

International Conflict Resolution through Mediation: Under which Conditions does the European Union effectively mediate?

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International Conflict Resolution through Mediation - Under which Conditions does the EU effectively mediate?

Although the European Union can be considered the most successful internal peace project in history, it is questionable whether the EU successfully acts as a global security player externally. This thesis, therefore, examines the role of the EU as an inter- and intrastate mediator and explores the question of whether and under which conditions the EU is effective in its mediation efforts. The conceptualization of mediation effectiveness consists of a two-dimensional theoretical framework that distinguishes between objective effectiveness – whether and to what extent a peace agreement was signed – and subjective effectiveness in terms of internal EU goal-attainment. To empirically measure the effectiveness of mediation, qualitative case studies and qualitative comparative analysis (QcA) are conducted. The empirical analyses aim at identifying common conditions among the cases influencing mediation effectiveness and thus, determining under which conditions the EU mediates effectively, respectively ineffectively. The conditions influencing mediation effectiveness can be differentiated into two dimensions: 1. Concurrent factors which can be understood as characteristics and behaviour of a mediator, such as the mediator's leverage, coherence, and mediation strategy, and 2. Context factors, such as the severity of the crisis and the conflicting party's willingness to compromise. The empirical results show, firstly, that the EU overall does not exceed a medium degree of effectiveness in direct mediation cases, but the EU is more effective when mediating as the sole mediator in a specific conflict. Secondly, leverage and coherence of a mediator are necessary conditions for mediation to be effective, and together with the conflicting parties' willingness to compromise, these conditions are considered sufficient to explain mediation effectiveness. These results entail important policy recommendations for the EU to change its mediation behaviour and to adopt the mediation approach to the context of a specific crisis.

1 Introduction

The implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993 created the third pillar of the European Union, which strengthened the EU's competences in the field of foreign and security policy (legal basis: TFEU). This expanded mandate gave the EU the opportunity to act more strongly and unified as a global security actor, and as a result of these new competences, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was established in 2010. The EEAS is a comprehensive EU foreign policy office that manages the EU's response to international crises, and within the EEAS, a mediation support team was specifically established with the aim of "promoting the use of mediation as a tool for the EU's initial response to emerging or ongoing crisis situations." (EEAS 2014).

Mediation is, thus, an integral part of the EU's external action toolkit and is used as an instrument to promote peace, democracy and protect human rights worldwide. This commitment of the European Union is enshrined in the Directive (EC 15779/09) on the development of the EU's mediation and dialogue capacities towards a more systematic approach to mediation. As a result of the

implementation of this policy, the number of EU mediation efforts in inter- and intra-state conflicts has increased. For example, the EU mediated, respectively is mediating, in the conflicts between Kosovo-Serbia (2011-present), Georgia-Russia (2008-present), Israel-Palestine (2006), and Russia-Ukraine (2014-present), etc. However, despite increasing efforts, the share of mediation efforts by the European Union still lags significantly behind the United Nations, international organisations as well as individual states (Bergmann 2018). Overall, the EU mediated mainly in intra-European conflicts, while the EU played only a limited role in conflict resolution in the Middle East and Africa. One reason for this could be that the EU does not offer mediation because it does not have a patriarchal interest in a particular conflict or, conversely, because the EU has an interest in the conflict, e.g. in oil or other natural resources, and therefore European mediation efforts are rejected by the conflict parties, as the EU is perceived as a biased mediator. Another reason could be that the conflict parties are not willing to resolve the conflict or are in a stalemate situation and therefore, mediation offers are generally rejected (Keels & Greig 2019). However, the object of this paper is not to explore under which circumstances EU mediation occurs, but under which circumstances the EU effectively mediates. One example where the EU has mediated relatively effectively is the Kosovo-Serbia conflict. However, in some cases, the EU has also failed to mediate conflicts adequately. A recent example where the EU, respectively Germany and France, failed as mediators constitutes the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Although Germany and France succeeded in bringing the two parties to the negotiating table, resulting in two signed peace agreements (Minsk 1 and Minsk 2), peace could not be secured in the long term, as Russia clearly broke the peace agreements by annexing Crimea in 2014 and invading eastern Ukraine in February 2022. The outbreak of war shows the ineffectiveness of Minsk 2 and thus, the failed mediation efforts of the European Union. In face of these current developments, the question arises whether this international war could have been prevented through better mediation or whether mediation failed due to contextual factors such as the severity of the crisis. This leads to the central research question of the paper: *"Under what conditions does the EU mediate successfully?"* This question is crucial because depending on the outcome of the mediation, the EU either contributes to the peace process or to the aggravation of the conflict, which in the worst-case spurs war. Hence, the political and societal relevance of the paper becomes transparent: The societal relevance of securing peace and solving humanitarian problems not only internally but also externally, and the political relevance of being perceived as an effective and strong global security actor, which would lead to an increasing legitimacy of the EU, which in turn would allow the EU to intervene more in crises and contribute to a peaceful society - assuming that the EU mediates effectively. Yet, the relevance of this issue is not sufficiently addressed in the academic literature. Scholars encounter methodological difficulties when trying to empirically measure the effectiveness

of mediation, as the EU has mediated only a limited number of inter- and intra-state disputes in recent decades. While most qualitative papers fail to compare cases, quantitative papers are inexistant due to limited data availability. This thesis, therefore, fills the gap in the academic literature by conducting qualitative case studies and qualitative comparative analysis (QcA). The qualitative case studies allow for in-depth knowledge of the mediation cases, while the QcA allows for quantifying comparisons between the cases. Consequently, it can be determined whether EU mediation efforts succeed or respectively fail due to contextual factors, such as the severity of the conflict, or whether the EU fails to act adequately as a mediator due to concurrent factors (characteristics and behaviour of the mediator), such as the mediator's leverage, coherence, or mediation strategy. If mediation efforts fail due to the mediator's characteristics and behaviour, for example, then important policy recommendations for the EU and its role as a global peace actor emerge from these findings.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Definition of Mediation

As mentioned before, mediation is an integral part of the EU's conflict resolution toolbox. The term mediation can be defined in different ways (GIP 2020). Within this thesis, the definition of the Council of the European Union is adopted since the European Union is the subject of the study. According to the Council, mediation can be defined as follows:

"[...] a way of assisting negotiations between conflict parties and transforming conflicts with the support of an acceptable third party. The general goal of mediation is to enable parties in conflict to reach agreements they find satisfactory and are willing to implement. The specific goals depend on the nature of the conflict and the expectations of the parties and the mediator" (Council of the European Union 2009).

In other words, mediation is a form of third-party intervention that facilitates dialogue between the parties to a conflict. Mediation differs from other forms of third-party interventions – arbitration and adjudication – in two ways. First, mediation is a voluntary process, meaning that disputants can either accept or reject a mediation offer. Thus, for mediation to take place, both disputing parties must be willing to resolve the conflict. For instance, it is often the case that mediation does not occur since parties are not willing to sit down together at the same table and negotiate. Second, the outcome of

the mediation is non-binding, meaning that the parties are not legally bound to hold their peace agreement. This distinguishes mediation from arbitration and adjudication which are legally binding (Lee & Greig 2019). Consequently, to capture mediation effectiveness, not just short-term peace agreements should be considered but also long-term peace since the disputing parties are legally not obliged to comply with the signed peace agreement and can theoretically break the peace agreement anytime. Furthermore, different forms of mediation can be distinguished. Within the European Union, five different mediation forms are implemented:




Figure 1: Different forms of EU mediation efforts. Source: EEAS 2013. (drawn from 2009 EU Concept)

On the one hand, the EU can indirectly influence the mediation processes by, for instance, (a) *financing mediation* processes through certain financial instruments which has been done extensively in Uganda or South Sudan (EEAS 2013). Another way of indirectly impacting the outcome of mediation is (b) *leveraging mediation*. For instance, the EU can provide diplomatic leverage and/or economic abetment to mediation processes and can provide follow-up political assistance through civilian or military crisis management instruments (EEAS 2013). An example of this would be Indonesia, where the EU used its leverage - in this case humanitarian aid - to encourage the parties to reach an agreement. Closely related to this approach, the EU can also (c) *promote mediation* by setting good practices and thus, using its credibility as a political instrument to promote dialogue between the parties to a dispute. The experience in Northern Ireland, for example, has proven useful in enhancing European credibility for international support that could be used later in the case of the Philippines.

In addition, the EU can *(d) support mediation efforts of others*, such as the UN or the African Union. The EU can facilitate mediation processes led by other actors by providing capacity building, training, logistical support, and provision of expertise to mediators and parties to the conflict (EEAS 2013). This has been done several times, such as in South Sudan or in Israel-Palestine where the EU supported the mediating party. On the other hand, the EU can also *(e) directly mediate* in the peace process by acting as a mediator itself, either as a lead- or co-mediator (EEAS 2013). These different forms of mediation efforts logically influence the outcome of mediation in various ways. The European Union, for instance, only supporting mediation efforts of third parties or directly mediating in the dispute will have different implications on the outcome of mediation. In the context of this thesis, the focus will lay on direct mediation efforts where the EU acted as sole- or co- mediator to identify under which conditions the EU effectively mediates as direct intermediary. For example, if all European mediation forms were considered, the results would likely suffer from omitted variable bias, as other parties acting as direct mediators could influence the relationship between the developed factor and the outcome variables. Therefore, examining direct EU mediation efforts can minimise the expected methodological shortcomings. Based on the International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) database, the following conditions must be met to be a case of direct EU mediation (ICB codebook).

- ❖ EU intervenes as acceptable third party in negotiation process between the conflicting parties (thus: shuttle diplomacy efforts excluded)
- ❖ EU acts as direct mediator in dispute and is actively involved in the negotiation process
- ❖ The outcome of the mediation process is non-binding
- ❖ Mediation is a non-violent form of intervention
- ❖ Mediation is a voluntary process in which conflict parties participate by their own choice

These direct European mediation efforts are normally carried out by one or more of the following actors within the EU's foreign policy system (Bergmann 2020):

- ❖ High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission
- ❖ Presidency of the Council of the EU
- ❖ EU Special Representative(s) for a world region or policy field
- ❖ Heads of EU delegations or CSDP missions in third countries
- ❖ Senior EEAS officials
- ❖ MEPs

This definition of direct European mediation efforts will be used throughout the thesis and the selection of case will be based on the developed definition.

2.2 Literature Review

To show which conditions influence the success of mediation a literature review is useful to explore the correlation or potential causal mechanism between mediation efforts and success, and to adequately develop the most appropriate theory. Overall, the academic literature on international mediation is rather limited; in particular, the European Union as an intermediary has not been sufficiently researched. Nevertheless, some scholars have made the EU the subject of their research. Since the objective of this thesis is to examine under which conditions the EU effectively acts as direct mediator in inter- and intra-state conflicts, the literature review is only focusing on studies investigating the EU as direct mediator.

Bergmann, for instance, published several papers focussing on the outcome of European mediation efforts and the explanation factors leading to successful mediation. In his study from 2018, Bergmann conducts a cross-case comparison of the UN¹/EU² mediation efforts in the Kosovo-Serbia conflict and finds that European mediation efforts were more successful compared to UN mediation efforts. He explains this differing outcome firstly, by context factors, such as the timing of mediation and, secondly, by the behaviour and characteristics of the mediator (=concurrent factors) – the leverage and the used manipulation strategy. The leverage of the EU in the Kosovo-Serbia conflict is considered relatively high, since the EU could incentivise the western Balkans with an EU membership perspective, and thus, the conflicting parties were more willing to settle the ongoing dispute. Besides, the used manipulation mediation strategy of the EU is seen as effective since it pushed the parties closer to a peace agreement (Bergmann 2018). However, one should mention that manipulation strategies can also backfire and lead to renewed conflicts in the long run. This shows a methodological weakness of the paper since mediation effectiveness is only measured in objective terms (whether a peace agreement was signed or not) and not subjective terms (perception of success of mediation) although considering subjective opinions would allow better predictions about the long-term effectiveness of mediation.

In the most recent paper from 2020, however, Bergmann is measuring mediation effectiveness along the objective perspective (conflict-settlement degree) and the subjective perception of mediation effectiveness (EU's internal goal-attainment degree) by comparing EU mediation efforts and outcomes in Kosovo-Serbia, Georgia-Russia and Montenegro. His empirical findings show that EU mediation effectiveness varies significantly across the cases and the findings supported the study results from

¹ UN-led Kosovo Status Talks in Vienna (2006–2007)

² EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina (since 2011)

2018 that conflicting-parties willingness to compromise and the mediation strategy are necessary conditions for mediation effectiveness, whilst the leverage and coherence of the mediator also pose an explanatory model for mediation effectiveness (Bergmann 2020). The 2015 paper by Bergmann and Niemann applies the same theoretical framework, distinguishing between the internal "goal achievement perspective" and the external "conflict resolution perspective". The empirical analysis focuses on European mediation efforts in Serbia and Kosovo (Belgrade-Pristina dialogue) and they conclude that the EU was relatively effective in terms of leverage and its mix of manipulation and formulation strategies, while the EU was less effective in terms of coherence (Bergmann & Niemann 2015). Nevertheless, the authors do not consider the conflicting parties' perspectives on mediation effectiveness and thus, fail to capture the overall subjective perception of mediation success.

Chaban et al. (2019) go one step further by examining the EU's self-perceptions of its mediation effectiveness vis-a-vis external perceptions (= conflicting parties' perspective) of EU mediation effectiveness in the case of the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Ukrainian and European actors were asked about the EU's (im)partiality, coherence, and credibility as well as its mediation strategies. The EU's role as an effective peacemaker was seen as ambivalent, resulting in an internal image of unity but an external perception of division. They conclude that (im)partiality is not related to mediation effectiveness, while perceived EU incoherence can explain the ineffectiveness of mediation efforts to some extent (Chaban et al. 2019). These findings are supported by Elgström et al. (2017), who compare the perceived EU's mediation effectiveness by local elites in the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine conflicts and Palestine and find that (im)partiality does not influence mediation outcomes, but the presence of other mediators and the EU's internal incoherence play an important role in the outcome of mediation efforts (Elgström et al. 2017). It should be noted, however, that Chaban et al. (2019) and Elgström et al. (2017) only focus on perceived effectiveness, while the objective outcome of mediation efforts remains unstudied.

In summary, the academic literature suggests a link between concurrent factors, contextual factors, and the success of mediation. However, the overall academic literature on the EU as an effective peacemaker remains insufficient. Only a few studies focus on the EU and its mediation effectiveness, while not a single study focuses on the objective and subjective outcomes of mediation - taking into account the perspectives of the third party and the conflict parties. Moreover, the qualitative case studies lack comparative analysis (except for Bergmann 2015, 2020 and Elgström 2017), and the lack of quantitative studies makes it impossible to generalise the findings. Therefore, this paper contributes to filling the gap in the academic literature by introducing an extended theoretical framework based on the literature review and employing a different methodological approach.

2.3 Effectiveness of Mediation

Mediation effectiveness can be conceptualised in different ways. Within this thesis, the focus lays on an outcome-based understanding of mediation effectiveness, which includes objective and subjective indicators of mediation effectiveness. Overall, mediation effectiveness is difficult to conceptualise because it cannot simply be measured by a signed peace agreement, as the parties to the conflict are not obliged to adhere to the mediated agreement in the long term, and therefore a signed peace agreement does not necessarily mean that peace will be established in the long term. Therefore, other factors need to be taken into account in order to classify mediation as effective. For example, the perception of mediation success by the conflicting-parties and the mediator could indicate whether a signed peace agreement is likely to last in the long term.

Young developed a widely used theoretical framework for conceptualising mediation effectiveness. According to Young (1994), mediation effectiveness can be distinguished between "effectiveness as goal achievement" and "problem-solving effectiveness". Effectiveness in terms of goal achievement represents the internal, subjective EU perspective on mediation effectiveness, i.e. the degree to which the EU has achieved its goals as a mediator in a particular mediation case. Problem-solving effectiveness represents the external, objective conflict resolution perspective - i.e. whether and to what extent a peace agreement was signed and implemented (Young 1994). This conceptualisation is applied in some mediation studies, e.g. Bergmann & Niemann (2015) and Bergmann (2020), etc. However, measuring subjective effectiveness only from the intra-EU perspective is lacks validity as, firstly the mediators' assessments of their own practice are often inaccurate, as Charkoudian (2009) has found and, secondly the perspective of the conflict parties is disregarded. Therefore, another layer is added to Young's theoretical framework: The conflict parties' perspective on the effectiveness of European mediation efforts (Chaban et al. 2019, Elgström et al. 2017). Incorporating the perspective of the conflict-parties contributes to a better assessment of the long-term effectiveness of mediations than analysing mediation success from a purely EU-internal goal achievement perspective. In summary, including this layer better captures the effectiveness of mediation as it incorporates the perceptions of the conflict parties and thus, makes future predictions of long-term peace more accurate, respectively less biased. The effectiveness of mediation is therefore conceptualised as follows:




Figure 2: Conceptualizing mediation success (Outcome Variable).

Overall, the theoretical framework distinguishes between objective and subjective perspectives on mediation effectiveness. The objective perspective includes information on whether a (5) full settlement, (4) major settlement, (3) minor settlement, (2) process agreement, or (1) no agreement was reached. The subjective perspective differentiates between the conflict-party perspectives and the EU-specific perspective on mediation effectiveness. The values range from (1) very low to very high (5). These different levels of mediation effectiveness are later summarized by an aggregated mediation effectiveness value.

2.4 Conditions for Mediation Effectiveness

After having explored how mediation effectiveness can be conceptualized, the focus of this chapter lays on identifying possible factors/conditions that influence mediation effectiveness, in other words how different degrees of mediation effectiveness can be explained by factor variables (=independent variables in statistical language). One widely used theoretical framework in peace studies was developed by Greig (2005) who differentiates between three dimensions influencing the occurrence

of mediation: 1. Concurrent factors, 2. Context factors and 3. Pre-existing factors (Greig 2005). This framework can also be transferred to capture the effectiveness of mediation as logically, the factors influencing the occurrence of mediation also influence the mediation process and consequently, the outcome of mediation. Drawing upon Greig’s framework (2005) and the literature review, the following factors are identified which are likely to impact the success of mediation:




Figure 3: Factors influencing mediation effectiveness (Factor variables).

2.4.1 Concurrent Factors

First, concurrent factors, which can be understood as the characteristics and behaviour of the mediator, affect the mediation outcome. For instance, the **(a) Mediators leverage** impacts the outcome of mediation. The mediators leverage includes the mediator’s resources of power, influence, and persuasion to bring the conflicting parties to a peace agreement (Touval & Zartman 1985). Power instruments of the EU include stick and carrot methods. Carrot methods are, for example, the prospect of EU membership or the offer of financial, political or diplomatic support through the EU’s institutional capacities. Stick measures usually consist of imposing economic sanctions on the disputants. According to Touval, ‘the more powerful international actors are, the more effective they are as intermediaries’ (Touval 1992). Consequently, one would expect great powers, such as the European Union, to be particularly effective as mediators if the mediators bring resources of power to the negotiating table. Gelpi (1999) finds empirical support that mediation by great powers increases the chance of mediation success (Gelpi 1999, Wallensteen 2014). This leads to the first hypothesis:

H1: The leverage of the mediator is a condition for mediation effectiveness.

Furthermore, the **(b) Coherence of the mediator** has an impact on whether the mediation will be successful (Bergmann 2020, Chaban et al. 2019). If the European Union as mediator adopts a coherent mediation approach and signals a strong and unified stance towards a particular conflict, then the disputants perceive the mediation attempt as consistent and are therefore more willing to conclude a peace agreement. Therefore, the second hypothesis is as follows:

H2: The coherence of the mediator is a condition for mediation effectiveness.

The concept of coherence is closely connected to the **(c) Credibility of a mediator**. The credibility of the mediator encompasses the extent to which the disputants believe the mediator's statements, threats, or promises, thus influencing the outcome of the mediation (Kydd 2003, Elgström 2017). If the EU and the mediation approach are perceived as coherent, then the EU is likely perceived as a credible mediator. For this reason, it is not the credibility of the mediator that is tested as condition, but the coherence.

Besides, the **(d) (Im)partiality of a mediator** possibly influences the mediation outcome. Some scholars claim that full impartiality is a prerequisite for mediators' effectiveness (Assefa 1987, Wehr 1979). However, more recent studies have shown that biased mediators can be effective as well. Kydd (2003) goes one step further and argues that unbiased mediators have a credibility problem, as the mediator's intention is to portray the other party as peaceful irrespectively of whether this is actually the case (Kydd, 2003). Besides, Elgström (2017) finds empirical support that biased mediators are not the main reason for ineffectiveness of mediation (Elgström 2017). Moreover, it should be questioned whether a mediator can be fully impartial, especially considering that mediators often mediate to pursue their self-interests. Therefore, it is expected that the EU acts mostly as a biased mediator, especially in its eastern neighbourhood, due to personal self-interests such as oil trade or EU enlargement, which is why the impartiality factor is not examined.

Besides, the **(e) Nature of EU involvement** is assumed to influence the success of mediation (Elgström et al. 2017). Considering the theoretical framework, only direct mediation efforts will be included. However, whether the EU acted as sole- or co-mediator is likely to have a different impact on the outcome of the mediation, as the presence of other mediators changes the mediation dynamics, e.g. the coherence of the mediation approach, as it is more difficult to find common ground between more mediators involved in the negotiations. Therefore, the following hypothesis is put forward:

H3: The nature of EU involvement is a condition for mediation effectiveness.

In addition to the characteristics of the mediator, the behaviour of the EU as mediator also influences the mediation outcome, such as the **(f) Mediation strategy** used in the mediation process. Scholarly

literature mostly distinguishes between three mediation strategies: *Facilitation*, *Formulation*, and *Manipulation* (Wallensteen 2014). *Facilitation* is a strategy that requires less interventionist action by the EU (Touval & Zartman, 1985; Bercovitch, 1992). The EU mediator primarily serves as a communication channel and information provider between the disputing parties but does not make substantive proposals for a compromise solution. *Formulation* is a more proactive strategy that the mediator can use by formulating strategies to resolve the conflict (proposals for compromise). *Manipulation* is the most interventionist strategy, where the EU actively tries to make substantive proposals and directly influences the mediation process through coercive measures (such as stick-and-carrot measures). The academic literature has addressed the question of which mediation strategies are more likely to succeed, but the literature shows a mixed picture. While some studies conclude that manipulative strategies are the most successful form of mediation strategies (Beardsley et al. 2006; Bercovitch et al. 1991; Bercovitch and Houston 1996), other studies suggest that formulation strategies are more likely to lead to a peace agreement (Bergmann & Niemann 2015). Overall, however, the academic literature agrees that mediation strategies are likely to have an impact on mediation outcomes, leading to the fourth hypothesis:

H4: The mediation strategy of the mediator is a condition for mediation effectiveness.

Considering the past mediation efforts of the EU in inter- and intra-state conflicts, the most frequently used EU mediation strategy is formulation. Consequently, it seems reasonable to assume that the formulation strategy is the most successful strategy the EU can adopt, as facilitation and manipulation tend to be risk-averse strategies where the EU either does not mediate enough or risks fuelling the conflict by actively manipulating one or both parties to the dispute. However, different strategies are used depending on the severity of the conflict. High Intervening strategies seem to be more effective in high-intensity conflicts, while less intervening strategies are more appropriate in low-intensity conflicts (Bercovitch & Gartner 2006, Bergmann & Niemann 2015). For this reason, contextual factors are also identified as conditions for mediation success.

2.4.2 Context Factors

Secondly, contextual factors significantly influence the outcome of mediation efforts. Contextual factors can include the nature of the conflict (= type and complexity of the problem), the severity of the conflict, the duration of the conflict as well as the willingness of the conflict parties to compromise (Greig 2005). Due to the scope of the work, only the **(g) severity of the crisis** as well as the **(h)**

willingness of the conflict parties to compromise are used as factor variables to explain mediation effectiveness, as these conditions have a higher explanatory power than the others according to scientific literature. Bergmann and Niemann (2015) have shown, for example, that the higher the level of violence in a conflict, the higher the likelihood that the parties will agree to a third party offer to mediate their conflict, but the lower the likelihood that mediation will lead to a full settlement (Bergmann & Niemann 2015). Therefore, the degree of crisis is expected to influence mediation effectiveness, respectively mediation ineffectiveness, leading to the fifth's hypothesis:

H5: The severity of the conflict is a condition of mediation ineffectiveness.

In addition, the characteristics of the disputants, such as the conflict parties' willingness to compromise, are likely to influence the outcome of mediation. For example, if the conflicting parties are not willing to compromise, then mediation is likely to be ineffective as no conflict resolution will take place. Therefore, it is expected that the conflict parties' willingness to compromise is a sufficient condition for the effectiveness of mediation, which leads to the sixth's hypothesis:

H6: The conflict parties' willingness to compromise is a condition for mediation effectiveness.

2.4.3 Pre-existing Factors

According to Greig, in addition to concurrent and contextual factors, pre-existing factors also influence the occurrence of mediation, respectively the outcome of mediation (Greig 2005). Pre-existing factors can be, for example, the number of previous mediation efforts and the degree of success of these mediation efforts. For example, after years of conflict and the failure of previous mediation efforts, it is likely that at some point the disputants will find themselves in a stalemate situation where it becomes difficult to reach a consensus since opinions have become entrenched over the years (Greig 2005). Thus, pre-existing factors - the number and success rate of previous mediation attempts - could influence the outcome of current mediation attempts. However, due to the scope of the study, this relationship is not tested, as CP willingness to compromise is already tested as a factor which likely results from previous mediation outcomes.

Overall, the developed factors (IV) that influence mediation outcome (DV) have been identified in a number of peace studies, but the empirical evidence remains inconclusive on the extent to which these factors influence mediation effectiveness. This paper, therefore, examines how these conditions influence the effectiveness, respectively ineffectiveness of mediation. In the following, an overview of the developed conditions and outcome variables is given:

Conditions

Outcome



- Concurrent factors**
 - Mediators leverage
 - Coherence of mediator
 - Credibility of mediator
 - Impartiality
 - Nature of EU/EC involvement
 - Mediation strategy

- Pre-existing factors**
 - Previous mediation efforts
 - Previous outcome of mediation efforts

- Context factors**
 - Severity of conflict
 - CP willingness to compromise

- Objective outcome**
 - Full settlement
 - Major settlement
 - Medium Settlement
 - Minor settlement
 - No agreement

- Subjective outcome**
 - 1) *EU perspective*
 - very high
 - high
 - medium
 - low
 - very low

 - 2) *Disputants perspective*
 - very high
 - high
 - medium
 - low
 - very low

Figure 4: Conditions and outcome variables. Source: Own elaboration.

3 Methodology

In this methodological chapter, both empirical approaches are presented, including the Qualitative Case Studies and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QcA). In the next step, the data and the operationalisation of the data are presented and in the last step, the case selection method and the cases are introduced.


3.1 Research Design 1 – Qualitative Case Studies

The first empirical analysis consists of qualitative case studies for all direct European mediation efforts. This step precedes the QcA analysis to gather information on the characteristics of the crisis, the disputants, the mediator, the mediation attempt as well as the outcome of the mediation. This qualitative approach allows for in-depth analysis of individual cases along the developed factors and outcome variables (Figure 4) by including a variety of different data sources (see chapter on data). The data collection process takes place in a broader and more flexible way, which is very useful given the lack of quantitative data on mediation cases, for example, on concurrent factors (such as leverage, coherence, etc.) and, moreover, conflict management databases do not distinguish between direct and indirect mediation efforts and often do not distinguish between European and international mediation attempts. The qualitative analysis is thus primarily used for data collection purposes, which is why the qualitative case studies are presented rather briefly due to the scope of this thesis. Based on the qualitative case analysis, a cross-case table is created at the end of the empirical chapter containing information on factors influencing mediation effectiveness and the outcome of mediation - mediation effectiveness. This data is used in the next step for the QcA analysis. Normally qualitative case studies are used as the second step of QcA, but here the order is reversed, as the QcA is based on my own developed "database", which makes the QcA analysis more transparent.

3.2 Research Design 2 - Fuzzy QcA

In the second step of the empirical analysis, a fuzzy Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QcA) is conducted based on the qualitative results of the case studies. The QcA design allows to make systematic comparisons between cases based on their outcome by comparing a set of conditions/factors to a set of effective, respectively ineffective mediation outcomes. This set-theoretic approach thus enables to explain why mediation efforts were effective in some cases but not in others and seeks to uncover the causal mechanism of mediation efforts and outcomes. The developed QcA within this thesis is used for descriptive as well as explanation purposes (Mello 2021). The descriptive approach enables to summarize and identify patterns in the data whereas the explanation approach allows for an assessment of whether and how empirical results match the theoretical expectations by testing the developed hypothesis (Mello 2021).

To understand which conditions result to what extent in different mediation outcomes, a fuzzy QcA is employed since the data is not binary (0 or 1) in nature but can take different values. For instance, the outcome of mediation is not just measured in effectiveness (1) and ineffectiveness (0) but as a value between 0.0 (minimum value) and 1.0 (maximum value). The fuzzy-set QcA addresses, therefore, an important limitation of the crispy-set QcA since the fuzzy-set approach allows the cases to vary by their degree of conditions and outcome (Pappas & Woodside 2021). Consequently, the fuzzy QcA is better suitable to understand and capture complex causality such as the relationship between mediation efforts and mediation effectiveness (Mello 2021). The following illustration shows an approximate overview of the QcA circle used in this analysis (some steps are changed within my analysis):



After the qualitative data has been gathered and analysed in the qualitative case analysis, the data is calibrated in the next step of the QcA in line with fitting calibration sets. After the data calibration, factors influencing mediation effectiveness can be identified as either necessary or sufficient conditions or non-significant conditions for the effectiveness of mediation. What is exactly meant by necessary and sufficient conditions? **A necessary condition is a condition that must be present for an event to occur**, but it alone does not provide a sufficient cause for the occurrence of the event. **A sufficient condition is a condition or set of conditions that will produce the event**, but the presence is not necessary for the outcome to occur (Mello 2021). The causal inference of QcA can thus, be written mathematically as the following (Mello 2021):

1. Necessary condition: If $X\{1\}$, then $Y\{1\}$ $X\{1\} \Rightarrow Y\{1\}$
2. Sufficient condition: Only if $X\{1\}$, then $Y\{1\}$ $X\{1\} \Leftarrow Y\{1\}$

To illustrate this with an example: Oxygen is a *necessary condition* for human life, but its presence alone does not *suffice* for human life since more resources are required for human survival, such as sleep, water, and food. Oxygen, sleep, water, and food are thus, *jointly sufficient* conditions for human life. Applying this logic to conditions influencing mediation effectiveness: A *necessary condition* is a prerequisite for mediation success to occur, but it does not guarantee the occurrence of mediation success whereas the presence of a *sufficient condition* guarantees mediation success, but the presence of the condition is not necessary for mediation effectiveness to occur. Once sufficient and necessary conditions are identified using mathematic formulae and the statistical programme R, their significance can be measured along **consistency and coverage**. Mello compares the concept of **consistency to statistical significance** whereas **coverage** can be equated with **statistical strength**:

‘Similar to statistical significance, consistency measures the degree to which an empirical relationship between a condition or combination of conditions and the outcome comes close to set-theoretic necessity and/or sufficiency. Similar to statistical strength, coverage measures the empirical importance or relevance of a condition or combination of conditions’ (Mello 2021).

In general, the closer the values for consistency and coverage are to 1, the more confident we can be about a set-theoretic relationship. First, necessary conditions are analysed along consistency and coverage before sufficient conditions and combinations of conditions are analysed through a truth table construction and subsequent Boolean minimization (Mello 2021). The truth table construction is considered the analytical core of the QcA, as the truth table shows the number of logically possible combinations of conditions leading to mediation effectiveness by testing individual conditions and combinations of conditions for their sufficiency. Each row of the truth table refers to a possible factor

configuration and is thus a statement about sufficiency (Mello 2021). In the final step of the empirical analysis, the results of the truth table can be minimalized and interpreted. Within this thesis the conservative solution is used, as this minimalization procedure excludes logical remainders and thus shows the actual causal structure of sufficient conditions, leading to increasing validity. To double check the results, the parsimonious solution procedure is applied with allows including logical remainders.

In summary, this set-theoretical analysis enables to test individual conditions and combinations of conditions for their necessity and/or sufficiency and thus, to answer the research question, under which conditions the EU mediates successfully. The main advantage of this methodology is that it allows for an in-depth focus on individual cases while uncovering patterns across multiple cases, which allows for generalization of the findings. Another advantage is that it can be applied to only a few cases when the limited number of cases makes conventional statistical analysis impossible. Therefore, a small number of cases can be compared to detect patterns between all included cases and consequently understand changes within a small sample size (Intrac 2017).

3.3 Data

As the European Union has only directly mediated a limited number of inter- and intra-state conflicts in recent decades, the data on European mediation efforts is first examined before the case studies are presented. The QcA analysis enables to include qualitative as well as quantitative data. Since quantitative data on mediation efforts, especially regarding concurrent factors (characteristics and behaviour of mediator) and the subjective outcome of mediation, is inexistant, qualitative data is gathered first to get more in-dept knowledge about specific cases and to determine whether European mediation attempts have taken place directly or indirectly. The qualitative sources include academic secondary literature (Bergmann 2020, Bergmann & Niemann 2015), reports from non-profit civil society actors (EIP, Carnegie, Berghof Foundation, etc.), and official European institutions (European Parliament, European Commission, EEAS, Mediation Support Team). In addition, news coverage is included, e.g. articles from BBC and Deutsche Welle, etc. These news providers were selected for their pan-European and neutral news coverage.

In the next step, widely used and well-known conflict management databases (ICM, ICB, MILC, CWM) are used to collect quantitative data on European mediation cases, as there is no overview to be found in qualitative literature about all direct EU mediation efforts and the databases should include all

mediation efforts. Besides, this step is helpful to make comparisons between the gathered qualitative data and existing quantitative data. The data is collected from the International Conflict Management (ICM), the International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) databases, the Civil war mediation database (CWM), and the Managing Intrastate Low-level Conflict database (MILC). The ICM dataset focuses on civil and interstate wars and contains conflicts between 1945 and 1995 and codes a total of 5 disputes in which the EU mediated (Afghanistan/USSR, Somalia civil war, Yugoslavia 1991, Iraq-Kuwait, Azerbaijan - Armenia) (ICM). The ICB database focuses on international crises and includes data between 1918 to 2017 and codes 2 international disputes in which the EU directly mediated (Russo-Georgian war, Serbian train incident (ICB) (Berovitch 2011). The MILC database includes intrastate low-intensity conflicts and codes two disputes in which the EU acted as the sole intermediary among the conflicting parties between 1993-2004: Israel/Palestine 1997/2001 and Macedonia 2001. The CWM codebook includes Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Indonesia, Israel, Macedonia, and Russia as European mediation efforts (CWM). These databases are merged to provide more information on mediated conflicts, such as concurrent, context, and pre-existing factors that influence the outcome of mediation. Overall, the qualitative and quantitative data are combined and critically compared to provide a more accurate picture of direct European mediation efforts.

3.4 Operationalization of Data

To be able to conduct the qualitative empirical analysis and to draw systematic comparisons between cases in the QcA analysis, the developed factor and outcome variables must first be operationalised. Some previously developed factors that potentially influence the effectiveness of mediation were omitted, firstly because of limited data and, secondly because the ratio between factors and cases needs to be appropriate (Mello 2021). Therefore, pre-existing factors were omitted as it is assumed that concurrent and contextual factors have greater explanatory power for the outcome variable. However, pre-existing factors will be shortly addressed in the qualitative case studies.

In addition, the dimensions of mediation effectiveness are simplified by disregarding the perceptions of the conflict parties on mediation effectiveness, as qualitative interviews would have to be conducted to adequately capture the perspective of the conflict parties and it would be too complex to create an aggregated value for mediation effectiveness from three dimensions, especially as the CP perspective often consists of more than two parties. As this would go beyond the scope of the paper, only the conflict resolution level and the internal EU goal achievement level are analysed and an

aggregated effectiveness value of the two dimensions is created. Since the effectiveness score still includes the subjective and objective perspective, it is argued that the score still has validity.

3.4.1 Mediation Effectiveness

Firstly, the outcome variable mediation effectiveness will be operationalized. The proposed operationalization of the objective *conflict-settlement perspective* and the *subjective goal-attainment perspective* is adopted from Bergmann & Niemann (2015) and Bergmann (2020). The objective conflict-settlement degree is operationalized as follows:

- (5) **Full settlement of conflict:** All conflict issues have been fully settled through negotiated agreements
- (4) **Major settlement of conflict:** The majority of conflict issues have been fully or partially settled through negotiated agreements
- (3) **Minor settlement of conflict:** A small number of conflict issues have been fully or partially settled through negotiated agreements
- (2) **Process agreement:** No agreement has been made on the settlement of conflict issues, but there is agreement on holding further rounds of negotiations, establishing procedural aspects for talks, or on strategies for the implementation of concessions; or: **Ceasefire agreement:** Obliges parties to stop all military action against the respective enemy and to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict
- (1) **No settlement:** The mediation efforts have neither led to the full or partial settlement of any conflict issue through negotiated agreements nor to any process agreement to continue the mediation process
(Bergmann & Niemann 2015)

The conflict-resolution degree will be analysed along the signed peace agreement as well as the degree of implementation of the agreement since a signed peace agreement does not necessarily mean that the conflict parties have implemented the peace agreement.

The subjective perception of mediation effectiveness includes the internal EU *goal-attainment perspective*. Since an outcome-oriented approach to mediation effectiveness is adopted within this thesis, the goal-attainment perspective will only focus on the EU's outcome goals regarding mediation and not on process goals. Overall, EU effectiveness in terms of goal attainment is operationalized as followed:

- (5) **Effectiveness is very high:** The EU has been able to achieve all its mediator goals to a very high degree
- (4) **Effectiveness is high:** The EU has achieved most of its mediator goals to a high degree
- (3) **Effectiveness is medium:** The EU has attained most/some of its goals only to a medium degree
- (2) **Effectiveness is low:** The EU has not attained most of its goals
- (1) **Effectiveness is very low:** The EU has not achieved any of its mediator goals
(Bergmann 2020)

Translating the conflict settlement degree and the goal-attainment degree into measures of mediation effectiveness: (5) EU effectiveness is very high if there is a full settlement of the conflict and the EU has been able to achieve all its mediator goals to a very high degree; (4) EU effectiveness is high if there is a major settlement of the conflict and the EU has achieved its mediator goals to a high degree; (3) EU effectiveness is medium if there is a minor settlement of the conflict and the EU has attained its goals only to a medium degree; (2) EU effectiveness is low if there is only a process or ceasefire agreement and the EU has not attained most of its goals; and (1) EU effectiveness is very low if there is no agreement at all and the EU has not achieved any of its mediator goals.

3.4.2 Conditions for EU Mediation Effectiveness

In this section, the conditions for mediation effectiveness will be operationalized to the extent possible: Nature of EU involvement, Mediator's leverage, mediator's coherence, mediation strategy, severity of crisis and CP willingness to compromise.

First, the *nature of EU/EC involvement* can influence the effectiveness of mediation. In line with the theoretical framework, the nature of EU/EC involvement must be direct, however, the EU can act either as sole or co-mediator in the negotiation process. As the number of mediators involved in the process is likely to affect the outcome of the mediation, a binary factor is created to indicate whether the EU acts as the sole mediator or as a co-mediator:

- (1) The EU acts as direct sole mediator in the negotiation process**
- (0) The EU acts as direct co-mediator in the negotiation process**

The EU's *leverage* can be understood as the power influence and persuasive power of the mediator, including resources in terms of economic, political, humanitarian, and diplomatic instruments, etc. The degree of EU influence is operationalised as follows:

- (5) Verry high leverage:** The EU used very high resources of power (e.g. economic aid/sanctions, EU accession incentives, partnership agreements)
- (4) High leverage:** The EU used high resources of power
- (3) Medium leverage:** The EU used medium resources of power
- (2) Low leverage:** The EU used low resources of power
- (1) Very low leverage:** The EU used very low resources of power

The degree of EU *coherence* shows how consistent European mediation efforts are in terms of coordination between the different EU institutions and actors involved in European mediation efforts (=horizontal coherence) and the substantive consistency between individual Member States' policies

towards a conflict and mediation activities (vertical coherence) (Bergmann & Niemann 2015, Bergmann 2020). EU coherence is operationalised in the following way:

- (5) **Very high coherence:** Very coherent EU mediation approach and very united stance of MS towards mediation efforts and conflict issues
- (4) **High coherence:** Coherent approach and united stance of MS towards mediation efforts and conflict issues
- (3) **Medium coherence:** Medium coherent approach and united stance of MS towards mediation efforts and conflict issues
- (2) **Low coherence:** Low coherent approach and low united stance of MS towards mediation efforts and conflict issues
- (1) **Very low coherence:** Very low coherent approach and very low united stance of MS towards mediation efforts and conflict issues

Based on Bergmann (2020), the *mediation strategy* of the mediator is operationalized as follows:

- (3) **Manipulation:**
 - EU exerts considerable pressure on the parties, drawing on its leverage to move parties towards an agreement
 - EU actively intervenes in the negotiations by making substantive suggestions, and offering implementation assistance
- (2) **Formulation:**
 - EU puts forward proposals and suggestions on how to settle the conflict
 - EU has higher degree of control over the negotiation process, but without aiming to change the parties' cost-benefit calculations
- (1) **Communication-Facilitation**
 - EU supplies (missing) information about the conflict and each side's interests to the parties and arranges interactions between them
 - EU enables exchanges of communication between the parties through the trilateral negotiation structure

The *severity of the crisis* is not operationalized in the number of fatalities since it is argued that the number of fatalities is not representative for the severity of the crisis. Within this thesis the hostility coding scheme of the ICM codebook is used since this operationalization gives a better estimate of the severity of the crisis and the potential outbreak of violence:

- (5) **War:** Full-scale war (threshold of 1000 fatalities)
- (4) **Use of force:** Outbreak of military hostilities between the armed forces of two or more parties (serious clashes)
- (3) **Display of force:** Display of force threatening internal stability/security (e.g. military demonstrations)
- (2) **Threat to use force:** Verbal indicators of hostile intent - Threat to use armed forces/violate territory of another party
- (1) **No militarized threat:** The dispute is a disagreement of interests at the diplomatic level, with no foreseeable military consequences, implications or threats apparent at this time (non-violent diplomatic disagreement)

The *willingness of the conflict parties to compromise* also ranges from very low to very high. This assessment is made by analysing whether the conflict parties expect benefits from the outcome of the mediation and are therefore willing to compromise, or whether the CPs are situated in a deadlock and are thus not willing to deviate from their initial goals.

- (5) **Very high willingness to compromise:** The CP have a very high degree of willingness to accept mediation outcomes
- (4) **High willingness to compromise:** The CP have a high degree of willingness to accept mediation outcomes
- (3) **Medium willingness to compromise:** The CP have a medium degree of willingness to accept mediation outcomes
- (2) **Low willingness to compromise:** The CP have a low degree of willingness to accept mediation outcomes
- (1) **Very low willingness to compromise:** The CP have a very low degree of willingness to accept mediation outcomes

3.5 Case Selection

In this chapter, the method of case selection and the selected cases are presented. Based on the selected cases, qualitative case studies and a comparative analysis are conducted in the empirical chapter.

The case selection procedure is in line with the QcA case selection methods, as some criteria have to be fulfilled for the QcA analysis to work. In QcA, there are several options for sample size selection. One option is to select cases based on the given population, which would mean that all cases where the EU has mediated conflicts are considered (Mello 2021). Since the EU has mediated a few international and domestic disputes in recent decades, the population is set as the sample size. However, some criteria must be met for all cases to be included. First, the sample size must differ in its outcome to make comparisons between cases and to determine whether there is a relationship between the developed factors - concurrent, contextual, and pre-existing factors - and the outcome of mediation. Secondly, the factors influencing the outcome of mediation must differ to some extent to understand the changes in outcome. It is assumed that these criteria are likely to be met, as EU mediation efforts in international or internal crises are seen as inconsistent and varying in their degree of effectiveness (Bergmann 2020). The advantage of the given population approach is that all cases can be included in the analysis and thus the results can be generalised. However, as different databases code different mediation attempts and the secondary literature does not always agree on whether a mediation case can be considered a direct/indirect or a European/national mediation attempt, data on direct European mediation efforts is inconsistent and limited. Therefore, the case

selection method is also based on data availability. Furthermore, the case selection is in line with the previously proposed definition of direct European mediation efforts, i.e. indirect European mediation efforts are not considered, but only mediation cases where the EU acted as a direct mediator (either as the sole mediator or as co-mediator) and not only promoted, supported, funded, or assisted third party mediation efforts.

According to databases on international conflict management (ICM, ICB, MILC, etc.), academic literature (Bergmann & Niemann 2015), and official websites of European institutions (EEAS, etc.), the following cases are considered direct EU mediation efforts where the EU was actively involved in the negotiations:

Case	Durati on	Nature of EC/EU involveme nt	Who represents EU?	Other third parties involved as mediators	Outcome	Source
Kosovo-Serbia	March 2011-today	Direct mediator between Kosovo and Serbia	EU lead facilitator Robert Cooper (2011-2012), High representative Catherine Ashton (2012-2014), High representative Federica Mogherini (2015-)	-	7 technical agreements, Brussels Agreement and implementation of Brussels agreement	Begmann& Niemann 2015,
Montenegro	Nov 2001-March 2002	Direct mediator between Serbia and Montenegro	High representative Javier Solana	-	March 2002: Belgrade agreement on foundation of state union between Serbia and Montenegro	Begmann& Niemann 2015,
Yugoslavia	June 1991-July 1991	Direct mediator between 6 Yugoslav republics	EC Troika, later Lord Carrington	-	July 1991: Brioni agreement	Begmann& Niemann 2015,
Georgia	2008-today	EU as co-mediator bw South Ossetia & Abkhazia		OSCE- and UN-led mediation efforts: Geneva discussions	Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism	Bergmann 2020, CWM

Bosnia & Herzegovina	October 2009	EU as co-mediator in the Butmir Process	Carl Bildt (Swedish foreign minister)	US	No agreement reached	Begmann& Niemann 2015,
Macedonia	July-August 2001	EU as co-mediator	Francois Leorad, Javier Solana	US	August 2001: Ohrid Framework agreement	Begmann& Niemann 2015,
Kosovo	August - december 2007	EU as co-mediator in the Troika process	EU chief negotiator Wolfgang Ischinger	USA, Russia	No agreement reached	Begmann& Niemann 2015,
Bosnia Herzegovina	Jan 1992-April 1994	EU as co-mediator between Bosnia and Herzegovina	Lord Carrington and Lord Owen	UN	No agreement reached (Vance-Owen plan rejected by Bosnian serbs)	Begmann& Niemann 2015,
Ukraine – Russia	2014	Germany and France as mediators in Geneva, Normandy Minsk 2 format	Germany and France	In Geneva format: US	Minsk 2 agreement	Elgström 2018
Montenegro	2015-2017	EU as co-mediator	EU Commissioner Hahn	US	Przino Agreement	Choibion 2017

The analysis excludes efforts of shuttle diplomacy, such as the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and Egypt in 2013, as well as mediation efforts where the EU was not actively involved in the negotiation process, as in Israel/Palestine in 2006 and Somalia in 2012, or was not formally recognised as a mediator, as in Indonesia (Aceh) in 2004 (EEAS 2013). Although the EU was not officially recognised as an organisation in the mediation process between Russia and Ukraine in 2014, but the mediation efforts were carried out by the member states France and Germany, the mediation case is nevertheless included since Germany and France are considered representatives of the EU and because of the current relevance of the case at hand. In total, 10 cases between 1991 and today could be identified as direct European mediation efforts: Georgia 2008-present, Kosovo 2007, Kosovo-Serbia 2011-present, Montenegro 2001-2006, Yugoslavia 1991, Macedonia 2001, Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1994, Bosnia & Herzegovina 2009, Montenegro 2015-2017, and Russia-Ukraine 2014-present.

4 Qualitative Case Studies

This empirical chapter aims at analysing individual case studies and identifying the degree of mediation effectiveness and the degree of conditions influencing mediation effectiveness by examining academic literature, reports from non-profit organizations, and independent news coverage. The results of the analysis will later be used for the QcA analysis. Since the *conditions of EU mediation effectiveness* – concurrent factors, context factors, and pre-existing factors – and the outcome variable *mediation effectiveness* have already been operationalized in the chapter before, the qualitative analysis is conducted with respect to the 5-point operationalization scale of the variables (see operationalization in data chapter).

The empirical analysis is structured as follows: For each case, first, the context of the conflict is shortly mapped out and the European mediation efforts. Secondly, mediation effectiveness is examined along the objective *conflict-settlement perspective*, so whether and to what extent peace agreements are reached, and the subjective perspective, the internal *EU goal-attainment perspective*. Thirdly, the conditions influencing mediation effectiveness – concurrent, context, and pre-existing factors – are analysed. Once each case has been analysed a cross-case comparisons table is composed at the end of the empirical chapter to detect similar and diverging patterns between the cases.

4.1 Georgia 2008-today

The 2008 **Russo-Georgian war** (also known as the "Five-Day War", which lasted from 8 to 12 August 2008) was triggered by the conflict over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which are official regions of Georgia but are described as "breakaway regions" claiming independence from Georgia due to their ethnic diversity. When Georgian forces launched a military operation against South Ossetia (with a majority Russian-speaking population) on 7 August, Russia responded with a massive deployment of its troops in Georgian territory, initially in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and later advancing further into Georgian territory (Bergmann 2020). As a result of the outbreak of the 5-Day War, the EU (under Sarkozy, the French EU Presidency) acted as the sole mediator between the conflicting parties, and Sarkozy succeeded in brokering a 6-point ceasefire agreement (also known as the "Protocole d'Accord") between Russia and Georgia. Shortly after the agreement was signed, Russia withdrew its troops from Georgian territory, but despite the immediate ceasefire agreement, Russia did not adhere to the signed ceasefire agreement in the long term but instead increased its military presence in the

occupied territories (Forsberg & Seppo, 2011). The ceasefire agreement was therefore unable to ensure long-term stability in Georgia and resolve the ethnic conflict between the two breakaway regions (Turan Information Agency 2019). Although this case was not a direct European mediation effort but rather shuttle diplomacy by Sarkozy – as the EU was not represented as an organisation and the parties to the conflict had no direct contact – and is therefore not considered in the qualitative analysis, the shuttle diplomacy efforts led to the end of the 5-day war and paved the way for the start of international post-conflict negotiations: The Geneva International Discussions (GID) (Bergmann 2020).

The Geneva International Talks (2008-present) are led by the UN, OSCE, and EU, and the GID format brings together representatives of Georgia, Russia, the US, and the two breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Panchulidze 2020). The first round of the International Geneva Discussions took place on 15 October 2008, shortly after Russia officially recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and called on other states to follow its decision (Bergmann 2020). As expected, this step meant a bad start for the GID, as Georgia rightly upholds its the principle of territorial integrity. Overall, the only tangible agreement to emerge from GID was the establishment of the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) in 2009, and since 2016 the GID are locked in a standstill.

4.1.1 EU Mediation Effectiveness

To determine whether European mediation efforts between 2008 and today have been effective, firstly the degree of the *conflict settlement* is assessed. The first and only tangible agreement under the GID format was reached in 2009 on the establishment of the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), which facilitates communication and dialogue on security issues between the territories controlled by Georgia and Abkhazia/South Ossetia. The IPRM can be seen primarily as a confidence-building measure to prevent a future escalation of violence, however, the IPRM was not able to resolve the security situation between Georgia and the Abkhazian and South Ossetian territories (Bergmann & Niemann 2015, Bergmann 2020). In addition, some minor technical agreements were reached on environmental, cultural, and humanitarian issues, such as the exchange of prisoners between Georgian, Abkhazian, and South Ossetian authorities in 2016 (Panchulidze 2020). Nevertheless, the main issues related to the conflict, the use of non-force between Russia and Georgia, the establishment of international security arrangements, and the return of internally displaced persons have not been settled, as Russia is still in military control over the two regions.

The effectiveness of EU mediation in terms of conflict settlement can therefore be rated as *low*, as only the IPRM was established and minor process agreements were reached between Georgia and Russia on further rounds of negotiations – which are currently in a standstill –, but no agreements were reached on the settlement of the main conflict issues, the use of non-force between Russia and Georgia and the return of IDPs.

Assessing the *EU's effectiveness in achieving its internal mediation outcome goals*, three objectives of the EU can be identified: (1) Preventing a renewed escalation of the conflicts, (2) improving the living conditions of the conflict-affected population, and (3) contributing to a peaceful settlement of the conflict over South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Bergmann 2020, Council of the European Union 2013). The first outcome goal has been achieved to a moderate extent, as the security situation in the regions stabilised from 2012 onwards, following several violent incidents in the regions between 2009 and 2011 (Bergmann 2020). However, the second outcome goal has not been achieved, as the living conditions of the conflict-affected population could not be improved since the status of 200,000 refugees and IDPs remains unresolved. The third outcome goal can also be rated as low, as the GID have not been able to peacefully resolve the conflict between the parties to the conflict. The non-use of force between Georgia and Russia was recognised as the main point of contention, but this main conflict issue has not been settled (Giuashvili & Devdariani 2016). Moreover, the GID's goal of monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire agreement has not been achieved, as the ceasefire agreement brokered under President Sarkozy has not yet been fully implemented – nor has this been recognised by Russia (Giuashvili & Devdariani 2016, Panchulidze 2020). The overall degree of goal achievement is thus *low*, as the EU was neither able to resolve security and humanitarian issues in the conflict-affected regions, nor to contribute to a peaceful settlement of the conflict with a focus on the non-use of force between Georgia and Russia (Giuashvili & Devdariani 2016).

In summary, the effectiveness of mediation is assessed as *low* when combining the low level of conflict resolution and the low level of internal EU goal achievement.

Mediation effectiveness	Degree of effectiveness
Conflict-settlement perspective	Low
Goal-attainment perspective	Low
Combined	Low

4.1.2 Conditions for EU Mediation Effectiveness

Having established that European mediation efforts in the South Caucasus are rather ineffective, the conditions influencing mediation effectiveness are analysed to explain the relatively low level of the mediation outcome. First, concurrent factors – behaviour and characteristics of the mediator – and second, context factors – severity of crisis, parties' willingness to compromise – are mapped out.

For example, the *nature of EU involvement* potentially influences the outcome of mediation. In the Geneva International Discussions, the EU is involved as a direct co-mediator (together with the UN and the OSCE), so several mediators are involved in the negotiation process. Accordingly, the question arises whether the mediators produced a coherent mediation approach despite the multiparty mediation process.

The *coherence of the mediator* is analysed in terms of vertical and horizontal coherence. Looking at the EU's vertical coherence – the member states' policies on the conflict and the mediation activities – it becomes clear that the European member states were united in their support for the Geneva International Discussions but divided on the conflict issue. While some member states represented the pro-Russian camp, such as Germany and France, other member states represented the anti-Russian camp, such as the Baltic states and Sweden (Panchulidze 2020). Overall, member states disagreed on how to approach the conflict resolution process, resulting in a low degree of European policy coherence (Bergmann 2020). Looking at horizontal coherence – the coordination between the EU institutions and the different mediators involved in the negotiation process – it becomes clear that, firstly, the policy division among the member states has constrained the coordination of EU mediation efforts. Secondly, the number of European actors involved in the negotiation process (the European Commission, the EEAS, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, as well as the EU Delegation to Georgia and the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM)) challenges the coordination between the involved actors. The coordination between the EU Special Representative (EUSR) and the other EU institutions on the ground did thus not exceed a medium degree, as coordination turned into competition during the mediation process (Bergmann 2020). However, the coordination between the three mediators - the EU, the OSCE, and the UN - was relatively high due to common positions and frequent communication between the mediators (Panchulidze 2020). This ambivalent picture of horizontal and vertical coherence can thus be classified as a *medium level* of coherence.

The EU's leverage vis-à-vis the parties to the conflict can also be classified as *medium*. Considering Georgia, the EU's leverage is rather high, as the EU provides significant financial support, amounting to about €120 million per year (Panchulidze 2020). Moreover, the EU is Georgia's largest trading partner, and this close economic cooperation between the EU and Georgia is also established in an Association Agreement. This Association Agreement aims at establishing contractual relations with Georgia in the framework of the ENP, thereby bringing Georgia closer to EU accession. The EU accession incentive for Georgia is relatively high, with 78% of Georgian citizens in favour of EU accession, according to a 2019 poll by the National Democratic Institute (NDI 2020, Panchulidze 2020). In addition, the European Union has operated a peacekeeping mission in Georgia since 2008: The European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia). This shows that the EU exerts considerable influence on Georgia. Nevertheless, the EU's leverage over Abkhazia and South Ossetia is rather limited due to the non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Although the EU has been providing considerable financial support to the two regions since the 1990s, the EU's influence in terms of financial support was significantly weakened after Russia expanded its control over the two de-facto independent regions through military and financial means. Therefore, the degree of leverage vis-à-vis Abkhazia and South Ossetia is assessed as low. Towards Russia, the EU has rather little leverage due to the strong interdependence of their economic systems, as the EU is, for instance, dependent on Russian gas supplies. For this reason, the EU has not imposed sanctions against Russia, as these would harm the European economy. However, considering that the EU imposed economic sanctions on Russia in 2014 during the Ukraine crisis, it becomes clear that the EU has the power to impose sanctions on Russia. Therefore, the degree of leverage on Russia can be classified as medium to low. Considering the different degrees of influence on the conflict parties, the degree of leverage can be summarized as *medium* (Bergmann 2020).

The *mediation strategy* employed by the EU represents a mixture of facilitation and formulation. In the beginning, facilitation elements were mainly used, with the EU raising awareness of the parties by passing on missing information to other parties. Later in the negotiation process, the EU also used formulation strategies by proposing solutions, such as the IPRM, and actively participating in the negotiations. Overall, the EU used a *formulation strategy with facilitative elements* (Bergmann 2020).

The *willingness of the conflict parties to compromise* is *very low*, given their different preferences for resolving the conflict. While Georgia primarily seeks the restoration of its territorial integrity, Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia seek the recognition of the independence of the breakaway regions (Panchulidze 2020). According to the 2019 Caucasus Barometer in Georgia, the Georgian population, on the one hand, clearly favours the "restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity, which would result

in the reintegration of the breakaway regions into Georgia", while, on the other hand, the Abkhazians and South Ossetians do not consider 'rejoining' Georgia. Moreover, Russia claims not to be part of the conflict, but rather sees itself as a facilitator of the conflict, as Russia is satisfied with the status quo resulting from the signed ceasefire agreement due to the increased political and military control over the breakaway regions (Bergmann 2020). In summary, there is very little internal cohesion among the parties to the conflict, which explains the current stalemate in the Geneva talks.

Furthermore, taking the context of the crisis into account, it becomes evident that the *severity of the crisis* is *high* due to the previous outbreak of the 5-Day War. According to Deutsche Welle (2022), a total of more than 700 people died and tens of thousands of ethnic Georgians were displaced during the war in the South Caucasus (Deutsche Welle 2022). Although the war ended after five days due to the ceasefire agreement brokered by Sarkozy, heavy clashes continued to occur inside Georgian territory between 2009 and 2011 (Bergmann 2020, ICB). Thus, the severity of the crisis represents *use of force (4)* and can therefore be judged as *high*.

Conditions of EU mediation effectiveness	Degree of conditions
Mediator's leverage	Medium
Mediator's coherence	Medium
Mediator's strategy	Formulation
Conflict parties' willingness to compromise	Very Low
Severity of crisis	High

4.2 Kosovo 2007

Another example, in which the EU directly mediated an international conflict constitutes the Kosovo-Serbia conflict in 2007. The territory of Kosovo has been a conflict issue between Serbs and Albanians for hundreds of years. Whereas Serbia sees Kosovo as an irreversible part of Serbia, the Albanian majority in Kosovo wants full autonomy from Serbia given the history of Milosevic's era. In 1989 the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia escalated when Milosevic reversed Kosovo's autonomous status, and heavily armed conflicts between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Yugoslav army began. Aiming at settling the armed conflict, NATO launched a military operation in Kosovo (KFOR) and forced Milosevic to accept the ceasefire agreement brokered at the Rambouillet peace conference. Besides, the UN established a peace mission in Kosovo – the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo

(UNMIK) which took over the administration of Kosovo by “establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo” (United Nations Security Council 1999). However, when the efforts were proven unsuccessful and violent clashes between Serbs and Albanians re-occurred in 2004, the International Community decided to intervene in the dispute. From 2006-2007 the UN-mediated the peace process between Kosovo and Serbia, but the peace plan was finally rejected by Serbia since the provisions indirectly mentioned the status of Kosovo’s independence. As a result of that, in 2007, the US, EU, and Russia came together within the Troika process with the aim of re-establishing the deeply divided society of Kosovo and improving the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia (Caruso 2008, Vuković 2011). Nevertheless, the mediation attempt did not lead to any results.

4.2.1 EU Mediation Effectiveness

The mediators within the Troika process (EU, US, and Russia) proposed a 14-point document stating that Serbia “will not re-establish a physical presence in Kosovo”. In addition, the EU and the US informally proposed an “association of states” model between Kosovo and Serbia, however, the proposal was blocked by Russia. Both the informal and formal proposals were rejected since Kosovo demands full political independence, while Serbia insists that Kosovo remains within its borders, and the ‘association of states’ model was, according to Serbia, only another phrasing for Kosovo’s political independence (International Crisis Group 2007, Vuković 2012). Overall, the mediation process did not lead to any agreements. Thus, the overall *degree of conflict-settlement* is *very low*, as no agreements could be reached – not even to hold future negotiations.

Regarding the *EU’s goal attainment*, the chief negotiator of the EU Troika, Wolfgang Ischinger, mentioned the following outcome goal: “Our aim in the troika, even if we did not get a solution on Kosovo’s status, was to get agreement on the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, independent of how and when the status questions were resolved” (Caruso 2008). It becomes clear that due to the deadlock of the negotiations, the EU’s outcome goal has shifted from resolving Kosovo’s political status to stabilizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia – regardless of Kosovo’s final status (Vuković 2012). However, as no agreements on the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo could be reached during the negotiations, it becomes clear that the goal-attainment degree also constituted a *very low* degree.

Combining the goal attainment and the conflict settlement perspective, it becomes evident that the overall EU effectiveness was *very low*.

Mediation effectiveness	Degree of effectiveness
Conflict-settlement perspective	Very low
Goal-attainment perspective	Very low
Combined	Very low

4.2.2 Conditions for EU Mediation Effectiveness

The question remains why the International Community was unable to resolve the conflict and bring the conflicting parties to an agreement. The *nature of the EU's involvement* could pose an explanatory factor, as the EU did not mediate the conflict alone, but together with the US and Russia, which makes it difficult to pursue a coherent mediation approach, as Russia's rejection of the mediation proposal shows.

Besides, the vertical *coherence* of the EU mediation efforts can be assessed as rather low, as the EU member states had different views on the final status of Kosovo. While Germany, France, and Italy were in favour of an independent Kosovo, Spain, for example, opposed an independent Kosovo (Prinz 2012). The horizontal coherence shows a similar picture, as the mediators involved in the Troika process remained divided on the issue of Kosovo's political status. On the one hand, Russia clearly opposed Kosovo's independence, as Russia can be seen as a long-time ally of Serbia. On the other hand, the US was in favour of an independent Kosovo, while EU member states disagreed on Kosovo's final status (Vuković 2012). These divergent opinions on the conflict issue led to an incoherent mediation approach, as the mediators could not agree on a unified proposal. This horizontal incoherence clearly shows a lack of coordination and coherence between mediators. The overall coherence of the mediation attempt can therefore be classified as *low*.

Moreover, the *EU's leverage* can only be considered *medium*. Although Kosovo and Serbia are part of the Western Balkans, a region where all countries were offered EU accession prospects by the European Council conclusions of June 2003, the EU was nevertheless unable to employ more leverage in the form of economic or political incentives, besides the EU membership incentive in the long-term future, due to internal disagreements on Kosovo's final status (European Council 2003). Thus, the overall degree of leverage rated as *medium*.

Another factor influencing the effectiveness of mediation is the *willingness of the conflict parties to compromise*. Since the international mediation attempt was not requested by Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, but the conflict parties were rather pushed to hold the negotiations, this lack of parties' self-motivation to resolve the conflict composes a major obstacle to the effectiveness of mediation (Prinz 2012). Moreover, given the different preferences of Serbia and Kosovo over Kosovo's political status, it becomes clear that none of the parties was willing to make considerable compromises, indicating a stalemate situation. However, it could be said that the parties showed at least some willingness to cooperate due to the long-term EU accession incentive so the parties' overall willingness to compromise is rated as *low*.

The used *mediation strategy* was formulation, as the EU actively made proposals to resolve the conflict in the form of the 14-point plan but did not impose carrot-and-stick measures due to the limited leverage of the EU (Vuković 2012).

Another factor influencing the effectiveness of mediation constitutes the *severity of the crisis*. Given the severe history between Kosovo and Serbia from 1998-1999, when 15,000 Albanians were murdered during the genocide in Kosovo under Milosevic's regime, and the re-occurrence of serious clashes in 2004, the severity of the crisis is considered *high* due to the use of force (Bergmann 2020).

Conditions of EU mediation effectiveness	Degree of conditions
Mediator's leverage	Medium
Mediator's coherence	Low
Mediator's strategy	Formulation
Conflict parties' willingness to compromise	Low
Severity of crisis	High

4.3 Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today

After the International mediation efforts in Kosovo failed in 2007, Kosovo declared its unilateral independence in 2008, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Kosovo's declaration for independence did not violate any international law. Although a large part of the international community recognised Kosovo's independence, the conflict with Serbia over Kosovo's political status remains and thus, further mediation efforts were launched in 2011 by the European Union. After the ruling of the ICJ, the Serbian government was put under pressure and thus, accepted the European mediation offer. Since 2011, the EU leads the mediation process as the sole mediator in the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo, also known as the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. Although the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue has led to numerous agreements, tensions between Kosovo and Serbia have remained high, which resulted in a deadlock in the mediation process (Bergmann 2020).

4.3.1 EU Mediation Effectiveness

In the context of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, the EU is often seen as a relatively effective mediator (Bergmann 2017). To find out whether this common perception is valid, firstly the degree of *conflict resolution* and, secondly the degree of the EU's goal attainment is analysed.

In the first mediation phase from 2011-2012, the EU managed to broker seven technical agreements between Kosovo and Serbia, such as Kosovo's participation in regional institutions, recognition of university diplomas, freedom of movement, freedom of customs and trade, integrated border management, etc. In the second mediation phase from 2012-2014, the historic Brussels Agreement was signed, which was the first agreement of principles governing the normalisation of relations. The Brussels Agreement included the political representation of Kosovo Serbs in Northern Kosovo and the integration of the judicial and security structures of Northern Kosovo into Kosovo's legal framework. In the last mediation phase from 2015 until today, the implementation of the previous brokered agreements was negotiated, resulting in four signed agreements focusing on the implementation of police forces and the judiciary in northern Kosovo, as well as energy supply and telecommunications in Kosovo (Bergmann 2020). Summarising the three mediation phases and their outcomes, the EU's mediation efforts have led to a substantial settlement of the conflict, with most issues fully or partially resolved. However, given the unresolved final status of Kosovo - the Serbian side does not seem to accept Kosovo's independence as an irreversible reality - and the slow implementation of many

agreements, the assessment is less positive (Bergmann 2017, Bergmann 2020). In particular, the governance of northern Kosovo and its integration into the Kosovar legal framework remain contested issues (Bergmann 2020). Overall, the mediation effectiveness along the *conflict-settlement perspective* is thus rated as *medium-high*.

Regarding the EU's internal level of *goal achievement*, Bergmann (2020) identified two outcome goals of the EU in the context of mediation: The first outcome objective is to remove political obstacles in people's everyday lives in order to improve their living conditions. The second EU outcome objective is to normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia by finding a settlement for the administration of northern Kosovo (Council of the European Union 2012). Concerning the first outcome goal, the EU was able to significantly improve people's living conditions through the implementation of the Free Movement Agreement in 2013, although the recognition of university degrees as well as the areas of telecommunications and energy are still lacking behind. The second outcome goal could only be partially achieved, as the creation of a community of Serb-majority municipalities on Kosovo remain major conflict issues (Bergmann 2017). Considering the overall degree of the goal-attainment, the EU managed to reach its outcome goals to a *medium* degree.

In summary, considering both perspectives of mediation effectiveness, the overall degree of mediation effectiveness is assessed as medium.

Mediation effectiveness	Degree of effectiveness
Conflict-settlement perspective	Medium-high
Goal-attainment perspective	Medium
Combined	Medium

4.3.2 Conditions for EU Mediation Effectiveness

In the case of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, the EU acted as the sole lead mediator in the conflict and managed to solve the conflict issues between Serbia and Kosovo to some extent. To explain the medium degree of the EU's mediation effectiveness, the conditions for effective mediation are analysed.

The *vertical coherence* of the EU can be considered relatively *high*. Although some of the European member states were divided over Kosovo's final status (5 countries did not recognize Kosovo's independence: Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Cyprus, and Greece), the lack of recognition of Kosovo by the five member states has not prevented the EU from generating a relatively coherent approach to tackle the regional instability in Kosovo. In addition, all member states supported the mediating institutions (EEAS/High Representative/Commission) in their efforts to broker agreements between Kosovo and Serbia (Bergmann 2020). Besides, the EU's *horizontal coherence* can be seen as rather *high* since the coordination of the involved EU institutions between the High Representative, the EEAS, and EEAS, the European Commission, and EULEX was seen as complementary (Bergmann 2020). Thus, the overall degree of *coherence* is evaluated as *high*.

Considering the *leverage* of the mediator, the EU was able to employ a *high degree* of leverage vis-à-vis both parties. As mentioned before, both parties were offered the prospect of EU accession in 2003. Besides, in 2008 the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) was signed between Serbia and the EU regulating important obligations, such as the establishment of a free trade area and the harmonization of Serbian legislation with European legislation. The SAA is an instrument to assist Serbia in meeting relevant criteria for a potential EU membership and provides financial assistance to Serbia amounting to around €170 million per year (Bergmann 2020). Due to this pre-accession assistance, Serbia became an official candidate for EU accession in 2012. Regarding Kosovo, the EU established the EULEX mission in 2008 enhancing the rule of law in Kosovo's institutions in full compliance with human rights standards (EULEX Kosovo 2022). Furthermore, since 2016, a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Kosovo is in place establishing contractual relationships between Kosovo and the EU. However, the SAA with Kosovo did not provide a clear EU membership prospect due to the non-recognition of Kosovo by some European Member States. Nevertheless, the EU was able to encourage Kosovo to advance on its path towards European integration by recognizing Kosovo as potential candidate for EU accession in 2017. As an EU official summarised, "*Enlargement is the big pull factor, is the big carrot. They [Kosovo and Serbia] want to*

join the club [...] they do not want to be outside, because they know in the long term, they will be worse off" (Bergmann 2020). Therefore, the overall leverage towards both parties can be identified as *high*.

Considering the used *mediation strategies*, in the first technical dialogue mediation phase, the EU used facilitation elements by exchanging information between the disputants. Later in the negotiation process, the EU used formulation strategies by actively making suggestions for compromises, such as proposals on technical issues and integrated border management (Bergmann 2020). However, the EU also employed manipulation elements through *the "creation of a strong incentive structure for the parties to make concessions by linking the disputants' EU membership prospects to the mediation process"* (Bergmann 2020). The EU was able to draw on its leverage by employing conditionality on Serbia's and Kosovo's EU accession on the progress of the mediation process which constitutes a key element of the manipulation strategy. By combining the three mediation phases, the EU mostly used *formulation strategies with strong elements of manipulation*.

Moreover, *the conflicting parties' willingness to compromise* influences the outcome of mediation. Serbia's claim of effective territorial control over Kosovo hardened the beginning of the EU-mediated negotiations, however, during the peace negotiations Serbia's position towards Kosovo weakened since Serbia expected political and economic gains from the EU membership accession and was, therefore, willing to make some compromises. Serbia's main objective moved from upholding its territorial integrity to strengthening its influence over the Serb-majority communities in North Kosovo, respectively minimising the interference of Pristina in North Kosovo (Crisis Group 2011). From Kosovo's side, the territorial and constitutional integrity of Kosovo are non-negotiable and thus, Kosovo's goal is to integrate the northern, Serb-majority municipalities into its legal and political framework, which has been partially settled through the Brussels agreement (Bergmann 2020). Although the parties to the conflict have diverging political goals, Kosovo's and Serbia's incentive to advance on their path toward EU membership, led to expected gains resulting from the negotiation process and, thus, the parties were willing to make some compromises. More precisely, given the imposed conditionality on EU accession, the parties have hardly any chance not to compromise. Therefore, the overall degree of both parties' willingness to compromise can be classified as *medium*, especially considering the deadlock in which the parties found themselves prior to the mediation efforts (Bergmann 2020).

Furthermore, the *severity of the crisis* is identified as *medium*, as force was clearly displayed given Kosovo's upgrade of its security force into an army with 5000 troops in December 2018, which Serbia perceived as a threat and responded that the move could trigger a military response (European Parliament 2019). This clearly shows the display of force threatening to destabilise internal security and thus, the severity of the conflict is classified as medium.

Conditions of EU mediation effectiveness	Degree of conditions
Mediator's leverage	High
Mediator's coherence	High
Mediator's strategy	Formulation/Manipulation
Conflict parties' willingness to compromise	Medium
Severity of crisis	Medium

4.4 Montenegro 2001-2006

Another case in which the EU mediated as the sole mediator constitutes the conflict over Montenegro's Independence between 2001 and 2006. After the fall of Milosevic in September 2000, the question arose whether Montenegro should stay within or outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), consisting of the Republic of Montenegro and the Republic of Serbia at that time. While one-half of Montenegro's citizens wanted independence, the other half wanted to maintain a joint state with Serbia (Bergmann 2020). Therefore, the European Union decided to intervene as the sole mediator between the governments of Montenegro, Serbia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The first mediation phase was led by High Representative Solana and lasted from 2001-2002 which resulted in the Belgrade agreement: The foundation of the State Union between Serbia and Montenegro. The second meditation phase from 2002-2006 was led by Special Envoy Ambassador Miroslav Lajcak which focused on the implementation of the Belgrade agreement. Resulting from the mediation processes, the FRY transformed from a federal republic into a political union with the possibility for Montenegro and Serbia to become fully independent states and to leave the state union after 3 years through a referendum process – which led to Montenegro's and Serbia's independence in 2006 (Tocci 2007).

4.4.1 EU Mediation Effectiveness

The agreement on the establishment of a state union between Serbia and Montenegro can be considered a great success, especially considering that the mediation process led to Montenegro's independence in 2006. However, a closer look at the degree of *conflict resolution* and the content of the Belgrade Agreement reveals that, due to the vagueness of the Belgrade Agreement, some conflict issues were only partially resolved in the first mediation phase, such as the political and legal framework for relations between Serbia and Montenegro, international representation and foreign policy, and economic and financial policy. The political and legal framework of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro has been broadly defined, but some issues remain open, such as the concrete decision-making procedures within the federal institutions, the Constitutional Commission, and the election of representatives for the unicameral parliament. The issue of international representation and foreign policy has also only been partially settled, as the procedures for representation have not been further defined. The most contested issue remains the creation of a common market and the harmonisation of economic and financial systems, as these suggestions remained inconclusive without any proposed solutions by the EU on how to comply. In contrast, the issues of security and defence were fully resolved. Overall, thus, 3 out of 4 conflict issues were only partially settled (Bergmann 2020). The second mediation phase, the implementation of the Belgrade Agreement, which focused on the intra-Montenegro dispute over referendum rules, led to the adoption of the Constitutional Charter and the Referendum Law. The Constitutional Charter, which regulates the political and legal framework for relations between Serbia and Montenegro, gave further substance to the political and legal framework, while the provisions on international representation and economic policy remained vague. Moreover, the Constitutional Charter did not resolve the disagreements over the distribution of responsibilities in the areas of intellectual property rights, visas, asylum and migration, border management, and minority rights. Thus, the Constitutional Charter has only partially resolved the conflict issues. However, with the adoption of the Referendum Law on the Independence Referendum, the criteria for Montenegro's Independence were fully resolved, paving the way for Montenegro's independence in 2006 (Tocci 2007). Taking the two mediation phases together, all agreements reached during the mediation process represent either a full or partial settlement of the individual issues, so that the overall degree of conflict resolution represents a substantial settlement of the conflict, representing a *high degree* of conflict settlement.

When analysing the EU's internal goal achievement perspective, a similar picture emerges. According to High Representative Solana, one of the EU's main goals was the creation of a common state union between Serbia and Montenegro (Solana 2002). With the implementation of the Constitutional Charter, a renewed federal constitutional framework was created between Serbia and Montenegro, ensuring the functioning of the common state. However, as the state union has not preserved, it becomes clear that this goal could not be achieved in the long run. Nevertheless, Solana's proposal to create a common state union between Serbia and Montenegro underlines another fundamental objective of the EU: To ensure regional stability (Bergmann 2020). The EU's goal was not to prevent Montenegro's independence but to postpone it to not endanger regional stability. This goal was fully achieved through the recognition of the independence referendum in Montenegro by all parties. Therefore, the EU can be considered highly effective in terms of achieving its outcome goal (Bergmann 2020).

Combining the high level of conflict resolution and goal achievement, it becomes transparent that the EU presented a high level of mediation effectiveness.

Mediation effectiveness	Degree of effectiveness
Conflict-settlement perspective	High
Goal-attainment perspective	High
Combined	High

4.4.2 Conditions for EU Mediation Effectiveness

To be able to explain the high effectiveness of European mediation efforts in the case of Montenegro, conditions influencing mediation effectiveness are analysed. The *Nature of EU involvement* in the Montenegrin independence mediation process was direct and the EU acted as the sole mediator in the negotiation process. Due to the *nature of EU involvement*, it is expected that the EU was able to follow a relatively coherent mediation approach.

Considering the vertical *coherence* of the EU, the European Member States agreed on establishing a State Union between Serbia and Montenegro, as Montenegro gaining independence immediately could jeopardize the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina and further destabilise Kosovo and Macedonia (see Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1994). This common position within the EU clearly shows a very high level of vertical coherence. However, when looking at the horizontal

coherence, the degree of coordination among different EU actors involved in the mediation efforts was medium, and overall decreased during the mediation process. At the beginning of the mediation efforts, High Representative Solana and the European Commission had complementary views, however, during the Belgrade Agreement, their opinions diverged (Bergmann 2020). Nevertheless, by combining the very high level of vertical coherence with the medium level of the horizontal coherence, the overall degree of coherence is categorized as *high*.

The *leverage* of the EU can be seen as *high* since the EU provided considerable financial assistance to the governments of FRY, Serbia, and Montenegro resulting from the Dayton agreement in 1995 to enhance the cooperation between the EU and the former Yugoslavian countries. In 2001 the EU provided financial assistance to Serbia and Montenegro amounting €330 million and in 2002, the EU provided another €205 million to the conflicting parties (European Commission 2002). In addition to financial assistance, the EU was able to incentivize Serbia and Montenegro with an EU membership perspective resulting from the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) launched in 1999 and the inclusion of FRY within the SAP, as well as the conclusion of the European Council in 2003 to offer all western Balkans potential EU membership status. Although the prospect of EU accession was especially important in the long-term – for Serbia as well as Montenegro – the EU's concessions for further EU association and continued financial support provided expected short-term benefits for the conflicting parties (Bergmann 2020). Besides the EU exerted its leverage by making the EU accession conditional on the outcome of mediation. Thus, the leverage of the EU vis-à-vis both parties can be judged as *high*.

Considering the employed *mediation strategies*, the EU used a mixture of all mediation strategies – Facilitation, formulation, and manipulation (Bergmann 2020). Whereas the beginning of the mediation process was characterized by facilitation strategies, formulation was the main mediation strategy during the two mediation phases. For instance, the proposal of the creation of a state union between Serbia and Montenegro falls clearly under the formulation strategy since Solana actively proposed solutions on how to solve the conflict (Solana 2002). In the second mediation phase manipulation tactics were employed. The EU recommended the settlement of the conflict through the creation of a state union between Serbia and Montenegro and asked them to follow their recommendation. Moreover, the EU threatened to withdraw its resources and the countries' EU accession prospect by imposing conditionality on the outcome of mediation (Bergmann 2020). This clearly shows that the EU was able to draw on its leverage to employ stick and carrot methods. In sum, the EU mostly employed *formulation and manipulation strategies*.

Besides, the *conflicting parties' willingness to compromise* was rather *high* since Serbia's main objective was to keep a constitutional, federal relationship with Montenegro, and thus, Serbia continued a policy of moderate support for a state union. The Serbian Government insisted on the implementation of the Belgrade Agreement unless an independence referendum would show that the majority of the Montenegrin population wanted to leave the FRY. The main objective of Montenegro's government was to achieve independence, accompanied by the establishment of a common market between Serbia and Montenegro. Once the Belgrade Agreement was signed, however, the Montenegrin government was reluctant to give any support to the newly created state union since Montenegro wanted to become independent after 3 years (Bergmann 2020). However, overall, both parties wanted to continue a strong economic relationship and agreed to solve all remaining issues, including the future political and legal framework, international representation and foreign policy; security and defence, and economic and financial policy – although there were some disagreements on the nature of the constitutional arrangement (Bergmann 2020). Furthermore, both parties wanted to maintain their prospect for future EU membership and thus, the overall willingness of the parties to compromise can be judged as *high* (Bergmann 2020).

The *severity of the crisis* is judged as *low* since Montenegro was regarded a relatively stable country in Yugoslavia since Montenegro and Serbia were willing to peacefully settle the conflict and thus, regional peace was not endangered (Blockmanns 2006). However, inter-ethnic tensions within Montenegro took place due to the influx of 80.000 Albanian refugees resulting from the Kosovo war and the bombing of NATO against Serbia between 1998 and 1999, and therefore, the crisis is judged as 'threat to use force' – representing a low degree of crisis severity.

Conditions of EU mediation effectiveness	Degree of conditions
Mediator's leverage	High
Mediator's coherence	High
Mediator's strategy	Manipulation
Conflict parties' willingness to compromise	High
Severity of crisis	Low

4.5 Yugoslavia 1991

Another conflict in which the European Community mediated is the Yugoslav civil war in 1991. The Yugoslav wars were characterised by ethnic conflicts and wars of independence within the territory of Yugoslavia lasting from 1991 to 2001 due to the rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia under Milosevic. When Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence on 25 June 1991, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) moved into Slovenian territory and a ten-day war broke out between the Yugoslav (Serbian army) and Slovenian forces. Prior to the outbreak of the ten-day war, ethnic fighting had also begun between Serbs and Croats within Croatian territory over Croatian independence between 1991-1995, known as the Croatian War of Independence. As a result of these wars, the European Community decided to intervene in the crisis and broker a peace agreement between the former Yugoslav republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro and Serbia. The European Community acted as the sole lead mediator in the peace talks between the six Yugoslav republics within the framework of the EC Troika, consisting of the foreign ministers of Italy, Luxembourg, and Belgium, led by Hans van Broek (later replaced by the EC Special Envoy Lord Carrington). In July 1991, the parties to the conflict signed the Brioni Agreement, which consisted of ceasefire agreements and further negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia (Väyrynen 1997). As a result of the Brioni Agreement, the Yugoslav armies withdrew their troops from Slovenia, and Croatia and Slovenia postponed their declaration of independence for three months (CVCE 2021). Overall, the Brioni Agreement was in place until 1992, the year the Yugoslav federation fragmented.

4.5.1 EU Mediation Effectiveness

The Brioni agreement sought to create a ceasefire, a three-month moratorium on the implementation of the Slovenian's and Croatian's declaration of independence, and a commitment to further negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia. Although the Brioni agreement led to a ceasefire between Serbia and Slovenia and put an end to the 10 days of war, the agreement had no mitigating impact on the fighting in Croatia. A reason for this was that important conflict issues were left unresolved due to the vagueness of the Brioni agreement which in turn spurred radical nationalism in Croatia and Serbia. In addition, the Brioni agreement failed to create an environment in which further negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia could take place due to the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1992 (Väyrynen 1997, Bergmann 2020). Therefore, when considering the broader *conflict-settlement perspective* of the signed peace agreement, it becomes evident that the Brioni agreement was not able to settle the conflict issues between the conflicting parties. Although a ceasefire and a process agreement were

reached, the conflicting parties did not comply with the peace agreement and thus, the conflict-resolution degree can only be categorized as *very low*.

When assessing the *goal-attainment perspective* of the European Community, one outcome goal constitutes to immediately stop all acts of violence: “All parties concerned will refrain from any unilateral action, particularly from all acts of violence” (Brioni declaration 1991). However, the EC was not able to terminate the conflicts within Yugoslavia as seen by the continued fights and Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. In addition, the outcome goal of the EC to maintain the federal republic of Yugoslavia failed in the long term. Therefore, the effectiveness in terms of outcome goals can only be seen as *very low*.

Combining the goal attainment and conflict settlement sphere, the EC mediation effectiveness constitutes a *very low degree*.

Mediation effectiveness	Degree of effectiveness
Conflict-settlement perspective	Very low
Goal-attainment perspective	Very low
Combined	Very low

4.5.2 Conditions for EU Mediation Effectiveness

This sub-chapter aims at assessing why the mediation efforts of the European Community in Yugoslavia resulted in a very low degree of mediation effectiveness. During the Yugoslav civil war, the European Community acted as the sole mediator in the conflict, which leads to the assumption that level of the EC’s coherence was rather high since no other mediators were involved in the negotiation process.

Nevertheless, when considering the vertical coherence of the EU, it becomes transparent that the national Member States were strongly divided on the issue of recognising the independence of Slovenia and Croatia and on how to resolve the crisis. Germany, for example, supported Croatia, while the UK and France were unwilling to seriously challenge Serbia (Väyrynen 1997). The vertical coherence is thus considered very low. The horizontal coherence - the coordination between the EC institutions and the involved mediating actors - is often described as "far more coordinated than in

many other such situations" (Väyrynen 1997). However, the attempt by the European Communities to pre-emptively recognise Slovenian and Croatian independence was a grave misjudgement that ultimately even fuelled the conflict by encouraging Croatia and Serbia to increase their use of force in Bosnia (Väyrynen 1997). This shows that the low vertical coherence significantly affected the horizontal coherence of the mediators. In summary, the overall horizontal and vertical coherence can be classified as *low*.

The European Community was able to draw on its *leverage* to some extent by granting loans and credits to Yugoslavia, however these economic instruments were only used for a short time. In attempt to force the Yugoslav republics to sign the ceasefire agreement, the European Community suspended all financial assistance to Yugoslavia and banned the export of military assistance. The economic sanctions were mainly directed against Serbia; however, the Serbian and Croatian governments were aware that they were unlikely to receive extensive punishment from the West for their aggressive role in the conflict (Väyrynen 1997). This perception of the conflict parties had a significant impact on the credibility of the European Community in the mediation process. The EC was perceived as a biased mediator, as the EU wanted to maintain Yugoslavia due to economic self-interest, which significantly reduced the EC's leverage. Therefore, the overall employed leverage of the EC did not exceed a *very low degree*.

Regarding the *mediation strategy*, the EC was not able to develop a comprehensive policy strategy. Mainly reactive measures were taken instead of proactive strategies. Although the EU used some manipulative tactics by threatening to cut economic aid if the parties did not sign the peace agreement, these methods were not integrated into a comprehensive political strategy. Therefore, no comprehensive EC mediation strategy could be identified.

Moreover, the *willingness of the parties to the conflict to compromise* was very low due to the growing nationalism within Yugoslavia. All of Yugoslavia's republican leaders were unwilling to compromise on their political goals. For example, Milosevic's ideology of creating a "Greater Serbia" by incorporating the Yugoslav republics into a Serbian territory clearly shows the lack of willingness to concede (Väyrynen 1997).

Besides, the *severity of the crisis* is another factor influencing the effectiveness of mediation. According to the Centre for Transitional Justice, the Yugoslav war claimed around 140,000 lives and is often described as the deadliest conflict in Europe after World War II (International Centre for Transitional Justice 2009). The severity of the crisis is therefore considered *very high* due to the high number of casualties.

Conditions of EU mediation effectiveness	Degree of conditions
Mediator's leverage	Very low
Mediator's coherence	Low
Mediator's strategy	-
Conflict parties' willingness to compromise	Very Low
Severity of crisis	Very High

4.6 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1994

Due to the ongoing Yugoslav civil war in 1992 and the ineffectiveness of the Brioni Agreement to end the wars and insurgencies in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Community decided to intervene as a direct co-mediator in the Bosnian war from 1992-1994 (Bergmann & Niemann 2015). After Bosnia declared its full independence in March 1992, shortly after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, fighting over strategic territories between Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs within Bosnian territory began. When 'ethnic cleansing' by Serbia occurred within Bosnian territory, the European Community decided to intervene in the conflict (Levi 2014). In the first phase of mediation between 1992 and 1993, the EC, under EC representative Lord Carrington, intervened as the lead mediator in the crisis, together with UN representative Cutiliero. The mediators presented the so-called "Cutiliero-Carrington Peace Plan", which divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into three entities along "ethnic lines". Although the peace plan was initially signed by Serbs, Bosnians and, Croats on 18 March 1992, it was later rejected by the Bosnian Serbs (Levi 2014). This marked the beginning of the second mediation phase from 1993-1994, in which the EC representative Lord Owen acted as co-mediator to mediate the conflict under the leadership of UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance. The "Vance-Owen peace plan" proposed the division of Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous regions, however, the plan was ultimately rejected, and no agreement could be reached between the parties to the conflict (Bergmann & Niemann 2015). Overall, the Bosnian war lasted until 1995 and was finally terminated by the US-brokered Dayton Agreement. However, the Dayton Agreement was later declared dysfunctional due to its complex constitutional structure and non-compliance with the European Charter of Fundamental Human Rights (ECHR) (Levi 2014).

4.6.1 EU Mediation Effectiveness

The assessment of the *conflict-settlement degree* is rather straightforward since no agreements could be reached resulting from the European mediation efforts – neither a peace agreement nor a process agreement was signed. The degree of conflict resolution thus represents ‘no settlement of the conflict issues’. Considering the *goal-attainment* dimension, it becomes clear that the EC also achieved only a *very low* level of effectiveness, as the European Community was not able to end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which can be identified as the main outcome goal of the European Community, identified in the Cutiliero-Carrington Peace Plan as well as the Vance-Owen peace plan.

The combination of the two dimensions shows a *very low* level of mediation effectiveness, which highlights the ineffectiveness of European mediation attempts in the case of Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Mediation effectiveness	Degree of effectiveness
Conflict-settlement perspective	Very low
Goal-attainment perspective	Very low
Combined	Very low

4.6.2 Conditions for EU Mediation Effectiveness

To understand why the level of mediation effectiveness constitutes only a very low degree, factors influencing the outcome of mediation pose an explanation for the mediation ineffectiveness. Since the conditions for mediation effectiveness in the case of Bosnia & Herzegovina do not significantly differ from the case of Yugoslavia, as the mediation efforts took place in the same context and time frame, the classification of the factors is only briefly mentioned in this chapter.

Overall, the European Community acted as co-mediator in the negotiation process together with the UN, and the EC was unable to provide a *coherent* mediation approach due to the disagreement among the involved actors (CVCE 2022). The domestic and foreign policy preferences of the Member States were marked by diverging opinions on which parties should be pressed by what means. Whereas Germany, for instance, supported the independence of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia, France wanted to maintain a Yugoslav republic (Touval 2002). This low degree of vertical coherence also translated into a low degree of horizontal coherence, so the EC was overall only able to show a *low* degree of coherence.

Moreover, the European Community lacked sufficient *leverage* to persuade the parties to make concessions, as the EC could only use limited means of power due to a lack of economic and military resources (Touval 2002). Towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU only provided humanitarian aid, not military support. Furthermore, the EC's low credibility, because of the failure of mediation efforts in Yugoslavia in 1991, posed an enormous challenge to terminate the conflict as well as to exert a high degree of leverage, especially over Serbia (Levi 2014). Besides, no clear EU accession incentive could be given to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus, the EU also lacked leverage towards Bosnia & Herzegovina. Overall, the considerable discrepancy between the EC's capabilities and expectations led to a decline in the EU's credibility as a legitimate mediator and thus, resulted in limited leverage (Richter 2018). In summary, it can therefore be said that the EC had only a *very low* level of leverage. Due to this low degree of leverage, no consistent mediation strategy could be applied.

When taking the *disputing parties' willingness to compromise* into account, it becomes evident that the conflicting parties were not willing to make concessions since the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims believed that they had better options than to concede. Besides, during the European mediation attempts, it became apparent that the US did not support the proposed solutions from the mediators which caused uncertainty among the parties about whether the proposed solutions will benefit the parties (Touval 2002). Thus, the *willingness to compromise* is seen as *very low*.

Besides, the *severity of the crisis* was *very high*. Estimates suggest that around 100.000 people were killed only during the Bosnian war (Touval 2002). Thus, this case is identified as a full-scale war, as the threshold of 1.000 fatalities was far exceeded.

Conditions of EU mediation effectiveness	Degree of conditions
Mediator's leverage	Very low
Mediator's coherence	Low
Mediator's strategy	-
Conflict parties' willingness to compromise	Very low
Severity of crisis	Very High

4.7 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009

Another direct mediation effort of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina occurred in 2009. Since the Dayton agreement was widely perceived as dysfunctional in terms of its constitutional framework due to its complexity and non-compliance with the ECHR, Bosnia and Herzegovina was at risk of falling into a state crisis. The institutions and political decision-making processes within Bosnia and Herzegovina were highly contested between the main political parties representing the three constituent peoples, the Bosniaks, the Serbs and the Croats (Richter 2018). Therefore, the EU acted as the lead mediator under the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt (later: Olli Rehn, the Commissioner for Enlargement) together with the US in the so-called Butmir process to reform the political structure of Bosnia & Herzegovina. During the two negotiation rounds, the EU and the US launched a high-level mediation effort and put comprehensive proposals forward, however, the proposals were rejected. Overall, the Butmir process did not lead to any tangible results (Richter 2018).

4.7.1 EU Mediation Effectiveness

In their conflict-settlement proposal, the EU and the US proposed firstly, a compromise for the apportionment of state property, which has been the last remaining condition to fulfill the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), and secondly, constitutional reforms in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Richter 2018). Nevertheless, the proposals were rejected and overall, the two negotiation rounds did not lead to any tangible results, except for process agreements to continue technical talks between the conflicting parties. Thus, it becomes evident that the EU showed a *low* level of mediation effectiveness in terms of *conflict settlement*.

In terms of the *EU's goal attainment*, a similar picture emerges. The outcome goals of the EU to establish peace and promote democracy by reforming the political structure of Bosnia & Herzegovina could not be achieved since no agreements could be reached (Richter 2018). Since no outcome goals could be achieved during the negotiation process, the goal-attainment perspective is judged as *very low*.

By combining the conflict-settlement perspective and the EU’s goal attainment perspective, the overall degree of EU’s mediation effectiveness results in a *very low-low* degree. However, since the mediation process did not result in any tangible results regarding the conflict issues, the overall mediation process is be evaluated as *very low*.

Mediation effectiveness	Degree of effectiveness
Conflict-settlement perspective	Low
Goal-attainment perspective	Very low
Combined	Very low

4.7.2 Conditions for EU Mediation Effectiveness

In the 2009 mediation attempt in Bosnia & Herzegovina, the EU acted as a direct co-mediator together with the US in the Butmir process, which resulted in a very low level of mediation effectiveness. Thus, the question arises why the mediation efforts were unsuccessful. Overall, the *coherence* among the involved actors in the negotiation process can be seen as relatively complementary, however, the level of EU’s coherence was rather low. The EU’s horizontal coherence was low in terms of policymaking and implementation, as the EU struggled to speak with a single voice (Richter 2018). According to Richter (2018): “Major initiatives such as the police reform initiative were highly contested among the EU actors present on the ground and suffered from a lack of strategic alignment of the different actors.” This incoherence of European interventions was also visible in the European mediation efforts, adding to the perspective of the conflicting parties that the EU’s mediation approach to the crisis and the respective mediation is inconsistent, also due to the EU’s previous interference in domestic politics (Richter 2018). Therefore, the overall *coherence* does not exceed a *low level*.

However, since the EU did not prevent the genocide during the Milosevic regime in the Bosnian war from 1992-1994, the EU's exerted much more *leverage* in the mediation efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2009, applying almost all foreign policy instruments, from enlargement conditionality to crisis management and military missions. First, continuous efforts were made in the field of civilian and military crisis management, notably the European Union Police Mission (2003–2012) and EUFOR Althea (since 2004). Second, through the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), the EU offered incentives such as trade agreements and financial support in the EU pre-accession stage and provided Bosnia and Herzegovina with a clear EU membership perspective by employing conditionality on the

EU accession (Richter 2018). Moreover, the EU set incentives to close the Office of the High Representative in B&H, which would result in the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the High Representative still held the legislative, executive, and judicative powers in the country. Overall, the leverage of the EU can be classified as *very high*. Although the EU's leverage was very high, the mediation efforts were unsuccessful which raises the question: Why did mediation fail? One explanation constitutes that the EU accession incentive was "perceived as weak and distant" by Bosnia and Herzegovina (Juncos 2011). Moreover, the imposed threats were not perceived as credible by the conflicting parties, implying that high leverage should be accompanied by the perceived credibility of the mediator by the parties to the conflict.

The same logical applies to the mediation strategy. Although the EU and the US presented a power-based mediation approach, as seen by the sticks-and-carrots measures, the manipulation strategies were ineffective due to lacking credibility of the mediator. For example, the following carrot measures were used:

"What we offer is to speed up the process which leads to candidate status for membership in the EU and, as soon as possible, the abolishment of the visa regime for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while NATO has certain conditions for speeding up the process of becoming its member" (Rehn 2009).

In addition to the positive incentives, the EU also employed stick measures, such as threatening to terminate further EU integration (Richter 2018). These coercive measures were aimed at pushing the conflicting parties to reach an agreement, however, since the EU was not perceived as a credible mediator, the power-mediation approach proved to be ineffective. This implies that manipulation strategies should only be used if the EU is perceived as a credible mediator, otherwise the mediation is likely to fail.

Another factor that influencing the effectiveness of mediation is the *willingness of the conflict parties to compromise*. First, the parties to the conflict did not perceive the EU as a credible threat, as Bosnia was aware of the importance of peace and stability in Bosnia for EU member states, so the conflict parties expected more losses than benefits from the mediation process and were, therefore, less willing to compromise. Secondly, the polarization and radicalisation of party politics led to an increase in nationalism in the country, so the parties were not willing to deviate from their political goals. For Bosniaks remaining in the dysfunctional status quo was unacceptable, while for Bosnian Serbs, the EU's position of mainly empowering Bosniaks was unacceptable (Juncos 2011). This shows that the parties were not willing to compromise, as the expected losses outweighed the expected benefits from the mediation process. Nevertheless, it is argued that due to the risk at falling into a state crisis,

the political parties were at least somewhat willing to compromise and thus, the willingness of the parties to concede is judged as *low* instead of very low.

Given the *severity of the crisis* dimension, the threat of a state crisis within Bosnia was existent, and force was displayed in the form of abuses by police and other law enforcement officials, which threatened to destabilise internal security (Council of Europe 2015). This display of force can be equated with a *medium* level of crisis severity.

Conditions of EU mediation effectiveness	Degree of conditions
Mediator's leverage	Very high
Mediator's coherence	Low
Mediator's strategy	Manipulation
Conflict parties' willingness to compromise	Low
Severity of crisis	Medium

4.8 Macedonia 2001

Another direct European mediation instance constitutes the conflict over the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in 2001. After Macedonia declared its Independence in 2001, severe civil armed conflict within Macedonia emerged between the two main ethnic groups in Macedonia, the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority. These ethnic tensions within the FYROM were also exacerbated by the political elites (Ilievski 2009). Intending to terminate the insurgencies and reforming the political structure in Macedonia, the EU, OSCE, US, and NATO decided to intervene in the dispute. The EU acted as co-mediator in the international efforts which led to the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) between the Macedonian government and the Albanian opposition.

4.8.1 EU Mediation Effectiveness

The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) successfully terminated the armed conflicts within Macedonia and regulated the protection of group rights of the ethnic communities in Macedonia. The Agreement includes areas of decentralisation; fair representation and financial support for the preservation of culture; and language and education (Berghof Foundation 2019, Ohrid Agreement 2001). The degree of conflict-settlement of the individual provisions ranges from issues being fully settled to being

partially settled. Whereas the decentralization regarding the governance structure has been fully settled – which contributed majorly to the social cohesion process – the issue of fiscal decentralization was still contested. Furthermore, the fair representation of non-majority communities, especially the ethnic Albanian community, was still lacking behind as well as the language rights of non-majority communities. However, education offered in the Albanian and Turkish national languages has been already largely realized (EIP 2015). Overall, all these conflict issues have been either fully or partially settled, and the provisions of the Ohrid Framework Agreement have been fully incorporated into the Macedonian legal and political system. Therefore, the overall *conflict-resolution* degree is considered *a major settlement of the conflict*, representing a high degree of conflict settlement.

The *goal-attainment dimension* presents a similar picture since the EU managed to reach all its outcome goals to some extent. By examining the Ohrid framework agreement, the following three outcome goals can be identified: 1. Stabilizing national security by strengthening Macedonia’s democracy, 2. Closer integration between Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community, and 3. Promoting a peaceful civil society with respect to ethnic identities (Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001). When analysing to what extent these outcome goals have been achieved, it becomes evident that the goal-attainment degree is rather high. The first outcome goal to stabilize national security by strengthening Macedonia’s democracy was reached to some extent, as seen by the decentralization of the governance structure enhancing national security and democracy. Nevertheless, anti-democratic structures within the political system and anti-democratic sentiments within the society remain. The second outcome goal, the closer integration between Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community was also only reached to a medium extent at that time, as the Greek veto over EU and NATO Membership made the accession process increasingly uncertain at that time (Ilievski 2009). Considering the third outcome goal together with the conflict-settlement perspective, it becomes evident that protecting ethnic communities was mostly settled through the OFA enhancing a peaceful civil society. Combining the degrees to which the three outcome goals have been achieved, the overall the goal attainment presents a medium-high degree.

Combining the medium-high degree of internal goal-attainment and the high degree of conflict settlement, the overall European mediation effectiveness constitutes a *high degree*.

Mediation effectiveness	Degree of effectiveness
Conflict-settlement perspective	High
Goal-attainment perspective	Medium-high
Combined	High

4.8.2 Conditions for EU Mediation Effectiveness

The EU mediated as a direct co-mediator in the negotiation process in Macedonia 2001, together with the OSCE, US, and NATO, and the mediators managed to bring the parties to sign the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which can be seen as highly effective mediation outcome. Due to the number of mediators involved in the negotiation process, the question arises whether the mediators were able to put forward a coherent mediation approach. The horizontal coordination between the involved actors, especially the EU, the OSCE, and NATO, was rather high due to the establishment of intense working relations between the mediators and the willingness to convert their policy objectives. Besides, the vertical coherence was high since the EU acted in a unified manner i.e. the Member States acted jointly and were not split by unilateral actions (Schneckener 2002). Therefore, the overall degree of *coherence* can be judged as *high*.

The EU's *leverage* can also be classified as *high* considering the financial support and political incentives employed by the EU. In total, the EU transferred 452.3 Mio. EURO to Macedonia between 1992 and 2001 to support enterprises and the financial sector, various infrastructure projects, and institution-building. Besides, the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in April 2001 offered Macedonia a clear prospect of EU integration, regular economic aid, improved trade relations, and an advanced political dialogue with the EU (Schneckener 2002). These incentives, especially the EU accession incentive, can thus be classified as *high leverage* (EEAS 2013, Ilievski 2009). Nevertheless, widespread scepticism in Montenegro about the credibility of the EU's incentive to comply with the EU accession was present due to the Greeks' veto, suggesting that leverage should go hand in hand with the perceived credibility of the mediator by the conflicting parties.

Although the leverage of the EU can be seen as relatively high, the employed *mediation strategy* can be identified as the least interventionist strategy. The mediators used mostly *facilitation* strategies by forwarding missing information between the conflicting parties (Todorova 2016).

The conflicting parties' willingness to compromise can be classified as *medium* since the conflicting parties did not believe the threats and promises of the EU given the previous unsuccessful mediation efforts in Yugoslavia, however, due to the ethnic insurgencies taking place, the conflicting parties were willing to resolve the conflict issues to some extent. Thus, the overall willingness of the conflicting parties is judged as medium.

Looking at the *severity of the crisis*, it becomes transparent that severe insurgencies took place in the Republic of Macedonia due to the ethnic conflicts between the Macedonian security forces and the Albanian guerrillas. Thus, the severity of the crisis is characterized as *high* due to the use of force.

Conditions of EU mediation effectiveness	Degree/values of conditions
Mediator's leverage	High
Mediator's coherence	High
Mediator's strategy	Facilitation
Conflict parties' willingness to compromise	Medium
Severity of crisis	High

4.9 Macedonia 2015-2017

Starting with the boycott of the Parliament by the largest opposition party in 2014 and the wiretap scandal in 2015, Macedonia (now: North Macedonia) was situated in its worst crisis after the ethnic fights within Macedonia in 2001. Several protests emerged within the country and the civil society was characterized by deep political distrust due to the exposed corruption, voter fraud, suppression of free media, and efforts to manipulate the judiciary. These developments spurred inter-ethnic tensions within the country and deeply affected Macedonia's economy. Due to these anti-democratic developments within Macedonia, the EU (under Commissioner Hahn) decided to mediate the conflict in cooperation with the US. As a result of the mediation process, in 2015, the so-called Przino Agreement was signed by the four biggest political parties in Macedonia. This agreement paved the way for Macedonia's parliamentary elections in December 2016 (Choibion 2017).

4.9.1 EU Mediation Effectiveness

The Przino Agreement addresses the main conflict issues in Macedonia, such as the return of the opposition party (SDSM) to parliament, the organisation of the new government in preparation for the 2016 elections, and the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate issues related to the interception of communications (European Commission 2015). While the three conflicting issues were fully resolved within the proposed timeframe, the implementation of some agreements was characterised by a slow process, e.g. electoral procedures and independent media (Accession Watch Report). Nevertheless, most of the main conflict issues have been fully or partially resolved through

the implementation of the Przino Agreement, so the overall level of conflict resolution represents a *high resolution of the conflict issues* (Choibon 2017).

Looking at the *achievement of the EU's goals*, it becomes evident that the EU has achieved most of its goals to a *high degree*. Within the framework of the Przino Agreement, the following 3 goals of the EU can be identified: 1. Commitment to the Euro-Atlantic process, 2. Commitment to democratic principles, and 3. Ending inter-ethnic violence (Przino Agreement 2015). The commitment to the Euro-Atlantic process has been fully settled considering the NATO membership of North Macedonia in 2020 (NATO 2020). However, the second commitment regarding democratic principles was only partially settled by the political parties, as demonstrated, for example, by President Ivanov's move on 12 April 2016 to excuse all politicians under criminal investigation in connection with the wiretapping allegations, indicating a lack of democratic standards and political will (Choibon 2017). Nevertheless, the country has moved from a hybrid regime to a "flawed democracy", showing the democratisation process of Macedonia's political system (European Western Balkans 2022). The third outcome goal, terminating inter-ethnic violence, has been fully achieved, as there have been no inter-ethnic uprisings so far. Nevertheless, it is still too early to tell whether this internal peace will last in the long run, especially since democratic developments are still pending. However, considering that within a few years Macedonia has evolved from the brink of a state crisis into to a relatively democratic country, being a NATO Member State and holding the status of an EU candidate, it becomes transparent that the EU has achieved most of its mediation goals to a relatively high degree. Taking both perspectives together, the overall EU mediation effectiveness rating is *high*.

Mediation effectiveness	Degree of effectiveness
Conflict-settlement perspective	High
Goal-attainment perspective	High
Combined (Mediation effectiveness)	High

4.9.2 Conditions for EU Mediation Effectiveness

The Prizno Agreement resulting from European and US mediation efforts led to a substantial settlement of the conflict issues within Macedonia. In order to explain this high level of effectiveness, the conditions influencing mediation effectiveness are analysed.

The *high coherence* of the mediation approach can be used as an explanatory factor for the high degree of mediation effectiveness. The coherence of the EU and the US was seen as relatively complementary in the case of Macedonia. Besides, the European institutions, respectively the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the European Council, closely coordinated their mediation efforts and their common position (Choibon 2017). This high degree of horizontal coherence can be explained by the high level of vertical coherence since the national Member States had common positions regarding the mediation efforts and agreed on a common approach to solve the conflict. Thus, the overall degree of *coherence* can be considered *high*.

The exerted *leverage* by the EU can be considered *medium*. On the one hand, Macedonia held an EU candidate status since 2005, however, due to the continuous Greek veto over Macedonia's EU and NATO accession until 2019, the EU was not able to propose a firm EU Membership incentive and thus, the future role of the EU concerning conflict management in Macedonia became increasingly uncertain (Choibon 2017, Ilievski 2009). Nevertheless, the European Commission made the open EU accession negotiations conditional on the continued implementation of the Prizno Agreement which led to substantial progress in the implementation of certain reforms (Council of the European Union 2022). Thus, exerted *leverage* by the EU can be classified as *medium*.

Another factor potentially influencing the degree of mediation effectiveness constitutes the behaviour of the mediators in the conflict: The used *mediation strategy*. The mediators used a mixture of facilitation and formulation strategies. In the beginning, mostly facilitative elements were used while later substantive proposals were formulated, and clear deadlines were set to get the parties to reach an agreement (Choibon 2017). Thus, the overall mediation strategy can be identified as *formulation with facilitative elements*.

The slow implementation of the agreements and numerous missed deadlines of the conflicting parties show a rather *low degree* of the *conflicting parties-willingness to compromise*. Overall, the conflicting parties were not willing to fully commit themselves to the mediation process. As Choibon formulated it: *"The very low levels of internal cohesiveness have led to spoiler behaviour of the ruling party – and*

hence greatly undermined the mediation process’ purview and effectiveness” (Choibon 2017). Due to the lack of political will and the toxic political climate, the internal cohesion of the conflicting parties – respectively the ruling party and the opposition – was rather low resulting in a poor commitment to the implementation of the Pržino Agreement. Therefore, the overall degree of the *conflicting parties-willingness to compromise* is estimated to be *low* (Choibon 2017).

The *severity of the crisis* is classified as *medium*, given the massive anti-government protests within Macedonia in the wake of the 2015 wiretap scandal. The display of force was thus clearly present and threatened to push Macedonia into a severe state crisis.

Conditions of EU mediation effectiveness	Degree of conditions
Mediator’s leverage	Low
Mediator’s coherence	High
Mediator’s strategy	Facilitation + Formulation
Conflict parties’ willingness to compromise	Low
Severity of crisis	Medium

4.10 Russia-Ukraine 2014-today

In November 2013, a wave of demonstrations, also known as maiden demonstrations, began in Ukraine in favour of Western integration and democratic reforms (Elgström 2017). As a result, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia flared up, leading to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in February 2014. This military action by Russia formed the starting point for the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Intending to end the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine, the International Community responded with several mediation attempts. The first mediation attempt began in 2014 under the Geneva format, with the EU and the US acting as direct mediators between Russia and Ukraine in the context of the G8 and G20 summits. Subsequent mediation attempts included the Normandy format (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, France), the Minsk 1 format (Ukraine, Russia, OSCE), and the Minsk 2 format (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, France). In the Normandy and Minsk-2 formats, the EU was not represented as an organisation, but France and Germany participated as individual actors (Elgström 2018). However, as Germany and France are often seen as the voices of the EU, the mediation attempts in Normandy and Minsk 2 are considered direct European mediation efforts.

Overall, the first two mediation attempts (Geneva, Normandy) failed, while the Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 format resulted in two signed ceasefire agreements between Russia and Ukraine. Nevertheless, both signed ceasefire agreements were broken by Russia. The Minsk 1 agreement was broken with the annexation of Crimea by Russia, while the Minsk 2 agreement was broken by Russia's invasion of eastern Ukraine on 24 February 2022, starting with its invasion of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions and later proceeding further into Ukrainian territory. In face of these developments, the second fierce European war after the Yugoslav war broke out. Overall, neither the Minsk 1 Agreement nor the Minsk 2 Agreement were able to secure peace between Russia and Ukraine or to resolve the conflict issues at hand. In the following, only the Geneva, Normandy, and Minsk 2 Agreements will be discussed, as these three mediation processes can be regarded as European mediation efforts.

4.10.1 EU Mediation Effectiveness

Since no agreement could be reached in the negotiations within the Geneva and Normandy format, it becomes evident that the EU mediation effectiveness in terms of *conflict settlement* is very low, representing a conflict-settlement degree of zero. The Minsk 2 negotiation format, however, led to the signed Minsk 2 peace agreement by Russia and Ukraine, including conflict issues such as an immediate ceasefire agreement, the release of prisoners of war, and constitutional reform in Ukraine granting self-government to certain areas of Donbas, and restoring control of the state border to the Ukrainian government. Nevertheless, the agreement's provisions were never fully implemented from Russian and Ukrainian sites, as seen by the ongoing war. Since no settlement could be found on any of these conflict issues, the conflict resolution degree of the Minsk 2 agreement is considered *very low* (Landwehr 2019).

Regarding the *outcome goal attainment* of the EU, it becomes apparent that the EU was not able to achieve its set outcome goals. The outcome goals of the EU indicated in the Minsk 2 agreement include the immediate ceasefire agreement as well as the restoration of Ukrainian territorial integrity. Neither was the EU able to establish peace between Ukraine and Russia nor was the EU able to resolve issues related to the conflict, such as the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the EU insists that the Minsk 2 agreement remains the basis for any future resolution to the conflict and is the only path toward peace between the conflicting parties. Thus, the EU sees itself as relatively effective when it comes to the peace agreement and the imposed sanctions on Russia. Thus, the *achievement of goals* is assessed as *low* instead of very low.

By combining the very low level of conflict resolution and the low level of goal attainment, the overall effectiveness constitutes a *very low*-low degree. However, as the Minsk 2 agreement cannot be considered ineffective yet, as the mediation process is currently in a deadlock, the overall effectiveness is evaluated as *low*.

Mediation effectiveness	Degree/value of effectiveness
Conflict-settlement perspective	Very low
Goal-attainment perspective	low
Combined	Low

4.10.2 Conditions for EU Mediation Effectiveness

In the Ukrainian-Russian crisis, the EU mediated as a direct co-mediator with the US in the Geneva process, and within the Normandy and Minsk 2 formats (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France), the EU acted as the sole mediator. Due to the variety of different actors involved in the overall crisis intervention between Ukraine and Russia, the question arises whether the EU was able to put forward a coherent mediation approach.

The horizontal coherence of the mediators was quite high in the Normandy and Minsk 2 formats, as only Germany and France were actively involved as mediators and the coordination between the mediating actors was seen as complementary. When analysing the vertical *coherence* of the EU, it becomes clear that the coherence between the member states was high concerning the mediation efforts, while the coherence on the question of how to resolve the conflicts was rather low, as the individual member states disagreed at the beginning of the mediation efforts on how to deal with Russia and which sanctions should be imposed and to what extent. While the Balkan states and Sweden and Finland were in favour of strong economic sanctions, the Central European countries tended to take a moderate position on economic sanctions due to their economic ties with Russia (GIP 2020). A unified European position was only established after Russia attacked the Donetsk and Lugansk regions (Elgström 2017). However, overall the EU is united in its position that Russia must recognise the territorial integrity of Ukraine and immediately stop the war crimes. The overall level of coherence of the EU can therefore be rated as *high*.

Overall, the degree of the EU's *leverage* vis-à-vis the parties to the conflict varies considerably. Towards Ukraine, the EU has been able to exert a high degree of leverage due to the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and EU accession incentives (Elgström 2017). Economic cooperation between the EU and Ukraine was further strengthened in 2017 under the EU-Ukrainian Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), and a few months earlier the EU activated visa-free travel to the Schengen area for Ukrainian citizens (European Commission 2016). In addition, the EU has supported Ukraine with substantial humanitarian, political, financial, and military assistance since 2014. Finally, the European Council granted Ukraine official candidate status for EU accession on 23 June 2022. The leverage vis-à-vis Ukraine can therefore be considered relatively high, as it is in Ukraine's interest to join the European Union to have support from the European member states in the face of the ongoing war. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the leverage should be mainly used against Russia to terminate the war of aggression against Ukraine. Toward Russia, the leverage was considerably lower due to the economic interdependence of the EU and Russian economies. However, despite the backlash of economic sanctions on the EU, the EU has imposed several sanctions on Russia since 2014, including financial and economic sanctions and travel bans. Nevertheless, the European sanctions regime against Russia is limited, especially given its gas dependency on Russia. Thus, the overall degree of leverage imposed on both parties can be classified as *medium*.

During the Normandy and Minsk 2 negotiation processes, the EU used mostly formulation strategies, proposing solutions in form of peace agreements on how to settle the conflict, accompanied by manipulation strategies later in the negotiation process, imposing economic sanctions on Russia (Chaban et. al 2018).

In addition to concurrent factors influencing the effectiveness of the mediation, contextual factors also have a significant impact on the outcome of the mediation. Firstly, the *willingness of the parties to the conflict to compromise* is considered *very low*, as Russia is not willing to resolve the conflict by recognising the territorial integrity of eastern Ukraine and is thus an extraordinarily difficult actor to negotiate with. Concerning the provisions of the Minsk 2 agreement, for example, it becomes clear that Russia and the separatist leaders in eastern Ukraine do not intend to implement provisions 4 and 9 of the agreement. Point 4 stipulates that new local elections must be held in the separatist areas in accordance with Ukrainian law, and point 9 provides the full restoration of Ukrainian state control over the country's borders. Two years after the signing of Minsk 2, there is not the slightest indication that Russia and the separatists intend to fulfill these elements of the agreement (Carnegie 2017). On the Ukrainian side, a similar picture emerges. Ukraine demands that Russia recognises the territorial integrity of eastern Ukraine and immediately withdraw Russian troops from Ukrainian territory, and

accordingly the Ukrainian government supports the Minsk-2 agreement. However, point 11 of the Minsk-2 Agreement makes it almost impossible for the Ukrainian government to comply with the agreement even if it wanted to. One reason for this constitutes provision 11 of the agreement, which states that Ukraine must amend its constitution to grant special status to the separatist regions. However, amending the constitution requires a two-thirds majority in the Ukrainian parliament, which will not be forthcoming in the foreseeable future (Carnegie 2017). This shows that there is very little willingness to compromise on the part of the parties to the conflict, especially since the Minsk II agreement left it up to Russia to decide whether Ukraine had changed its constitution to Russia's satisfaction, and then to return control of Ukraine's eastern border. Unsurprisingly, Russia has not done that so far (Carnegie 2017). This shows that the Minsk 2 agreement was designed to fail, and one might even say that the agreement has hardened the CP's willingness to compromise.

Another contextual factor contributing to the ineffectiveness of the mediation results is the *severity of the crisis*. The ongoing European war can be seen as the second most severe war after the Yugoslav wars in 1991. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has recorded a total of 4,889 civilian deaths during the Russian military war on Ukraine as of 3 July 2022 (Statista 2022). However, the number of unreported cases is likely to be considerably higher. Due to the high number of fatalities, the ongoing war, and the visible security threat to the International Community, the severity of the crisis is considered *very high*.

Conditions of EU mediation effectiveness	Degree/values of conditions
Mediator's leverage	Medium
Mediator's coherence	High
Mediator's strategy	Formulation/Manipulation
Conflict parties' willingness to compromise	Very low
Severity of crisis	Very high

4.11 Cross-case Comparisons

After the individual case studies were analysed, the following sub-chapter shortly summarises the findings of the individual cases in a cross-case comparison table:

Cases	X₁ Nature of EC/EU involvement	X₂ Mediators leverage	X₃ Mediators' coherence	X₄ Mediation strategy	X₅ Conflicting parties willingness to compromise	X₆ Severity of crisis	Y Mediation effectiveness
Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today	Sole mediator	High	High	Manipulation	Medium	Medium	Medium
Montenegro 2001-2006	Sole mediator	High	High	Manipulation	High	Low	High
Yugoslavia 1991	Sole mediator	Very low	Low	-	Very low	Very high	Very low
Georgia 2008-today	Co-mediator	Medium	Medium	Formulation	Very low	High	Low
Bosnia&Herzegovina 2009	Co-mediator	Very high	Low	Manipulation	Low	Medium	Low
Macedonia 2001	Co-mediator	High	High	Facilitation	Medium	High	High
Macedonia 2015-2017	Co-mediator	Medium	High	Formulation	Low	Medium	High
Kosovo 2007	Co-mediator	Medium	Low	Formulation	Low	High	Very low
Bosnia&Herzegovina 1992-1994	Co-mediator	Very low	Low	-	Very low	Very high	Very low
Russia-Ukraine 2014	Co-mediator	Medium	High	Formulation	Very low	Very high	Low

This cross-case table reveals some interesting patterns. Out of the 10 European mediation efforts, four of the mediation efforts were relatively effective (Montenegro 2001-2006, Macedonia 2001, Macedonia 2015-2017, and Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today), while the other 6 mediation efforts were rather ineffective. This success rate of 40% seems rather low at first, especially considering that when the EU mediated as the sole mediator, the EU was able to relatively successfully mediate two out of the three conflicts (Kosovo 2011-today, Montenegro 2001-2006) implying that the EU is more successful in its mediation efforts when mediating as the sole mediator. However, this correlation might emerge from other conditions influencing mediation effectiveness, such as contextual factors. When analysing the table, it becomes apparent that context factors significantly impact the outcome of mediation. In all the mediation cases – except for Kosovo 2007 – the conflicting parties' willingness to compromise seems to be a sufficient condition for explaining mediation effectiveness, as shown by the lower or equal X-values of the CP's willingness to compromise compared to the Y-values of mediation effectiveness. This finding would be logical, as the parties must be willing to reach an agreement for mediation to be effective, and thus, the parties' willingness to compromise could pose a sufficient condition for mediation effectiveness. Furthermore – except for Montenegro 2001-2006 – it seems that the more severe a crisis is, the more likely mediation will be ineffective which could indicate that the severity of the crisis is a sufficient condition to explain the non-outcome, mediation ineffectiveness. Moreover, it is assumed that the severity of the crisis significantly influences the parties' willingness to compromise. If the severity of the crisis is quite high, it is likely that the parties will find themselves in a stalemate situation due to entrenched opinions over the years and therefore, the parties are not willing to reach an agreement. In addition to context factors influencing mediation effectiveness, the characteristics of the mediator pose an explanation for mediation effectiveness. The mediator's leverage seems to be a necessary condition for mediation effectiveness, as the X values of leverage are higher than the Y values – except for Macedonia 2015-2017 – suggesting that this factor is a prerequisite for mediation success. Besides, the mediator's degree of coherence is always higher than the level of mediation effectiveness implying that the mediator's coherence might also be a necessary condition for mediation effectiveness. Overall, these results are logical, as the EU needs to exert some leverage and adopt a coherent mediation approach to bring the conflict parties towards an agreement. However, as the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 shows, exerting strong leverage on the conflict parties without being perceived as a credible mediator is likely to lead to an unwillingness of the parties to make concessions, so mediation is likely to fail. This result suggests that the EU should only exert high leverage if it is perceived as a credible mediator by the parties to the conflict, and the EU is likely to be perceived as a credible mediator if the EU adopts a coherent mediation approach and is not involved in the conflict. Furthermore, it seems that the mediation

strategy results from the degree of leverage of the mediator: The more leverage the EU has, the more likely interventionist mediation strategies are used. Regarding the effectiveness of mediation strategies, it seems like the effectiveness is dependent on the context of a specific crisis. These observations from the cross-case table can be tested in the next step of the QcA analysis by converting the qualitative data into quantitative data and then making systematic comparisons between cases by measuring the impact of individual and joint sufficient and/or necessary conditions on the outcome of mediation, respectively mediation in/effectiveness.

5 QcA

Whereas the first part of the empirical analysis aimed at identifying and analysing the degree of conditions influencing mediation effectiveness, and the degree of mediation effectiveness for each case study, the QcA analysis aims at measuring under which conditions the European mediation efforts are effective, respectively ineffective. As the data was already gathered and interpreted in the cross-cases table, in the next step of the QcA, the fuzzy data is calibrated in line with fitting calibration sets. After the data is calibrated, factors influencing mediation effectiveness and mediation effectiveness can be identified as either *necessary or sufficient conditions* – or non-significant conditions – for mediation effectiveness with the help of mathematic formulas and the R studio software. In the next step, a truth table is constructed which is not just limited to testing individual conditions but to testing combinations of conditions for their sufficiency. In the last step of the empirical analysis, the empirical results can be analysed along consistency and coverage which enables an interpretation of the findings (Mello 2021).

5.1 Data Calibration

The first step of the empirical analysis consists of the calibration procedure of the qualitative data into quantitative data. Since a fuzzy QcA is being conducted, the data calibration procedure is done in fuzzy calibration sets which allows for continuous set approximates between 0.0 and 1.0 and thus, makes the findings more elaborate through varying factor and outcome levels (e.g. varying degree of mediation effectiveness). Each factor variable and outcome variable $X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5, X_6, Y$ – for each case study – is assigned a value between 0.0 and 1.0, with 0.5 as the cut-off point, following the logic ‘inside a given set’ reflected by the value 1.0; ‘outside a given set’ reflected by a value of 0.0; and ‘neither-in-or-out a given set’ reflected by the value 0.5. The value of 0.5 can be seen as the cross-over point or

point of maximum ambiguity. However, before calibrating the data, a calibration scale must be set. Within this thesis, a 5-value calibration scale is applied which is in accordance with the operationalization of the variables (5-point scale) before:

1.0 = full membership; the case is fully in the set (fully in)

0.7 = More in than out

0.55³ = ambiguity; cross-over point (neither in or out)

0.3 = More out than in

0.0 = full non-membership; the case is fully out of the set (fully out)

(Pappas & Woodside 2021)

This calibration scale will be applied to all conditions influencing mediation effectiveness (IV), and mediation effectiveness (DV). Since the operationalization of my variables in the qualitative chapter was done with a 5-point scale, the qualitative data can simply be transferred into quantitative data, however, instead of dividing 1 by 5, an existing calibration scale was used (Pappas & Woodside 2021). To give an example of mediation effectiveness: When the mediation outcome is considered “very highly” effective (conflict-settlement degree of 5 + goal-attainment degree of 5) resulting from the case analysis, then the outcome variable is coded with a score of 1.0 (“fully in”). When the mediation outcome is considered “highly” effective (conflict-settlement degree of 4 + goal-attainment degree of 4), then the value 0.7 is assigned (“more in than out”). However, when the mediation outcome is judged as “medium”, then the case is coded as 0.55 (“neither in nor out”), reflecting the conflict-settlement and goal-attainment degree of 3. The point 0.55 thus constitutes the cross-over point between mediation effectiveness and mediation ineffectiveness (lower than 0.55: ineffective, higher than 0.55: effective). When the outcome of mediation is considered “low”, then the data is coded as 0.3 (“more out than in”) (conflict-settlement and goal-attainment degree of 1). When mediation effectiveness is considered “very low”, then the data is coded as 0.0 (“fully out”) (conflict-settlement and goal-attainment degree of 0). If the degree of goal achievement and the degree of conflict resolution differ, the mean of the two values is used as the effectiveness value. The calibration procedure also applies to the conditions influencing mediation effectiveness: Mediator's leverage, coherence, etc. The results of the calibration from the qualitative data to quantitative data can be found in the appendix (Figure 1 in appendix).

³ Since within the QcA, the value 0.5 should be avoided, the value 0.55 is used.

5.2 Identifying and Analysing Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Outcome

After the data is calibrated and presented in a table, necessary and sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness (X1: Nature of EU/EC involvement, X2: EU's leverage, X3: EU's coherence, X4: Mediation strategy⁴, X5: Severity of crisis and X6: CP willingness to compromise) can manually be tested through mathematic formula – which is recognized as good pre-step/practice – before moving to the truth table construction. The following formula based on Mello (2021) are used to calculate necessary and sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Consistency}_{\text{Necessity}}(Y_i \leq X_i) &= \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum Y_i} & \text{Coverage}_{\text{Necessity}}(Y_i \leq X_i) &= \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum X_i} \\ \text{Consistency}_{\text{Sufficiency}}(X_i \leq Y_i) &= \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum X_i} & \text{Coverage}_{\text{Sufficiency}}(X_i \leq Y_i) &= \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum Y_i} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{PRI} = \frac{\sum \min(X_i, Y_i) - \sum \min(X_i, Y_i, \sim Y_i)}{\sum X_i - \sum \min(X_i, Y_i, \sim Y_i)} \quad \text{Relevance of Necessity} = \frac{\sum(1 - X_i)}{\sum(1 - \min(X_i, Y_i))}$$

5.2.1 Individually Necessary Conditions for Mediation Effectiveness

“A necessary condition is a prerequisite for mediation success to occur, but it does not guarantee mediation effectiveness”

The primary measure of fit for necessary conditions is *consistency*, the empirical fit of an assumed set-theoretic relationship, and the recommended consistency threshold for necessary conditions is 0.90 which will be used as the threshold in this analysis since the smaller the number of cases is, the higher the consistency score should be. Besides, the degree of *coverage* – the degree to which a cause or causal combination ‘accounts for’ instances of an outcome – as well as the *relevance of necessity (RoN)*, which enables distinguishing trivial from relevant necessary conditions, must be significant (used threshold: above 0.5). This means, that if a condition has a higher consistency score than 0.9 and its degree of coverage and relevance are above 0.5, then the condition can be identified as a necessary condition for mediation effectiveness. After applying the mathematic formulas to all

⁴ Mediation strategy had to be disregarded since the operationalization was not in accordance with the 5-point scale.

respective conditions influencing mediation effectiveness, the following conditions were found to be **necessary conditions**:

Consistency of Necessity (mediator's leverage) = 0.96

Coverage of Necessity (mediator's leverage) = 0.64

Relevance of Necessity (mediator's leverage) = 0.71

Consistency of Necessity (mediators' coherence) = 1.0

Coverage of Necessity (mediators' coherence) = 0.67

Relevance of Necessity (mediator's coherence) = 0.74

The results of the calculations are consistent with the QcA R results which can be found in the appendix (Figure 2 in appendix). A visualization of the correlation between leverage and effectiveness, and coherence and effectiveness in the form of an x-y plot can be found in the appendix (Figure 3 and 4 in appendix). The findings show that the **mediator's leverage** is a necessary condition for mediation effectiveness, as seen by the consistency ratio of 0.96 and the degree of coverage (0.64), and relevance of necessity (0.71). This indicates that the **EU's leverage must be present** for mediation efforts to be effective, however, the presence of the EU's leverage does not guarantee mediation effectiveness. This result points to mediation being ineffective if the EU does not use leverage, since leverage is a prerequisite for mediation success. This finding, thus, entails important policy recommendations for the EU to always use a high level of leverage if the EU wants to mediate successfully (e.g. EU accession incentives, economic sanctions, etc.). However, as seen in the qualitative analysis, leverage should be accompanied by the credibility of the mediator, otherwise the leverage exerted is likely to be ineffective. Nevertheless, since the coverage ratio of leverage is only 0.67, other conditions likely have higher explanatory power for mediation effectiveness, such as the coherence of the mediator.

The consistency score of the **mediator's coherence** is 1.0, which shows that the mediator's coherence is a perfect empirical fit for the assumed set-theoretic relationship between coherence and effectiveness. Besides, the level of coverage constitutes a degree of 0.67 which shows that coherence has a minimal stronger impact on mediation effectiveness than the mediator's leverage. Furthermore, the RoN measure shows that coherence is a relevant necessary condition and not a trivial necessary condition (the closer the value to 1, the more relevant the factor). Overall, this finding denotes that the EU's coherence is an almost perfect necessary condition for mediation effectiveness which implies

that the **EU's mediation approach must be coherent**, otherwise mediation will be ineffective. This empirical finding is consistent with the theoretical expectations since the EU should be coherent in its mediation efforts to be able to bring the conflicting parties towards an agreement, otherwise, the parties might reject the peace agreement since the EU is perceived as an incoherent and incredible mediator. In sum, the coherence and leverage of the mediator are prerequisites for the success of mediation and consequently, these conditions explain mediation failure. Thus, when the EU mediates, it must use both leverage and a coherent mediation approach.

5.2.2 Individually Sufficient Conditions for Mediation Effectiveness

“The presence of a sufficient condition guarantees mediation success, but the presence of the condition is not necessary for mediation effectiveness.”

This sub-chapter identifies and analyses sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness. Since the presence of sufficient conditions would guarantee mediation effectiveness, one should be cautious about identifying sufficient conditions since this would be a strong assumption regarding mediation, especially if a condition would be deemed individually sufficient for mediation effectiveness. Before moving to the truth table construction and the truth table minimalization which allows for testing of jointly sufficient conditions, individual conditions will be tested for their sufficiency. Besides consistency and coverage, another measure is applied: The Proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) which identify simultaneous subset relations of sufficient conditions, so whether conditions or combination of conditions are both sufficient conditions for the outcome and the non-outcome. For sufficient conditions, the recommended threshold to identify the variable as sufficient is a consistency score of 0.75, and the coverage and PRI of sufficiency should be above 0.5 (Mello 2021). The applied formula for sufficiency leads to identifying the following condition as **sufficient condition**:

Consistency of sufficiency (CP willingness to compromise) = 0.89

Coverage of sufficiency (CP willingness to compromise) = 0.67

PRI of sufficiency (CP willingness to compromise) (X, Y) = 0.72

PRI of sufficiency (CP willingness to compromise) (X, ~Y) = 0.28

These results are in line with the results of the parsimonious solution term calculated through R (Figure 5 in appendix). A visualization of the correlation between CP's willingness to compromise and effectiveness in the form of an x-y plot can be found in the appendix (Figure 6 in appendix). These results indicate that the **conflicting parties' willingness to compromise** is a sufficient condition for mediation effectiveness, as seen by the very high consistency score (0.88), the high degree of coverage (0.79), and the high degree of PRI for the outcome (0.72). This means that if the parties to the conflict are willing to compromise, **mediation is guaranteed to be successful**, however, this does not mean that mediation must necessarily fail if the parties are not willing to reach an agreement, as the condition of CP willingness could not be identified as a necessary condition for mediation success. This empirical finding is plausible because if the conflicting parties are willing to reach a compromise, then mediation will be effective; however, the willingness of the parties to compromise is not necessary for mediation to be effective since the EU can use its leverage to push the parties towards an agreement, such as to employ conditionality on the outcome of the mediation process. One example poses the case of Macedonia 2015-2017 in which the parties to the conflict were relatively unwilling to settle the conflict, however, mediation was nevertheless successful due to imposed conditionality. This suggests that more conditions are jointly sufficient to explain the effectiveness of mediation and the parties' willingness to compromise is not an individual sufficient condition to explain the outcome under investigation. As the EU's coherence and leverage were previously identified as necessary conditions for mediation effectiveness, this means that these conditions should also be jointly sufficient conditions to explain the outcome of mediation since these conditions must be present for mediation to be effective. Therefore, it is expected that the mediator's leverage, the mediator's coherence, and the parties' willingness to compromise are jointly sufficient conditions to explain mediation effectiveness.

5.2.3 Jointly Sufficient Conditions for Mediation Effectiveness

To detect whether the suggested conditions are individually sufficient or jointly sufficient for the outcome to occur, a truth table is constructed and respectively minimalized through subsequent Boolean minimalization. The truth table results can be found in the appendix (Figure 7). The truth table procedure shows the number of possible configurations of sufficient conditions leading to mediation effectiveness and thus, each row of the truth table is a statement of sufficiency. The combinations which could not be attributed to either the outcome or the non-outcome are indicated with a question mark. Overall, of the 10 European mediation cases, only 3 cases – Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today, Montenegro 2001-2006, and Macedonia (2001) – could be used to explain mediation

effectiveness through sufficient configurations of conditions. The minimalization of the truth table through the conservative solution leads to the following results:

M1: X1..Nature*X2..Leverage*X3..Coherence*X5..CP.willingness + X2..Leverage*X3..Coherence*X5..CP.willingness*X6..Severity → Y..Effectiveness		incIS	PRI	covS	covU
1	X1..Nature*X2..Leverage*X3..Coherence*X5..CP.willingness	1.000	1.000	0.352	0.113
2	X2..Leverage*X3..Coherence*X5..CP.willingness*X6..Severity	0.870	0.538	0.563	0.324
M1		0.889	0.714	0.676	
cases					
1	X1..Nature*X2..Leverage*X3..Coherence*X5..CP.willingness	Montenegro 2001-2006; Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today			
2	X2..Leverage*X3..Coherence*X5..CP.willingness*X6..Severity	Macedonia 2001; Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today			

$$M1: X1 \cdot X2 \cdot X3 \cdot X5 \rightarrow Y \quad ((\cdot) = \text{Boolean AND}; (+) = \text{OR})$$

$$M2: X2 \cdot X3 \cdot X5 \cdot X6 \rightarrow Y$$

The minimization formulas can be read as the following:

- (1) *The EU as the sole mediator and the EU's leverage and the EU's coherence and the CP willingness to compromise are jointly sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness (Cases: Montenegro 2001-2006, Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today), or:*
- (2) *The EU's leverage and the EU's coherence and the CP willingness to compromise and the severity of the crisis are jointly sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness (Cases: Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today, Macedonia 2001)*

These statements of sufficiency show under which conditions the EU is guaranteed to mediate effectively. The only difference in the first and the second solution term is $X1/\sim X1$ (EU as sole/co-mediator) and $X6/\sim X6$ (severity/non-severity of crisis) which yet produce the same outcome, since $X2$ (EU's leverage), $X3$ (EU's coherence), and $X5$ (CP willingness to compromise) lead to mediation effectiveness irrespectively of $X1$ and $X6$. To illustrate this with an example: While the crisis in Macedonia in 2001, where the EU acted as a co-mediator, was considered severe, the crisis in Montenegro in 2001-2006, where the EU acted as the sole mediator, was considered less severe, but both mediation cases were effective. Therefore, $X1$ and $X6$ can be dropped since the conditions are rather a statement of circumstances than sufficiency. One explanation for this is that if the crisis is deemed severe, more mediators take part in the negotiation process, and thus, the EU likely acts as a co-mediator, as shown in the second solution term. The first solution term shows that if the crisis is deemed less severe then fewer mediators are involved in the negotiations and thus, the EU is likely to

act as the sole mediator. Thus, the severity of the crisis and the nature of EU involvement cannot be considered sufficient conditions for the outcome but the EU's leverage, coherence, and the conflicting parties' willingness to compromise can be considered jointly sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness since the combination of these conditions leads to the outcome mediation effectiveness. This further logical minimalization procedure can be expressed through the following simplified solution term:

$$M3: X2 \cdot X3 \cdot X5 \rightarrow Y$$

The third solution term shows that *“the EU's leverage and the EU's coherence and the CP willingness to compromise are jointly sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness”*. This finding is in accordance with the results before, as the mediator's leverage and coherence were identified as necessary conditions for mediation effectiveness, so the conditions must be present for mediation effectiveness to occur. Besides, the CP's willingness to compromise could already be identified as a sufficient condition. Therefore, the **leverage, coherence, and conflict parties' willingness can be considered jointly sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness.**

5.2.4 Jointly Sufficient Conditions for Mediation Ineffectiveness

As only three cases could be used to show sufficient combinations of conditions for mediation effectiveness, combinations of sufficient conditions are also examined for mediation ineffectiveness (1 minus Y), as more cases can be considered, and accordingly, important policy recommendations can be derived from the "worst practices". Moreover, this step allows for the examination of the results of jointly sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness before, as jointly sufficient conditions for the outcome should also hold jointly sufficient conditions for the non-outcome, more precisely, the non-existence of these conditions should explain the non-outcome. This counterfactual analysis, therefore, makes the results more robust. The results of the truth table for the non-outcome, mediation ineffectiveness can be found in the appendix (Figure 8). The following solution term could be obtained from the conservative minimisation procedure for mediation ineffectiveness:

```

M1: ~X1..Nature*X2..Leverage*~X5..CP.willigness*X6..Severity +
~X2..Leverage*~X3..Coherence*~X5..CP.willigness*X6..Severity +
X2..Leverage*X3..Coherence*X5..CP.willigness*X6..Severity
-> Y..Ineffectiveness

```

	incIS	PRI	covS	covU
1 ~X1..Nature*X2..Leverage*~X5..CP.willigness*X6..Severity	0.875	0.765	0.434	0.109
2 ~X2..Leverage*~X3..Coherence*~X5..CP.willigness*X6..Severity	1.000	1.000	0.589	0.217
3 X2..Leverage*X3..Coherence*X5..CP.willigness*X6..Severity	0.848	0.462	0.302	0.023
M1	0.892	0.818	0.767	

```

cases
1 ~X1..Nature*X2..Leverage*~X5..CP.willigness*X6..Severity Kosovo 2007, B&H 2009;
Georgia 2008, Macedonia 2015-2017, Russia-Ukraine 2014-today
2 ~X2..Leverage*~X3..Coherence*~X5..CP.willigness*X6..Severity B&H 1992-1994;
Yugoslavia 1991
3 X2..Leverage*X3..Coherence*X5..CP.willigness*X6..Severity Macedonia 2001;
Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today

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M1: (1) $\sim X1 * X2 * \sim X5 * X6 + (2) \sim X2 * \sim X3 * \sim X5 * X6 + (3) X1 * X2 * X3 * X5 * X6 \rightarrow \sim Y$

(1) *EU as co-mediator + EU's leverage + non-willingness to compromise + severity of crisis -> ~Y*
(Cases: Kosovo 2007, B&H 2009, Georgia 2008-today, Macedonia 2015-2017, Russia-Ukraine 2014-today)

(2) *EU's non-leverage + non-coherence + non-willingness to compromise + severity of crisis -> ~Y*
(Cases: Yugoslavia 1991, B&H 1992-1994)

(3) *EU as sole-mediator + leverage + coherence + willingness to compromise + severity of crisis -> ~Y*
(Case: Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today, Macedonia 2001)

Only the first and the second solution term can be considered, as the third solution term is not significant, as shown by the low PRI value, indicating that the solution term is better suitable to capture mediation effectiveness than ineffectiveness, and the low degree of coverage, indicating statistical weakness. This solution term, however, is suitable to capture mediation effectiveness and supports the results above on jointly sufficient conditions explaining mediation effectiveness. Nevertheless, within this chapter, only the first and second solution terms are analysed, including overall 7 ineffective mediation cases, respectively 6 since the case Macedonia 2015-2017⁵ explains effectiveness instead of ineffectiveness.

Interestingly, the first solution term shows that the EU's leverage is a jointly sufficient explanation for mediation ineffectiveness, although it was previously identified as a condition for mediation effectiveness. One explanation for the ineffectiveness of leverage is the lack of credibility of the

⁵ Disregard the case Macedonia 2015-2017 since it was an effective mediation case instead of an ineffective one (R coded it with the ineffective cases due to the similarity of the case Macedonia 2015-2017 with Kosovo 2007, B&H 2009, Georgia 2008-today and Russia-Ukraine 2014-today: Conflict parties' willingness rather low)

mediator. To give an example: If the EU exerts high leverage vis-à-vis the conflict parties, but the CPs do not perceive the EU as a credible mediator, i.e. the parties to the conflict do not believe the mediator's threats or promises, then the CPs are less willing to make concessions, which likely leads to the ineffectiveness of mediation (Kosovo 2007, B&H 2009, Georgia 2008, Russia-Ukraine 2014-today). Therefore, exerted leverage should always be accompanied by the perceived credibility of the EU otherwise, the exerted leverage will be ineffective. Besides, the solution term suggests that the EU as co-mediator poses a jointly sufficient explanation for mediation ineffectiveness, suggesting that the EU mediates more effectively as the sole mediator (as seen in the third solution term), which could be due to increased coherence of the mediation attempt. Furthermore, as expected, the conflict parties' unwillingness to compromise and the severity of the crisis pose jointly sufficient conditions for mediation ineffectiveness. Overall, 4 recent ineffective mediation cases could be explained through *"EU as co-mediator + EU's leverage + non-willingness to compromise + severity of crisis"* which implies firstly, that the EU tends to be more coherent in mediation attempts overall, and employs some degree of leverage, however, leverage should go hand in hand with the credibility of the intermediary for mediation to be effective and secondly, that context factors significantly contribute to mediation failure.

The second solution term was able to explain mediation ineffectiveness through two older mediation cases, Yugoslavia 1991 and B&H 1992-1994. This solution term also yields important findings, as it shows that the *"EU's lack of leverage, the EU's lack of coherence, the CP's unwillingness to compromise, and the severity of the crisis together sufficiently explain the ineffectiveness of mediation"*, which means that mediation is guaranteed to fail when this configuration of conditions is present (Cases: Yugoslavia 1991, B&H 1992-1994). When analysing the statistical values, this set-theoretic relationship becomes even clearer, as the solution term indicates a consistency value of 1, which shows a perfect statistical relationship between the configuration of sufficient conditions and the ineffectiveness of mediation, and ideally explains the non-outcome, as indicated by the PRI value of 1. These results support the findings on the conditions influencing mediation effectiveness, as the mediator's leverage, the mediator's coherence, and the CP's willingness to compromise were identified as jointly sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness, and thus the inexistence of these conditions logically also provide a jointly sufficient explanation for mediation ineffectiveness. Since only older mediation cases could be attributed to the second solution term, this implies that the EU is nowadays appearing more coherent in its mediation attempts and is exerting more leverage, which shows that the EU has strengthened its capacities in conflict resolution in recent years.

Moreover, the severity of the crisis impacts mediation ineffectiveness significantly, as the condition is present throughout all the solution terms. More precisely, the severity of the crisis poses a jointly sufficient condition for the non-outcome, mediation ineffectiveness. This result is consistent with the mathematical calculations as well as the parsimonious solution term for the non-outcome (Figure 9 in appendix). These results imply that the more severe the crisis, the more likely mediation will fail (see scatter plot: Figure 10 in appendix). This finding is not surprising and rather logical, as the higher the crisis, the less willing the conflict parties are willing to concede - e.g. due to antagonistic relations between the conflict parties - and thus mediation fails. However, as seen in the third solution term, mediation can still be effective when the severity of the crisis is relatively high, implying that the EU can draw on its leverage in order to push the parties towards an agreement (Macedonia 2001; Kosovo 2011-today).

Overall, as shown in the first solution term, the **EU's leverage and the EU as co-mediator contribute to mediation failure together with the CP's unwillingness to compromise and the severity of the crisis**, implying that the EU should intervene more as the sole mediator and should accompany its leverage with credibility. The the second solution term has shown that the **EU's lack of leverage and lack of coherence**, as well as the **conflict parties' unwillingness to compromise**, and the **severity of the crisis** provide a **jointly sufficient explanation for the ineffectiveness of mediation**, which is in line with the previous results, as the mediator's leverage, coherence, and the CP's willingness to compromise are jointly sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness and thus the inexistence of these conditions are also jointly sufficient to explain mediation ineffectiveness. Furthermore, the severity of the crisis poses a strong sufficient explanation for mediation ineffectiveness, meaning that the more severe the crisis, the more likely mediation will fail because the parties to the conflict are unwilling to compromise. However, since the severity of the crisis is not deemed individually sufficient for mediation ineffectiveness which would mean that mediation would be ineffective if the crisis were too severe, regardless of the EU's mediation efforts, but was identified as a jointly sufficient condition for the non-outcome, implying that not only the context factors lead to mediation failure but in combination with concurrent factors. In sum, these findings challenge conventional perceptions about mediation failure only due to context factors and imply that the failure of mediation does not only occur due to context factors, such as the severity of the crisis and the CP's unwillingness to compromise, but also due to concurrent factors, such as the EU's coherence and leverage, resulting in important policy recommendations for the EU to change and adapt its mediation behaviour to the context of a specific crisis – which has been done extensively since no recent ineffective mediation case could be explained through the EU's lack of coherence or lack of leverage.

6 Empirical Results of Case Studies and QcA

The empirical results have shown that overall, the European Union relatively successfully mediated the conflicts in Macedonia 2001, Macedonia 2015-2017, Montenegro 2001-2006, and Kosovo-Serbia (2011-today), whereas the EU was relatively ineffective in the cases of Georgia 2008-today, Kosovo 2007, Yugoslavia 1991, Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1994 and 2009, and Russia-Ukraine 2014-today. To understand why some mediation efforts were successful whilst some mediation efforts failed, the empirical results from the case studies and the QcA will be combined, as the causal mechanism between the factor and outcome variable at play becomes more apparent. First, the **concurrent factors** – the behaviour and characteristics of the mediator – influencing the outcome of mediation are discussed.

When the EU mediated as the sole mediator, mediation was more effective overall (2 out of 3 cases). In the case of Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today and Montenegro 2001-2006 the EU managed to mediate relatively effectively as the sole mediator. This result suggests that the prominence of other mediators might be unfavourable for effective EU mediation, e.g. for reasons of competition leading to less coherence in mediation efforts, which has been the case in the mediation attempts in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo 2007. The QcA analysis, however, was only able to explain the effectiveness of mediation through the combination of the conditions 'sole mediator' and 'non-severity of crisis' (Montenegro 2001-2006), and the ineffectiveness through 'co-mediator' and 'severity of crisis' (Yugoslavia 1991). This result suggests that the type of EU involvement (sole/co-mediator) - together with the severity of the crisis - is an explanatory factor for the effectiveness of mediation, respectively for mediation ineffectiveness.

Moreover, the mediator's coherence is a necessary condition for mediation effectiveness, as shown in the cases of Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today, Montenegro 2001-2006, and Macedonia 2001, which means that the EU must follow a coherent mediation approach (vertical coherence) and speak in a single European voice (horizontal coherence) by discussing national preferences first and finding a common European ground, before mediating a conflict, otherwise mediation will be ineffective (Yugoslavia, Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1004 and 2009 etc.). Overall, this finding is logical, as it is assumed that the mediator's coherence leads to increased credibility of the mediator and thus, the conflicting parties are more willing to find a compromise, and consequently, mediation is more likely to be effective.

The same logic applies to the EU's leverage, which could also be identified as a necessary condition for mediation effectiveness. The EU must use its leverage to be able to effectively mediate, otherwise, mediation fails (Yugoslavia, Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1004). However, the qualitative case analysis has shown that leverage must be accompanied by the credibility of the mediator, otherwise, the CP do not believe the threats or promises imposed by the mediator leading to mediation ineffectiveness (such as in Bosnia & Herzegovina 2009). In particular, imposing conditions on the outcome of mediation is proven effective, such as making further EU integration or accession conditional on the signing of a peace agreement (e.g. Macedonia 2015-2017). Besides political incentives, the EU can also use its economic power in form of stick-and-carrot methods to push the parties towards an agreement. However, if the EU exerts high leverage, then this power of influence should be accompanied by the credibility of the EU by the conflicting parties since the CP are more willing to concede when they can draw expected benefits from the mediation outcome, and consequently, mediation is more likely to be effective.

Additionally, the case studies revealed the pattern that the EU's leverage likely influences the mediation strategy (Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today, Montenegro 2001-2006). The more leverage the EU has, the more interventionalist mediation strategies can be used due to increased legitimacy. Regarding the effectiveness of mediation strategies, it seems that manipulation strategies are effective in high-intensity conflicts (Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today, Macedonia 2015-2017).

Overall, the results concerning concurrent conditions are in line with the theoretical framework and thus, all developed **hypotheses regarding concurrent factors can be approved (H1, H2, H3, H4)**. This was expected, as the behaviour and characteristics of the mediator influence mediation effectiveness, and for the EU to successfully mediate, a certain level of leverage and coherence must be adopted to be able to bring the conflicting parties to reach an agreement.

Second, in addition to concurrent factors, **context factors** pose an explanatory factor for mediation effectiveness. The CPs' willingness to compromise directly influences mediation effectiveness, more precisely it functions as a jointly sufficient condition for mediation effectiveness, respectively mediation ineffectiveness. This result does not come unsurprising since the conflict parties must be willing to reach an agreement for mediation to be effective. Nevertheless, the condition does not pose a necessary condition for mediation effectiveness, which means that the conflict parties do not have to be willing to compromise for mediation to be effective. The EU can draw on its coherence and leverage to bring the parties towards an agreement, which has been done in Macedonia 2015-201. Therefore, the CP's willingness to compromise together with the EU's leverage and the EU's coherence

can be seen as jointly sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness since coherence and leverage pose necessary conditions for mediation effectiveness which makes them jointly sufficient to explain the outcome, respectively the non-outcome, as the lack of these conditions logically explains mediation ineffectiveness (as shown by counterfactual analysis).


Besides, the severity of the crisis influences mediation ineffectiveness significantly. As shown in the case studies, the more severe the crisis is, the more likely mediation will be effective. The QcA analysis was able to confirm this finding through the counterfactual analysis. The severity of the crisis could be identified as a strong jointly sufficient condition to explain the ineffectiveness of mediation. Nevertheless, this effect seems to be 'mediated' through the CPs' unwillingness to reach an agreement: The more severe the crisis, the lower the CPs' willingness to compromise, and thus, the more likely mediation will be ineffective. As the severity of the crisis is not individually sufficient to explain mediation ineffectiveness, this finding implies that the EU can still influence the conflict parties through other means to reach an agreement.

Regarding context factors, the results are in line with the theoretical expectations since it was expected that the CPs' willingness to compromise is a jointly sufficient condition to explain mediation effectiveness, while the severity of the crisis was expected to influence mediation ineffectiveness. Therefore, **hypotheses H5 and H6 can be approved.**

In sum, the mediator's leverage and coherence could be identified as necessary conditions for mediation effectiveness, and together with the CP's willingness to compromise, these conditions sufficiently explain the outcome under investigation. These results suggest a direct causal mechanism at place between the factor and outcome variables. The other developed conditions influencing mediation effectiveness such as the severity of the crisis, the nature of EU involvement, the mediator's leverage, and the mediation strategy also seem to influence mediation effectiveness although indirectly. Overall, the findings denote a complex causal relationship between the conditions influencing mediation and mediation effectiveness. Based on the empirical finding, a simplified potential causal graph is established:

Direct effects:

Indirect effects:



Graph 4: Own elaboration based on empirical findings

7 Conclusion

Overall, the empirical analysis has shown that the **EU was able to mediate relatively successfully in 4 out of 10 mediation cases**, so the EU can be considered moderately effective in its mediation efforts, which can be explained by different degrees of conditions influencing mediation effectiveness (concurrent and contextual factors). While some conditions influencing mediation effectiveness are conducive factors (EU as sole mediator, leverage, coherence, CP's willingness to compromise), some factors are constraining factors (severity of the crisis). The leverage and coherence of the mediator could be identified as necessary conditions for the effectiveness of mediation, which means that the EU should always use a high degree of leverage and coherence to be able to settle the conflict, otherwise mediation fails. Moreover, the willingness of the CP to settle the conflict, together with the EU's leverage and coherence, are jointly sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness, i.e. if the parties are willing to settle the conflict and the EU uses leverage and coherence, then mediation is effective, which answers the research question under which conditions the EU mediates successfully: **The EU mediates successfully when it exerts high leverage, accompanied by the perceived credibility**

of the mediator, and high coherence, and when the conflict parties are willing to compromise. This empirical result indicates that effective mediation depends on both concurrent and contextual factors. While concurrent factors are considered necessary conditions for mediation effectiveness, contextual factors (together with concurrent factors) are considered sufficient conditions for mediation success. This finding implies that concurrent factors have higher explanatory power for mediation ineffectiveness than context factors, as concurrent factors are prerequisites for mediation effectiveness, whereas context factors seem to have a higher explanatory power for mediation effectiveness, as the CP's willingness to compromise could be identified as strong sufficient condition to explain mediation effectiveness. Nevertheless, as shown by the counterfactual analysis, the severity of crisis also poses a strong condition for mediation for ineffectiveness. Overall, this means that both context and concurrent conditions must be favourable for mediation to be successful. Therefore, both the theoretical framework and the developed hypotheses can be confirmed.

8 Discussion

Some methodological shortcomings within this paper arise. One shortcoming constitutes the number of case studies used in the analysis. As the EU mediated only a limited number of inter- and intrastate disputes, the analysis only includes 10 case studies. Typically, the QcA approach is designed for 15 to 50 cases. This limited number of cases, in particular the small number of effective cases, raises some issues as only three cases could be included in the truth table analysis to explain sufficient combinations of conditions leading to mediation effectiveness. Identified sufficient conditions for mediation effectiveness should therefore be considered with caution. Nevertheless, since the QcA analysis also included counterfactual analysis explaining mediation ineffectiveness through combinations of sufficient conditions, the results are robust. Overall, this approach is best suited to make cross-case comparisons and consequently to understand under which conditions the EU mediates effectively, respectively ineffectively. As the EU was relatively ineffective in some mediation efforts, future research could thus examine under which conditions EU mediation fails.

Furthermore, the data for the QcA analysis is gathered from secondary literature and neutral news providers, as it was not feasible within the scope of this thesis to conduct interviews for each case study, and accordingly, qualitative biases cannot be avoided. However, since the secondary literature and media reports were not adopted without comparisons with other literature, the results are still profound. Nevertheless, qualitative bias cannot be entirely avoided, especially since the calibration of my variables is based on my own qualitative analysis.

Moreover, measuring mediation effectiveness is rather challenging because mediation is a multi-layered, multi-track process, making it difficult to identify a single mediation process and outcome. Although it was originally proposed to include the perceptions of the conflict parties on the effectiveness of mediation, it would have been firstly too difficult to determine the perceptions of the CP on the effectiveness of mediation without conducting interviews and secondly to create an overall mediation effectiveness score, as often several conflict parties are involved in the mediation process. The measurement of mediation effectiveness in this paper is thus based on both the conflict resolution perspective and the internal EU goal achievement perspective. However, for future research, it is recommended to include the proposed conflict party perspective on mediation effectiveness.

Besides, only some conditions influencing mediation effectiveness were investigated, while some conditions, such as pre-existing factors (e.g. success rate of previous mediation efforts), and public opinion, which may influence mediation effectiveness, were disregarded due to the scope of the study. Thus, some potential conditions not captured by the model may influence the causal relationship between factor and outcome variables. For this reason, one should be cautious about making causal claims due to exogeneity issues.

Overall, future research could reverse the logic of QcA - as has been done in this paper - if quantitative data is not available. Accordingly, qualitative case studies could be conducted first, followed by the QCA analysis. This would provide more transparency in the QCA analysis, as quantitative data is not just blindly adopted, but qualitative case analyses are conducted prior to the QCA analysis to gain more detailed knowledge about the cases and to be able to calibrate the cases accordingly.

9 Policy recommendations

Several policy recommendations for the EU can be derived from the empirical analysis. First, the EU should intervene more in intra- and inter-state disputes, as the EU was able to mediate relatively successfully in recent years which could be due to the establishment of the EEAS and the European Mediation Support Team which led to increasing competencies and capabilities of the EU to intervene in international conflict resolution. In particular, the EU was especially successful when mediating as the sole mediator since the EU was able to put forward a more coherent mediation approach than together with other mediators, suggesting that the **EU should intervene more in crises as the sole mediator**. Second, the EU needs to adopt a **flexible mediation approach adapted to the context of a particular crisis**. For example, more interventionist mediation strategies (such as manipulation) are proven more effective in high-intensity conflicts and thus, the mediation approach and the mediation

strategy should be adopted to the context of a specific crisis. The third policy recommendation addresses the characteristics of the mediator: The EU must **always act as a coherent mediator and exercise leverage** to bring the parties to an agreement, otherwise, mediation will fail, as these conditions are prerequisites for the success of mediation. Since the CP's willingness to compromise could not be identified as necessary but as a jointly sufficient condition for mediation effectiveness, this means that the EU can draw on its leverage to push the parties towards an agreement. This can take form of high-interventionalist mediation strategies (manipulation strategies), for instance by imposing conditionality on the mediation outcome. This entails important lessons for the EU to intervene in crisis although the CP might be relatively unwilling to compromise, and the severity of the crisis is considered high. Nevertheless, the qualitative analysis led to the observation that the EU must be perceived as a credible mediator to be able to successfully exert high leverage and manipulative strategies to get parties to reach an agreement, and therefore, leverage should be accompanied by the credibility of the mediator. Moreover, it is expected that the more coherent the EU appears, the more likely the CPs perceive the EU as a credible mediator, suggesting that a coherent mediation approach can also contribute to increasing the EU's credibility. The fourth policy recommendation, therefore, includes a **bottom-up mediation approach**, as this increases trust in European mediation efforts and thus enhances the legitimacy and credibility of the EU, which in turn leads to a greater willingness of the conflict parties to reach an agreement. For this reason, especially in 'weak conflicts', less interventionalist mediation strategies should be used, with the EU acting only as a 'facilitator' to grant trust and legitimacy to the disputing parties.

Nevertheless, the power of the EU in the field of conflict resolution should not be overestimated, as firstly, the outcome of mediation also strongly depends on the context of the respective crisis, and secondly, a discrepancy between the expectations of the EU as an effective mediator and the reality of the conflict leads to an imbalance within the mediation attempt, which is likely to result in the failure of the mediation. Overall, the ineffectiveness of mediation could be an interesting topic for new research to be able to draw political lessons from the "worst practices" for future European mediation attempts. Especially in face of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, it is important to study the conditions under which European mediation efforts fail to be able to learn from ineffective mediation efforts or to change ineffective mediation patterns, such as the use of high leverage without being perceived as a credible mediator by the conflict parties. Therefore, further research should contribute to investigating under which conditions the EU does not mediate successfully.

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Appendix

Figure 1 - Calibration of cases:

Cases	X1 = Nature of EU involvement	X2 = EU's leverage	X3 = EU's coherence	X4 = EU's mediation strategy	X5 = CP williness to compromise	X6 = Severity of crisis	Y = Mediation effectiveness	~Y = Mediation ineffectiveness
Georgia (2008-today)	0	0.55	0.55	2	0	0.7	0.3	0.7
Kosovo (2007)	0	0.55	0.3	2	0.3	0.7	0	1
Kosovo-Serbia (2011-today)	1	0.7	0.7	3	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.45
Montenegro (2001-2006)	1	0.7	0.7	3	0.7	0.3	0.7	0.3
Yugoslavia (1991)	1	0	0.3	0	0	1	0	1
Bosnia & Herzegovina (1992-1994)	0	0	0.3	0	0	1	0	1
Bosnia & Herzegovina (2009)	0	1	0.3	3	0.3	0.55	0.3	0.7
Macedonia (2001)	0	0.7	0.7	1	0.55	0.7	0.7	0.3
Macedonia (2015-2017)	0	0.55	0.7	2	0.3	0.55	0.7	0.3
Russia-Ukraine (2014-today)	0	0.55	0.7	2	0	1	0.3	0.7

Figure 2 - Necessary conditions for Y:

	Cons.Nec	Cov.Nec	RoN
X1	0.352	0.417	0.8
X2	0.958	0.642	0.712
X3	1	0.676	0.736
X5	0.676	0.889	0.961
X6	0.845	0.426	0.421
~X1	0.648	0.329	0.39
~X2	0.549	0.415	0.658
~X3	0.592	0.442	0.665
~X5	0.789	0.384	0.375
~X6	0.704	0.847	0.94

Figure 3: X-Y plot of leverage and mediation effectiveness




Figure 4: X-Y plot of coherence and mediation effectiveness




Figure 5 - Parsimonious solution of sufficient conditions for Y:

```

M1: X5..CP.willigness -> Y..Effectivness
      incIS  PRI  covS  covU  cases
-----
1  X5..CP.willigness  0.889  0.714  0.676  -  Macedonia 2001; Montenegro 2001-2006; Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today
      M1  0.889  0.714  0.676
    
```

Figure 6: X-Y plot of CP's willingness to compromise and mediation effectiveness




Figure 7 - Truth table Y:

	X1..Natur	X2..Lever	X3..Coher	X5..CP.wil	X6..Severi	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0?		0	-	
2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.48	0 B&H 1992-1994
3	0	0	0	1	0	0?		0	-	
4	0	0	0	1	1	1?		0	-	
5	0	0	1	0	0	0?		0	-	
6	0	0	1	0	1	1?		0	-	
7	0	0	1	1	0	0?		0	-	
8	0	0	1	1	1	1?		0	-	
9	0	1	0	0	0	0?		0	-	
10	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.61224	0 Kosovo 2007,B&H 2009
11	0	1	0	1	0	0?		0	-	
12	0	1	0	1	1	1?		0	-	
13	0	1	1	0	0	0?		0	-	
14	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	3	0.7037	0.33333 Georgia 2008,Macedonia 2015-2017,Russia-Ukraine 2014-today
15	0	1	1	1	0	0?		0	-	
16	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7931	0.45455 Macedonia 2001
17	1	0	0	0	0	0?		0	-	
18	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.46154	0 Yugoslavia 1991
19	1	0	0	1	0	0?		0	-	
20	1	0	0	1	1	1?		0	-	
21	1	0	1	0	0	0?		0	-	
22	1	0	1	0	1	1?		0	-	
23	1	0	1	1	0	0?		0	-	
24	1	0	1	1	1	1?		0	-	
25	1	1	0	0	0	0?		0	-	
26	1	1	0	0	1	1?		0	-	
27	1	1	0	1	0	0?		0	-	
28	1	1	0	1	1	1?		0	-	
29	1	1	1	0	0	0?		0	-	
30	1	1	1	0	1	1?		0	-	
31	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1 Montenegro 2001-2006
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1 Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today

Figure 8 - Truth table ~Y:

	X1..Natur	X2..Lever	X3..Coher	X5..CP.wil	X6..Severi	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0?		0	-	
2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1 B&H 1992-1994
3	0	0	0	1	0	0?		0	-	
4	0	0	0	1	1	1?		0	-	
5	0	0	1	0	0	0?		0	-	
6	0	0	1	0	1	1?		0	-	
7	0	0	1	1	0	0?		0	-	
8	0	0	1	1	1	1?		0	-	
9	0	1	0	0	0	0?		0	-	
10	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	1 Kosovo 2007,B&H 2009
11	0	1	0	1	0	0?		0	-	
12	0	1	0	1	1	1?		0	-	
13	0	1	1	0	0	0?		0	-	
14	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	3	0.85185	0.66667 Georgia 2008,Macedonia 2015-2017,Russia-Ukraine 2014-today
15	0	1	1	1	0	0?		0	-	
16	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.82759	0.54545 Macedonia 2001
17	1	0	0	0	0	0?		0	-	
18	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1 Yugoslavia 1991
19	1	0	0	1	0	0?		0	-	
20	1	0	0	1	1	1?		0	-	
21	1	0	1	0	0	0?		0	-	
22	1	0	1	0	1	1?		0	-	
23	1	0	1	1	0	0?		0	-	
24	1	0	1	1	1	1?		0	-	
25	1	1	0	0	0	0?		0	-	
26	1	1	0	0	1	1?		0	-	
27	1	1	0	1	0	0?		0	-	
28	1	1	0	1	1	1?		0	-	
29	1	1	1	0	0	0?		0	-	
30	1	1	1	0	1	1?		0	-	
31	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0.65217	0 Montenegro 2001-2006
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.88235	0 Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today

Figure 9 - Parsimonious solution of sufficient conditions for ~Y:

```

M1: X6..Severity -> Y..Ineffectiveness
-----
              inc1S  PRI  covS  covU
-----
1  X6..Severity  0.851  0.781  0.930  -
-----
              M1  0.851  0.781  0.930
-----
              cases
-----
1  X6..Severity  B&H 1992-1994; Kosovo 2007,B&H 2009; Georgia 2008,Macedonia 2015-2017,Russia-Ukraine 2014-today;
              Macedonia 2001; Yugoslavia 1991; Kosovo-Serbia 2011-today
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```

Figure 10: Scatter plot – Severity of crisis and mediation ineffectiveness

