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The Two Faces of the Netherlands

A Multilateral Approach to the Dilemmas in Dutch Foreign Policy Regarding the Korean War
and the NDVN 'Nederlandse Detachement Verenigde Naties'

MA Thesis International Relations in Historical Perspective

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Abstract

It is not well-known in the Netherlands that nearly 5,000 soldiers served from December 1950 to January 1955 during the Korean War. From these 5,000 soldiers, 120 soldiers lost their lives on the Korean peninsula. During the beginning of the Cold War, the United States led the United Nations in a mission against the communists in Korea. The Netherlands, amongst fifteen other countries, answered the call of the United States, and sent several naval ships and most importantly the 'Nederlands Departement Verenigde Naties', the NDVN. This battalion of volunteers served under United States command and were part of some of the most crucial battles during the war.

Existing literature reveals that the Dutch government was not a willing participant of the Korean War, but were persuaded by the United States because of its political pressure. The Korean War came at an inopportune moment for the Netherlands because they were rebuilding their nation after the Second World War and had just lost the majority of the Netherlands East Indies. The limited existing literature states describe the course of the Netherlands in Korea and show that the government withdrew its attention to the conflict almost immediately after entering the war in 1950. Nevertheless, the war lasted 2 more years and Dutch troops stayed in Korea until December 1954 where they worked closely with the United States under the flag of the United Nations.

These previous studies have looked at the actions of the Dutch government in a descriptive manner. They have failed to analyze these decisions critically or academically. As a result, this study has drawn from these descriptive studies and has analyzed the foreign policy of the Netherlands in regard to the Korean War through the lenses of multilateralism and allyship with a focus on the Dutch-American alliance specifically as this relationship has shown to be the most influential in regard to the Dutch government's decisions during the Korean War. Additionally, small-state theory has been applied to look at the Netherlands'

position in international politics and whether the relationship between a large state, the United States, and a small-state, the Netherlands, has been affected by the Netherlands' position.

During this study, the following research question was analyzed '*How was the Netherlands influenced internally and externally in its foreign policy regarding the Korean War and the deployment of the NDVN*'? Dutch policy regarding the Korean War was influenced by several aspects. The Netherlands was undergoing a change in foreign policy from an independent and neutral policy to one that was influenced by Atlanticism and focused more on alliances. Although these alliances, especially the Dutch government-American alliance, were at the center of foreign politics for the Dutch government, the Netherlands had a complicated relationship with the United States. While the Netherlands did confront the United States several times regarding its Korean War policy, Dutch diplomats were generally a loyal ally within United Nations and NATO context. This is partly due to the position of the Netherlands as a small state that felt the need to side with bigger states such as the United States. In regard to the Korean War, the Dutch government cabinet did not prioritize its participation and sacrificed the welfare of its troops because of the lack of attention from the government after the NDVN's initial deployment. The Dutch government focused more on issues closer to home such as the development of NATO and the unresolved issue of Netherlands New Guinea instead.

Keywords: The Netherlands, Korean War, Foreign Policy, NDVN, Multilateralism, Atlanticism, Critical Ally, Small State

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Introduction

“The Netherlands Government have never failed to take a clear and unequivocal stand as regards the aggression by the North Koreans and Chinese in Korea. The Government have observed with satisfaction how this dangerous attack on the peace in the Far East and in the world has been checked with the weapons and material assistance of a larger number of free countries. They have observed with as much satisfaction how a large majority of the peoples cooperating in the United Nations were willing to defend the precious good of collective security.” – Aide Mémoire from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 11th, 1951.¹

This quote from the Dutch government Ministry of Foreign Affairs tells us about the position that the Netherlands took in public about the Korean War. The Netherlands supposedly was a true ally who never hesitated about its involvement in the conflict and was willing to protect the shared value of collective security together with its United Nations allies. However, contrary to the quote above, the reality of the Netherlands and the Korean War was more complicated than the straightforward narrative that was presented by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to intrinsic motivations such as the belief in a common good such as collective security, the Netherlands was also influenced by its own national politics and by other countries involved in the Korean War. The aspects mentioned above will be explored in this study.

Research Question

The main research question of this study *‘How was the Netherlands influenced internally and externally in its foreign policy regarding the Korean War and the deployment of the NDVN?’* was divided by several sub-questions:

¹ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3406, 11 April 1951.

1. What were the decisions made the Dutch government? What was the chronological order and how are any the changes in the policy explained if there were any?

This question will look at all of the decisions and national political debate on the Korean War. It will also include reactions of the Netherlands on decisions made by the United Nations as well as reflections on its own stance in regard to sending troops to Korea.

2. How did the role of the NDVN in the Korean War help influence Dutch foreign policy and Dutch international relations?

This question will zoom in on the NDVN as a crucial part of the Dutch government foreign policy and how the NDVN influenced this policy as well as the diplomatic and political ties between the Netherlands and the United States. It will discuss the highlights of the battalion as well as personal experiences from veterans to show whether the policy on the NDVN was successful in achieving its aims.

3. Did the Dutch government have intrinsic motivations to send troops to Korea?

The main topic of discussion here will be the general ideologies behind Dutch foreign policy. This will include a look at the changes that the Netherlands made going from a focus on neutrality to a focus on alliances as well as other central concepts such as anti-communism and collective security.

4. What were the external influences on the Dutch government to send troops to Korea?

This final question will explore American-Dutch relations from both positive and negative sides. The question of alliance and being a critical ally, as referred to by Van

Staden, will a focal point. Additionally, this question explores the Dutch government position within the larger field of international politics with the United Nations as the main organizational structure.

To understand the Dutch government's decisions during the Korean War, the following paragraphs will provide background information on the Korean War and the political situation in the Netherlands from the year 1950 until 1954.

The Korean War

On June 25, 1950, North-Korean troops attacked its neighbors to the South, signaling the beginning of the Korean War.² This was due to the rising tensions since the liberation from Japan after the end of the Second World War in 1945. The liberation meant that the Korean peninsula would be divided into two parts, similar to Germany. The Northern part was under the control of the Soviet Union and the Southern part was influenced by the United States of America.³ The attack from the North was for the United States a crucial moment. It was a signal of the rising influence of the Soviets and Communist China in Asia.⁴ As a result, the United States sent troops immediately, even before it received authority from the United Nations Security Council.⁵ This approval came with the ratification of resolution 85 on July 7.⁶

² G. Benthem van den Bergh, Duco Hellema, and Herman de Lange, *Europa eenmaal andermaal: beschouwingen over veiligheid* (Amsterdam: Mets, 1985), 15.

³ Christ Klep and Richard van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo. De Nederlandse militaire deelname aan vredesoperaties sinds 1945* (Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers, 2000), 175.

⁴ Pieter Caljé and Jaap den Hollander, *De lange twintigste eeuw: van 1870 tot heden* (Houten: Spectrum, 2013), 348.

⁵ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 31.

⁶ A.R.J. ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname in de Korea-Oorlog* (Utrecht: Rijksuniversiteit, Instituut voor Geschiedenis, 1983), 16.

The two sides, backed by communist and capitalist powers respectively, participated in a war that would take the lives of four million people.⁷ In 1953 the Korean War would end officially with an armistice. The Korean War was also at the beginning of the Cold War, in which the two major powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, fought many different battles on the Asian continent.⁸

Without diving into much detail, this will be done in first chapter, the Netherlands was present in the war from 16 July 1950 until 24 January 1955 as part of the United Nations troops in Korea, under the command of the United States Army. It was one of sixteen countries under the flag of the United Nations.⁹ The NDVN, ‘Nederlandse Detachement Verenigde Naties’, consisted of 4,748 troops in total. This contribution to the war came with much reluctance under the pressure of the United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie and United States politicians.¹⁰

The Dutch government Political Situation

The reluctance of the Netherlands was mainly due to the political situation of the country. Since 7 August 1948 the government Drees-Van Schaik was in power. It was a government coalition made up of four different political parties, the Katholieke Volkspartij ‘Catholic People's Party’ (KVP), Partij van de Arbeid ‘Labour Party’ (PvdA), Christelijk-Historische Unie ‘Christian-Historical Union’ (CHU), and the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie

⁷ Bruce Cumming, *The Korean War. A History* (New York: Random House, 2010); Kathryn Weathersby, “New Evidence on the Korean War,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6, no. 7 (1995-1996): 30-125.

⁸ Benthem van den Bergh, Hellema, and de Lange, *Europa eenmaal andermaal*, 15.

⁹ Ruud H. Hoff, *Internationale machtsverhoudingen na 1945* (Meppel: Boom onderwijs, 2008), 52.

¹⁰ “Korea Oorlog,” Ministerie van Defensie, accessed July 8, 2022, <https://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/historische-missies/missie-overzicht/1950/korea-oorlog>; M.D. Schaafsma, *Het Nederlandse Detachement Verenigde Naties in Korea 1950-1954* (Den Haag: Staatsdrukkerij, 1960); R. Stiphout, *De Bloedigste Oorlog. Het vergeten Bataljon Nederlandse Militairen in Korea* (Amsterdam: L.J. Veen, 2009).

‘People's Party for Freedom and Democracy’ (VVD). The Communistische Partij Nederland ‘Communist Party of the Netherlands’ presented itself as a rigorous but isolated opposition party during the time.

In 1950, the Netherlands was still occupied with rebuilding its nation after the Second World War. The economy was in a bad shape and the country was struggling with material losses as a result of war damages.¹¹ Additionally, the country also had to recover from losing a large part of its kingdom, the Netherlands East Indies, now known as Indonesia, after an independence war in 1949.¹²

During the Drees-Van Schaik cabinet some important ministers were appointed. The Prime Minister was Willem Drees, a social democrat. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dirk Stikker, was a controversial man who had to leave his position as minister after a vote of censure. The Ministers of Oorlog and Marine ‘war and navy’ were Wim Schokking and Hans Jacob. Cabinet Drees-Van Schaik fell on 24 January 1951.

From 15 March 1951 until 2 September 1952, there was a new cabinet for a short period of time. This cabinet was known as Drees I and was a center-oriented cabinet.

After elections in 1952, Drees continued his time as Prime Minister. This time, the coalition party of the VVD was replaced by the ARP, the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij ‘Anti-Revolutionary Party’. Kees Staf became the Minister of War and Navy. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dirk Stikker, was replaced by two ministers due to internal political troubles.¹³ Joseph Luns, formally known as the Minister zonder Portefeuille translated into ‘without portfolio’, who did not have an assigned topic but was usually involved in many

¹¹ Amry Vandenbosch, *Dutch foreign policy since 1815: a study in small power politics* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 292.

¹² Vandenbosch, *Dutch foreign policy since 1815*, 306.

¹³ Duco A. Hellema, *Neutraliteit & vrijhandel: de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse buitenlandse betrekkingen* (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 2001), 179.

different departments depending on where they were needed, became responsible for bilateral relations and non-European questions, like newly-independent Indonesia and Netherlands New Guinea, and the Korean War. Johan Beyen, formally the Minister of Foreign Affairs was responsible for multilateral relations and primarily focused on European integration.¹⁴ This cabinet lasted until after the Korean War, 1956.

The Netherlands had a lot on its plate due to the repercussions of the Second World War, the loss of territory, and national political struggles within parties and the cabinet but also across parties in the House of Representatives and this caused a lack of enthusiasm on the Netherlands' part to engage in combat in Korea.

Historiography

As briefly mentioned before, the existing literature on the Korean War, especially the Dutch government contribution to this war, is scarce. Ruud Hoff writes for example that “the fighting in Korea ended in July 1951.”¹⁵ This is not only incorrect but also illustrates the fact that most of the literature that does exist tends to focus on the first year of the conflict 1950-1951. Most of the literature that is available are descriptive studies of the Dutch government's decisions and the activities of the NDVN and personal accounts of the war, such as Frans van Dreumel's *We liepen naast de vijand: dagboek van een Korea-veteraan* and Phillipus P. Meerburg's *Legerpredikant in Korea*.¹⁶ In general, there is a lack of critical and academic engagement in regard to Dutch policy on Korea.

¹⁴ Hellema, *Neutraliteit & Vrijhandel*, 179; Albert Kersten, *Luns: een politieke biografie* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2010), 98.

¹⁵ Hoff, *Internationale machtsverhoudingen na 1945*, 52.

¹⁶ See for example: Willem van der Veer, *Wij bidden om de dageraad: Kruisvaarders naar Korea* (Amsterdam: Scheltens & Giltay, 1951); Wim Dussel, *Tjot: Nederlanders in Korea* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij v/h C. de Boer Jr., 1952); Phillipus P. Meerburg, *Legerpredikant in Korea* (Wageningen: N.V. Gebr. Zomer en Keunings Uitgeversmij, 1952); Wim Hornman, *Ik wil leven* (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1952); R. Stiphout, *De Bloedigste*

The Netherlands and the Cold War

Main literature on the Netherlands during the fifties focuses on the development of the Western Union (WU), predecessor to the European Union, and NATO. Hoff talks about ‘the multipolar system of European powers shifted towards a bipolar system after the war as the United States and the Soviet Union became the two dominant powers of the world’.¹⁷ While Caljé and Den Hollander focus on the close cooperation between the Western countries, including the Netherlands, and the United States as part of this bipolar system.¹⁸ The foreign policy of the Netherlands, led by Minister Luns, could be defined as explicitly anti-communist according to Alfred van Staden.¹⁹

As previously mentioned, the Netherlands had a few key problems to address during the fifties. These were the establishment of NATO and the Western Union, the loss of the Netherlands East Indies as a colony and the economic rebuilding of the country. Duco Hellema points out that the remaining control that the Dutch government had of Netherlands New Guinea, which remained a colony until 1962, was the most dominant foreign policy issue during these years.²⁰ Additionally, the ‘Indonesian question’ influenced the Dutch government’s views on the Marshall plan, its role within NATO and the United Nations.²¹ None of these studies engage with the Korean War as an aspect of these multilateral relations that the Netherlands undertook as part of its foreign policy post-Second World War. However,

Oorlog. Het vergeten Bataljon Nederlandse Militairen in Korea (Amsterdam: L.J. Veen, 2009), and Frans van Dreumel, *We liepen naast de vijand: dagboek van een Korea-veteraan (1950-1951)* (Leeuwarden: Uitgeverij Elikser B.V., 2011).

¹⁷ Hoff, *Internationale machtsverhoudingen na 1945*, 19.

¹⁸ Caljé and den Hollander, *De lange twintigste eeuw*, 344-345.

¹⁹ Alfred van Staden, *Een trouwe bondgenoot: Nederland en het Atlantische bondgenootschap (1960-1971)* (Baarn: In den Toren, 1974).

²⁰ Hellema, *Neutraliteit & Vrijhandel*, 170.

²¹ Hellema, *Neutraliteit & Vrijhandel*, 155-156.

all of the elements mentioned above did affect Dutch policy in Korea and vice versa, as will be explained in this study.

The Netherlands and the Korean War

When looking for literature on the Netherlands and the Korean War, the Ministry of Defense served as the start of the search for sources. This was an interesting start as the ministry has produced its own short summary of the Korean War filled with statistics and other accounts on governmental level.²² While this account is not very detailed it can serve well in answering questions related to the Dutch government's reflection on the war and account of the events.

The ministry of Defense has also sponsored several studies on the Korean War. Klep and Schaafsma both published books on the Dutch government military participation in peace operations. Klep and van Gils focused on a more general story of all the peace operations since the Second World War²³, while Schaafsma's book provides a general overview of the NDVN in Korea by focusing on the activities in Korea while trying to keep a mostly neutral tone without too much interpretation of these events in Korea.²⁴ Stiphout, contrarily, provides a record of the NDVN in Korea in a study which is not funded by the Ministry of Defense.²⁵

Most of these academic scholars did not look at the Dutch government contributions to the UN mission from an analytical IR perspective. Instead, they have mainly done descriptive research based on archival documents.

²² "Korea Oorlog," Ministerie van Defensie, accessed July 8, 2022, <https://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/historische-missies/missie-overzicht/1950/korea-oorlog>.

²³ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*.

²⁴ Schaafsma, *Het Nederlandse Detachement Verenigde Naties*.

²⁵ R. Stiphout, *De Bloedigste Oorlog*.

The United States and the Netherlands

After the end of the Second World War, the United States enjoyed a tremendous popularity in the Netherlands because of its role in the liberation. However, political relations were complicated between the two states because of the Netherlands East Indies.²⁶ The Dutch government had been involved in a war for independence from 1945 until 1949 and a peace agreement, which included the sovereignty to be handed over to the United States of Indonesia, was struck under pressure from the United States.²⁷

However, the main image of the Netherlands and the United States were that of good allies within international organizations. The idea of American-Dutch estrangement was not really explored until the growing tensions in the late sixties.²⁸ The entanglement of the two nations was more complex in the fifties than studies until now have shown and this study would like to explore the alliances between these states with its problems and complexities. Additionally, the relationship between the Netherlands and the United States has mainly been analyzed within NATO-context. However, Dutch-American relations extended beyond NATO into the United Nations and also to Korea.

Theoretical Framework

Several theories and concepts were applied to the Netherlands' policy during the Korean War. The following paragraph entails a quick summary of all of the theories and how they intertwine before the concepts are explained in detail.

Constructivist binary thinking during the Cold War caused that many countries had to side with either the United States or the Soviet Union. These two largest states had almost all

²⁶ Alfred van Staden, "American-Dutch political relations since 1945. What has changed and why?," *BMGN-Low Countries Historical Review* 97, no. 3 (1982): 81.

²⁷ Hellema, *Neutraliteit & Vrijhandel*, 170.

²⁸ van Staden, "American-Dutch political relations since 1945," 80.

the power within international politics and therefore small(er) states flocked towards them for protection. The classification of a country as a small state was therefore quite important. Relations and alliances between states were unilateral, on a one-to-one basis, but mainly multilateral within international organizations. These were both regional organizations such as NATO but also non-regional such as the United Nations. However, these diplomatic ties between smaller and bigger states caused problems as the smaller states had to be unconditionally loyal to avoid isolation and becoming vulnerable. This meant that there was little room for criticism towards the bigger states.

Small-State Theory

A small state can be defined as “the state which is characterized by limited national capabilities and the way by which it uses such capabilities in achieving the objectives of its foreign politics, with make a comparison between its capabilities and other countries’ capabilities. It must be perceived as a small state by its leaders and other states’ leaders in the international system.”²⁹

According to a definition by Jan Hoffenaar, small states are attributed different properties. They tend to choose the side with the strongest party during a conflict, ascribe great importance to international organizations, decide its foreign policy on its own security issues and are more vulnerable and have less political alternatives than greater powers.³⁰

‘Within the context of the Cold War, it is easy to consider the Netherlands as a small state compared to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal

²⁹ Abdelraouf Mostafa Galal, “External behavior of small states in light of theories of international relations,” *Review of Economics and Political Science* 5, no. 1 (2020): 38-56. DOI 10.1108/REPS-11-2018-0028.

³⁰ Jan Hoffenaar, “Nederland en zijn militaire veiligheid,” in *De wereld volgens Nederland. Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek in historisch perspectief*, eds. Jacco Pekelder, Remco Raben, Mathieu Segers (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 2014), 180.

Republic of Germany. However, the definition of smallness is relative to the particular context in which states operate. Scholars like Browning, Erlandsson and Hoffenaar point out that defining what constitutes a small state is next to impossible.³¹ Moreover, Browning states that there is an unjustified “tendency to equate ‘smallness’ with a lack of power”,³² while Dijk et al. assert that “small does not necessarily mean insignificant”.³³

The Netherlands was generally perceived as a small state despite its economic prowess. In the international community the position of a small state differed very much per topic. Within the context of the Cold War, it was generally assumed that small states were forced to pick sides between the two major states, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The position of a small state could influence its policy both on national and international level.

Therefore, it is important to look at the decisions of the Netherlands and see whether its decisions fit into the framework of the Netherlands being a small state, according to

³¹ Christopher Browning, “Small, Smart and Salient? Rethinking Identity in the Small States Literature,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19, no. 4 (2006): 669–684, 670; Susanna Erlandsson, “Window of Opportunity. Dutch and Swedish Security Ideas and Strategies 1942–1948,” PhD diss., (University of Uppsala, 2015), 17; Hoffenaar, “Nederland en zijn militaire veiligheid,” 179, as cited by Stefanie F.M. Massink, “A critical ally (1949-1977): the Dutch government Social Democrats, Spain and NATO,” in *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The influence of smaller powers*, eds. Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson (London/New York: Routledge, 2020), 67.

³² Browning, “Small, Smart and Salient?,”: 669, as cited by Stefanie F.M. Massink, “A critical ally (1949-1977): the Dutch government Social Democrats, Spain and NATO,” in *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The influence of smaller powers*, eds. Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson (London/New York: Routledge, 2020), 67.

³³ Ruud van Dijk et al., ‘Introduction. A Small State on the Global Scene’, in *Shaping the International Relations of the Netherlands, 1815–2000. A Small Country on the Global Scene*, eds. Ruud van Dijk et al. (London: Routledge, 2018), 1, as cited by Stefanie F.M. Massink, “A critical ally (1949-1977): the Dutch government Social Democrats, Spain and NATO,” in *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The influence of smaller powers*, eds. Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson (London/New York: Routledge, 2020), 67.

Hoffenaar's definitions, or whether the Netherlands also deviated from the small-state stereotypes during the Korean War.

(Social) constructivism

The binary thinking between capitalism and communism is linked to the concept of social constructivism. The focus of social constructivism is on human awareness or consciousness and its place in world affairs. This focus on social interactions leads to ideas and beliefs which are seen as the foundation of either cooperation or conflict.³⁴ During the Cold War these overarching ideas and beliefs were rigid, belonging to either a capitalist or a communist bloc.

Another aspect that is closely linked to the constructivism is interventionism. When we talk about interventions it is important to differentiate between humanitarian interventions and military interventions.³⁵ Jackson and Sørensen define humanitarian interventions as an action to provide security for people and protect its rights.³⁶ The spread of humanitarianism and human rights are often met with a decline of state sovereignty and the right of non-intervention.³⁷

Interventions usually must be justified and are therefore also closely linked with a normative element. What is meant by this is that interventions are most often based on certain ideological founded norms and values such as the protection of democracy and the intrinsic value of humans. Military intervention, especially, must be justified. Jackson and Sørensen go as far as to claim that the deployment of any weapons or military troops must be justified and can never be divorced from normative considerations.³⁸

³⁴ Robert Jackson, and George Sørensen, *An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 209; Weathersby, "New Evidence on the Korean War,": 30-125.

³⁵ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*.

³⁶ Jackson and Sørensen, *An Introduction to International Relations*, 136.

³⁷ Jackson and Sørensen, *An Introduction to International Relations*, 144.

³⁸ Jackson and Sørensen, *An Introduction to International Relations*, 43.

The Cold War and the Korean War more specifically are located within the beginning stages of international normative politics.³⁹ The rise of the United Nations in a post-World War II political climate made for an interesting balance between non-interventionism and non-aggression policies by the Soviet Union and the United States as well as indirect confrontation between these two major powers during wars like the Korean War.

The use of constructivism is important for this thesis to analyze the underlying ideas of the Dutch government in its decision-making process and whether they were influenced by the binary thinking between either capitalism or communism during the Cold War and the Korean War. Constructivism and interventionism will also help answering questions on the intrinsic motivation of the NDVN volunteers as well as the Dutch government in its decision to join the Korean War.

Multilateralism and Atlanticism

While this will be explored later in greater detail, the Netherlands seemed to have shifted its foreign policy from neutrality politics to Atlanticism after the Second World War. Atlanticism refers to the close relationship and cooperation between Western Europe and the Northern America regarding political, economic and security matters. The most important consequence of this policy would be the Atlantic Pact, also known as NATO.⁴⁰ Atlanticism was in line with bloc-thinking and was about having a solid pact against the communists. The Netherlands, after the loss of its colonial power, had to deal with not being as big of an international power and had to shift its focus to alliances with the United States. This included financial aid, as

³⁹ Cuming, *The Korean War*.

⁴⁰ Nina Græger and Kristin M. Haugevik, "Defining Atlanticism," in *The revival of Atlanticism in NATO?: Changing security identities in Britain, Norway, and Denmark* (St. Olavs Plass: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2009), 12-13.

seen in the Marshall Plan, but also military aid as there was a fear that a new war could arise on the European continent.⁴¹

Critical allyship

Alfred van Staden talks about the Dutch government as an American ally in *Een trouwe bondgenoot: Nederland en het Atlantische bondgenootschap 1960-1971*. This loyal allyship is seen within NATO context as lending unconditional support to the alliance-leader, the United States, a strong identification with the goals and interests of the alliance, wanting to be a good example for states within and outside the alliance, aiming for a strong military integration and cooperation and dutiful and conscientiously fulfilling promises and agreements.⁴² According to van Staden, Dutch foreign policy, while led by Luns, had NATO at the center of all decisions and took priority over other fundamental thoughts such as West-European unification, the creation of an international legal order, and improving circumstances in the Third World.⁴³ However, in order to ultimately achieve all of these goals, the Netherlands needed the United States. As a result, from the Second World War onwards, the United States had the Netherlands as a loyal ally.⁴⁴ According to Massink, he [Van Staden] “argues that from the beginning of the 1970s a more disapproving stance towards the United States and NATO emerged in the Netherlands. a shift from the 1950s and 1960s, when the Dutch government mostly acted as a loyal ally”.⁴⁵

Van Staden claims that the Netherlands was mainly loyal to the United States during the 1950s. In regard to the Korean this study wants to analyze whether the Netherlands was

⁴¹ Duco Hellema, "De historische betekenis van de Nederlandse toetreding tot de NAVO," *Atlantisch Perspectief* 23, no. 2 (1999): 11.

⁴² van Staden, *Een trouwe bondgenoot*, 221.

⁴³ van Staden, *Een trouwe bondgenoot*, 23.

⁴⁴ van Staden, *Een trouwe bondgenoot*, 26; 225.

⁴⁵ Massink, "A critical ally (1949-1977),"": 68.

indeed a (mostly) loyal ally to the United States. This will be done by applying the characteristics assigned to a loyal ally to the Netherlands and seeing to what extent these are fulfilled within the context of the Korean War. In contrast, a critical ally would deviate from the descriptions of van Staden and criticize the policy of its ally, the United States in this case.

Methodology

This thesis has combined archival analysis with IR theory to achieve a multi-level analysis of the Netherlands on international, governmental, and individual level. The main primary sources come from the official archives of the Netherlands, ‘het Nationaal Archief’, which would be translated the English as the Netherlands’ National Archive. The descriptions in the notes and bibliography will be in Dutch as this will provide with the reader with the most accurate information to find the sources in the archives.

A few specific examples of collections are 2.03.01/2358 which is a collection of reports from the Bureau of Foreign Intelligence dated from 1950;⁴⁶ 2.03.01/3405, which is a collection of documents regarding the visit of a Korean mission to ask for support in the war;⁴⁷ 2.03.01/3406, which are documents regarding the military cooperation with Korea.⁴⁸ These sources will help answer questions related to any ideological motivations involved in the policy-making process and the arguments in favor or against intervention because of its more detailed account of council meetings and ministerial meetings.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ 2.03.01/ 2358: Inlichtingenrapporten en nota’s van Bureau Inlichtingen (BI), de Buitenlandse Inlichtingendienst (BID), andere inlichtingendiensten en het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken betreffende politieke, militaire en economische aangelegenheden in het buitenland – 1946-1969, jaargang 1950.

⁴⁷ 2.03.01/ 3405: Stukken betreffende de Koreaanse kwestie, bezoek van een Koreaanse missie, alsmede verzoeken om steun voor het noodlijdende volk van Korea, 1948-1962.

⁴⁸ 2.03.01/ 3406: Stukken betreffende de militaire samenwerking met Korea, vanaf 1953 Zuid-Korea, 1950-1962.

⁴⁹ Notulen van de Ministerraad. June 26, 1950; Notulen van de Ministerraad. July 3, 1950; Notulen van de Ministerraad. July 17, 1950; Notulen van de Ministerraad. August 2, 1950; Notulen van de Ministerraad. August

In addition to these archives, this thesis will look at the minutes from the House of Representatives, primarily looking at the time period from 1949 until 1955.⁵⁰ These documents will be used to answer any questions regarding the Dutch government's position on the Korean War as well as the opinion of the opposition parties. The notes from the plenary debate will also serve to analyze whether the government had a majority in favor of intervention from the start or whether parties had to be convinced and if so, how they were convinced.

While these archives focus on national politics, the United Nations' archive will give insight into the Dutch government's representation on an international level. These documents will include resolutions, minutes of General Assembly meetings as well as Security Council meetings, available through the UN Digital Archives.

In addition to governmental documents, this thesis will look at interviews with veterans taken from the Veterans' Institute.⁵¹ These interviews will explore the motivation of

7, 1950; Notulen van de Ministerraad. August 14, 1950; Notulen van de Ministerraad. August 21, 1950; Notulen van de Ministerraad. August 28, 1950; Notulen van de Ministerraad. October 2, 1950.

⁵⁰ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 783, Hand. 1949-1950, II; NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 791, Hand. 1950-1951, I; NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 792, Hand. 1950-1951, II; NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 800, Hand. 1951-1952, I; NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 810, Hand. 1952-1953, I; NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 821, Hand. 1953-1954, I; NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 832, Hand. 1954-1955, I.

⁵¹ "Interview 349," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/349/>; "Interview 428," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/428/>; "Interview 920," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/920/>; "Interview 966," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/966/>; "Interview 967," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/967/>; "Interview 1026," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/1026/>; "Interview 1125," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/1125/>; "Interview 1302," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/1302/>; "Interview 1348," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/1348/>; "Interview 1463," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/1463/>.

the volunteers of the NDVN and its experiences with the Korean War and will give insight into non-state actors' experiences with the Dutch government's policy.

Historical context and the theories and concepts applied are taken from secondary sources, mainly written by Dutch historians. The primary sources will be used to support or nuance previous research on the Dutch government foreign policy during the Cold War and the Korean War.

Academic Relevance

Previous studies on the Netherlands and the Korean War have been descriptive and lacked critical engagement. This thesis offers an in-depth exploration of Dutch policy and a critical analysis of the decisions made in light of the rise of Atlanticism, constructivist politics, and the Netherlands as a small state. Additionally, this study nuances the position of the Netherlands as a non-critical ally of the United States during the 1950s. The combination of these different concepts makes for a unique perspective on the Korean War and the Dutch government's involvement.

Chapter 1 – Dutch Policy Regarding the Korean War

This chapter will look at a chronology of the most important decisions made in Dutch politics and zoom in onto the NDVN and its most important contributions and events in the Korean War. It will conclude with a short observation on the line of events and present a so-called red thread throughout the years. This chapter aims to answer the first two sub-questions of this thesis: *‘What were the decisions made the Dutch government?’* and *‘What was the chronological order and how are any the changes in the policy explained if there were any?’*

A Chronology of Decisions by the Dutch government

Before the Korean War began the first important decision was made by the Dutch government, the recognition of the Republic of Korea on July 25, 1949.⁵² This meant that any attack by North Korea would be an attack by a non-recognized state and an infringement on the sovereignty of the South.

On 26 June 1950 Minister Stikker announced a press release designating the battle in Korea as a test of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Drees worried that the involvement of the United States in Korea would mean less or no military support from the United States in towards other countries, including the Netherlands.⁵³ A memorandum addressed to Drees predicts that Korea will be a long and bloody war and that the war between the United States and the Soviet Union will spread from the Korean peninsula across East-Asia. It also speculates about a Soviet attack in Europe in the winter of 1950.⁵⁴ These statements show a definition between larger states, the United

⁵² NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3405, 25 July 1949.

⁵³ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 394, Hand. 1910-1911, 26 June 1950, 10.

⁵⁴ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 2359, June-July 1950.

States and the Soviet Union and smaller states as well as the Netherlands' fear of non-protection from the United States.

On 3 July 1950 the Dutch government decided on the deployment of the Hrs. Ms. Evertsen, a torpedo hunter which was previously on the coast of Indonesia. The Dutch government also explicitly came forward in support of the United Nations resolution to help on the side of South Korea.⁵⁵ The marine was supposed to be under its command instead of the United Nations, but practice showed that the United States would be in charge instead.⁵⁶ The Netherlands tried to justify sending naval forces by contextualizing this choice with its own history as a seafaring nation.⁵⁷

Trygve Lie, United Nations Secretary General, sent a telegram to the Dutch government expressing his thank for the military support. He also asked for additional troops from the Netherlands. This was discussed in a meeting of ministers on July 17.⁵⁸ The Prime Minister said that the Netherlands could not send more troops because of the reorganization within the Dutch government army. However, this topic was discussed again on August 2, 1950, after the Prime Minister was visited by a United States ambassador and Minister Schokking was visited by United States senator Cain. It was then decided, reluctantly, that there will be an opportunity for Dutch soldiers to volunteer for a mission in Korea.⁵⁹

The Dutch government questioned the need for a Dutch reinforcement on October 2nd, 1950, because of the rapid developments in Korea.⁶⁰ Despite this attempt to forgo intervention in Korea the United States did not reply to its questions. As a result, the Council of Ministers

⁵⁵ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 394, Hand. 1910-1911, 3 July 1950, 2; NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3406, 3 July 1950.

⁵⁶ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 394, Hand. 1910-1911, 3 July 1950, 2.

⁵⁷ ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 13.

⁵⁸ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3406, 17 July 1950.

⁵⁹ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 394, Hand. 1910-1911, 2 August 1950, 11-12.

⁶⁰ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 394, Hand. 1910-1911, 2 October 1950, 14.

decided to continue with the deployment despite the request to withdraw this deployment by Communist Party members Gortzak, van Santen, and Gorkels.⁶¹

After the deployment of the NDVN on 26 October 1950, the Dutch government was silent on the matter of Dutch involvement in Korea for quite some time. The Netherlands decided to get involved in relief programs of the United Nations, UNKRA and UNCURK, by sending money and entering into UN committees which monitor the developments.⁶² Most propositions for Korean aid were not received positively. Minister Stikker addressed the Dutch government contributions to civil support in Korea, which consists of 1,8 to 2,4 million guilders, with a heavy heart because of the Dutch government own financial troubles.⁶³ During the meeting of the Council of Ministers, questions were asked whether the financial support for Korea may be premature or whether the Netherlands would be able to contribute less to the cause.⁶⁴

The next big decision was made in March 1951, the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the Queen of the Netherlands to address a change in the law 'Demobilisatievoorzieningen 1948'. This change would focus on the return of NDVN troops and should ease its way into society through the offer governmental aid.⁶⁵ While this was

⁶¹ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 5179, 2 October 1950.

⁶² General Assembly resolution 410, *Relief and rehabilitation of Korea*, A/PV.314 (1 December 1950), available from <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/5>; NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3405, 27 October 1950; United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea*: supplement no.12, A/1881 (7 October 1950-5 September 1951), available from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/704427?ln=en>; General Assembly resolution 701, *Korea: reports of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction*, A/PV.414 (11 March 1953), available from <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/7>.

⁶³ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 394, Hand. 1910-1911, 13 November 1950, 7.

⁶⁴ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 394, Hand. 1910-1911, 13 November 1950, 7.

⁶⁵ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 5179, 3 March 1951.

more of a national policy change, the decision does indicate that the Dutch government was paying attention to the NDVN at the time.

On May 29, 1951, the Department of War sent a memo on the decision to deploy a second wave of NDVN troops. This was despite the negative reports from the frontline.⁶⁶ However, as Minister Staf addressed on 31 May, the Dutch government was unwilling to withdraw its troops because of the responsibilities that it had assigned itself.⁶⁷

During the war, the Dutch government did not change its policy much. The main changes stem from the ratification of UN resolutions. For example, resolution 500 signaled the beginning of a UN embargo on the Chinese and the Soviet Union as part of additional measures and the Dutch government worked according to this resolution.⁶⁸ As Stikker said on 21 November 1951: “the embargo should not be solved unilateral but within international context [translated].”⁶⁹

During 1952 and 1953 the Dutch government did not pay much attention to the activities of the NDVN in Korea. The main concerns were with the financial costs of the mission and the costs of the UN programs that were set up. Instead, the focus shifted more and more towards the Netherlands New Guinea and the Netherlands’ policy decisions increasingly depended on the decisions of other Atlantic partners. This change nuances the claims of van der Peet and de Moor who observed that the Dutch government were becoming less and less concerned with Asia in general. Instead, it is more accurate to say that the Dutch government focus shifted from East Asia to Southeast Asia. During these two years of political neglect, the Dutch government finally sent a government official to Korea to inspect

⁶⁶ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3406, 29 May 1951.

⁶⁷ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 792, Hand. 1950-1951, II, 1907-1915.

⁶⁸ General Assembly resolution 500, *Additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea*, A/PV.330 (18 May 1951), available from <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/5>.

⁶⁹ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 800, Hand. 1951-1952, I, 490-495.

the Dutch government troops, the NDVN. State secretary Kranenburg reported back to the Netherlands in the House of Representatives on 13 November 1952. His report was a very positive one, praising the contributions of the troops and the general morale and discipline of the soldiers.⁷⁰

For the rest of the war, the Dutch government did not make any noteworthy decisions on the Korean issue. After the armistice, on 12 March 1954, Ministers Beyen and Luns shared that Minister Luns would join the Geneva Conference on 26 April 1954 to discuss the Korean armistice.⁷¹ Minister Luns was very positive during this conference and clearly joined the side of the United States during the discussion on a peace agreement.⁷² The speech of Luns will be discussed in further detail in the chapter on the Netherlands as an ally.

In July 1954 the Netherlands signed a declaration together with the other fifteen countries that fought under the UN flag in Korea which detailed its position on the peace negotiations in Geneva. The most important content of this declaration included the importance that the states gave to the unification, independence, and freedom of Korea and that they stood behind its intervention because they acted within the principles of the United Nations Charter.⁷³

On 23rd of August 1954 Minister Staf expressed his desire in the Council of Ministers to withdraw the NDVN to which the council agreed.⁷⁴ This withdrawal would not be a complete withdrawal as the Dutch government would leave behind a Dutch frigate in order to remain in the area and so that there would still be a (symbolic) Dutch presence in Korea.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3406, 13 November 1952.

⁷¹ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 821, Hand. 1953-1954, I, Appendix 26.

⁷² NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3406, 26 April-15 June 1954.

⁷³ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 821, Hand. 1953-1954, I, 1084-1086.

⁷⁴ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 400, Hand. 1910-1911, 23 August 1954, 5; NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3406, 23 August 1954.

⁷⁵ NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 38, 14 September 1954.

The first contingent of the NDVN left on October 17 and the last departed from Korea in December 1954.⁷⁶

The last mention of the NDVN or the Korean War is in passing during a debate on the Indonesian issue in the House of Representatives on December 21, 1954. This is done by representative Klompé who, translated, says: “History has taught that where the free world acts with power and in solidarity the Russian retaliated. I think of the airbridge in Berlin, I think of Korea.”⁷⁷ The mention of the NDVN in national debates have served similar purposes to Klompé’s, to gain more attention for another cause rather than to focus on the NDVN itself.

Zooming in on the NDVN

Now that the timeline of the Dutch government politics is clear it is time to look more specifically at the ‘NDVN’, *Nederlandse Detachement Verenigde Naties*. This will be done based on personal accounts by veterans and military reports from the frontline.

The Netherlands chose to first send naval ships to Korea before sending ground troops. This development, by its own arguments, was supposed to be more symbolic because of the modest amount of fighting forces. When the Korean War broke out, the Dutch government were very quick to deploy naval ship Hrs. Ms. Evertsen because it was on the coast of Indonesia. It would serve until 12 September 1950 for patrol and escort purposes.⁷⁸ The Dutch government were reluctant to send ground troops because of its deficient military and it did not expect a large group of motivated soldiers to send out a battalion, the smallest possible troop.⁷⁹ This is why, on July 25, 1950, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused the appeal of

⁷⁶ NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 38, 5 October 1954; NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3406, 11 November 1954; early December 1954; 14 December 1954.

⁷⁷ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 832, Hand. 1954-1955, I, 598.

⁷⁸ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 177.

⁷⁹ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 394, Hand. 1910-1911, 7 August 1950, 2.

the United Nations Secretary General and the United States to deploy additional troops to the Korean frontline.⁸⁰

However, the pressure from the United States resulted in the decision to make deployment possible on voluntary basis, the *Nederlandse Detachement Verenigde Naties*. Drees was afraid that failing to send additional troops would discredit the Netherlands as a loyal ally in the eyes of the United States.⁸¹ While the recruitment was not handled on a grand scale the number of voluntary sign-ups exceeded the government's expectations.⁸² On August 11 the first selection was made for the NDVN. Men had to be between 19 and 35 years old and have already served a minimum of twelve months, preferably with some experience in the tropics. On the 25th of August 1,670 men had volunteered. The number 1,670 comes from A.R.J. ten Velde's research while Klep and van Gils talk about 2,000. Because the latter talk about an estimate, this study applies ten Velde's amount. From those 1,670, 453 could not be contacted after the first sign-up, 418 did not fulfil the requirements needed, another 100 did not show up for the mandatory examination and taken into account the people who did not make it through the examination, the final amount of volunteers was just over 500.⁸³ These 500 men were not enough for a battalion so the government decided to extend the sign-up deadline and ended up with 636 men who signed a one-year contract to go to Korea.

With its many soldiers it is difficult to pinpoint the motivations of the soldiers because these were quite diverse. Some were veterans from Indonesia who were unable to adapt to civilian life. Others wanted the financial compensation that was given or wanted to advance

⁸⁰ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 2359, 25 July 1950.

⁸¹ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 33.

⁸² Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 34.

⁸³ ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 27.

its career within the army.⁸⁴ Some wanted to repent for its crimes during the Second World War or wanted to fight because they were too young to fight during the Second World War.⁸⁵

The prestige of the NDVN was questioned at several points during the war. Because it was difficult to gather new volunteers each time, rumors started to spread that there were war criminals from the Second World War, Schutzstaffel-members, or SS-members, in Korea with the NDVN. Especially the communist party tried to discredit the Dutch government's decision through this rumor. Prime Minister Drees defended the NDVN in November 1950 against the accusations of Gortzak during a debate.⁸⁶ In the Dutch press, the NDVN were called unprofessional because the strict vetting procedure, the fighting preparedness, and therefore also the behavior of the men became worse over time. There was a general lack of training, and an increase of scandals made its way from the frontlines to the Netherlands.⁸⁷

However, the United States was quite happy with the Dutch government troops. They were seen as convincing on the battlefield and were trustworthy soldiers.⁸⁸ In a letter from commander Mildren to commander Eekhout the United States expressed its 'sincere thanks for your splendid service and our heart-felt wishes for your continued success. [...] Your unit fought with courage, skill and determination is evidenced by the award of the covered PUC merely one but twice. [...] So long as there are units like the Netherlands Detachment, so long will the UN Forces continue to grind under heel the tyranny of the Red aggressor'.⁸⁹

This praise can be explained by the fact that the military prowess of the men, especially the first group of NDVN soldiers, was quite high given that these volunteers had

⁸⁴ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 36.

⁸⁵ ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 32-33.

⁸⁶ ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 41.

⁸⁷ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 41.

⁸⁸ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 41.

⁸⁹ NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 12, 12 August 1951.

prior experience in military service, mainly in Indonesia.⁹⁰ The agreement was that the NDVN would be under United States command as part of the 38th regiment in the 2nd division of the 8th army of the United States.⁹¹ This would be after they received a training in the Netherlands until its deployment and an additional training in Korea. The NDVN met on 24 October 1950 on the Binnenhof in The Hague for an official farewell from the government. Prime Minister Drees addressed the NDVN telling them that they were to go to secure world peace and to make sure that all that is right was to be restored.⁹² The first group of the NDVN left the Netherlands on October 26 and arrived in Korea on November 23 in Busan where they left for Daegu to receive additional training.⁹³ They joined the 38th 'Rock of the Marne' Regiment on December 13.⁹⁴ The NDVN received its baptism to fire on the third of January 1951 when they successfully covered the withdrawal of the 38th infantry regiment in Wonju.⁹⁵ A five-day siege of Wonju happened in February where the NDVN made three counterattacks on the last day to clear its position.⁹⁶ The next big event for the NDVN was the May Massacre in 1951. The NDVN was tasked with closing a vital gap in the defensive line near Hill 1051. They had to attack hordes of Chinese that were attempting to break through this line. Four days and nights NDVN was the only force standing in the path of the enemy and the friendly lines. Casualties were so high that NDVN has to be bolstered by reserves from the Republic of Korean Army.⁹⁷

⁹⁰ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 180.

⁹¹ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 181.

⁹² Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 34.

⁹³ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 180; NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 68, 26 October 1950; 23 November 1950.

⁹⁴ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 180.

⁹⁵ NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 68, 3 Januari 1951; January 1951.

⁹⁶ NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 68, 12 February 1951.

⁹⁷ NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 68, 18 May 1951; July and August 1951.

A new group of troops was hard to find. Men who were already in Korea did not want to extend its contracts because of the disappointing experiences and the new troops were mostly rookie soldiers with no prior experience and had to go through even more training. In February 1951 only 450 soldiers were available for deployment, and it even got worse.⁹⁸ In September 1951, while the new recruits were still in training in Korea, the NDVN participated in some of the bitterest and bloodiest fighting of the war for Heartbreak Ridge which finally fell on 6th of October 1951.⁹⁹ The changing of the guard was anything but flawless because of the selection of volunteers with its diverse prior training. Commander Buurman van Vreeden sends out a request for a tighter selection with a priority for vetting on morality and a request for trial periods to be implemented. This would increase the stakes of the soldiers and increase morale and cooperation.¹⁰⁰

Despite the intentions of Dutch politicians, as seen by representative Vermeer who says during a debate on June 1, 1951, that the Netherlands can and may not distance itself from Korea after this good start of the mission,¹⁰¹ the government did indeed withdraw its attention from the cause. The request of Buurman van Vreeden led to nothing, and the training and recruitment of Korea-volunteers worsened. While the government did not want to look for volunteers for Korea outside of the army they decided to advertise outside the army in February 1952.¹⁰²

Despite this bad report from the commander the NDVN once again delivered on the battlefield. Despite being fairly new in Korea the NDVN battles on terrain near Chorwon Valley for Silver Star Hill. The soldiers distinguished themselves by performing many gallant

⁹⁸ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 39.

⁹⁹ NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 12, 3 October-31 October 1951; NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 68, November 1951.

¹⁰⁰ NL-HaNA, Defensie/ Kleine Archiefbestanden, 1, 2.13.188, inv.nr. 949, 27 Oktober 1951.

¹⁰¹ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 792, Hand. 1950-1951, II, 1940.

¹⁰² Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 39.

and heroic achievements, cited by many other governments and remained here until March 1952.¹⁰³ After this period the NDVN was sent all over the country to fight, such as the battle for Bunker Hill in October 1952,¹⁰⁴ and the defense of Nudae,¹⁰⁵ before the armistice in July 1953, where the commander of the NDVN was present at the signing in Panmunjom.¹⁰⁶ Ironically enough, the NDVN was at its highest amount of soldiers with 1,093 soldiers in 1953 during the signing of the armistice in July.¹⁰⁷

After the armistice, the NDVN received the highest South-Korea reward ‘the Korean Presidential Unit Citation’ for its performance during the war from its arrival until 8 April 1953.¹⁰⁸ The time of duty was still not over as they needed to stay in case war broke out again and they had to supervise the start of the rebuilding of the country. Commander Knulst addressed the predicted shortages of staff in April 1954 because of the retreat of Korean troops. At the time the NDVN had 156 Korean soldiers amongst its ranks and without them they could not perform its designated duties as the battalion would become too small.¹⁰⁹ His request and the final decision of the Dutch government was that, rather than keeping an incomplete and insufficient battalion, the NDVN should return to the Netherlands. This decision was made in August 1954 and the actual return of the troops happened in December 1954.¹¹⁰

¹⁰³ NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 68, March 1952.

¹⁰⁴ NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 68, October 1952.

¹⁰⁵ NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 68, 27 January-8 April 1953.

¹⁰⁶ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3406, 27 July 1953.

¹⁰⁷ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 39.

¹⁰⁸ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3406, 1 October 1953.

¹⁰⁹ NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 46, 1 April 1954.

¹¹⁰ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 400, Hand. 1910-1911, 23 August 1954, 5; 2NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3406, 23 August 1954; 11 November 1954; early December 1954; 14 December 1954.

Overall, Korea was quite the disappointment for the Dutch troops. The climate and war circumstances were much worse than the troops were told. In addition, the government did not want to invest too much in the Korean War which resulted into a lack of good materials and equipment. The total calculated expenses of the Netherlands were 67 million guilders of which 15.6 million would go towards personnel expenses and 51,6 million would go to material expenses.¹¹¹ In the end it would cost the Netherlands 49 million guilders of which 22.7 million personnel expenses and 26.4 million went to materials.¹¹²

From 1950 until 1954, 16,225 people signed up for deployment to Korea but only 3,972 actually went. These were 3,418 different people as some went more than once.¹¹³ The NDVN experienced 120 deaths of which 112 lives were lost in battle, 6 had fatal accidents and 2 because of illnesses. 645 soldiers were injured of which 381 were injured in battle, 52 in an accident, 26 during practice and 186 because of illness. There were also three people who went missing in Korea.¹¹⁴

According to the historian ten Velde, those returning from Korea found the appreciation from civilians and society as a whole despite the lack of attention that they received during its deployment. From the interviews with Korea-veterans, conducted by the Dutch government Veteran's Institute, it is clear that the Korean War was confusing for the troops.¹¹⁵ Many volunteers that went to Korea came directly from the Netherlands East Indies

¹¹¹ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 38.

¹¹² ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 34.

¹¹³ ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 30.

¹¹⁴ J.P. Tack, "Het Nederlandse VN-optreden in Korea (slot)," *Militaire Spectator* 153, no. 2 (1953): 90.

¹¹⁵ "Interview 349," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/349/>; "Interview 428," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/428/>; "Interview 920," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/920/>; "Interview 966," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/966/>; "Interview 967," Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/967/>; "Interview 1026,"

where they fought for the Dutch government in the Indonesian Independence War. These soldiers were unable to re-enter society and chose to return to the army and to the front albeit in a different war. The soldiers were usually employed for about a year and then sent back to the Netherlands.

The first batch of soldiers were in Korea until the end of 1951 and left Korea relatively unscathed. The military troops had already been in war and could handle the challenges fairly well compared to later groups for which Korea was its first war. Most of the tasks consisted of running patrols and standing by. This is interesting because this was the period when the Dutch government gave the Korean War the most attention. The general perception that they had was therefore quite positive.

The soldiers that were in Korea in 1952 and 1953 struggled the most. The living conditions worsened while the war continued. The lack of attention from the government made things even worse as requests for additional materials and equipment were usually delayed or late. One example of such a request is from late December 1951 where a report mentions a shortage of winter clothing and kitchen supplies.¹¹⁶ The visit from Kranenburg can be seen as a good development in giving the NDVN some political attention and giving the troops the opportunity to address the issues at the frontline. However, Kranenburg, unlike the stories from the NDVN veterans themselves, is positive about the situation on the frontline when he returns from Korea.

Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/1026/>; “Interview 1125,” Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/1125/>; “Interview 1302,” Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/1302/>; “Interview 1348,” Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/1348/>; “Interview 1463,” Veteranen Instituut, accessed December 28, 2021, <https://www.veteranenvertellen.nl/vi/interview/1463/>.

¹¹⁶ NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 12, 18 December-31 December 1951.

Something that the veterans continued to say was that the Dutch government and the Dutch government people forgot about Korea. The soldiers who returned were barely given a welcome and some chose to continue fighting in Netherlands New Guinea. This meant that the additional laws and policies that the Netherlands implemented, for example the ‘Demobilisatievoorzieningen 1948’ failed to provide for a good return for the troops. Klep and van Gils were correct when they called the NDVN the ‘forgotten battalion in a forgotten war’ because the government failed them during and after the war when it came to political recognition and providing for them.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 43.

Chapter 2 – Dutch Motivations

After discussing the decisions made by the Netherlands this thesis will now make an analytical turn and discuss the underlying principles of the decision-making process. This chapter will deal with the general concepts and ideologies behind Dutch foreign policy during the Korean war; the Dutch government turn away from neutrality, anti-communism and belief in collective security and human rights. This relates to the sub-question *'Did the Dutch government have intrinsic motivations to send troops to Korea?'*

A New Foreign Policy

Before the Second World War, the Netherlands was a passive spectator within international politics. Especially until the entry into the League of Nations the Netherlands had a history of neutrality when it came to its foreign policy.¹¹⁸ The internationalization of organizations was worrisome to the Dutch government because of the sanctions regime that came with the membership. However, the Netherlands saw no other way than to join the League because it would otherwise become an international pariah.

The Dutch government's membership was a topic of discussion throughout the first half of the twentieth century until the Second World War. Several politicians kept warning that the membership and the alliances that were forged through the League of Nations would make a position of neutrality impossible when a new conflict arose.¹¹⁹ As a compromise the Dutch government tried to limit the influence of the League of Nations by keeping to its own defense policy and away from military conflict that did not concern the Dutch government.

¹¹⁸ van Staden, *Een trouwe bondgenoot*, 12.

¹¹⁹ J. den Hertog, "Zelfstandigheidspolitiek. De achtergrond van een cruciale term in het buitenlands beleid van Nederland 1900-1940," *BMGN-Low Countries Historical Review* 124, no. 2 (2009): 182.

This resulted in a policy that can be characterized by neutrality and independence up until the Second World War.

After the Second World War, in which the Netherlands had failed to stay neutral, there was a sentiment amongst politicians that the neutrality policy had failed.¹²⁰ This is set in contrast to the First World War in which the neutrality policy had worked well for the Dutch government and led to viable position in international politics.¹²¹ The Second World War had proven that the Netherlands could not continue to stay away from international conflicts. This meant that the Netherlands was of the opinion that it should steer away from neutrality and towards a more suitable foreign policy. One that would be more active and based on alliances. The Netherlands was not very happy with this change in foreign policy. The general consensus amongst politicians was that the neutrality policy was based on independence and the change to alliances would make the Netherlands too dependent on other states in times of duress.¹²²

A clear exposition on the Dutch government foreign policy came from representative Marga Klompé of the Catholic People's Party (KVP) on 16 January 1951:

‘there is insecurity and fear about the future; the role of the Netherlands in international politics had been played out because we are a small power and the playball of the larger powers [...] Our country still has not processed the Second World War and until now we have set out a policy of neutrality because of which we still have to learn how the art of proactive politics. Many of us feel like European cooperation was forced under the pressure of the United State however we alone are of little meaning in the Anglo-Saxon world. Continental

¹²⁰ Herman A. Schaper, "Het Nederlandse veiligheidsbeleid 1945-1950," *BMGN-Low Countries Historical Review* 96, no. 2 (1981): 277-299, 278.

¹²¹ Jan Hoffenaar, "Voorwaarts verdedigen 1949-1989," in *200 Jaar Koninklijke Landmacht 1814-2014*, ed. Ben Schoenmaker (Amsterdam: Boom, 2014), 162.

¹²² ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 5.

focus is strictly necessary, and this include Atlantic cooperation as well as the membership of the United Nations.’¹²³

The Dutch government, too some extent, considered cooperation and alliances to be a necessary evil in order to continue diplomatic relations with other countries.

The United States presented itself as a powerful and suitable ally for the Dutch government as well as other allied forces on the European continent.¹²⁴ NATO became a form of multilateral cooperation, more specifically Atlanticism. Atlanticism was based on several principles; the belief that American-European cooperation would be the strongest force against the Soviets, and the fact that the United States had replaced Europe as the new leader of the Western world. This last aspect is illustrated in a memorandum to Drees where the United States at the beginning of the Korean War is set in the position of England in 1939 at the beginning of the Second World War, a position of leadership of the West.¹²⁵

In addition, a new form of international organization, the United Nations, was in the beginning stages of establishment and the United States was pressuring European states to join this venture. The United Nations would become an organization based on universal cooperation and the belief of a new world order. However, the Netherlands was more focused on the previous mentioned NATO and Western European cooperation as will be explained in the chapter on the Netherlands and the United States within the United Nations. Stikker and

¹²³ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 792, Hand. 1950-1951, II, 1076-1079.

¹²⁴ Herman A. Schaper, "Het Nederlandse veiligheidsbeleid 1945-1950," *BMGN-Low Countries Historical Review* 96, no. 2 (1981): 277-299, 278; Hoffenaar, "Voorwaarts verdedigen 1949-1989," 162.

¹²⁵ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 2359, June-July 1950.

Luns' approach to Atlantic cooperation can therefore be seen as Euro-Atlanticism,¹²⁶

Atlanticism with a focus on Europe.

This approach to international politics was not truly implemented until the summer of 1950, the beginning of the Korean War. Until then the Netherlands was not concerned with its own defense, according to ten Velde. The Netherlands had little enthusiasm for the Atlantic pact and wanted to focus on the restoration of its own country after the war in Indonesia.¹²⁷ However, on July 24, the Netherlands changed its policy because they saw Korea as a warning for a possible new war.¹²⁸

Anti-Communism

Atlanticism, the cooperation between Western Europe and Northern America, should be seen within the context of the Cold War where bloc-thinking was particularly popular in politics. The Netherlands has been seen as an anti-communist country during the Cold War and also during the Korean war. This anti-communist policy was made up of two aspects, the fear of communist expansion in the world and especially on the European continent and the dislike for communist ideals and the way of governing.

Expansion fear

The first mention of the communist expansion is from April 1950 in a memo from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is mentioned that the Chinese-communist threat in South-East

¹²⁶ Mathieu Segers, "Nederland en de Europese integratie," in *De wereld volgens Nederland. Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek in historisch perspectief*, eds. Jacco Pekelder, Remco Raben, Mathieu Segers (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 2014), 94.

¹²⁷ ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 59.

¹²⁸ ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 59.

Asia but there is no mention of Korea.¹²⁹ In May 1950 the Ministry set out a goal to prevent that South-East Asia becomes more communist.¹³⁰

On 14 September 1950 representative Vorrink talked about the communist aggressor in South-Korea. According to him it was important that NATO and the Western Union increase its activity to deter the communists because Western Europe could not defend itself in case of a Russian attack. He saw the attack in Korea as a test-case in order for the Russians to see how far they can take it before there is a retaliation. Tilanus agreed with Vorrink and called Korea an alarm clock and saw a likeness between Korea and Western Europe. Schokking, Minister of Foreign Affairs, prioritized the defense of the Atlantic and looked to the United States to provide everything that the Netherlands needs to defend itself.¹³¹ It is clear from this debate that Korea incited a fear amongst the Dutch government that the communists, especially Russia, would want to expand its territory and that the United States and NATO would be its best chance at survival.

Bloc-thinking

The major flock of western countries to the United States came with many repercussions. On December 23, 1950, the Dutch government was asked by the United States to break off all diplomatic ties to communist governments and impose economic sanctions.¹³² This was mainly focused on the Soviet Union and Communist China as the United States saw China as a satellite state of Russia. The Prime Minister saw Russia and China as equally dangerous so did not disagree with this notion.¹³³ The United States had an aversion to communism mainly

¹²⁹ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv.nr. 2358, April 1950.

¹³⁰ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv.nr. 2358, 22 May 1950.

¹³¹ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 783, Hand. 1949-1950, II, 2454-2457.

¹³² NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 394, Hand. 1910-1911, 23 December 1950, 7.

¹³³ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 394, Hand. 1910-1911, 23 December 1950, 7.

because it considered the ideas to be new, radical, and dangerous and reminded them of the abolitionist movement of the nineteenth century.¹³⁴

Dutch anti-communism also took the form of outspoken aversion to the Soviet Union, which was seen as a barbaric and ungodly dictatorship. The Dutch government had additional reasons to denounce the Bolshevik regime: the Romanov imperial family, executed by the Bolsheviks, had been cousins of Dutch Queen Wilhelmina.¹³⁵ During the Korean War this opinion did not change. At the beginning of the Korean War the communists were described as the aggressors with the desire to expand its territory, as mentioned before. During the conflict the communists were seen as conniving, trying to divide the United States and Western Europe in an attempt to destabilize the power balance in the world.¹³⁶ They were also the only ones unwilling to talk about an armistice or peace. At the Geneva Conference in 1954 Luns spoke out against the communists by disapproving of its attitude during the conference and its willingness to negotiate and calling them liars who try to cover up its own role in the Korean War.¹³⁷

The communist side was mainly talked about in a negative way during national debates and in the council meetings. The only party that nuanced this view is the Communist Party of the Netherlands, the most prominent opposition party. Bloc-thinking also worked the other way around from the side of the communists. Representative Gortzak criticized Atlantic cooperation within NATO saying that the Atlantic pact is the preparation and provocation for

¹³⁴ R.M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red. The McCarthy Era in Perspective* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 37–43; Rimko van der Maar, ““Easily Emotional” and “Always Inclined to Extremes.” Ambassador Herman van Roijen and Dutch Anxiety about American Anti-Communism, 1947–53,” *Diplomatica* 4, no. 1 (2022): 103.

¹³⁵ Ben Knapen, *De lange weg naar Moskou: Nederlandse relaties tot de Sovjet-Unie, 1917-1942* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1985), 125; van der Maar, “Easily Emotional”: 104.

¹³⁶ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 810, Hand. 1952-1953, I, 431-434.

¹³⁷ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3408, 4 May 1954.

a third world war: ‘You, proponents of this American war politics, have come this far with your fear and war hysteria that you would demolish the best traditions of this country.’¹³⁸ This was not only a criticism on Atlanticism but also referred to the neutrality politics that the Netherlands kept to before. This quote was from May 29, 1951, and is the same day that the Netherlands decided to send a new group of NDVN troops to Korea.¹³⁹

Anti-communism was a strong tool to unite governments and people as a transnational phenomenon.¹⁴⁰ Albeit the sometimes-skeptical view on the United States as an ally, the Dutch government considered them to be the lesser of two evils making them side with them in this divided binary system. Where the United States was very successful in using anti-communism to pull states to its side, the Netherlands was less successful in this endeavor when they tried to hold onto Netherlands New Guinea by stressing Indonesia’s pro-communist politics.

Collective Security

When the Cold War began the concept of collective security was on the rise. The combination of bloc-thinking and multilateralism and the establishment of the United Nations made for several instances where the collective was at the center of politics. According to A.R.J. ten Velde, collective security was the main goal of the Dutch government contributions to the Korean War. It wanted the restoration of peace and security in the area.¹⁴¹

The concept of collective security was mainly evoked within the United Nations. Sixteen countries answered the call of the United Nations and successfully kept the

¹³⁸ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 792, Hand. 1950-1951, II, 1876; 1885-1890.

¹³⁹ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 3406, 29 May 1951.

¹⁴⁰ van der Maar, “Easily Emotional”: 101.

¹⁴¹ ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 13.

communists from taking over the Korean peninsula and expanding its territory.¹⁴² The Netherlands explained that it considered it its duty to answer this call because of the collective security of the world which in turn prevented the communist expansion which was a threat to this.¹⁴³ At the United Nations General Assembly Minister Stikker also looked toward collective security while trying to set forward a positive image of the Dutch government response to the United Nations call for troops:

‘The Netherlands Government, for its part, has, by the immediate dispatch of naval forces and the forthcoming departure to the front of ground troops, demonstrated its determination effectively and wholeheartedly to take part in our collective measures for guaranteeing the security which is a matter of life and death for all of us.’¹⁴⁴ Prime Minister Drees defends the government’s intention to send troops to be in line with collective security and applauds the swift actions of the United Nations. On the other hand, he also mentions that the contribution of the Dutch government is modest and could be seen as more of a symbolic contribution but the intention behind this albeit small force is that the Netherlands wants to show its dedication to the collective.¹⁴⁵

Within national politics the same opinion is set forward by the government as seen on 15 November 1950 when Drees defended the actions of the United Nations and the United States when it was attacked for using the absence of the Soviet Union in the Security Council to put forward a resolution to help South Korea under the flag of the United Nations. He stressed the

¹⁴² Tack, “Het Nederlandse VN-optreden,”: 89.

¹⁴³ ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 13, 23.

¹⁴⁴ United Nations General Assembly, *Official records of the General Assembly, 5th session, plenary meetings, verbatim records of meetings 1* (19 September to 15 December 1950): 57. Available from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/735601?ln=en>.

¹⁴⁵ ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 15, 42.

importance of collective security and that the United Nations is fighting in Korea to protect this important principle.¹⁴⁶ Minister Stikker addressed the situation in Korea during a debate on January 18, 1951, saying that the aggression in Korea is not a singular event and not just about Korea but about the wider importance of collective security and is world encompassing. ‘The forces that the Netherlands have sent may be modest in comparison to other but is undeniable proof that the Netherlands has moved against any who endanger this security.’¹⁴⁷ At the end of the war, in November 1954, the House of Representative talked about the NDVN for the last time. They consider the troops to be brave and capable soldier who fought in name of the Dutch government people and contributed to the collective security in the Far East.¹⁴⁸

The notion of collective security was evoked multiple times throughout the Korean War by the Dutch government both in national and international politics. In international politics, the Korean War had to show that collective security as not just a loose term but something of value to the United Nations which was willing to intervene to protect it. Interestingly, the United Nations also evoked the idea of human rights in its resolutions.

An example is UNGA Resolution 804:

1. *Expresses its grave concern* at reports and information that North Korean and Chinese Communist forces have, in a large number of instances, employed inhuman practices against the heroic soldiers of forces under the United Nations Command in Korea and against the civilian population of Korea;

¹⁴⁶ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 791, Hand. 1950-1951, I, 473-477.

¹⁴⁷ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. Nr. 792, Hand. 1950-1951, II, 1130-1140.

¹⁴⁸ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 832, Hand. 1954-1955, I, 379; ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 46.

2. *Condemns* the commission by any governments or authorities of murder, mutilation, torture, and other atrocious acts against captured military personnel or civilian populations, as a violation of rules of international law and basic standards of conduct and morality and as affronting human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person.¹⁴⁹

The Netherlands did not go along in the same line of thinking. While it did ratify and act according to the resolutions set forward by the United Nations, the Netherlands was mainly concerned with collective security and its own unilateral relations.

According to Peter Malcontent, the Netherlands has an invented tradition of being a leader in fighting for human rights. He claims that this tradition stems from the 1970s when Joop Den Uyl was Prime Minister and at the head of a left-wing cabinet.¹⁵⁰ To contextualize Malcontent's claim, the ministers of Foreign Affairs have been known to like profiling the Netherlands as a country that values religious tolerance and freedom. This has been done throughout modern history according to Malcontent and is strengthened by the claim that the Netherlands wants nothing to do with power politics. The Netherlands should be seen as an international leader who values moral-legalistic politics as a basis for a peaceful world order.¹⁵¹

He begins this tradition in 1970 because the Netherlands desperately held onto Netherlands New Guinea as a colony which damaged its reputation and stilted the

¹⁴⁹ General Assembly resolution 804, *Question of atrocities committed by the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces against United Nations prisoners of war in Korea*, A/PV.467 (3 December 1953), available from <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/8>.

¹⁵⁰ Peter Malcontent, "Nederland en de mensenrechten," in *De wereld volgens Nederland. Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek in historisch perspectief*, eds. Jacco Pekelder, Remco Raben, Mathieu Segers (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 2014), 128.

¹⁵¹ Malcontent, "Nederland en de mensenrechten," 128.

incorporation of human rights as a visible part of Dutch foreign policy.¹⁵² While it is true that the Netherlands held onto New Guinea until 1962, one could argue that the Netherlands was very much involved with human rights in its foreign policy because the Dutch government considered Netherlands New Guinea to be a national policy, according to Minister Staf in 1951.¹⁵³ However, this study has found no mentions of human rights from the Dutch government on the Korean War.

Conclusion on Intrinsic Motivations

While the Dutch government did hold onto ideals and concepts such as collective security, the main reasons for the Netherlands in making its decisions on foreign policy were very much practical and not as much ideological or moral although they did try to portray themselves as morally-motivated people. The Netherlands had many things to learn and unlearn during the Korean War because of its shift in philosophy. After more than a century of neutrality, it is imaginable that changing to an alliance-focused foreign policy would take some getting used to. As the politicians from the time already acknowledged, the Dutch government had to learn being dependent on others and unlearn its pride in being autonomous. Additionally, this shift was combined with a growing divide between two major world philosophies; communism and capitalism.

The Dutch government's presence in Korea can partially be explained by its stance on collective security and anti-communism. However, this thesis has found that the shift to alliances and more specifically the Dutch government-American alliance was the most influential in sending the NDVN. However, the next chapter will show the complex nature of this relationship.

¹⁵² Malcontent, "Nederland en de mensenrechten," 130.

¹⁵³ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 792, Hand. 1950-1951, II, 1915.

Chapter 3 – Dutch-American Relations within International

Organizations

After looking at the intrinsic motivation of the Dutch government it is important to look at the external factors that influenced the decision-making of the Dutch government. Within the scope of this thesis the focus will lie on the Dutch government-American relations both unilateral and within international organizations to answer the question *‘What were the external influences on the Dutch government to send troops to Korea?’*

The Netherlands as a Loyal Ally

One of the main reasons that the Netherlands was described to be a loyal ally of the United States is because the country it is true that it was mainly loyal. The United States had goodwill in the Netherlands because of its role during the liberation of the Second World War and its aid in the form of the Marshall plan.¹⁵⁴ This made it so that the Netherlands sided with them during the Cold War and were susceptible for American influences. The Netherlands felt that they owed it to the United States for its role in World War II and they believed that a small country had to show respect to state to which it owed its independence.¹⁵⁵ This can be seen in the extent to which the Netherlands tried to prove its position. The Netherlands exceeded similar countries in its military contributions within NATO context such as Belgium, Norway, and Denmark.¹⁵⁶ This can also be explained because the Netherlands made NATO policy a cornerstone of its foreign policy, more so than other members. Prioritizing

¹⁵⁴ van Staden, *Een trouwe bondgenoot*, 33.

¹⁵⁵ van Staden, "American-Dutch political relations since 1945," 88.

¹⁵⁶ van Staden, *Een trouwe bondgenoot*, 237.

this international cooperation is in line with Hoffenaar's characteristic of a small-state, which is elaborated on later in this chapter.¹⁵⁷

More practically, the Dutch government was an ally because the Netherlands needed the United States to secure its own national security.¹⁵⁸ Within the power politics of the Cold War, the Netherlands needed the United States as a front against the Soviet Union in combination with its European allies. The NATO and the American leadership would benefit the Netherlands because it feared a European struggle for power on the continent as a small state with many powerful neighbors such as France and West-Germany.¹⁵⁹ The American presence in Europe would hopefully balance the aspirations of these Western-European powers.¹⁶⁰

Overall, the Dutch government was happy with the military and financial support from the United States despite being aware of the political motives of America. These motives were mainly focused on the expansion of its influence to oppose the Russian's expansion. The American's presence on the European continent brought more stability and gave Europe a better chance of standing up against the Russians.¹⁶¹ The Korean War was an event in which the Dutch government had to prove that they were worth the American support. The Dutch government wanted to use its troops to show off to the Americans. By participating in the war on the side of the United Nations, the government wanted to create the same goodwill that the United States enjoyed with the Dutch government and ensure American military support in Europe. The NDVN were successful in doing that. As was discussed in the first chapter, the NDVN soldiers were received well by the Americans. The letter from Mildren to Eekhout

¹⁵⁷ Hoffenaar, "Nederland en zijn militaire veiligheid," 180.

¹⁵⁸ van Staden, *Een trouwe bondgenoot*, 232.

¹⁵⁹ Hellema, "De historische betekenis van de Nederlandse toetreding tot de NAVO," 12.

¹⁶⁰ Hellema, "De historische betekenis van de Nederlandse toetreding tot de NAVO," 11.

¹⁶¹ Hoffenaar, "Voorwaarts verdedigen 1949-1989," 162.

shows as much: ‘so long as there are units like the Netherlands Detachment, so long will the UN Forces continue to grind under heel the tyranny of the Red aggressor.’¹⁶²

Alfred van Staden has said in his study about American-Dutch relations that ‘the United States found in Holland one of its most loyal allies and staunchest supporters. For example, in 1950, the Dutch government gave wholehearted support to U.S. policies in the United Nations concerning the Korean War. In sending a combat unit composed of volunteers, the Netherlands was one of the fifteen countries that joined America in the UN Forces to help South Korea to repel the attack from the north.’¹⁶³ Through this decision the Netherlands presented themselves very differently to the outside then they did during its national debates. Prime Minister Drees said on July 17, 1950, that the Netherlands cannot send troops because its own military is in bad shape. Stikker agreed with Drees and Schokking and was not very enthusiastic either.¹⁶⁴ However, during the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 23, 1950, after the Dutch government were persuaded to send the NDVN, Stikker presented a different story:

‘In this connection we who are here together owe a grateful tribute to the American boys who, in the service of the United Nations, at once went into action all who, together with the struggling South Koreans who are defending its freedom, have hitherto borne the brunt of the fighting. The Netherlands Government, for its part, has, by the immediate dispatch of naval forces and the forthcoming departure to the front of ground troops, demonstrated its

¹⁶² NL-HaNA, Ned. Detachement VN Korea, 2.13.56, inv.nr. 12, 12 August 1951.

¹⁶³ van Staden, "American-Dutch political relations since 1945,": 85.

¹⁶⁴ NL-HaNA, 2.02.21.01, inv. nr. 394, Hand. 1910-1911, 17 July 1950, 10.

determination effectively and wholeheartedly to take part in our collective measures for guaranteeing the security which is a matter of life and death for all of us.’¹⁶⁵

The Netherlands, through Stikker, presented itself as an enthusiastic nation, willing to help in Korea and also applauds the United States openly. This is of course in contrast to its own internal meeting as well as its own communication with the United States State Department where the Netherlands sent its refusal to send more troops.¹⁶⁶ The Netherlands felt obligated to side with its allies instead of critiquing them when in public.¹⁶⁷ Thus, to the outside world, the Netherlands was a loyal ally.

The Netherlands as a Critical Ally

Van Staden argued that the critical stance of the Netherlands toward the United States and NATO emerged in the 1970s and that this was a shift from the 1950s and 1960s when the Dutch government acted as a mostly loyal ally.¹⁶⁸ However, while the Dutch government did try to be as positive as possible about Dutch-American relations, the government had a lot of criticism on United States policies on unilateral basis and within national politics.

While the United States did enjoy a large popularity in the Netherlands because of the Second World War, the late 1940s did not help Dutch-American relations. This was because of the American stance on the police actions of the Dutch government in Indonesia.¹⁶⁹ Luns explained in *Luns: ‘ik herinner mij...’*, which contains the memories of Mr. Joseph Luns as

¹⁶⁵ United Nations General Assembly, *Official records of the General Assembly, 5th session, plenary meetings, verbatim records of meetings* 1 (19 September to 15 December 1950): 57. Available from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/735601?ln=en>.

¹⁶⁶ NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 2359, 25 July 1950.

¹⁶⁷ van Staden, *Een trouwe bondgenoot*, 76.

¹⁶⁸ Massink, “A critical ally (1949-1977),”: 68.

¹⁶⁹ van Staden, “American-Dutch political relations since 1945,”: 81.

told to Michel van der Plas, that the Netherlands has felt abandoned by the United States on this topic and has been silent on this matter either.¹⁷⁰ This discontent and sometimes mistrust went on during the Korean War.

One of the main events that illustrates the critical stance of the Netherlands was as follows. In September 1950, Truman gave the order to cross the border of the 38th parallel to conquer the entire Korean peninsula. The North Korean troops were pushed back the following month. The order of the United States was done so without consulting its UN allies and received criticism from different countries, including the Netherlands. Drees warned the United States again, after doing repeatedly so, that this order went against the mandate of the United Nations and that the United States should focus on resolving the Korean conflict and work towards a lasting peace agreement which this order did not.¹⁷¹ In a memo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister Stikker was informed that the violation of the 38th parallel would be a *casus belli* for the Russian to get directly involved in the war.¹⁷² Before, its support of the North Korean troops was still very much implicit. The Netherlands proposed a buffer zone alongside the 38th parallel instead but the careful approach to the conflict is not received well by the United States.¹⁷³ Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1951, Mr. Stikker, addressed his concern on the rising tension and the strict policy of the United States against Russia.¹⁷⁴ He also said that the Netherlands was dragged into the Korean War by the Americans against its own will.¹⁷⁵ It was clear to the Dutch government that the United States were not allowing them to have any say in the conflict. The Americans did not want to involve small states in the

¹⁷⁰ Joseph Marie Antoine Hubert Luns, and Michel van der Plas. *Luns: Ik herinner mij...* (Leiden: Sijhoff, 1972).

¹⁷¹ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 34.

¹⁷² NL-HaNA, Kabinet Minister-President, 2.03.01, inv. nr. 2359, 9 September 1950.

¹⁷³ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 34.

¹⁷⁴ Benthem van den Bergh, Hellema, and de Lange, *Europa eenmaal andermaal*, 114.

¹⁷⁵ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 43.

peace negotiations,¹⁷⁶ and because of its small contribution and fear of losing face, the Dutch government did not go against the United States' wishes.¹⁷⁷

Mixed Feelings in the United Nations

Before Korean War

During the establishment of the United Nations the Netherlands disagreed with many of the choices that were made. One of them was the neglect of smaller states and the other one was the veto-system in the United Nations Security Council.¹⁷⁸

The first negative encounter with the United Nations Security Council was its interference in the Dutch government' police actions in Indonesia in 1947 and again in 1949.¹⁷⁹ The United States even threatened to withhold all aid to the Netherlands unless they complied with the United Nations Security Council. Dirk Stikker in turn threatened to block the NATO pact if the Netherlands was forced to give up its colony but the alliance was too important for the Dutch government to actually follow through on this treat.¹⁸⁰

While it was clear by now that the Dutch government had to break with neutrality politics, they did not trust its security to the United Nations because of these experiences and turned to NATO and the United States.¹⁸¹ This is nuanced by the position of the United States in the United Nations. According to Duco Hellema, the Netherlands was distrustful of the United Nations because of the powerful position that larger powerful states had. Joseph Luns

¹⁷⁶ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 36.

¹⁷⁷ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 36.

¹⁷⁸ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 28.

¹⁷⁹ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 30.

¹⁸⁰ C. Wiebes, and B. Zeeman. "United States 'Big Stick' Diplomacy: The Netherlands between Decolonization and Alignment, 1945–1949," *International History Review* 14, no. 1 (1992): 45–70; Floribert Baudet, "The Ideological Equivalent of the Atomic Bomb. The Netherlands, Atlanticism and Human Rights in the Early Cold War," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 9, no. 4 (2011): 273; van der Maar, "Easily Emotional": 108.

¹⁸¹ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 27-29.

was critical on the position of the United States in the United Nations, saying that the country was abusing its power.¹⁸² Another politician, Eelco van Kleffens, did not support the United Nations. He was a proponent of regional agreements and organizations which would secure nations. According to him a worldwide organization lacked a shared political basis which would prevent the organization from guaranteeing safety to states.¹⁸³ However they did want to be a member of the United Nations to stay involved and avoid being a political pariah. This motivation is similar to its motivation to join the League of Nations at the beginning of the twentieth century.

During the Korean War

The Netherlands was not a big proponent of the United Nations interference in the Korean War. They feared escalation of violence and also were scared that it would damage its relations with states in the East if they were to enter this conflict.¹⁸⁴ This is one of the main reasons why the Netherlands wanted to join the Korean War with a symbolic contribution in the form of naval ships.¹⁸⁵ Another argument was that the Netherlands did not agree with the dictatorial regime by Syngman Rhee who was the leader of South-Korea.¹⁸⁶

Additionally, the Netherlands was against the United States was on the recognition of Mao's Communist China. The Dutch government preferred to have them in the United Nations Security Council because they had more power and were therefore more important to cooperate with.¹⁸⁷ The Dutch government recognized the Chinese People's Republic on

¹⁸² Duco Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld: de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland* (Houten-Antwerpen: Spectrum, 2010), 203.

¹⁸³ Hans Krabbendam, *Four centuries of Dutch-American relations, 1609-2009* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009), 634.

¹⁸⁴ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 32.

¹⁸⁵ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 32.

¹⁸⁶ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 32.

¹⁸⁷ Klep and van Gils, *Van Korea tot Kosovo*, 32.

January 27, 1950, which was against the will of the United States who feared the rise of Chinese communism just as much as the Russians. However, the Netherlands saw the Chinese way as different from the Russian's communism and especially its desire for expansion.¹⁸⁸

However, overall, because of the relatively absent Soviet Union in the United Nations, the Netherlands accepted the overwhelming influence of the United States on the United Nations and kept to an introverted foreign policy to fix its social-economic problem and hopefully avoid the discussion of Netherlands New Guinea within the United Nations.¹⁸⁹ The Korean issue made it clear to the Netherlands that they were too much militarily and financially dependent on the United States and could therefore not keep its own autonomous policy for the large part. This dependence also explains its lack of interest in the Korean War as they did not have a say in matters when compared to the United States.

After the Korean War

The issue at hand has already been mentioned before, Netherlands New Guinea. This colony was the only territory that the Netherlands was able to keep after the war for independence, which happened before the Korean War. However, the issue continued on alongside the Korean War and was deemed more important by the government. Klinkert and Teitler argue that the Netherlands regularly exposed itself as a critical ally of the United States in the 1950s. They write that this was visible with the American policy during the Korean War because the Netherlands felt 'needlessly burdened' with its fragile relation to Indonesia [due to the

¹⁸⁸ ten Velde, *De Nederlandse deelname*, 6.

¹⁸⁹ J. De Moor, 'Aan de Amerikanen overgeleverd. Nederland, de Verenigde Staten en de oorlog in Korea, 1950-1953', 174.

unresolved Netherlands New Guinea question] and objected against the Americans several times.¹⁹⁰

At first the Dutch government did not want to attend the Geneva conference or have any conference at all because they feared that the issue of the Netherlands New Guinea would be discussed there. The Netherlands did not want to have anyone from the outside involved in this issue. Instead they were trying to shift the focus to Indo-China as an additional topic of discussion. During the ninth General Assembly of the United Nations, Minister Luns publicly stated that the Netherlands New Guinea issue was of no concern to the United Nations and that it was a matter between Indonesia and the Dutch government only.¹⁹¹

After its involvement in the Korean War, the Netherlands had hoped that the United States would side with them on this issue when it was no longer avoidable that this would be discussed in the United Nations. However, this was not the case as the United States ultimately intervened in this conflict on the side of the Indonesians.

Observations on the Netherlands as a Participant in International Politics

When looking at the behavior of the Netherlands while considering Atlanticism and small-state theory, the Dutch government behaved according to the principles of these theories in regard to the Korean War. In light of Atlanticism, the Netherlands wanted to enforce its relationship with America regarding political, economic, and security matters. As seen above, the Dutch government were very much aware of its dependence on the United States as well as the popularity that the major power enjoyed within Dutch society. In the speech from Stikker at the United Nations, the Netherlands also appealed to the shared interests of the two

¹⁹⁰ Wim Klinkert and Gerke Teitler, "Nederland van neutraliteit naar bondgenootschap. Het veiligheids-en defensiebeleid in de twintigste eeuw," in *De Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek in de twintigste eeuw*, eds. Beatrice De Graaff, Bob Duco Hellema, and Bert van der Zwan (Amsterdam: Boom, 2003), 26.

¹⁹¹ NL-HaNA, BuZa, 2.05.117, inv. nr. 19771, 27 September 1954.

nations. This is in line with Græger and Haugevik's definition where cooperation and close relationships between European countries and Northern America are based on mutual interests due to "common heritage and a shared destiny".¹⁹² The shared destiny in this example would be ensuring collective security and defending the freedom of the Koreans and also the world.

Considering small-state theory, the Netherlands acted similar to Hoffenaar's definition.¹⁹³ The Netherlands was limited in its options to choose its own policy in regard to Korea and were forced to side with either the United States or the communists. They also appealed to its legal-moral values in the sense that the Netherlands had recognized South Korea while they had not recognized North Korea and therefore acknowledge the breach of sovereignty. Additionally, the Netherlands valued the importance of NATO and also the United Nations to a certain extent and let these organizations influence its foreign policy greatly. The decisions that the Netherlands made within its foreign policy was mainly based on its own security and secondly on the security of its close allies.

The Netherlands and the United States had a complicated relationship during the fifties. The United States had great power and influence on the Dutch government because of its history together and also as one of the two major powers during the Cold War. Meanwhile, the Netherlands feared political isolation and being subjected to a new war in Europe and therefore wanted to align themselves with the United States for as much as possible without sacrificing too much of its own resources. They also wanted to prove its loyalty as a political ally and sent the NDVN to Korea to show its support to the United States. In the background, the Netherlands New Guinea was the top priority of the Dutch government which caused neglect of its troops in Korea.

¹⁹² Græger and Haugevik, "Defining Atlanticism," 12-13.

¹⁹³ Hoffenaar, "Nederland en zijn militaire veiligheid," 180.

Conclusion

This research was done to add to the existing literature of the Netherlands during the Korean War as there is a scarcity of literature on this topic. Previous studies had looked at the Netherlands in regard to the decolonization of the Netherlands East Indies during the 1940s and 1950s but failed to look at the intricacies of the Dutch government involvement in Korea. Studies on Korea have mainly focused on the two major powers of the United States and the Soviet Union as they were the states who influenced the Korean War the most. Especially the United States had been a major topic of discussion ranging from its own foreign policy to its strategies within the United Nations.

Additionally, this thesis aimed to add to the framework of the Dutch government as a loyal albeit critical ally of the United States. Existing historiography had established the Netherlands as a critical ally of the United States from the 1970s onward with the events of the Vietnam War and rising tensions of the Cold War. Existing literature reveals that the Dutch government cabinet did not want to participate in the Korean War at first but changed its mind in order to protect its own interests.

The main question that this thesis set out to answer was, *'How was the Netherlands influenced internally and externally in its foreign policy regarding the Korean War and the deployment of the NDVN?'* This was done by looking at the political decisions and debates of the Dutch government about Korea, the main activities of the NDVN, identifiable motivations of the Netherlands, and the position of the Dutch government-American relations and the position of the Dutch government within the United Nations.

The title of this thesis became 'the Two Faces of the Netherlands' because the Netherlands had two very different sides when it came to the Korean War. On the one hand, during national debates and when it came to political attention to the NDVN, the Dutch government did not care about the Korean War. They used the NDVN to advance its alliance

with the United States but did not give the Korean War much attention after the first group of soldiers was deployed. Instead, the Netherlands focused on issues closer to home such as its European and NATO alliances as well as Netherlands New Guinea, which was the only territory that the Dutch government owned after the war against Indonesia in the 1940s. This caused operational problems such as a lack of reinforcements and a shortage of equipment. This general lack of attention and ignoring the negative reports from the frontline resulted in an overall negative experience of the NDVN soldiers who in turn made a positive impression on the United States Army and actually helped with the Netherlands' reputation amongst the Americans.

On the other hand, the Netherlands presented themselves during international meetings as an enthusiastic team player that was willing to fight for the common ideas of the United Nations. This image made it seem like the Dutch government had more of an intrinsic motivation to help the Koreans when in fact there was instead more external pressure to act in accordance with the United States' ideals. The Netherlands had several negative experiences with the United Nations and also with the United States as the nation-state did not consider the smaller states in its decision-making process on war strategies. This mistrust and an overall feeling of being forced to cooperate with the United States because there was no better alternative is partly due to the fact that the Netherlands had become a small-state after its loss of colonial territory after the Second World War.

To answer the research question, the Netherlands was mainly influenced by its alliances with the United States as well as its new alliance-based foreign policy. Despite its issues the Netherlands needed the United States and were overall a loyal ally and wanted to prove this loyalty during the Korean War.

Due to the scope of this study it was impossible to continue on the Dutch government-American relations regarding Netherlands New Guinea which was discussed in the United

Nations directly after the end of the Korean War. Another interesting angle for this topic would be to look further into the influence of individuals on the Dutch government policy in Korea. This would open up the opportunity to look at private correspondence of, for example, the Dutch government Prime Minister Willem Drees as well as look at the reports from NDVN commanders and other government officials.

A lesson to be learned from this is that the Dutch government has to keep its attention with its troops during a deployment. While international politics are interesting, the Netherlands failed to protect and provide for its own citizens in Korea and also after its return. Because this was the first participation of the Netherlands in a foreign country after the Second World War we can only hope that the treatment of these kind of missions has improved over time and will improve in the future. Simultaneously, there can also be hoped for that the political situation on national level is not that different from its international status so that the Netherlands can no longer be accused of being two-faced.

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