



How did the United States exert politico-economic hegemony on the different countries of Chile and Guatemala, and why did the restoration of US hegemony result in a paradigm shift of US foreign policy?

An analysis of the aims, methods and impact of US counterrevolutionary practices in two countries and time periods.



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Bachelors Thesis
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“My dearest brothers do not let yourselves be fooled with pretty promises, and confessions extracted in desperate circumstances: you have been colonized, and your Provinces have been colonies and miserable factories: It has been said not to be so; but this infamous quality is not erased with nice words, but with the perfect equality of privileges, rights and prerogatives: through an evil process and of eternal injustice, command, authority, the honors and the rents have been the patrimony of the Europeans: the Americans have been excluded from the stimuli that excite virtue, and have been condemned to work in the mines, and to live like slaves, bent under the yoke of their despots and strange governors. The Metropole (Spain) has monopolized commerce, and has prohibited foreigners from coming to sell, or coming to buy from our Ports, and us from negotiating in theirs, and with this prohibition of eternal inequity and eternal injustice has reduced us to the most hideous misery. The Metropole, each year sends bands of employees who come to devour our sustenance, and to treat us with insufferable insolence and haughtiness; bands of governors, ignorant, greedy, thieving, unjust, barbaric, vengeful, who commit their depredations without limit or fear; because the means are very difficult, because your countrymen are their patrons; because the supreme government sits three thousand leagues away and it is there they have their families and protectors who defend them, and participate in their thievery, and because they are Europeans and you are Americans: The Metropole charges us daily with financial burdens, tributes and impositions without number, that result in ruining our fortunes, with no means of recourse: the Metropole does not want us to manufacture, or to grow, they want us to buy everything from them at exorbitant and scandalous prices that ruin us: The legislation of the Metropole is in benefit of her, and on the ruining and degrading of the Americas, which it has treated always like a miserable factory.”¹

-José Amor de la Patria, 1810.

Passage from the “Politico-Christian Catechism”.

Published on the eve of the Chilean Independence War.

Translation is my own.

¹ José Amor de la Patria. Transcripción del Catesismo político christiano dispuesto para la instrucción de la juventud de los pueblos libres de la América Meridional. Disponible en Memoria Chilena, Biblioteca Nacional de Chile <http://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/602/w3-article-99218.html> Accedido en 19/06/2021.

Abstract

This investigation aims to bridge the historiographical gap that exists in the study of the Guatemalan US backed coup 'd'état that toppled Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in 1954, and the US backed coup 'd'état in Chile that toppled Salvador G. Allende in 1973. Historiography has shunned comparisons between these cases due to the time differential and the extent to which the countries present contrasting socio-political and economic elements for historical comparison. In doing so, US foreign policy shifts have often been divorced in scholarship from the coups from which they originated. This investigation contends that both 1954 and 1973 cases identify the ushering of a new foreign policy paradigm (with respect to Latin America mostly) based on the exertion of hegemony, and constructed according to the international political climate, which in turn was informed by cold war developments that create different international paradigms in the two cases. These inform the differences in the method of restoring hegemony, after revolutionary governments have weakened it.

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Important Abbreviations:

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

FDR: Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Exim: Export-Import Bank

IRCA: International Railways of Central America

OAS: Organization of American States

PGT: Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, Guatemalan Communist Party

UFCO: United Fruit Company

UP: Unidad Popular, Popular Unity

US: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWII: World War Two

Introduction

The Napoleonic wars of the early 19th century caused the collapse of the Catholic monarchy of Spain in 1808. In 1810, colonial Chile seized this moment and embarked on a revolutionary War of Independence. In 1818, that independence was attained, and the Republic of Chile was born.² In 1824, after spending two years as a department of the Mexican Empire, which too had emerged after the Mexican Independence War against the Spanish Empire, the Republic of Guatemala was proclaimed.³ Much like most imperial titans of the old world, the Spanish Empire withered and faded, and along with it so did the colors of the red and white cross of its flag, that once engulfed the map of Spanish America. This once red and white map, was by the middle of the 19th century a collection of newly formed republics, forged through a series of civil and independence wars. It is often neglected or only briefly mentioned, in the historiographical accounts of the “long nineteenth-century”, that by 1825, the mightiest of early-modern empires, was faced with collapse.⁴

These new Republics would gradually be inserted under the umbrella of a new patron. By the end of the century, the Monroe Doctrine, implemented by President James Monroe in 1823, which pressured European empires to diminish their influence over the Western Hemisphere, resulted in the old European hegemon being replaced by a different, informal empire.⁵ It was that of the red, white, and blue stripes, and of the fifty stars, the United States of America.

The Monroe Doctrine, however, would soon abandon its noble non-interventionist tenets and vision of American representative governments and would become a tool of informal imperialism, that South but mostly Central America would suffer under.⁶ By the early 20th century both Chile and Guatemala would be subject to the process of hegemonic exertion by the US. Their economies would become dependent on the tools by which these countries became shackled to the North American hegemon, multinational corporations.

Corporations like the United Fruit Company in Guatemala wielded tremendous economic and political power, by utilizing the corrupt Guatemalan polity to usurp its economic independence. The UFCO would establish a presence throughout Central America and establish a neocolonial paradigm of governance and trade. Great works of Latin American literature, like *Cien Años de Soledad* by Gabriel Garcia Marquez, would represent the company as a villainous octopus “and the U.S. government as a cynical imperial power supporting the company’s stranglehold on the transportation, communications, and (at least

² Poirier Eduardo. “Guerra de la Independencia de Chile.” In: *Chile en 1910, Edición del Centenario de la Independencia*. Santiago de Chile, Impr. Barcelona. pp. 1-41.

³ Anna, Timothy. “The Independence of Mexico and Central America.” In: *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, edited by Leslie Bethell, 471-506. The Cambridge History of Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

⁴ James E. Lewis. “The American Neighborhood Re-defined” In: *American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood: The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783-1829*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. pp. 155-157. Accessed November 10, 2020. ProQuest Ebook Central.

⁵ Roger A. Pillet. “The Monroe Doctrine.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 54 (1914): 131-33. Accessed June 19, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.uu.nl/stable/1012581>.

James E. Lewis. “The American Neighborhood Re-defined” In: *American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood: The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783-1829*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. pp. 177-187. Accessed November 10, 2020. ProQuest Ebook Central.

⁶ Ibid. (both)

by implication) electoral and military infrastructures in many smaller nations.”⁷ This was an apt representation of the Guatemalan politico-economic reality. The term “Banana Republic” was first used by author O. Henry in *Cabbages and Kings*, published in 1904, in reference to Honduras. It refers to countries of a mono-export culture, usually bananas, with corrupt and inept political infrastructures.⁸ Guatemala would rightly belong to this group. In October 1944 however, a revolution was born of a broad coalition, including parts of the armed forces, intellectuals, teachers, and students. They would topple the government and stage democratic elections. The next ten years would be known as the “10 years of Spring”, in which socio-political democratization would take place as well as a reframing of productive relations. Two administrations oversaw this period of growth, that of Juan José Arevalo, and of Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán.⁹ In June 1954, however, citing a communist threat emanating from the Guatemalan government, the Eisenhower White House, the CIA, the UFCO and Guatemalan exiles would stage a violent counterrevolution which would restore US hegemony and plunge the country into decades-long instability.¹⁰

Chile was by no means a Banana Republic. The polity was composed of strong political institutions cemented in a democratic foundation through a US inspired constitution.¹¹ Yet, it too, suffered from dependency on the US through the same instruments of hegemonic exertion, multinationals. Chile is to this day the largest exporter of copper.¹² Thus, that was the coveted resource. Corporations like Anaconda Copper and Kennecott Copper Corporation exploited the state’s need for capital investment and proceeded to acquire the largest reserves in the northern regions. They made little effort to re-invest profits into the Chilean economy.¹³ In contrast to little Guatemala, this relationship between capital and the state was opposed by intellectuals and politicians alike. During the 1950’s leading Latin American economist Raul Prébisch, argued that the US-Chile relationship was

⁷ Caroline Field Levander. “The Mercurial Space of “Central” America, New Orleans, Honduras, and the Writing of the Banana Republic” In: *Hemispheric American Studies*. Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 2007. pp. 144. Accessed June 19, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Gabriel Garcia Marquez, *Cien Anos De Soledad* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1967).

⁸ Caroline Field Levander. “The Mercurial Space of “Central” America, New Orleans, Honduras, and the Writing of the Banana Republic” In: *Hemispheric American Studies*. Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 2007. pp. 144. Accessed June 19, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

O. Henry, *Cabbages and Kings*. by O. Henry Pseud (Garden City: Doubleday, Page., 1904).

⁹ Stephen M. Streeter, “Overthrowing the Revolution: U.S.-Guatemalan Relations to 1954,” in *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). pp. 7-32.

Richard H. Immerman. "Guatemala as Cold War History." *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 4 (1980): 629-630. Accessed June 18th, 2021. doi:10.2307/2150608.

¹⁰ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, “The Battle Begins,” in *Bitter Fruit: the Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University, David Rockefeller center for Latin American Studies, 2005), pp. 7-24.

¹¹ *Constitucion Politica del Estado de Chile: Promulgada en 29 de Diciembre de 1823*. Santiago de Chile, Imprenta Nacional.

Chile. S.l., Chilean Govt. 1915. pp. 77-84, 107-116.

<https://heinonlineorg.proxy.library.uu.nl/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/chle0001&id=1&collection=cow&index=>

[Accessed June 18th 2021]

¹² Mathilde Carlier, “World Leading Copper Exporters 2020,” Statista, May 26, 2021,

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1116864/global-copper-exports-by-country/#:~:text=Chile%20is%20the%20world's%20leading,the%20total%20exported%20value%20globally.>

[Accessed June 19th 2021]

¹³ Lubna Z. Qureshi, “Early U.S.-Chilean Relations,” in *Nixon, Kissinger, Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 20-21.

contradictory to the paradigm of global liberal capitalism that FDR had envisioned.¹⁴ Thus Developmentalism was adopted as a key economic doctrine in Chile. This was based on Keynesian policies of state investment to incur growth by fortifying industrialization efforts as to diminish import dependence and protect domestic markets.¹⁵ However, it proved inadequate in rectifying the dependency on the copper multinationals which accounted for most exports and by far the largest contribution to Chilean state budgets.¹⁶ Therefore the Chilean electorate saw fit to change this relationship, and in 1970, the first Marxist was elected in South America. This was Salvador Allende a former physician turned politician, having been radicalized both by witnessing the effects of poverty on peripheral populations, but also due to US imperialistic conduct in the region.¹⁷ In 1973 however, the Nixon White House, the CIA, and the Chilean armed forces, after having succeeded in destabilizing the prosperous Allende government, staged a violent and bloody coup, which replaced Allende with a far-right authoritarian, who some call fascist, named Augusto Pinochet and restored US hegemony over one of the oldest republics in history.¹⁸ Much like in Guatemala the coup replaced Arbenz with far-right strongman Carlos Castillo Armas.

In both cases, different US establishments replaced prosperous democratic, with dictators of a specific politico-economic character. Both revolutionary regimes had weakened US hegemony over their countries by similar policies, depending on the respective needs of each economy. We can identify a similar anti-hegemonic program in two radically different countries, two decades apart. This begs the question of how the US was exerting hegemony onto these dissimilar countries, through similar means. A comparison between these two case studies has not been formulated, to my knowledge, mainly due to the otherwise incomparable realities of Chile and Guatemala, which only share a language and a colonial past. Placing them into the same analytical framework of US hegemonic practices across the 20th century would bridge the historiographical gap that is presently keeping them disconnected, since both the revolutionary governments phrase similar politico-economic aims, and the post-restoration regimes express similar politico-economic policies. They are only separated by the international politico-economic context of their different periods, which informs the mode of restoration.

¹⁴ Robert J. McMahon and Patrick J. Hearden, "An Economic Perspective on US Involvement," in *Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2008), pp. 60-73.

Theodore H. Moran. "Introduction," in *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence : Copper in Chile*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. pp. 3-4.

And: Theodore H. Moran. "The Multinational Copper Companies in Chile and the Growth of Economic Nationalism, 1945-1954: Declining Terms of Trade and the Early Elaboration of a Framework for Dependencia" in: *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence : Copper in Chile*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. pp. 72

¹⁵ Naomi Klein, "The Other Doctor Shock: Milton Friedman and the Search for a Laissez-Faire Laboratory ," in *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, 1st (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), pp. 55-57.

¹⁶ Lubna Z. Qureshi, "Early U.S.-Chilean Relations," in *Nixon, Kissinger, Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 20-21.

¹⁷ Salvador G. Allende. (1939). *La realidad médico-social chilena*. (Universidad de Chile) Disponible en <https://doi.org/10.34720/mj3z-6m24>

Mark T. Hove. "The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, U.S.-Chilean Relations, and the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala." *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 4 (2007): 623-30. Accessed May 20th, 2021.

¹⁸ Peter A Goldberg. "The Politics of the Allende Overthrow in Chile." *Political Science Quarterly* 90, no. 1 (1975): 93-116. Accessed June 19, 2021. doi:10.2307/2148700.

The most important contribution of this thesis, however, lies with the mode of restoration and its impact on US foreign policy. Both restorative processes of hegemony triggered a departure from previous foreign policy doctrines and ushered in new paradigms. In both cases, the new paradigm was forged according to the international developments that ruled the political attitudes of the 1950's and early 1970's. Thus, the process and method of restoring and justifying the exertion of hegemony becomes subject to the international context in which it takes place. In Guatemala, the restoration process was justified by a communist threat against which the US securitized its interests. The 1950's were the heyday of anti-communism in the west; thus, the geopolitical climate was amenable to anti-communist interventionism, framed as safeguarding liberty against totalitarianism. During the early 1970's the world was no longer inclined to support regime change against communism, especially after the Bay of Pigs failed invasion of Cuba, and the Vietnam War. Therefore, the policy of securitizing US interests through counterrevolution had to be reformulated and justified in other ways. This is why Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger would first destabilize the Chilean economy as to provide a material justification for the coup that would follow. As opposed to Guatemala, where US involvement was plain, in Chile, the hand of the US would have to be obscured. Another important division between the two cases and periods is the theoretical approach to economic restoration. Whereas in Guatemala the economy was tied to the US only on the fundamental level of control of resources and land, in Chile, the economy had financial ties to United States banking institutions. Therefore, the restoration was financialized, and economics was weaponized as to usher in and test the economic paradigm that would become predominant among the western world, neoliberalism.

Scholarship has diversified avenues of research with respect to the coup in Guatemala. Stephen Streeter, in *Managing the Counterrevolution, the United States and Guatemala* uses the coup as a starting point in studying the broader restoration process.¹⁹ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, in *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, study the coup itself and the broader implications of UFCO involvement.²⁰ Abigail Adams and Timothy Smith, in *After the Coup: An Ethnographic Reframing of Guatemala 1954*, discern the impact of the coup on Mayan socio-political and economic development.²¹ Richard Immerman, frames the coup in strictly cold war terms, and its impact on Latin American revolutionary movements, implying that the authoritarianism of the Cuban communist project was derived from the failures of liberalism in Guatemala in Arbenz's defensive capabilities.²² None of these authors, however, engage with the direct impact of the restoration process on US foreign policy in the emerging schema of global cold war politico-economic securitization.

The Chilean coup has been studied extensively due to the scholarly disagreements on the involvement of the US in setting the preconditions, the successes of the Allende government, and the neoliberal restoration, which Arturo Valenzuela argues, led to the

¹⁹ Stephen M. Streeter. In *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961*. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000.

²⁰ Schlesinger, Stephen, and Stephen Kinzer. *Bitter Fruit: the Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University, David Rockefeller center for Latin American Studies, 2005.

²¹ Adams, Abigail E. "Reflecting Upon the Historical Impact of the Coup." Essay. In *After the Coup: an Ethnographic Reframing of Guatemala, 1954*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2011.

²² Richard H. Immerman. "Guatemala as Cold War History." *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 4 (1980): 629-653. Accessed June 18th, 2021. doi:10.2307/2150608.

Chilean miracle, referring to the post-coup economic growth.²³ Lubna Qureshi argues that Allende was on a path of success, derailed by US interference, in *Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: US Involvement in the 1973 coup in Chile*.²⁴ Naomi Klein argues that the coup served as a violent transition into the first testing ground of the Shock doctrine of Milton Friedman, which spectacularly failed, in *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*.²⁵ In contrast, scholars like Falcoff, hold the view that Allende's politics caused disaster and perverted political institutions.²⁶ Yet, there is no engagement with how the events before and after 1973, represent a clear departure from past foreign policy doctrines and propel capitalist history into a new age, specifically due to the adoption of a new paradigm by the US.

Two theoretical frameworks will be employed to analyze the events in question. These are hegemony, and securitization. There is an ample body of theory which imbues diverse definitions onto what hegemony entails. This thesis will interpret the Gramscian concept of hegemony. Antonio Gramsci rejected the material and historical determinism of Marx and Engels. Marx had argued that the ideological superstructure, was determined by the economic base to the economic base. Gramsci retorted that ruling was through ideas which re-formulated the conception of man's role in society. He argued the ruled, must give consent to their rulers for them to exert political domination. Therefore, such domination was not based on coercion but rather on willing subjugation of the subaltern classes to whatever power expresses the most desirable ideas.²⁷ This can be applied to the notion of cultural leadership in history.²⁸ The US emerged as the clear cultural leader of the west after WWII. Only that the dichotomy of the cold war, ingrains economic theories into the cultural sphere. These determine the material aspect of people's lives. Gramsci stated that the moderates of the Risorgimento, the movement toward Italian unification, had asserted the hegemony of their interests rather than their persons, in contrast to what Mussolini would do.²⁹

Likewise, the framework of liberty under liberal capitalism as opposed to the totalitarianism of communism and the centrally-planned economy, asserted the interests of the US on a global scale. These are reflected through the tools by which they are imposed, multinationals. This fuses the interests of the state with those of private organisms like the UFCO or Anaconda, creating a hegemony that acquires a politico-economic character of its own. Therefore, this thesis will showcase how the division of the superstructure according to Gramsci into "civil" and "political" society is in both cases one-and-the-same. Civil society morphs our socio-political consciousness and political society exerts direct dominion through control. When hegemony fails to take hold through consent, much like after 1944 in Guatemala and 1970 in Chile, those who refuse the domineering powers their consent, are

²³ Arturo Valenzuela. "The Chilean Miracle: Lessons of South America's Success Story." *Harvard International Review* 19, no. 4 (1997): 24-60. Accessed June 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.uu.nl/stable/42762331>.

²⁴ Lubna Z. Qureshi. *Nixon, Kissinger, Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.

²⁵ Naomi Klein. "The Other Doctor Shock: Milton Friedman and the Search for a Laissez-Faire Laboratory ." In: *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, 1st ed., New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007.

²⁶ Mark Falcoff. "Chile: Pinochet, the Opposition, and the United States." *World Affairs* 149, no. 4 (1987): 183-94. Accessed June 12, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672111>.

²⁷ Gerard de Vries, Michiel Leezenberg. "Critical Theory," in *History and Philosophy of the Humanities an Introduction* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2019), pp. 220-224.

²⁸ Thomas R Bates. "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36, no. 2 (1975): 353. Accessed June 19, 2021. doi:10.2307/2708933.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 353.

punished through the apparatus of political society, the state, in this case the US.³⁰ We observe a global case of hegemonic exertion where the interests of the hegemonic power become both those of the state, but also of its instruments of manufacturing consent, private companies which symbolize in the liberal-capitalist mode, the initiative and primacy of the individual. There is a dissonance to be noted here. That is how in both cases the interests of multinationals are opposed to those of individual Chileans and Guatemalans. Therefore, a threat must be manufactured as for the hegemonic model to retain credibility. In Guatemala that is communism, and in Chile, a failing economy of the US's own making.

Securitization is also transplanted over a broad body of theory in diverse subjects.³¹ The theory of securitization that will be employed is that formulated by Beatrice De Graaf. De Graaf constructs a framework where securitization is a multilayered process. Political elites, keen to protect "acquired values", their interests, engage in "speech acts" which produce a threat that is framed in an *extraordinary* character therefore requiring *extraordinary* solutions.³² This is simple to gauge in both the Guatemalan case where the speech acts that will be demonstrated below frame communism as the threat, and in Chile where although socialism *is* an underlying concern, the threat, due to the international context, is framed as one of a failing economy unable to deliver relief to Chilean society.

Methodology

This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first will discern the significance of the difference of the two countries and how such differences impacted their historical development and informed the methods by which hegemony was exerted onto them. For this chapter, secondary literature will be employed as to construct a chronological alignment of their development. A Chilean government source published in 1915 will be used to discuss the political infrastructure of the country as well as the strength of its institutions. Guatemalan historical government records are more challenging to access; therefore, secondary literature is critical in order to formulate an appraisal of its own institutions and philosophies of governance.

The second chapter will focus on the extent to which hegemony was exerted, how it was weakened during the two governments of the ten years of spring, and on what grounds the restoration then took place. Secondary literature is essential in order to comprehend the impact of the reformist period (1944-1954), but primary sources bear the weight of significance. Several documents found in different collections of the State Department's Office of the Historian will be employed as to showcase the manner in which the securitization framework was erected that would lead to restoration. These include discussions between high ranking officials of the administration, public statements made by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and senate committee hearings that have been made

³⁰ Thomas R Bates. "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36, no. 2 (1975): 353. Accessed June 19, 2021. doi:10.2307/2708933.

³¹ Jocelyne Cesari. "Securitization of Islam in Europe." *Die Welt Des Islams* 52, no. 3/4 (2012): 430-49. Accessed June 18, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.uu.nl/stable/41722006>.

Trine Villumsen Berling. "Bourdieu, International Relations, and European Security." *Theory and Society* 41, no. 5 (2012): 451-78. Accessed June 20, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.uu.nl/stable/23263479>.

Dagmar Rychnovská. "Securitization and the Power of Threat Framing." *Perspectives* 22, no. 2 (2014): 9-31. Accessed June 18, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.uu.nl/stable/24625251>.

³² Beatrice De Graaf, and Cornel Zwierlein. "Historicizing Security - Entering the Conspiracy Dispositive." *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* 38, no. 1 (143) (2013). 59.

public. Primary accounts are critical for this chapter as to showcase the transition into a new foreign policy paradigm, heavily influenced by cold war rhetoric.

The last chapter focuses on the Chilean case. It follows the same structure as the previous chapter, with an important caveat that will link the two cases beyond my choosing them. The primary accounts in this section are declassified White House and State department materials such as cables and memoranda made available through the National Security Archive. These detail the involvement of the Nixon white house in both the coup but also the preparatory economic destabilization that preceded it. In both chapters the roles of the secretaries of state, Dulles and Kissinger are extensive. So are the presidents' who however do not receive as much exposure as their State Department operatives do. This material is invaluable in noting how the respective restorations took place but also how they represent historical inflection points in US foreign policy. The Declassified Record on Regime Change project was also invaluable to this research as it provided the main bulk of primary accounts that implicate Nixon, Kissinger and others in the events from 1970-1973.

Chapter 1: Hegemony in Democracy & Kleptocracy ***Chile & Guatemala: The Significance of Radical Difference***

Aims & Methods

Chile and Guatemala are radically different. The differences that concern this chapter are those concerning their economies and their political institutions and infrastructure.³³ Analysis of these helps to formulate how economic and financial hegemony is applied in accordance to the countries' inner socio-political and economic dynamics. It also provides grounds for a discursive, context-based comparison: Diverse economic and political realities separate Chile and Guatemala, yet, I will argue these are instrumental in forging a similar framework of exploitative relations that led both countries to their respective political revolutions in 1944 and 1970. Revolutions which although separated by both time and political context, phrase similar demands. The comparative model I will employ is based on the Method of Difference, originally formulated by John Stuart Mill. This method highlights discrepancies of features, amidst others that do not differ, in the two comparable cases. The main discrepancy is the political infrastructure of the two countries.

I will showcase the divergence in post-independence historical development with respect to three factors: the efficacy in developing a polity with a consolidated democratic foundation, a resource exporting-based economy, and the relationship of these two factors with private capital interests working in congruence with US foreign policy. This chapter will then discern the structural nature of hegemonic imposition. This refers to engendering structures of denationalization, artificially maintained through three factors: foreign capital interests of multinational corporations, the support and cooperation provided by the US political establishment, and internal political and economic elites whose agency in protecting their interests must not be neglected.

Chile:

Chile's landmass is almost that of Metropolitan Spain and France put together. It would stretch from Edinburgh to Senegal. The northernmost regions of Chile were militarily conquered during the Pacific War in 1879, against allies Peru and Bolivia. The region was discovered to be rich in mineral resources, and its territorial identity had never been defined by the Spanish Empire as to belong to colonial Peru, Chile or Bolivia. The defeated allies signed territorial concessions which brought the Tarapaca region of Bolivia's seaboard and the region of Arica, previously held by Peru, under Chilean sovereignty.³⁴ Copper, the exploitation of which is critical to this investigation, was discovered in the northern regions, specifically in the province of Antofagasta, previously belonging to Bolivia, which is located in the Atacama desert.

³³ The differences range from geography to ethnography and beyond.

³⁴ Robert No Burr, "Conclusion," in *By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 260-262.

According to the Chilean government, after 1891 copper mining increased in volume, due to large investment of capital from Britain and the United States.³⁵ British stakes in Chilean mining however were absorbed by the United States after WWI as to curb European influence in the American continent, per the Monroe doctrine. During the Great War, the United States kept the price of nitrates artificially low, partially due to their large stockpile, depriving Chile of the vast wealth it could accumulate through its exports. After the war, due to the production of German synthetics as a substitute for nitrate, copper became the country's most significant export.³⁶

During the 1920's two multinational companies emerged as significant actors with controlling interests in the Chilean copper industry. These were Anaconda and the Kennecott copper corporation. Kennecott acquired Bradden Copper Company and Anaconda acquired the mine in Chuquicamata, Antofagasta, the world's largest. The notion of "denationalization" was introduced as far back as 1912 by Chilean historian Francisco Encina. As historian Theodore Moran explains, denationalization described the process by which Chile lost control of its natural resources and by extension, its economic sovereignty.³⁷ Kennecott and Anaconda accounted for 7-20% of the nation's GDP and copper itself was responsible for financing 10-30% of the public budget. Copper exports also accounted for 30-80% of national income. In 1927, according to Qureshi an unnamed Chilean politician stated: "the government of Chile is subordinated to North America bankers and it cannot undertake any guarantee or sign any loans without the approval of these bankers".³⁸ This showcases the early *financial* dependence on the US, which would be escalated mid-century.

Another unnamed politician denounces the conditions in copper towns*³⁹ stating that poverty and isolation lead to high rates of alcoholism and immiseration.⁴⁰ Such political opposition was based on Chile's strong democratic foundation and constitution. The Chilean constitution describes a political infrastructure implicitly equipped to withstand economic pressures exerted by multinationals, which it did not. The polity imposes rigorous checks on executive authority and is composed of a bicameral Congress. It restricts the army's ability to qualify for legislative elections.⁴¹ A critical legislative caveat implemented towards the mining sector however, allowed resources and surface right to be purchased by corporations

³⁵ Chile. S.I., Chilean Govt. 1915. pp. 210-212. <https://heinonline-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/chle0001&id=1&collection=cow&index=> [Accessed June 18th 2021] And others like France and Germany to a much lesser extent.

³⁶ Lubna Z. Qureshi, "Early U.S.-Chilean Relations," in *Nixon, Kissinger, Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 19-21.

³⁷ Moran, Theodore H.. "Introduction," in *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence : Copper in Chile*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. pp. 3-4.

³⁸ Lubna Z. Qureshi, "Early U.S.-Chilean Relations," in *Nixon, Kissinger, Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 20-21.

³⁹ Copper towns were settlements near copper reserves where mining workers dwelled.

⁴⁰ Lubna Z. Qureshi, "Early U.S.-Chilean Relations," in *Nixon, Kissinger, Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 20-21.

⁴¹ *Constitucion Politica del Estado de Chile: Promulgada en 29 de Diciembre de 1823*. Santiago de Chile, Imprenta Nacional.

Chile. S.I., Chilean Govt. 1915. pp. 77-84, 107-116. <https://heinonline-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/chle0001&id=1&collection=cow&index=> [Accessed June 18th 2021]

or individuals.⁴² Thus, the polity succumbed to the denationalization of control over resources and the US monopoly which emerged after the end of the Great War. Political and social elites did in fact oppose this relationship between private capital and the state. Perhaps the best example is a book authored by Allende himself, *The Medico-Social Reality of Chile*. Allende provides a comprehensive account of the physical effects of poverty the working class was subjected to.⁴³

The antithesis of Chile's democratic character with its relationship to multinationals speaks to the title of this chapter and to another broader assertion of this investigation. How multinational corporations can erode a state's democratic foundations by utilizing existing legislative caveats rendering their actions legal. There were no caveats in Guatemala, only corruption.

Guatemala:

The concept of hegemony is much more apparent in the case of Guatemala and has been used by academics as a leading theoretical framework through which to analyze the nation's 20th century historical development.⁴⁴ It was exerted through endemic corruption that permeated the state. The pre-existing divide between Guatemala's conservative elites and the thousands of landless peasants did not create the necessary conciliatory post-independence political atmosphere.⁴⁵ By the end of the 19th century, just as in Chile, the interests of European powers were replaced with those of the US.⁴⁶ As opposed to Chile, which enjoyed a *relative* social cohesion in terms of politics and ethnographic and demographic accounts, the Guatemalan independence project enjoyed neither.⁴⁷ The ethnographic composition of the country, the Church's socio-political role, and the divisions of the liberal and conservative factions of Guatemalan political society merit a closer inspection in the framework of examining a national identity and its political infrastructure.

A constitution modeled after those of Spain (1812) and the US was drafted, yet ethno-political divisions ran too deep to reconcile. The liberal majority that dominated the national assembly annulled all colonial and imperial laws. There is an ethnic component to this

⁴² Chile. S.I., Chilean Govt. 1915. pp. 97-98. <https://heinonline-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/chle0001&id=1&collection=cow&index=> [Accessed June 18th 2021]

⁴³ Salvador G. Allende. (1939). *La realidad médico-social chilena*. (Universidad de Chile) Disponible en <https://doi.org/10.34720/mj3z-6m24>

⁴⁴ Stephen M. Streeter, "Overthrowing the Revolution: U.S.-Guatemalan Relations to 1954," in *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). pp. 8.

⁴⁵ Patricia Alvarenga Venutolo. "La Construcción de la Raza en la Centroamérica de las Primeras Décadas del Siglo XX." *Anuario De Estudios Centroamericanos* 38 (2012): 13. Accessed June 1, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.uu.nl/stable/43871191>.

Anna, Timothy. "The Independence of Mexico and Central America." In *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, edited by Leslie Bethell, 474. The Cambridge History of Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

⁴⁶ Stephen M. Streeter, "Overthrowing the Revolution: U.S.-Guatemalan Relations to 1954," in *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). pp. 8-9.

⁴⁷ Adams, Abigail E. "Reflecting Upon the Historical Impact of the Coup." In: *After the Coup: An Ethnographic Reframing of Guatemala, 1954*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2011. pp. 4-7.

agenda. Liberal politicians represented rural segments of the ladino*⁴⁸ population, the largest demographic group, to which most liberals belonged. Conservatives, mostly creoles*⁴⁹ holding the greatest economic capital, were suspicious as to what greater ladino participation in government would entail for the class privileges they enjoyed.⁵⁰ The interests of the Mayans, Guatemala's largest indigenous community, were still neglected.⁵¹ They endured the greatest weight of poverty as well as the least political participation.⁵² The socio-political role of the Church was also divisive along liberal-conservative lines. Liberals implemented a separation of church and state, which the conservative pro-imperial elite opposed. The Catholic Church cemented class privilege in terms of land holding, education, and governance.⁵³

Decades long divisions, wars, and persistent militancy delegitimized constitutional authority.⁵⁴ Caudillismo emerged as the dominant political model. This was the rule or following of strong, personalist autocratic military and political leaders. Caudillismo became dominant with the increased socio-political agency of ladinos.⁵⁵ Dependency on the US was amplified by President Manuel Estrada Cabrera who assumed office in 1898. Cabrera granted a railway contract to Minor C. Keith, future UFCO Vice-President. He already owned prime banana land in the country. Cabrera would later grant Keith the entire railway track and a 99-year tax exemption, allowing him to consolidate land and infrastructure. Cabrera also sold Empresa Electrica to US Electric Bond and Share company, personally profiting over 40000\$. This exemplifies how large multinationals ingratiated themselves with corrupt Guatemalan leaders to establish a foothold in the country. Here we observe the works not of a legislative caveat but the combination of underdevelopment and a corrupt undemocratic

⁴⁸ Ladinos are the non-indigenous people of Guatemala of mixed Hispanic and Native ethnic ancestry. They are the largest demographic group of the country.

Patricia Alvarenga Venutolo. "La Construcción de la Raza en la Centroamérica de las Primeras Décadas del Siglo XX." *Anuario De Estudios Centroamericanos* 38 (2012): 13. Accessed June 1, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.uu.nl/stable/43871191>.

⁴⁹ Americans born of European blood.

⁵⁰ Patricia Alvarenga Venutolo. "La Construcción de la Raza en la Centroamérica de las Primeras Décadas del Siglo XX." *Anuario De Estudios Centroamericanos* 38 (2012): 16. Accessed June 1, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.uu.nl/stable/43871191>.

⁵¹ Patricia Alvarenga Venutolo. "La Construcción de la Raza en la Centroamérica de las Primeras Décadas del Siglo XX." *Anuario De Estudios Centroamericanos* 38 (2012): 11-39. Accessed June 16, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.uu.nl/stable/43871191>.

⁵² Anna, Timothy. "The Independence of Mexico and Central America." In *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, edited by Leslie Bethell, 471-506. The Cambridge History of Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

⁵³ Claudia Dary, et al. "Guatemala: Entre La Biblia y la Constitución." In *Antología Del Pensamiento Crítico Guatemalteco Contemporáneo*, 85. Argentina: CLACSO, 2019. Accessed June 1st, 2021. doi:10.2307/j.ctvtAnna, Timothy. "The Independence of Mexico and Central America." In *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, edited by Leslie Bethell, 471-506. The Cambridge History of Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

⁵⁴ Anna, Timothy. "The Independence of Mexico and Central America." In *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, edited by Leslie Bethell, 483-484, 506. The Cambridge History of Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 483, 506.

polity, that allowed the large-scale exertion of hegemony through acquiescence to foreign control of main economic sectors.⁵⁶

General Jorge Ubico, the last dictator prior to the ten years of spring, encouraged plantation owners to dissolve workers' rights, and at times even execute them. Ubico also gifted the UFCO tax exemptions, provided it with further land grants and did not press the company on any commitments of economic development.⁵⁷ The mass corruption, violence against peasants, Mayans, and endemic inequality could not be diplomatically resolved due to the lack of a strong democratic foundation. The mode by which Guatemalan democracy had to assert itself was through a popular uprising of a broad coalition.⁵⁸ Such was the nature of Guatemalan political affairs.

Conclusions:

Only two of the three factors mentioned above appear in Guatemala: The proliferation of Guatemalan denationalization through the influence of predatory multinationals and the cooperation of these entities with domestic political forces that arose out of the troubled Guatemalan political context, caudillos. It is critical to note the agency of domestic agents as it is one of the main differences with Chile. In Chile a robust political infrastructure, with restrictions to executive power, and a more developed economy prevented the rise of caudillismo as the dominating political force but failed to stop the same type of corporate entities from erecting the foundations of denationalization.⁵⁹

The context of each country determines its response. In Chile, the revolution was attained through purely electoral means. This is because of the existing infrastructure and the stability of state institutions which allowed the popular will to be reflected in upper echelons of government. In Guatemala, the political revolution could not be attained democratically due to the lack of proper mechanisms of government transition, the relationship of caudillos with the army, as well as systemic corruption. Thus, although the end result is comparable -a popular mobilization against a similar framework of exploitation- the radical differences of the two countries manifest themselves in the mode of emancipation from hegemonic domination. In both Chile and Guatemala, the Monroe Doctrine-based foreign policy, expelling European influence from the Americas and exerting economic control through actors like the UFCO and Anaconda. The state however has yet to directly involve itself as to safeguard such interests. Departure from this more passive approach to foreign policy is a focal point of the thesis.

⁵⁶ Stephen M. Streeter, "Overthrowing the Revolution: U.S.-Guatemalan Relations to 1954," in *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). pp. 8-12.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid. 12-13.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 12.

Chapter 2: The Corporate Overlord, The Revolutionary, & The Empire ***Cold War, Case 1: 10 Years of Spring, the Eisenhower Administration, the United Fruit Company, Anti-Communism, and the Assault on Democracy.***

Prologue:

In January of the year 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower took office as President of the United States. He was elected on a promise to take a tougher stance against international communism, especially after the “losses” of China and North Korea to weak foreign policy decisions. Early in his term, President Eisenhower gave a powerful speech that was called “The Chance for Peace”. During the speech, he stated “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities...This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense....”⁶⁰ Eisenhower had bravely, and honorably served in the European theater of WWII as Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe. For all his anti-communism, his first actions as President seem to point to a de-escalation of tensions, and to work towards an international peace forged by the mighty superpowers of the time.

Unfortunately for Guatemala, only a year after the speech, rifles roared, planes strafed and bombed towns and cities, including the capital, Guatemala City, destroying schools and hospitals as American warships blockaded the country. The achievements the sweat of laborers had attained were nullified, and the hopes of the children of the 10 years of spring became distant memories almost overnight, as the far right coupist Carlos Castillo Armas, strangled Guatemalan democracy and re-installed caudillismo. All of this was orchestrated, financed and backed by the Eisenhower administration.⁶¹

Aims, Methods and Actors:

This first Cold War chapter, set between 1944-1956, will first discuss how such hegemony was combatted during the 10 years of spring and what was the reaction in part of the hegemonic forces; Washington and the UFCO. In order to discern the nature of this reaction the human link between government and corporation will be mentioned.

⁶⁰ “Address ‘The Chance for Peace’ Delivered Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors.” The American Presidency Project, April 16, 1953, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-chance-for-peace-delivered-before-the-american-society-newspaper-editors>.

⁶¹ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, “The Battle Begins,” in *Bitter Fruit: the Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University, David Rockefeller center for Latin American Studies, 2005), pp. 7-24.

Richard H. Immerman. "Guatemala as Cold War History." *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 4 (1980): 639-649. Accessed June 18th, 2021. doi:10.2307/2150608.

Both these sources provide, in the page numbers noted, an extensive account of the invasion itself and intricately discern the all-encompassing role of both the CIA and the White House, from numbers of arms and the amount of money granted to the coupists, to CIA pilots who participated in the bombing.

The international context, at the time, like Guatemala herself, was experiencing a change. The impact of the Cold War on world politics is a core factor in both cases. This informs the contribution of this thesis: How both the 1954 coup, but also the 1973 one in Chile, represent departure points from previous foreign policy doctrines in relation to the method of hegemonic domination. In this case, virulent anti-communism, at its most intense during the 1950's, was employed as a tool by which to securitize US interests.⁶² By framing the Guatemalan government as communist, Eisenhower could cite the threat of communism as legal justification for the restoration.⁶³ This was not a new phenomenon. Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown in 1953 by a joint CIA-MI6 coup due to his nationalization of British Petroleum interests in Iran, as CIA declassified documents prove.⁶⁴ What is novel about the Guatemalan coup was that the threat of communism was fictitious, so were the justifications for it, as will be demonstrated. Guatemala became the example by which the US would justify regime change to securitize its interests, while pretending to defend continental liberty. Declassified documents however prove that within executive circles, there was no paranoid delusion about communist totalitarianism in Guatemala. The political ideology under which this process of social democratization and economic growth took place will discern what merit the communist charge held.

The Roosevelt Transition

During the early 20th century, under the Monroe Doctrine the US absorbed Europe's influence on the Americas. Several jingoistic incursions were launched against Nicaragua, Honduras, and others, in order to establish pro-American governments and protect private interests. Guatemala was never subjected to such militarist adventurism. The October Revolution of 1944, however, was a clear threat to this hegemonic and imperialistic US-Central America relationship. Yet there was no US attempt to subdue it. This was due to a foreign policy paradigm shift undertaken by FDR, toward the Good Neighbor doctrine. For a time, this truly transformed intra-continental relationships as Good Neighbor operated on realist convictions that militarism in the region only bred politico-economic instability. It is important to establish this shift as to showcase how Eisenhower then discarded Good Neighbor, proceeding to formulate his own, interventionist doctrine, the first victim of which was Guatemala.⁶⁵

⁶² Irving Louis Horowitz, "Culture, Politics, and McCarthyism." *The Independent Review* 1, no. 1 (1996): 101-10. Accessed June 18, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.uu.nl/stable/24560908>.

⁶³ Michelle Denise Getchell, "Revisiting the 1954 Coup in Guatemala: The Soviet Union, the United Nations, and "Hemispheric Solidarity"." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 17, no. 2 (2015): 83, 87. Accessed June 18, 2021. <https://www-jstor-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/stable/26926192>.

⁶⁴ "CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup," *The National Security Archive*, August 19, 2013, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/>.

⁶⁵ Fredrick B. Pike, *Fdr's Good Neighbor Policy : Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos*. 1st ed. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1995.

George Black, *The Good Neighbor: How the United States Wrote the History of Central America and the Caribbean* (New York, 1988).

Guillermo Toriello, et al. "La Batalla De Guatemala: Introducción." In *Antología Del Pensamiento Crítico Guatemalteco Contemporáneo*, 19-22. Argentina: CLACSO, 2019. Accessed June 16, 2021. doi:10.2307/j.ctvtwx2km.4.

Milestones: 1953-1969, "The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957", US State Department, Office of the Historian. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/eisenhower-doctrine> [Accessed June 10th 2021]

The Presidency of Juan Jose Arevalo: 1944-1950

Arevalo's most important contribution was the new constitution, drafted in 1944. It democratized the polity and included elements of social democratization. The constitution emphasized the dominance of the legislative assembly, freedom of political parties and increased access to voting. It also provided significant protections for labor. It established freedom of speech and of the press, the 8-hour workday, a minimum wage, paid vacation, the right to organize, join organizations and strike, and a social security system. It also set up a network of labor tribunals for the impartial assessment of disputes and dismissals.⁶⁶

An examination of Arevalo's political ideology will discern whether it is compatible with how it was framed by senior US officials. In 1959, Spruille Braden who had served as Assistant Secretary of State to President Truman, and who by 1959 was a major UFCO lobbyist, testified in Congress to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, that he thought Arevalo was "a very astute and very clever Communist."⁶⁷ In the same meeting, which concerned assessments of the threat that Fidel Castro posed, Braden, not only admits that the US supported Castillo-Armas, and that Somoza, who Braden calls a dictator, was instrumental in ridding Guatemala of Arbenz, but that the US should have done so sooner, stating "...weakness and stupidity which at first prevented the United States from taking positive action to support Col. Castillo Armas in his drive to overthrow the Arbenz Communist regime in Guatemala... Fortunately for all of us, President Somoza of Nicaragua courageously saved the day by supplying arms and planes to Castillo Armas."⁶⁸ Apart from re-enforcing the claim of how communism is framed as the threat that needs securitizing against, this source also reveals the interconnection between the UFCO and the Eisenhower administration, and the alignment of their interests. The linkage between the UFCO and the administration betrays how the process of hegemonic exertion is one in which the US government and the company work in congruence.

Arevalo was indeed astute, but a communist he was not, as his own words spell out:

"Communism is contrary to human nature, for it is contrary to the psychology of man, which is composed of great and small things, of noble and ignoble desires, of high and low instincts,

⁶⁶ Richard H. Immerman. "Guatemala as Cold War History." *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 4 (1980): 629-633. Accessed June 18th, 2021. doi:10.2307/2150608.

Stephen M. Streeter, "Overthrowing the Revolution: U.S.-Guatemalan Relations to 1954," in *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). pp. 14.

⁶⁷ Stephen M. Streeter, "Overthrowing the Revolution: U.S.-Guatemalan Relations to 1954," in *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). pp. 14, 16.; Testimony of Spruille Braden, 17 July 1959, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Communist Threat to the United States through the Caribbean*, Part 5, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1960, pp. 296.

⁶⁸ Testimony of Spruille Braden, 17 July 1959, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Communist Threat to the United States through the Caribbean*, Part 5, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1960, pp. 256. Armas corroborates the claim about Somoza in a letter he penned to his CIA handlers in mid-1953, where he literally begs the CIA for more money, "I am very sorry to have to raise this subject again but, I beg you to please send me some money as soon as possible." *Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Guatemala*, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 43. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d43> [Accessed May 27th 2021]

of capabilities and weaknesses, of frivolity and heroism. . . . Here we see the superiority of the doctrine of democracy....”⁶⁹

Such was the extent of Arevalo’s communist ties, who had actually been pressured by Washington to the point of banning communist organizing and a specific publication called “Octubre”.⁷⁰ Arevalo’s political convictions were mostly inspired by FDR and Thomas Jefferson.⁷¹ His reforms were modeled after the New Deal. Furthermore, Arevalo had pledged support to the United States should WWII ever come to be.⁷² In another instance, Arevalo expressed on what grounds progress was being attained:

“Our revolution is not explained by the hunger of the masses but by their thirst for dignity... Our socialism does not, therefore, aim at ingenious distribution of material wealth to economically equalize men who are economically different. Our socialism aims at liberating men psychologically and spiritually... We call this post-war socialism "spiritual" because in the world, as now in Guatemala, there is a fundamental change in human values. The materialistic concept has become a tool in the hands of totalitarian forces. Communism, fascism and Nazism have also been socialistic. But that is a socialism which gives food with the left hand while with the right it mutilates the moral and civic values of man.”⁷³

Spiritual socialism was a vague but romantic vision of a liberal society. It rejected any sort of Marxist analysis.⁷⁴ Ironically, Arevalo was trying to institute capitalist reforms of liberal character. Although his policies can be seen as Keynesian with regards to spending⁷⁵, labor-oriented reforms were inspired by the New Deal, in particular the 1938 National Fair Labor Standards Act that established among others, minimum wage and worktime provisions.⁷⁶ Washington had praised Arevalo’s unwillingness to implement significant land

⁶⁹ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, “The Battle Begins,” in *Bitter Fruit: the Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University, David Rockefeller center for Latin American Studies, 2005), pp. 32. The quotation is pulled from a book entitled “A New Day in Guatemala” by Samuel Guy Inman, I have attached the original citation here: Samuel Guy Inman, *A New Day in Guatemala* (Wilton, Conn.: Worldover Press, 1951), p. 13.

⁷⁰ Max Gordon. "A Case History of U. S. Subversion: Guatemala, 1954." *Science & Society* 35, no. 2 (1971): 140.

⁷¹ Richard H. Immerman. "Guatemala as Cold War History." *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 4 (1980): 631. Accessed June 18th, 2021. doi:10.2307/2150608.

⁷² Stephen M. Streeter, “Overthrowing the Revolution: U.S.-Guatemalan Relations to 1954,” in *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). pp. 14.

⁷³ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, “An Age of Reform,” in *Bitter Fruit: the Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University, David Rockefeller center for Latin American Studies, 2005), pp. 39-40.

⁷⁴ Richard H. Immerman. "Guatemala as Cold War History." *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 4 (1980): 631. Accessed June 18th, 2021. doi:10.2307/2150608.

⁷⁵ Social spending was drastically increased: education spending rose 155% from 1944 to 1950 and spending for the construction of schools and hospitals tripled in both 1945 and again in 1950. New ministries were also established for Public Health, Social Assistance, and Education and Labor. A 1950 study by US economists referenced by Max Gordon, found that income redistribution had “moderate” results favoring Indian, and dissatisfied urban families. Max Gordon. "A Case History of U. S. Subversion: Guatemala, 1954." *Science & Society* 35, no. 2 (1971): 135-136. And: Bucheli, Marcelo. “Multinational Corporations, Totalitarian Regimes and Economic Nationalism: United Fruit Company in Central America, 1899-1975.” *Business History* 50, no. 4 (2008): 444.

⁷⁶ U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division, “The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as Amended.” PDF (Washington, May 2011).

reform, by the end of his presidency though, he was accused of “demagogic incitement of the masses against the status quo.”⁷⁷ The status quo was tremendously favorable for US assets.

Capital, Land, Infrastructure, & Bananas, in the Years of Anti-Communism: United Fruit & Friends

Thomas McCann was an employee of the UFCO for twenty years, he eventually became company Vice-President. Later, he wrote a candid account of the company’s international conduct. A particularly applicable example is:

“Guatemala was chosen as the site for the company's earliest development activities at the turn of the century because a good portion of the country contained prime banana land and because at the time we entered Central America, Guatemala's government was the region's weakest, most corrupt and most pliable. In short, the country offered an 'ideal investment climate,' and United Fruit's profits there flourished for fifty years. Then something went wrong: a man named Jacobo Arbenz became President.”⁷⁸

For the first time, the UFCO saw its treasured economic hegemony defeated by a political sovereignty that was not for sale. Hegemony’s relation to monopoly merits mention. Monopoly, in this case, refers to exhaustive control over a specific market. Those intimate with the works of Adam Smith, know that for a market to be interactive, the state should intervene to dissolve monopolies. The UFCO was the epitome of monopoly. It exerted control over land, resources, and infrastructure, vital sectors of agrarian economies.

The company was the largest landowner, employer, exporter, and transporter of goods. Caudillos saw the UFCO as an actor who could not only bring intensive capital investment, but who also could modernize countries lacking infrastructure. Such modernization required infrastructure. The IRCA gained a 99-year tax exemption in 1901, as part of a deal to construct a railway connecting Guatemala City to Puerto Barrios, the only Caribbean port in the country, which the company owned and controlled. The UFCO was granted land and transportation concessions.⁷⁹ During the 1930’s the IRCA was essentially absorbed by the UFCO.⁸⁰ Therefore, the UFCO owned the land, the railways, and the most profitable port. The Electric Bond and Shares company was also the only utilities company whose underperforming services were available.

Marcelo Bucheli rightly points out “The period of the ‘Banana Republics’ shows that the less democratic a government was, the more inclined it was to accommodate itself to the interests of the United States and United Fruit.”⁸¹ Such interests were not compatible with an emerging democratic polity. Holding productivity levels hostage, gave the UFCO tremendous influence over political affairs, since it could generate an unemployment crisis overnight.

⁷⁷ Stephen M. Streeter, “Overthrowing the Revolution: U.S.-Guatemalan Relations to 1954,” in *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000), pp. 15. The quotation has been taken from Streeter’s book, the original citation is attached here: “The embassy’s comment is quoted in Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 102.”

⁷⁸ Thomas McCann, *An American Company: The Tragedy of United Fruit* (New York: Crown, 1976) pp. 17.

⁷⁹ Marcelo Bucheli. “Multinational Corporations, Totalitarian Regimes and Economic Nationalism: United Fruit Company in Central America, 1899-1975.” *Business History* 50, no. 4 (2008): 441.

⁸⁰ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, “The Overlord: The United Fruit Company” in *Bitter Fruit: the Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University, David Rockefeller center for Latin American Studies, 2005), pp. 70-71.

⁸¹ Marcelo Bucheli. “Multinational Corporations, Totalitarian Regimes and Economic Nationalism: United Fruit Company in Central America, 1899-1975.” *Business History* 50, no. 4 (2008): 443.

This is how the concept of hegemony becomes an almost political model of its own, within the state its exerted onto.

Arbenz would proceed to target monopolistic semi-feudal practices through state competition and legislation.⁸² This would harm corporate interests greatly, while benefitting the Guatemalan people. However, US interests were antithetical to the people's interests as an exchange between Eisenhower and the US Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey in 1954 affirms: "We should.... stop talking about democracy and make it clear that we are quite willing to support dictatorships of the right if their policies are pro-American." Stated Humphrey, to which Eisenhower responded in a now famous line, "you mean they're OK if they're *our* s.o.b's [sons of bitches]?" Humphrey then stated that the US "was being much too idealistic in its relations with other nations. Whatever we may choose to say in public about ideas and idealism, among ourselves we've got to be a great deal more practical and materialistic."⁸³ This exchange showcases how the US establishment, was exerting political and economic hegemony as a policy framed in realpolitik terms, irrespective of people's lack of consent to pro-Americanism.

The commitment to supporting anti-democratic forces, militarily if necessary, speaks to a departure from Good Neighbor, but also to the interplay between the three factors that connect the Guatemalan and Chilean cold war chapters: foreign capital interests, US foreign policy, and local actors. What is also interesting is that the above exchange took place after the coup in Guatemala, from this angle we can gauge that the events in Guatemala usher a new paradigm of global power-politics. Guatemala was not the first case of instigating a coup to protect private interests, that was the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran. It also wasn't the first case of intervention along cold-war terms, that was during the Greek civil war. Mossadegh and the Greek war both had a communist character to them.

What is novel about this case is the fusion of intervention justified in cold war anti-communist terms, without there being any communism or Soviet influence to oppose. This is in order to protect US interests reflected by multinationals, by installing knowingly anti-democratic far-right regimes which promoted a cartel-predatory capitalist model pillared by Washington. This was a case of *economic* securitization, half of the main theoretical analytical framework of the thesis, the other being hegemony. They are however dependent on each other as the survival of hegemony against Arbenz relies on the securitizing process. The securitizing actors, in this case Washington and the UFCO, invoke *extraordinary* measures as to protect a set of acquired values, termed the referent object, in this case capital interests framed under the cloak of anti-communism, from a looming threat, termed the referent subject.⁸⁴ Obviously, the threat cannot be framed as a country democratizing at unprecedented rates, with exuberant increases in political and individual freedoms. Thus, the threat becomes fictitious communist ties.

⁸² Richard H. Immerman. "Guatemala as Cold War History." *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 4 (1980): 634. Accessed June 18th, 2021. doi:10.2307/2150608.

⁸³ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part I, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 143. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d143> [Accessed April 25th 2021]

⁸⁴ Beatrice De Graaf, and Cornel Zwierlein. "Historicizing Security - Entering the Conspiracy Dispositive." *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* 38, no. 1 (143) (2013). 59.

Two other examples can be utilized under the scope of anti-communist securitization. The first is a shipment of arms, ordered by the Arbenz government from Czechoslovakia.⁸⁵ Washington used this to prove some communist conspiracy looking to subvert US influence in the western hemisphere. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated the following during a press conference on the communist threat in Guatemala: "...subsequent developments in the way of this surreptitious shipment of arms into Guatemala from behind the Iron Curtain."⁸⁶ The caveat is that the US had imposed an arms embargo on the country, forcing Arbenz to update archaic military equipment by turning to the communist bloc. The second was that Arbenz had ties to the USSR and that the Soviets were looking to build airfields capable of carrying bombers to the Panama Canal and the US mainland.⁸⁷ This was not the case, and a CIA report found that the USSR did not influence Arbenz, and that the only Soviet affiliate was the PGT. The PGT was even opposed to bringing soviet-style communism to Guatemala insisting to Arbenz the most the country could hope for were the foundations of an agricultural capitalist economy. During the same press conference, on June 8th 1954, Dulles stated:

"There is a persistent effort by the authorities in Guatemala to represent the present problem there as primarily a problem between Guatemala and the United States relating to the United Fruit Company... If the United Fruit matter were settled, if they gave a gold piece for every banana, the problem would remain just as it is today as far as the presence of Communist infiltration in Guatemala is concerned. That is the problem, not the United Fruit Company."⁸⁸

Dulles once worked for a Boston Law firm which represented the UFCO in a contract negotiation in Guatemala in 1936. Now, Dulles was on the *board* of that firm, Sullivan and Cromwell, which also represented the IRCA, a UFCO subsidiary. His brother Allen was head of the CIA.⁸⁹ This showcases another instance in which we can observe the extreme interconnection between Washington's political establishment and the company, thus a direct alignment of their interests.

Enter the Radical: The Arbenz Presidency, 1950-1954

Jacobo Arbenz Guzman immediately instigated efforts to undermine the private monopolies of resources, land, infrastructure, and energy. This was in order to establish state competition to the UFCO and Electric Bond. A World Bank study on the Guatemalan economy found that inadequate transportation, monopolization, and tax exemptions were the primary agents of underdevelopment. According to the 1951 study, the state was losing

⁸⁵ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, "The Secret Voyage of the "Alfhem" in *Bitter Fruit: the Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University, David Rockefeller center for Latin American Studies, 2005), pp. 148-150, 160.

⁸⁶ United States, and United States. Department of State. Historical Office. *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955 : Basic Documents*. Department of State Publication ; General Foreign Policy Series, 6446. pp. 1310. Washington: For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957.

⁸⁷ Stephen M. Streeter, "Overthrowing the Revolution: U.S.-Guatemalan Relations to 1954," in *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). pp. 14-15.

⁸⁸ *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents*. Department of State Publication ; General Foreign Policy Series, 6446. pp. 1310. Washington: For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957.

⁸⁹ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, "The Secret Voyage of the "Alfhem" in *Bitter Fruit: the Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University, David Rockefeller center for Latin American Studies, 2005), pp. 106.

2.000.000\$ annually to previously granted exemptions.⁹⁰ The UFCO had historically undervalued land holdings for tax purposes. Arbenz wanted to dissolve monopolies through state competition. The most important measures were the planned construction of a highway which would run parallel to the IRCA railway, the construction of a state-owned port in the Caribbean, challenging the primacy of Puerto Barrios and also the plan to build a hydroelectric plant by which to provide cheap energy, and diversify the economy.⁹¹

In 1952, Congress ratified Decree 900. This was an agrarian reform law that created agrarian councils which would nationalize then re-distribute unused land of estates of over 672 acres.⁹² The UFCO owned about 550.000 acres of prime banana land, over two-thirds of which remained uncultivated. By 1954 about 359.000 acres were expropriated under Decree 900. Little under 2\$ million was offered in compensation. The company formally protested requesting from 15\$ to 19\$ million, it was denied. In 1951, before the land reforms, a UFCO senior official, Walter Turnbull, had been dispatched to negotiate with the new administration. He demanded the status quo remain. Arbenz simply replied that the company would now have to respect the state's role as arbiter of land and labor disputes, and that it increases efforts to respect the rule of law. Baffled, Turnbull refused. The company fired 4000 workers from one of its plantations. Arbenz expropriated 26.000 acres and forced the company to negotiate with union leaders as to re-hire workers and pay back wages worth 650.000\$. For the first time, the Guatemalan state had asserted its interests over those of foreign capital. The grip of the US was weakening. Half a million people directly benefited from the reforms, out a three million population. The impact of material reform was unprecedented.⁹³

Restoring Hegemony: The Empire Strikes Back

Ironically, although Washington had toppled a government to protect the UFCO, the company was accused of breaking anti-trust statutes stateside. The lawsuit that had been filed was delayed as to not coincide with the coup. This caused humiliation for the establishment since it had proven that in a robust legal system, the UFCO would be held accountable to its

⁹⁰ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Guatemala: Summary of a Report of a Mission*. (Washington, D.C., 1951), pp. 81.

⁹¹ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, "The Secret Voyage of the "Alfhem" in *Bitter Fruit: the Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University, David Rockefeller center for Latin American Studies, 2005), pp. 74-76.

Bucheli, Marcelo. "Multinational Corporations, Totalitarian Regimes and Economic Nationalism: United Fruit Company in Central America, 1899-1975." *Business History* 50, no. 4 (2008): 444.

Max Gordon. "A Case History of U. S. Subversion: Guatemala, 1954." *Science & Society* 35, no. 2 (1971): 137-138.

Richard H. Immerman. "Guatemala as Cold War History." *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 4 (1980): 634-635. Accessed June 18th, 2021. doi:10.2307/2150608.

⁹² Jacobo Arbenz, Marco A. Villamar Contreras, Alfonso Fortuny, Roberto Fanjul, "Decreto 900," *Diario Oficial de la Republica de Guatemala*, Impreso de Tipografia Nacional, Guatemala, Guatemala City, (1952), pp. 1-6.

Stephen M. Streeter, "Overthrowing the Revolution: U.S.-Guatemalan Relations to 1954," in *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). pp. 18.

⁹³ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, "The Overlord: The United Fruit Company" in *Bitter Fruit: the Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University, David Rockefeller center for Latin American Studies, 2005), pp. 74-76.

monopolistic practices. This frames the UFCO as an instrument of hegemony. Streeter quotes a Guatemalan post-coup official exposing the hypocrisy: “Now that we have fought a war to rescue the country, including this North American business organization [UFCO], from the Reds, you come along and openly confirm what they had been saying about the company and us.” The UFCO settled out of court with the Justice Department.

After the coup, the restoration of hegemony was two-fold, on the political and economic fronts. Land was returned to corporate overlords, and unions were dissolved, decimating wages, as Armas revoked the 1944 constitution.⁹⁴ Violent political persecutions followed.⁹⁵ A State Department official stated: “The revolution in Guatemala is nationalist and anti-Yanqui in its own right. It is... a movement for “social justice” and reform. If the international Communist movement had gained no foothold at all in Guatemala one might expect that the United Fruit Company, the Railways, and the Electric Power Company... would still be the victims of persecution in Guatemala...”⁹⁶ The statement reveals Washington’s knowledge of the true political character of Guatemalan reformists, directly contradicting Dulles’s 1954 statements, exposing them to be a communicative tool of securitization by their inflammatory and public nature.⁹⁷

The hegemonic restoration in Guatemala is much simpler than in Chile. Eisenhower wished to convert the country into a “showcase” of the dynamism of private investment, by diversifying the economy, *exactly* what Arbenz attempting with domestic means and international loans.⁹⁸ The same process was taken over by Washington and US private investment into new sectors like mining and banking. The result was disastrous, proving FDR’s Good Neighbor as more successful as the 1954 invasion destabilized the country for decades. The issue of anti-communism would later be cited to justify a genocide of Mayans by racist Evangelical dictator Rios Mont.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume VII, American Republics: Central and South America*, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 35. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v07/d35> [Accessed June 18th 2021]

⁹⁵ Stephen M. Streeter, “Salvaging the Multinational Corporations: UFCO, IRCA, Empresa Electrica” in *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). pp. 165-173.

⁹⁶ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part I*, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 457. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d457> [Accessed May 28th 2021]

⁹⁷ Guillermo Toriello, et al. "La Batalla De Guatemala: Introducción." In *Antología Del Pensamiento Crítico Guatemalteco Contemporáneo, 19-22*. Argentina: CLACSO, 2019. Accessed June 16, 2021. doi:10.2307/j.ctvtwx2km.4.

⁹⁸ Stephen M. Streeter, “Salvaging the Multinational Corporations: UFCO, IRCA, Empresa Electrica” in *Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). pp. 164.

⁹⁹ Anika Oettler. Report. German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2006. pp. 5-26. Accessed June 18, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.uu.nl/stable/resrep07565>.

Yoc Cosajay, Aura Marina. "Violencia Sexual a Mujeres Indigenas Durante El Conflicto Armado Interno Y El Genocidio En Guatemala." *Caravelle* (1988-), no. 102 (2014): 157-62. Accessed June 18, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.uu.nl/stable/43863901>.

Adam Jones, “Genocides of Indigenous Peoples,” in *Genocide: a Comprehensive Introduction* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2017).

Chapter 3: The Peaceful Socialist, The Bloodthirsty Dictator, & The Diplomat

Cold War, Case 2: Nationalism, Socialism, Fascism, Neoliberalism; The Chilean Convergence

Prologue:

In 1987, writing for World Affairs magazine, Mark Falcoff authored an article on the political situation in Chile, as the fascist¹⁰⁰ Pinochet regime was reaching its nadir. Falcoff excoriates former socialist president Allende, leveling a stringent catechism of his years in power, even going so far as to write that “Allende sought to pervert democratic institutions in such a way as to accomplish a ‘transition to socialism’ over the heads of the Chilean electorate.”¹⁰¹ This was historical revisionism of the highest order, and as revisionism often is, historically illiterate as well. There is no engagement on his part as to what caused the failures of the Allende regime, or why the economic downturn was so rapidly aggressive. It is treated as a domestic matter of policy whereas it was not. The Nixon white house would destabilize the economy to an extreme degree, in order for a military coup to be justified. The days of rampant anti-communism were over, and a more tactful approach was required; it took the form of Dr. Henry Kissinger. However, Falcoff also expresses how much worse dictator Augusto Pinochet was, who unleashed an unprecedented wave of violence onto Chile, the oldest South American democracy. By 1985, the political situation in Chile had become untenable, only 5% of the population expressed appeal toward any national leadership figure, at a time when almost *half* the population was below the poverty line. Minimal social spending resulted “in severe deterioration in the coverage and quality of public health services, lower wages for teachers, and lower pensions for the elderly.”¹⁰²

Aims Methods & Actors:

The primary aims of the chapter are to discuss how the exertion of economic and financial hegemony was practiced, how the hegemonic framework was weakened during the presidency of Salvador Allende, the reaction of hegemonic forces, and finally, the restoration and its impact. This will be done in comparison to the previous case of Guatemala. In any other context, these countries are incomparable. The comparison therefore is only viable through the hegemonic framework.

These cases are connected by three factors; the historical exertion of hegemony through similar tools that create dependency -multinational corporations-, the political

¹⁰⁰ There is a scholarly debate on whether the label fascist is accurate when applies to Pinochet and his regime. Journalist and author Samuel Chavkin repeatedly levels the charge against the Pinochet regime in *Storm Over Chile: The Junta Under Siege*. Chilean Historian Gabriel Salazar also links Pinochet to facets of fascist leadership. Other scholars however find that there is no palingenetic ultranationalism in Pinochet’s rhetoric. However there is creole nationalism and racial classification to be identified. Also, Chile did not have the pre-history to stage a revisionist rebirth of a “glorious” past as in Italy, Germany, or Spain, therefore the palingenetic argument falls flat in face of historical comparison.

¹⁰¹ Mark Falcoff. "Chile: Pinochet, the Opposition, and the United States." *World Affairs* 149, no. 4 (1987): 183-94. Accessed June 12, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672111>.

¹⁰² Alejandro Foxley, “Successes and Failures in Poverty Eradication: Chile ,” World Bank, May 24, 2004, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/292491468743165841/pdf/308060CL0poverty01see0also0307591.pdf>.

revolutions that weakened hegemony through economic nationalism and socialism, and the counterrevolutions that suppressed democracy and re-asserted hegemony. In both cases three groups of actors contribute to this process: multinationals, Washington, and domestic forces, aligned with both private capital interests and Washington's national interests. The framework of control is in both cases inextricable from the political economy. The framework of restoration is similar in terms of violence, but divergent in terms of the international context in which it transpires. The effect of restoration is again very similar, that is the proliferation of objective, or structural violence. This refers to violence exerted not by a subjective actor but rather imposed by objective circumstance.

The main contribution to the historiographical record of the previous chapter was centered on how the Guatemalan case represents a departure from the previous foreign policy doctrine, the Good Neighbor. The new paradigm relied on an international system of securitization, based on the surging anti-communism of the 1950's. Whether or not a communist presence in Guatemala was what was threatening capital interests was irrelevant in the schema of global securitization. This would become the Eisenhower doctrine, adopted in 1957, invoking communism as legal justification for international intervention.¹⁰³ This practice however had started in Caracas in 1954, during the Organization of American States meeting, in which an anti-communist resolution was passed and later cited as justification for intervention.¹⁰⁴ Guatemala was the inflection point after which the Eisenhower White House would devolve into the practice of supporting dictatorships of the right, should they be "pro-American".¹⁰⁵ This captures half of the central theme this thesis: the way that in restoring hegemony, successive US administrations would shift into a new foreign policy paradigm by the nature of the counterrevolution they mounted, but also by the international geopolitical context. Chile represents the other half, as this chapter will demonstrate.

The more advanced political infrastructure and economy of Chile add a layer of complexity that needs to be studied in conjunction with international developments, both in economic theory and the image that was now associated with Washington interventionism. As for the latter, the Vietnam war, but also the Guatemala intervention had severe consequences for Washington's prestige and international image, and the political zeitgeist was therefore not as amenable to anti-communist incursions. Due to these developments, the Chilean intervention needed to first acquire material justification. This is why Nixon and Kissinger would destabilize the economy of Chile to an extreme degree, as to justify the incoming onslaught of reforms.¹⁰⁶ These reforms however, theorized by Milton Friedman,

¹⁰³ *Milestones: 1953-1969*, "The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957". <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/eisenhower-doctrine> [Accessed June 10th 2021]

¹⁰⁴ Mark T. Hove. "The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, U.S.-Chilean Relations, and the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala." *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 4 (2007): 623-30. Accessed May 20th, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24916199>.

¹⁰⁵ Found in the State Department's Office of the Historian. "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part I", "Memorandum of Discussion of the 229th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 1st, 1954.": <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d143> [Accessed April 25th 2021]

¹⁰⁶ Lubna Z. Qureshi, "Undermining the Chilean Experiment: 1971" in *Nixon, Kissinger, Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 85-105.

Caputo, Orlando, and Graciela Galarce. "Economía Y Correlación De Fuerzas En El Gobierno De Allende 1970-1973." In *La Vía Chilena Al Socialismo 50 Años Después: Tomo I. Historia*, edited by Henry Robert Austin, Vasconcelos Joana Salém, and Ramírez Viviana Canibilo, 361-96. Ciudad De Buenos Aires, Argentina: CLACSO, 2020. Accessed April 17th, 2021. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1gm023v.23.

"'Chile', Memorandum of Conversation with Anaconda Copper Executives, 17 August 1971, White House, Memoranda and Letters Attached, Confidential," National Security Archive Publishes Digitized Set of 2,100 Henry Kissinger "Memcons" Recounting the Secret Diplomacy of the Nixon-Ford Era, May 26, 2006, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB193/>

would also require the transformation of the state into a tool of authoritarian social and political control which would alter social relations to the benefit of monetary capital over labor capital.¹⁰⁷ This produces a dissonance that detracts from the supposedly scientific validity of neoliberalism, ironically, the first time this model of market orthodoxy was applied, it was through the barrel of a gun, rather than through rational, individual choice. It also failed disastrously.¹⁰⁸

Creating the Nemesis: The Radicalization of Salvador Allende

This section revolves around a historical event that renders the comparison of these cases not solely one of my own political choices but rather of organic historical developments. During the early 1950's, Washington had a high regard for Allende, who had considered the United States as an international example in the fight against fascism. He had also praised Roosevelt for the Good Neighbor policy which allowed for the democratization of states like Guatemala, now underway to becoming a modern capitalist economy.¹⁰⁹ This all changed during the OAS meeting in Caracas in March 1954, where Secretary Dulles was attempting to legitimize the threat to democracy that the Guatemalan government was branded as. This was clearly an issue of securitization, framing the narrative in such a way as to portray communism as a present threat endangering "acquired values" of the American states. The US put forth an anti-communist resolution vote, which they could then cite as legal currency for intervention. Although Chile casted an affirmative vote, this was against the popular will.¹¹⁰ It also angered Allende who stated that the resolution was a propagandistic attack that left the:

"impression that the mountains of [our] countries are infested with communists, that our coasts are full of communist ships, that the small country of Guatemala threatens the existence of the largest of the bourgeois countries. Like David and Goliath. But Guatemala does not have a sling. Its only sling is showing the road to follow for introducing progress and liberty in the nations of America."¹¹¹

The resolution and the conduct of Secretary of State Dulles showed that the United States was not interested in tackling the economic challenges American countries were

"'Extreme Option: Overthrow Allende'," National Security Archive, September 21, 2020, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2020-09-15/extreme-option-overthrow-allen>

¹⁰⁷ Naomi Klein, "The Other Doctor Shock: Milton Friedman and the Search for a Laissez-Faire Laboratory," in *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, 1st (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), pp. 49-71. Marcus Taylor. "'Chicago to the Rescue' – The Emergence of Neoliberalism in Chile" in: *From Pinochet to the 'Third Way': Neoliberalism and Social Transformation in Chile*. London: Pluto Press, 2006. pp. 30-52. Accessed June 12, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

¹⁰⁸ Alejandro Foxley, "Successes and Failures in Poverty Eradication: Chile," World Bank, May 24, 2004, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/292491468743165841/pdf/308060CL0poverty01see0also0307591.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ Lubna Z. Qureshi, "Early U.S.-Chilean Relations," in *Nixon, Kissinger, Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 23.

Mark T. Hove. "The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, U.S.-Chilean Relations, and the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala." *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 4 (2007): 651. Accessed May 20th, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24916199>.

¹¹⁰Mark T. Hove. "The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, U.S.-Chilean Relations, and the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala." *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 4 (2007): 624. Accessed May 20th, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24916199>.

¹¹¹ Ibid. 634.

facing. Dulles left ten minutes after the resolution was passed.¹¹² Allende would decry the approval of the resolution stating “It pains me that our country had not made common cause with this small and great nation [of Guatemala].”¹¹³ Arbenz was overthrown, and scores of protests took Chile by storm. One of such protests was led by Allende, his future presidential rival Eduardo Frei, and poet Pablo Neruda. They chanted the Chilean national anthem in front of the Guatemalan embassy in a touching display of international solidarity. Congress passed a resolution decrying the jingoistic intervention of the US. Chilean hearts and minds were lost overnight, and Allende would never forget that when Latin American nations embarked on a path of autarky, the US no longer stood behind their democratic ideals.¹¹⁴ In a letter penned by Chilean students to Eisenhower in 1960, they wrote “If the injustices of today [poverty, starvation, illiteracy, lack of civil rights] are all that Christianity or democracy can offer this continent, no one should be surprised if the best children of these nations turn toward Communism.”¹¹⁵ Allende stated in 1958 “the [U.S.] Department of State insists upon a policy that is odious and anti-popular. . . We Chileans demand the right to seek our own solutions and to follow the roads that best suit our habits and traditions.”¹¹⁶

Marxism, for Real This Time: The Presidency of Salvador Allende

Academic scholarship has reached a consensus that the downfall of the ten years of spring was due to employing anti-communism as a diplomatic cover for the restoration of US politico-economic hegemony. Contrastingly, the Chilean case lacks consensus. Left-leaning scholarship suggests that the economic deterioration experienced by Chile by the end of Allende’s time in office was more so due to interference from Nixon, Kissinger, but also Anaconda and Kennecott. Others place the blame on the misguided macroeconomic policies of the UP which resulted in very high inflation and a dramatic decrease of real wages. Economists and politicians like Larrain and Meller examine UP’s economic program divorcing it from international trends, stating that macroeconomic tunnel vision and bad state investments crippled economic growth.¹¹⁷ Other Latin American scholars like Orlando Caputo and Graciela Galarce, examine both domestic failures and their interconnection with international pressures.¹¹⁸

According to Larrain and Meller, the diagnosis of Allende’s coalition of leftist parties, Unidad Popular (UP) was three-fold. Much like Guatemala, Allende asserted that the three main trends that needed tackling were monopolies, dependence on the US, and the domestic oligarchy which owned most large estates.¹¹⁹ In 1970, Congress passed a constitutional amendment that allowed for the expropriation of private property. Allende nationalized the copper industry, among others, and redistributed land. Compensation would be granted to all

¹¹² Mark T. Hove. "The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, U.S.-Chilean Relations, and the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala." *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 4 (2007): 634. Accessed May 20th, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24916199>.

¹¹³ Ibid. 636.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. 639.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. 653.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. 661.

¹¹⁷ Felipe Larrain and Patricio Meller, “The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience, 1970-1973,” in *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America: a National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1991), pp. 218-221.

¹¹⁸ Caputo, Orlando, and Graciela Galarce. "Economía Y Correlación De Fuerzas En El Gobierno De Allende 1970-1973." In *La Vía Chilena Al Socialismo 50 Años Después: Tomo I. Historia*, edited by Henry Robert Austin, Vasconcelos Joana Salém, and Ramírez Viviana Canibilo, 361-96. Ciudad De Buenos Aires, Argentina: CLACSO, 2020. Accessed April 17th, 2021. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1gm023v.23.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

companies except for Anaconda and Kennecott due to a provision allowing for deductions in case of excess profits. Public wealth from nationalization and higher copper pricing would increase social spending, which rose to 70%. Employment opportunities and wages rose significantly, especially in the periphery. Coupled with price controls and high tariffs, inflation was stabilized and decreased. In 1970-1971, real wages increased by 22%, while the inflation rate fell to 22% from 36%. The economy grew by 8% and unemployment fell to under 4%. Even right-leaning economists like Larrain describe these numbers as remarkable.¹²⁰ The UP economic program aimed at reforming living conditions by shifting social relations of production in favor of labor capital.¹²¹

Financial Fury

“Make the economy scream” Nixon said after Allende’s election, in a meeting with former Attorney General turned convict John Mitchel, Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor, and CIA Director Richard Helms in September 1970.¹²² The United States would proceed to successfully destabilize the Chilean economy. Nixon ordered Chilean government bank accounts in US banks to be frozen. The US would also stop buying Chilean copper. Allende turned to Western Europe, but Kennecott would engage in legal action against shipments claiming them to be their property, unlawfully seized.¹²³ This information seems to escape the purview of Allende critics, which reveals the extent to which the influence of the United States and US multinationals impacted objective circumstance which placed constraints on the agency of the Allende government.

Employing this declassified source in the framework of hegemony coupled with securitization, answers part of the the *how* component, as to the methods by which hegemony was restored. The directive to destabilize the economy betrays that hegemony is unavoidably connected to dependency; when there is a break from dependency, there is a counteroffensive to re-assert it. This is the case for both Guatemala and Chile. Dependency ensures the exertion of hegemony. In turn, dependency is created through multinational corporations.

¹²⁰Felipe Larrain and Patricio Meller, “The Socialist-Populist Chilean Experience, 1970-1973,” in *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America: a National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1991), pp. 175-221.

¹²¹The vision of the UP, was to slowly disintegrate the private holding of the means of production, bringing them under the control of workers. Not only would this increase employment and wages massively, it would also allow for much better working conditions while reducing the coercive aspect of employer-employee relations by bridging the gap in the bargaining power between the two.

Chitelco, a subsidiary of US multinational ITT, a telecommunications giant, was also brought under state control, paying ITT 24\$ million in compensation.

Lubna Z. Qureshi, “Undermining the Chilean Experiment: 1971” in *Nixon, Kissinger, Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 85-105.

Caputo, Orlando, and Graciela Galarce. "Economía Y Correlación De Fuerzas En El Gobierno De Allende 1970-1973." In *La Vía Chilena Al Socialismo 50 Años Después: Tomo I. Historia*, edited by Henry Robert Austin, Vasconcelos Joana Salém, and Ramírez Viviana Canibilo, 361-84. Ciudad De Buenos Aires, Argentina: CLACSO, 2020. Accessed April 17th, 2021. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1gm023v.23.

Ávalos, Beatrice. "Luchando Por Educación “para Todas Y Todos”.: La Visión Educacional De La Unidad Popular Y De Salvador Allende." In *La Vía Chilena Al Socialismo 50 Años Después: Tomo II. Memoria*, edited by Henry Robert Austin, Vasconcelos Joana Salém, and Ramírez Viviana Canibilo, 155-74. Argentina: CLACSO, 2020. Accessed May 30th, 2021. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1gm02mm.14.

¹²² “Extreme Option: Overthrow Allende’ ,” National Security Archive, September 21, 2020, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2020-09-15/extreme-option-overthrow-allende>.

¹²³ Lubna Z. Qureshi, “Undermining the Chilean Experiment: 1971” in *Nixon, Kissinger, Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 85-105.

These perform the economic and financial actions by which they establish a controlling influence over the subject nations' economy. In Guatemala, this was through reliance on the cultivation and export of foodstuffs by means owned by corporations. In Chile, dependency was created through control of natural resources and a mono-export culture, but also through debt, mounted on years' worth of loans.

US Secretary of the Treasury John Connally pressured World Bank director Robert McNamara to stop issuing further loans to Chile, so did the Inter-American Bank and the Exim Bank.¹²⁴ The Exim cutoff impeded Chile from importing Boeing jets, pushing them to buy far costlier Soviet-made planes. Ambassador to the US Orlando Lettelier, met with Kissinger to discuss the issue of lines of credit. While feigning ignorance of the matter, Kissinger had met with an Exim official to prevent the loan. According to Qureshi, Kissinger told Nixon the following over the phone: "He [Exim official] can attach banking conditions, which, if they don't come across on expropriation, enable us to prevent the thing [loan] from coming through. What they would do is retrieve the application and process it over a period longer than the expropriation hearings."¹²⁵ In addition to this, in 1972, Washington exploited the massive debt that previous administrations had accumulated, which stood at 4\$ billion. A credit blockade was imposed, thus 30% of export earnings went to financing the debt. The US refused to reschedule or re-negotiate the foreign debt.¹²⁶ The result of increased spending with no credit to finance its debt obligations was massive inflation. The punitive credit policy can be partly attributed to pressures and recommendations by Anaconda and Kennecott, which were vying to re-acquire their assets in Chile.¹²⁷

In 1971, Kissinger met Anaconda President John Place and Vice-Chairman of the board William Quigley, to discuss the expropriation of Anaconda holdings. Quigley suggests that "if they [UP] do not reach fair settlements, we will make every effort to cut off their access to international credit, but if they reach fair settlements, we would be willing to have normal relations." Kissinger had other ideas. He maintained "that we not open credits no matter what Allende does with regard to Anaconda." And that "we should keep the pressure on Allende now while there is still a chance that he might be overthrown."¹²⁸

This source displays the clear-cut attempts at economic destabilization by both Kissinger and Anaconda executives. While Quigley is only concerned with company interests, Kissinger's goal is restoration. This document is critical in displaying the methods and aims of counterrevolutionary practices under the scope of the international context. Kissinger uses financial instruments in order to destabilize the government to the point of its overthrow. The alignment of private and state interests assumes a forefront role in the restoration. Kissinger seems more bent on destroying the socialist experiment than the predatory multinational is, showcasing the political implications of hegemony. "Political society" cannot allow dissent to the hegemony it exerts. If such dissent is successful, then hegemony becomes discredited. In 1970, a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon corroborating that a military coup was inviable, reveals how Kissinger presented options on

¹²⁴Ibid. 89.

¹²⁵ Ibid. 90.

¹²⁶ Ibid. 115.

Marcus Taylor. "The Rise and Crisis of Developmentalism" in: *From Pinochet to the 'Third Way': Neoliberalism and Social Transformation in Chile*. London: Pluto Press, 2006. pp. 27. Accessed June 12, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

¹²⁷ Ibid. 90.

¹²⁸ "'Chile', Memorandum of Conversation with Anaconda Copper Executives, 17 August 1971, White House, Memoranda and Letters Attached, Confidential," National Security Archive Publishes Digitized Set of 2,100 Henry Kissinger "Memcons" Recounting the Secret Diplomacy of the Nixon-Ford Era, May 26, 2006, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB193/>.

how to destabilize the Allende regime.¹²⁹ Since there was no support for a military coup, Kissinger replaces the Eisenhower doctrine with a tactful use of financialized capitalism, to induce the conditions by which a coup can be justified materially, rather than through anti-communism, which the international context was no longer amenable to. Thus, securitization assumes a softer, seemingly detached approach. This marks another foreign policy paradigm shift.

The Radical Right Converges: Politics & Economics of the Chilean Restoration

Allende had desired Chile to take an influential position in the non-aligned movement. Chile's socialism, as opposed to Soviet-style communism would be peaceful, a powerful example of the Third World shedding the shackles of dependency. When the days turned sour, the efforts of Washington having succeeded, neither the USSR nor China came to the rescue of the peaceful socialist. Even by the end, when the CIA, and the army were plotting the end of the experiment, Allende refused to arm his own Socialist Party. Such was his will to peace.¹³⁰ A week before the coup, when polarization was manifest in everyday situations and the economy was in shambles, a million Chileans marched past the Presidential palace, and chanted that they, the people, would defend Allende. They did try. Falcoff's revisionism portraying the coupists as widely supported, remains historically illiterate, as a million Chileans prove. Allende informed Pinochet, the head of the armed forces, of his intention to hold a referendum on his government, a week before the coup. Qureshi points out that if Pinochet was confident that there was virtually no support for the government, he would have cancelled the coup. A transition to centrism did not satisfy his ambitions.¹³¹

On September 11th 1973, the armed forces of Chile, after purging all opposition to the coup from their ranks, violently took power. Allende, besieged, committed suicide and a new hyperviolent period was ushered. At least 3000 were killed, and tens of thousands suffered in unimaginable ways in football stadiums turned into elaborate torture facilities.¹³² Democracy was wholeheartedly abolished.¹³³ A noted conservative Judge in Chile, Juan Guzman, thought the coup would usher in a renewed normalcy, "but that never happened, we had Pinochet for 17 years" he says, "when I started realizing as a judge that most of the people that had been killed were paupers, very poor people, old women, old men, lots of outlaws also, some kids, then I realized that this was really a slaughter." Guzman, who eventually indicted Pinochet for permanent kidnappings and aggravated homicides, would answer the question "Do you think he [Kissinger] should have been put on trial?", in a 2016 interview, with "Yes".¹³⁴

¹²⁹ "Kissinger and Chile: The Declassified Record on Regime Change 'Kissinger, Memorandum for the President, "Covert Action Program-Chile, November 25, 1970."," National Security Archive, accessed April 20, 2021, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/>.

¹³⁰ Lubna Z. Qureshi, "Allende's Fall: 1972 & 1973" in *Nixon, Kissinger, Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 111-137.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² "Truth Commission: Chile 90," United States Institute of Peace (United States Institute of Peace, October 2, 2014), <https://www.usip.org/publications/1990/05/truth-commission-chile-90>.

¹³³ Ibid. And: Lubna Z. Qureshi, "Allende's Fall: 1972 & 1973" in *Nixon, Kissinger, Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 111-137.

¹³⁴ IdahoPTV, "Dialogue: Judge Juan Guzman," YouTube (YouTube, April 10, 2016), Minute: 24:34. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGQH8MyVoXM&ab_channel=IdahoPublicTelevision.

Lubna Z. Qureshi, "Allende's Fall: 1972 & 1973" in *Nixon, Kissinger, Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 136.

The extent of Kissinger's involvement would be later revealed as extensive, upon declassification of sensitive materials. One of such, are the minutes of a Washington Special Activities Group meeting where economic assistance and debt rescheduling for the fascistic regime are approved, showcasing the immediate re-establishment of friendly relations by removing tools of destabilization like the credit blockade.¹³⁵ By supplying the means to stabilize an economy they themselves, had thrown into Tartarus, the US supported a pro-American dictatorship of the right, that consented to hegemonic restoration. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Jack Kubisch stated, "Our policy on Allende worked very well." Kissinger replies, "We'll get the credit for this anyway."¹³⁶ In another declassified telephone conversation between Kissinger and Nixon, the foreign policy shift from the Eisenhower doctrine is almost mentioned by name. Kissinger states the newspapers are covering the coup in a negative light, expressing frustration "I mean instead of celebrating- In the Eisenhower period we would be heroes." Nixon replies "...our hand doesn't show on this one," Kissinger responds, "We didn't do it. I mean we helped them. [redacted] created the conditions as great as possible." This exchange reveals the differing international contexts, diverging from the openly interventionist Eisenhower period whereas the political atmosphere of the 1970's, as Kissinger states, was not as receptive to Washington's jingoistic interventions. Nixon states in the same conversation "Let's forget the pro-communist [in reference to the Allende government]. It was anti-american all the [unintelligible] way."¹³⁷ The issue of communism was replaced with a pragmatic framework of economic growth and material relief to an economy ravaged by inflation where, as Juan Guzman states, "there was [a] lack of products [in the stores]."¹³⁸

The economic reforms of Chicago University graduates and later Milton Friedman, would have been impossible to legislate in a functioning democracy. They are reminiscent of the contracts and land concessions that caudillos would grant the UFCO in Guatemala. Now Chile had its own caudillo, and as for the serious human rights violations he incited, newly promoted Secretary of State Kissinger had this to say, during a 1975 meeting with Pinochet's Foreign Minister:

"My view on the question of human rights is that it is on two levels. One is that it is a total injustice. Nobody goes around making statements regarding what is going on in Kampala or the Central African Republic or hundreds of other countries around the world. The other is the problem of helping your government under the prese[ent?] conditions, which we did not create, but which make it difficult for us. It would help enormously helpful if something can be done."¹³⁹

For Kissinger, human rights were an issue of communicative policy. Their violation was of great concern, from a perspective of facilitating securitization of US interests. "otherwise [if

¹³⁵ "Kissinger and Chile: The Declassified Record on Regime Change 'National Security Council, Memorandum, Jeanne W. Davis to Kissinger, "Minutes of the WSAG Meeting of September 12, 1973," National Security Archive, accessed April 20, 2021, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/>.

¹³⁶ Ibid

¹³⁷ "Kissinger and Chile: The Declassified Record on Regime Change 'Telcon, Kissinger - Nixon, September 16, 1973, 11:50 a.m." National Security Archive, accessed April 20, 2021, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/>.

¹³⁸ IdahoPTV, "Dialogue: Judge Juan Guzman," YouTube (YouTube, April 10, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGQH8MyVoXM&ab_channel=IdahoPublicTelevision. Minute: 3:39.

¹³⁹ "Kissinger and Chile: The Declassified Record on Regime Change 'Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, "Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Carvajal, September 29, 1975." National Security Archive, accessed April 20, 2021, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/>.

nothing is done about human rights], congress will place restriction upon restriction against u.s. interests.”¹⁴⁰ During the 1950’s, it was the Arbenz government supposedly committing the human rights violations, being communists and all, now however, it was the US allies openly doing so, therefore a policy of securitization was implemented in shaping international, and congressional perspectives. The subtleties of the significance of difference in international context discern how regime change must work in tandem with global geopolitical attitudes.

Bretton Woods was dead and buried, US surpluses no longer subsidized pro-American governments around the world, therefore a financial structure of global hegemony had to be formulated. Neoliberalism would also work as an experiment, to test the durability of radical capitalism and discover whether it would be capable of becoming the international economic model of the western world, it did. Friedman’s alternative to the New Deal became the cornerstone of Chilean reforms.¹⁴¹ This was based on deregulation, meaning the government must remove all regulations that impede private profit accumulation, privatization, which refers to selling any state assets to corporations at a profit, and cutbacks to social programs.¹⁴²

According to Taylor, this was only possible by re-transforming social relations of production. Capital was prioritized in its monetary form, rather than its productive contingent: labor.¹⁴³ Financial institutions came to represent the bulk of national income, as banking was privatized and internal interest rates were unleashed, attracting foreign investment into Chilean financial markets, resulting in the re-monopolization of sectors like mining. Seven firms accounted for 97% of the industry’s value.¹⁴⁴ Borrowing from international financial markets, banks then lent to domestic debtors at inflated rate, profiting greatly on return.¹⁴⁵ In 1974, inflation reached 375%, the highest in the world, according to Klein.¹⁴⁶ By 1975, measures to reduce the fiscal deficit left over 200.000 unemployed, one third of the public sector, the unions of which were now banned. A freeze on wages due to inflation depreciated their real value massively. People were unable to buy milk and bread.¹⁴⁷ The invisible hand made the poor poorer. Friedman went to Chile to rectify the situation. He suggested the market be allowed greater freedoms and to further cut social spending by 25%. Pinochet agreed. The economy contracted by 15% with 20% unemployment. “By 1988, when the economy had stabilized and was growing rapidly, 45% of the population had fallen below the poverty line. The richest 10 percent of Chileans, however, had seen their incomes increase by 83 percent”.¹⁴⁸ Such was the Chilean miracle that neoliberal apologists eulogize,

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Naomi Klein, “States of Shock: The Bloody Birth of Counterrevolution” in *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, 1st (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), pp. 75-97.

¹⁴² Ibid. Additionally, a flat tax-rate was imposed, and taxes were lowered overall, efforts to protect domestic markets and local businesses from cheaper foreign imports through tariffs and customs barriers were dissolved and price controls were thrown out the window, including on labor, revoking the minimum wage. Eventually, hospitals, the post office and schools were privatized as well.

¹⁴³ Marcus Taylor. “Neoliberalism and Creative Destruction: 1973-1989” in: *From Pinochet to the 'Third Way': Neoliberalism and Social Transformation in Chile*. London: Pluto Press, 2006. pp. 61. Accessed June 12, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. 62.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. 79-80.

¹⁴⁷ Naomi Klein, “States of Shock: The Bloody Birth of Counterrevolution” in *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, 1st (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), pp. 75-97.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. 79-86.

And: Alejandro Foxley, “Successes and Failures in Poverty Eradication: Chile ,” World Bank, May 24, 2004,

and which offered the impetus for the application of more moderate neoliberal policies globally.

In 1976 Supreme Chief Pinochet met with Secretary Kissinger in Santiago. They compare the coup to Franco's actions during the Spanish civil war. This reflects a recurring theme: concern for communism. In 1954, the fictitious totalitarianism of communist rule in Guatemala, was enough to invoke military action, whereas in truth the ten years of spring were the most progressive in the country's history, as Allende's first years in office were. "In the United States, as you know, we are sympathetic to what you are trying to do here...the previous government was heading toward Communism. We wish your government well. At the same time, we face massive domestic problems...over the issue of human rights... congress is debating further restrictions on aid to Chile. We are opposed." Says Kissinger. Communism is thus a clear instrument of the securitization process. Kissinger frames it as a threat, against which he expresses support for the military government. The economic aid he advocates for the fascistic regime, is the same aid that was refused to Allende.¹⁴⁹ When hegemony was restored in both cases at the expense of democracy, human rights, and economic growth, this source reveals the dissonance between Washington's interests, and general prosperity.

This conversation perfectly casts Kissinger and Pinochet as the metaphorical figures that guide this thesis. Kissinger is the representation of soft power, which works to punish those who do not consent to the hegemony of the US. John Foster Dulles was not as resourceful, nor diplomatic, yet the international context did not require him to be. Dulles met with UFCO officials to hear their grievances and devise a counterrevolution strategy. Kissinger met with Anaconda and Kennecott officials to hear their grievances and devise a credit-punitive revenge.¹⁵⁰ Pinochet represents the domestic actors, willing to partner themselves with US interests, in search of power and authority, like Armas in Guatemala. And much like the Guatemalan coup would lose Latin American hearts and minds, in 1976, arms sales to Chile would cease, and the fascist regime would remain a pariah.¹⁵¹

Much later, Pinochet was indicted on egregious crimes. He died a convict, serving his sentence. Kissinger lives, it is unknown if he thought back to his early years as a Jewish refugee, fleeing the barbarism of Nazi Germany, as Pinochet was slaughtering thousands, at his complacency and acquiescence. 28 years after the Kissinger-sponsored coup on 9/11 1973, passenger planes hijacked by air pirates would strike the twin towers and the Pentagon, killing over 3000 innocent people, in the name of some perverted form of Islam, close to the numbers that Pinochet ordered the death of in Chile, in the name of anticommunism.

<https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/292491468743165841/pdf/308060CL0poverty01see0also0307591.pdf>.

¹⁴⁹ "Kissinger and Chile: The Declassified Record on Regime Change 'Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, "U.S.-Chilean Relations," (Kissinger - Pinochet), June 8, 1976." National Security Archive accessed December 17th, 2020, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/>.

¹⁵⁰ "'Chile', Memorandum of Conversation with Anaconda Copper Executives, 17 August 1971, White House, Memoranda and Letters Attached, Confidential," National Security Archive Publishes Digitized Set of 2,100 Henry Kissinger "Memcons" Recounting the Secret Diplomacy of the Nixon-Ford Era, May 26, 2006, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB193/>.

¹⁵¹ John R. Bawden, "Cutting Off the Dictator: The United States Arms Embargo of the Pinochet Regime, 1974-1988." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 45, no. 3 (2013): 513-515. Accessed June 1st, 2021.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/24544279>.

Conclusion

In Guatemala, US hegemony became its own political model. A way for caudillos to accrue tremendous wealth, and breath fire into the productive engines of their fiefdoms. The major capital investment the UFCO, IRCA, and Electric Bond brought, modernized infrastructure and abused cheap labor potential, while the cartel absorbed the land, resources, infrastructure, and energy of the country, making no commitment to reinvest the wealth. As caudillos profited and lived lavishly, it was the cartel that ran the state. There were no caudillos in Chile, until 1973 at least. Yet, national budgets depended mostly on two companies, Kennecott and Anaconda. The copper towns in which their workers lived did not see any excess profits the two giants siphoned up North. Economic independence is usurped and a forced subjugation to private capital facilitates hegemonic exertion. In Guatemala, this was due to the Banana Republic status of the country, in Chile, to a legislative caveat. Hegemony was exerted onto democracy and kleptocracy alike.

The political revolutions of 1944 and 1970 transformed this relationship, favoring their electorates. In both cases there was a will to cooperate with the US. It was not reciprocated, and the revolutionary governments were toppled. The counterrevolutions served as a translation of the Monroe Doctrine into cold war interventionist terms. The Guatemalan coup represented a departure from the Good Neighbor doctrine in Central America, which had transformed the continental role of the US into a more benevolent patron. The US establishment utilized the anti-communist western attitude to fabricate a legal justification for intervention. Only Arevalo was a New Deal liberal, and Árbenz was attempting to build an agro-capitalist foundation for a formerly semi-feudal economy. There was no communism, there was only the land and bananas of United Fruit, from which members of the administration like Dulles and Braden directly profited. A policy of supporting pro-American dictatorships of the right was born and the Eisenhower doctrine came to be.

The way counterrevolution was practiced in Chile, represents a departure from the Eisenhower doctrine, in that it was not communism that was cited as the counterrevolutionary legitimator. The Nixon White House alongside Anaconda and Kennecott would financially destabilize Chile from afar. Kissinger met with Anaconda executives and devised the credit punitive strategy, isolating Chile from the global system of exchange. Kissinger seemed determined on this destabilization approach indefinitely, irrespective of Anaconda's interests. Removing Allende, who proved socialism could be democratic and successful, and lead a country to prosperity was what mattered, since he would vindicate the non-authoritarian left, and the cold war, although tamed from its haywire days in the 1950's-1960's, was still a global battlefield of hegemony. Thus, he needed to be discredited, and his attempt at socialism framed as a failure in the eyes of the world. He would be replaced by a new US-sponsored paradigm: neoliberalism. This would be the first implementation of financialized capitalism, which we associate with the 1980's. Financial services accounted for most national income, and the mode of hegemony was thus shifted by establishing profitable inextricable ties between Chilean and US banking institutions. Natural resources came to share the framework of economic domination with financial institutions, the new frontier of hegemonic exertion. The results for Chileans were disastrous.

Historiography of US foreign policy often neglects how, the need to usher new foreign policy paradigms, very often resulted from the need to securitize US interests through counterrevolution. A comparison of these case studies diversifies the body of scholarship on *why* foreign policy shifts happened and *how* this was achieved through interpreting international political attitudes. Furthermore, this thesis expands the horizons of comparison between radically different Latin American countries by discerning that for all their

differences, similar methods of domination were applied, with respect to the political identity of the countries.

The conclusions reached in this chapter, reflect the hypothesis stated in the introduction. There was no communism in Guatemala, and the US, as declassified documents reveal, made conscious efforts to destabilize the socialist experiment in Chile. There was no paranoia or delusion about either Guatemala or Chile. US officials state in both cases that the revolutionary governments were producing sound results, and that the USSR held little influence over Arevalo, Árbenz or Allende. The only unspoken reason of *why* global securitization was adopted, is that democratic socialist success stories could not be allowed to upset the cold war dichotomy which pitted the admittedly more democratic US capitalist model against the deeply, and evidently authoritarian communism of the USSR or China.

The framework of this research should not remain exclusive to these two case studies. There is no shortage of US interventions in Latin America. The Videla dictatorship in Argentina in 1976, or the Uruguayan civic-military dictatorship of 1973, can be brought under the umbrella of anti-communist securitization through a coup. Both countries instigated heavy political persecutions and financialized their economies quickly becoming dependent on US financial institutions. They can both be analyzed historically through the theoretical framework of hegemony and securitization that this thesis provides. However, historiography should not limit itself to events long past. The same framework persists into counterrevolutionary practices in Latin America during the 21st century. Three case studies are the most applicable: the juridico-political coup against leftist Brazilian President Luiz Lula da Silva in 2018, which imprisoned him on false grounds as it was later revealed, and who was replaced -democratically- with far-right authoritarian President Jair Bolsonaro, a Pinochet-like neofascist figure.¹⁵² The second case is the paramilitary coup which ousted leftist President Evo Morales of Bolivia, who had undertaken a similar political program as Allende, and Lula. He was replaced by a de facto dictatorship headed by white supremacist Jeanine Añez.¹⁵³ She too would attempt to engage in the same financialization and privatization as the other far-right figures only that she would be overwhelmed by the Bolivian *democratic* restoration a year later. The last case is the Bolivarian Revolution in

¹⁵² Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, “Lula: There Is a Right-Wing Coup Underway in Brazil,” The New York Times (The New York Times, August 14, 2018), <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/opinion/lula-brazil-candidacy-prison.html>.

Noam Chomsky, “I Just Visited Lula, the World's Most Prominent Political Prisoner. A ‘Soft Coup’ in Brazil's Election Will Have Global Consequences.,” The Intercept, October 2, 2018, <https://theintercept.com/2018/10/02/lula-brazil-election-noam-chomsky/>.

Andrew Fishman et al., “Exclusive: Brazilian Judge in Car Wash Corruption Case Mocked Lula's Defense and Secretly Directed Prosecutors' Media Strategy During Trial,” The Intercept, June 17, 2019, <https://theintercept.com/2019/06/17/brazil-sergio-moro-lula-operation-car-wash/>.

Alexandre de Santi and Rafael Moro Martins, “In Sharp Rebuke, Brazil Supreme Court Rules Judge Who Locked Up Lula Was Biased,” The Intercept, March 15, 2021, <https://theintercept.com/2021/03/15/brazil-lula-sergio-moro-supreme-court/>.

¹⁵³ Mark Weisbrot, “Silence Reigns on the US-Backed Coup against Evo Morales in Bolivia ,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, September 18, 2020), <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/sep/18/silence-us-backed-coup-evo-morales-bolivia-american-states>.

Forrest Hylton, “Bolivia's Coup Government Is a Far-Right Horror Show,” Jacobin, March 12, 2019, <https://jacobinmag.com/2019/12/bolivia-coup-evo-morales-jeanine-anez>.

Denis Rogatyuk, “Bringing Bolivia's Coup Leaders to Justice Is Essential for Protecting the Democratic Process,” Jacobin, accessed June 18, 2021, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/05/bolivia-coup-2019-democracy-jeanine-anez-hrw-oas-movement-toward-socialism>.

Venezuela during 1998-1999 when Hugo Chavez won the elections and drafted a new constitution. Several coup attempts have been attempted by the US, the latest being in 2019.¹⁵⁴ Venezuela has been under an embargo and sanctions for years, destabilizing its economy and isolating it internationally. However, this last case must also mention, if employed in this framework, that corruption, incompetence, and bouts of violence are indeed present in a system the artificial isolation of which, has contributed to rising authoritarianism.¹⁵⁵ As more time passes, the intricacies of these 21st century cases will be revealed as more documents come to be declassified regarding the Bush, Obama and mainly Trump administrations and the depredations of their intelligence apparatus in Latin America.

Dictatorships of the right were supported, and democracies were overthrown. In 1954, the most powerful nation in the world toppled the government of a small and beautiful Central American country. The violence this ushered would scar the country forever, the human cost would be untold, and its government remains corrupt and effete to this day. In 1973, the great Republic of Chile experienced a level of violence that was unprecedented in its scale and brutality. The wealthiest of its people would know vast riches. Half its people would know poverty. The US remains as powerful as it was then and continues to topple Latin American governments. Should one remove the intricate historical analysis, that is the portrait that remains.

¹⁵⁴ “Venezuela: Former American Soldiers Jailed over Failed Coup,” BBC News (BBC, August 8, 2020), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-53686509>.

¹⁵⁵ Max Fisher and Amanda Taub, “How Does Populism Turn Authoritarian? Venezuela Is a Case in Point,” The New York Times (The New York Times, April 1, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/world/americas/venezuela-populism-authoritarianism.html>.

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