

SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY

WATER COOPERATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN



Eline de Jong

6448240

Master Thesis International Relations in Historical Perspective

Utrecht University

Supervisor: Dr. Petra van den Boomgaard

15 June 2022

Wordcount: 15.250

CONTENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| Abstract..... | 4 |
| Introduction | 4 |
| Historiography | 6 |
| Theoretical framework | 9 |
| Primary sources | 10 |
| Structure | 11 |
| Chapter One: Jordan and Israel: The Friedliest of Enemies..... | 12 |
| Early relations | 12 |
| The 1948 War..... | 13 |
| A five-decade balancing act between Israel and the Arab world..... | 14 |
| The 1994 peace treaty | 17 |
| Warm peace, cold peace, and normalization..... | 18 |
| Conclusion | 20 |
| Chapter Two: The Prevailing Water Narratives | 21 |
| The role of water | 21 |
| Agriculture and Zionism | 24 |
| Israeli water narratives | 26 |
| Jordanian narratives | 28 |
| Road to the 1994 peace treaty | 30 |
| Conclusion | 31 |
| Chapter Three: The Securitization of the Water Sector | 32 |
| Water as a national security issue | 32 |
| Water discourse in Jordan..... | 33 |
| The 1998 strategy..... | 34 |
| The 2008 strategy..... | 35 |
| The 2016 strategy..... | 37 |
| Israel’s water policy..... | 38 |
| Transitional master plan (2002)..... | 39 |
| Long-term master plan (2011)..... | 40 |
| Israeli water sector – key issues (2018)..... | 42 |
| Potential for cooperation..... | 43 |

| | |
|------------------------|----|
| Conclusion | 45 |
| Conclusion | 46 |
| Primary sources..... | 49 |
| Secondary sources..... | 50 |
| Appendix | 55 |

Image title page: Former Israeli prime minister, Yitzhat Rabin and King Hussein of Jordan during the signing of the Israel Jordan Peace Treaty on 26 October 1994, whilst former U.S. President Bill Clinton is applauding the deal (Photo/ Nati Shohat).

ABSTRACT

Jordan and Israel share a history of conflict. Despite their differences, the countries have always managed to cooperate on issues of security and water. This thesis studies the water cooperation between Jordan and Israel. It researches why Jordan and Israel, two (former) enemies, cooperate on water, and how this cooperation results in mutual securitization. To answer this research question, securitization theory is used. This thesis makes an original contribution to securitization theory. The theory primarily focuses on how a state securitizes an existential threat, whereas this thesis argues two states can also securitize together. To analyze the securitization of the water sector in the two countries, water strategies of both governments are examined. In these reports one can find justifications for cooperation. This study finds that Jordan wishes to cooperate with Israel to increase its supply, which is crucial since it is in dire need for water. Israel wants to cooperate with Jordan since it benefits from a strong and stable Jordanian state, and cooperation would help achieve its sustainability goals. Thus, through cooperation, Jordan and Israel securitize together whilst having different securitizing goals.

Keywords: Israel, Jordan, transboundary water cooperation, securitization theory

INTRODUCTION

In November 2021, Israel and Jordan signed a declaration of intent for the Water-for-Energy Deal. In this deal, Jordan provides solar energy to Israel in exchange for Israeli desalinated water (Kraemer 2022). Especially for Jordan, steps are necessary because the country is in urgent need for water; it is the second most water scarce country in the world (UNICEF n.d.). This scarcity is due to the depletion of the Jordan River and due to unequal distribution of water among bordering countries (Elmusa 1995, 63). In contrast to Jordan, Israel has managed to improve its water security over the past decade. Because of its lengthy coastline, Israel succeeded to build a host of desalination plants. Jordan lacks this coastline and has therefore been dependent on sales of water from Israel. In this new deal, Jordan provides Israel renewable energy in return, which Israel lacks due to space limitations (Kraemer 2022). The agreement, if implemented, would be one of the largest cooperation projects since the countries signed a peace deal in 1994 (Davis 2021).

Cooperation between Jordan and Israel is surprising considering their conflict history, known as the Arab-Israeli conflict. This conflict involves the tensions between Arab countries and Israel, dating to the establishment of Israel in 1948. Water has played a major role in the conflict; water became a strategic and diplomatic issue that regularly threatened to bring Israel to clash with its neighbors. Disputes over the Jordan waters played a significant part in the descent to the Six-Day War (1967). Despite these clashes, the countries recognized the urgency to secure their supply of water. The Johnston Plan (1953) between Israel and Arab countries was the first deal on water, but without success. The plan was only adhered to by Israel and Jordan (Manna 2006, 58; Elmusa 1995, 63-64). This shows that from early on, Jordan and Israel were willing to cooperate on water regardless of their political differences.

Despite the need for water, the new deal is not supported by the Jordanian public. Hundreds of protests broke out in Jordan, arguing the deal moves towards normalizing ties with Israel while the latter continues to occupy the Palestinian territories. Opponents also warned that the deal would force Jordan to be dependent on its neighbor without providing a solution to the country's water problems (Davis 2021).

The research question this thesis attempts to answer is why Jordan and Israel, two (former) enemies, cooperate on water and how this cooperation results in mutual

securitization. This thesis will draw on securitization theory (ST) of the Copenhagen School. In order to answer the research question, the following subsidiary questions will be dealt with: 1) what are causes for the antagonistic attitudes on the one hand, and the friendly attitudes on the other, that arose between Israel and Jordan?, 2) what changed, if anything, in the water narratives in Israel and Jordan, and how did this contribute to the drafting of the 1994 peace treaty?, and 3) how do Israel and Jordan attempt to securitize water through their own national water plans and through cooperation between them? Each of these subsidiary questions will be discussed in the first, second, and third chapter, respectively.

This topic holds societal relevance since it shows that cooperation over scarce resources is possible, even between countries that have antagonistic attitudes towards each other. This research provides a possibility for the advancement of transboundary water cooperation, which can result in an improvement in water security. For regions disproportionately affected by climate change, water scarcity can occur more regularly (Kraemer 2022). This phenomenon stresses the urgency for improving water security in the affected regions.

The literature on the relationship between water and conflict is extensive. Academics are divided on the topic; one side believes that water scarcity will drive or cause conflict, whereas the other side sees little history of conflict, and instead opportunity for collaboration (Burgess, Owen, and Sinha 2016, 387-89). This research presents a case study that shows the possibility for cooperation. By analyzing both countries' national water plans, this thesis demonstrates how framing of securitizing actors determines how water is being perceived and consequently influences the measures taken.

Historiography

Various academics have focused on explaining and assessing the cooperation between Jordan and Israel. Schäfer (2013) has done so by using ST. The main question in his book is how security perspectives influence the perception of water scarcity and what the impact is on bilateral relations between Israel and Jordan in terms of security. Through the examination of scientific and security discourses in Jordan and Israel, Schäfer discusses to what extent water has been securitized (Schäfer 2013, 2-3). He borrows the concept of securitization from ST by the Copenhagen School. This theory is a useful framework for

analyzing what is and what is not a security issue. Securitization is the process by which an issue comes to be presented as an existential threat to the referent object. Through speech acts, extraordinary measures aimed at tackling the threat are being justified (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 87). To analyze the processes of securitization, Schäfer presents a historical overview of measures designed at securing the supply of water in Jordan and Israel. Next, he analyzes the influence of the security perspectives in both countries on the dynamics of securitizing water between Israel and Jordan (Schäfer 2013, 2-3). Schäfer finds that different perspectives on security have resulted in periods of securitization¹, violization², opportunization³, non-politicization⁴, and politicization⁵ in Jordan and Israel since 1953. In Jordan, a longing for inner stability and economic development developed (Schäfer 2013, 94-97, 101), which resulted in closer cooperation on water and other issues with Israel. In Israel, the perception of Jordan as the enemy changed (Schäfer 2013, 95-104).

Schäfer's analysis of different security perspectives and how these affect views on water scarcity is useful. Schäfer shows that cooperation was a gradual process. However, in his analysis, Israel's and Jordan's attempts at securitization are discussed separately. This thesis argues their attempts at securitization are dependent on each other, and they securitize together whilst having different end goals.

There are other explanations for cooperation, of which Hussein (2016) presents one. He argues that for the Israeli government, priority is to maintain a strong military and security cooperation with the Jordanian government. The Israeli government supports a strong Jordanian state for the protection of its border. Also, Jordan is one of the two Arab countries that recognizes the Israeli state, and cooperation thus provides Israel political legalization. Whereas Jordan is driven by commercial interests, mainly by water and energy security (Hussein 2016, 186, 188-89). On the other hand, the window of opportunity in 1993 has also played a role, as Jägerskog (2003) argues. The signing of the Oslo Accords between Palestine and Israel in 1993 presented an opportunity for Jordan to pursue peace with

¹ An issue is securitized when it is thought of as an existential threat and thus justifies responses that go beyond normal political practices (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 77).

² Violization occurs when violence is used to avoid a designated security threat (Schäfer 2013, 26-27).

³ Opportunization is when there is an opportunity for an actor to achieve a higher-order goal (Schäfer 2013, 27).

⁴ A non-politicized issue is one that the state does not deal with and is also not in any other way made an issue of in public debate and decision (Schäfer 2013, 91).

⁵ Politicized means that the issue is part of public policy, in the need of government decisions and resource allocation (Schäfer 2013, 91).

Israel. Such a deal would not have been positively received earlier in the Arab world, and the Palestinians in Jordan (who form a majority of the population) would be strongly against it in the absence of any significant movement on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Jordan also assumed strong economic and military support from the US if it would settle on a peace agreement with Israel (Jägerskog 2003, 115).

Jägerskog's analysis is insightful for understanding the functioning of the water sector in and between both countries. A limitation of Jägerskog's work is that the source is relatively close in date to the Peace Treaty. Accordingly, sources focused on the development of the water sectors and of cooperation must be examined.

To comprehend the reasons for cooperation, it is necessary to understand how the water issue is being perceived in both countries. Hussein (2018) examines how water scarcity is perceived and framed in Jordan. He investigates the discourse and the elements comprising the discourse (Hussein 2018, 385). He finds that different (sub)narratives exist at different levels of politics. For more insight information on the Jordanian perspective, Munther Haddadin is a valuable source. He was a member of the Jordanian delegations to the Middle East Peace Process and oversaw the files of water in the bilateral negotiation conference. He has published many articles and books on these peace negotiations since. An example of useful work is *Negotiated Resolution of the Jordan-Israel Water Conflict* (2000), in which he discusses the processes associated with the water conflict between Jordan and Israel, as far back as 1953. In another work, Haddadin (2002) analyzes the Jordanian-Israeli water affairs and goes into depth about the peace negotiations in 1994.

Focusing more on Israel, Alatout (2008), Kartin (2001), and Morag (2001) describe the connection between water, agriculture, and Zionism. In Zionism, water has an ideological, economic, and strategic value. Water therefore holds great value in Israeli society. Alatout (2009) demonstrates how the Israeli government, to achieve its political goals, has first constructed water as abundant, and later as scarce, even though there was no actual change in water resources. Feitelson (2002) discusses the implications of these water narratives for its policies and the water sector throughout the 20th century.

For the analysis it is necessary to understand the context between the two countries. Medzini (2019) conducted an extensive analysis on Israeli-Jordanian relations. He provides a descriptive account of all relevant historical events between the two countries of the past century. Research Medzini has done is relevant for the first chapter of this thesis, to

understand the antagonistic and friendly attitudes between Israel and Jordan. Other useful sources for the historic relations between the countries are Barari (2014) and Yitzhak (2017). Podeh (2015) examines both countries' reasons for agreement to the 1994 peace treaty and describes how it was an opportunity that could not be missed.

The discussed secondary sources help to answer the research questions of the first two chapters, and thus help explain the countries' attitudes towards each other, how water narratives have changed in both countries, and how Israel and Jordan came to the 1994 peace treaty. In the third chapter, to study how the countries attempt to securitize the water sector, both governments' water plans are analyzed through securitization theory; the theoretical framework of this thesis.

Theoretical framework

Securitization theory of the Copenhagen School helps examine the perceived threats and measures taken by the governments to ensure water security. By analyzing the issue through this lens, differences in perceived threats will become apparent between the two governments. Through these differences and similarities in perception, one can explain the corresponding measures that have been taken. Securitization is the process of making an issue a security issue. Something is a security issue when it is presented as posing an existential threat to the survival of a referent object⁶. When an issue is successfully presented as an existential threat, it legitimizes the use of exceptional political measures (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 76). Justification occurs through speech acts towards the relevant audience. For successful securitization, there needs to be some degree of approval between the carrier of the securitizing speech act and the relevant audience that is appealed to; otherwise, a securitizing move is incomplete. The process of securitization can be regarded as a continuum that runs from non-politicized, through politicized to securitized (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 77-78).

Concerning the topic of this thesis, the referent object is the state; this is what needs to survive. The securitizing actors are the governmental actors of both countries that manage the water sector. Securitization theory provides an understanding of why Jordan

⁶ The referent object is the entity that must survive, and it is therefore justified to take extraordinary measures for (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 77).

and Israel are cooperating on water, since analysis through this theory will provide insight into the way water security is being framed and perceived by both governments and thus how extraordinary measures are being justified.

The Copenhagen School mainly concentrates on the middle levels (where the referent object often is the state) of securitization in which egoistical political actors primarily construct their securitizations against each other (Buzan and Wæver 2009, 254). However, some threats can be dealt with by different states simultaneously. When two states' securitizing goals are dependent on each other, states can securitize together. This thesis makes (to its knowledge) an original contribution to securitization theory by the introduction of mutual securitization. Mutual securitization shows how actors, even those who have antagonistic attitudes towards each other, can securitize jointly for different interest.

The Copenhagen School focuses on actors who securitize *against* each other, while this thesis argues that actors can also securitize *together*. Mutual securitization is appropriate to this case study because through Israeli and Jordanian cooperation, both attempt to securitize for their own reasons. For successful securitization, they are dependent on each other. Jordan wants to securitize water, whereas Israel wants to become more sustainable and wants to securitize its national security by the stabilization of Jordan. To understand Israeli and Jordanian securitization processes and goals, the water discourse of the respective governments needs to be analyzed.

Primary sources

To analyze the water discourse at the government level in Israel and Jordan, primary sources of both countries must be examined. In this manner, the securitizing processes are revealed since government documents contain information on how water is being framed and what the proposed solutions are.

In Jordan, three national water plans of the main securitizing actor, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI), have been published. The publications date from 1998, 2008, and 2016. These documents contain the official water discourse of the Jordanian government. Therefore, the framing of the causes of the water issue and the proposed solutions are securitizing moves. Through the specific discourse, MWI attempts to justify its measures. The 1998 strategy followed relatively short after the 1994 peace treaty and is

therefore interesting for the analysis of improvements. The 2008 strategy is prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, which ensures for a useful comparison with the 2016 strategy, that being after the crisis. The comparison of the two strategies shows an increased level of urgency for the securitization of the water sector due to the increased population.

In Israel, also three government strategies are analyzed. The first document (2002) is from the Parliamentary Investigation Committee of the Water Sector (PCI). At the time, PCI was the main securitizing actor. The document is a crisis report, assigned to determine who is responsible for the water crisis and to recommend urgent measures. The second document (2011) is the long-term master plan by the main securitizing actor at the time, the Israeli Water Authority (IWA). It is the first long term national master plan for the water sector that has been approved and adopted. It identifies the causes, measures taken, and recommendations for further action. The last document (2018) is composed by a representative of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. The document focuses on the key issues of the water sector and is thus relevant for analysis through securitization theory. Throughout the three Israeli reports, the language used becomes increasingly less urgent, indicating that water is increasingly securitized.

Structure

In the chapter hereafter, the causes for the antagonistic and the friendly attitudes between Israel and Jordan are examined. Political reasons for their agreement to the 1994 peace treaty are discussed. In the second chapter, the value of water to Israel and the water narratives constructed by both countries until 1994 are analyzed. It shows that in Israel, throughout the years, water became less of a security goal, while the stabilization of Jordan became a higher security goal. This change in value resulted in Israeli participation in the treaty. The analysis of both government's water plans through securitization theory is conducted in the last chapter. It examines the change in discourse at the government level, justifying cooperation between the countries. The conclusion states that both countries attempt at mutual securitization, although they have different securitizing goals.

CHAPTER ONE

JORDAN AND ISRAEL: THE FRIENDLIEST OF ENEMIES

Despite the wars fought between Jordan and Israel, their mutual hostility, and many threatening proclamations by both country's leaders, the history of the two nations is in many ways similar. Both Jordan and Israel adopted a moderate pro-Western policy, fought against the national Palestinian movement, and opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank. Thereafter, both fought against Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorism (Yitzhak 2017, 559).

However, both have also had their differences. These differences concern the fate of the Palestinians and the function of Jerusalem and the West Bank. Jordan is concerned about the Palestinian fate since half of its population is from Palestinian descent and because Jordan needs to take Palestinian interests in account to remain connected with the Arab world. On the other hand, Israel believes the Palestinians "reside" on Israeli lands and limits their liberties in the West Bank. Concerning Jerusalem, Israel wishes to solely rule over the city and appoint the city as its capital, whereas Jordan wants Jerusalem to be partly Arab due to religious motivations.

Jordan and Israel have stood beside each other, as well as opposed each other at war. This first chapter discusses the relevant background information for understanding both the antagonistic and the friendly attitudes that arose between Israel and Jordan.

Early relations

In the Ottoman Empire, Jordan and Israel shared the same lands, which came with similar interests in the area: the establishment of a Jewish state on the one hand, and the establishment of an Arab Empire on the other. From the early 1920s, the Zionist leadership⁷ and the Hashemite Dynasty⁸ realized their future survival depended on each other. To gain legitimacy, the Jews had to get along with the local Arab population and the neighboring

⁷ Here referred to as Zionists, meaning a believer in the establishment of a Jewish state. In 1948 the State of Israel was established, and thus from then onwards referred to as Israel.

⁸ In 1921 the Emirate of Transjordan was established. Emir Abdullah, from the Hashemite Dynasty, ruled during this British protectorate. In 1946, the country became known as the Hashemite Kingdom of the Transjordan, with Abdullah as their King. Since 1949, the nation is recognized as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Medzini 2017, 407). When this thesis mentions Jordan, it refers to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Arab countries – which Jordan could help with – and Jordan wished to create an Arab Empire – which the Zionists could hinder. Both promised to not get in each other’s way (Medzini 2019, 407-8). Soon, they found reason to cooperate. The national Palestinian movement, created in the early 1920s, wished to establish an independent Palestinian state. This threatened the Zionists but also Jordan. The Zionist movement aspired to create a state in the same area. Jordan, on the other hand, intended to annex Palestine to Transjordan. This shared interest resulted in political cooperation with the goal to hinder Palestinian ambition. In the 1930s, this cooperation evolved into intelligence connections. Zionists provided Emir Abdullah with intelligence about Palestinians, and in exchange, the Emir gave Zionists information on the Arab world (Yitzhak 2017, 560). As the countries grew closer, it was assumed that Jordan would not join the Arab military preparations to fight the Jews once the British withdrew from Palestine⁹ (Medzini 2019, 409). However, the King had trouble balancing its relationship with Israel and the Arab world. Soon, Jordan realized it was unable to support both sides.

The 1948 War

Contrary to expectations that Jordan would not participate in an attack on the Jewish state, the Arab Legion, the army of Transjordan, was involved in many attacks on Jewish convoys. Many Jordanians disagreed with the engagement with the Jews, and thus King Abdullah felt he had to side with the Arab front against the future Jewish State. He allowed his Legion to help Palestinians attack Jewish settlements and convoys. Refugees from Palestine began to assemble to the West Bank. Abdullah was being pressured to help the refugees fight Jewish attacks. Israel and Jordan attempted to resolve the conflict politically: Jordan suggested that the Jews delayed their declaration of independence and agree to become an autonomous part of his Kingdom with representation in its Parliament. The Jews rejected the proposal, resulting in the declaration of war (Medzini 2019, 409-10).

During the war, Jordan engaged in attacks that led to the collapse of Jewish settlements and managed to capture the Old City of Jerusalem, the West Bank¹⁰, and the

⁹ Israel, Jordan, and Palestine were under a British Mandate since the early 1920s. Jordan gained independence in 1946, the Jews in 1948, and the British withdrew Palestine in 1948 (Britannica n.d.).

¹⁰ Some historians believe the Arab side was not united behind the aim of the destruction of Israel. In *Collusion across the Jordan*, Avi Shlaim holds the central thesis that there was an unwritten agreement between King

international airport. Israeli attempts to regain Jerusalem failed, resulting in many casualties. Consequently, Israel was forced to accept a UN-imposed 30 days truce. This allowed Israel to prepare for the continuation of the war. Israel went on an offensive which drove the Arab Legion from the previously mentioned areas, except from Jerusalem and the major cities of the West Bank. The conflict forced hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees¹¹ to the West and East Bank, increasing the number of refugees under Jordanian control drastically (Medzini 2019, 410-11).

In September 1948, Israeli and Jordanian officials resumed contact, and signed an agreement, promising not to fight in the divided city of Jerusalem, ending the hostilities between the two countries (Medzini 2019, 411).

A five-decade balancing act between Israel and the Arab world

The improved relationship between Jordan and Israel was received with increasing disapproval by the Arab world. In 1949, Jordan signed an armistice agreement with Israel (Barari 2014, 31). However, Jordan soon hesitated, fearing Arab reaction and expulsion from the Arab League. Abdullah expected that any concession from his part would result in serious domestic opposition, and thus ended talks with the Israelis (Barari 2014, 31-32; Medzini 2019, 411-12).

The assassination of King Abdullah in 1951 marked a turning point in the Israeli-Jordanian relationship (Barari 2014, 32). Both countries wanted to reach a new agreement that would keep the border areas quiet but failed. In the next seven years, many border incidents occurred, caused by infiltration of Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel, resulting in aggressive Israeli response (Medzini 2019, 412).

King Hussein, Abdullah's successor, realized the territorial integrity of Jordan and his survival depended on good relations with Israel (Medzini 2019, 412). Israel also had interest in ensuring the Kingdom's borders and sovereignty. For one, the Kingdom served as a buffer zone preventing the spread of nationalism from Iraq; second, it stopped the spread from

Abdullah and Jewish representative Golda Meir whereby both sides agreed to the partition of Palestine and the annexation by King Abdullah of the areas designed for Palestinians in the partition plan (Barari 2014, 27).

¹¹ The flight of 750,000 Palestinian refugees in 1948 is also known as the *Nakba*, or "catastrophe" (Ibish 2018). However, whether the Zionists forced the Palestinian to leave is hotly debated. This side argues that there was no Zionist master plan to expel the Arabs from Palestine, arguing the Arabs were leaving to move out of harm's way (Morris 2005).

Nasserism, an Arab nationalist ideology, through the Middle East (Yitzhak 2017, 562). By then, President Nasser of Egypt was the common enemy. Thus, shared interests made the countries grow closer together, leading to secret meetings between Hussein and Israelis (Medzini 2019, 412).

The rise of PLO changed these new developments between Israel and Jordan since the latter was forced to make many strategic decisions. In 1964, PLO began to launch attacks against Israel. In response, Israel had to take a more active counterapproach. When Israel launched an attack against Jordan in 1966, Hussein sided with the rest of the Arab world. He feared to become isolated from the Arab world and to consequently lose his throne. Rising tensions led to the pre-emptive strike on Egypt by Israel, resulting in the Six-Day War. Israel warned Jordan would be unharmed if it were to stay out of conflict, but Hussein ignored this and launched an attack on Jerusalem and other Israeli cities. This resulted in aggressive Israeli response, attacking the Jordan air force and its bases. Within 48 hours, Israel succeeded in capturing the entire West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem with its holy sites. On the third day of war, Jordan asked for a cease fire and two days later, Syria and Egypt did, resulting in the end of the short yet intensive war (Medzini 2019, 412-13).

A month after the war, Hussein renewed contact with Israel. Their talks concerned the future of the conquered West Bank. Jordan demanded the return of all occupied areas, in exchange for political settlement, but Israel refused. To Israel, Jerusalem was important for religious reasons, and the West Bank for security reasons (Yitzhak 2017, 563-64). However, Israel was faced with a dilemma: if it annexed the entire West Bank, then most of the population would gain political and civic rights whilst being Arab. This could endanger the Jewish character of Israel. As a solution, Israel continued its occupation and began to establish Jewish settlements. A new co-existence was created in the West Bank: Jordan looked after civilian affairs while Israel was responsible for law and order and the prevention of growing acts of terror by the Palestinian population (Medzini 2019, 414).

After the Six-Day War, there was a growing Palestinian nationalism and an increase in anti-Israel terror, leading to closer ties between Israel and Jordan. Since Jordan was continuing negotiations with Israel, Jordan was also a target, mostly of the Syrians, and the Palestinian radical nationalist organizations felt they had to overthrow the monarchy and replace it by a Palestinian State (Medzini 2019, 415). Israel was worried about Jordan and

decided to support the Hashemite regime. Owing it to Israel, Jordan remained undamaged since Israel sent planes over Syrian units to help the Jordanian army withstand them from Jordanian territory (Yitzhak 2017, 564).

Since the 1970s, Jordan and Israel held many high-level meetings. Affairs involving the Jordan River, prevention of Palestinian terror acts, permission for Israeli Arabs to travel via Jordan to Mecca, pest and flood control, and other common issues were agreed upon. Despite the absence of a formal agreement, the relations between the two countries were described as excellent ties between friendly enemy countries. Partaking in two conflicting causes, Jordan had to balance its choices to lose support of neither side. Therefore, it chose to not actively participate in the 1973 Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel. However, Hussein was forced to send an army. He gave Israel notice about his plan, and hence Israeli-Jordanian relations remained unharmed (Medzini 2019, 415-16).

After the 1973 War, the balance of power in the Middle East changed. PLO gained legitimacy and received official recognition as the only representative of the Palestinian people (Yitzhak 2017, 564). Israel and Jordan made various local arrangements along the border that would enable them to co-exist peacefully. In 1988, Jordan decided to disengage from the West Bank. Its priority now was to ensure that the uprisings would not spread to the East Bank. Secretly Israel and Jordan were collaborating to make sure the borders were safe (Medzini 2019, 416-17).

During the Kuwait Crisis (1990-1991), Jordan was put in an uncomfortable position again. King Hussein had to decide whether to support Saddam Hussein, backed by PLO, or the US-led coalition, including Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. King Hussein refrained from deciding, resulting in the imposition of American economic sanctions on Jordan. After the victory of the Western coalition, around 250,000 Palestinians who worked in the Arab Gulf States were expelled and had to seek refuge in Jordan, which was unable to deal with this massive inflow of people. Hence, Jordan had to seek Israeli intervention in Washington to lift the economic sanctions (Medzini 2019, 417), which Israel successfully did. This Israeli action suggests a lot about their relationship with Jordan: they want to keep Jordan as a partner and benefit from a strong Jordanian state.

The 1994 peace treaty

Political changes in the Middle East led to renewed talks between Israel and Jordan over a peace agreement. Talks in September 1993 between Israelis and Palestinians led to the mutual recognition between Israel and PLO.¹² Hussein saw an opportunity for peace with Israel, resulting in the signing of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty on 26 October 1994 (Yitzhak 2017, 567). From August until October 1994, teams of experts worked out the details of water allocation, border demarcation, and mutual security. Often, Hussein and Rabin¹³ were called in to resolve outstanding problems. On 16 October, for example, the two worked through the night and went through the draft agreement, paragraph by paragraph (Podeh 2015, 240). This dedication shows the leaders' close ties and willingness for a peace agreement.

The treaty involved various issues, such as international boundaries, water, crime and drugs, environment, interim measures, and more. In terms of border demarcation, Jordan maintained its territorial sovereignty over some disputed lands, whilst Israeli farmers were allowed to continue their work there. Interestingly, the security component of the treaty did not contain the involvement of any third party, demonstrating the amount of trust between the parties (Podeh 2015, 240).

The agreement deals extensively with water issues (Medzini 2019, 418). Israel agreed to supply Jordan with fifty million cubic meters a year (Podeh 2015, 240). Many more agreements were made: the countries agreed to their rightful allocations of the Jordan and the Yarmouk¹⁴, to ensure that management and development of their water resources do not harm the other party, to cooperate on increasing water supply, to prevent contamination, to mutual assistance in the relief of water shortages, and to share information and joint research and development in water-related subjects (OKH, n.d., Article 6).

The Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty was an opportunity that could not be missed. According to Podeh (2015), there are three variables that ensured the successful drafting of

¹² The on 13 September 1993 signed peace treaty between Israel and PLO is also known as the Oslo I Accord (Barari 2014, 45).

¹³ Yitzhak Rabin was the prime minister of Israel, from 1974-1977, and from 1992 until his assassination in 1995.

¹⁴ The rightful allocations in accordance with the agreed acceptable principles, quantities, and quality as set out in Annex II of the treaty (OKH n.d., Article 6).

the agreement. Firstly, both Hussein and Rabin enjoyed substantial political and public support. Hussein ruled since 1953, was an experienced, trustworthy, and charismatic leader in the eyes of his people. This reputation allowed him to accept the somewhat controversial agreement. Rabin enjoyed a comfortable majority in the Knesset. This was one of the only moments that on both sides of the conflict both leaders enjoyed wide popularity and legitimacy. Secondly, both leaders were willing to take a bold step and change the course of events: they believed it was an overdue historical mission to establish Israeli-Jordanian peace. The last variable relates to the history of past interactions; ever since the 1920s the countries had a unique connection. Their mutual concern about the Palestinian problem¹⁵ and other bilateral interests always dominated when experiencing setbacks. The combination of their long mutual history and trust stimulated a quick negotiations process (Podeh 2015, 241-43).

Warm peace, cold peace, and normalization

The optimism that prevailed in Jordan after signing the treaty soon disappeared. The peace treaty failed to filter into the Jordanian population; it remained mostly a government-to-government agreement (Medzini 2019, 419). Three main reasons are widely seen as hindering the success of the warm peace model: limited peace rewards, Jordan becoming isolated from the Palestinian track, and the shift to the right in Israel (Barari 2014, 104).

The promised peace dividends were threefold. Firstly, some argued that signing the agreement would allow Jordan to regain all its claims; its right to water resources and Jordanian land, to protect the country from threats and conspiracies, and to ascertain the Kingdom's borders. Secondly, peace with Israel was a strategic option since Jordan was isolated due to its pro-Iraq position in the Gulf war. Lastly, Jordan's isolation after the Gulf war had its toll on the Jordanian economy. The government argued that the expected peace dividends would help Jordan bring in investments and create jobs. When increased economic conditions failed to take place, people started to turn against the peace treaty (Barari 2014, 103/106-7).

At the same time, the Jordanian opposition – Islamist movements, trade unions, Arab nationalists, and others – wished to undermine the treaty and normalization of

¹⁵ This is discussed on page 13 and 15-16.

relations with Israel, arguing that the new situation was removing Jordan from the Arab consensus and relieving the Palestinians of responsibility (Yitzhak 2017, 568). The opposition believed that the treaty deprived the Palestinian refugees of their right to return to their homeland. Israel believed the Jordanian-Israeli relationship could be separated from the Palestinian cause. As Israel continued to accept policies against the Palestinians, its relations with Jordan increasingly deteriorated (Barari 2014, 107-10).

The right-wing successor of Rabin prioritized domestic political considerations over the relationship with Jordan and Palestinians. Netanyahu¹⁶ focused on his political survival rather than peace making. His policies made Hussein realize that he was not a partner for peace. The relationship reached a low when in September 1997 Israel tried to assassinate Khalid Mash'al, head of the Hamas political bureau in Amman. The act was a violation of the peace treaty and Jordan's sovereignty (Barari 2014, 111-15). The right-wing Israeli policies weakened the pro-peace camp in Jordan and empowered the anti-normalization forces. Jordanians ceased to have faith in normalization (Barari 2014, 119-20).

Despite the absence of public support, the Jordanian government continued to cooperate with Israel. When the Second Intifada¹⁷ broke out, tensions arose between Jordan and Israel because of Israel's – according to Jordan – disproportionate force against the Palestinians. The Jordanian government found it hard to support the Palestinians on the one hand, and the peace treaty with Israel on the other hand. Despite Jordan's public declarations and media reports, there were secretive talks between the King and the Israeli government. The greatest threat to Jordan were the Islamic terrorists who wished to topple the Hashemite regime because of its position against Iraq, cooperation with the US, and peace with Israel (Yitzhak 2017, 569-71).

The crises that occupied the Middle East since the start of the Arab Spring (2010) and the rise in radical Islamic terrorism have strengthened political and security cooperation between Jordan and Israel. Israel and the West feared the toppling of the Hashemite regime and the replacement by an Islamic and Arab nationalist one. Consequently, Israel and Jordan took several measures to strengthen the regime. Israel increased, among other measures,

¹⁶ After winning the 1996 elections, Benjamin Netanyahu formed a right-wing governing coalition, in which seven of the eight party members rejected the Oslo agreement (Barari 2014, 112).

¹⁷ The Second Intifada is the Palestinian uprising against Israel from 28 September 2000 until approximately 2005, but the end-date is debatable. In this armed conflict, more than 3,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis were killed (El-Haroun, Farrell, and Ayyub 2020).

its economic aid to Jordan and the amount of water it provides to increase the King's status. After the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and the rise of ISIS, military and intelligence cooperation between Israel and Jordan further increased (Yitzhak 2017, 571-74).

The increased external threats led to closer bonds between the countries. From 2014 onwards, in exchange for Israel's years of willingness to defend the Hashemite regime, the Jordanians took several steps towards normalization (Yitzhak 2017, 574). Security cooperation continues to be a hallmark in the ties between Israel and Jordan. But the warmth that existed between Hussein and Rabin is absent. There have been no cultural ties or exchanges due to the opposition of Jordan's intellectual, media, and academic elite (Medzini 2019, 419). However, the Jordanian government is stimulating the normalization process and hopes to legitimize it in the eyes of the Jordanian people (Yitzhak 2017, 575).

Conclusion

Jordan has always found itself in the middle of two sides: Israel on the one hand and the Arab world on the other. Often, these two sides were irreconcilable, forcing Jordan to side. Having to choose the Arab-side led to the involvement of Jordan in the 1948 war, the Six-Day war, and the 1973 war. Due to Israeli policy against the Palestinians, siding with Israel resulted in Arab disapproval and public discontent. However, neither Jordan nor Israel ever wanted to get hostile with one another. Both have geopolitical reasons to cooperate with each other, facing similar threats from PLO and extremists. To Israel, Jordan is a buffer zone against radical Islam and ISIS. For Jordan, cooperation with Israel comes with US aid.

Peace between Israel and Jordan started off warm but soon became cold peace. Since the 2000s, external threats increased, leading to closer bonds between the countries. The relations have never become as warm as they had been between Hussein and Rabin, but security cooperation remains meaningful. Government-to-government relations are relatively good, but Jordan as a whole remains hostile towards Israel (Yitzhak 2017, 568).

CHAPTER TWO

THE PREVAILING WATER NARRATIVES

The previous chapter analyzed the political relations between Israel and Jordan that were necessary for understanding the attitudes towards each other. However, the chapter omitted the water component which will be elaborated on in this chapter. Water plays a major role in the relations between the countries, providing ground for early cooperation.

Due to the Six-Day War, there is a major difference in the amount of water resources each country controls. These differences have partially determined the power relations between Jordan and Israel. Israel is the hydro-hegemon in the region, resulting in Jordanian dependency on Israel. This chapter examines what, if anything, changed in the water narratives in Israel and Jordan, and how these changes contribute to the drafting of the 1994 peace treaty. The water narratives are important because these show how water is perceived, valued, and framed in both countries, and hence justify cooperation in the case of Jordan and Israel. First, the role of water between Jordan and Israel is discussed. Thereafter, a discussion of the ideological, economic, and strategic value of water in Israel follows. Next, the water narratives prevalent in both countries leading up to the peace treaty are examined.

This chapter shows that the changing value of water to Israel has contributed to the higher ranking of normalization with Jordan on the security agenda. In Jordan, the urgency of the water scarcity narrative has led to closer cooperation with Israel.

The role of water

From early onwards, water has an important role in the relations between the two countries. At the heart of the water dispute between Israel and Jordan is the Jordan River and its drainage basin since both withdraw large percentages of their water from it. The sources of the upper Jordan River are three major springs. One of these, the Hasbani, has its source in Lebanon, while the Dan has its source in Israel and the Banias has its source in the Israeli-occupied Golan-Heights. These three springs unite inside Israel and flow south into Lake Tiberias/Kinneret before continuing towards the Dead Sea. Around 10 km south of Lake Tiberias/Kinneret the Jordan is joined by the Yarmouk, which is the main water source for Jordan (See Figure 1 below). Sharing the river is not the only problem, another issue is

that the quantity of water in the Jordan is declining because more water is withdrawn from it than is renewed. This is particularly critical in years of drought: the decline in flow threatens the quality of the water. Thus, the water issue is not merely one of quantity but also one of quality (Jägerskog 2003, 69-72).

Figure 1. The Jordan River Basin, 2005



Source: UNDP/Green Cross

After 1948, governments in the region announced unilateral projects for the exploitation of the Jordan River Basin, leading to a series of conflicts. Consequently, the US responded, who argued that a settlement of the water disputes had to be included for

durable peace in the Middle East. It therefore sent Eric Johnston¹⁸ to the region in 1953 to encourage cooperation over water resources. However, the agreement failed because the political circumstances were not favorable during the time. The Arab states refused to sign the agreement because it would imply their recognition of Israel. Nevertheless, there was a positive outcome of the Johnston Plan. Namely, Israel and Jordan initiated regular meetings – the so-called picnic table talks – to discuss allocations and other water-related issues. These efforts promoted an implied agreement between them; both complied with the allocations determined by Johnston, and both respected their water development plans. This was not least due to the US' provision of funding for the plans if Israel and Jordan were to accept each other's plans and allocations (Jägerskog 2003, 83-84).¹⁹

Other Arab states disagreed with Israeli plans and decided to interfere. From 1955 to 1964, the Arab states attempted to stop this development by military means. Thereafter, they realized they could not stop the plans by military force (Jägerskog 2003, 84-85). In 1964 Nasser called for an Arab Summit to discuss the matter. The states agreed to the Arab Diversion Project, which would divert portions of the Baniyas, Hasbani, and Yarmouk (Haddadin 2006, 248). These efforts aggravated military response from Israel, who attacked the structures various times, effectively stopping construction. These incidents are often seen as a prelude to the 1967 war; some argue that they were part of the chain of events leading up to the war. However, it would be false to perceive these water-related incidents as the direct cause (Jägerskog 2003, 85).

After the 1967 war, Israel controlled more water resources, resulting in the hydro-hegemonic position. Before the war, Israel controlled 25 percent of the flow into the Jordan Basin, compared to 42 percent after the war. Including the control over the West Bank aquifers, Israel was now in charge of over 80 percent of the surface and the groundwater resources it uses (Jägerskog 2003, 85).

In 1969, tensions rose between Israel and Jordan because the former believed the latter to have overutilized the East Ghor Canal. Consequently, Israel bombed the canal.

¹⁸ Eric Johnston was the personal representative of President Eisenhower with the rank of ambassador for a mission to the Middle East. He was a talented negotiator and perceived as unbiased in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Sosland 2007, 37).

¹⁹ For the US, political stability in the Middle East was crucial because of its oil interests and its struggle with the Soviet Union. Its strategy was to provide foreign aid, which could play an important role in the resettlement of Palestinians and the economic development of all states in the region (Sosland 2007, 37).

Overutilization was not the only reason; it was also as a punishment for providing a haven for PLO. Secret negotiations between Israel and Jordan, with the US as facilitator, ensured Israel from not attacking the canal again and ensured Jordan to stop the activities of PLO in its territory (Jägerskog 2003, 86).

Official negotiations over the peace treaty started in 1991. Several informal processes predated the peace talks. In 1979, Jordan removed a sandbank in the Yarmouk that obstructed water diversion into the Jordan supply system, leading to disputes between Jordan and Israel. To calm both parties, the UN set up regular meetings between both countries to discuss the division of water (The Hague Institute 2017, 48). These meetings resulted in feelings of mutual respect and contributed to Israel's understanding of the difficulties Jordan was facing in water supply (Haddadin 2014, 252/255). The informal meetings contributed to the building of trust between both parties, already a decade before the start of the peace negotiations.

As demonstrated, water has been a source of conflict as well as one of partnership. Both respected the Johnston allocations and were involved in secret meetings on water, showing that early on Jordan and Israel already moderately cooperated on water despite their political differences. Israel's actions regarding the safeguarding of their water resources are explained through the value it attaches to water, the topic of the next section.

Agriculture and Zionism

To understand the Israeli water narratives and the measures taken, it is crucial to understand the role water and agriculture have in Zionism. Attitudes towards agriculture considerably affect the scarcity and the related policies the Israeli government has introduced. To Zionists, agriculture promotes self-sufficiency, ensures the absorption of immigrants, and protects the borders. Hence, agriculture has always been the driving force behind the need to secure water resources (Morag 2001, 182).

Water was essential to develop Israel's agricultural enterprises which, ideologically and economically, were of crucial importance in the pre-state and early-state period (Morag 2001, 179). Agriculture is associated with a broad set of moral, ideological, and social ideas. Since the start of the Zionist settlement in the 19th century, the Zionist movement considers land transformation into a means of production to be the indicator of its success realizing its goal – a deeply rooted Jewish settlement in the country. Failure to flourish in agriculture

would be interpreted as the new settler's incompetence to adjust to the region (Kartin 2001, 277). Besides ideological importance, agriculture and water hold great economic and security value in Israel. The achievement of self-sufficiency in agriculture was considered crucial because Israel's leaders feared that the military situation might lead to Arab blockade of the country, denying Israel's access to goods. Furthermore, the agricultural sector was perceived as the ideal environment to absorb many immigrants and introduce them with the agrarian values of the early Zionists. Without access to water, there would be no large-scale agriculture and thus no economic basis for absorbing Jews in Palestine. Without settlement, the Jews would be unable to change the demographic balance in their favor and therefore unable to claim sovereignty over Palestine (Morag 2001, 182-84). The acknowledgement of the Israeli government of the special role agriculture has in Israeli society and security is perfectly illustrated in a speech from the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Moshe Sharett (1953): *"Without agriculture [there] shall not be a people rooted in the land, secure in its existence, stable in its character"* (Jewish Virtual Library 1953).

Many social and political groups look upon agricultural settlement as one of the forces of national security. The mission of these settlements is to defend the inner territory of the state; hence water resources are the main element for success of this mission (Kartin 2001, 277-78). The perception of agriculture as a function of national security, already at the end of the 20th century, becomes apparent in a report of the agricultural planning and development authority: *"The rural and agricultural sector in Israel executes a national and social responsibility in dispersing population, populating frontier regions, protecting national land and persevering open areas"* (Kartin 2001, 278).

The foundational concept of Zionism is that they made the desert bloom (Zeitoun et al. 2013, 309). Making the Negev, the desert in the south of Israel, "bloom", would prove their competence in rehabilitating nature. Thus, the Negev became a symbol for the strength of the Jewish nation. However, the Negev also had strategic value as a defense mechanism. Greening the desert brought new immigrants, which was desirable since an empty desert posed a security threat to Israel (Alatout 2008, 973). Having a wet north and an arid south, Israel had to think of a solution: the construction of the National Water Carrier (NWC). This project began construction in 1953 and finalized in 1964, carrying water from the north to the center and south (Menahem 1998, 294). The Knesset recognizes the

goal of the water planners during these years: *“to find and bring about maximal exploitation of the water resources in the country and convey hundreds of millions of cubic meters of water annually from the Sea of Galilee Southwards, in order to enable mass settlement in the Negev”* (PCI 2002, 40). Motivation for the project *“was not planned on the basis of economic criteria, but on the basis of the Zionist ideology of settling the Negev and making the desert bloom”* (PCI 2002, 40-41).

Thus, the connection between agriculture and Zionism shows the ideological, economic, and defensive role water holds in the country. Due to agriculture, Israel attaches great significance to its water resources. This influenced the narrative Israel has created around water, thereby justifying its measures during the 20th century.

Israeli water narratives

Since the early 1950s, water scarcity has been the dominant narrative on the environmental conditions of the Middle East. Contrary to common beliefs, the prevailing narrative of water resources before 1948, especially among Zionist practitioners, was one of abundance. The narrative that there were plenty water resources in the country was dominant, even though they had not been discovered yet. However, the abundance discourse attracted many immigrants to the region. This narrative is not widely known, showing the success of the later developed scarcity narrative; it erased even the possibility of imagining water resources any other way (Alatout 2009, 363/365). It also demonstrates the politicization of water and how narratives are easily constructed by political actors.

Around the mid-1930s the question of Palestine’s water potential became important for larger political issues, such as immigration policies (Alatout 2009, 372). Water became an important gauge for managing how many Jewish immigrants Palestine could absorb²⁰, meaning that more available water resources would allow Zionist experts to argue that Jewish immigration would not present an economic threat to Palestinians. This led to different and often contradictory assessments of water availability. Mandate experts argued that Palestine’s water resources were small, whereas Zionist experts stressed the abundance of Palestine’s untapped water resources, framing it as a problem of accessibility to water resources that had not been discovered yet (Alatout 2009, 960; Alatout 2009, 374-

²⁰ Also known as the absorptive capacity of Palestine.

75; Menahem 1998, 294). Abundance was not necessarily a fact, nor was it a foregone conclusion: it was carefully constructed (Alatout 2008, 960). The prevailing Zionist water abundance narrative legitimized opening Palestine to unlimited immigration, and it increasingly turned Palestine into an exclusive Jewish national home (Alatout 2009, 383).

The water abundance narrative did not last. Two reasons caused the shift from abundance to scarcity in the mid-1950s. Firstly, there was a growing ambition for a strong centralized state at the government level. Israel had now attracted many immigrants, but the state was still governed regionally. In the abundance narrative, there was no necessity for centralizing the water sector. The municipality, the city, or the region had their own water resources and hence could decide upon their own water policies. The framing of water as scarce justified the centralization of water management, and other issues, as more efficient. The scarcity narrative and the corresponding changes in favor of a centralized state altered the Jewish identity from an immigrant settler to a citizen of the modern nation-state (Alatout 2008, 961). The second reason for the emergence of the scarcity narrative is due to the increase in violence in the regional competition over water resources after 1950. The water potential of each state became a regional issue that would regulate that state's share of the Jordan. "*The greater Israel's water potential, [...] the less the Israeli share of the Jordan River would be*" (Alatout 2008, 971). Thus, Israel had reason to undervalue their water resources.

The hydraulic mission of the early state period (1948-1964) was to develop all available water resources and transport them to where necessary for agricultural and settlement purposes. This mission was driven by a nation-building agenda, and thus the developing projects were not subject to strict economic criteria (Feitelson 2013, 18), as demonstrated by the project of NWC. The construction of NWC and the refusal to refrain from construction can be seen as a securitizing move. The survival of Israel was presented as constantly at risk. This legitimized extraordinary measures and left no alternative but to build for Israel's survival (Schäfer 2013, 92). Development of water supply systems was presented as crucial for settlement and agricultural purposes, which were framed as national security and as an ideologically preferred way of life (Feitelson 2002, 301).

By 1965 most of the freshwater sources were fully utilized. Seawater desalination was considered but rejected due to its cost relative to the marginal value product of water in Israel at the time. This marked a transitional period: for the first time economic

considerations prevented the construction of a major water development project (Feitelson 2002, 301). From this point onwards, the policy emphasis shifted to the management of existing resources (Feitelson 2013, 19). Agriculture increasingly came to be perceived as a relatively minor economic sector, which should be evaluated on an economic basis (Feitelson 2002, 303). Israel came to realize it could not assure food self-sufficiency, and thus the agricultural policy shifted to a market-based agriculture (Feitelson 2013, 22-23). An additional development resulted from the Six-Day War: Israel gained control over most of the contested water sources, and thereby faded the perceived external threat to Israel's water supply, resulting in the near removal of water from the public agenda. Another consequence of the Six-Day War is the shift in focus to the newly occupied territories. The mountainous West Bank could not sustain new agricultural settlements, thus the new territories focused on suburban and exurban housing. As a result, the direct link between agricultural development and geopolitical goals was weakened, and with that the linkage between water and national security issues also declined (Feitelson 2002, 302-5).

This section illustrates the ability of Israel to frame the water narrative to fit their political goals. Water is not inherently political but can be made so by political actors who frame it as such. Scarcity increasingly evolved into a topic in need for political action, resulting in major water projects such as NWC. With the newly occupied territories after the Six-Day War, the external threat to Israel's water supply declined. Water disappeared almost entirely from the public agenda; water ceased to be linked to national security.

Jordanian narratives

The public discourse of water shortage in Jordan is an issue that dates to the 1970s (MWI 2004, S-1). The Six-Day War can be considered as the main event that contributed to the development of this discourse. However, the deeper roots of the discourse are found in 1948, the year of Israeli independence (Hussein 2016, 88). This is illustrated by former Jordanian Prime Minister Abdul Salam Majali during the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli negotiations: *"Israel has been behind Jordan's water agony. In 1946, the per capita water share of renewable resources was comfortable indicating a surplus in the population-water resources equation. That surplus abruptly diminished shortly afterwards with the arrival of the first wave of Palestinian refugees in 1948, and was eroded shortly after"* (Haddadin 2012, 500). Since the 1948 war, Jordan has tried to expand its control over water resources to provide

for its growing population and to support economic growth in the country. This shows through the first bilateral agreement over water resources with Syria in 1953, and Jordan's involvement with the Johnston Plan (Hussein 2016, 88). A national security perspective strongly influenced Jordan to collaborate with the Plan. Israel was constructed as a threat and as a competitor for water resources. Describing Israel as 'the enemy' demonstrates that Israel was framed as an existential threat to survival which had to be contained (Schäfer 2013, 93), leading to Jordan's agreement with the Johnston Plan.

However, the early water scarcity narrative was only known at the government level; it became a public discourse in the early 1970s. After the Six-Day War, Jordan lost Jerusalem and the West Bank, causing more Palestinian refugees to enter Jordan. This wave of refugees was different from 1948 because then, the Palestinian refugees went to the West Bank. As Jordanians lived in the East Bank, this did not have a major social impact on Jordanian perceptions. After the Six-Day War, Palestinian refugees left the West Bank and entered the East Bank. Consequently, food and water became scarcer in the region. Furthermore, Palestinians brought memories and stories about their perceptions of Israelis and the war with them. These narrations and experiences promoted the scarcity narrative among the public (Hussein 2016, 88-89).

After the Six-Day War, the Jordanian government continued to construct a water scarcity narrative, which justified the hydraulic mission of the state. During these years, many dams and water infrastructures were constructed. The scarcity narrative was fundamental for justifying these policies. After the droughts in 1975-1978, the government decided to transfer part of the water from the Jordan Valley to Amman because of the shortages due to population growth. This shows that in the 1970s the discourse of water scarcity was already public (Hussein 2016, 89).

In the Jordanian discourse the cause of water scarcity lies with the creation of Israel. The competing water and development plans in the years after, as well as the increase of refugees, are considered consequences of the main cause: Israel (Hussein 2016, 89). This is illustrated by Munther Haddadin²¹. In Jordan's statement on water during the 1994 peace negotiations he argues the negotiations should *"identify the heavy tolls that Jordan has been paying because of unilateral planning and use by Israel of the shared water resources;*

²¹ Munther Haddadin was a member of the delegation to the Bilateral Peace Negotiations (1991-1995), in which he led the team negotiating water, energy, and the environment (Haddadin 2012, xviii).

tolls that have burdened Jordan with adverse economic, social, and environmental impacts” (Haddadin 2012, 494-95). He continues and *“hope[s] to point out that Israel’s efforts to alleviate its water shortage have been at the expense of water stressed Jordan”* (Haddadin 2012, 495). Accordingly, in the Jordanian water discourse Jordan blames Israel for its scarcity. The 1994 peace treaty should return Jordan its rightful share of the Jordan.

Road to the 1994 peace treaty

Out of a position of power, Israel was willing to make concessions. Water ceased to be a national security issue to Israel, and became a second-order goal, essential for economic success (Schäfer 2013, 95). Now, a higher security goal was stabilizing its relationship with Jordan.

At the time in Jordan, the monarchy was highly criticized due to its decision not to take a side in the Kuwait Crisis.²² As a result, Jordan was internationally isolated and in enormous economic decline. To ensure economic development, Jordan was in the need of new international funds (Schäfer 2013, 95). Maintaining good relations with Israel is of interest to Jordan, as it comes with significant financial support from the US (The Hague Institute 2017, 53). To improve its international standing and to legitimize the monarchy through economic well-being, the peace treaty with Israel was signed. This changed the perception of threats in Jordan. Israel was not considered an enemy anymore as Jordan started to focus on threats to inner stability (Schäfer 2013, 96). The importance of water is stressed by a former Jordanian minister of the MFA, *“water was among the five key issues negotiated in 1994 as it is one strategic sector, as important as the other four. [...] Water is a matter of life or death, and this pushed the Jordanian negotiators towards concluding the peace treaty with Israel”* (Hussein 2016, 186). Thus, the 1994 peace treaty is perceived mainly as a solution to water scarcity in Jordan. Because of the urgency of the scarcity discourse, the Jordanian parliament voted in favor of the treaty. In Jordan, the understanding is present that *“this is a water problem, not a political issue”* (Hussein 2016, 187/89).

²² During the Kuwait Crisis (1990-91), Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait. This move was supported by PLO but opposed by a US-led coalition including Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Refraining from taking a side, King Hussein lost the sympathy of the US and neighboring Arab countries (Medzini 2019, 417).

Before the peace treaty, in Jordan, a disruption of the water supply was considered a threat to national security, strictly connected to the enemy Israel. The treaty created reliability for both parties and consequently the issue of water supply became a lower security threat. While water cooperation between Jordan and Israel has a long history, Jordan signed the peace treaty from a position of weakness to gain the necessary means for national security (Schäfer 2013, 96). For Jordan, cooperation with Israel is the only option to solve the water problem as their domestic water resources are insufficient to ensure a reliable supply (The Hague Institute 2017, 53). The framing of the water scarcity discourse gave opportunity for closer water cooperation with the Israeli government. For the Israeli government the normalization of the relations with Jordan was the main goal (Hussein 2016, 185-86).

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to answer the research question: what changed, if anything, in the water narratives in Israel and Jordan, and how did this contribute to the drafting of the 1994 peace treaty? As discussed, water has had a prominent role in Israeli society. Zionism and agriculture are ideologically connected. Moreover, agriculture ensured the inflow of immigrants and hence security. Thus, to Israel water and national security are interlinked. The development of the Israeli water narrative from abundant, to scarce, to the removal from the public agenda, contributed to a more favorable political environment for cooperation over water resources since the perception dominated that water could not harm national security anymore. In Jordan, the water narrative did not change; it has been one of scarcity since the 1970s. The changes in the Israeli narrative and the scarcity narrative in Jordan allowed for the drafting of the 1994 peace treaty. This is due to different related elements of the broader socio-political-economic context like Israeli interests about the Jordanian political stability, the Jordanian economic development goals, and the issue of water scarcity (Hussein 2016, 190). Jordan ceased to perceive Israel as the enemy, and out of desperate need for water and economic development Jordan agreed to the peace treaty.

In the next chapter, the Israeli and Jordanian national water plans since the peace treaty are analyzed through securitization theory. The chapter shows to what extent water is securitized in both countries and how they attempt to securitize for their own reasons through collaborative projects.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SECURITIZATION OF THE WATER SECTOR

The previous chapter examines how the politization of water between Jordan and Israel came about. This chapter analyzes how Jordan and Israel have attempted to securitize their water issues after 1994 through their own national water plans and through cooperation between them. Of both countries, three governmental documents are analyzed according to what the perceived issue is, proposed solutions, and how it is being framed. The framing – the attempts at securitization – in both documents contribute to the possibility for cooperation between both governments. The Red-Dead Canal and the more recent Water-for-Energy Deal are such examples. The Red-Dead Canal was a planned cooperative project between Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, to stabilize the Dead Sea and ensure potable water through a desalination plant in Aqaba (EcoPeace n.d.). After years of delays, Jordan decided to abandon the project in 2021 (Staff 2021). The recent Water-for-Energy Deal enables Israel and Jordan to interchange water and energy.²³ These projects demonstrate the possibility for the countries to securitize together whilst having different objectives.

Water as a national security issue

In the past two decades, Israel and Jordan have encountered severe droughts. This experience has intensified the water securitization discourse by states and international organizations (Weinthal, Zawahri, and Sowers 2015, 296). The securitization of the water discourse between Jordan and Israel can be characterized as tactical securitization. This type of securitization takes place when issues of low politics, such as water, are linked with the high politics issues of national survival. A perfect example is the 1994 peace treaty, in which water is connected to the avoidance of threats and the use of force between the two parties. Linking resource scarcity and high-profile issues like security is believed to increase public awareness, importance, and urgency in mobilizing resources and funds (Fischhendler 2015, 247-48). Coiners of securitization theory, Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) argue that *“The environment ... sets the conditions for sociopolitical-economic life. When these conditions are poor, life is poor”* (Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde 1998, 84).

²³ The Water-for-Energy deal is mentioned on page 5.

Thus, the environmental sector has spill-over effects to all sectors of security: the military, economic, societal, and political. When environmental security fails, all sectors will be threatened (Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde 1998). An effective securitizing actor should acknowledge these sectorial spill-over effects and emphasize the issue harms national security. In this manner, the extraordinary measures can be legitimized to the relevant audience. The next sections analyze Jordanian and Israeli attempts at connecting water security to other sectors and hence as an issue of national security.

Water discourse in Jordan

The main securitizing actor of the water sector in Jordan is the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI). MWI is responsible for overall national leadership on policy, strategic direction, and planning (MWI 2016, 18-19). By presenting the strategies in a certain manner, MWI is “speaking security”. This institution has the power to shift the threat from normal politics to a security issue, and thereby justifying the need for extraordinary measures to counter the threat.

MWI in Jordan has published three national water strategies, in 1998, 2008, and in 2016. This thesis finds these sources appropriate since these documents are the official government discourse on water.²⁴ The discourse at the government level is relevant since this is how the proposed measures and solutions are being justified. In the analysis of these documents, the focus will be on how MWI frames water scarcity and what the perceived causes are. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, how water scarcity is being framed by securitizing actors does not have to be the objective truth. Political actors can take advantage of the discourse by focusing on specific elements. By analyzing these three strategies separately, the shift in discourse becomes visible. The shift in discourse changes the proposed solutions over time.

Hussein (2018) argues the discourse of water scarcity in Jordan consists of two narratives: water insufficiency and water mismanagement. The insufficiency narrative is constructed to highlight factors external to the responsibility of the Jordanian government as reasons for scarcity. Government actors mainly frame the issue as insufficient, which

²⁴ All three national water plans are included because the 1998 strategy is right after the peace treaty, the 2008 strategy is before the Syrian refugee crisis, and the 2016 strategy is after/during the refugee crisis. These documents thus ensure the observation in shifts in discourse due to external factors.

opens solutions on the supply and conservation sides. The sub-narratives Hussein (2018) identifies for the insufficiency narrative are population growth, unfair sharing with neighboring countries, climate change, and Jordan as an (semi-)arid region. The mismanagement narrative argues reason for scarcity is bad governance and mismanagement of the water sector. This narrative is mainly deployed by donors and international organizations. The mismanagement narrative consists of three sub-narratives: leakages and physical losses, illegal wells and illegal uses, and unsustainable agricultural water use (Hussein 2018, 385-389). Both narratives and sub-narratives are present to varying degrees in the MWI strategies. However, in all three strategies, the insufficiency narrative is dominant. As a result, solutions on the supply side are mainly considered.

The 1998 strategy

In this strategy, population growth is framed as the main driver behind scarcity, resulting in the dominance of the water insufficiency narrative. MWI states that *“the population pressure on the water resources of Jordan today had never been as intense. [...] Jordan has hosted several waves of refugees, displaced persons, and returnees as a result of the prolonged conflict in the Middle East”* (MWI 1998, 3).²⁵ MWI also attributes scarcity to the unfair sharing with neighboring countries. On the 1994 treaty MWI writes: *“the water dispute has been all but resolved. Water projects were envisaged, and their implementation will slightly relieve the population-resources imbalance. Still, the hoped-for economic development boom has not been initiated”* (MWI 1998, 3). This shows the discontent about the treaty and the little improvement it has created. By emphasizing repeatedly that the *“rightful shares of the Kingdom shall be defended and protected”* (MWI 1998, 6), MWI blames other countries and thus external factors.

The water mismanagement narrative is also somewhat present in the strategy. The document argues that abrupt increases in population have led to the over abstraction of groundwater aquifers and illegal drilling operations, on which MWI will increase its controls. MWI also recognizes the water losses due to leakages and breaks and will establish programs for water resource conservation (MWI 1998). Also, they recognize there is a need

²⁵ Consequently, *“water use already exceeds the renewable freshwater resources by more than 20%”* (MWI 1998, 3).

for increased public awareness about the *“value of water for them and the well-being of the country for the sustainability of life, and for the economic and social development”* (MWI 1998, 7).

Throughout the report, MWI connects water scarcity to other sectors: *“water is a scarce and precious resource that is of vital importance to the continued socio-economic development of the Kingdom”* (MWI 1998, 16). Another example of this connection is the quote above on public awareness. As aforementioned, the linkage between water and socio-economic development creates a sense of importance and justifies extreme measures. The use of words such as *“vital”* is a linguistic tool deployed to portray urgency (Fischhendler 2015, 248). Through this framing, MWI makes the issue relevant for action.

In the 1998 strategy, the water insufficiency narrative is dominant. Even though the mismanagement narrative is present, most of the document is dedicated on issues such as population pressures and the unfair sharing with neighboring countries. Hence, measures are mainly focused on increasing supply.

The 2008 strategy

In comparison with the previous strategy, this document provides a more balanced representation of the insufficiency and mismanagement narrative. Population growth and the pressure it puts on water resources is yet perceived as major contributor to scarcity. *“Any unexpected population growth due to regional instability [...] would increase water demand and impact the plans to reach a balanced demand and supply”* (MWI 2009, 2-2). MWI still regard their water resources as threatened by neighboring countries since their 2022 goal is to ensure that *“shared water rights are protected”* (MWI 2009, 3-3).²⁶ New in this document is the inclusion of climate change: *“climate change scenarios all predict a further decline of our water resources”* (MWI 2009, 7/1).

The mismanagement narrative is more present in this document than in 1998. MWI states to *“reduce losses through leakage and breaks”* (MWI 2009, 5-4). MWI recognizes some internal factors that need to change; however, external factors are blamed for their mismanagement: *“the unsustainable abstraction of groundwater largely due to population*

²⁶ Another external factor influencing Jordan’s scarcity is the fact that *“Jordan is one of the four driest countries in the world”* (MWI 2009, 7/1).

growth and agricultural expansion is a major problem today. This has been exacerbated by the lack of enforcement ... and the near absence of controls" (MWI 2009, 3-1). New in this document is the perspective regarding agriculture. *"Jordan must manage its water resources giving priority to municipal and industrial needs and cap agricultural use"* (MWI 2009, 2-2). Water should go to other sectors since *"irrigation consumes more than 64% of the total water used in Jordan while agriculture's share of the GDP is 3%"* (MWI 2009, 5-2).

The use of language in this strategy is more serious than the previous document. The introduction²⁷ states this strategy should be considered as *"one of the highest priorities to perform on the national level"* (MWI 2009, foreword). This urgency is further emphasized when he continues that *"water scarcity in Jordan poses a serious challenge that will affect all sectors if not addressed with serious efforts"* (MWI 2009, foreword). The audience should be convinced of *"the relationship between water sustainability and cost, and social and economic development in Jordan"* (MWI 2009, 2-3). Again, this connection between water and other sectors highlights the urgency to conserve and increase the water resources.

Proposed measures to alleviate water stress and planned to operate by 2022 (MWI 2009, foreword) are the Disi water conveyance²⁸ and the Red-Dead Canal (RSDSC). According to this strategy, the RSDSC would ensure equal supply and demand by 2020 (MWI 2009, 1-2/1-5). Subsequently, implementation of these projects is one of the main themes in this strategy. Other mentioned solutions on the supply side are wastewater reuse and new dams. Demand side solutions are focused on caps on agriculture, the introduction of water tariffs, improvements of techniques to reduce physical losses, and controls on the use of groundwater (MWI 2009, 4-3;8/1). Another major factor that should influence demand is public awareness²⁹ (MWI 2009, 2-2). Nevertheless, in the strategy the Disi conveyance and the RSDSC are presented as crucial, without the projects Jordan will not be able to alleviate the country from its scarcity.

²⁷ The introduction is written by the Head of the Royal Commission for Water (MWI 2009).

²⁸ The Disi Water Conveyance is a project to convey water from the Disi aquifer, located in the southern desert on the Jordan-Saudi Arabia border, to various major cities. The project provides 100 million cubic meter of water per year, for the next fifty years (Danny et al. 2008, 9). The project finished and came into operation in 2013 and cost 1 billion USD (Economist Intelligence 2013).

²⁹ MWI states that they *"will create awareness among the Jordanian public and decision makers as it is the first step towards behavior change and lays the foundation for policy change"* (MWI 2009, 2-2).

The 2016 strategy

Prior to the discussion of this strategy, it is relevant to be aware of the changing demography since 2011. *“The Syria crisis forced more than 1.4 million Syrians to flee their homes and seek asylum in Jordan”* (MWI 2016, 21). The enormous population increase has had immense influence on the population-water resources equation. This strategy recognizes *“the increased demand resulting from the pressure of Syrian refugees on water resources”* (MWI 2016, 2). Refugees are mentioned 14 times in the document, indicating that this is, according to MWI, one of the most prominent issues affecting the water sector. However, this sub-narrative emphasizes the refugees and waves of immigration rather than the high natural fertility rate of Jordanians. In so doing, MWI blames refugees and immigrants and shows scarcity is not caused by Jordanians (Hussein 2016, 92-94). Climate change is also an often mentioned *“factor aggravating current water shortages”* (MWI 2016, 48). The protection and defense of *the rightful shares of the Kingdom’s water resources”* (MWI 2016, 26) remains important in this strategy.³⁰ To sum up, the dominant narrative of this strategy is that *“Jordan’s increasing population and demand for water, along with the influx of refugees, have swayed the already-critical water resources equation towards a projected deficiency of 56% of the total national sector needs by 2025”* (MWI 2016, 25).

The water mismanagement narrative is less present than in the previous strategy. For MWI, *“it has become critical to put in effort to protect, conserve, cap, and recover available water lost due to inefficiency and misuse”* (MWI 2016, 25). They recognize that *“non-revenue water, leakages and illegal uses is one of the major issues affecting the supply of water for domestic and other uses.”* MWI implemented different initiatives to reduce unbilled water, but *“only marginal improvement”* can be observed (MWI 2016, 15). Even though the previous strategy said to cap water allocated to agriculture, *“agriculture is currently the largest user of water.”* *“Fresh water allocated to irrigated agriculture ... will be capped and eventually reduced”* (MWI 2016, 12-13). The future tense of this sentence indicates that this remains an acknowledged problem that has not been dealt with appropriately. New in this strategy is the focus on sustainable developments, *“Jordan will*

³⁰ The fact that Jordan is a *“semi-arid to arid region with annual rainfall of less than 200mm”* (MWI 2005, 1) continues to have a role in the water scarcity in the region.

adopt as a national water sector objective, sustainable management of water and sanitation for all Jordanians” (MWI 2016, 7).

Most striking in this strategy is the use of language. This strategy makes great use of tactical securitization. MWI states: *“linking water scarcity with water security – and perhaps national security, puts a heavy responsibility for all custodians of water in the Kingdom”* (MWI 2016, foreword). Words such as “security” speak urgency. Water affects all sectors since it is *“central to a nexus of social, economic, and political issues that affect agriculture, energy, cities, trade, finance, and national security”* (MWI 2016, 3). However, *“water security remains central to the ... nexus, because food and energy security cannot be achieved without it”* (MWI 2016, 54). Framings like these increase public awareness, importance, and urgency in mobilizing resources and funds (Fischhendler 2015, 247). Moreover, linking water to issues of national survival justifies measures taken, such as the *“strict water-rationing program [that supplies] water to households only once a week”* (MWI 2016, 12). It also attempts to justify RSDSC, in combination with the stressed importance of the project: *“The Red-Dead Sea Project ... constitutes the major part of increased supply”* (MWI 2016, 27). Indirectly, MWI also legitimizes cooperation with Israel given the countries have been collaborating over the project.

Thus, in this strategy, the reason for growing scarcity is increased demand due to the influx of refugees. The urgent language frames it is an issue of national security. As a result, extreme measures need to be taken on the supply side. Thereby, MWI attempts to justify RSDSC and cooperation with Israel.

Israel’s water policy

The Ministry of Agriculture managed the water sector in Israel until 1996. First concern was to depend on (and over-pump) natural water resources to meet all demands, with agriculture being the dominant user. The tariffs for farmers were low and domestic supply was heavily subsidized. This strategy and constant population growth kept the Israeli water sector in a permanent state of vulnerability (Marin et al. 2017, 5). Three major water crises, in 1986, 1989, and 1991, showed the strategy was not sustainable. Eventually, the 1998 water crisis provided a policy window for political reforms. A Parliamentary Investigation Committee of the Water Sector (PCI) was established, leading ultimately to the formation of the modern institutional framework for water management (Marin et al. 2017, 5-6).

Because many entities were involved, and its management was political, there was a need for an autonomous agency regulating the water sector, leading to the establishment of the Israel Water Authority (IWA). Since 2007 IWA is the main securitizing actor; it is the national regulator for the whole water sector (Marin et al. 2017, 7). However, the water sector is impacted by national goals which are administered by other ministries (IWA 2011, 11).

Israel managed to securitize its water sector effectively. Since 2017, the availability of water is considered sufficient to meet the future needs of the country, whilst accounting for population growth and the predicted effects of climate change (Marin et al. 2017, 6). Three Israeli documents discussed below describe the changes in perceived problems, framing, and strategy in the water sector throughout the past two decades.

Transitional master plan (2002)

PCI, the drafter of this document and the main securitizing actor at the time, was authorized to develop this plan in the light of the deep crisis in the water sector and to provide immediate solutions for stabilizing the system (IWA 2011, 9/12). This committee was assigned *“to determine who is responsible for the crisis”* and *“to recommend urgent steps and emergency measures”* (PCI 2002, 4). The document contains valuable information on the perceived governmental shortcomings of the water sector.

In contrast with Jordan, PCI believes the root of the crisis in the Israeli water sector to be internal. *“This sad and astonishing result is the sour fruit of a continuous failure by Israel’s government”* (PCI 2002, 11). *“The crisis developed primarily because of a faulty organizational system and decision-making process”* (PCI 2002, 39). The main organizational issue is that thirteen ministries were responsible for a small role in the puzzle. *“The multitude of authorities dealing with the water issue, where there is no clear distribution of tasks and power among them, and there are frequent fundamental differences of opinion regarding the desired policy, which lead to conflicts of interest”* (PCI 2002, 11). Despite the *“know-how and ability to find solutions to the problem”* (PCI 2002, 39) in Israel, *“the collection of recommendations ... were ignored”, “national water plans have been prepared but ignored by Ministries”, and “reports have warned against the failings and shortsightedness in the management of the water sector, the conclusions were not adopted, and the lessons were not learned”* (PCI 2002, 12).

The language is urgent in the document: *“For over 30 years the Israeli water sector has been in a deep and continuous crisis”* (PCI 2002, 11). *“The Knesset announced a state of emergency”* (PCI 2002, 16). Framings such as these highlight the need to take action to counter the problem. The main solutions proposed are targeted on institutional reform and increasing supply. There should be an *“independent and professional water authority ... and not subject to any Ministry”* (PCI 2002, 80). *“In order to increase the supply of water, there are four practical sources: the desalination of seawater, the desalination of brackish water, the treatment of sewage water, and importation”* (PCI 2002, 116). The focus is on desalination, the first plant is expected to be opened by 2005³¹ (PCI 2002, 18).

Despite the emphasis on reform, agriculture remains to have a major role in Israeli society whilst being the main water consumer. *“The Committee rejects the claim, as if a spendthrift agriculture is the cause of the crisis in the Israeli water sector, and that the crisis may be resolved by means of drastic cuts in agriculture, or its liquidation. In the eyes of the Committee agriculture has a Zionist-strategic-political value, which goes beyond its economic contribution”* (PCI 2002, 12). Due to the value attached to agriculture, measures hardly include changes in the sector.

Long-term master plan (2011)

Until this plan, there has been *“no overall long-term national master plan for the national water sector [that] has been approved and adopted”* (IWA 2011, 9). The 2011 plan is a comprehensive strategy, constructed by defining the visions and objectives of the water sector, identifying the core issues, and determining the preferable policy in each (IWA 2011, 14). Because of these features and the fact that IWA is since 2005 the main securitizing actor, this document is deemed relevant for analysis. The primary objective is *“to ensure the supply of water, to provide sewage services and designate uses of treated wastewater and manage runoff and drainage – of suitable quality, quantity and reliability, and with economic efficiency, for the sustainable welfare of all the consumers”* (IWA 2011, 16).

An important challenge is *“improving the institutional-organizational structure responsible for supervision and regulation of the water”* (IWA 2011, 13). Even though the

³¹ PCI states that *“by this time the Government assumes that the State will have reached a desalination capacity of 400 million cu.M per annum* (PCI 2002, 18).

regulation of the water sector is now more centralized, there are still defects and shortcomings in *“the division of responsibility and authority”* (IWA 2011, 13).

Solutions of the shortage are focused on desalination, *“the assumption is that most of the additional amount of water will be achieved by desalination plants”* (IWA 2011, 55). Moreover, limits have been introduced in the amount of freshwater allocated to agriculture. However, this seems to be an emergency measure since it *“will only be considered if a shortage occurs which threatens the supply of drinking water to residents and/or there is concern over irreversible damage to the natural water sources”* (IWA 2011, 45).

Framing is not as urgent as in the previous document since many of the issues identified therein have been somewhat dealt with. Nevertheless, *“the current state of the water sector is highly problematic and ... the water sector operates within an emergency plan”* (IWA 2011, 73). Language such as *highly problematic* and *emergency* justify high expenditure and drastic changes. However, there has been a change in the threat to water. Prior threats of neighboring countries³² *“brought the issue of the plans to the epicenter of security-public interest. Since then, recognition of the existential need for natural water has declined* (IWA 2011, 10). The perception prevails that a *“desalination plant is cheaper than one day of battle”*, hence the last master plans did not achieve a central position in the interest of the public or government (IWA 2011, 10). The first master plans were derived from the Zionist vision of the state: the goal³³ was straight-forward. *“Today, the vision of Israeli society is divided between the wish to enhance economic welfare, to achieve social justice, hopes for peace in the Middle East”*, etc. (IWA 2011, 9). Hence, there is no comprehensive national planning on which to base objectives and goals (IWA 2011, 9). Nevertheless, the importance of water is emphasized multiple times since *“the water sector will continue to be a contributing factor for realizing Israel’s national goals”* (IWA 2011, 19). Lastly, agriculture remains important; *“maintaining it is a national objective”* (IWA 2011, 44).

³² The in chapter one discussed threats of neighboring countries in the 1960s.

³³ The goal to consolidate its borders and its security and absorbing immigration (IWA 2011, 9).

Israeli water sector – key issues (2018)

This document is drafted by a representative of the Knesset. It is relevant since it focuses on the key issues of the water sector – its sources of water, structure, operating methods, the water crisis, and the methods of addressing it (Avgar 2018, 3). As previously mentioned, at the time of drafting Israel knew to have sufficient water to provide future needs. *“Increasing the supply of desalinated water ... is one of the main measures”* to deal with the water shortage (Avgar 2018, 5). However, regulation of the water sector is still not ideal. The delay of the construction of many of the facilities *“indicate an ongoing failing and a severe problem with the government’s ability to govern”* (Avgar 2018, 27). *“Another method of addressing Israel’s water crisis is increasing the use of reclaimed wastewater”* (Avgar 2018, 5). The substitution of wastewater has mostly been proven effective in the agricultural sector. *“Even as the use of marginal water has seen an 177% increase, the use of fresh water in agriculture has declined by 40%”* (Avgar 2018, 9). *“Another method of reducing water use is through education and public relations activities intended to raise awareness”* (Avgar 2018, 6). Public awareness has ensured a general acceptance among the public for the emergency measures taken, such as high expenditure, cuts in allocation to agriculture, and determined quotas for water use (Avgar 2018, 22).

Since Israel has managed to secure supply of water, they can focus on second-order priorities: the side effects of its solutions. *“Desalination also has economic and environmental costs, including high energy consumption – which results in increased air pollution, use of chemicals, use of land on the coast, possible effects on the marine environment ..., and more”* (Avgar 2018, 13-14). The document acknowledges the declination of the level of the Dead Sea, leading to *“environmental, infrastructural, and touristic damage”* (Avgar 2018, 41). Hence, Israel has been considering the RSDSC since the 2000s. However, *“[the RSDSC] will only slightly slow down the rate by which the water level drops ... Furthermore, as the volume of water streamed to the Dead Sea increases, it might increase the potential for environmental damage”* (Avgar 2018, 42). Thus, the Knesset is pessimistic about the effectiveness of RSDSC.

Despite Israel’s success in securitizing supply, language of urgency is still present. There is still *“a state of emergency in the water sector”* due to low expected rainfall in the future (Avgar 2018, 24). Nevertheless, many effective changes have occurred since the

publishing of the 2002 strategy. Accordingly, the level of urgency is substantially lower than in the first two strategies.

Potential for cooperation

Since the 1994 peace treaty, Jordan and Israel have considered various cooperative projects. This section discusses the recently cancelled RSDSC and the new Water-for-Energy Deal. The discourses in the water strategies are important in the formation of these plans. Discourses are central in constructing and defining what the perceived issue is, and hence pushes towards the proposed solution (Hussein 2017, 528).

In 2002, the Israeli and Jordanian governments committed to a project to save the shrinking Dead Sea, justifying it with the peace and regional cooperation discourses. Only in 2005, after the end of the Intifada, they agreed to a feasibility study for RSDSC. The main goal is stabilization of the level of the Dead Sea. Minor goals are to desalinate water and to generate energy at affordable prices for the countries and to build a symbol of peace and cooperation in the Middle East (Hussein 2017, 534). However, the project has potential negative impacts on the environment: seawater intake may affect the ecosystem, leaks or spills may contaminate fresh water, and the mixing of seawater may have adverse effects on tourism and potash (Spiritos and Lipchin 2013, 121). The next paragraphs discuss the emerged discourses on RSDSC in Jordan and Israel.

The Jordanian Minister of MWI said the *“country’s water security is dependent on the desalination of seawater in the future”* (Namrouqa 2012). Similarly, the Prime Minister stated RSDSC would solve the country’s water crisis (Jordan Times 2015). This perspective is also present in the discussed water strategies in Jordan, justifying the construction of the conveyance. As argued, the insufficiency narrative is dominant in Jordan, legitimizing measures targeted at increasing supply. In the 2008 document, MWI emphasizes RSDSC will balance supply and demand by 2020. The urgent language and focus on water security in the 2016 strategy justify for this extreme measure taken. The Jordanian government portrayed the canal and desalination as the only solution for water security (Hussein 2017, 538). However, the aspect of cooperation with Israel in this project is not mentioned in the documents, indicating MWI downplays the role of cooperation in this project and instead focuses on the potential benefits of supply. The Jordanian population would never accept relying on Israel for its water supply. For this reason, the agreement is advertised as a way

to save the Dead Sea rather than an agreement of water exchange with Israel (Hussein 2017, 536).

The discourse in the Israeli strategies mainly blames ineffective internal structures for the inefficient management of the water sector. Internal reforms were necessary to securitize the water sector, resulting in the establishment of the IWA, enormous investments in five desalination plants, a decrease in allocation to agriculture, and increased public awareness. As a result, water is considered sufficient in Israel since 2017. Israel has various reasons for supporting RSDSC. Firstly, RSDSC enables a water swap between the countries. This is beneficial since Israel needs water in the south, while Jordan needs water in the north. Secondly, Israel increasingly focuses on environmental concerns. Mostly in the 2018 document, the importance of sustainability is highlighted. The restoration of the Dead Sea will preserve agricultural land, sustain tourist and industrial activities, and reserve sinkhole formation (Spiritos and Lipchin 2013, 121). Thirdly, the Israeli government also used Zionist discourses to justify RSDSC, while the “Zionist dream” is essentially complete. In this manner, it de-emphasizes aspects of regional cooperation while emphasizing completing the Zionist dream narrative (Hussein 2017, 536-37). Lastly, and most importantly, Israel has a major geopolitical concern for maintaining a strong and stable Jordanian state. The water security RSDSC brings Jordan would strengthen the state.

However, the project also faced major opposition. Environmentalists fear the negative side-effects and argue that the project would not save the Dead Sea. Other opposing parties are NGOs for social justice, demonstrating that environment and society cannot be separated (Hussein 2017, 534). Meaning that no deal can be made on the Dead Sea when the Palestinian issue is not addressed first. In Israel, the view is present that it is a “*drinking water for Amman*” project disguised as a “*saving the Dead Sea*” project (Hussein 2017, 534). Due to opposition, RSDSC was often delayed, which the Jordanian government blames on Israeli civil society (Hussein 2017, 535). Implementation has been postponed due to political tensions including stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace-making and the 2017 killing of two Jordanians by an Israeli security guard at the embassy in Amman (Synergia Foundation 2019). Consequently, the talks about the project stopped since 2017. Efforts to resume negotiations were hindered due to diplomatic crises between Jordan and Israel over Al-Aqsa Mosque (Al-Sharif 2020). After years of delay, Jordan cancelled the project in June 2021. The official reason from Jordan states there was “*no real Israeli desire*” for the plan to go ahead

(Staff 2021). For Israel, the project has become one of low politics; it is not vital to the survival of the state. Whereas for Jordan the project was still related to high politics since it would ensure water supply. This disparity is reason for the failure of RSDSC.

The cancellation of RSDSC did not end cooperation between the countries. The Water-for-Energy Deal allows Jordan to receive desalinated water from Israel, while the latter would draw clean energy from a Jordanian solar power plant, proposed to be built in the Jordanian desert. Sherri Goodman³⁴ perceives the deal positively, arguing that *“there are abundant solar resources in Jordan, and Israel has great capacity to provide water. They both have incentives, in their own national interests”* (Bilanceri 2022). This deal is important for Israel since it has not met its goal for renewable energy (Reuters 2021). For Jordan, it is more efficient to import water from Israel than developing its own desalination plants since the coastline is in the south, far from the Jordanian population centers (Riedel and Sachs 2021). Thus, both countries would benefit from this deal. RSDSC in contrast, would mainly benefit Jordan as Israel has already securitized its water resources and restoration of the Red Sea would be minimal. Israel only advantages from the deal through the stabilization of Jordan. The Water-for-Energy plan is mutually beneficial, making the countries interdependent. However, it remains to be seen if the cooperation continues. Public discontent in Jordan is major; every Friday since the announcement, protestors against a cooperation with Israel have gathered in Amman (Bilanceri 2022). Without any significant improvement on the Palestinian track, cooperation with Israel will not be accepted by the public. Whether that means the deal will not go through remains to be seen.

Conclusion

By emphasizing external factors as the cause for scarcity, Jordanian discourse justifies for measures targeted at increasing supply. The urgent language in the Jordanian plans legitimize extreme measures, such as RSDSC. As the Israeli strategies demonstrate, water increasingly became successfully securitized, allowing them to focus on issues of lower politics, such as the stabilization of Jordan and sustainability. Together, these discourses justify for RSDSC and the Water-for-Energy Deal. This demonstrates that two countries, whilst having different incentives, can securitize together for their mutual benefit.

³⁴ Sherri Goodman is a senior fellow at the Center for Climate and Security (Bilanceri 2022).

CONCLUSION

The Middle East, with North Africa, is the most water-scarce region of the world (UNICEF 2021). Countries possess different tools to attack water stress. Early 2000s, Israel decided to invest heavily in desalination techniques, which allowed Israel to ensure sufficient water supply by 2017. Jordan on the other hand, does not possess the economic means nor the favorable geological features for desalination plants. To increase supply and overcome its scarcity, Jordan has mostly focused on RSDSC, and more recently on the Water-for-Energy Deal. Both projects are in collaboration with Israel. Cooperation is surprising considering the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, this thesis studied the following research question: why are Israel and Jordan, two (former) enemies, cooperating on water, and how does this cooperation result in mutual securitization?

The first chapter examines the history of relations between Israel and Jordan to understand the causes for the antagonistic attitudes on the one hand, and the friendly attitudes on the other. Jordan has always found itself in the middle of two sides: Israel and the Arab world. Main cause for the antagonistic attitudes in Jordan is Israel's behavior against Palestinians. Even though the countries have been at war from 1948 to 1994, there was always space for security cooperation since they were facing similar threats, hence the friendly attitudes.

On water, the countries have also been cooperating, which chapter two discusses. Israel and Jordan adhered to the Johnston allocations and were involved in the "picnic table talks", showing early cooperation. The water narrative in Israel changed over the decades: from an ideological, economic, and defensive role to one that ceased to be linked to national security. In Jordan, the discourse of water as scarce has never changed. The Israeli detachment of water from national security and the desire for a strong Jordanian state, has led to their signing of the treaty. Jordan's wish for inner stability and hence economic development and water security made Jordan not perceive Israel as the enemy anymore, ultimately leading to the politization of water in the 1994 peace treaty.

How the countries have attempted to securitize water through their national water plans is the topic of the last chapter. In the Jordanian plans, MWI finds the causes of the scarcity to be external justifying solutions at increasing supply, with the RSDSC as the main

solution. Israel managed to securitize its water resources because of internal reforms and desalination investments. Main reason for Israeli support for RSDSC was increased cooperation with Jordan and the strengthening of the Jordanian state. The Jordanian government perceived no real Israeli desire for RSDSC and cancelled the project. There seems to be hope for the recent Water-for-Energy Deal. This deal is justified through the national water plans. In Jordan by its water scarcity narrative. Israel legitimizes it by their focus on sustainability. However, public discontent on the deal is major in Jordan, which might disrupt the deal. Whether the mutual benefits and interdependency are enough for the deal to go through remains to be seen.

The combination of the three chapters provides answers to the question of why Israel and Jordan are cooperating on water-related issues. Firstly, due to increases in water supply, Israel could permit to provide Jordan with water through the 1994 peace treaty and is open for collaborative projects in which Israel provides water. Secondly, Israel supports the strengthening of the Jordanian state since Jordan protects the Israeli borders. Thirdly, since recently, Israel has a strong sustainability focus and is in the need for green energy, allowing for RSDSC and the Water-for-Energy Deal. Lastly, Jordan is in dire need for water. In its national plans, water is perceived as a national security issue. Thus, Jordan would get into deep water to increase its supply, even though that means facing public discontent. To summarize, the countries are cooperating because Jordan wants to securitize water supply whereas Israel wants to securitize its national security and become more sustainable. Both have different incentives for securitization through cooperative projects but attempt to do so mutually. Although it being for different reasons, Israel and Jordan securitize together.

The value of this research goes beyond this case study. It shows that water can function as a catalyst for peace, as it did in the 1994 peace treaty. Water is the foundation of the treaty, leading to peace agreements on other aspects. Furthermore, it illustrates countries – even those with antagonistic attitudes towards each other – can cooperate to a certain extent. Academically, this thesis advances securitization theory. Rather than securitizing by oneself, it shows that different securitizations can find a common securitization method.

This study does suffer from limitations. Due to space limitations, it was impossible to analyze other documents besides the analyzed government reports of both governments. Inevitably, this gives a one-sided account of the issue. As a result, the water narratives of

the audience and the responses to the securitizing moves could not be analyzed. This leads to an incomplete analysis of the securitization in both countries. However, considering only the government level does seem most fit since securitizing moves are carried out by these political actors. The inability to discuss Jordanian public opinion and to what extent this contributes to delayed cooperation is an additional limitation. Another limitation is that due to language constraints only translated government reports could be analyzed. As a result, text can get lost in translation and/or the narratives prevalent in these documents might not be dominant in documents that were not accessible. By including multiple documents from each government this research attempts to circumvent this issue.

Future research should consider the influence of public opinion on Jordan's cooperation with Israel. The Jordanian government is generally supportive of cooperation since they are better able to distinguish the political from water. However, a sustainable peace between the countries seems unlikely without addressing the contested Palestinian issue. This tension between the public and the government should be researched. The disapproval of the Jordanian public might be explained by the public unawareness of the water scarcity. Of all Jordanian residents, 40 percent does not believe that the country is facing a crisis (USAID 2020). Future research should investigate whether an increased public awareness can make the public more supportive of cooperation.

The recent Water-for-Energy Deal does give hope for Israeli-Jordanian cooperation. In this deal, both countries would benefit from each other, keeping each other accountable. But it remains to be seen whether or not the Jordanian public will block this deal to prevent "normalizing ties with Israel".

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary sources

Avgar, Ido. 2018. *Israeli Water Sector – Key Issues*. The Knesset: Research and Information Center. <https://m.knesset.gov.il/EN/activity/mmm/mmmeng250218.pdf>

Israel Water Authority (IWA). 2011. *Long-Term Master Plan for the National Water Sector*. https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/policy/masterplan-main/he/masterplan_Water_Sector_Master_Plan.pdf

Jewish Virtual Library. 1953. "Water in Israel: Speech on Israel's Water Rights (November 30, 1953)." Accessed on 2 May 2022. <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/speech-on-israel-s-water-rights-november-1953>.

Ministry of Water and Irrigation. 1998. *Jordan's Water Strategy & Policies*. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. http://gis.nacse.org/rewab/docs/Jordan_Water_Strategy_and_Policies_of_2004_en.pdf

Ministry of Water and Irrigation. 2009. *Water for Life: Jordan's Water Strategy 2008-2022*. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. <http://www.emwis.net/thematicdirs/news/2009/05/jordan-jd586b-water-strategy-finalized>

Ministry of Water and Irrigation. 2016. *National Water Strategy 2016-2025*. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. https://www.pseau.org/outils/ouvrages/mwi_national_water_strategy_2016_2025_2016.pdf

Office to King Hussein I (OKH). n.d. "The Library: Treaty of Peace Between the Hashemite King of Jordan and The State of Israel: 26 October 1994." Accessed 25 March 2022. <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html>

Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Israeli Water Sector (PCI). 2002. *The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Israeli Water Sector, Headed by MK David Magen*. <https://www.knesset.gov.il/committees/eng/docs/englishwater.pdf>

Secondary sources

- Al Sharif, Osama. 2020. "Project to save Dead Sea going nowhere." *Al-Monitor*, 29 December 2020. <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/12/jordan-israel-dead-sea-project-environment-threats.html>
- Alatout, Samer. 2008. "'States' of scarcity: water, space, and identity politics in Israel, 1948-59." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (26), 959-982.
- Alatout, Samer. 2009. "Bringing Abundance into Environmental Politics: Constructing a Zionist Network of Water Abundance, Immigration, and Colonization." *Social Studies of Science* 39 (3), 363-394.
- Barari, A. Hassan. 2014. *Jordan and Israel: A Troubled Relationship in a Volatile Region*. Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Bilanceri, Serena. 2020. "Water for Energy: A controversial deal in a thirsty region." *Friedrich Naumann Foundation*, 4 April 2022. <https://www.freiheit.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/water-energy-controversial-deal-thirsty-region>
- Britannica. n.d. "Transjordan, the Hashemite Kingdom, and the Palestine war." Jordan: History. Accessed 10 June 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Jordan/Transjordan-the-Hashemite-Kingdom-and-the-Palestine-war>
- Burgess, J. Peter, Taylor Owen, and Uttam Kumar Sinha. 2016. "Human securitization of water? A case study of the Indus Waters Basin." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 2: 382-407.
- Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. 2009. "Macrosecritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitisation theory." *Review of international studies* 35, no. 2: 253-276.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Danny, Elaine, Kristina Donnelly, Roland McKay, Geoffroy Ponte, and Tetsuya Uetake. 2008. "Sustainable Water Strategies for Jordan". *University of Michigan*, 1-26.

- Davis, Hanna. 2021. "Hundreds protests in Jordan against water-energy deal with Israel." *Al Jazeera*, 26 November 2021. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/26/hundreds-protest-in-amman-against-water-energy-deal-with-israel>
- Economist Intelligence. 2013. "Disi water project comes on stream." Country: Jordan. Accessed 24 May 2022. <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1590783543>
- EcoPeace. n.d. "Red Dead Canal." Accessed 24 May 2022. <https://old.ecopeaceme.org/projects/dead-sea/red-dead-canal/>
- El-Haroun, Zainah, Stephen Farrell, and Rami Ayyub. 2020. "Young Palestinians seek new ways to achieve goals, 20 years after Second Intifada." *Reuters*, 28 September 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-israel-palestinians-intifada-annivers-idAFKBN26J2BF>
- Elmusa, S. Sharif. 1995. "The Jordan-Israel Water Agreement: A Model or an Exception?" *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3: 63-73.
- Feitelson, Eran. 2002. "Implications of shifts in the Israeli water discourse for Israeli-Palestinian water negotiations." *Political Geography* 21, 293-318.
- Feitelson, Eran. 2013. "The four eras of Israeli water policies. In *Water Policy in Israel*, edited by Nir Becker, 15-32. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Fischhendler, Itay. 2015. "The securitization of water discourse: theoretical foundations, research gaps and objectives of the special issue." *International Environmental Agreements* 15(3), 245-255.
- Haddadin, J. Munther. 2000. "Negotiated resolution of the Jordan-Israel water conflict." *International Negotiation* 5, no. 2: 263-288.
- Haddadin, J. Munther. 2002. *Diplomacy on the Jordan: International conflict and negotiated resolution*. New York: Springer Science & Business Media.
- Haddadin, J. Munther. 2006. "Conflict Resolution and Regional Cooperation." In *Water Resources in Jordan: Evolving Policies for Development, the Environment, and Conflict Resolution*, 236-263. New York: Routledge.
- Haddadin, J. Munther. 2012. *Diplomacy on the Jordan: International conflict and negotiated resolution*. New York: Springer Science & Business Media.

- Haddadin, J. Munther. 2014. "The Jordan River Basin: A conflict like no other. In *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Natural Resource Management. Water and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, edited by Erika Weinthal, Jessica J. Troell, and Mikiyasu Nakayama, 242-263. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis.
- Hague Institute for Global Justice, The. 2017. *Transboundary Water Cooperation over the lower part of the Jordan River Basin*. Project Report, August 2017. The Hague.
- Hussein, Hassam. 2016. *An analysis of the discourse of water scarcity and hydropolitical dynamics in the case of Jordan*. PhD Thesis. University of East Anglia.
- Hussein, Hassam. 2017. "Politics of the Dead Sea Canal: a historic review of the evolving discourses, interests, and plans." *Water International* 42(5), 527-542.
- Hussein, Hussam. 2018. "Lifting the veil: Unpacking the discourse of water scarcity in Jordan." *Environmental Science Policy* 89, 385-392.
- Ibish, Hussein. 2018. "A 'Catastrophe' That Defines Palestinian Identity". *The Atlantic*, 14 May 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/the-meaning-of-nakba-israel-palestine-1948-gaza/560294/>
- Jägerskog, Anders. 2003. *Why states cooperate over shared water: The water negotiations in the Jordan River Basin*. PhD diss., Linköping University Electronic Press.
- Jordan Times. 2015. "Refugee crisis aggravated Jordan's water problem – Ensour." *Jordan Times*, 25 August 2015. <https://jordantimes.com/news/local/refugee-crisis-aggravated-jordan%E2%80%99s-water-problem-%E2%80%94-ensour>
- Kartin, Amnon. 2001. "Water scarcity problems in Israel." *GeoJournal* 53 (3), 273-282.
- Kraemer, Tania. 2022. "Former foes Israel and Jordan work together to combat energy and water scarcity." *DW News*, 19 January 2022. <https://www.dw.com/en/former-foes-israel-and-jordan-work-together-to-combat-energy-and-water-scarcity/a-60310997>
- Manna, Maya. 2006. "Water and the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan." *Macro Center Working Papers*, Vol. 10: 58-64.
- Marin, Philippe, Shimon Tal, Joshua Yeres, and Klas Ringskog. 2017. "Water Management in Israel." *World Bank Group*.

- Medzini, Meron. 2019. "A Century of Israel-Jordan Relations." In *The Palgrave Handbook of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, edited by P. R. Kumaraswamy, 407-420. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Menahem, Gila. 1998. "Policy Paradigms, Policy Networks and Water Policy in Israel." *Journal Public Policy* 18 (3), 283-310.
- Morag, Nadav. 2001. "Water, Geopolitics and State Building: The Case of Israel." *Middle Eastern Studies* 37 (3), 179-198.
- Morris, Benny. 2005. "The Historiography of Deir Yassin." *Journal of Israeli History* 24(1), 79-107.
- Namrouqa, Hana. 2012. "Implementation of Jordan Red Sea Project to begin early next year." *The Jordan Times*, 27 March 2012.
<http://vista.sahafi.jo/art.php?id=1c8361119cd7e6f991688ba3e7bd7077bc547c19>
- Peoples, Columba, and Nick Vaughan-Williams. 2010. "Securitization theory". In *Critical Security Studies: An introduction*, 75-88. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
- Podeh, Elie. 2015. "The Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty 1994." In *Chances for peace: Missed opportunities in the Arab-Israeli conflict*, Elie Podeh, 235-244. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Reuters. 2021. "Israel and Jordan Pen Historic Water-for-Energy Deal." *Haaretz*, 22 November 2021. <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2021-11-22/ty-article/israel-and-jordan-pen-historic-water-for-energy-deal/0000017f-dc8b-df9c-a17f-fe9b92a00000>
- Riedel, Bruce, and Natan Sachs. 2021. "Israel, Jordan, and the UAE's energy deal is good news." *Brookings*, 23 November 2021. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/11/23/israel-jordan-and-the-uaes-energy-deal-is-good-news/>
- Schäfer, Philip Jan. 2013. *Human and Water Security in Israel and Jordan*. Vol. 3. Springer Science & Business Media.
- Sosland, Jeffrey K. "State-Building and Water Development, 1920-1956." In *Cooperating Rivals*, edited by James N. Rosenau, 19-61. State University of New York Press.

- Spiritos, Erica, and Clive Lipchin. 2013. "Desalination in Israel." In *Water Policy in Israel*, edited by Nik Becker, 101-123. Springer Science & Business Media.
- Staff, Toi. 2021. "After years of delays, Jordan said to nix Red Sea-Dead Sea canal with Israel, PA." *The Times of Israel*, 17 June 2021. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-years-of-delays-jordan-said-to-nix-red-sea-dead-sea-canal-with-israel-pa/>
- Synergia Foundation. 2019. "The Red Sea-Dead Sea Conveyance." Insights: Analyses & Assessments. Last modified 5 January 2019. <https://www.synergiafoundation.org/insights/analyses-assessments/red-sea-dead-sea-conveyance>
- UNICEF. 2021. "'Running Dry': unprecedented scale and impact of water scarcity in the Middle East and North Africa." Accessed 8 June 2022. <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/running-dry-unprecedented-scale-and-impact-water-scarcity-middle-east-and-north>
- UNICEF. n.d. "Water, sanitation and hygiene." Jordan. Accessed 10 December 2021. <https://www.unicef.org/jordan/water-sanitation-and-hygiene>
- USAID. 2020. "Social Media for Social Good: Raising Awareness of Jordan's Water Crisis." *Global Waters*, 11 February 2020. <https://medium.com/usaid-global-waters/gone-viral-raising-awareness-of-jordans-water-crisis-582b9d9625da>
- Weinthal, Erika, Neda Zawahri, and Jeannie Sowers. 2015. "Securitizing Water, Climate, and Migration in Israel, Jordan, and Syria." *International Environmental Agreements* 15(3), 293-307.
- Yitzhak, Ronen. 2017. "From cooperation to normalization? Jordan-Israel relations since 1967." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 4: 559-575.
- Zeitoun, Mark, Michael Talhami, and Karim Eid-Sabbagh. 2013. "The Influence of Narratives on Negotiations and Resolution of the Upper Jordan River Conflict." *International Negotiation* 18, 293-322.

APPENDIX



Faculty of Humanities
Version September 2014

PLAGIARISM RULES AWARENESS STATEMENT

Fraud and Plagiarism

Scientific integrity is the foundation of academic life. Utrecht University considers any form of scientific deception to be an extremely serious infraction. Utrecht University therefore expects every student to be aware of, and to abide by, the norms and values regarding scientific integrity.

The most important forms of deception that affect this integrity are fraud and plagiarism. Plagiarism is the copying of another person's work without proper acknowledgement, and it is a form of fraud. The following is a detailed explanation of what is considered to be fraud and plagiarism, with a few concrete examples. Please note that this is not a comprehensive list!

If fraud or plagiarism is detected, the study programme's Examination Committee may decide to impose sanctions. The most serious sanction that the committee can impose is to submit a request to the Executive Board of the University to expel the student from the study programme.

Plagiarism

Plagiarism is the copying of another person's documents, ideas or lines of thought and presenting it as one's own work. You must always accurately indicate from whom you obtained ideas and insights, and you must constantly be aware of the difference between citing, paraphrasing and plagiarising. Students and staff must be very careful in citing sources; this concerns not only printed sources, but also information obtained from the Internet.

The following issues will always be considered to be plagiarism:

- cutting and pasting text from digital sources, such as an encyclopaedia or digital periodicals, without quotation marks and footnotes;
- cutting and pasting text from the Internet without quotation marks and footnotes;
- copying printed materials, such as books, magazines or encyclopaedias, without quotation marks or footnotes;
- including a translation of one of the sources named above without quotation marks or footnotes;
- paraphrasing (parts of) the texts listed above without proper references: paraphrasing must be marked as such, by expressly mentioning the original author in the text or in a footnote, so that you do not give the impression that it is your own idea;
- copying sound, video or test materials from others without references, and presenting it as one's own work;
- submitting work done previously by the student without reference to the original paper, and presenting it as original work done in the context of the course, without the express permission of the course lecturer;
- copying the work of another student and presenting it as one's own work. If this is done with the consent of the other student, then he or she is also complicit in the plagiarism;
- when one of the authors of a group paper commits plagiarism, then the other co-authors are also complicit in plagiarism if they could or should have known that the person was committing plagiarism;
- submitting papers acquired from a commercial institution, such as an Internet site with summaries or papers, that were written by another person, whether or not that other person received payment for the work.


The rules for plagiarism also apply to rough drafts of papers or (parts of) theses sent to a lecturer for feedback, to the extent that submitting rough drafts for feedback is mentioned in the course handbook or the thesis regulations.

The Education and Examination Regulations (Article 5.15) describe the formal procedure in case of suspicion of fraud and/or plagiarism, and the sanctions that can be imposed.

Ignorance of these rules is not an excuse. Each individual is responsible for their own behaviour. Utrecht University assumes that each student or staff member knows what fraud and plagiarism



entail. For its part, Utrecht University works to ensure that students are informed of the principles of scientific practice, which are taught as early as possible in the curriculum, and that students are informed of the institution's criteria for fraud and plagiarism, so that every student knows which norms they must abide by.

| | |
|---|---|
| I hereby declare that I have read and understood the above. | |
| Name: | |
| Eline de Jong | Eline de Jong |
| Student number: | |
| 6448240 | 6448240 |
| Date and signature: | |
| 14 June 2022 |  |

Submit this form to your supervisor when you begin writing your Bachelor's final paper or your Master's thesis.

Failure to submit or sign this form does not mean that no sanctions can be imposed if it appears that plagiarism has been committed in the paper.