

# **European Security and Defense Policy: Uncertain developments throughout the 1990s**

**Given the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht treaty (1993), how can the agenda-setting theory explain the creation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999?**



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*Beyond differences and geographical boundaries  
there lies a common interest  
- Jean Monet*

**Abstract**

The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) of the European Union (EU) was implemented in 1999 and has been one major step towards a common European defense identity. The policy emerged out of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (1992) and the St-Malo declaration (1998). The latter was an agreement between France and the United Kingdom (UK) in favor of stronger European defense capabilities. Literature shows two conspicuous attributes in the formation of the policy: the switch of the UK from opposing the policy to approving it in the St-Malo declaration and the quick implementation of the ESDP. Drawing on agenda-setting theory in the EU and a political and historical interdisciplinary research, this paper demonstrates that the UK's approval to the policy was not a consequence of EU's agenda-setting procedure, and that the quick implementation can be drawn back to the exclusion of alternative actors. The paper will first present the agenda-setting framework of the EU, before analyzing the historical development.

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## 1. Introduction

Since the Second World War, the UK was seen as the “transatlantic bridge” (Oliver and William 2016, 547) in the Euro-American relationship. This is due to the “special relationship” (Oliver and William 2016, 547) the UK has with the United States (US), as they shared the same strategic interest in World War II (WII), and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Raymond 2006, 2-4). During the Cold War, the Euro-American relationship was especially strong, as they fought together against communism and in favor of a free market and liberal democracy (Oliver and William 2016, 549). The desire for this strong Euro-American bond is often referred to as Atlanticism, a notion that represents the wish for European and American foreign policies to center around the Atlantic (Daahler 2003, 154). Atlanticism is rooted in the mutual benefit that both Europe and North America gained from each other. For instance, through the Marshall Pact, the US gave European countries the confidence to overcome their strong differences, while, during the cold war, the US benefitted from Europe’s geographical proximity to the USSR (Daahler 2003, 147-149).

After the Cold War, internationalism emerged, a new approach that represented the interdependence between countries worldwide and their mutual interest in global peacekeeping. From a more normative perspective, this notion favored collective good over national interest (Dunne 2004, 905). Internationalism was hence countering Atlanticism in believing in global interdependence instead of in the priority of transatlantic relations. Especially in 1999, when during the Kosovo war, former UK prime minister, Tony Blair stated that “we are all internationalists now” (Dunne 2004, 905), there seemed to be an important change in international relations, suggesting that the UK left their “special relationship” (Oliver and William 2016, 547) behind. However, future events like the Iraq war in 2003 contradicted this belief, since the UK followed the lead of the US to attack Iraq, while the United Nations (UN) did not authorize it (Dunne 2004, 907). This decision of the UK to back up the US, led to strong controversies within the EU, as France and Germany pled against an invasion of Iraq (Oliver, William 2016, 554). Since the 1970s, France was the biggest opponent of the UK, the former being in favor of a stronger Europe without the influence of the US. This feeling is often represented by the notion of Europeanism (Dunne 2004, 895). The dichotomy between Atlanticism and Europeanism was very visible in the development of the common defense policy of the EU.

Already during the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s, member-states were debating about a common and autonomous defense policy (Nuttall 1997, 37). While no compromise could be found at that time, in 1992 the European Community (EC) launched the CFSP as part of the Maastricht Treaty (De Schoutheete 1997, 41). While the CFSP solely dealt with foreign affairs issues regarding humanitarian and civilian aid, seven years later, in 1999 at the Helsinki summit, the ESDP got implemented, which included military crisis management. This step can be seen as of major importance towards Europeanism, as it was the first time the EU cooperated on the military level and made it possible for the EU to act as an independent actor (Deighton 2002, 725-726). The main reason for the ESDP to be implemented was because

of a summit in December 1998 between France and the UK in St-Malo, where Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair commonly declared their preference in forming “the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces” (British-French Summit, St-Malo 1998). One year later, this proposal got incorporated at the EU Council in Helsinki and officialized in the treaty of Nice (2001) (Dyson and Konstadinides 2013, 26).

The strong commitment of the UK to the ESDP seemed rather surprising, because of the above-mentioned close relationship with the US. The theory of agenda-setting in the EU elaborated by political scientist Princen (2009) provides a strong theoretical framework to understand the evolution of policies in the Union, as it highlights the major factors that affect European decision-making. Hence, this thesis will focus on the general development of the ESDP to further understand the sudden change of the UK’s position and the short time frame in which the policy got implemented. This paper will therefore research how, given the establishment of the CFSP in 1992, the agenda-setting theory can explain the creation of the ESDP in 1999.

In order to answer the research question, the paper will adopt an interdisciplinary approach, integrating the disciplines of political science and political history. As previously mentioned, the agenda-setting theory in political science offers the theoretical framework for the analysis, while the historical analysis adds the historical depth of the evolution of the defense policy in the EU. The disciplines will be integrated through the technique known as ‘extension’ (Menken, Keestra 2016, 44), as political science adds to a more structured understanding of the historical development of the ESDP. Moreover, a purely political analysis would not allow delving in-depth into European history.

Although the policy includes economic considerations, as how many military troops a country must offer, this paper will exclude the economic perspective, as the discipline cannot explain the development of the policy. Furthermore, the philosophical discipline will not be included, as the research is based on empirical evidence, and not a normative argumentation. The research will be conducted in a single case study, to ensure an in-depth analysis of the development.

The academic value of this research lies in the continuation of Princen’s (2009) book “Agenda-Setting in the European Union”, which focuses on policy developments in the EU. Princen (2009) focused on healthcare and smoking policies. While these topics highly differ from international relations, this paper aims to test the theory in the specific subfield of political science. From a societal perspective, this research adds to the understanding of the complexity of the European decision-making, especially regarding the impact of the veto power of a singular EU member-state.

This paper will specifically look at the timeframe between the introduction of the CFSP in the Maastricht treaty and end with the common decision of the European Council in Helsinki to implement the ESDP (see Appendix). Furthermore, the actors analyzed in this research are based on the institutions of the EU Council, the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO. To conduct this research, archival sources will be analyzed to understand the step-by-step development of the policy, such as the presidency conclusions of the EU Council, reports of bilateral meetings between EU member-states, and speeches of prominent figures at NATO

summits. Lastly, this paper uses parliamentary reports of the WEU. As the development was member-state driven, using these sources will allow to give the most significant insights.

The paper is structured as follows: first, it will provide the theoretical framework, offering the agenda-setting theory as the base to analyze the development of the ESDP. The second part of the paper combines the historical development of the policy with an application of agenda-setting theory to it. Lastly, the conclusion will present shortcomings of the paper together with input for further research.

## 2. The EU's Agenda-Setting Procedure

A way to understand how European countries achieved to implement the ESDP is agenda-setting theory. This theory has been first introduced by Cohen et al. (1972) and since then widely developed (Kingdon 1984, Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Pralle 2003). However, Dr Sebastiaan Princen from Utrecht University seems to be the only academic who has specifically developed an agenda-setting theory for the European Union (2009). As Princen's (2009) framework builds on traditional agenda-setting insights, this chapter will provide an overview of the most prominent agenda-setting theories.

The chapter will be divided into three sections. The first one analyzes the venue-shopping theory and its application to the EU. The second section will explain the formation of policy agenda, while the third one will highlight how to ensure the success of an agenda.

### 2.1. Insights from the venue-shopping theory

According to Princen (2009), an important starting point for understanding how agenda-setting works in the EU is through the venue-shopping theory. Pralle (2003) explains that "Venue shopping refers to the activities of advocacy groups and policymakers who seek out a decision setting where they can air their grievances with current policy and present alternative policy proposals" (Pralle 2003, 234). In this quote, the "decision setting" refers to the venues politicians and advocates use to promote their agenda. Generally, venues differ in the tasks they fulfill, the authority they have in decision-making and/or in their composition (Pralle 2009, 10-11). Consequently, as Baumgartner and Jones (1993) highlight, the choice of venue is detrimental for politicians and advocates to fulfill their agenda. While venue-shopping can be used as an opportunity, the plurality of decision settings also leads to more opposition, as more actors are included in the process. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) further argue that the receptiveness of the venue chosen by politicians is instrumental for the likelihood of the policy to get through (Pralle 2003, 236). The receptiveness of venues differs due to the specificity of the issue, their institutional remit and/or the participating actors (Princen and Kerremans 2008, 1137). Pralle (2003) brings the theory further, by adding that a preference of venue can also come from ideological and/or cultural norms (Pralle 2003, 241-242).

Princen (2009) used Baumgartner and Jones's (1993) framework to develop his agenda-setting theory in the EU. The author emphasized how, as the EU is a multi-level organization, agenda-setting in the Union involves more venues than at the domestic level (Princen 2009, 16). Venues

on the international level allow national politicians and advocates to shift their agenda to the international level. There are three reasons for shifting an agenda from the domestic to the EU level, the first of which is simply the international nature of a challenge, for instance, pollution. The second reason is related to economies of scale, as dealing with topics in a broader perspective can be less costly and thirdly, idealistic considerations, such as the current establishment of the EU as an LGBTQ+ safe zone (Princen 2009, 28-29). It is worth emphasizing how merely shifting the agenda to the EU level does not ensure its successful implementation, given the multiplicity of issues presented to the Union (Princen 2009, 162). Next to venue shopping, another important consideration in agenda-setting theory is how the policy agenda is being formed.

## 2.2. Formation of policy agenda at the EU level

To theorize the policy agenda, Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) developed a so-called ‘garbage can model’ (1972, 2), explaining how in organized anarchies, agendas get implemented. Organized anarchies are defined by problematic preferences, unclear technologies, and fluid participation. The problematic preferences refer to uncertainty regarding the current issues and aims of the participants. That means that the actors cannot identify the problem correctly and hence do not know how to find the best solution (Cohen et al. 1972, 1). Cohen et al. (1972) explain that also time is an important factor to discover the nature of the problem. Unclear technologies refer to the ambiguous rules of processes, which lead to an uncertain development of decisions. Lastly, fluid participation indicates that not always the same actors are involved in the same decision-making procedures, which complicates the process (Cohen et al. 1972, 1). Furthermore, Cohen et al. (1972) identified different streams influencing the decision-making procedure in this instance: the stream of choices, indicating how many solutions exist, the stream of problems, defining the number of problems that exist, the rate of flow of solutions, assuming that specific solutions match specific problems, and the stream of energy of participants, describing the number of actors in the process and their involvement (Cohen et al. 1972, 3). While Cohen et al. (1972) apply their theory to universities, other scholars have applied the “garbage can model” to bigger organizations, as the UN (Lipson 2007).

Kingdon (1984) modified the “garbage can model”, explaining that there are only three streams who influence how an agenda is formed. Kingdon (1984) defined them as the problems stream, the political stream, and the policy stream. The problem stream highlights the evolution of the appearance of a topic. For instance, this can occur due to a sudden event or (in)formal feedback on an already existing policy. Kingdon (1984) here specifies that it is easier for a sudden event to become a clear policy if it builds upon a preexisting issue. Further, he presents the political stream as the overall national mood, including the current administration in place, an atmosphere that can change after new elections. The last stream is the policy stream, which is defined by experts and analysts examining problems and finding new technocratic solutions to them (Kingdon 2014, 197-199). Lastly, Kingdon (1984) establishes a clear difference between “governmental agenda” and “decision agenda” (Kingdon 2014, 4). “Governmental agenda” incorporates all agendas that may be considered for active decision-making, while conversely, the “decision agenda” solely incorporates agendas that will be implemented (Kingdon 2014, 4).



Princen (2009) draws on both theories, adding that in order to form a policy agenda in the European Union, there must be a transnational policy network. That means that a broad consensus is needed to shift the agenda to the EU level. To achieve so, experts and politicians must be connected throughout EU countries and debate the issue together. To move from the “governmental agenda”, which is the transnational policy debate, to the “decision agenda”, politicians must maneuver around vertical and horizontal blockades (Princen 2009, 151-156). “Vertical blockades” happen when EU members do not allow a topic to be discussed on the international level, as they want to keep it national. “Horizontal blockades” appear when EU policymakers are hindering each other’s agendas, for instance, because of different values or different political beliefs (Princen 2009, 16). The next section shows how it is possible to bypass the blockades.

### 2.3. How to ensure the success of agenda-setting at the EU level


Princen (2009) explains that blockades can be circumvented through three methods, namely conflict expansion and contraction, issue framing, and institutional opportunities and constraints.

Conflict expansion seems to be linear on the domestic level, as the mobilization of masses can work through elections, media, and protests. On the EU level however, conflict expansion happens automatically when other EU countries become involved in the issue at stake. At the same time, moving an issue to the EU level can simultaneously lead to conflict contraction, as there is no direct accountability of decision-makers and public mobilization is more difficult (Princen 2009, 38). Regarding the framing of issues and how to ensure their success, Princen (2009) argued that in order to bring an issue to the EU level, activists and politicians must specify why the EU is the right level of government to deal with the issue (Princen 2009, 36-41). Institutional opportunities and constraints refer to how an issue can be moved from the “governmental agenda” to the “decision agenda”. This can be realized in three ways. First, the view of different members can converge, second, it can affect a wide range of members and hence lead to easier decision-making or lastly, an external event can lead EU decision-makers to take a quick common decision (Princen 2009, 36-41).

Princen (2009) furthermore argues, that if an issue is already on the EU level, it is not unusual for politicians to include new institutional venues to maximize the chances of implementing the agenda. For instance, to get stricter EU fishery policies, environmental NGOs in the 1990s reframed the traditional fishing debate as a more environmental issue. Through involving the Environmental Council of Ministers, the debate shifted, enabling a stricter and more sustainable fishery policy (Princen 2009, 147-148). This example illustrates the potential success of involving other institutional venues.

To provide a clear overview of the previous chapter, the graph below shows a summary of the theoretical framework built by Princen (2009) (see figure 1). It focuses on why and how to move an agenda to the EU level and how to be successful in implementing it.

Figure 1: Moving from the domestic agenda-setting to the EU level




As Princen (2009) includes the multiple insights of traditional agenda-setting theory in his book to build a framework fitting the EU, this research will analyze the ESDP through his approach.

### 3. The historical development of the ESDP

This chapter will analyze the historical development of the ESDP and how the agenda-setting theory can be applied to it. It is divided into three parts including both a historical and political analysis. The first section explains the beginnings of the defense strategy in Europe between 1989-1992. The second one analyzes the development of a common defense strategy in the EU until the EU Council in Helsinki (1999), while the last section delves into the external factors that influenced the creation of the ESDP.

Before starting the analysis, it is useful to understand the repartition of the different states in the supranational institutions throughout the 1990s. The chart below shows the division of countries within these organizations: country (date of entry, if after 1990).

Figure 2: Repartition of countries in supernational states (1990-1999)



3.1. Formulating a defense strategy in Europe (1989-1992)

3.1.1. Ensuring European defense possibilities

In Europe, two different institutions were responsible for the security of their members. First, the Maastricht treaty (1992) introduced the CFSP. The goal of the CFSP was to safeguard the values, interest, and independence of the Union while strengthening the security of its members. Additional objectives were to preserve peace, strengthen international security, and promote international cooperation to consolidate and develop democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom. (Treaty on European Union 1992). The Maastricht treaty did not incorporate a common defense policy, as according to the treaty, military capabilities should be a matter of the Western European Union, which adhered to NATO (Treaty on European Union 1992).

Hence, in accordance with the EU, the WEU was the second institution ensuring the security of its members. They issued the Petersberg Declaration in June 1992, which guaranteed the organization’s role concerning European defense. The Petersberg Declaration is also often referred to as the Petersberg tasks. There, the WEU declared their willingness to use military units that could be employed for humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management under the supremacy of NATO (Petersberg Declaration 1992, 208). For instance, one of their tasks was the Sharp Guard Mission, in which the WEU was responsible to enforce the restrictions of the United Nations (UN) in Yugoslavia. While the WEU was successful in this task, the number of missions they took part in throughout the years focused on small scale interventions and was generally limited, especially because the WEU did not have many military resources (CVCE (3) 2016).

Still, the common framing of a foreign and security policy and the strong statement of the WEU in the Petersberg Declaration showed that EU member-states were willing to collaborate for their security and defense. Furthermore, the signatories of the Maastricht treaty specified that “the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense” (WEU (4) 1995, 269) could be a future objective of the EU. Additionally, former Secretary-General of the WEU Jose Cutileiro stated in 1995, that with the implementation of the Petersberg Declaration a “turning point” had been reached in which the WEU could deal with crisis management that “match[ed] the specific challenges of the post-Cold War world” (Cutileiro 1995). The former Secretary-General further stated that the broadening of the WEU “was a political consequence of its new dual role in the service of both the Alliance and the European Union” (Cutileiro 1995). While the importance of the WEU for the EU was shown above, the next chapter will delve into the significance of the former in relation to NATO.

### 3.1.2. European Pillar in NATO

The WEU was valuable for NATO, because of the structure of the Atlantic organization in the changing geopolitical environment of the 1990s. NATO is an alliance that was formed in 1948 aiming to reintegrate Germany in Western politics, to defend Western countries against the USSR and to link the US to Europe through an official institution (Borawski and Young 2001, XVIII). With the fall of the Soviet Union and the threat of a massive attack vanishing in 1991, NATO redirected its focus to “maintain an overall strategic balance and to remain ready to meet any potential risks [...] (arising) from instability or tension” (Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation 1991).

Hence, in order to reinforce the integrity and efficiency of the Atlantic Alliance, NATO encouraged the European Union to develop a European Security Identity in line with the European Pillar of NATO (Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation 1991). Especially, in 1991, as the war in Yugoslavia seemed to become a major threat to global peace, and because of the geographical proximity of Yugoslavia to Europe, it was necessary to ensure that EU member-states were able to protect themselves without the obligatory help of the United States if the latter did not wish to get involved ((European Political Cooperation, 1991; Cutileiro 1998).

NATO implemented the European Pillar in their strategic concept of 1991, which enabled and authorized the WEU to formulate the Petersberg Declaration in 1992.

### 3.1.3. EU’s change of receptiveness

The sections above showed how, through the Maastricht treaty (1992), the EU approved the military capabilities of the WEU and NATO, while simultaneously delegating defense tasks to other organizations. The next paragraphs demonstrate that since the 1970s, the EU became more receptive to the idea of a common European defense. For instance, through the Maastricht treaty (1992), the EU ensured the possibility for EU member-states to have a common defense in the WEU. This suggests that the EU knew about the necessity of common defense capabilities and approved it.

The delegation of tasks and the change of venue occurred already during the time of the European Community (EC), especially in 1984. At that time, many member-states of the EC (Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg, France, The Netherlands, West Germany, UK) tried to implement a security and defense identity. However, as Greece, Denmark and Ireland were opposed to it, the EC venue did not become receptive to the issue. As the policy could not get through on the EU level, member-states in favor of the policy turned to the WEU, where with the Rome declaration (1984), they established the WEU as the forum for coordination on Alliance affairs and foreign policy questions. Hence, EU members in favor of a common defense could use the WEU venue to act in concert (Jopp 1997, 154). This is a good example to show how changing the venue from the EC to the WEU created the opportunity for an agenda to pass.

The venue of the EU was not receptive to the agenda of common defense in 1984. However, in 1992, with the implementation of the CSFP, the topic was moved within the EU venue to the “governmental agenda”, as the EU knew and discussed about the necessity for a common defense. However, advocates for the European defense capabilities did not manage to move the agenda from the “governmental agenda” to the “decision agenda” within the EU. Again, member-states moved to the venue of the WEU to form a common defense policy. The implementation of the Petersberg Declaration (1992) shows that the agenda-setting procedure in the WEU was a success.

In the following eight years after the Petersberg Declaration the defense strategy of the European Union evolved and led to the formation of the ESDP. The following chapter will show the development inside the European Union, focusing on member-states, bilateral and European Council meetings to show the implementation process of the policy.

## 3.2. Development of a defense strategy in the European Union

### 3.2.1. Understanding the development of ESDP through European Council summits

The chapter will analyze the development of the ESDP through EU Council summits. The European Council assembles the heads of government of the EU member-states. Since the 1960s, the council has dealt with the political and strategic development of the European Union. Hence, to understand how the ESDP was formed, it is useful to look at the Council conclusions and analyze when and how the EU debated the formation of a common defense and security policy. This section will analyze the uncertain development of the ESDP. First, the straightforward evolution between the Maastricht treaty (1992) and the EU Council in Madrid (1995) will be shown, before delving into the problems the EU encountered until the Amsterdam treaty (1997). Lastly, the progress between the Amsterdam treaty (1997) and the EU Council in Helsinki (1999) demonstrates the quick development of the ESDP within the Council.

Between the Maastricht (1992) and the EU Council in Madrid (1995), it seemed as if the European members were moving on quickly, asserting their ideologies and goals of being a stronger voice in international affairs. Especially, right after the formation of the CFSP, the European member-states continued to discuss the matter of common defense at the EU Council in Lisbon (1992). There they concluded that “the CFSP should contribute to ensuring that the

Union's external action is less reactive to events in the outside world, and more active in the pursuit of the interests of the Union and in the creation of a more favorable international environment” (Lisbon European Council 1992). This statement is of particular significance, as it expresses the wish of European member-states to be a stronger player in the post-Cold War period. The EU’s position intensified in 1993 when at the EU Council of Brussels, EU members decided upon the implementation of a stability pact. This agreement was set to “reinforce the stability in Europe [...], (and) the implementation of the common foreign and security policy” (Brussels European Council 1993). At the EU Council in Madrid of 1995, the member-states then declared their willingness to strengthen the link between the WEU and the EU, ensuring that the EU could formulate an effective response to international affairs (Madrid European Council 1995).

However, the first uncertainties showed at the EU Council in Madrid. For instance, in the presidency conclusions of the Madrid summit, a reference is made to “many of us” (Madrid European Council 1995) being in favor of strengthening the link between the WEU and EU (Madrid European Council 1995). This suggests that the EU members did not have a unanimous preference. It is hence not surprising that the question about the increase of cooperation between the WEU and EU got a lot of attention at the first Intergovernmental Conference in Turin in 1996. Especially the point to set up effective structures and procedures to be able to act stronger as a union was highly debated (Turin European Council 1996). Additionally, the relaxation of the unanimity rule and the incorporation of the WEU in the EU were also matters of discussion (Florence European Council 1996). The Amsterdam treaty (1997) did not incorporate any of these points. It seems that because the discrepancies between the members-states’ were too profound, the council stopped discussing the matter until the European Council meeting in Vienna in 1998.

It was only at the French-British summit (St-Malo declaration) in December 1998, that a new input on the matter was given, calling for the necessity “for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (British-French Summit, St-Malo 1998). After the summit, the European Council started negotiations again in order to expand their common foreign policy to a security policy.

Surprisingly, after the St-Malo declaration and the European Council meeting in Vienna (1998), the EU achieved to implement the ESDP within two years. After the Vienna Council (1998), Gerhard Schröder, president of the European Council and chancellor of Germany issued a reflection on Europe’s Security and Defense (February 1999), highlighting that the main question was “how Europe can possess appropriate structures and capabilities to conduct crisis management in the sense of the Petersberg task” (German presidency paper, Bonn 1999). The German presidency presented different options, regarding what military capabilities the EU could use:

1. “European (EU/WEU) led operation using NATO assets and capabilities: Conducted by the European having recourse to NATO assets [...],

2. Autonomous European (EU/WEU) led operations conducted by the Europeans without recourse to NATO assets.” (German presidency paper, Bonn 1999)

The first option then became adopted and approved by the Council meeting in Cologne in 1999, which ensured the supremacy of NATO. Additionally, there, the EU member-states decided to incorporate the Petersberg Declaration in the EU.

When the ESDP was decided upon at the European Council in Helsinki (1999), the members stated their determination “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army” (Helsinki European Council 1999). It is important to emphasize how the insistence on NATO’s engagement signals the ongoing commitment of the EU members to the organization. Similarly, the specification about the EU’s reluctance to create an army ensures the supremacy of NATO.

One may wonder how after the difficult negotiations in the European Council throughout the 1990s such a fast creation of the ESDP was possible. Especially, the failure of including a defense mechanism in the Amsterdam treaty could lead to the conclusion that the EU was not ready for having a defense identity. Chapter 3.2.3. will try to investigate the reasons why EU member-states did not find a compromise before, and what made them change their standpoints in 1998. However, given the similar historical development within the WEU and the EU Council towards the policy, the paper first elaborates on the process within the former institution. Chapter 3.2.2. will focus on the transfer of WEU capabilities to the EU.

### 3.2.2. Transfer of WEU capabilities to the EU

Until 1998, the transfer of capabilities of the WEU to the EU was seen as radical within the former institution and it is only after the St-Malo summit, that the WEU gave more thought to the transfer of capabilities. As shown in chapter 3.1.1., according to the Maastricht treaty (1992), the military capabilities were a matter of the WEU, while having the future possibility of being incorporated in the EU. If this were to be the case, WEU relations with NATO would be replaced with a direct relationship between the EU and the Alliance (WEU (4) 1995, 270). However, in the assembly discussions of the WEU, not much attention was given to the transfer of tasks to the EU. Still, in 1995, the WEU reports refer to the integration of the WEU into the EU as an “extreme position” (WEU 1994, 68), which was not worth debating (WEU 1994, 68).

Only after the St-Malo declaration (1998), more serious thought was given to the topic. In 1999, during the WEU Ministerial Council meeting in Luxemburg (1999), the WEU member-states expressed “their willingness to allow bodies of the Council of the European Union direct access” to the WEU capacities (WEU Ministerial Council, Luxemburg 1999). This decision was remarkable, as it expressed a first step in transferring their capabilities to the EU. Finally, in the European Council in Helsinki, EU member-states as well agreed upon transferring WEU capabilities to the EU, officially incorporating the Petersberg Declaration as a matter of the Union (Helsinki European Council 1999).

Although from the present perspective it might seem intuitive that the transfer of the WEU capabilities with the EU happened simultaneously to the formation of the ESDP, the temporal aspect of the decision-making process is important. Hence, it is relevant to highlight the rapid switch from considering the idea as extreme to the incorporation of the policy in the Treaty of Nice (2001). In order to fully understand how this change happened, it is necessary to analyze the development within the most powerful member-states of the EU.

### 3.2.3. Perspectives of member-states of the EU

As the European Union is based on intergovernmental decision-making, it is important to understand the standpoints of singular member-states. Incorporating their perspective will help analyze the changes that led to the formation of the ESDP. However, instead of considering the perspective of all members states, the next chapter will focus on the UK, France, and Germany. This is due to two main reasons. First, the St-Malo declaration in 1998 gave the major incentive for the EU to form the ESDP. As the declaration was published by France and the UK, it is evident to analyze the development of their position towards the ESDP. Second, relying on Klaus Brummer's (2006) analysis, the UK and France can be considered the two biggest military forces of the EU in the 1990s, aiming to increase their high-intensity warfare. Germany, on the other hand, was keener on stabilization, peacebuilding, and conflict management. The compromise of those three, as Brummer argued, then led to a well-balanced European Defense, that no other country needed to contradict (Brummer 2006, 7-8). According to Brummer, other EU member-states would then automatically follow the lead of the three countries (Brummer 2006, 7-8). France was aware of the power that the three countries had over the European agenda. The country declared in 1994, that building a defense capacity will depend on the harmonization of views between France, Germany, and the UK (WEU (2) 1994, 223-224). Hence, the first section will focus on the UK, the second on France and the third one on Germany.

#### 3.2.3.1. *The change of heart of the UK*

The following chapter will present the UK's strong preference for military individuality and the country's reasons for having a negative attitude towards a European security and defense policy. Later on, this chapter will elaborate on the UK's change of perspective regarding the policy.

As the UK is a geopolitical global power, it has always been of great importance for them to show their individual supremacy. For instance, in the 1990s, the UK had important political and economic interests in their former colonies and members of the Commonwealth. The Falkland Islands war of 1982 is a representative example of the UK's global power. In this war, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, an archipelago located in the coastal area of the country. As the islands belonged to the UK, the latter sent a significant amount of naval and air forces to protect them, where the UK won the war in 10 weeks, ensuring their geopolitical supremacy (Freedman 1982, 196). This example shows that to sustain their territories, it was of major importance for the UK to keep their individual freedom regarding foreign affairs. This is because, given the complexity of the Union decision-making process, it would have been difficult for the EU to



take a quick common decision on the matter. Former UK Prime minister Margaret Thatcher emphasized this feeling in 1992, highlighting that “countries with a history and tradition such as Britain’s cannot allow their hands to be tied on defense and on foreign policy” (WEU (2) 1992, 150). In 1994, the position of the UK was still the same, when former Secretary of the UK declared that “the United Kingdom’s defense policy is designed to support [...] the freedom and territorial integrity of the United Kingdom and its dependent territories, and its ability to pursue its legitimate interests at home and abroad” (WEU (2) 1994, 224). Next to securing their military individuality, the UK resisted a common European defense because of their special relationship with the US.

The strong relation the UK had with its partner on the other side of the Atlantic, contributed to Great Britain’s strong adherence to the supremacy of NATO. As it would have been detrimental to NATO to build a separate defense mechanism in the EU, the UK used its power to prohibit it. Therefore, the UK advocated for a European Pillar under NATO, guaranteeing that the obligations and arrangements of NATO were the fundamental priority of its members. This was visible in 1992 when the UK and Italy protected NATO by persuading EU member-states to build the WEU as the European Pillar of NATO, rather than as an alternative to the latter. At the time, France and Germany were arguing for the opposite, wishing for a WEU under the authority of the European Council, a plan that favored the independence of the EU regarding NATO (WEU (2) 1992, 150). In 1994, to further strengthen the role of the WEU in NATO, the UK proposed to include Norway in the WEU. This was highly debated, as Norway was not part of the EU but part of NATO, suggesting that the UK wanted to open up the WEU to non-EU members (WEU (4) 1994, 127). While this proposal never got accepted, both examples show how a European defense mechanism was not part of the UK’s geopolitical goals. Also, at the intergovernmental conferences before the Amsterdam treaty (1997), the UK showed their determination for the WEU staying autonomous from the EU and establishing NATO as the principal component of the security and defense in Europe. The UK was especially opposed to having a higher institution taking defense decisions in their name (WEU (2) 1995, 120). To conclude, Great Britain saw their bilateral relationship with the US and the other European States as essential to make better decisions for their national interest (WEU (2) 1994, 224).

The UK maintained this view until former British Prime minister, Tony Blair, came to power in 1997. He declared at the informal EU Council summit in Pörtlach (1998) that “there (is) [...] a strong willingness, which the UK obviously shares, for Europe to take a stronger foreign policy and security role” (Informal European summit Pörtlach 1998). The goal of the UK was further clarified with an address by George Robertson, the Secretary of State for Defense of the United Kingdom, at a setting of the WEU. At the meeting, Robertson accentuated upon the need “to enable the European Union to have a more united and influential voice, articulated with greater speed and coherence [...], and backed up when the need arises with prompt and effective military action” (WEU 1998, 104). Furthermore, the officer added that it was necessary for “Europe to take its proper place in the world (and that it) [...] is the time for some fresh thinking on the future direction of European defense” (WEU 1998, 104). This position was formally declared at the St-Malo summit, in December 1998.

Scholars identified two reasons why the UK possibly changed their mind. Smith and Latawski (2003) indicate that it could have been “to assert British leadership with regard to EU military affairs in order to compensate for non-participation in the single currency project” (Smith and Latawski 2003, 128). Another explanation is referring to the change from a conservative to a socialist government in 1997. Both aspects could indicate why the UK’s strategy regarding European defense changed right after the Amsterdam treaty (1997) (Dryburgh 2010, 263).

To conclude, history shows that the UK always had been an opponent to European defense capabilities. Only with the St-Malo declaration (1998), the official position of the UK seemed to change. It must be made clear, that even by conforming to a stronger Europe, the UK did not endanger the status of NATO and certified that all actions taken by the European Union needed to “act in the conformity with (the) [...] respective obligations in NATO (British-French Summit, St-Malo 1998). The next chapter will delve more in-depth into France’s reason on being for favor of the ESDP, as the country signed the St-Malo declaration with the UK.

#### *3.2.3.2. France’s advocacy for the ESDP*

Since the 1970s, France had been a strong advocate for a common European defense and was at the same time reserved towards NATO. For instance, in 1994, former French Prime minister Edouard Balladur stated “that the (Atlantic) alliance cannot do everything. It should not stand in the way of a proper European defense identity and should leave room for Europeans to act on their own if they wish and are able to do so” (WEU (3) 1994, 309). This leads to the conclusion, that France’s goal was to defend their personal interests, build a strong Europe and contribute to international stability through ensuring a stronger WEU (WEU (2) 1994, 223-224).

France’s relationship with NATO was ambiguous. They felt reluctant towards the organization, as the UK and the US opposed their wish to be an equal partner regarding the usage of nuclear weapons. Hence, since France wanted to ensure their geopolitical power and prestige, former president Charles de Gaulle decided in 1960 to withdraw their military capacities from NATO. It is worth mentioning, that withdrawing military capabilities does not mean leaving NATO, which France indeed did not do. For centuries, the goal of France has been to a strong military force worldwide. Hence, when withdrawing their military capabilities of NATO, they put their efforts into the building of a European defense (CVCE (2) 2016). Indeed, at the intergovernmental conferences before the Amsterdam treaty (1997), France advocated for a new second European parliamentary chamber, which would oversee the WEU (WEU (3) 1995, 190). In this scenario, the second chamber would include the WEU in the EU, enabling the latter to have common defense capabilities (WEU (3) 1995, 190).

In light of these considerations, it is possible to notice how, in the 1990s, France was a strong advocate for Europeanism. Therefore, the agreement upon the common goal expressed by UK and France at St-Malo (1998) can be considered as a success for France. However, because of European defense capabilities staying under NATO, the St-Malo declaration should rather be understood as a compromise between Europeanism and Atlanticism. To further grasp why the implementation of the ESDP was as rapid, it is useful to look at the role of Germany.

### *3.2.3.3. Germany's soothing role in the development of the ESDP*

Germany was a strong advocate for a common European defense. Already at the intergovernmental conferences before the Maastricht treaty (1992), Germany encouraged stronger security and defense cooperation. The country took this initiative to counter the possible unilateralism of the US after they won the Cold War (Wagner 2005, 461). Germany continued its efforts throughout the 1990s, advocating in favor of a merger between the EU and the WEU under the CFSP (WEU (1) 1995, 85). France and Germany had the same common goal to implement a common defense policy. An attempt of both countries to pursue their common interest was the implementation of the Eurocorps in 1992, which will be dealt more in-depth with, in section 3.2.3.4.

After the St-Malo summit (1998), Gerhard Schröder, the former Chancellor of Germany, was the main actor ensuring the implementation of the ESDP. While this is due to the long-lasting advocacy of Germany for a common European defense, it is also because Germany did not want to choose between France and the UK. When in 1998, France and the UK declared their willingness to build a common security and defense policy under the EU, Gerhard Schröder concluded that “the initiative offered a real chance to overcome the sometimes-painful tensions that had in the past torn Germany between French and British views on European defense” (Andreani, Betram, and Grant 2001, 21). Especially as Germany simultaneously had the presidency over the European Council and the Western European Union, they used this opportunity to implement the common defense goals of France and the UK. The European Council in Cologne (1999) was the main step towards that objective, as a general acceptance within the Council could be reached (Andreani, Betram, and Grant 2001, 21).

Germany well used their soothing role in the establishment of the ESDP. Especially also by ensuring NATO, that the ESDP would not overlap with the former (Wagner 2005, 463). At the same time the country, with the help of France pushed for further integration, for instance through the Eurocorps.

### *3.2.3.4. Bilateral military cooperation: The Eurocorps*

In 1992, Germany and France formed the military cooperation, the Eurocorps. The main reasons for this bilateral collaboration were the slow development of defense capacities within the EU and their agreement at the Elysée treaty of 1963. The purpose of the latter was to strengthen the relations between both countries, hence also through common military capacities (CVCE (1) 2016).

The Eurocorps were the first military cooperation within the Union. However, when the countries declared their wish for cooperation, other WEU, as well as NATO member-states, criticized them, as they feared that both countries would withdraw their military resources from the respective institutions (WEU 1993, 179). Although from today's perspective, it seems intuitive that the Eurocorps were subordinate to the WEU and NATO, at that time, the former German minister of defense Volker Rühle had to ensure both organizations, that European security structures would be under the supremacy of NATO and that the allies do not need to

worry (WEU (1) 1992, 165). While this statement re-ensured their partners, in 1993, France and Germany invited other EU member-states to join, which Belgium, Spain, and Luxemburg did. Their first operation was in 1998 in Bosnia and Herzegovina under NATO command (CVCE (1) 2016).

The Eurocorps are a good example to show how fragile, in the beginning of the 1990s, the situation was between the supranational organizations. While Germany and France pushed for further integration, the other NATO and WEU members were afraid of them building a competing independent entity.

### 3.2.4. Analysis of Agenda-theory within the European Union

The next sections will apply the agenda-setting theory to the development in the EU. The first section explains the role of the different venues and their receptiveness, while the second one analyses the power of the blockade imposed by the UK to the formation of the ESDP. Lastly, the third section will examine the move from the governmental to the decision agenda of the policy.

#### 3.2.4.1. *Venue shopping did not matter in the development of the ESDP*

To understand the role of venues in the case of the ESDP, this section will first identify which venues exist before explaining why the choice of venue does not seem to have an important influence on the development of the policy.

Regarding the formation of the ESDP in the EU, five different venues can be identified:

- 1) the domestic venue of the UK,
- 2) the bilateral venue of Germany and France,
- 3) the bilateral venue of the UK and France,
- 4) the venue of the WEU, and
- 5) the venue of the European Council.

Until the meeting in Pörschach (1998), the UK tried to keep the issue in the domestic venue. However, at the same time, the country was open to the venue of the WEU to discuss European defense, while being specifically opposed to the venue of the EU Council. In the German French bilateral venue, the heads of government of the countries successfully implemented the Eurocorps. This was an attempt to form a stronger common European defense. However, since the Eurocorps was included in the WEU and NATO, the status-quo did not substantially change. While the WEU could have been an important venue regarding the development of the ESDP, WEU member-states did not use the venue to discuss defense matters of the EU. Instead, the importance of the venue lied in its receptiveness to implement the Petersberg Declaration, which could be considered as the first steps to the formation of the ESDP. The British-French venue only got receptive to the formation of a common defense, as a consequence to the change in the domestic venue of the UK. Regarding the venue of the EU Council, the historical analysis has shown that given the frequent debates dating back to the implementation of the CFSP in 1992, the venue had been receptive to the issue. However, through the St-Malo declaration, the

EU Council was able to move the policy agenda from the “governmental agenda” to the “decision agenda”.

Princen (2009) argued in his theoretical framework that involving new institutional venues increases the chances of a policy agenda getting implemented, especially as it leads new actors to deal with the problem. As mentioned in the paragraph above, European defense had been on the governmental agenda of the EU Council since the introduction of the CFSP. Hence, according to Princen’s theory (2009), it would have been useful for the supporters of a common European defense to involve multiple venues within the EU, also to alternate the actors. However, while multiple venues were involved, the actors did not differ between them (see figure 2). For instance, between the WEU and the EU, most of the actors involved in the decision-making procedure were the same. This could also be the reason for the WEU not to debate about the implementation of the policy, as they did so already in the EU Council venue. Therefore, it is arguable that by changing venues without including new sets of actors, the chosen venue is not relevant for the agenda to get implemented. The next section will analyze the formation of the policy agenda and the role of the blockade of the UK.

#### *3.2.4.2. The power of the UK’s blockade*

Princen (2009) explains that for a policy agenda to be formed, there must be a broad transnational policy network, which requires broad consensus between the member-states. Regarding the ESDP, the transnational policy debate was already in place through the creation of the CFSP, the assigning of defense capabilities to the WEU and the opening of a future possibility to frame a common defense policy. In the first years of the 1990s, the debate centered around the common foreign policy of the EU, and only from 1994 onwards, a transnational policy debate around common defense arose, especially in the EU Council summits. Princen (2009) highlights that the switch from a “governmental agenda” to a “decision agenda” is specifically difficult because of vertical and horizontal blockades. Indeed, the EU Council had difficulties collectively endorsing the policy, as shown by the failure of the Amsterdam treaty. The historical analysis further demonstrates that the strongest blockade was coming from the UK. This blockade was a vertical one, as the UK tried to keep the matter on a national level and hence prohibiting the agenda to get to the EU level. The country refused to incorporate a common defense strategy in the EU, as they were scared to have their “hands tied” (WEU (2) 1992, 150) regarding their foreign defense policies and because of their relationship with the US. As the UK was present in every venue, apart from the German-French one, the decision to implement the policy could not be made without the UK, leading to the EU not being able to move forward. The next section will further analyze how it was possible for the EU to resolve UK’s blockade.

#### *3.2.4.3. Bypassing the blockade through converging views*

Princen (2009) identified three methods to help resolving a blockade and consequentially moving the policy agenda from the “governmental agenda” to the “decision agenda”: conflict expansion/contraction, issue framing, institutional opportunities/constraints.

As shown in the previous sections, the change of venues did not substantially affect which actors were present in each venue. Hence, the conflict could not substantially expand nor

contract during the development of the policy. Regarding the framing of the issue, the main problem was about the EU defense capabilities being within NATO or not. For instance, the discussion about the Eurocorps and the debate about their inclusion in the WEU/NATO showed the importance to frame the issue correctly, so as not to provoke the opposition of Atlanticist supporters. In the case of the ESDP as well, ensuring the supremacy of NATO was essential for the UK to accept it.

Regarding institutional opportunities and constraints, Princen (2009) highlights three different concepts on how to make an agenda successful: convergence of views, a wide range of members affected, and external events. The historical analysis has shown that, through the convergence of views between France and the UK formulated in the St-Malo declaration (1998), the EU Council was able to implement the policy. If that had not happened, the EU would have not been able to circumvent the blockade of the UK. The analysis further demonstrated that the number of EU member-states affected did not increase, mainly because no conflict expansion occurred. To be able to analyze whether external events had an impact on the evolution of the ESDP, the next chapter will analyze the role of outside actors and events.

### 3.3. Outside actors and events influencing the creation of the ESDP

#### 3.3.1. Trust of NATO in EU's independent defense

As laid out in section 3.1., NATO was supportive of a European Pillar throughout the 1990s, which also enabled the WEU to issue the Petersberg Declaration. The feeling of trust that NATO had in the WEU intensified throughout the North Atlantic summits of 1994 and 1996, for instance by implementing the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The purpose of the task force was to provide military capabilities that could be used by NATO and the WEU (Smith and Latawski 2003, 125). NATO's trust in the WEU can be noticed in the former's declaration after their summit in Berlin (1996), in which they state that "an essential part of this adaptation (the CJTF) is to build a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO, which will enable all European Allies [...] to act themselves as required; and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership" (Bailes 1999, 310). Additionally, in the Washington summit of 1999, NATO approved the ESDP (North-Atlantic Council summit, Washington DC, 1999).

However, the analysis of NATO accepting European military independence, seems to contradict the strong opinion of the UK, who wanted to ensure the supremacy of the Atlantic organization and did not accept European military independence. In general, it seems as if the published documents of NATO can be misleading in understanding the perspective of supporters of Atlanticism on the development of the ESDP. This is possible because many EU members states were members of NATO and hence influenced the statements that the organization published. Therefore, to understand the perspective of outside members, it is useful to look at the most important one in the international arena: The United States.

#### 3.3.2. Failure of trust of the United States?

The position of the United States towards the European Pillar is ambiguous, as the country had sent many mixed signals to its European partners throughout the 1990s. The next paragraph

will present some examples of the United States' doubts and conclude with the influence they had on the formation of the ESDP.

In 1991, the Bush administration raised concerns about the possibility of the EU browbeating the US, if they had their own security and defense identity in NATO. It was only when European states ensured to assume greater responsibility regarding their own defense, and hence reinforce NATO, that the US accepted the European Pillar (Cornish 1996, 755). Another example of the US's skepticism was regarding the implementation of the Eurocorps. The country was again specifically scared about Germany and France replacing NATO and focusing more on a Eurocentric defense (Sloan 2010, 10). Both examples show the lack of trust the US had towards European states.

The US's strongest opposition was related to the St-Malo declaration (1998) when former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that the EU should avoid the "decoupling, duplication and discrimination" of NATO (Albright 1998). The problem with decoupling indicates the US's fear of the EU leaving NATO. Duplication illustrates the US's concern in not having enough military resources for both organizations. Lastly, avoiding discrimination points to the fact that third nations, which are in Europe but not in the EU, e.g., Norway and Iceland, should not be excluded from European defense capabilities. These three points are known as the 3 Ds. This speech led to a stronger reaction of the EU, in comparison to the two examples shown above. Former British NATO Secretary-General George Robertson defended the ESDP to a NATO summit in 1999, in which he stated that the European Defense and Security will instead be based on 3 Is: "improvement in European defense capabilities; inclusiveness and transparency for all Allies; and the indivisibility of Trans-Atlantic security, based on our shared values" (Robertson 1999). The Helsinki conclusions show that all aspects mentioned by George Robertson were implemented in the policy, as it states that the EU does not want to create a European army, only act if NATO is not engaged and will ensure arrangements between non-EU European NATO members in order for them to contribute to EU military crisis management.

To conclude, the analysis shows that the doubts of the US had an important influence on European member-states. At the beginning of the 1990s, EU members complained about the US treating them like enemies instead of allies (Sloan 2010, 10). It is only by witnessing the implementation of all points raised by Albright, that the US's influence in the formation of the ESDP can be understood.

Next to the pressure, the US exerted on the EU, the next section will describe how external events influence the creation of the ESDP.

### 3.3.3. The Kosovo war and how it shows the necessity for the EU to change

As mentioned, the urgency for the ESDP also lied in external events, the most important of which was the Kosovo war (1998-99). The armed conflict was fought between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Batora, Osland, and Peter

2017, 11). The reason for the EU to intervene in the war is the proximity of Kosovo to Europe (Smith and Latawski 2003, 138).

Indeed, the Kosovo war was an important push for the EU to take more military responsibility. For instance, former UK Prime minister Tony Blair stated at the press conference of the informal EU Council in Pörschach in October 1998 that “as Kosovo has brought home to us, it is right that Britain and other European countries, as part of Europe, play a key and leading role and that we enhance our capabilities to make a difference in those situations” (Informal European Summit, Pörschach 1998). The British-Italian summit in 1999 further showed necessity “for improved European military capabilities for autonomous action in the field of the Petersberg tasks backed up by credible military forces” (British-Italian summit, London 1999). These declarations further illustrate the vision European member-states had in being a leading global force regarding peacekeeping missions and the disappointment they felt during the Kosovo war.

The EU’s failure to act was due to the lack of unity in implementing common decisions. An example is a ban of Yugoslav Airlines (JAT) to land in the EU as a sanction towards the government in Belgrade. While the General Affairs Council of the EU concluded that it was necessary to ban these flights, Greece and the UK opposed it, which resulted in a delay of several months to finally implement the ban (Batora, Osland, and Peter 2017, 12). This minor sanction and the problems the EU had to implement it, is representative of major coordination issues between EU countries. Another example is the economic and political sanctions that the EU enforced on Belgrade. As these were not backed up with military capabilities, they had no power over Kosovo (Smith and Latawski 2003, 132). Additionally, with the conflict further intensifying, European member-states accepted their inability to act by releasing a declaration on how “the EU encourages international security organizations to pursue their efforts” (Smith and Latawski 2003, 132). This apparent incapability gave the EU the last ideological and institutional urgency to implement the ESDP, as their goal was to be a strong force worldwide.

The next section will apply the insights of the agenda-setting theory to the previously mentioned historical factors outside of the EU, and their influence on the creation of the ESDP.

#### 3.3.4. The value of external actors and events

In his theoretical framework, Princen (2009) specifies that external events help in bypassing a blockade. In the case of the Kosovo war and the ESDP, this seemed to be the case, as in the St-Malo declaration (1998), France and the UK referred to the necessity of military action to respond to international crises (France-British Summit, St-Malo 1998). While the countries do not specifically mention the Kosovo war, the temporal and geographical proximity of the summit to the conflict, seems to point to a relation between both happenings.

An aspect that Princen (2009) does not specify in his theoretical framework is the influence of outside perspectives on the specific content of a policy. However, the incorporation of Albright’s 3 Ds in the policy shows how the US and/or NATO was able to influence the content



of the ESDP. This suggests that more attention ought to be given to the role of external actors in the agenda-setting theory of the EU.

#### 4. Conclusion

This paper researched the development of the ESDP in the 1990s by analyzing it from a historical and political science perspective. The first chapter presented the agenda-setting theory for the EU. The main and second chapter delved into the development of the ESDP within the European Union. Lastly, the final chapter analyzes outside developments and actors that had a direct influence on the policy.

A major finding of this research is that no conflict expansion/contraction occurred. As argued in chapter 3.2.4.1., there was no real venue change, as the relevant actors within the venues were the same. This increased the difficulty for France and Germany to push their agenda through. Especially as the UK was present in every venue, the country's blockade could not be bypassed. While this explains why it took the EU Council so long to move the policy to the "decision agenda", it also helps to understand the quick time frame the EU needed between the St-Malo declaration and the EU Council in Helsinki (1999) to decide upon the ESDP. This is due to the intergovernmental nature of the EU and all actors needed to implement the policy being already present. This led to an easier implementation of the policy, as no further actor had to be consulted before enforcing the ESDP.

Another interesting finding deals with the influence of the US on the development of the ESDP. While Princen (2009) incorporates the importance of outside happenings in his framework, he does not deal with the role of outside actors. Indeed, in the case of the ESDP, the analysis showed that the Kosovo war had a significant influence on the development of the policy. However, since the EU also incorporated aspects of the US's criticism towards the policy, it seems as if outside actors played a significant role regarding the content of the policy. This also represents an avenue for further research, as it would be useful to further investigate the influence of non-EU member-states regarding agenda-setting in the Union. This would allow a deeper understanding whether the influence is present only in this specific case study, or if it can be theorized as a common factor in the agenda-setting of the European Union.

These reflections and findings highlight the usefulness of interdisciplinarity in social sciences. The use of the historical and political science discipline gave an in-depth empirical perspective to Princen's (2009) theoretical framework, also highlighting how it can be further developed. Menken and Keestra's method of extension (2016), which involves the addition of disciplines to each other (2016, 44), helped to answer the research question and added valuable insights to both disciplines (2016, 44). From a political science perspective, the methods used in historical research contributed to an understanding of how the agenda-setting theory of the European Union can be further developed, e.g. the role of external actors. From a historical perspective, the agenda-setting theory provides important insights, as the consequences of the UK's blockades and the role of the venues in the ESDP. Without the framework offered by Princen (2009), it would be of major difficulty to analyze why the position of the UK had such a strong impact on the overall development of the policy.

Finally, there are some apparent limitations to this research. For instance, the theoretical framework of Princen did not include the agenda-setting procedure of singular countries. Especially regarding the UK's change of position, the paper is only able to give limited findings for the country to change its mind. While the failure of the EU in the Kosovo war might be a possible explanation, other scholars (Dryburgh 2010; Smith and Latawski 2003) hypothesized that the change from a conservative to a socialist Prime minister or the desire to make up for not participating in the single currency project was also possible reasons for the UK to change their mind (Dryburgh 2010, 263; Smith and Latawski 2003, 128). It would hence be of great use to apply the agenda-setting theory to the development of the ESDP within the UK and link it to the research conducted in this paper.

Moreover, this paper is limited in its research due to the historical framework focusing on the timeframe before the implementation of the ESDP. However, scholars argue (Bickerton, Irondelle, and Menon 2011; Brummer 2006) that due to the problem of implementation in the EU, European goals and reality differ strongly. In the case of the ESDP, this is particularly noticeable, as the ESDP's framework does not incorporate a strategic structure (Brummer 2006, 5-6). Furthermore, the member-states autonomy is the primary focus of the ESDP, which leads to an overly complex decision-making procedure. (Bickerton, Irondelle, and Menon 2011, 6). Therefore, analyzing the efficiency of the ESDP after its implementation could provide insights into the goals different EU countries pursued before implementing the policy.

Lastly, it would be interesting to compare the insights of this research with another European defense policy, as the Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO), which is also member-state driven. This research would add to a better understanding of the agenda-setting theory in the EU and would be valuable for society, so to retrace European problems and their related solutions. Especially now that Great Britain is not part of the EU anymore, further research can analyze which actors today are blocking further integration.

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# Appendix

Figure 3: Important dates in creation of ESDP

