
The Remote History of Remote Warfare

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ABSTRACT

The discovery of remote warfare in the War on Terror has resulted in an influx of research within the field of conflict studies. In short, remote warfare differs from conventional warfare because of its physical and moral remoteness from the actual violence. Despite the fact that remote warfare was discovered in the War on Terror, this does not mean that it is solely a contemporary phenomenon. To substantiate this claim, this study compares a case study prior to the War on Terror to the timeless aspects of remote warfare. The fact that the American intervention in the Chilean election and its violent aftermath in the early 1970s cannot be excluded from the definition of remote warfare, attests to the belief that remote warfare is not solely a contemporary phenomenon. This observation led this study to the question as to why conflict analysts indicated remote warfare to be a result of the War on Terror in the first place. Current studies argue three different causes namely (1) the new type of enemy that the United States faced during this war, (2) the unpopularity of this war, and (3) the giant leap in scientific innovation in remote weaponry that was made during this war. However, this study argues that these three supposed timebound causes are not specific to this era. In fact, this combination of societal circumstances also existed during the Vietnam war. Consequently, both the timeless and the timebound aspects of the current understanding of remote warfare are not sufficient to deem this military tactic to be solely contemporary. This revelation has grave consequences for the field of conflict studies. Besides the academic purpose of this field, conflict analysts also operate outside of the academic world. This is especially the case when they scrutinise the ethical challenges of remote warfare in contemporary conflicts. This study aims to add to this crucial exploration by urging conflict analysts to include historical conflicts in their research. This addition will deepen their grasp of this phenomenon and will increase their ability to hold our governments accountable for the actual costs of war.

Keywords: Remote Warfare – Conflict Studies – American Contemporary Warfare – the Cold War

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INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Unrelenting Evolution of Warfare

Humankind learns from war, but never from its consequences. The first recorded violent conflict in history occurred in 1469 B.C.E. in Megiddo, Palestine.¹ And despite the fact that we have not seen the last war as a result, humankind has learned from it in other ways. Defeat in war is put simply the greatest incentive for military innovation, thus creating an eternal arms race.²

The bronze weapons of the Mesopotamians and Egyptians in the antiquity, for example, turned into iron, due to its increased efficiency and durability. To combat these superior tools, projectile weapons such as the bow and arrow, slings, and spear-throwers were perfected. And starting in the second millennium B.C.E. the newly created chariot triumphed over the battlefield.³ With the change in weaponry, new strategies emerged. In the eighth century B.C.E. siege craft entered the world stage, an art mastered in particular by the Assyrians. Later, the Phoenicians expanded the number of possible battlefields when they took war to the seas with their galleys.⁴

As time went on, the public also got more involved in warfare. With the French Revolution, armies diverted from solely including mercenary troops. Mass conscription was installed instead, to assemble a bigger – and more importantly – cheaper

¹Gerard Chaliand, David Woods, and R. Bin Wong, *A Global History of War : From Assyria to the Twenty-First Century* (Oakland 2014), 10.

²Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., 'Recovery from Defeat : The U.S. Army and Vietnam', in George J. Andreopoulos and Harold E. Selesky (eds.) *The Aftermath of Defeat: Societies, Armed Forces, and the Challenge of Recovery* (New Haven 1994) 124-142, 124.

³Gerard Chaliand, *A Global History of War*, 10.

⁴Ibid., 11.

army.⁵ And during World War I, the public was unable to avoid the horrors of war as they got dragged into the battle by an ambush of propaganda.⁶ World War II went even further in terms of public involvement, as it became a war with a frightening number of civilian casualties.⁷

After the resolution of the gruesome World War II, humankind reacted again to violence by innovating with the aim to inflict even more violence themselves. The introduction of nuclear weapons prevented the breakout of conflicts between major powers. Yet, instead of annihilating war altogether, their battles travelled to other parts of the globe, such as Vietnam, and Korea.⁸

And even today the global arms race of humankind still continues. The War on Terror was ignited by the attack on the twin towers on 9/11, 2001. Ever since, the United States has invaded multiple countries in the Middle East and Central Asia in retaliation. According to conflict analysts, this war was again accompanied by a “newness” into its military strategies – most commonly referred to as “remote warfare”. This new strategy was the result of the American ambition to fight wars from both a physical and a moral distance.

In this study, however, I will argue that remote warfare is not solely a contemporary phenomenon. To substantiate this claim I will bring forward a case study from the Cold War, which exhibits the same tactics and intentions as this supposedly new strategy of remote warfare.

1.2 The Historiography of Remote Warfare

Ever since this discovery was made, conflict analysts have been tripping over themselves to define and explain this new strategy, and a coining contest began.⁹ Despite the fact that research into this new discovery resulted in a wide range in terminology to describe the same thing, the actual observations on the strategy are not far apart.

⁵Ibid., 13.

⁶Ibid., 14.

⁷William L. O’Neill, *World War II : A Student Companion* (New York 1999), 7.

⁸Gerard Chaliand, *A Global History of War*, 16.

⁹Jolle Demmers, Lauren Gould, ‘An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare: AFRICOM and the ‘Hunt’ for Joseph Kony’, *Security Dialogue* 49 (2018) 5, 364-381, 365.

Demmers' and Gould's "liquid" warfare depicts this newness as warfare that consists of "flexible, open-ended, 'pop-up' military interventions, supported by remote technology and [that is] reliant on local partnerships and private contractors".¹⁰ "Vicarious warfare", the brainchild of Waldman, presents that this newness is contributed to a new way of approaching war in which the American army chooses the "tactical manifestation of seeking to fight war without the people, without political or legal consequence, and on an indefinite basis".¹¹ Lastly, and most commonly used to describe this newness, Watts and Biegon define "remote warfare" as a "strategy of countering threats at a distance, without the deployment of large military forces" and which "involves a combination of drone strikes and air strikes from above, knitted together by the deployment of special forces, intelligence operatives, private contractors, and military training teams on the ground".¹²

For the remainder of this study, I will use the term "remote warfare" to discuss this discovery of the military strategy designed to fight wars from both a physical and a moral distance. I have chosen this term, because of its prevalence in the works of important studies by influential researchers such as the Oxford Research Group.¹³

As mentioned before, despite this range in terminology, the observations of these different researchers are astoundingly similar. I have noticed three recurring themes. I interpret these themes as the core ideas of the current paradigm on remote warfare. I, furthermore, have divided these core ideas into "timebound" and "timeless" aspects of remote warfare. The "timebound" aspects are the supposed causes of remote warfare, which currently ground this type of warfare firmly in the War on Terror. The "timeless" aspects, on the other hand, are not time specific. These aspects are descriptive and define the characteristics of this warfare strategy.

The first core idea of remote warfare consists of its timebound causes, which are attributed to the War on Terror. Allegedly, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (among others) have prompted the United States army to drastically change its strategies

¹⁰Jolle Demmers, Lauren Gould, 'An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare', 364, 366.

¹¹Thomas Waldman, 'Vicarious Warfare: The Counterproductive Consequences of Modern American Military Practice', *Contemporary Security Policy* 39 (2018) 2, 181-205, 188.

¹²Tom Watts, Rubrick Biegon, 'Defining Remote Warfare: Security Cooperation' (November 2017) *Remote Control: Briefing number 1* (Oxford Research Group), 1.

¹³Oxford Research Group, 'Oxford Research Group Annual Report 2018', 4. <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=b40bd033-be8c-4598-b275-80a8389323a0>

for a multitude of reasons.¹⁴ These reasons are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.2.

The second and third core ideas are not related to the causes of remote warfare but rather to its inherent characteristics. In the second core idea current studies agree that risk-aversion tactics are an important aspect of contemporary warfare. These “risks” consist of all the possible financial and moral costs of warfare both domestically and abroad. An important risk to note is the support of the public for war. Public support may waver due to domestic casualties, especially when these were in vain.¹⁵ As a result of this risk-averse attitude, conflict analysts claim that the United States army chooses for “light-footprint” operations in contemporary wars, with the deployment of small special troops, local forces, private contractors, and remote weaponry, as opposed to the old “boots on the ground” approach.¹⁶

The final core idea of remote warfare highlights the lack of transparency which accompanies this supposedly new American warfare tactic. Battles are conducted in secret in order to have plausible deniability if things go awry. This has two major problematic outcomes. First, due to the secretive nature surrounding remote warfare the public is unable to hold their governments accountable for their actions abroad. Secondly, because of the fact that the costs of war are deflected upon others in remote warfare, the immediate costs are unknown to the public, thus normalizing violence.¹⁷ These ethical consequences of remote warfare are scrutinised by many, such as Airwars, and The Intimacies of Remote Warfare Programme, but not much progress has been made into lasting change.¹⁸

¹⁴Jolle Demmers, Lauren Gould, ‘An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare’, 365.

¹⁵Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Aaron Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War : American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts* (Princeton 2009), 25.

¹⁶Jolle Demmers, Lauren Gould, ‘An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare’, 366. : Thomas Waldman, ‘Vicarious Warfare’, 188. : Tom Watts, Rubrick Biegon, ‘Defining Remote Warfare’, 1.

¹⁷Jolle Demmers, Lauren Gould, ‘An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare’, 365.

¹⁸More information about the goals and methods of Airwars and The Intimacies of Remote Warfare Project can be found on their websites.

<https://airwars.org> : <https://intimacies-of-remote-warfare.nl>

1.3 Remote Warfare in the Cold War

This study aims to shift the current paradigm on remote warfare as to the belief that remote warfare is solely a contemporary phenomenon. To justify this claim, this study will analyse an American covert operation from the Cold War which shares all of the timeless aspects of the now assumed purely contemporary tactics of remote warfare.

Covert operations were mainly used during the Cold War to secretly overthrow a hostile regime. The United States used this tactic a staggering 64 times, of which 6 were aimed at democratically chosen governments.¹⁹ The United States leadership resorted to this kind of operations due to its low military, economic and overall reputational costs. The latter was achieved by the ability of covert operations to “[deflect] blame onto others” because of its design in which “domestic opposition forces in the target state [took] on the heavy lifting [...] as well as the blame if the operation [failed]”.²⁰ In essence, covert operations were created as a new means of risk-averse intervention which secured plausible deniability if things turned sour on the battlefield.

The covert operations of the Cold War thus resemble the timeless aspects of the tactics of remote warfare as defined by current studies. This study is not the first to identify this striking resemblance. However, it is the first to consider this resemblance important. Waldman, for example, dismisses this similarity because “[the cold war tactics] emerged in very different strategic contexts and were focused on technological and geometrical, as opposed to human and social manifestations of distance”, and never returns to the subject.²¹

The fact that current studies of remote warfare do not consider its history sufficiently, results in gaps within our understanding of the subject and could create wrong perceptions and misguided solutions for the ethical challenges of remote warfare in contemporary warfare.

¹⁹Lindsey A. O’Rourke, *Covert Regime Change : America’s Secret Cold War* (Ithaca 2018), 2, 7.

²⁰Lindsey A. O’Rourke, *Covert Regime Change*, 8.

²¹Thomas Waldman, ‘Vicarious Warfare’, 2, 184.

1.4 Method

To fill these gaps in current research, I will examine a covert operation from the Cold War as a case study, and compare it with the timeless aspects of remote warfare. If indeed, this case study cannot be distinguished from contemporary examples of remote warfare, we would have to consider it *not* to be a solely contemporary phenomenon.

In Chapter 2 I analyse the different existing theories on remote warfare and I will create a new timeless definition, which combines already agreed upon research. If the timebound criterion is indeed correct, this timeless definition of remote warfare should only result in contemporary case studies being identified as examples of remote warfare.

In Chapter 3 I test this theory in practice. The covert operation from the Cold War is introduced and compared to the composed timeless definition of Chapter 2. The case study in question is the secret intervention of the Nixon administration in the Chilean election and its violent aftermath during the early 1970s. This chapter illustrates that the chosen case study from the Cold War indeed shows symptoms of the tactics of remote warfare, even though this should not be possible.

In Chapter 4 I bring forward three primary sources which prove that the symptoms of remote warfare, claimed in the previous chapter, are not just a coincidence. In addition these sources confirm that the leadership of the United States actually had the intentions of remote warfare during their intervention in Chile. The primary sources consist of three recently disclosed classified documents from the Nixon administration. In these documents, correspondence between President Nixon, National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, William Rogers, and CIA Deputy Director of Plans, Thomas Karamessines, are logged. In this correspondence it is explicitly stated that the United States leadership insists on a covert operation in Chile with risk-averse tactics and a lack of transparency to hide their own involvement and thus avoid backfire if things go awry. These decisions are in line with the timeless aspects of remote warfare, and thus these supposed timeless aspects are not specific enough to conclude that the tactics of remote warfare are solely contemporary.

In Chapter 5 I focuss on the supposed timebound causes of remote warfare in current studies. Again, a lack of specificity creates problems for the claim of contemporality. This deficiency is proved by transposing these supposed timebound causes from the War on Terror to the Vietnam war. The result of this is, that the exact causes that should ground the theory of remote warfare in the War on Terror, can also be easily applied to the Vietnam war. This historical example solidifies the assumption that these supposed timebound aspects are in fact not sustainable.

To sum up, the aim of this study is to shift the paradigm of studies on remote warfare by stating that both the timeless and timebound aspects are not specific enough to conclude that remote warfare is indeed a solely contemporary phenomenon.

In the conclusion of this study I will reflect on the consequences of this paradigm shift. My intention with this study - as a part of the Humanities Honours Programme - is to enhance future research on remote warfare with historical knowledge to combat its ethical challenges of today.

2 | THE REMOTE DEFINITION OF REMOTE WARFARE

2.1 The Three Core Ideas of Remote Warfare

As mentioned in the introduction, a copious amount of conflict analysts have studied contemporary American warfare and have concluded that there was a change in tactics during the War on Terror. This chapter is based on the current (mostly overlapping) theories about remote warfare from the works of Demmers and Gould, Biegon and Watts, and Waldman.

The goal of this chapter is to combine their research into a timeless definition of remote warfare, and subsequently test if this definition is indeed time specific to the War on Terror. This hypothesis is tested in Chapters 3 and 4.

Before this study turns to a timeless definition of remote warfare, however, this chapter first analyses the current time specific definition of remote warfare. This definition is based upon the three core ideas that reoccur in the different works on remote warfare. These three core ideas are explained and substantiated by a contemporary case study: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

OIF launched on March 19, 2003, with a clear objective: to cleanse Iraq from its weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein's regime, and replace the latter with a democratic government.¹ OIF was part of the American War on Terror as a retaliation of the 9/11 attacks despite the fact that the 9/11 Commission, the CIA, and even the president himself, eventually admitted that there was no

¹Perry, Walter L., Richard E. Darilek, et al., 'Introduction', in: Walter L. Perry et al. (eds.), *Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Decisive War, Elusive Peace* (Santa Monica 2015) 1. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/10.7249/j.ctt19w72gs.9>

credible evidence linking Saddam Hussein and his regime to the 9/11 attacks.² This contemporary example fits perfectly with the current beliefs on remote warfare and is thus an excellent case study to illustrate the current paradigm on remote warfare.

2.2 The Origin of Remote Warfare

The first commonly held core idea of remote warfare is its origin and is thus time-bound. Across the board, studies indicate the War on Terror to be the first set of wars in which the tactics of remote warfare were used.³ Despite the fact that these studies are all in accordance with this, they do indicate different causes for its emergence. Three leading arguments for this belief are discussed below.

2.2.1 Facing a New Type of Enemy

The War on Terror was a peculiar war for the United States army, because of the fact that its enemy was not another conventional army. It rather, consisted of a loose set of terrorists which operated through shadowy networks and cells across different borders in the Middle East, and Central Asia. The United States was incapable of adapting quickly enough on the battlefield with its conventional way of fighting against such a fluid enemy. This is why some scholars argue that the United States altered its warfare strategy during the War on Terror. The United States army simply learnt from its enemy and even mimicked its opponent's fluid structure through smaller and – most importantly – more mobile operations.⁴

OIF was one of these wars where the United States was confronted with terroristic strategies. Especially after the rather disappointing parliamentary elections of January 2005, terrorist attacks against both the American troops and the Iraqi people mounted.⁵

²David Holloway, *9/11 and the War on Terror* (Edinburgh 2008), 5-6.

³Jolle Demmers, Lauren Gould, 'An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare', 365 : Thomas Waldman, 'Vicarious Warfare', 185 : Tom Watts, Rubrick Biegon, 'Defining Remote Warfare', 1.

⁴Jolle Demmers, Lauren Gould, 'An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare', 365.

⁵Christopher Gelpi, *Paying the Human Costs of War*, 54-55.

2.2.2 An Unpopular War

The second possible cause of remote warfare during the War on Terror – according to scholars – is the unpopularity of this war amongst the public.⁶ The great number of American casualties in combination with a lack of progress, terribly upset the public at home.⁷ This negative perception of the War on Terror resulted in overall war fatigue in the United States. In order to not completely lose the public’s backing of the war, the United States army desperately needed to decrease its number of casualties, without actually pulling back all of its troops in defeat. This is why they resorted to a new risk-averse strategy commonly associated with remote warfare according to scholars on the subject.⁸ Defence Secretary, Roberts Gates remarked something along the same lines: “[a]rguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves”.⁹ More details on the risk-averse aspect of remote warfare are discussed in Chapter 2.3.

OIF was one of the wars that resulted in war-challenging public outrage.¹⁰ In the span of three years the presidential approval rating dropped from 70 to a meager 35 percent (Figure 5.2 on page 38). The combination of the heavy number of American casualties with rather unsuccessful outcomes, culminated in the American public’s unwillingness to sacrifice its army personnel.¹¹

2.2.3 Innovations in Remote Weaponry

The final supposed cause of remote warfare in the War on Terror were the new advancements in technology, which made it possible for the United States army to let its valuable personnel remain at a distance from danger. The first targeted killing with a drone, for example, took place on October 7, 2001.¹²

⁶Jolle Demmers, Lauren Gould, ‘An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare’, 365.

⁷Christopher Gelpi, *Paying the Human Costs of War*, 54-56.

⁸Jolle Demmers, Lauren Gould, ‘An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare’, 365.

⁹Tom Watts, Rubrick Biegon, ‘Defining Remote Warfare’, 1.

¹⁰Jolle Demmers, Lauren Gould, ‘An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare’, 365.


¹¹Christopher Gelpi, *Paying the Human Costs of War*, 54-56.

¹²James I. Walsh, Marcus Schulzke, *Drones and Support for the Use of Force* (Ann Arbor 2018), 12.

Afterwards, the United States' investment in Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) surged. Figure 2.1 shows the yearly budget of the United States for UAS from 1988 up to 2013. This figure clearly shows the exponential growth of investments during the War on Terror on remote weaponry.¹³

Operation Iraqi Freedom, which started in 2003 and only came to a conclusion in 2011, was part of the American War on Terror. This means that these major investments in UAS during these years also effected this war.

Figure 2.1: U.S. Yearly Budget on Unmanned Aerial Systems, 1988-2013.



2.3 Risk-Aversion Tactics

The second core idea of remote warfare is the prevalent use of risk-aversion tactics. Waldman, a conflict analyst who focusses his studies on contemporary warfare, recognises two types of risk-aversion tactics: “danger-proofing”, and “delegation”. Despite the fact that these two combat the same problem, namely the unpopularity of domestic casualties abroad, they propose different solutions.

¹³Jeremiah Gertler, ‘US Unmanned Aerial Systems’, in: Erik Rudaski (ed.), *Drone Strikes : Effectiveness, Consequences and Unmanned Aerial Systems Background* (New York 2014) 45-110, 61.

2.3.1 Danger-proofing

The tactics of “danger-proofing” are all about preventing public backlash over domestic casualties of warfare. The United States especially has developed a “force protection fetish” over the years. Instead of fighting the enemy directly on the battlefield, the United States army regularly opts to react by airpower and stand-off weapons from a distance. The usage of remote weaponry gives the army the option to keep its valuable personnel far away from hostile areas and its potential risks.¹⁴ Danger-proofing an operation has a great impact on public support of a mission as is visible in figure 2.2. This data shows that the public opinion is only favourable of military actions by 50 percent or more when United States army personnel are not in danger themselves.¹⁵

Figure 2.2: Public Attitudes Toward Military Action Against the Islamic State.

	Favor	Oppose	Don't know/ No answer
Air strikes in Iraq	71	21	8
Air strikes in Syria	69	21	9
Military advisors to Iraq	66	29	6
Train and equip Rebels	48	40	11
US ground troops	39	55	6
Drone strikes	56	38	6
Manned aircraft	43	51	6

Danger-proofing OIF was a high priority from the beginning. On March 21, 2003, two days after the initial invasion of Iraq, the United States and its allies launched an extensive bombing campaign named “shock and awe”. This massive air assault was designed to shorten the war by scaring the enemy into surrendering, before ever having to put valuable army personnel in danger. The “shock and awe” campaign was not the last use of remote weaponry in OIF. Over the entire course of the war, a total of 30.000 coalition bombs and missiles were dropped on strategic targets without risking any army personnel from the United States army and its allies.¹⁶

¹⁴Thomas Waldman, ‘Vicarious Warfare’, 189.

¹⁵James I. Walsh, *Drones and Support for the Use of Force*, 22.

¹⁶Laurie Collier, Julie Carnagie, ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom, March 2003’, *War in the Persian Gulf Reference Library*, (2004) Vol. 1: Almanac, 119-133,120, 126.

2.3.2 Delegation

The results of the tactics of “delegation” are similar in their outcome but have a different accent. “Delegation” within remote warfare is all about “shifting the burden of risk and responsibility onto others” and by doing so “externalizing the burden of war”.¹⁷

Sometimes it is impossible for an army to operate through remote weaponry to avoid the consequences of war. However, delegation provides another solution. The benefit of delegation is the concealment of the actual financial and/or moral costs of war from the public by transferring them to local forces, private contractors, and militias. This way, the public has no clear image of the costs of war. Furthermore, these tactics desensitize the public from wars fought far-away, because they are never confronted with its casualties or horror stories, such as the use of inhuman strategies carried out in their name.¹⁸

Besides the tactics of danger-proofing, the tactics of delegation were also used profusely in OIF. During this war the United States operated through an extensive number of private contractors in the region. Over the course of the war this number grew exponentially. The initial 10.000 private contractors from the start of the war in 2003, quickly doubled to 20.000 in 2004, and eventually grew to 30.000 in 2007.¹⁹

2.4 Lack of Transparency

In the third core idea, current researchers agree that remote warfare is clouded by a lack of transparency. Conflict analyst, Waldman, defines this part of remote warfare as the tactics of “darkness”. He deems this to be a “catch-all term to encompass the use of covert action and special forces operations [or] offensive cyber warfare capabilities”.²⁰

¹⁷Thomas Waldman, ‘Vicarious Warfare’, 189.

¹⁸Thomas Waldman, ‘Vicarious Warfare’, 189.

¹⁹Sarah K. Cotton, et. al, ‘Private Military and Security Contractors Are Not a New Phenomenon: A Brief History of Military Privatization’, in: Sarah K. Cotton et al. (eds.) *Hired Guns : Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Santa Monica 2010) 33-42, 35.

²⁰Thomas Waldman, ‘Vicarious Warfare’, 195.

The omission of these crucial details about violence used abroad by predominantly western governments have raised questions about the accountability and legality of remote warfare.²¹ Institutions like The Intimacies of Remote Warfare Programme emerged with the “aims to inform the public about the intimate realities of remote wars waged in their name” by conducting independent, evidence-based research into the costs of remote warfare”.²²

As the name “darkness” suggests, examples of these tactics are hard to find. Something that has come up after extensive research about OIF is the fact that the previously mentioned number of private contractors of 30.000 in Iraq in 2007, is probably not even close to the actual number. Although *these* (armed) contractors worked directly for the Department of Defence and the Department of State, many others were hired by these first generation of contractors, making these new contractors “sub-contractors”. The United States Government still pays for these forces but does not know of their existence or their ethics.²³ And when the United States Government does not know of this, the public surely does not know about it, and thus cannot complain.

Furthermore, the financial costs of these private contractors and sub-contractors also lack clarity. An estimate of the Congressional Budget Office in 2008, indicated that the United States spent between 3-4 billion dollars on private contractors between 2003 and 2007 for OIF.²⁴ The fact that this American institution cannot give a concrete number suggests the importance of the darkness surrounding remote warfare.

2.5 A New Timeless Definition

The goal of this chapter was to combine the research on remote warfare to construct an overview of the current paradigm on remote warfare. This paradigm was furthermore substantiated with a contemporary case study: Operation Iraqi Freedom. It has been concluded that the current paradigm of remote warfare consists of timebound and timeless aspects. Because of these timebound aspects this current

²¹Tom Watts, Rubrick Biegon, ‘Defining Remote Warfare’, 1.

²²Quote retrieved from their website. <https://intimacies-of-remote-warfare.nl>

²³Sarah K. Cotton, ‘Private Military and Security Contractors Are Not a New Phenomenon’, 36.

²⁴Ibid., 36.

definition cannot be used to conduct historical research. So, this study will generate a timeless definition, based upon the research of Demmers and Gould, Biegon and Watts, and Waldman.

For the remainder of this study the definition of remote warfare will be as follows:

Remote warfare is a collection of political and military tactics which are designed to shift the financial and/or moral costs of war to other actors in the effort to avoid its negative consequences. These political and military tactics can include but are not limited to: the employment of private contractors, local forces, and militias; the utilization of covert operations; the replacement of personnel in hostile areas with remote weaponry; and the secretive nature surrounding the communication of any of the forementioned to the public.

In the next chapters I will compare this completely timeless definition of remote warfare with an historical case study from the Cold War. The hypothesis is that if this case study cannot be ruled out to be remote warfare – essentially meaning that the timeless aspects of the definition of remote warfare are not specific enough – the exclusive understanding of remote warfare as a contemporary phenomenon should be reconsidered.

3

THE REMOTE SYMPTOMS OF REMOTE WARFARE

3.1 The Diagnosis of Remote Warfare

In this chapter I will analyse what actually happened in the chosen case study, and will prove the existence of symptoms of remote warfare in the Cold War. The first part of the chapter focusses on the key players of the American intervention in the Chilean elections and its violent aftermath during the 1970s, and how they looked at the world around them. The second part of this chapter discusses the details of the different covert operations set up by the United States Government in Chile. Finally, in the third part, the case study will be compared to the timeless definition of remote warfare. For now, this chapter turns to the question of what actually happened in Chile. The story begins with the ascension of Richard Nixon into America's highest office.

3.2 The Eye of the Tornado

After his inauguration on the 20th of January 1969, President Nixon faced a myriad of new challenges in the severely changed landscape of foreign policy. The United States had lost its title of unquestionable leadership in the world as they continued the disastrous and immensely unpopular war in Vietnam. The erosion of American power abroad became abundantly clear when its traditional allies turned their back onto the United States.¹ At the same time, new rivals – the Soviet Union and the

¹Frederik Logevall, Andrew Preston, 'Introduction : The adventurous Journey of Nixon in the World', in: Frederik Logevall, Andrew Preston (eds.) *Nixon in the world : American foreign relations, 1969-1977* (New York 2008) 3-22, 4.

People's Republic of China – entered the mainstage of world politics. The Nixon-administration found themselves in the eye of the tornado, with limited time to reinforce its already penetrated sails and bail the water from its cellars, before the next unstoppable force of nature struck them unprepared.

3.2.1 The Nixon Doctrine

To combat the country's corroding image in world politics, President Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Kissinger, devised a new course for the United States. This new approach was heavily influenced by their binary worldview. In their perceptions of the world, conflicts were solely a duel between good and evil.² Despite the fact that they deemed themselves "good", the men did not intend to fight this "evil" as their predecessors had done with much vigour. Nixon and Kissinger proclaimed that the United States would from now on only extend political, economic and diplomatic support on behalf of their allies. The clear omission of military support from this list, proved to be a key element into their new course for America called the "Nixon Doctrine".³

The reason behind this new risk aversive course was the fact that the United States had padlocked themselves to the sinking ship of Vietnam, with the risk that they might drown the United States on their way down. President Nixon argued that in the future the United States "must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam".⁴ Not only did Nixon want to refrain from new military commitments abroad, but he also wanted to cut the United States loose from a capsized Vietnam. To accomplish this, he ordered the withdrawal of American troops from the battlefield, while the South Vietnamese troops scrambled to take their place.⁵

²Kristian Gustafson, *Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974* (Dulles 2007), 87.

³Frederik Logevall, Andrew Preston, 'Introduction : The adventurous Journey of Nixon in the World', 6.

⁴Ibid., 6.

⁵Ibid., 6.

3.2.2 The Miscalculation on Latin America

Besides the fact that Nixon and Kissinger had a clear indifference about the fate of the people in Asia, they also shared a non-interventionist sentiment on Latin America. Both of them deemed that this continent was and always had been unimportant. Kissinger once even exclaimed to the Chilean foreign minister in 1969 that “nothing of importance can come from the South. History has never been produced in the South. The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo”.⁶

Nixon went even further and speculated that the people of Latin America were not ready for democracy and thus were best suited for authoritarianism. In 1971 he told an aide that “people in the world are at different stages of development, and each needs a system that’s his own”.⁷ It has been speculated that Nixon’s grim opinions on the continent could have been triggered by his visit to Venezuela as Vice-President in 1958, when his motorcade suffered through a mob of protesters that buried them with stones.⁸

Nixon’s opinions about the ability of Latin America to host democracy, did not worry him in terms of diplomatic relations with the continent. In his speech on Halloween 1968, he stated that the ongoing instability in Latin America resulted in his willingness to deal with nondemocratic regimes, which were scarcely recognised around the globe.⁹ In private his position on this matter was even more stark as he told Kissinger that he did in fact favoured dictatorships over democracies for diplomatic relations.¹⁰

In retrospect we can affirm that both President Nixon and his trusted advisor would later eat these words as Latin America – the place they deemed so unimportant for history – would do lasting damage to both of their careers. But at that moment in time, both men did not suspect the eventual consequences of toying with

⁶Mark Atwood Lawrence, ‘History from Below: The United States and Latin America in the Nixon Years’, in: Frederik Logevall, Andrew Preston (eds.) *Nixon in the world ; American foreign relations, 1969-1977* (New York 2008) 269-288, 269.

⁷Mark Atwood Lawrence, ‘History from Below: The United States and Latin America in the Nixon Years’, 273.

⁸Ibid., 273.

⁹Ibid., 273-274.

¹⁰Ibid., 274.

the democratic integrity of Chile – an example of a nation they did not think to be “ready” for this style of governance.

3.2.3 Chile’s Challenge to Balance

Despite the fact that both President Nixon and Kissinger thought so lowly of Latin America, they did acknowledge the role this continent could play for the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Anxiety in the United States over this part of the world stemmed from the fear of the possible successful communist party in Chile in the upcoming national elections. Under their leader, Allende, they threatened to become another Cuba: a communist country in America’s backyard.

The consolidation of the communist Allende government – Kissinger argued – would create the possibility that Chile might become a “support base and entry point” for the Soviet Union. President Nixon furthermore stressed the fact that Allende’s victory would embolden other leftist parties in Latin America to try the same. In other words, both men feared that a communist Chile would kick off a chain reaction around the continent – and possibly the entirety of the western hemisphere – affecting the position of the United States and endanger the balance of the world.¹¹

The United States Ambassador in Chile, Korry, agreed with them. A communist turn in Chile would pose no peril on its own, according to him, but the fact that it would be the first time that a Marxist government had come to power by electoral means in the Cold War, caused him to worry about the future.¹²

Nixon and Kissinger put the ambassador and the CIA to action in the effort to block Allende’s election, but it was too little, too late. The plan consisted of some funding for anti-Allende propaganda and small efforts at influencing the Chilean Congress with monetary means.¹³ Their shared imagined nightmares started to become reality when on September 4, 1970, the polls in Chile closed. Allende had won with a meagre 2 percent difference over his opponent. His 36.6 percent of the votes outnumbered the former right-wing president Alessandri by 39,000 votes.¹⁴

¹¹Ibid., 277.

¹²Kristian Gustafson, *Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile*, 104.

¹³Ibid., 111.

¹⁴Ibid., 107.

Kissinger was furious over these events in Chile and remarked that President Nixon “was beside himself”.¹⁵ Their business had not yet finished in Chile. President Nixon issued another attempt at an intervention. The first had proved that they would need to do more to see some positive results. This decision propelled the United States forward into the world of covert operations, a staple within the United States arsenal during the Cold War as their leaders tried to navigate the ship through the eye of the tornado.¹⁶

3.3 The CIA in Chile

As mentioned above, covert operations were intensively used by the United States in the Cold War, especially when it attempted to overthrow a hostile regime. The United States performed a staggering 70 regime changes in this time period, of which 64 were covert.¹⁷ Of those 64 covert, 6 were to replace liberal democratic governments with authoritarian regimes (such as was the case in Chile).¹⁸

3.3.1 Covert Operations Theory

Leaders decide to either act covertly or overtly on the basis of two considerations: (1) tactical factors, consisting of the mission’s estimated costs and its likelihood of success and (2) strategic factors, consisting of the benefits of said operation and how it will look.¹⁹ Both of these considerations result predominantly in a preference for the use of a covert operation, because (1), the overall costs are lower for covert operations due to its use of local forces, and (2) for the lower risks that accompany the “plausible deniability” of covert operations.²⁰

It is important to remember that not every covert operation entails the same. Herman Kahn, a futurist with a great body of work about warfare in the Cold War, devised the famous four-step “Escalation Ladder” of covert operations. The

¹⁵Ibid., 107.

¹⁶Lindsey A. O’Rourke, *Covert Regime Change*, 2, 7.

¹⁷Ibid., 2.

¹⁸Ibid., 7.

¹⁹Ibid., 8.

²⁰Ibid., 7-8.

first threshold consists of common and standard security measures pursued by all the states around the globe at all times and is thus not concerning. The second threshold consists of “non-invasive support” such as the use of propaganda. The third threshold concern the funding and possible arming of groups within other democracies. Lastly, the fourth threshold, consists of secret direct violent action within another state.²¹

As the escalation ladder suggests, covert operations can easily mutate over time and escalate in size and consequences. This was also the case for the covert operations in Chile. When no favourable results were made, the United States government would decide to increase the manpower and the overall effort into changing Chile’s course away from communism.

3.3.2 The Escalation of the Chilean Operation

After the Chilean election results had put an end to the Nixon-administration’s wish to block a legitimate communist win, they set out a new plan under the name “Track II”. The CIA reported to have spent 153.000 dollars so far in “Track I”, in which they had attempted to induce a multitude of influential Chilean groups such as the Christian Democratic Party, the armed forces, to use legislative or military means to thwart Allende’s election in what Kahn would call “non-invasive support”.²² Track II would hurl the Nixon-administration through the third threshold of Kahn’s escalation ladder.

The first situation report of Track II was issued on September 17 1970 and stated that in the Chile operation “units [would] operate under the cover of the [Redacted] 40 Committee approval of September 14, for political action and the probing for military possibilities to thwart Allende”.²³ In Track II officers approached possible Chilean coup leaders and gave them assurances of strong support from the highest levels of the United States government when they decided to make a (military) move against the Allende government.²⁴

²¹Kristian Gustafson, *Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile*, 81.

²²Ibid., 110.

²³Ibid., 117.

²⁴Ibid., 119.

The big problem, however, was that the CIA could find no suitable coup plotters among the Chilean volunteers.²⁵ On one occasion they even asked a coup plotter to stand down, as they were afraid that his unsuccessful actions would diminish any further possibility of the end of the Allende government.²⁶ Eventually, it would prove that the United States had less control over the various groups which were planning a coup within Chile than they had anticipated.

3.3.3 Losing Control

At the end of October 1970, a serving officer from the Chilean army approached the American assets to request funds for a plan to kidnap the Chilean general Schneider.²⁷ General Schneider had made clear earlier that year that under his supervision the army would respect the constitutional process and not intervene in the elections. This statement angered the conservative officers in his ranks, who viewed that a communist government threatened that same constitution.²⁸ The American assets decided to provide the coup plotters with resources despite the fact that the CIA did not know who exactly had requested its help for the kidnapping.²⁹ Only five hours after the machine guns were delivered, a group of armed men ambushed General Schneider on his way to work. He was shot by his attackers while he drew his own pistol. General Schneider eventually died on the operating table on October 25, where he succumbed to his inflicted wounds.³⁰

The CIA officers on site scrambled to uncover if these weapons, which were used in the ultimately assassination of a Chilean general, had been the ones they had provided without any thought. Eventually it was confirmed that this was not the case, but the association with the killing of General Schneider would remain either way.³¹ To cover its tracks, the CIA paid “hush money” to various coup plotters to keep its participation secret. Furthermore, they recovered the money they had

²⁵Ibid., 125.

²⁶National Security Archive, *CIA, Operating Guidance Cable on Coup Plotting, October 16, 1970*.
<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8i.htm>

²⁷Kristian Gustafson, *Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile*, 128.

²⁸Ibid., 119.

²⁹Ibid., 128.

³⁰Ibid., 129.

³¹Ibid., 132.

initially given to the unknown officer and send it back to the United States. The weapons, which had also been provided by the CIA, were dumped into the harbour.³²

The CIA had nothing to do with the gone wrong kidnapping of General Schneider on paper. However, they had spread the message that they were interested in a coup in which they had mentioned General Schneider in particular. The coup plotters all had knowledge on its position on this matter and thus the CIA cannot be entirely absolved from blame.³³

To conclude, the CIA's covert operation in Chile had escalated over time according to Kahn's escalation ladder and had eventually spiralled out of control. The CIA scrambled to bury its participation and deflected all the blame to the local forces, as they wished to stay remote from the battlefield.

3.4 The Acts of Remote Warfare

The aim of this study is to prove that the tactics of remote warfare existed before the War on Terror, meaning that it is not solely a contemporary phenomenon. To demonstrate this, this study has removed the timebound aspects of remote warfare from its definition to produce a new timeless one:

Remote warfare is a collection of political and military tactics which are designed to shift the financial and/or moral costs of war to other actors in the effort to avoid its negative consequences. These political and military tactics can include but are not limited to: the employment of private contractors, local forces, and militias; the utilization of covert operations; the replacement of personnel in hostile areas with remote weaponry; and the secretive nature surrounding the communication of any of the forementioned to the public.

This definition consists of two distinct parts. The first part contains the objective of remote warfare, namely "to shift the financial and/or moral costs of war to other actors in the effort to avoid its negative consequences". The second part is a

³²Ibid., 132.

³³Ibid., 135.

list of tactics commonly used to obtain this objective. In these examples the tactics of “danger-proofing”, “delegation”, and “darkness” are all represented.

3.4.1 Remote Warfare in Chile

After studying the case study *an sich*, tactics of both “delegation” and “darkness” appear in the American covert operations in Chile. First of all, the United States was adamant about using only local forces to overthrow the newly chosen communist government of Chile. To obtain this effort they deployed American assets to organise and recruit local coup plotters to help them in their mutual effort.

Secondly, these American assets operated in secret in a bigger covert operation. This covert operation developed over time like Kahn’s prototype escalation ladder for covert operations. In the beginning the United States only attempted to stop the communist take-over by spreading propaganda and buying off different influential locals. Later on, however, they recruited, organised and funded operations of local forces. And when things turned awry, they scrambled to disassociate themselves from the situation.

The covert operation in Chili never reached the final threshold of Kahn’s escalation ladder. It is unclear whether this was due to the operation’s abrupt ending after the assassination of General Schneider or if the United States never would have reached for those measures.

3.5 Possible Critique

This chapter analysed what actually happened during the American intervention in the Chilean elections and its violent aftermath in the early 1970s. It has concluded that this case study from the Cold War does indeed show symptoms of remote warfare, when compared to the timeless definition.

However, this analysis is still open to different points of critique. Firstly, critics could state that this resemblance is just a streak of coincidences. However, the actions made within this case study did not happen by chance. They fit perfectly within the general outlook from the Nixon-administration on military interventions abroad as mentioned in Chapter 3.2.1.

Secondly, critics could argue this case study to be an aberration and thus not part of a grander military theory. However, as mentioned in Chapter 3.3, the United States operated in 64 instances with a covert operation to overthrow a regime during the Cold War. Further research into these other examples should indicate a coherent American military strategy.

Finally, critics could point out the fact that the decisions for the undertaken actions, which might appear like remote warfare characteristics, were substantiated by other reasons than the deflection of costs. These critics would be right if I would stop my argument here. It is true that I have speculated in this chapter as to the reasons of Nixon and Kissinger behind their decisions on Chile. In the next chapter, however, I will turn to three primary sources, which will affirm the speculation that the United States also had the intentions commonly associated with remote warfare.

4

THE REMOTE INTENTIONS OF REMOTE WARFARE

4.1 Looking for the Truth in Primary Sources

The previous chapter concluded that the American intervention in Chile shows the symptoms of remote warfare. This chapter determines if these symptoms indeed correlate with the intentions of remote warfare namely: the shifting of financial and/or moral costs of war to other actors to avoid its negative consequences.

In order to reveal this correlation, this chapter analyses three disclosed classified documents of correspondence between key players at three different moments on the timeline, namely (1) the planning phase, (2) the executive phase and (3) the reflective phase. I have gathered all of the transcripts from the National Security Archive and have added the original images in the Appendix.ⁱ The first transcript stems from a phone conversation a week after the election results in Allende's favour, and shows the planning of Track II of the operation. The second transcript – an excerpt from a CIA operational guide – shows the actual execution of this covert operation. The third, and final transcript shows how the United States leadership reflected upon their secret actions in Chile after the successful coup.

This chapter highlights fragments of these transcripts which allude to the intentions of remote warfare. Additionally, these quotes are compared with the timeless definition from chapter 2. This analysis shows that the tactics of remote warfare existed before the War on Terror, which will have grave consequences for the field of conflict studies.

ⁱAll transcripts have been gathered from the National Security Archive's website.
<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu>

4.2 Transcript I : The Planning Phase

As mentioned before, this first transcript originates from about a week after the Chilean election results on the 12th of September 1970. Around noon, Secretary of State, William Rogers, discusses his worries about the upcoming intervention in Chile with National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger.ⁱⁱ Rogers opens the subject of Chile and very clearly states that they should tread carefully if they decide to take action in Chile.³ Interestingly, President Nixon had chosen Rogers for the position of Secretary of State because Rogers knew very little about foreign policy. This lack of knowledge on the subject would help Nixon and his trusted advisor, Kissinger, to keep foreign policy decisions within the White House, as opposed to the State Department.⁴ Despite his benightedness, Rogers did not fear to lecture Kissinger on the dangers of a covert operation:⁵

R: Okay. On Chile, CIA [sic.] has prepared a paper with general conclusions which I think are pretty good—our people agree. But whatever we do, I think there are two things we should take into consideration: one, we want to be sure the paper record doesn't look bad. No matter what we do it will probably end up dismal. So our paper work should be done carefully. [redacted] I talked with the President at length about it. My feeling—and I think it coincided with the President's—is that we ought to encourage a different result from the [redacted] but should do so discretely so that it doesn't backfire.

ⁱⁱThe transcript itself shows the date September 14th instead of September 12th, this is however incorrect according to the National Security Archive's website.

<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=7201993-National-Security-Archive-Doc-7-NSC-Kissinger>.

³National Security Archive, *Doc. 7. NSC Kissinger Telcon, "Secretary Rogers," September 12, 1970 (page 2)*. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=7201993-National-Security-Archive-Doc-7-NSC-Kissinger>.

⁴Kristian Gustafson, *Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974* (2007), 86.

⁵National Security Archive, *Doc. 7. NSC Kissinger Telcon, "Secretary Rogers," September 12, 1970 (page 2)*.

<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=7201993-National-Security-Archive-Doc-7-NSC-Kissinger>.

Rogers' first consideration has clearly been taken into account as this document – and countless others – are still redacted on several instances more than 50 years later. Rogers' wish to keep the record clean is in clear accordance with the third core idea of current studies on remote warfare: the lack of transparency. Mudding your own involvement in a dubious situation is a textbook example of the tactics of remote warfare.

Because of these redactions Rogers' second consideration has been lost. His final notes are also hard to read because of a redaction. Presumably the word “election” has been lost in the last sentence (“we ought to encourage a different result from the election”), but this cannot be argued with certainty.⁶

Finally, Rogers notes that they should work “discretely” after they “encourage a different result” in the effort “that it doesn't backfire”. Kissinger responds:⁷

K: The only question is how one defines “backfire.”

R: Getting caught doing something. After all we've said about elections, if the first time a Communist wins the U.S. tries to prevent the constitutional process from coming into play we will look very bad.

In this second fragment it becomes clear why the paper record should remain clean to Rogers: to preserve their image. If they were to intervene and would be caught in the act, the costs of their actions would fall on them. Rogers, thus, had the same intentions which are commonly associated with those of remote warfare: to deflect the costs of war.

Kissinger tries to ease Rogers' worry by telling him that the president is doing his best to prevent that horror scenario from happening by keeping their forces in the shadows:⁸

K: The President's view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an Aliente [sic.] takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture.

⁶National Security Archive, Doc. 7. NSC Kissinger Telcon, “Secretary Rogers,” September 12, 1970 (page 2).

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

This ideal to shift the blame of your own actions onto others by employing them to do your dirty work is another classic example of the tactics of remote warfare. Rogers agrees with the idea to work “through Chilean sources”, so they can hide themselves behind them in case of potential “backfire”.⁹

It is clear that both men are planning to act covertly in the Chilean elections. Kissinger only seems surer of success in this endeavour. Rogers already speaks about the executive concerns such as his doubts about a certain asset in the fragment below, and about the forementioned paper record:¹⁰

R: I talked to [redacted]. I think it's important that he understand [sic.] that what he's doing is not his doing but encouraging the Chileans to do what they should. If it's our project as distinguished from Chilean it's going to be bad from us. [sic.] I'm not sure he's the best man to do it. I'm not sure he's the most discrete fellow. [redacted]

Despite these indisputable words by both these men about the United States' potential involvement, they do not indicate that they have followed through on this plan. It merely indicates a planning phase. The second phase, the executive phase, says a lot more about the actual orders to their agents.

4.3 Transcript II : The Executive Phase

The second transcript originates from October 16, 1970 – roughly a month after Allende's victory. In a secret cable, Thomas Karamessines, CIA Deputy Director of Plans, conveys Kissinger's orders from the day before in an operational guide to the CIA Station Chief in Santiago, Henry Hecksher.^{xi}

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

^{xi}It is important to note that I have ignored the pencil additions to the transcript, which attempted to fill in the redacted parts of the transcript. I did not know with certainty from whom these additions are, and how reliable they are.

The operational guide communicates to the operatives in Chile that the United States government wants to instigate a coup to overthrow Allende, without showing the world that they had anything to do with this regime change:¹²

It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October [the day of his inauguration] but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource. It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG [United States Government] and American hand be well hidden.

Just like the previous transcript, it is mentioned that the United States Government's presence should remain hidden from the public. Again, this lack of transparency is a clear indicator of the tactics of remote warfare. In addition to the previous transcript though, this is a clear directive from the United States leadership to its agents in Chile. Rogers' wish to disguise "getting caught doing something" is granted by a clear operational guide to inform the United States assets of the secretive nature of the intervention.¹³

The operational guide further explains what is expected from the CIA: first, they are to secure new military contacts in secrecy, and second, inform Viaux, a known coup plotter, that he and his group will have to stand down for the time being, as they are not prepared enough to inflict a successful regime change. This message should state the following:¹⁴

[W]e have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you together with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support.

¹²National Security Archive, *CIA, Operating Guidance Cable on Coup Plotting, October 16, 1970*.
<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8i.html>

¹³National Security Archive, *CIA, Operating Guidance Cable on Coup Plotting, October 16, 1970*.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

It is clear that the United States government is heavily involved not only in the planning but also in the directing of local assets. The operational guide concludes with the following message:¹⁵

Please review all your present and possibly new activities to include propaganda, black operations, surfacing of intelligence or disinformation, personal contacts, or anything else your imagination can conjure which will permit you to continue to press forward toward our [redacted] objective in a secure manner.

This final statement of the transcript shows the fact that the United States did not shy away from using all of the possibly available assets to instigate a coup. Furthermore, it is pressed once again that they should operate in a “secure manner” to ensure their secret involvement.¹⁶

4.4 Transcript III : The Reflective Phase

The last transcript used in this study dates from September 16, 1973, mere days after the military coup that not only overpowered Allende’s regime, but is also the reason for his demise.^{xvii} It is the first time that Kissinger and Nixon discuss the U.S.’s role in this coup after the overthrow of Allende.

Interestingly, the two men discuss the coverage from the national newspapers of the Chilean coup. Surprisingly, they have avoided the backlash from their own actions in this narrative of the events but are still unsatisfied with the press on the subject. The men note how they would be perceived as heroes in another period, implying that they perhaps would have acted in the open if the circumstances would have been different:¹⁸

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

^{xvii}“P” stands for President Nixon in transcript III.

¹⁸National Security Archive, *President/Kissinger, September 16, 1973, 11:50 a.m. (previously posted May 26, 2004)*. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB255/index.htm>

P: [...] Nothing new of any importance or is there?

K: Nothing of very great consequence. The Chilean thing is getting consolidated and of course the newspapers and [sic.] bleeding because a pro-Communist government has been overthrown.

P: Isn't that something. Isn't that something.

K: I mean instead of celebrating – in the Eisenhower period we would be heros. [sic.]

P: Well we didn't – as you know – our hand doesn't show on this one though.

K: We didn't do it. I mean we helped them. [redacted] created the conditions as great as possible.

Despite this clear ignorance of the gravity of their own actions, they hint at the fact that this is not the first instance they operated behind the scenes in another country: “our hand doesn't show on this one”. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the United States has operated covertly in dozens of democracies with this method.¹⁹

The final line of the fragment perfectly summarises the United States' role in the overthrow of Allende. They did not do anything in particular themselves, but rather helped local forces to accomplish their mutual goals. Their unspoken assumption is that that distinction clears them from any backlash or consequences.²⁰

4.5 My Disregard of the Timebound Causes

In the previous chapter it was concluded that the American intervention in the Chilean elections showed the symptoms of remote warfare. This was visible because of its similarities with the commonly used tactics in its strategy as described in the timeless definition. This strategy included local forces, local militias, and covert operations. However, it was not clear if the intentions behind these tactics were the same as in remote warfare.

This is why I turned to primary sources in this chapter. I used three transcripts from the National Security Archive from three distinctly different time peri-

¹⁹National Security Archive, *President/Kissinger, September 16, 1973, 11:50 a.m. (previously posted May 26, 2004)*.

²⁰Ibid.

ods within this intervention, namely the planning phase, the executive phase, and the reflective phase. After an examination of certain fragments within these transcripts it has been made clear that the United States leadership intended to deflect the moral costs of war to other actors to avoid its negative consequences.

The fact that both the tactics as the intentions of remote warfare already existed in the Cold War rules that remote warfare did not emerge in the War on Terror. This discovery has consequences for the current definition of remote warfare, which still consists of both the timebound and timeless aspects. Until now I have disregarded the timebound aspects of remote warfare in order to be able to conduct historical research. However, in the next chapter I will argue why these timebound aspects are also insufficient to ground remote warfare in the War on Terror.

5 | THE REMOTE CAUSES OF REMOTE WARFARE

5.1 Exposing the Supposed Timebound Causes

Chapters 3 and 4 scrutinised the timeless aspects of remote warfare and concluded that these cannot be used to confirm remote warfare to be solely a contemporary phenomenon. However, the current definition of remote warfare also consists of timebound aspects, which ground remote warfare in the War on Terror, as has been discussed in Chapter 2.2. These timebound aspects consist of three different causes of remote warfare, which all can be found in the War on Terror.

However, in this chapter I will illustrate that when these three supposed timebound aspects are transposed to another era – in this instance the Cold War – one cannot exclude this period of time as the original starting point as all of these causes of remote warfare also existed in the Cold War. This means that these three supposed causes are not specific enough.

In each part of this chapter one of these three causes is briefly summarised (the original explanation can be found in Chapter 2.2). Thereafter, this chapter will argue why these supposed timebound causes can also be found in the Cold War.

5.2 An Old New Enemy

The War on Terror was an unconventional battle for which the United States was not well equipped when it entered the battlefield. Its troops endeavoured an enemy that did not follow the unwritten rules of warfare: this new enemy operated through shadowy networks and cells across different borders, and purposefully avoided actual

battlefields. To combat this new type of warfare the United States adopted a more fluid structure. Its army attacked in small and mobile operations, with the aerial support of remote weaponry.¹

As mentioned above, when one regards this case study on its own, this seems like a plausible starting point for the start of remote warfare. However, this is not the first time that the United States army adapted to an enemy that refused to fight conventionally, because of its military inferiority.

The most obvious example that comes to mind is from the Cold War, when the United States army also faced new war tactics in the Vietnam war. The Vietnamese insurgents were specialised in a new, unconventional type of warfare they called “People’s War”.² In this strategy they recognised their own inability to win the war in a conventional way in dedicated battlefields against the military powerhouse, the United States. So, instead, they chose their battles carefully, and methodically designed a long-term plan to eventually overcome their opponent, despite the obvious difference in firepower.³

The People’s War strategy consists of three phases. The first phase involves mobilizing the citizens. The insurgents build their political infrastructure in this phase and make themselves known to the public by conducting well-chosen terroristic acts against the regime. When the insurgents deem their support sufficient, they crank up the violence and enter the second phase. In this phase, small guerrilla operations against important political, economic and military targets are put into action to exhaust the enemy. In the third phase, the insurgents change their strategy to something a bit more conventional. They combine their guerrilla forces and openly battle the regime. No longer do they solely operate from the shadows.⁴

The Vietnam war has taught the United States army that maintaining a conventional strategy against an insurgent movement will achieve little at best and generate new opponents at worst. To best combat an insurgency, one has to change its military objectives from the conventional destruction of enemy forces and the controlling of pieces of land to winning the hearts and minds of the population.⁵

¹Jolle Demmers, Lauren Gould, ‘An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare’, 365.

²Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., ‘Recovery from Defeat’, 126.

³Ibid., 126.

⁴Ibid., 126-127.

⁵Ibid., 127.

Someone who vocalised this need for military re-organization against an insurgency was President Kennedy. In his address to the graduating class at West Point in 1962, he warned the fresh troops that they would face:⁶

another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins – war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It requires . . . a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a wholly different kind of military training.

Kennedy’s observations did not just remain words; he turned them into action. He ordered the creation of a new Special Interdepartmental Group to oversee the process of the counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam. Furthermore, he sought and won approval from Congress to increase the number of Special Forces, and directed the army to develop a new strategy, with synchronised military training.⁷

To conclude, the War on Terror was not the first war that caused the United States army to turn its war tactics more fluid and mobile – both characteristics of remote warfare. The new type of enemy that the United States faced in the Vietnam war had caused the same decades before. So, this argument is transposable to another era, and thus it is not reliable to indicate the starting point of remote warfare in the War on Terror.

5.3 Fighting An Unpopular War, Again

The second argument used in current studies on remote warfare, is based on the fact that the War on Terror was not received well amongst the public. According to them, this negative outlook on the United States’ interventions in the middle East resulted in war fatigue, and a high-strung military frantically trying to avoid any more casualties. The United States leadership decided to slowly pull back its troops while claiming not to have been defeated.⁸ However, the United States could not

⁶Ibid., 128.

⁷Ibid., 128.

⁸Jolle Demmers, Lauren Gould, ‘An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare’, 365.

abandon its interventions entirely, and thus they created a new risk-averse strategy with the employment of local forces and remote weaponry.⁹ The Vietnam war was another highly unpopular war, which generated an entire movement in the United States, which advocated for peace and eventually won.¹⁰

Something that is often noted to cause a war to become unpopular is the number of casualties. However, this is not as simple an equation as one might imagine. The popularity of a war does not correlate one on one with the number of casualties suffered. Decisive studies on this subject have concluded that it matters to the popularity of the war at home, when these casualties occurred. Casualties in a successful operation are simply not regarded as tragic as those caused in an unsuccessful one.¹¹

This can be clearly seen when one visualises the number of domestic casualties with either the war's or presidential approval rating set out against a timeline. I define a war to be unpopular when the approval rating drops below 50 percent, as there is no longer a majority behind the initial decision. In order to observe if both the Vietnam war and the War on Terror indeed both were unpopular, this study has gathered visual representations of the forementioned criterion.

As visible in figure 5.1, support for the Vietnam war had a decisive turning point, congruent with military setbacks.^{xiii}¹³ An additional vertical line indicates the disastrous Tet-offensive, which was initiated on the night of 30-31 January 1968 by the combined forces of the North Vietnamese army and the rebellious Viet Cong. It consisted of a set of targeted attacks on American and South Vietnamese strongholds and had a clear impact on American public support.¹⁴

⁹Laurie Collier, Julie Carnagie, 'Operation Iraqi Freedom, March 2003', 120, 126.

¹⁰Bruce Dancis, *Resister : A Story of Protest and Prison during the Vietnam War* (Ithaca 2014) 328-330.


¹¹Christopher Gelpi, *Paying the Human Costs of War*, 25.

^{xiii}Important to note is the fact that the index is wrongly stated below the figure. The dotted line presents the "Cumulative Hostile Deaths", instead of the number of support and vice versa.

¹³Christopher Gelpi, *Paying the Human Costs of War*, 29.


¹⁴*Ibid.*, 29.

Figure 5.1: Combat Casualties and Support for Vietnam war, 1965-1971.



The same graph can be made for the Iraq war, which is visible in figure 5.2.¹⁵ The most important aspect of this figure, for this study, is the drop in presidential approval below 50 percent in 2005, when the United States army fought and lost control over the country after the disastrous Parliamentary Elections of January.¹⁶

Figure 5.2: Combat Casualties and Presidential Approval, Iraq War, 2003-2006.



¹⁵Ibid., 55.

¹⁶Ibid., 54-55.

To sum up, public support for wars declines significantly with the occurrence of casualties without any military gains. This results in the need for the army to either reduce the overall casualties or to make those new casualties in successful assaults. For both the Vietnam and the Iraq war, the decision was made to pull back American troops, and replace them with locals and remote weaponry.

Thus, the scholars, again, have not isolated a clear argument as to why remote warfare emerged in the War of Terror. Armies have prior to that date adjusted its military tactics to accommodate public opinion, resulting in the implementation of remote warfare as can be observed in the highly unpopular and influential Vietnam war.

5.4 “New” Equipment Of Before

The third, and final, argument that scholars bring forward to prove that remote warfare emerged during the War on Terror, is that this coincided with some major advancements in the technology of remote weaponry. Remote weaponry is crucial within the tactics of remote warfare, because these innovations give (the American) forces a great advantage as they no longer have to risk their own lives in certain operations but can send a machine to do their work.¹⁷ Despite the fact that the use of remote weaponry feels very contemporary, they have been part of multiple arsenals since the Second World War. Early variants of the modern drones were produced by both Germany and the Allies. Germany, for example, experimented with a ground vehicle named the Goliath Remote-Controlled Mine, which one could steer under enemy tanks from a safe distance. These Goliath’s carried up to 60 kilograms of explosives.¹⁸ Figure 5.3 shows two Allied soldiers examining a captured Goliath to uncover its secrets.¹⁹

¹⁷Jolle Demmers, Lauren Gould, ‘An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare’, 365.

¹⁸H.R. Everett, Michael Toscano, *Unmanned Systems of World Wars I and II* (Cambridge 2015), 480.

¹⁹H.R. Everett, Michael Toscano, *Unmanned Systems of World Wars I and II*, 485.

Figure 5.3: Two Allied Soldiers Examine a Goliath Remote Controlled Mine



The innovation and production of unmanned vehicles took off in the Cold War. One of the earliest recorded studies on the subject was in 1964, when the engineer John W. Clark wrote about remote control in hostile environments.²⁰

When plans are being made for operations in these [inhospitable] environments, it is usual to consider only two possibilities: either placing a machine in the environment or placing a protected man there. A third possibility, however, would in many cases give more satisfactory results than either of the others. This possibility employs a vehicle operating in the hostile environment under remote control by a man in a safe environment.


Clark called these new remotely controlled machines “telechiric machines”, which would roughly translate from Greek as “technology of manipulation at a distance”. He visualised his idea in a drawing, visible in figure 5.4.²¹ In this drawing

²⁰Grégoire Chamayou, *Drone Theory* (London 2015), 21.

²¹Grégoire Chamayou, *Drone Theory*, 21.

Clark made a clear distinction between the safe area, in which the valuable person would reside and the hostile area, in which the telechiric machine would operate. Important to note is the addition of a camera to the machine, so that the machine operator has a visual of the situation in the hostile area without actually being there.

Figure 5.4: A Drawing of Clark's Telechiric Machine, 1964.



The first unmanned vehicles that looked like Clark's drawing were the American Ryan KDA-1 Firebees, visible in figure 5.5.²² Originally, they were designed as targets for pilots in training, but they were adapted to collect intelligence during surveillance and reconnaissance operations in the Vietnam war. Between 1964 and 1974, the Firebees flew a whopping 3.435 times over Southeast Asia. These Firebees were not perfect machines as they needed assistance with both take-off and landing, and they carried no weapons on their own. However, they did replace vulnerable pilots in their reconnaissance operations, distancing valuable lives from the battlefield.²³

The first targeted killing with a drone took place in the War on Terror. It was directed against Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban.²⁴ However, as shown above, unmanned vehicles in combat have been around since the Cold War. And even despite the fact that they could not fire at the enemy troops, they did save human lives. Thus, it was not the technological climate of the War on Terror that created remote weaponry, but actually the innovative thinkers of the century prior.

²²H.R. Everett, Michael Toscano, *Unmanned Systems of World Wars I and II*, 602.

²³James I. Walsh, *Drones and Support for the Use of Force*, 11.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 12.

Figure 5.5: A Ryan Q2-A (Right), and Three KDA-1 Firebees (the Rest)



5.5 The Insufficiency of the Current Definition

To conclude, this chapter has provided a critical look on the arguments of current scholars that remote warfare was caused by the circumstances of the War on Terror. In each part of this chapter one of the three supposed causes of remote warfare was discussed. However, as this chapter has shown, these same arguments can also be made to prove the hypothesis that remote warfare was caused by the end of the Vietnam war and coincided with the new type of enemy that the United States army faced, the unpopularity of the war, and the new surge in technological innovation in remote weaponry. Thus, the supposed timebound aspects do not ground the timeless aspects of remote warfare in the War on Terror, because they are not specific to that era at all.

Subsequently, both the timeless and timebound aspects are not sufficient to deem the War on Terror to be the cause and start of remote warfare. This implies that the military of political tactics of remote warfare could have been around for longer than commonly believed. Thus, history could give more insights into these tactics and how to combat its ethical challenges.

6 | CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary

Humankind learns from war, but never from its consequences. Defeat in warfare ignites the desire to win the next time around. And thus, improved weapons accompanied by new strategies are developed to secure victory in the future. This results in an eternal arms race.

A military development discussed profusely within the field of conflict studies is the discovery of remote warfare. “Remote warfare” – as defined by this study – is

a collection of political and military tactics which are designed to shift the financial and/or moral costs of war to other actors in the effort to avoid its negative consequences. These political and military tactics can include but are not limited to: the employment of private contractors, local forces, and militias; the utilization of covert operations; the replacement of personnel in hostile areas with remote weaponry; and the secretive nature surrounding the communication of any of the forementioned to the public.

The aim of this study was to shift the current paradigm within conflict studies on the subject of the contemporality of remote warfare. Until now, conflict analysts have regarded the War on Terror to be the genesis of remote warfare. To substantiate this claim three different causes of remote warfare have been brought forward. First, conflict analysts mention the new type of enemy that the United States faced in the War on Terror. According to them, this unconventional enemy caused a shift within the United States army operations in the Middle East and Central Asia. The United States army regarded it the best option to mirror the structure of its fluid enemy to

operate as effectively as possible. The second argument points out that the War on Terror was a highly unpopular war domestically, thus creating the need to keep the perception of its costs as low as possible. The third, and final, argument expressed is the great advancements made in the technology of remote weaponry during the War on Terror, which made this strategy possible.

Despite the reasons listed above, I question this exclusive understanding of remote warfare in this study. To open the discussion on this subject, I argued that a case study from the Cold War cannot be excluded from the definition of remote warfare, if one disregards the timebound aspects of the definition. This means either that the tactics of remote warfare are not exclusive to contemporary warfare, or that its definition is not tight enough.

To generate this shift in paradigm, I started in this study with the construction of a timeless definition of remote warfare in Chapter 2. This chapter based itself on the influential works of Demmers and Gould, Biegon and Watts, and Waldman. The overlapping three core ideas of remote warfare were extracted from these studies and reworked into a new timeless definition.

Chapter 3 put this new timeless definition to the test. A covert operation from the Cold War was introduced and compared to the definition. It was concluded that the American intervention in the Chilean elections and its violent aftermath in the 1970s indeed shows the symptoms of remote warfare, in the form of the use of local forces and covert operations.

However, symptoms are not enough to diagnose a case study as an example of remote warfare. In Chapter 4, I examined three primary sources from the National Security Archive. These sources consisted of correspondence between the United States' leadership and the CIA. After analysis I concluded that the Cold War case study not only showed symptoms, but also the intentions of remote warfare. It was the leadership's operative to deflect the costs onto other actors by ways of "delegation" and "darkness" surrounding its operations. Not only did they attempt this, but they also succeeded, as the United States' actions in the Chilean elections have been absent from both media and scholarly attention.

The last chapter provided another point of critique to the current paradigm of remote warfare within the field of conflict studies. Besides the fact that the timeless definition of remote warfare is applicable to the past, its supposed timebound aspects are as well. Chapter 5 again listed the three arguments as to why remote warfare

was caused during the War on Terror, and transposed them to the Cold War, and specifically the Vietnam war. After analysis I concluded that if one changes “War on Terror” to “Vietnam war”, the causes of remote warfare still make sense. Thus, the Vietnam war cannot be excluded to be the starting point of remote warfare. This means – again – that the current definition of remote warfare is not specific enough.

6.2 The Consequences of This Study

Not only do I state that it is possible to research remote warfare in history I also take this stance one step further. I argue for the importance of the expansion of the time scope within the research on remote warfare for the following reasons.

6.2.1 Unobstructed Research

The big problem with current research into contemporary case studies is the amount of obstruction from the governments involved. Governments will always plead that they cannot provide all the evidence because of national security reasons. In reality, this does not have to be the real reason behind their unwillingness to cooperate, but this is an easy way out of answering tough questions.

The benefit from research into historical case studies is that this obstruction is less prevalent, and eventually diminishes when one travels far enough back in time. My research in the remote warfare tactics used during the Cold War, was greatly aided by the amount of primary source material that has been declassified in recent years. And over the years, eventually, the remaining redacted lines will be made open to the public, when the people involved are no longer alive.

6.2.2 The Evolution of Warfare

As reflected upon in the introduction of this thesis, warfare evolves over time. With each defeat, new attempts are made to innovate enough to guarantee a victory in the future. This evolution also has to be taken into account with the tactics of remote warfare. This change from conventional American warfare to this new urge to remain as far away as possible from the battlefield, did not suddenly appear in the

War on Terror. This change was rather gradual, creating a spectrum. This works exactly like colour mixing with paint. If a painter starts with a dark red colour, but keeps adding small splashes of yellow, eventually the paint in front of them is no longer red. In case with our warfare spectrum, this can also be observed. At the beginning of the timeline the American conventional type of warfare is exclusively used, but with every new decision it changes more towards contemporary warfare. Eventually, enough is changed to consider it to be completely new, and the traces of its former state are barely recognizable anymore.

The task for conflict analysts is to track this type of warfare in history, to determine how it came to be and when it stopped being conventional. Only then, the true essence of this type of warfare will come to light.

6.2.3 The Ethics of Contemporary Warfare

Just like there is a spectrum of warfare, there is a spectrum of ethical decisions made during war. The ethical challenges of remote warfare are a hot topic in current debates about ethics in warfare. Non-profit organisations such as Airwars and The Intimacies of Remote Warfare Programme have dedicated themselves to holding governments accountable for their crimes while using these tactics.

However, before the consequences of contemporary remote warfare can be denounced, an overview has to be made from this ethical spectrum over time. When exactly did we cross our ethical lines? In what ways, for example, do our current drones differ from the unmanned Goliath Mines from World War II? Both were designed to attack the enemy, while the operators of the machine were safely removed from the dangers of the battlefield. In both instances the enemy is not capable of defending itself, and thus this could both be considered unethical.

After we have established this spectrum of ethical challenges and determined where we draw our ethical lines as humanity, we will hopefully finally learn the right lessons from war.

7

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A | APPENDIX

A.1 Transcript I (Figure A.1)

This phone conversation between Secretary of State, William Rogers, and Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger shows the intentions of remote warfare in its planning phase. The men discuss how they could intervene in the democratic process of the Chilean elections without incriminating themselves. Eventually they decide upon keeping their record clean and the implementation of local forces. Both of these are clear indicators of the tactics of remote warfare.

A.2 Transcript II (Figures A.2-A.5)

This CIA operational guide was constructed by CIA Deputy Director of Plans, Karamessines, to convey the orders from Kissinger to the CIA Station Chief in Santiago, Henry Hecksher. Again, this transcript shows the tactics of remote warfare as it instructs the assets to approach coup plotters in secret and give them instructions on when and where to strike. This was all in the effort to keep the hand of the United States Government hidden in the Chilean coup on the Communist Allende.

A.3 Transcript III (Figure A.6)

This conversation between President Nixon and his trusted Security Advisor, Kissinger, shows their reaction to the negative national news-cycle on the Chilean coup. Before changing the subject, they note that technically the United States is not involved in the coup, because their hand does not show.

Figure A.1: Transcript I (September 12th, 1970)

SANITIZED COPY

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
9/14/70 12:15 p.m. (Page 2)

R: Okay. On Chile, CIA has prepared a paper with general conclusions which I think are pretty good--our people agree. But whatever we do, I think there are two things we should take into consideration: one, we want to be sure the paper record doesn't look bad. No matter what we do it will probably end up dismal. So our paper work should be done carefully. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I talked with the President at length about it. My feeling--and I think it coincides with the President's--is that we ought to encourage a different result from the [REDACTED] but should do so discretely so that it doesn't backfire.

K: The only question is how one defines "backfire."

R: Getting caught doing something. After all we've said about elections, if the first time a Communist wins the U.S. tries to prevent the constitutional process from coming into play we will look very bad.

K: The President's view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an Aliente takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture.

R: I have been disturbed by Corry's telegrams. They sound frenetic and somewhat irrational. I know that he's under pressure but we ought to be careful of him. He's got tender nerve ends. I don't know if you saw his telegrams.

K: Yes, I did.

R: And I think we've got to be sure he acts with discretion. He's a high-strung fellow.

K: I think what we have to do is make a cold-blooded assessment, get a course of action this week some time and then get it done.

R: I talked to [REDACTED] I think it's important that he understand that what he's doing is not his doing but encouraging the Chileans to do what they should. If it's our project as distinguished from Chilean it's going to be bad from us. I'm not sure he's the best man to do it. I'm not sure he's the most discrete fellow. [REDACTED]

K: Is it?

R: Not that I know of right now. We ought, as you say, to cold-bloodedly decide what to do and then do it.

[p. 2 of 2]

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Figure A.2: Transcript II (October 16th, 1970) Page I/IV

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 DO NOT EXCEED 60 TYPEWRITER CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES.

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 With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
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 JNIT: [REDACTED]
 EXT: [REDACTED]
 DATE: 16 October 1970

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MR 89-38 #11 CIA Mr. [REDACTED]
 10/17
 By CODY, NARA, Dand [REDACTED]

SECRET

LESNA ENABLED ACCOUNTS

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

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IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO (EYES ONLY [REDACTED])
 16 14 08 z Oct 70

1. ^{TRIPKURS} [REDACTED] POLICY, OBJECTIVES, AND ACTIONS WERE REVIEWED AT HIGH USG LEVEL AFTERNOON 15 OCTOBER. CONCLUSIONS, WHICH ARE TO BE YOUR OPERATIONAL GUIDE, FOLLOW:

2. IT IS FIRM AND CONTINUING POLICY THAT ALLENDE BE OVERTHROWN BY A COUP. IT WOULD BE MUCH PREFERABLE TO HAVE THIS TRANSPIRE PRIOR TO 24 OCTOBER BUT EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD WILL CONTINUE VIGOROUSLY BEYOND THIS DATE. WE ARE TO CONTINUE TO GENERATE MAXIMUM PRESSURE TOWARD THIS END UTILIZING EVERY APPROPRIATE RESOURCE. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THESE ACTIONS BE IMPLEMENTED CLANDESTINELY AND SECURELY SO THAT THE USG AND AMERICAN HAND BE WELL HIDDEN. WHILE THIS IMPOSES UPON US A HIGH DEGREE OF SELECTIVITY IN MAKING MILITARY CONTACTS AND DICTATES

COORDINATING OFFICERS CONTINUED....

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Figure A.3: Transcript II (October 16th, 1970) Page II/IV

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0 THAT THESE CONTACTS BE MADE IN THE MOST SECURE MANNER.
IT DEFINITELY DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONTACTS SUCH AS REPORTED
IN SANTIAGO 544 WHICH WAS A MASTERFUL PIECE OF WORK.

3. AFTER THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION IT WAS
DETERMINED THAT A VIAUX COUP ATTEMPT CARRIED OUT BY
HIM ALONE WITH THE FORCES NOW AT HIS DISPOSAL WOULD
FAIL. THUS, IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO OUR ^{TEAM} ~~OBJECTIVES~~
^{TIME} ~~OBJECTIVES~~. IT WAS DECIDED THAT ^{CIA} ~~OBJECTIVES~~
GET A MESSAGE TO VIAUX WARNING HIM AGAINST PRECIPITATE
ACTION. IN ESSENCE OUR MESSAGE IS TO STATE, "WE HAVE
REVIEWED YOUR PLANS, AND BASED ON YOUR INFORMATION
AND OURS, WE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT YOUR PLANS
FOR A COUP AT THIS TIME CANNOT SUCCEED. FAILING, THEY
MAY REDUCE YOUR CAPABILITIES FOR THE FUTURE. PRESERVE
YOUR ASSETS. WE WILL STAY IN TOUCH. THE TIME WILL COME

COORDINATING OFFICERSCONTINUED.....

RELEASING OFFICER ~~SECRET~~ AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Figure A.4: Transcript II (October 16th, 1970) Page III/IV

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RESTRICTED HANDLING
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Copy ____ of ____

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED)

~~SECRET~~ PAGE THREE CITE HEADQUARTERS

○ WHEN YOU TOGETHER WITH ALL YOUR OTHER FRIENDS CAN DO SOMETHING, YOU WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE OUR SUPPORT." YOU ARE REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE TO VIAUX ESSENTIALLY AS NOTED ABOVE. OUR OBJECTIVES ARE AS FOLLOWS: (A) TO ADVISE HIM OF OUR OPINION AND DISCOURAGE HIM FROM ACTING ALONE; (B) CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO AMPLIFY HIS PLANNING; (C) ENCOURAGE HIM TO JOIN FORCES WITH OTHER COUP PLANNERS SO THAT THEY MAY ACT IN CONCERT EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER 24 OCTOBER. (N.B. SIX GAS MASKS AND SIX CS CANNISTERS ARE BEING CARRIED TO SANTIAGO BY SPECIAL ~~COURIER~~ COURIER ETD WASHINGTON 1100 HOURS 16 OCTOBER.)

4. THERE IS GREAT AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE ACTIVITIES OF TIRADO, CANALES, VALENZUELA ET AL AND WE WISH THEM OPTIMUM GOOD FORTUNE.

5. THE ABOVE IS YOUR OPERATING GUIDANCE. NO OTHER

COORDINATING OFFICERS CONTINUED....

RELEASING OFFICER ~~SECRET~~ AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

THIS FORM FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED RESTRICTED HANDLING MESSAGE USERS ONLY!

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Figure A.6: Transcript III (September 16th, 1973)

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TelCon:9/16/73 (Home)11:50
Mr. Kissinger/
The President:

K: Hello.

P: Hi, Henry.

K: Mr. President.

P: Where are you. In New York?

K: No, I am in Washington. I am working. I may go to the football game this afternoon if I get through.

P: Good. Good. Well it is the opener. It is better than television. Nothing new of any importance of is there?

K: Nothing of very great consequence. The Chilean thing is getting consolidated and of course the newspapers and bleeding because a pro-Communist government has been overthrown.

P: Isn't that something. Isn't that something.

K: I mean instead of celebrating - in the Eisenhower period we would be heros.

P: Well we didn't - as you know - our hand doesn't show on this one though.

K: We didn't do it. I mean we helped them. _____ created the conditions as great as possible(??)

P: That is right. And that is the way it is going to be played. But listen, as far as people are concerned let me say they aren't going to buy this crap from the Liberals on this one.

K: Absolutely not.

P: They know it is a pro-Communist government and that is the way it is.

K: Exactly. And pro-Castro.

P: Well the main thing was. Let's forget the pro-Communist. It was an anti-American government all the ~~wide~~ way.