



Utrecht University

433160

Intercultural Communication Master's Thesis

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Title: The Future of the European Union

Research Focus: The Externalisation of an Internalised National Identity in European Political Discourse.

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Submitted: 17.04.2022

Word Count: 10,094

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Abstract

With changing dynamics in European politics, the EU's future is becoming increasingly uncertain. There are many factors contributing to the political disharmony, such as economic and demographic, but this research explores the concept of identity. More specifically, identity is investigated in relation to a European and national identities in eastern and western EU member states as their coexistence is a key determinant of the EU's future.

To discuss the relationship between different national identities, this project analysed political discourse in a European and national context. Discourse reflects one's inner understanding of their identity in external language, but this research also discovered that language is reactive to external perspectives of identity. The methodology selected passages from political speeches and provided a comparative analysis.

This analysis not only revealed the present construct of each politician's identity, but also how and why it has developed in such a way. This was achieved by exploring its historical foundation which showed a clear link between past, present and future political action. Based on this analysis, the results suggested that understanding national identities helps to navigate complex and delicate inner EU relations. This research concluded that if the EU stabilises national identities in its union, it can ensure future stability and strengthen a European identity.

Introduction

The EU is a complex political project which has been encouraging peace between sovereign European nations since 1945. It offers social and economic welfare to all member states to create a collective European identity. Many of the EU's founders believed a political entity founded on liberal values would provide a definite solution to interstate conflict in Europe (Katzenstein, 2009). The future of the EU, however, has been destabilised by separatist political movements, such as Brexit and rising illiberal nationalism (ibid, p.85). In response to the EU's instability, scholars have researched European citizens' loyalty to national and a European identity (Robyn, 2005, Alnaes, 2014, Karner & Kopytowska, 2017). Building on previous research, this project explores the representation of different national identities in political discourse in the EU. This is important because the coexistence of contrasting political ideologies in the EU threatens its stability as a union.

To highlight the problem the EU faces, this research focuses on eastern and western political discourse in European politics because they are politically and socially different. By analysing political discourse in relation to different nations, we can explore the link between national identity and the external articulation of language. This requires further analysis on the representation of the self in discourse, defined as an internalised identity, and what has been internalised can only be recognised by what is externalised. This research approaches the discussion of the self from two angles. Firstly, it explores the construct of a national identity from an internal and an external perspective. Then we examine the discursive values one produces in reaction to the dual perspective of their identity. Values act as the moral guide to how we understand the world and this research analyses values according to one's national identity. Political discourse analysis thus reveals how and why politicians act in a particular way. With this understanding, we consider how the EU can anticipate and navigate different political values to unite nations under one collective identity.

This leads to the following sub-questions:

1. Which internalised national values motivate western and eastern European political discourse?
2. In light of the discourse analysis, how could the EU navigate the conflicting dynamics of European politics?

Primary Material

In line with this research's central concern, the following three politicians have been selected for a critical discourse analysis: Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel and Mateusz Morawiecki. The selection is based on their divergences on political and economic policies in the EU. This enables a comparative analysis and gives a diverse representation of vastly opposing political discourses in the EU. Other research into political discourse in northern and southern Europe would give a broader representation

of the political dynamics in the EU, but the theory and analysis developed in this project can be applied to other European nations for future research. The resulting discourse from these polarities can be identified in the European parliament, a space where politicians express their vision of communal projects. Macron, Merkel and Morawiecki participated in a conference titled *Debating the Future of Europe* in 2018. This analysis examines the origin and representation of their values motivating each politician's discourse in the European parliament.

Thereafter, the discourse in a European context will be compared to a national political setting. This comparison triggers this research's analysis to develop a more comprehensive understanding of each politician's interests and motivations. The national context in question concerns the COVID-19 pandemic which provoked a social and economic crisis in European nations. A time of crisis was chosen because it causes nations to become introverted and reflect on their own national needs. Karner and Kopytowska (2017) argue that a crisis often gives rise to 'alternative ideological reactions'. As Karner and Kopytowska suggest:

...a perceived sense of crises perfectly suffices to trigger similar processes of collective soul-searching, debate, disagreement and political antagonism. It gives rise not only to nationalist identity politics, but also to alternative ideological reactions in increasingly contested discursive fields. (Ibid, p.6)

Karner and Kopytowska (2017) convey that a crisis is reflected in discourse which allows this research to examine European national discursive responses in relation to the EU's collective unity. This analysis of discourse across an expansive political and an introverted context, gives an overview into the EU's predicament of unifying sovereign nations and ensuring its survival as a union.

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Chapter 1

Theoretical Framework: What is European Identity?

A Fragmented Political Identity

Before analysing the political discourse, we must first consider the layers of a European identity to understand the relation to eastern and western national identities. Katzenstein (2009) argues that a European identity is a political construct intertwined with a project of economic enlargement. However, due to economic disparities, this economic project has caused a political divide between cosmopolitan liberalists and illiberal populists. Salais (2014) and Münch (2016) argue that liberal politicians represent the winners of economic globalisation such as France and Germany. Hence, liberalists are pro-supranational economic projects such as the liberalisation of the single market in the Schengen Zone and a common currency (Demir, 2020). Such projects express a collective European identity through positive participation and identification with a communal project to increase their economic welfare.

As a result, Salais and Münch proceed to explain that the political endeavours of the liberal winners in the EU reflect their own economic and national interests which undermines the foundation of the EU. Such countries build the centre whilst the illiberal losers, for example Poland, are pushed to the periphery and reject a communal EU identity. Norman Fairclough (2010), a specialist in political discourse, develops the link between economic disparity and political divide. He notes:

...squeezed between a globalised economy and aggressively introverted cultures that proclaim an absolute multiculturalism implying a rejection of the other, the political space is fragmenting and democracy is being debased (Fairclough, 2010, p.394).

Linking back to the contrast between an expansive European project and illiberal introverted nations, Fairclough discusses the resulting fragmented political space. This research uses this dichotomy to investigate how the EU can accommodate diverse national identities and political ideologies under one collective identity. Thus, European identity is based on a communal economic and political project, but Katzenstein appropriately describes the EU as a 'project and a process' (Ibid, p.24) as it continues to navigate the fragmented political space.

European Values

Developing the construct of a European identity, the EU is founded on shared values to unite European nations, for example, social equality and democracy (Karner & Kopytowska, 2017). The EU seeks to integrate nations with these values via a conscious affiliation, in what some scholars describe as an imagined community (Alnaes, 2013, Anderson, 1983). Fuchs and Klingemann (2011) discuss the link between abstract values as the inner foundation of a collective identity and its outside image. They underline:

The building of collective identity is also about shared representations of a group, an active process of shaping and creating an image of what the group stands for and how it would like to be seen by others (Ibid, p.89).

Thus, relating their theory to the EU, the external image of a European identity is constructed from the inside via values. These values are vital to the EU's stability because they create a collective identity whilst allowing for differences in national identities as evident in the EU motto 'Diversity in Unity'. Such an ideation was coined by Tony Blair as 'subsidiarity' (Katzenstein, 2009, p.76) when addressing terrorism in a multicultural United Kingdom. Blair advocated that everyone had the right to maintain affiliation to their own culture while sharing a collective set of values. In the EU, the values define its inner identity by promoting generic similarities between European nations whilst maintaining national identity. This is a serious problem the EU is facing as it attempts to build a collective inner and outer representation without compromising individual states' identity.

What is National Identity?

A Sociohistorical Construct

Balancing nations' identity needs in the EU is primordial because national identity is an extremely powerful political ideology. With the example of Brexit, when a nation feels its identity is compromised, it seeks to protect through separation. Katzenstein (2009) defines national identity as a sociohistorical construct which ties a collective group of people emotionally to customs and traditions (p.51). Political discourse engages people with national identity by evoking powerful images from shared collective history which gives a sociocultural group a sense of distinction. Therefore, the historical basis is integral to the present internalisation of an identity. Particularly problematic for the EU, is the lack of historical 'emotional roots' (Ibid, p.50) which makes creating a clear European identity challenging. Katzenstein explains:

The emergence of a distinctive European political identity thus necessarily enters into some kind of collision with the more historically and politically sedimented allegiances toward the nation-state (Ibid, p.32).

National identity conflicts with European identity as its values are deeply internalised in collective groups through which people understand the world. National identity enables a sense of belonging in these groups with shared historical experiences and values. Such an identity is appealing as it is a marker of differentiation from other sociocultural groups and defines who belongs and who does not (Reese-Schäfer, 2016).

East-West European Divide: Poland

Connecting the theory on European values and national identity, this section discusses the EU's values in relation to eastern and western national identities in Europe. Since WW2, there has been a distinct economic and political divide between western and eastern European nations, with communism in Poland and liberal democracy in France and Germany (Demir, 2020). France and Germany are also part of the EU's founding countries whereas Poland is a relatively new member and has had less influence on the European political community. As a result, western countries have defined the values of the EU project in line with their political structures which has made merging with eastern political ideologies conflictual.

This leads our discussion to the theory of *othering*. *Othering* occurs when a collective identity is perceived from the outside as lacking something. In a European context, the western countries create the 'in-group' as powerful, wealthy, and developed, whilst eastern countries create the 'out-group' (Neumann, 1988, p.4). The outside perspective of a collective group's identity is applicable, as it directly influences discourse since identity is the 'internalisation of an external perspective' (Ibid,

p.152). Therefore, many scholars argue that Poland sees itself as inferior to western countries as it battles for its identity to be recognised and legitimised in the EU (Karner & Kopytowska, 2017, Lucarelli, Cerutti, & Schmidt, 2012).

Poland's history can be further examined to understand its inner and outer perspective as the *other*. Poland is politically and geographically in between Russia and Europe and throughout history it has oscillated between westernisation and easternisation (Ibid, p.151). Poland was especially destabilised during WW2 with the separate German and Soviet invasion. Later in the 1990s, Poland underwent a process of modernisation and industrialisation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since Poland is new to the EU, Katzenstein's notion of European identity being a 'project and process' (2009, p.24) becomes relevant as western democratic and juridical European values are projected onto former Soviet territory to expand its liberal ideology. This, however, has been a catalyst for conflict and thus, this research discusses how understanding a nation's past can help the EU to approach different political ideologies.

France and Germany

In comparison, France and Germany have an established and stable identity in European politics. Their historical and national values align with the core liberal values of a European identity. Germany favours a 'federal Europe' (Katzenstein, 2009, p.102), epitomised by Joschka Fischer's speech at the European Parliament on May 12th, 2000, in which he proposed a European Federation based on the principle of subsidiarity (Novy, 2013). Germany envisages a strong commission consisting of a parliament and one delegate per member state which is a replicate of the federal legislative power in the Bundestag. With the German model, the emphasis is placed on sharing competences within a federal political framework based on their *Grundgesetz*. The *Grundgesetz*, established in 1949, ensures the protection of human inalienable rights. As a result of its aligning liberal values, Germany has gained influence in the EU and evolved as a winner of the EU's economic expansion.

On the European political stage, France's political vision of the EU is also guided by its national history. French politicians, such as Macron, have focused on democracy to breach the gap between centralised European institutions controlled by elites and European citizens. The French nation is built on popular sovereignty (Katalin, 2014) as evident by its multiple popular revolutions. French politicians strive to impose their internalised national values in the EU as it was not established by citizens, but by political elites and experts. Their discourse focuses on engaging citizens democratically with the EU to increase individual social rights as explained by Fuchs and Klingemann (2011):

The 'French conception' of nation is thus characterized by a vigorous universalism. French patriots often considered their nation as the principal source of progress and expansion of democratic values in the world and did not distinguish 'France' from the Republic (Ibid, p.127).

Fuchs and Klingemann (2011) discuss the outside representation and values tied to French national identity. French politicians see their nation as ‘the principal source of progress’ and believe an individual’s inalienable social rights are universal. Therefore, they designate social cohesion and equality as their priority in the EU (Fuchs & Klingemann, 2011). Despite the French and German different political structures, both models defend the same values of a European identity. Using this theory, this research’s analysis will develop the link between a nation’s history and political discourse to explore the inner relations between eastern and western EU member states.

Methodology: Critical Discourse Analysis

Fairclough’s three-dimensional model on critical discourse analysis (2012), will guide the analysis of political discourse in this research. CDA unveils how people deliver a message to convince others of their political stance via framing. Fuchs & Klingemann suggest:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for this item described (2011, p.46).

Fuchs & Klingemann (2011) explain that framing is to insist on one perception of reality to impose a homogeneous discourse in a public sphere. Politicians attribute values to form a representation of a subject and a political ideology, a concept defined by Rigney (2007) as a collective repetition of values. Fairclough’s model explores the relationship between language, ideology, and political power in discourse. The first dimension is called the micro-level, referring to the language in the discourse, such as attributes the speaker chooses to frame an issue. The micro-level further reveals the internalised moral values which motivate the speaker’s discourse (Fairclough, 2012, p.48). The meso-level of Fairclough’s model concerns the institutional context of the discourse and the audience consuming it. The discourse is thus conditioned by the context and must function within the institutional frame it is produced to be legitimised (Ibid, p.42).

The third dimension called the macro-level, refers to the wider societal and historical context conditioning the discourse. For example, the speaker may rely on the naturalisation of knowledge (Ibid, p.74) which is taken for granted in a specific context as highlighted by Fairclough:

...people inevitably draw on, anticipate and respond to other events and other texts. So we cannot understand particular events or particular texts, or the significance of these for the participants, without exploring and asking about (Ibid, p.421).

This can take the form of intertextual or temporal references which help to contextualise a concept in relation to something else to increase the salience of the discourse. Thus, combining the three levels of Fairclough’s model, discourse is intertwined with the individual’s linguistic choices and the institutional

and sociohistorical context. Effectively combining all three elements of Fairclough's model, allows the values and goals in discourse to be communicated.

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Chapter 2

Analysis: Macron's Discourse on European Identity

Macron addressed the European parliament in April 2018 in a speech titled *A Europe of Ambition* to outline his vision in a conference on the future of Europe. Prior to this speech, Macron had been campaigning for a reformed European project at the Sorbonne based on the values of democracy. He continues to be centrally concerned with democracy in the European parliament which he frames as a core ideal of a European identity.

In the opening section, he states to his fellow leaders of European member states: 'à faire vivre nos combats pour les idéaux qui nous ont faits'¹ (Macron, 2018), the principal one being 'notre attachement à la démocratie.'² His discourse corresponds to Tony Blair's subsidiarity approach on shared ideals as the foundation of European nations' coexistence. Macron reinforces the value of democracy with an intertextual reference which is an example of the naturalisation of knowledge (Fairclough, 2012):

Ici-même à Strasbourg comme à Bruxelles, vous faites vivre chaque jour cette démocratie en Europe dont parlait Tocqueville.³

Alexis de Tocqueville, a French aristocrat and liberalist, detailed democracy in the United States in the 1830s in his work *De la Démocratie en Amérique* and advocated people's social liberty rights (Schleifer, 1980). Tocqueville believed democracy was an inevitable historic reoccurrence, given the French revolutions he experienced. Such a reference gives Macron's vision of Europe a historic foundation and meaning as he continues to argue that 'la démocratie libérale'⁴ universally protects the rights of individuals and minorities. Thus, Macron's values are the product of historical French ideology, referring to Fuchs and Klingemann's (2011) argument that 'French patriots often considered their nation as the principal source of progress and expansion of democratic values in the world' (p.127). The internalised values Macron externalises are the driving force of French discourse on a European identity as he seeks democratic expansion throughout Europe.

¹ (Translation from the writer of this research) to revitalize our fight for the ideals that made us

² our commitment to democracy

³ Even here in Strasbourg as in Brussels, you vitalize every day this democracy in Europe of which Tocqueville talked about.

⁴ Liberal democracy

Uniqueness

Macron believes democracy unites European citizens under one identity label and strengthens a European identity. To develop his viewpoint on a European identity, he emphasises the uniqueness of the European model, a concept theorised as inherent to a collective identity as it gives a sense of distinctiveness from others (Reese-Schäfer, 2016). These attributes were selected as they specify his conception of the EU's uniqueness compared to the rest of the world.

Attributes
This treasure
European miracle
A unique model to the world
In which other place in the world
This democratic model which gathers us is unique
A unique culture in the world
This identity distinguishes us
A unique space of stability and security in the world

Table 1.1

Macron frames the EU as a distinct political and cultural project in the world which supports the theory that identity is constructed from the inside and outside. From the inside, Macron argues the European community sees other continents composed of sovereign nations, for example in Asia, as lacking such a unique unified model and from the outside, Europe is viewed as a distinct union with a democratic rule of law. Macron progresses to exemplify this by singling out the political disharmony in America, a country which historically has been an ally of western European countries and shares many of the civil and political values Macron supports. However, at the time of Macron's speech, America was politically destabilised with Donald Trump's presidency which Macron uses as a warning of nationalism and illiberalism. In doing so, Macron is striving for the EU to project an 'image d'une Europe protectrice et efficace'⁵ to the outside world and of a unique political project which ensures inner 'stabilité' and 'sécurité'⁶.

Nationalism

Macron uses the topic of American politics as a platform to frame nationalism and populism as a threat to a European identity. Macron repeatedly balances the assets of a functioning European democracy and the pitfalls of nationalism. He frames nationalism as a pernicious and outdated political concept which endangers the future of Europe and its supranational collective identity. Macron mentions nationalism eighteen times, but he consistently frames this political ideology in a very specific manner.

⁵ image of a protective and efficient Europe

⁶ stability and security

Attributes
Our national egoisms
Illiberal fascination
Fatal delusion
The illusion of the strong power of nationalism
These powers which can fascinate some
They propose gilded paths
Yesterday's nationalism
That would be playing in the hands of the populists
Wind up their passions
Fascination for authoritarian sovereignties

Table 1.2

Nationalism is a political phenomenon rising in European states with political parties in France such as *Le Rassemblement National* and the *Alternative für Deutschland* in Germany. Europe has experienced a series of crises which Macron refers to as ‘ces désordres du monde’⁷, giving rise to ‘alternative ideological reactions’ (Karner and Kopytowska, 2017, p.6). Macron’s framing of nationalism, however, is focused on fanaticism and *pathos*. *Pathos* is discourse which galvanises emotions to ‘exciter ces passions’⁸ as opposed to *logos* which focuses on rationality (Bierens de Haan, 1954). Such a linguistic concept was identified by Victor Klemperer, a Jewish-German who documented the Nazi regime and German nationalism from a linguistic perspective. He explains:

Wenn einer lange genug für heldisch und tugendhaft: fanatisch sagt, glaubt er schließlich wirklich, ein Fanatiker sei ein tugendhafter Held, und ohne Fanatismus könne man kein Held sein (Klemperer, 1975, p.25).⁹

Klemperer observed how the Nazis changed the semantic meaning of fanaticism to become inseparable from being a national hero. With emotional language, nationalistic regimes create illusions ‘du pouvoir fort’¹⁰ and install fanatical devotion to create ‘souverainetés autoritaires’¹¹, something Macron is highly aware of. The Nazi discourse was emotionally loaded with *pathos* and encouraged people to view everything in an extreme manner. Macron thus frames nationalistic and anti-EU populists as outdated and irrational, but still posing a substantial risk to the EU as a democratic ‘project and process’ (Katzenstein, 2011, p.24).

⁷ These disorders in the world

⁸ Authoritarian sovereignties

⁹ When one hears that heroic and virtuous means fanatic for long enough: he finally believes a fanatic is a virtuous hero and without fanaticism one cannot be a hero.

¹⁰ Strong power

¹¹ authoritarian sovereignties

Democracy and Citizens

Since Macron frames nationalism as outdated, he strategically attributes democracy as the polar opposite. Each selected attribute is based on Macron’s framing of European democracy as progressive and innovative, and he uses temporal references.

Attributes
Neither abstract, nor dated
you make our Europe living in its diverse sensitivities, its divergences and convergences
Even here in Strasbourg as in Brussels, you vitalize every day this democracy in Europe
we have made it live for seventy years
to keep this European democracy alive
we need to revitalize the debate
It is in this spirit of attempting and innovating
to organize a true European debate

Table 1.3

Macron uses the past and present to illustrate the difference between democracy and populism. Instead of belonging to ‘hier’¹², Macron’s vision of European democracy is ‘ni abstrait, ni daté’¹³ and it is not an illiberal illusion but enables a ‘vrai débat européen.’¹⁴ He characterises and personifies democracy as organic and inherent to the EU’s future by focusing on its vitality. To make European democracy ‘vivant’¹⁵, Macron underlines that it will be a collective responsibility. However, out of the collective responsibility, he distinguishes between citizens and elites. He states: ‘comment se satisfaire d’élections européennes auxquelles moins d’un citoyen sur deux se déplace pour voter?’¹⁶ His subsequent framing of European citizens and their democratic rights is a particular point of interest.

Attributes
It is what our fellow citizens expect from us and we owe it to them
It is not the people who have abandoned the idea of Europe but the treason of the clerics which threatens it
We must listen to the European people’s anger today
To protect our fellow citizens
The renaissance of a Europe carried by the spirit of its people
to have the real European objectives, that will only allow our peoples to choose

Table 1.4

¹² Yesterday

¹³ Neither abstract nor dated

¹⁴ True European debate

¹⁵ alive

¹⁶ How can one be satisfied of European elections in which less than one citizen out of two votes?

Macron frames European citizens in a collective manner with the possessive pronoun ‘nos’¹⁷ instead of the definite article ‘les’¹⁸ and with the prefix ‘con-citoyens’¹⁹. Macron is focused on constructing social values as the foundation of the EU which empower European people with true democratic procedures. These values preserve individual liberties and create a sentiment of belonging to form an identity. Macron’s internalised French historical values are further exemplified by his focus on the renaissance of European social values which will be embodied its people. Macron argues that democratically empowering European citizens will result in a united Europe with a stable identity, but it is the responsibility of European political elites to ensure democratic legitimacy and dispel nationalism.

Merkel’s Discourse on a European Identity

Solidarity

Merkel also contributed a speech in 2018 on the future of Europe in Strasbourg. This speech was her last in the European Parliament after a long political career on the European stage which received an emotional response from the parliamentary audience. However, Merkel’s call for coordination in the form of a European army to ensure the long-term future of Europe divided European politicians in the parliament. Her speech received additional criticism from Mateusz Morawiecki as Merkel did not propose any concrete economic reforms. Instead, Merkel was centrally concerned with social policies such as border protection and asylum to form a *Gemeinschaft* in Europe. Merkel’s focus on social cohesion is evident by analysing her framing of the value of tolerance.

Attributes ²⁰
I spoke then of tolerance
We need more than ever the understanding that tolerance is the soul of Europe
This solidarity is based on tolerance
Tolerance requires to respect
Tolerance and solidarity are our common future

Table 2.1

Merkel states ‘Solidarität’²¹ (Merkel, 2018) eighteen times and specifies that interstate tolerance requires respect to ensure stability and peace in the EU. She frames tolerance, instead of economic policies, as primordial to future solidarity between European nations and by employing the verb ‘gründen auf’²², Merkel highlights tolerance as a concrete part of solidarity. Thus, her vision is guided by liberal values to construct a supranational identity from the inside and create an image of unity on the outside. Merkel continues to justify the need for tolerance and solidarity. Firstly, Merkel frames a

¹⁷ our

¹⁸ The (plural)

¹⁹ Fellow citizens

²⁰ German translations are completed by the writer of this research

²¹ Solidarity

²² To base on

community as an innate way of living and each attribute has been aligned with Macron’s personification of democracy being alive.

Merkel’s Attributes of a Community	Macron’s Attributes of Democracy
That counts for the family. That counts for the village community, for the sports club and equally for a community such as the European Union.	Even here in Strasbourg as in Brussels, you vitalize every day this democracy in Europe.
To stand up for one another is a fundamental requirement for any functioning community.	Even here in Strasbourg as in Brussels, you vitalize every day this democracy in Europe.
Just as one needs air to breath.	we have made it live for seventy years.
We sense in this house the heartbeat of European democracy.	to keep this European democracy alive.

Table 2.2

Merkel frames a community as inherent to humanity’s existence. She evokes the image of a family, a sports club and a village which have been collective social communities throughout history. Merkel’s analogies encourage people to contextualise the community they exist in with a European community. Merkel frames solidarity in a community as a ‘universeller Wert’²³ and a European community is personified as the ‘Herzschlag’²⁴ which provides ‘die Luft zum Atmen’²⁵. The temporal reference ‘damals’²⁶ situates her message to another speech in 2007 when Germany assumed presidency of the EU. In this speech, her emphasis was also on tolerance in a European community which projects a stable image of herself to other EU politicians. Macron included a similar reference to a prior speech at the Sorbonne, during which he emphasised the importance of democracy in France.

Secondly, she carries her core value of tolerance to address the divergences in national states’ interests. With tolerance and solidarity, Merkel argues that states can pursue their national interests, without instigating conflict. To respect the interests of other nations, she conveys that a European identity demands shared values and compromises within one’s own nation. These attributes have been selected because they provide a new light on Neumann’s theory (1988) of *othering*.

Attributes
The interests and needs of others can be understood as well as one’s own needs
Individual national decisions always have effects on the whole community
Europa can only function as a legal community when rights are the same everywhere
Human rights policy which undermines the credibility of the common European foreign policy

Table 2.3

²³ Universal value

²⁴ Heartbeat

²⁵ The air to breath

²⁶ At that time

Merkel emphasises that state members must assume social and political responsibility within their nation and act in the interest of the European community. Her framing of responsibility corresponds to the German federal political system because Merkel entrusts EU member states to govern freely in line with their national interests, such as border protection and migration. Rather than *othering* nations in a derogative manner, the *other* is defined by Merkel as those who do not abide by the values of the European community. For example, ‘Menschenrechtspolitik’ must be a respected value in each European member state. Therefore, Merkel’s values of a European identity determine who belongs to the inner European political *Gemeinschaft* and who does not. Furthermore, from a linguistic perspective, Merkel employs *logos* (reason) to promote the economic advantages of European interstate tolerance and solidarity:

Und natürlich gehört zu einem stabilen Wohlstandseuropa auch eine stabile Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. Wir wollen den europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus weiterentwickeln.²⁷

The use of *logos* makes her political vision convincing as there is a logical flow to her argument: a stable economy and currency belongs to a stable and prosperous Europe which means the European ‘Stabilitätsmechanismus’²⁸ must be developed more. As a result, Merkel goes beyond the social benefits of solidarity, and she effectively emphasises the political and economic advantages. She states that the EU’s ‘Wirtschaftssysteme insgesamt grüner wird’²⁹, leading to more ‘wirtschaftlichen Erfolg’³⁰ and not only can these benefits be achieved within the EU, but also on a global economic scale.

Nationalism and History

Similar to Macron, Merkel’s internalised national history is evident in her externalised discourse. The intertextual reference to Walter Hallstein’s description of the EU as a ‘beispiellose Kühnheit’³¹ is comparable to Macron’s idealisation of Alexis de Tocqueville. Hallstein, a German diplomat, was a founding father of the EU. He advocated European integration based on a federal system and famously stated that ‘national sovereignty is a doctrine of yesterday’ (Soetendorp, 2014, p.20). The reference, thus, constructs a historical foundation for her vision of Europe as a united community. However, in comparison to Macron’s critical framing of nationalism as illiberal and fanatical, Merkel’s attack on nationalism is not as fierce. There are only two critical observations: ‘nationale Egoismen zu überwinden’³² and ‘Nationalismus und Egoismus noch nie wieder eine Chance in Europa haben’³³. The sociohistorical construct of national identities builds collective national pride and distinctiveness

²⁷ And naturally a stable economic and currency union also belongs to the stable prosperity of Europe. We want to further develop the stability mechanism.

²⁸ Stability mechanism

²⁹ On the whole economic systems will become greener

³⁰ Economic success

³¹ Unprecedented audacity

³² To overcome national egoisms

³³ Nationalism and egoism never have a chance in Europe again

(Katzenstein, 2009), but it can also be psychologically scarring with emotions such as trauma and guilt. On this topic, literature has discussed guilt and shame regarding Germany national identity post WW2 (Vees-Gulani, 1970). Vees-Gulani (1970) discusses the rebuilding of German cities after the war and states:

Significantly, the rebuilding that took place was again symptomatic of the psychological situation in Germany. While the ruins had been external reflections of the inner destruction of the people who, without orientation, existed among them, the approach taken to rebuilding the cities immediately after the war displayed the now deep seated suppression and denial of both the horror Germany had caused and the destruction of its cities which was one of its consequences. (Vees-Gulani, p.47, 1970).

The war destabilised German identity, which had not only been psychologically destroyed, but also physically with the bombing of cultural and historical German landmarks. As a result, Merkel does not draw on her past for positive national internalised values, because they were ruptured by the events of WW2. Instead, she uses Germany’s past as a guide and is focused on reconstructing social values to build a stable German identity in the EU. However, Merkel and Macron conclude their speeches by emphasising the collective historical experience of European nations with temporal references to conceptualise a future European identity.

Merkel’s Attributes	Macron’s Attributes
We owe it to ourselves, we owe it to the previous generation and we owe it to the future generation.	I belong to a generation that has not experienced war and I belong to a generation that is enjoying the luxury of forgetting what its predecessors have been through.
That means nationalism and egoism never have a chance in Europe again	But I also come from a place and a family that has experienced all the loses of our past
To remember the horror of the First World War 100 years ago	I do not want to belong to a nation which will have forgotten its own past

Table 2.4

The collective memories of European wars motivate Macron and Merkel’s project of a European community. Merkel interconnects the past, present and future, to support her plea to uphold the values in her discourse. Despite having different values motivating their discourse, both politicians envisage a Europe of mutual state respect founded on liberal values. They convey the need for European states to assume responsibility to remember and internalise the past to guide them in the present and the future with values of democracy and tolerance.

Morawiecki’s Discourse on European Identity

Polish History

Mateusz Morawiecki also contributed a speech on the future of Europe under scrutiny from European elites in the audience. Poland had recently reformed its juridical system to politicise its state legal

system. Starting from Poland’s undermining of the EU’s fundamental legal values, Morawiecki’s internalised, and the external perception of Polish identity greatly influences his discourse. Firstly, Morawiecki draws on Polish history to justify its weaker economic prowess in comparison to other western European countries. Similar to Macron and Merkel, he uses temporal references to the past, present and future to launch his vision on the future of Europe. The attributes highlight Morawiecki’s discourse on Poland’s national inferiority to the west and his justification.

Attributes
Poland would also have been one of the founding fathers of the European Community. That's what the Polish government-in-exile had wanted. ³⁴
Polish society was therefore kept outside of the first stage in European integration and sustainable development.
Free countries begin with a historic project 60 years ago.
We're still part of a difficult process of sewing together different parts of Europeans history and memory.
we have to rebalance the relationship between the main and member states and the EU institutions.
remember that our countries have started from a different place. In 1989 Poland's economy was based on coal and heavy industry.
digitization has led to a winner-takes-all distribution of wealth.

Table 3.1

Morawiecki focuses on Poland’s exclusion from the EU’s development before it became a member. He emphasises Poland’s historic restrictions as it transitions from a communist to a modern industrialised state in comparison to other European countries who were ‘free’ to develop. While discussing the EU’s historic development, Morawiecki states that Poland is still ‘sewing together different parts of European history and memory’ (Morawiecki, 2018). Such an internalised traumatic memory of the past can be seen as a consequence of western and eastern occupation during WW2. Poland’s fragmented national identity shares similarities to Germany’s, but whilst Germany has had time to rebuild and stabilise its inner and outer national identity, Poland’s is still developing. Macron also recognised the east-west historical divide embedded in collective European memory, whilst Merkel discussed the importance of individual state history:

dépasser les clivages entre le Nord et le Sud, l'Est de l'Ouest, les petits ou les grands, le repli sur les égoïsmes nationaux (Macron, 2018).³⁵

die Frage der Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen in verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten aufgrund der eigenen Geschichte, aufgrund ihrer demografischen Entwicklung, unterschiedliche Reaktionen auslöst. (Merkel, 2018).³⁶

³⁴ Translation from live interpreter, Dorota Kolinska (2018), in European parliament

³⁵ to go beyond the cleavages between the North and the South, the East and the West, the little ones and the big ones, the fall back on national egoisms.

³⁶ The question of receiving migrants triggers different reactions due to (nations’) own history, due to their demographic development.

Macron discusses the need to reconcile in the present the historical divides in Europe to develop a future European identity. Merkel connects this by recognising that states' reactions to political and social issues depends on their national historical values. Due to western countries superior development in the EU, these wealthy countries form the 'in-group' whilst eastern countries belong to the 'out-group' (Neumann, 1988, p.4). Morawiecki attempts to bridge the economic inequality with European reforms and 'rebuilding the (European) economy, offering prosperity to all today.' Whereas Merkel and Macron also focus on innovating European policies for the collective good as a community, Morawiecki is intent on elevating Poland's status in the EU.

Populist Discourse

Morawiecki does not only justify European policy reforms with east-west disparities, but also with his representation of economic and social crises within the EU. The framing of such crises differs greatly from Merkel and Macron on a linguistic level.

Morawiecki Attributes	Macron Attributes	Merkel Attributes
existential crisis, the financial crisis, the banking crisis, the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit or Russian aggression.	the big migrations, the global insecurity, the economic, social and environmental transformations.	The political global, economic and technological challenges are developing ever faster and ever far-reaching.
Today seems to be without precedent different to the 70s or the 80s or the first decade of this century. That's because it's not just one crisis but accumulation of several crises.	to give a collective response to these disorders in the world.	We have lived through a big public debt crisis. We have helped each other with natural catastrophes.
European Investment Bank has warned that the European Union is suffering from a chronic lack of investment.	A context in which the geopolitical threats, and we will get back indeed during the discussion, give Europe a bigger responsibility every day.	Worldwide migration movements are also impacting us.

Table 3.2

Merkel and Macron frame these crises as natural phenomena resulting from climatic, social, migratory and economic transformations. Morawiecki, however, portrays the crises as shortcomings of the EU. He conceptualises the EU as static and outdated since it faced the same crises in the 1970s and 1980s. As analysed in the following section, this is important as it gives Morawiecki a platform to externalise a positive image of Poland's national competences. Morawiecki's framing of European crises in the parliament is a product of his internal image of inferiority and victimisation, thus he displays traits of

populist language. This is further evident when he frames citizens' dissatisfaction with the EU which he believes is responsible for the crises in Europe. Macron also expressed citizens' discontent, but there are key linguistic differences.

Morawiecki	Macron
it is the Parliament that reflects the voice of its citizens expressed in universal elections	We must listen to the European people's anger today
The joint goal which is the safety and security of our citizens	Europe of people
we know that a lot of Europeans aren't so enthusiastic	It is not the people who have abandoned the idea of Europe but the treason of the clerics that threatens it
many Europeans no longer like the direction of the EU is going in	how can one be satisfied of European elections in which less than one citizen out of two votes?
they don't have any influence on the future of Europe	To protect our fellow citizens

Table 3.3

Morawiecki evokes images of injustice and anger to empower European citizens with democracy. Thus, he partially shares the liberal European ideals advocated by Macron and Merkel. Similar to Macron, he questions the EU's democratic legitimacy, but not because democracy is an internalised national and social value, rather it reflects his dissatisfaction with Poland's political influence in the EU. Morawiecki's discourse is more provoking and direct towards the elites in the EU parliament as he conveys that the political power is too centralised. He sees himself as the politician carrying the voice of the people and presents himself as a hero with noble values: 'I was part of the anti-communist opposition fighting for freedom and democracy.' This distinguishes Macron and Morawiecki as the French president strongly condemned populism which galvanises people's passions. Aware of his own image as a populist as well as his national identity image, Morawiecki defends his discourse:

You can be offended by that. You can close your eyes to it. You can say it's just a marginal group but it's not going to change the reality of the fact that it's not a marginal group. Democratic legitimacy has to be reinforced. You can call that populism if you like (Morawiecki, 2018).

Morawiecki justifies his discourse because it represents the interests of European citizens. His statement, however, is generalising and condenses the complexity of democratic legitimacy in the EU into a simplified representation. Morawiecki's framing of social reality is anti-elite and anti-institutional as he portrays the victimisation and social injustice of European citizens which is inherently linked to his dissatisfaction with Poland's national image in the EU. He believes Polish social development is impeded by European 'exclusion, poverty and inequality', especially since he believes globalisation has 'led to a winner-takes-all distribution of wealth' which corresponds to Münch's theory (2016) of economic losers and winners.

Externalisation of National Image

Aware of the external western perspective of Poland’s national identity, Morawiecki feels compelled to justify Poland’s membership in the EU to the political elites in the parliament. Morawiecki thus externalises a positive image of Poland, describing his nation as a ‘fully-fledged member’ to stamp a political identity on the EU project. He starts with the Polish point of view on Europe’s future, as seen with the first attribute, rather than a collective perspective like Macron and Merkel, and he continues to exemplify Poland’s approach to European challenges.

Attributes
We were one of the first countries to give full democratic rights to women as well and this shows how Poland has deep roots in parliamentarism and the rule of law.
In Poland we’ve managed to do this. We have dealt with VAT fraudsters who are stealing from our citizens. we’ve done something positive for Polish and European tax revenue.
In Poland we are aware of the importance of this and that’s why we’ve introduced measures to clean up our air and fight against smog.
we have the most ambitious social policy since the fall of communism.
we would be happy to contribute in a disproportionately high amount as compared to our GDP.
member states whose judiciaries don’t work properly is something that we’ve shown you can fight against.

Table 3.4

Regardless of the topic, whether tax, juridical system, environment or democracy, he frames Poland as a progressive and competent state. This is very effective after he heavily emphasised what the EU lacked and now highlights what Poland can offer. In comparison to France, Morawiecki lacks the ability to draw on Poland’s national past to resurface powerful images. Despite Merkel’s discourse also being limited by Germany’s past, Germany had time to rebuild its national image on an economic and social foundation. Due to his national identity’s instability, he situates Poland’s modern success to other EU member states to give the impression of competency: ‘one of the first’, ‘we have the most’ and ‘our strategy has brought excellent effects.’ Fuchs and Klingemann’s discussion (2011) of a group’s external identity representation is relevant to this analysis:

The building of collective identity is also about shared representations of a group, an active process of shaping and creating an image of what the group stands for and how it would like to be seen by others (p.89).

Morawiecki frames Poland’s national image as exemplary with its national approach to global issues such as climate change and tax fraud. The discourse seeks to influence perceptions of Poland as it battles for its identity to be recognised as powerful in the EU (Karner & Kopytowska, 2017, Lucarelli, Cerutti, & Schmidt, 2012). Macron and Merkel’s discourse comparatively included fewer references to their national success as their countries are externally and internally perceived as powerful. Merkel, for

example, even modestly admits that: ‘Deutschland nicht immer tadellos verhalten hat’³⁷. Thus, she does not feel obliged to externalise Germany’s image as a worthy member state of the EU.

Role of the Nation in the EU

Morawiecki’s nationally introverted discourse conflicts with his desire to benefit from an expansive political project. He criticises the globalised ‘winner-takes-all distribution of wealth’ whilst benefiting from liberal globalisation such as foreign investment or the migration of Polish workers to western Europe (Fuchs & Klingemann, 2011, p.61). He also seeks geopolitical protection from the EU against Russia which he frames as threatening ‘the architecture of Eastern Europe, but it’s aimed at destabilizing the West.’ Morawiecki expects the national benefits as an EU member state, but he is not prepared to accept the ‘grands compromis’³⁸ Macron discusses or Merkel’s appeal for individual state responsibility to uphold the European ideals: ‘einzelne Mitglied seine Verantwortung Zuhause erfüllt.’³⁹ Hence, he selects what suits Poland best from a supranational ideation to empower its national identity as explored by Fuchs & Klingemann (2011):

Joining the European Union thus was and is often celebrated by East-Central European politicians and commentators as a return to an important national project begun in the interwar and/or wartime periods that was aborted by the communist takeover. (Fuchs & Klingemann, 2011, p.126).

The discussion on the eastern European focus on national identity projects is evident in Morawiecki’s discourse. His envisagement of state sovereignty in the EU is outlined in the table below and is contradictory to Merkel and Macron’s.

Attributes
National parliaments are the voice of the sovereign and the lifeblood of democracy.
You can't understand the continuity of Europe without understanding its Greco Roman and Judaeo-Christian roots.
Our continent has been shaped by its culture and institutions over hundreds of years.
Respecting national identities is part of the trust that must be built in the EU.
Every country has a right to set up its legal system in line with its own traditions.
forcing us to transfer competences from national level to EU level until we end up with some sort of supranational state.
A united Europe in the face of threats which respects the will of nation-states.

Table 3.5

Whereas Macron discussed individual democratic rights and Merkel a community, Morawiecki prioritises the sovereignty of national states in Europe. His vision also has a historic foundation just as

³⁷ Germany has not always behaved impeccably

³⁸ Grand compromises

³⁹ Each member fulfils its responsibility at home

Merkel referred to Hallstein and Macron to Tocqueville. Morawiecki idealises Charles de Gaulle who rejected a supranational European state and advocated a Europe of sovereign states. Morawiecki rebukes the EU ‘forcing us to transfer competences from national level to EU level until we end up with some sort of supranational state.’ Whereas Merkel framed the EU parliament as the ‘Herzschlag’⁴⁰ of democracy, Morawiecki believes national parliaments are ‘the lifeblood of democracy’ as they have existed for ‘hundreds of years.’

Moreover, the recent Polish alliance with Hungary and Italy reflects his right-wing illiberal stance and a return to historical national values. For example, to defend Polish sovereignty, he believes ‘every country has the right to set up its legal system in line with its own traditions’. Poland had reinstated a controversial Soviet-style court system which is heavily politicized by the Polish ruling party to protect itself from EU laws and restrict liberal social rights, contradicting his appeal for citizens’ democratic rights. Such an act of defiance preserves state sovereignty and symbolises Poland’s rejection of its sovereign powers being controlled by a centralised political entity. The discourse is reactive to the liberal ideals determined by western countries. Hence, Poland defends its sovereignty in the EU rather than prioritising the collective European ideals. Since these ideals conform to western countries’ perception of a political community, a conflict arises with eastern countries as they hold onto an idealised image of a nation.

Macron’s Discourse on National Identity

Social Cohesion

A European identity was framed by discursive values intrinsically linked to the politicians’ inner understanding and outer perspective of their national identity (Katzenstein, 2009). Since this research is centrally concerned with the coexistence of national identities in the EU, this analysis explores discourse in a national context. Discourse from the pandemic was chosen because it forced European nations to be reactive to an abnormal situation. Thus, European politicians reassessed their national priorities in relation to the EU. Macron gave a national televised address amidst rising infection rates on March 12, 2020. He extended coronavirus restrictions to suppress the virus on a national and European scale. Macron had thus far been praised for his government’s handling of the pandemic, but his refusal to postpone municipal elections received public scrutiny. In the opening passage of his speech, Macron emphasises social collectiveness and the attributes outline his focus on the physically vulnerable members of French society.

⁴⁰ Heartbeat

Attributes ⁴¹
But the virus can have very serious consequences, especially for those of our fellow citizens who are elderly or suffer from chronic illnesses such as diabetes, obesity or cancer.
the illness will first affect those who are most vulnerable
the most urgent need is to protect those of our fellow citizens who are most vulnerable
we must continue to buy time and monitor those who are most fragile

Table 4.1

Macron highlights the importance of collectively protecting vulnerable citizens as he values a community founded on solidarity and compassion. He explicitly states that the nation's priority is the health of its citizens which must be protected at all costs as each person's life holds value: 'La santé n'a pas de prix'⁴² and the government will 'sauver des vies quoi qu'il en coûte'⁴³ (Macron, 2020). Much like his attack on nationalism as it undermines the solidarity of a European community, Macron criticises individual interests which oppose his value of social cohesion: 'L'autre écueil, ce serait le repli individualiste'.⁴⁴ Thus, he projects Merkel's vision of individual nations assuming responsibility to preserve a European community onto individual citizens in a nation to act in the interest of the community and ensure the 'protection des autres'⁴⁵.

To encourage social solidarity, Macron does not only focus on the physically vulnerable, but also on health care workers who exemplify his value of social cohesion. Macron frames this collective group in a glorified and heroic manner to emphasise their collective endeavour for the good of French society.

Attributes
Hospital staff, doctors, nurses, paramedics, emergency medical personnel, hospital workers, private physicians, and the entire staff of France's Public Health Service are working assiduously and effectively.
it is thanks to them, because they all answered the call
I would like first of all to express the nation's gratitude to these white-coated heroes
They all agreed to take time out of their personal and family lives for the sake of our health
our healthcare professionals are incredible in terms of innovation and commitment

Table 4.2

Macron uses the image of health care workers as a marker of French national values to prompt his listeners to show the same social commitment. He describes the health care workers as 'héros'⁴⁶ with a unified 'blouse blanche' uniform who have patriotically 'répondu présents'.⁴⁷ The context of a crisis, whether geopolitical or pandemic, triggers Macron's value of social unity founded on individual

⁴¹ Translation from: Macron, E. (2020, 12 March). *ADRESSE AUX FRANÇAIS* (Transcript). Élysée. <https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-15339-fr.pdf>.

⁴² Health has no price

⁴³ Whatever the cost

⁴⁴ The other danger would be that of being too centred on individual self-interest

⁴⁵ Protection of others

⁴⁶ Heroes

⁴⁷ Answered the call

responsibility. This was reflected in his EU speech: ‘Un contexte où les menaces géopolitiques donnent à l’Europe une responsabilité plus grande chaque jour.’⁴⁸ By conveying the link between individual sacrifice and social unity in times of crisis, Macron erases social divisions and psychologically assimilates everyone into one social community. The values Macron expects from French citizens are also fundamental to his government’s handling of the pandemic. He states: ‘C’est le respect que nous avons envers vous, et c’est évidemment ce que la Nation vous doit’⁴⁹ which closely resembles his statement in the European parliament: ‘C’est ce que nos concitoyens attendent de nous, c’est ce que nous leur devons.’⁵⁰ This gives an image of unity between citizens and the government to jointly protect the nation and its health.

Evidently Macron relies on social values as a moral compass to guide his nation through the pandemic. To strengthen the importance of these values, Macron reminds his listeners of their historical foundation: ‘de placer l’intérêt collectif au-dessus de tout, une communauté humaine qui tient par des valeurs : la solidarité, la fraternité’⁵¹. ‘La solidarité’ and ‘la fraternité’ resonate with French people in a national context and evoke powerful patriotic emotions to make them emotionally invested in the social cause of the nation. Macron thus discursively integrates the past into the present to shape the future. He finishes the speech on national history to give greater emphasis:

Mais le temps, aujourd’hui, est à la protection de nos concitoyens et à la cohésion de la Nation. Le temps est à cette union sacrée qui consiste à suivre tous ensemble un même chemin, à ne céder à aucune panique, aucune peur, aucune facilité, mais à retrouver cette force d’âme qui est la nôtre et qui a permis à notre peuple de surmonter tant de crises à travers l’histoire.⁵²

France’s reliance on social values to collectively survive crises throughout history makes Macron’s discourse as appear logical and reliable. These national historical events are internalised by French people, and they give Macron’s discourse clarity: ‘Un principe nous guide pour définir nos actions.’⁵³ Thus, clarity is inherent to a nation’s identity because it creates engagement and identification. If a national identity is ambiguous, then people become defensive and seek a stable identity built on clear values because they act as a lens to understand and approach political and social issues.

⁴⁸ A context in which the geopolitical threats give Europe a bigger responsibility every day.

⁴⁹ This is out of our respect for you and is obviously what the nation owes you.

⁵⁰ It is what our fellow citizens expect from us and we owe it to them

⁵¹ Men and women able to place the collective interest above everything, a community of human beings held together by values: solidarity and fraternity.

⁵² But today is the time for protecting our fellow citizens and for the nation’s cohesion. It’s the time for that sacred unity which consists in following the same path together, not panicking, being afraid or complacent, but regaining that strength of mind which has enabled our people to overcome so many crises throughout history.

⁵³ we are guided by one principle

Democracy

An example of Macron using internalised national values to guide his approach to the pandemic can be seen with his insistence on democratic normality. He encourages everyone, including vulnerable citizens, to participate in municipal elections as they hold such symbolic political and social value in France. The attributes in this section of the speech, highlight Macron’s vision of an open democratic society.

Attributes
In this context, I have asked scientists about our municipal elections, whose first round will be held in a few days.
I also asked the Prime Minister to consult broadly with all political parties.
The Government will work out this system in the coming days with all the elected representatives and officials in our country.

Table 4.3

Macron conveys that the elections are safe, and he trusts in the ‘civisme’⁵⁴ of French citizens, despite insisting on the dangers of mass gatherings earlier in his speech. This emphasises the importance Macron places on each individual citizen’s participation in democratic procedures which he strongly criticised in his EU speech: ‘comment se satisfaire d’élections européennes auxquelles moins d’un citoyen sur deux se déplacer pour voter?’⁵⁵ Macron also focuses on the dangers which threaten democracy and thus motivate his discourse:

Mes chers compatriotes, il nous faudra demain tirer les leçons du moment que nous traversons, interroger le modèle de développement dans lequel s’est engagé notre monde depuis des décennies et qui dévoile ses failles au grand jour, interroger les faiblesses de nos démocraties.⁵⁶

Macron is concerned with the vulnerability of French democracy during the pandemic, but he believes electoral normality with its historic foundation and social values will carry France through this crisis. He stresses that ‘toutes les familles politiques’⁵⁷ have been consulted who share the same ‘volonté’⁵⁸ to uphold the elections. He strategically communicates that it is ‘élus’⁵⁹ officials who will assume responsibility to ensure democratic legitimacy and procedures.

⁵⁴ Civic-mindedness

⁵⁵ how can one be satisfied of European elections in which less than one citizen out of two votes?

⁵⁶ My dear compatriots, tomorrow we shall have to learn the lessons of the time we’re living through, question the development model our world has adopted for decades – whose failings are being exposed for all to see – and question the weaknesses of our democracies.

⁵⁷ All political families

⁵⁸ desire

⁵⁹ elected

Europe

Having discussed Macron's framing of French national values, his discourse on the EU is important because it relates this analysis to how national needs are situated in a European community. The table below comparatively exemplifies how Macron frames the impact of COVID-19 in France and Europe.

Attributes on COVID-19 in France	Attributes on COVID-19 in European
the most serious health crisis France has experienced in a century.	This epidemic, which is affecting every continent and striking every European country.
I have asked the government to prepare, as of now, a national and European recovery plan consistent with our priorities and commitments for the future.	we'll have to adopt them as Europeans, Europe-wide, because that's the level at which we've built our freedoms and protections.
In France we have the best virologists, the best epidemiologists, specialists of great renown and clinicians too.	The greatest European specialists spoke out this morning in an important publication.

Table 4.4

Macron conveys that the impact of the pandemic in France and other European countries is equivalent. Since the crisis is European-wide, Macron emphasises that a coherent European approach is essential. Importantly he argues that French and EU interests are economically and health-wise reciprocal which evokes an image of France as a sedimented member of a European community. Macron shows respect to European health experts, using the superlative 'les plus grands spécialistes européens'⁶⁰, and he mirrors the competence of French medical experts: 'Nous avons en France les meilleurs virologues'⁶¹. Macron's confidence in France's role as an EU member state reflects the security of the French national identity with its deep emotional roots. Similar to Merkel's modesty in her EU speech, Macron admits 'nous nous inspirions de ce que les Allemands ont su par exemple mettre en œuvre avec un système plus généreux, plus simple que le nôtre.'⁶² The security of his national identity, unlike Morawiecki, allows him to convey that the French medical system is flawed and he draws inspiration from France's major European ally.

Merkel's Discourse on National Identity

Social Collectiveness

The key values of Merkel's European speech were solidarity and tolerance to achieve mutual economic enlargement. In her national COVID-19 address, however, she is strikingly more concerned with social collectiveness and the humanitarian wellbeing of German citizens. Her national address received high praise and it was honoured as 'Speech of the Year' (Jones, 2020) by a board of rhetoric specialists from Tübingen University. Merkel's framing of the pandemic as 'dramatisch'⁶³ which has changed the 'Vorstellung von Normalität'⁶⁴ constructs a platform to convey her values of social solidarity. The

⁶⁰ European specialists

⁶¹ We have the best virologists in France

⁶² we were inspired by what the Germans have done, for example, with a more generous, simpler system than ours

⁶³ Dramatically (Translation by the writer of this research)

⁶⁴ Conception of normality

attributes display her praise of social groups to create engagement with the nation’s fight against COVID-19.

Attributes
what each and every individual can contribute.
that is the guideline of all our actions: to slow down the spread of the virus.
doctors, in the nursing service or in any other function in our hospitals and in the healthcare system in general. You are on the front line for us in this fight.
express my thanks here to people who are rarely thanked. Anyone who sits at a supermarket checkout or fills shelves these days is doing one of the hardest jobs there is at the moment.

Table 5.1

Merkel’s discourse shares similar traits to Macron’s as she prioritises the detrimental social impact of the virus rather than the economic. She acknowledges the consequences of limiting social contact as it is ‘selbstverständlich’ and ‘natürlich’⁶⁵ which corresponds to her EU vision of a community being an organic way of life. Therefore, Merkel conveys that social contact should not be discarded, but adapted:

Skype Telefonate, Mails und vielleicht mal wieder Briefe schreiben. Die Post wird ja ausgeliefert.⁶⁶

From the broad perspective of the community’s social cohesion, Merkel proceeds to highlight the value of the individual in the community. Just as Macron was concerned with vulnerable citizens, Merkel emphasises that every life ‘zählt’⁶⁷ to justify her call for the sacrifice of physical contact and the responsibility of each individual citizen to adhere to the national restrictions. She develops this with her praise of health care and supermarket workers. They are framed as heroic members of the social community who are doing ‘einen der schwersten Jobs’⁶⁸ and by praising them, she consolidates rapport between the government, herself as a leader and the citizens. This rapport enables social collectiveness amongst all levels of the social hierarchy, from the working class to government officials.

Nationalism and History

Merkel builds German identity from the inside via social values in the present. Continuing the analysis on Germany’s history limiting its political discourse, there are comparatively fewer references to national pride than Macron. There is one superlative attributed to Germany’s health care system as ‘eines der besten der Welt’⁶⁹ and one allusion to the *Robert Koch Institut* health care experts. Instead, there are subtle references to other elements of German national identity.

⁶⁵ Self-evident and natural

⁶⁶ Skype, phone calls, emails and maybe write letters again. The mail will be delivered.

⁶⁷ counts

⁶⁸ One of the hardest jobs

⁶⁹ One of the best in the world

Attributes
to limit the economic, social and cultural damage.
I know how hard the closures that the federal and state governments have agreed on interfere with our lives and our democratic self-image. These are restrictions that have never existed in the Federal Republic.
for someone like me, for whom freedom of travel and movement was a hard won right.
So let me say: It's serious. Take it seriously too. Since German unity, no, since the Second World War, there has not been a challenge to our country where our common solidarity is so important.

Table 5.2

Fundamental to Merkel's core message of social collectiveness are the inalienable social rights implemented in the *Grundgesetz* in 1949. The pandemic, however, has forced the German government to restrict these rights 'wie es sie in der Bundesrepublik noch nie gab',⁷⁰ for example, 'Bewegungsfreiheit'⁷¹ which is a 'schwer erkämpftes Recht'.⁷² The emergency laws Merkel's government imposed were highly sensitive regarding the country's fascist history. Merkel justifies the restrictions not only because they save lives, but also because they limit cultural damage: 'Den ökonomischen sozialen kulturellen Schaden zu begrenzen.'⁷³ This links back to the analysis on Germany's national identity being scarred by Nazism and allied bombing in WW2, but its national image continues to be rebuilt on liberal values.

As in Merkel's EU speech, the references to Germany's past evoke negative connotations. Thus, Merkel's discourse concentrates on preserving cultural and social values Germany has been reconstructing since the war and reunification. The reference to the 'deutsche(n) Einheit'⁷⁴ serves as a reminder of the difficulty of social separation when people were socially isolated from friends and family, similar to the detrimental social impact of the pandemic. Merkel relates her personal experience in the GDR: 'Für jemandem wie mich, für die Reise- und Bewegungsfreiheit ein schwer erkämpftes Recht waren.'⁷⁵ This is effective because she portrays understanding of the pandemic social challenges and a personal experience is real and meaningful. Merkel concludes her speech with an allusion to WW2 and Germany reunification to coin the current crisis as a 'historische Aufgabe'⁷⁶ to socially unite.

⁷⁰ have never existed in the Federal Republic.

⁷¹ Freedom of movement

⁷² A hard fought right

⁷³ To limit the economic, social and cultural damage

⁷⁴ German unity

⁷⁵ for someone like me, for whom freedom of travel and movement was a hard won right

⁷⁶ Historic task

Morawiecki's Discourse on National Identity

Nationalism and Economy

On April 16, 2020, Morawiecki held a televised address to announce the second stage of lifting COVID-19 restrictions with the Minister of Health, Łukasz Szumowski. Morawiecki's government had accrued political support throughout the pandemic (Wondreys & Mudde, 2020) and this analysis, thus, investigates how he engaged people with his political discourse. Morawiecki opens his speech by emphasising Poland's success compared to other countries during the pandemic.

Attributes
In Poland it is 200 people per million inhabitants; in the Czech Republic about 600, in Italy and Spain over 3 thousand. ⁷⁷
In the whole of Western Europe this number is significantly higher than in Poland.
very rapid growth, as we have seen in France, Germany and especially in Spain and in Italy.
we have a better situation with regard to society as a whole than in Western Europe.
such as a ban on larger gatherings, events, concerts and such meetings, where we know that the transmission of the virus in Western Europe was very violent.
without an audience in the stands because we know that this was one of the big mistakes made by our friends from Western Europe.

Table 6.1

Morawiecki frames Poland as more competent than other European countries. He specifies that Poland managed the pandemic better than western countries, despite their superior economic disposal and health care systems. Such discourse corresponds to his EU speech in which he outlined Poland's image as a fast-developing state on course to become a powerful EU member state. This is significantly different to Macron and Merkel who do not boast superiority to other states but conveyed that every European country is suffering from the pandemic. Investigating Morawiecki's claim that Poland successfully handled the pandemic, a study titled *COVID-19 pandemic and unemployment dynamics in European economies* (Su & al. 2021), highlighted that Poland economically suffered less damage than other European countries. However, it also concluded that the pandemic exposed the shortcomings of Poland's health care system:

...it is worth noting that the COVID epidemic caused, in practice, total inefficiency of the health care system in Poland, with very limited access not only to specialist, planned diagnostic procedures or operations but also to basic family doctors. We expect that consequences of this situation must increase the number of deaths. (Barańsk & al. 2021, p.5).

The study highlights that Poland's poor health system was responsible for significant excess deaths. This is important because the study's claim can be linked to Morawiecki's discourse which prioritises the economy rather than the nation's health care system. The one reference to Poland's medical capacity implies that Poland is under-equipped and requires economic investment: 'to make adjustments in our

⁷⁷ Translation from student of Polish nationality at the University of Utrecht.

health service to buy new equipment.’ The attributes underline Morawiecki’s representation of Poland’s economy and his government’s intervention.

Attributes on Economy
We will build a new economic reality.
We want to make an exception for farmers here.
The hotel industry is one of the most important sectors in the economy. The hotel industry is the industry that can and will certainly count on state support.
The financial shield is at the stage we assumed, and positive talks are under way with the European Commission and various financial institutions.
almost 900 000 companies have already joined the various programmes. This means that a huge group of entrepreneurs not only trusted our procedures, our proposals, but simply that they are already benefiting from our protection programmes and job.
And very many smaller, medium-sized companies have commented positively on our actions related to the financial shield.

Table 6.2

Morawiecki’s discourse is primarily concerned with creating a ‘new economic reality’ after the damage caused by the pandemic. Instead of creating rapport between Polish citizens and state government via social values, Morawiecki promises economic prosperity and stability. With the government furlough and economic protection schemes, Morawiecki believes the government has installed ‘trusted procedures’ which have received ‘positive’ reactions from citizens. Rather than glorifying a social group such as health care or supermarket workers to create social collectiveness, Morawiecki highlights the government’s focus on economically supporting working class groups such as farmers and hotel workers.

Social Collectiveness

Despite not prioritising the nation’s health, Morawiecki does not only convey that Poland must recover on an economic level, but also on a social level ‘because these are the two dimensions of our life.’ Instead of emphasising the value of the individual’s life with only two references to citizens’ wellbeing, Morawiecki discusses the disruption the pandemic caused to national religious celebrations.

Attributes
the Easter holiday which has just passed was certainly a very difficult time for all Poles.
the unusual and difficult Easter was certainly a great psychological burden for the vast majority of us.
as we have already presented it before Christmas.
the rule of one person per 1.5 metres will also apply in churches.

Table 6.3

Referring back to Morawiecki's quote in his European speech on the 'Greek Roman and Judaeo-Christian roots' of a European identity, his national discourse evokes that the 'in-group' (Neumann, 1988, p.4) of a social community is ethnically defined. Serhii's work (2012) discusses the religious language associated with Polish ethnicity in his investigation into the formation of social communities in eastern Europe. He describes:

At any rate, ethnolinguistic, ethnoracial, and religious idioms of Polishness referred rather to a closely knit community of ethnic Poles, separating them from other ethnic groups (p.110).

Morawiecki emphasises that Easter and Christmas are important to the nation's collective ethnic-historical roots and culture to ensure the Polish national identity's sense of distinctiveness. Easter is the oldest Christian festival in Poland, celebrating the resurrection of Jesus, and it is associated with a collective holy and spiritual holiday to celebrate Polish-Christian roots. Morawiecki's discourse sympathises to show understanding that 'all Poles' have collectively suffered a 'difficult time' and endured a 'great psychological burden'. Symbolically, Easter represents a time of rebirth and Morawiecki strategically places the phrase 'new economic reality' after Easter to give a sense of optimism for Poland's economic recovery. Thus, by alluding to symbolic festivals embedded in national customs, he creates engagement with his discourse.

*

Conclusion and Discussion

This research was centrally concerned with the external representation of the self in political discourse to investigate the political dynamics between eastern and western countries in the EU. This discussion revealed that identity is inherently bound to national identity. National identity was defined as a sociohistorical construct, shaped from an inside and outside perspective, which creates an in-group and an out-group in a collective community (Neumann, 1988). This analysis of political discourse highlighted that national identity forms an extremely powerful political ideology as it is deeply internalised, and conditions the values which determine politicians' vision of the EU's future. These values, however, do not only build national pride but also insecurity and instability. Germany is still dealing with difficult emotions from the past and Morawiecki's populist discourse results from his desire to rebuild a damaged national identity. Whereas Macron strikingly imposed national historical values of pride in his discourse, such as popular sovereignty, which have been developing for centuries.

A European community and identity are governed by western countries' liberal values, embodied by Macron and Merkel, which are centrally concerned with an individual's inalienable social rights. Since liberalism perceives an individual's rights as universal, it forms an expansive ideology as seen with the EU's growing influence in former Soviet territory. Illiberalism is reactive to the expansive nature of liberal hegemony and Morawiecki's nationally introverted discourse, intent on defending Poland's

sovereign rights, reflects this. Hence, we can understand Poland's rejection of a European identity because Morawiecki feels threatened by the compromises European values require to form a community as his country socially and economically develops. If the EU wants greater political influence on an international scale and compete in a political sphere of multipolarity, it has to navigate and predict illiberal resistance, not only from eastern but western countries. Nationalism is so deeply embedded that, with the example of Brexit and the disintegration of the Soviet Union into national states, any perceived threat to a state's sovereignty will provoke a counter-reaction. Thus, an identifiable European identity which creates engagement and commitment is vital to the EU's future. As epitomised by Morawiecki's discourse, a social group which lacks a stable or desirable identity is liable to radicalism and populism.

Using this research's analysis of discourse, the EU can understand how states' national identity results in an external political ideology to devise an integration strategy and predict their behaviour. For example, the EU should not be surprised when extracting states from the Soviet orbit that there is resistance to their pursuit of liberal hegemony. It is therefore crucial to not only perceive European political issues through western values and understand that expanding a liberal ideology further east will not automatically ensure peace. Eastern European countries need time to adapt from communism and to rebuild their national identity as Germany continues to do. Therefore, present European politics is deeply intertwined with each nation's history as historical experiences provide meaning to an identity and we rely on them for values to guide us in the present.

Furthermore, globalisation has brought inequality with economic losers and winners (Münch. 2016) and it is understandable that Poland focuses on the economic gap between western and eastern nations in Europe. Poland, however, is not outright illiberal and has the potential to adopt the western values of a European identity. Morawiecki's discourse displays liberal and illiberal values because he is not opposed to western values, but he also perceives them as a threat to Poland's development as a powerful nation. He idealises a glorified image of Polish identity and is thus preoccupied that it could be consumed by a supranational European state as it was by the Soviet Union. Hence, why he picks and chooses from the economic benefits of globalisation and then retreats into his national shell. If the EU ensures economic equality to stabilise Polish national identity, then Poland's likelihood to adopt liberal values will increase. Appreciating that nationalism far outweighs a supranational ideology, means that the EU can adroitly navigate further EU integration and build trust with member states to consolidate its future as a union.

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Appendix

A. Passages analysed from Macron's speech in the European Parliament

Je suis très heureux et très honoré de répondre à votre invitation en cette journée, Monsieur le Président, pour pouvoir, comme vous l'avez rappelé à l'instant, échanger librement sur la situation de notre Europe dans un contexte tout particulier.

Echanger librement parce que les propositions, les discours, je les ai faits il y a maintenant plusieurs mois, en particulier à La Sorbonne, et c'est ce temps d'échange qui me paraît aujourd'hui indispensable dans ce lieu où vous faites vivre chaque jour notre Europe dans ses sensibilités diverses, ses divergences et ses convergences, en construisant les indispensables compromis qui la font avancer. Nous allons échanger dans un contexte qui rend notre responsabilité plus grande encore.

Contexte où une forme de guerre civile européenne réapparaît, où nos différences, parfois nos égoïsmes nationaux paraissent plus importants que ce qui nous unit face au reste du monde. Contexte où la fascination, et j'y reviendrai, illibérale grandit chaque jour. Contexte où les menaces géopolitiques – et nous y reviendrons à coup sûr dans la discussion – donnent à l'Europe une responsabilité plus grande chaque jour. Ceux des grands conflits internationaux, le Levant comme le Sahel, mais aussi de l'émergence de grandes puissances autoritaires et d'une stratégie clairement élaborée qui vise à remettre en cause le cadre du multilatéralisme où l'Europe avait pris toute sa place et qui était aussi le cadre à la fois de son influence mais dans lequel nous avons collectivement construit la paix.

Et donc ce moment nous donne une responsabilité toute particulière. Nous ne pouvons pas faire comme si, en quelque sorte, nos discussions étaient ordinaires. Et ce moment, c'est celui qui nous sépare des élections européennes à venir, où nous aurons à faire vivre nos combats pour les idéaux qui nous ont faits. Et je veux, pour amorcer notre discussion, simplement partager avec vous deux convictions fortes. convictions fortes.

La première, c'est que si nous décidons d'abandonner notre attachement à la démocratie et tout ce qu'elle emporte en Europe, ils feront fausse route. La deuxième, c'est que nous pouvons dans ce cadre, et nous devons construire, une nouvelle souveraineté européenne par laquelle nous apporterons la réponse claire, ferme à nos concitoyens que nous pouvons les protéger, apporter une réponse à ces désordres du monde. En effet, dans ce monde et ce moment difficile, la démocratie européenne, je le crois très profondément, est notre meilleure chance. La pire des erreurs serait d'abandonner notre modèle, j'ose dire notre identité.

Ici-même à Strasbourg comme à Bruxelles, vous faites vivre chaque jour cette démocratie en Europe dont parlait TOCQUEVILLE. Notre identité, c'est d'abord cette démocratie respectueuse de l'individu, des minorités, des droits fondamentaux, ce qu'on appelait du nom que je revendique encore « la démocratie libérale ».

Je ne veux pas laisser s'installer cette illusion mortifère qui, ne l'oublions jamais, ici moins qu'ailleurs, a précipité notre continent vers le gouffre. L'illusion du pouvoir fort, du nationalisme, de l'abandon des libertés. Et je récusé cette idée qui gagne même l'Europe que la démocratie serait condamnée à l'impuissance. Face à l'autoritarisme qui partout nous entoure, la réponse n'est pas la démocratie autoritaire mais l'autorité de la démocratie.

Parce que cette liberté émancipe et protège l'individu, un Parlement comme le vôtre, le nôtre, est un miracle européen. Rassembler pacifiquement les représentants élus des peuples d'Europe pour délibérer ensemble dans leurs différences, forts et lourds de leur histoire et de ce qui les a parfois divisés est un modèle unique au monde. Ce trésor, nous le faisons vivre depuis soixante-dix ans. Ne nous y habituons pas. Nous avons pris tous les risques et traversé le pire pour en arriver là et si l'on veut être plus concret encore, regardons autour de nous, comparons-nous et regardons parfois ces puissances qui peuvent fasciner certains par une prétendue efficacité.

Dans quel autre endroit au monde a-t-on cette même exigence en matière évidemment économique, géopolitique, diplomatique et militaire mais aussi de respect des minorités, de liberté des consciences, d'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes, de respect pour la vie privée ? Où ailleurs à ce point, avec la même vitalité et la même force ?

Alors il y a des divisions entre les pays au sein même de cet hémicycle, mais au-delà de ces divisions, ce modèle démocratique qui nous rassemble est unique au monde. L'identité de l'Europe, c'est plus qu'une démocratie soucieuse de liberté, c'est une culture unique dans le monde qui combine cette passion de la liberté, le goût de l'égalité, l'attachement à la diversité des idées, des langues, des paysages.

Ce modèle européen n'est ni abstrait, ni daté. Il s'incarne aujourd'hui dans notre attachement commun à la protection de l'environnement, du climat, de la santé. Il se développe aujourd'hui dans notre approche de la révolution numérique où seuls les Européens sont autant attachés à la liberté d'innovation comme à la juste régulation et à la protection de leur vie privée. Cette identité nous distingue bien évidemment des puissances autoritaires avant tout, mais aujourd'hui aussi, il faut bien le voir, de certains alliés les plus proches.

Notre partenaire américain, avec qui nous partageons tant, fait face aujourd'hui à la tentation du désengagement et du rejet du multilatéralisme, de l'enjeu climatique ou des questions commerciales. Ce modèle, j'en suis convaincu, est puissant comme aucun autre et fragile tout autant car sa force à

chaque instant dépend de notre engagement et de notre exigence. Chaque jour, nous devons le défendre ensemble. Alors pour être à la hauteur de cet engagement, la première condition c'est la vérité et la responsabilité.

Certains imputant tous nos maux à une Europe honnie, fuyant ainsi leurs propres responsabilités, nous disent avec aplomb que les peuples ne veulent plus de l'Europe. Ils proposent des voies dorées ; parfois disent avec aplomb que les peuples ne veulent plus de l'Europe. Ils proposent des voies dorées ; parfois on les croit. Ils se soustraient ensuite à leurs responsabilités quand il faudrait conduire leur peuple jusqu'au bout de cette aventure.

Je crois que rien n'est plus faux. Il serait commode, en effet, de dissoudre le peuple ou d'exciter ces passions pour éviter de proposer un chemin. De critiquer sans proposer, de détruire sans rebâtir. Ce n'est pas le peuple qui a abandonné l'idée européenne, c'est la trahison des clercs qui la menace. Il faut entendre la colère des peuples d'Europe aujourd'hui. Ce n'est pas de pédagogie dont ils ont besoin mais d'un projet nouveau, d'une exigence d'efficacité au quotidien. Et ceux qui font commerce de cette colère qu'ils attisent proposent pour seul avenir la voie sans issue du retour au déchirement nationaliste d'hier. Nous en avons expérimenté toutes les voies et toutes les conséquences.

Pour raviver l'Europe des peuples, nous devons donc accepter d'agir autrement en puisant à la source de la démocratie et regardons les choses en face : comment se satisfaire d'élections européennes auxquelles moins d'un citoyen sur deux se déplace pour voter ? Alors construisons dans l'année qui vient la réalité d'un débat structuré sur des convictions, des propositions. Nous ne pouvons pas aujourd'hui faire comme hier, c'est-à-dire refuser de parler d'Europe, répartir les places, accuser Bruxelles ou Strasbourg de tous les maux. Continuer à faire cela, c'est décider d'avoir un jeu de dupes qui sera peut-être plus confortable pour chacun d'entre nous mais qui nous conduira à ne résoudre aucun problème. Je crois comme vous à la noblesse et à la complexité du choix démocratique.

En tant que représentants des peuples d'Europe vous l'incarnez, vous faites chaque jour des choix, vous définissez des compromis, vous forgez des solutions, car vous avez reçu le mandat des peuples. Et notre devoir commun est de faire vivre cette démocratie européenne, au fond si jeune.

C'est la raison pour laquelle en amont des élections et du temps contraint des campagnes électorales, nous devons faire vivre le débat, créer cet espace public européen que bien souvent nous avons laissé en friche. C'est dans cet esprit d'essayer et d'innover que j'ai proposé des consultations citoyennes dès cette année.

Je lancerai en France celles-ci cet après-midi même, un débat franc, ouvert, rugueux et difficile, mais indispensable pour savoir ce qui rassemble et sépare, pour sortir de l'alternative simpliste du oui ou non à une question généralement dont on n'examine pas ni les présupposés, ni les textes implicites. Mais d'avoir démocratiquement un débat critique sur l'Europe qui est la nôtre.

Je me réjouis que tous les Etats membres aient accepté de partager cette démarche, je sais l'engagement du président JUNCKER et de la Commission européenne dans cette action et je veux l'en remercier. Et je mesure aussi votre rôle essentiel, Monsieur le Président TAJANI, dans cet exercice et je veux aussi vous en remercier. Et je vous invite chacune et chacun dans vos pays et partout en Europe à animer, participer à ces débats essentiels car ils sont une condition de cette vitalité démocratique.

La deuxième conviction que je veux rapidement partager avec vous, c'est celle de la nécessaire souveraineté européenne. Défendre l'idée européenne, ce n'est pas défendre une idée abstraite, la dilution en quelque sorte de nos propres souverainetés, non, c'est acter du fait que face à ces grands bouleversements du monde, ces grandes transformations, ce moment que nous vivons, nous avons besoin d'une souveraineté plus forte que la nôtre, complémentaire et pas de substitution, qui seule permettra face aux grandes migrations, à l'insécurité planétaire, aux transformations économiques, sociales et environnementales d'apporter les bonnes réponses. C'est cela cette souveraineté européenne à laquelle je crois.

Vous l'aurez compris, Mesdames et Messieurs, le Parlement européen est à mes yeux le siège de la légitimité européenne, de sa responsabilité et donc de sa vitalité. C'est ici que se joue une partie de l'avenir de l'Europe, l'Europe comme rassemblement de notre souveraineté par et avec une souveraineté plus grande encore, celle qui nous unit. Cette union au service de la paix et de la solidarité offrant au monde un espace unique de stabilité et de sécurité. C'est ici que nous devons ancrer la renaissance d'une Europe portée par l'esprit même de ses peuples. Je souhaite que dans les prochains mois nous parvenions à dépasser les clivages entre le Nord et le Sud, l'Est de l'Ouest, les petits ou les grands, le repli sur les égoïsmes nationaux.

J'appartiens à une génération qui n'a pas connu la guerre et j'appartiens à une génération qui est en train de s'offrir le luxe d'oublier ce que les prédécesseurs ont vécu. Il y en a beaucoup qui aujourd'hui pensent qu'on peut continuer à préférer les confrontations habituelles, les certitudes d'hier, parce que nous nous sommes habitués, les divisions bien connues et bien concertées. Mais je viens aussi d'une terre et d'une famille qui a connu toutes les saignées de notre histoire passée. Alors les choix sont simples, moi je ne veux pas appartenir à une génération de somnambules, je ne veux pas appartenir à une génération qui aura oublié son propre passé ou qui refusera de voir les tourments de son propre présent. Chacun dans les temps qui s'ouvrent reprendra ses responsabilités, mais je veux appartenir à une génération qui aura décidé fermement de défendre sa démocratie, parce que ça n'est pas un mot auquel on s'est habitué ou dans lequel on s'est alangui, c'est un mot qui a tout son sens parce qu'il est le fruit de batailles passées.

Je veux appartenir à une génération qui défendra cette souveraineté européenne parce que nous nous sommes battus pour l'avoir, parce qu'elle a un sens et parce qu'elle est la condition qui permettra aux

génération à venir, de choisir, à ce moment-là, elles-mêmes leur avenir. Et je ne céderai à aucune fascination pour les souverainetés autoritaires, je ne céderai à aucune facilité des temps présents, mais je pense qu'ensemble, notre responsabilité dans les mois à venir, c'est d'organiser le vrai débat européen, d'avoir les véritables échéances européennes, qui seules permettront à nos peuples, de choisir, ceux qui veulent une Europe qui ne propose plus, ceux qui veulent une Europe du repli, ceux qui veulent une Europe de l'habitude ou ceux qu'ils sont prêts à porter une Europe de l'ambition, d'une souveraineté réinventée, d'une démocratie vivante, celle à laquelle nous croyons. Je vous remercie.

B. Passages analysed from Merkel's speech in the European Parliament

Vor fast fünfzig Jahren nannte der ehemalige deutsche Kommissionspräsident Walter Hallstein die europäische Einigung eine „beispiellose Kühnheit“. Das war 1969, zehn Jahre vor der ersten Direktwahl zum Europäischen Parlament. Damals steckte die Europäische Gemeinschaft noch in den Kinderschuhen. Viele unserer größten Errungenschaften – Schengen, der Binnenmarkt, eine gemeinsame Währung – waren noch visionäre Projekte. Aber der Grundstein war gelegt, und mit ihm bestand nach Jahrhunderten der Kriege und Diktaturen für die Bürgerinnen und Bürger Europas erstmals die Aussicht auf eine dauerhafte friedliche und stabile Zukunft. Und heute stehe ich mit Freude, aber auch mit Dankbarkeit, vor dem größten demokratischen Parlament der Welt.

Sie, die 751 Abgeordneten aus 28 Staaten, vertreten gemeinsam über 500 Millionen Menschen; das sind nahezu sieben Prozent der Bevölkerung der Welt. Wir spüren in Ihrem Haus den Herzschlag der europäischen Demokratie.

Es ist jetzt über elf Jahre her, dass ich zum ersten Mal vor diesem Haus geredet habe. Deutschland hatte seinerzeit, 2007, die EU-Präsidentschaft übernommen. Ich habe damals von der Vielfalt gesprochen, die uns eint und nicht teilt, von der Freiheit, die immer wieder neu verteidigt werden muss und die Europa wie der Mensch die Luft zum Atmen braucht. Ich habe damals von einem grundlegenden Wert gesprochen, der Europa auszeichnet, von einem Wert, der Freiheit und die Vielfalt in Europa miteinander verbindet. Ich habe von der Toleranz gesprochen. Ich habe davon gesprochen, dass die Toleranz, die Seele Europas und damit ein unverzichtbarer Grundwert der europäischen Idee ist.

Die globalen politischen, wirtschaftlichen und technologischen Herausforderungen entwickelten sich immer schneller und immer tiefgreifender. Wir haben eine große Staatsschuldenkrise durchlebt, der internationale Terrorismus hat vor der Europäischen Union nicht haltgemacht, Kriege und bewaffnete Konflikte finden nur wenige Flugstunden von hier genau vor unserer Haustür statt, weltweite Flucht- und Migrationsbewegungen betreffen auch uns Europäer ganz konkret, und der digitale Fortschritt verändert unsere Lebensweise in atemberaubendem Tempo. Wir spüren die Folgen des Klimawandels, alte Verbündete stellen bewährte Allianzen in Frage, mit Großbritannien wird erstmals ein Land die Europäische Union wieder verlassen.

Aber wir spüren noch etwas anderes: Es ist immer weniger erfolgversprechend, alleine auf der globalen Bühne die Interessen, die man hat, durchzusetzen. Und das bedeutet umgekehrt: Es wird immer wichtiger, dass wir Europäer zusammenstehen. Dafür benötigen wir innerhalb der Europäischen Union mehr denn je die Achtung des anderen und seiner Interessen. Wir brauchen mehr denn je das Verständnis, dass die Toleranz die Seele Europas ist, dass sie ein ganz wesentlicher Bestandteil dessen ist, was uns Europäer ausmacht, und dass wir nur mit ihr die Bereitschaft

entwickeln können, die Interessen und Bedürfnisse des anderen auch als die eigenen Bedürfnisse zu verstehen.

Das führt uns zum Kern der europäischen Solidarität, ohne die erfolgreiches Handeln nicht denkbar ist. Diese Solidarität gründet auf der Toleranz, und sie macht unsere Stärke, die es nirgendwo sonst gibt, als Europäer aus, und zwar aus drei Gründen:

Erstens: Die Solidarität ist ein universeller Wert. Sich füreinander einzusetzen ist eine Grundvoraussetzung für jede funktionierende Gemeinschaft. Das gilt für die Familie, das gilt für die Dorfgemeinschaft, für den Sportverein und gleichermaßen für eine Gemeinschaft wie die Europäische Union. Die Solidarität ist ein fester Bestandteil der Europäischen Verträge, sie ist ein zentraler Teil unseres Wertekanons. Die Solidarität ist ein Teil der europäischen DNA.

Wir unterstützen Länder und Regionen in ihrer wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung oder beim Kampf gegen die Jugendarbeitslosigkeit, wir helfen einander bei Naturkatastrophen, wir stehen uns im Fall von Terroranschlägen oder Reaktorunfällen gegenseitig bei, wir haben in der europäischen Staatsschuldenkrise sogenannte Rettungsschirme aufgespannt, um hiervon betroffenen Ländern zu helfen, dass sie ihre wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Probleme lösen konnten.

Schon diese wenigen Beispiele zeigen, dass die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union und mit ihnen die Bürgerinnen und Bürger der Europäischen Union in schwierigen Zeiten und Notlagen eben nicht alleine dastehen. Diese wenigen Beispiele zeigen umgekehrt aber auch, dass individuelle nationale Entscheidungen immer Auswirkungen auf die ganze Gemeinschaft haben.

Und deshalb zweitens: Solidarität geht immer auch nur mit Verantwortung für die Gemeinschaft aller einher. Konkret heißt das: Wer rechtsstaatliche Prinzipien in seinem Land aushöhlt, wer die Rechte der Opposition und der Zivilgesellschaft beschneidet, wer die Pressefreiheit einschränkt, der gefährdet nicht nur die Rechtsstaatlichkeit in seinem eigenen Land, sondern er gefährdet die Rechtsstaatlichkeit von uns allen in ganz Europa.

Denn Europa kann natürlich nur funktionieren als Rechtsgemeinschaft, wenn das Recht überall gleichermaßen gilt und geachtet wird. Wer darauf setzt, Probleme alleine durch neue Schulden zu lösen, und eingegangene Verpflichtungen missachtet, der stellt die Grundlagen für die Stärke und die Stabilität des Euroraums in Frage. Denn unsere gemeinsame Währung kann nur funktionieren, wenn jedes einzelne Mitglied seine Verantwortung für tragfähige Finanzen auch zu Hause erfüllt.

Das heißt, dass Solidarität immer auch bedeutet, nationale Egoismen zu überwinden. Dabei weiß ich sehr wohl, dass sich auch Deutschland nicht immer tadellos verhalten hat oder in den Augen mancher tadellos verhält.

Und daraus folgt drittens: Die Solidarität zum Nutzen aller bedeutet im Ergebnis auch, im wohlverstandenen eigenen Interesse zu handeln. Respekt und Unterstützung für andere und die Vertretung eigener Interessen sind kein Widerspruch – ganz im Gegenteil!

Die Toleranz gebietet zu respektieren, dass die Frage der Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen in verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten aufgrund der eigenen Geschichte, aufgrund ihrer demografischen Entwicklung unterschiedliche Reaktionen auslöst.

Das also macht Europa aus: Solidarität als universeller Grundwert, Solidarität als Verantwortung für die Gemeinschaft und Solidarität als wohlverstandenes Eigeninteresse.

Und natürlich gehört zu einem stabilen Wohlstandseuropa auch eine stabile Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. Wir wollen den europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus weiterentwickeln.

Ich glaube, dass die Menschen sich wünschen, dass Europa genau diese Probleme angeht, die ihnen auf den Nägeln brennen. Die Menschen wünschen sich ein Europa, das die Antworten auf die Fragen gibt, die uns bedrücken. Das bedeutet nicht, dass Europa überall sein muss. Es gilt unverändert, dass nicht jedes Problem in Europa ein Problem für Europa ist. Solidarität bedeutet nicht Allgegenwärtigkeit. Aber Solidarität bedeutet, dass Europa da handelt, wo es gebraucht wird, und dass es da dann stark und entschieden und wirksam handeln kann.

Ich bin überzeugt: Europa ist unsere beste Chance auf dauerhaften Frieden, auf dauerhaften Wohlstand, auf eine sichere Zukunft. Unser Zusammentreffen in Paris auf Einladung des französischen Präsidenten, um an das Grauen des Ersten Weltkriegs vor hundert Jahren zu erinnern, sollte uns noch einmal bewusst gemacht haben, was passiert, wenn Nationen voreinander keinen Respekt haben, und was passiert, wenn Gemeinschaften wie der Völkerbund damals, der als Folge des Ersten Weltkrieges gegründet wurde, scheitern. Es kam das noch größere Grauen.

Deshalb dürfen wir diese europäische Chance nicht vertun. Das sind wir uns selbst schuldig, das sind wir der vergangenen Generation schuldig, und das sind wir den kommenden Generationen schuldig. Das bedeutet: Nationalismus und Egoismus dürfen nie wieder eine Chance in Europa haben. Sondern Toleranz und Solidarität sind unsere gemeinsame Zukunft. Liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, es lohnt sich allemal, sich dafür zu mühen!

C. Passages analysed from Morawiecki's speech in the European Parliament

Poland is celebrating the five hundred and fiftieth anniversary its first Parliament and the hundredth anniversary of his independence. We were one of the first countries to give full democratic rights to women as well and this shows how Poland has deep roots in parliamentarism and the rule of law.

National parliaments are the voice of the sovereign and the lifeblood of democracy. The discussion on the future of Europe is one of the most important debates that we can have particularly on the 100th anniversary of the end of the First World War which began a very difficult history of the 20th century in Europe. The cataclysms of two world wars and the genocide all cried the crimes saw the free countries begin with a historic project 60 years aiming to find what could bring us together.

If it hadn't been for the Iron Curtain and the tragic division of Europe, Poland would also have been one of the founding fathers of the European community. That's what the Polish government-in-exile had wanted at the time. Polish society was therefore kept outside of the first stage in in European integration and sustainable development so now as a fully-fledged member of the EU we want to do our bitto aim to create a constructive program for the future of our continent.

We have our expectations as every country in the European Union does but we also have plenty to offer. you can't understand the continuity of Europe without understanding its Greek Roman and judeo-christian roots.

Our continent has been shaped by its culture and institutions over hundreds of years and respecting national identities is part of the trust that must be built in the EU constitutional pluralism. Article 4 of the treaty is one of the great values of the EU and every country has a right to set up its legal system in line with its own traditions.

As a young man I was part of the anti-communist opposition fighting for freedom and democracy. Since the fall of communism, we're still part of a difficult process of sewing together.

In the last few years, the European Union has been dealing with a number of existential crisis; the financial crisis, the banking crisis, the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit and Russian aggression. The situation today seems to be without precedent different to the 70s or the 80s or the first decade of this century. That's because it's not just one crisis but accumulation of several crises happening at the same time. You can be offended by that. You can close your eyes to it. You can say it's just a marginal group but it's not going to change the reality of the fact that it's not a marginal group. Many Europeans no longer like the direction the EU is going. People have a freedom gene in their DNA. They want to decide on their future their children's future, their family's future, their society's future for themselves.

Since the Second World War that contract meant rebuilding a feeling of security and rebuilding the economy, offering prosperity to all today. We have to rebalance the relationship between the main and member states and the EU institutions. De Gaulle's vision is one way of doing this.

Unless we have an ambitious cohesion policy, this can't be a one-way route street for underdeveloped countries. So let's be very clear limiting cohesion policy is populism. Doesn't matter whether you call it pro or anti-European populism cohesion policy and an ambitious fight with disparities in the Union is a win-win strategy. Something that's good for all our members fighting inequality.

The European route to a low-carbon economy or even a zero emissions economy is certainly a worthy goal. I've got a road to a clean environment and healthy citizens. Where in Poland we are aware of the importance of this and that's why we've introduced measures to clean up our air and fight against smog. The EU must take into account the differences between our economies. It also needs to offer different instruments to support the different member states. For many years Poland didn't have the opportunity to change to natural gas because it only came from one direction from Russia.

The Russian hybrid war in Ukraine and elsewhere interference in the democratic process of countries of the West and their events like what we saw in Salisbury or Russians involvement in Syria. What Russia has done in the Ukraine threatens the architecture of Eastern Europe but it's aimed at destabilizing the West.

Capitalism continues to intensify digitization which has led to a winner-takes-all distribution of wealth. Europe should be an entity on the global stage defending its interests. It should be powerful so as to better defend our interests how a European sovereignty cannot mean building up Europe at the expense of the force of member states because the force of a sovereign Europe comes from the force of its member states weak member states and countries who feel they're being ignored would be a recipe for indifference to the EU. Forcing us to transfer competences from national level to EU level until we end up with some sort of super state.

D. Passages analysed from Macron's national speech

Cette épidémie qui affecte tous les continents et frappe tous les pays européens est la plus grave crise sanitaire qu'ait connue la France depuis un siècle. Dans l'immense majorité des cas, le Covid-19 est sans danger, mais le virus peut avoir des conséquences très graves, en particulier pour celles et ceux de nos compatriotes qui sont âgés ou affectés par des maladies chroniques comme le diabète, l'obésité ou le cancer.

Les personnels des hôpitaux, médecins, infirmiers, ambulanciers, les agents des Samu et de nos hôpitaux, les médecins de ville, l'ensemble des personnels du service public de la santé en France sont engagés avec dévouement et efficacité. Si nous avons pu retarder la propagation du virus et limiter les cas sévères, c'est grâce à eux parce que tous ont répondu présents. Tous ont accepté de prendre du temps sur leur vie personnelle, familiale, pour notre santé.

C'est pourquoi, en votre nom, je tiens avant toute chose à exprimer ce soir la reconnaissance de la Nation à ces héros en blouse blanche, ces milliers de femmes et d'hommes admirables qui n'ont d'autre boussole que le soin, d'autre préoccupation que l'humain, notre bien-être, notre vie, tout simplement. Je veux aussi, ce soir, saluer le sang-froid dont vous avez fait preuve. Face à la propagation du virus, vous avez pu ressentir pour vous-mêmes, pour vos proches, de l'inquiétude voire de l'angoisse, et c'est bien légitime. Tous, vous avez su faire face en ne cédant ni à la colère, ni à la panique. Mieux, en adoptant les bons gestes, vous avez ralenti la diffusion du virus et ainsi permis à nos hôpitaux et nos soignants de mieux se préparer. C'est cela, une grande Nation. Des femmes et des hommes capables de placer l'intérêt collectif au-dessus de tout, une communauté humaine qui tient par des valeurs : la solidarité, la fraternité.

Partout en Europe, elle s'accélère, elle s'intensifie. Face à cela, la priorité absolue pour notre Nation sera notre santé. Je ne transigerai sur rien. Un principe nous guide pour définir nos actions, il nous guide depuis le début pour anticiper cette crise puis pour la gérer depuis plusieurs semaines et il doit continuer de le faire : c'est la confiance dans la science. C'est d'écouter celles et ceux qui savent. Les plus grands spécialistes européens se sont exprimés ce matin dans une publication importante. J'ai réuni aujourd'hui, avec le Premier ministre et le ministre de la Santé, notre comité scientifique de suivi. Nous avons en France les meilleurs virologues, les meilleurs épidémiologistes, des spécialistes de grand renom, des cliniciens aussi, des gens qui sont sur le terrain et que nous avons écouté, comme nous le faisons depuis le premier jour.

C'est aussi de se préparer à une possible deuxième vague qui touchera un peu plus tard, en nombre beaucoup plus réduit, des personnes plus jeunes, a priori moins exposées à la maladie, mais nombre beaucoup plus réduit, des personnes plus jeunes, a priori moins exposées à la maladie, mais qu'il faudra soigner également. Dans ce contexte, l'urgence est de protéger nos compatriotes les plus vulnérables. L'urgence est de freiner l'épidémie afin de protéger nos hôpitaux, nos services d'urgence

et de réanimation, nos soignants qui vont avoir à traiter, comme je viens de vous l'expliquer, de plus en plus de patients atteints. Ce sont là nos priorités. C'est pour cela qu'il nous faut continuer de gagner du temps et suivre celles et ceux qui sont les plus fragiles. Protéger les plus vulnérables d'abord. C'est la priorité absolue. C'est pourquoi je demande ce soir à toutes les personnes âgées de plus de 70 ans, à celles et ceux qui souffrent de maladies chroniques ou de troubles respiratoires, aux personnes en situation de handicap, de rester autant que possible à leur domicile.

Dans ce contexte, j'ai interrogé les scientifiques sur nos élections municipales, dont le premier tour se tiendra dans quelques jours. Ils considèrent que rien ne s'oppose à ce que les Français, même les plus vulnérables, se rendent aux urnes. J'ai aussi demandé au Premier ministre, il l'a fait encore ce matin, de consulter largement toutes les familles politiques, et elles ont exprimé la même volonté. Mais il conviendra de veiller au respect strict des gestes barrières contre le virus et des recommandations sanitaires. Je fais confiance aux maires et au civisme de chacun d'entre vous.

La mobilisation générale est également celle de nos chercheurs. De nombreux programmes français et européens, essais cliniques, sont en cours pour produire en quantité des diagnostics rapides, performants et efficaces. Nous allons améliorer les choses en la matière, et au niveau français comme européen, les travaux sont lancés. Nos professeurs, avec l'appui des acteurs privés, travaillent d'ores et déjà sur plusieurs pistes de traitement à Paris, Marseille et Lyon, entre autres. Les protocoles ont commencé. J'espère que dans les prochaines semaines et les prochains mois, nous aurons des premiers traitements que nous pourrions généraliser. L'Europe a tous les atouts pour offrir au monde l'antidote au Covid-19. Des équipes sont également à pied d'œuvre pour inventer un vaccin. Il ne pourra pas voir le jour avant plusieurs mois, mais il est porteur de grands espoirs. La mobilisation de notre recherche française, européenne, est aussi au rendez-vous et je continuerai de l'intensifier. Cette épreuve exige aussi une mobilisation sociale envers les plus démunis, les plus fragiles.

Aussi, tout sera mis en œuvre pour protéger nos salariés et pour protéger nos entreprises quoi qu'il en coûte, là aussi. Dès les jours à venir, un mécanisme exceptionnel et massif de chômage partiel sera mis en œuvre. Des premières annonces ont été faites par les ministres. Nous irons beaucoup plus loin. L'Etat prendra en charge l'indemnisation des salariés contraints à rester chez eux. Je veux, en la matière, que nous nous inspirions de ce que les Allemands ont su par exemple mettre en œuvre avec un système plus généreux, plus simple que le nôtre. En parallèle, j'ai demandé au Gouvernement de préparer d'ores et déjà un plan de relance national et européen cohérent avec nos priorités et nos engagements pour l'avenir. Nous devons aussi porter une réponse européenne. La Banque centrale a déjà, aujourd'hui, fait part de ses premières décisions. Seront-elles suffisantes ? Je ne le crois pas. Il lui appartiendra d'en prendre de nouvelles. Mais je vais être là aussi très clair avec vous ce soir : nous, Européens, ne laisserons pas une crise financière et économique se propager. Nous réagirons fort et nous réagirons vite. L'ensemble des gouvernements européens doit prendre les décisions de soutien de

l'activité puis de relance quoi qu'il en coûte. La France le fera, et c'est cette ligne que je porterai au niveau européen en votre nom.

J'ai essayé de vous donner, ce soir, ce qui doit être la ligne de notre Nation tout entière. Nous devons aujourd'hui éviter deux écueils, mes chers compatriotes. D'une part, le repli nationaliste. Ce virus n'a pas de passeport. Il nous faut unir nos forces, coordonner nos réponses, coopérer. La France est à pied d'œuvre. La coordination européenne est essentielle, et j'y veillerai. Nous aurons sans doute des mesures à prendre, mais il faut les prendre pour réduire les échanges entre les zones qui sont touchées et celles qui ne le sont pas. Ce ne sont pas forcément les frontières nationales. Il ne faut céder là à aucune facilité, aucune panique. Nous aurons sans doute des mesures de contrôle, des fermetures de frontières à prendre, mais il faudra les prendre quand elles seront pertinentes et il faudra les prendre en Européens, à l'échelle européenne, car c'est à cette échelle que nous avons construit nos libertés et nos protections. L'autre écueil, ce serait le repli individualiste.

Le Gouvernement et moi-même serons là, nous prendrons toutes nos responsabilités pour vous. Je pense à tous nos soignants à l'hôpital, qui auront les cas les plus graves à traiter mais aussi beaucoup d'urgences. Je pense aux médecins, aux infirmiers, aux infirmières, à tous les soignants qui sont aussi hors de l'hôpital qui se sont formidablement mobilisés et que nous allons de plus en plus solliciter dans les semaines à venir. Je sais pouvoir compter sur vous. Le ministre de la Santé aura l'occasion aussi de préciser, dans les prochaines heures, les règles pour que nous vous aidions à bien vous protéger contre le virus. C'est le respect que nous avons envers vous, et c'est évidemment ce que la Nation vous doit. Les règles seront claires pour chacun, elles seront là aussi proportionnées et expliquées. Je compte sur vous toutes et tous pour faire Nation au fond. Pour réveiller ce qu'il y a de meilleur en nous, pour révéler cette âme généreuse qui, par le passé, a permis à la France d'affronter les plus dures épreuves. Mes chers compatriotes, il nous faudra demain tirer les leçons du moment que nous traversons, interroger le modèle de développement dans lequel s'est engagé notre monde depuis des décennies et qui dévoile ses failles au grand jour, interroger les faiblesses de nos démocraties.

Nous devons en reprendre le contrôle, construire plus encore que nous ne le faisons déjà une France, une Europe souveraine, une France et une Europe qui tiennent fermement leur destin en main. Les prochaines semaines et les prochains mois nécessiteront des décisions de rupture en ce sens. Je les assumerai. Mais le temps, aujourd'hui, est à la protection de nos concitoyens et à la cohésion de la Nation. Le temps est à cette union sacrée qui consiste à suivre tous ensemble un même chemin, à ne céder à aucune panique, aucune peur, aucune facilité, mais à retrouver cette force d'âme qui est la nôtre et qui a permis à notre peuple de surmonter tant de crises à travers l'histoire. La France unie, c'est notre meilleur atout dans la période troublée que nous traversons. Nous tiendrons tous ensemble. Vive la République ! Vive la France !

E. Analysed passages from Merkel's national speech

Das Coronavirus verändert zurzeit das Leben in unserem Land dramatisch. Unsere Vorstellung von Normalität, von öffentlichem Leben, von sozialen Miteinander - all das wird auf die Probe gestellt wie nie zuvor.

Ich glaube fest daran, dass wir diese Aufgabe bestehen, wenn wirklich alle Bürgerinnen und Bürger sie als IHRE Aufgabe begreifen.

Deswegen lassen Sie mich sagen: Es ist ernst. Nehmen Sie es auch ernst. Seit der Deutschen Einheit, nein, seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg gab es keine Herausforderung an unser Land mehr, bei der es so sehr auf unser gemeinsames solidarisches Handeln ankommt.

Ich möchte Ihnen erklären, wo wir aktuell stehen in der Epidemie, was die Bundesregierung und die staatlichen Ebenen tun, um alle in unserer Gemeinschaft zu schützen und den ökonomischen, sozialen, kulturellen Schaden zu begrenzen. Aber ich möchte Ihnen auch vermitteln, warum es Sie dafür braucht, und was jeder und jede Einzelne dazu beitragen kann.

Zur Epidemie - und alles was ich Ihnen dazu sage, kommt aus den ständigen Beratungen der Bundesregierung mit den Experten des Robert-Koch-Instituts und anderen Wissenschaftlern und Virologen: Es wird weltweit unter Hochdruck geforscht, aber noch gibt es weder eine Therapie gegen das Coronavirus noch einen Impfstoff.

Solange das so ist, gibt es nur eines, und das ist die Richtschnur all unseres Handelns: die Ausbreitung des Virus zu verlangsamen, sie über die Monate zu strecken und so Zeit zu gewinnen. Zeit, damit die Forschung ein Medikament und einen Impfstoff entwickeln kann. Aber vor allem auch Zeit, damit diejenigen, die erkranken, bestmöglich versorgt werden können.

Deutschland hat ein exzellentes Gesundheitssystem, vielleicht eines der besten der Welt. Das kann uns Zuversicht geben. Aber auch unsere Krankenhäuser wären völlig überfordert, wenn in kürzester Zeit zu viele Patienten eingeliefert würden, die einen schweren Verlauf der Coronainfektion erleiden.

Das sind nicht einfach abstrakte Zahlen in einer Statistik, sondern das ist ein Vater oder Großvater, eine Mutter oder Großmutter, eine Partnerin oder Partner, es sind Menschen. Und wir sind eine Gemeinschaft, in der jedes Leben und jeder Mensch zählt.

Ich möchte mich bei dieser Gelegenheit zu aller erst an alle wenden, die als Ärzte oder Ärztinnen, im Pflegedienst oder in einer sonstigen Funktion in unseren Krankenhäusern und überhaupt im Gesundheitswesen arbeiten. Sie stehen für uns in diesem Kampf in der vordersten Linie. Sie sehen als erste die Kranken und wie schwer manche Verläufe der Infektion sind. Und jeden Tag gehen Sie aufs Neue an Ihre Arbeit und sind für die Menschen da. Was Sie leisten, ist gewaltig, und ich danke Ihnen von ganzem Herzen dafür.

Aber alles, was Menschen gefährden könnte, alles, was dem Einzelnen, aber auch der Gemeinschaft schaden könnte, das müssen wir jetzt reduzieren.

Ich weiß, wie dramatisch schon jetzt die Einschränkungen sind: keine Veranstaltungen mehr, keine Messen, keine Konzerte und vorerst auch keine Schule mehr, keine Universität, kein Kindergarten, kein Spiel auf einem Spielplatz. Ich weiß, wie hart die Schließungen, auf die sich Bund und Länder geeinigt haben, in unser Leben und auch unser demokratisches Selbstverständnis eingreifen. Es sind Einschränkungen, wie es sie in der Bundesrepublik noch nie gab.

Lassen Sie mich versichern: Für jemandem wie mich, für die Reise- und Bewegungsfreiheit ein schwer erkämpftes Recht waren, sind solche Einschränkungen nur in der absoluten Notwendigkeit zu rechtfertigen. Sie sollten in einer Demokratie nie leichtfertig und nur temporär beschlossen werden - aber sie sind im Moment unverzichtbar, um Leben zu retten.

Und lassen Sie mich auch hier Dank aussprechen an Menschen, denen zu selten gedankt wird. Wer in diesen Tagen an einer Supermarktkasse sitzt oder Regale befüllt, der macht einen der schwersten Jobs, die es zurzeit gibt. Danke, dass Sie da sind für ihre Mitbürger und buchstäblich den Laden am Laufen halten.

Es kommt auf jeden an. Wir sind nicht verdammt, die Ausbreitung des Virus passiv hinzunehmen. Wir haben ein Mittel dagegen: wir müssen aus Rücksicht voneinander Abstand halten. Der Rat der Virologen ist ja eindeutig: Kein Handschlag mehr, gründlich und oft die Hände waschen, mindestens eineinhalb Meter Abstand zum Nächsten und am besten kaum noch Kontakte zu den ganz Alten, weil sie eben besonders gefährdet sind.

Ich weiß, wie schwer das ist, was da von uns verlangt wird. Wir möchten, gerade in Zeiten der Not, einander nah sein. Wir kennen Zuwendung als körperliche Nähe oder Berührung. Doch im Augenblick ist leider das Gegenteil richtig. Und das müssen wirklich alle begreifen: Im Moment ist nur Abstand Ausdruck von Fürsorge.

Schon jetzt gibt es viele kreative Formen, die dem Virus und seinen sozialen Folgen trotzen. Schon jetzt gibt es Enkel, die ihren Großeltern einen Podcast aufnehmen, damit sie nicht einsam sind.

Wir allen müssen Wege finden, um Zuneigung und Freundschaft zu zeigen: Skypen, Telefonate, Mails und vielleicht mal wieder Briefe schreiben. Die Post wird ja ausgeliefert. Man hört jetzt von wunderbaren Beispielen von Nachbarschaftshilfe für die Älteren, die nicht selbst zum Einkaufen gehen können. Ich bin sicher, da geht noch viel mehr und wir werden als Gemeinschaft zeigen, dass wir einander nicht allein lassen.

Dies ist eine dynamische Situation, und wir werden in ihr lernfähig bleiben, um jederzeit umdenken und mit anderen Instrumenten reagieren zu können. Auch das werden wir dann erklären.

Wir sind eine Demokratie. Wir leben nicht von Zwang, sondern von geteiltem Wissen und Mitwirkung. Dies ist eine historische Aufgabe und sie ist nur gemeinsam zu bewältigen.

Dass wir diese Krise überwinden werden, dessen bin ich vollkommen sicher. Aber wie hoch werden die Opfer sein? Wie viele geliebte Menschen werden wir verlieren? Wir haben es zu einem großen Teil selbst in der Hand. Wir können jetzt, entschlossen, alle miteinander reagieren. Wir können die aktuellen Einschränkungen annehmen und einander beistehen.

Wir müssen, auch wenn wir so etwas noch nie erlebt haben, zeigen, dass wir herzlich und vernünftig handeln und so Leben retten. Es kommt ohne Ausnahme auf jeden Einzelnen und damit auf uns alle an.

F. Passages analysed from Morawiecki's national speech

Cała ta sytuacja jest mocno obciążająca psychicznie ale na pewno jest bardzo głęboki sens tego wszystkiego co robimy ten sens ja dostrzegam przede wszystkim w tym że poprzez nasze działania nasze obostrzenia Kupujemy sobie czas kupujemy czas ale jednocześnie powoduje że dużo więcej osób może ocalić swoje życie. Wystarczy porównać naszą sytuację liczby zakażeń do osób które są zakażone w innych państwach. W Polsce jest to 200 osób na milion mieszkańców w Republice Czeskiej około 600 we Włoszech i Hiszpanii powyżej 3 tysięcy w całej Europie Zachodniej jest to znacząco większa lub większa liczba niż w Polsce. Dzięki temu też mamy czas na dostosowania w naszej służbie zdrowia na kupowanie nowego sprzętu. Ten okres był bardzo ważny ponieważ w dużym stopniu udało nam się zapanować nad niekontrolowanym i nad bardzo gwałtownymi przyrostem i takie jakie widzieliśmy we Francji w Niemczech a zwłaszcza w Hiszpanii i we Włoszech. Dlatego też dzisiaj warto popatrzeć na tę rzeczywistość jako ciągle obarczone dużą niepewnością jako taki taniec na linie jak mówią niektórzy epidemiologii ostrożne kroki do przodu ale ale właśnie do przodu po to żeby zbudować nową rzeczywistość gospodarczą i w ramach tej nowej rzeczywistości gospodarczej chcemy zaproponować pewne nowe reguły dzisiaj. W jakiś sposób taki symboliczny można też nazwać tę nową rzeczywistość. Zasadą trzech i jest to izolacja identyfikacja i informatyzacja izolacja to doskonale wiemy.

Musimy zachować ten właściwy dystans ale przede wszystkim też te maseczki które od dzisiaj w środkach komunikacji publicznej czy na zewnątrz budynków już obowiązują obowiązują po to żeby zmniejszyć prawdopodobieństwo transmisji Korona wirusa. Po drugie identyfikacja będziemy coraz lepiej starali się opanować sztukę badania kto z kim miał kontakty. Tutaj wdramy aplikację dla osób które są w kwarantannie i dzięki temu będziemy mogli coraz więcej wiedzieć o tym kto mógł potencjalnie być zakażony. Plus kilka dodatkowych kwestii o których powie minister zdrowia. I trzecie i to informatyzacja jak najwięcej pracy zdalnie tam gdzie można ją wykonywać jak najwięcej cyfrowych procesów po to żeby nie musieć wchodzić w bezpośredni kontakt pomiędzy poszczególnymi osobami. Bardzo ciężko byłoby osiągnąć jednocześnie te trzy cele czyli pełną swobodę przemieszczania się bez śledzenia bez badania ruchu osób kto z kim się kontaktował kto mógł potencjalnie zarazić kogoś innego.

To na pewno na pewno pewne obostrzenia jeszcze długo będą obowiązywały chociażby zakaz większych zgromadzeń imprez koncertów tego typu spotkań na których wiemy że w Europie Zachodniej nastąpiła bardzo gwałtowna transmisja Korona wirusa. Ale tam gdzie. Mamy wysokie prawdopodobieństwo że nie będzie to wpływało na gwałtowny przyrost zakażeń Korona wirusem tak jak w etapach które dzisiaj przedstawiamy i w łagodzeniu pewnych czynności działań funkcji gospodarczych to decydujemy się na takie właśnie zmiany. Drodzy rodacy znajdujemy się w zupełnie nowej rzeczywistości rzeczywistości która przez dłuższy czas nie będzie niestety z nami i musimy się

nauczyć w niej żyć i uczymy się w niej żyć z każdym dniem z każdym tygodniem z umiarem podchodząc do informacji które stawiają nas w lepszym świetle wobec innych bo wiemy że ten wirus ma bardzo również.

Szanowni państwo pan premier właśnie przedstawił ten plan etapy. One nie oznaczają że epidemia się kończy będziemy musieli nauczyć się żyć z epidemią. Przez najbliższy czas czy dłuższy czas nie ma takich danych które by mogły z całą pewnością powiedzieć że epidemia wygaśnie za miesiąc dwa pięć miesięcy. Jediną datą która jest pewna to jest pojawienie się szczepionki i leków kiedy ona nastąpi.

ożliwość pójścia do lasu możliwość pójścia do parku dają nam pewien oddech ale używamy ich z dużym rozsądkiem. To nie jest zachęta do. Bez ograniczonego nieograniczonego przebywania w tych przestrzeniach my cały czas powinniśmy się maksymalnie izolować tylko maksymalnie izolować się nie da w naszych domach przez rok. Dlatego potrzebujemy tego wyjścia i używają ich tych możliwości które teraz wszyscy będziemy mogli z nich skorzystać używając ich państwo rozsądnie używają ich w taki sposób żeby swoją kondycję poprawić psychiczną ale nie narazić innych na zachorowanie.

Branża hotelarskiej jak najbardziej jest jedną z ważnych branż w gospodarce i może liczyć na wsparcie zarówno w ramach tarczy antykryzysowej postojowe które oferujemy dla tych firm jak również jeśli są to firmy do dziewięciu osób zatrudniające do 9 osób to zwolnienie z ZUS a jeśli do 49 osób to zwolnienie z ZUS w 50 procentach w połowie. Jeśli jednak są to firmy które wymagają większego zastrzyku płynności dodatkowego kapitału czy gwarancji albo tej pożyczki która może być umorzona nawet do %75. Jak mówiłem niedawno prezentując tarczę finansową to również jak najbardziej branża hotelarskiej jest tą branżą która może liczyć i będzie liczyć na pewno na wsparcie państwa.

Spotkałem się wczoraj z panem prezesem Zbigniewem Bońkiem i z panią minister Dmowski. Omawialiśmy zasady możliwego powrotu do sportu zwłaszcza sportowców którzy chcą ćwiczyć muszą ćwiczyć przed olimpiadą która została o rok przełożona ale chcemy żeby jak najwięcej polskich sportowców tam odnosiło wiele sukcesów. I rozmawialiśmy również o ekstraklasie. I tutaj umówiliśmy się w taki sposób że za tydzień do dwóch tygodni od wczoraj otrzymam propozycję ze strony PZPN Polskiego Związku Piłki Nożnej i ekstraklasy. W jaki sposób mogłoby wyglądać mogłyby wyglądać rozgrywki czy powrót do rozgrywek i w jakim etapie i kiedy zobaczymy te procedury. Dyskutujemy oczywiście z ministrem zdrowia z panem ministrem Szumowski i podejmiemy wtedy decyzje dotyczące tego czy taki czy i na jakich zasadach taki powrót do rozgrywek jest możliwy.

Tarcza finansowa jest na takim etapie na jakim zakładaliśmy toczą się pozytywne rozmowy z Komisją Europejską również z instytucjami finansowymi różnymi które będą brały udział również w

w zbieraniu środków na tarczę finansową. Pierwsze środki są dostępne praktycznie w czasie kiedy będziemy jeszcze w kwietniu chcieli dystrybuowany wśród firm mikro małych i średnich to te pierwsze 75 miliardów złotych. Przypomnę że już ruszył program tarczy antykryzysowej który jest dobrym dopełnieniem czy uzupełnieniem tarczy finansowej gdyż w ramach tego programu mamy już finansowanie postojowe mamy ulgi w ZUS i na dziś na dzień dzisiejszy już prawie 900 tysięcy firm przystąpiło do różnych programów które zaoferowali raz jeszcze warto to powtórzyć bo 900 tysięcy firm to znaczy że ogromna grupa przedsiębiorców.