	-	0,109*	0,095	0,109*

* Significant at >10% change

Figure 4

Visualisation of Gini scores

Differences between 2013 and 2014 are largest for all Gini scores. The Gini score change for total income between 2013 and 2014 and between 2013 and 2016 indicate a significant increase in equality with a percentual difference of 10.9% (Atkinson, 2008).

As shown in Figure 5, cultural institutions (*n* = 474) in the Randstad receive less subsidies on average than those outside the Randstad, whilst the own income of the institutions in the Randstad is on average higher than for those outside the Randstad. These differences were however not significant, respectively *p* = .198 and *p* = .426.

Figure 5

Mean incomes for cultural institutions within and outside of the Randstad

Mauchly's test for the two way repeated measures ANOVA for total subsidies indicated a violation of the sphericity assumption, $\chi^2(5) = 1372$, $p = .001$. Since sphericity is violated ($\varepsilon = 0.520$), Greenhouse-Geisser corrected results are reported. No significant interaction effect between Randstad and time was found, $F(1560,736.42) = 1.044$, $p = .338$, $\eta^2 = 0.002$. For total own income, Mauchly's test was significant, $\chi^2(5) = 454.89$, $p = .001$, $\varepsilon = 0.687$. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected results reported no significant interaction effect, $F(2061,972.76) = .855$, $p = .428$, $\eta^2 = 0.002$. For total income, Mauchly's test was significant too, $\chi^2(5) = 819.63$, $p = .001$, $\varepsilon = 0.593$. No significant interaction effect was found, using Greenhouse-Geisser corrected results, $F(1779,839.47) = .334$, $p = .690$, $\eta^2 = 0.001$.

Qualitative results

Museums

When asked about the presence of a Matthew effect as a result of size, opinions on its presence differ amongst the respondents. One director states that especially smaller institutions, with either a too specific or too general profile, are disappearing. Another believes large institutions profit from efficiency advantages that come with larger organizations, and that the largest museums have siphoned traffic and attention away from the smallest museums with large blockbuster exhibitions. Two others believe size is not really a factor, but that success relies on clear policy and the ability to stay socially relevant, something which can also be achieved by small institutions with few employees.

A central theme in the interviews with museums was growth and the ability of institutions to grow. One respondent stated they felt a pressure to keep growing since "flat is dead". Without growth, an institution loses its room for innovation and can lose its societal relevance. When this happens, they become less interesting for sponsors, public and private funds and the different governmental layers. All interviewed directors stated that this can lead to a downward spiral that is hard to escape from. This, they believe, is because of the interrelatedness of the different aspects in which growth can take place: income, marketing, visibility, audience numbers, large or innovative exhibitions. As one punt it: "Success is a circle". When a museum has the ability, i.e. the financial means, to create interesting exhibitions, something can be put into motion:

> *"The activities you undertake lead to something, that allows you to take another stap, for which you can try to raise funds. In that way, you do not have to keep surviving as an organisation but you can create space to try new ideas, which can bring forth things that lead*

to more visitors, which increases income and that in turn helps raise ideas for fundraising so that you can undertake new projects. One thing leads to another." (Museum 1)[5]

"Marketing without programming is of no use. You need to invest in appealing exhibitions that focus on a national audience. That is where it starts. And you need to assure that you bring these under attention, that you have a marketing budget that suits this. It is programming and marketing. When you are able to create momentum for that, when you are able to generate funds to invest in that, then you have the ability to escape from that Matthew effect." (Museum 4)

The hard part is to find the starting point for this upwards spiral out of stagnation or decline. Subsidies, mostly paid by municipalities, can play a part in this:

"And when you can invest, I expect that can help you gain more visitors. The point is that you need money first to be able to change, renew, strengthen. That really has to come from subsidies." (Museum 2)

But there are other ways to kickstart growth that do not have to rely on an increase budget to come first. Two directors mentioned the chance to cooperate with larger museums on a joint theme that allowed the smaller institutions to profit from the marketing and expertise of the larger ones. The two larger institutions in the sample stated they believed larger institutions have an obligation to society to share their knowledge and cooperate with others, as the goal to bring art and heritage to people goes beyond their own venue walls. A key requirement in any case, according to three directors, is for the museum to have a clear mission, a 'why', with a clear profile for the museum and audience that can consistently be followed. Investing in professionalising relationship management, those relations too that do not directly make you money, can be of great help to gain traction.

The location of the museum can have an impact on what kinds of extra income they can raise to enable growth. On the one hand, a more rural location can provide opportunities for increased income. Due to a lack of alternatives nearby, a museum restaurant could thrive. On the other hand, the size of the municipality the museum resides in and the dominant political views there can affect the possibilities for an increase in subsidies from the municipal level. As the director of a museum in a smaller municipality stated:

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[5] Quotes from the interviews were translated into English. Due to the limited amount of museums and pop music venues in the province of Utrecht, whether an institution was inside or outside the Randstad (i.e., the municipality of Utrecht) is omitted to ensure anonymity.

"No more can come from the municipality then we receive from them now. A city like Utrecht gets a lot more money from the national government to support culture. They have a relatively higher budget per capita. [...]. I'm not sure about Amersfoort, but all the other municipalities are in rough financial waters because laws and regulations were transferred to the municipalities. That puts pressure on arts and culture, because if you cut that, just put on a DVD." (Museum 5)

Options for sponsorships too can differ with location: three directors mentioned how in in larger cities in particular, businesses often have little connection with their city. In smaller communities, there is more goodwill towards local cultural institutions. However, investing in sponsorships is something that takes time and effort.

The nature of sponsorships has changed in the past years and nowadays it plays only a marginal role, which private and public funds also acknowledge. Direct financial sponsoring is less common than at the start of the century. Often, businesses agree to in kind sponsorships or partnerships with a lot of required reciprocity from the cultural institution. One director noted that the motivation for businesses to sponsor culture has changed, turning more towards corporate social responsibility rather than increasing sympathy and awareness for a brand.

Although the old marketing functions of sponsorships may be less important now than at the start of the century, they still play a role. For these marketing purposes, large cultural brands are more interesting than smaller ones and only the very top segment of museums can really profit from it according to three of the directors, indicating a Matthew effect for the size of museums and their ability to gain income from sponsorships:

"The Rijksmuseum is different. That is pre-eminently a brand with which businesses want to affiliate themselves. But even for the Stedelijk Museum it is already much more difficult." (Museum 3)

When it comes to applying for funds, the smaller museums experience an entry bar that is difficult to overcome. The bureaucracy around the applications can be difficult. Small institutions lack time and knowledge on how to deal with the paperwork and do not always plan ahead as far as deadlines require. One of the smaller museums managed to "get into" one of the larger funds by one-time hiring an external advisor. This helped them build a track record at the fund and increase their understanding of the applications. A respondent of a larger museum stressed that you need to know how to stay relevant for funds:

"There is a lot of money in the Netherlands, for arts and culture too. That's at the funds, public and private, but you need to look at what their goals and ambitions are and adjust to

that. […] If you do not move with the social goals of the funds and you keep making art-historic exhibitions that are very interesting from an art-historic perspective but do not match the goals of a fund when it comes to reaching new audiences or education, then you just will not get that funding." (Museum 4)

This increased focus on societal goals at funds comes along at the same time as the 'soft requirements' of the three cultural codes: the code diversity and inclusion, fair practice code and cultural code of conduct (Cultuur+Ondernemen, n.d.). These codes can play a role in professionalisation within cultural institutions. An increasing number of funds and subsidy providers require institutions to follow these codes or otherwise provide an explanation to why they did not.

At this time, the respondents experienced no problems with the cultural codes. However, if acting in accordance to these codes becomes a stricter requirement they might pose a problem for some institutions. One respondent stated their institution was simply too small to be able to operate in accordance with the governance code. Another believes diversity and inclusion to be very important, but can see how diversity would not be applicable for certain museums.

The respondents did not feel an increased pressure from subsidy providers or private funds to increase their own income since 2012. They often impose it on themselves from a belief that diverse income streams are a sign of a healthy organisation. One respondent describes the cap on how much own income they can generate, due to the maximum of visitors they can feasibly expect to get for their niche on a yearly basis. They state some forms of cultural (immaterial) heritage simply cannot be profitable to preserve and present and will always be largely dependent on public funding.

Pop music venues

The pressure felt by the museums to grow was not as present with the pop music venues. These venues, especially those within the city of Utrecht, operate within a network, or chain, of venues. This is traditionally thought to function as a breeding ground for talent that can climb the ladder from the smallest to the largest concert hall. The two respondents from Utrecht stated there was a cap to how far they could grow, with expanding the audience capacity of their venues not being a feasible option due to this chain:

"[…] you are limited in your capacity, you have to work with what you have. We have looked at the possibility to increase the capacity of our hall, but you do have to deal with the chain, where you do not want to compete in capacity with a larger venue. You still sometimes try to look for room to grow, but you are very much limited to your building." (Pop venue 2)

The reason a pop venue would want to increase their hall's capacity is to do with scale advantageous. Costs such as hiring technicians stay relatively equal with higher audience numbers.

One of the respondents stated that after their venue had focused on increasing the efficiency of their exploitation in the number of events they hosted, they now plateaued and marginal costs increase at the same rate as income. There is a strong focus on increasing their own income, and the pop music venues rely less on public subsidies than most museums. Because the percentage of their income that comes from subsidies is low, the pressure to increase their own income has always been present and is not the result of budget cuts of recent years.

It is somewhat ingrained in the sector to focus on breaking even with ticket sales and catering income, which can require risk averse programming. Two of the respondents describe looking at other sources of income such as funds as relatively new for their venues:

> *"A show can only have a place here if it proves their success. [This stems] from the idea that we truly have to be able to stand on our own two feet. I try to create some space now and then by appealing to other funds, as we are now a core venue and a part of that regulation. I do try. I try to find somewhat of a balance between daring to take risks and purely focussing on the business aspect."* (Pop venue 1)

As is the case for the museums, funds have been focussing on societal themes such as inclusion, diversity and community building, by funding venues that focus on connections and added value for their surrounding neighbourhood or town. One director mentioned this had positive effects on how their upcoming educational programs were received with funds. However, following the cultural governance code increased expenses, and they believe it could lead to problems for the venue in the future.

Being part of the chain of venues means that the smaller venues within Utrecht all take up a relevant place, with increasingly clear niches and target audiences, and experience less problems as a result of their size than reported by the smaller museums. There is good contact between the venues within the chain and a willingness to cooperate with each other.

The interviewed director of the stage outside the city of Utrecht had different experiences. Today's audiences are increasingly looking for large, well-known artists and are less interested in niches and experiments, he believes. Booking these big artists is out of reach for small stages located outside of large cities. This is not helped with the opening of TivoliVredenburg, the largest music complex in the region that opened its doors in 2014:

> *"Managers and artists choose the biggest to earn more, so they go for TivoliVredenburg. The side effect is that with [the opening of TivoliVredenburg,] it has become increasingly difficult to offer good shows in the other municipalities."* (Pop venue 3)

With a decreasing percentage of the audience coming from the municipality the venue resides in, he believes it is important regional venues redetermine their role. As they are subsidised by the local community, they have a responsibility towards the community. He sees merging with other locally subsidized institutions that are often struggling too, such as music schools and libraries, as a way to create multipurpose venues that can still be a relevant meeting place for the community.

Focus on the societal functions of pop music venues is increasing again after the large budget cuts of 2011, according to two of the respondents. They see production houses and community culture houses (*buurtcultuurhuizen*) that were cut are being built up again:

> *"I believe a countermovement is underway, certainly with the new 'woke generation', and that there is more attention to the societal value of culture. The stigma that culture was just something else that needed to be paid for, rammed in by Halbe Zijlstra, it is now clear for everyone that is not the case. [...] I feel like we are again intrinsically valued and not just economically."* (Pop venue 1)

It is clear from this quote a focus on market values was present after 2011 and that is seems to be declining now. Participants did not state their venues had to change the way they operated since 2012 due to this fact. However, the renewed focus on the societal functions of pop music venues does give them the opportunity to change their programming to along with this movement.

Discussion

Conclusions

The results show that how Dutch cultural institutions experienced the increased focus on market values since 2012 in terms of challenges and opportunities to their operations varies per subsector and depends on the size and location of the institution. There are large differences between Dutch cultural institutions in terms of income. To a degree, the challenges these institutions face are related to their size. The existing differences have not increased over the period 2013-2016.

The quantitative data shows no evidence of a Matthew effect for total income, subsidies or own income for cultural institutions in the Netherlands. Only between 2013 and 2014 did the Gini coefficient change significantly, decreasing by 10.9%, indicating an increase in equality between institutions. Without significant differences being visible over an extended period of time, the presence of a (inverted) Matthew effect of size cannot be concluded and hypothesis H1 must be rejected.

When looking at pop music venues specifically, the qualitative data also do not indicate a Matthew effect of size. However, for the museum sector the qualitative data suggests small size can

negatively impact the organisation. For smaller museums it is harder to maintain relevance because of limited budgets to invest in innovation and exhibitions. They have more difficulty to apply for funds due to a lack time and expertise and the lack of innovation and exhibitions decrease their chance of getting funds allocated. Sponsorships play a very marginal role in the funding of museums nowadays, and are only of relevance for the very top segment of the sector.

The conclusion that there is no Matthew effect on income for size is present for the period 2013-2016, is in line with the findings from Gielen and Van Asselt (2015). For museums, they found significant differences between large and small institutions between 2012 and 2013. This was mostly caused by differences in subsidy income, which decreased more in 2013 for smaller institutions due to budget cuts that were implemented from the start of the policy cycle of 2013-2016. For the other subsectors studied, differences between 2012 and 2013 were also largest, although inverse. As this study only looks at the policy cycle 2013-2016, such differences cannot be seen.

As for a Matthew effect for location, no significant evidence was found in the quantitative analysis. H2 is therefore also rejected. The experts interviewed were not in agreement on the presence of a Matthew effect for location. For museums, arguments can be made both for and against a rural location as a negative factor on income. Two attributes of location that can impact income, how much connection businesses feel to their town or city and the number of wealthy inhabitants, cannot directly be linked to the size or centrality of the city of residence. A Matthew effect for location is supported by the qualitative data for pop venues, but due to the very limited sample size cannot be concluded from this study.

From the interviews it can be concluded that it can be very difficult to grow as a small museum. For the pop music venues in Utrecht, the chain of venues makes it harder to expand and also undesirable. If this is the case, one would expect most institutions would generally stay the same size, if they are not the victim of municipal budget cuts. This is supported by the quantitative data, that do not show significant changes in income inequality.

It must be concluded that there is no Matthew effect in income trends for cultural institutions in the Netherlands for the period 2013-2016. The quantitative results refute both the hypotheses for size and location. Results from the qualitative results are more ambiguous however. This ambiguity is more in line with the findings of Gielen and Van Asselt (2015). Both the composition of the sample and the short length of the accessed period in this study can have skewed the quantitative results. This would explain the discrepancy between the quantitative and qualitative results.

Regarding how cultural institutions experienced the increased focus on marked values, no increase in pressure was felt to increase the own income since 2012. Less than in 2012, cultural

institutions seem to be judged on economic factors alone, and importance placed on intrinsic value and societal impact has increased, especially at funds. This creates an opportunity for cultural institutions to adapt their programming to these values. This does not mean institutions have stopped focussing on ensuring programming is financially viable. For some institutions, as can be seen at the pop music venues, it can open the possibility to attract funds as a new form of income to support their programming.

With the diminishing role of sponsorships in recent years for most institutions, there was a need to compensate for the loss of that income source. Funds and governmental layers were reported to be understanding of the changing function of sponsorships in judging applications.

A notable change in the organisational structure for some of the institutions could be seen, partly caused by the soft requirements of the three cultural codes. In some cases, this professionalisation has opened up possibilities for other innovation within the institution or applying for funds. Mostly the larger organisations included in the interviews were able to use this as an opportunity to increase their societal impact, investing in educational programs or collaborations outside of their own walls.

The cultural codes aid in professionalising the sector and can help creators, but they do raise the cost of cultural institutions. The governance code can require additional employees and the fair practice code and the need to focus on diversity and inclusion raises costs. Smaller institutions expressed their concerns if they would be able to adhere to all codes. When the cultural codes become a stricter requirement for funding, they might prove to be a risk for creating a Matthew effect for the size of cultural institutions.

Limitations and future research

The quantitative data set used suffered from a number of limitations that impact both the internal and external validity. Firstly, the current data set did not allow for the further disaggregation of 'other own income' suggested by Gielen and Van Asselt (2015). The data set used is subject to a lot of missing data for the subcategories making up the total subsidy income and total own income. The qualitative results also suggest that looking at differences in sponsoring income could be of value. As the data from both OCW and the national associations are collected on a voluntary basis, this data likely all suffer from the problem of missing or incorrect data. Further disaggregating income streams might therefore not be feasible to research at all.

Second, the dataset used only included data from cultural institutions that received funding from OCW or the G9. If a Matthew effect of location has been present for some time predating 2013, this data set will have skewed the results of both the analysis of a Matthew effect on location and size.

Although not all municipalities in the G9 are part of the Randstad, they are by definition large municipalities. Institutions residing in the G9, will have become relatively large before 2013.

Lastly, though the quantitative data show an absence of a Matthew effect for the Dutch cultural sector as a whole, the qualitative data suggest the effects of size could be very different between subsectors (i.e., museums, pop music venues, performing arts companies, etc.). Calculating Gini coefficients specific to each subsector could therefore lead to different results. The dataset used for this study was unfit for this analysis, as sector categories applied to the same institutions often changed between years, indicating that these were unreliable.

A number of interest groups and associations for cultural institutions collect data from their members.[6] As their members supply this data on a voluntary basis, data is often incomplete or incorrect. Furthermore, these associations are not always willing (or allowed) to share their data with third parties as they fear it can damage their lobbying power or their members. Thus, whilst some data from these associations was acquired for the purpose of this research, the reliability and limited size of the data was unfit for use. With support in the form of data use from these associations, future research could be able to better examine the effects of size on each subsector.

There is a demand for more centralized data on supply, participation and finances from both the cultural sector and politics (Boekmanstichting, 2020). Currently, large scale research will require either costly data collection or the cooperation of the interest groups and associations. Data is collected locally by municipalities as a requirement for all subsidized institutions but is not actively shared. National cooperation on making this data available is necessary to form and substantiate national and local policies and can save money unnecessarily spend on aggregating data. However, the fact that the data warehouse from OCW stopped including data from the G9 after 2016 shows this situation likely will not change soon.

As noted in the procedure section above, using the Gini coefficient has advantages over the dichotomous distinction used by Gielen and Van Asselt (2015). However, the Gini coefficient is most sensitive to inequalities in the middle part of the spectrum (De Maio, 2007). This will have affected the Gini scores in this study, as the differences in the sample are largest at both ends of the spectrum. For total income in 2013, the top 10% of institutions in the sample represent 59.8% of total income for the sample and the bottom 10% just 0.4%. Future research could look at alternative measures of income inequality to combat this problem, such as the Atkinson index (De Maio, 2007).

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[6] Most notable are the Museum Association, the Association of Theatre and Concert Hall Boards (*Vereniging van Schouwburg- en Concertgebouwdirecties*, VSCD), the Association of Dutch Pop music venues and Festivals (*Vereniging Nederlandse Poppodia en -Festival*, VNPF) and the Dutch Association for the Performing Arts (*Nederlands Associatie voor Podiumkunsten*, NAPK).

Concluding remarks

Overall, the current study shows the large differences that exist between cultural institutions in the Netherlands, both in distribution of income streams and their experiences and challenges in business operations. These differences, although pressing, seem to be fairly stable and did not change significantly between 2013 and 2016, indicating there is no Matthew effect present in the Dutch cultural sector.

Because smaller institutions struggle to maintain their level of operations and experience difficulty to grow, it is understandable that the presence of a Matthew effect was presumed in the literature. However, the results from this study disprove the presence of a Matthew effect for either location or size. Thus, no policy changes are required to mitigate a Matthew effect to ensure the national policy goal of giving everyone the opportunity to enjoy the richness of culture, as the diversity and geographical distribution of cultural institutions is not under threat of a Matthew effect.

It must be emphasized that many forms of art will always be dependent on public funding. Some institutions, such as niche museums, have a conservational task of keeping (immaterial) cultural heritage alive and the level of income they can feasibly generate can be limited. The renewed trend towards valuing cultural institutions on their intrinsic value instead of only on economic grounds can already be of help for these institutions.

It is clear from this research that smaller cultural institutions experience significant difficulties. The difficulty these institutions experience in growing out of their precarious position can be helped by one-time investments from the different governmental layers, such as by creating regulations for innovation for which institutions can apply. A number of cultural institutions have proved that with the right vision, a kickstart can help them enter a positive spiral that can have positive impact their relevance, impact on and connection with the local community, and help them tap into other forms of income to eventually be more financially healthy and resilient. For such a regulation to reach the smaller institutions, it must be assured the bar to apply for it is as low as possible.

Another way to kickstart the growth of smaller institutions is by encouraging collaborations between large and smaller institutions in a region. Both sides of such a collaboration can profit from the shared marketing and expertise. This has already proven successful for museums in the province of Utrecht. The interviews with pop music venues and museums suggest that larger institutions are open to collaboration and that they feel the task to bring culture to people extends beyond their venue walls.

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       s/2019/06/11/uitgangspunten-cultuurbeleid-2021-2024

Appendix A: topic list and code tree

Topic list

- Opening: kunt u iets vertellen over uw functie bij [culturele instelling]?
- Denkt u dat er sprake is van een Mattheüseffect in de cultuursector in Nederland?
    - Waarom wel/niet? / waardoor
    - Wat zou er verder achter kunnen zitten/ zijn er nog alternatieve verklaringen voor?
- Wat doet [culturele instelling] met betrekking tot het genereren van eigen inkomsten?
    - Denk aan sponsor- en donatiewerving, commerciële activiteiten
- Is dit in de afgelopen jaren (sinds 2012) veranderd?
    - Is er een andere focus aangebracht?
    - Is er iets veranderd met betrekking tot de publieksinkomsten?
    - Zijn er meer of minder werknemers betrokken bij acquisitie?
- Hoe gaat het met de eigen inkomsten?
    - Zijn de eigen inkomsten in lijn met de beleidsplannen van [culturele instelling]?
    - Waardoor wel/niet?
    - Hoe verhoudt [culturele instelling] zich in dit opzicht tot andere instellingen volgens u?
- Ervaart u een toegenomen druk op [culturele instelling] sinds u hier kwam werken om eigen inkomsten te genereren?
    - Waarom wel/niet?
    - Wat voor effect heeft dit op [culturele instelling]?
    - Is het mogelijk de eigen inkomsten (verder) te doen groeien? Voorbeeld als onduidelijk: door te investeren in extra werknemers op het gebied van fondsenwerving.
- Zijn er andere dingen veranderd binnen [culturele instelling] of de bredere cultuursector in de afgelopen jaren?
    - Wat voor invloed hebben die gehad op [culturele instelling]?
- Afsluiting: zijn er verder nog dingen die u wilt delen? Heeft u nog vragen voor mij?

Code tree

Musea	Blockbusters	publieksgroei discussie
		succes wordt bestraft
	Collectie vs tentoonstellingen	functie tentoonstellingen
		functie vaste collectie
		tentoonstellingspubliek
	Consolidatie	consolidatie
	Eigen inkomsten	cultureel ondernemerschap
		diversie inkomsten is gezond
		druk op eigen inkomsten
		hoge eisen inkomsten
		lage eigen inkomsten slecht teken
		rol van vastgoed op financiën
		verwachtingen rondom eigen inkomsten
	Fondsen	aansluiting bij fondsen
		fondsen lastig voor kleinen
		iedereen is fondsenwerver
		in de molen komen
	Groeien	alleen kunnen overleven
		basis om te investeren
		blijven vernieuwen
		de wil moet er zijn
		duidelijk merk
		flat is dead
		groei belangrijk
		imago voor opwaartse spiraal
		losse organisatie
		max op bezoekersgroei
		mazzel en relatiebeheer
		missie scherp houden
		naar een basis voor tentoonstellingsbudget
		neerwaartse spiraal
		niveau handhaven
		oorzaak groei eigen inkomsten
		op tijd een aantal stappen
		opwaartse spiraal
		organische ontwikkeling
		professionalisering relatiebeheer
		programmering en marketing tegelijk
		realistisch naar subsidieverstrekker
		ruimte om ideeën uit te werken
		slimme marketing
		succes is een cirkel
		succes trekt succes aan
		themajaar als startpunt
		uit neerwaartse spiraal komen

		visie nodig
		zichtbaarheid als vliegwiel
	Locatie	afgelegen ook kans
		bedrijven verbonden met stad
		goodwill van gemeenschap
		kleine gemeenten
		liggen trekt makkelijker publiek
		plek voor horeca
		verhuizen geen optie
		vermogende bewoners
	Maatschappelijke functie	functie niet gesubsidieerd
		instellingen overeind houden
		maatschappelijke rol
		museumtaak kan niet rendabel worden
		zonder ons verdwijnt het
	Omvang	groot vs klein
		kleine instellingen verdwijnen
		samenwerking groot klein
	Sponsoring	motivatie van sponsoring
		sponsoring alleen voor 1%
		sponsoring en imago
		sponsoring lastig voor kleinen
		sponsoring teruggenomen
		sponsoring veranderd
		visie en relevant
	Zachte eisen	D&I is niet voor iedereen
		D&I moet oprecht zijn
		educatie
		governance
Poppodia	Eigen inkomsten	druk bestond al
		meer dance
		ook risico's nemen
		plafond bereikt
		sterk afhankelijk van eigen inkomsten
	Fondsen en subsidie	denkwijze financiering
		doelstellingen overnemen
		fondsen gaan voor grote namen
		maatschappelijke thema's keren terug
		meer risico in programmering
		subsidie blijft spannend
	Keten	eigen gezicht krijgen
		max op groei
		niche invullen
		onafhankelijk geworden
		plek in keten
		prijsstijging personeel

	samenwerking
Maatschappelijke functie	heropbouw
	minder lokaal publiek
	weer intrinsiek beoordeeld
Omvang	aanbod gaat voor groot podium
	schaalvoordelen
Overig	consolidatie
	horeca en recette belangrijkst
	ligging niet relevant
	onafhankelijk worden
	verkopen toch uit
Profilering	compact en knus
	duidelijke profilering
	imago gekregen
	samenvoeging tot cultuurcentrum
	wat is je functie
	wereld is veranderd
	zichtbaarheid programmering
Zachte eisen	educatie
	professionalisering

Appendix B: SPSS syntax

* Encoding: UTF-8.

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet2.
GLM Sub2013 Sub2014 Sub2015 Sub2016 BY Randstad
 /WSFACTOR=time 4 Polynomial
 /MEASURE=Subsidy
 /METHOD=SSTYPE(3)
 /PLOT=PROFILE(time*Randstad time) TYPE=LINE ERRORBAR=NO MEANREFERENCE=NO
YAXIS=AUTO
 /EMMEANS=TABLES(OVERALL)
 /EMMEANS=TABLES(Randstad) COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI)
 /EMMEANS=TABLES(time) COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI)
 /EMMEANS=TABLES(Randstad*time)
 /PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE ETASQ OPOWER HOMOGENEITY
 /CRITERIA=ALPHA(.05)
 /WSDESIGN=time
 /DESIGN=Randstad.

GLM Eig2013 Eig2014 Eig2015 Eig2016 BY Randstad
 /WSFACTOR=time 4 Polynomial
 /MEASURE=Own_income
 /METHOD=SSTYPE(3)
 /PLOT=PROFILE(time*Randstad time) TYPE=LINE ERRORBAR=NO MEANREFERENCE=NO
YAXIS=AUTO
 /EMMEANS=TABLES(OVERALL)
 /EMMEANS=TABLES(Randstad) COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI)
 /EMMEANS=TABLES(time) COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI)
 /EMMEANS=TABLES(Randstad*time)
 /PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE ETASQ OPOWER HOMOGENEITY
 /CRITERIA=ALPHA(.05)
 /WSDESIGN=time
 /DESIGN=Randstad.

GLM Tot2013 Tot2014 Tot2015 Tot2016 BY Randstad

```
/WSFACTOR=time 4 Polynomial
/MEASURE=Total_income
/METHOD=SSTYPE(3)
/PLOT=PROFILE(time*Randstad time) TYPE=LINE ERRORBAR=NO MEANREFERENCE=NO
YAXIS=AUTO
/EMMEANS=TABLES(OVERALL)
/EMMEANS=TABLES(Randstad) COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI)
/EMMEANS=TABLES(time) COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI)
/EMMEANS=TABLES(Randstad*time)
/PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE ETASQ OPOWER HOMOGENEITY
/CRITERIA=ALPHA(.05)
/WSDESIGN=time
/DESIGN=Randstad.
```