The Rippling Effects of European Citizenship

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and Civic Engagement in the Netherlands.

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Abstract

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 has introduced legal European Union (EU) citizenship to all citizens of EU member states. This unique development has introduced international citizenship that exist next to national citizenship. This thesis, links the construction of legal EU citizenship to civic engagement with the EU and specifically focusses on the Netherlands. The following research question is answered: *did the creation of European citizenship with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty change civic engagement in the Netherlands with the EU?* This question is answered by using Switzerland as an example of a successful (semi-)federal institution. Three elements of Swiss civic engagement are determined: common civic culture, member state involvement and democratic quality. These elements are measured before and after the creation of the Maastricht Treaty to distinguish whether civic engagement in the Netherlands with the EU has changed. Thereafter it is discussed how EU legal citizenship has influenced this change. The elements are measured by analysing Eurobarometers, EU legal documents, Dutch parliamentary documents, voter turn-out and an interview with member of European Parliament (MEP), Sophie in 't Veld. The analysis shows that civic engagement in the Netherlands with the EU has changed in a negative sense. EU legal citizenship has not directly influenced this change, but influenced it indirectly by the individualization that it provides. Furthermore, EU legal citizenship holds the potential to increase civic engagement in the Netherlands.

Table of contents

Introduction

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 has been of great importance for the integration of the European Union (EU). Under the presidency of Jaques Delors, European collaboration would reach further than it had since its establishment in 1951. Article A of the Maastricht Treaty candidly states: 'This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever-closing union among the peoples of Europe'.[1] In the new treaty some well-known advances were made: the establishment of the European Monetary Union, the introduction of the Euro and the increase in power of the European Parliament.[2] Within the context of these prominent changes, Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty is sometimes overlooked. This article describes a new legal status for all citizens living in a member state, namely EU citizenship.[3] The creation of EU citizenship has emerged from a growing focus on the individual in the EU over multiple decades. For example, through addressing citizens instead of governments in EU Treaties or by incrementally expanding the power of the citizen selected EU Parliament.[4] Since the Maastricht Treaty, EU citizens hold two types of citizenship: national and EU. Although this new international citizenship did not result in tremendous changes, it brought new legislative potential. EU citizenship represents a symbolic coat hanger on which different rights and duties can be hung directly. It gives the EU the potential, like national citizenship already accomplishes, to make legislation directly applicable for individual citizens.[5]

The creation of European citizenship might not have been accompanied by many new civil rights and duties, it did open up the discussion on citizenship within the EU and the opportunities for political development that come with it. Citizenship is a comprehensive term, and knows many approaches. It can be a practice, status, membership and 'performance'. The most common definition that is offered is that 'citizenship is membership of the nation-state'.[6] So, how can the concept of citizenship then be applicable for the EU? Although many critics of the EU may describe it as a super state, it is not directly comparable

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[1] Treaty on European Union, (1992), Maastricht, *C191/1,* available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:11992M/TXT

[2] Watts, D., *The European Union,* (Edinburgh, 2008), 41.

[3] Isin, F., Saward, M., 'Questions of European Citizenship', In: Isin, F., Saward, M., (eds.), *Enacting European Citizenship*, (Cambridge, 2013).

[4] See for example the Rome Treaty where it states that it wants to 'ensure the economic and social progress of their countries', in comparison to the Maastricht Treaty states that it wants to, 'promote economic and social progress for their peoples'.

[5] Duff, A., 'The Main Reforms', in: Duff, A., Pinder, J., Pryce, R., (eds.), *Maastricht and Beyond: Building a European* Union, (London, 2002), 30.

[6] Isin E.F., Nyers, P., 'Introduction: Globalizing citizenship studies', in: Isin E.F., Nyers, P., (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies* (New York, 2014), 1-11, 1.

with a nation state. The British had even successfully objected the use of the word federal in the Maastricht Treaty.[7] However, with the creation of legal EU citizenship with the Maastricht Treaty, it has become evident that citizenship moves beyond the nation state.

The establishment of EU citizenship and the overarching bureaucratic structure of the EU, implies a more republican form of government. The development of republican elements brings EU civic engagement into perspective. Republican government namely emphasizes the importance of citizenship and the participation in public affairs that come with it.[8] Civic engagement seems to be insisted through the Maastricht Treaty and has been explicitly encouraged by the EU in the decades thereafter.[9] The creation of EU citizenship therefore raises the question whether it has actually contributed to civic engagement. Therefore, this thesis will focus on whether the creation of EU legal citizenship has influenced civic engagement. Previous research on this subject has focused on how civic engagement can influence the EU (instead of the other way around), how the EU has made civic engagement an important part of its policy, how civil society organizations respond to the stimulation of EU civic engagement, or how the creation of EU citizenship has influenced the EU itself.[10] This literature does not specifically relate civic engagement to the Maastricht Treaty. One article by Kohler-Koch analyses the Maastricht Treaty and civic engagement, but focusses on how non-governmental organizations (NGO's) influence EU's democratic capacity and the article does not explicitly link the legal creation of citizenship to civic engagement.[11] This thesis therefore wants to contribute to the body of research concerning EU citizenship and EU civic engagement, by explicitly linking the two. In the next chapter, previous research on these topics will be discussed further.

To demarcate the subject of this thesis, the research will focus on one member state specifically: the Netherlands. The Netherlands has been a founding member of the European institution and has generally been a pro-European country. This makes the Netherlands an

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[7] Duff, A., 'The Main Reforms', 20.

[8] Dagger, R., 'Republican Citizenship', in: Isin, E.F., Turner, B.S., (eds.), *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, 145-157, 149.

[9] Bee, C., *Active Citizenship in Europe: Practices and Demands in the EU, Italy, Turkey, and the UK,* (London, 2017), 6.

[10] Bee, C., Guerrina, R., 'Participation, Dialogue and Civic Engagement: Understanding the Role of Organized Civil Society in Promoting Active Citizenship in the European Union', *Journal of Civil Society*, 10(2014)1, 29-50.; Kohler-Koch, B., Quittkat, C., *De-Mystification of Participatory Democracy: EU-Governance and Civil Society,* (Oxford, 2013).; Smismans, S., 'European civil society and citizenship: Complementary or exclusionary concepts', *Policy and Society*, 28(2009)1, 59-70.; Bee, C., *Active Citizenship in Europe.*; Kostakopoulou, D., 'The Evolution of European Union Citizenship', *European Political Science*, 7(2008), 285-295.

[11] Kohler-Koch, B., 'Post-Maastricht Civil Society and Participatory Democracy', *Journal of European Integration*, 34(2012)7, 809-824.

interesting case to study elements like identification and engagement with the EU. Additionally, the author has done previous research on, and has personal experience with, the Dutch environment, which provides a certain expertise on this subject. Considering what has been previously been discussed, the following research question will be answered in this thesis: *did the creation of European citizenship with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty change civic engagement in the Netherlands with the EU?* To answer this question, it is necessary to find an appropriate theory which can be used to measure civic engagement. That is why in the first chapter, a theoretical framework will be constructed where the federal structure of Switzerland is used as a model to identify measurable factors of civic engagement. In the second chapter, citizenship as a phenomenon is discussed and it is examined how it is constructed on the EU-level. In the third, fourth and fifth chapter three factors: common civic culture, member-state involvement and quality of democracy, will be discussed in each chapter respectively. The final chapter will be a concluding chapter where the components of citizenship will be linked to the measured factors of civic engagement. This is done by firstly drawing conclusions on the difference in civic engagement before and after the Maastricht Treaty. Secondly, it will be discussed how legal EU citizenship might have affected this change.

Chapter 1: Theoretical and methodological foundation

Theory

There is no theory that can adequately explain active citizenship within the EU. Although citizenship moves beyond the nation state, the nation state can still be a helpful instrument to make sense of European citizenship. Therefore, Switzerland will be used as an example to shape a theoretical framework for analysing civic engagement in a (semi-)federal setting. Switzerland is a suitable country to use as a federal comparison for several reasons. Switzerland legally became a federal state in 1848 and reflects a multi-lingual and multi-cultural federation, despite being presented as a multi-national state by some.[12] Furthermore, Switzerland is geographically located in Europe, so it is culturally and politically similar to EU member states, while not being adjusted to the institution that it will be compared to. Lastly, Switzerland can also be described as a successful federal state, where citizens primarily identify with the Swiss federal state despite its pluri-cultural roots within the different cantons.[13]

Articles by Cheneval & Ferrín and Church & Dardanelli are used to point out different factors of the Swiss state that contribute to participatory citizenship.[14] These factors will be discussed to determine how they can be used to measure Dutch civic engagement within the EU. For this theoretical framework, factors that are discussed in the articles will be divided into three categories: common civic culture, canton/member state competence and democratic quality. These categories will be adjusted to be applicable to the Netherlands. To do so, the Swiss national state represents the EU and cantons represent member states.

The first factor that is identified in the articles, is having a common civic culture. A common civic culture is an important element of the Swiss political landscape, because it provides a way of identifying and engaging with the nation state. In the Swiss case, a common civic culture can be described as rooted in federalism, direct democracy and neutrality, and supported by foundational myths. These components of Swiss common civic culture have a

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[12] Dardanelli, P., 'Multi-lingual but mono-national: Exploring and Explaining Switzerland's Exceptionalism', in: Caminal, M., Requejo, F. (eds.), *Federalism, Plurinationality, and Democratic Constitutionalism Theory and Cases,* (Abindon, 2011), 2.

[13] Cheneval, F., Ferrín, M., 'Switzerland as a model for the EU', in: Cheneval, F., Ferrín, M (eds.) *Citizenship in segmented societies; lessons for the EU,* (Cheltenham, 2018), 10-39, 21, 36.

[14] Cheneval, F., Ferrín, M., 'Switzerland as a model for the EU'; Church, C., Dardanelli, P., 'The Dynamics of Confederalism and Federalism: Comparing Switzerland and the EU', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 15(2005)2, 163-185.

long history and have been strongly promoted by the elites.[15] In other words, they did not develop naturally. Over time, identification with the Swiss nation state has contributed to the idea that one's local identity is not jeopardized, but guaranteed by the national government. Swiss common civic culture has strongly contributed to civic engagement on a national level throughout the different cantons. Therefore, EU common civic culture will be investigated in the Netherlands through several Eurobarometer surveys that were held in the Netherlands in the period before and after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Secondly, networks of civil society organizations that promote EU citizenship will be investigated to see how the EU promotes a European civic culture and what it entails.

   Both common civic culture and European identity are important themes to this thesis. As their meaning overlaps, it is important to distinguish the difference between the two to have a full understanding of this thesis. Civic culture concerns features of our social and cultural world (dispositions, practices, processes) that establish pre-conditions for people to participate in the public sphere in a civil and political society.[16] A common civic culture is when people share these features. European identity can be seen as a group identity. Group identity is an internalized state confined to a subset of group members. This group accepts a fundamental similarity that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves and to also point out an 'other'.[17] The important difference between the two terms is that common civic culture describes features of our social world, and that European identity is something internalized by individuals. The two terms complement each other in that they describe similarity or 'sameness'. They also influence each other because a common civic culture can be the named fundamental similarity that constructs a European identity.

The second factor is canton involvement, which translates into member-state involvement for the EU. In Switzerland, the cantons are the crucial middle level between the state and the communes and are the building blocks for the federation. Within the Swiss federal constitution, they are implementers of public policy and thus form the face of the political system to their citizens.[18] Their involvement with the Swiss state is hugely important for a

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[15] Cheneval, F., Ferrín, M., 'Switzerland as a model for the EU', 20.

[16] Dahlgren, P., 'Reconfiguring Civic Culture in the New Media Milieu', in: Corner, J., Pels, D., (eds.), *Media and the Restyling of Politics: Consumerism, Celebrity and Cynicism*, (London, 2003), 151-170, 154, 155.

[17] Huddy, L., 'From Group Identity to Political Cohesion and Commitment', in: Huddy, L., Sears, D.O., Levy, J., (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology,* (New York, 2013), 737-773, 739.; Capello, R., 'Cohesion Policies and the creation of a European Identity: The Role of Territorial Identity', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56(2018)3, 489-503, 492.

[18] Church, C., Dardanelli, P., 'The Dynamics of Confederalism and Federalism', 172.

successful government. The same can be said for a member state of the EU: member states are the primary actors in the EU and form the middle level between citizen and the EU. The involvement of the Dutch government with the EU will therefore be analysed by using Dutch policy documents concerning European policy, to determine how they operate as the primary actor and how this can influence civic engagement with the EU.

The third factor is democratic quality. Democratic quality concerns an exact procedure carried out according to recurring methods, structural characterises of the product and the satisfaction with the results.[19] Because this concerns democracy, it is crucial that it is measured to what extent citizens are being involved. The articles by Cheneval & Ferrín and Church & Dardanelli mention that in this respect,the EU might learn from the Swiss quality of democracy with its responsiveness to citizens through input and output.[20] An important factor which enhances the quality of democracy in Switzerland is the considerable role direct democracy plays within national politics. The interaction with citizens and their possibility for direct political participation has given strong legitimacy to the national government and is seen as in important factor for providing civic engagement with the national government. To investigate the democratic quality of the EU in the Netherlands, voter turnout for the European elections and referendums will be analysed. Furthermore, the quality of democracy of the EU is discussed by looking at input, output and social legitimacy.

These three factors will be used as indicators of civic engagement in the Netherlands with the EU. The three factors separately influence civic engagement and together give a strong indication if it has changed or not. In the final chapter this will provide that the research question can be answered.

Method

This thesis will compare the three elements of civic engagement before and after the legal enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty. For some elements, changes before and after the Maastricht Treaty can be measured quite easily. For example, the Eurobarometers and voter turnout are quantitative data where differences can be indicated quickly. For the other elements like EU networks of citizenship promotion and Dutch government policy documents, this is not measured so easily. That is why for these elements the analysis will be

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[19] Diamond, L., Morlino, L., 'The quality of Democracy: An Overview', *Journal of* Democracy, 15(2004)4, 20-31, 21, 22.
[20] Church, C., Dardanelli, P., 'The Dynamics of Confederalism and Federalism', 180.; Cheneval, F., Ferrín, M., 'Switzerland as a model for the EU', 36.

explicitly executed in two steps. Firstly, the situation before and after the Maastricht Treaty will be analysed, focussing on the frequency of occurrence, the effectiveness and the attitude that is reflected. Secondly, the outcomes of the analysis are compared to be able to draw conclusions on whether changes have taken place for these elements and thus whether changes have taken place for civic engagement. In the final chapter, the analysis of EU citizenship will be measured against the changes in the different elements of civic engagement. Here, themes, structures, and processes that are both found in the analysis of citizenship and in the analysis of civic engagement will be indicators that EU citizenship has influenced the changes in civic engagement.

For the analytical chapters, primary sources are used. The Eurobarometers that are used in chapter 3, have been collected through the online Eurobarometer database of the EU.[21] The years that have been chosen for the documents are 5 and 2 years prior and after 1992. These years are chosen to determine whether trends regarding the conclusions of the surveys can be identified and to ensure that these trends can be related to the Maastricht Treaty instead of being too far removed from it. The official EU documents that are also used in this chapter, are chosen because they directly relate to the funding schemes that were constructed since the Maastricht Treaty. The parliamentary documents that are used in chapter 4 have been collected through the online archival database of the Dutch government.[22] The database was searched for documents that have a more detailed or elaborate description of the government's attitude towards the EU or documents that were specifically composed to describe this attitude. This meant that documents that described important events within the relationship between the Netherlands and the EU (Dutch presidency, EU enlargement et cetera) were chosen, because these documents satisfied the named conditions. A maximum of 7 years prior and after 1992 was used as a searching criterion to still be able to relate the documents to the Maastricht Treaty. The data on voter turnout in the Netherlands and the EU are collected through a Dutch website managed by an organization aimed at spreading knowledge and through the website of the European parliament.[23] Furthermore, a semi-structured interview was conducted with Dutch member of the European Parliament (MEP), Sophie in 't Veld. Quotes from the interview are used in chapter 5.

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[21] Database accessible through: https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/screen/home
[22] Database accessible through: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/uitgebreidzoeken/parlementair
[23] Data found on: https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrp8wsz/opkomst_bij_tweede_kamerverkiezingen; Data found on European Parliament website: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en/turnout/

Chapter 2: EU citizenship

EU citizenship has been a new concept in the past decades. With its creation in the Maastricht Treaty, international citizenship gained legal status and has since coexisted with national citizenship. Before EU citizenship can be examined further, citizenship as a concept will be discussed first. Citizenship is a phenomenon that on the one hand is invisible or intangible for most people, but on the other hand it is of great importance in peoples' daily life. This is affirmed by the fact that for the majority of all people in the world, citizenship is something that we are granted at birth, is not a choice, and will not be changed during our life. Rights, duties, status, identity and politics are all connected to it and a certain citizenship determines how you are treated anywhere in the world. Because it determines how people are treated, many more topics like gender, postcolonialism, ethnicity, transnationalism, multiculturalism and sexuality are influenced by citizenship.[24] Although citizenship has a broad sphere of influence, this thesis will focus on the aspect of participation. So, in this chapter the practice of citizenship will be discussed both in general and on an EU level. Furthermore, citizenship as a legal status is examined. Lastly, the legal construction of EU citizenship within the Maastricht Treaty will be analysed and related to the theoretical discussion on citizenship and participation.

Citizenship has always been a vehicle for exclusion and inclusion. Ancient Greek society considered citizenship as something sacred and only reserved for a select group of people. To be a citizen, you had to be a man of at least 18 years of age with two Athenian parents and a father who already held citizenship. The allocation of citizenship was a multi-stepped and a very formal process. Inequality was an underlying human value and reflected the natural order of things.[25] Looking at the further historical development of citizenship by taking some giant leaps through time, individuality and equality before the court started playing a more important role in Western society and paved the way to the idea of political community.[26] Although inclusion and exclusion were still important consequences of citizenship, other mechanisms within a political community emerged. Over the past two

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[24] Kochenov, D., *Citizenship*, (Cambridge, 2019) 4, 6, 8.; Nyers, P., 'Introduction: Why Citizenship Studies', *Citizenship Studies*, 11(2007)1, 1-4, 1, 2.; Stoks, G., 'Transnational citizenship: problems of definition, culture and democracy', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17(2004)1, 119-135, 120, 121.

[25] Manville, P.B., *The origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens*, (Princeton, 1997), 4, 8. Kochenov, D., *Citizenship*, 63.

[26] Thelen, D., 'How Natural are National and Transnational Citizenship? A Historical Perspective', *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies,* 7(2000)2, 549-565, 559.; Kochenov, D., *Citizenship*, 63, 64.

decades these mechanisms have been discussed within academic debate, and especially through the journal *Citizenship Studies*. The debate surrounding citizenship has been greatly influenced by the journal and especially by its editors, Isin, Nyers and Turner. Their journal has demonstrated the great sphere of influence of citizenship by broadening the debate on the subject and show that it can move beyond a state centric polity.[27]

Isin and Nyers define citizenship as: 'an 'institution' mediating rights between the subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects belong'.[28] This definition highlights three important dimensions of citizenship that are relevant for this thesis: the possibility of citizenship outside a state context, the importance of rights of both polity and subject and the dynamic potential of citizenship. First of all, the definition uses 'institution' as its subject which means that a city or a nation-state is not the only possible vehicle of citizenship. Through history, the idea of a political community mainly emerged on a local and a national level, however in the past decades we have become increasingly affected by events that take place on an international level, which have been tackled through an international institution. This has led to, although filtered through national citizenship, the creation of international citizenship within the EU. The EU has been unique so far in regard to a legal citizenship on an international level.[29]

Secondly, the definition by Isin and Nyers highlights the importance of rights of both the polity and the subject. These rights and duties determine the relationship between citizens and institution. Traditionally citizens' rights can be divided into civil, political and social, and citizens' duties can be divided into military conscription, taxation and participation. The combination of rights and duties is always an outcome of struggle in a society and is expressed within a legal institution. Examples of these rights are: free speech (civil), standing for office (political) and unemployment insurance (social).[30] These citizens' rights have become applicable to more topics in modern society than the traditional kinds. Ecological and sexual rights have, for example, been the result of social struggle within contemporary societies. Likewise, citizens' duties are changing, with for example conscription disappearing

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[27] Nyers, P., 'Introduction: Why Citizenship Studies', 1, 2.
[28] Isin, E.F., Nyers, P., 'Introduction: Globalizing citizenship studies', 1.
[29] Dobson, L., Kirchner, E., Christiansen, T., *Supranational Citizenship*, (Manchester, 2006), 1.; Maas, W., 'European Union citizenship in retrospect and prospect', in: Isin, E.F., Nyers, P., (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies*, (New York, 2014), 409-417, 409.
[30] Isin, E.F., Nyers, P., 'Introduction: Globalizing citizenship studies', 2.

within many institutions and the changed obligation to vote in the Netherlands which was abolished in 1970.[31]

Thirdly, by emphasizing rights and duties within the interpretation of citizenship, a third dimension presents itself. These rights and duties only exist when people act upon them. Like the conscription example, the duty might be disappearing in many countries, but governments may still call upon this duty in times of war. This duty will only exist when it is invoked. Another example is active and passive suffrage; to go vote requires an action, but to be able to be voted for, does not. This shows that citizenship can be either active or passive. It makes citizenship an act or a dynamic phenomenon, instead of a stationary or framed condition. Understanding citizenship as a status is an example of a more stationary interpretation of citizenship which can exclude many people that are able to enact citizenship, but are excluded from a formal citizenship status. A good example of this is when people mobilize a rally for same-sex marriage, debate about their pension, advocate for the legalization of certain drugs or leak information about their government, they act upon citizenship rights or struggle for the expansion of them. These acts can also be performed by people who do not hold a passport and are formally considered as non-citizens. However, citizenship status remains an important way to obtain citizenship rights.[32]

These three interpretations of citizenship are important for understanding the creation of EU citizenship within the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the process towards it. These interpretations are necessary to understand that citizenship moves beyond the state, and furthermore they help us move beyond the understanding of citizenship as a stationary status. As we have seen, subjects find themselves within two dimensions of citizenship; rights and duties on the one hand and


Figure 1 visual representation of the two dimensions of citizenship

active and passive on the other hand. When expressed within a visual tool, these dimensions look as depicted in figure 1. Different events within the subject of citizenship can be placed

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[31] Aarts, K., 'Dertig jaar later: De empirische houdbaarheid van argumenten voor en tegen opkomstplicht', *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 28(2001)2, 80-94, 80.

[32] Isin, E.F., Nyers, P., 'Introduction: Globalizing citizenship studies', 2, 3.; Isin, E.F., Nielsen, G.M., 'Introduction: Acts of Citizenship', in: Isin, E.F., Nyers, P. (eds.), *Acts of Citizenship*, (London, 2008), 1-12, 3, 4, 6.

withing the matrix of figure 1. Like the obligation to vote in the Netherlands, moved from the right upper corner to the left upper corner after the obligation was abolished in 1970 and so became an active right instead of an active duty.

The harbinger of a European citizenship can already be found before the creation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and can be traced back to the origin of the European cooperation after the Second World War. Advocates of a European cooperation saw nationalism as a major cause of the destructive war and sought to develop a supranationalist sense instead. A European idea developed, where cooperation could bring future peace safety and prosperity.[33] Post-war Europe developed a European sentiment, but steps towards legal or practical citizenship were not yet taken. Besides, scholars agree that this European 'sentiment' was mainly based upon economic intentions instead of cultural or political ones.[34] The first European legal entity was created with the Paris Treaty in 1951. With the European Coal and Steel Community, an institution for mediating rights (which Isin and Nyers use within their definition of citizenship) was created on a European level. The treaty included the right of free movement for workers within the member-states and can be seen as one of the first legal indications of European citizenship and a first possibility to practice European citizenship.

An important development of European citizenship, is the development of the European parliament. This body of the EU gives citizens a direct way of practicing citizenship through European elections that were first held in 1979. This citizen-elected body of the EU, also gained legislative powers over the decades after the first elections. The European parliament started as a consultative body and has gained powers that now are equal to the national governments. [35] The development of the parliament has introduced the active right to vote for all adult European citizens. Another important right that was established in this period, is the right to free movement. First the Schengen agreement was signed in 1985, and later this right was assimilated in the EU through the Amsterdam Treaty.[36]

The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 became an important external factor within the EU for intensified efforts towards European integration and it also meant the return of the

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[33] Watts, D., *The European Union,* (Edinburgh, 2008), 5, 6, 7.; Maas, W., 'European Union citizenship in retrospect and prospect', 410, 411.
[34] Milward, S.M., *The European Rescue of the Nation-*State, (London, 2000). 4.; Gilbert, M., *European Integration: A Concise History*, (Lanham, 2011), 46.; Dedmand, M. J., *The origins and Development of the European Union 1945-2008: a history of European Integration,* (London, 2010), 7, 8.
[35] Hix, S., Noury, A., Roland, G., 'Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament', *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(2006)2, 494-511, 494.
[36] Ademmer, E., Barsbai, T., Lücke, M., Stöhr, T., '30 Years of Schengen: Internal blessing, external curse?', *Kiel Policy Brief*, 1(2015)88, 1-15, 1, 2.

discussion on legal EU citizenship. What this citizenship should include was not immediately clear, but it would at least signify a respect for human, social and political rights and the completion of the creation of the right to free movement.[37] At the Dublin summit in 1990, it was discussed whether the planned intergovernmental conference (IGC) on the monetary union should be accompanied by an IGC on European citizenship. The Spanish delegation urged the topic further by writing a proposal that argued EU's citizenship should be based on Schengen's legal framework. The European parliament also catalysed the discussion by passing two resolutions in 1991 that provided further description of EU citizenship in addition to national citizenship, mainly fitting in a framework of human and social rights. Through bargaining, the German-French integrational motor and the influence of national politics, European citizenship was added into the Maastricht Treaty during the Maastricht negotiations.[38]

Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty states: 'Citizenship of the Union in hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be citizen of the Union. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subjected to the duties imposed thereby.'.[39] The most important rights granted in the Maastricht Treaty were the right of free movement and residence within the member states and the right to vote and stand candidate at municipal and European elections in the member state of residence where an individual is not a national.[40] The Treaty also mentioned the obligation of all member states to respect human rights as established in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms from 1950.[41] However, a catalogue of these rights is not included in the Treaty. Creation of legal citizenship and making its rights Treaty-based, had another important consequence. EU citizenship meant that individuals were legally fixed and that the rights mentioned in the Treaty would be directly applicable to them. So, individuals could refer to these rights within national and EU courts when challenging actions of national governments or the EU itself.[42]

The legal creation of EU citizenship provided the mediation of rights through the EU. This meant that active rights were legally fixed and it created a gateway ifor further

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[37] Maas, W., 'European Union citizenship in retrospect and prospect', 414.
[38] Maas, W., 'European Union citizenship in retrospect and prospect', 414. [38] Maas, W., 'The Evolution of EU Citizenship', in: McNamara, K.R., Meunier, S., (eds.), *Making History: European Integration and Institutional Change at Fifty*, (Oxford, 2007), 240, 241.
[39] Maastricht Treaty, Article 8.
[40] Maastricht Treaty, Article 8a, 8b.
[41] Maastricht Treaty, Article F.
[42] Defeis, E.F., 'Human Rights, the European Union and the Treaty Route: From Maastricht to Lisbon', *Fordham International Law Journal,* 35(2012)5, 1207-1230, 1229, 1230.

development of rights and duties deriving from the EU. It was possible to refer to individuals on a bureaucratic level while being reinforced by law. To use the same expression as mentioned in the introduction: a symbolic coat hanger was created, on which it would be possible to hang all kinds of rights and duties. So, although EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty appears more static and one-sided and only containing a few active rights, it cannot be reduced to just being a status. EU citizenship has the potential to evolve, for example through social struggle or international bargaining, and should therefore be seen as a dynamic phenomenon.

Chapter 3: EU common civic culture

Now that the legal creation of EU citizenship has been analysed and it has been made clear what this exactly entails, the following chapters will look into different factors of civic engagement to see whether the creation of EU citizenship has influenced them. This chapter will look into the first factor arising from the theoretical framework: EU common civic culture. In a national context, common civic culture has famously been described by Anderson as an 'imagined community': a cultural artifact which has been fabricated by the state.[43] This phenomenon is underlined by Hobsbawm. He shows how traditions as part of the nation state are often invented for the sake of a national identity.[44] In a European context, the EU also has comparable tendencies of 'fabricating' a European identity. This is demonstrated for example through explicit European symbols like the introduction of a European flag, anthem and currency. In this chapter other efforts towards a common civic culture and their potential influence on a European identity will be discussed.

This chapter will use two Eurobarometer surveys that were held before the Maastricht Treaty, and two that were held afterwards. The Eurobarometers provide an indication to what extend Dutch people identify with Europe and what their attitude is towards the EU. Furthermore, the presences of EU common civic culture will be investigated by looking at EU networks of civil society organizations that promote an EU a common civic culture. Different types of EU-related sources will be used to see whether there have been alterations within these networks after the creation of the Maastricht Treaty. These two elements will be analysed to investigate an EU common civic culture in the Netherlands. This chapter will show that a European common civic culture has strengthened slightly despite a more negative attitude towards the EU of Dutch citizens. EU networks and funding schemes can be seen as an explanation for it.

Eurobarometers

The Eurobarometers are biannual surveys held on behalf of the European commission and within all member states. The idea for the Eurobarometers started in the 1960s and were meant to research the lack of knowledge of the European population on various EU topics, and to then reduce this deficit. Furthermore, the surveys were meant to measure attitudes

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[43] Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London, 2006), 4, 5, 6.
[44] Hobsbawm, E., Ranger, T., *The Invention of Tradition,* (Cambridge, 2007), 11, 13, 14.

towards various topics concerning the EU. The first surveys were conducted in 1974 and since its start, the Eurobarometers have given the European commission and other EU institutions insight in the effectiveness of their policies, especially policies targeted at European integration. Part of the Eurobarometers is therefore aimed at measuring support for the EU or European Community (EC) and for European integration. The standard Eurobarometers have a structure based on continuity within their questions and methods so that the surveys can be compared over time, between member states and through a combination of the two.[45]

The Eurobarometers that are relevant for this thesis are those before and after 1992, when legal European citizenship was introduced. Survey questions concerning Dutch people's support for the EU and the EC, and whether they felt like they have a European identity, can provide insight in the presence and shifts of a common civic culture. Questions that are used for determining a common civic culture, are the questions that concern people's attitude towards the EU and whether they experience some kind of European identification and through what factors they experience this identification. The Eurobarometers ask questions that are largely continuous across the different surveys or are otherwise very similar. Questions of interest to this chapter are processed within Table 1. Furthermore, two graphs from the last Eurobarometer survey from May 1997 are added. These graphs show the fluctuations within the answers to question 2 and 3 of the table.

The surveys show that the general attitudes of Dutch citizens towards the European Union have become more negative after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. This mainly becomes clear from the changes in answers of questions 2 and 3, which show that people have a more negative view on EU membership and the benefits of this membership. The other questions are more difficult to compare because they lack synchronicity. However, it is interesting to look at question 5 from the table. Around 60% to 63% of Dutch people said they never thought about being European in '87 and '90, 43% of Dutch people saw themselves as 'Dutch only' in '97. The positive answers to this question ('often', 'sometimes' on the one hand, and 'Dutch and European', 'European and Dutch', 'European only' on the other hand) are more difficult to compare because of the difference in gradations, but it seems like less people have never identified with the EU. Although this question cannot be compared as well as question

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[45] Nissen, S., 'The Eurobarometer and the process of European integration: Methodological foundations and weaknesses of the largest European survey', *Quality & Quantity,* 48(2014)2, 713-728, 713, 714, 715.; Saris, W.E., Kaase, M., 'Eurobarometer: measurement instrument for opinions in Europe', in: Saris, W.E., Kaase, M. (eds.), *ZUMA-Nachrichten Spezial Band 2,* 5-23, 5, 6.; European Commission, 'Eurobarometer', last updated 8 January 2019, last consulted 6 April 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/echo/eurobarometer_en

2 and 3, question 5 gives the impression that the increasing negative attitude towards the EU was not necessarily connected to identification with the EU. The idea that citizens' identification with the EU has not become more negative like their general attitude towards the EU, might be explained by the growing attention for and promotion of European identity by the EU.

Civil society organizations

Rosa Sanchez Salgado argues that the EU has been the driving force behind the Europeanization of civil society organizations. She shows that EU policies are passed to promote European integration, and that civil society organizations are considered to be the vehicles for selling the specific policy to EU citizens or to create enthusiasm for it. Civil society organizations have namely been a central actor within fundamental topic of European politics, like the EU's democratic capacity or European citizenship. Their influence comes from their role as an essential social actor separated from state and market.[46] Sanchez Salgado clains that the Maastricht Treaty was the point of 'relaunching the integration process' where the EU established the first initiatives meant to specifically promote European values.[47] This first initiative was launched in 1994 by Commission president Jaques Delors. After strengthening the economic and political cooperation within the Maastricht Treaty, Delors wanted to give EU an ethical and spiritual dimension to make it into a sustainable institution. He launched the 'Soul for Europe' initiative, which funded religious communities at first and sought their support to integrate Europe. This later developed into an independent civil organization that promoted European values.[48] Further attempts at advancement of European values were implemented through funding constructions. Funding was granted to organization meant for activities which adhered to the values of the integration process including European citizenship.[49]

Legal documents regarding EU funding of civil society organizations show that these constructions developed after the Maastricht Treaty. The first legal structure for such funding was the Community action programme. This programme was launched in 2004 and ran until

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[46] Sanchez Salgado, R., *Europeanizing Civil Society: How the EU Shapes Civil Society Organizations*, (Basingstoke, 2014), 1.; Ghaus-Pasha, A., 'Role of Civil Society Organizations in Governance', *6th Global Forum on Reinventing Government: Towards Participatory and Transparent* Governance, (2005), 3.
[47] Sanchez Salgado, R., *Europeanizing Civil Society*, 3, 147, 149.
[48] Sanchez Salgado, R., *Europeanizing Civil Society*, 149.; Matlak, M., 'Jaques Delors, the Single Market and the Failed Attempt to Give a Soul to Europe', *Europe University Institute working paper, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies,* (2018), 6.; European Commission, *Written Question E-3397/00*, C163E/106, June 6th 2001.
[49] Sanchez Salgado, R., *Europeanizing Civil Society,* 149.

2006 with a budget of 72 million euros, averaging 24 million euros per year.[50] The main objective of the programme was 'to promote and disseminate the values and objectives of the European Union'.[51] The programme offered grants to organizations 'pursuing an aim of general European interest'.[52] Prior to this programme the EU had supported active citizenship for a number of years through funding, but it did not yet have a legal base.[53] The Community action programme was followed by the Europe for citizens programme running from 2007 to 2013 with a budget of 215 million euros, averaging a little under 31 million a year.[54] This programme had a similar delineation of objectives as the previous programme: 'bringing Europe closer to its citizens by promoting Europe's values and achievements, while preserving the memory of the past'.[55] The Europe for citizens programme was renewed for a period between 2014 to 2020 with a budget of 185,5 million euros, averaging 26,5 million euros a year.[56]

For the Netherlands, information can be found on projects that have been funded by the Europe for Citizens programme between 2014 and 2020. In that period 32 projects, where a Dutch organization was the project leader, were funded by the Europe for Citizens programme. There were another 134 projects where a Dutch organisation was a partner in a project. The funding programme was divided in two strands: European remembrance, and democratic engagement & civic participation. The latter strand was branched into town twinning, network of towns and civil society projects as subcategories.[57] One of the projects that was financed through the civil society projects strand, was the 'Civic Council on European Democracy'. Its purpose was to create a Council of artists, experts and citizens from different member states and different strands of society which would discuss and formulate concrete recommendations to improve the democratic empowerment of European citizens. This project was led by civil society organization de Balie, which produces

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[50] European Council, 'Council Decision of 26 January 2004 establishing a Community action programme to promote active European Citizenship (civic participation)', *2004/100/EC*, (2004), Article 6.
[51] European Council, 'Council Decision of 26 January 2004', Article 1a.
[52] European Council, 'Council Decision of 26 January 2004', Article 4.1.
[53] ECORYS, 'Interim Evaluation of the Europe for Citizens Programme 2007-2013', 5, https://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/doc1227_en.pdf , last consulted on 10 May 2021.
[54] European Parliament, European Council, 'Decision No 1904/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 establishing for the period 2007 to 2013 the programme 'Europe for Citizens' to promote active European citizenship', *1904/2006/EC*, (2006), Article 11.
[55] European Parliament, European Council, 'Decision No 1904/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006', Article 2c.
[56] European Council, 'Council regulation (EU) No 390/2014 of 14 April 2014 establishing the 'Europe for Citizens' programme for the period 2014-2020', *390/2014*, (2014), Article 12.
[57] European Commission, *Europe for Citizens Programme: projects,* https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/europe-for-citizens/projects/; DutchCulture, 'Europe for Citizens NL 2014 – 2020', *Eindrapport Europe for Citizens 2014 – 2020*, (2021), 14.

independent projects about art, culture and politics. The project received 60.230 euros.[58] Another funded project under the European remembrance strand was the project 'How to Survive a European Democracy?', led by art organization Stichting Autre Directions. The project was a travelling pop-up museum telling stories of European dictatorship of the past. Furthermore, it gave people the opportunity to rethink European democracy and what their role is within it. The project received 100.800 euros.[59] A third project from the Networks of towns strand, wanted to build a network of European City Embassies where urban questions and innovations are shared between citizens, students and experts. The project was set up by creative platform, Pakhuis de Zwijger, and received 150.000 euros.[60]

These projects are some of the examples of the kinds of projects that were funded through the Europe for Citizens programme. Although there is no specific data available on the funding programmes between 2004 and 2013, it can be assumed that these projects had a similar construction and intention, as the legal description and outline of the funding schemes were similar. The projects that were funded by the EU seem to be designed to encourage citizens to actively engage with the EU and openly discuss it. Like the stated objectives of the funding programme, the EU seems to encourage and support the development of a common European civic culture through their funding scheme. With themes like the remembrance of a shared past, the celebration of and engagement with a shared democracy, and the affiliation between Europeans through connecting cities. This structured encouragement of a European common civic culture seemed to be initiated from the Maastricht Treaty and onwards. Starting with Delors' initiative 'Soul for Europe', a funding scheme started developing and reached legal construction a little over ten years after the Maastricht Treaty. It is difficult to determine whether these efforts had the desired effect of strengthening the idea of common European values and interests. The analysed Eurobarometers give a slight indication of a strengthened European identity in the years after the Maastricht Treaty, but within the scope of this thesis it is impossible to determine whether efforts of the EU towards this goal are the main reason

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[58] De Balie website, *Over ons*, https://debalie.nl/over-ons/#organisatie; European Commission, 'Europe for Citizens programme: Civic Council on European Democracy', *Project Details*, (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/europe-for-citizens/projects/efc-project-details-page/?nodeRef=workspace://SpacesStore/0f5a07f3-d707-4314-94a0-9223f3dc025c

[59] Website Autre Directions, *Over Autre Directions*, https://www.autresdirections.nl/meta/over-autres-directions;European Commission, 'Europe for Citizens programme: How to Survive a European Democracy?', *Project Details*, (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/europe-for-citizens/projects/efc-project-details-page/?nodeRef=workspace://SpacesStore/ac44d71e-89b2-4cfd-ac00-cd2f88d1652a

[60] European Commission, 'Europe for Citizens programme: The European City Embassies Network', *Project Details*, (2014), https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/europe-for-citizens/projects/efc-project-details-page/?nodeRef=workspace://SpacesStore/6b8c5c5b-97fd-4e33-b817-9361eaa1426c; website Pakhuis de Zwijger, *Over Ons*, https://dezwijger.nl/over-ons

behind it. More importantly, in the period after 1992, an institution-led encouragement of a common civic culture developed. This is especially interesting when taking into account that national identities are also a state-led fabrications.

So, the Maastricht Treaty seemed to be a starting point of a growing focus on a common European civic culture in the Netherlands. Taking into consideration that a common identity is something fabricated by an institution, this development can be seen as contributing to the construction of common civic culture. However, there are some stumbling blocks for the EU. Firstly, there is already a strong national civic culture and identity that its European counterpart is competing against. Secondly, there is no 'captive audience' for the construction of a European civic culture like there is for a national civic culture. The EU does not have the opportunity to reach citizens through for example schools or media since these are predominantly national constructs. A lot has to be overcome for the EU to develop its common civic culture further, although it seems possible. When considering the development of national civic culture over time, it might take a lot of time for the EU to achieve similar potence.

	June 1987	**June 1990**	**July 1994**	**May 1997**
1. Unification (%)	36 for very much 45 for to some extent 8 against to some extent 4 against very much 8 no reply	25 for very much 52 for to some extend 11 against to some extent 4 against very much 8 no reply		
2. Membership (%)	82 good thing 11 neither 3 bad thing 3 no reply	82 good thing 10 neither 3 bad thing 5 no reply	77 good thing 14 neither 4 bad thing 6 don't know	74 good thing 15 neither 5 bad thing 5 don't know
3. Benefit (%)	69 benefit 15 not benefitted 16 no reply	74 benefitted 13 not benefitted 13 no reply	71 benefitted 13 not benefitted 16 don't know	69 benefitted 16 not benefitted 15 don't know
4. Regret (%)	50 very sorry 37 indifferent 3 relieved 10 no reply	55 very sorry 34 indifferent 3 relieved 8 no reply		
5. Do you see yourself as European? (%)	8 often 25 sometimes 63 never 5 no reply	8 often 29 sometimes 60 never 3 no reply		43 Dutch only 48 Dutch and European 5 European and Dutch 4 European only 1 don't know
6. Integration speed '90 (%) '94 & '97 (scale from 1 to 7)		59 agree 28 disagree 13 no reply	3.5 perceived current speed 4.8 desired speed	3.6 perceived current speed 4.6 desired speed

Table 1 Eurobarometer conclusions regarding common civic culture
1. In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Wester Europe?
2. Generally speaking, do you think that Dutch membership of the European Community/European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?
3. Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Netherlands has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community/European Union?
4. If you were to be told tomorrow that the European Community had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or relieved?
5. Does the though ever occur to you that you are not only Dutch but also a European? ('87)/Do you ever think of yourself as not only Dutch, but also European? ('90)/In the near future do you see yourself as: Dutch only, Dutch and European, European and Dutch, European only? ('97)
6. We are currently witnessing rapid changed in Central and Eastern Europe. In your opinion, what should the European Community do about this?; Speed up its economic, political, and monetary integration so that, by becoming stronger, it can participate more effectively in building a wider united democratic Europe. ('90)/ In your opinion, how is in the European Union, the European unification advancing nowadays? Please look at these people (show card). Number 1 is standing still, number 7 is running as fast as possible. Choose the one which best corresponds with you opinion of the European Union, European unification. And which corresponds best with what you would like? ('94, '97)

Support for European Union Membership
### 1981-1996

Figure 2 Fluctuations concerning the answer to the question: 'Generally speaking, do you think that Dutch membership of the European Community/European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?' between 1983 and 1995. The top and bottom line represent results from the surveys held in the Netherlands. The middle line represents the average from all of the EU. Source: Standard Eurobarometer 46 (May 1997) p. 20.

## Benefit from European Union Membership
1983 - 1995

Figure 3 Fluctuations concerning the answer to the question: 'Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Netherlands has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community/European Union?' between 1983 and 1995. The top and bottom line represent results from the surveys held in the Netherlands. The middle line represents the average from all of the EU. Source: Standard Eurobarometer 46 (May 1997) p. 20.

Chapter 4: Member state involvement

The member states of the EU are its central actors. How member states have or should have control over the dynamics within the EU is often contested within political and academic discussion. A liberal view ascribes exclusive control to member states, while functionalists see that European integration creates new opportunities at the EU level.[61] Besides having a considerable influence within the EU, member states have another important role: they are the face of the EU for their citizens. The Dutch government implements EU policy and can function as an accessible entrance to European affairs for the public. The approach of the Dutch government towards the EU can therefore alter public opinion and people's attitude towards it. Van Keulen discusses how Dutch EU politics 'have been consistently pragmatically driven, instead of embedded in an ideology or pushed by a strive for power'.[62] This pragmatic view often manifested itself through the focus of the Dutch government for economic cooperation at the expense of other competences of the EU.

An important reason for this view on the EU stems from Dutch political tradition of passive consensus. Historically speaking, politicians and the general public were regarded as extremely permissive of political developments. Publicly questioning benefits or pitfalls of the EU was very uncommon until the mid-1990s. This sheds new light on figures 2 and 3 of the previous chapter; the Dutch pro-EU stance has often been mistaken for citizens having a supranationalist attitude. However, the Maastricht Treaty can be interpreted as a rude awakening for the Netherlands to the realities of European politics, with especially 'Black Monday' (the diplomatic failure during Maastricht negotiations) having a clear cause. During Black Monday, a Dutch treaty proposal was rejected by all but one member state. Through the developments in the 1990s, Dutch and EU relations moved beyond an economic perspective and started showing more signs of Euroscepticism.[63] In this chapter these developments will be researched further through Dutch parliamentary documents from the described periods to understand how the Dutch government had changed as the face of the EU and with it has influenced European citizenship. The analysis will show that the Dutch government became

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[61] Beyers, J., Trodal, J., 'How Nation States 'Hit' Europe: Ambiguity and Representation on the European Union', *West European Politics,* 27(2004)5, 919-942, 921.

[62] Keulen, van, M., *Going Europe or Going Dutch: How the Dutch Government Shapes European Policy*, (Amsterdam, 2006), 97.

[63] Keulen, van, M., *Going Europe or Going Dutch*, 98, 99, 100.; Lijphart, A., *Verzuiling, pacificatie en kentering in de Nederlandse* politiek, (Haarlem, 1998), 196, 197, 198, 199, 200.; Hoetjes, B.J.S., 'The Netherlands: A former founding father in search of control', in: Wessels, W., Maurer, A., Mittag, J., (eds.), *Fifteen into one?: The European Union and its member states*, (Manchester, 2003) 315, 316, 317, 318.

more openly critical of the EU after the Maastricht Treaty and shifted its focus from economic cooperation to institutional reform. Furthermore, it seemed that in the period after the Maastricht Treaty the EU is discussed more often and more critical in the parliament. This eventually changes how the EU is portrayed to Dutch citizens, and in turn influences European citizenship.

Pre Maastricht

As has been explained in the method section, mostly documents that describe notable events in the Dutch and EU relations are discussed here: the enlargement of the EC with Portugal and Spain in 1986, the Dutch presidency of the Council in 1986 and 1991 and the negotiations concerning the Maastricht Treaty. These parliamentary documents give a general impression of the attitude of the Dutch government to the EC. The impression is that European cooperation is mainly seen as an economic issue and that decisions concerning European cooperation are not openly opposed. In the preparation of the Dutch presidency of the European Council in the first half of 1986, three topics were pointed out that would receive the most attention: the internal market, technology policy and cooperation within the economic and monetary sector. These topics were considered important to combat unemployment in Europe and to increase Europe's economic competitiveness.[64] Again, economic cooperation seems the main concern for the Dutch government. In response to the proposed plans of the Dutch government, only one motion was submitted that suggested that the endorsement of a specific sales tax should also be a priority of the Dutch presidency.[65] This lack of feedback from the Dutch Parliament was also noticeable with the approval of the Spanish and Portuguese accession to the EC. In a report of a meeting between the commission foreign affairs and the Dutch MEP, it was discussed how the national parliament would not have the chance to have any input on the accession agreement and would only be able to accept it. One of the MEP stated:

'[..] I note that it cannot be a matter of extensive deliberation for the Houses of the States General whether or not they can approve the accession treaty. It is a matter of

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[64] Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Nota: Voorzitterschap Nederland van de Raad van Ministers van de Europese Gemeenschappen in de eerste helft van 1986*, 19228, 1985-1986, 3, 5.
[65] Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Motie van het lid van Iersel C.S.,* 19228, 1985-1986, 1.

just having to approve, because in the end, after all the negotiations and after all the commitments, there is no choice left on the table'[66]

Even though there was some discussion regarding the impact on the economic cooperation of the member states, it seemed the national parliament did not have the opportunity or willingness to go against the accessions treaty. A member of the national Parliament (MP) stated:

> 'It has rightly been argued that the House of Representatives hardly has any margin. That means that we have to say yes or no to the treaty. Given the past, it will be a yes. But at the same time it is clear, also from the interventions that have been held here, that we are expressing a political yes, while we are all filled with great skepticism about the ability we have to absorb it economically as well.'[67]

Besides that it is indicated that the Dutch parliament does not have the opportunity to go against the treaty, the economic consequences of the European enlargement seemed to be the largest concern. Both the Dutch presidency and the accession of Spain and Portugal were handled with limited push back from the national parliament and a general focus on the economic aspects of the European Community. The former observation can be linked to what van Keulen states, that publicly questioning the benefits and merits of the European integration was 'not done' in the period before the Maastricht Treaty.[68]

The Dutch government remained predominantly supportive of the developments surrounding the Maastricht negotiations and decisions that were made: 'The sum of preserving the exciting, improving parts and realistic prospects of further reinforcement, justifies in the eyes of the government a favorable outcome. [..] The Maastricht Treaty is therefore worthy of our trust.'[69] A reason might be that during the negotiations and the

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[66] Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Verslag van een gesprek met Nederlandse leden van het Europees Parlement: Goedkeuring van het op 12 juni 1985 te Madrid en Lissabon tot stand gekomen Verdrag betreffende de toetreding van het Koninkrijk Spanje en de Portugese Republiek tot de Europese Economische Gemeenschap en de Europese Gemeenschap voor Atoomenergie, met Toetredingsakte, Bijlage en Protocollen*, 19122, 1985-1986, 3.
[67] Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Verslag van een gesprek met Nederlandse leden van het Europees Parlement,* 6.
[68] Keulen, van, M., *Going Europe or Going Dutch*, 99.
[69] Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Memoires van toelichting: Goedkeuring van het op 7 februari 1992 te Maastricht tot stand gekomen Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie met Protocollen, een overeenkomst betreffende de sociale politiek tussen de Lidstaten van de EG, met uitzondering van het Verenigd Koninkrijk, en verklaringen*, 22647, 1991-1992, 19.

signing of the Treaty, the Netherlands was the president of the European council. This view is reinforced as the previously described blunder by the Dutch presidency is hardly mentioned in the reflective report. It does mention that 'the Dutch government accepted a substantial risk when it decided in September to submit an adapted, more Community-oriented [..] draft.'. The failure was framed as a step they felt necessary to take: 'However, in its capacity as chairman the government felt, towards partners and parliament, national and European, compelled to make a serious effort to give the future Union a communitarian, coherent and more democratic character'.[70]

In a political sense, the Dutch government was forced to explicitly express its support for the treaty since it had an important role in its construction. The new treaty did however receive more critique from the parliament. Where the plan for the Dutch presidency in the council in 1986 received 1 motion, the plans for the approval of the Maastricht Treaty received 21 motions and 7 amendment changes that were all submitted by MP's. To compare this amount further; within the period of approval for the Single European Act, 4 motions where submitted.[71] One of them invited the Dutch government to construct a database where all meetings being held concerning the internal market should be summarized.[72] One motion concerning the Maastricht Treaty requested the government to hold an advisory referendum on its approval or another suggested that the Maastricht Treaty did not do enough for the democratic quality of the EC and that the government should make sure to achieve improvements before the next European elections.[73] The amount of motions and the content of them changed with the Maastricht Treaty, it seems like they became more in number and became more critical. This seems a first indication of the 'wake-up call', Hoetjes and van Keulen talk about.[74]

Post Maastricht

The more critical attitude of the Dutch parliament, also seemed to be adopted by the government. Documents that were selected for the period after the Maastricht Treaty, discuss two notable events: the enlargement of the EU in 1995 and the Dutch presidency in the

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[70] Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Nota: Nederlands voorzitterschap van de EG in de tweede helft van 1991*, 22052, 1991-1992, 8.
[71] Number accumulated through the database of the Dutch government accessible through the *zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl* website, by searching for all documents with the associated document number.
[72] Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Motie van het lid van Iersel*, 19626, 1986-1987, 1.
[73] Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Motie van het lid Brouwer,* 22647, 1991-1992, 1.; Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Motie van de leden Jurgens en Weisglas*, 22647, 1991-1992, 1.
[74] Keulen, van, M., *Going Europe or Going Dutch*, 100.; Hoetjes, B.J.S., 'The Netherlands: A former founding father in search of control', 317.

council in 1997. In general, the attitude of the Dutch government in this period seemed more critical of the EU and seemed to focus on more themes than just an economic one. This critical attitude is for example distinguishable in the parliamentary document that discusses the EU enlargement and 1995 and the predicted future enlargement of the EU with the accession of Eastern- and Central-European countries. With the fall of communism after 1989, the government thought it to be necessary that the Eastern- and Central-European countries were assimilated with the economy and politics of Western-Europe.[75] It is stated that prior to any further enlargement of the EU, multiple reforms should take place to make the EU function properly.[76] It is for example declared that the Dutch financial contributions to the EU should not increase 'unacceptably' after 1999 or that deregulation and subsidiarity are necessary for the EU to 'put its own house in order'.[77] Clearly, the tone concerning the EU seemed to have changed after the Maastricht Treaty since the government seemed much more openly critical and even sets conditions for further enlargements.

Even in the discussion of the economic relationships between the Netherlands and EU, the government seems more critical while before the Maastricht Treaty economic unification and development of the internal market were always prominent on the agenda. The economic situation is described as 'undesirable' and the government insists on 'doing everything possible to remedy this'. A more restrictive budget policy is discussed and it is considered to introduce a system of 'net limitations' where excessive differences between income and expenses concerning the EU are limited.[78] Even the Dutch presidency in the council seemed to have a different approach; where before the Maastricht Treaty the Dutch presidency went hand in hand with ambitious goals and plans, this presidency was described as aimed at continuity and coherence.[79] An explanation for this increasing criticism might be the development of populism in the same period. Populism is characterised by the idea that there is a gap in society between the virtuous peoples and the corrupt elites which typically causes aversion to supranational institutions like the EU.[80]

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[75] Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Nota: Uitbreiding van de Europese Unie*, 23987, 1994-1995, 2.
[76] Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Nota: Uitbreiding van de Europese Unie*, 23987, 1994-1995, 17.
[77] Ibidem, 11, 13.
[78] Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Brief van de minister van financiën: Financiële relatie tussen Nederland en de Europese* Unie, 24099, 1994-1995, 7, 10.
[79] Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Verslag van het Nederlands voorzitterschap: Nederlands Voorzitterschap van de Europese Unie van 1 januari tot 1 juli 1997*, 25110, 1996-1997, 2.
[80] Otjes, S., Louwerse, T., 'Populists in Parliament: Comparing Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism in the Netherlands', *Political Studies*, 63(2015), 60-79, 60.

Besides having a more critical and reserved attitude towards the EU, the sometimes exclusive focus on economic cooperation within the EU seemed to expand to further themes, especially an institutional one. For example, the Dutch presidency in 1997 was more diverse in its primary aims. The Union needed to be brought closer to its citizens, it needed to act more decisively and it needed reforms to manage further enlargement.[81] These main aims are in contrast with the economically focused aims of the presidency in 1986. Also, the critique from the Dutch government on the EU seemed to mostly be directed towards the institutional characteristics of the EU. Two trends seem to occur simultaneously in this period that give an explanation to the attitude of the government: the development of populism and the development of EU beyond economic collaboration.

This chapter has shown that there has been a significant change in how the Dutch government has functioned and been involved as a member state of the EU. The Maastricht Treaty seemed to be a turning point into a more critical attitude towards the EU. Furthermore, the focus seemed to expand from economic cooperation to institutional reform. These developments can be linked to two more general trends in society: populism and EU integration. As the Dutch government is the face of the EU to its citizens, this shift can be interpreted as being influential to Dutch European citizenship. As after the Maastricht Treaty the EU was more and more portrayed as a flawed institution, this can, among others, influence the view on the EU of Dutch citizens and in turn affects European citizenship. Besides being more negative concerning the EU, the Dutch government seemed to discuss the EU more often and more critically in the parliament.

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[81] Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Verslag van het Nederlands voorzitterschap: Nederlands Voorzitterschap van de Europese Unie van 1 januari tot 1 juli 1997*, 3.

Chapter 5: Democratic quality

It is often been determined that the European Union has a democratic deficit. There are, however, different understandings of this democratic deficit. It could be interpreted through the lack of opportunities of active participation, the lack of full-fledged elections or the lack of overlap between representation and new initiatives. Although there are different understandings of the democratic deficit of the EU, there is a consensus that it is not an ideal political institution in terms of its democratic quality.[82] Schmitter notes that an aspect that makes this democratic deficit more prominent is that since the Maastricht Treaty, the public has become more politicized in regards to the EU. European issues appeared on the national agenda more often and political opinions on the EU influenced votes on national politicians. Through these developments, politicians seemed increasingly hostile towards European integration.[83] This notion corresponds with the findings from the previous chapter, where the Dutch government seemed to discuss EU themes more often and more critically. The democratic quality of the EU on the one hand and the public awareness of it on the other, will be discussed in this chapter.

The question of democratic quality regarding the EU can be summarized as what is seen as an appropriate source of legitimacy. This chapter will therefore focus on procedural legitimacy, efficiency and social legitimacy to analyse the democratic quality of the EU and considers whether it has changed after the Maastricht Treaty. For these different types of legitimacy, data concerning voter turn-out and a few legal documents and an interview with MEP Sophie in 't Veld will be used to give insight into EU democratic quality. Sophie in 't Veld is a Dutch MEP for the liberal fraction Renew Europe. It will be compared whether these different sources of legitimacy have changed before and after the Maastricht Treaty and how public awareness of EU issues has influenced these developments. The chapter will show that the democratic quality of the EU leaves much to be desired and that the Maastricht Treaty has done very little to change this.

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[82] Jensen, T., 'The Democratic Deficit of the European Union', *Centre for Comparative and International Studies, Living Reviews in Democracy*, (2009), 1, 2.
[83] Schmitter, P.S., 'Making Sense of the EU: Democracy in Europe and Europe's Demicratization', *Journal of Democracy*, 14(2003)4, 71-85, 79.

Procedural legitimacy

Procedural legitimacy of the EU can be understood in twofold: firstly the electoral procedure and secondly European governance. The electoral procedure in the EU is executed through the European Parliament where every 5 years elections determine the MEP for the coming period. European elections are often described as second-order national elections where

Table 2 Comparison of the voter turnout of Dutch national and European elections in the period surrounding the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. See footnote 87 and 88 for reference.

	National elections[84]		European elections[85]
1986	85,8%	1984	50,9%
1989	80,3%	1989	47,5%
1994	78,7%	1994	35,7%
1998	73,3%	1999	30,0%

voters use European elections either to express loyalty to a national party or they use them as a referendum on the performance of the national government. The elections are thus secondary and are a national contest instead of a European one.[86] The European electoral system falls is overshadowed by its national equivalent. This is visible when comparing voter turnout in the Netherlands for national and European elections. When looking at the data in table 2, the turnout for national elections is significantly higher throughout the period surrounding the Maastricht Treaty. The explanation for this difference can be found in the lack of social base, this explanation will be explored later on.[87] Another explanation can be found in the construction and legislative position of the European parliament. The European Parliament is considered to have an incomplete chain of representation. It has limited power to control the government (European Commision). Normally this is a critical mechanism in national governments, where the governments derive from the parliament and a parliamentary opposition provides voters with competing political views.[88] Whether the electoral deficit is to

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[84] Data found on: https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrp8wsz/opkomst_bij_tweede_kamerverkiezingen
[85] Data found on European Parliament website: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en/turnout/
[86] Burg, van der, W., Gattermann, K., Vreese, de, C.H., 'Introduction: How different were the European elections of 2014', *Politics and Governance,* 4(2016)1, 1-8, 1, 2.; Hix, S., Marsh, M., 'Punishment or Protest?: Understanding European Parliament Elections', *The Journal of Politics*, 69(2007)2, 495-510, 495, 496.
[87] Decker, F., 'Governance beyond the nation-state. Reflections on the democratic deficit of the European Union, *Journal of European Public* Policy, 9(2002)2, 256-272, 261.
[88] Holzhacker, R., 'Democratic Legitimacy and the European Union', *European Integration*, 29(2007)3, 257-269, 260.; Jensen, T., 'The Democratic Deficit of the European Union', 2.

be fixed by replicating national politics or through a different route exceeds the scope of this research, but it can be stated that a stronger linkage between the Parliament and the other European institutions is lacking.

When talking about national and European politics with MEP Sophie in 't Veld, she sees the same issue as the second-order national elections suggests. She says that: "the fact that voters do not choose their own European political leaders is definitely not good and ensures disinterest with citizens".[89] The Maastricht Treaty in this instance has made certain steps towards expanding electoral powers, by creating a system of co-decision concerning legislation between the council and the parliament.[90] However, these steps did not seem to influence the interest of Dutch citizens when looking at the voter turnout after 1992, on the contrary, the voter turnout seemed to drop significantly. In 't Veld sees the unworkable intergovernmental structure as an important cause and also holds the Dutch national government responsible: "National politicians in the Netherlands do not encourage Dutch citizens to engage in European politics in any way".[91]

The lack of linkage between electoral power and the European Commission also encourages a deficit in European governance where decisions are made behind closed doors and without public justification. Instead of forcing the European government to openly justify actions, in 't Veld sees that European Commissioners are in cahoots with their national government: "It seems like the European Commission seems to work for national governments instead of for European citizens". She suggests that an important first step to break through this governmental deficit could be by making the European Commission smaller and with it, make it more independent. With this, Commissioners are not representatives of national governments, thus: "the composition of the commission can eventually be a better representation of the elections, which will in its turn make it much more interesting to vote".[92] The Maastricht Treaty did not seem to make any significant steps towards the implementing these changes towards bridging the electoral and governmental deficits.

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[89] Interview Sophie in 't Veld, 26-05-2021.
[90] Mathijsen, P., 'The Power of Co-Decision of the European Parliament Introduced by the Maastricht Treaty', *Tulane European & Civil Law Forum*, 8(1993), 81-93, 85, 86.
[91] Interview Sophie in 't Veld, 26-05-2021.
[92] Interview Sophie in 't Veld, 26-05-2021.

Efficiency

The above discussed procedural legitimacy can be considered input legitimacy: what happens with the input from citizens? When looking at efficiency, this legitimacy turns to output: what is the eventual legislation created? Concerning the latter question, a few arguments can be given stating that the EU holds strong legitimacy. The most obvious one is that the EU holds strong legitimacy because it is a polity that is much more qualified to handle international issues than individual member states.[93] Another output argument is provided by Crombez. He shows that the policy output of in the EU does not deviate far from the preference of the median-voter. With the output being close to the average European voter, the EU has strong efficiency legitimacy.[94] Crombez does not however take the minority vote into account, which is an important part of Dutch politics with its multiparty system and consensus model. Other scholars also have similar positive results when looking at the efficiency of European legislation.[95]

One thing that is underlined by Sophie in 't Veld, is that it also matters what is eventually done with the results of legislation. She gives the example of resent events concerning the COVID-19 pandemic and EU's vaccine policy. When the European Commission faced a lot of criticism concerning the vaccination program, national governments did not respond while the they had to express their approval with every step of the program's construction. This made them jointly responsible for the constructed policy and its failures. Later on, when vaccination programs started to gain momentum, national governments took credit for the favourable developments.[96] Blame shifting and credit taking is a problem when legislation output is considered in practice and it can nullify the legitimacy that the output has since the EU is portrayed as the culprit.[97] What can be said about efficiency is that it has not changed drastically since the Maastricht Treaty and can be seen as a way of giving the EU legitimacy. However, this legitimacy does often not hold in practice.

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[93] Jensen, T., 'The Democratic Deficit of the European Union', 4.
[94] Crombez, C., 'The Democratic Deficit in the European Union: Much Ado about Nothing?', *European Union Politics*, 4(2003)1, 101-120, 112, 113.
[95] Moravcsik, A., 'In Defense of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2002), 603-624.; Menon, A., Weatherill, S., 'Transnational Legitimacy in a Globalising World: How the European Union Rescues its States', *West European Politics*, 31(2008)3, 397-416.
[96] Interview Sophie in 't Veld, 26-05-2021.
[97] Schmidt, V.A., 'Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and 'throughput'', *Political* Studies, 61(2013), 2-22, 10, 11.

Social legitimacy

What has been established in the second chapter is that citizenship is much more than just voting during elections; it is dynamic and is expressed through engagement with a polity. A social base facilitates this interaction. As De Beus puts it: "It is important to acknowledge that European identity is a prerequisite to the fundamental democratization of the European politics as well".[98] Although it is contested that a social base is strictly necessary, it can be said that it makes institutionalization of democracy at the European level much easier.[99] This element of European legitimacy has been discussed in chapter three. This chapter showed how European identity has its stumbling blocks and is competing with a national identity, but still seemed to persist while attitudes towards the EU became more negative. In this respect, the EU remained its legitimacy as identification with the EU seemed to persist. However, this identification cannot be said to be incredibly high and the EU definitely has ground to cover.

A second element of social legitimacy is the social base in the form of a public monitoring. Sifft et al find through an analysis of media discourse that there is no functioning European-wide discourse and that there is a communication lag between the European governance and EU citizens. The data represented in the article does not indicate a shift in these findings after the Maastricht Treaty.[100] These issues reinforce the lack of association with the EU. So, the Maastricht has not influenced social legitimacy much except for the efforts by the EU to encourage a European identity.

These types of legitimacy of the EU have been presented as being separate components of the institution, however it might be helpful to realize that they are also related to each other. Their interconnectedness resembles a chicken and egg question: is a social deficit caused by procedural issues or the other way around? The same question can be asked in the remaining combinations. What however can be concluded concerning the democratic quality of the EU, is that it has some lingering issues and that a democratic deficit remains. These issues have not (explicitly) been caused by the Maastricht Treaty, and have only made a very limited contribution to solving these issues within social legitimacy. The procedural steps taken in the Maastricht Treaty did not seem to provide any significant improvements either. The flawed

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[98] Beus, de, J., 'Quasi-National European Identity and European Democracy', *Law and Philosophy*, 20(2001), 283-311, 300.

[99] Jensen, T., 'The Democratic Deficit of the European Union', 6.

[100] Sifft, S., Brüggemann, M., Kleinen-Von Königslöw, K., Peters, B., Wimmel, A., 'Segmented Europeanization: Exploring the Legitimacy of the European Union from a Public Discourse Perspective', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(2007)1, 127-155, 136, 147.

democratic quality of the EU hinders citizens to actually engage with the institution as it is difficult to have access to the institution and it causes a lack of social resonance.

As has been mentioned in the introduction of this chapter and has been concluded in the previous chapter, a different influential development did take place in the period of the Maastricht Treaty. It showed that the Dutch government had become increasingly Eurosceptic after the Maastricht Treaty. It seems that this scepticism cannot be traced back to an increasing democratic deficit, rather Euroscepticism has disclosed EU shortcomings more than ever. As Sophie in 't Veld also underlines, the national government play a big role within the Eurosceptic attitude in the Netherlands. The critique on the EU from the Dutch government might eventually obstruct improvements of the EU's democratic quality. The influence of the Maastricht Treaty on the democratic quality can therefore be summarized, not as causing any issues, but as indirectly making the EU's shortcomings more obvious.

Chapter 6: Conclusion - EU citizenship and civic engagement

This thesis has been investigated if and how three different elements of civic engagement (common civic culture, member state involvement, democratic quality) in the EU have changed before and after the Maastricht Treaty. This final chapter will be analysed to what extent the creation of a legal European citizenship within the Maastricht Treaty has influenced this civic engagement, so that the research question can be answered. To start this analysis, we have to refer back to the theoretical framework. The theoretical framework has established that civic engagement is determined by the three measured elements in chapters 3, 4 and 5. These elements together are indicators for civic engagement in the Netherlands with the EU. The conclusions from these three analytical chapters are as follows.

Chapter 3 concludes that there is a European common civic culture in the Netherlands that is explicitly stimulated by the EU since the Maastricht Treaty. The creation of this common civic culture is in competition with a national identity, but it is pointed out that a common civic culture has persisted and seemed to have strengthened slightly. Chapter 4 determines that the Dutch government developed a much more Eurosceptic attitude after the Maastricht Treaty. Furthermore, the EU seemed a much more prominently discussed topic in the parliament. As the Dutch government is an important link in the chain of the EU as an institution that mediates rights from and to its citizens, the government's critical attitude can get in the way of this transference. Chapter 5 assesses that the EU had a persisting democratic deficit in period surrounding the Maastricht Treaty. The treaty did not cause these shortcomings or made any significant improvements, however, it made the shortcomings in democratic quality of the EU more obvious. The flawed democratic quality of the EU hinders citizens to actually engage with the institution as there is a lack of access and a lack of social resonance.

From these chapters it can be concluded that civic engagement has changed after the Maastricht Treaty, but mainly in a negative sense. Although the construction of a European civic culture has increased, the other two elements were more influential in their more negative development. The creation of European citizenship within the Maastricht Treaty has not influenced this change directly, since there no direct link was found between the elements of civic engagement and the creation of legal citizenship. For example, legal citizenship has not been an explicit reason for the Dutch government to become more sceptical nor has it fixed or worsened the democratic deficit. However, some form of indirect influence of legal European citizenship on civic engagement can be distinguished. To show this, it will be

discussed how every element influences European citizenship as defined in the second chapter and secondly how European legal citizenship is connected to this.

Common civic culture

A European common civic culture provides shared features in our socio-cultural world that offer a way of identifying with the European institution. This individual assimilation provides a framework that encourages citizens to actively engage with the institution. As described in chapter 3, common civic culture is something that is constructed by a government, instead of something that develops naturally. The EU, like national governments before it, has made efforts to construct civic culture and with it a European identity, however, with somewhat disappointing results when compared to a national identity. Still a form of European identity is detectable as previously discussed. The Swiss example shows that a common civic culture related to the overarching institution, contributes to the idea that one's local identity or national identity is guaranteed by it instead of threatened. In comparison to the Dutch identity, a European identity is far less prominent in the Netherlands. Together with the fact that continuous EU-instigated funding programmes are necessary for the construction of a European identity, this suggest that a European identity is in competition with a national identity instead of seen as guaranteeing a national identity. As this framework is lacking, active civic engagement with the EU will be difficult to strengthen.

However, it is important to note that the more idealistic competition between national and EU identity is not the only aspect that influences civic engagement. Common civic culture is related to our socio-cultural world, nevertheless economic and political realities also reveal competing identities. For example, the rights that EU citizenship has brought, have also created competition on the labour market where cheaper labour in one member state threatens the income of labourers amongst others in the Netherlands. Or political differences, like national laws that make abortion illegal in one member state and which is looked at negatively by generally more progressive Dutch citizens. This clash between national identities goes beyond the social and cultural solidarity that is tried to be constructed by the EU and obstructs the encouragement of civic engagement within the EU. These more realistic influences on civic engagement could be an interesting aspect for further research.

With the slight strengthening of a European identity, the Maastricht Treaty seemed to have influenced European common civic culture. The creation of legal European citizenship could have influenced this development in the following way: with the creation of legal citizenship,

the mediation of rights is applicable on a direct individual level instead of through national citizenship. This individuality transmitted by the EU is important for the construction of a European identity or in other words a group identity. A group identity is an internalized state confined to a certain group and as this description suggests, it needs to be *individually* internalized. By legally making an institution able to address individuals, this internalization can be much easier. Therefore, the creation of a legal citizenship can have influenced the construction of a common civic culture and with it, civic engagement.

Member state involvement

The Dutch government developed a much more sceptic attitude towards the EU after the Maastricht Treaty. This scepticism might have been caused by the development of populism in the same period. Either way, this attitude negatively impacts the willingness and possibility for citizens to engage with the EU. As the Dutch government is the primary actor within, and the important middle level of the EU, their Eurosceptic attitude has great influence on how citizens view the EU. It has been discussed that the involvement of the Swiss cantons with the Swiss national state, is an important cause for successful government and civic engagement with the national state. The Swiss example shows that civic engagement in the Netherlands is decreased because of diminishing involvement of the Dutch government with the EU since the Maastricht Treaty.

When going back to the definition of citizenship that has been provided by Isin and Nyers, the influence of member states can be summarized as guaranteeing the uninterrupted mediation of rights between the EU and EU citizens. As has been mentioned, the Dutch government has great influence on this mediation. However, the creation of legal citizenship has influenced the interference of member states and with it has influenced civic engagement. With the creation of legal EU citizenship, it has become easier for the EU to interact with citizens directly without interference of the national government. Rights and duties are namely directly applicable through EU citizenship and do not need national citizenship or national institutions as a filter. However, EU citizenship is not as developed as national citizenship and does not have many rights and duties attached to it. Member states are sill the main filter for the EU to reach EU citizens. EU citizenship has not yet developed enough for the EU to bypass national governments, but it does have the potential to do so.

Democratic quality

The EU has a democratic deficit that arises from a lack of input, output and social legitimacy. This was not changed after the Maastricht Treaty. These shortcomings do not give citizens enough opportunities to access the institution or to influence and change it. In the Swiss state, the national government obtains their political legitimacy through their responsiveness to their citizens. Furthermore, their political system is quite unique in how it facilitates direct democracy. Both are important factors in providing civic engagement with the Swiss national government. The lack of democratic quality in the EU means it discourages civic engagement of EU citizens.

Just like with the influence of legal citizenship on member state involvement, legal citizenship also creates a potential change. The creation of legal citizenship gives the EU more potential to strongly improve their democratic quality because legal citizenship is an important way to obtain rights. Like legal citizenship has been described in this thesis: it represents a symbolic coat hanger where right and duties can be hung directly. It creates the opportunity to expand rights and duties that are also active rights and duties. This will also influence civic engagement with the EU in the Netherlands. As has been mentioned before, legal citizenship is not yet developed enough to influence civic engagement in this way, instead it has created the potential to do so.

Having discussed how legal citizenship influenced civic engagement, the research question can be answered. To answer the question: did the creation of European citizenship with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty change civic engagement in the Netherlands with the EU? It has been determined that civic engagement has changed in a mainly negative sense after the Maastricht Treaty. It can be said that legal citizenship has only slightly influenced this change within the aspect of common civic culture. In addition, it has not played into the potentials that legal citizenship holds in regards to membership involvement and democratic quality. If legal citizenship is to be used to truly change civic engagement, this potential needs to be developed further. This potential could perhaps be advanced by developing the supranational aspects of the EU, like Sophie in 't Veld also has suggested. This way EU citizenship will become a stand-alone construct instead of being filtered through national citizenship. This could mean that the opposing attitudes of member states could be overcome and more EU rights and duties could be added. To fully dissect and develop the potentials of EU citizenship, future research is needed. Therefore, the potential of EU citizenship to increase civic engagement, could be the subject of future research.

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