

# The 2004 European Enlargement Round and the Curious Case of Cyprus



© luzitanija - Fotolia

**Aristofanis Aristofanous**

Utrecht University

Master Thesis

June 2022

Word count: 15924

# Contents

<b>ABSTRACT</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>5</b>
ACADEMIC DEBATE	6
METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE	10
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EU ENLARGEMENT</b>	<b>13</b>
1.1 RATIONALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM: OPPOSING LOGICS OF ACTIONS	13
1.2 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE EASTER ENLARGEMENT ROUND OF 2004	15
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>THEORY IN PRACTICE: EU ENLARGEMENT THEORY AND THE UNIQUE CASE OF CYPRUS</b>	<b>22</b>
2.1 CYPRUS'S PARTICULARITY	22
2.2 TOWARDS AN EXPANDED ENLARGEMENT THEORY: INTERGOVERNMENTALISM, INSTITUTIONALISM, AND POLITICAL ECONOMY LOGIC	29
<b>CHAPTER 3</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>THE ROAD TO MEMBERSHIP: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS</b>	<b>31</b>
3.1 THE INFLUENTIAL ROLES OF GREECE AND TURKEY	32
3.2 THE 1994 CORFU EUROPEAN COUNCIL SUMMIT	33
3.3 THE EU-TURKEY CUSTOMS UNION	34
3.4 THE 1995 MADRID EUROPEAN COUNCIL	35
3.5 THE 1997 LUXEMBOURG EUROPEAN COUNCIL	35
3.6 ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THREAT	37
3.7 THE 1999 HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL	38
3.8 TOWARDS THE SIGNING OF THE ACCESSION TREATY	40
3.9 AFTERMATH: REJECTION OF THE ANNAN PLAN AND EU MEMBERSHIP	42
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>48</b>

## Abstract

The island nation of Cyprus was part of the 2004 Eastern Enlargement round despite the country's inability to adhere to the EU membership criteria. The sensitive political situation that exists since 1974 was predicted to cause several problems to the European Union, making the country's accession puzzling. The dominant theoretical narratives explaining the EU Eastern Enlargement round, based on the underlying principles of *rationalism* and *constructivism* fail to convincingly explain this historical development creating a gap in the literature. In this thesis *intergovernmentalism* and *institutionalism* is applied to provide better understanding of the motives and decision-making process of the European Union. The historical analysis has demonstrated that the Cyprus' institutional upgrades came as result of a series of threats and side deals made by Greece, as Athens used its position as an EU member state to benefit Cyprus' European cause. The EU was forced to accept the problematic Cypriot membership in order to safeguard the rest of the Eastern Enlargement project and to create a closer institutional relationship with Greece's regional rival, Turkey. This analysis reveals that the EU behavior towards enlargement is guided for a large part, by side deals, side payments and the balancing of interests of the EU member states and candidate countries.

## **List of Abbreviations**

- AKP - Justice and Development Party
- CEECs - Central and Eastern European Countries
- CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy
- EFTA - European Free Trade Association
- EU - European Union
- NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- RoC - Republic of Cyprus
- TRNC - Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
- UN - United Nations
- USA - United States of America

## Introduction

The Republic of Cyprus was admitted to the European Union (EU) in May 2004 during the Union's biggest and most historic enlargement.<sup>1</sup> The island's accession to the EU was thought to promote security and prosperity within the island, as well as offer a chance of rapprochement between the two largest ethnic groups of the country (the Greek Cypriots, with strong links to Greece and the Turkish Cypriots, with strong links to Turkey).<sup>2</sup> However, since the tension between these two groups has not been resolved since the country's accession, this optimistic assessment proved wrong. In contrast, the division continues to create problems for the Union, especially when it comes to its relations with neighboring Turkey.

When the EU accepted the Cypriot membership application in the late 1980s, the EU became automatically involved in one of the longest, unresolved conflicts on the continent. At that time, the import of the unsettled dispute between the two ethnic groups within Cyprus into the EU had an inflaming potential for the relationship between Turkey and EU member state Greece, with consequences on an economic, humanitarian, and most importantly, security level. Since Cyprus' application, the frozen conflict has helped other issues between the two countries, such as the definition of the borders of the continental shelf and maritime waters, airspace violations, the handling of the recent refugee crisis, to emerge time and time again, and dominate the agenda of their bilateral relations.

The puzzle lies on the reasons as to why the EU, between the late 1980s and 2004, was interested in institutionalizing a partnership with Cyprus, a partnership that would import a serious and complex unresolved dispute into the European Union, and a partnership that, at least temporary, would hamper the EU's relations with Turkey, an important strategic partner. In addition, Cyprus' accession had the possibility of expanding a local dispute into the larger region of the East Mediterranean by involving Greece (Cyprus' patron country) and threatening an EU member-state's stability and peace.

---

<sup>1</sup> Europarl.europa.eu. (1998). *Luxembourg European Council (12/97): Presidency Conclusions*. Retrieved 19 January 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm).

<sup>2</sup> European Commission. (1993). *Commission opinion on the application by the Republic of Cyprus For Membership-extracts*-. Retrieved 19 October 2021, from [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC\\_93\\_5](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_93_5).

## Academic Debate

In pursuit of solving the above-mentioned puzzle, this thesis touches upon the broader debate surrounding the enlargement of the European Union. Why does the EU expand and admit new members? Taking into consideration that each EU enlargement round is unique and the scope of analysis covering all these rounds is too broad, this thesis focuses on the enlargement round that Cyprus was a part of: the EU enlargement round of 2004. This enlargement round is oftentimes explained through the theoretical lens of either *Rationalism* or *Constructivism*. Two theories with opposing understandings of the political world, that are briefly explored to reach the epicenter of this question.

### *Rationalism vs Constructivism*

The rationalist approach to EU enlargement considers states to act in a ‘self-interest’ manner and in a way that advances their own goals.<sup>3</sup> Following this basic assumption international organizations such as the EU are associations created with the purpose of helping individual states pursue these goals with greater efficiency.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, the decision to admit a new member state within such an organization is based on the egotistic preferences of both existing and candidate members. These preferences, when broken down, reflect the desire for strategic material gain and security.<sup>5</sup> The central rationalist approach that examines the size of an international organization is *club theory*, which predicts that a new member state will be admitted if it is to the benefit of the organization and to each potential member.<sup>6</sup>

Against the rationalist approach, stands the theory of constructivism. The assumption on which the theory is based, is that actors on the international stage, such as states, behave according to ‘internalized cultural values and social norms instead of their own, individual utility’.<sup>7</sup> The constructivist approach thus focuses not on the strategic logics of action, as underlined by the

---

<sup>3</sup> Schimmelfennig, F. (2003). *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*. Themes in European Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 27.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. 19.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. 20.

<sup>6</sup> Sandler, T., & Tschirhart, J. T. (1980). The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 18(4), 1491.

<sup>7</sup> Schimmelfennig, F. (2003). *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*. Themes in European Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 69.

rationalist approach. Instead, it assumes the so-called *logic of appropriateness*. *Appropriateness* alludes to the interconnected rules and routines of political institutions, and how these are applied differently according to the situation and the role of the actor. The course of action taken is therefore, not chosen based on the consequences of the action on the individual's interests, but rather based on the conformity to institutional rules and collective social identities.<sup>8</sup> Constructivism views international organizations as both 'community representatives' and 'community-building' agencies. Their goals are not, as the rationalist believe, purely 'efficient problem-solving'. They are determined by the cultural and institutional environment of the community they represent.<sup>9</sup> From the perspective of an international organization, enlargement thus means greater community building through socialization, and greater strength of the collective identity and legitimacy of that community.<sup>10</sup>

A large part of the debate on how best to explain the Eastern Enlargement round of 2004, has so far been based upon these general principles of Rationalism and Constructivism. This debate is further elaborated on Chapter 1. However, these approaches lack explanatory power when analyzing the case of Cyprus' accession to the EU, leaving a gap in academic enlargement scholarship: the major flaw, is that both debates focus mostly on the EU accession of central and eastern European states, countries that likewise joined the Union in 2004 but with vastly different characteristics and challenges for the EU than Cyprus. In other words, Cyprus is a unique case study as its accession differs from the rest of the countries in the enlargement round, in part due to its interconnectedness with the case of Turkey's European path. This thesis aims to further the theoretical understanding of the Eastern Enlargement round as described above, by adding an intergovernmentalist and institutionalist framework and applying political economy reasoning, as done by Christina Schneider.<sup>11</sup>

In short, Schneider's main theoretical claim is that the various EU enlargement rounds succeeded despite the rise of major conflicts, caused by the divergent effects enlargement would have, because member states were able to redistribute the expected gains of enlargement among themselves in a way that prevented opposing countries from facing material losses, and thus

---

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. 70.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 74.

<sup>11</sup> Schneider, C. (2009). *Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement*. Cambridge University Press, 8-9.

removed any reasons to stop the enlargement.<sup>12</sup> This theoretical framework has a rationalist mindset and relies heavily on intergovernmentalism, and institutionalism (further explained in Chapter 1.2) yet is specific to the environment of the EU and sheds new light on how rationalism can be applied, providing a manner to understand the Cyprus puzzle that is examined.

### *Academic Perspectives on Cypriot EU Accession*

Considering the gap within the academic debate regarding the case of Cyprus in enlargement literature, it is necessary to examine the academic perspectives on the island's accession outside the scope of enlargement theories. Three arguments can be found. The first line of argument concerned the future of EU-Turkish relations and how Cyprus's European journey would affect them. For example, in 2000 Neil Nugent in his article explained that the accession case of Cyprus would add oil to the fire of an already deteriorating relationship between Turkey and the EU.<sup>13</sup> While Turkey had been an EU associate country since 1963 and signed a Customs Union in 1995, the EU's *Agenda 2000* presented the prospects of Turkey's European membership in a very dim light. He also wrote, certain European politicians frequently talked openly about the supposed incompatibility between European and Turkish cultures. Nugent points criticism over Turkey's human rights record and how Greek vetoing over the transfer of funds intended for Turkey further infuriated Ankara.<sup>14</sup> Nugent furthermore cites reasons for Turkey to be against a possible Cypriot membership, as Ankara described the Cypriot application as a Greek-Cypriot policy that was in violation of the will of the Turkish Cypriots.<sup>15</sup> In addition, Cyprus as an EU member would gain every right to block Turkey's European Union accession aspirations.<sup>16</sup> In sum, Nugent's observations are that Cyprus's potential membership threatened an already strained EU-Turkish relationship. A relationship that was in the best interests of Brussels to maintain, considering Turkey's large economic and political importance for the EU.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>13</sup> Nugent, N. (2000). EU Enlargement and 'the Cyprus Problem'. *JCMS: Journal Of Common Market Studies*, 38(1), 138.

<sup>14</sup> Commission of the European Communities (1997). *Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Europe*. Archive of European Integration. 56. Retrieved 17 March 2022, from <http://aei.pitt.edu/3137/1/3137.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> Nugent, N. (2000). EU Enlargement and 'the Cyprus Problem'. *JCMS: Journal Of Common Market Studies*, 38(1), 138.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.



Along similar lines, in 2003 Semin Suvarierol tied the EU- Turkey relationship to the Cyprus problem. She argued Turkey would greatly benefit from finding a solution to the Cyprus problem as there was no way to move forward in the EU without normalizing its relationship with Cyprus and Greece.<sup>18</sup>

A third line of argumentation stems from the serious security concerns for the EU. Jolanda Van Westering described the island as ‘a politically unstable and divided country with deep rooted tensions between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.’<sup>19</sup> The increasing migration of mainland Turks to the occupied north of the island, and the 1997 ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC)-Turkey Declaration which announces partial integration between the two ‘countries’ exacerbated these tensions.<sup>20</sup> Neill Nugent, cited above, also touches upon the security dimensions of the Cypriot EU membership. He argued that Cyprus’s European path would intensify the Greek-Turkish antagonism in an area of the world already prone to insecurity.<sup>21</sup> He furthermore warned that an open war between the two Cypriot guarantors was not out of the question, and that what he described as a fierce and complicated dispute, would become EU’s problem if Cyprus acceded to the Union. Henri J. Barkey was predicting a crisis in the Turkish-West relations back in 2001<sup>22</sup>. In his article he warns that if the accession of Cyprus continues as planned and if a divided Cyprus enters the EU, then Turkey would alienate itself from Europe and much of the cooperation between Turkey and Greece would be negated.<sup>23</sup> Possibly, he argued, Turkey would respond with the annexation of the northern part of Cyprus, which would result in a permanent division of the island. The author even warned about possible military confrontation between the two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece.<sup>24</sup>

The three lines of argument in the academic conversation above, share concern over Cyprus’ accession to the EU from an external relations and security standpoint. Yet Cyprus’s

---

<sup>18</sup> Suvarierol, S. (2003). The Cyprus obstacle on Turkey's road to membership in the European Union, *Turkish Studies*, 4(1). 62.

<sup>19</sup> Westering, J. (2000). 'Conditionality and EU Membership: The Cases of Turkey and Cyprus'. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 5(1). 97.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. 111.

<sup>21</sup> Nugent, N. (2000). EU Enlargement and ‘the Cyprus Problem’. *JCMS: Journal Of Common Market Studies*, 38(1), 139.

<sup>22</sup> Barkey, H. J., & Gordon, P. H. (2001). Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis. *The National Interest*, 66, 83.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

potential membership also viewed as problematic for internal reasons. As Westering, Avery, and Cameron pointed out, the country's particular situation, as divided, semi occupied and without governmental control over 37% of its territory, meant that the advancing accession put a heavy challenge on European policy makers. The Copenhagen criteria, established to ensure compliance with EU provisions did not cover such a complicated candidate, raising questions on its eligibility for EU membership. For example, how would the government of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) be held accountable for the human rights violations happening to the north of the island?<sup>25</sup> Or, how would the EU body of rules, *acquis communautaire*, be implemented in that region? How would the northern part of island handle the economic challenges of the common market?<sup>26</sup> Likewise, Westering pointed out the contradictory fashion of the EU when implementing its own criteria since Cyprus was granted candidate status before complying with the Copenhagen criteria of achieving institutional stability, being able to guarantee the respect of human rights and the protection of minorities in its whole territory.<sup>27</sup> She argued, this implied some criteria to be considered more important than others for the EU, and thus questioned the supposed meritocracy that guided the enlargement process.<sup>28</sup>

These articles prove that there were academic discussions on the potential harmful effects for the EU, if Cyprus became a member state before the division was resolved. Despite warnings of negative consequences for EU-Turkey relations, reenforced security issues between EU member Greece and Turkey, and a lack of compliance with Copenhagen criteria, Cyprus' accession was completed in 2004. The main question that naturally occur and which is central in this thesis, is: how can Cyprus' 2004 accession to the European Union be explained in light of the expected negative consequences of the accession and the existence of the Cyprus problem?

## **Methodology and Structure**

The scope of this research is limited to the time frame of 1990, the year when Cyprus applied for membership, until 2004, the year of accession. It is important to clarify upfront that the

---

<sup>25</sup> Westering, J. (2000). Conditionality and EU Membership: The Cases of Turkey and Cyprus. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 5(1). 97.

<sup>26</sup> Avery, G. and Cameron, F. (1999) *The Enlargement of the EU*, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press. 98.

<sup>27</sup> Westering, J. (2000). Conditionality and EU Membership: The Cases of Turkey and Cyprus. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 5(1). 113.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. 115.

debate of the EU enlargement and its process, as discussed in this research, is based on the politics of existing member-states and their preferences regarding the decision to accept new members, since this thesis investigates an EU perspective. The politics of applicant states and the reasons for their desire to join the EU, will therefore not be discussed.

The sources used for this research are both primary and secondary. The primary sources mostly come from the online archives of the EU and consist of decisions of various European Councils, Eurostat Statistics, European Commission press releases, reports and opinions and European Parliament briefings. As this thesis focuses on the EU decision making, it is only logical that EU sources are the basis for the research. In addition to those sources, newspaper articles and foreign ministry announcements are used as well, because they often provide the missing links between the EU official documents and the stance of various individual actors. The secondary literature used, consists of books and articles focusing on the historical aspect of Cyprus's European journey and political analysis commenting on the issues of the Cypriot application and candidacy.

The thesis develops in three main chapters. To answer the main research question, the first chapter of this thesis covers a careful examination and clear understanding of different theories of enlargement. A clear overview of the literature that covers the enlargement of the EU is given, with a special focus to the enlargement round of 2004. This first chapter answers the subquestion, what are the main theoretical approaches used to explain the EU's eastern enlargement round of 2004? The choice of the articles used, reflect the main theoretical trends of this event.

Subsequently, chapter two applies the theories to the unique case of Cyprus and tests their applicability. The chapter demonstrates why the current literature fails to convincingly explain Cyprus's road to EU membership and highlights the need for a different approach to the matter. The second chapter also features a more detailed analysis of the theoretical framework that is proposed as an alternative to the aforementioned rationalist and constructivist approaches.

The third and final chapter is a historical analysis of Cyprus's road to full membership and an investigation of the decisions, treaties, deals and side-payments that made it possible. Finally, in the conclusion the main question as to why the EU acceded Cyprus into the Union in 2004

despite known issues is answered, advancing our theoretical understanding behind the enlargement of the EU and international organizations in general.

# Chapter 1

## Theoretical Perspectives on EU Enlargement

The European Union is a political organization that has grown over the years both in size and in political importance since the inception of the preceding European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. From an economic union of Western-European nations, to one of the largest and most important political bodies in the world, its members enjoy a variety of benefits, and membership is an attractive prospect for most countries located in the continent and its proximity. The EU prides itself of having brought peace, democracy, and stability to the continent.<sup>29</sup> Throughout the decades of its existence the Union has accepted new member states in different enlargement rounds and currently includes 28 countries thus-far.

In the field of international relations this phenomenon of constant expansion has sparked discussion on the question *why* the EU enlarges and accept new members. In the last thirty years, almost every analysis on this issue has been centered within a broader debate in international relations theory, that of rationalism vs. constructivism. Researchers providing enlargement theories explaining various enlargement rounds, roughly follow the underlying assumptions of one or the other theory.

This chapter provides an overview of the main theoretical approaches to this issue, with a special focus on approaches around the 2004 enlargement round, as it is the one more relative to this thesis. After explaining the main assumptions of the two meta-theories, this chapter delves into the EU enlargement theories specifically, ending with a historiography of the Eastern Enlargement of the EU.

### 1.1 Rationalism and Constructivism: Opposing Logics of Actions

Constructivism and rationalism can be defined as social meta-theories with an opposing understanding of the manner upon which the political world conducts itself. At the most basic level, rationalism builds upon a nature of the world guided by individualism and materialism, while

---

<sup>29</sup> *Key European Union achievements and tangible benefits*. Retrieved 19 June 2022, from [https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/achievements\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/achievements_en).

constructivism does so by a social and ideational ontology.<sup>30</sup> Constructivists assume that political/state actors act with a *logic of appropriateness*, meaning that in each situation, they choose the path which is the most appropriate, depending on the relationship between their role and the situation. The appropriateness of each action is formulated by the norms that the political institution they belong to dictate, and the role that said actors fulfill.<sup>31</sup> These assumptions are contradicted by the rationalist view, which assumes that political actors behave with a *logic of consequentiality*. A logic of consequentiality means that action is guided by its expected outcome. Therefore, actors behave in a certain way to either achieve a desirable outcome or avoid an undesirable one. These preferences in the consequences are subjective to each actor and are formulated based on egotistical and materialistic motives.<sup>32</sup>

This divergence in understanding of the social and political realm leads researchers to have a different view of the nature and purpose of political organizations such as the EU. For rationalists, political organizations are mere instruments for the more efficient pursuit of their material and security interests.<sup>33</sup> A state's desire to enter or remain in such organizations is strictly determined by the cost-benefit calculation of membership.<sup>34</sup> For constructivist, organizations represent a community of like-minded states. They help develop and express the norms and goals of this community by setting the standards of legitimacy and appropriateness. Membership in international organizations according to this theory is determined by the state's compatibility with the culture, identity, values and beliefs of the community of nations that form the organization.<sup>35</sup> These two different lenses naturally offer scholars researching EU enlargement opposing explanations as to why the EU as a political organization opts to enlarge.

---

<sup>30</sup> Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2002). Theorizing EU enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research. *Journal of European public policy*, 9(4), 508.

<sup>31</sup> March, J. G., and Olsen, J. P. (1989) *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: Free Press, 160-161

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1), 6-8.

<sup>34</sup> Sandler, T., & Tschirhart, J. T. (1980). The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 18(4), 1491.

<sup>35</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig & Ulrich Sedelmeier (2002) 'Theorizing EU enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 513.

The enlargement of the EU has been defined as the process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization.<sup>36</sup> The differentiation between horizontal and vertical institutionalization is important, as both processes are closely correlated, and in the field of International Relations the theoretical debates surrounding them are very close. In this thesis the focus lies on the ‘widening’ of the EU, i.e., the extension of its geographical boundaries by including more states in its institutions.

Since the major principles of each approach to enlargement have already been established, it is not hard to identify the condition under which the accession negotiations of the EU and potential members are considered successful. The rationalist hypothesis explains that a new member is accepted when both existing members and applicant state stand to gain more from full membership rather than any other form of association.<sup>37</sup> On the other hand, the constructivist hypothesis rejects that material reasons are the most important aspect that guide member state preferences. Instead, it argues that social identities, norms and values shape the behavior of the actors in a political organization such as the EU.<sup>38</sup> Consequently, the enlargement preferences of the EU’s member states and the negotiation outcomes between them and applicant states will depend upon the degree of cultural and normative match between the two parties. Eventually, according to constructivism, the geographical borders of the EU will expand until they reach its cultural borders.<sup>39</sup>

## **1.2 Historiography of the Easter Enlargement Round of 2004**

Cyprus acceded into the EU on the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2004, along with nine other countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The inclusion of ten new countries within one round of enlargement was unprecedented for the EU. This milestone in the history of the continent successfully reunited two parts of Europe, that had been separated for over half a century, as a result of the Cold War.

---

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 503.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 510.

<sup>38</sup> Nugent, N. (2017). *The government and politics of the European Union*. London: Palgrave, 459.

<sup>39</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig & Ulrich Sedelmeier (2002) ‘Theorizing EU enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 516.

Today, the EU thus celebrates the outcome of this endeavor, as a positive milestone. However, that was not an apparent case twenty-four years ago, when the accession negotiations with the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) began. The decision of the European Council in Luxemburg in 1997 to begin the negotiations for enlargement and the success of these negotiations were somewhat puzzling to many academics.<sup>40</sup> The scholarly discussion that was generated, resulted in a mostly constructivist perspective in analysis behind the enlargement reasoning of the EU. There were of course, several rationalist approaches as well. The following sections of this chapter presents the main approaches in both camps.

### *Rationalism Applied*

In the rationalist camp, Lars Skalnes gives a geopolitical framework to the eastern enlargement. The geopolitical considerations of the EU members, according to Skalnes provided the strongest reasons for their decision to accept so many countries from the ‘Eastern bloc’, even though it seemed like a decision that would hurt their material interests in the short term.<sup>41</sup> Those considerations were born in the first place because the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe created power vacuums, instability, and a need for radical political and economic change.<sup>42</sup> There were fears that in this transitional environment, reforms would be abandoned, and nationalist fueled conflicts would arise. A scenario like this was thought to have an impact on the security and stability of the rest of the Union, especially in the member states bordering the CEECs.<sup>43</sup> The crisis in Yugoslavia that started in 1991-92 showed that such fears were not exaggerated. The uneasy security of the region created a link for the European Commission between the successful transition of those countries to market economies and the neutralization of any threats through spillover to the rest of the EU.<sup>44</sup> This link was expressed in the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993.<sup>45</sup> Policy makers in the EU found that support

---

<sup>40</sup> Europarl.europa.eu. (1998). *Luxembourg European Council (12/97): Presidency Conclusions*. Retrieved 14 June 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1\\_en.htm#enlarge](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm#enlarge).

<sup>41</sup> Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2005). *The Politics Of European Union Enlargement*. Taylor & Francis Ltd. 214- 215.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Friis, L., and Murphy, A. (1999) The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37(2), 220.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN COPENHAGEN 21-22 JUNE 1993 CONCLUSIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY, Consilium.europa.eu. Retrieved 14 June 2022, p.12, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf>.



for Eastern European politicians who were in favor of reforms according to the Copenhagen criteria would most likely lead to a more stable continent. This support would come through economic aid, trade agreements and eventually the promise of full membership.<sup>46</sup>

One of Skalnes' key supporting arguments is the timing of the accession negotiations. The decision of the EU to commit itself to the enlargement path was made in 1993, after the horrors of the crisis in Yugoslavia alerted the European community.<sup>47</sup> Similarly, despite their earlier exclusion in the first round of enlargement negotiations in March 1998, on grounds that they had not made enough progress to meet the Copenhagen criteria, five of the CEECs - Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania - were quickly reincluded after the crisis in Kosovo led EU policy makers to the conclusion that the danger to the stability of Central and Eastern Europe was greater than originally thought.<sup>48</sup> This decision was made by the European Council of Helsinki in 1999.<sup>49</sup> Another aspect of Skalnes' reasoning comes from the almost simultaneous enlargement of another organization, that of NATO, in the same geographical area. Furthermore, Skalnes' points out that this enlargement was first proposed by German politicians (as mentioned before Germany is located on the border with a lot of the CEECs and therefore prone to be affected the most by any tension in the region) and the need to promote stability in the region was one of the focal points behind the reasoning to do so.<sup>50</sup> Skalnes in essence argued that European policy makers considered their security interests in Eastern Europe to be of greater importance than the short term material loss they would take from their economic concession to these countries and the cost of enlargement they would suffer.<sup>51</sup>

A second advocate of the rationalism viewpoint is Andrew Moravcsik. Together with Milada Anna Vachudova, he argued that the Eastern enlargement is easily understood from the

---

<sup>46</sup> Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2005). *The Politics Of European Union Enlargement*. Taylor & Francis Ltd, 214-215.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. 224.

<sup>49</sup> European Commission - Press Corner. (1999). *Commission sets out an ambitious accession strategy and proposes to open accession negotiations with six more candidate countries*. Retrieved 14 June 2022, from [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_99\\_751](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_99_751).

<sup>50</sup> Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2005). *The Politics Of European Union Enlargement*. Taylor & Francis Ltd, 231.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

perspective of national interest and state power.<sup>52</sup> They analyzed the enlargement preferences of member states by calculating the material cost and benefits of accepting the CEECs into the Union and concluded the gains far exceeded the costs of enlargement.<sup>53</sup>

Likewise, according to a 1997 study by Baldwin, Francois, and Portes, the accession of twelve new countries (Romania and Bulgaria included) was estimated to bring 100 million new consumers to the common market, generating a profit of 10 billion euros for the existing fifteen members.<sup>54</sup> Importantly, these gains far exceeded the costs of enlargement.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, the geopolitical interests of member states would have also been met by enlargement as the stabilization and economic growth of Eastern Europe would lead to fewer, or none national conflicts, better management of immigration waves and a reduction of the defense costs, especially those spent on border guarding.<sup>56</sup> These perspectives demonstrate the material considerations behind the 2004 enlargement.

Moravcsik and Vachudova combined these materialistic considerations with intergovernmentalist theory: existing EU member states used their ‘bargaining power’ to limit the costs of accepting new member states.<sup>57</sup> There was a great imbalance of power in favor of the EU-15 during the accession negotiations, because the benefits of membership were so great for the candidate countries, that they were willing to accept harsher terms in order to be allowed to join. One example of this is the division of funds from the EU’s Structural and Cohesion funds and from the Common Agricultural Policy. The new members had to accept a smaller share at the beginning as their less affluent regions and farmers had to accept a phase-in of the EU money.<sup>58</sup> Not only that, the new members were to be kept out of the Schengen zone for some years:<sup>59</sup> they were required to reinforce their borders and wait seven years before their citizens could fully exercise

---

<sup>52</sup> Moravcsik, A., & Vachudova, M. A. (2003). National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement. *East European Politics and Societies*, 17(1), 43.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 50.

<sup>54</sup> Baldwin, R. E., Francois, J. F., and Portes, R. (1997). The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and Central Europe. *Economic Policy*, 12(24), 167.

<sup>55</sup> Moravcsik, A., & Vachudova, M. A. (2003). National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement. *East European Politics and Societies*, 17(1), 50.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 51.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Most 2004 Enlargement round EU member states joined in 2007, with the exception of Cyprus, Romania, and Bulgaria.

the right to live and work anywhere in the EU.<sup>60</sup> The general conclusion of the writers was that the 2004 round of enlargement, as with any previous one, did not run against the material interests of either existing or new members.<sup>61</sup>

### *Constructivism Applied*

The constructivist side of the argument was intended to fulfil missing links in the rationalist theories as explained above. For example, Frank Schimmelfennig proposed ‘rhetorical action’ as the missing link between Moravcsik’s institutional intergovernmentalism, which, according to him, reasonably explains why an association agreement with the CEECs was the result of the ‘bargaining process’ between the existing member states of the EU, and the puzzling - from a classic rationalist perspective - final decision of the Union to offer full membership to those countries.<sup>62</sup> Rhetorical action can be described as the usage of norm-based arguments with the purpose of advancing one’s interests.<sup>63</sup>

Schimmelfennig viewed the EU through a constructivist lens, so he understood its formation and increasing integration to be given legitimacy by its ideals. He identified the belief in, and protection of liberal human rights as one of the cornerstones of the European community.<sup>64</sup> Social pluralism, rule of law, democracy, private property, and a market-based economy are all fundamental norms of the EU, which in turn originate, and base their legitimacy in these liberal human rights.<sup>65</sup> The constitutive ideology of the EU is perfectly represented in its membership rules and requirements.<sup>66</sup> *Sociological institutionalism*, which is the theoretical framework behind Schimmelfennig’s analysis, predicts that the EU will accept as a full member any European state that shares and adheres to these norms.<sup>67</sup>

---

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, 52.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, 53.

<sup>62</sup> Schimmelfennig, F. (2001). The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. *International Organization*, 55(1), 47-48.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, 48.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 59.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN COPENHAGEN 21-22 JUNE 1993 CONCLUSIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY, Consilium.europa.eu. Retrieved 14 June 2022, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf>.

<sup>67</sup> Schimmelfennig, F. (2001). The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. *International Organization*, 55(1), 59.

It is upon these norms that supporters of enlargement were able to base their preferences and successfully ‘shame’ their opponents into conceding a path towards accepting the CEECs as full members.<sup>68</sup> This was achieved despite the lack of sufficient material bargaining power from the CEECs and their supporters inside the EU.<sup>69</sup> The opposition found itself ‘rhetorically entrapped’, as they could neither be overly vocal about their objections nor threaten to veto the enlargement. The reason is that, according to constructivists, going openly against the community’s values, norms and commitments would seriously harm their integrity.<sup>70</sup> Schimmelfennig did not claim that the motives of the advocates of the enlargement were based on selflessness and pure ideology, quite the contrary. However, he reached the conclusion that norms, in an institutional environment, are powerful enough to force actors to go against their material interests in order to protect their credibility.<sup>71</sup>

Second, Ulrich Sedelmeier also departed from the materialistic rationality of action and proposes that, the ‘collective identity’ which the EU has created for itself is the better framework for explaining its behavior towards the issue of the Eastern enlargement. His main argument was that the EU, throughout its existence, had created an identity for itself in which there is embedded the idea of a ‘special responsibility’ towards the countries of the former ‘Eastern bloc’.<sup>72</sup> This identity produced the necessary norms that restricted a behavior by its member states that sought purely the maximalization of their material self-interests.<sup>73</sup> In contrast, it reinforced the legitimacy of an accommodating policy-making towards the preferences of the CEECs.<sup>74</sup>

Lastly, Sedelmeier traced the creation of this aforementioned ‘special responsibility’ back to the years of the Cold War. It became more important during the late 1980s with the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’. A major part of this idea was, the support of the EU was crucial to the necessary political and economic reforms that would in turn lead to the creation of liberal democracies and their eventual integration with the rest of its members.<sup>75</sup> This fit perfectly with the EU’s

---

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, 48.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, 77.

<sup>72</sup> Cowles, M., & Smith, M. (2001). *The State of the European Union*. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 166.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, 167.

constitutive values and norms. After all, in the establishing Treaty of Rome in 1957, the determination for ‘an ever closer union’ among the peoples of Europe and the call on all peoples of Europe who share these ideals to join, are explicitly mentioned.<sup>76</sup> Additionally, there was already a precedent between the promise of membership as a prize for a democratic and market-based economic turn. It was a promise that successfully supported these turns in Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>77</sup> Another way that the EU’s ‘special responsibility’ towards the CEECs formulated and became almost a commitment, is the many statements that were issued by politicians on both, member state and EU level.<sup>78</sup> These statements made it clear to the CEECs that their coerced exclusion from the integration project was noted and condemned. They also reassured them that without their participation, the idea of a united Europe remained incomplete.<sup>79</sup> Sedelmeier concludes that the decisions that led to the eventual acceptance of the CEECs as full members were decisions made in principle and these principles were the main obstacle behind any opposition that was openly justified on the material costs of enlargement.

---

<sup>76</sup> EUR- Lex. *Treaty of Rome (EEC)*. Retrieved 14 June 2022, from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0023>.

<sup>77</sup> Cowles, M., & Smith, M. (2001). *The State of the European Union*. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 167.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, 168.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

## **Chapter 2**

# **Theory in Practice: EU Enlargement Theory and the Unique Case of Cyprus**

### **2.1 Cyprus's Particularity**

The leading approaches to the Eastern enlargement round of 2004 suffer in the universality of their application. Each deal with the CEECs and their particularities, while the island nations of Cyprus and Malta are being bypassed as side notes. Given the circumstances of the greatly important end of the communist reign in Eastern Europe, it is understandable why the aforementioned academic literature chose to focus on that geographical area of the enlargement round.<sup>80</sup> After all no major transformations accompanied those two countries' accession, as both were already liberal democracies with a market-based economy and were under no threat of collapsing because of instability.<sup>81</sup> Yet when examining Cyprus's case the 2004 enlargement historiography has left significant gaps in our understanding of the Eastern enlargement, as none of the aforementioned approaches sufficiently explains why the EU accepted Cyprus as a full member. This chapter sets out to answer this question by systematically examining the aforementioned arguments through key events surrounding Cyprus' path to EU accession between 1993 and 2004.

#### *The Case of Cyprus and Rationalist EU Enlargement Arguments*

To commence with the rationalist arguments: the geopolitical considerations suggested by Skalnès do not seem to fit very well in the case of Cyprus. As mentioned above, the island was already considered 'Western' in the sense that it had a functioning democracy with a stable state apparatus. Its economy already fit most 'free-market' standards. There was no need for major systemic changes in the country, and there was no threat of instability and collapse. The incentive from the EU to facilitate liberal changes was not as strong. In sum, Skalnès' theory offers explanatory power to the CEECs accession, but not Cyprus' accession.

---

<sup>80</sup> Engert, S. (2010). *Eu enlargement and socialization : Turkey and Cyprus*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 15.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

Furthermore, the EU's desire to neutralize nationalistic-fuel conflicts on its borders through enlargements makes little sense in the case of Cyprus, due to the internal division on the island. In fact, it can be argued that Cypriot accession discussions occurred amidst worsened tension within Cyprus, illustrated by a series of events in the 1990s. Firstly, in the summer of 1996, Turkish extremists killed two Greek Cypriots on the 'Green Line' – the United Nations established border between the two groups – during an anti-occupation protest that turned into a violent clash. On the 11th of September 1997, the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denктаş stated during an interview, that a possible accession of the island in the EU under the jurisdiction of the RoC, would strip the Turkish Cypriots of their rights. He added, rather ominously, that the remedy of that would be war.<sup>82</sup> Only the next year the RoC had purchased the Russian-made long range anti-aircraft missiles, S-300. Ankara, upon discovering this, threatened to intervene militarily and 'take them out' by force.<sup>83</sup> Under heavy pressures from the United States of America (USA) and the EU, RoC president Clerides, abandoned this ambitious armament effort and send the missiles to Crete to avoid any further escalation. What is more, a possible renewal of the Cypriot-Turkish tension would most likely drag Greece as well, and the EU would have no choice but to get involved in the broader Greek-Turkish antagonism in the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>84</sup> The probability of this scenario massively increased when the *Imia crisis* in 1996, almost pushed Turkey and Greece into armed conflict. In short, in a matter of two years, just as the accession negotiations were about to commence, these serious incidents proved right all the concerns of some member states that considered Cyprus as a dangerous addition to the EU.<sup>85</sup> This contradicts the stabilization argument mentioned above.

From the rationalist materialistic viewpoint that Moravcsik and Vachudova advocated, Cyprus's accession makes more sense at first glance. From 1996 to 2000 Cyprus's GDP remained the highest among candidate countries and kept rising to reach 86% of the total EU average.<sup>86</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> Friis, L. (2002), Looming shadows: the European Union's eastern enlargement and Cyprus, in Diez, T. (ed), *The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict, Postmodern Union*, Manchester University Press, 27.

<sup>83</sup> Barkey, H. J., & Gordon, P. H. (2001). Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis. *The National Interest*, 66, 88.

<sup>84</sup> Featherstone, K. (2001). Cyprus and the Onset of Europeanization: strategic usage, structural transformation and institutional adaptation. *South European Society and Politics*, 5(2), 145.

<sup>85</sup> Friis, L. (2002), Looming shadows: the European Union's eastern enlargement and Cyprus, in Diez, T. (ed), *The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict, Postmodern Union*, Manchester University Press, 26.

<sup>86</sup> Eurostat (2002), *Statistical yearbook on candidate and south-east European countries* p. 69, Retrieved 16 October 2021, from <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/def8e63c-f638-4e60-9fe2-92dfa28ac5ae/language-en#>

Because of this, Cyprus received a positive economic evaluation on the Commission's report on Cyprus's progress towards accession in 1998.<sup>87</sup> Cyprus accession does seem to be within the economic interests of the EU and was not expected to create any significant problems, seemingly confirming this enlargement theory.<sup>88</sup>

The particularity of this case however disrupts this neat calculation. The Cyprus problem not only caused tension between Ankara and Nicosia, but also prevented Turkish EU membership. The long-standing political issue of Turkey's illegal occupation of a large part of the island did not allow the two cases to be examined independently during the accession discussion period of 1993-2004. By allowing the RoC to enter the EU as a full member, and more importantly by allowing the country to enter without its reunification being a precondition, the EU put the possible future accession of Turkey at risk.<sup>89</sup> Even though the EU strongly advocated for a solution to the Cyprus problem and declared emphatically that reunification would facilitate the accession, Cyprus was allowed to proceed with accession negotiations even after reunification efforts fell through.<sup>90</sup> After accession, the RoC would have the ability to veto Ankara's entry.<sup>91</sup> The EU would thus be deprived of the important long-term material benefits of a Turkish EU membership.<sup>92</sup> After all, at the time of the beginning of the enlargement negotiations with Cyprus, Turkey was the EU's sixth larger trading partner.<sup>93</sup> Cyprus's accession therefore, does not seem at first to be against the material interests of the EU members, yet the complexity of the situation makes the case that this approach too, fails to fully explain the EU's choice.

---

<sup>87</sup> European Commission (1998). *Regular report from the Commission on Cyprus's progress towards accession*, p. 21. Retrieved 16 October 2021, from <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/5502dcd0-d088-4545-87d3-bda2bbada86f>

<sup>88</sup> Westering J. (2000), 'Conditionality and EU Membership: The Cases of Turkey and Cyprus', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 5(1), 111.

<sup>89</sup> Nugent, N. (2000). EU enlargement and the Cyprus problem. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(1), 138.

<sup>90</sup> European Commission. (2002). *Presidency Conclusions Seville European Council 21 and 22 June 2002*. Retrieved 18 October 2021, from [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC\\_02\\_13](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_02_13).

<sup>91</sup> Nugent, N. (2000). EU enlargement and the Cyprus problem. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(1), 138.

<sup>92</sup> Nugent N. (2007). The EU's Response to Turkey's Membership Application: Not Just a Weighing of Costs and Benefits. *Journal of European Integration*, 29(4), 495.

<sup>93</sup> Nugent, N. (2000). EU enlargement and the Cyprus problem. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(1), 138.



## *The Case of Cyprus and Constructivist EU Enlargement Arguments*

Moving on to the constructivist approaches of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, different issues arise that render both approaches unable to explain Cyprus's path towards membership. The country's perceived European character and general eligibility as a potential candidate were affirmed early on. However, there was a clear mention in the Commission's opinion in 1993 on the island's application for membership, namely, that a political solution was expected to be found before accession.<sup>94</sup> In addition, the Commission document criticized the violation of the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the island.<sup>95</sup> The RoC could not guarantee the free movement of people, goods and capital in its territory nor the effective implementation of the *acquis communautaire*. The assumptions of the constructivist theory on political organizations, point that membership would not be denied to any country that adheres to the rules and norms of that organization. Cyprus, however, was in clear violation of said rules and norms as Nicosia could not fulfil its obligations of membership as defined by the criteria established by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993.<sup>96</sup>

Second, Schimmelfennig's argument on 'rhetorical action', although not entirely unapplicable, appears weak in this case. Perhaps the core normative argument that was in favor of Cyprus's eligibility, is the fact that the country was able to fulfil most of its membership criteria (excluding, of course, the political issue) and the ones that could not fulfil, were not because of actions taken by the RoC. This position was affirmed by the European observer for Cyprus, Serge Abou in a series of reports he issued during 1994 and 1995.<sup>97</sup> These reports stated that the Greek Cypriots had shown their willingness to reach a solution while the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey rejected the proposals that were presented to them. Abou identified the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as the culprits for the human rights violations that were committed in the north part of the island.<sup>98</sup> The Cypriot government used this argument to their utmost advantage, claiming that the

---

<sup>94</sup> COMMISSION OPINION ON THE APPLICATION BY THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS FOR MEMBERSHIP - EXTRACTS -. (1993). Retrieved 19 October 2021, from [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC\\_93\\_5](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_93_5).

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN COPENHAGEN 21-22 JUNE 1993 CONCLUSIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY. European Parliament. (1993). Retrieved 19 October 2021, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf>.

<sup>97</sup> Joseph, J. (1999). Cyprus and the E.U.: Searching for a Settlement in the Light of the Accession, *Cyprus Review*, 11(1). 45.

<sup>98</sup> Engert, S. (2010). *Eu enlargement and socialization : Turkey and Cyprus*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 58.

EU denying its membership application and tying it to the Cyprus problem, meant that both the Union and the norm complying Greek Cypriots were being held hostage by an illegal pseudo-state, the TRNC and the country that was keeping an occupation force in 'its' territory, Turkey.<sup>99</sup>

Despite that, there were plenty of normative arguments used against the Cypriot membership. Until 1998, several EU members that expressed serious reservations about including Cyprus in the enlargement round as long as the status quo was maintained.<sup>100</sup> The French foreign minister Hubert Védrine conveyed the opinion on October 5<sup>th</sup> of 1998, that there could be no automatic membership for a divided island.<sup>101</sup> A month later France, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands even issued a joint statement during the EU General Affairs Council, drawing attention on the difficulties that the Cyprus case presented in the opening of the first seven chapters of the *acquis*.<sup>102</sup> They expressed the opinion that only through reunification those problems could be overcome and negotiations could continue.<sup>103</sup> Otherwise issues would arise in the future, especially in the development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).<sup>104</sup> In addition, there were concerns about the legality and legitimacy of the application. When then president of the RoC, George Vassiliou applied for membership in 1990, it was done without the consent of the Turkish Cypriot part of the population, even though the application was submitted on behalf of the whole island.<sup>105</sup> The Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş protested the application vigorously and sent a letter to the European Commission stressing his disapproval and emphasizing that Cyprus joining an international organization of which Greece and Turkey were not both members, was prohibited by the Cypriot constitution.<sup>106</sup> When accession negotiations

---

<sup>99</sup> Nugent, N. (2000). EU enlargement and the Cyprus problem. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(1), 137.

<sup>100</sup> European Parliament. (2000). *Cyprus and the Enlargement of the European Union (2)*. Retrieved 23 October 2021, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/1a3\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/1a3_en.htm).

<sup>101</sup> PRS GROUP (1998). COUNTRY ANALYSIS; INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY RISK GUIDE (ICRG). Retrieved 14 June 2022, from. [POLITICS \(uu.nl\)](https://www.prs.nl/).

<sup>102</sup> *Joint Statement Made By Italy, France, Germany And The Netherlands On The Greek Cypriot-EU Membership Process During The EU General Affairs Council November 9, 1998*. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011). Retrieved 25 October 2021, from [https://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-made-by-italy\\_-france\\_-germany-and-the-netherlands-on-the-greek-cypriot-eu-membership-process-during-the-eu-general-affairs-council-br-november-9\\_-1998.en.mfa?fbclid=IwAR1diXVm68VmyoLFjLwmiy0aTx0leEHQyOEejxQxL2js9YHxjoibZ7ulYpE#](https://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-made-by-italy_-france_-germany-and-the-netherlands-on-the-greek-cypriot-eu-membership-process-during-the-eu-general-affairs-council-br-november-9_-1998.en.mfa?fbclid=IwAR1diXVm68VmyoLFjLwmiy0aTx0leEHQyOEejxQxL2js9YHxjoibZ7ulYpE#).

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Nugent, N. (2000). EU enlargement and the Cyprus problem. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(1), 137.

<sup>106</sup> Buhari-gülmez, D. & Gülmez, S. B. (2008). The EU Conditionality in the Cyprus Problem: Catalyzing Euro-Scepticism in Turkey? . *Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi* , 14 (35) , 4.

begun in 1998, the Turkish Cypriot representatives refused to participate despite being invited due to the refusal of the EU to recognize the TRNC and pressures by Turkey.<sup>107</sup> Without Turkish Cypriot participation, the serious normative argument could be made about the legitimacy and ethical aspects of overriding the objections of a sizable and distinct part of the population of a country.<sup>108</sup>

Third, concerning the idea of any ‘special responsibility’ that the EU felt towards Cyprus, mentioned by Sedelmeier, there is no sign to demonstrate that this was the case before 1993. Even though Cyprus became an Associate Country of the EU in 1972 and a Customs Union was signed in 1987, there was no mentions about a possible future membership.<sup>109</sup> Nonetheless, after the EU accepted Cyprus’s eligibility for membership in 1993, its involvement in the solution of the Cyprus problem was inevitable. The conclusions of the European Council in Luxemburg in 1997 stated that ‘the accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities and help bring about civil peace and reconciliation. The accession negotiations will contribute positively to the search for a political solution to the Cyprus problem...’.<sup>110</sup> This is the point where the EU seems to take active responsibility and becomes more involved in the efforts for a solution to the unsettled dispute. This makes Sedelmier’s ‘special responsibility’ framework appear oddly fitting at this later stage.

However, up to 2002 the prospect of Cyprus’ EU membership hardened Turkey’s and the Turkish Cypriot leadership’s stance towards reunification, making the EU position counterproductive.<sup>111</sup> For example, when the EU announced its intentions to start accession negotiations with the RoC, Turkey reacted immediately by declaring Ankara’s own intentions of integrating the TRNC in a similar manner.<sup>112</sup> Turkey did not settle for just words, and even before negotiations between the EU and the RoC commenced in 1998, an association agreement was signed between the governments of Turkey and the TRNC.<sup>113</sup> The EU approached the issue of

---

<sup>107</sup> Baun, M. J. (2000) *A Wider Europe: the process and politics of European Union enlargement*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 100.

<sup>108</sup> Nugent, N. (2000). EU enlargement and the Cyprus problem. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(1), 137.

<sup>109</sup> Engert, S. (2010). *Eu enlargement and socialization : Turkey and Cyprus*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 55.

<sup>110</sup> European Parliament. (1998). *Luxembourg European Council (12/97): Presidency Conclusions*. Retrieved 19 January 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm).

<sup>111</sup> In 2002 the Justice and Development Party won the general elections in Turkey, which saw a shift in Turkey’s policy towards supporting the efforts of Kofi Annan for a solution plan before 2004.

<sup>112</sup> Kramer, H. (1997). The Cyprus problem and European security. *Survival*, 39(3), 17.

<sup>113</sup> *Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the establishment of an Association Council*. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Cyprus's membership using the standard procedure for candidate countries. That means conducting the negotiations with the representatives of the RoC, the only legal political entity of the island, and despite expressing the desire for the Turkish Cypriots to participate, their refusal to participate without first having their 'state' or 'political equality' recognized, was to be expected.<sup>114</sup> Any expectations from the EU that the economic benefits of membership would act as catalyst for overcoming the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot objections could at that point be characterized as wishful thinking.<sup>115</sup> In other words, the EU had failed to fulfill her 'special responsibility' to be a driving force towards reunification of the island.

The next milestone that influenced the eventual accession of only the southern part of the island was the Helsinki European Council in 1999. There the council made the decision that the future of Cyprus's European path would not be conditioned on the successful settlement of the Cyprus problem.<sup>116</sup> This decision freed the hands of the Greek Cypriot side and allowed it not to compromise any further in their pursue for reunification.<sup>117</sup> With their future in the EU secured the Greek Cypriots felt empowered to reject the Annan plan for reunification. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Union either ignored or was blind to the fact that its role in the Cyprus problem was counterproductive and that it pushed both sides to be more unbending in their positions.<sup>118</sup> What is more, it can also be concluded that the special responsibility argument does not hold up to explain Cyprus' accession as it does for the accession of the CEECs.

---

(2011). Retrieved 22 November 2021, from <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/agreement-between-the-government-of-the-republic-of-turkey-and-the-government-of-the-turkish-republic-of-northern-cyprus-on-the.en.mfa>.

<sup>114</sup> For a more detailed analysis of the EU strategy towards Cyprus see: Diez, T. (2002), Last exit to paradise? The European Union, the Cyprus conflict and the problematic 'catalytic effect'. In Diez, T. (ed), *The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict, Postmodern Union*, Manchester University Press, 139-162., Kramer, H. (1997), 'The Cyprus problem and European security', *Survival*, 39:3, 16-32., Kyris, G. (2012) The European Union and the Cyprus problem: a story of limited impetus, *Eastern journal of European studies*, 3 (1). 87-99.

<sup>115</sup> Dodd, C. H., & Axt Heinz-Jürgen. (1999). *Cyprus : the need for new perspectives*. Eothen Press. 191.

<sup>116</sup> Europarl.europa.eu. (1999). *Helsinki European Council 10-11.12.1999: Conclusions of the Presidency*. Retrieved 24 November 2021, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm).

<sup>117</sup> Kyris, G. (2012). The European Union and the Cyprus problem: a story of limited impetus. *Eastern journal of European studies*, 3 (1). 90.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

## 2.2 Towards an Expanded Enlargement Theory: Intergovernmentalism, Institutionalism, and Political Economy Logic

The second chapter thus far has established that our current understanding of the EU's behavior towards enlargement candidates is not complete, as the enlargement case of Cyprus is not satisfactorily explained in any rationalistic or constructivist calculation the literature has provided. An alternative narrative is proposed in this thesis, one that has its basis on the rationalist general principles, but which differs in the way the cost-benefit calculation is measured.

The hypothesis of this research is that a clearer picture of the conditions under which enlargement takes place is most likely to be formed when there is an examination of the multilateral negotiations and agreements between the various member states, so as to identify when there is a change in attitude, and any objections on new memberships are lifted. This can be achieved by not looking at the negotiation process as a 'black box', but instead to try and find the conditions, side-payments and side-deals that were made before the 'breakers' of the enlargement agreed to support it.<sup>119</sup>

The core argument of this narrative is that the EU cannot be viewed as one party and the applicant state as another. The EU is the sum of its parts, and its widening has a divergent effect on each part. Any new member joining the Union is bound to cause clashes when these effects are asymmetric or when it is expected that the new member will increase the diverseness of policy preference.<sup>120</sup> The members who stand to gain most, inevitably come into conflict with those who stand to lose or gain less.<sup>121</sup> Despite the occurrence of these conflicts, the EU has successfully enlarged time and time again. The reason behind this success is that the various governments have managed to find a compromise and distributed the benefits of enlargement from the relative winners to the relative losers.<sup>122</sup> Or vice-versa the relative winners took upon themselves some of the costs that the relative losers were burdened with.

---

<sup>119</sup> Schneider, C. (2009). *Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement*. Cambridge University Press, 4.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.* 61.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.* 4.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.* 5.

‘Distributional conflict’ poses a serious threat to enlargement because of the specific institutional environment of the EU. For a country to be accepted there needs to be unanimous consent.<sup>123</sup> A single veto can block the entry of a new country. This gives a massive advantage to the relative losers of a possible enlargement because they can theoretically delay or block indefinitely an agreement that goes against their interest or leverage a side-payment that sufficiently compensates them.<sup>124</sup> In some cases the cost of the redistribution of the enlargement gains falls upon the new member, in the form of reduced membership rights.<sup>125</sup> However, this is done in a restricted time frame as to not create a permanent second class membership of the EU.<sup>126</sup>

One of the most basic principles of this framework, which has its roots on rationalistic assumptions, is that any enlargement attempt needs to provide positive net-benefits for both candidate and existing EU members.<sup>127</sup> Not only that, but it also cannot be overwhelmingly beneficial to some parties while providing just minor positive effects to others.<sup>128</sup>

This theoretical framework offers superior tools in the attempt to understand the Cypriot membership and the EU’s process of enlargement in general. The unsettled dispute within the country of Cyprus provides it with complexities that most European nations do not have, and its relations with Greece and Turkey make it a case with a set of challenges that the EU has had major problems handling. The advantage of this theory is that it breaks down the EU as unit and looks at each component separately instead of a homogenous group. It is not enough to explain an enlargement round by its outcome. Instead, the examination of the conflicts the case of Cyprus has caused, and their eventual resolution is the best way to shine a light on the reasons that make an enlargement round successful. In addition, this theory makes use of the particular institutional environment of the EU in a way that the approaches that have been discussed so far do not.

---

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid. 6.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid. 7.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid. 57.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter 3

### The Road to Membership: A Historical Analysis

When the European Commission confirmed Cyprus's eligibility to become a member state in 1993, it was quite clear that it would do so only if the Cyprus problem, as mentioned earlier, was resolved, and the island was reunited.<sup>129</sup> Specifically, the Commission's opinion on the application of Cyprus stated: 'Cyprus's integration with the Community implies a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question... the institutional provisions contained in such a settlement should create the appropriate conditions for Cyprus to participate normally in the decision-making process of the European Community and in the correct application of Community law throughout the island.'<sup>130</sup> However, six years later at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, the EU made a different statement: 'The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition.'<sup>131</sup>

This chapter draws a historical analysis of Cyprus's European path from the time of the country's application in 1990, to its eventual inclusion on the enlargement round of 2004. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate how and why the EU shifted its position and how the existence of the obstacle on Nicosia's normative compliance (meaning the persistence of Cyprus problem) was eventually overlooked. To do so, this chapter shows how Greece was able to bargain the accession of Cyprus into the EU, and in doing so, this chapter demonstrates how intergovernmentalist institutional theory adds explanatory power to the EU enlargement case of Cyprus and enlargement theory in general.

---

<sup>129</sup> European Commission (1993). *COMMISSION OPINION ON THE APPLICATION BY THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS FOR MEMBERSHIP, CELEX1, /\* COM/93/0313 FINAL \*/*. Op.europa.eu. Retrieved 18 May 2022, from <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/99cd34a4-e06a-4e6f-a957-b8f562034cdc> .

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> European Parliament (1999). *European Council Helsinki 10-11.12.1999: Conclusions of the Presidency*. Europarl.europa.eu. Retrieved 18 May 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm).

### 3.1 The Influential Roles of Greece and Turkey

Cyprus' and Greece's historical, cultural, linguistic and religious bonds date back to more than three millennia. After the Cypriot application for membership in 1990, Greece's foreign policy goal became to methodically use its privileged position from inside the EU to accompany Cyprus' European endeavor and push for the island's inclusion in the Eastern Enlargement round. Greece was able to do this by taking advantage of the highly systematized decision-making process of Brussels, that was built upon the need for absolute consensus on issues such as enlargement.<sup>132</sup>

At the same time the Cypriot journey towards integration with the EU was heavily connected with Turkey's own European path. Even though this connection was perceived as undesirable for both the Turkish side and the EU, one EU member insisted on making this connection happen. That member was Turkey's regional rival, Greece.<sup>133</sup> Athens had already been a major obstacle in the adaptation of the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement of 1963, in order to accommodate the EU's Southern Enlargement and include Spain, Portugal and of course, Greece.<sup>134</sup> In addition, the Greek government blocked the fourth financial protocol of economic assistance to Turkey, provided for by the Ankara Agreement.<sup>135</sup> Greece lifted its resistance towards the summoning of the 1994 EEC-Turkey Association Council, only when the EEC presidency offered to take a clearer stance in support of Greek side and mention that the Cyprus problem has a negative effect on the EEC-Turkish relations.<sup>136</sup> For every step that the EU wanted to take towards a closer integration with Turkey, it paid with a side deal to bypass Greek objections, which would play a key role in Cyprus' EU accession in line with institutionalist theory and demonstrated by the following events.

---

<sup>132</sup> Engert, S. (2010). *Eu enlargement and socialization : Turkey and cyprus*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 59-60.

<sup>133</sup> Dembinski, M. (2001). *Bedingt handlungsfähig: Eine Studie zur Türkeiipolitik der Europäischen Union*, HSFK-Report 5/2001, Frankfurt: Hessische Stiftung Friedensund Konfliktforschung. 32.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. 33.

<sup>135</sup> *AGREEMENT establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey (signed at Ankara, 12 September 1963 )*. (1977). p 10. retrieved 23 May 2022, from [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f8e2f9f4-75c8-4f62-ae3f-b86ca5842eee.0008.02/DOC\\_2&format=PDF](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f8e2f9f4-75c8-4f62-ae3f-b86ca5842eee.0008.02/DOC_2&format=PDF).

<sup>136</sup> Dembinski, M. (2001) *Bedingt handlungsfähig: Eine Studie zur Türkeiipolitik der Europäischen Union*, HSFK-Report 5/2001, Frankfurt: Hessische Stiftung Friedensund Konfliktforschung. 33.



### 3.2 The 1994 Corfu European Council Summit

In the first part of 1994 Greece held the EU presidency, and therefore lead the European Council that took place in Corfu in June 1994. In what is arguably one of the biggest wins of Greek foreign policy, the Greek Presidency managed to secure the commitment of its partners that the next round of accession negotiations and eventual enlargement would include Malta and Cyprus.<sup>137</sup> Also no statement tied a successful solution of the Cyprus problem with the country's European future. This was therefore a huge step forward for the Cypriot cause, and at the same time a great divergence by the EU on its normative commitment to uphold the standards of membership it set in Copenhagen only a few months prior.

Professor of International Relations William Wallace, described this turn of events as follows: 'Late at night during the Corfu European Council in June 1994 the Greek Presidency secured from its distracted partners the declaration that accession negotiations with Cyprus and Malta, as priority candidates, would begin within six months of the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference planned in 1996.'<sup>138</sup> According to other sources, Greece even threatened to block the imminent European Free Trade Association (EFTA) enlargement if the European Council did not agree to remove any passages that mentioned the reunification of the island as a precondition for the beginning of enlargement negotiations with the country.<sup>139</sup>

Faced with the decision to put the EFTA enlargement at risk, the EU took an accommodating stance to the Greek demands. Accommodating this side deal allowed the rest of the EU members to enjoy the benefits of the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland while the problems of the case of Cyprus are ignored for the time being. In other words, Greece was using its bargaining power to further the cause of Cyprus' accession, and Cyprus' accession became a bargaining chip in larger enlargement debates.

---

<sup>137</sup> Europarl.europa.eu. (1998). *Corfu European Council, 24 and 25 June 1994 - 2- An extract of the presidency conclusions: Corfu European Council, 24 and 25 June 1994*. Retrieved 26 May 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/cor\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/cor_en.htm).

<sup>138</sup> Wallace, W. (2000). From the Atlantic to the Bug, from the Arctic to the Tigris? The Transformation of the EU and NATO. *International Affairs*, 76(3), 477.

<sup>139</sup> Dembinski, M. (2001). *Bedingt handlungsfähig: Eine Studie zur Türkeiipolitik der Europäischen Union*, HSFK-Report 5/2001, Frankfurt: Hessische Stiftung Friedensund Konfliktforschung, 34.

### 3.3 The EU-Turkey Customs Union

The next phase of Greek pressure upon the EU came at the Essen European Council in December 1994. To the frustration of the German presidency Greece vetoed the EU Customs Union with Turkey while it was in its final stages of negotiation.<sup>140</sup> Illustratively, Sir Leon Brittan, who was the representative of the European Commission in the EU-Turkey meeting in Brussels on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December 1994, praised the progress made thus far to the implementation of the Customs Union but, blamed the inability of its realization to ‘the opposition of a single member’.<sup>141</sup>

Greece would eventually drop its veto in March of 1995 after the French presidency was able to work out a compromise with Athens. The result of the French-Greek bilateral negotiations was that the EU was finally be able to establish its Customs Union with Turkey and release the fourth financial protocol to Ankara. Greece received the promise of the EU, that a schedule of accession negotiations with Cyprus would be established, and that said negotiations would commence no later than six months after the Intergovernmental Conference to review the Maastricht Treaty.<sup>142</sup> What is more, Greece bargained that all references to the accession of Cyprus only after a solution was found, be dropped, otherwise it would not lift its veto over Turkey nor would it approve the release of the fourth financial protocol.<sup>143</sup>

Distributional conflict, as explained in chapter 2 clarifies the events that occurred when the EU tried to form a closer relation with a Turkey. A closer EU-Turkish partnership would hamper Greek interests as the two countries have unsettled disputes, such as the Cyprus problem. The international backing that Greece receives as a member of the EU, would be substantially weakened if Turkey also formed a closer relationship with the same organization. This is evident from example of NATO. The Greek side received little to no support from NATO, during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Imia crisis, and the several other instances of Turkish provocative

---

<sup>140</sup> Ramming, S. (2008), ‘Cyprus's Accession Negotiations to the European Union: Conditional Carrots, Good Faith, and Miscalculations’, *International Negotiation*, 13(3), 379.

<sup>141</sup> European Commission (1994). *Bulletin of the European Union*, p. 115, Retrieved 28 May 2022, from <http://aei.pitt.edu/65215/1/BUL392.pdf>

<sup>142</sup> BLACK, I., & PALMER, J. (1995). EU opens way for negotiations to admit Cyprus. *The Guardian (London, England)*. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from <https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&u=utrecht&id=GALE|A170644713&v=2.1&it=r&sid=bookmark-ITOF&asid=92abb4c9>.

<sup>143</sup> Engert, S. (2010). *Eu enlargement and socialization : Turkey and cyprus*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 59-60.

behavior. For Greece, as the theoretical framework predicts, the costs caused by closer EU-Turkey relations lead it to be able to extract a side payment to allow the rest of the EU to reap the benefits of the Customs Union with Turkey.

### **3.4 The 1995 Madrid European Council**

Despite all efforts made by the Greek government, the accession of Cyprus was far from certain. Nor was the success of the enlargement negotiations fully disconnected from the Cyprus problem just yet. This is demonstrated by the presidency conclusions where the Council in Madrid declared the great importance it attached to the successful solution of the Cyprus question.<sup>144</sup> Not only that, it also confirmed its commitment to actively ‘work towards a resolution of the Cyprus question taking into account the prospective accession of Cyprus to the European Union. We will support the UN Secretary General’s Mission of Good Offices and encourage dialogue between and with the Cypriot communities.’<sup>145</sup>

While the language used by the Council is clearly balanced as to not upset its Greek partners and, on paper, appear to keep their commitments made earlier that year. However, it seems obvious that the EU attempted to mitigate the problem of accepting a divided country into the organization. It is also apparent from the text that the EU in 1995 was still optimistic that the next round of UN mediation talks would be successful, and the Cyprus problem solved before they would have to definitively decide on the island’s European future.

### **3.5 The 1997 Luxembourg European Council**

During the months leading up to the Luxembourg European Council, planned for the December of 1997, Greece made it its priority to separate the Cypriot accession process from the new round of negotiations aiming to finding a solution to the Cyprus problem.<sup>146</sup>

The Greek prime minister Costas Simitis attached the success of the EU-Cyprus negotiations to the European plan to incorporate most of the CEECs. He made it clear to his

---

<sup>144</sup> European Parliament (1998), *MADRID EUROPEAN COUNCIL 15 and 16 DECEMBER 1995 PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS*. Retrieved 2 June 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/mad1\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/mad1_en.htm).

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

<sup>146</sup> Martin, N. (2015). *Security and the Turkey-EU Accession Process*. Palgrave Macmillan. 37.

European peers that Greece would not accept an accession treaty for any new EU members unless Cyprus was also included. He was also adamant in the long-standing Greek position that Cyprus's European progress should not by any means be conditional to the solution of the Cyprus problem. In an interview with the Financial Times, he said: 'Greece will use all measures offered in the framework of the European Union to achieve what it considers to be right'.<sup>147</sup> He also added that he hoped it would not be necessary for Greece to veto the EU membership for former Communist countries.<sup>148</sup>

Therefore, suddenly the EU was faced with the possibility of the whole Eastern enlargement project being derailed because of the Cyprus problem. As a result, the conclusions of the presidency of the Luxemburg European Council reflected to a significant extent the Greek demands: it set an official date for the beginning of the accession process of Cyprus and in addition, it placed the island within the same framework as the rest of the CEECs.<sup>149</sup> From that point on the EU seemingly considered Cyprus as definite part of the Eastern Enlargement project.<sup>150</sup>

The events above have demonstrated that the progress of the institutional status of Cyprus would not have been possible without the Greek threats. The heterogenous preferences of the EU member states would not have permitted it otherwise. In other words, side dealings and bargaining seem to have motivated the EU to accept Cyprus into the Eastern Enlargement project, rather than normative ideals. The next part of this chapter makes a more depth analysis of this divergence of opinions and policy preferences within the EU to underline this finding.

---

<sup>147</sup> Mortimer, E., & Hope, K. (1997). Greece hints at EU expansion veto Simitis warns of trouble if Cyprus is excluded from next wave of enlargement. *Financial Times (London, England)*. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from <https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/document?crd=24178cac-d217-40cb-8e24-0d68a602544e&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RJ0-7CP0-00D0-040C-00000-00&pdsourcingtype=&pdcontentcomponentid=293847&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true&pdacts=1655254774486>.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> European Parliament (1998). *LUXEMBOURG EUROPEAN COUNCIL 12 AND 13 DECEMBER 1997 PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS*. Retrieved 2 June 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm)

<sup>150</sup> Ramming, S. (2008). Cyprus's Accession Negotiations to the European Union: Conditional Carrots, Good Faith, and Miscalculations. *International Negotiation*, 13(3), 371.

### 3.6 Accession Negotiations Under Threat

The official start of the accession negotiations between Cyprus and the EU was on the 31 of March in 1998. However, the most substantial part of the negotiations, which involved the opening of the first seven chapters of the *acquis*, were planned to commence in November of the same year.<sup>151</sup> The aforementioned deals made by the Greek and Cypriot governments put the Cypriot European cause in the right trajectory and membership no longer looked like an impossibility. However, on the eve of the opening of the seven *acquis* chapters, another setback came to show to the Cypriots that membership was not a certainty either.

On November 9<sup>th</sup> Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands issued a joint statement expressing their concern over the continuation of the islands division and the inability of the involved parties to make any significant progress in solving the dispute.<sup>152</sup> They predicted that as the negotiations would progress several problems would arise, caused by the particularity of the situation that Cyprus found and finds itself in.<sup>153</sup> The statement also makes notice of the fundamental problems the division of the island would cause for the functioning and coherence of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and it concludes that the only way to resolve these issues is by solving the Cyprus problem before the negotiations continue.

This statement was not a surprise, nor was it the first sign of resistance by individual EU member states. In August 1997 the Italian minister of foreign affairs Lomberto Dini urged the EU to negotiate with both Turkish and Greek Cypriots and demanded that the Union had to recognize that there are two peoples, two republics, two governments and two entities on the island.<sup>154</sup> In a two-day meeting of the EU foreign ministers in Edinburgh in March 1998 the French foreign

---

<sup>151</sup> European Parliament (2000). *Cyprus and the Enlargement of the European Union (2)*. Retrieved 3 June 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/1a3\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/1a3_en.htm).

<sup>152</sup> *Joint Statement Made By Italy, France, Germany And The Netharlands On The Greek Cypriot-EU Membership Process During The EU General Affairs Council November 9, 1998 / Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Mfa.gov.tr. Retrieved 3 June 2022, from <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-made-by-italy-france-germany-and-the-netharlands-on-the-greek-cypriot-eu-membership-process-during-the-eu-general-affairs-council-br-november-9-1998.en.mfa?fbclid=IwAR1diXVm68VmyoLFjLwmiy0aTx0leEHQyOEejxQxL2js9YHxjoibZ7uIYpE>.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>154</sup> Associated Press International. (1997). Greek officials denounce Italian statement on Cyprus. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from <https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/document?crd=64a4b7db-65fb-4e53-b0fd-c90ce41f5125&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RWN-0KB0-00BT-M3HB-00000-00&pdsourcingtype=&pdcontentcomponentid=138211&pdmfid=1516831&pdurlapi=true>.

minister Hubert Vedrine characterized the prospect of a divided Cyprus becoming a EU member as ‘unrealistic’ and that this was a position not unique to France.<sup>155</sup> He emphasized that this prospect would create enormous problems for the Union.<sup>156</sup> French president Jacques Chirac added the statement that the EU ‘could not import the divided island’s Greek-Turkish feud’ and that the EU ‘should freeze accession negotiations if the Turkish Cypriots refuse to come to the table.’<sup>157</sup> He added that ‘the EU does not have a vocation to take in a piece of Cyprus and to take in problems which are not its own.’<sup>158</sup> He concluded with the sentence that was perhaps the most damaging for the Cypriot case, that the EU should suspend negotiations with Cyprus if it became clear that they cannot negotiate with the whole island.<sup>159</sup>

### 3.7 The 1999 Helsinki European Council

The next milestone that would determine Cyprus’s European future came at the Helsinki Council in December 1999. There were serious preparations being made by the Greek delegation during the runup to the Council. At the Cologne European Council summit in June, Greece reminded the EU that it still held significant power over the Union’s dealings with Turkey by blocking a German initiative for grading Turkey official EU candidacy status.<sup>160</sup> This way, the Greek delegation through its new minister of foreign affairs, George Papandreou, connected the issue of Cyprus and the Turkish candidacy case. Papandreou was also set on decoupling the renewed UN efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem to the country’s accession. They demanded a clear statement from the EU, that the political settlement of the Cyprus problem would not be an absolute precondition for membership.<sup>161</sup>

---

<sup>155</sup> AP Archive. Aparchive.com. (2020). UK: EDINBURGH: FOREIGN MINISTERS EU MEMBERSHIP TALKS UPDATE (2) | Retrieved 3 June 2022, from

<http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/ffaed75b66eb22df43a9878037335103>.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid

<sup>157</sup> Hamilton, D. (1998). EU MINISTERS TO TACKLE KOSOVO, CYPRUS MINEFIELDS. AAP NEWSFEED. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from <https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/document?crd=2ecb7e42-3d15-40f2-a3a4-da644b5df4d8&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3S70-MHP0-0048-T2KT-00000-00&pdsourcgroupingtype=&pdcontentcomponentid=160586&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true>.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>160</sup> Martin, N. (2015). *Security and the Turkey-EU Accession Process*. Palgrave Macmillan. 45.

<sup>161</sup> Hannay, D. (2005). *Cyprus: The search for a solution*, Bloomsbury Publishing, 112.

Two days before the Council meeting in Helsinki (which was planned for the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> of December), Greece was the only EU member still not giving its consent to Turkey becoming an official candidate.<sup>162</sup> The EU found itself in a difficult position as it was unable to progress with the Turkish candidacy nor with the Eastern enlargement as long as the Greeks heavily implied a veto.<sup>163</sup> Thus, the only choice left to the Europeans was to grant Greece its interest: in exchange for Athens's support of the Turkish candidacy the EU agreed to disconnect the accession of Cyprus from the solution to the Cyprus problem and issued a clear statement that Cyprus would become an EU member state even if the division of the island remained and the issue was not resolved by the time of accession.<sup>164</sup>

The Greek Cypriot reaction to the Helsinki presidency conclusions was ecstatic.<sup>165</sup> After Helsinki the possibility of a Cypriot membership became official and most of the goals of the Greek foreign policy had been achieved. The EU highlighted that a political settlement would facilitate the accession, to not appear as giving a 'blank cheque' to the Greek Cypriots.<sup>166</sup> The reality of the situation was that any conditionality towards the Greek Cypriots was limited.

Up until this point in the historical analysis, the theoretical framework, as described in chapter 2, provides clarity behind the EU's motives. Cyprus moves closer and closer to membership through a series of threats and side deals made by the Greek government and delegation. The EU in turn was able to fulfill the EFTA enlargement and safeguard the Eastern Enlargement while also concluding the Customs Union with Turkey and offering Ankara the status of official candidate. The objections towards the Cypriot membership were lifted only when beneficial for EU projects came under threat by Greece. The EU thus 'ignored' its own criteria for membership, by deciding to admit a divided Cyprus, with the prospect of reunification still far way.

---

<sup>162</sup> Martin, N. (2015). *Security and the Turkey-EU Accession Process*. Palgrave Macmillan. 51-52.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid. 51.

<sup>164</sup> Engert, S. (2010), *Eu enlargement and socialization : Turkey and cyprus*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 62.

<sup>165</sup> Hannay, D. (2005), *Cyprus: The search for a solution*, Bloomsbury Publishing. 113.

<sup>166</sup> European Parliament (1999). *European Council Helsinki 10-11.12.1999: Conclusions of the Presidency*. Europarl.europa.eu. Retrieved 07 June 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm).

### 3.8 Towards the Signing of the Accession Treaty

For the next three years after Helsinki, the EU took the role of a spectator and let the UN and the two Cypriot communities negotiate a possible solution without interference.<sup>167</sup> During this period the European Council of Seville in 2002 confirmed the Union's preference to a solution being found before accession, but it still considered the decision taken at Helsinki as the basis of its position<sup>168</sup>

In parallel, the EU continued the accession negotiations with the RoC. Apart from the division of the island few substantial problems arose, and Cyprus progressed quite rapidly towards membership. However, the efforts towards an end of the occupation and reunification of the island were not moving in the same pace, due to obstructive behavior from the Turkish Cypriot side.<sup>169</sup>

As it became clear that Cyprus would eventually join the EU, and the strategy of threats, delay and demands of international recognition that was previously employed by Ankara and Denktash proved ineffective, the Turkish side changed its attitude and a new round of bilateral negotiations with the aegis of the UN begun in January 2002. After several meeting and rounds of talks the Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented his solution plan to the two communities of Cyprus on the 11th of November 2002.<sup>170</sup>

However, the Turkish Cypriot side rejected the plan on December 10<sup>th</sup>, two days before the European Council in Copenhagen, where the accession negotiation between the EU and Cyprus (along with the rest of the CEECs) were about to be concluded.<sup>171</sup> Meant to disrupt Cyprus' accession progress, this development instead pushed the EU to conclude its accession negotiations with the RoC and accept that the island would be part of the next enlargement round even if it remained divided. To combat the normative nightmare that was the accession of a government that did not exercise control over large chunks of its territory, the Copenhagen Council decided to

---

<sup>167</sup> Engert, S. (2010), *Eu enlargement and socialization : Turkey and cyprus*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 62.

<sup>168</sup> European Commission (2002). *Presidency Conclusions Seville European Council 21 and 22 June 2002*. Press corner. Retrieved 7 June 2022, from [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC\\_02\\_13](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_02_13).

<sup>169</sup> Eralp, D., & Beriker, N. (2005), 'Assessing the Conflict Resolution Potential of the EU: The Cyprus Conflict and Accession Negotiations', *Security Dialogue*, 36(2), 184

<sup>170</sup> Ibid. 185.

<sup>171</sup> Axt, H. J. (2003). Gordischer Knoten in Kopenhagen nicht durchgeschlagen: Zypern, die Türkei und die EU. *Integration*, 26(1), 73.



suspend the implementation of the *acquis* on the northern side of the island until it decided otherwise in the future. Additionally, the Council still expressed its desire to see a united Cyprus becoming a member and stated that it was ready to accept whichever solution the two communities agreed upon.<sup>172</sup> Meanwhile, the Anan plan negotiations were extended until the end of February 2003.<sup>173</sup>

Parallel to the case of Cyprus and the preparations for the Eastern Enlargement, the same Copenhagen Council had also to deal with the matter of the setting an official date for the beginning of accession negotiations with Turkey. Greece, staying true to its Helsinki commitment was one of only four EU members pro to setting an official date to start the negotiations no later than 2004.<sup>174</sup> In an ironic twist, the other EU members were skeptical about granting Turkey an official date, as there was widespread sentiment that Turkey did not do enough to meet its membership requirements.<sup>175</sup>

In March 2003 Denktash and his ‘government’ rejected once again the Annan plan, receiving the blame for the failure of this round of negotiations and the missed opportunity that the accession of Cyprus presented. What is more, the newly elected government of Tassos Papadopoulos, who held less compromising views to the possible solution of the Cyprus problem than the previous government of Glafkos Clerides, had its normative commitment not yet put to the test.<sup>176</sup> This turn of events sealed the fate of the island, to accede as a divided territory. On the 16<sup>th</sup> of April the RoC and the EU signed the Accession Treaty in Athens, and Cyprus was to be welcomed in the Union along with Malta and the rest of the CEECs on May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004.

The developments after Helsinki appear to be a weaker point for the theoretical framework hypothesized in this thesis. On one hand, we don’t see much resistance from the EU on the accession of Cyprus. The commitment that the members undertook in Helsinki to accept the island even absent of a solution, was kept. There was however heavy, investment from the side of the EU

---

<sup>172</sup> European Commission. (2002). *Presidency Conclusions Seville European Council 21 and 22 June 2002*. Retrieved 18 October 2021, from [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC\\_02\\_13](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_02_13).

<sup>173</sup> Axt, H. J. (2003). Gordischer Knoten in Kopenhagen nicht durchgeschlagen: Zypern, die Türkei und die EU. *Integration*, 26(1), 74.

<sup>174</sup> Martin, N. (2015). *Security and the Turkey-EU Accession Process*. Palgrave Macmillan. 81.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> Engert, S. (2010). *Eu enlargement and socialization : Turkey and cyprus*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 64.

on the negotiations for a solution, especially the ones that produced the Annan plan. Since this plan was identified as the best possible chance for a united island to accede, there is no way to tell that whether the EU would keep its commitment to Cyprus, had the Greek Cypriot side shown resistance to the plan. The Greek Cypriot cause was helped by the continued obstructive and uncompromising stance of Denktash and Turkey. Clerides's government had shown, all through the 90s and up until early 2003 (when he lost the elections and Tassos Papadopoulos took over as president) that it held the political will to achieve a solution, and by extension create a country that adhered to the membership criteria set by the EU.<sup>177</sup>

It is still unknown whether the bargaining power of Greece would be enough to push Cyprus all the way to membership had the behavior of the Greek Cypriots been different. The Eastern Enlargement held immense significance for the EU, and it did its best to protect it in the past from the Greek veto (hence the decisions of Corfu, Luxemburg and Helsinki). However, last-minute blockages by Greece, became increasingly costly for the country so close to accession and after all negotiations had been successfully. In addition, the bargaining power of Greece was reduced after already agreeing to Turkey becoming an official candidate. Athens could no longer use the EU's desire for closer integration with Turkey to aid Cyprus, as this time around, it was the rest of the European member states that held reservations about starting accession negotiations with Turkey.

### **3.9 Aftermath: Rejection of the Annan Plan and EU Membership**

The final months before Cyprus' EU accession clearly demonstrate the importance of deals and bargaining in understanding the EU motive behind accepting a divided EU. The end of 2003 brought significant changes in the leadership of the Turkish side.<sup>178</sup>

After massive pressure from the international community the RoC, Turkey, and the TRNC, begun a new round of talks in early 2004 to revise the Annan plan and to agree on a final text that

---

<sup>177</sup> Ramming, S. (2008). Cyprus's Accession Negotiations to the European Union: Conditional Carrots, Good Faith, and Miscalculations. *International Negotiation*, 13(3), 373.

<sup>178</sup> In November the Justice and Development party (AKP) won the parliamentary elections in Turkey, and this party was more accommodating towards changing the status quo on the island in order to facilitate Turkey's own European path. The next month the reign of Rauf Denktash was ended after more than thirty years as the de facto political leader of the Turkish Cypriots. A new government was formed under Mehmet Ali Talat who held the appearance of being a more pro-solution leader.

would be brought up for vote on each community.<sup>179</sup> This time the Turkish Cypriot side agreed on the finalized version of the plan and signed the document, while the Greek Cypriot side did not. Nevertheless, both sides agreed to submit the plan for a referendum on the 24<sup>th</sup> of April 2004, a week before planned EU accession. The Turkish Cypriots, after a long history of rejecting reunification attempts, accepted the plan with a 65% ‘yes’ vote. On the other side of the ‘green line’, the Greek Cypriots with their European future already secured, rejected it, as they viewed it as a plan that was against their best interests, as it threatened their position within the Cypriot state and internationally. Notably, the Greek Cypriot political leadership and Tassos Papadopoulos in particular, urged the nation not to accept the plan.<sup>180</sup>

The EU reacted with furious language with the EU Enlargement Commissioner exceptionally vocal and undiplomatic in his statements.<sup>181</sup> He stated that he felt cheated by Tassos Papadopoulos’s government.<sup>182</sup> Nevertheless, with the Eastern Enlargement round around the corner there was little the EU could do. The Accession Treaty was already signed. In other words, the EU did not hold any institutional legal leverage over the RoC, nor was it in a position to punish the seemingly normative non-compliance of the Greek Cypriots.<sup>183</sup> Therefore, the lens of side deals, interest brokerage, and bargaining explains why the EU welcomed Cyprus as member state on May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004, whilst it being a divided country then, and still remaining so today.

---

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

<sup>180</sup> Διάγγελμα Τάσσου Παπαδόπουλου. Users.uoa.gr. Retrieved 13 June 2022, from [http://users.uoa.gr/~nektar/history/3contemporary/tassos\\_papadopoulos\\_diaggelma.htm](http://users.uoa.gr/~nektar/history/3contemporary/tassos_papadopoulos_diaggelma.htm).

<sup>181</sup> Jan Amussen (2004). *Cyprus after the failure of the Annan-Plan*, European Center for Minority Issues, 3.

<sup>182</sup> XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE. (2004). *European commissioner urges "yes" to UN plan on Cyprus*. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from <https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/document?crd=0172e82f-391a-4c9c-ba03-cea631853143&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A4C6X-6M50-00RC-91R1-00000-00&pdsourcgroupingtype=&pdcontentcomponentid=8078&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true>.

<sup>183</sup> Engert, S. (2010). *Eu enlargement and socialization : Turkey and cyprus*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 65.

## Conclusion

The 2004 Eastern Enlargement round of the EU was the largest and one of the most important in the history of the organization. Never before, nor after, were ten countries admitted simultaneously in an organization famous for its strict standards of membership. The inclusion of eight former communist countries was a big step towards ending the continent's division between East and West, a reality that resulted from the Cold War. Academic interest was piqued by this Eastern Enlargement and scholars applied divergent theoretical approaches to explain this enlargement round. Corresponding with the larger debate in international relations theory, this research has demonstrated in chapter 1 that the approaches to the Eastern Enlargement have been based mostly on either a *rationalist* or *constructivist* output.

Upon closer examination, the 2004 Enlargement Round included two countries that differ in their characteristics from the rest of the Central and Eastern European countries. Malta and Cyprus. The inclusion of Cyprus in this enlargement round appears problematic as the two current academic approaches, as outlined in chapter 1, have trouble explaining why the country was eventually allowed to become a member state.

Considering the rationalist-based approaches, possible geopolitical and security considerations of the EU failed to explain why the EU invited the active nationalistic dispute between the Cypriot Greeks and Turks in its jurisdiction. The dispute and hostility between the two sides and their two patron countries flared up several times in the 1990s even as accession negotiations with Cyprus were being conducted. Through primary and secondary source analysis, this thesis has found that the possibility of EU membership only exacerbated the tension. In addition, the material benefits of Cyprus's membership failed to cover the costs of risking the material benefits of a future Turkish membership. By allowing Cypriot accession, the EU gave veto power to a country that was seriously disaffected by Turkey and would logically oppose the Turkish membership while the occupation problem persisted.

On the constructivist side of the argument, neither Schimmelfennig's 'rhetorical action' nor Sedelmeier's idea of a 'special responsibility' by the EU, gave a satisfactory explanation. The RoC was in violation with certain core normative principles of the EU by not being able to fulfil its membership criteria prior to accession. Consequently, EU member states non-supportive of the

Cypriot membership could not be shamed into accepting its accession based on normative reasons. The EU offering membership as a prize, to condition the behavior of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities into being more compromising, to facilitate a solution of the Cyprus problem, is also not a satisfactory explanation. The signs had been clear from the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus, that these negotiations hardened the stance of the Turkish Cypriot side. Furthermore, the almost unconditional offer of membership only to the Greek Cypriot side, removed any incentive to the Greek Cypriots to accept a plan that was not in accordance with their best interests.

Therefore, the theories identified in the academic debate as key to understanding the Eastern Enlargement, did not offer satisfactory explanatory power when they are applied in the case of Cyprus. This left a gap in the literature that this thesis has attempted to fill by offering an alternative framework of understanding based on Schneider's application of institutionalism and intergovernmentalism.

The historical analysis conducted in chapter 3 has revealed that each upgrade in Cyprus' progression, from associate county to membership, was made possible through the insistence of the Greek government. Greece taking advantage of their position as an EU member state and the highly institutionalized environment of the EU, used its bargaining power to demand the institutional upgrade of Cyprus. These upgrades took place in the face of serious resistance by several EU members. These members understood the problems that the Cypriot membership would create for the EU, such as the import of the Cyprus problem into the Union and consequently, a more complicated relationship with neighboring Turkey, in addition to being uncomfortable with the country's normative situation. Greece, through its close bonds with the country of Cyprus stood to gain disproportionately more by the island's membership than the rest of the EU member states and therefore had to accept some losses in order to lift the opposition's resistance and resolve this 'distributional conflict'. These losses came in the form of Greece giving its consent to a closer EU-Turkish relationship. Moreover, Greece was able to leverage Cyprus' accession by threatening to block the EFTA enlargement and Eastern Enlargement, thus threatening to deprive the EU of the benefits of said enlargement rounds. The EU had to accept the risks and losses that accompanied with the Cypriot membership, to satisfy the Greek demands and be able to enjoy the gains of including the EFTA countries and the CEECs into the EU.

Therefore, despite the existence of the Copenhagen criteria and the normative turn in EU's enlargement process, this analysis has demonstrated that the progression of Cyprus towards the European institutions relied heavily on institutionalist, intergovernmentalist reasoning. The heterogeneity of attitudes towards the prospect of the Cypriot membership, the distributional conflict it created, in addition to the quit pro quo nature of the deals that lifted the resistance to the country's eventual accession, confirm to a large extent the validity and utility of the chosen theoretical framework to explain, why the EU accepted Cyprus as a member state despite the expected negative consequences it would create, and despite the continuing existence of the Cyprus problem.

The value of this thesis is thus found in the newly added perspectives on the understanding of the Eastern Enlargement. It has demonstrated how closely interconnected the accession of the CEECs was to the case of Cyprus, and how this accession round came under threat more than once because of the Cyprus problem. Regarding Eastern Enlargement theory, this thesis has shown that the functioning of the EU consists, for a large part, of bargaining, side deals and balancing the interests of member and candidate states. This is in support of the rationalist underlying implications.

On the other hand, despite the explanatory value the chosen narrative provided, this research does not come without its shortcomings. Yes, the historical analysis of chapter 3 has shown that one small country's inability to adhere to certain normative considerations of the EU was not enough from the EU's perspective to sacrifice the future accession of the CEECs and the prospect of Turkish membership. In other words, the EU's intergovernmentalist balance of interest put aside its normative considerations. Nonetheless, it has not been demonstrated definitively that material considerations pushed the EU into accepting the Greek demands. For that to happen extensive research is required and further recommended into the material benefits of the Eastern Enlargement, and the material gains of the closer integration with Turkey for the EU, and a comparison with any material losses the EU faced by going against its own normative rules and criteria. Furthermore, additional investigative analysis could be made into the proceedings of each European Council behind the Presidency Conclusions used for this analysis. For example, interviews with the people who were part of the negotiating teams of the state actors involved, could help to identify the reasoning behind the decisions that led to the eventual membership of

Cyprus from an inside perspective. Such extensive research was unfortunately, outside the possible scope of this thesis.

This limitation has left a gap in our understanding of the events after the Helsinki European Council. There is some confusion as to what ultimately led the EU into accepting the divided Republic of Cyprus. Was it the continuing normative commitment of the Greek Cypriot side? Was it the decisions made at Helsinki that made it irreversible? Or was it fueled by fears that Greece would realize its threat and block the Eastern Enlargement even at the last minute? Since the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan and thus their definite normative non-compliance with the Copenhagen criteria on border disputes, came after the signing of the Accession Treaty, it is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion on this matter. Much is dependent on how the EU viewed the Cypriot state at each point of the path to membership. By understanding the island as one country with an occupation and minority problem, then the framework chosen fits well. If, however the EU sees Cyprus as two separate communities then it makes much more sense to reward the compliant one. Based on the conclusions of this research, this matter is recommended for further research.

To conclude, the findings of the thesis shed new light to the perception of the Eastern Enlargement. Its limitations at the same time reveal that there are still missing pieces into having a clear picture of this significant enlargement round. Hopefully this research's shortcomings provide ideas for the future researchers to dive into, and one day, complete the puzzle and create a holistic and comprehensive theoretical approach to the Eastern Enlargement and motives behind the EU accessions that have shaped the EU as we know it today.

## Bibliography

### Primary sources:

- Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the establishment of an Association Council.* Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011). Retrieved 22 November 2021, from [Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the establishment of an Association Council / Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs \(mfa.gov.tr\)](#).
- AGREEMENT establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey (signed at Ankara, 12 September 1963).* (1977). Retrieved 23 May 2022, from [resource.html \(europa.eu\)](#).
- AP Archive. (2020). *UK: EDINBURGH: FOREIGN MINISTERS EU MEMBERSHIP TALKS UPDATE* (2). Retrieved 3 June 2022, from <http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/ffaed75b66eb22df43a9878037335103>.
- Commission of the European Communities (1997). *Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Europe*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved 17 March 2022, from <http://aei.pitt.edu/3137/1/3137.pdf>
- Corfu European Council. An extract of the presidency conclusions: Corfu European Council, 24 and 25 June 1994. Retrieved 26 May 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/cor\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/cor_en.htm)
- European Commission. (1993). *Commission opinion on the application by the Republic of Cyprus For Membership- extracts-*. Retrieved 19 October 2021, from [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC\\_93\\_5](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_93_5).
- European Commission. (1994). *Bulletin of the European Union*, p. 115, Retrieved 28 May 2022, from <http://aei.pitt.edu/65215/1/BUL392.pdf>.
- European Commission. (1998). *Regular report from the Commission on Cyprus's progress towards accession*. Retrieved 16 October 2021, from <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/5502dcd0-d088-4545-87d3-bda2bbada86f>
- European Commission (1999). *Commission sets out an ambitious accession strategy and proposes to open accession negotiations with six more candidate countries*. Press Corner. Retrieved 14 June 2022, from [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_99\\_751](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_99_751).
- European Commission. (2002). *Presidency Conclusions Seville European Council 21 and 22 June 2002*. Retrieved 18 October 2021, from [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC\\_02\\_13](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_02_13).
- European Council. (1993). *European Council in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993 Conclusions of the Presidency*. Retrieved 14 June 2022, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf>.
- European Parliament (1998). *Madrid European Council 15 and 16 December Presidency Conclusions*. Retrieved 2 June 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/mad1\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/mad1_en.htm).
- European Parliament. (1998). *Luxembourg European Council (12/97): Presidency Conclusions*. Retrieved 19 January 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm).
- European Parliament. (1999). *European Council Helsinki 10-11.12.1999: Conclusions of the Presidency*. Retrieved 18 October 2021, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm).



- European Parliament. (2000). *Cyprus and the Enlargement of the European Union (2)*. Retrieved 3 June 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/1a3\\_en.htm](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/1a3_en.htm)
- European Union Law. Treaty of Rome (EEC). Retrieved 14 June 2022, from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0023>.
- Eurostat. (2002). *Statistical yearbook on candidate and south-east European countries*, Retrieved 16 October 2021, from <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/def8e63c-f638-4e60-9fe2-92dfa28ac5ae/language-en#>
- Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011). *Joint Statement Made By Italy, France, Germany And The Netherlands On The Greek Cypriot-EU Membership Process During The EU General Affairs Council November 9, 1998*. Retrieved 25 October 2021, from [Joint Statement Made By Italy, France, Germany And The Netherlands On The Greek Cypriot-EU Membership Process During The EU General Affairs Council November 9, 1998 / Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs \(mfa.gov.tr\)](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/Rep_of_Turkey_Ministry_of_Foreign_Affairs).
- Key European Union achievements and tangible benefits*. Retrieved 19 June 2022, from [https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/achievements\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/achievements_en).
- Διάγγελμα Τάσσο Παπαδόπουλου*. Retrieved 13 June 2022, from [http://users.uoa.gr/~nektar/history/3contemporary/tassos\\_papadopoulos\\_diaggelma.htm](http://users.uoa.gr/~nektar/history/3contemporary/tassos_papadopoulos_diaggelma.htm).

## Literature:

- Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1), 3- 32.
- Avery, G., & Cameron, F. (1999). *The Enlargement of the EU*, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.
- Axt, H. J. (2003). Gordischer Knoten in Kopenhagen nicht durchgeschlagen: Zypern, die Türkei und die EU. *Integration*, 26(1), 66- 77.
- Baldwin, R. E., Francois, J. F., and Portes, R. (1997). The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and Central Europe. *Economic Policy*, 12(24), 125-176.
- Barkey, H. J., & Gordon, P. H. (2001). Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis. *The National Interest*, 66, 83-93.
- Baun, M. J. (2000). *A Wider Europe: the process and politics of European Union enlargement*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Buhari-gülmez, D. & Gülmez, S. B. (2008). The EU Conditionality in the Cyprus Problem: Catalyzing Euro-Scepticism in Turkey?, *Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi* , 14 (35), 1- 38.
- Cowles, M., & Smith, M. (2001). *The State of the European Union*. Oxford University Press, Incorporated.
- Dembinski, M. (2001). *Bedingt handlungsfähig: Eine Studie zur Türkeipolitik der Europäischen Union, HSFK-Report 5/2001*, Frankfurt: Hessische Stiftung Friedensund Konfliktforschung.
- Dodd, C. H., & Axt Heinz-Jürgen. (1999). *Cyprus: the need for new perspectives*. Eothen Press.
- Engert, S. (2010). *Eu enlargement and socialization: Turkey and Cyprus*. London: Taylor & Francis Group.
- Eralp, D., & Beriker, N. (2005). Assessing the Conflict Resolution Potential of the EU: The Cyprus Conflict and Accession Negotiations. *Security Dialogue*, 36(2), 175- 192.
- Featherstone, K. (2001). Cyprus and the Onset of Europeanization: strategic usage, structural transformation and institutional adaptation, *South European Society and Politics*, 5(2), 141- 164.

- Friis, L. (2002), Looming shadows: the European Union's eastern enlargement and Cyprus, in Diez, T. (ed), *The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict, Postmodern Union*, Manchester University Press, 15- 33.
- Friis, L., and Murphy, A. (1999). The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37(2), 211- 232.
- Hannay, D. (2005). *Cyprus: The search for a solution*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Jan Amussen (2004). *Cyprus after the failure of the Annan-Plan*. European Center for Minority Issues.
- Joseph, J. (1999). Cyprus and the E.U.: Searching for a Settlement in the Light of the Accession. *Cyprus Review*, 11(1). 33- 57.
- Kramer, H. (1997). The Cyprus problem and European security, *Survival*, 39(3), 16- 32.
- Kyris, G. (2012). The European Union and the Cyprus problem: a story of limited impetus. *Eastern journal of European studies*, 3(1), 87- 99.
- Skålnes, L. S. (2005). Geopolitics and the eastern enlargement of the European Union. In *The Politics of European Union Enlargement* (pp. 229-250). Routledge.
- March, J. G., and Olsen, J. P. (1989). *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: Free Press.
- Martin, N. (2015). *Security and the Turkey-EU Accession Process*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Moravcsik, A., & Vachudova, M. A. (2003). National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement. *East European Politics and Societies*, 17(1), 42- 57.
- Nugent, N. (2000). EU Enlargement and 'the Cyprus Problem'. *JCMS: Journal Of Common Market Studies*, 38(1), 131-150.
- Nugent N. (2007). The EU's Response to Turkey's Membership Application: Not Just a Weighing of Costs and Benefits, *Journal of European Integration*, 29(4), 481-502.
- Nugent, N. (2017). *The government and politics of the European Union*. London: Palgrave.
- Ramming, S. (2008), Cyprus's Accession Negotiations to the European Union: Conditional Carrots, Good Faith, and Miscalculations. *International Negotiation*, 13(3), 365- 386.
- Sandler, T., & Tschirhart, J. T. (1980). The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Surve., *Journal of Economic Literature*, 18(4), 1481-1521.
- Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2002). Theorizing EU enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research. *Journal of European public policy*, 9(4), 500- 528.
- Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2005). *The Politics Of European Union Enlargement*. Taylor & Francis Ltd.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2001). The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. *International Organization*, 55(1), 47- 80.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2003). *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric. Themes in European Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schneider, C. (2009). *Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement*. Cambridge University Press.
- Suvarierol, S. (2003). The Cyprus obstacle on Turkey's road to membership in the European Union. *Turkish Studies*, 4(1). 55-78.
- Wallace, W. (2000), From the Atlantic to the Bug, from the Arctic to the Tigris? The Transformation of the EU and NATO. *International Affairs*, 76(3), 475- 493.
- Westering, J. (2000). Conditionality and EU Membership: The Cases of Turkey and Cyprus. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 5(1). 95-118.

## News Articles:

- Associated Press International. (1997). *Greek officials denounce Italian statement on Cyprus*. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from <https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/document?crd=64a4b7db-65fb-4e53-b0fd-c90ce41f5125&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RWN-0KB0-00BT-M3HB-00000-00&pdsourcingtype=&pdcontentcomponentid=138211&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true>
- Barber, L., & Buchan, D. (1998). EU reaches compromise deal over Cyprus. *Financial Times (London, England)*. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from <https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/document?crd=51148c2c-aaee-4c35-bf8e-7649facb4d50&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3S7K-VS00-00D0-010K-00000-00&pdsourcingtype=&pdcontentcomponentid=293847&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true>.
- BLACK, I., & PALMER, J. (1995). EU opens way for negotiations to admit Cyprus. *The Guardian (London, England)*. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from <https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&u=utrecht&id=GALE|A170644713&v=2.1&it=r&sid=bookmark-ITOF&asid=92abb4c9>.
- Hamilton, D. (1998). EU MINISTERS TO TACKLE KOSOVO, CYPRUS MINEFIELDS. *AAP NEWSFEED*. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from <https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/document?crd=2ecb7e42-3d15-40f2-a3a4-da644b5df4d8&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3S70-MHP0-0048-T2KT-00000-00&pdsourcingtype=&pdcontentcomponentid=160586&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true>.
- Mortimer, E., & Hope, K. (1997). Greece hints at EU expansion veto Simitis warns of trouble if Cyprus is excluded from next wave of enlargement. *Financial Times (London, England)*. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from <https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/document?crd=24178cac-d217-40cb-8e24-0d68a602544e&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RJ0-7CP0-00D0-040C-00000-00&pdsourcingtype=&pdcontentcomponentid=293847&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true&pdcts=1655254774486>
- Malinov, Y. (1998). ADVENTURES OF S-300 COMPLEXES AT APHRODITE'S ISLAND. *What The Papers Say (Russia)*. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from [ADVENTURES OF S-300 COMPLEXES AT APHRODITE'S ISLAND \(uu.nl\)](ADVENTURES OF S-300 COMPLEXES AT APHRODITE'S ISLAND (uu.nl))
- PRS GROUP (1998). *COUNTRY ANALYSIS; INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY RISK GUIDE (ICRG)*. Retrieved 14 June 2022, from [POLITICS \(uu.nl\)](POLITICS (uu.nl))
- XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE. (2004). *European commissioner urges "yes" to UN plan on Cyprus*. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from <https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/document?crd=0172e82f-391a-4c9c-ba03-cea631853143&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A4C6X-6M50-00RC-91R1-00000-00&pdsourcingtype=&pdcontentcomponentid=8078&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true>.

