




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Master Thesis

Listening to Euroscepticism?

A Mixed-Methods Analysis of Opposition to European
Integration and Differentiated Integration

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1. Introduction

In May 2021, the institutions of the European Union (EU) officially opened the Conference on the Future of Europe (European Commission, 2021a, p. 4). Intended to include citizens more in discussions and debates at the European level, it was described by the European Commission (Commission) as a “a major pan-European democratic exercise” (European Commission, 2021b). Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that “Citizens' expectations are clear: they want to have their say on the future of Europe, on matters which affect their lives. Our promise today is equally clear: we will listen” (European Commission, 2021a).

However, listening and acting according to citizen’s concerns and preferences, responsive behavior, is considered an essential component of democratic polities and should consequently also be applied outside of conferences (Dahl, 1971; Schneider, 2018). Especially since the news about a pan-European conference on the future of Europe are unlikely to reach large parts of EU citizens. Over ten years after the Lisbon treaty entered into force, the EU is still perceived as technocratic and distant from most citizens’ lives (Foster et al., 2021). Citizens fear that further integration and an extension of EU competences threatens their influence on public policy (Foster et al., 2021). Populist parties all over Europe are able to exploit and expand those concerns, as illustrated by their success and especially the Brexit referendum (Foster et al., 2021).

On the other hand, many observers and academics agree that more integration is necessary for the EU to be able to tackle global interdependent crises, such as Covid-19, climate change or migration (Busse et al., 2020; Dinan et al., 2017). The question of how to include citizens in further integration steps remains unanswered, while the need to include them is rising, as referenda and Eurosceptic parties illustrate the potential impact of public opposition to integration (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). The huge differences between public support for integration across member states add an additional layer of complexity (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). Differentiated integration is being discussed as a potential way of accounting for differences in integration preferences (Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2020). It allows member states in favor of integration to integrate further in some areas, while respecting other member states’ opposition to integration there, by providing the opportunity to opt-out. Following this argument, differentiated integration could even be able to take national publics into account, thereby allowing for “democratic” control over integration (Cheneval et al., 2015).

In this thesis I will take this theoretical possibility to the test, by asking whether differentiated integration is actually used as a means to respond to national publics and their concerns towards EU integration. To this end I will try to answer the research question, *to what*

extent and how does opposition to integration influence patterns of differentiated integration across member states?

I am going to address this question in the following master thesis. In the upcoming chapter, I will provide an insight into my theoretical framework and my methodology before briefly reflecting on the question's academic as well as societal relevance.

1.1. Theoretical Framework

Based on existing literature on the dynamics of EU participatory structures and responsiveness, I develop a theoretical framework for a potential causal relationship between national public opposition in a member state and differentiated integration in chapter 2.

Existing research on responsiveness suggests the presence of responsiveness of integration to rather general in many cases EU wide support for integration (Williams & Bevan, 2019; Zhelyazkova et al., 2019). However, due to the heterogeneity of opposition to and support for integration across member states and policy areas, I argue that a more in-depth approach is needed (Meijers et al., 2019; Zhelyazkova et al., 2019). Based on the debate on the existence of a European public sphere, I argue that when examining EU responsiveness to public opinion in light of the normative legitimacy debate, it is reasonable to focus on national publics rather than a European public. This is due to the lack of a European public sphere enabling EU wide processes of public deliberation and discussion, which is indispensable for the formation of a European public opinion (Habermas, 2006). Following this argumentation and based on literature on anticipatory representation I develop a potential causal path for responsiveness between national publics and the EU level, identifying the path through the Council of the EU (Council) as the most promising one, due to the intergovernmental nature of the Council (Cheneval et al., 2015; Meijers et al., 2019; Nicolaidis, 2012). Again referring to the heterogeneity of public opinion on integration across policy areas and member states, I argue in accordance with theoretical literature, that differentiated integration is suitable for being the outcome of responsiveness to national public opinion (Cheneval et al., 2015). Through a discussion of relevant literature on EU responsiveness, public opinion and differentiated integration, I identify hypotheses and theoretical expectations, to which the methodological framework will be applied. I hypothesize that there is congruence between patterns of opposition to integration and patterns of differentiated integration across member states and expect that national public opposition has a causal effect on differentiated integration. I further expect salience, politicization, close elections, government strength and ideology, opposition party preferences, heterogeneity of integration preferences across member states and

interdependence in the relevant policy area to influence the responsiveness in terms of differentiated integration. Due to this two-fold approach of developing both hypotheses and theoretical expectations and the reference to “what” as well as “why” in the research question, a mixed methods research design is applied to answer the question. In the following I will give a short overview over this design and how it relates to the research question.

1.2. Research Question & Methodological Framework

In chapter 3, I develop a mixed method research design based on the research question, *to what extent and how does opposition to integration influence patterns of differentiated integration across member states?* Due to the conceptual and empirical complexity of this question, I evaluate it in two steps. In the first step, I will look into the congruence between patterns of opposition to integration and patterns of differentiated integration across member states in a policy area. In a second step, I will evaluate and analyze the extent and how popular opposition to integration influences differentiations. The first step is based on a quantitative analysis, the second step is based on a combination of a quantitative and a qualitative approach. The combination of the two approaches is based on the nested analysis approach (Lieberman, 2005). The advantage of this approach is that the quantitative analysis serves both as an analytical means and as a case selection technique (Lieberman, 2005). Applying this to my research, I conduct the quantitative analysis to evaluate the congruence between opposition to integration and differentiated integration and to evaluate the potential existence of a causal effect between those two. The following qualitative analysis is then focused on identifying whether there is really a causal effect of public opposition to integration on differentiated integration. This is done by applying a process-tracing analysis or a process based covariational analysis, depending on data availability.

The quantitative analysis is based on Eurobarometer data for the measurement of public opposition to integration and the EUDIFF2 dataset for the measurement of the extent of differentiated integration in secondary law (Duttle et al., 2016). I focus on differentiated integration in secondary law since secondary law represents the output of the European policymaking structures and my goal is to evaluate the responsiveness of those structures. For the qualitative analysis, I have to rely on academic and newspaper articles as well as other available data since the case selection here is not deliberate.

Both of those analyses are significantly limited by data availability. As a consequence, my analysis will only cover the policy areas of agricultural policy and market policy from 2005 to 2011, since only for those cases matching data is available.

The analysis is still valuable since my research design is not only able to give potential insights into the existence of responsiveness and with that the democratic functioning of the union, but it might also be able to allow for the identification of crucial factors or conditions for this relationship and might consequently enable an evaluation of the current participatory structures in place.

1.3. Academic Relevance

With this thesis I am contributing to the growing body of literature dealing with congruence and responsiveness of European public policy and integration. The current academic interest in this topic is exemplified by the number of articles published in recent years, especially in the *Journal of European Public Policy and European Union Politics* (De Bruycker, 2020; De Wilde & Rauh, 2019; Hobolt & Wrátil, 2020; Meijers et al., 2019; Schneider, 2018; Torcal & Christmann, 2019; Williams & Bevan, 2019; Wrátil, 2018; Zhelyazkova et al., 2019). While responsiveness has been examined in a number of cases, an analysis of differentiated integration as a potential result of responsiveness, has not yet been conducted. Furthermore, while most approaches were based on a systemic approach, looking at correlation and introducing causal considerations by relying on large-n methods like time series analysis, some authors are calling for more procedural approaches to responsiveness in the European Union (De Wilde & Rauh, 2019; Meijers et al., 2019; Zhelyazkova et al., 2019). With my research design I try to combine the systemic approach with a procedural one. Moreover, most existing papers conceptualize support for integration one-dimensional, which leaves out the heterogeneity across both member states and policy areas, thereby potentially introducing bias in their analysis. I try to avoid this by looking at integration preferences across member states and policy areas. I hope to be able to contribute to the literature on the causes of differentiated integration with this thesis as well. Recognizing the empirical reality of integration, this academic perspective on European integration has been developing into a broad and innovative field of research (Cheneval et al., 2015; Duttler et al., 2016; Leruth & Lord, 2015; Leuffen et al., 2013; Malang & Holzinger, 2020; Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2014). The procedural approach in my thesis enables profound insights into conditions for differentiated integration. Moreover, it can provide evidence for or against the notion of differentiated integration as “democratic” instrument for control over integration (Cheneval et al., 2015).

1.4. Societal and Political Relevance

While this concept of demoiocracy remains largely unknown outside of academic debates, the more general debate about the democratic legitimacy of the Union is far from over. Sometimes it is directly addressed, like during the public discussion about the Spitzenkandidaten after the appointment of Ursula von der Leyen (Mudde, 2019). In some cases, the debate is addressed indirectly in public discussions by referring to the European institutions as out of touch with citizens (Clement, 2015). This frame is and has been especially relevant for argumentations of anti-European movements as well as parties and is illustrated by the “take back control” slogan of the leave campaign (Gove, 2016). In such argumentations, the EU is usually portrayed as undemocratic and inefficient counterpart of the democratic nation state, slowly eroding the nation state’s sovereignty (Clement, 2015; Gove, 2016). The Covid-19 pandemic and the common procurement of vaccines could have changed the perception of the EU as inefficient, however, recent public opinion data suggests the opposite (Leonard & Pugierin, 2021). In most member states more people agree to the claim that integration has gone too far in 2021 than in 2020 (Leonard & Pugierin, 2021).

The issue of responsiveness also gained attention in the area of climate policy, as illustrated by a meeting of Commission Vice President Timmermans with climate activist Greta Thunberg, who stated “We know that the changes will not come from inside, from negotiations, from politicians discussing these things with lobbyists. The changes will come when there is enough public opinion, that enough people are aware and are pushing for change ” (Mathiesen & Wax, 2021). This again underscores the general perception of the EU institutions as irresponsible to the public. Those considerations and developments demonstrate the relevance of a focus on public opposition to integration and responsiveness.

At the same time alongside the Covid-19 pandemic several developments in recent years unveiled the functional need for more integration in some policy areas, but substantial progress has often been hindered by unwilling governments or unwilling citizens (Dyson & Marcussen, 2010). As a consequence, the concept of differentiated integration as a potential way towards deeper integration gained attention outside of the academic community as well (Chrisafis & Rankin, 2017). Under the title “[t]hose who want more do more”, the commission even included a scenario based on differentiation in their 2017 “White Paper on the Future of Europe” (European Commission, 2017). However, while the normative question whether differentiated integration is a good way forward remains contested, it underscores the societal relevance of this issue.

2. Theory

Does the EU work for its citizens? This question has been asked since the beginning of the European integration project. During its early years, the question was usually answered by looking at the output for the common citizen and the answers were optimistic (Bellamy, 2019; Innerarity, 2014; Ruchet, 2011; Scharpf, 1997). Integration seemed to provide peace and prosperity (Bellamy, 2019). Integration steps in areas like the single market were mostly successful in delivering on their promises of growth, without threatening the core competencies of sovereign nation states (Bellamy, 2019). In this environment integration was seen as a rather technical exercise removed from the political arena and backed by a “permissive consensus” (Bellamy, 2019; Hooghe & Marks, 2009). However, with slower growth and the integration of policies closer to the core competencies of nation states, politicization grew and according to some authors, the “permissive consensus” turned into a “constraining dissensus” (Bellamy, 2019; Hooghe & Marks, 2009).

This development led many to demand more participation when it comes to integration. Many authors proposed structural adjustments in the democratic structure of the European Union to strengthen participation and criticized “technocratic” decision making in Brussels (Fabbrini, 2017; Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Habermas, 2006). These demands were taken into account and the reforms of the Lisbon treaty were aimed at more participation for citizens. For most critics, these reforms did not go far enough, and 15 years later there is still widespread criticism of the participatory structure of the Union.

But do those participatory structures really produce the outcomes citizens prefer? Does EU policymaking respond to citizens preferences or are they getting lost in the structural complexities of the European polity? Are citizens preferences taken into account when it comes to more or less European integration? While these questions did not get much attention at the time of the reforms and early discussions about participation, more recently interest in them grew and more and more researchers are looking into responsiveness at the EU level (Beyer & Hänni, 2018; Hobolt & Wratil, 2020; Meijers et al., 2019; Schneider, 2018; Zhelyazkova et al., 2019). To answer those questions, it is important to clarify the definition of responsiveness and why it matters, which will be done in the following.

2.1. Responsiveness

For the sake of conceptual clarity it is important to define the concept of responsiveness and to specify the differences to the often synonymously used concept of congruence (Beyer & Hänni, 2018). There is a broad range of definitions for responsiveness at the European level, however

what unites them is the focus on the relationship between public opinion and the government's actions or policies. How this relationship is conceptualized differs across definitions. Some authors define responsiveness as “[t]he extent to which a government’s policies mirror the preferences of its citizens” (Dahl, 1971; Zhelyazkova et al., 2019, p. 1), thereby referring to the overlap of preferences and policies, while others focus on the (causal) effect of public opinion on policies or actions (Beyer & Hänni, 2018). I am going to follow the conceptual framework by Beyer & Hänni, I argue that the former definition constitutes congruence, while responsiveness “includes a causal element which is absent from the notion of congruence” (Beyer & Hänni, 2018, p. 16). To capture this element in my theoretical framework, I will rely on Wrátil’s definition of responsiveness as “refer[ing] to a situation, in which different levels of public opinion induce governments to implement corresponding levels of public policies” (2015, p. 4).

Such a responsive relationship between citizens and their political institutions is considered an essential component of democratic legitimacy (Schneider, 2018). Robert Dahl even conceptualizes the term “democracy” as reserved “for a political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens” (1971, p. 1). While this relevance of responsiveness for democratic legitimacy is apparent, the question why governments would act accordingly has to be addressed. What may be the rationale to act according to citizens preferences? Reviewing potential answers to this question is crucial for understanding its further implications for democratic legitimacy but it may offer insights into the conditions for such responsive relationships between citizenry and their governments as well.

Assuming rational politicians and governments one can argue that they act according to public preferences in anticipation of the next election, in which public opinion may be decisive for their electoral performance (Stimson et al., 1995). This explanation enables a conceptualization of responsiveness as “dynamic” or “anticipatory representation” (Mansbridge, 2003; Stimson et al., 1995). However, electoral performance does not only depend on public opinion. Governments also depend on information, electoral support or campaign donations, which can be provided by interest groups in exchange for influence (Klüver & Pickup, 2019). While sometimes the interests of interest groups and the general public overlap, this is not always the case and public opinion might have to compete with interest groups for influence on policies and government actions (Degner & Leuffen, 2020; Klüver & Pickup, 2019). The essential question here is how decisive public opinion really is

for the government's behavior and how this relationship plays out at the European level. In the following I will review several papers aiming at answering this question.

2.2. A Responsive Union?

After outlining what is meant by responsiveness, why it matters for EU democracy and which may be the causes of responsive behavior by governments, I will now give a brief overview over existing literature on responsiveness at the EU level.

There are various approaches to EU congruence and responsiveness, focusing on different aspects of EU policymaking. Some authors focus on congruence or responsiveness between citizens policy preferences, e.g. on a left-right axis and EU policymaking (Golder & Stramski, 2010; McDonald & Budge, 2005; Powell, 2000; Zhelyazkova et al., 2019). Others put responsiveness or congruence with pro or anti integration preferences at the center of their research (Bølstad, 2015; Toshkov, 2011). As my thesis is built around the concept of integration preferences, I am going to follow the second line of research here. The findings originating from this line of research are mixed. Dimiter Toshkov finds that the claimed relationship between EU-wide public opinion on integration and integration is present, but only until the mid-1990s (2011, p. 186). This focus on an EU-wide public opinion might overshadow the heterogeneity between member states in that regard, which will be discussed in more detail in 2.4. Jørgen Bølstad on the other hand, focuses on public opinion data from several member states (2015). His results show that there are two different trends of public opinion on integration in the "core" states, or the founders of the EEC, compared to the UK, Ireland, and Denmark, which he refers to as "periphery" states (Bølstad, 2015). Like Toshkov, Bølstad notes that "integration is significantly influenced or constrained by public opinion in both the core and the periphery" (Bølstad, 2015, p. 23). Those results strengthen the thesis that higher public support for integration leads to more integration in terms of policy output. After a decade of high levels of Euroscepticism, Brexit and during a time of criticism towards EU policies especially in the area of health, it is reasonable to ask whether the opposite holds as well: Does higher opposition to integration lead to less integration in terms of policy output?

As in the case of support for integration the question is which public should be taken into account. While some of the researchers above focus on responsiveness to European public opinion, I argue that due to the nonexistence of a properly developed European public sphere it is reasonable to focus on responsiveness to national public opinions instead (Bølstad, 2015; Zhelyazkova et al., 2019). I will briefly outline the rationale behind this argument in the following section.

2.2.1. European Publics?

There are two interconnected arguments that question the possibility of a responsive and democratic union at its conceptual core. One is based on a lack of a European public sphere (De Vreese, 2007) and the other one on a lack of a European demos (Wiegandt, 1995).

Most researchers agree that there is no such thing as a European public sphere yet. This is not problematic when looking at the degree of congruence or responsiveness from a purely empirical angle. However, as the debate on responsiveness is situated in the broader debate on the democratic legitimacy of the Union, one must consider that an examination of responsiveness or congruence always has a normative dimension as well. The lack of a “European Public Sphere” is in the opinions of many scholars in this field an obstacle on the way to a democratically legitimate Union (De Vreese, 2007; Schmidt, 2020). The argument follows the logic of “ideal discourse” and “public deliberation” as elements of legitimacy. Consequently, it is especially relevant for responsiveness since the formation of public opinion relies on those elements. However, most debates and processes of public deliberation in the Union take place within member states, due to the mostly national media landscape. There are also transnational debates on political topics, however they are usually still debated within the national institutions of the public spheres in each member state or reach only a really small percentage of EU citizens.

This argument is closely connected to the discussion on a shared European identity and a “European demos” (Scharpf, 2003; Schmidt, 2020, p. 15). This argument is illustrated by a decision of the German constitutional court, which contains the statement that there is no homogeneous “European people” in the EU on which the democratic legitimacy of a “European state” can be based (Wiegandt, 1995, p. 896). Kalypso Nicolaïdis argues that the debate on the existence of a European “demos” and a European identity is not able to envisage the EU system outside of the “nation-state model” (2004, p. 101). She argues that “[t]he EU is neither a union of democracies nor a union as democracy”, while proposing to understand the EU as “a union of states and of peoples – a ‘demoicracy’ – in the making” (Nicolaïdis, 2004, p. 101). This concept, based on multiple “demoi” instead of one demos, underscores the normative argument for focusing on multiple national public opinions instead of a European one.

This proceeding also fits the focus on opposition to integration in this thesis, as Euroscepticism depends highly on national contexts (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). Consequently, responsiveness to national public opposition to integration will be examined.

2.2.2. Potential Paths of Responsiveness

As outlined in 2.2, there is already a considerable amount of research on the existence of responsiveness to support of integration. While aiming at answering the question *if* there is responsiveness, most of this research did not look deeper into *how* public opinion influences EU public policy. With this thesis, I am trying to contribute to answering this question. To be able to answer this “how” question it is essential to look into potential paths through which public opposition to integration or public opinion in general may be able to affect integration in terms of policy output. This also requires a brief look into potential conditions or moderating factors for such responsiveness.

The most obvious and direct causal effect of public opinion on policy decisions can be observed in referenda, as citizens are in many cases able to influence them directly without being dependent on intermediaries (Wratil, 2015). Nevertheless, most authors do not include them in their conceptualizations of responsiveness, as policy change in this case does not depend on the government acting according to public opinion, at least if the referendum is binding.

In a 2019 article, Meijers et al. develop a typology of potential actors and paths of responsiveness in the EU (2019). They differentiate between the national public and an EU public (Meijers et al., 2019, p. 1727). According to their model, national publics could potentially influence EU public policy supranationally via the European Commission (“the Commission”), the Council of the EU (“the Council”) and the European Parliament and nationally via their national governments and parliaments (Meijers et al., 2019, p. 1727).

Theoretically, the Parliament has incentives for acting in accordance with their potential voters’ preferences, nevertheless its legislative competences remain limited (Meijers et al., 2019). The Commission on the other side does have important legislative competences, however their electoral accountability is low, which limits the incentives to respond to public opinion considerably (Meijers et al., 2019). Existing research points to “high levels of support for the EU lead to decreased unilateral legal act adoption in the Commission, while high levels of neutrality toward the EU are associated with increased unilateral legal act adoption” (Williams & Bevan, 2019, p. 611).

Then there is the path through the council, where the “governments’ accountability to voters at home provides the central incentives for them to respond to public opinion” (2018, p. 55). Christopher Wratil examined democratic responsiveness in the EU by focusing on the Council, thereby treating national governments as “agents of responsiveness” (2015, p. 2). His findings indicate that governments’ positions in the Council tend to be more responsive to

domestic public opinion when there are electoral incentives and vice versa if there is low “electoral pressure” (Wrátil, 2015, p. 3). He argues that this “result supports the liberal intergovernmentalist conjecture that governments are generally capable of acting as ‘agents of the public’ in the Council” (Wrátil, 2015).

Nevertheless, as outlined in 2.2 public preferences must compete with sectoral interests (Klüver & Pickup, 2019). To model the potential influence of public preferences and sectoral interests on government positions on the EU level, Degner & Leuffen consider both the anticipatory representation as well as classical liberal intergovernmentalist and political economy approaches (2020, p. 494). The findings of their analysis of the responsiveness of Germany’s position in Economic and Monetary Union negotiations support the anticipatory representation approach, as they conclude that “[w]hen in disagreement, the German government – fully aware of the public’s attention and concerns about the Eurozone Crisis – followed the public rather than business groups” (Degner & Leuffen, 2020, p. 501). This finding strengthens the microfoundations of the potential relationship between national public opinion and EU policy through the Council, however one must take into account, that there were few times when politicization and media coverage of EU economic and monetary policy decision making were as high as during the analyzed time period of 2008 to 2013. This is important since those factors are widely recognized as moderating factors for responsiveness, which makes the examined case a most likely case for responsiveness. Nevertheless, these findings are in line with other papers on the effect of public opinion on national governments’ initial policy positions in the Council (Hobolt & Wrátil, 2020, pp. 364, 362, 363)”.

While often criticized as “highly secretive” and “consensual at the voting stage”, I argue based on the findings outlined above, that this path is likely to be the most promising one, when it comes to responsiveness to national public opinions on integration (Degner & Leuffen, 2020; Hobolt & Wrátil, 2020; Wrátil, 2018). Since this potential path ranges from the public to governments electoral incentives into Council negotiations, there are several potential conditions and moderating factors that should be considered.

Salience, the relative importance actors attribute to a specific political matter (Beyers et al., 2018), may be important, since e.g., voters’ preferences on less salient issues could be less influential for their voting decision and the other way round (Beyers et al., 2018). This might lead vote-maximizing governments to focus on being responsive to public opinion in more salient issue areas (Beyers et al., 2018). Politicization is closely related to salience and might be an outcome of increased salience of an issue, but it describes a different phenomenon (De Bruycker, 2020). Politicization can be conceptualized as “the demand for, or the act of,

transporting an issue or an institution into the sphere of politics - making previously unpolitical matters political” (Zürn, 2019).

But regardless of the potential path, the main question that remains is whether and how much control European citizens really have over EU integration. The referenda in Denmark, France and the United Kingdom illustrated the potential impact of national publics, but they were rather about integration in general and often accompanied by simplified campaigns polarizing the issue (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). However, support for integration is multidimensional and usually more complex than “leave” or “remain” (Meijers et al., 2019). Moreover, while integration in one policy area is preferred by the citizens of one member state, others reject integration in this area, while preferring deeper integration in a different area (Meijers et al., 2019; Zhelyazkova et al., 2019). In light of this multidimensionality of support for integration across member states and policy areas, the traditional unitary approach to integration does not seem to be able to reflect integration preferences in their complexities (Dyson & Marcussen, 2010). More recent approaches recognize these complexities and propose to look into alternatives to these unitary models of integration. They further recognize that there always has been some sort of differentiation in integration and that it may even be helpful to enable further integration (Leuffen et al., 2013). Consequently, models of differentiated integration might be able to capture the heterogeneity of national public support or opposition to integration, enabling responsiveness to national integration preferences in a democratic way (Cheneval et al., 2015). In this thesis I will evaluate whether the empirical reality supports this proposition. To be able to do this, a closer look into the concept of differentiated integration and existing explanations is essential and will follow in the next section.

2.3. Differentiated Integration

There are many different concepts describing alternative models of integration like “Multi-Speed”, “Variable Geometry” or “À la Carte” (Leruth & Lord, 2015; Stubb, 1996, p. 285). The framework of “differentiated integration” is able to encompass these numerous concepts through its broad definition (Leruth & Lord, 2015). Holzinger and Schimmelfennig define differentiated integration as “policies, in which the territorial extension of European Union (EU) membership and EU rule validity are incongruent” (Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012, p. 292). Within this broad definition, it is useful to distinguish different forms of differentiated integration (Leuffen et al., 2013). Leuffen et al. introduce a typology based on “vertical” and “horizontal” integration or differentiation, as well as “internal” and “external” horizontal differentiation (2013, pp. 1, 17). Vertical refers to the “level of centralization” of integration or

differentiation. Horizontal integration or differentiation is used to describe the “territorial extension”, which can be internal, i.e. between members of the EU, and external, i.e. including non-EU states (Leuffen et al., 2013, pp. 1, 17).

Besides its analytical function, capturing incongruence in EU rule validity and territorial extension, some authors argue that it is a normative concept and differentiated integration leads to a “Europe in bits and pieces” or even the disintegration of the union (Andersen & Sitter, 2006; Curtin, 1993; Schmidt, 2020; Weiler, 1999). This normative rejection of differentiation regained popularity after the Brexit referendum, as some politicians, like former Belgian prime minister Guy Verhofstadt called for the end of opt-ins and opt-outs (2020). Nevertheless, most authors approaching differentiated integration from a normative perspective rather emphasize potential opportunities by arguing that it may be capable of overcoming the integration deadlock by providing a more flexible framework of integration (Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2020). Intergovernmentalist proponents of this mode of integration view differentiations and opt-outs as expression of national sovereignty (Adler-Nissen, 2015; Moravcsik & Nicolaïdis, 1999; Risse, 2003). Even the Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe mentions a form of differentiated integration as one of five scenarios for future cooperation and argues that in this scenario “[t]he unity of the EU at 27 is preserved while further cooperation is made possible for those who want” (European Commission, 2017, p. 20).

As I will be following a similar argument, by examining democratic legitimacy in terms of responsiveness to national public opposition in the form of differentiated integration, a crucial question relates to how the European publics evaluate differentiated integration. While differentiated integration might be a way of accounting for differences in public support, citizens might prefer unitary integration. Unsurprisingly, support for differentiated integration also varies considerably across member states, however support for EU membership is in most cases higher than support for differentiated integration (Leuffen et al., 2020). This does not preclude the argument of differentiated integration and opt outs as signs of national sovereignty, but it is important to keep this in mind.

Other authors claim that “opt-outs may actually reinforce the integration process”, arguing that “the everyday management of opt-outs signals a retreat from national sovereignty rather than an expression of it” (Adler-Nissen, 2015). This argument is based on the loss of political influence in Brussels, due to opt-outs (2015).

As demonstrated in this section, differentiated integration is at least theoretically suitable for enabling more integration and addressing the objections of opponents of deeper integration at the same time (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 54). Following this line of reasoning,

differentiated integration may also be a way to ensure democratic or "demoicratic" legitimacy of the integration process, as the EU still consists of multiple national publics with different preferences regarding integration (Cheneval et al., 2015). For the validation of this claim though, one must examine whether public opposition contributes to differentiated integration. For such an examination it is important to investigate existing explanations for differentiated integration, to figure out to what extent public opposition to integration may influence the extent of differentiated integration. This will be done in the following section.

2.3.1. Explanations for Differentiated integration

To identify potential pathways through which public opinion on integration might influence differentiated integration it is essential to understand potential causes of differentiated integration.

Schimmelfennig et al. argue that explanations of differential integration should consider two variables: Interdependence and Politicization, thus including both rationalist and constructivist approaches to integration (2015, p. 770). Following their argument, interdependence in a policy area acts as the "main driver of integration" by creating a demand for integration. Following their argumentation, polarization on the other hand tends to be a barrier to meeting this demand. The rationale behind this is based on the assumption that the general public plays a more important role in politicized policy areas. Assuming that the public tends to be less supportive of integration than political and economic elites, politicization acts as a barrier to integration (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, p. 771). Based on these considerations, Schimmelfennig et al. develop the expectation that a high level of interdependence should lead to integration when the level of polarization is low. Polarization should not matter when the level of interdependence is low because in this case there is no demand for integration in the first place (2015, p. 772). A combination of high levels of interdependence and polarization is assumed to result in either integration failure, low levels of integration, or differentiated integration (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, p. 772). Horizontal differentiation is thus most likely to result from a high degree of interdependence and "asymmetric politicization between member states" (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, p. 765).

2.4. Responsive Differentiation?

As outlined in 2, the democratic legitimacy of the EU is still subject to debate. While the governance structure's origins were rather output-focused and the Union seems to deliver "government for the people" in many aspects, the success of efforts to include more

“government by the people” is less clear. It is therefore relevant to examine whether those structures live up to their promises of more government by the people. Examinations of responsiveness at the EU level has mixed results as well, but there seems to be a certain level of responsiveness under certain conditions at least in some policy areas. However, to what extent public opinion is able to compete with other interests for influence on public policy is likely to depend on factors like issue salience, politicization and the strength of competing interest groups. Furthermore, it is important to take into account, that due to the lack of a European public sphere or a European identity there is no consistent single European public opinion, but rather a multitude of national ones. This applies to public support and opposition to European integration as well.

Differentiated integration may be a way of taking into account the differences in support for integration across member states, thereby allowing for democratic control over integration (Cheneval et al., 2015). Such an argument however is only valid if differentiated integration is actually responsive to the “demoi” (Cheneval et al., 2015). Since this relationship between national public opinion and differentiated integration has not yet been subject to systematic analysis, this master thesis aims to fill this gap.

While there are several forms of differentiated integration, I will focus on “negative” differentiated integration, or opt-outs, since my thesis is aimed at evaluating the responsiveness to public opposition to integration in terms of differentiated integration which is most likely to take the form of opt-outs. Moreover, opt-outs fit into the argument of differentiated integration as a way to preserve national sovereignty.

2.5. Research Question, Hypotheses and Expectations

Based on the theoretical argumentation above, the research question of this thesis is the following: *to what extent and how does opposition to integration influence patterns of differentiated integration across member states?*

I intend to answer this question in two steps. First, I am going to examine whether and to what extent the patterns of opposition to integration match the extent of differentiation of member states in a policy area. Because answering this question will uncover the static degree of congruence between citizen’s opposition and opt-outs, it does not allow for causal inference. In order to approach the ideal of causal inference and to answer my research question, I will subsequently evaluate and analyze to what extent and how popular opposition to integration influences differentiation.

Before laying out the empirical strategy, that I am going to apply to uncover this relationship, it is essential to take a closer look at what the literature implies for my research goal and research question to develop hypotheses and empirical expectations.

Since I will apply a mixed-methods research design in my paper, I will develop both classical deductive hypotheses, as well as less deductive theoretical expectations. I am going to use deductive hypotheses to answer the question whether and to what extent the patterns of opposition to integration match the extent of differentiation of member states in a policy area, since I will try to answer it with a quantitative framework. To answer the question, to what extent and how popular opposition to integration influences differentiation in the form of opt-outs, I will develop theoretical expectations that leave a certain degree of flexibility, thereby allowing for the identification of inductive insights, since this part will be based on a qualitative framework and has received less attention from researchers. A more extensive justification and discussion of my choice of methods will follow in chapter 3.

2.5.1 Hypotheses

As discussed in 2.2, the literature on responsiveness of European institutions remains partly inconclusive, however most of the papers uncover evidence for an influence of public opinion. While some authors find evidence for a positive effect of public support on EU legislative production and integration (Toshkov, 2011), others suggest a negative relationship between public opinion and legislative activity at the European level (Williams & Bevan, 2019). Existing research examining the responsiveness of governments in the Council find national governments to be responsive to national public opinion under certain conditions, on which I will elaborate later in this section and in the following (Hobolt & Wrátil, 2020; Wrátil, 2015). Based on those considerations, I expect a positive relationship between patterns of differentiation and patterns of opposition to integration.

H1: The higher public opposition to integration in a policy area in a member state, the higher the share of differentiated legal acts in this policy area for this member state.

Given the emphasis on the importance of politicization and issue salience for the responsiveness of public policy in the literature and their crucial role in the potential paths of responsiveness, I expect salience and politicization to be of importance for the expected relationship in *H1* (De Bruycker, 2020; Hobolt & Wrátil, 2020). At the same time, literature on differentiated integration highlights politicization as a condition for differentiated integration

(Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). Considering the intuitive moderating effect of issue low salience and politicization, I expect responsiveness to be lower in less salient policy areas.

H2: The higher the salience of a policy area in a member state, the stronger the relationship between opposition to integration and differentiation.

2.5.2. Theoretical Expectations

In the following I am going to identify theoretical expectations to answer the second part of my research question trying to evaluate to what extent and how popular opposition to integration influences differentiation in the form of opt-outs. In contrast to the more deductive approach of the first part of my research question, however, the density of literature here is very low, which is why I have chosen a more inductive approach. Yet, this approach is not purely explorative, since I also formulate theoretical expectations and subsequently review them. Nevertheless, I will formulate them very openly and look for further factors in the analysis to enable inductive insights.

The first expectation is aimed at evaluating the extent of the influence of popular opposition on differentiation. Considering the few existing papers trying to identify a causal effect of public opinion by using different versions of time series analyses I *expect a causal effect of opposition to integration on the extent of differentiated integration* (Bølstad, 2015; Toshkov, 2011). However, to enable an examination of how opposition influences opt-outs, one must take on a procedural perspective (Zhelyazkova et al., 2019).

For the sake of such a procedural, causal perspective, it is indispensable to establish a potential causal chain from public opinion. To identify those, I am going to divide the process into four partly overlapping phases. Those phases are inspired by the liberal intergovernmentalist model of European integration, as they broadly follow the path of “national preference formation”, “configuration of state preferences” and “interstate negotiation” (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 482). In these phases I am going to identify potential factors that might act as moderators or conditions with regard to responsiveness. The identification of potential factors is important, since the role those factors play is of interest to answer the question of how public opposition affects differentiation and they are useful to identify reasons for the potential nonexistence of the hypothesized causal relationship.

The first phase I identified is preference *formation*. As highlighted in 2.2.1, public opinion is highly heterogenous both between member states and inside a member state. Nevertheless, focusing on the public opinion at the nation state level is the most reasonable

choice, as it fits my research goal, which is based on opposition to a transfer of competences from the nation state to the European level. Moreover, member states tend to have their own public spheres in which the formation of a public opinion, or public discourses can take place (De Vreese, 2007). The geographical limits of those public spheres may not always correspond directly with national borders, as they sometimes rather delineate linguistic areas, however most European nation states do have certain central newspapers or tv channels, contributing to the formation of a “national” public opinion (De Vreese, 2007). For the existence of responsiveness to opposition to integration, there obviously has to be a certain share of people opposed to integration. Relevant actors at this stage include the national public, national and international media, interest groups, national parties and the national government. I conceptualize this phase at the beginning of the path not because it is assumed that the formed public opinion will be stable throughout the process, but rather as the causal path, asked for in the research question starts with public opinion. For analytical reasons it is therefore essential to “isolate” public opinion at one point in time, to evaluate its effect.

After this formation process, there must be some sort of transmission of public opinion to the relevant actors. This can be done by a research institute, think tank or media measuring or picking up public opinion and publishing it. I call this phase the *transmission* phase. Following the insights provided by the literature discussed in 2.2.2, I *expect salience and politicization to play an important role at this point in time*, as media coverage and politicization both influence it and depend on it. Consequently, as discussed in 2.2.3, I also expect national media to play an important role in this phase.

The next and particularly crucial phase is the pressure phase. As discussed in 2.2, public opinion has to compete with sectoral interests for influence on the national government’s stance in the Council. In this phase, based on the considerations in 2.2, taking the anticipatory representation into account, I expect *elections in the close future* to be moderating the examined relationship, as especially in those phases there is a large dependence of the government on large parts of the public (Degner & Leuffen, 2020; Klüver & Pickup, 2019). This may be a result of the national governments intention to be perceived as defenders of domestic interests on the European stage, especially in the case of strong domestic anti-integration preferences. Outside of election periods, governments might be more dependent on sectoral interest groups, due to lobbying and party donations. As laid out in 2.2.3 the strength of this dependence, however, depends again to a large degree on the *party or parties in government*, as some parties are traditionally closer to economic interest groups. I therefore expect the governing party to play a role in this phase as well. This does not mean, however, that the interests of the economic

interest groups cannot overlap with public opinion, but it is important to take that into account. As a last step in this phase, the government's dependence on public support depends on the *opposition parties' stance towards integration as well as their strength*, as described in 2.2.3. Followingly, I expect those factors to be relevant as well. While the described factors are mostly factors potentially limiting the relationship, there is still reason to expect responsive governments in the Council, as Degner and Leuffen demonstrated (2020).

I call the fourth and final phase the negotiation phase. This phase covers the period after the government assumed the integration-opposing position of the public and tries to reach an outcome in Council negotiations that is in accordance with this position. This phase depends to a large degree upon the position of the remaining other governments in the Council. This is because in the case of a common rejection of legislation there is no differentiation. Consequently, and in accordance with existing literature on causes for differentiated integration I *expect heterogeneity in public and governmental preferences* across member states to play a role in the expected relationship between public opposition to integration and opt-outs (Leuffen et al., 2013). Considering interdependence as a condition for differentiated integration, as outlined in 2.4.1, it is reasonable to expect the extent of *interdependence* to be of importance for the negotiation phase (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). Furthermore, the *negotiating power of the national government* in the Council may play a role. At this stage the national government might also use national public opinion to strengthen their intergovernmental negotiation position, similar to Schelling's "paradox of weakness", by arguing that it will not be possible to "sell" a certain negotiation outcome to the citizens "at home" (Schelling, 1980).

	Formation	Transmission	Pressure	Negotiation
Actors	National public National media Interest groups National parties National government	Media Research institutes	National public Media Interest groups National parties National government	National government Other governments EU institutions
Factors	Extent of opposition to integration	Saliency Politicization	Close elections Government strength Government ideology Opposition party integration preferences	Heterogenous preferences Interdependence Government Power

Table 1: Relevant actors and factors in the responsiveness phases.

Table 1 lists the relevant actors and factors that are expected to play a role in a potential relationship between public opposition to integration and differentiated integration. While this seems to be a rather static model of responsiveness to national opposition to integration, it does not preclude overlapping phases or changes in public preferences throughout the process. Those processes may be interrelated and the model itself is not able to account for these dynamic interdependencies. For the purpose of this thesis however it is appropriate, as it is merely meant to allow for the theoretical identification of relevant actors and mechanisms without leading to a static framework of analysis.

In the following a mixed-methods research design aimed at answering my research question and at analyzing the hypotheses and expectations will be presented.

3. Research Design

In the following I am going to outline my methodological framework, by giving an overview over the general mixed methods approach, justifying my case selection, describing the selected cases, outlining my operationalization strategy and presenting both the quantitative as well as the qualitative part of my framework.

With the following research design, I intend to provide answers to my research question, *to what extent and how does support for integration influence patterns of differentiated integration across member states*. As described in chapter 2, I am going to approach this question in two steps: First, with an examination of whether and to what extent the patterns of

opposition to integration match the extent of differentiation of member states in a policy area. Second, with an evaluation and an analysis of the extent and how popular opposition to integration influences differentiation.

The former will be based on a quantitative research design aimed at identifying correlation between the patterns of opposition to integration and the extent of differentiation of member states in a policy area. This is appropriate, since this part of the research question aims at uncovering the extent to which these patterns match, which can in this situation be interpreted as “congruence between citizens’ viewpoints and actual policy outputs” (Beyer & Hänni, 2018, p. 17). Moreover, this proceeding allows for the identification of relevant cases for the second part of my methodological framework. I am going to add a step between the first and the second part of my analysis: introducing a lag into the analysis and controlling for covariates. This allows for public opposition to have an effect on the share of differentiated integration. To isolate this effect and reduce potential biases, the controls are introduced in the analysis. With this step I am trying to take the data used for the examination of congruence in the first part of the analysis and get one step closer to the causal aspect of responsiveness, which will be evaluated in the second step.

The second part, the evaluation and analysis of the extent and of how popular opposition to integration influences differentiation will be approached with a qualitative research design. As described above, the proceeding in the quantitative part only allows for the identification of correlation, which is why in the second part, two relevant cases are going to be selected and an in-depth analysis will be applied, to ascertain whether there is a causal relation behind this correlation. The cases will be selected based on the degree to which they are in line with the responsiveness-hypotheses. Only selecting cases that are in line with my expectation significantly limits the external validity of my analysis, but as the qualitative part of my approach is aimed at uncovering whether there really is an effect of public opinion on differentiation, selecting “most-likely” cases is the right choice for my research goal (Gerring, 2017). This more inductive part of my research design is necessary since no causality-based research on this relationship seems to exist so far. After selecting cases, I will then try to trace the mechanism which could have led from opposition to integration to an opt-out. This will be done by applying a process-tracing analysis, based on the examination of relevant newspaper and academic articles and official data. Due to the low data availability on the specific mechanisms in the cases, it is not possible to fulfil the criteria for an in-depth process tracing and the analysis itself will resemble a covariational analysis from a procedural perspective (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).

Consequently, the first part of my analysis is aimed at identifying congruence between integration preferences and differentiation, while the second part is intended to uncover the causal aspect of responsiveness (Beyer & Hänni, 2018). This proceeding is largely guided by the “nested analysis approach”, developed by Evan S. Lieberman (2005).

This “nested analysis approach” provides a coherent, unified approach to mixed method research, by giving clear guidelines on how to combine quantitative and qualitative research designs appropriately (Lieberman, 2005, p. 436). The basic idea behind the approach is to start with a preliminary large-n analysis. In the case of robust and satisfactory results, a model-testing small-N analysis follows, while if the results do not fulfil the criteria, a model-building small-N analysis is applied. While I rely on this framework for guidance, I will not follow it strictly and try to stay open for inductive insights since the field is not yet explored widely. The usage of theoretical expectations, while remaining open for inductive insights in the qualitative part of my research design is meant to allow for both a more model-testing oriented analysis and one that is closer to model-building, depending on the large-N results.

I opted for this research design, because it allows me to both approach responsiveness from a systemic, broad point of view, which is necessary to estimate the overall responsiveness to opposition towards European integration and have an in-depth look at how this relationship might have emerged. There have been several publications addressing the issue of responsiveness from a systemic point of view and there have also been studies, taking causality into account, by relying on statistical means, like time-series analyses. The qualitative part of this thesis differs from those existing publications, as it takes a close look at only two cases to evaluate the existence of a responsive relation. The combination of systematic and qualitative research in this area is unique.

To allow for an in-depth analysis within the limited space of a thesis, I will only focus on a limited number of policy areas over a limited period of time, which will be selected based on theoretical considerations and data availability. In the following sections, I am going to outline and justify the selection of two policy areas for the analysis, operationalize the relevant concepts, describe the envisioned approach of the quantitative as well as the qualitative part of my research design, before critically discussing the validity and the limitations of my research design.

3.1. Case Selection: Policy Areas and Timeframe

In this section, I am going to describe how I selected the policy areas and the timeframe, justify the selection and give a short introduction into the policy areas and the period of time. From a

theoretical point of view, it would be beneficial to select policy areas in order to control for some potential background variables (Gerring, 2017). As described in Chapter 2, politicization and the salience of the respective policy areas are expected to play a major role in moderating the effect and may even be necessary conditions for responsive policymaking. Consequently, two policy areas with different levels of politicization should be selected. However, this is not possible, due to the lack of differentiated integration in secondary law in highly politicized policy areas, like social policy or security and defence policy. Matching data for both public opposition to integration in a policy area and differentiation can only be found for the years 2005 to 2011 in the areas of agriculture policy and market policy. While this may reduce the validity and introduce bias into my analysis, it will still be valuable since there is also reason to assume that there is responsiveness in these less politicized policy areas as well. As I focus on differentiated integration in secondary law, it might be better to focus on these policy fields, as some authors argue that “conflicts in areas of high salience and politicization such as the integration of core state powers advance treaty-based differentiation, whereas heterogeneity in low-salience policy fields is often dealt with through legislative differentiation” (Duttelle et al., 2016: 407). Furthermore, I am going to control for potential biases and take this limitation into account when assessing my results and their validity in chapter 5.

After laying out the reasons for the selection of the time frame and the policy areas, it is important to give a short overview over relevant characteristics of these, since they may influence the analysis or change the interpretation of my findings.

3.1.1. European Integration in the Late 00s and Early 10s

The chosen period from 2005 to 2011 was a crucial period for the EU, characterized by several developments like the economic crisis, the Lisbon treaty and enlargement rounds. In the following I am going to briefly describe the most important developments and their relevance to my research question. This description will be structured along my main theoretical concepts: responsiveness, public opinion and (differentiated) integration.

The most important development for responsiveness was the Lisbon treaty, entering into force on December 1, 2019 (Devuyst et al., 2012). Alongside several legal developments, the treaty strengthened the European Parliament, inter alia by significantly extending the co-decision procedure, as well as the European Council, whose structures were formalized (Devuyst et al., 2012). Furthermore, the treaty was aimed at facilitating decision-making in the Council, by extending qualified majority voting (QMV) to more areas and by changing the QMV threshold, based on population figures (Devuyst et al., 2012). This new format changed

the power to block legislation of some countries significantly. This might have changed the conditions for responsiveness to national public opposition and for differentiated integration.

The sovereign debt and Euro crises between 2010 and 2013 as well as the European reaction were especially relevant for public opinion on integration (Hobolt & Wratil, 2015). The crises significantly increased politicization and salience of EU integration (Hobolt & Wratil, 2015). Due to the different circumstances and effects on member states the effects on support for integration were heterogenous, while the consequences of the EU's attempts to solve issues were apparent as never before (Hobolt & Wratil, 2015).

Shortly before the relevant period in 2004, the EU was enlarged by 10 new member states, the most ambitious enlargement round (Epstein & Jacoby, 2014). This development is especially relevant for differentiated integration and integration in general, since the EU did not only become more heterogenous, from this point on it has also been harder to get individual states' positions through at the EU level (Epstein & Jacoby, 2014).

3.1.2. Agriculture

The common agricultural policy (CAP) has been one of the core policy areas for common European action since the early days of European integration. Based on considerations on European food security, it was the first policy area of the European Economic Community (EEC) and had been the policy area with the highest budget in the EU for a long time (Snyder, 2012). While its significance in terms of budget share declined from 70 percent in 1985 to 37 percent in 2018, it is still considered to be one of the most important fields in EU policymaking (European Commission, 2021c).

Considering my research question, it is essential to highlight that agricultural policy integration is less salient and less politicized than integration in most other policy areas (Snyder, 2012). Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that especially since the Eastern enlargement in 2004 the agricultural systems of the member states differ considerably with regard to structure and demand for policy intervention (Snyder, 2012). This leads to diverging views on the structural and regulatory basis of the CAP (Snyder, 2012). Examples for differentiated integration in agricultural policy include exceptions for some Eastern member states in Directive 1999/74/EC (1999) on minimum standards for the protection of laying hens or an exception for Germany in Regulation 670/2003/EC (2003) laying down specific measures concerning the market in ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin (Malang & Holzinger, 2020).

3.1.3. Market Policy

Based on the “four freedoms”, the free movement of goods, capital, services as well as people, the European Single Market is often described as one of the most if not the most successful EU policy (Egan, 2012). Its main objectives include removing barriers to trade within the EU, providing growth and ensuring global competitiveness, while managing the effects of globalization (Egan, 2012). In recent years its role in providing standards for market regulation grew significantly (Egan, 2012). While the rationales behind market integration are debated, most scholars agree that interdependence and spillover effects contributed significantly to its extension (Egan, 2012).

As agricultural policy, market policy integration is less politicized and salient than integration in other areas (Egan, 2012). Another similarity between the policy fields is the heterogeneity, when it comes to regulatory needs and demands, resulting from the heterogeneity of markets and industries among member states.

3.2. Operationalization and Measurement

In this section I will operationalize the key concepts, developed in chapter 2. The central concept of my thesis is the idea of responsiveness of integration. Conceptualized as “refer[ing] to a situation, in which different levels of public opinion induce governments to implement corresponding levels of public policies”, I am going to operationalize the degree of responsiveness as the degree to which different levels of public opinion influence integration.

To be able to evaluate this, it is essential to operationalize and measure public opposition to integration as the independent variable, differentiated integration in the form of opt-outs as dependent variable and several control variables, based on the theoretical framework developed in chapter 2. This will be done on the following pages.

3.2.1. Independent Variable: Public Opposition to Integration

While responsiveness refers to the degree to which public opinion influences integration, my analysis will only be focussed on public opposition to integration. To capture public opposition to the integration of specific policy areas for member states I will use Eurobarometer data from 2005 to 2010, as this is the only time frame for which there is data on both variables. The Eurobarometer contains the question “For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?”, which can be answered with “(NATIONALITY) government”, “Jointly within the EU” or “Don’t know” (European Commission, 2004: 17). Since my aim is to measure

opposition to integration in a policy area, I am going to use the *share of respondents, who stated that they prefer decisions in that area to be made by their national government.*

3.2.2. Dependent Variable: Differentiated Integration

Following the typology of differentiated integration introduced above, my analysis will only include internal horizontal differentiation (Leuffen et al., 2013). Horizontal differentiation is the only relevant type for my framework since it covers differentiation across countries and my theoretical framework is based on the differences in national public integration preferences. Because my theoretical framework is based on EU member states, only internal horizontal differentiation is relevant at this point. However, for reasons of clarity I will refer to this type as differentiation from now on. To avoid “instrumental differentiation”, which is the result of enlargements, I will pay attention to the number of differentiations in the years after the accession of new member states (Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2014). As outlined in chapter 2, differentiated integration may also entail enhanced cooperation, and followingly “deeper” integration of a subset of member states, however since I am focussing on the effect of public opposition to integration and the number of cases of enhanced cooperation remains very limited, it is reasonable to conceptualize differentiations as opt-outs from legislation in this context. Furthermore, I argue that this operationalization fits the purpose of evaluating responsiveness to integration preferences, since integration in research on responsiveness is typically measured in terms of policy output (Toshkov, 2011; Bølstad, 2015). Consequently, when measuring not the responsiveness to support for integration, but to opposition to integration across member states it is coherent to rely on non-participation in union legislation, opt-outs.

For the measurement of differentiations, I will use a variable, containing the “number of differentiated articles per member state in a given legislative act” from the EUDIFF2 dataset, by Duttler et al., which “contains all legislative acts in EU secondary law from 1958 – 2012” (2016, p. 410). The intended analysis requires a reshaping of the dataset to turn the unit of analysis from *legislative act per year of its applicability* (Duttler et al., 2016) into *legislative acts per year per member state*. To be able to measure the *extent of secondary law differentiation* I am going to calculate the *share of legislative acts containing one or more differentiated articles per year of its applicability of all legislative acts the member state participated in per year of its applicability* for every member state in subsets of policy areas. Since a similar proceeding has to my knowledge not yet been applied in other papers, I am not able to compare my approach of measuring the extent of differentiated secondary law integration.

3.2.3. Control Variables: Saliency, Elections, Politicization

While the first part of the quantitative analysis is aimed at identifying correlation to evaluate congruence between public opposition to integration and differentiated integration in the form of opt-outs, the second part is planned to move from congruence to responsiveness. Following the definition of responsiveness in chapter 2 requires an introduction of causality into the analysis. It is therefore important to control for potential covariates. Relevant covariates from a theoretical perspective were identified beforehand and will be operationalized in the following.

To account for the electoral rationale as a potential moderator of the strength of responsiveness, a dummy variable will be included in the analysis, indicating whether a *national election* took place in the respective year. This data will be collected online.

The saliency of integration in the policy area in the respective country will be measured by using the inverse of the *share of respondents, who stated that they “don’t know”*, since a low share of respondents with no preference indicates a higher level of saliency.

Moreover, I will try to account for the potential role of politicization, by including a dummy variable as well. This variable differentiates between years before 2009 and the years 2009, 2010 and 2011. Due to a lack of more precise measurements, I developed this proceeding based on the argument, that the Euro crisis in 2009 politicized integration in almost every policy area (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). Since this measurement is not able to account for variation across cases it is likely to be influenced by general time-specific factors that affect both politicization and the overall extent of differentiated integration across cases (Morgan & Winship, 2015). Consequently, it is important to take potential biases resulting from that measurement into account when examining the results.

3.3. Quantitative Analysis

The relevant variables from the datasets are then transferred into a new dataset, including the *share of respondents, who stated that they prefer decisions in that area to be made by their national government (opposition to integration)*, the *inverse share of respondents who do not know their preference in this regard (politicization)*, the *share of legislative acts containing one or more differentiated articles (extent of secondary law differentiation)*, the *share of treaty articles acts containing differentiations (extent of primary law differentiation)* for every member state and every year of analysis per policy area.

The identification of congruence will be enabled by regression analyses and corresponding regression plots. I will therefore regress the average extent of differentiation on

the average value of public opposition to integration in the policy area. As a second step, moving from congruence to responsiveness, I will introduce a lag of 1 year into the dependent variable containing the extent of differentiation, thereby looking for a causal effect of the public opposition variable. The lag of one year is justified, as about 75 % of proposed legislative acts are adopted within one year, as demonstrated in *Figure 3* (Schneider, 2018). One can observe here that most legislation is adopted in fewer than 365 days, but opinion data must be published or transmitted first and may take some time to be used or to influence decisions, which is why I will include a model with a lag of two years as well.




Figure 1: Median Time to Adoption by Year. Source: Schneider, 2018; EULO

As this second part of the analysis is trying to get closer to identifying a causal effect, it is important to control for covariates. This will be done by including control variables, introduced in 3.2.3. I will interact *opposition to integration* and *salience*, *opposition to integration* and *politicization*, as well as *opposition to integration* and *national election* to be able to identify their potential role as mediators of the hypothesized effect. This proceeding allows for the identification of relevant country-years for further analysis.

3.4. Qualitative Analysis

Cases in which congruence between public opinion on integration and the extent of differentiation is high and in which the second step indicates the potential presence of a causal effect will be selected and examined more closely with a process tracing analysis to uncover whether the congruence is in fact the result of responsiveness. This will be achieved by

examining the selected cases, identifying the differentiations, and applying a process tracing analysis. Since the analysis is partly based on expectations drawn from a theoretical framework, while at the same time aiming at inductive insights, a combination of a “theory-testing process tracing” and a “theory-building process tracing” approach would be the ideal solution (Beach & Pedersen, 2019). The causal mechanism derived from the expectations is intended to be operationalized by “developing propositions about potential empirical fingerprints”, following the theory-testing approach (Beach & Pedersen, 2019, p. 9). However, since the amount of reliable evidence for the existence of a causal process in the specific cases is very limited, the analysis is closer to a covariational analysis (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). Nevertheless, since one of my research goals is to offer a procedural approach to responsiveness, the analysis is intended to be as close as possible to a process tracing analysis in phases with sufficient evidence, while resembling a covariational analysis in phases where evidence is rarer (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).

In both cases I will try to assess whether there is support for the presence of the expected causal mechanism, based on empirical evidence (Beach & Pedersen, 2019; Blatter & Haverland, 2012). I will collect this evidence by examining data as well as newspaper and academic articles to trace the potential causal effect of public opinion on differentiation. The search for empirical data will not be structured along methodological lines but be guided by findings and data availability throughout the process. Ideally a process tracing analysis based on interviews would be applied, however this would exceed the scope of this thesis. Moreover, it is unclear to what extent one would be able to identify and interview individuals with knowledge on the exact case selected, since the case selection is not deliberate.

The proceeding will be guided by an examination of the phases of the potential relationship, developed in chapter 2. The empirical expectations about the roles of different factors during those phases will then be evaluated according to the empirical evidence found in the analysis. While this more deductive, theory-testing approach is targeted at identifying the presence of the expected mechanism, I am going to look for potential inductive insights and alternative mechanisms and causes of the differentiation as well, which is closer to a theory-building approach. Furthermore, I am trying to take potential equifinality and multicausality into account, when evaluating my findings.

4. Analysis

In the following, I am going to describe my analysis and my findings, to be able to evaluate to what extent and how opposition to integration influences patterns of differentiated integration

across member states. As outlined in 3, this will be done by firstly examining whether and to what extent the patterns of opposition to integration match the extent of differentiation of member states in a policy area, aiming at the identification of congruence between integration preferences and differentiated integration. To evaluate whether this congruence is a result of a causal effect of public opinion on differentiations or to identify reasons for the nonexistence of this relationship, I will secondly evaluate and analyze to what extent and how popular opposition to integration influences differentiation in the form of opt-outs.

4.1. Quantitative Analysis

This section is intended to examine whether and to what extent the patterns of opposition to integration match the extent of differentiation of member states in a policy area. This will be done by examining scatter plots of national averages, to evaluate the following hypothesis: *The higher public opposition to integration in a policy area in a member state, the higher the share of differentiated legislative acts in this policy area for this member.*

After examining congruence in this regard, I will, as described in 3, try to get closer to the concept of responsiveness, by introducing causality into the equation. For this sake, I am going to introduce a lag of one and two years and apply a linear regression analysis on my data. Moreover, I am going to focus on country-years instead of national averages. This analysis will also contribute to the evaluation of the first hypothesis, however, allows for first statements on potential causality as well. This is due to the assumption, that public opposition takes a certain time to influence EU policymaking and followingly differentiated integration, as described in 3. However, the number of observations and data availability does not allow for an appropriate identification of a causal effect of public opposition on differentiated integration, which is why the qualitative part of my research design will follow. This second part is at least theoretically not only able to identify a potential causal effect but allows for the identification of the path of influence, potential conditions for this path and potential obstacles as well. An overview over the analyses and additional statistical means applied can be found in Appendix A.

In order to properly evaluate my data for the analysis and the findings, it is essential to first describe the data on both the independent variable, *opposition to integration*, measured as the share of people opposing integration in a policy area and the dependent variable, *the extent of differentiated integration*, measured as the share of legislative acts containing at least one differentiation. This will be done in the following.

4.1.1. Descriptive Statistics

In the following I will describe the data used for my analysis over time and across member states, to give an overview of the data and provide information on its distribution, which might lead to biases.

Average opposition to integration or the average share of people opposing integration is relatively stable over time both in market and agricultural policy, as displayed in figure 2. The difference between opposition to integration in agriculture policy and in market policy however is notable. While average opposition in agricultural policy ranges between 42.1 percent in 2005 and 47.4 percent in 2006, average opposition to integration in market policy ranges between 32.2 percent in 2006 and 35.9 percent in 2008. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify common patterns of increasing and decreasing opposition to integration. This is likely due to the correlation of both variables with opposition to integration in general.




Figure 2. Average share of people opposing integration in a policy area.

The extent of differentiated integration, displayed in figure 3 and measured as the average share of legislative acts containing at least one differentiation remains low over time, although with notable variation between the years. In the area of agriculture there is no differentiation in the years 2010 and 2011, which may complicate the analysis. The extent of differentiated integration increases continuously from 0 in 2005 to 0.03 in 2010, before decreasing again afterwards.




Figure 3. Average share of legislative acts containing at least one differentiation.

As I argued in chapter 2, relying on EU-wide averages of public opposition to integration means that the heterogeneity of this opposition across member states cannot be accurately represented. This is exemplified by figure 4, displaying the average share of people opposed to integration in the policy fields per member state. While opposition to integration is greater in agricultural policy than in market policy in all member states, it varies considerably across member states. Opposition to agriculture integration is highest in Finland, with 80.5 percent opposing integration and lowest in Cyprus, with only 25.5 percent of opposition. The member state with the highest average of opposition to integration in market policy is also Finland, with 48.7 percent, while Cyprus again has the lowest average with only 23 percent of people opposed to integration in that policy area.




Figure 4. Average share of people opposed to integration in a policy field.

When looking at differentiated integration per member state in figure 5, considerable differences between member states and policy areas can be observed as well. Differentiated integration in agricultural policy is distributed completely differently across member states. In this area, Slovakia has the highest average share of legislative acts containing at least one differentiation over the examined period from 2005 to 2011, with about 1.75 percent. With 0.15 percent of all legislative acts containing differentiations, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Sweden have the lowest share in the area of agriculture policy. With roughly 2.92 percent, the highest average share of legislative acts containing differentiations in market policy is found in Denmark. Slovakia on the other hand is with about 0.1 percent the member state with the lowest share in that regard.




Figure 5: Average share of legislative acts containing at least one differentiation in a policy field.

While these descriptive statistics already present a preliminary picture of the distribution of both the average of public opposition to integration and the average extent of differentiated integration over time and across the two policy areas, the aim of this first analytical step is the identification of congruence. This will be done in the following, by examining scatter plots of these averages.

4.1.2. Congruence between Public Opposition to Integration and Differentiated Integration

The following section is intended to evaluate whether and to what extent the patterns of opposition to integration match the extent of differentiation of member states in a policy area. This will be done by examining scatter plots of the average public opposition to integration

from 2005 to 2011 and the average share of legislative acts containing at least one differentiation per member state, first in agriculture policy and second in market policy. As the quantitative part of the analysis does not only aim at identifying correlations but also for case selection, I will assign letters to the member states, according to table 2, to make them visible in the scatter plots.

Member State	Letter	Member State	Letter	Member State	Letter
Austria	a	Greece	j	Poland	s
Belgium	b	Hungary	k	Portugal	t
Cyprus	c	Ireland	l	Slovakia	u
Czech Republic	d	Italy	m	Slovenia	v
Denmark	e	Latvia	n	Spain	w
Estonia	f	Lithuania	o	Sweden	x
Finland	g	Luxembourg	p	United Kingdom	y
France	h	Malta	q		
Germany	i	Netherlands	r		

Table 2: Letters for the identification of member states

A. Agriculture

Hypothesis H1, *the higher public opposition to integration in a policy area in a member state, the higher the share of differentiated legislative acts in this policy area for this member state* is not supported by figure 6, displaying average opposition to integration and the average share of legislative acts containing at least one differentiation for every member state in the area of agriculture policy. The regression line indicates a slight positive correlation between public opposition and the extent of differentiated integration, corresponding to the direction of the hypothesis, however this correlation is too small to confirm the hypothesis. On the contrary, the data in the graph points to no relationship between the two variables. The member states with high values for opposition to integration can be found mostly in the mid-range of the extent of differentiated integration, like e.g., Finland. The states with high shares of legislative acts containing differentiations are also not among the ones with the highest opposition to integration, exemplified by Slovakia’s position. Cyprus represents a deviant case with regard to the hypothesis, as it is the member state with the lowest opposition to integration, while having one of the highest shares of differentiated legislative acts. However, there are some cases that fit the direction of the hypothesis at the lower end of the spectrum of the dependent variable. Belgium and Denmark have almost no differentiated legislative acts, while also having low opposition to integration.




Figure 6: Congruence differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in agriculture policy.

B. Market

The picture in market policy is similar. The data in figure 7 does not support the hypothesis either. Again, the regression line indicates a slight positive correlation, but looking at the distribution of the plot, the statement that *the higher public opposition to integration in a policy area in a member state, the higher the share of differentiated legislative acts in this policy area for this member state* is not supported. Nevertheless, one can observe that all member states with values over 40 percent for opposition to integration in market policy, have average shares of differentiated legislative acts higher than 0.5 percent. The United Kingdom for example has the third highest share of people opposed to integration and with 2.45 percent, the second highest share of legislative acts containing at least one differentiation. Looking at the other end of the spectrum, Cyprus, with the lowest value for opposition to integration, is also among the member states with the lowest share of differentiated legislative acts. While those cases rather support the hypothesis, Denmark represents the deviant case in this regard. While having the highest value for differentiated integration in market policy, it is in the lower spectrum of opposition to integration. Finland and the Czech Republic on the other hand are the member states with the highest opposition to market policy integration, being in the lower mid-range when it comes to differentiated integration.




Figure 7: Congruence differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in market policy.

C. Overview

After examining the data for agricultural and market policy with regard to the question whether and to what extent the patterns of opposition to integration match the extent of differentiation of member states in a policy area, it is possible to state that the patterns of opposition do not match the extent of differentiated integration in a member state. There are several cases in which the extent of differentiation matches the amount of public opposition to integration, but there are also cases in which the opposite applies. This first analysis followingly points towards a rejection of the hypothesis, that *the higher public opposition to integration in a policy area in a member state, the higher the share of differentiated legislative acts in this policy area for this member state*. Nevertheless, in this analysis I examined national averages over time, which might veil time-specific variation on both variables. To take those into account I will focus on country-years as my unit of analysis in the next section. This analysis will also contribute to the evaluation of congruence between integration preferences and differentiated integration. Additionally, I will try to get closer to the concept of responsiveness, as conceptualized in 2.

4.1.3. From Congruence to Responsiveness

As laid down in chapter 3, in the following section I will examine country-year data on public opposition to integration and differentiated integration, to be able to evaluate congruence in more detail and get closer to responsiveness, allowing for a causal effect of public opposition

on differentiated integration. This will be done by examining scatter plots and regression analyses.

I will first examine data on public opposition to integration and the share of differentiated legislative acts per member state and year to answer the question, whether and to what extent the patterns of opposition to integration match the extent of differentiation of member states in a policy area. This will be done by evaluating the hypothesis, that *the higher public opposition to integration in a policy area in a member state, the higher the share of differentiated legislative acts in this policy area for this member state.*

In a second step I am then trying to get closer to the more procedural concept of responsiveness, to gain potential first insights into the question, to what extent and how popular opposition to integration influences differentiation in the form of opt-outs. In this step I will try to introduce causality in the analysis, by lagging the dependent variable, differentiated integration, by one and by two years and by introducing potential moderating factors like close elections and salience into the models. This allows for statements about *H2: The higher the salience of a policy area in a member state, the stronger the relationship between opposition to integration and differentiation* and about the expected *effect of public opposition on differentiated integration.*

A. Congruence - Agriculture

As outlined above, I will in the following again evaluate congruence in this case based on country-year data. As displayed in figure 9, one can see that the data points on the share of differentiated legislative acts are grouped around certain values. Those similar levels of differentiated integration could be due to common differentiations in some legislative acts in some years. Moreover, there are several country-years without any differentiated legislative acts. However, this does not pose a problem for the evaluation of congruence between citizen preferences and differentiated integration. As can be seen in the slope of the regression line, the data in this graph does not point to an overlap of public opposition and differentiated integration in a given year for member states. When looking at the different value groups of country-years on the share of differentiated legislative acts, this becomes even more clear, since all groups seem to be more or less equally distributed across the spectrum of opposition to integration. Followingly, one can reject the H1 in the case of agriculture policy.




Figure 8: Congruence differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in agriculture policy – country-years

B. Congruence – Market

The examination of congruence between public opposition to integration and the share of differentiated legislative acts in market policy yields similar results as the analysis on agricultural policy. Here as well, the data is grouped around certain values on the share of differentiated legislative acts and there are several country-years without differentiations. Moreover, the regression line also does not point to correlation between the two variables. Nevertheless, when looking at the groups, one can observe that the country-years with highest share of people opposed to integration are rather in the lower spectrum when it comes to the share of differentiated legislative acts. This however points in the opposite direction than H1. Concluding, one can reject H1 in the area of market policy, based on the data in figure 9.




Figure 9: Congruence differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in market policy – country-years

C. Responsiveness – Agriculture

In the following I am going to analyze whether there might be an influence of national public opposition to integration on member states' share of differentiated legislative acts and which role salience plays in this regard. My hypothesis, developed in 2, is the following: *The higher the salience of a policy area in a member state, the stronger the relationship between opposition to integration and differentiation. Moreover, I expect a causal effect of opposition to integration on the extent of differentiated integration.* The evaluation of the H2 and the expectation will be done by examining scatter plots and regression analyses with a one and a two-year lag in the dependent variable. This proceeding accounts for the time public opposition takes to influence differentiated integration, as explained in 3. First, I am going to examine regression outputs, before again examining scatter plots of the lagged data.

Figures 10 and 11 display the regression output of regressing the share of legislative acts containing at least one differentiation on the share of people opposed to agricultural policy integration, the salience of agriculture policy and the interaction of public opposition and salience. In figure 10, the share of differentiated legislative acts is lagged by one year, in figure 11 by two. This means that the potential effect of public opposition of e.g., 2005 on differentiated integration in 2006 and 2007 will be measured, respectively. The results in the two figures, however, do not point in that direction. In both outputs, the relevant coefficients of public opposition are small and not significant. The same applies to the coefficients of salience and the interaction term.

	Dependent variable:					Dependent variable:			
	Share of legislative acts containing at least 1 differentiation					Share of legislative acts containing at least 1 differentiation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Public opposition	0.002 (0.01)	-0.26 (0.50)	0.003 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.19 (0.51)	-0.003 (0.01)	0.0003 (0.01)	
Salience		-0.11 (0.22)				0.14 (0.22)			
Public Opposition X Salience		0.003 (0.01)				-0.002 (0.01)			
Politicization			-0.94 (0.89)				-1.07 (1.21)		
Public Opposition X Politicization			-0.003 (0.02)				0.003 (0.03)		
Elections				-0.96 (1.04)				0.54 (1.15)	
Public Opinion X Elections				0.02 (0.02)				-0.01 (0.02)	
Constant	0.61 (0.45)	11.76 (21.30)	0.94* (0.52)	0.84 (0.53)	0.81 (0.49)	-12.45 (21.71)	1.07** (0.53)	0.68 (0.57)	
Observations	150	150	150	150	125	125	125	125	
R ²	0.0004	0.002	0.13	0.01	0.0001	0.01	0.07	0.01	
Adjusted R ²	-0.01	-0.02	0.12	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.05	-0.02	
Residual Std. Error	1.40 (df = 148)	1.41 (df = 146)	1.31 (df = 146)	1.41 (df = 146)	1.38 (df = 123)	1.38 (df = 121)	1.34 (df = 121)	1.39 (df = 121)	
F Statistic	0.06 (df = 1; 148)	0.11 (df = 3; 146)	7.57*** (df = 3; 146)	0.44 (df = 3; 146)	0.02 (df = 1; 123)	0.46 (df = 3; 121)	3.25** (df = 3; 121)	0.21 (df = 3; 121)	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 10: Responsiveness differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in agriculture policy (lag of 1 year) - left

Figure 11: Responsiveness differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in agriculture policy (lag of 2 years) – right

A look at the scatter plots in figures 12 and 13 points to similar conclusions. There are several groups of data points on the dependent variable, that are relatively equally spread out on the axis displaying public opposition. As in figure 11, the country-years with the highest opposition to integration all have no differentiations at all, or a low share of differentiated legislative acts in both plots. Those results are contrary to the expected effect of public opposition on differentiated integration. As there does not seem to be a relationship between the two variables, it is not possible to evaluate the impact of salience, elections or politicization at this point. It is important to note that I cannot account for member state specific factors, other than the salience of the issue area, elections and politicization.





Figure 12: Responsiveness differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in agriculture policy (lag of 1 year) - left

Figure 13: Responsiveness differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in agriculture policy (lag of 2 years) - right

D. Responsiveness – Market

In market policy a similar picture appears. However, while in the model with a two-year lag displayed in figure 15 the relevant coefficients are not significant, the coefficient of public opposition, salience and the interaction between those two variables in the other model in figure 14 are significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Moreover, the size of the coefficient of public opposition is considerable and indicates a 1.3 percent increase of the share of legislative acts containing differentiations if public opposition to integration increases by one percent.

This result supports the expected existence of responsiveness in terms of differentiated integration. The coefficient of the interaction effect in figure 14 is significant but very small, which indicates that there is no moderating effect of salience on this relationship, as hypothesized in *H2*. Since the results in the models containing elections and politicization do not point towards a responsive relationship, it is not possible to make a statement on the potential moderating effect of elections or politicization. The coefficient of politicization is very high and significant, but this may be due to general time-specific factors as outlined in 3.2.3.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Share of legislative acts containing at least 1 differentiation					Share of legislative acts containing at least 1 differentiation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Public opposition	-0.01 (0.03)	1.30** (0.65)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.001 (0.04)	0.96 (0.76)	0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	
Salience		0.51** (0.25)				0.34 (0.29)			
Public Opposition X Salience		-0.01** (0.01)				-0.01 (0.01)			
Politicization			5.16** (2.13)				8.43*** (3.14)		
Public Opposition X Politicization			-0.12* (0.06)				-0.25*** (0.09)		
Elections				2.62 (2.33)				0.60 (2.95)	
Public Opinion X Elections				-0.07 (0.07)				-0.02 (0.08)	
Constant	1.76* (1.04)	-45.98** (23.15)	-0.06 (1.26)	1.03 (1.23)	1.65 (1.24)	-30.28 (26.75)	0.13 (1.35)	1.51 (1.44)	
Observations	150	150	150	150	125	125	125	125	
R ²	0.001	0.03	0.06	0.01	0.0000	0.01	0.06	0.0004	
Adjusted R ²	-0.01	0.01	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	-0.02	
Residual Std. Error	2.57 (df= 148)	2.55 (df= 146)	2.50 (df= 146)	2.57 (df= 146)	2.74 (df= 123)	2.74 (df= 121)	2.67 (df= 121)	2.76 (df= 121)	
F Statistic	0.10 (df= 1; 148)	1.46 (df= 3; 146)	3.24** (df= 3; 146)	0.46 (df= 3; 146)	0.001 (df= 1; 123)	0.55 (df= 3; 121)	2.58* (df= 3; 121)	0.02 (df= 3; 121)	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 14: Responsiveness differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in market policy (lag of 1 year) - left

Figure 15: Responsiveness differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in market policy (lag of 2 years) – right

The scatter plots do not present evidence for a relationship between the variables. Accordingly, it is not possible to confirm the expectation, however, there is some support for the expected responsiveness in the model with a one-year lag. With regard to the research question, one can state that there does not seem to be a general effect of public opposition to integration on the extent of differentiated integration, but in some cases, there is evidence for such an effect. Moreover, contrary to the plots in agriculture policy there are some country-years in line with the expectation, that more public opposition in a year in a member state correlates with a higher

share of differentiated legislative acts. Those cases are relevant since the lack of a general effect does not preclude the existence of responsiveness to opposition in the form of differentiated integration in individual cases. A closer look at those cases might provide insights into whether this type of responsiveness exists in individual cases and might allow for the identification of the reasons for its existence or nonexistence. Followingly a closer look at those cases, as outlined in 3, could prove to be insightful. I will elaborate on the selection process for those cases in the following section.




Figure 16: Responsiveness differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in market policy (lag of 1 year) - left




Figure 17: Responsiveness differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in market policy (lag of 2 years) - right

4.1.4. Case Selection

As outlined in 4.1.3.D., I will in the following describe the process of identifying relevant cases for the in-depth qualitative analysis. I will select cases in line with the hypothesis, to be able to identify a potential responsive relationship, identify obstacles that prevented public opinion from affecting differentiated integration or identify conditions, that would have to be present for such a relationship. Due to the non-satisfactory results of my quantitative analysis, the following qualitative analysis will be guided by a model-building approach, based on a deliberate selection of cases, according to the proceeding foreseen in the nested-analysis approach (Lieberman, 2005). Since extensive analysis of all relevant cases is not possible, due to the limited space of this thesis, I am going to focus on two cases. Those cases are selected based on their fit to the expected relationship between public opposition and differentiated integration. I chose this proceeding since it allows me to focus on cases, in which such a relationship is most likely. The advantage of those most-likely cases is, that if there is evidence for the expected relationship, the qualitative approach might expose conditions or moderating factors. If there is no such evidence or evidence for the non-existence of the relationship, it allows me to disregard the theoretical expectation, that there is responsiveness to public

opposition to integration in the form of differentiated integration in the examined period of time, with a relatively high degree of certainty.

From a theoretical point of view, it is desirable to examine a case from agriculture policy and a case from market policy, since it allows me to retain the scope of my analysis. Followingly, I select the cases which are most in line with the expectation of responsiveness from both policy areas, as illustrated in figures 18 and 19. Those cases are in agriculture policy Slovakia with public opposition in 2006 and differentiated integration in 2007 as well as the United Kingdom with public opposition in 2009 and differentiated integration in 2010, in market policy. The selection of the one-year lag period is due to the better fit of those two cases with this lag to the hypothesis.




Figure 18: Case selection agriculture policy (lag: one year) - left




Figure 19: Case selection market policy (lag: one year) - right

4.2. Qualitative Analysis

In the following I am going to try to evaluate the theoretical expectations, developed in chapter 2. The main goal is to evaluate the first expectation, that there is a causal effect of opposition to integration on the extent of differentiated integration. Since the findings of the quantitative analysis indicate that there is no effect of public opposition to integration on differentiated integration on a broad scale, the analysis is focused on evaluating whether such an effect might be present in individual cases, what the conditions for such an effect could be and how different factors influence a potential effect.

Following the methodology outlined in chapter 3, I will apply a process tracing analysis, based on newspaper articles, relevant academic and non-academic literature as well as official data on the cases of Slovakia between 2006 and 2007 as well as the UK between 2009 and 2010 for that purpose. Due to a lack of concrete information on the actual processes in these two specific cases, however, it is not possible to fulfil the requirements of an in-depth process tracing. As a consequence of this unfortunate circumstance, the analysis will resemble a

qualitative covariational analysis, in which the existence or non-existence of the theoretical expectations will be assessed (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). While a process tracing analysis would have been a more appropriate choice to evaluate whether the expected responsive relationship was present in the cases, the choice of most-likely cases still allows for in-depth insights into this potential relationship. Furthermore, the procedural approach of a process tracing analysis will still be applied, by evaluating the cases along the potential causal path of responsiveness developed in chapter 2.

The search for information was based predominantly on the archives of newspapers focussed on EU policy and politics, like EURACTIV and European Voice, but also on archives of national newspapers, and archives of containing various newspapers, like the British Newspaper Archive. As stated before, the use of interviews would be ideal for the uncovering of a causal effect but would exceed the scope of this thesis. Moreover, as the case selection is not deliberate, there could be problems with finding interview partners, who are able to share insights on differentiated integration in agricultural policy in Slovakia or in market policy in the UK in the chosen time periods.

The analysis is structured as follows. First, a short introduction into the cases will be presented. In a second step the presence of relevant factors and evidence for a causal path will be analysed, structured along the four phases of the potential path between public opposition to integration and differentiated integration, developed above. The theoretical expectations are based on the influencing factors of salience, politicization, elections, government strength, government ideology and opposition party integration preferences. Then, after every analysis there will be a brief overview over the findings across the phases. A more extensive overview and a discussion of the findings will follow in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

4.1.1. Agriculture Policy – Slovakia 2006 - 2007

In this section I am going to analyse the relationship between public opposition to integration in agricultural policy in 2006 and the extent of differentiated integration in this policy area in 2007 in Slovakia. First, I am going to present a general assessment of the case and an overview over the relevant values on the two variables, before then presenting the evidence for the existence or non-existence of a causal effect along the phases identified in chapter 2.

The case of Slovakia displays 58 percent opposition to integration in 2006 and its share of legislative acts containing differentiations was at 6.96 percent in 2007. Both of those values are significantly higher than the average on those variables, which is why the case was chosen based on its fit with the responsiveness hypothesis. Slovakia in 2006 and 2007 consequently

represents a most-likely case for the existence of EU responsiveness to national public opposition to integration in terms of differentiated integration. Before analysing evidence for a causal path of this potential responsive relationship, one has to take into account the characteristics of Slovakia with regards to (differentiated) integration. One must be aware of the very close accession of Slovakia to the EU in 2004, which might have led to a high number of instrumental differentiations, which do not fit into the theoretical framework, since they are meant to facilitate accession and can consequently not be regarded as an expression of responsiveness to public opinion. However, in the years before 2007 Slovakia did not have any legislative acts containing differentiations, which speaks against this explanation for the high share in this year.

A. Formation

Following my argumentation in chapter 2, there must be a certain share of people opposed to integration to trigger responsiveness to this opposition. In 2006 the share of people in Slovakia opposing integration in agricultural policy was, according to Eurobarometer data, at 58 percent. Interestingly, this share represents a significant increase from only 45 percent in the year before. While it was not possible to find further information on the national public debates and discussions surrounding agriculture policy integration or integration in general, I argue based on the data presented, that it is possible to consider the condition of having a certain share of people opposed to integration fulfilled.

B. Transmission

The next phase is the transition phase, during which public opposition to integration is transmitted to the government by a variety of potential actors. It was not possible to find media reports on public opposition to agriculture integration in Slovakia in the relevant time. Nevertheless, there are two factors indicating that opposition to integration might have been known to the Slovak government at that time. One factor is the increase of public opposition to integration in that field by 13 percentage points in one year. The other one is based on the salience of agricultural policy integration in Slovakia during that year, which was with 98 percent particularly high compared to the average across member states in that year, following my measurement outlined in 3. It is not possible to consider the condition of transmission of public opposition fulfilled based on those considerations.

C. Pressure

For the government to take on the position of the public, by opposing integration in agricultural policy, I assume there must be some sort of pressure, based on the considerations in 2.6.2. The government may have had this position before, but that would then not be responsiveness as I defined it in chapter 2. I expect close elections, government strength, government ideology and opposition party integration preferences to be relevant here. In the case of Slovakia, there were elections in 2006 and a subsequent government change (Haughton & Rybář, 2008). This indicates two relatively weak governments in power during the relevant period (Haughton & Rybář, 2008). The first government, in power until June 4, 2006, was a coalition government of four conservative and liberal parties (Haughton & Rybář, 2008). After June 4, a centre-left, populist coalition assumed office, made up by social democrats, right-wing Eurosceptics and liberal Eurosceptics. Regarding the stance on integration, there were no big openly anti-integration opposition parties before the elections, while there were two Eurosceptic parties in the government after (Haughton & Rybář, 2008).

Based on these developments it is reasonable to assume that both governments were highly dependent on public opinion at that time, which would, based on the theoretical considerations in chapter 2, incentivize responsive behaviour by the government. Considering the high salience and high opposition to agriculture integration responsive behaviour to opposition to agriculture policy integration would be expected. Nevertheless, due to the lack of empirical data on the pressure by national actors, I cannot verify whether this pressure was actually present. Moreover, the EU played only a minor role in the election campaigns of the parties and the debates surrounding the elections, which also speaks against the presence of politicization of integration in Slovakia at that time (Haughton & Rybář, 2008).

D. Negotiation

The last step between public opposition to integration and differentiated integration is situated at the EU level. The Slovakian government would have to react to the pressure and assume an anti integration stance in Council negotiations. Since there were two governments in power during the relevant period, it is important to differentiate here. Information on government positions towards the EU at that time is rare and there is no information on the governments' positions on integration in agricultural policy, which is why I have to rely on more general information. The Brussels representation of the first government voiced some concerns towards EU market regulation when arguing, “[w]e only departed from the paternalistic system of the previous regime a few years ago, and we don't want to get back to some of its elements by too

strict and bureaucratic measures initiated at the EU level” in 2005 (Kubosova, 2005). The second government even partly consisted of nationalist, Eurosceptic parties (Haughton & Rybář, 2008). It is not possible, however, to evaluate whether they opposed integration in agriculture.

According to my theoretical framework differentiated integration can result from a governments opposition to integration in the Council only if there is interdependence in this policy area, since this creates demand for integration in the first place (Leuffen et al., 2013). And without this demand the anti-integration stance would rather result in no integration at all. Agricultural policy is a highly interdependent policy area since the agricultural sector is reliant on export conditions and other market factors, which create demand for integration. Additionally, I expect heterogenous preferences to be a condition for differentiated integration as an outcome. Since there is no data on governmental preferences, I am only able to evaluate whether there is heterogeneity among national publics. This is the case for agriculture policy, with member states like Cyprus where only 27 percent of people opposed agriculture integration in 2006 and states like Finland where opposition to integration was at 81 percent that year.

Based on those considerations, I am not able to support or reject the expectation that the effect of public opposition had an influence in this phase. Nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective the factors I considered to be conditions for such an effect in this phase were present.

A. Overview

In the case of Slovakia in 2006 and 2007, most conditions and factors expected to contribute positively to a responsive relationship between public opposition to integration and differentiated integration were present: From a significant increase of public opposition to agriculture integration to 58 percent in the relevant year to high salience of agriculture policy integration in the transmission phase, elections, weak governments and a rejection of some regulatory interventions by the government as well as high interdependence and heterogenous preferences among member states. Nevertheless, these considerations are based on only a few sources. Moreover, I am not able to make statements on whether causality between the phases was present, due to a lack of evidence. Consequently, I am not able to evaluate the expectation that there is *a causal effect of opposition to integration on the extent of differentiated integration*, conclusively for Slovakia in 2006 and 2007.

4.1.2. Market Policy – United Kingdom 2009

In the following I am going to apply my methodological framework developed in chapter 3, to the case of opposition to market policy integration in the UK in 2009 and differentiated integration in 2010. As in 4.1.1, I will start with a general overview over the relevant variables and the case, before going through the potential phases of responsiveness, trying to identify evidence for a causal effect.

In 2009 the share of people opposed to market policy integration in the UK was at 48 percent. In the following year, 8.3 percent of differentiated legislative acts contained at least one differentiation. Whether those high values are causally related to each other will be evaluated in the following.

A. Formation

The first condition that must be present for responsiveness to public opposition to integration in market policy in terms of differentiated market policy integration, is the presence of a certain extent of opposition to integration in that policy area. In the case of the UK in 2009, the share of people opposed to market policy integration was at 48 percent, which is less than 50 percent, but higher than the 41 percent of people supporting integration. It is also the highest value across member states that year. While the availability of data was better than in the first case, it was not possible to find coverage of the anti-integration stance of the UK public in 2009, or debates surrounding this issue.

On the grounds of the majority opposing market policy integration in the UK in 2009, I argue that this condition is fulfilled. However, this majority must be transmitted to policymakers, the media, or other actors to have an effect. The presence of such a transmission will be evaluated in the next section.

B. Transmission

In chapter 2 salience and politicization were identified as potential factors enabling or moderating responsiveness to public opposition to integration. The salience of market policy integration in 2009, measured according to the proceeding outlined in the research design chapter, was at 89 percent, which is a relatively low value, also across member states that year. Whether market policy integration was politicized in the UK that year is difficult to determine, but as salience is often a condition for politicization, it is reasonable to assume that politicization in that area was also relatively low.

C. Pressure

In the pressure phase close elections, government strength and ideology as well as opposition party integration preferences are expected to play a role for responsive behaviour to opposition to market policy integration. As in the case of Slovakia in 2006, there were elections in the UK in 2010, which resulted in a government change as well. Gordon Brown's Labour government was replaced by a conservative-liberal government under David Cameron in May 2010 (Quinn et al., 2011). While the first government was a one-party government, the second one was a coalition government. Nevertheless, due to the election loss of Labour in 2010, both governments can be considered rather weak (Carey & Geddes, 2010).

There was also considerable pressure by think tanks like Open Europe, which criticized the Commission's information campaigns as biased and referred to them as propaganda for integration ("EU communications derided as 'biased propaganda'," 2009). This sentiment towards integration was also present in the broader media landscape ("Why is Britain Eurosceptic?," 2009). Especially the press outlets with a high circulation imposed a "rigidly Eurosceptic line on their journalists" (Grant, 2008, p. 3). The pressure resulting from that is described by Charles Grant in a 2008 essay, in which he argues that, "the press does have a big influence on the way ministers present policy" (2008, p. 4). He further argues that the ministers "regularly brief the tabloids that they are fighting nefarious schemes dreamed up by the Commission or other countries" (2008, p. 4).

Based on the gathered information and the accounts of Grant, it is possible to state that public opposition to integration was picked up and used for pressuring the government to adopt an anti-integration stance. This, however, only refers to public opposition to integration in general without a clear reference to market policy integration. Moreover, Grant also states that "such stories bear very little relationship to what the minister concerned has in fact said in the Council of Ministers" (2008, p. 4), thereby already referring to the negotiation phase, discussed in the following section.

D. Negotiation

As already indicated above, the pressure put on governments to act according to public opposition to integration does not necessarily mean that the government does so in Council meetings, which are not public. However, these comments were based on the Labour government's behaviour. The Brown government acted in continuity with UK's traditional stance towards the EU, without voicing intentions to join the Eurozone or Schengen and with a preference for intergovernmental EU policymaking (Carey & Geddes, 2010). The stance of

Cameron's government on the EU, on the other side, was more pronounced (Carey & Geddes, 2010). Before being elected the leader of the Conservative party, he had announced that under his leadership the party would leave the European People's Party (EPP), due to their pro-integration position ("UK Conservatives in the EPP-ED: Will they stay or go?," 2009).

An anti-European stance of the government in Council negotiations does not lead to differentiated integration per se. Based on the literature discussed in chapter 2, I identified interdependence in the policy area and the heterogeneity of public preferences as theoretical conditions for that. Market policy is of course a prime example of an interdependent policy area and one of the main drivers of integration by creating demand for that (Leuffen et al., 2013). As I do not have access to data on government preferences on market policy integration at that time, I have to rely on public opinion data again. Based on the Eurobarometer data used in the quantitative analysis I argue that heterogeneity of market policy integration preferences is present in 2009. Public opposition to integration that year ranged from 24 percent in Germany to 48 percent in the UK.

E. Overview

As in the case of Slovakia, the expectation that there is *a causal effect of opposition to integration on the extent of differentiated integration*, cannot be conclusively evaluated in the case of the UK in 2009 and 2010. Nevertheless, also in this case several of the conditions and contributing factors expected to influence responsiveness in terms of differentiated market policy integration were present. A relatively high share of people opposed to market policy integration was present. However, whether this opposition was transmitted to policy makers remains unclear, also in light of the low values for salience and politicization. The evidence for pressure on the government to assume an anti-integration stance is strong, but it is not possible to evaluate whether this resulted from high levels of public opposition, from the views of editors, journalists, or media owners or from different factors. Whether the government then assumed those preferences in Council negotiations is again difficult to prove, due to a lack of data on corresponding meetings.

5. Conclusion

In this thesis I tried to evaluate the responsiveness of differentiated integration to national public opposition to integration by answering the following question:

To what extent and how does opposition to integration influence patterns of differentiated integration across member states?

This evaluation was based on two parts, an examination whether and to what extent the patterns of opposition to integration match the extent of differentiation of member states in a policy area as well as an evaluation of to what extent and how popular opposition to integration influences differentiation.

In this concluding chapter I am going to present my findings, discuss them in light of theoretical and societal considerations, outline shortcomings, challenges as well as limitations of my approach, before reflecting on the implications of this thesis for future research and policy.

5.1. Findings

In the following I am going to present my findings alongside the hypotheses and theoretical expectations I developed to answer the research question in chapter 2. As indicated in chapter 4, I am not able to evaluate them conclusively, due to data availability issues.

I developed hypothesis H1, *the higher public opposition to integration in a policy area in a member state, the higher the share of differentiated legal acts in this policy area for this member state*, based on existing research indicating evidence for responsiveness of EU integration to public support for integration (Bølstad, 2015; Meijers et al., 2019; Schneider, 2018; Wratil, 2015). The quantitative analysis, applied to this hypothesis indicated in both agricultural policy and market policy a light positive correlation between average public opposition to integration and the average extent of differentiated integration. This correlation would support the H1, however, the correlation was very small and alongside some cases in line with the hypothesis there were a lot of deviant cases as well. Based on those consideration, it is possible to reject H1 both in agriculture and in market policy.

Hypothesis H2, *the higher the salience of a policy area in a member state, the stronger the relationship between opposition to integration and differentiation*, is based on several papers and theoretical considerations on a positive moderating effect of salience on responsiveness (Hobolt & Wratil, 2020). This hypothesis is rejected based on analysis 4.1.3.C.

and D. In both agricultural and market policy, the models containing a one-year as well as the models containing a two-year lag for the independent variable did not support the expected moderating effect of salience on responsiveness in terms of differentiated integration to public opposition to integration. Nevertheless, it is important, to mention at this point that this may be due to the nonexistence of responsiveness in the models. Moreover, both chosen policy areas are among the less salient policy areas when it comes to European integration.

Based on existing research accounting for causality, I developed the expectation that there is *a causal effect of opposition to integration on the extent of differentiated integration*. This expectation was analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. The quantitative analysis did uncover the expected causal effect. On the contrary, there was no evidence for this effect in both one and two-year lag models in agriculture policy and only limited evidence in market policy. However, in both cases there were some country-year cases, that were in line with the expectation: Slovakia in 2006 and 2007, as well as the UK in 2009 and 2010. Those cases were chosen, following the rationale that due to their status as those most-likely cases for responsiveness, a qualitative analysis might uncover the actual existence of a causal effect. Additionally, potential insights into conditions and factors preventing or enabling responsiveness were expected from a more in-depth analysis of these cases. Since fulfilling the requirements of an in-depth causal process tracing was not possible due to a lack of data on the chosen cases, an analysis closer to a covariational analysis from a process perspective was applied (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). The qualitative analysis of the expectation that there is *a causal effect of opposition to integration on the extent of differentiated integration* is difficult to evaluate based on my findings. While in both agriculture as well as market policy I am not able to evaluate the expectation conclusively, in both cases many of the expected conditions and contributing factors were present.

Due to logical considerations, I expected the presence of *a certain extent of opposition to integration* to be a condition for an effect of public opposition. This condition was fulfilled in both cases. However, this is primarily attributable to my case selection technique, in which I chose cases with high values for opposition to integration.

Salience and *politicization* were expected to be contributing factors to a responsive relationship (De Bruycker, 2020; Hobolt & Wratil, 2020). While the presence of politicization was difficult to determine, agricultural policy integration was very high in the case of Slovakia in 2006. In the case of the UK in 2009 salience of market policy integration was rather low. According to those considerations I argue that, in the case of Slovakia a transmission of public

opposition was likely, due to the significant increase within one year. There is less evidence however, for such a transmission in the case of the UK.

I further expected *close elections*, *government strength* as well as *ideology* and *opposition party preferences* to influence responsiveness. Those considerations were based on the literature on the electoral rationale for responsiveness and anticipatory representation (Mansbridge, 2003; Stimson et al., 1995). Interestingly in both cases there were elections in one of the two examined years, followed by a change of government. Based on considerations outlined in chapter 4, I considered all four governments in power in the two cases to be rather weak. Furthermore, in both cases the government changed to a rather integration unfriendly government. While in the case of Slovakia I could not find evidence for anti-integration pressure from the opposition, in the case of the UK there is reliable evidence for such pressure. This pressure can also be found in the UK's press landscape at that time, as outlined in chapter 4. Based on those findings, I argue that in both cases there is some evidence for pressure on the government. In the case of Slovakia this evidence is not as clear as in the case of the UK, but the presence of close elections in combination with the significant increase in public opposition to integration mentioned above, could have led to an anti-integration pressure on the governments in power. The most interesting takeaway, however, is the presence of both close elections and government changes in both most-likely cases for a responsive relationship between opposition to integration and differentiated integration.

In its last phase, I expected *heterogenous preferences* and *interdependence* to be conditions for the potential responsive relationship. These expectations are based on research on explanations for differentiated integration (Leuffen et al., 2013; Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). I consider those conditions to be fulfilled in both cases, since both policy areas are connected to highly interdependent sectors and the Eurobarometer data indicates heterogenous preferences in those areas.

5.2. Shortcomings, Challenges and Limitations

In the following I will evaluate and discuss the explanatory strength of my findings, by looking at limitations and potential challenges in terms of internal and external validity.

The reliability or internal validity of my analysis, the “validity of inferences about” (Gerring, 2017: 195) the effect of public opposition to integration on differentiated integration, is limited by several factors. The quantitative part, aiming at the identification of congruence is descriptive and not focussed on causality. As the measurements of the two variables are quite precise and description is the goal, this part of the analysis will have a high level of internal

validity (Gerring, 2017). The other quantitative part introducing causality into the analysis, displays less internal validity, due to limited data availability, which is why the subsequent qualitative approach was chosen (Gerring, 2017).

Although qualitative case studies often have a higher degree of internal validity, due to the possibility to closely monitor and reconstruct the causal relationship of interest, the degree of internal validity is highly dependent on the broad availability of high-quality data for this process of reconstruction. In a complex and sometimes opaque context like intergovernmental decision-making at the EU level, this posed some difficulties. To increase the internal validity and to avoid a potential bias towards my expectations, I am going to keep this bias in mind while conducting the analysis and state “what sort of evidence would decisively prove or refute” my theory before starting to analyse the empirical material.

The generalizability of my framework, the external validity, is limited by several factors as well. First, as mentioned above, several case selection choices I had to make limit the generalizability. As policy areas were chosen that both display a low level of politicization and are generally similar, generalization of my findings to other policy areas is limited. It is consequently possible that the nonexistence of responsiveness in my findings results from the low level of politicization.

Moreover, since I chose country-year cases that are in line with my hypothesis and display high values on both variables, one should not generalize the findings from the quantitative analysis of these cases, because they represent influential or most-likely cases. Nevertheless, the generalizability of the findings of my qualitative analysis on the procedural aspects is not limited by this most-likely case status since the identified potential processes might be generalizable. Moreover, the selection of an influential case has some upsides as well, since the non-existence of responsiveness in the selected case may be useful to question responsiveness at all, since it was the most-likely case to display this feature based on the preliminary analysis. The relatively short time-frame limits external validity as well, especially since the chosen time between 2005 and 2011 was characterized by huge political and economic developments, as outlined in 3.1.2.

Concluding, one can argue that the main limitation of my methodological framework is data availability. This holds both for the quantitative and the qualitative part. However, as discussed, I am going to keep those limitations in mind when conducting the analysis and try to reduce their influence through that. Furthermore, as the field of responsiveness to opposition to European integration in terms of differentiated integration has not yet been explored thoroughly, the value of this contribution lies more in shedding light on the existence or non-

existence of potential connections and conditions, while at the same time allowing for a broader view on this issue across member states and years.

5.3. Discussion of Findings

In the following I will discuss the findings in general, in light of theoretical considerations and with regard to their societal relevance.

While the quantitative analysis indicated that there is neither congruence between average opposition to integration and the average extent of differentiated integration nor an effect of national public opposition to integration on the extent of differentiated integration on the systemic level, the qualitative analysis provided some interesting insights on the case level. I argue that the findings of my qualitative analysis demonstrate that an effect of public opposition on differentiated integration is at least structurally possible. I am not able to state whether this effect was present in the examined cases, however, many of the conditions for such an effect were present.

What those findings indicate for my theoretical framework and for societal and political considerations, will be discussed in the following two sections.

5.3.1. Theoretical and Methodological Implications

Since there are no other publications looking into EU responsiveness in terms of differentiated integration in secondary law, I am not able to reject or support existing theories. Nevertheless, I am able to reflect on the broader approaches and theories surrounding this topic and evaluating my findings in their light.

To begin with, my findings contradict the findings of many papers indicating a responsive relationship between public opinion on integration and integration (De Bruycker, 2020; Wratil, 2015). They are more in line with Toshkov's findings, that responsiveness decreased after the Maastricht treaty (2011). Most of those papers were focussed on European-wide public support for integration in general, while my approach was focused on taking into account heterogeneity across policy areas and member states and public opposition to integration. Furthermore, while those papers focussed on integration in general, my focus on differentiated integration differs considerably. In light of these considerations, it might be possible that there is responsiveness to the overall sentiment towards integration, but not to policy area specific preferences. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that there is responsiveness in terms of integration, but not in terms of differentiated integration.

It is also possible that my methodological framework was not able to capture responsiveness accurately. This might have been due to the limited amount of data in the qualitative analysis. A similar methodological proceeding including interviews with relevant officials might be able to uncover responsiveness in the examined cases. An extension of the quantitative analysis to a bigger time frame might also provide valuable insights.

Furthermore, I am not able to evaluate theories on differentiated integration considering my findings, since most of them are primarily based on primary law differentiation. Primary law differentiation can usually be found in politicized policy areas, secondary law integration is more prevalent in less politicized areas (Duttie et al., 2016). Considering the role of politicization as a potential contributing factor for responsiveness, it might be possible that there is responsiveness in terms of differentiated integration in primary law. Nevertheless, I am able to argue based on my findings that the normative argument of differentiated integration as a means to enable democratic integration is at least questionable in terms of the integration of secondary law.

5.3.2. Societal and Political Implications

The fact that I was not able to find evidence for responsiveness to public opposition to integration in my analysis, allows for some considerations on the societal implications of this finding. First, as outlined above, I am not able to make statements on the presence of EU responsiveness in general. Nevertheless, my findings in combination with the papers indicating responsiveness to EU-wide public support figures (Williams & Bevan, 2019; Wratil, 2015), represent evidence that EU integration is responsive to the overall sentiment towards integration, but not to the heterogeneity behind this support, in terms of member states and policy areas.

Furthermore, the length and complexity of the potential causal path, as well as the unavailability of data and the number of conditions illustrate a structural problem when it comes to EU responsiveness. As outlined in the introduction, many perceive the European institutions technocratic and alienated from citizens' everyday lives (Foster et al., 2021). They fear that they are going to lose control over political developments and that their voice will not be heard by politicians and bureaucrats in the often also physically distant Brussels (Foster et al., 2021). This sheer length of a potential influence of national public opinion on integration and the number of conditions that have to be in place for such an influence to reach the EU level, demonstrate that there is some reason behind this. Furthermore, the unavailability of data on intergovernmental decision making in the Council makes it hard for citizens to even find out

whether their voice is heard. More transparent decision-making procedures in the Council could help citizens to hold national governments accountable for their stance in the Council.

Those factors do not imply that the EU is undemocratic, however, it illustrates that there is a need to extend the “major pan-European democratic exercise” to the existing EU policymaking structures as well.

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Appendix A – Additional Analyses

In the following I included several additional analyses I conducted for my quantitative analyses. The first part is intended to take into account the distribution of the dependent variable, extent of differentiated integration, by removing the zeros. The second part is intended to control for factors that could introduce a bias into my analyses. In both of those analyses, I did not go into detail, since my number of cases limits the significance of these analyses.

A1. Analysis of the data after removing the zeros from the dependent variable

Due to the high number of zeros on the dependent variable, I removed cases with the value of zero on the dependent variable and applied preliminary analyses to the data, to figure out whether the distribution would introduce a bias into my analysis. These results did not yield any new insights, which is why they were not included in the thesis. Regression outputs and scatter plots of these analyses can be found in the following.

A1.1. Analysis of agriculture policy with a lag of one year




Figure A1: Responsiveness differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in agriculture policy after removing cases with the value of zero on the dependent variable.

A1.2. Analysis of agriculture policy with a lag of two years




Figure A2: Responsiveness differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in agriculture policy after removing cases with the value of zero on the dependent variable.

A1.3. Analysis of market policy with a lag of one year




Figure A3: Responsiveness differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in market policy after removing cases with the value of zero on the dependent variable.

A1.4. Analysis of market policy with a lag of two years




Figure A4: Responsiveness differentiated integration and public opposition to integration in market policy after removing cases with the value of zero on the dependent variable.

A2. Fixed Effects

Since I am not able to account for factors within the countries that were constant over time aside from salience of integration in a policy area and elections, like e.g., the power of agricultural interest groups trying to influence policy, I applied a fixed effect model to account for those potential influences on my analyses. Since there were no significant results, I only included them in this appendix. In the following you can find the regression outputs of those analyses.

A2.1. Agriculture Policy

<i>Dependent variable:</i>		<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Share of legislative acts containing at least 1 differentiation		Share of legislative acts containing at least 1 differentiation	
Public opposition	0.04* (0.03)	Public opposition	0.01 (0.03)
Observations	150	Observations	125
R ²	0.02	R ²	0.002
Adjusted R ²	-0.17	Adjusted R ²	-0.25
F Statistic	2.86* (df = 1; 124)	F Statistic	0.22 (df = 1; 99)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure A5: Fixed effects estimation of the extent of differentiated integration on public opposition to integration (lag of 1 year) - left

Figure A6: Fixed effects estimation of the extent of differentiated integration on public opposition to integration (lag of 2 years) - right

A2.2. Market Policy

<i>Dependent variable:</i>		<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Share of legislative acts containing at least 1 differentiation		Share of legislative acts containing at least 1 differentiation	
Public opposition	-0.02 (0.07)	Public opposition	0.06 (0.08)
Observations	150	Observations	125
R ²	0.001	R ²	0.01
Adjusted R ²	-0.20	Adjusted R ²	-0.24
F Statistic	0.08 (df = 1; 124)	F Statistic	0.63 (df = 1; 99)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure A7: Fixed effects estimation of the extent of differentiated integration on public opposition to integration (lag of 1 year) - left

Figure A8: Fixed effects estimation of the extent of differentiated integration on public opposition to integration (lag of 2 years) - right

Appendix B. Code

```
#I. Extract relevant information from the EUDIFF2 dataset#####
```

```
#load EUDIFF2 dataset
```

```
rm(list = ls())
```

```
setwd("C:/Users/Elija/Documents/MSc/4 Thesis/Data/R")
```

```
library(rio)
```

```
library(haven)
```

```
library(stargazer)
```

```
difall <- data.frame(as_factor(read_dta("JEPP-EUDIFF2.dta")))
```

```
#reshape to long format
```

```
vars <- names(difall)[7:35]
```

```
difall <- reshape(difall,  
                 direction = "long",  
                 varying = vars,  
                 sep = "_",  
                 timevar = "country",  
                 idvar = "legactID"  
)
```

```
summary(difall$policy_aggregated)
```

```
dif <- subset(difall, force >= 2005)
```

```
#Create Policies with Differentiations dummy
```

```
dif$adum <- NA
```

```
dif$adum[dif$a < 1 ] <- 0
```

```

dif$adum[dif$a > 0] <- 1

dif$adum <- factor(dif$adum)
dif[3000:8000, c("a", "acat", "adum")]          # check
dif[is.na(dif$a) | is.na(dif$adum),
  c("a", "adum")
]
table(dif$adum,dif$a)

summary(dif$a, useNA = "always")
summary(dif$adum)
table(dif$adum, dif$force, dif$policy_aggregated)
table(dif$adum,dif$force)
table(dif$adum,dif$country)
table(dif$adum,dif$policy_aggregated, useNA = "always")
table (dif$adum)

#Calculate share of legislative acts containing at least 1 differentiation

table(dif$policy_aggregated)

#Agriculture

difag <- subset(dif, policy_aggregated == "Agriculture" & force >= 1996 & force <= 2012)

table(difag$adum, difag$force, difag$country)
table(difag$adum, difag$country)

#Market

difma <- subset(dif, policy_aggregated == "Market" & force >= 1996 & force <= 2011)

table(difma$adum, difma$force, difma$country)
table(difma$adum, difma$country)

```

```
#II. Load new dataset containing both EB and EUDIFF2 data#####
```

```
##### 1. Analysis: Congruence 2005-2010
```

```
EBDIFF1 <- import("EBDIF.xlsx", sheet = "Congruence")
```

```
#1.A.1 Public Opinion Agricultural Policy on Differentiation 2005 - 2010 - Averages
```

```
model1 <- lm(EBDIFF1$DifAgAv~EBDIFF1$EBAgAv)
```

```
summary(model1)
```

```
plot(DifAgAv ~ EBAgAv, data=EBDIFF1, ylab = "Share of acts containing one or more  
differentiations", xlab = "Public opposition to integration",
```

```
pch=as.character(EBDIFF1$countrynr))
```

```
abline(lm(DifAgAv ~ EBAgAv, EBDIFF1))
```

```
stargazer(model1,
```

```
  out = "1_Congruence.html",
```

```
  dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation", "Share of  
legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
```

```
  covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Public Opposition"),
```

```
  digits = 2
```

```
)
```

```
#1.B. Public Opinion Market Policy on Differentiation 2005 - 2010 - Averages
```

```
model2 <- lm(EBDIFF1$DifMaAv~EBDIFF1$EBMaAv)
```

```
summary(model2)
```

```
plot(DifMaAv ~ EBMaAv, data=EBDIFF1, ylab = "Share of acts containing one or more  
differentiations", xlab = "Public opposition to integration",
```

```
pch=as.character(EBDIFF1$countrynr))
```



```
abline(lm(DifMaAv ~ EBMaAv, EBDIFF1))
```

```
stargazer(model1,  
  model2,  
  out = "1_Congruence.html",  
  dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation", "Share of  
legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",  
  covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Public Opposition"),  
  digits = 2  
)
```

#1.3 Public Opinion Agricultural Policy on Differentiation 2005 - 2010 - CountryYears

```
EBDIFF1a <- import("EBDIF.xlsx", sheet = "Agri")
```

```
model1a <- lm(agri_difshare~agri_opposed, EBDIFF1a)  
summary(model1a)
```

```
plot(log(agri_difshare) ~ agri_opposed, data=EBDIFF1a, ylab = "Share of acts containing  
one or more differentiations", xlab = "Public opposition to integration")  
abline(lm(agri_difshare ~ agri_opposed, EBDIFF1a))
```

#1.4 Public Opinion Market Policy on Differentiation 2005 - 2010 - CountryYears

```
EBDIFF1b <- import("EBDIF.xlsx", sheet = "Market")
```

```
model2a <- lm(EBDIFF1b$market_difshare~EBDIFF1b$market_opposed)
```

```
plot(market_difshare ~ market_opposed, data=EBDIFF1b, ylab = "Share of acts containing  
one or more differentiations", xlab = "Public opposition to integration")  
abline(lm(market_difshare ~ market_opposed, EBDIFF1b))
```

```

summary(model2a)
##### 2. Analysis: Responsiveness lag (dif(t-1))

EBDIFF2 <- import("EBDIF.xlsx", sheet = "1Lag")

#2.A. Public Opinion Agricultural Policy on Differentiation 2005 - 2011

model3 <- lm(EBDIFF2$agri_difshare~EBDIFF2$agri_opposed)
summary(model3)

model4 <- lm(EBDIFF2$agri_difshare~EBDIFF2$agri_opposed
            +EBDIFF2$agri_salience
            + EBDIFF2$agri_salience:EBDIFF2$agri_opposed)
summary(model4)
plot(model4)

model4a <- lm(EBDIFF2$agri_difshare~EBDIFF2$agri_opposed
            +EBDIFF2$politicization
            + EBDIFF2$politicization:EBDIFF2$agri_opposed)
summary(model4a)

model4b <- lm(EBDIFF2$agri_difshare~EBDIFF2$agri_opposed
            +EBDIFF2$selection
            + EBDIFF2$selection:EBDIFF2$agri_opposed)
summary(model4b)

plot(agri_difshare ~ agri_opposed, EBDIFF2, ylab = "Share of acts containing one or more
differentiations", xlab = "Public opposition to integration")
abline(lm(agri_difshare ~ agri_opposed, EBDIFF2))

stargazer(model3,
          model4,
          out = "Agrilag1.html",
          dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",

```

```

covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Salience", "Public Opposition X Salience"),
digits = 2
)

```

```

stargazer(model3,
  model4,
  model4a,
  model4b,
  out = "Agrilag1Full.html",
  dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
  covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Salience", "Public Opposition X Salience",
"Politicization", "Public Opposition X Politicization", "Elections", "Public Opinion X
Elections"),
  digits = 2
)

```

#2.B. Public Opinion Market Policy on Differentiation 2005 - 2011

```

model5 <- lm(EBDIFF2$market_difshare~EBDIFF2$market_opposed)
summary(model5)

```

```

plot(market_difshare ~ market_opposed, EBDIFF2, ylab = "Share of acts containing one or
more differentiations", xlab = "Public opposition to integration")
abline(lm(market_difshare ~ market_opposed, EBDIFF2))

```

```

model6 <- lm(EBDIFF2$market_difshare~EBDIFF2$market_opposed
+ EBDIFF2$market_salience
+ EBDIFF2$market_salience:EBDIFF2$market_opposed)
summary(model6)
plot(model6)

```

```

model5a <- lm(EBDIFF2$market_difshare~EBDIFF2$market_opposed
+EBDIFF2$politicization

```

```
+ EBDIFF2$politicization:EBDIFF2$market_opposed)
summary(model5a)
```

```
model5b <- lm(EBDIFF2$market_difshare~EBDIFF2$market_opposed
+EBDIFF2$election
+ EBDIFF2$election:EBDIFF2$market_opposed)
summary(model5b)
```

```
stargazer(model5,
model6,
out = "Marketlag1.html",
dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Salience", "Public Opposition x Salience"),
digits = 2
)
```

```
stargazer(model5,
model6,
model6a,
model6b,
out = "Marketlag1Full.html",
dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Salience", "Public Opposition X Salience",
"Politicization", "Public Opposition X Politicization", "Elections", "Public Opinion X
Elections"),
digits = 2
)
```

3. Analysis: Responsiveness lag (dif(t-2))

```
EBDIFF3 <- import("EBDIF.xlsx", sheet = "2Lag")
```

#3.A. Public Opinion Agricultural Policy on Differentiation 2005 - 2011

```
model7 <- lm(EBDIFF3$agri_difshare~EBDIFF3$agri_opposed)
summary(model7)
```

```
model8 <- lm(EBDIFF3$agri_difshare~EBDIFF3$agri_opposed
+ EBDIFF3$agri_salience
+ EBDIFF3$agri_salience:EBDIFF3$agri_opposed)
summary(model8)
plot(model8)
```

```
model8a <- lm(EBDIFF3$agri_difshare~EBDIFF3$agri_opposed
+EBDIFF3$politicization
+ EBDIFF3$politicization:EBDIFF3$agri_opposed)
summary(model8a)
```

```
model8b <- lm(EBDIFF3$agri_difshare~EBDIFF3$agri_opposed
+EBDIFF3$selection
+ EBDIFF3$selection:EBDIFF3$agri_opposed)
summary(model8b)
```

```
plot(agri_difshare ~ agri_opposed, EBDIFF3, ylab = "Share of acts containing one or more
differentiations", xlab = "Public opposition to integration")
abline(lm(agri_difshare ~ agri_opposed, EBDIFF3))
```

```
stargazer(model7,
model8,
out = "Agrilag2.html",
dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Salience", "Public Opposition x Salience"),
digits = 2
)
```

```
stargazer(model7,
```

```

model8,
model8a,
model8b,
out = "Agrilag2Full.html",
dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Salience", "Public Opposition X Salience",
"Politicization", "Public Opposition X Politicization", "Elections", "Public Opinion X
Elections"),
digits = 2
)

```

#3.B. Public Opinion Market Policy on Differentiation 2005 - 2011

```

model9 <- lm(EBDIFF3$market_difshare~EBDIFF3$market_opposed)
summary(model9)

```

```

plot(market_difshare ~ market_opposed, EBDIFF3, ylab = "Share of acts containing one or
more differentiations", xlab = "Public opposition to integration")
abline(lm(market_difshare ~ market_opposed, EBDIFF3))

```

```

model10 <- lm(EBDIFF3$market_difshare~EBDIFF3$market_opposed
+ EBDIFF3$market_salience
+ EBDIFF3$market_salience:EBDIFF3$market_opposed)
summary(model10)
plot(model10)

```

```

model10a <- lm(EBDIFF3$market_difshare~EBDIFF3$market_opposed
+EBDIFF3$politicization
+ EBDIFF3$politicization:EBDIFF3$market_opposed)
summary(model10a)

```

```

model10b <- lm(EBDIFF3$market_difshare~EBDIFF3$market_opposed
+EBDIFF3$selection
+ EBDIFF3$selection:EBDIFF3$market_opposed)

```

```
summary(model10b)
stargazer(model9,
  model10,
  out = "Marketlag2.html",
  dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
  covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Salience", "Public Opposition x Salience"),
  digits = 2
)
```

```
stargazer(model9,
  model10,
  model10a,
  model10b,
  out = "Marketlag2Full.html",
  dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
  covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Salience", "Public Opposition X Salience",
"Politicization", "Public Opposition X Politicization", "Elections", "Public Opinion X
Elections"),
  digits = 2
)
```

4. Analysis: Responsiveness lag (dif(t-1)) excluding countryyears without differentiations

#4.A. Public Opinion Agricultural Policy on Differentiation 2005 - 2011

```
EBDIFF4 <- import("EBDIF.xlsx", sheet = "1LagX0Agri")
```

```
model11 <- lm(EBDIFF4$agri_difshare~EBDIFF4$agri_opposed)
summary(model11)
```

```
model12 <- lm(EBDIFF4$agri_difshare~EBDIFF4$agri_opposed
+ EBDIFF4$agri_salience
+ EBDIFF4$agri_salience:EBDIFF4$agri_opposed)
```

```
summary(model12)
```

```
plot(model12)
```

```
plot(agri_difshare ~ agri_opposed, EBDIFF4, ylab = "Share of acts containing one or more differentiations", xlab = "Public opposition to integration")
```

```
abline(lm(agri_difshare ~ agri_opposed, EBDIFF4))
```

```
stargazer(model11,
```

```
  model12,
```

```
  out = "Agrilag1X0.html",
```

```
  dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
```

```
  covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Public Opposition X Saliency", "Saliency"),
```

```
  digits = 2
```

```
)
```

#4.B. Public Opinion Market Policy on Differentiation 2005 - 2011

```
EBDIFF5 <- import("EBDIF.xlsx", sheet = "MarketX01")
```

```
model13 <- lm(EBDIFF5$market_difshare~EBDIFF5$market_opposed)
```

```
summary(model13)
```

```
plot(market_difshare ~ market_opposed, EBDIFF5, ylab = "Share of acts containing one or more differentiations", xlab = "Public opposition to integration")
```

```
abline(lm(market_difshare ~ market_opposed, EBDIFF5))
```

```
model14 <- lm(EBDIFF5$market_difshare~EBDIFF5$market_opposed
```

```
  + EBDIFF5$market_saliency
```

```
  + EBDIFF5$market_saliency:EBDIFF5$market_opposed)
```

```
summary(model14)
```

```
plot(model14)
```

```
stargazer(model13,
```

```
  model14,
```



```

out = "Marketlag1X0.html",
dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Public Opposition x Salience", "Salience"),
digits = 2
)

```

5. Analysis: Responsiveness lag (dif(t-2)) excluding countryyears without differentiations

#5.A. Public Opinion Agricultural Policy on Differentiation 2005 - 2011

```
EBDIFF6 <- import("EBDIF.xlsx", sheet = "2LagX0Agri")
```

```

model15 <- lm(EBDIFF6$agri_difshare~EBDIFF6$agri_opposed)
summary(model15)

```

```

model16 <- lm(EBDIFF6$agri_difshare~EBDIFF6$agri_opposed
+ EBDIFF6$agri_salience
+ EBDIFF6$agri_salience:EBDIFF6$agri_opposed)
summary(model16)
plot(model16)

```

```

plot(agri_difshare ~ agri_opposed, EBDIFF6, ylab = "Share of acts containing one or more
differentiations", xlab = "Public opposition to integration")
abline(lm(agri_difshare ~ agri_opposed, EBDIFF6))

```

```

stargazer(model15,
model16,
out = "Agrilag2X0.html",
dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Public Opposition x Salience", "Salience"),
digits = 2
)

```

```

model15a <- lm(log(EBDIFF6$agri_difshare)~EBDIFF6$agri_opposed)
summary(model15a)
plot(model15a)

```

#5.B. Public Opinion Market Policy on Differentiation 2005 - 2011

```
EBDIFF7 <- import("EBDIF.xlsx", sheet = "2LagX0Market")
```

```

model17 <- lm(EBDIFF7$market_difshare~EBDIFF7$market_opposed)
summary(model17)

```

```

plot(market_difshare ~ market_opposed, EBDIFF7, ylab = "Share of acts containing one or
more differentiations", xlab = "Public opposition to integration")
abline(lm(market_difshare ~ market_opposed, EBDIFF7))

```

```

model18 <- lm(EBDIFF7$market_difshare~EBDIFF7$market_opposed
+ EBDIFF7$market_salience
+ EBDIFF7$market_salience:EBDIFF7$market_opposed)

```

```

summary(model18)
plot(model18)

```

```

stargazer(model17,
  model18,
  out = "Marketlag2X0.html",
  dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
  covariate.labels = c("Public opposition", "Public Opposition x Salience", "Salience"),
  digits = 2
)

```

```

model17a <- lm(log(EBDIFF7$market_difshare)~EBDIFF7$market_opposed)
summary(model17a)
plot(model17a)

```

```
##### 6. Additional Analysis: Fixed effects
```

```
library(plm)
```

```
Agri1Fixed <- plm(agri_difshare ~ agri_opposed,  
  data=EBDIFF2,  
  index = c("id", "t"),  
  model= "within")
```

```
summary(Agri1Fixed)
```

```
plot(Agri1Fixed)
```

```
stargazer(Agri1Fixed,  
  out = "Agri1Fixed.html",  
  dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",  
  covariate.labels = c("Public opposition"),  
  digits = 2  
)
```

```
Market1Fixed <- plm(market_difshare ~ market_opposed,  
  data=EBDIFF2,  
  index = c("country", "t"),  
  model= "within")
```

```
summary(Market1Fixed)
```

```
plot(Market1Fixed)
```

```
stargazer(Market1Fixed,  
  out = "Market1Fixed.html",  
  dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",  
  covariate.labels = c("Public opposition"),  
  digits = 2  
)
```

```

Agri2Fixed <- plm(agri_difshare ~ agri_opposed,
  data=EBDIFF3,
  index = c("id", "t"),
  model= "within")
summary(Agri2Fixed)
plot(Agri2Fixed)

stargazer(Agri2Fixed,
  out = "Agri2Fixed.html",
  dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
  covariate.labels = c("Public opposition"),
  digits = 2
)

```

```

Market2Fixed <- plm(market_difshare ~ market_opposed,
  data=EBDIFF3,
  index = c("country", "t"),
  model= "within")

```

```

summary(Market2Fixed)
plot(Market2Fixed)

```

```

stargazer(Market2Fixed,
  out = "Market2Fixed.html",
  dep.var.labels = "Share of legal acts containing at least 1 differentiation",
  covariate.labels = c("Public opposition"),
  digits = 2
)

```