

Through the eyes of the hunted:



**Migrants' and media perspectives on the what, why,
when, where and who of xenophobia in Cape Town**
A discourse analysis of newspaper articles & a thematic content analysis of
semi-structured interviews

Esther Verrips, 2017

**Through the eyes of the hunted: Migrants' and media perspectives on the
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Master Thesis International Development Studies

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Preface

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Abstract

In this paper, the what, why, when, where and who (the five Ws) of xenophobia in Cape Town, South Africa is discussed. Ever since the end of apartheid, the negative sentiments towards foreigners in South Africa have been growing. In 2008, the biggest xenophobic attack yet took place, in which more than 60 people died, hundreds were injured and thousands had fled. Ever since then, the tensions between African foreign nationals and South Africans have been palpable and attacks occur on a monthly to yearly basis. Through analyses of literature, newspaper articles and interviews with African migrants, the five Ws are explored. All three sources revealed that what is happening in South African should be considered as 'xenophobic'. The reasons vary from foreigners stealing jobs meant for locals, to the apartheid legacy, to the failure of the government to provide for its citizens and denying the existence of xenophobia. The timeline in which xenophobia is presented is mostly from 2008 onwards, however literature argued that it started after the end of apartheid. The xenophobic violence usually happens on the Eastern Cape, in cities such as Johannesburg, Durban and Pretoria and spreads from there to the townships of Cape Town, such as Khayelitsha. There is no clear consensus on who has the most power or who is to blame for xenophobia, although the government is mentioned by all three sources as a very powerful stakeholder. The interests of these stakeholders have also been explored and it has been concluded that all stakeholders are only fending for themselves, for their own survival. This clash in interest could possibly be solved by an independent third party stakeholder with selfless interests, who would take care of the basic needs of the other stakeholders. If nothing were to change, the hunted would still continue to fall prey.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Migrants face difficulties and challenges in trying to participate in the economy (Vale, 2002). South Africa has one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. The Bill of Rights guarantees rights to all residents in the country (Crush, 2000). However, there seems to be a misbalance between this constitution and practices. While the constitution is very inclusive in guaranteeing rights to all inhabitants, xenophobic attacks have occurred since post-apartheid (Neocosmos, 2010). Apparently, xenophobic feelings are spread in every level of society, from the locals to police who reportedly helped in xenophobic attacks. The King of the Zulus also made comments that foreigners should go back home because they are enjoying the wealth that is meant for local people (Crush, 2000).

Xenophobia is defined as the “intense dislike, hatred or fear of those perceived to be a stranger” (Crush, 1996). In May 2008, xenophobic violence in South Africa reached an all-time high; hundreds of people were injured, thousands had fled and more than 60 people had died (Wimmer, 2010). Since these attacks, xenophobic violence spread across the country, from Johannesburg to Durban and Cape Town. These anti-foreigner sentiments are primarily targeted towards other Africans, therefore it is also called Afrophobia (Klotz, 2016). The eruption of violence in 2008 was an illustration of sentiments that had been present for a while (Dodson, 2010). Desmond Tutu’s ‘rainbow nation’ had in fact been an exclusionary space ever since the abolishment of apartheid. Xenophobic sentiments are still present in today’s South African society and are leading to chaos, fear, anger and in some cases violence (Klotz, 2016). Due to the South African government’s silence, the problem is not being addressed properly, if at all.

Xenophobic violence against non-nationals in South Africa has worsened. Ever since the end of apartheid in 1994, attacks have occurred in many provinces. While some ascribe this violence to competition for resources, others blame governance issues in certain provinces. Most of the violent attacks have been carried out by black South Africans. In the context of this xenophobic violence, white people are not victims (Crush, 1996). This xenophobic violence is black against black. Myths surround the discourse of xenophobia, with migrants being portrayed as criminals, vectors of disease and blamed for taking away business (Crush, 1996).

The objective of this paper is to explore the five Ws concerning xenophobia: what happens; why does it happen; when does it happen; where does it happen and who is involved. This technique is often used in journalism, to get the whole story on a certain

subject (Singer, 2008). By focusing on the five Ws in this thesis, the social phenomenon of xenophobia is put into context. Through discussing spatiality (where) and temporality (when) the geography of xenophobia is included. The element of ‘why’ adds in another dimension: what can trigger or stimulate xenophobia? However, the main focus of this paper will be on the ‘who’. By determining who is involved and who has a stake in xenophobia, stakeholders can be identified. Xenophobia is a social problem (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010), which means the solution lies with people. If there is any hope of combatting xenophobia, the people who are involved and their power in xenophobia have to be identified.

These five Ws will be answered from two different perspectives: that of media and migrants. A discourse analysis of newspaper articles will pinpoint dominant ideas in the written media on xenophobia. Migrants’ perspectives will be explored through interviews with African migrants, to provide narratives. Through comparing the results from two different levels or sources, knowledge on xenophobia will be more holistic and inclusive. However, it is not assumed that there is one coherent migrant perspective or one coherent media perspective. It is about multiple perspectives from both migrants and newspaper articles and seeing whether there are similarities between some of the narratives of migrants and some of the discourses from newspaper articles.

1.1. Academic relevance

The academic world has devoted some attention to these outbreaks of violence and its causes. However, little research has been done on the experiences of migrants with xenophobia (Dodson, 2010). The role of media can also not be underestimated. Discourses are created and also here it will be interesting to see whether the views of theory and practice collide with those portrayed by the media. The academic relevance is purely creating new knowledge through the analyses from migrants’ perspectives and comparing this to media reports.

1.2. Development relevance

Xenophobia is a complex phenomenon and authors agree that it is hard to point the finger at one stakeholder to be the cause of xenophobia. However, if through comparing theory, practice and media certain stakeholders can be identified as having the most power in xenophobia, the international community can create targeted policies to combat xenophobia. It is important to map out the different stakeholders, their interests and their powers, because then underlying agendas can be revealed. If xenophobia is ever to be stopped, these agendas

have to come to the surface and then targeted policies can be created. This ties into goals 3 and 10 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are about good health and well-being and reducing inequalities (UN, 2016). If xenophobia can be stopped through well-targeted interventions and policies, migrants' and South Africans' health and well-being will improve. Besides this, through creating a clearer discourse on xenophobia and its stakeholders, hopefully the xenophobic violence will decrease through the spread of knowledge. This is related to goal 10; reducing inequalities. Therefore, this research proposes to study the what, why, when, where and who of xenophobia in Cape Town from two different perspectives; newspaper articles and migrants' narratives.

1.3 Chapter summary

Xenophobia is a social phenomenon - in which local South Africans target African migrants - that has been occurring in South Africa since 2008. This paper will discuss the what, why, when, where and who (five Ws) of xenophobia in Cape Town. This will be done through a discourse analysis of newspaper articles and a thematic content analysis of interviews. The focus within the five Ws will lie with the 'who'; stakeholders will be identified through the two different analyses.

Chapter 2. Theoretical framework

This chapter introduces and clarifies the main theories and concepts that are used in this paper. The research questions are introduced at the end of the chapter. The theoretical framework will be presented in the form of the five Ws, therefore clarifying the academic point of view on xenophobia.

2.1. Xenophobia: the ‘what’

There is no consensus on what ‘xenophobia’ entails exactly. While some authors argued that it is a psychological state of hostility towards foreigners, others characterized xenophobia as contempt and mistrust. Therefore, the term ‘xenophobia’ refers to a rather vague concept. However, in this paper the definition of Yakushko (2009) will be used, for it encompasses almost every aspect of xenophobia. According to Yakushko (2009) xenophobia is “attitudinal, affective, and behavioral prejudice toward immigrants and those perceived as foreign.”

According to Crush (2001), local studies have revealed that South Africans’ attitudes towards black foreigners are surprisingly hostile, expressing itself in verbal and physical denigration. Especially the physical attacks have been covered widely in the media. Graphic images of violent attacks on black foreigners in South Africa depicted some of the situations that African migrants deal with in South Africa. In these pictures, migrants’ possessions are being burned, scenes of aggression are displayed and in the worst case, migrants themselves are being set alight (Dodson, 2010).

On May 11th, 2008 the xenophobic violence started in Alexandra, a township in Johannesburg. South Africans invaded a factory that was inhabited by Zimbabweans, who were consequently chased into townships. During the chase, shops were looted, shacks were set alight and two people were killed. The violence spread to other townships in Johannesburg within days. Eventually it also spread to Cape Town, Durban and surrounding areas (Steenkamp, 2009). These attacks had profound consequences: more than sixty people had died and more than one hundred thousand migrants were homeless. Around 35.000 people became displaced internally and thousands more had to que at borders while they were trying to return to their country of origin (Steenkamp, 209).

2.2. Xenophobia: the ‘why’

The discourse of xenophobia in South Africa has been researched quite extensively. Most articles relate to the root causes of xenophobia and try to uncover underlying issues that lead to xenophobia. From multiple articles can be concluded that nationals defend their xenophobic attitudes through economic reasons (Dodson, 2010; Wilkinson, 2015). Migrants can be employed at lower wages and without the benefits and protections locals have (Dodson, 2010). They thus compete unfairly with South Africans. Locals feel threatened in competition for jobs.

Dodson (2010) identified five primary axes for xenophobia; economic, the denial of the existence of xenophobia, cultural stereotyping, political and socio-political. The last two axes however are quite similar and are therefore presented as one in this paper.

Economic & material explanations

Nationals feel threatened by the competition migrants create. According to Wimmer (2010), xenophobia is the result of profound competition between indigenous and migrant groups. From the perspective of nationals, migrants come in and compete for the same working opportunities and living space. However, Wimmer (2010) argued that the conflicts arise from the perception of competition, instead of actual competition. Adjai (2013) also argued that the xenophobic sentiments are at its core about a struggle for socio-economic resources. Migrants have become the scapegoats; they are blamed for stealing jobs, education, health care and housing. However, recent World Bank data debunked the argument of job-stealing migrants. The Migrating for Work Research Consortium (MiWORC) found that 96 percent of the working population between 15 and 64 were South Africans (Mwiti, 2015). Only four percent could be categorized as ‘international migrants’. Even though migrants were more likely to get hired than South Africans, MiWORC said this was mostly in low-wage informal sectors with no protection, benefits or contracts; jobs that locals do not want.

According to the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants, the most xenophobic violence occurs in areas where there are high levels of economic deprivation and informal housing (Adjai, 2013). Migrants and South Africans with low socio-economic status struggle for good housing in cities. Therefore, they both end up in the same urban informal settlements. The close proximity of ‘the foreigner’ is seen as a threat to the South African’s access to resources (Adjai, 2013). According to Gordon (2015), this animosity is not rare when different groups

are competing for the same resources. People that have more economic hardship are more likely to exhibit less friendly sentiments towards foreigners (Gordon, 2015).

Denial of existence of xenophobia

On July 3rd, 2008, President Thabo Mbeki said that the attacks were not xenophobic (Crush, 2010). Dodson (2010) argued that this represents one of two things: a great form of denial or an expression of ignorance. For Mbeki, this xenophobia was not in line with the image of South Africa that he wanted to portray, and therefore xenophobia was denied (Dodson, 2010). President Zuma has since also denied the claim that South Africans are xenophobic (Bateman, 2017).

Cultural stereotyping

According to Dodson (2010), cultural differences between foreigners and nationals are exaggerated. This in turn leads to animosity and prejudice. The xenophobia that is present in South Africa is 'black against black'. Black South African nationals feel threatened by other black Africans. The prejudice goes far, in that sometimes even South Africans are victims of xenophobic violence, due to looking foreign, or 'too black' (Crush, 1996).

Political and socio-political

The production and reproduction of xenophobia is, according to Dodson (2010), the result of a lack of political leadership. There are multiple politicians that have made statements about xenophobia; thus influencing the debate. The Minister of Water and Sanitation and the Small Business Development Minister have both made comments that reflect negatively on foreign nationals (Wilkinson, 2015). Another institution that has a big influence on xenophobia in day-to-day practices is the police, which will be explained in chapter 2.5.

According to Mosselson (2010), a state of exception has been created. This has been the dominant model for how the South African government deals with non-nationals. This has created the possibility of exclusion of migrants, leading to migrants being targeted in order for nationals to confirm their own status and political rights. Mosselson (2010) argued that xenophobia is merely a symptom of the problem, an outcome of the state of exception. The state of exception is a governance model, which allows illegal activities without legal consequences. In practice, this means that South African nationals can attack non-nationals without the state intervening. It is a form of power in which the state stays in the clear but

exerts power over the population (Mosselson, 2010). The biggest part of this power lies in the state's ability to determine who the 'exception' is. By determining who is excluded, the state also determines the norm. According to Vale (2002), the South African security industry has created a discourse on the premise that migration is a threat to South Africa. He argued that policy-makers could gain power and create this discourse through the growing public unease concerning migration.

This exclusion of migrants can be tied to the creation of a new South African national identity after the end of apartheid. After the end of apartheid, the South African government wanted to build a new, strong and united South Africa (Neocosmos, 2010). However, in doing so, the focus was on national identity and citizenship. This concept of citizenship had nothing to do with norms or values and everything to do with where people were born. This notion of citizenship is therefore exclusionary and can be used as a basis for discrimination and xenophobia. The path to xenophobia for nationals was paved way by the South African government in this sense. According to Neocosmos (2010) a politics of nationalism was created, based on indigeneity. This means that only people that are indigenous should enjoy the resources and wealth of South Africa. However, indigeneity is not a fixed factor; it is constructed by the one who is in power (Neocosmos, 2006).

2.3. Xenophobia: the 'when'

The biggest xenophobic attack yet took place in 2008. Attacks have been happening ever since, some bigger than others. According to the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) one person was killed every week in 2011 due to xenophobia ("Quelling xenophobia in South Africa's townships", 2013). In 2015, several xenophobic incidents took place over the course of a few months. In March 2015, Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini argued that foreigners should "pack up their bags and go home" (Smith, 2015). This sparked violence across Durban – where the speech was held – and the rest of the country. However, authors argued that xenophobia took place in South Africa long before the outburst of violence in 2008. According to Crush (2001) violence against foreign traders started in 1996 in Johannesburg and became increasingly common. Then, in 1998, three foreigners were thrown off a train by a group of South Africans. A national survey by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) concluded that between 1994 and 1995 there "was a considerable growth in negative sentiments, in other words xenophobia, towards

illegals/immigrants/aliens". It could be said that xenophobia towards African migrants started after the end of apartheid.

2.4. Xenophobia: the 'where'

When one googles 'xenophobia' the first suggestion with a country that comes up is: 'xenophobia in South Africa'. Because the attacks have been widely covered by media, it is known that xenophobia is occurring in South Africa. Within South Africa, the violence usually starts around Johannesburg, then spread to other major cities such as Durban and Cape Town (Crush, 2001; Steenkamp, 2009; Neocosmos, 2006; Neocosmos, 2008; Adjai; 2013). Even though not many studies have been done on the spatiality of xenophobia in South African cities, it is noticeable that even though xenophobia is mostly happening in the big cities, it does not actually start in the center of the cities. This can be derived from authors who described incidents of xenophobia and mostly mentioned townships as places where it occurs (Neocosmos, 2008; Adjai, 2013; Matsinhe, 2011). Ordinarily, an incident happens in a township, which sparks more incidents and in the end a big attack which can lead to violence in the city center. However, the violence usually erupts and stays in the townships of the major cities. This can be explained by the fact that most xenophobic violence occurs in areas where there are high levels of economic deprivation and informal housing (Adjai, 2013). Migrants and South Africans both end up in the same urban informal settlements, which can lead to clashes.

2.5. Xenophobia: the 'who'

In literature on xenophobia, multiple stakeholders are mentioned. The three main stakeholders that are mentioned often are; the government, the police and local South Africans (Adjai, 2013; Neocosmos, 2006; Dodson, 2010). These three all have a certain role to play in the xenophobia that has been and is currently happening in South Africa. Almost all authors agreed that the government has a big role – if not the biggest - to play in xenophobia. As explained in the 'why' of xenophobia, after the end of apartheid the government created a discourse that excluded migrants and therefore put a target on their backs. Any political leader who speaks out about xenophobia or migrants, contributes to the discussion. Officials who talk negatively on migrants can instigate xenophobic violence and confirm a discourse which some South Africans might hold against foreigners. By denying the very existence of xenophobia and arguing that it is just crime, the government is passively condoning the

violence against foreigners. The government's passive stand on xenophobia has an effect on what happens on the ground (Neocosmos, 2010). Besides this, the government did not fulfil some of the promises made after the end of apartheid. Where people were hoping for more employment and more opportunities, unemployment is still a big issue in South Africa. The government is not willing to owe up to this failure and therefore points the finger to foreign nationals, who supposedly steal jobs away from the locals (Neocosmos, 2010). The argument is that the government provides jobs, but that foreigners take them instead of the locals, which they were meant for. By not owning up to the failures, the government is scapegoating migrants. From Dodson's (2010) perspective, the government is the one who holds the power in xenophobia and at the moment is failing to combat it. Neocosmos' (2010) argument is in line with Dodson's (2010); his central argument is that the state discourse is xenophobic. He backs this statement by providing examples of xenophobic statements from political leaders and abuse of migrants by police. This leads to the second stakeholder: police.

The second stakeholder that is mentioned often is the police. There have been multiple instances in which police is xenophobic. Stories of brutality and police helping South Africans attacking foreigners often pop up in literature (Dodson, 2010; Crush, 2001; Handmaker & Parsley, 2001; Adjai, 2013). Crush (2001) and Handmaker and Parsley (2001) described how in 2000, Mozambican migrants were attacked by South African police officers and dogs as part of a training exercise. Like this type of violence, police brutality is an ongoing dilemma in South Africa. Victims of this brutality are almost always black (Handmaker & Parsley, 2001).

In March of 2000 the South African Police Service (SAPS) introduced Operation Crackdown. It was portrayed to combat crime to "ventilate all criminal elements and illegal immigrants" (Handmaker & Parsley, 2001). Areas with large migrant communities such as Hillbrow in Johannesburg were targeted. This led to an endless amount of charges for human rights abuses, such as destroying legitimate refugee papers and sending refugees to a deportation camp. Another incident happened in 2001, where a teacher was arrested and beaten on the grounds of "complexion, facial appearance, accent and her style of dressing" (Handmaker & Parsley, 2001). A similar operation to Operation Crackdown was initiated by the South Africa Police Service in 2015; Operation Fiela. Interestingly, the operation was initially launched to combat assaults on foreigners. However, it has been criticized for targeting migrants and hastening their deportations (Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016). Some

immigrants were deported before they could speak with their lawyers. The SAPS are breaking international law by deporting asylum-seekers before their final status is determined (Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016). According to a survey, 47 percent of South Africans said that they were stopped by the police, compared to 71 percent of refugees that were interviewed (Valji, 2004). The identification of foreigners is done through certain criteria, such as height and skin color. In trying to establish whether a person is an illegal immigrant, the police look for a certain accent, language, pronunciation or usage of certain words, like slang (Adjai, 2013). Physical appearance also matters; the type of clothing, hairstyle and vaccination marks. One of the justifications for arresting migrants, ties into the belief that migrants commit crime. Therefore, the police are ‘ensuring safety’ by arresting migrants (Adjai, 2013).

The third stakeholder which has been mentioned often are the local people. The verbal and physical xenophobia that is happening on the ground is done by local South Africans. They can be influenced by the government, officials, kings, police and others, but in the end the locals are the one actually attacking foreigners. They receive information about foreigners - e.g. that migrants are stealing their jobs - and act on that information. Therefore, they are also an important stakeholder in xenophobia. The media often portrays xenophobic events as sporadic, non-planned, in the moment events. However, in many instances the violence has been organized by locals. Business owners are trying to eliminate the competition and therefore organize such xenophobic attacks, meaning that locals deliberately organize xenophobia (Adjai, 2013).

2.6. Research Questions

As mentioned in the introduction, the five Ws of xenophobia in Cape Town will be analyzed on two different levels; newspaper articles perspectives and migrants’ perspectives. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will discuss the respective research questions.

1. What are the perspectives of newspaper articles on the five Ws of xenophobia in Cape Town?
2. What are the migrants’ perspectives on the five Ws of xenophobia in Cape Town?
3. How can possible differences in and between these perspectives be explained?

Within the five Ws, the main focus will be on the ‘who’; stakeholders and how much power they have, according to newspaper articles and migrants.

2.7. Chapter summary

Xenophobia in South Africa takes the form of verbal and non-verbal violence towards African migrants. Foreign nationals have been attacked, burned, killed and been made to flee the country due to the hand of xenophobia. This can be traced back to a few factors which influence xenophobia: firstly, the perceived threat that migrants create in competition of resources with locals. Secondly, the denial of the existence relates to the government's unwillingness to label the events as 'xenophobia'. Thirdly, the cultural stereotyping axe argues that cultural differences between foreigners and nationals are exaggerated. The political axe discusses the role of the government in trying to encourage citizenship after the end of apartheid. Even though the attacks of 2008 put xenophobia in South Africa on the map in terms of media attention, xenophobic attitudes were born after the end of apartheid in 1994 and are still present in the South African society today. This xenophobia mostly starts in the townships of big cities and has a possibility of spreading to other locations. The government, the police and locals are often mentioned in literature as having big roles to play in xenophobia. The failure of the government to properly address the issue, the brutality of the South African Police Service and the frustration of the locals together create a very toxic cocktail of xenophobia.

In the following chapter, the methodology for the discourse analysis and the thematic content analysis will be discussed.

Chapter 3. Methodology

In this chapter the operationalization of constructs, sampling strategy, methods and techniques, positionality of the author, relations in the field and practices challenges will be discussed. Each step that was taken will be explained accordingly in order to make replication of this research as easy as possible.

This research project consisted of two parts: one part was desk-based and one part was field-based. The desk-based part consisted of a discourse analysis of newspaper articles on xenophobia in Cape Town and South Africa. The fieldwork was a thematic content analysis of semi-structured interviews held in with African migrants in Cape Town.

	Desk-based research	Fieldwork
Data collection	3.2 Newspaper articles study	3.4 Semi-structured interviews
↓	↓	↓
Data analysis	3.2 Discourse analysis	3.5 Thematic Content Analysis

Table 1. Data collection and analysis

3.1. Operationalization of constructs

Before going into the field, the plan was to focus on a specific group of migrants. However, during the fieldwork it turned out that these ideas were not realistic. Therefore, some changes had been made to the type of migrant that was approached for this research. An example: the first plan was to determine in the field whether or not to focus on legal or illegal migrants. However, a lot of migrants are in legal limbo so it is difficult to pinpoint whether they have a legal or illegal status. Therefore, both of these categories have been included in the sample.

As long as people were African migrants living in Cape Town, they were included in the study. Most people interviewed are from Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Malawi. However, also countries like DRC, Somalia, Senegal and many more are mentioned as countries of origin.

People from all African countries were included to see if there were any differences in experiences in xenophobia depending on the country of origin.

The definition of xenophobia that will be used in this research is “attitudinal, affective, and behavioral prejudice toward immigrants and those perceived as foreign” (Yakushko, 2009) Concerning the fieldwork: what counted as a ‘xenophobic experience’ was up to the respondent. It could be very clear, for instance in violence or verbal attacks. However, it could also be subtle and it was up to the respondent to interpret that. If the respondent felt that a specific instance was xenophobic, it was counted as xenophobic.

The definition of stakeholder that will be used in this research is that of the man who introduced the concept, Edward. The word ‘stakeholder’ itself says it all: it is “a person, group or organization that is influenced by or has influence in an organization, a decision, a product or a project (Edward, 1984). The word is mostly used in business, when having a stake in a company or business. However, as mentioned in the definition, it can also refer to somebody who has an interest in a certain decision or project. When one brings it back to the word itself, it is about someone who holds a stake, somebody with an interest in something. For this research, the focus will be on who can influence xenophobia; who holds a stake?

This research is about xenophobia from local South Africans directed towards other Africans in Cape Town. However, while most articles have focused on the perpetrators, little literature is available on a migrant perspective (Mngxitama, 2008). It is important to look at a conflict such as xenophobia from a perspective of the target as well as the perpetrator. First, one can clearly understand concrete experiences of experienced xenophobia (Swim et al., 2003). Second, through focusing on migrants’ experiences, one can reveal which members of the minority group of migrants have to deal with xenophobia the most (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001). Third, it is more empowering to ask targets about their experiences than letting the perpetrators talk for the targets (Oyserman & Swim, 2001). Fourth, one can argue that targets can be seen as the ‘experts’ on xenophobia (Swim, Cohen, & Hyers, 1998). The author of this thesis stresses that although the migrant can be seen as the ‘victim’, there is always room for resilience and individual variance in coping with xenophobia (Mellor, 2004). Therefore, the word ‘targets’ is more appropriate for African migrants dealing with xenophobia than ‘victims’.

3.2. Discourse analysis of newspaper articles

According to Foucault (1976/1990), discourses claim a status of truth in order to gain power. He argued that a community of experts set up rules for telling the truth and therefore have power, through setting up a discourse (Peet & Hardwick, 2015). The objective of this part of the research is to determine how xenophobia in Cape Town is constructed by discourses found in newspaper articles. The author is aware of the fact that a discourse is co-constructed and is not a fixed entity (Foucault, 1976/1990). Therefore, it should be noted that the results of this discourse analysis should always be viewed within the context of the current South African climate and factors that might influence and co-construct the discourse of xenophobia in South Africa.

It is essential that the process of data collection is explained. Firstly, the internet was used to locate appropriate articles. Multiple South African newspapers were selected, on international, national and regional levels. In total five newspapers were chosen: “The Guardian”, “The Mail and Guardian”, “The Daily Voice”, “Eyewitness News” and “News 24”. Most of the newspapers were in English and “The Daily Voice” is a mix of English and Afrikaans. Due to the author being Dutch, these articles were no trouble to read. The choice to select international, national and regional newspapers was a conscious one. There is a possibility that there is a difference in discourse concerning xenophobia in South Africa between international, national and regional newspapers. In order to get a more holistic view on the discourse in South Africa, newspapers from different levels were chosen.

After identifying the newspapers, articles were selected which concerned xenophobia in South Africa. With all newspapers, the search engines on the websites were used to find articles on the topic. The words ‘xenophobi(a/c)’, ‘Cape Town’, ‘migrants’ and ‘violence’ were included in the search. The article titles that popped up were then read to determine whether they were fit for this discourse analysis. Some were irrelevant and the ones that were relevant were then skim read. After skim reading the relevant articles and determining once more whether they fit this research, 27 articles remained (see Appendix C). The remaining articles were then read again more carefully, multiple times. Whilst reading, words or concepts that came up frequently were written down and coded within the article. Among the codes were the five Ws. After going through all the articles, the process was repeated in order to make better and more comprehensive codes. This process was reiterative, in which coding and interpretation of concepts were open for change. After repeating this process of reading, interpreting and

coding three times, dominant discourses could be identified. This will be discussed in chapter five.

3.3. Semi-structured interviews: sampling strategy

Migrant organization Scalabrini had been contacted to receive more information on migrants. However, this organization was not comfortable with sharing private information. Therefore, people on the street were approached and asked where they came from. This method of sampling is called purposive sampling or judgment sampling (Tongco, 2007). This is not random; the researcher determines what needs to be known and then tries to find people who are willing to provide the needed information. In the beginning of the fieldwork the sampling was quite random as one does not know who is a foreign national and who is not. However, after a while it became easier to determine whether someone was foreign or not. Certain traits, clothing or skin color could hint at a foreign nationality and thus the author would go up to people she thought would be foreign. This has resulted in 47 interviews and two focus group discussions. These people were working on markets, in bars, as informal traders, taxi-drivers, Uber-drivers and construction workers. They were all low and middle/high class. Some of them lived in the city center (where rent is expensive) and others were living in locations. Snowball sampling was also used; a couple of people made contact with their foreign friends and these were interviewed as well. Interviews lasted from 15 minutes to an hour. This due to someone having little or a lot of experience with and opinions on xenophobia and time restriction. Besides these interviews, two focus group discussions have been done with 19 migrants. These migrants were on the street waiting for jobs and when given food, they were very willing to discuss xenophobia. As these men were living in townships such as Khayelitsha, they were the victims of xenophobia on a daily basis. The same interview format was used for the focus group discussions as for the interviews.

All interviews were done in English and most of the times there was no language barrier. Before starting an interview, the author would ask the person if she could ask them a question. When the answer was positive, the author asked where the person was from. If the person was a South African citizen or another nationality, a short conversation would take place and then both parties would continue their separate ways. When the person was an African foreign national, the research would be explained. Then, the person would be asked if they minded to be interviewed. It was explained that every interview is anonymous and confidential. If they consented, it would be asked if it was okay to record them. Usually it was fine, however one

man did not want to be recorded and his story was written down. However, writing down his story and conversing with him at the same time was very hard. His data was not therefore included in this research, as the writings were incoherent and therefore did not add anything constructive to the research. After having explained everything to the respondent, consent would be asked for one more time and afterwards the recording started.

Initially a list of questions was composed and during the interviews these gave a semi-structure. Together, the author and the migrant would create a narrative in a two-way street flow. The interviewed could be steered by the author with the questions asked and the migrant could have an influence by deciding to talk about a certain topic instead of another. With every interview, new insights would arise. New questions would be asked and added to the discussion guide to make sure that the guide would cover all bases that were needed for a relevant interview. After about 17 interviews, the guide was no longer needed. The question had been memorized by heart and this helped to have a more informal conversation during the interviews. The discussion guide can be found in Appendix B. After about 30 interviews, there was a point of saturation, in which no new information came up. However, the author felt that by continuing the interviews up until 47, this results of this research would be easier to generalize.

At first, it was intended that migrants filled out a ten-day diary. However, in the field it quickly became apparent that even 10 minutes of their time is a lot. The people that were asked to participate were mostly working on the streets for 9 hours a day, six or seven days a week. They were very hard-working and it is amazing how many people have wanted to participate. The response rate was very high; about 90 percent of people who were asked to do an interview, were migrants. About 80 percent of all people that were asked, were willing to do an interview. Therefore, the selection bias that could occur when selecting respondents, is not very likely in this research.


Table 2 below lists the 47 participants of the semi-structured interviews. The category 'township' refers to whether respondents live in a township or not. The category 'years' refers to how many years the respondent has lived in South Africa. The category 'country' refers to the respondent's country of origin. 'Education' refers to the highest level of education the respondent has had. Within the 'job' category, 'Uber' and 'taxi' stand for Uber- and taxi-drivers. 'SV' stands for street vendor and 'domestic' stands for domestic worker.

Respondent	Age	Gender	Township	Years	Country	Education	Job
R1	31-40	M	No	6-10	Malawi	-	Bartender
R2	31-40	M	No	6-10	Zambia	-	Bartender
R3	20-30	M	-	6-10	Congo	Col/uni	Uber
R4	20-30	M	No	1-5	Zimbabwe	Col/uni	Bartender
R5	20-30	M	No	6-10	Zimbabwe	High	Bartender
R6	20-30	M	No	-	Rwanda	Col/uni	Taxi
R7	20-30	M	No	6-10	Congo	Col/uni	Bartender
R8	31-40	M	No	1-5	Burundi	Col/uni	Bartender
R9	20-30	M	No	1-5	Zimbabwe	-	Bartender
R10	20-30	F	No	1-5	Zimbabwe	High school	Domestic
R11	31-40	M	No	16-20	Senegal	-	SV
R12	20-30	M	No	6-10	Somalia	-	SV
R13	31-40	M	No	1-5	Malawi	-	SV
R14	31-40	M	No	1-5	Zimbabwe	-	SV
R15	31-40	M	No	6-10	Nigeria	Col/uni	SV
R16	20-30	M	No	6-10	Zimbabwe	-	SV
R17	20-30	M	No	16-20	Nigeria	Col/uni	SV
R18	31-40	M	No	1-5	Cameroon	High school	SV
R19	41-50	M	No	16-20	Angola	Col/uni	Taxi
R20	41-50	M	No	11-15	Congo	High school	Taxi
R21	31-40	M	No	6-10	Malawi	Col/uni	Manager
R22	31-40	F	No	1-5	Malawi	Col/uni	Manager
R23	31-40	M	Yes	1-5	Angola	Primary school	SV
R24	41-50	M	No	20+	Nigeria	Col/uni	SV
R25	31-40	F	No	11-15	Malawi	High school	Domestic
R26	41-50	M	No	11-15	Somalia	Primary	SV


						school	
R27	50+	M	No	6-10	Sudan	-	SV
R28	31-40	M	-	6-10	Malawi	Col/uni	SV
R29	31-40	M	No	6-10	Congo	-	SV
R30	31-40	M	Yes	16-20	Angola	-	SV
R31	31-40	M	-	11-15	Nigeria	Col/uni	SV
R32	41-50	M	-	11-15	Malawi	-	Domestic
R33	41-50	M	Yes	16-20	Malawi	Col/uni	SV
R34	50+	M	-	20+	Sudan	Col/uni	SV
R35	31-40	M	Yes	11-15	Zimbabwe	-	SV
R36	31-40	M	No	6-10	Malawi	-	SV
R37	31-40	M	No	11-15	Malawi	Col/uni	Manager
R38	20-30	M	No	1-5	Zimbabwe	High school	SV
R39	-	M	Yes	6-10	Somalia	-	SV
R40	20-30	M	No	1-5	Malawi	-	SV
R41	41-50	M	-	11-15	Nigeria	PhD	SV
R42	41-50	M	-	20+	Senegal	-	SV
R43	41-50	M	-	16-20	Senegal	-	SV
R44	31-40	M	No	6-10	Zimbabwe	Col/uni	SV
R45	20-30	M	No	1-5	Senegal	-	SV
R46	41-50	M	-	16-20	Burundi	-	SV
R47	41-50	M	No	20+	Nigeria	-	SV

Table 2. List of participants in the semi-structured interviews


In graphs 1, 2 and 3 some of the data from table 2 is displayed. The number of people with a certain age, number of people per country of origin and the number of people per number of years spent in South Africa are presented.



Graph 1. Number of people with a certain age



Graph 2. Number of people per country of origin



Graph 3. Number of years in South Africa

3.3.1. Thematic Content Analysis (TCA)

A Thematic Content Analysis is a form of presenting qualitative data. In this case, the qualitative data takes the form of interview transcripts that were collected in the field. The TCA descriptively illustrates the content of the transcripts by theme (Anderson, 2007). This is done through the identification of certain themes that frequently came up in the transcripts. The goal of a TCA is to give voice to the related voices across respondents by identifying common themes. It is important to stay as close to the text as possible in naming and grouping the themes in order to keep interpretation to a minimum.

In this research, the computer program Nvivo was used to carry out this TCA. The interviews have been transcribed literally, only including verbal features of the interaction. This is due to limited time and resources in the setting of the interviews, which were mostly on the street. After the interviews had been transcribed, they were imported into Nvivo. Then, through reading the transcripts again, certain common themes were coded. This was a reiterative process, as codes constantly changed when reading a next transcript. Eventually, through a lot of recoding, 36 main themes were identified, of which some had sub-themes. Parts of transcripts were then grouped into the relevant node and highlighted with a specific color corresponding to the specific node. Then, after a few days the original transcripts were reread

without looking at the previously made categories, after which each node was reconsidered. The results of the TCA will be presented in chapter seven.

3.4. Positionality of the author

The author is a white/Indonesian female from the Netherlands. Therefore, there may be issues concerning gender or perceived power relations. It could very well be that the author is seen as powerless, or without authority, for instance in interviews. This could have an impact on the collected data, compared to if the author were a male. Next, the author is Western. This could be interpreted as being wealthy and from a high socio-economic class. This could also affect the type of information the migrants disclose. Besides that, the author is 24 years old, which can be interpreted as young and inexperienced.

Evermore, the author has an interest in minority groups that are being marginalized or stigmatized. This interest could influence the direction of the interview as the author is interested to hear stories of marginalization.

3.5. Relations in the field

Since this research is asking migrants to tell very personal stories, an amicable relationship where the respondent feels comfortable is preferred. The researcher also became close friends with some of the respondents, but in other cases more distance was kept. Coming back to the positionality of the author, gender did prove to be a construct which influenced the interaction with the respondents in some cases. It happened quite often that male respondents would respond romantically to the authors questions. Then a healthy distance was kept while still being polite. However, this could have also influenced the data. It is possible that respondents felt ashamed of telling their stories because they were romantically interested. It could also go the other way: that some people made their stories more dramatic than they actually were to draw attention to themselves.

3.5.1. Practical challenges

There were some challenges in the field. Firstly, a couple of people that were approached, did not want to be interviewed. When asked why, one said: “You’re not going to make a change in my life”, while the other said: “They hate us, the locals. I don’t want to talk about it.” Xenophobia had not even been mentioned, but apparently xenophobia had had a great impact on this man. So much so, that he did not want to speak about it. However, it is these types of

people, whose lives have been affected by xenophobia, that are interesting for the research. That begs the question whether the people who say 'yes' to being interviewed, are maybe the ones who don't really have experience or a big trauma from xenophobia. Perhaps the ones who don't want to be interviewed, have the most information. It could also go the other way though: that the people who did not want to be interviewed, did not really have anything to say about xenophobia. These two non-response extremes could therefore balance each other out.

Secondly, it also happened sometimes that people were scared. In these interviews, questions are asked about the government, police and other institutions. One Somalian guy literally said: "I'm scared." Maybe he thought that an article would be written and that he would be punished for the things he said. Luckily, a friend of his convinced him that it was okay to be interviewed.

Thirdly, another struggle was the language barrier: all migrants spoke English, but the levels varied a lot. Miscommunication was not uncommon. Besides that, a lot of people spoke very quietly and mumbled. It was therefore sometimes difficult to understand, especially when transcribing. Another issue was that all of these interviews were done on the street, which meant that there is also street noise. This also made it difficult to understand each other. This could have influenced data collection as one can misunderstand or misinterpret each other. It could have also influenced the data analysis when transcribing and interpreting the audio.

3.5.2. Ethical insurance

To ensure the anonymity of respondents, all names and audio/written files with names were deleted or modified to a number. This number varies from R1 to R47 in which R stands for 'respondent'. Verbal consent was asked before each interview and only after this was given, were respondents recorded.

3.6. Limitations

With every research project there are limitations. With this specific project the limitations are tied to the limited time and resources, as the fieldwork part could maximum be four months.

Firstly, although this research is about ‘migrants’ perspectives’, it must be said that each and every migrant has its own unique story. This research is not about piling migrants’ stories together. The data from the interviews can be used to view whether some migrants have similar experiences in xenophobia or not. Even though the narratives will never be identical, there is a possibility of similarities in experiences.

As said in the introduction, there is a gap in knowledge concerning xenophobia; the voices of migrants have – in the author’s opinion – not been covered enough. That is what this research is about: to give some African migrants a voice. In no way is the intention to pile those voices together. Each voice must be heard individually. Therefore, the goal of this research is to leave each story as unique as possible and to try to discover similarities among those unique stories. The same goes for the discourse analysis. This analysis is not a portrayal of a coherent media perspective. The discourse analysis is about finding similarities in discourses on xenophobia between different articles. Both the ‘migrants’ perspectives and the ‘newspaper articles perspectives’ are no representation of one perspective of either all migrants or all newspapers. Each story, whether told by a migrant or written down in an article, is treated as a separate entity and does not represent a perspective from the whole category of ‘migrants’ or ‘newspaper articles’.

The second limitation is related to the discourse analysis on newspaper articles. This analysis is framed within a Foucauldian framework on the power of discourse on knowledge and truth. However, the very point of post-structural Foucault is that there is no truth. Therefore, one could argue that the discourse analysis itself is a discourse, for it is presenting a certain truth and is constructed within a certain frame of mind and thought by the writer. Perhaps this discourse analysis only reinforces a certain discourse with which the author (unknowingly) identifies. Therefore, it could be argued that this analysis cannot be objective.

The third limitation is that the selection of relevant newspaper and literature articles are also biased. Since there is a choice to be made by a human, bias cannot be avoided. Perhaps some articles had more photos that drew attention and caused the author to choose that article instead of another. Selection of articles therefore cannot be completely random.

The fourth limitation is related to the sampling strategy of the interviews. Although people were ‘randomly’ approached on the street for interviews, this cannot be one hundred percent

random. In purposive sampling, the researcher always makes a judgment on whether to interview someone or not, based on circumstantial factors. Therefore, a specific type of migrant could be 'overrepresented' in this research, e.g. migrants who live in the city instead of townships. However, seeing that the response rates were 90 and 80 percent and there is a heterogeneous group of respondents, the chances of having significant selection bias is unlikely in this research.

Another limitation can be that some respondents were given food and drinks. This could lead to getting answers that they think the researcher wants to hear. However, it can also be seen as a type of compensation that breaks the ice and opens people up to talk about personal experiences.

3.7. Chapter summary

This research project consisted of two parts: one part was desk-based and one part was field-based. The desk-based part consisted of a discourse analysis of newspaper articles on xenophobia in South Africa. Five newspapers were chosen for the analysis of news articles, on an international, national and regional level. For the fieldwork, a Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) was done to identify common themes within transcripts of interviews with African migrants in Cape Town. However, there are limitations to this research due to its qualitative nature, mostly related to biases. Furthermore, Foucault's discourse theory gives rise to the existential question whether through analyzing discourses, a certain discourse is (re)produced.

Chapter 4. Regional thematic framework

In this chapter, information will be given in order to provide context for South Africa and xenophobia. First off, history is looked at. The apartheid and its end could play a role in how South Africans deal with certain conflicts or dilemmas. The promises they were made after the end of apartheid, and the failure to meet those promises is influencing South African citizens' state of mind. Besides history, migration to South Africa is also touched upon. Some facts and numbers will be presented to paint a clearer picture on migration. Finally, data will be presented from the World Bank and Trading Economics on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), unemployment and inequality which could all influence (un)rest in the society and therefore influence xenophobia.

4.1. Contemporary South Africa

South Africa is a country with a lot of history. In order to understand the complex dynamics of this country, it is important to take history into account. South Africa's history has been divided into five categories: pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial, apartheid and post-apartheid (Worden, 1996). In the 19th century, diamonds and gold were discovered which led to industrialization and the development of infrastructure. However, it also led to more conflicts, especially with the British Empire over the mining industry. This war lasted from 1899 to 1902 and in 1909 the Union of South Africa was formed as a dominion of the British Empire. After becoming a self-governing nation in 1934, the dominion came to an end in 1960 and the country was renamed to the Republic of South Africa. From 1948 until 1994, Afrikaner nationalism ruled South African politics. This era is known as apartheid; as racial segregation and the domination of the white minority was born in 1960. Apartheid is an Afrikaans word which means 'segregation'. These white supremacy thoughts had started in the 19th century, but were legislated in the 20th century. One of the main acts of legislation was the Homeland Citizens Act of 1970. This act forcibly evicted thousands of Africans from the city centers to 'Bantu homeland'. This was territory that was set aside especially for black citizens of South Africa. The goal was to make territories as homogenous as possible: whites near whites and blacks near blacks. In Cape Town specifically, Africans were pushed to relocate in settlements outside of the white city. This removal of South Africans from the city center to the outskirts was done without giving people adequate resources, such as housing. This is how the informal settlements, also called 'townships' or 'locations' were born (Worden, 1996).

In Cape Town, the five biggest townships are Khayelitsha, Mitchell's Plain, Nyanga, Langa and Gugulethu.



Figure 1. Map of Cape Town's biggest townships

April 27th, 1994 was the day that apartheid ended and the first democratic elections were won by the African National Congress (ANC) in charge by Nelson Mandela. However, recently there has been a lot of unrest and critique on the ANC. Since the death of Nelson Mandela, three presidents have been elected. The current president is Jacob Zuma. Unfortunately, Zuma seems to be corrupt and while the research was conducted in Cape Town, a lot of peaceful and violent protests against Zuma were held. People feel not taken care for by their government, while they had such high hopes for a better life after the end of apartheid.

4.2. Migration to South Africa

South Africa is a country that is trying to manage a large flow of migrants, both internal and cross-border (Vale, 2002). Because it is one of the biggest economies in Africa, it is very attractive for migrants to improve their well-being by migrating to South Africa. Besides that,


South Africa is also attractive because of its democratic government and well-established infrastructure (Meny-Gibert & Chiumia, 2016). Reasons for migrating vary from political unrest, environmental degradation and economic unstableness. There are many undocumented migrants living in South Africa and therefore it is difficult to obtain accurate data on migration. Guestimates of the number of undocumented migrants in South Africa range between 1 and 2 million people (Meny-Gibert & Chiumia, 2016).

According to Statistics South Africa (Chiumia, 2016), 39.2 percent of the total arrivals in 2010 is from Zimbabwe, 14.2 percent is from Mozambique, 7.1 percent is from Malawi and 6.3 percent is from Lesotho. The numbers presented here are all guestimates and vary between organizations. According to Statistics South Africa (Chiumia, 2016), in 2011 the foreign-born population was 2.1 million. However, in 2016 it declined to 1.6 million. Statistics South Africa suspects that people have lied about their nationality due to fear of xenophobia (Chiumia, 2016). However, the UNHCR estimates that there are 3.1 million foreigners in South Africa (Chiumia, 2016).


Net migration is the number of immigrants coming in minus the number of emigrants going out of a country. If net migration is a positive number, that means more people are coming in than going out. From 1997 on to 2007, net migration of South African has steadily increased from around 160,000 people in 1997 to 1.4 million people in 2007 (World Bank, 2017). After 2007, either less people immigrated to South Africa or more people emigrated out of South Africa, because net migration has steadily decreased until 2012. In 2012, the net migration was at 600,000 (see graph 4). When putting this into the context of xenophobia, a relation can be spotted. In 2008 were the first, big xenophobic attacks in South Africa, where a lot of people died and were displaced. It could be that the number of immigrants (1.4 million the year before) triggered the attack, as it was the highest number ever in South Africa. A result of the xenophobic attacks could then be the decline of net migration; perhaps people were too scared to immigrate into the country or perhaps people moved out of the country due to fear. Of course it is debatable whether this is a direct and causal relationship, but the timing of it seems to suggest a relationship.

However, when looking at graph 5, the international migrant stock of South Africa as a percentage of the population has steadily risen from 2005 onwards to 2015. That would mean that either a lot more immigrants have come in or that the population has not grown. The

former can be debunked by graph 4 and the latter is debunked by data from the World Bank which suggests that the South African population has been growing quite a bit. The only other explanation could be the number of undocumented immigrants. South Africa does have quite a number of undocumented foreigners and it may very well be that some of these have been included in some data and not in others (Dodson, 2010). Therefore, data on migration could paint a non-representative picture of the reality.




Graph 4. Net migration to South Africa. Data from World Bank (2017)



Graph 5. International migrant stock as percentage of the population. Data from World Bank (2017)

4.3. GDP, unemployment & inequality

The South African GDP has been steadily declining since 2011 where it hit a peak of 416 billion US\$. In 2016 the GDP was 294.8 billion US\$, declining more than 100 US\$. However, GDP growth is expected to go from 0.4 percent in 2016 to 1.1 percent in 2017 (World Bank, 2017a). The declining GDP can be explained by certain domestic problems such as weak investment in combination with uncertainty concerning policies. Commodity prices have also taken a plunge, pushing GDP further down (World Bank, 2017a). The declining of GDP has a negative influence on unemployment, which has been slowly rising. In the first quarter of 2017, unemployment was at 27.7 percent; the highest jobless rate in South Africa since 2004 (Trading Economics, 2017). For youth the unemployment rate is even higher; from 2016 up until the first quarter of 2017 it has been around 54 percent (Trading Economics, 2017a).



Graph 6. GDP in billions of US\$ of South Africa. Data from World Bank (2017)

As explained in the introduction, some people migrate to South Africa in hopes of better economic opportunities. Not only is GDP declining and is unemployment rising, South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world concerning income level. According to the World Bank (2017), South Africa is the country with the worst score on the GINI. The GINI coefficient represents the income distribution of nation's citizens and is mostly used as a

measure of inequality. South Africa has the highest GINI score, making it the most unequal country in the world. South Africa’s score in 2011 was 63.38. Based on table 2, most of the respondents from this research are from Malawi, Zimbabwe and Nigeria. There is a big gap between those countries and South Africa in terms of the GINI coefficient, as can be seen in figure 2.

According to Statistics South Africa, the poorest 20 percent of the population consume less than three percent, while the wealthiest 20 percent consume 65 percent (World Bank, 2017a). Due to some South Africans being very wealthy, people have hopes of finding better economic opportunities in South Africa. For instance, if one is born in Malawi - where the GINI was around 46 percent in 2010 - chances are that most people are not extremely rich (Trading Economics, 2017b). However, because South Africa’s differences are more extreme, people hope that they will end up on the wealthy section. It could very well be that this inequality is attracting migrants in that sense. If all a person is used to, is that most people they know are poor – and equality is higher compared to South Africa – one might look for a country with more inequality and therefore perhaps more chances of succeeding in finding employment. In this way, inequality could have an influence on migration.




Figure 2. GINI coefficient of Malawi, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and South Africa, 2011.
 Source: World Bank, (2017)

It must be noted however, that this data from the World Bank (2017) stems from 2011 and is the most recent. A lot could have changed the last years, so the data should not be taken as truth at the very moment. It does, however, paint a picture of the situation in South Africa. Another critical note should be made that a lot of data from the World Bank is missing; some countries do not have a score.

4.4. Chapter summary

South Africa is a country with a violent history of which the consequences can still be seen in today's South African society. GDP is declining and unemployment is rising, which could cause unrest and anger in a society. It is also one of the most unequal countries in the world. Besides that, the country is trying to manage a large influx of migrants, although the xenophobic attacks of 2008 potentially had an effect on this influx; it decreased. However, a proportion of the immigrants in South Africa are undocumented and therefore it is difficult to draw any conclusions on the data on migration to South Africa.

Chapter 5. Dominant Discourses in Newspaper Articles

In this chapter, a discourse analysis of newspaper articles will be discussed. Newspaper articles have been found on three different levels – international, national and regional – to get a coherent picture on media articles and its discourses. With each level, the five Ws of xenophobia will be discussed. The goal of this discourses analysis is to find dominant ideas or notions that are painting a certain picture of xenophobia. According to Foucault (1976/1990), the construction of certain discourses can influence the image of xenophobia of the public. Therefore, it can possibly also influence practice and policy concerning migration and xenophobia. In later chapters, these discourses analyses will be compared with the interviews and the literature.

5.1. International newspaper discourses

The paper that was chosen to represent international media is “The Guardian”. Eight articles were picked and carefully analyzed. This revealed several themes that kept coming up in the articles.

Firstly, most of the articles were written from a certain perspective. It is almost impossible for an article to be neutral; all are embedded in a certain discourse. Particular words and phrases are mentioned which clearly portray that discourse. The overall stand of these articles was that xenophobia is not favorable. Phrases such as “backlash against foreigners” and “resentment against foreigners” were used multiple times. In two of the articles, it was mentioned that this xenophobia has hurt the image of South Africa being a tolerant country; an image which was born at the end of apartheid (“The Guardian”, 2017; Smith, 2015).

“South Africa’s reputation as a haven of tolerance for the tired, the poor, the huddled masses of a turbulent continent has been shaken.” (Smith, 2015)

To get the point across that xenophobia is not acceptable, four out of eight articles used quotes and stories from migrants who have dealt with xenophobia (Clayton, 2013; Smith, 2015; Smith, 2015a; Wilkinson, 2015). This creates a more personal picture for the reader, which could incite sympathy. Phrases suggesting that foreigners have to flee in order to be safe (Smith, 2015; Wilkinson, 2015) can trigger sympathy. Seeing that newspapers need to be sold, a bit of marketing comes into play with every article. This strategy of using personal

stories to incite a more personal connection between the reader and the story-teller encourages a sympathetic relationship, which sells better than more complex analyses of a problem (Berns, 2004). Often, this story comes with a dramatic telling of events, including personal histories, descriptions of injuries and trauma. Editors encourage writers to make articles more personal, as keeping social problems on an individual level makes the problem feel more comfortable and less obtrusive (Berns, 2004). This can clearly be seen in the following excerpt.

“They came to South Africa in search of a better life and, for a while, found the promised land. Fungai Chopo got work as a builder, his wife, Memory, was hired as a maid, and they shared a decent house with their two children. The hunger, joblessness and poverty of their home in Zimbabwe was banished. This week all that changed for the Chopos and for many like them. One night just before midnight about 15 men burst into the family home, clubbed Fungai until he bled, threatened to kill the family and stole all they had, including the HIV medication that keeps Memory alive.” (Smith, 2015)

However, making a story more personal does not have to be a bad thing. It can draw attention to social problems, as people could feel connected or sympathetic towards these stories. Through story-telling, xenophobia could be put on the map as a complex social problem that South Africa is struggling with at the moment.

Secondly, some articles made use of literature and academic reports. Especially the article by Wilkinson (2015) was entirely based on literature. Interviews with professors from the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) at Wits University were used. This article debunked the myth that foreign nationals are stealing South Africans’ jobs with recent data from the Migrating for Work Research Consortium (MiWORC). Using academic sources and publishing data from reports can give an article about international or national issues an image of accurateness (The Media Insight Project, 2017).

Other observed discourses in these articles will be discussed within the five Ws below.

What

All articles used the word ‘xenophobia’ instead of ‘crime’. Therefore, it can be argued that these authors all feel as if what is happening in South Africa is not crime, but xenophobia.

One article called it “resentment against foreign nationals” (“The Guardian”, 2017). Besides this, two articles described some form of violence from which foreign nationals have to flee in order to be safe (Smith, 2015; Wilkinson, 2015).

“Foreigners have fled for safety from a recent eruption of xenophobic violence in which at least five people have died and shops have been looted and torched.” (Smith, 2015)

Why

As for the question to why this xenophobia is happening, the most popular answer was that “foreigners are taking jobs” (“The Guardian”, 2017; Wilkinson, 2015; “The Guardian”, 2015). Other explanations included the fact that South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world (see figure 2) and the violent apartheid legacy (Smith, 2015). All these explanations were again based on literature and interviews with experts.

When

All authors agreed that this xenophobia started in 2008, with the biggest attack to date. However, the articles of “The Guardian” (2017), Reuters (2015), “The Guardian” (2017), Smith (2015a), Smith (2015b) also mentioned xenophobic riots in 2015. The article by Clayton (2013) described a xenophobic event that took place in 2013; a taxi driver was arrested, tied to and drabbed by a police vehicle. All articles discussed xenophobia that is happening at the time of writing. Therefore, it can be said that based on these articles, the timeline of xenophobia in South Africa of these articles is from 2008 until the time of writing in 2017.

Where

The articles discussed issues and riots that happened in Pretoria and the place that was hit the worst; Durban. These articles did not discuss xenophobia in Cape Town.

Who

To the question of who has a stake in xenophobia, the articles came up with multiple answers. Firstly, the role of Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini was mentioned in five articles (“The Guardian”, 2015; Wilkinson, 2015; Smith, 2015; Reuters, 2015; Smith, 2015b). The authors agreed that Zwelithini aggravated anti-foreigner sentiments by telling foreigners to “pack their bags and leave” (Smith, 2015).

Secondly, besides the king, the government was also mentioned quite a few times. In two articles the government was mentioned as being in a position to control xenophobia, e.g. by employing the army to control the violence (Smith, 2015b; Smith, 2015a). Wilkinson (2017) asserted that some ministers have made statements which can be seen as not helping to calm the tensions. The Minister of Water and Sanitation commented that even though she is not xenophobic, the fact that most shops are run by African foreigners is “a recipe for disaster” (Wilkinson, 2017). Smith (2015) argued that the government of South Africa “is still wrestling with how to define the problem”. In a personal story in this article, the government was portrayed as not helping the South Africans, which lead to citizens targeting foreigners.

“What about us? Our government is doing nothing for us. The reason we’re fighting foreigners is because of our government.” (Smith, 2015)

Thirdly, police were also mentioned as not helping, as they are scared for their own lives (Smith, 2015). In the article from “The Guardian” (2017), it was explained that police use stun grenades, rubber bullets and water cannons in an attempt to maintain order between anti-immigration protesters and foreign nationals. In the article by Smith (2015a), a foreigner explained how the police are not doing enough.

Fourthly, the role of president Zuma is also acknowledged. Apparently he asked South Africans to not blame all crime on foreign nationals (“The Guardian”, 2017). However, he also argued that South Africans are not xenophobic. In the articles by “The Guardian”, (2015) and Clayton (2013) it is explained that Zuma condemns the violence and explains that many migrants contribute to the economy.

Fifthly, three articles used data and sources from academia. Therefore, academia also has a role to play, seeing as it provides data and knowledge on the topic from an ‘experts’ point of view. This, however can also be seen as the creation a discourse. According to Foucault (1976/1990), power lies with a community of experts who claim to know the truth about certain topics. That would mean that data from these sources; professors, researchers, academic reports, literature and academic institutions (such as universities, MiWORC, and the ACMS) is creating a powerful discourse according to Foucault (1976/1990).

5.2. National newspapers discourses

The papers that were chosen to represent national media were “Eyewitness News” (EWN) and “The Mail & Guardian”. From both the former and the latter, four articles were chosen and analyzed. This revealed several themes that kept coming up in the articles.

Eyewitness News (EWN)

Two articles by EWN were on the same topic; Zuma arguing that South Africans are not xenophobic. However, there was a clear difference of approach to the topic between both articles. While the article written by Bateman (2017) took a clear stand with his article, Sekhotho (2017) did not. Sekhotho’s article was purely descriptive. The article consisted of only quotes and rephrasing of president Zuma, without any personal notes detectable. However, by only quoting one person and not reporting on other sides of the debate, or discussions on the topic, the author is promoting a discourse. By trying to remain neutral, Sekhotho only reported one side of the news – namely what Zuma said at that time. Yet would she have included more sources and thereby shed light on multiple sides of a debate, she would have been more successful in staying neutral.

The article by Bateman (2017) was more clear in taking a stand. Although it was a very short article, he has managed to subtly put his own opinion into the article. In two instances he lightly promoted his own discourses. Firstly, in the following excerpt.

“The president says the incidents, which have been described as xenophobic, are usually triggered by a specific event. “What I am saying is, we should not highlight that and give the wrong impression that South Africans are xenophobic.” Zuma also downplayed the recent looting of foreign-owned shops.” (Bateman, 2017)

It is the wording of the last sentence in which he makes his point of view clear. The word “downplayed” implicates that according to Bateman, Zuma has misjudged or is portraying the events as less serious than it actually was. Besides this, Bateman said: “also downplayed”. The word ‘also’ is a positive addition, which means that this downplaying is not the first thing that Zuma did ‘wrong’ in his eyes. Seeing as additions usually follow right after each other, one can assume that Bateman was referring to the sentences before. Therefore, the whole excerpt can be seen as a critique on Zuma, based on two words in the final sentence.

Secondly, he continued to critique Zuma in his final sentence of the article.

“The president did however say he is concerned by the attacks on foreigners.” (Bateman, 2017).

Again, he made clear how he feels about Zuma with one word. Bateman could have written: “The president said he is concerned by the attacks on foreigners.” But, by adding “did however”, he made clear that according to him, Zuma has made mistakes, “however” he is concerned. So, after making mistakes, Zuma is however doing one thing right. One word changed the whole meaning of the sentence. In total, Bateman managed to change the entire discourse and message of the article with three small words. Especially with this example, one can see how powerful the use of language is.

The other two articles, by de Kock (2017) and Mortlock (2017) described how at least fifteen Somalis have been killed in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. The article by de Kock (2017) focused on the perspective of a community policing forum in Khayelitsha, which argued that this violence is not xenophobia and that the community condemns these acts. Mortlock (2017) wrote from two perspectives: just as de Kock (2017) she argued that the community condemns the violence, but she also shed light on the perspective of foreign nationals by explaining their fear. Both articles did not use the word ‘xenophobia’.

The Mail & Guardian

Two of the articles chosen were about different subjects in xenophobia: one was about inequality and poverty and the other was about xenophobia ‘at the top’. Even though they were about different things, both articles were written from a very clear discourse and opinion.

Firstly, both articles had academia as their source. Data and knowledge presented in the first article is collected from human rights organizations, the African Center for Migration and Society (ACMS), the Lawyers for Human Rights’ Refugee Rights Program and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (Ratlebjane, 2016). The second article collected data from the African Futures Institute, the Makerere University, the University of Witwatersrand and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (Hunter, 2015).

Both articles tried to focus on the academic data by quoting and paraphrasing a lot of data. However, with certain sentences in between presenting data, a discourse can be discovered. In the article by Ratlebjane (2016), she argued the following.

“But even as the investigation was ongoing, and in the weeks leading up to the report’s release, foreigners have fallen victim to attacks in their host communities.” (Ratlebjane, 2016)

The word where a discourse is revealed is “victim”. In this particular sentence, it can be seen as a saying to indicate that the foreigners were targeted. However, the specific use of the word ‘victim’ indicates that she sees the foreigners as victims. By writing it down and publishing it, this is a discourse of victimization. Foreigners are portrayed as victims, which can be seen as problematic as it characterizes foreigners as passive, helpless victims. However, per individual and even per group there is agency and power. No person is ever powerless. This discourse that Ratlebjane (2016) is (re)creating overlooks the resilience, agency and power of migrants.

The article by Hunter (2015) was also relatively clear in its message, although less than Ratlebjane’s. The first sentence of the article was as follows.

“The African continent is yet to forgive South Africa for the xenophobic attacks on African migrants and, more than six weeks later, many Africans are skeptical about trusting the country.” (Hunter, 2015)

The word “forgive” immediately indicates that South Africa was in the wrong. Also choosing to use the word “xenophobia” instead of “crime” reveals that Hunter does think what happened is xenophobia. This was also a clear stand. The rest of the article consisted of quotes and paraphrasing of researchers, academics and policymakers. As mentioned before, by using knowledge of ‘experts’, a certain discourse is recreated and reconfirmed: the academic discourse.

The articles by Whittles (2017) and Cohen and van Vuuren (2017) described the tensions between Nigerians and South Africans in neighborhoods in Johannesburg called Rosettenville, Mamelodi and Atteridgeville. Whittles (2017) focused on Rosettenville and

shows both sides of the story; that of Nigerians – who are accused of drug dealing and prostitution – and that of South Africans who want to rid their neighborhood of such crimes. He described the protests as follows;

“The collaboration has stoked xenophobic sentiment in the communities, but the protests appear to emanate from disagreements that have nothing to do with nationality.” (Whittles, 2017)

Whittles thus argued that the root of the problem in this community is not xenophobia. South Africans have a problem with crime, that is seemingly caused by Nigerians. This causes xenophobic sentiments and aversion towards Nigerians, but the real problem is crime.

Cohen and van Vuuren (2017) focused on Mamelodi and Atteridgeville and explained that the situation is quite similar to that in Rosettenville; South Africans want to put a stop to crime and believe that Nigerians are the main actors.

What

According to Bateman (2017), what is happening in Pretoria and South Africa in general is xenophobia. In Johannesburg shops of foreign nationals were looted night after night. However, in Sekhotho’s article (2017), it was described how Zuma argued that South Africans are not xenophobic but that the violence is aimed at crime. During the anti-immigrant march in Pretoria, police used stun grenades, water cannons and rubber bullets. Within 24 hours, at least 137 people were arrested. Both Ratlebjane (2016) and Hunter (2015) argued that it is xenophobia and not crime that was occurring at the time. Ratlebjane (2016) described how it is not only violent xenophobia, but also a denial of rights and the putting up of certain limitations which burden migrants. Hunter (2015) followed up on that; in 1994 everyone living in South Africa could vote. Now, only South African citizens have the right to vote. Whittles (2017) argued that the tensions in Rosettenville are not xenophobia, but these tensions do ignite xenophobic sentiments. Cohen and van Vuuren (2017) argued that it is xenophobia, as can be seen from the title of the article: “South Africa faces continent’s wrath as xenophobia rears its head again”. Both articles by de Kock (2017) and Mortlock (2017) did not call the events in Cape Town ‘xenophobic’.

Why

Bateman (2017) said that the violence erupted in Pretoria this year because of a march against immigrants. Sekhotho (2017) described how Zuma said that the outbreak of violence was complex and aimed at crime. Ratlebjane (2016) described a report which concludes that the cause of the violence was competitiveness between South African and foreign shopkeepers. Therefore, it was concluded that it is not South Africans versus foreigners, but foreign shopkeepers competing with South African shopkeepers. Hunter (2015) described how South Africa has been increasingly focused on citizenship since the end of apartheid. Apparently, there is also a feeling of absence of social justice in South Africa. According to Hunter's (2015) source, the Zuma administration views the continent as a place from which to extract value. Therefore, in Hunter's article (2015), the leadership was blamed for xenophobia. However, Whittles' (2017) article described that what is happening in Rosettenville is not xenophobia, but a stand against crime. Cohen and van Vuuren (2017) also argued that the reason for this violence comes down to South Africans claiming they want to stop crime. Another reason that was presented in this article was the competition for jobs, business opportunities and housing. De Kock (2017) and Mortlock (2017) argued that the community in Cape Town condemns crime and therefore attack foreigners.

When

The violence in Pretoria happened in February of 2017 (Bateman, 2017; Sekhotho, 2017). The articles by Hunter (2015) and Ratlebjane (2016) described xenophobia that started in 2008 up until the moment of writing in 2015/2016 respectively. The tensions of Whittles (2017) and Cohen and van Vuuren's (2017) articles arose in February of 2017. The articles by de Kock (2017) and Mortlock (2017) described violence that happened in 2017.

Where

In February, xenophobic violence took place in Pretoria and Jeppestown in Johannesburg (Bateman, 2017). The article of Sekhotho (2017) only described the violence at the anti-immigrants march in Pretoria. Ratlebjane (2016) reported xenophobia in Johannesburg and Kwa-Zulu-Natal. The article by Hunter (2015) did not describe a specific place, but was more focused on xenophobia in the whole of South Africa. Whittles (2017) and Cohen and van Vuuren wrote about tensions in certain neighborhoods in Johannesburg. The article by de Kock (2017) and Mortlock (2017) described violence against a Somali foreigner in Khayelitsha, a township in Cape Town.

Who

According to Bateman (2017), Zuma definitely has a role to play. How big of a role is not clear, as it was quite a small article. Sekhotho (2017) described how Zuma argues that political leaders should try to cool down the situation. In the article of Ratlebanje (2016) xenophobia was presented as a ‘battle’ between national and foreign shopkeepers. The government was also blamed for a big part. The South African Constitution gives equal rights to citizens and foreigners, except for the right to vote. However, the law is not always enforced and violations of human rights take place on a daily basis. The government and other institutions are excluding foreigners, for instance by limiting foreigners’ chances to work. In Hunter’s article (2015), the ‘top’ is blamed for xenophobia. Leadership since the end of apartheid put too much focus on citizenship and too little focus on partnership. The role of the police was also described. Whittles (2017) article explained how during a march, the police were:

“...powerless to stop the attacks on the Nigerians’ property. They couldn’t do anything. Our crowd was way too big. The cops just parked across the road and watched.” (Whittles, 2017)

Cohen and van Vuuren (2017) described how the police in Mamelodi and Atteridgeville used tear gas and rubber bullets, thus taking a very active stand. However, the role of the government is described as non-active and even a failure. In the articles by de Kock (2017) and Mortlock (2017), the foreigners are portrayed differently; as perhaps being the cause of the violence. Locals argued that foreigners are bringing in crime and by attacking the foreigners, they are attacking crime.

5.3. Regional discourse

The papers that were chosen to represent regional media, are “Daily Voice” and “News 24”, even though some articles were not about Cape Town. From the former, four articles were picked and from the latter seven articles were chosen and analyzed. This revealed several themes that kept coming up in the articles.

Daily Voice

Firstly, two out of the four articles were mostly descriptive in only reporting quotes and paraphrasing ministers and president Zuma (Moatshe, 2017; Maromo, 2017). However, even in only quoting people, these articles promote a certain discourse; the discourse of the people they are quoting.

Secondly, the other two articles were quite clear in promoting a certain discourse. Both writers tried to incite sympathy for foreigners by writing about circumstances in a particular manner. Once again, personal stories and detailed descriptions of drama are used for marketing purposes and the creation of sympathy.

The first article described how a Congolese woman had to give birth on a train near Johannesburg because she was denied healthcare at three different hospitals (Waters, 2017). This article was written from the perspective that healthcare is a basic human right and therefore the Congolese woman was entitled to it. Waters (2017) mentioned the Constitution which entitles asylum seekers to the same health care as every other citizen. She described what the Congolese woman and her husband had to go through, in a very personal matter. The way of describing it incites empathy and provokes anger at these institutions who turned a pregnant woman away.

“Francine spent the 45-minute train ride to Joburg vomiting as the other passengers tried their best to assist her. But when the train pulled into Park Station at 7am, after Francine had been in labor for more than five hours, her infant daughter, Emmanuella, could not wait any longer. The train doors opened and passengers immediately cried for help. Security guards quickly came, bringing boxes to create a semblance of privacy for Francine to give birth. They immediately called an ambulance, but Francine delivered her baby on the station floor.” (Waters, 2017).

The way this has been described is with a lot of emotion and drama. It could have been written much more neutral, but adding phrases such as “delivered her baby on the station floor” created a picture for the reader that describes the ‘inhumanity’ of the situation. As a reader, one could think: “nobody should have their baby on the station floor”. This particular way of adding that little detail is done to provoke a reaction out of the reader. The goal of this article is made clear through a statement of Francine’s husband. He hoped that this story could shed some light on the discriminatory treatment of foreign nationals in South Africa. Waters (2017) took a clear stand in this article through calling this situation “discriminatory” towards migrants.

An article by Lepule (2016) described how Somali shop owners in Dunoon, Cape Town, live in fear as they are threatened by locals. This article was written with the intention of triggering sympathy for the foreigners. This can be seen in the sentence below.

“A group sharing a dry loaf of bread – their only meal for the day – outside a looted shop say they lost everything, even their passports.” (Lepule, 2016)

This whole sentence is full with words to create sympathy; “a dry loaf of bread”, “their only meal for the day”, “outside a looted shop”, “they lost everything”. By describing the circumstance in such detail, Lepule (2016) was trying to paint a picture that incites sympathy. Besides this, she also added a quote from a South African who condemns xenophobia. It is interesting that she decided to put this in her article, seeing as there are so many people she could have interviewed. From this can be concluded that another message that she wanted to get across to her readers is that not all South Africans are xenophobic.

News 24

What can be noticed when reading the articles from News 24 is that these eight articles all tried to stay as ‘neutral’ as possible. All articles used mostly quotes and paraphrases. They just reported what other people have said, and gave little to no other information or opinion on the matter. The articles by Raborife (2017), Tandwa and Etheridge (2017), Tandwa (2017) and Mngadi (2017) used only quotes and paraphrases. Petersen (2017) also used mostly quotes, however she did speak specifically of “xenophobia”; therefore, also creating a discourse that what is happening is indeed xenophobia.

Sisulu (2017) described a foreign national being torched to death in his own container shop. The title of the article was: “Man torched to death in possible xenophobic attack”. There is a picture of the spaza shop and underneath it says: “this is the container spaza shop in which Kasin Mohamed was murdered.” The word “murdered” clearly gave message that this was not an accident. However, in the next couple of phrases, Sisulu used the word “died” twice instead of “murdered” or “killed”. This gives out a confusing message, just like the title: a “possible” xenophobic attack. By using the word “murdered” it seems as if Sisulu (2017) was trying to make sure readers know it was deliberately. However, by saying “possible xenophobic attack” and “died” later on, it seems as if he tried to retract the statement made before. Therefore, it is hard to draw any conclusions on the discourse of this article.

The only article that used the word “xenophobia” is that by du Plessis (2017). This article was about how fewer African students are enrolling at South African universities and how this is a cause for concern. The article again used mostly quotes from professors, however the angle was different from the other six analyzed articles, as it was describing how xenophobia negatively affects the country.

What

Only the articles from Tandwa (2017) and Sisulu (2017) described xenophobia as such. Tandwa (2017) described how violence broke out in Pretoria. At least ten houses were set alight during a protest in Rosettenville. Sisulu’s article (2017) described how a foreign national’s shop was set alight with him still inside.

Why

In Tandwa’s article (2017), it was explained that angry residents raided what they called drug dens. Community members had made a vow to clear the area of drugs and prostitution. Sisulu interviewed a local who argued that people who had businesses around the village were not happy with the foreign guy to run a business there. The local suspects that these business people had something to do with this fire (Sisulu, 2017).

When

Tandwa’s (2017) description of events took place in February of 2017. Sisulu’s article (2017) was written in April of 2017, a couple of days after the shop and man had been set alight.

Where

In Tandwa's (2017) article, the violence happened in Pretoria West and Rosettenville. The shop fire happened near East London in the Eastern Cape (Sisulu, 2017).

Who

Community members took action against foreigners in Tandwa's article (2017). The article also described the opinions of president Zuma and Minister of Home Affairs Malusi Gigaba. Also in Sisulu's article (2017), it was allegedly locals who took matter into their own hands and set the foreigner's shop on fire.

5.4. Chapter summary

In this chapter, newspapers from an international level, a national level and a regional level have been analyzed. In total, five papers containing 27 articles were analyzed. On the international level, "The Guardian" had been chosen. The eight articles all were (subtly) embedded in a discourse that acknowledged and sometimes clearly condemned xenophobia. This was done through for instance describing personal stories concerning xenophobia which could trigger sympathy with the reader. Three articles also used academic sources to back up their statements. The Zulu King, the government, the police and president Zuma were identified as having a stake in xenophobia.

On a national level, "The Mail & Guardian" and "Eyewitness News" had been chosen. Out of eight articles, four were embedded in a discourse that condemned xenophobia. The other articles tried to remain neutral or argued that it was not xenophobia. "The Mail and Guardian" used academic sources quite often and two articles from this newspaper were against xenophobia very clearly. Another discourse that came up in one article of this newspaper was the victimization of migrants. Migrants were portrayed as powerless, passive victims of xenophobia. The article from "Eyewitness News" that was embedded within a discourse critiqued Zuma in a very subtle but noticeable way.

On a regional level can be noticed that authors were much more inclined to stay neutral. Four articles were analyzed from the "Daily Voice", in which two were against xenophobia and used personal stories to convey that message to the public. The other two articles in this newspaper stayed on a very superficial and descriptive level. For "News 24" all articles tried to stay as neutral as possible, only relaying information directly from someone else, such as

Zuma or certain ministers. Out of seven articles from this newspaper, only one author described the events as “xenophobia”. The rest called it either “possible xenophobic attack” or only relayed what other people had said on the matter.

It seems that there is a difference in how authors approach the topic of xenophobia between levels of newspapers. Most articles of the international newspaper were clear in taking a stand against xenophobia. Then, moving down to the national level it became a bit less: four out of eight articles took a clear stand and the rest remained relatively neutral or conveyed that South Africans condemn xenophobia but also want to put a halt to crime. Moving down to the regional level and especially the “News 24” newspaper, authors became much more careful in putting in their own opinion. Perhaps that was the goal of the newspaper, to only relay information and not go into any detail. It could be that international newspapers have a bit more freedom in what they write compared to regional newspapers. However, it is striking to see that there is a difference in writing about xenophobia between international, national and regional newspapers. Going towards the bottom level, less and less authors are taking a stand against xenophobia.

What

Most articles used the word ‘xenophobia’ instead of ‘crime’, indicating that the authors put the events in a discourse of xenophobia. The cases that were written about can be described as physical violence against foreigners.

Why

The reasons for xenophobia that were discussed the most are that foreigners are supposedly stealing jobs from locals, the legacy of the apartheid regime and that locals are taking a stand against crime.

When

These newspaper articles have picked up on xenophobia in 2008 - when the big attacks happened – up until the present.

Where

Xenophobia was described as taking place in (townships in) Pretoria, Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town.

Who

The Zulu King, the government, the police and president Zuma were identified as having a stake in xenophobia. Besides this, the role of foreigners and locals was also highlighted and put in a context of crime.

Based on these newspaper articles, stakeholders are presented as having a certain interest. These interests can be seen in table 3. These interests are purely based on the 27 articles that were analyzed.

Stakeholder	Interest
Zulu King	Foreigners leaving
Government / officials	(Foreigners leaving) To prevent disaster
Police	Trying not to get killed whilst doing a good job
President Zuma	Presenting image of not being xenophobic, stopping unrest
Foreigners	Protecting themselves, making a living (crime)
Local community members	Protecting community against crime, attack foreigners, get jobs 'back'

Table 3. List of stakeholders and their interests

Especially for the government it is hard to determine one specific interest, as officials' views differ extremely. While some condemn the violence, others encourage the xenophobic sentiment. Besides this, it is also difficult to conclude from these articles how much power stakeholders have in achieving these interests. What can be done, is determine which stakeholders are mentioned in the most articles. Per article, one or two most prominently discussed stakeholders were chosen. A count of all the articles led to table 4.

Stakeholders	Number of times mentioned	Percentage of total
Zulu King	4	15%
Government / officials	12	44%
Police	12	44%
Zuma	8	30%
Foreigners	3	11%
Locals	8	30%

Table 4. Stakeholders and the number of times mentioned

From this table can be concluded that the 27 articles which were analyzed in this study mentioned the government and officials and the police the most. They were only counted if they were described as having a stake in xenophobia and doing something with that stake. From this count could be deferred that in the incidents that were described in the articles, the government and the police had a stake and were therefore mentioned the most times. These two stakeholders are merely mentioned the most, which could indicate that they are viewed as having the most power. However, no direct conclusion can be drawn from this analysis.

Chapter 6. Thematic Content Analysis of Interviews

In this chapter, some excerpts from interviews with migrants will be displayed. The author would like to stress that these stories are very personal and sensitive. In no way is the displaying of these stories meant to generalize ‘a migrant experience’. It is about giving migrants a voice, a platform where they can tell what happened to them or their friends. The two focus group discussions are also incorporated within this chapter.

In total, 35 nodes were created to categorize respondents’ answers. Out of these 35 nodes, 18 have been selected to represent the five Ws. This can be seen in table 5.

Nodes	Which ‘W’
(Personal) experiences with xenophobia	What
Apartheid	Why
Blame	Who
Corruption	Why
Government gives SAs a lot	Who + why
Job (stealing) jealous	Why
Lack of education	Why
Role media	Who
Role community leaders	Who
Role foreigners	Who
Role government	Who
Role King Zulu	Who
Role police	Who
Role local SAs	Who
Stealing wives	Why
Townships dangerous	Where
West vs. East Cape	Where
Verbal xenophobia	What

Table 5. Nodes and which ‘W’ they will be used for

The question of ‘when’ will be deducted from the interviews themselves, as no particular node was created for that.

6.1. What

In order to get an image of what the migrants in this study thought about xenophobia, (personal) experiences are highlighted. All respondents reported to have heard of xenophobia and know what it is. As one respondent put it:

“Xenophobia is a national discourse where the nationalities of South Africa fight the foreign nations” (R5, 2017).

Out of 47 respondents, 37 reported that they have had an experience with xenophobia (79 percent). Five said they had no experience with xenophobia and five were unclear whether they had experienced xenophobia or not.

The 37 who did have experiences with xenophobia were either directly involved in xenophobia or indirectly. Indirectly meaning that friends, colleagues or acquaintances had been involved and they had heard about it. A migrant from Zambia explained how xenophobia is targeted towards African foreigners specifically.

“Yes, yes. It was so violence on black people. Beating up fellow black people. To me, it wasn't making any sense, because to them it looks like foreigners are all black people. But that's not true. Anyone who is not South African is a foreigner, being a Chinese, colored, Indian or someone from Europe. But them they just concentrate on their fellow black people.” (R2, 2017)

From the stories of the migrants in this research can be seen that xenophobia can be physical, verbal or behavioral. The next three excerpts are examples of each form respectively. The first example is from a Nigerian street vendor.

Ja, during that time we were at Cape Point. In 2010 the time of the world cup, we normally use a table like this to put the shoes and clothes on. Then they did xenophobia. Police supposed to come and let us know because we are paying for the rent. But the police didn't tell us, so it's not easy for me to pack the things. So they attack me, some of them they take pairs of shoes. Some of them take shoes and beat me. I have to run away because life is important. So I have to escaped. Some of them fetch my stuff. I just let it go, because it's part of life. I go to police, write a report. They say they open a case. But there's little you can do

about it. Thank God I'm alive. So since that time, anytime I hear the noise they want to do attack, I just try to avoid them. (R31, 2017).

A description of verbal xenophobia came from a migrant from Malawi.

"Because I experienced verbal xenophobia when I was in college. So when we were finishing, one of my cousins said: let's take a group picture. One girl said: "I cannot take a picture with these foreign monkeys". So for me it was like: what?!" (R22, 2017)

One Somalian respondent told his story about being a witness of a shooting and then being questioned and suspected by the police for the shooting.

"They shoot him, only one guys. I know that guy because he's next to me, my neighbor. But South Africans guys, they shoot each other. So after that used to happen, police ask many questions, yeah. After that I answered I say; me I don't have card, I'm refugee I don't have anything. He said to me; you see what happened? Because if I see they cannot shoot me, me I run away. Because I can't do nothing. So after that, I explained to police; I didn't shoot him. He says: we are suspect to you shooting. Because I say: come inside, you must check everything. I don't have gun, I don't have... eh... knife so how can I kill him? They checked it. So I see that happen my eyes." (R12, 20017)

These are just a couple of stories that migrants have discussed. There are many more stories on physical, verbal and behavioral xenophobia directly or indirectly. These excerpts however, give an image of what the African migrants in this research have to deal with in South Africa on a day to day basis.

As can be concluded from these excerpts: xenophobia can involve physical violence, verbal harassment or behavioral prejudice. This is in line with the definition of Yakushko (2009), who describes xenophobia as attitudinal, affective and behavioral prejudice. It can take any form, as long as the migrant feels that it is xenophobia.

6.2. Why

6.2.1. Apartheid legacy

Some migrants argued that the legacy of apartheid is still very present in the mind of South Africans. A migrant from Nigeria argued that the South Africans are making the foreigners feel the way they felt during apartheid. This was corroborated by many more migrants.

“You are basically more or less you become kind of like a second-class citizen. In the sense that, I will say, under apartheid blacks felt like they were eh... they were marginalized to a large extent. They felt that they were the bottom order of the richer groups. So I think as migrants in South Africa, we’ve come to feel that situation. In the sense that now it is reversed. The way they felt at that time, they now make us feel.” (R24, 2017)

6.2.2. Corruption

Besides the legacy of apartheid, corruption is also a reason for xenophobia that was mentioned. One migrant from Malawi argued that this corruption is the cause of xenophobia. Migrants feel as if the whole system is corrupt, from the police up. They described police making deals with criminals or locals in order to make some money.

“Ja it’s a big problem. That is what is causing all these problems, xenophobia. Because those guys with the corrupt police they do it open, like they are selling. Because they don’t fear police, they don’t fear nobody. Now the people get tired, they say: “you police are not doing anything concerning this issue. We are gonna take the law in our own hand.” (R28, 2017)

6.2.3. South African government gives South Africans a lot

A lot was spoken about how the South African government gives the locals a lot for free. Apparently, local South Africans get grants for certain things, such as when they have children. Besides this, they also get promised free housing. One migrant from Cameroon had the perfect analogy about fishing.

“It starts from home already; you grow up like this. You know how to survive. You can’t get anything for free. Here they get houses for free, they get many things for free. They go to hospital for free. But us we don’t have that! We must work hard to get anything! Then when you come here, you see the way things are better at home. Because everyone at home is

working hard. But here, the South Africans they don't work hard. They work two days, in the weekend they go and drink. They drunk, Monday they don't come to work. The government yes. This started a long time ago, everything for free so why stop now? If you give fish free to a child, it doesn't learn how to catch a fish. The day you don't have a fish, you are not there. You start going crazy, because if you learned to catch a fish, you can catch it. Now you ask: give me a fish, every time." (R18, 2017)

This is in line with what a Nigerian migrant said; they are not self-sustaining.

"The resources are limited. So people are battling to get access to those resources a lot. It's like now we are battling for resources in the country. Ehm... they don't want to compete with us. So they result to other means. And those means sometimes become violent and dangerous. So they cannot sustain themselves, because most of us, where we come from, we've learned to survive in business, to do business, to be self-sustaining. So here, they are never self-reliant. They always rely on the government and all those things. In a free-market environment, they are not able to compete. So I think those aspects, they resort to violence and sabotage." (R24, 2017)

Besides this, some migrants also argued that the government is not meeting its promises. This angers the locals and they act it out on foreigners, whom they see doing business and therefore making progress.

"They say they not doing it actually toward us, they do that to tell the government because the government promised them to give them free house, free education, free water, free electricity. Well, when the government doesn't do it, that frustration and anger go towards immigrants." (R3, 2017)

6.2.4. Job stealing

By far the most discussed reason for xenophobia: locals thinking that foreigners are stealing their jobs. Out of 47 respondents, 40 mentioned this reason (85 percent). While some migrants disagreed with this statement, some did agree, seeing as foreigners are more willing to be employed for lower wages than locals.

“Foreigners are not like... they are always scared. That is why they would do anything to get money. Because the job to clean the walls, if the boss asks me to clean the wall, I’ll give you hundred rand. If he asks this to a South African, they will ask for more. So they say, we foreigners we take their jobs. Because for us, you must understand, it’s like we have that mentality. But if you use it here, it is like nothing. I do understand them, like yeah.” (R1, 2017)

However, other migrants did not agree with the premise that foreigners steal locals’ jobs.

“So, and as they came up to say that the reason why they are doing this is because the foreigners are taking their jobs. But when you look at things, when you look at what we are doing here, is there any sign that we are taking any jobs from anybody? We use our inner sense; we try to come up with something to help ourselves. Because we don’t rely on anybody, you know, to improve our living. So they said that this is the reason why they are attacking the foreigner. But when you look at it, it is unfounded.” (R17, 2017)

Some migrants also argued that the government is using migrants as a scapegoat for not providing the promised employment to the locals.

“I don’t think if a foreign national comes in here and works, he’s actually stealing your job. So maybe also the government needs to fulfill the promises. Because, they are using that as a weapon of saying: “we’re not getting anything done because there’s an influx of people coming here.” While there is also an influx of them going out of the country. But people don’t see that.” (R22, 2017)

A couple of migrants even argued that they are creating more jobs for locals, by employing South Africans in their shops.

6.2.5. Lack of education

Some migrants explained that locals do this type of violence due to lack of education.

“Because I mean, you cannot see somebody in your country and you know... you keep on saying; go back to your country you are a foreigner because you say so you don’t know where

you are going tomorrow. Because if you are very, very educated, if you are sensible you will know that maybe one day I will also go to another people's country! I may even make a family there!" (R15, 2017)

As can be concluded from these excerpts: according to the migrants in this research there is a plethora of reasons for xenophobia. The number one reason that the migrants discussed was that locals feel that foreigners are stealing their jobs, which is in line with literature. The apartheid legacy, corruption, lack of education and the grants that the government gives South Africans were also reasons that came up frequently.

6.3. When

Out of 47 respondents, 32 actually mentioned temporality of xenophobia (68 percent). Out of these 32, 22 (69 percent) discussed the events of 2008, in which more than 60 foreigners were killed. Other years that are mentioned are: 2010, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. One respondent said that xenophobia has been happening every year since 2008.

6.4. Where

Out of 47 respondents, 36 specifically mentioned a place (77 percent). Often they argued that xenophobia is very bad in the Eastern Cape, especially Johannesburg, Durban and Pretoria. Even though most respondents did think xenophobia is worse in Johannesburg than in Cape Town, Cape Town was also mentioned by 32 respondents. They stressed how xenophobia in Cape Town mostly centers itself in and around townships. Townships that are mentioned often linked to xenophobic violence are Khayelitsha and Nyanga in Cape Town. From the stories of these migrants, it seems as if the worst xenophobia happens in the Eastern Cape, but that this type of violence is comparable with the xenophobic violence that happens in the townships of Cape Town.

6.5. Who

Based on literature and other articles on xenophobia in Cape Town, the migrants were asked questions on seven potential stakeholders. These stakeholders included: the media, community township leaders, foreigners, the government - including president Zuma -, the king of Zulu's, police and South African locals. Respondents were asked about each of these,

their roles in xenophobia and how much power they have in xenophobia. Purely looking at how many people mentioned each stakeholder, table 6 was created.

Stakeholder	Number of people who mentioned them	Percentage of total
Media	10	21%
Community township leaders	22	47%
Foreigners	7	15%
Government	43	91%
King Zulu	5	11%
Police	39	83%
South African locals	26	55%

Table 6. Stakeholders identified during interviews and how many people mentioned them, either positively, negatively or neutral.

6.5.1. Media

Most people who talked about the media in South Africa agreed that it is balanced and not corrupt. They did find media very important, seeing as it is the only way of hearing about certain events, so many migrants felt like the media has a lot of power. One respondent spoke about the importance of social media. She argued that a lot of the times, events that are not covered by regular media are covered on social media such as twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp. People can get warned before an attack happens through social media. She thought that perhaps regular media would not cover certain xenophobic events to prevent it from spreading to other cities. She then went on to argue that there are two main television channels in Cape Town and that they approach things differently.

“I think media, politically I would say there are two channels here. CBC and ETV. ETV is more private, more privately owned the way I understand it. And CBC is government owned. I’ve picked up that every time there is something scandalous and it’s affecting foreign nationals like ETV goes quick on it. So mostly you always know, even on twitter, you always know quickly what’s happening. While CBC hides it, I don’t know out of embarrassment or they’re waiting for approval or what..” (R22, 2017)

This respondent was the only one who went in detail about the nature of media in Cape Town. Another migrant did however say that some things – such as killings - are not covered by the media. Lastly, one migrant argued that because the media portrays South Africa as a nirvana, it encourages people to migrate. When they come here however, they realize South Africa is a difficult country to live in.

“Because if you are Congo the way they see South Africa like a good place to stay. You live a good life, freedom, money. It’s not that...” (R7, 2017)

From these excerpts can be seen that according to the migrants in this research, the media has a role to play in xenophobia. Media can relay information that would otherwise not be known to the public. It can however, determine what to relay and what to hold back. As R22 described, this can have something to do with who owns the channel and what their interests are. Media can therefore portray a false image of certain events, or even of a country. However, social media can pick up what has been left aside by regular media.

6.5.2. Community township leaders

There are mixed stories about the role of community township leaders. While most migrants agreed that they have a role to play, there was disagreement on what role they play. Some respondents argued that community leaders are against xenophobia, others argued that they are inciting it, by encouraging the community to blame and attack foreigners. Quite a few migrants described how in the township Langa, the leaders discussed the importance of foreigners in the community. They then let the community know that they would not tolerate violence against foreigners in Langa. This community therefore protects foreigners and none of the respondents ever said anything bad about Langa.

“Ja a lot of foreigners, but sometimes they don’t act badly to them. Langa, the last xenophobia they make a meeting. The parents for the Langa people. They met and say; you mustn’t touch any foreigners. For the foreigner is the one who give us food, is the one who helps us, they rent our houses, they support us. No one can touch them. I just hear only Langa did that. Only Langa say that, leave them alone.” (R11, 2017)

Some argued that communities use the church or any other institutions to convey their message.

“They use the church; they use eh... whatever organizations they have in their local areas. So they use those people to say: let’s protect the foreigners. They will tell you that these foreigners are people like us.” (R32, 2017)

However, others argued that no matter what community leaders will do, the youngsters will do whatever they want.

“Even priests that are going in the field to preach, show them the way of god. To change their mentality. But they can’t do nothing when youngsters want to do their things. They will do so. So there is no power for that, they can shout and talk what about they can say. They are there, they are doing their job, they advise whatever for those who want to listen. But the youngsters, no way.” (R19, 2017)

Other migrants even argued that community leaders are encouraging South Africans to attack foreigners. This has to do with the claim that foreigners are taking their jobs, because they can sell stuff cheaper than South Africans.

“No the leaders they make it more. Especially in the locations, the foreigners have got nice shops. Especially the tax-shops that is selling cigarettes whatever. They work very hard, they open until late and then they work together and they have everything in the shops and it’s cheaper. So other shops can’t compete. South Africans can’t compete. So what he do; he tell the community that foreigners are taking their jobs. Then they attacking the shops. They push them to attack.” (R34, 2017)

Nine migrants were able to give a percentage of how much power they thought the community leaders had in stopping xenophobia. The mean of these percentages is 59 percent, so nine respondents in this research felt like the community leaders have 59 percent of power to stop xenophobia.

Concluding, the migrants’ opinion on the role of community leaders is divided. While some argue that they are protecting the foreigners, others disagree and claim that they either don’t have enough power to do anything or that they are encouraging violence against foreigners.

6.5.3. Foreigners

Even though only a few migrants discussed foreigners as playing a role in xenophobia, it mostly came down to the idea that there are too many foreigners in the country. They argued that some migrants - mostly Somalians - are making too much money, while locals can't find jobs. One migrant argued that some foreigners bring crime into the country. Multiple stereotypes are connected to certain countries, one of them being that Nigerians are drug dealers and pimps.

“It’s a part of... depends on other things also what foreigners are doing in this country. Because all of us foreigners, in terms of doing things, some of us we are very well, some sell drugs. Let’s say everybody knows that the Nigerians sell drugs. And now, when you come now today, big pockets. Everybody knows that Tanzanians are number one in this country, even now when I’m talking to you, I can point it. They are doing, following people who are walking with a backpack. They attack it. What they do, they came and open your bag and without you noticing, they are very professional. Then they steal. And Zimbabweans, same story, my country Mozambique also. They steal, the guns whatever. Each and every country they have got their own committed crime. When you came to Malawi, also they are so professional in buying stolen goods. All these foreign countries, involved in crime whereby the citizens are watching it. And see: “hey we didn’t have this before.” And these people come far away and we accommodate them in our community. Now they are doing this. So, all of them rise together and try to fight that kind of crime. Maybe for two or three months in Joburg, there is some problem which happened. Those breaking foreigners’ shops, trying to burn the houses, you know the reason why that started? The reason is; some of Nigerians were recruiting young girls like your age, put them in prostitution. To be like slavery. They’ll take them and lock them in certain houses and they don’t have access to talk to their families and all this kind of rubbish. And then be used with different men so the money goes straight to their pockets.” (R28, 2017)

Thus, even though not many people mention the role of foreigners, it usually came down to the notion that there are too many foreigners in South Africa and that they bring negativity and crime to the country.

6.5.4. Government

When it came to the government, opinions varied extremely. Migrants' statements ranged from the government being xenophobic to them condemning xenophobia. Five simple codes were created in Nvivo to describe the role of the government: bad, good, blame, percentage of power and power. For 'bad', 26 people had something to say, while for 'good', 19 people had something to say. First off, some excerpts from the 'bad' category.

Bad

The argument that was made quite often is that by not speaking out against the locals who are xenophobic, the government is actually indirectly supporting these kinds of activities.

“So ehm... the biggest problem here is the issue of ehm... attacking migrants. The xenophobia. The saddest part is that the government does nothing to protect us. So in too many ways, you know... they support it silently. Because since the first xenophobia attacks in 2008 no South African has been prosecuted or convicted. 64 people lost their lives in 2008 and no one was convicted or prosecuted.” (R24, 2017)

“Well... maybe. Because if they say so, if they say South Africans are not xenophobic, you know what? Maybe it will have an impact on their economy, on their political whatever and whatever. So sometimes they have to cover. Ehm... all along I thought they are working to stop it. But when I heard the president saying that South Africans are not xenophobic, I thought he was wrong. I strongly think it's wrong to say that they are not xenophobic. Because he's denying the problem that is apparent, that is a clear problem. Maybe the first thing is to admit that there is a problem, that we need to find a solution.” (R38, 2017)

Besides this, some migrants also argued that the government is not fulfilling its promises that were made after the end of apartheid and foreigners are blamed for their failure.

“But Zuma is not able to meet up his mandates, it becomes wrong when it takes the foreigners as scapegoats. To say: these jobs are not available to you because there are so much foreigners in our country. These foreigners are taking the jobs that should have been yours. It's deceit. It creates animosity, dislike between the foreigners and the South Africans.” (R24, 2017)

Another argument commonly made was that the government does not punish the people who commit xenophobic crimes. This in turn leads people to think that they can be xenophobic, as there is no punishment or repercussion for their actions.

“People do not commit certain crimes because they are deterred by the punishment from doing it. But in the situation where there is no punishment for a crime being committed, people take the laws in their own hands. So the case of the xenophobic attacks, South Africans feel like there is no punishment for killing a foreigner. That is why when you watch tv you see shops being looted, people being attacked in the streets, because they believe that nothing can be done to them.” (R24, 2017)

Good

However, some migrants thought that the government was trying its best to stop xenophobia. These respondents argued that the government is trying, but the people are too difficult to stop.

“Oh they are trying, but you know the people are very difficult. Yeah, that is what people... they make the gun... because of... they are very rude. Yes. They always break the law. But government is trying.” (R13, 2017)

Another migrant argued that the government is an apparatus which cannot patrol on the streets. After they hear about violence happening, they will help foreigners.

“They condemn it. But you know what? The government is eh... is not an organization. They won't know much what is taking place. Because you know our president, where he stays, it's a place that you and me can't get in. They hear it after. Now the government from them they say: “oh that is what is happening, okay let us take measure and step the police.” So that they can prevent that. South African government have been doing it. Anytime where there's violent, they protect the foreigners. Hundred percent.” (R28, 2017)

Eighteen people were able to give a percentage of how much power they thought the government had in stopping xenophobia. The mean of these percentages is 80 percent, so eighteen respondents in this research felt like the government has 80 percent of power to stop xenophobia.

Concluding, the view of migrants in this research on the government is divided. Some argued that the government is instigating xenophobia by denying the very existence of it; therefore, essentially quietly supporting it. Others said that the government is trying its best to stop xenophobia, but that it is hard because the people will do what they want and the government only hears about xenophobia after it already happened.

6.5.5. King of Zulu

All five migrants who mentioned the king, mentioned him negatively. He instigated violence against foreigners by saying that foreigners should pack their bags and leave the country.

“There was a time whereby king of Zulus talked about the foreigners, they must go. Each and every time somebody talks about the foreigners being portrayed as a cause of a problem or a particular issue, that triggers something that is already simmering underneath. So once the spark is put on it, it accelerates. That’s what happening. Some issues are neglected to be addressed by the government. Whenever somebody in authority says something about foreigners, it triggers a spade of violence across the country.” (R37, 2017)

Concluding, according to the migrants in this research, the King can instigate violence against foreigners by making speeches that reflect negatively on foreigners.

6.5.6. Police

With the police, five codes were made; bad, good, blame, percentage of power and power.

Bad

Starting with ‘bad’, police was often mentioned as not helping and being scared for their own lives. Often, migrants hear that they will have to open a file, and nothing happens after that. However, sometimes migrants even argued that police are involved in xenophobia, by helping South Africans or making trouble for foreigners. One respondent explained how his Nigerian friend was choked to death by xenophobic police.

“Ehm... sometimes the police also be involved, you see. Because the reason why I said the police, some of them are xenophobic. Because last month, one of our brothers was choked to death. Ja! Right here! He was choked to death by xenophobic police people. You know what happened? They found him with a substance. Now instead of taking him to the police station,

they handcuffed him. After handcuffing him, one of them choked the guy on the neck. From there, he died. Ja, that is xenophobic attack. Because you cannot see a South African citizen commit a crime and handcuffing him and choking him on the neck. Ja! I've never seen such a thing!" (R15, 2017)

This was actually featured in the local newspaper (see Appendix A), in which was argued that the drug dealer died from taking an overdose of his own drugs. An autopsy later, however, revealed that he had no drugs in his body.

Another argument that was made against police was that when a foreigner needs help in a township, they will not show up. First of all, they are too scared to come to a township and second of all when they hear it is a foreigner who needs help, they will stay away.

"Ja even police. They just ignore you because... you are 'that migrant'. Yeah. The only fact that you speak English. So another thing that I noticed, some migrants that are living in township like outside of... the city center. They are... they are facing these... involved in accidents, they are injured. You have to call the police or ambulance. But the only fact that if they discover, like they can hear that your accent is not from here or... the fact that you speak only English. They know, like another native language. They will take long to come to you."
(R8, 2017)

One migrant also mentioned the horrific incident that was caught on video of a Mozambican tied to the back of police car.

"Not always, especially when it's black police. There's a lot of crime which police committed like one Mozambican, they kill him. Argument of driving whatsoever, I don't know what started the problem. But they dragged him, on the back, tied his arms and driving. That policeman even now is in prison." (R28, 2017)

Also, some respondents reported that corruption was big in the police department.

"They can keep on doing that, you see? These police need some money; you can bribe them. You can give you something, they clear for you. They close the case. So, they work with these people. You see? When you do a bad thing in Zimbabwe, it's not easy." (R33, 2017)

Good

On the other hand, there are migrants who argued that the police are trying the best they can in protecting citizens. These respondents claimed that even though the police are trying, criminals are not scared of police and they will keep on committing crime.

“Yeah, they do. But you know these people like South Africans they are... very rough people. They don't get scared of police, they fight with police, they will beat them with stones. They don't care. Police will try their best.” (R25, 2017)

Fourteen respondents were able to put a percentage on how much power they thought the police have in stopping xenophobia. The mean of these percentages is 64 percent, so fourteen respondents in this research felt like the police have 64 percent of power to stop xenophobia.

Concluding, the opinions of migrants in this research on the role of the police is not unanimous. While some argue that police are xenophobic, other say that they are trying to help.

6.5.7. South African locals

A phrase that was used quite often and came back with almost every stakeholder, is that no matter what that stakeholder is doing, the locals are ‘taking the law into their own hands’.

“In a country where there is a rule of law, when something happens and you can't apprehend the person that are involved in that, you should take the person to court. Rather than taking the law into your hands. So, in most cases you see people taking the law into their own hands and that is not good.” (R17, 2017)

“I've stayed in so many countries in Africa. This is the only country in Africa where citizens take law into their hands and the government is quiet about it.” (R24, 2017)

Some people felt as if locals have more power than institutions such as police, the government or community leaders.

“Yes, kind of. Because it's freedom can you see? That's why this freedom is too much freedom. If the police, I come from a country where our police is trained properly. Where one

police can control maybe twenty people, one policeman. Twenty people will listen to one. Here, I don't think it will be possible. You see?" (R21, 2017)

"And some don't even get caught, because last year the other xenophobia there was a Zimbabwean guy who we even saw on tv. They showed on tv how he got beaten, beaten, beaten and people are watching until a police car went past and he was crawling and later died a few days in hospital. But you could see that the criminals had more power, the community wanted to help but because the criminals know them, they were scared for their own lives. So they had to just stand and watch. Because most people wanted to help, but failed because these people know where they stay. "They will target our children", so you can see that the criminals, the ones who actually initiate it, have more power over everything that happens. So some people want to protect or help you out, but the moment they know you, you become a target. So most people back away." (R22, 2017)

Seven respondents were able to put a percentage on how much power they thought the locals have in xenophobia. The mean of these percentages is 76 percent, so seven respondents in this research felt like the locals have 76 percent of power in xenophobia.

Concluding, the migrants who mentioned South Africans locals as stakeholders argued that they have a lot of power, sometimes even more than national or regional institutions. The way the migrants talked about the locals portrays a certain aspect of autonomy and freedom for the locals that they have not experienced in any other country before: the freedom to take the law into their own hands.

6.6. Interests & Blame

From the interviews with the migrants, certain interests can be discovered that are connected to the stakeholders. This is displayed in table 7.

Stakeholder	Interest
Media	Represent interest of the owner Relay information
Community township leaders	Look after the community
Foreigners	Survive, make a living

Government	Appear to be not xenophobic Stop crime Appear to not be responsible for failures
King of Zulu	Foreigners to leave
Police	Survive and do their job
Locals	Survive Make things happen for themselves by taking matters into their own hands

Table 7. Stakeholders and their interests identified during interviews

As can be seen from this table, based on the interviews, each and every stakeholder is interested in itself; its own survival. The same can be deduced from the stakeholder's interests from the discourse analysis. The media is relaying information, but it depends on who owns that particular medium on what information is relayed. The community leaders are trying to look after the community, either by protecting foreigners because they are contributing to the community or by attacking foreigners because they are taking over business. The foreigners are trying to survive and make a living by setting up businesses. The government is trying to stop crime, but is very much focused on appearances; trying to deny responsibility for xenophobia and its failures after the end of apartheid. The Zulu king is very straightforward: according to migrants, he just wants foreigners to leave. The police are trying to do their jobs, but are also careful in doing so because they want to stay alive. Finally, the locals also just want to survive, and since nobody is helping them, they are making things happen for themselves.

Thirty-three respondents were able to blame a certain stakeholder or more. Table 8 shows the stakeholders and the number of respondents that blame them.

Stakeholders	Number of people who blame them	Percentage of total
Community leaders	1	3%
Foreigners	3	9%
Government	15	45%
King of Zulu	1	3%

Local South Africans	16	48%
Police	3	9%
Blame more than 1	8	24%

Table 8. Stakeholders identified during interviews and the number of respondents that blame them

As can be deduced from this table, the local South Africans are blamed the most for xenophobia, followed closely by the government. The difference is one respondent (3 percent).

6.7. Respondent comparison

In this research, a lot of different types of respondents were included. Different countries of origin within the African continent, difference in education level and how long they had been in South Africa. In this sub-chapter, it will be discussed whether these factors had an influence on who they blamed for xenophobia.

Starting with country of origin. Interviews were held with migrants from twelve African countries. A comparison was made between all respondents from the same country whether they blamed the same stakeholder or not. This was not the case; there was no relationship between the country of origin and the stakeholder that was blamed for xenophobia.

The next factor is education level. In this research, it has been split up into: college/university, high school, primary school, PhD and unassigned. Unassigned meaning that the respondent did not talk about it. It is noticeable in this category that most people with higher education (college/university and PhD) chose the government as their main stakeholder (69 percent). Migrants with education from high school and primary school, however, mostly chose the local South Africans as the one to blame (62,5 percent). Migrants in the category of ‘unassigned’ mostly chose the local South Africans as the ones to blame as well (87,5 percent). It is unfortunate that a lot of migrants were in the ‘unassigned’ category, because there seems to be a pattern arising here. It seems as though the people who have enjoyed higher education, such as college or university were more inclined to blame the government, while migrants with lower education levels were more likely to choose the local South Africans. This could have to do with critical thinking: a lot of highly educated migrants that

were spoken with, were often talking about something they had read or heard on the news. They often showed newspaper articles and were able to critically think about those articles. Critical thinking is a skill that is usually trained in college or university (Wals & Jickling, 2002). It may be that people with higher education levels were more able to question the information that was presented to them than migrants with lower education levels. In that sense, they could perhaps think a bit 'deeper' in terms of who was to blame. The most obvious answer is to blame local South Africans, as they are the ones who are attacking foreigners. However, people with higher education seem to think beyond the obvious and take into account the political situation as well.

Lastly, the factor of how long the migrants have been living in South Africa and who they blamed. There seems to be a connection here as well. Migrants who had been in South Africa less than 10 years were more inclined to blame the local South Africans (56 percent). However, those who were living in South Africa for longer than 10 years were more inclined to blame the government (69 percent). This could be due to the fact that the people who lived there longer, have experienced it more or read about it more. Also, they could have had experience with the 2008 attacks and formed an opinion based on how the government dealt with that.

6.8. Chapter summary

In this chapter, the views, ideas and stories of African migrants dealing with xenophobia in Cape Town have been explored. The five Ws have been discussed through the perspectives of these migrants. From the stories that were told can be concluded that xenophobia can involve physical violence, verbal harassment or behavioral prejudice.

There are many reasons for xenophobia according to migrants. The reason that was mentioned most was that foreigners are supposedly stealing the jobs of locals. Other reasons that were touched upon are the apartheid legacy, corruption, lack of education and the grants that the government gives South Africans.

For a timeline of xenophobia, migrants put xenophobia in a perspective from 2008 until now, with yearly outbreaks of violence.

Concerning the spatiality of xenophobia, migrants argued that the worst xenophobia happens in Johannesburg, Durban, Pretoria and the townships in Cape Town such as Khayelitsha and Nyanga.

The role of media, community township leaders, foreigners, the government, the King of Zulu, the police and South African locals have been discussed. The interests of these stakeholders were also identified based on the interviews with the migrants. It revealed that each and every stakeholder is only interested in the well-being of themselves. It is not a surprise that this would lead to clashes. People's interests differ as people's position's differ. If for instance the government would make sure that they were going to take care of communities, foreigners, the police and locals, each stakeholders' interest would shift. However, because everybody is so busy saving their own 'species', nobody looks out for each other anymore and the 'other' is just standing in the way of what they want.

There was no unanimous opinion of the migrants in this research on who has the most power and who is to blame most in xenophobia. For the most power, the government was chosen with a mean of 80 percent. However, migrants blamed the locals the most for xenophobia with a mean of 48 percent (the government is a close second, with only one respondent less: a three percent difference).

This outcome was suspected: there is no unanimous migrant perspective. Every migrant has experienced different events under different circumstances. Perhaps one migrant had experienced a case where the police was very helpful, while another had bad luck and was not helped at all. It is noticeable though that in both the power and the blame question, the locals and the government were number one and two interchangeably. This could indicate that even though there was not one perspective, the stories do seem to point towards these stakeholders as being the biggest (and perhaps baddest).

Chapter 7. Conclusion

In this chapter a comparison will be made concerning the five Ws through literature, the discourse analysis and the thematic content analysis. The research questions of this paper were:

1. What are the perspectives of newspaper articles on the five Ws of xenophobia in Cape Town?
2. What are the migrants' perspectives on the five Ws of xenophobia in Cape Town?
3. How can possible differences in and between these perspectives be explained?

The answers of these questions are concluded in the next five sub-chapters, intertwining the five Ws of the discourse analysis with the thematic content analysis and literature.

7.1. What

According to literature, what has been happening and is still happening in South Africa can be called 'xenophobia'. Xenophobia can take multiple shapes: verbal, physical and behavioral prejudice. This is in line with what the respondents reported in the interviews. Stories were told of verbal abuse, physical abuse and prejudice towards foreigners. In the discourse analysis however, there was less clarity. Some authors argued that the events are to be called 'xenophobic' and that this is something to be condemned. Other authors did not use the word 'xenophobia', but instead used 'crime' or likewise words; in that sense creating a discourse that what is happening can be labelled as crime instead of xenophobia. It was noticeable that the more global the newspaper, the more outspoken the authors were in condemning xenophobia. Perhaps authors from more local or regional newspapers felt less comfortable in openly defying the government or their fellow South Africans than authors with a bit more distance from the country or subject.

7.2. Why

Through the three different channels of information gathered in this study, there was a consensus on the question of 'why'. While newspaper articles mostly pointed at the idea that foreigners are stealing jobs, literature and migrant interviews revealed more deep-seated reasons. The legacy of apartheid was mentioned, with South Africans feeling marginalized during this period and now inflicting that pain on foreigners as some kind of revenge. Often, fingers were also pointed towards the failure of the government to fulfill its promises after the

end of apartheid, leading to frustration and anger within South African communities. Especially the literature on xenophobia was focused very much on the failure of the government to create an inclusive state and notion of citizenship. Corruption was also a point of frustration for a lot of migrants; they argued that it was in every layer of the system and often resulted in prejudice and abuse of foreigners. One thing that was only mentioned by migrants and not in the literature or newspaper articles was that South Africans do not learn to be self-sustaining. This as a result of the post-apartheid government which provides its citizens with grants and houses, while foreigners have learned to work hard in order to sustain their lives. South Africans are often called 'lazy', as they have not learned to work for what they get. The last point that migrants made was that it is often a lack of education which leads to South Africans attacking foreigners. Arguments were made that foreigners are everywhere, and that they are good for the economy. Not having the right information can lead to a misjudging of a certain (minority) group and can have severe repercussions.

7.3. When

In this part of the context of xenophobia, an interesting difference can be observed between literature, newspaper articles and migrant interviews. Both newspaper articles and interviews with migrants revealed that xenophobia started in 2008 and has not ended yet. However, literature argued that there have been xenophobic sentiments in South Africa ever since the end of apartheid in 1994. This is an interesting difference. It is no surprise that the media only really picked up xenophobia from 2008, seeing as that is when the biggest attack happened. According to literature, some events happened before 2008, but they were quite small compared to the attack of 2008. Seeing as media is looking for sensation and drama, it does not come as a surprise that it started covering the topic of xenophobia more from 2008 onwards. However, the migrants corroborate that same temporality: 69 percent of the respondents who discussed temporality spoke about the 2008 attacks. Only one migrant spoke about an event that happened before 2008. This could be linked to the fact that it had not been covered in the media as much as after 2008; how else are people supposed to know about these events? If the media does not cover that news very often, then the people on the ground do not receive that information. These discourses of temporality can therefore be linked to one another. It is a surprise though, that academia was aware of these xenophobic sentiments that started before 2008. This could be due to the fact that some organizations such as the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) published reports on the xenophobic sentiments

post-apartheid. While the general public perhaps did not access this information, academia did.

7.4. Where

For the question of ‘where’, there was also a consensus between the literature, the newspaper articles reviewed and the migrants’ interviews. The xenophobic violence mostly centers around the biggest cities in South Africa, with a special focus on the Eastern Cape. Cities such as Johannesburg, Durban and Pretoria are hit the worst, and usually the violence spreads to other cities such as Cape Town. While there have been some instances of xenophobic violence in the city center of Cape Town, most information referred to the townships as the haven of xenophobia. This was supported by literature, the newspaper articles analyzed and the stories of the migrants that were interviewed. Especially Khayelitsha was named quite often as a dangerous place for migrants in Cape Town.

7.5. Who

There seems to be some overlap but no consensus for the question of ‘who’ concerning xenophobia. Literature mostly referred to the government as the main actor in this social phenomenon. By creating an exclusionary notion of citizenship, by failing to fulfill promises made post-apartheid, by scapegoating migrants and by denying the very existence of xenophobia, the government is – according to literature - the key stakeholder in xenophobia in South Africa. From the discourse analysis it was much harder to make any conclusion on who the authors viewed as the most prominent stakeholder. The only way of analyzing was by counting the number of articles that mentioned a specific stakeholder. The government and the police were tied in first place. Even though no real conclusion can be drawn from this count, it does give an indication of what stakeholder is covered most in these newspaper articles concerning xenophobia. Finally, the migrants also identified quite a lot of stakeholders. Opinions varied widely, ranging from blaming the police, to the government, to locals etc. However, in the questions of who had the most power and who was to blame for xenophobia, the locals and the government came in first and second place interchangeably. Migrants thought that the government had 80 percent of power in xenophobia and the locals were blamed three percent more than the government.

As interests of these stakeholders were revealed during the interviews, it was remarkable to see that not one stakeholder had another stakeholder's interests at heart too. They were only focused on their own survival and this inevitably leads to clashes with how the other stakeholder survives.

There is no unanimity on who is the most powerful stakeholder or who is to blame for xenophobia. It is remarkable however, that from all three perspectives, the government was named as being one of the most prominent stakeholders. Literature, the newspaper articles and the migrants all mentioned the important role of the government. It is the stakeholder that was mentioned the most by all three sources of information. Even though no definite conclusion can be drawn, it does point in a certain direction.

Two final findings were that migrants with higher education usually blamed the government more, while migrants with lower education levels were more inclined to blame the local South Africans. This could be tied to critical thinking, which is usually stimulated during the pursuit of higher education. The second finding was that migrants who had lived in South Africa for more than 10 years were more likely to blame the government, while migrants who had lived in South Africa for less than 10 years were more inclined to blame the local South Africans.

Chapter 8. Discussion

Firstly, this research was a project that the author was incredibly passionate about. The goal was to give a voice to the people that were underrepresented in a social phenomenon that was targeting them. This is related to a professional bias: as a researcher one always has interests and disinterests (Chambers, 2006). One takes its topic of interest with them into the field. The interviews were about what the researcher wants to know and finds interesting. Seeing as the interviews were semi-structured, there was room for respondents to talk about what they found interesting. However, as interviewer one always has the opportunity to steer a conversation back to what one finds interesting.

Secondly, as was concluded in this paper; most xenophobia in Cape Town takes places in the townships, such as Khayelitsha. However, as a researcher it was impossible to go there and conduct interviews safely. This is called the spatial bias (Chambers, 2006): one can never get an idea of the reality unless one goes there. However, in this case it would have been foolish to go into a township. Attempts have been made, as the author came in contact with government officials via friends and was given the opportunity to go to Bellville with a government vehicle. Bellville is a place with a lot of migrants and therefore the author went there, with a friend and an intern from the Western Cape Government Department. However, it soon became clear that this was incredibly unsafe and soon after arriving, a taxi was taken back into town. Also via a friend, the author was introduced to a place called the Cycle, where migrants from townships such as Khayelitsha came every day to find work. This was perfect, as it was not required to go into a dangerous township, but it did provide the opportunity to speak with migrants who lived in the townships.

Thirdly, the author selected respondents by ‘randomly’ asking people on the street where they were from and asking if they wanted to be interviewed. However, with this purposive sampling method there is always a personal bias involved (Chambers, 2006). Subconsciously, one always makes a decision on who to approach and who not. However, given the response rates of 90 and 80 percent, it is unlikely that this bias is significant.

Fourthly, as said before, the number one goal of this research was to give a voice to marginalized people. This can be seen through the many quotes throughout this thesis. It was about telling the stories of migrants, their personal experiences. They cannot be simplified

into a statement, with an illustrative quote. They deserve to be displayed and read separately. So many migrants have told incredible, heart breaking and shocking stories. They had to be represented in this thesis.

Fifthly, Cape Town is quite a dangerous city. The plan was to go for more than 47 interviewees. However, when the 47th interview was over, the author was attacked with a knife. It was in broad daylight on a market in the city center and it was an attempt at robbery. Even though no harm was done, the author decided to stop interviewing after this incident. It is important to always be aware that even if one is living in a city for quite some time, one is still seen as 'the Western one' which is connected to wealth. South Africa is one of the most unequal countries and poverty is extreme. It is important to never feel too comfortable in a country, as staying alert can prevent harmful outcomes.

However, this research also had some strong points. Starting with the topic itself: it is very poignant, current and important. Xenophobia is happening on a day to day basis and the stories of migrants have not been heard enough. This research gives voice to those who have been hunted for a long time now. Academia so far has not covered this topic from this angle enough and this research contributes to fill that gap.

Besides these reasons, this research has a big amount of data that were collected from the interviews. In this research, 47 individual migrants have been interviewed and focus group discussions have been done with 19 migrants. This totals up to 66 migrants whose opinions have been collected and presented in this thesis. Given the response rates of 90 and 80 percent, the heterogeneous mix of respondents and the fact that saturation took place, it can be argued that the results of this thesis – concerning the interviews – are generalizable to Cape Town. The Thematic Content Analysis transcended the individual discourse but did not replace or invalidate it. That is what science is about: the unique individual phenomenon continues to exist while the commonality takes form in the analysis through data reduction. The analysis can have generic consequences for the collective and not just the individual. Therefore, even though it is hard to generalize qualitative data, this research is an attempt, aimed specifically at Cape Town.

For future research, it is therefore recommended to replicate this research and collect more stories in different regions. It would be interesting to do more research in other parts of the

country, such as Johannesburg, Durban and Pretoria. Also, if there was an opportunity to do so, to look into the situation in the townships. Next, it would also be interesting to focus on just the spatiality of xenophobia. Where exactly does it start and is there a pattern of spreading to other parts of town or even other cities? How does violence spread? It would be interesting to look more in-depth at the spatial context of xenophobia in South Africa. Another option for future research is to create a quantitative survey, perhaps based on the qualitative data presented in this research.

Besides this, the author is hopeful that this situation in South Africa will be picked up by an international media agency, development organization or for instance an organ of the UN that can actually help improve the situation. Seeing as all these stakeholders are involved and they all have different interests, it would be helpful to have an independent third party to help set everything on track so that stakeholders don't have to be selfish anymore. This does tie into the extreme inequality and poverty that many South Africans and foreign nationals are living in. In the state that the country is in now, stakeholders can't afford to be selfless. That is the irony of this horrific situation: the stakeholders' situations would improve if they were more selfless; as interests would then align instead of clash.

The title of this thesis was based on a quote by a respondent concerning xenophobia in Cape Town:

“As if they are hunting animals”

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Appendix A: Pictures



This man had been stabbed with a screw driver. His lung collapsed and he had a large infection which had to be treated with surgery.

This man had been robbed and almost stabbed in the heart. However, he managed to block the knife with his left arm.





This is R15 from Nigeria. He is very well-read and up to speed on what is happening in South Africa currently. He told me a story about his friends' brother being choked to death by police officers. Apparently, the guy had drugs on him. Instead of arresting him and taking him in, police handcuffed him and choked him to death. However, the newspaper article describes the dealer taking his own drugs and dying from it. Bystanders argue that it was the police who killed him. R15 argued that the media are protecting its police officers. The Nigerian government demanded an investigation, as no autopsy found heroin in the victim's body: he had not

swallowed his own drugs.

Photo a bystander took of Tochukwu Nnandi after he was choked to death by police.





R15 had invited me to the memorial service of Nnandi. Friends and family prayed, laughed, danced and sung for him. It was a very uplifting ceremony, as it was about “celebrating his life, not his death” (R15, 2017).

R15 praying for the friends and family of Nnandi.



Appendix B: Discussion Guide

This is the outline that was used to interview African migrants in Cape Town. However, usually questions were added, removed etc. depending on the story of the migrant.

Introductory questions

1. How old are you?
2. Are you studying, working?
 - What are you studying/what is your job?
 - How often do you work/study?

Opening questions

3. Where are you from?
4. What was your situation there?
5. What did you do there? Work, study?
6. What did your life look like back then?
7. Why did you move?

Present

8. Did your situation improve?
9. Why / what part?
10. What does your life look like now?
11. Is it difficult being a migrant here?
12. Which parts are difficult?
13. How do locals react to you – being a migrant?
14. Have you heard of the xenophobic attacks that happened in Cape Town?
15. What do you think about that?
16. Why do you think stuff like that happens?
17. How do you feel about that?

18. Have you ever experienced xenophobia? That could also be a joke or remark for instance.

No:

19. So no local has ever made a comment or joke about you not being South African?

20. Do you know any people that have had xenophobic experiences?

Stakeholders:

21. Can you name all parties involved for me? Who do you think are involved, that could be any institution, person, whatever you feel.

22. And what about ... the ones missing.

23. And what would they want? What is their interest or goal in xenophobia?

- Go through each one, what is their goal.

24. Okay, I'm going to name a few actors and I want you to say how much power you think they have in xenophobia. You can pick a number between 0 and 10, 0 being no power and 10 being all the power. Do you understand?

- Government
- Police
- Local community leaders
- South African individuals
- Foreigners
- Media
- Foreigners

25. Can you explain? In what way do they have power? What do they do? Can you give me some examples?

- Go through each one.

26. If you had to choose one actor, who would you hold most responsible or accountable? Who do you blame the most

27. What do you think could be a solution to this xenophobia?

Appendix C: Table of Newspaper Articles used for the Discourse Analysis

Number	Headline	Author and date	Source
1	South African police use force to disperse anti-immigration protesters	“The Guardian”, 2017	The Guardian
2	South Africa’s xenophobic attacks: are migrants really stealing jobs?	Wilkinson, 2017	The Guardian
3	Xenophobia in South Africa: ‘They beat my husband with sticks and took everything’	Smith, 2015	The Guardian
4	Xenophobic violence in South Africa leaves at least five dead	“The Guardian”, 2015	The Guardian
5	South Africa sends army to stop xenophobic attacks	Reuters, 2015	The Guardian
6	South African sends in army after xenophobic violence leaves seven dead	Smith, 2015	The Guardian
7	Johannesburg’s foreign shop owners close up early amid threats of violence	Smith, 2015	The Guardian
8	Eight South African police arrested over death of man dragged behind van	Clayton, 2013	The Guardian
9	Khayelitsha CPF condemns xenophobic violence in Tshwane	de Kock, 2017	Eyewitness News
10	At least 15 Somali nationals killed in CT over last two months	Mortlock, 2017	Eyewitness News
11	Crime, feuds incorrectly called xenophobia attacks – Zuma	Bateman, 2017	Eyewitness News
12	Zuma: I doubt South Africans are xenophobic	Sekhoto, 2017	Eyewitness News
13	Xenophobia a convenient scapegoat for Rosettenville and Mamelodi	Whittles, 2017	Mail & Guardian
14	Inequality and poverty drive xenophobia	Ratlebjane, 2016	Mail & Guardian
15	Xenophobia starts ‘at the top’	Hunter, 2015	Mail & Guardian
16	SA faces continent’s wrath as xenophobia rears its head again	Cohen & van Vuuren, 2017	Mail & Guardian
17	Baby born at train station after 3 hospitals turns mom away	Waters, 2017	Daily Voice
18	Get out or lose everything	Lepule, 2016	Daily Voice
19	Mbalula’s “Zim soldiers”	Maromo, 2017	Daily Voice

	remarks spark diplomatic row		
20	Zuma's refugee warning	Moatshe, 2017	Daily Voice
21	DA to report Mbalula to SAHRC over Zimbabwean soldier comments	Raborife, 2017	News 24
22	Joburg can't be safe haven for local or foreign criminals - Mashaba	Petersen, 2017	News 24
23	Man torched to death in possible xenophobic attack	Sisulu, 2017	News 24
24	Police can't do it all – KZN Premier Mchunu	Mngadi, 2017	News 24
25	South Africans fed up with crime, not xenophobic – Zuma	Tandwa& Etheridge, 2017	News 24
26	South Africans are not xenophobic – Gigaba	Tandwa, 2017	News 24
27	Xenophobia fears: 'Fewer African students enrolling at SA universities'	du Plessis, 2017	News 24