

Money talks.

Do organizations' DEI initiatives close the wage gap between gender?





Universiteit Utrecht

Master thesis

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Date:	24 th of June 2022

Preface

Very proudly I present this master thesis to you. This thesis is written to obtain my Master's degree of the Master of Science named "Sociology: Contemporary Social Problems" at Utrecht University in the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences. 8 years ago, I would only dream of writing this sentence, and now I have to pinch myself to make sure it's reality!

My academic road has been full of bumps, detours and hold-ups, that I can say for sure. But I'm so happy to complete my academic journey with a Master thesis on a topic I'm very passionate about: gender inequality. As I climbed my way up from mbo to hbo and eventually to university, I'm so lucky to have had a strong support circle of people I wouldn't have been able to have achieved this without them.

First of all, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Rense Corten, for his directness and his strict feedback. Your directness about the status of my thesis made me want to work even harder to prove to you I could succeed in writing a thesis. I'm also very happy you always quickly provided me with helpful feedback when requested, and that you always responded incredibly fast on my endless emails with questions. I would also like to thank my fellow student Ruben van der Vliet for making the time to videocall with me when I was very lost with SPSS and statistics and didn't know what to do. You helped me to get back on track with my analyses and for that I'm incredibly grateful. Last but certainly not least I would like to thank my boyfriend Jason, for his (emotional) support and his patience whenever I was complaining on how much work I had to do. Also, mom and dad, thank you for giving me another two years to go after my dreams of obtaining the doctorandus title, I'm so proud to have you as parents.

Having that said, I hope you enjoy your reading.

Jill van Hennik

Utrecht, June 24th, 2022

Abstract

The wage gap between male and female pay is a persistent phenomena policy makers have tried to close for over 40 years. Despite the implementation of (national) policies, legislations and other initiatives, the gender wage gap has remained resilient. On organizational level, Diversity, Equity and Inclusion policies and/or initiatives (DEI) have been implemented to create a more equal working environment. However, researchers don't agree on the effects of these policies. They debate whether DEI policies contribute to a more equal workplace or if they highlight and enlarge the differences between gender. Therefore, the goal of this research was to gain more insights in DEI policies/initiatives and to clarify its effects on the gender wage gap. To do so, we used the European Workforce Survey data (EWFS) from 2018 to test our hypotheses (N=2185). The regression analyses results show that, as expected, we found a wage gap present between the male and female respondents of the EWFS. Next to that, we found that one out of the six tested DEI initiatives/policies has a significant positive effect on the gender wage gap. The other five tested DEI initiatives/policies show no significant effect, meaning they don't influence the gender wage gap. Based on the results we make recommendations for future research, and we mention our policy advice.

Ethical procedure

Before starting to work with the data, an ethics protocol was submitted for review through the UU Ethics Review and Registration Site on 02-04-2022 under the reference number 22-1144.

The Ethical Review Board of the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences of Utrecht University approved this protocol on 26-04-2022.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Despite attempts to close the wage gap that exists between gender, research implies the gap hasn't closed and can still be identified in the labor market around the world (e.g., Weichselbaumer, & Winter-Ebmer, 2005; Kunze, 2008; Leping & Toomet, 2008; Carlsson & Rooth, 2016). Examples of these attempts are equal employment opportunities (EEO), antidiscrimination laws and policies governing equal family leave and training opportunities (Blau & Kahn, 1995). The difficulty in closing the wage gap lies in the driving mechanisms behind wage gaps in general that are yet to be discovered (Leping & Toomet, 2008), but some studies suggest that unobservable characteristics such as ability and motivation or even discrimination could explain the gap (Altonji & Blank, 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Rooth, 2010). The Gender Pay Gap can simply be described as the gap between male and female pay that can be shown on either hourly, weekly or monthly level.

Around the globe, women earn on average 80% or less of what men earn (Altonji & Blank, 1999; Blau & Kahn, 2006; Leslie, Manchester & Dahm, 2017). This gender wage gap remains significant, even when women obtain a similar education, work in similar industries, do not have career breaks and are willing to relocate (Stroh, Brett & Reilly, 1992). There has been close to 40 years of equal pay legislation in the European Union, but the gap between male and female wages has remained resilient, despite the increase in the number of Member States' female employment, welfare models or Members' own national equality legislation and policies (Vosko et al, 2009). After controlling for observable differences such as differences in personal and job characteristics, a significant part of the gender pay gap remains unexplained (Maršíková, 2012; Blau & Kahn, 1995).

But why do we want our working environment to be more gender diverse, inclusive and equal? As Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas (2011) state, workforce diversity is regarded as a "social good", influencing the individual well-being of employees, resulting in a higher work satisfaction. A diverse working environment broadens employees' perspectives, enriches the workplace in this way which strengthens teams and offers greater resources for problem solving (Cox, 2001). Diversity doesn't only include differences in sex, categories such as nationality, ethnicity, social class and background, sexual orientation, age, mental and physical capabilities and religion all fall under the umbrella of diversity (Maršíková, 2012). All these factors could have an influence on the pay gap, however, in this thesis we will only focus on the pay gap specified by gender. Back to workforce diversity, Song et al. (2015) found that the quality and quantity of group performance differs in groups of which the gender is either heterogenous or homogenous. The mixed gender group performed better compared to the same-sex group. Hoffman and Maier (1961) found the same result during their study in which they constructed sixteen homogeneous groups and twenty-five heterogeneous groups in terms of gender that interacted weekly for discussions, problem-solving, and role-playing exercises. They showed that heterogeneous groups produced a better quality of solutions compared to the homogeneous groups (Hoffman and Maier, 1961). DiTomaso et al (2007) adds that diversity increases the opportunity for creativity. This creativity also pays out in business performance, as Wright et al. (1995) found that diverse companies perform better, measured by their stock prices.

When looking at the underlying mechanisms behind the Gender Pay Gap, things become much more complicated (Smith, 2012). Sex segregation and stereotyping processes gently push men and women to different parts of the labor market, where women's work is often under-evaluated and rewarded differently compared to men's (Robinson, 2001). In addition, societal norms expect the woman to take on most of the domestic labor and childcare, resulting in men being able to devote more and uninterrupted time to their careers. As a result, men get to invest more time in their jobs,

giving them career advantages over women. Logically, this results in an uneven lifetime earning profile (Smith, 2012). These effects are combined Becker's Human Capital Theory (1965), in which human capital is explained as a resource that determines one's position in the labor market. The higher one's human capital resources, the quicker this person will find a high-paid job. According to this theory, women's human capital is lower compared to men's, because of their often-interrupted careers and time in the labor market due to different factors. Taking this theory and the aforesaid into account, we draw our first research question:

To what extent does gender of European employees have an impact on their income?

Besides attempts of national gender equality legislation as mentioned above, diversity policies within organizations became an important part of organizational strategies around 1990 that sought to facilitate a more equal working environment (Groeneveld & Verbeek, 2012). Often, DEI programmes/policies are implemented based on common sense, lacking empirical evidence of their effectiveness in the context of the organization (Ellemers, Sahin, Jansen, & van der Toorn, 2018). Ignoring the lack of evidence of their effectiveness, implementing diversity policies/programmes is considered by many as the right step to take to create fair chances and treatment and a labor market free of discrimination and inequality (Dover Kaiser & Major, 2019).

Diversity, Equity and Inclusion policies (DEI) seek to improve diversity and equality on the workforce, of which Kalev, Dobbin and Kelly (2006) name the most common ones: affirmative action plans, diversity training, diversity committees, diversity taskforces, diversity evaluations for managers, networking programmes and mentoring programmes. However, research found that DEI programmes could have opposite effects, depending on the kind of initiative/programme (Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, 2006; Herdman & McMillan-Capehart, 2010). The literature remains divided about the question if DEI programmes and policies have positively effects on gender equality or not (Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, 2006). Unintended consequences of DEI initiatives are that they could create an illusion of equal treatment (Plaut, Thomas, Hurd & Romano, 2018), act as a window dressing of an inclusive workplace for the outside world whilst the reality is different (Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, 2006; Leslie, 2018), evoke feelings of exclusion and unfairness amongst the majority groups (Dover et al., 2019) and creates an image of minority groups needing extra hands to be professionally successful (Dover et al., 2019; Leslie, 2018).

In sum, research has documented a female wage penalty that can only be partially explained. However, it is not yet clear whether the introduction and implementation of DEI policies contributes to closing the gender pay gap. Therefore, we introduce the following research question:

Why does the presence of DEI initiatives have a positive or negative effect on this relation?

To answer this research question, we will use data from the European Sustainable Workforce Survey (ESWS), the second wave, from 2018. Using this data, we aim to generate more insights in the relationship between gender and wage and how this effect would be moderated by the DEI initiatives and policies available. Using the results of this research we aim to contribute to the question on how to close the gender pay gap and to give policy recommendations that answer the policy question:

Which DEI policy contributes the most to closing the gender pay gap and how can this be implemented to be the most effective?

Chapter 2: Theory section

In this chapter we will discuss the most important literature around the wage gap topic. Based on theory and findings from other scholars, we will draw hypotheses with the expected outcomes of this research. We begin this chapter by explaining the mechanisms and theories behind wage inequality. Next, we describe DEI policies/programmes, what they entail and their alleged effect on the gender wage gap.

2.1 Human capital

Becker (1965) coined the term “human capital” to describe people’s knowledge and skills relevant to the labor market. Human capital is seen as a resource, which means that the more human capital you’ve got, the higher your position in the labor market will be. Whoever possesses the most knowledge and skills will find a high-paid job quicker compared to a person with little human capital. Nowadays, human capital is obtained through (formal) education. This means that the more time and money you’ve invested in your education and the higher your grades, the more human capital you’ve generated, the more you are seen as an attractive employee by potential employers. However, both Becker (1965), Hendricks (2002) and Pasban and Nojehdeh (2016) state that besides educational level, labor force participation also adds up to human capital. “On the job training” consists of professional and technical skills, knowledge, information, innovation and creativity that can’t be taught in schools, but employers find highly desirable.

Taking this information into account, Becker (1965) developed the human capital theory, which argued that because education and training are to be viewed as a resource or capital and are highly influential on someone’s job and rewards, people make investments in educational resources. For a long time, women possessed less human capital than men, simply because they weren’t entitled to the same level of education as men (Becker, 1964). However, according to Charles (2011), an unequal level of education is no longer an integral part of the gender wage gap nowadays, as women have increasingly gained access to education in many countries and even surpass men in some. However, other characteristics do still influence the gender wage gap, such as marital status and having children (Polacheck & Xiang, 2009). Polacheck and Xiang state that marital status, having children and the spacing of births of children do have an influence on the human capital of women. For instance, women’s careers often include intermittent periods of labor force participation and non-work (e.g., due to childbirth), resulting in a lower human capital. After all, according to the human capital theory, time spent having children is time not-spent gaining human capital through labor force participation and gaining work experience. In turn, a smaller human capital results in a lower wage compared to men (Polachek & Xiang, 2009). A similar result was found by Tharenou and colleagues, who found that domestic responsibilities reduce women’s work experience on training and development, thus human capital. This results in career opportunity inequalities, e.g., training and development on the job, often related to managerial advancement, particularly advantaging men. Logically, women’s career paths are characterized by an interrupted career, spiral career progress with more radical job changes and more specialized jobs (Tharenou & Conroy, 1994; Tharenou, Latimer & Conroy, 1994).

Following from this, Budig and England (2001) mention the motherhood penalty. Evidence found in multiple studies confirm the finding that mothers have less favorable positions in the labor market than non-mothers (men included) (Glass, 2004; Polachek & Xiang, 2009; Glauber, 2007).

Polachek and Xiang (2009) acknowledge this statement and add that having children and one's marital status play a major role in the gender wage gap, better known as family effects. The writers state that married women with children earn less compared to married women without children. Glauber (2007) found a 4% to 8% decrease in wages if women have two to four children, Budig and England (2001) found a 7% reduction in wage per child. These decrease in wages were not found for men. According to Polachek (1975a), when married women space their births widely apart, they receive even lower wages. Adversative, married men with children earn more than unmarried men, and spacing births widely apart is associated with higher earnings (Polackek, 1975b). To conclude, the gender wage gap also varies by marital status, having children and the spacing of the births of children.

2.2 Social roles and norms

Why are women disadvantaged in the labor market for having children? Sociologists suggest that careers should be viewed as social roles, defined by society, linking individuals to a certain social structure (Barley, 1989). Social structures are built and maintained by social norms. These social norms are set up by society and give people guidelines for e.g., behaviour (Eagly & Steffen, 1984). For centuries there has been a social norm in place that expects women to take care of the household and childcare. "Social norms reflect the different roles the social context ascribes to women and men, revealing that men and women do not operate in equivalent contexts with equivalent cultural and social support" (Roethlisberger, Gassmann & Martorano, 2022, p. 2). Social norms are reflected in personal values and beliefs and in what people think. Household tasks and childcare are still commonly seen as female tasks, whereas men are expected to invest in their professional career and bring home the money (Judge, Livingston & Hurst, 2012). Judge et al. (2012) also point out that these social norms have a strong influence on labor market choices, opportunities and outcomes. Besides this, society portrays assertive women as bossy and disagreeable women as difficult, whereas assertive men are seen as leaders and disagreeable men as standing up for his own views (Judge et al., 2012). Partly because of these social norms, gender discrimination in the workplace occurs, making it harder for women to be successful professionally, thus earning less compared to men (Maršíková, 2012). Maršíková also mentions the selection of men and women in different sectors and occupations, relating to their different (expected) care responsibilities as a possible explanation of the gender wage gap. Building on that second statement, women are more likely to be concentrated on jobs affected by wage floors, to be in jobs or sectors where there's a limited scope for collective bargaining and to be more concentrated in jobs that may be excluded from wage floors (such as minimum wage regulations) (Rubery, Grimshaw & Figueiredo, 2005).

2.3 New Home Economics

In line with the human capital theory, Becker (1965) introduced new home economics. This theory views the household as a "small factory" that aims to achieve the highest possible level of well-being. Households are entities that need to create their output as efficiently as possible to maximize income, just like production factories do. To do this, there needs to be a role specialization within the household (Becker, 1965; Berk & Berk, 1983). According to Becker, the most efficient role division should be the traditional household role division. Here, the man is the main breadwinner, and the woman is fully

specialized in household tasks, both men and women invest in their human capital to specialize in their tasks. However, Oppenheimer (1988) criticizes the new home economics by stating that the attitudes of society with regard to gender roles have changed over the years. Due to the introduction of flexible working contracts, the job security of men has declined, leading to women working more and more in paid work to maintain a stable income. Berk and Berk (1983) state that with technological improvements of household devices (e.g., dishwasher, washing machine), women have time left and don't need to fully allocate all their time to household tasks.

Concluding, the traditional role division of the men as breadwinner is no longer the most efficient, thus leading to a different role division in which women also provide an income to the household.

2.4 Social identity theory

"The social identity theory connects social structures and individual identity through the meanings people attach to their memberships in salient identity groups, such as racial, ethnic or gender" (Chow & Crawford, 2004, p. 23). Those meanings shape social interactions between people. The disproportionate representation of some identity groups over others might have a negative impact on the social structure and interactions in the workplace.

According to the social identity theory, people prefer to interact with people that belong to their own social group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As Ely and Thomas (2001) state, when we apply this knowledge to the workplace, we see that white males tend to predominate in higher functions whilst minority groups such as women often have junior positions. This creates in-group favoritism amongst white males in higher positions, who also possess the power to promote people and divide resources such as education and training.

When combining all discussed theories and literature we're able to draw the following hypothesis:

H1. Women earn less compared to men.

2.5 Organizational diversity

Diversity implies the distribution of personal attributes amongst interdependent members of work units, within organizations (Jackson et al., 2003). Having a diverse workforce could result in positive impacts on decision-making processes as skills, abilities, information resources and knowledge are increased (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998).

According to Song et al. (2015) and Zenger and Lawrence (1989), mixed gender groups outperform groups that are composed by only males or females. A gender diverse groups benefits from a broader set of skills, abilities and experiences through the gender-specific learning experiences and different social backgrounds of the group members. Hoffman and Maier (1961) complimented this statement by concluding that gender heterogenous groups produced a higher quality of solutions compared to the gender homogenous group. Song et al. (2015) performed a similar study that showed how gender composition of a group affects productivity. The results showed that female participation in groups has a positive effect on the quality and quantity of the group's performance. DiTomaso et al. (2007) found that gender diverse groups are more creative compared to gender homogenous groups, leading to more creative and innovative team performances.

To increase diversity and equality in the workplace, diversity, equity and inclusion policies and/or programmes became popular during the nineties. The initial aim of these policies, besides creating a more diverse working environment, was to reduce workplace discrimination against women and minorities (Groeneveld & Verbeek, 2012; Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, 2006).

2.5.1 DEI initiatives and policies

According to Dover, Kaiser and Major (2019, p.6), as shown in table 1, organizations adopt diversity initiatives to create fairer, more efficient and effective workplaces and to communicate its organizational values.

Table 1. Reasons organizations adopt diversity initiatives

Justice Rationale ("moral motive")	<u>Overall Goal: Create Fairer Workplaces</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce workplace discrimination against protected classes • Facilitate reporting & remediation of discriminatory actions • Prevent retaliation against discrimination claims • Comply with anti-discrimination law
Instrumental Rationale ("business case")	<u>Overall Goal: Create more efficient & effective workplaces</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capitalize on diverse perspectives & cultural knowledge • Remove inefficiencies (interpersonal conflict, tension, loss of talent) caused by prejudice and discrimination
Signalling rationale	<u>Overall Goal: communicate Pro-diversity values to stakeholders</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attract candidates from underrepresented groups • Encourage pro-diversity values & behaviour among employees • Demonstrate commitment to justice to investors, employees, job candidates and general public.

Note: adopted from "Mixed signals: The unintended effects of diversity initiatives" by T. L. Dover & B. Major, 2019, *Social Issues and Policy Review*. P. 6.

Starting with the justice rationale or moral motive, organizations aim to establish equal access, fair treatment and a workplace environment without discrimination or harassment. This is the oldest rationale of DEI initiatives, as the first DEI programmes and policies were designed as anti-discriminatory efforts.

The instrumental rationale includes the next generation of DEI efforts and is based on the belief that diverse working environment makes an organization more profitable. With this motive DEI policies aren't just a responsibility to create discriminatory free working environments, they're seen as an opportunity and implemented accordingly.

The signaling rationale functions more as a communicative motive too let (potential) employees and the general public know where the organization stands with its DEI values (Dover, Kaiser and Major, 2019).

As Kalev, Dobbin and Kelly (2006) state, some companies only implement DEI policies with the signaling motive, so their efforts function as window dressing to make the company look good in terms of their diversity efforts. The writers also mention that other companies implement DEI efforts only with a justice rationale in mind, to cover for themselves in case of discriminatory lawsuits. Or as Schoen and Rost (2021) state, complimenting the third motive of Dover, Kaiser and Major (2019), it has become "en vogue" to have diversity strategies and mention those in almost every external

communication form. Organizations mention them in business reports, on their websites and in media reports. However, their effects are almost never discussed, raising the question if DEI initiatives are only used to signal the modernity of the organization.

2.5.2 Unintended consequences of DEI initiatives

DEI policies/initiatives are implemented to create a more equal workplace for minorities in general (Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, 2006). As explained before, the term “minorities” is comprehensive and includes amongst others ethnic minorities, people with different religions and sexuality, but also people who identify as a woman (Maršíková, 2012). Therefore, when we talk about the unintended consequences of DEI initiatives/policies for minorities, this goes for all minority group members, including women.

Besides being implemented to establish equality in a professional environment, it has been discovered DEI policies could have unintended negative consequences. According to Dover et al. (2019), DEI efforts could give out a signal that minority groups need special treatment to succeed in a professional environment. On top of this, Dover, Major and Kaiser (2016) state that DEI initiatives could result in more discriminatory behaviour towards minority groups as majority group members might feel that they’re being disadvantaged, and minority members get preferential treatment at their expense. This is a major threat for the success of the initiatives, which highly depends on employee support to have a lasting effect (Avery, 2011). Implementing DEI policies could also give the (false) impression that those organizations are less discriminatory against minority groups, which results in the underestimation of discrimination against minority groups and not taking reports of discrimination seriously (Dover, Kaiser and Major, 2019). In this way, the intention of DEI policies to create a more equal working environment could give out a false image of equal treatment (Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, 2006).

As researchers don’t fully agree on the effectiveness of DEI initiatives/policies, we will mention the effects and unintended consequences of the most popular forms of diversity policies and programmes, according to the literature.

2.5.3 Affirmative action

Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen (2006) explain affirmative action as a proactive policy where an organization devotes resources to make sure people are not discriminated against based on their gender or ethnic origin. Examples are hiring quota or financial aid to minority-owned businesses. Affirmative action is an “artificial, transitional but necessary stage on the road to a truly diverse workforce” (Thomas, 1990, p. 117). The artificial part is explained to be necessary because it requires constant attention and drive to make it work. Affirmative action should be implemented as a future orientated response to demographic changes instead of focusing on legality or inequity. Affirmative action plans allow organizations to monitor their performance and enable for corrections (Czarniawska & Hopfl, 2002).

However, critics of affirmative action claim it is “a medicine that harms its patients”, aiming towards the backlash it causes, e.g., court cases in which majority group members file lawsuits on discriminatory grounds for not getting the same -preferential- treatment as minority group members (Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen, 2006). Despite the negative effects of affirmative action plans, scholars claim it is an effective way to enhance diversity (Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen, 2006; Dobbin & Kalev,

2015; Holzer & Neumark, 2000). Affirmative action plans increase employer's willingness to hire minority members, increases the number of minority applicants, increases employer's tendencies to provide training and to evaluate employees (Holzer & Neumark, 2000). According to Taylor (1995), majority group members working in organizations with affirmative action plans generally value this type of personal characteristic-based remedies for discrimination. Adding up to this, women and minority group members don't show traces of self-doubt working for organizations practicing affirmative action (Taylor, 1994; Holzer & Neumark, 2000).

To conclude, scholars don't agree on the effects that affirmative action plans could have. As there is slightly more proof on the positive effects of affirmative action, we can draw the following hypothesis:

H2a. The difference in income between men and women is smaller when affirmative action plans are implemented in the organization.

2.5.4 Diversity training

Pendry, Driscoll and Field (2007) define diversity training as "a distinctive set of instructional programmes aimed at facilitating positive intergroup interactions, reducing prejudice and discrimination, and enhancing the skills, knowledge, and motivation of participants to interact with diverse others" (p. 28). Nearly all Fortune 500 companies use diversity training as part of their diversity policy, but according to Dobbin and Kalev (2016), the positive effects of diversity training rarely last beyond two days. Despite many organizations having implemented this type of policy, Azmat and Boring (2020) state there's a lack of empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of diversity training.

Dobbin and Kalev mention that diversity trainings are often implemented for other reasons than reducing discrimination. Often, the legal case for diversity is highly underlined by emphasizing the huge settlements of discriminatory legal battles. Diversity training might activate bias or spark backlash, which isn't odd considering three quarters of companies that implemented diversity training use negative messages in their training (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016). Organizations also seem to favor diversity training that targets individual behaviour and attitudes (Jackson et al, 2003). Besides this, diversity trainings are often mandatory, evoking anger and resistance amongst the participants (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016).

However, when implemented the right way, diversity trainings could have a positive impact after all, resulting in attitude changes, meaningful intercultural understanding and even behavioural change (Dobbin & Kalev, 2016; Bezrukova et al., 2016). When making the trainings voluntary, there's no negative feelings towards the training, leading to better results. However, employees who choose to follow such trainings often already are supportive of diversity initiatives and are not the ones that need diversity training the most (Dobbin, Kalev & Kelly, 2007). On top of this, contextual and design factors of a diversity training implementation could result in larger effect sizes, respectively cognitive learning and repetition, and should be taken into account more often (Bezrukova et al., 2016).

We draw the following hypothesis based on this information:

H2b. The difference in income between men and women doesn't alter when diversity training is present.

2.5.5 Diversity committees and taskforces

Diversity taskforces are personnel consultants of different organizational functions and social groups that come together as a group to identify problem areas and brainstorm for solutions. Most of the time issues such as recruiting, retaining and promoting are discussed but also recommending solutions, monitoring implementations and the progress of their impact (Dobbin & Kalev, 2015).

Dobbin, Kalev and Kelly (2007) state that diversity committees are highly effective in creating a more diverse working environment, because they make a group of people responsible for the progress. According to Dobbin and Kalev (2015), the presence of diversity taskforces has a significant negative effect on the number of white men in management positions and an increase in women and minority members in management functions. A slightly different form of diversity committees are diversity taskforces. Based on this information we can draw the hypothesis:

H2c. The difference in income between men and women is smaller when diversity committees and/or taskforces are present.

2.5.6 Diversity evaluations for managers

Dobbin, Kalev and Kelly (2007) suggest that subjects who are told their decisions are being reviewed are less likely to be influenced by their own stereotypes in hiring people for jobs. Therefore, General Electric, the first organization ever to implement an equal opportunity evaluation in 1969, claimed that it was the key to achieving equal opportunities in the organization. A diversity evaluation system is a measurement system that gives out rewards and penalties designed to facilitate behavioural changes in management. Like diversity trainings, diversity evaluations for managers are very popular in the corporate world, whilst having minor effects on the diversity in management level (Dobbin, Kalev & Kelly, 2007). Research has found that diversity evaluations for managers are not enough to change (hiring) behaviour (Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006). As stated by Dobbin, Kalev and Kelly (2007), diversity evaluations for managers are mostly implemented to tackle the hiring bias to create a more diverse working environment, not necessarily for creating a more equal workplace with equal reward systems. We can draw the following hypothesis based on this information:

H2d The difference in income between men and women doesn't alter when diversity evaluations for managers are present.

2.5.7 Networking programmes and mentoring programmes

According to Athey et al (2020), networking and mentoring programmes could include information sharing, informal teaching, or career advice from senior workers and/or upper-level employees and developing human capital. The effects of networking and mentoring programmes are often named in one breath by scholars, as they are found to be similar to one another (e.g., Granovetter, 1974; Azmat & Boring, 2020; Dobbin, Kalev & Kelly, 2007). Therefore, in this paragraph, we discuss the effects of both networking programmes and mentoring programmes as they often go hand in hand.

Ever since Granovetter's 1974 book "Getting a Job", showed that most jobs are found through people's social networks, organizations set up networking and mentoring programmes. As Azmat and Boring (2020) state, specifically women are likely to benefit from networking and mentoring

programmes, as it gives them access to career-related information of a higher quality. They can learn “the tricks of the trade” (p.772) through this programme.. Mentoring programmes could help women who otherwise would be under-served in human capital development. Networking and mentoring programmes are described as symbolic but highly effective (Edelman & Petterson, 1999; Dobbin & Kalev 2007).

The writers conclude that networks programmes aren’t as effective for minority members as mentor programmes. Network programmes bring together people from the lowest rungs of the corporate ladder, whereas mentor programmes put aspiring managers into contact with people who are already higher on the corporate ladder. Mentor programmes create the necessary social networks that normally gives white men a head start for career success.

Based on this information we can draw the following hypothesis:

H2e. *The difference in income between men and women is smaller when networking programme initiatives are present.*

H2f. *The difference in income between men and women is smaller when mentor programme initiatives are present.*

2.5.8 Diversity managers

Diversity managers are described as “tempered radicals” that combine commitment to social justice in terms of diversity whilst keeping achievements of organizational goals in mind (Kirton, Greene & Dean, 2007). Assigning responsibility by naming a diversity manager ensures that new diversity policies are carried out as designed (Dobbin & Kalev, 2015). As Dobbin and Kalev (2015) state, diversity managers keep other managers focused on the problem of diversity in general and specifically within their organization. They keep close contacts with minority communities in help for hiring and retention of employees, design diversity programmes and lobby on top management level for funding of those programmes. The main difference with diversity task forces is that they have the authority to keep track of retention, promotion and hiring efforts of individual managers, which diversity task forces can’t do. According to Dobbin and Kalev (2015), implementing diversity managers won’t solve all diversity problems overnight, but over time could have a positive effect on creating a more equal work environment.

H2g. *The difference in income between men and women is smaller when diversity managers are assigned.*

2.5.9 Overview of the mentioned DEI initiatives/policies and their effects

Table 1. *Overview of the mentioned DEI policies/initiatives and their effects on closing the gender wage gap according to the literature*

Affirmative action	Effective
Diversity training	Not effective
Diversity committees and taskforces	Effective
Diversity evaluations for managers	Not Effective
Networking programmes	Effective
Mentoring programmes	Effective
Diversity managers	Effective

3. Data and method

3.1 Data and dataset

We've used the *European Sustainable Workforce* data from 2018, which is the second wave of the longitudinal transnational dataset *Sustainable Workforce Survey (SWS)*. The SWS is part of the *Sustainable Workforce* project, which is a scientific research project financed by the European Research Council. The project aims to research the role of organizations in Europe during the creation of a sustainable working population (Van der Lippe, Lössbroek, Van der Put & Martens 2022). According to the researchers, organizations play a key role in building a sustainable workforce. The organizations invest resources as time and money in human capital, social capital, develop work-private life policies, enhance long-term employability for older workers and invest in flexible but secure contractual arrangements. The Sustainable Workforce project aims to explore the causes and consequences of such investments. Data was gathered amongst employees and HR-managers from nine European Countries, namely the Netherlands, Spain, Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These countries were chosen strategically because they represent different types of welfare regimes and offer ample variation in macro-level conditions. The organizations were chosen by industry and size. Six occupational industries were selected: Production, the Healthcare industry, the Telecom industry, Financial services, the Transport industry and Higher education. According to Van der Lippe et al. (2022), selecting a small number of organizations belonging to these industries makes it possible to compare causes and consequences of sustainable workforce investments within and across industries. Only organizations that exceeded the 40 employees mark if they had one establishment or 20 if they had more than one establishment were selected. After this the organizations to approach were randomly selected, leading to a total of 113 organizations willing to participate in the second wave. Employees from three to six different departments within the companies were approached to participate, from both departments that contributed to the core activity of the organization and departments that did not directly contribute to the core activity of the organizations (e.g., finance and communication). To summarize, data was collected in each of the nine countries within 113 organizations, in which three to six different departments per company were approached to participate.

This way of data collection implies that the data consists of clusters of respondents instead of individual independent responses. The sampling of respondents began with organizations in different countries willing to participate, to departments on manager level, to employees. This means one of the assumptions for linear regression models has been violated -each observation is assumed to be independent of the others- as the respondents are clustered per country, organization and manager. This needs to be considered when interpreting the results of the analyses, as outcomes could be falsely significant or standard errors could be underestimated.

The other assumptions include multicollinearity, normal distribution and outliers requirements. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) tested multicollinearity and were all between 1 and 3. With a threshold of 10, these numbers between 1 and 3 mean there's a small chance of issues regarding the multicollinearity (Allen, Bennett & Heritage, 2014). In appendix 1 we added plots to show the variables are normally distributed. Based on these plots we can also see that outliers are absent.

Out of 8008 distributed questionnaires, 4345 workers returned the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 54%. For the Managers questionnaire this is 68% (274/401) and for the Organizational questionnaire this is 89% (101/113). As the focus of this thesis lays on the differences

between men and women, missings on the gender variables were filtered out. This leaves us with a selection of 4144 respondents. We also filtered out the missings on any of the used variables, to give us an equal number of respondents for every variable. Therefore, the final sample consists out of 2185 respondents.

3.2 Variables and operationalization

Income

The dependent variable in this research is *Income*. The respondents were asked to give up their average net monthly earnings in an open question during the interview. We applied a log transformation on the variable to make it less skewed and patterns more visible. The logarithm made it easier to interpret the data and to see if the assumptions of the regressions were met.

Gender

The independent variable in this research is *gender*. This question asked respondents to fill out their gender. We transformed this variable into a dummy variable of which man is (0) and woman is (1).

DEI initiatives

The moderating variable in this research is the presence of DEI initiatives. The EWFS measured this using six items that each covered a different DEI programme or policy. The human resource managers of each organization had to indicate whether the mentioned DEI initiatives were available or active within their organization (1) or not (2). As only one human resource manager per organization filled out this question regarding DEI initiatives, contradictions in answers are ruled out. As mentioned in the literature, it is known DEI initiatives can have opposite effects and outcomes on the organisation and her employees (Dover et al., 2019; Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, 2006; Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen, 2006). Therefore, we decided to analyze each mentioned DEI programme or policy in the questionnaire separately. These are affirmative action plans, diversity training for managers, diversity committees or diversity task forces, diversity evaluations for managers, networking programmes for women, mentoring programmes for women and diversity managers. To analyze these variables we created dummy variables of which (0) is not available or present and (1) is available or present.

Control variables

The variables *educational level, age, duration of employment at organization, type of labor contract, hours a week contracted to work for organization, marital status* and *children living at home* are added to the analyses as they might influence the dependent variable income.

The higher someone's *educational level*, the more human capital he or she possesses, according to Becker (1965). Therefore, educational level was added as control variable. For each country there was a variable asking for the respondent's educational level in that country's language. Therefore we computed the nine variables into one to create this control variable. The new educational level variable included the educational level of every respondent. We didn't alter the scale, as the separate educational variables were all measured based on the same scale. The scale included (1) not completed primary education; (2) primary education or first stage of basic education; (3) lower level secondary education or second stage of basic education (GCSE or equivalent); (4) upper secondary education (AS, A Level or GNVQ); (5) post-secondary, non tertiary education (NVQ); (6) first

stage of tertiary education (BA or BSC); (7) second stage of tertiary education (MA or MSC) and lastly (8) for doctoral degree (PhD).

We also included the variable *age* in our analysis. The longer someone is working, the higher his/her human capital as it has increased through working experience and/or on the job training (Hendricks, 2002; Pasban & Nojdedeh, 2016).

We chose to add *the duration of employment at organization* as a control variable. The question belonging to this variable was “how many years have you been working for this organization?”. The longer someone has been working at an organization, the higher the chance he or she has been giving a promotion or participated in a training during their time at that particular organization, thus increasing their human capital. Respondents could fill in the number of years they have been working for the organization in an open answer response. If the respondent has worked at the organization for less than one year, he/she filled in a 0. There was one outlier in this variable; 60 years of employment. We chose to not include this outlier in the analysis as it might influence the overall results.

When employees have a *temporary labor contract*, the possibilities to grow within the organization are often limited, with no to little chances to grow within the company and increase their earnings. (De Witte & Naswall, 2003). The question to measure this variable was “what kind of labor contract do you have?”, with a multiple-choice answer option of (1), fixed contract (2) temporary contract, (3) on-call contract, (4) apprentice/trainee contract, (5) sub-contracting, (6) temporary employment agency contract, (7) other. As there’s only one type of fixed contract and multiple flexible contracts, we created a dummy variable in which (0) is not a fixed contract and (1) is a fixed contract.

Hours a week contracted to work for organization was added as a control variable as often the income of the employee is, amongst others, determined based on the contracted hours a week.

Marital status was added as a control variable and recoded into a dummy variable of which 0 is “not married” and 1 is “married”.

Polachek and Xiang (2009) and Polachek (1975b) mentioned that being married could influence one’s income and therefore is added as a control variable.

According to Polachek and Xiang (2009) having children could impact one’s earnings. To analyze whether the so-called motherhood wage penalty exists within our sample, we added the variable *number of children living at home* to the analysis. Because we want to know whether having children has an impact on the earnings of our (female) respondents, we created a dummy variable in which (0) means having no children living at home and (1) means the respondents does have one or multiple children living at home.

3.3 Method

IBM SPSS software was used to conduct the analyses. To test the hypotheses, we used multiple regression models. The first model we tested is a simple regression that measures the direct effect of the independent variable gender on the dependent variable income. The second model, which is a multiple linear regression, analyzed the effect of the independent variable gender on the dependent variable income, including control variables *educational level*, *age*, *duration of employment*, *type of labor contract*, *marital status* and *number of children living at home*. The DEI policies/initiatives were also added as control variables. Our third model was also a multiple linear regression, which analyzed the moderation effects. Therefore, interaction terms of gender and the presence of DEI initiatives was created and included in the analysis.

4. Results

4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of all included variables in this regression analysis on income. Our final sample consists of 2185 respondents that work at 101 different organizations. Of the participating organizations 5 companies were registered in the United Kingdom, 7 in Germany, 7 in Finland, 10 in Sweden, 23 in the Netherlands, 6 in Portugal, 5 in Spain, 12 in Hungary and 26 in Bulgaria. Of these 101 organizations, 30 companies were active in manufacturing, 18 in the healthcare sector, 26 in higher education, 10 in the transport business, 9 in telecommunication and 8 in financial services.

Out of our final sample, 58% is female (mean = 0.58). The mean of income is reported as 3.59 which can be calculated to an average income of €3.927,35 (mean = 3.59, min = 0, max = 5.95, SD = 0.90). Given the large standard deviation, the scores of the respondents vary above and below the average score.

Around 21% of the respondents reported their organizations to have at least one DEI policy or initiative in place. Diversity committees or taskforces is the most common DEI initiative/policy according to the respondents, of which 34% reported their organization to have in place. For the control variables, we see that on average the respondent has required an educational level of post-secondary, non-tertiary education (NVQ) or First stage of tertiary education (BA or BSC) (mean = 5.53, min = 1, max = 8, SD = 1.54). A rather large standard deviation of 1.54 on a 1 to 8 scale implies many respondents score below and above this mean. The average age of the respondents is 44 years old (mean = 43.85, min = 20, max = 77, SD = 11.43). However, the standard deviation of 11.43 indicates many respondents score below and above this mean. Furthermore, 90% of employees have a fixed contract (mean = 0.90) and have been working for the organization for an average of 11.6 years (mean = 11.60, min = 0, max = 49, SD = 10.37) but the standard deviation of 10.37 indicates many respondents score below and above this mean. The respondents work an average of 24 hours a week at their organization, but with this variable the standard deviation is very high indicating again that there are many respondents score above and below this mean (mean = 24.30, min = 0, max = 56, SD = 18.07). 52% of the respondents is married (mean 0.52) and 51% of the respondents report to have at least one child living at their home (mean 0.51).

Table 2. Descriptive statistics

	N	Min	Max	Mean	S.D.
Female	2185	0	1	0.58	
Income	2185	.00	5.95	3.59	0.90
Diversity initiatives (present = 1)					
<i>Affirmative Action plans</i>	2185	0	1	0.25	
<i>Diversity training managers</i>	2185	0	1	0.28	
<i>Diversity Committees or taskforces</i>	2185	0	1	0.34	
<i>Diversity evaluations for managers</i>	2185	0	1	0.15	

<i>Networking programmes for women</i>	2185	0	1	0.14	
<i>Mentoring programmes for women</i>	2185	0	1	0.15	
<i>Diversity Managers</i>	2185	0	1	0.18	
Educational level	2185	1.00	8.00	5.53	1.54
Age	2185	20	77	43.83	11.43
Duration of employment at organization	2185	0	49	11.60	10.37
Fixed contract	2185	0	1	0.90	
Hours a week	2185	0	56.00	24.30	18.06
Married	2185	0	1	0.52	
Children living at home	2185	0	1	0.51	

4.2 Regression analyses

Table 3 shows the standardized regression coefficients that predict the net monthly earnings of the respondents. Model 1 examines the direct effects of gender on net monthly earnings. The direct effect appears to be significant (Adjusted $R^2 = .010$, $F(1, 2185) = 22.116$, $p < .001$). This shows that gender, in this case identifying as a woman, has a significant negative effect on net monthly earnings ($B = -.182$, $p < .001$). In this model, gender explains 10% of the variance.

We've added the control variables DEI initiatives and policies, educational level, age, duration of employment at organization, type of labor contract, hours a week contracted to work for organization, marital status and children living at home at model 2. This model explains 27.4% of the variance and is significant (Adjusted $R^2 = .274$, $F(15, 2185) = 56.062$, $p < .001$). The DEI initiatives/policies Affirmative Action plans, Diversity training managers, Diversity Committees or taskforces, Diversity evaluations for managers, Networking programmes for women, Mentoring programmes for women and Diversity managers were tested in this model. Not every DEI initiatives/policy appeared to be significant, and not all initiatives/policies have a positive effect on the dependent net monthly earnings variable. Affirmative Action Plans ($B = -.192$, $p < .001$), Diversity evaluations for managers ($B = -.273$, $p < .001$), Networking programmes for women ($B = .209$, $p < .001$) and Diversity managers ($B = .242$, $p < .001$) appear to have significant effect on net monthly earnings. Affirmative Action Plans and Diversity Evaluations for managers appear to have significant negative effects on the net monthly earnings. The effect of educational level on net monthly earnings of women has a small negative effect on the dependent variable but is not significant ($B = -.006$, $p = .768$). The control variable Age ($B = .075$, $p < .01$) is significant and shows a positive effect, thus with age increases one's monthly net earnings. The same goes for respondents with a fixed contract ($B = .087$, $p < .001$) and working hours a week ($B = .212$, $p < .001$). However, the duration of employment at organization has a negative effect on monthly net earnings, but is not significant ($B = -.001$, $p = .982$). Furthermore, the female respondent's Marital status ($B = -.001$, $p = .944$) and having children living at home ($B = -.014$, $p = .481$) both showed to have a negative

but insignificant effect on net monthly earnings. Based on these results, hypothesis 1, stating that the relationship between gender and income is negative for women, can be accepted

The mediating role of DEI initiatives/policies on the effect of gender on net monthly earnings are shown in Model 3 by adding them as interaction terms. In total, Model 3 explains 28.3% of the total variance and is significant ($R^2 = .283$, $F(22, 2185) = 40.180$, $p < .001$). Comparable to model 2, Diversity evaluations for managers ($B = -.323$, $p < .001$), Affirmative Action Plans ($B = -.166$, $p < .001$) and), Networking programmes for women ($B = .144$, $p < .05$) and Diversity managers ($B = .245$, $p < .001$) show a significant effect on employee's monthly net earnings. Of the significant DEI policies/programmes, Networking programmes for women and Diversity managers had a positive significant effect on the dependent variable, Affirmative Action plans and Diversity evaluations for managers showed a negative significant effect on the dependent variable.

Surprisingly, the control variables Marital Status ($B = .001$, $p < .946$) and Duration of employment ($B = .004$, $p = .860$) have turned into a positive effect whereas in model 2 these had a negative effect. However, both variables are not significant in model 3, as are the control variables Children living at home ($B = -.014$, $p = .482$) and Educational level ($B = -.005$, $p = .806$). Control variables Age ($B = .070$, $p < .01$), Fixed contract ($B = .079$, $p < .001$) and Contracted hours a week ($B = .212$, $p < .001$) showed a positive significant effect, thus having a positive significant effect on net monthly earnings.

Only one interaction effect showed a significant effect. The interaction effect of Diversity evaluations for managers and gender was significant and showed a positive effect on the dependent variable ($B = -.075$, $p < .05$). This would mean that the logarithmic income of men in organizations with an implemented diversity evaluation would be 2.69 ($3.013 - .091 * 0 - .323$) and that of women 2.674 ($3.013 - .091 * 1 - .323 + .075$), leaving a wage gap of log income .016. This means that the wage gap between men and women doesn't completely disappear when organizations have implemented Diversity evaluations for managers, but that it tightens the gap more than not having any policy in place at all (men log income 3.013 compared to female log income of 2.922, difference of log income .091). Interaction effects Diversity training managers x female, Networking programmes for women x female and Mentoring programmes for women x female showed a positive effect but weren't significant. Also, interaction effects Affirmative Action plans x female, Diversity Committees or taskforces x female and Diversity managers x female were not significant and showed a negative effect. Based on these results, none of the hypothesis of 2a till 2g can be accepted. Only the interaction effect of Diversity evaluations for managers showed a positively significant effect, however, we expected this to be non-present. This means that the presence of such DEI policy/initiatives makes for lower wages for women compared to men, on top of the gender wage gap that's already there.

Table 3. Regression analyses for variables predicting income (N = 2185)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	3.699***	.027	2.959***	.124	3.013***	.124
Female	-.182***	.039	-.056**	.034	-.091***	.045

Diversity initiatives				
<i>Affirmative Action plans</i>	-.192***	.043	-.166***	.068
<i>Diversity training managers</i>	.009	.053	.001	.089
<i>Diversity Committees or taskforces</i>	.021	.050	.057	.079
<i>Diversity evaluations for managers</i>	-.273***	.059	-.323***	.092
<i>Networking programmes for women</i>	.209***	.092	.144*	.156
<i>Mentoring programmes for women</i>	-.028	.088	-.097	.145
<i>Diversity managers</i>	.242***	.051	.254***	.079
Educational level	-.006	.011	-.005	.011
Age	.075**	.002	.070**	.002
Duration of employment at organization	-.001	.002	.004	.002
Fixed contract	.087***	.057	.079***	.057
Hours a week	.212***	.001	.212***	.001
Married	-.001	.036	.001	.036
Children living at home	-.014	.035	-.014	.035
Interaction DEI initiatives x <i>female</i>				
<i>Affirmative Action plans x female</i>			-.021	.086
<i>Diversity training managers x female</i>			.007	.110
<i>Diversity Committees or taskforces x female</i>			-.046	.101
<i>Diversity evaluations for managers x female</i>			.075*	.118
<i>Networking programmes for women x female</i>			.078	.194
<i>Mentoring programmes for women x female</i>			.090	.182
<i>Diversity managers x female</i>			-.004	.104
Adjusted R2	.010	.274	.283	
F	22.116 ***	56.062***	40.180***	

***<.001, **<.01, *<.05

5. Conclusion

The goal of this research was to create more insights in and clarity of the effects of DEI policies on the gender wage gap, to see if they actually help to close the gap. Multiple theories tend to explain why this is the case, for example the human capital theory, New Home Economics and the social identity theory. Organizations implement diversity policies hoping to create a more fair, diverse, efficient and equal working environment and to communicate its organizational values (Dover, Kaiser & Major, 2019; Schoen & Rost, 2021; Groeneveld & Verbeek, 2012; Ellemers, et al. 2018; Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, 2006). There are many diversity and inclusion policies, however, in this research we focused on the most used and implemented policies/plans; Affirmative Action plans, Diversity training for managers, Diversity Committees or taskforces, Diversity evaluations for managers, Networking programmes for women, Mentoring programmes for women and Diversity managers. Scholars don't agree on the effects of the mentioned DEI initiatives, as some claim they could have negative unintended consequences, whilst others claim DEI policies have a positive effect on closing the wage gap (Dover et al., 2019; Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, 2006; Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen, 2006) DEI policies might serve as window dressing for the organization, to give the false impression that the organization is acting on creating a more equal working environment (Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, 2006). To investigate the effect of DEI initiatives on the gender wage gap, we created two research questions: *To what extent does gender of European employees have an impact on their income?* and *Why does the presence of DEI initiatives have a positive or negative effect on this relation?*

We start with our finding of the negative effect of gender on income, or more specifically, that of women on income. This finding is in line with previous findings by other scholars, supporting the Gender Wage Gap phenomena (Weichselbaumer, & Winter-Ebmer, 2005; Kunze, 2008; Leping & Toomet, 2008; Carlsson & Rooth, 2016). We conclude that the income of women is lower compared to the income of men, also when controlled for educational level, age, duration of employment at organization, type of labor contract, hours a week contracted to work for organization, marital status and children living at home.

In addition, another important finding of this research is that most DEI policies appear not to have an impact on the relationship between gender and income. Only one DEI policy shows a significant effect; Diversity evaluations for managers, which appears to make the gender wage gap slightly slimmer. However, it must be noticed that one of the regression assumptions was violated, thus significant levels might be overestimated. Furthermore, the unintended consequences of diversity policies could have also had an effect on their influence of closing the wage gap. DEI initiatives could result in majority members feeling disadvantaged or excluded as they might feel as if minority members get preferential treatment at their expense (Major & Kaiser, 2016). Consequently, DEI initiatives and/or policies could have the opposite effect and thus could result in more discriminatory behavior towards minority members (including women) (Avery, 2011). Moreover, it is not known in which way the initiatives are implemented. As stated by Dobbin and Kalev (2016), mandatory diversity trainings are not effective and could lead to the unintended consequences mentioned above.

6. Discussion

This research aimed to give more insight in the effects of diversity initiatives/policies on the gender wage gap. There are several restrictions we need to give attention to. Firstly, one of the assumptions for regression analyses were violated. The European Workforce Survey data consists out of clusters of respondents (from country to organization to managers to employees). This implies that respondent results are not independent of one another, meaning we had to be careful interpreting the outcomes as the significant results of the analyses could have been overestimated and standard errors underestimated.

A possible explanation for the insignificant effects of most of the researched DEI policies could be that diversity initiatives are currently implemented based on common sense (Ellemers et al., 2018). A lack of evidence of the effects of diversity initiatives supports the statement of Kalev, Dobbin and Kelly (2016) that DEI initiatives serve as window dressing for the organization to promote an image of equal treatment. Based on the results of this research, we wonder if diversity policies are the most effective tools to close the Gender Wage Gap. Perhaps the scope of these diversity policies is too wide, as they often focus on equality in general and not specifically on the wage gap (Dobbin & Kalev, 2015).

Additionally, we haven't looked at differences of the effects of DEI policies/initiatives between countries as this was not part of the scope of this research. Therefore, with the results of this study we can state the effects of DEI policies/initiatives on the gender wage gap within the whole of Europe and not on country level. Besides that, the sample of this research was quite large and included organizations from each of the industry categories and from every country partaking in the survey. This added to the reliability of the results of our analyses.

Furthermore, the European Workforce Data questionnaire data relies for the biggest part on self-assessment questions. This begs the question of validity of the instrument of data collection. For instance, it's likely respondents answered socially desirable responses to the question about their net monthly earnings. Its possible respondents gave up a higher income than they actually have. However, the European Workforce Survey was piloted before being used on a large scale, during which the data collectors tested the scale reliabilities and validity of their instruments. Therefore, we expect validity to not have a major effect on the results of this research.

In addition, the European Workforce Survey only included organizations that exceeded a 40 employee mark and that were active in one of the six selected industries were approached to participate in the data collection. Organizations that are active in a different industry of counted less than 40 employees were excluded from the study. Future research should include smaller organizations in their sample that are active in different industries than the selected six, to make the results and conclusion of research stronger and more valid.

6.1 Future research

Taking the cultural differences that could exist between the different European countries into account, between-countries results could look very different compared to the European-wide results. To also state the effects between countries, we suggest future research could provide these insights.

As noted in the conclusion, the survey didn't ask the organizations details about the DEI policies/initiatives, only if they were present or not. For future research to build upon these results, we suggest adding more in-depth questions to the survey to discover how and in which way the initiatives are implemented. As stated by Dobbin and Kalev (2016), how DEI policies are implemented

makes a huge difference on their effectiveness. E.g., some compulsory DEI programmes have negative effects compared to when employees can follow these programmes voluntarily.

Furthermore, we suggest further research on the “why” question based on the results of this study. According to the literature, affirmative action, diversity training and networking/mentoring programmes should have a positive effect on promoting a more equal working environment. This begs the question why, according to this research, they don’t have a positive effect on closing the gender wage gap.

Lastly, research aimed at gaining information and new insights on closing the gender wage gap contributes to a more equal world. As found in this study also, the gender wage gap still very much exists. Therefore, further research on this topic on general should be conducted so we can strive towards equal pay for men and women.

7. Policy advice

In this chapter we will answer the policy research question *Which DEI policy contributes the most to closing the gender pay gap and how can this be implemented to be the most effective?*

In this research we concluded that most diversity policies/programmes don't have an effect on closing the gender wage gap. This begs the question if DEI policies or programmes are the right tools address this issue with. However, as stated by Ellemers et al (2018), most DEI programmes/policies are implemented based on common sense whilst lacking empirical evidence of their effectiveness. DEI could also serve as facade for the organization to make it look like the organization promotes equal treatment whilst there might be discrimination and inequality present (Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, 2016). Our first policy recommendation would be to emphasize implementation of DEI policies/programmes based on their effectiveness in different context and environments. Not every policy is a good fit for every organization, therefore the organizations need to perform a thorough research on which policy would suit their organization best. They would also need to consider the method of implementing a DEI policy/pogramme, as Dobbin and Kalev (2016) found that e.g., diversity trainings only have a positive effect when employees can follow the courses voluntary.

This research found that out of seven tested popular DEI programmes/policies, only "Diversity evaluations for managers" had a positive significant effect on closing the gender wage gap. Based on these results we would suggest investing in this DEI programme in particular, however, as we violated one of the regression assumptions, we would suggest further research about the effectiveness of this programme and its effects in particular. We would advice to perform exploratory research to other DEI policies and their effects on closing the gender gap as well, before making a strong suggestion on which DEI policies to invest in to close the gender wage gap.

When organizations want to invest in the other policies as well, we advice them to perform long term follow-up evaluations to maximize the effects of training programmes and to make them more successful (Rynes & Rosen, 1995). Other factors for more success according to Rynes and Rosen (1995) include perceived top management support for a more diverse working environment, explicit managerial rewards for trying to increase diversity in a team and using a broad definition of diversity.

If organizations don't want to continue using DEI policies/programmes because of their lack of evidence that they actually work (Ellemers et al., 2018), we advice organizations to look for an alternative for DEI programmes/policies, preferably a policy or initiative that's already been proven to be highly effective in closing the wage gap. For instance, hiring more female managers. Some scholars suggest hiring more female managers has a positive effect on decreasing the gender wage gap (Hultin & Szulkin, 2003; Hirsch, 2013; Zimmermann, 2022). According to Zimmermann (2022), there are two mechanisms that explain the impact female managers have on the wage gap. First, female employees might benefit from homophily and mentoring when interacting with their female managers (Hultin & Szulkin, 2003). Second, female managers might want to use their power in the organization to change organizational practices, resulting in a more gender-equal organization (Cohen & Huffman, 2007). Women in managerial positions more often adapt policies that promote gender equality and diversity, e.g., work-life practices or practices promoting female employees explicitly (Dobbin, Kim & Kalev, 2011). As Zimmerman (2022) states, the direct promotion of women positively influences women's wages, narrowing the gender wage gap. Besides this, women in managerial positions create a spillover effect of implementing and promoting gender equality and diversity policies and programmes, further declining the gender wage gap (Zimmerman, 2022). "Increasing the share of female managers might close the gender wage gap faster than board quotas." (Zimmerman, 2022, p. 367).

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

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Assumptions regression analysis plots



Appendix 2

SPSS Syntax

* Encoding: UTF-8.

* Encoding: .

*Independent variable: gender Q12 Are you male or female?

*Dependent variable: Income Q100_1 What are your net monthly earnings from your main job at this organisation? Please refer to your average earnings in recent months

*moderator variable: DEI initiatives OQ20_1 till OQ20_7:Please indicate whether your organisation has the following personnel programmes aimed at stimulating the hiring and promotion of women in your organization: POLICY

*control variables

Years of employment: Q1 How many years have you been working for this organization?

Type of contract Q5 What kind of employment contract do you have?

Contracted hours a week Q7_1 How many hours a week are you contracted to work for this organization: ... Hours a week

Children Q 79 Do you have children living at home?

age Q13 How old are you?

Educational level (Q17_BG Q17_UK = 1)

Marital status Q72 Do you currently live with a partner?

*

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.

GET

FILE='O:\FSW\SOC\Sustainable_workforce_N\5_2 Data wave 2\Jill\2. Employee Manager Organisation '+

'merged\Jill\SWS EQMQOQ final kopie.sav'.

*independent gender

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Q12

/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Q12

```
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
```

```
*Recode.
```

```
RECODE Q12 (1=0) (2=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
VALUE LABELS Q12 0 "male" 1 "female".
```

```
*
```

```
*dependent income.
```

```
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Q100_1
```

```
/ORDER=ANALYSIS.
```

```
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Q100_1
```

```
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
```

```
*create Logarithm variable for income.
```

```
COMPUTE Income_log=LG10(Q100_1).
```

```
VARIABLE LABELS Income_log 'logarithm income'.
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
missing values Income_log (99996, 99997, 99999).
```

```
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Income_log
```

```
/ORDER=ANALYSIS.
```

```
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Income_log
```

```
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
```

*moderator DEI policies/plans

OQ20_1 tm OQ20_7

*OQ20_1 Affirmative action plans.

RECODE OQ20_1 (2=0) (1=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO Affirmative_action_plans.

VARIABLE LABELS Affirmative_action_plans 'affirmative action plans'.

EXECUTE.

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Affirmative_action_plans

/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Affirmative_action_plans

/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.

*OQ20_2 Diversity training for managers.

RECODE OQ20_2 (2=0) (1=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO Diversity_training_managers.

VARIABLE LABELS Diversity_training_managers 'Diversity training for managers'.

EXECUTE.

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Diversity_training_managers

/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Diversity_training_managers

/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.

*OQ20_3 Diversity committees or diversity task forces.

RECODE OQ20_3 (2=0) (1=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO Diversity_Committees_taskforces.

VARIABLE LABELS Diversity_Committees_taskforces 'Diversity Committees or diversity taskforces'.

EXECUTE.

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Diversity_Committees_taskforces

/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Diversity_Committees_taskforces

/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.

*OQ20_4 Diversity evaluations for managers.

RECODE OQ20_4 (2=0) (1=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO Diversity_evaluations_managers.

VARIABLE LABELS Diversity_evaluations_managers 'Diversity evaluations for managers'.

EXECUTE.

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Diversity_evaluations_managers

/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Diversity_evaluations_managers

/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.

*OQ20_5 Networking programmes for women.

RECODE OQ20_5 (2=0) (1=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO Networking_Women.

VARIABLE LABELS Networking_Women 'Networking programmes for women'.

EXECUTE.

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Networking_Women

/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Networking_Women

/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.

*OQ20_6 Mentoring programmes for women.

RECODE OQ20_6 (2=0) (1=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO Mentoring_Women.

VARIABLE LABELS Mentoring_Women 'Mentoring programmes for women'.

EXECUTE.

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Mentoring_Women

/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Mentoring_Women

/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.

*OQ20_7 Diversity managers.

RECODE OQ20_7 (2=0) (1=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO Diversity_Managers.

VARIABLE LABELS Diversity_Managers 'Diversity managers'.

EXECUTE.

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Diversity_Managers

/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Diversity_Managers

/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.

*Missings.

missing values Affirmative_action_plans Diversity_training_managers

Diversity_Committees_taskforces Diversity_evaluations_managers Networking_Women
Mentoring_Women

Diversity_Managers (99996, 99997, 99999).

*correlation of DEI variables

REGRESSION

/MISSING LISTWISE

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA

/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT Income_log

/METHOD=ENTER Affirmative_action_plans Diversity_training_managers

Diversity_Committees_taskforces Diversity_evaluations_managers Networking_Women
Mentoring_Women

Diversity_Managers.

* _____

*Control variables:

* Q1 How many years have you been working for this organization?

FREQUENCIES Q1.

DESCRIPTIVES Q1.

RENAME VARIABLES Q1 = work_for_org.

*Bloxplot.

EXAMINE VARIABLES=work_for_org

/PLOT BOXPLOT STEMLEAF HISTOGRAM NPLOT

/COMPARE VARIABLES

/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES EXTREME

/CINTERVAL 95

/MISSING LISTWISE

/NOTOTAL.

*60 years is an outlier so remove.

MISSING VALUES work_for_org (60, 99996, 99999).

FREQUENCIES work_for_org.

DESCRIPTIVES work_for_org.

*type of contract Q5 What kind of employment contract do you have?

.

FREQUENCIES Q5.

*hercoderen naar dummy.

RECODE Q5 (1=1) (2 3 4 6 7=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO fixed_contract.

VALUE LABELS fixed_contract 0 "No" 1 "Yes".

* missing values.

missing values fixed_contract (99996, 99997, 99999).

FREQUENCIES fixed_contract.

DESCRIPTIVES fixed_contract.

*Contracted hours a week Q7_1 How many hours a week are you contracted to work for this organisation: ... Hours a week.

FREQUENCIES Q7_1.

DESCRIPTIVES Q7_1.

RENAME VARIABLES Q7_1 = Contract_hours.

* missing values.

*60 en 70 uur outliers dus die weghalen.

MISSING VALUES Contract_hours (60, THRU 99999).

FREQUENCIES Contract_hours.

DESCRIPTIVES Contract_hours.

*children Q 79 Do you have children living at home?

FREQUENCIES Q79.

DESCRIPTIVES Q79.

*Recode into dummy.

RECODE Q79 (2=0) (1=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS).

EXECUTE.

VALUE LABELS Q79 0 "no" 1 "yes".

* missing values.

missing values Q79 (99996, 99997, 99999).

FREQUENCIES Q79.

DESCRIPTIVES Q79.

*age Q13 How old are you?

* missing values.

MISSING VALUES Q13 (99996, 99997, 99999).

FREQUENCIES Q13.

DESCRIPTIVES Q13.

*Educational level.

*Recode the educational level for every country variable into one.

compute educ = 99.

if (Q17_BG = 1 OR Q17_DE= 1 OR Q17_ES= 1 OR Q17_FI= 1 OR Q17_HU= 1 OR Q17_NL= 1 OR Q17_PT= 1 OR Q17_SE= 1 OR Q17_UK = 1) educ = 1.

if (Q17_BG = 2 OR Q17_DE= 2 OR Q17_ES= 2 OR Q17_FI= 2 OR Q17_HU= 2 OR Q17_NL= 2 OR Q17_PT= 2 OR Q17_SE= 2 OR Q17_UK = 2) educ = 2.

if (Q17_BG = 3 OR Q17_DE= 3 OR Q17_ES= 3 OR Q17_FI= 3 OR Q17_HU= 3 OR Q17_NL= 3 OR Q17_PT= 3 OR Q17_SE= 3 OR Q17_UK = 3) educ = 3.

if (Q17_BG = 4 OR Q17_DE= 4 OR Q17_ES= 4 OR Q17_FI= 4 OR Q17_HU= 4 OR Q17_NL= 4 OR Q17_PT= 4 OR Q17_SE= 4 OR Q17_UK = 4) educ = 4.

if (Q17_BG = 5 OR Q17_DE= 5 OR Q17_ES= 5 OR Q17_FI= 5 OR Q17_HU= 5 OR Q17_NL= 5 OR Q17_PT= 5 OR Q17_SE= 5 OR Q17_UK = 5) educ = 5.

if (Q17_BG = 6 OR Q17_DE= 6 OR Q17_ES= 6 OR Q17_FI= 6 OR Q17_HU= 6 OR Q17_NL= 6 OR Q17_PT= 6 OR Q17_SE= 6 OR Q17_UK = 6) educ = 6.

if (Q17_BG = 7 OR Q17_DE= 7 OR Q17_ES= 7 OR Q17_FI= 7 OR Q17_HU= 7 OR Q17_NL= 7 OR Q17_PT= 7 OR Q17_SE= 7 OR Q17_UK = 7) educ = 7.

if (Q17_BG = 8 OR Q17_DE= 8 OR Q17_ES= 8 OR Q17_FI= 8 OR Q17_HU= 8 OR Q17_NL= 8 OR Q17_PT= 8 OR Q17_SE= 8 OR Q17_UK = 8) educ = 8.

missing values educ (99).

FREQUENCIES educ.

DESCRIPTIVES educ.

* Marital status Q72 Do you currently live with a partner?.

FREQUENCIES Q72.

DESCRIPTIVES Q72.

*Recode into dummy.

RECODE Q72 (2,3=0) (1=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO Married.

EXECUTE.

VALUE LABELS Married 0 "no" 1 "yes".

* missing values.

missing values Married (99996, 99997, 99999).

FREQUENCIES Married.

DESCRIPTIVES Married.

*

*take out all missings for the same number of N at every variable.

COMPUTE nomiss = nmiss (Q12, Q13, Income_log, work_for_org, fixed_contract, educ,
Contract_hours, Q79, Married, Affirmative_action_plans, Diversity_training_managers,

Diversity_Committees_taskforces, Diversity_evaluations_managers, Networking_Women,
Mentoring_Women, Diversity_Managers) = 0.

FILTER BY nomiss.

FREQUENCIES Q12, Income_log, educ, Q13, work_for_org, fixed_contract, Contract_hours, Q79,
Married, Affirmative_action_plans Diversity_training_managers

Diversity_Committees_taskforces Diversity_evaluations_managers Networking_Women
Mentoring_Women Diversity_Managers.

DESCRIPTIVES Q12, educ, Income_log, Q13, work_for_org, fixed_contract, Contract_hours, Q79,
Married, Affirmative_action_plans Diversity_training_managers

Diversity_Committees_taskforces Diversity_evaluations_managers Networking_Women
Mentoring_Women Diversity_Managers.

*_interaction effects_____

*create interaction variables.

COMPUTE interaction_DEI_1 =Affirmative_action_plans*Q12.

COMPUTE interaction_DEI_2 =Diversity_training_managers*Q12.

COMPUTE interaction_DEI_3 =Diversity_Committees_taskforces*Q12.

COMPUTE interaction_DEI_4 =Diversity_evaluations_managers*Q12.

COMPUTE interaction_DEI_5 =Networking_Women*Q12.

COMPUTE interaction_DEI_6 =Mentoring_Women*Q12.

COMPUTE interaction_DEI_7 =Diversity_Managers*Q12.

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=interaction_DEI_1 interaction_DEI_2 interaction_DEI_3 interaction_DEI_4

interaction_DEI_5 interaction_DEI_6 interaction_DEI_7

/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=interaction_DEI_1 interaction_DEI_2 interaction_DEI_3 interaction_DEI_4

interaction_DEI_5 interaction_DEI_6 interaction_DEI_7

/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.

*regression assumptions check (VIF, normal distribution, outliers).

EXAMINE VARIABLES= Income_log, Q12, educ, Q13, work_for_org, fixed_contract, Contract_hours,
educ, Q79, Married, Affirmative_action_plans Diversity_training_managers

Diversity_Committees_taskforces Diversity_evaluations_managers Networking_Women
Mentoring_Women Diversity_Managers

/PLOT BOXPLOT STEMLEAF HISTOGRAM NPLOT

/COMPARE VARIABLES

/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES EXTREME

/CINTERVAL 95

/MISSING LISTWISE

/NOTOTAL.

REGRESSION

/MISSING LISTWISE

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL

/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT Income_log

/METHOD=ENTER Q12, work_for_org, Q13, fixed_contract, educ, Contract_hours, Q79, Married, Affirmative_action_plans, Diversity_training_managers,

Diversity_Committees_taskforces, Diversity_evaluations_managers, Networking_Women, Mentoring_Women, Diversity_Managers, interaction_DEI_1, interaction_DEI_2, interaction_DEI_3, interaction_DEI_4,

interaction_DEI_5, interaction_DEI_6, interaction_DEI_7.

*check coherence between the variables.

CORRELATIONS Income_log, Q12, Q13, work_for_org, fixed_contract, educ, Contract_hours, Q79, Married, Affirmative_action_plans Diversity_training_managers

Diversity_Committees_taskforces Diversity_evaluations_managers Networking_Women Mentoring_Women Diversity_Managers.

* _____.

*descriptives and frequencies all variables.

FREQUENCIES Q12, Income_log, educ, Q13, work_for_org, fixed_contract, Contract_hours, Q79, Married, Affirmative_action_plans Diversity_training_managers

Diversity_Committees_taskforces Diversity_evaluations_managers Networking_Women Mentoring_Women Diversity_Managers interaction_DEI_1, interaction_DEI_2, interaction_DEI_3, interaction_DEI_4,

interaction_DEI_5, interaction_DEI_6, interaction_DEI_7.

DESCRIPTIVES Q12, educ, Income_log, Q13, work_for_org, fixed_contract, Contract_hours, Q79, Married, Affirmative_action_plans Diversity_training_managers

Diversity_Committees_taskforces Diversity_evaluations_managers Networking_Women Mentoring_Women Diversity_Managers interaction_DEI_1, interaction_DEI_2, interaction_DEI_3, interaction_DEI_4,

interaction_DEI_5, interaction_DEI_6, interaction_DEI_7.

*

*analyses.

REGRESSION

/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N

/MISSING LISTWISE

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE

/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT Income_log

/METHOD=ENTER Q12

/METHOD=ENTER Q13, educ, work_for_org fixed_contract Contract_hours Q79 Married Affirmative_action_plans

Diversity_training_managers Diversity_Committees_taskforces Diversity_evaluations_managers

Networking_Women Mentoring_Women Diversity_Managers

/METHOD=ENTER interaction_DEI_1 interaction_DEI_2 interaction_DEI_3 interaction_DEI_4

interaction_DEI_5 interaction_DEI_6 interaction_DEI_7

/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID,*ZPRED)

/RESIDUALS HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) NORMPROB(ZRESID).

*

*assumption check

REGRESSION

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/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT Income_log
/METHOD=ENTER Q12
/METHOD=ENTER Q13 educ work_for_org Contract_hours fixed_contract Q79 Married
Affirmative_action_plans Diversity_training_managers Diversity_Committees_taskforces
Diversity_evaluations_managers Networking_Women Mentoring_Women Diversity_Managers
/METHOD=ENTER interaction_DEI_1 interaction_DEI_2 interaction_DEI_3 interaction_DEI_4
interaction_DEI_5 interaction_DEI_6 interaction_DEI_7
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED)
/RESIDUALS NORMPROB(ZRESID).
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