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From Isolationism to Engagement on the World Stage: The People's Republic of China's Position within the United Nations Security Council: 1971-2004

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Abstract

This thesis looks at the extent to which the People's Republic of China's (PRC) voting position shifted in the United States Security Council (UNSC) from October 1971 to December 2004. After the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989, the PRC was forced to integrate further into the international system and for this to happen their stance on national sovereignty rights, in relation to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), went from one of isolationism to engagement; This shift was made possible due to modernisation reforms conducted by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s. The unexpected consequence of this shift was the increase in soft power that the PRC received and the added reputation that comes with it. As such, the PRC registered this effect and began engaging with UNPKO at a greater rate, further boosting its soft power, and highlighting the shift away from its stance on sovereignty during the isolationist period after Tiananmen. This is directly reflected in the data of the PRC's voting record from passed UNSC resolutions.

This thesis will highlight four separate phases in which the PRC's position changed. These time periods will be: 1971-1976, 1977-1981, 1982-1989 and 1990-2004.

The PRC's use of abstentions, vetoes and nonparticipation is analysed and compared with other members of the Permanent Five (P5) UNSC to reflect its position. Additionally, the PRC's own UNPKO contributions will be scrutinised against the voting record data, so as to spotlight the effects that soft power, generated from UNPKO, had on the PRC's voting pattern and therefore explain the shift.

Abbreviations

CPC – Communist Party of China

MINUGUA - The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala

PLA – People's Liberation Army

PRC – People's Republic of China

P5 – Permanent Five United Nations Members

RoC – Republic of China

RoK – Republic of Korea

UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

UN – United Nations

UNPKO – United Nations Peacekeeping Operation(s)

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

US – United States of America

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UNFICYP- United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNEF II - Second United Nations Emergency Force

UNDOF – United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNTAG – United Nations Transition Assistance Group

UNTAC – United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

UNTSO – United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation

UNPREDEP – United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

UNMISS – United Nations Mission in South Sudan

Figures and Tables[1]

Figures

Figure 1) The People's Republic of China's Voting Pattern: 25th October 1971 – 31st December 1976

Figure 2) The People's Republic of China's Voting Pattern: 1st January 1977 – 31st December 1981

Figure 3) Permanent Five Members' Abstention Record: October. 1971 – December 1989

Figure 4) The People's Republic of China's Voting Patter: January 1990 – December 2004

Figure 5) Permanent Five UNSC Member Abstention Record: January 1989 – December 2004

Tables

Table 1) The People's Republic of China's voting pattern: January 1982 – December 1989

Table 2) The People's Republic of China's Personnel Contributions: November 1989 – December 2004[2]

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[1] All data used to create the figures and tables for this thesis is data sourced and compiled by the author. [1] See; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Via, *https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=en&cc=Voting+Data&p=&f=&rm=&ln=en&sf=&so=d&rg=50&c=Voting+Data&c=&of=hb&fti=0&fct__2=Security+Council&fct__9=Vote&fti=0&fct__2=Security+Council*. [Accessed: 01/03/2019].

[2] United Nations Peacekeeping. *Troop and Police Contributors*. (February, 1st, 2019) Via, *https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors*. [Accessed 25/3/2019].

Contents

Introduction

From the United Nation's (UN) founding in 1945 until the autumn of 1971, the China seat was occupied by Chiang Kai-Shek's Republic of China (RoC), despite widespread criticism from the People's Republic of China (PRC) between these years, who held *de facto* control over the Chinese mainland. Throughout the 1960s, annual resolutions were brought forward by the PRC's allies to the General Assembly questioning the validity of the RoC's position in China's permanent membership seat and instead called on the PRC's admission in their place. This pressure finally forced the UN to adopt Resolution 2758, stripping the RoC's position as holder of the Chinese seat and handing it over to the PRC.[3]

Initially, the PRC took a distanced and apprehensive approach towards the UN system as a collective whole. While on one hand it followed UN rules without challenging them outright, its own participation in, not only the process, but the political world order as whole, was limited and minimal.[4] As such, at the first stages of admittance to the UN, the PRC took an independent and isolated approach by not aligning itself with any factions in the international order of the day at the UN - be it the West, Eastern Bloc or the Third World group.[5] This is reflected in the PRC abstentions and nonparticipation concerning issues of peacekeeping and sovereignty. As such, the PRC's first abstention at the UN Security Council (UNSC) came only eight months after its admittance on the issue of extending peacekeeping operations in Cyprus, being the only nation not to vote 'Yes' at the meeting.[6]

However, by the mid-2000s the PRC's position and behaviour within the UN was being categorised as "more integrated… and cooperative… within international institutions than ever before".[7] The only exception to this behaviour was when issues regarding member state national sovereignty were raised at the UNSC, often in reference to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) and peace enforcement in conflict zones.[8] Even then, the PRC's long held defence of nation states' sovereignty rights was beginning to be seen as of

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[3] United Nations, Security Council. *Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations*. S/2758 (XXVI). (October, 25th, 1971). Via, *https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/327/74/IMG/NR032774.pdf?OpenElement*. [Accessed: 23/05/2019].

[4] Liu, Wei. *China in the United Nations.* (Hackensack, New Jersey: World Century, 2014), p.6

[5] Ibid.

[6] See; United Nations, Security Council. *United Nations Security Council Resolution 315*. S/Res/315. (June, 1th, 1972). Via, *https://undocs.org/S/RES/315(1972)*. [Accessed: 11/7/2019].

[7] Johnston, Alastair, I. "Is China a Status Quo Power?". In, *International Security.* (Vol. 27, No.4., 2003), p.55.

[8] Pearson, Margaret, M., "China in Geneva: Lessons from China's Early Years in the World Trade Organization"., In, *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*. (eds) Alastair I. Johnston, and Robert S. Ross. (California, US: Stanford University Press, 2006), p.267.

lesser importance when applying its own political agenda. The cumilation of this newfound approach can be seen when the PRC voted 'Yes' on Resolution 1545 in the Spring of 2004, which saw the establishment of a UNPKO in Burundi.[9]

Research question

The PRC that occupied the China seat in 2004 was very different to the one that had entered the international institution in 1971. From its isolationist, cautious and obstructive approach and position within the UNSC in 1971, to its assertive, confident and self-assured approach and position in 2004, a noticeable shift had occurred. This therefore leads to the overarching question: *What caused the PRC's position at the UNSC to change from 1971-2004?*

To answer this question, it must be explained what is meant by the PRC and who the actors are within it.

When referencing the PRC this thesis will be referring to the main decision makers in Chinese society at the given time. Naturally, given the PRC's one-party state system, it is the Communist Party of China (CPC), and the Central Committee that runs it, who are the main actors in the PRC. The individuals of the CPC change between 1971-2004 and so consequently, when a change in policy and approach towards the UNSC occurs in the PRC - often due to changes in foreign policy - the individuals involved with this change will be addressed directly. The main individual actors will be the leader of the CPC, the General Secretary and paramount leader, the designated member of the Politburo Standing Committee in charge of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and the Permanent Representative of China to the UN.[10]

Additionally, how the PRC's foreign policy changed its actions at the UNSC and the role of individuals in the instigation and creation of this change will be explained. In turn, this will shed light on to what degree foreign policy fundamentally changed the position of the PRC at the UNSC by 2004.

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[9] See; United Nations, Security Council. *United Nations Security Council Resolution*. S/RES/1545. (May, 21st, 2004). Via, *https://undocs.org/S/RES/1545(2004)*. [Accessed: 12/6/2019].

[10] Due to the nature of governance in the PRoC, more than one position can be occupied by the same individual: For example, Xi Jingping is currently both leader of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and the General Secretary of the CPC

Historiography and academic relevance

Historiography on the PRC's rise from isolated and protectionist to that of a great power in the 20th and 21st centuries is abundant. Academics and political commentators focus on the PRC's historically unprecedented economic rise which has seen a c.10% annual average GDP growth, and more than 850 million of its people being brought out of poverty.[11] However, the bulk of historiographical work comes after the economic, social and political reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s. This in large part is because of the Cold War and interest from the West being mainly focused on the USSR. In turn, it was only after the demise of the Communist Bloc that the 'China Threat Theory' literature began to appear.[12]

Similarly, it is only with the PRC's newfound position in the international community that works on the PRC's historical relationship with the UN have also begun to appear. Even today, the question of whether the PRC is a power with good intentions or not is still readily debated by international relations theorists.[13]

Literature on the PRC engagement with UNPKO is a newer and still emerging field. Few books have been written on the topic, with Pang Zhongying's formative 2005 article *China's Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping* and Yin He's 2007 paper *China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations* being some of the first such pieces.[14] It would be a fair assumption that because both of these pieces of work came in the second half of the 2000s that that is when the PRC first engaged with UNPKO. Instead, it was in fact in 1989 that the PRC sent its first military personnel on a peacekeeping operation.[15] Notably, He investigates and analyses PRC UNPKO operations only after 1999, leaving the prior decade without a large degree of analysis.

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[11] The World Bank. "*The World Bank in China – Overview*" (April 8, 2019)., Via https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview. [Accessed: 13/5/2019].

[12] See; Shaohua, Hu, "Revisiting Chinese Pacifism,". In, *Asian Affairs*, (Vol. 32, No. 4, 2006), pp. 256-278.

[13] See; Harnisch, Sebastian., Sebastian Bersick and Jorn-Carsten Gottwald. *eds. China's international roles: challenging or supporting international order?*. (New York; London: Routledge, 2016). And, see; Huang, Yukon. "China's road to becoming a 'Responsible' world power." In, *Financial Times.* (March 26, 2013). Via: *http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/26/china-s-road-to-becoming-responsible-world-power-pub-51323*. [Accessed: 24/7/2019].

[14] See; Zhongying, Pang. "China's Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping"., In, *International Peacekeeping*, (Vol. 1, Iss. 1, 2005). And, He, Yin. "China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations". In, *Institute for Security and Development Policy*. (Asia Paper, 2007).

[15] Data from; United Nations. *Namibia – UNTAG Facts and Figures*. Via, *https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/untagF.htm*. [Accessed: 20/03/2019].

Recently, Christoph Zürcher conducted a more thorough analysis on PRC peacekeeping, going back to 1981, however, this analysis does not discuss to a great degree the clear links between PRC UNPKO and its position within the UNSC, and the consequential effects that UNPKO have had on PRC votes in the UNSC.[16] It is in this historical gap of the literature that this thesis intends to place itself.

Additionally, this thesis relies on groundwork conducted by Miwa Hirono in his analysis into several PRC UNPKO operations on the ground during the 1990s. Unfortunately, little data on PRC UNPKO commitments on the ground level is readily available from the UN, with only short mission summary reports appearing on its main website. Therefore, much of the assumptions formulated regarding PRC UNPKO personnel are on the back of Hirono's work.[17]

Lastly, in 1999, Ann Kent penned the book *China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance*, which was the first of its type in western print to investigate the PRC's position on human rights within the UN.[18] Kent attributed the PRC's role within the UN into three different phases: 1971-78, 1979-89 and 1990-1999.[19] Kent's phases solely reflect on the PRC's role within the UN in relations to its approach to the issue of Human Rights. However, despite being based on a separate issue to this thesis, which outlines the PRC's position towards sovereignty, how this effects its involvement in UNPKO and the soft power gained from them, this categorisation serves as the main inspiration for the four phases outlined in this thesis and is upon which they were built.

Structure

The first chapter of this thesis will begin by looking at the theoretical framework on which this thesis is built. The three main topics of research focus on the PRC's approach to sovereignty between 1971-2004, the soft power gained from UNPKO because of this shift in

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[16] Zürcher, Christoph. *30 Years of Chinese Peacekeeping*. (CIPS Report, Jan. 2019).
[17] Lanteigne, Marc, and Miwa Hirono. China's Evolving Approach to Peacekeepin. (London & New York; Routledge, 2012)
[18] Kent, Ann. *China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance*. (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2nd ed., 2013).
[19] Ibid., p.15.

approach to sovereignty, and the voting power of the PRC at the UNSC on passed resolutions.

As such, Krasner's sovereignty debate will be focused upon first. This will be followed by a look into Joseph S. Nye Jr's idea of Soft Power. Following this voting power literature will be used to highlight the effects of certain votes at the UNSC. Lastly, the concept of UNPK will be defined so as to add clarity on what constitutes the term peacekeeping when applied to the UNSC.

The second chapter of this thesis will start with a brief historical overview and discussion on the PRC's stance toward the international community and the UN, along with its stance on the issue of sovereignty in international relations in the early years of its admission. The PRC's stance regarding sovereignty directly affects the policy the country takes towards UNPKO and therefore will provide context to the PRC's position when voting at resolutions concerning members' sovereignty.

Once this has been established, it will then be possible to investigate the PRC's voting record between its ascension to the China Seat in 1971 and the first engagement it has with contributing to UNPKO in 1989. This investigation will analyse specifically the use of the vote types 'Abstain' and 'Nonparticipation' to evaluate the PRC's attitudes; it is with the lasting and official vote that the PRC commits itself, rather than the rhetoric and hyperbole in the lead up, and hence from which where an assessment can be made. Consequently, the dependent variable of the PRC's voting patterns at the UNSC between 1971-1989 will be evaluated without the input of the independent variable of UNPKO personnel contributions, which are absent due to a dedicated position on complete respect of other member states' sovereignty rights.

The third chapter will then investigate how the PRC's position and approach to the UNSC changes, both in general attitude and in voting patterns, when UNPKO contribution are undertaken by the PRC. In order to better understand how UNPKO may have affected the PRC's position, it is necessary to investigate why a change in behaviour from the PRC came about when it did, and also how it is that UNPKO gave the PRC the ability and legitimacy to shift its position.

Methodology

To find out how the PRC's position at the UNSC has shifted from isolationist to engagement between 1971-2004, it is necessary to establish a dependent variable from which the PRC's position can be measured. However, as a nation's position within the hierarchy of international order is a somewhat subjective matter, this thesis aims to formulate a position using UNSC voting data. By collecting data on how the PRC voted, it is possible to assess its position within the UNSC by then contrasting it with other members of the UNSC.

This thesis therefore builds on the hypothesis that, a nation that makes contributions to UNPKO will naturally generate soft power on the world stage. How, therefore, does this accumulation of soft power manifest itself at an institution such as the UN Security Council? This thesis will show that it is through voting behaviour, relating to the issue of sovereignty, that the PRC's soft power can be adjudged and can used as one explanation for the PRC's shift at the UNSC.

A member at the UN Security Council with little soft power will be unable to assert its agenda at the council meetings and in turn will adopt a policy of disengagement and obstructiveness. This assumption is supported by the work of Ian Hurd, Peter Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson, who claim that the agenda of the UN Security Council is dictated by the wishes of permanent council members on what they deem of international importance. Additionally, permanent members' right to veto not only affects the passage of resolutions but can also block issues from being on the agenda with the threat of its use of veto. [20] However, as Bennis Phyllis adds, a nation requires power, on top of just the right to veto, to be able to credibly support its agenda.[21]

For a permanent member such as the PRC, their agenda can be ascertained from their own foreign policy, and it would be assumed that any resolution that goes against the PRC's foreign policy, such as the PRC's strict adherence to Westphalian sovereignty and encouraging respect for it in the international community, will be met with an obstructive

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[20] See; Hurd, Ian. "Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council." In, *Global Governance*, (Vol. 8, Iss.1, 2002), pp.35–51. And; Wallensteen, Peter and Patrik Johansson. "Security Council Decisions in Perspective". In, *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*, ed. David M. Malone. (London: Lynne Rienner Publications, 2004), pp. 17–33.

[21] See; Bennis, Phyllis. "United Nations Remains a U.S. Tool." In, *Peace Review* (Vol. 8, no. 2, 1996), pp.279-282.

vote at the Security Council. Consequently, the amount of soft power that the PRC wields at the UN Security Council will affect its approach to voting in the institution, and the amount of soft power it has is dependent on its engagement in UNPKO.

Thus, it should be possible to treat the PRC's voting record at the UNSC as a dependent variable, and its foreign policy, specifically regarding UNPKO contributions, and the consequent soft power obtained as the independent variable. Henceforth, this thesis will engage in statistical analysis of the PRC's voting record data at the UNSC - the dependent variable – and contrast it with the PRC's foreign policy and position with regards to Westphalian sovereignty to create a link between the two data sets. Following on from this analysis, the sudden contribution of PRC UNPKO personnel – the independent variable – and consequent soft power generated from it, will be investigated and used to determine whether it has played a role in the PRC shift in the UNSC.

In order to assess the attitude the PRC has towards the issue of sovereignty and the perceived role that the PRC wishes to see from UNPKO, it will be necessary to use qualitative research to analyse official documents released by the government on such issues. This can be done by looking at White Papers, such as the 2000 White Paper titled *The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue*, that have been released by the CPC over the years when dealing directly with the issue of sovereignty. [22]

Furthermore, the Constitution of the PRC will be assessed to clearly outline where the country stands on the principles of sovereignty. This will be shown when looking at the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence* policy that the country has adopted as the bedrock for its definition on what is to be understood by the phrase sovereignty. [23] Both of the above types of source should never be used as a basis for the definition of sovereignty as a universal principle, but rather, they should be used to understand specifically the PRC's approach and attitude towards the issue and consequently their settled upon definition of the principle.

The benefit of using these documents is that they are straight from the source and so cannot be disputed for their authenticity and credibility. However, as is true with all states over the course of history, what is declared publicly as a set of principles and policies on

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[22] White Paper—The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," *Taiwan Affairs Office and The Information Office of the State Council*, (issued. February 21, 2000), Via, *http://www.taiwandocuments.org/white.htm.*, [Accessed: 18/07/2019].

[23] *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, (Adopted: 4 December 1982), available via, *http://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution.html.*, [Accessed 15/07/2019].

which the state stands, in practice, do not always match up with the actions taken by said state.

While on one hand this remains a problem with the use of these official documents when assessing the PRC's true intentions, it is at least possible to check if the rhetoric of the PRC matches with its actions when viewing the voting process at the UNSC. Quantitative data analysis will be conducted using the voting records of UNSC meetings which are all published online and can be found in the *United Nations Digital Library*. The quality and degree of detail varies widely when it comes to online published material. During the years with which this study is concerned, the Security Council voted on 1287 occasions.[24] Moreover, between 1971-1991 there were 433 voting sessions; the total increased by almost 100 per cent in almost half as many year with 854 session between 1991-2004.[25] An initial issue facing this research is the fact that the UNSC votes are recorded in prose, and no data table is available to quickly view the results therefore requires individual assessment of the meetings' minutes. This makes it difficult for an academic study of this size to view the records on draft resolutions as well, and so only passed resolutions will be assessed, as it is on these resolutions that a UNSC member submits its final position on a given issue.

Similarly, attempting to understand the reasoning behind every vote cast by the PRC in this period is not practical - this is due to the inability to see all information and reasoning behind decision making from individuals at the top of the PRC's foreign policy creation process. Instead, the issue on which the vote was being had will be recorded, and the vote cast by PRC representatives will be catergorised. While this means the depth of analysis is not as full as is theoretically possible, it allows for a general rule of thumb to be established on PRC voting patterns and intentions with relation to peacekeeping and the issue of sovereignty, an analysis which has not been conducted before.

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[24] See; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Via, *https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=en&cc=Voting+Data&p=&f=&rm=&ln=en&sf=&so=d&rg=50&c=Voting+Data&c=&of=hb&fti=0&fct__2=Security+Council&fct__9=Vote&fti=0&fct__2=Security+Council*. [Accessed: 24/7/2019].
[25] Ibid.

Chapter 1: Theoretical and conceptual framework

This thesis will be based around the theoretical framework of the sovereignty debate, voting-power literature, power, and the concept of peacekeeping. Understanding these concepts and theories is needed to establish the theoretical and conceptual framework in which this research is based.

Krasner's sovereignty debate

The topic of state sovereignty is well entrenched in international relations literature today, and has been researched, written and argued about since in the 1980s; However, it has not always been this way. R. B. J. Walker truly opened up the topic for further discussion with his landmark work *State Soveriernty, Global Civilization, and the Rearticulation of Political Space* (1988) which discredited assumption that state sovereignty would soon be a thing of the past.[26]

Following Walker's work, the debate around sovereignty in international relations literature remained split, primarily between *realists* and *liberal interdependence theorists*, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and was meticulously categorised and archived by Janice Thomson in an *International Studies Quarterly* article in 1995.[27] However, the main breakthrough in state sovereignty theory in international relations truly came with Stephen Krasner's seminal work *Sovereignty: Organised Hypocricy* (1999) which formally outlined the four fundamental concepts of sovereignty in international relations, hitherto undifferentiated from one another.[28]

Krasner categorised the four types of sovereignty as such: international legal sovereignty – referring to the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between two territorial entities that have formal juridical independence; Westphalian sovereignty – referring to political organisation on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures

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[26] Walker, Rob, B. J., *State Sovereignty, Global Civilization, and the Rearticulation of Political Space*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Center of International Studies; World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper, no. 18., 1988).

[27] Thomson, Janice, E., "State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research". In, *International Studies Quarterly*. (Vol. 39, No. 2, June, 1995), pp.213-233.

[28] Krasner, Stephen, D., *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1999).

within a single territory;[29] Domestic sovereignty – referring to the formal organisation of political authority within the state and their ability to regulate control within the borders of their own polity[30]; Interdependence sovereignty – referring to the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of resources, capital and information across the border of their state.[31] It is on the basis of Krasner's differentiations that *sovereignty* as a topic has been categorised henceforth.[32] As such, this thesis will use the framework of Westphalian sovereignty outlined by Krasner when discussing the topic of sovereignty as a whole. This has been done so as to avoid confusion when referring to the sovereignty of the PRC in an international context, while also staying true to the PRC's own functional understanding of the term *sovereignty* during the period from 1971-2004, which will be explained in the first chapter of this thesis. Therefore, Westphalian sovereignty remains the primary theoretical framework that this thesis will work from and whether the PRC practices *de facto* sovereignty from a domestic or interdependent point of view is an issue for further discussion and research outside of this thesis.

Theoretical framework of power

A crucial aspect of this study is the need to endeavor to understand how nation states use power to influence others in multilateral organisations such as the United Nations. In order to understand how this process occurs, not only must power itself be defined, but it must also be catergorised. Having, obtaining, and using power will be defined as having the ability to influence the decision making and behaviour of others in order to achieve the outcomes that you wish to see come about. This thesis will follow the definition of power as outlined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. in his book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*'. By definition, power can be exercised in several ways: coercion with threats; coercion and carrot-on-a-stick style leading with financial payments; or through attracting others to what you want via instilling into them your own aims and strategy.[33]

In the sphere of international relations theory, the 'national power' approach is the simplest way to measure when sizing up a nation state. Supporters of this approach measure

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[29] International legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty involve issues of authority and legitimacy, but not control.
[30] Domestic sovereignty involves both authority and control of a state within its own polity.
[31] Interdependence sovereignty is exclusively concerned with the issue of control of the state, and not authority, to regulate movement across its borders.
[32] Ibid., pp.3-4.
[33] Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.* (London: Basic Books, 1990), p.2.

power as being directly linked with the possession of resources deemed critical for successful power projection and national protection.[34] The variables used to measure national power are categorised as being naturally and socially inherent in a nation state. As such, a nation's geography, natural resources and population affects the nation's natural national power, whereas, a nation's ideology, political institutions and stability, and its physical military force, all helps make up its social national power.[35] Using this approach would suggest that any nation with an abundance of both natural and societal national power would by definition be a powerful geo-political nation, however, this is evidently not always the case. The shortfalls of the national power definition can be explained when factoring in a nation's 'soft power'.

The term soft power is a relatively new term applied to states' actions in relation to foreign policy. The term has been developed and built upon since its first utterance in Nye's seminal work "*Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*".[36] Soft power can be catergorised as the attraction through aims and strategy in the form of power exercises, with 'hard power' instead being more closely linked with the coercion through 'carrot-on-a-stick and threats' power exercise catergorisations. Soft power is a premise substantiated by its analogues and antithetical position in relation to hard power; that is, while hard power is exerted through coercive means, specifically through expression of a state's military and economic might with the intention to influence others, soft-power instead focuses on a attracting others to align themselves with their preferences, goals and aims by using such channels as culture, political values, policies, *et cetera*.[37] Furthermore, as Nye explains, nations with higher levels of soft power are able to exert a greater degree of influence over other nations that would otherwise have to utilise a relatively larger amount of military and economic power.[38]

On the other hand, this is not to say that military and economic power themselves cannot also be sources of soft power in the right context. For instance, a nation using the logistics and manpower of its military to aid in humanitarian and disaster relief and general

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[34] Tellis, Ashley J., Janice Bially, Christopher Layne, and Melissa McPherson., *Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), pp.16-23.
[35] Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*. (NewYork: Pearson, Longman, 2009), p.60.
[36] Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*., p.2.
[37] Nye, Jospeh S. Jr, *Soft Power: The means to Success in World Politics*., x.
[38] Ibid., p.26

peacekeeping has the added benefit of projecting the potential reach and power of a nation at short notice to other nations globally.

What makes soft power unique?

Soft power as a theoretical concept implies that, by taking on increased importance and relevance, a state can in turn increase its own soft power and use this newly acquired soft power to implement its own agenda.[39] Consequently, due to the advantages that controlling large amounts of soft power has on a state's own position within the international order – such as increased legitimacy and credibility - many countries have recognised the need to utilise soft power tools and resources so as to achieve this outcome.[40] In this sense, soft power is increasingly becoming as important to states in achieving their foreign policy on the world stage as hard power has been to states in centuries past.

However, unlike hard power, soft power is considerably harder to conceptualise and measure. This is since individual states for the most part seek to achieve different objectives by using their soft power. Consequently, as Shin-wa Lee notes, "scholars… have found it difficult to build a [universal] theoretical model that explains how soft power tools and resources are developed and used [on a global stage]".[41] This thesis aims to tackle this hole in soft power theory by categorising peacekeeping as one of the major tools for gaining and implementing soft power in the context of the UNSC.

How soft power works through the UN

The matter of peacekeeping seems to contradict the nature of soft power, due to it being a method in which countries can directly channel their military and financial powers. However, in this thesis, the action of peacekeeping is represented by the efforts of the UN, a self-proclaimed non-governmental organisation, which uses the military and financial powers of its member states to conduct peacekeeping under its own banner. This leads to the question

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[39] Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.* (London: Basic Books, 1990), pp. x, 2.
[40] Lee, S.W. "The Theory and Reality of Soft Power: Practical Approaches in East Asia". In, Lee S.J., Melissen J., eds., *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*. (Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011), pp. 11-12.
[41] Ibid., p.12.

of whether multilateral organisations like the UN itself are capable of projecting hard or soft power.

The UN is certainly capable of projecting the power of its organisation thanks to the powers given to it by individual member states.[42] However, with no forces of its own and a small budget reliant on the economic contributions from its members, the UN has by definition only as much hard power as it can muster from its member states. Its formation in 1945 was solely at the behest of its member states in which it was to serve their agendas for the betterment of world peace and cooperation. Furthermore, as will be discussed later, Article 2.7 of its Charter categorically protects and shields the legal sovereignty of its member.[43]

Likewise, The UN does not exert soft power so much as its members exert their soft power through it, under the guise and banner of the UN itself. On the face of it, this will leave many people with the belief that soft power is being originated and channeled by the UN itself, but in fact, given how dependent the UN is on its member states, the real power lies with the member states themselves.

This is not to say that the UN lacks any soft power projection abilities of its own. Culture and ideology are the only power resources that the UN is capable of generating on its own terms. Because of this, the UN has heavily exported its diplomatic cultural pluralism model and created what has been coined a Cultural Diplomacy at its headquarters in Geneva. Cultural Diplomacy has been accredited with "bridge building and facilitating cooperation and partnership" and therefore it enlarges the cultural landscape by creating new artistic and linguistics bonds; And "by promoting understanding between countries and peoples, cultural diplomacy helps bridge divides and create respect among cultures".[44] Despite this, UN soft power does not permeate through the UNSC, given that the UNSC is a council of its members, and not the face of the institution as a collective whole.

However, the UNSC voting records are an important yard stick for measuring the varying influence of global nation states' soft power projection, thanks to the UN's universality, legal framework, and relative attractiveness which does give its votes and

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[42] For a short list of legal powers, see; United Nations. "Functions and Powers of the General Assembley"., Via *http://www.un.org/ga/about/background.shtml*. [Accessed 18/05/2019].

[43] Nye, Joseph S. "The Soft Power of the United Nations". *Project Syndicate*. (November, 2007). Via, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-soft-power-of-the-united-nations?barrier=accesspaylog. [Accessed, 18/05/2019].

[44] Doeser, James and Melissa Nisbett. *The Art of Soft Power: A Study of Cultural Diplomacy at the UN Office in Geneva*. (King's College London, 2017), p.3.

pronouncements an unparalleled level of legitimacy in the global geopolitical landscape.[45] For instance, the PRC by the 1990s learnt to value the UN for its attractiveness, soft power resources and utility, which, even if they vary over time and have their limits, nevertheless grant governments a platform for their message, while also keeping them in check with the globally accepted norms of governance.[46]

How UNPKOs create soft power for members of the UNSC

In the context of UNPKO, soft power can be gained by successfully supporting missions through humanitarian, security, and financial means. This is because not only does successful contribution reduce the pressure on the UN institution as a whole, and therefore all members within said institution, but because it also shows a positive attitude and willingness to engage with the principles of the UN – international peace and security - and by association the wider international community.[47] In order to explain this further, and understand how the PRC itself can gain soft power, it is useful to look at historical examples where soft power has been cumulated from UNPKO for other UNSC member states.

Sticking to East Asia, the author Sook Jong Lee successfully outlined the Republic of Korea's (RoK) triumph in garnering importance and influence on the world stage thanks to its soft power, in the book *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia* (2011).[48] Lee shines light on the *Segyehwa* (Globalisation) slogan and policy that was utilized by Kim Young-sam's government 1993-1998 which saw to extend South Korean influence on the international stage through the means of soft power. Coined "International Contribution Diplomacy" it involved increased engagement with institutions such as UN Peacekeeping. Resultantly, because of success on this front, the RoK adopted the nickname 'Global Korea' and emerged onto the world stage with a newfound identity and legitimacy.[49] It comes as no surprise therefore that it was also in 1993 that the RoK first engaged in UNPKO by sending a

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[45] Nye, Joseph S. JR., *Soft Power: The means to Success in World Politics*. p.95.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Fukushima, Akiko. "Modern Japan and the Quest for Attractive Power". In, Lee S.J., Melissen J., eds., *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*. (Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011), p.73.
[48] Lee S.J., Melissen J., eds., *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*. (Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011), pp.139-150.
[49] Ibid.

battalion of 504 military personal to the ongoing mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and since then has sent a further c.11 0000 peacekeeping personnel to 17 different countries.[50]

Additionally, the positive light in which UNPKO are viewed by the international community, and the soft power that they generate, can support the national interests of a country too. An example of this can be seen in the normalisation of militarism. As highlighted by Michael Edward Walsh and Jeremy Taylor, Japan over the last half a century has been able to expand its 'military' thanks to its involvement in peacekeeping missions such as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). This is because, as a member of the UN, it is obliged to contribute to peacekeeping missions with personnel, financial backing and military means. However, the exercise of a Japanese military is strictly forbidden in its constitution, which was reformulated after the Second World War.[51] Consequently, the positivity of soft power of Japanese image in the international community has allowed it to develop its military capacity domestically where it otherwise would not have been able to.

Soft power gains by the PRC during UNPKO

The best example of soft power gains from UNPKO can be seen when viewing the PRC's largest commitment to a UNPKO in the 1990s with UNTAC in 1992. UNTAC symbolised the biggest split with the CPC's principles to date given its status as largest UNPKO ever undertaken; The mission at its peak had 15 900 military personnel, 3500 civilian police, 1150 civilians, and 465 UN volunteers from 45 participating countries, all under the banner of the UN.[52] However, as scholars argue, UNTAC was unique in that unlike many UNPKO to date the mission was orchestrated on the basis of consent of the main belligerents and adhered to the principles of peacekeeping neutrality, while simultaneously undermining the sovereignty of the Cambodian government by assuming administrative control over all government functions.[53] Despite this, given the administrative power of the UN, and the sheer scale of the operation, UNTAC acts as a primary case study for this period to evaluate how soft power manifests itself through UNPKO.

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[50] Roehrig, Terence. *"South Korea, Foreign Aid, and UN Peacekeeping: Contributing to International Peace and Security as a Middle Power.".* In, *Korea Observer*, (Vol. 44. No. 4.,Winter 2013), pp.634-638.
[51] Taylor, Jeremy, and Michael Edward Walsh. "UN Operations in Africa Provide a Mechanism for Japan's Military Normalization Agenda". In, *The National Bureau of Asian Research.* (Jan. 4, 2014).
[52] Zürcher, Christoph. *30 Years of Chinese Peacekeeping.*, p.21.
[53] See; Zürcher, Christoph. *30 Years of Chinese Peacekeeping.*, p.21.; Fravel, M. Taylor. "China's Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Operations Since 1989". P.1110

As will be shown in Table 2, some 488 personnel were on mission on behalf of the PRC during the entirety of UNTAC. The objective of the mission, and at face value, for the PRC personnel, was to restore peace and civil government by guaranteeing free and fair election and the ability to construct a new constitution for the country.[54]

PRC personnel were told to keep a low profile during the entire mission, in accordance with the current foreign policy which saw to build ties with the West and not antagonise the US, to promote the 'Charm offensive' and encourage the wider international community it was to become a peaceful great power.[55] The personnel contributed were made up of mainly military engineers and due to the PRC significant contributions they made up 19% of UNTAC engineering capacities.[56] The Chinese engineers that were fixing the roads in the region were lauded for their "diligent work ethic" by locals and officials alike.[57] The PRC was also accredited with successfully helping reconstruct a large degree of Cambodian infrastructure repairing four airports, four highways totalling 640 kilometres, building or rebuilding 47 bridges and completing many other service projects.[58]

Furthermore, their "friendly, smiling [and] diligent" behaviour when on mission resonated with Cambodians who associated the Chinese engineers with the PRC as a whole.[59] In contrast, Bulgarian personnel who acted "rudely" on mission contributed to a poor view of Bulagarian efforts, tarring the whole nation among Cambodians.[60]

Consequently, perceptions of the PRC transformed in Cambodia from being an intervening and 'irresponsible power', owing to their previous support of the Khmer Rouge, to being viewed positively by both local populations and government officials for keeping the peace and making amends.[61]

By changing local opinion and those of the ruling classes in Cambodia, soft power had been generated by the PRC leading to stabilised relations with a neighbouring country on

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[54] Zürcher, Christoph. *30 Years of Chinese Peacekeeping*., p.22.
[55] Ibid., p.23.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Survey conducted with Cambodian villagers, See; Hirono, Miwa. *China's Evolving Approach to Peacekeeping.* p.92.
[58] White Paper – China's National Defence", *Information Office of the State Council Of the People's Republic of China.* (Beijing; July, 1998), Section IV. Via, *http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/5.4.htm#4,.* [Accessed: 23/7/2019].
[59] Hirono, Miwa. *China's Evolving Approach to Peacekeeping.* p.92.
[60] Whitworth, Sandra. "Gender, Race and the Politics of Peacekeeping'". In, Edward Moxon-Browne, (ed.), *A Future for Peacekeeping?,* (London: Macmillan, 1998), p.180.
[61] Hirono, Miwa. *China's Evolving Approach to Peacekeeping.* pp.88-94.

its southern border and in turn supporting its own national interests. It is no surprise then that it was also in 1992 that the PRC submitted its largest number of abstentions at the UNSC.[62]

Voting-power literature on abstentions and nonparticipation

In voting-power literature, the significance of the use of the abstention at the UN Security Council is widely accepted. As E.M. Bolger, D.S. Felsenthal, and M. Machover, the leading theorists and academics in the field of voting-power literature, all attest: within the UN Security Council - when dealing with non-procedural matters - abstention, nonparticipation or absence of a permanent member of the UN Security Council has not in practice been regarded as equivalent to the casting of a veto, should not be equated as such, and therefore should be categorised differently.[63]

In practice, as of 1946, an abstention from voting on non-procedural matter at the UN Security Council by a permanent member is not to be interpreted as a veto. Additionally, since 1950, the same understanding is applied to nonparticipation and a voluntary absence in the voting process when concerning permanent members.[64] In the case of non-permanent members, an abstention has the same effect as a 'No' vote, however, when it comes to considering the intent behind an abstention of a permanent member, it is subjective and contextual; Therefore, an abstention and nonparticipation are considered *tertium quid* to a 'Yes' or 'No' vote.[65] Essentially, since the UN Security Council's membership expansion in 1966, nine affirmative votes out of a total of 15 are required to pass a resolution at the UN Security Council and as such an abstention or nonparticipation would not block a resolution from passing should it have the required votes, in contrast with a veto vote, which would block said resolution. M. Holler and H. Nurmi confirmed this theoretical understanding by showing that non-procedural matters have passed often without the assent of at least one of the five permanent UN Security Council members:

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[62] See Figure 4.
[63] See; Bolger, E.M., 'A value for games with *n* players and *r* alternatives'. In, *International Journal of Game Theory*, (Iss.22, 1993), pp.319–334. And; Felsenthal, D.S. and M. Machover. 'Models and reality: The curious case of the absent abstention', In, M.J. Holler and G. Owen (eds.), *Power Indices and Coalition Formation*, (Boston; Dordrecht; London;: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), pp. 87–103.
[64] Holler, Manfred J., and Hannu Nurmi. *Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After.* (New York; Berlin;: Springer, 2013), P.81.
[65] Ibid.

"[Between] 1946-97, this happened in the case of 300 resolutions – well over 28% of the total 1068 resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council… On 15 December 1973, Resolution 344 was carried by the votes of the non-permanent members, with all *five* permanent members abstaining or not participating… [and] the US has long made it a firm rule never to vote for any resolution condemning Israel; but occasionally such resolutions are adopted with the US abstaining."[66]

With this understood, this thesis will build-upon the assumption that abstentions and nonparticipation by permanent members is of far greater symbolic and contextual value than a simple 'No' vote, but does not hold the practical effects of a veto which categorically blocks a resolution. Additionally, an abstention vote and nonparticipation, while both being categorised as *tertium quid* in the voting process, reflect different intent. On the one hand, an abstention is a clear objection to a proposed resolution but a willful engagement with the UN system, whereas on the other hand, non-participation reflects a sense of disillusionment with the voting process and subject and therefore a clear objection to the UN system as a whole and the issue at hand.

Voting-power literature on veto powers

The differentiation between the right to veto and the choice to abstain or refusal to participate, is a stark one. While the reason behind an abstention or nonparticipation can be assessed in a variety of different ways due to the contextual nature of such a vote, and as such is harder to pin down, a vote to veto is far more conclusive. This is due to the fact that a veto vote is nearly always explained by the state that voted in such a manner in the minutes of the meeting at the UN Security Council on the day. For instance, as will be explored further in this thesis, the PRoC's decision to veto resolution S/1997/18 in 1997 was explained to the council by the PRC Ambassador to the UN Security Council Qin Huasun and the reason for the veto was clearly explained.[67]

The idea behind the granting of the veto to permanent members evolved directly from the fact that for many of the Security Council's resolutions to be a success it would require the military, financial and political backing of the current super powers.[68] Therefore, extra

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[66] Holler, Manfred J., and Hannu Nurmi. *Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After*. p.82, fn18.
[67] United Nations, Security Council. *3730th Meeting*. S/PV.3730, (January 10th, 1997)., p.20. Via, *https://undocs.org/s/PV.3730*. [Accessed: 22/05/2019].
[68] Winter, Eyal. "Voting and Vetoing". In, *The American Political Science Review*. (Vol. 90, Iss. 10., December, 1996), p.813

power is granted onto permanent members within the UN Security Council due to their larger presence in the international order. Eyal Winters (1996) also comments that in voting-power literature, the power of the veto is considered especially formative when assessing the power of permanent member states in the Security Council as a whole.[69] "One way in which Permanent members… acquire their excessive power… [is] by vetoing proposals repeatedly on the same issue" as it takes away the power from non-permanent members to set their own agenda in the council.[70] As such, a permanent member such as the PRC is able to set their own agenda on the international stage by vetoing resolutions on the grounds of one specific issue.

<div align="center">The concept of peacekeeping in a UN framework</div>

The framework for maintaining and upholding international peace and security from the perspective of the UN is explained in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VI, titled 'Pacific Settlement Of Disputes', acts as a manual to its members on how to deal with conflicts in a peaceful manner be it through "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice".[71] Chapter VII, titled 'Acton With Respect To Threats To The Peace, Breaches Of The Peace, And Acts of Aggression', then gives the legal basis and fundamental mission goals needed for any physical intervention in a conflict.[72] It is no coincidence that Chapter VI in particular precedes Chapter VII as it conveys the message that a peaceful settlement should always be sought first for any conflict in line with the values of the UN – dialogue, freedom of expression, tolerance and peaceful coexistence.[73]

Despite the extensive commentary on how to uphold and maintain 'the peace' by non-military and military means, the term 'peacekeeping' itself is never used throughout the entirety of the UN Charter. The reasons for this are not clear, but the commitment to uphold the principles of peacekeeping are at the basis of the Charter itself, with Article 1 requiring

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[69] Ibid., pp.813-920.
[70] Ibid., p.820.
[71] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, (24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI), Chapter VI.
[72] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, (24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI), Chapter VII.
[73] Doeser, James and Melissa Nisbett. *The Art of Soft Power: A Study of Cultural Diplomacy at the UN Office in Geneva.*(King's College London, 2017), p.3

the UN to "maintain international peace and security".[74] Because of this, peacekeeping has become the UN's largest task despite the omission of the word itself from the Charter.[75]

Peacekeeping operations under the UN banner need to be differentiated from its closely aligned, but fundamentally different in character, international peacebuilding operations. Both types of operations are individual pillars that are often referred to in more general colloquial terms as 'global peace missions'. The UN itself does this when associating the terms to general engagement strategies it employs throughout the globe.[76] Zhao Lei defines the differences as such:

> "Peacekeeping is UN led and/or mandated to monitor ceasefires and/or to support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements… peacebuilding is a much broader concept, extending the peace function to a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms conducted by the UN and other national or non-national actors, in order to address both the immediate consequences and root causes of a conflict.".[77]

Conclusion – Combining realism and liberalism

To best assess the PRC's shift from isolationism to engagement, Krasner's realist theory outlined in the sovereignty debate, and Nye's liberalist theory which is outlined by the positioning of soft power as a tool for exerting influence, have been combined.

Traditionally, as schools of thought, both realism and liberalism have been considered to juxtapose each other. The former is considered as being a more pessimistic view on the functioning of the international system, and the latter as depicting a more optimistic view.[78] However, in this instance the two theories can co-exist and both be used to explain the transition of the PRC from being an isolationist state in 1971, to that of an engaged and active

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[74] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, (24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI), Chapter I, Article 1.
[75] Howard, Lise M. "Peacekeeping, Peace enforcement and UN Reform". In, *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.* (Vol. 16, No. 2, 2015)*,* p.10.
[76] The UN lists ongoing operations generally on its website as such. See,; United Nations Peacekeeping. "Peacekeeping operations: led by the United Nations Department of Peace Operations". Via,. *https://www.unmissions.org/.*, (Retrieved, 11/05/2019).
[77] Lei, Zhao. "Two Pillars of China's Global Peace Engagement Strategy: UN Peacekeeping and International Peacebuilding". In, Lanteigne, Marc, and Miwa Hirono. China's Evolving Approach to Peacekeepin. (London & New York; Routledge, 2012), p,102.
[78] Sleat, Matt. "Introduction: The Resurgence of Realist Political Theory." In, *Liberal Realism: A Realist Theory of Liberal Politics*. Manchester University Press, 2015, pp, 1-20.

state on the world stage by 2004. This is because soft power can be used by nations to compete with one another without having to directly infringe on other nations' sovereignty. This is possible due to the addition of voting power at the UNSC. Consequently, the UN and UNPKO, are the playing field and vehicle in which nations can flex their soft power and directly confront other nations without having to infringe upon their sovereignty directly.

Chapter 2 – From isolationism to modernisation at the UNSC: 1971-1989

Introduction to the world stage

The PRC's sudden admittance to the China Seat in October 1971 propelled the country into an institution that was already a well-established and functioning bureaucratic machine for the international community. As such, the PRC was distanced and uneducated on the complex system of the UN with its structures, procedures, etiquette and political environment being alien to their diplomats.[79] Furthermore, the PRC was the only member of the permanent five (P5) that was still classified as a developing nation. While this put it on good terms with the 'Third World' it hindered its ability to dedicate adequate resources for the UN so as to participate actively and on the same level as the other P5.[80]

On top of the limitations that befell the PRC at the time, there was also a disinterest from Beijing towards the process of the UNSC as a whole in the initial decade of its membership. Given the centralised governance style of the CPC, this allowed for a greater degree of freedom in policy implementation for individual actors that would otherwise be strictly controlled by the central committee.[81] An example of an actor that benefitted from this initial approach was the PRC's first Permanent Representative, Huang Hua, who held the position from 1971-1976.

Given the PRC's relative ignorance into the workings of the UNSC meant that it adopted a 'wait-and-see' approach to proceedings.[82] Additionally, its main principles were considered and chosen because of its developing status, its tentative approach to the UN originating from its ignorance and can be evaluated as being adopted from its interpretation of the UN Charter. Ergo, the PRC initially insisted on the principles of sovereignty equality and strict non-interference in international affairs, aid commitments by developed countries

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[79] He, Yin. "China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations". In, *Institute for Security and Development Policy*. (Asia Paper, 2007), p.19.
[80] Ibid.
[81] 81 Liu, Wei. *China in the United Nations.* (Hackensack, New Jersey: World Century, 2014), p.6.
[82] Guihong, Zhang, and Feng Yugiao. "China's UN Diplomacy: 1971-2011". In, *Strategic Analysis*. (Vol. 35, No.6., 2011), p.975.

to developing ones, and the right of states to develop and exist on their own terms, again, linking with its principle of defending sovereignty rights.[83]

Sovereignty as a vehicle for protectionism

Because of varying cultural, ethical, social, political, and economic structures, of each independent member state within the UN, large discrepancies exist between individual nation states, and collective and multilateral decision making ideals. This was acknowledged by the UN founders in the UN Charter by omitting a definitive stance on where it is acceptable to intervene in a conflict affecting persons within the border of a single nation-state. There is no section within the UN charter that says it is acceptable for the UN to disrespect a nation states sovereignty, and in fact, as established in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Articles 2.4 and 2.7 in Chapter I of the Charter protect the right of nation states' sovereignty.[84] Furthermore, Chapter VII directly addresses the way in which peacekeeping actions can be taken for "international"[85] conflicts, under articles 39, 42, 43, 47, 48 and 51, but never for solely national conflicts. Therefore, conflicts such as civil wars do not provide legal authorization for peacekeeping actions to be undertaken under the framework of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It is on these grounds that the PRC establishes its stance on protecting sovereignty for nation states and it is from this viewpoint that the actions taken by the PRC since the UN's creation, can be understood.

This attitude and approach can be labelled as upholding the 'status quo' of the UN charter, Chapter I, sections 2.4 and 2.7, and is infamously undertaken by the P5 members of the PRC and Russia.[86] Under this approach, the UN Charter's text is taken literally and used as legal framework and as a benchmark for decisions and conclusions; if a resolution contradicts the legal framework or text of the UN Charter, it is not acceptable and should not be adopted. The PRC claims that the reason it takes this stance is due to the clear-cut consensus that can be drawn from decisions made on the basis of the status quo and it would therefore minimize confusion, contradictions and abuse of powers by sovereign nation states

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[83] Ibid., p.977.
[84] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, (24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI) Chapter I, Article 2.4., 2.7.
[85] See; United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, (24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI), Chapter VII, Articles: 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 51.
[86] This includes the current Russian Federation and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

within the multilateral system.[87] However, as Bruno Simma outlines, there are a number of downsides to this approach, the most pressing being that this stance limits the UN's ability to act in the face of humanitarian crises.[88] Additionally, Jane Stromseth highlights the decision taken by both Russia and the PRC to block humanitarian peacekeeping intervention in Kosovo in 1999 which went against the opinion and support of all members of the UN, bar Namibia, who instead hoped to intervene to stop the humanitarian crisis from unfurling any further.[89] Thus, it can be deduced that the PRC's commitments to the principles of sovereignty are, at times, of higher importance to the state than humanitarian crises and the PRC will justify its decision with the legal framework of the UN Charter.

The PRC's stance towards sovereignty and non-interference by foreign agents has been clearly defined by the country with the adoption of the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence* included in the Constitution of the country. The *Five Principles*, which were agreed upon by the PRC and India following a dispute over Tibetan sovereignty in 1954, are found as follows in the preamble of the PRC's Constitution:

> "China adheres to an independent foreign policy as well as to the five principles of *mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity*, *mutual non-aggression*, *non-interference in each other's internal affairs*, *equality and mutual benefit*, and *peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries*".[90]

It is this section from the Constitution, which acts as the supreme law for all of the PRC, that the countries stance towards sovereignty can be derived – a state's sovereignty is absolute, and it is the right only of the state itself to open up its polity to others.

This attitude and support of absolute sovereignty rights has been one of the primary pillars of Chinese foreign policy ever since the first systematic translation of international law into Chinese following the Second Opium War in the 19th Century.[91] Furthermore, despite

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[87] Stromseth, Jane. "Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change". In, *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political dilemmas.* ed., Holzgrefe, J. L., and Robert O. Keohane., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.253.

[88] Simma, Bruno. "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects". In, *The European Journal of International Law*, (Volume 10, 1999), pp.5-6.

[89] Stromseth, Jane. "Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change"., p.238.

[90] *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, (Adopted: 4 December 1982), available via, *http://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution.html*., [Accessed 15/07/2019].

[91] Carrai, Maria Adele. "Will the Belt and Road Initiative change China's stance on sovereignty and non-interference". In, *GlobalTaxGov*. (8th February, 2019). Via,

undergoing three transformations since 1954, in 1975, 1978, and 1982, and up to the present day another eight revisions thereafter, the phrasing above has remained the same throughout. This shows the strict adherence to the Westphalian model of sovereignty that the PRC adopted and has remained committed to over the years, while also neatly defining their position on the issue of sovereignty in the groundings of constitutional law. On top of this fact, the UN Charter's defence of these sovereignty principles means that not only is this the principle of the PRC, but it is the *de jure* principle of international law and the wider international community.

Another issue which further outlines the PRC's unique position on sovereignty rights relates to the ongoing dispute with the RoC. For the PRC, the term sovereignty is understood as having been able to have absolute and final authority and legitimacy on what occurs within its own polity. This stance can be sourced from the PRC's *One-China Principle*, which again is outlined in the Chinese Constitution.[92] The principle itself states that the PRC is the sole rightful government of all China and any other government claiming so is illegitimate. Additionally, no foreign country could recognise both countries simultaneously and so must choose between the PRC and the RoC. This was once more formally outlined in a White Paper from the PRC in 2000 titled "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue", again reiterating such principles.[93] It is because of this, that the PRC used the sovereignty debate between 1971-1976 as a protective principle on the world stage.

Voluntary and protective isolationism: PRC voting records 1971-1976

The PRC's accession to the China seat came at a time of distinct conflict for the PRC as a whole. Two years prior, Sino-Soviet relations had been tested to their deepest degree with tense armed conflict along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 following a border dispute over sovereign rights for China's northern territory.[94] As a result, the PRC found itself in

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https://globtaxgov.weblog.leidenuniv.nl/2019/02/08/will-the-belt-and-road-initiative-change-chinas-stance-on-sovereignty-and-non-interference/., [Accessed: 16/07/2019].
[92] *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, (Adopted: 4 December 1982), available via, *http://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution.html*., [Accessed 18/07/2019]. And
[93] "White Paper—The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," *Taiwan Affairs Office and The Information Office of the State Council*, (issued. February 21, 2000), Via, *http://www.taiwandocuments.org/white.htm.*, [Accessed: 18/07/2019].
[94] See; Gerson, S. Michael. *The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969.* (Center for Naval Analyses, November, 2010), pp.10-16.

conflict with not only its old allies on its northern border, but also with the United States, which it still saw as an imperialist hegemon, vehemently anti-communist, and therefore another potential threat to the PRC's interests in the Western Pacific and consequently China's own sovereignty in the region.[95] Resultantly, Mao Zedong's CPC adopted a strategy of *Liangge quantou daren* (fighting with two fists) for the PRC, when concerning its outward approach to the international community.[96] In short, the strategy, as described by Joseph Yu-Shek Cheng, "pushed China to confront the two superpowers at the same time [on the international stage]" and led the PRC down a route of direct and open conflict with the two hegemons; where possible the PRC would use the China seat at the UN to disrupt and openly obstruct proceedings within in the UN Security Council at time solely to reduce the influence of the two states.[97]

As mentioned previously, given the CPC's lack of interest and understanding of the UNSC, individual actors were granted more leeway in directing policy as they saw fit. Huang Hua was first to be appointed as Permanent Representative of China at the UN. Hua's previous successes before obtaining this role were similarly with helping establish the PRC's foreign policy. Hua has been accredited as one of the chief architects in re-establishing relations between the PRC and the US which led to Richard Nixon's groundbreaking visit to Beijing in 1972.[98] He was described as being highly effective, a sharp operator, and more than able to hold his own with his peers at the UNSC and most appropriately as "playing a pivotal role in communist China's relations in with the international community".[99] Despite such prominent accolades and adoration in the historiography, evaluations of his time as the Permanent Representative are exceedingly limited in Western literature. However, his approach to the UNSC can be best illustrated by assessing his vote choices on resolutions at the UNSC.

Assessing the voting records in Figure 1 instantly shows a distinct and unique approach to the voting process. Most noticeably, the PRC used the ability to abstain from

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[95] Cheng, Yu-Shuk Joseph, and Franklin Wakung Zhan. "Chinese Foreign Relation Strategies Under Mao and Deng: A Systematic and Comparative Analysis". In, *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*. (Vol. 14, Iss. 3, 1999), p.96.

[96] Cheng, Joseph Yu-shek, and Shi Zhifu. *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Duiwai GuanxiShigao (1949-1964) (A History of the Foreign Relations of the PRC, 1949-1964)*. (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd., 1994), pp.301-316.

[97] Cheng, Yu-Shuk Joseph, and Franklin Wakung Zhan. "Chinese Foreign Relation Strategies Under Mao and Deng: A Systematic and Comparative Analysis"., pp.96-98.

[98] Brown, Kerry. "Huang Hua obituary*". In, *The Guardian*. (November 24, 2010). Via: *https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/25/huang-hua-obituary.*, [Accessed: 29/7/2019]. *Retrieved* 30 August 2015.

[99] Ibid.

voting on eight separate occasions - more so than any other nation on the UNSC.[100] Following on from this, on six of the eight occasions that the PRC chose to abstain, it was the only member of the entire UNSC that abstained.[101] From this it can be deduced that the PRC was adhering to its own principles in conflict with those of the 14 other members. Furthermore, on all six of these resolutions that it voted independently from the rest of the UNSC, the reason for the abstention was for reasons concerning the issues of sovereignty of a member state currently undergoing peacekeeping operations.[102] This vehement differentiation between the PRC and the other members of the UNSC on issues relating to sovereignty and UNPKO reflects the divergent opinion on to what degree a state's sovereignty should be respected in domestic issues and to what degree the international community should be able to intervene.

One such abstention prompted Hua to make a statement to the UNSC in 1973 regarding the recent establishment of UNEF II as a UNPKO in the Middle East:

"[This UNPKO will turn] turn sovereign Arab states in the Middle East into an area of international control…"[103]

Following this remark Hua went on to detail the PRC's opinion on UNPKO and so neatly summarize the contemporary foreign policy position towards peacekeeping:

"China has always been opposed to the dispatch of the so-called 'peacekeeping forces.' We maintain the same position with regard to the present situation in the Middle East. Such a practice can only pave the way for further international intervention and control, with the superpowers as the behind-the-scenes boss."[104]

Samuel Kim evaluated the PRC's approach in the first five years at the UNSC as being accepting of the UN rules and regulations, and not actively resisting resolutions

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[100] All data and figures retrieved from the online UN Library in New York's Archives; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Via, *https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=en&cc=Voting+Data&p=&f=&rm=&ln=en&sf=&so=d&rg=50&c=Voting+Data&c=&of=hb&fti=0&fct__2=Security+Council&fti=0.*, [Retrieved: 17/5/2019].
[101] See; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Resolutions; 315, 324, 334, 338, 343, 349.
[102] See; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Resolutions 315, 324, 334, 343, 349.
[103] See; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council Meeting Minutes: Resolution S/PV. 1750*. (October 25th, 1973), p.2. Via., *https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/828062?ln=en.* [Accessed, 8/8/2019].
[104] Ibid.

through the use of veto, despite clear objection to the principle of them. However, Kim also states how the PRC's participation was "extremely limited… [displaying an approach of] symbolic activism, [and] substantive passivism".[105]

Overall, for this period, the PRC's approach was unique in the international community. The PRC was not afraid to differentiate itself from its colleagues at the UNSC on the principle of sovereignty, which it saw as being the centre point to both its foreign policy and the institution of the UN as a whole. Fundamentally, on nearly 40% of votes held over this period, the PRC either abstained or refused to participate in the voting process, clearly therefore outlining a severe lack of confidence in the process and their position within the UNSC.

A large factor in the PRC's approach, especially in relation to the use of the abstention vote, appears to be down to the involvement of Huang Hua as Permanent Representative. However, in order to adequately reflect this influence, it is necessary to assess the period after Hua stepped down from his position in lieu with a general change of approach to the UNSC in general following 1976.

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[105] Kim, Samuel. "Behavioral Dimensions of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy". In, *China Quarterly* (Vol. 72., 1977), pp.713–742., Via: (Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009).

The People's Republic of China's Voting Pattern: Oct. 1971 - Dec. 1976

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total
■ Number of Votes	6	17	20	22	18	18	101
■ Abstentions	0	2	4	1	0	1	8
■ Nonparticipation	0	3	4	9	7	7	30

■ Number of Votes   ■ Abstentions   ■ Nonparticipation

Figure 1) The People's Republic of China's Voting Pattern: 25th October 1971 – 31st December 1976

Transitioning from Maoism to Dengism: PRC voting records 1977-1981

Mao's death in the autumn of 1976 saw a departure from strict traditional isolationism and the new incumbent head of the CPC, Deng Xiaoping, brought in a new era of modernization and drastic restructuring for the PRC in relation to the domestic economy and many political and social institutions.[106] However, as He points out, even after the Cultural Revolution and reforms being brought in by Xiaoping, in 1978, the PRC's foreign trade volume was a mere $20 Billion USD; So, clearly a change in attitude and policy in relation to economic reform from the CPC still encounters a lag between policy and practice. In the same vein that a lag affect occurs for economic reforms, so too does policy lag at times in the context of voting patterns at the UNSC.

As such, the policy of the PRC between 1977 and 1981 can be viewed as a mass of old Maoist ideals in the *Liangge quantou daren* strategy of the early 1970s, and the new ideals of Xiaoping's government which saw to modernize the PRC and bring it further into the international community.[107] Consequently, the *yitiaoxian* strategy (One United Front Strategy) was adhered to when dealing with the international community. The *yitiaoxian* strategy saw that the PRC would align with its former enemy in the US in order to counteract the Soviet threat on its northern border and effectively uniting with the rest of the world against the Eastern Bloc.[108] While this was the foreign policy of the PRC between 1977-1981, and was accepted by Xiaoping personally, its manifestation in the voting pattern at the UNSC was not too indifferent from the five years prior.[109]

Viewing Figure 2 reveals a number of clear similarities in voting preferences when dealing with the UNSC. Firstly, the choice to engage in a voting type of 'nonparticipation' is nearly the exact same as that of five years prior. Nearly 30% of the types of votes cast by the PRoC were nonparticipation votes, a similar percentage when compared with the nonparticipation votes in Figure 1. This data suggests that while foreign policy changed to an extent within the CPC, the fact that the PRC were newcomers to the UNSC and the

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[106] Kent, Ann. *China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance*. (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p.31.

[107] Cheng, Joseph Yu-shek, and Shi Zhifu. *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Duiwai GuanxiShigao (1949-1964) (A History of the Foreign Relations of the PRC, 1949-1964)*, pp.301-316.

[108] Cheng, Yu-Shuk Joseph, and Franklin Wakung Zhan. "Chinese Foreign Relation Strategies Under Mao and Deng: A Systematic and Comparative Analysis". p..98

[109] Li, Yihu, "Deng Xiaoping and Contemporary China's International Policy". In, *Guoji Zhengzi Yanjiu* (Studies of International Politics)., (Peking University, Vol. 3.,1994), pp.13-18.

international community was a factor that affected voting preferences more during this period.[110]

This point can be further supported when looking at the topic in which a large amount of the nonparticipation votes were cast. From Resolutions 403 to 499, the PRC refused to participate in 33 of them. Of these nonparticipation votes, all 33 were due to conflict with the Security Council's approach and lack of respect for member states' sovereignty which fundamentally went against the PRC's own universal principles on sovereignty.[111] Evidently, despite a mild shift in foreign policy with a general further acceptance and engagement with the UNSC, the PRC still chose to detach itself from proceedings by nonparticipation, particularly on the topic of national sovereignty.

Another interesting aspect of the data is the difference between Figure 1 and Figure 2 when looking at the number of abstentions taken by the PRC. In stark contrast to the first five years, between 1977-1981, the PRC did not abstain on any votes at the UNSC. This trend correlates directly with the fact that Huang Hua left his post at the end of 1976. The incoming representative, Chen Chu, who served from 1977-1980 has a minimal amount of western literature written about him in contrast to his predecessor. This differentiation between Chu and Hua suggests the difference in influence that each character had on other countries at the UNSC and indeed the international community overall. Therefore, looking at the data suggests that induvial actors can have an effect on the voting pattern in relations to abstentions, given that abstentions categorically stopped after 1976, and did not again appear regularly in use until after 1990.

Evaluating this period once again shows that the PRC's voting preferences were quite unique among the P5. Only France and the UK as members of the P5 chose to also use the nonparticipation technique between 1971-1981. France used a nonparticipation vote only once in 1975 in relation to the admission of Comoros, a former colony of France, and similarly the UK only once used a nonparticipation vote in 1980, again relating to a colonies independence in Southern Rhodesia.[112] Additionally, among all UNSC members during this decade, only Iraq, Benin and Libya also opted for the strategy of nonparticipation in the

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[110] Guihong, Zhang, and Feng Yugiao. "China's UN Diplomacy: 1971-2011", p.975.
[111] See; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Resolutions; 403 – 499.
[112] For the relative UN Resolutions, see; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Resolutions. 376, 463.

voting process.[113] This further reinforces the image that the PRC was choosing a voting preference for nonparticipation on the grounds that it was disillusioned with the system as a whole, as a direct result of a conflict in policy on the issues of sovereignty and UNPKO with the UNSC and international community.

The People's Republic of China's Voting Pattern: Jan. 1977 - Dec. 1981

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total
Number of Votes	20	21	18	23	15	97
Abstentions	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nonparticipation	6	10	7	6	4	33

Figure 2: The People's Republic of China's Voting Pattern: 1st January 1977 – 31st December 1981

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[113] For Iraq, who chose nonparticipation on 10 separate occasions, see from; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Resolutions, 346-381. For Benin, who chose nonparticipation on 6 separate occasions, see from; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Resolutions 389-420. For Libya, who chose nonparticipation on 6 separate occasions, see from; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Resolutions 390-420.

Modernisation reforms: voting records 1982 - 1989

By 1982 Xiaoping's modernisation reforms can be seen to be in full swing. At the forefront of these reforms was a new foreign policy adopted by the PRC. At the 12th National Congress of the CPC Chinese leadership outlined the main principles of the PRC's foreign policy going forward were to be based on peace and independence.[114] The bedrock of these principles was the respect for sovereignty rights as viewed by the PRC. In a speech at the start of the conference, Xiaoping stated:

> "Independence and self-reliance have always been and will always be our basic stand. While we Chinese people value our friendship and cooperation with other countries and other people, we value even more our hard-won independence and sovereign rights. No foreign country can expect China to be its vassal nor can it expect China to accept anything harmful to China's interests"[115]

On the above basis the PRC agreed to cooperate and engage in the international community on the strict understanding and basis that its own interpretation of sovereignty rights would be respected on issues relating to the PRC.

While the PRC's foreign policy focused on protecting Chinese sovereignty just as heavily as it had in previous decades, its approach to the sovereignty debate in the UNSC began to shift. For the first time at the UNSC, in mid-December 1981, the PRC approved an extension to an existent UNPKO in the form of the UNFICYP.[116] As Zürcher explains, prior to this vote, the PRC viewed UNPKO as a "thinly veiled disguise for imperialist interventions by the great powers" which disrespected sovereignty rights of other nations.[117] Moreover, in 1982 the PRC agreed to finally commit to contributing to the UNPKO assessed funds which it had categorically rejected to do before given its ideological incompatibility with the institution.[118]With the introduction of Xiaoping's modernisation reforms the PRC's stance on the sovereignty debate began to change and this can be reflected in the UNSC voting records.

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[114] Han Nianhong (ed.). *The Foreign Policy of Contemporary China.* trans. in; Yu-Shuk Joseph Chen and Franklin Wakung Zhan. "*Chinese Foreign Relation Strategies Under Mao and Deng: A Systematic and Comparative Analysis*"., (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1988), p.4.

[115] Maxwell, Robert. (ed.), *Deng Xiaoping: Speeches and Writings*. (Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 2nd ed., 1987), p.86.

[116] See; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Resolution: 495.

[117] Zürcher, Christoph. *30 Years of Chinese Peacekeeping*., p.19.

[118] Fung, Courtney. "China's Troop Contributions to U .N . Peacekeeping," In, *Peace Brief.* (Iss. 212, U.S. Institute of Peace, July 2016), p.1.

An immediate departure from the approaches taken in 1971-76 and 1977-81 is apparent when looking at Table 1. Most strikingly of all is the departure from the strategy of nonparticipation that was so prevalent in the 1970s and early 1980s. On no occasion did the PRC see fit to refuse to participate in the voting process at the UNSC. Whereas in the decade prior the PRC routinely refused to participate in votes relating to nations' sovereign rights and on the idea of implementing or extending UNPKO, the PRC was now voting 'Yes'. The impact of this change is further enhanced when it is understood that on all votes between 1971-1989, the PRC did not once vote 'No' on a UNSC resolution, and instead used abstentions and nonparticipation to voice its disapproval.[119] This only increases the impact of the abstention vote and nonparticipation when assessing the PRC's record during this period and thus makes the PRC sudden engagement and approval of UNSC Resolutions even more noteworthy.

Table 1 shows the use of a total of one abstention and nonparticipation in the entire timeframe from 1982-1989. The abstention cast in April of 1982 was on Resolution 502, relating to the Falklands War and demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities between Argentina and the UK with a complete withdrawal of Argentine forces. The PRC was joined in its abstention by three other nations – Poland, Spain and the USSR – and saw the resolution passing with 10 votes for and one against by Panama.[120] Unfortunately, the PRC declined to make a statement on its choice to abstain and so an official reason for the choice of its vote is not apparent. Generally, this vote can be seen as an anomaly given its deviation from the overall trend.

The period spanning 1982-1989 saw a rapid withdrawal of obstruction, objection and opposition against issues relating to the sovereignty debate and UNPKO.[121] The categorical reason for this relates to the introduction of Xiaoping's modernisation policy which built on the *yitiaoxian* strategy of aligning with US interest. Resultantly, the PRC ideological opposition to UNPKO on the basis of sovereign rights took a secondary position alongside the need for modernizing its economy by opening its internal markets to foreign direct

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[119] See; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Resolutions: 302 - 646
[120] See; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Resolution. 502.
[121] Choedon, Yeshi. "China's Stand on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Changing Priorities of Foreign Policy,". In, *China Report*. (Iss. 41., 2005), p.41.

investment and advanced technology by maintaining positive links with the US and the Western world.[122]

Year	Number of Votes	Abstentions	Nonparticipation
1982	29	1	0
1983	17	0	0
1984	14	0	0
1985	21	0	0
1986	12	0	0
1987	13	0	0
1988	20	0	0
1989	20	0	0
Total	146	1	0

Table 1) The People's Republic of China's voting pattern: January 1982 – December 1989

[122] Zhongying, Pang. "China's Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping"., In, *International Peacekeeping*, (Vol. 1, Iss. 1, 2005), pp.89-90.

Conclusion - Assessment of the shift from isolation to modernisation: 1971-1989

The PRC's initial acceptance into the China Seat at the UNSC saw it approach the institution with restraint and trepidation to an organization it knew very little about. Given its newcomer status, Kim suggests that the PRC approached proceedings correctly and pragmatically "mastering her new trade and adjusting her crude ideological preconceptions to the institutional milieu".[123] Accordingly, as Figures 1 and 2 shows, abstentions and nonparticipation became a primary tool in conveying objection to issues it deemed to contradict the UN Charter's position on national sovereignty. Primarily, it was the many UNPKOs that were proposed and engaged in throughout the period that drew the PRC's scorn. UNEF II, the Emergency Force set up to oversee the ceasefire between Israel and Syria, Egypt and Lebanon, UNDOF and UNIFIL, operations in Lebanon and the aforementioned UNFICYP focusing on separating Turkish and Greek Cypriots, where the main UNPKOs that drew objection from the PRC between 1971-1981.[124]

The PRC's position in the international order was also relatively ignored and side-lined during this phase in large part due to the on-going Cold War that preoccupied much of the West's, and in particular, UN's, attention. This is especially evident when looking at the US's attitude towards the PRC from 1971 to 1981.[125] Furthermore, Figure 3 displays the PRC's position regarding other P5 members on the use of abstentions. In a similar vein, the PRC's confidence to assert its own agenda and policies on proceedings appear to have waned. The PRC appears relatively on par with the other P5 members when it came to proclaiming its own agenda to the UNSC during the first period from 1971-1976. However, towards the end of the 1980s, its individual influence and agenda, and its confidence to assert it, appear to have depleted – likely due to Xiaoping's new foreign policy strategy.

By 1982, Xiaoping's reforms were well underway and the shift in foreign policy from Mao's era, which were entrenched in rigid ideological beliefs protecting the idea of national sovereignty, are clearly reflected in the UNSC voting record data. The strategy of using abstentions and nonparticipation were sidelined in favour of courting the US and not alienating the West and UN institution as a whole, while simultaneously protecting PRC's

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[123] Kim, Samuel. "The People's Republic of China in the United Nations: A Preliminary Analysis". In, *World Politics*. (Iss. 26, 1974), p.315.

[124] Guihong, Zhang, and Feng Yugiao. "China's UN Diplomacy: 1971-2011". pp.975-976.

[125] Oksenberg, Michel. "A Decade of Sino-American Relations". In, *Foreign Affairs*. (New York; Council of Foreign Relations New York; Vol. 61, Iss. 1; Fall, 1982), pp.175-195.

national interests against the northern Soviet threat.[126] Hence, the PRC began to approve of UNPKO, the first being at the end of 1981, and also began to contribute to the UNPKO budget, all the while keeping out of operations with its own power resources.

The UNSC voting data from 1971-1989 reflects a shift from actively and vocally opposing UNPKO on clearly established ideological grounds, to beginning to soften to the principle of UNPKO because of benefits gained from supporting them to its domestic markets and international image; this can be labelled as a shift from isolationism to modernization.

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[126] Liu, Wei. *China in the United Nations.* P.6.

Permanent Five Abstention Record: Oct.1971 - Dec. 1989

|	Oct. 1971 - Dec. 1976	Jan. 1977 - Dec. 1981	Jan. 1982 - Dec. 1989.
France	8	7	0
PRoC	8	0	1
USSR	9	19	13
U.K.	11	10	7
U.S.	18	16	21

Figure 3: Permanent Five Members' Abstention Record: October. 1971 – December 1989

Chapter 3 – A catalyst for change: The effects of the Tiananmen Square protests on the PRC's position in the UNSC, 1990-2004

Boots on the ground and a fundamental change in policy

The 1980s laid the groundwork for fundamental change to occur in the PRC. Off the back of far more liberal and relaxed economic policies from Xiaoping, in particular the gradual welcoming of Foreign Direct Investment into Chinese markets, the PRC was beginning its journey in to becoming a primary player in the global order. However, nominal GDP growth between 1980-1990 was relatively low, increasing from $306 billion in 1980 to $394b by 1990, thus displaying how initial government policy often took time to bear fruit.[127]

Likewise, the PRC's shift from categorical opposition to UNPKO on sovereignty grounds, to a progressive follower of UNPKO, took a substantial portion of time. In the 1970s, the PRC used the "principle of three no's" – "no voting, no financial contribution, and no deployment".[128] Then, the first approval of a UNPKO, namely UNFICYP, came in December of 1981, while financial backing for the institution also came a number of months after in 1982, with preliminary financial support for the institution.[129] It was only nearly a decade later though that the PRC first contributed to UNPKO with personnel. By the end of 1998 the PRC released a White Paper on National Defence, in which it is suggested that not necessarily all parties need to accept UNPKO involvement in order for a mission to go ahead. Additionally, each mission should be contextual, "Compulsory means should not be adopted indiscreetly" and the PRC should be "practical and realistic", meaning a larger degree of flexibility on just how much force could be used in each mission would be decided upon on a case-by-case basis.[130]

All the while, as shown by Figures 1, 2, and Table 1, this change in policy from the CPC is clearly mirrored in the voting pattern of the PRC at the UNSC. The second half of this thesis aims to further research whether a change in the voting pattern can also be brought

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[127] Data from; United Nations. *National Accounts – Analysis of Main Aggregates (AMA)*. Via, *https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/CountryProfile*. [Accessed: 15/03/2019].
[128] Sun, Meicen. "A Bigger Bang for a Bigger Buck: What China's Changing Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Says About Its Evolving Approach to International Institutions". In, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, (Vol. 13., Iss. 2., April, 2017),p.338
[129] Fung, Courtney. "China's Troop Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping". p.1.
[130] "White Paper – China's National Defence", *Information Office of the State Council Of the People's Republic of China*. (Beijing; July, 1998), Section IV. Via, *http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/5.4.htm#4*,. [Accessed: 23/7/2019].

about by UNPKO personnel contributions and the effects that these personnel have during a UNPKO.

The catalyst

As Chapter 2 already established, Xiaoping's modernisation reforms played a large role in engaging the PRC into the UNSC and the wider international community. However, the main catalyst for change came about as a result of events occurring in the latter half of 1989.

The events of Tiananmen Square and the many corresponding protests that sprang up across China in June of 1989 are, to this day, still shrouded in mystery. What is clear, is the fact that the CPC gave order for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to harshly quash the protests, leading to the deaths of a substantial number of PRC citizens, and the implementation of near universal martial law within the country.[131] The actions of the PLA at the behest of the CPC led to their denouncement by international governments and a sudden period of international isolation.[132]

The backlash to the government crackdowns after Tiananmen, from the international community, was severe. Bilateral aid to the PRC was decreased by 82% to $700 million from 1988-1990 and on the basis of a 20% increase in global aid commitments, this caused China to lose c.$11 billion in financial aid over four years.[133] Ann Kent further highlights the symbolic backlash that came from the UN itself when at the forty-first session of the Sub-Commission in August 1989, China became the first permanent member of the UN Security Council to be publically condemned for its human rights violations.[134] As Rosemary Foot neatly summarises:

"for a body that relies on public shaming as a means of attempting to change governmental behaviour, this was a critical moment".[135]

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[131] Miles, James A. R., *The Legacy of Tiananmen: China in Disarray.* (University of Michigan Press, 1997), p.28.
[132] Fravel, M. Taylor. "China's Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Operations Since 1989". In, *Asian Survey.* (Vol.36., November, 1996), pp.1109-1110.
[133] Foot, Rosemary. *Rights beyond borders : the global community and the struggle over human rights in China., p.117.*
[134] Kent, Ann. *China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance*. p.56.
[135] Foot, Rosemary. *Rights beyond borders : the global community and the struggle over human rights in China.* p.119.

It should come as no surprise therefore that just as the international community was beginning to clamp down on the PRC's growing influence in the international community, that the PRC too would launch the first stages of its charm offensive. Just as how the PRC learnt that by adhering to international norms in the 1980s would benefit its national interests, it similarly learnt that, after Tiananmen, not respecting international policies and ideals, such as human rights, could undermine its own security, economic and social development and the credibility and legitimacy of its own ideological principles and foundations. [136] Therefore, as argued by Kent in 2002, while the PRC learnt to respect international ideals, it did not necessarily integrate them into their own system:

> "[The PRC's] need for moral stature and quest for international status thus help tone down the realism of its foreign policy, both in appearance and reality. In many cases, this does not mean that China has internalized international norms but that it is prepared to be more pragmatic about its interests than its statements of principle would suggest and to make tactical adaptations."[137]

PRC UNPKO personnel contributions 1989-2004

The fundamental aspect of the charm offensive was the new approach the CPC was willing to take towards its policy of UNPKO. Up until 1989, the PRC had never sent any personnel in any capacity to engage in peacekeeping missions under a UN banner. This changed when it willingly sent 20 military observers to the UN Transitions Assistance Group (UNTAG) to help monitor elections in Namibia in November 1989.[138] Interestingly, this came at a time when the number of UNPKOs across the board increased, and the very nature and purpose of UNPKO changed with them.

The end of the Cold War brought with it new challenges, and a vacuum of power that the UN was expected to fill. As a UN Press Release in 2016 explained: "While the United

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[136] He, Yin. "China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations". In, *Institute for Security and Development Policy*. (Asia Paper, 2007), p.27.

[137] Kent, Ann. "China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations." In, *Global Governance*. (Vol. 8, Iss. 3, 2002), p.345.

[138] Data from; United Nations Peacekeeping. *Namibia – UNTAG Facts and Figures*. Via, *https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/untagF.htm*. [Accessed: 20/03/2019].

Nations was never as paralysed during the cold war as many have portrayed, the new dynamic gave the organization new leeway to act. This brought promise and peril"[139].

This leeway to act manifested itself primarily through a change to the role of UNPKO. In 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then Secretary General, penned the now formative report *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping* outlining how the UN should respond to conflict in the post-Cold War world. The report suggested that the UN's UNPKO mandate should extend beyond its current capabilities and should now aim to tackle conflict with:

> "preventive deployment… [and] post-conflict peace-building [to tackle] outright aggression, imminent or actual… [and for UNPKO to be established] for the prevention of conflict, [to] facilitate the work of peacemaking and in many cases serve as a prerequisite for peace-building".[140]

Since the creation of the UN, until 1990, there had been a total of 18 UNPKO across the globe; by the end of 1999 that number had increased to 53.[141] Accordingly, so too did the number of personnel on mission. Prior to 1990, the highest number of personnel on a mission was C.26 500, in 1962.[142] As seen in Table 2, by the end of 1999, the peak number of personnel on a mission was 69 961 in 1993.[143]

The PRC was left with a problem. On one hand, it wished to stick to its principle of traditional peacekeeping, held by the restraints of respect for national sovereignty under its *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*. On the other hand, after the events of Tiananmen, it

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[139] United Nations, Department of Public Information. *"Boutros Boutros-Ghali Helped United Nations 'Find Its Footing' in New Global Landscape, Says Secretary-General at Memoriam Assembly Session"*. SG/SM/17552-GA/11763., (February, 18th, 2016). Via, *https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sgsm17552.doc.htm*. [Accessed: 29/7/2019].

[140] Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping," A/47/277 – S/24111. (June, 17th, 1992). Via, *https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/A_47_277.pdf* . [Accessed: 29/7/2019].

[141] Data from; United Nations Peacekeeping. *List of Peacekeeping Operations: 1948-2018*. Via, *https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/180413_unpeacekeeping-operationlist_2.pdf*. [Accessed: 20/3/2019].

[142] Global Public Policy Forum. *Size of UN Peacekeeping Forces: 1947-2011*. (January, 9th, 1996). Via, *https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/Size_of_UN_PK_force_by_year_-_2011_.pdf.* [Accessed: 1/06/2019].

[143] Global Policy Forum. *Peacekeeping Tables and Charts - Uniformed Perosonnel in UN Peacekeeping (1991-2012)*. Via, https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/peacekeeping/peacekeeping-data.html. [Accessed: 1/06/2019].

wished to be perceived as a responsible player in the international community, voluntarily assuming a fair share of responsibility.[144]

With such a significant change in approach to UNPKO, the PRC was forced to comply and make regular contributions further than just financial ones. From 1989-1999, the PRC's engagement with UN peacekeeping operations continued to grow. Its contribution to UNTAG was not an isolated one. Shortly after its commitment to UNTAG, the PRC deployed five military observers to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East.[145] UNTSO was the original peacekeeping operations set up by the UN in May 1948. By contributing troops to the original peacekeeping operation, and an operation that previously it had abstained against in the UNSC, the PRC was in effect giving its blessing to the very act of peacekeeping operations and displaying a commitment to the institution, so appreciated by the wider international community.

As seen in Table 2, the most significant of contributions during this period came in 1992 when China deployed 488 engineering troops and military observer, to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).[146] As Sophie Richardson notes, the PRC committed to UNTAC in spite of personal 'mixed feelings' about the mission itself, on the grounds that it potentially would encroach on the sovereignty of a fellow Asian nation state, in order to repair its image in the aftermath of Tiananmen.[147] Another possible explanation for increased involvement could be due to the proximity of UNTAC to the PRC's borders. The neighbouring status of Cambodia meant it wanted to play a larger role in stabilising a nation in its periphery to protect its image as the main player in the region, while keeping to its policy first laid out by Xiaoping in the 1980s, of protecting its own sovereignty and national interest above all else.[148]

Despite an evidential shift in policy in 1989, by the end of the 1990s the PRC still lagged behind considerably when compared to the P5 and other UN member states.[149] Furthermore, in 1993, PRC uniformed personnel on active UNPKO made up just 0.09% of

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[144] Ibid.

[145] Lanteigne, Marc, and Miwa Hirono. *China's Evolving Approach to Peacekeeping.*, p.16.

[146] United Nations Peacekeeping. *Troop and Police Contributors*. (February, 1st, 2019) Via, *https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors*. [Accessed 25/3/2019].

[147] Richardson, Sophie. *China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*. (New York: Columba University Press, 2010), p.162.

[148] Han Nianhong (ed.). *The Foreign Policy of Contemporary China*. p.4.

[149] United Nations Peacekeeping. *"Summary of Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations Dec 1999"*. (December, 1999), p.1., Via, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/pk_nationalcontrib_1999_monthly-countrytotalsbyrankoralphabet_missingmonths_1999.pdf., [Accessed: 27/5/2019].

the total number of peacekeepers.[150] However, by 2004 the PRC was contributing 1.6% (1036) of the manpower for UNPKO and was the 17th largest contributor of all member states, while being the largest contributor of personnel in the P5.[151]

While the PRC's contributions, very much forced by the events of Tiananmen in 1989, had increased dramatically from 1989 to 2004, sentiment in the CPC was one of wariness. Allen Carson points out that in the early 1990s, "An interest in playing the role of 'good citizen' on the international stage has led the Chinese to acquiesce to a series of interventions about which many in Beijing have real reservations".[152] Yet, by the end of 2004 the PRC was contributing its highest levels of personnel. This therefore demands an analysis of the PRC's voting patterns during this period and whether it can be said that there are again changes comparatively with the decades prior.

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[150] Data sourced via; United Nations. *Troops and Police Contributors – December 1993: Summary of Contributions to peacekeeping operations Dec 1993*., p.1. Via, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/dec-1993.pdf. [Accessed: 30/5/2019].
[151] Data sourced via; United Nations. *Troops and Police Contributors – December 2004: Summary of Contributions to peacekeeping operations Dec 2004.*, p.1. Via, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/december2004_2.pdf., [Accessed: 30/5/2019].
[152] Carlson, Allen., *"Protecting Sovereignty, Accepting Intervention: The Dilemma of Chinese Foreign Relations in the 1990s,"* (National Committee on United States-China Relations, China Policy Series, No. 18, September, 2002), pp.31-2.

Year	TOTAL TROOPS	TOTAL POLICE	TOTAL MILITARY OBSERVERS	TOTAL PROC PERSONNEL	TOTAL UN PERSONNEL
2004	787	194	55	1036	64720
2003	289	21	48	358	45815
2002	2	69	52	123	39652
2001	1	75	53	129	47108
2000	0	55	43	98	37733
1999	0	0	37	37	18410
1998	0	0	35	35	14347
1997	0	0	32	32	14879
1996	0	0	38	38	24919
1995	0	0	45	45	31031
1994	0	0	60	60	69356
1993	0	0	65	65	69961
1992	401	0	87	488	52154
1991	44	0	0	44	11333
1990	5	0	0	5	10304
1989	20	0	0	20	[153]

Table 2) The People's Republic of China's Personnel Contributions: November 1989 – December 2004[154]

[153] Number of personnel to the nearest hundred.

[154] Numbers refer to troop levels on 31 December for every year, except 1989, 1990 and 1998, which refer to troop levels on 30 November. Until 1992, UN statistics only recorded troops. From 1992, statistics differentiated between troops, military observers, and police. Data retrieved from; United Nations Peacekeeping. *Troop and Police Contributors*. (February, 1st, 2019) Via*, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.* [Accessed 25/3/2019].

The PRC ended 1989 having not abstained on any vote since 1982 and from using it as a strategy to influence proceedings and display its foreign policy agenda with regards to the UN since Huang Hua's resignation in 1976. However, as seen in Figure 4, this voting strategy reappears again during the 1990s and persists into the mid-2000s. The main use of the abstention vote is seen during the 1990s, and the number of abstentions correlates directly with the UNSC's increase in the number of UNPKO personnel, as shown in Table 2. Moreover, between 1990 and the end of 1999, 27 abstentions were cast in protest to a resolution that the PRC deemed to be in violation with another nation's sovereignty rights. Similarly, 11 abstentions were cast in the same vein regarding the overextension of rights for proposed or ongoing UNPKO.[155] On top of this, on 15 occasions during the 1990s, the PRC was the only nation to not vote 'Yes', setting it distinctly apart from its peers.

Zhongying notes that during the 1990s and early 2000s, the P5 as a collective group show a small but noticeable trend of normative agreement on issues of sovereignty rights against the need for UNPKO intervention.[156] As shown earlier, the PRC's actions pertaining to UNPKO became more closely aligned to the locus of ideas on the issue, while still adhering to the rhetoric of the 1980s. By logical extension it would be assumed that the PRC's voting pattern would be similar then to other P5 members. Nevertheless, Figure 5 shows the PRC acting in divergence to the norm. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s, as shown in Figure 3, the PRC's rate of the abstentions was lowest among the P5, during the 1990s they were noticeably the forerunners on the voting technique, and only the US matched their rate of abstention during the early 2000s.

Furthermore, despite standing out among the P5 on voting abstentions, particularly in regards to UNPKO and sovereignty issues, they also engaged in another form of voting aside from abstention and nonparticipation to convey their attitude. For the first time in 24 years, the PRoC exercised its right to veto as a permanent member - outside of selection for the Security General.[157] The veto came in response to a joint resolution proposed by Argentina,

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[155] See; United Nations Digital Library, *Security Council - Voting Data*. Resolutions: 647-1284.
[156] See; Zhongying, Pang. "China's Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping". pp.88-104; Hirono, Miwa. *China's Evolving Approach to Peacekeeping*. p.17.
[157] In 1972 the UNSC voted on Bangladeshi admission into the council. The PRoC vetoed the admission because of a request by its ally, Pakistan, to use Bangladesh as a bargaining chip in their attempts to gain the return of 90,000 prisoners of war held in India. For further information, See; United Nations, Security Council. *Admission of new Members Bangladesh*. S/10771, (25th August, 1972). Via, *https://undocs.org/en/S/10771*.

Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Venezuela. In the resolution, it was proposed to the council that:

> "For a three month period the attachment to MINUGUA of a group of 155 military observers and requisite medical personnel [would be established to oversee the ongoing peace process]"[158].

Here it was being directly proposed that peacekeepers under the UN banner would be able to intervene in Guatemala in order for "international agencies to support the [already internationally agreed upon] peace process"[159].

From the report of the Secretary General, which was in response to the 'Central America: Efforts Towards Peace', it was clearly stated that this process would "involve the deployment of UN military personal to verify the ceasefire".[160] What made the PRC's decision to veto even more damning upon UN cooperation and authority was the fact that both the government of Guatemala and the leaders of the Undidad Revolucionaria Nacional had already accepted the peace process guidelines laid out at the Oslo Peace Accords on 4th December 1996. The peace process itself had been ongoing since 1994 and finally an agreed upon conclusion, which would see UN peacekeepers transition the country from a state of bloody civil war to a fragile state of peace, had been established between the warring factions. As such, by vetoing resolution S/1997/18, the PRC was deliberately and purposefully hindering the peace process.

The reasons for the veto vote at the UN were outlined by the PRC on the day. Qin Huasun, Ambassador to the UN Security Council between 1995 – 1999, laid the blame for China's use of the veto directly at the feet of the Guatemalan government. In a statement read after the voting process at the Security Council, Huasun stated that the veto was used due to:

[Accessed: 22/05/2019].; Tyler, E. Patrick. "China Asserts Taiwan's Ties To Guatemala Led to Veto". *New York Times*, (January, 1997).

[158] United Nations, Security Council. *Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Venezuela: draft resolution.*, S/1997/18 (January 10th, 1997), p.2. Via, *https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_1997_18.pdf*. [Accessed: 21/05/2019].

[159] Ibid., p.1.

[160] United Nations, Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General "Central America: Efforts Towards Peace"*. S/1996/1045 (December 17th, 1996)., p.1. Via, *https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/368/21/PDF/N9636821.pdf?OpenElement.* [Accessed: 21/05/2019].

"the erroneous acts of the Government of Guatemala…[who] has, for four consecutive years, unscrupulously supported activities aimed at splitting China at the United Nations… [by] inviting… the authorities of Taiwan to the signing ceremony of the peace Agreement in Guatemala"[161]

As shown above, the PRC vetoed the resolution brought forward to introduce peacekeepers under The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) to help bring about peace in the conflict specifically because of the Guatemalan government's ties with the RoC. Henceforth, by having diplomatic ties with the government in Taipei, Guatemala was fragrantly violating the PRC's sovereignty by legitimising the RoC and "providing them with a venue for secessionist activities against China."[162]. Furthermore, the PRC addressed Guatemala's actions as trampling on Resolution 2758, which saw to protect the PRC's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[163] Ultimately, Resolution S/1997/18 was vetoed due to having fallen short of fully respecting the sovereignty principles held by the PRC in the late 1990s. Clearly, while their position may have relaxed, and their actions in UNPKO also may appear conforming, if it goes against the national interests, it will be opposed. Huasun clarifies this by explaining "No country's peace process should beat the expense of another country's sovereignty and territorial integrity".[164]

Eventually, following detailed negotiations, an agreement was reached which allowed for military observers to engage under MINUGUA on the strict basis that all support for the RoC's application to the UN be denied by Guatemala.[165]

Likewise, as shown in Figure 4, veto rights were exercised again in 1999, on near identical grounds for usage as the veto in 1997. In February 1999, the PRC vetoed any extension to the ongoing UNPKO UNPREDEP based in Macedonia. Unlike in 1997, Huasun did not blame the recipient countries links with the RoC as the reason for vetoing the Resolution. Instead, he claimed UNPREDEP was too:

"open-ended… [and that] the situation… has apparently stabilised… relations with neighbouring countries have been improved, and peace and stability have not been adversely

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[161] United Nations, Security Council. *3730th Meeting*. S/PV.3730, (January 10th, 1997)., p.20. Via, *https://undocs.org/s/PV.3730*. [Accessed: 22/05/2019].
[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid.
[164] Ibid.
[165] Goshko, John. "China Backs UN Monitors for Guatemala" In, *Washington Post*, (January, 21st, 1997), Cited in; Erik Voeten. "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action". In, *American Political Science Review,* (Vol.95., Iss. 4.), pp.845-858

affected by developments in that region… [and that] the original goal [of UNPREDEP] has already been met"[166].

However, the chairing president, Mr. Fowler, claimed that the reasons were "seemingly compelled by bilateral concerns unrelated to UNPREDEP".[167] Outside media outlets also attributed the bilateral concerns to Macedonia's links to the RoC and that the PRC vetoed the UNPKO on this basis alone.[168]

The PRC did not abandon its principles and ideological stance in the 1990s and early 2000s. In fact, it adapted to a new voting strategy that adopted elements from its position between 1971-1976, while not going as far as becoming isolationist. As shown, it actively abstained on 45 resolutions, in which 27 were for sovereignty rights violations, and 11 for overextension of mandate rights for UNPKO. In 1997 and 1999 it went a step further than it had before, vetoing resolutions that breached its national policy *One-China Policy*.[169] Additionally, it continued to connect with other world powers during this time on its principles. Elor Nkereuwem observed how in 2000, the PRC held the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, a key institution aimed at fostering economic cooperation with Africa, on the basis of the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*. [170] Yet, the 1990s and 2000s saw the PRC contribute personnel to UNPKO across the globe and end the year in 2004 as the largest contributor of personnel among the P5.[171] Evidently, the PRC deemed the benefits of UNPKO personnel contribution via soft power gains to outweigh the negative impact they would bring due to its confliction with its sovereignty principles.

[166] United Nations, Security Council. *3982nd Meeting*. S/PV.3982, (February, 25th, 1999)., pp.6-7. Via, *https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3982*. [Accessed: 6/08/2019].
[167] Ibid., p.6.
[168] See; Gee, Marcus. "Taiwan and China Fight Domestic Battle on World Stage". In *Globe and Mail*. (March, 1st, 1999). Via. *https://www.torontopubliclibrary.ca/detail.jsp?R=EDB0057*. [Accessed: 9/8/2019].
[169] "White Paper—The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," *Taiwan Affairs Office and The Information Office of the State Council*, (issued. February 21, 2000), Via, *http://www.taiwandocuments.org/white.htm.*, [Accessed: 18/07/2019].
[170] Nkereuwem, Elor. "Nontradtional Actors: China and Russia in African Peace Operations". (Stimson Center, 2017), p.13. Via, *https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Nontraditional-Actors-China-Russia-Africa-Peace-Operations.pdf*. [Accessed: 4/6/2019].
[171] Data sourced via; United Nations. *Troops and Police Contributors – December 2004: Summary of Contributions to peacekeeping operations Dec 2004.*, p.1. Via, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/december2004_2.pdf., [Accessed: 30/5/2019].

## The People's Republic of China's Voting Pattern: Jan. 1990 - Dec. 2004

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total
Number of Votes	37	42	74	93	77	66	57	54	73	65	50	52	68	67	59	935
Abstention	1	2	9	6	4	3	4	3	5	5	2	0	0	0	3	47
Nonparticipation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vetoes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2

(Y-axis: UNSC Resolution Votes; X-axis: Axis Title; Legend: Number of Votes, Abstention, Nonparticipation, Vetoes)

Figure 4) The People's Republic of China's Voting Patter: January 1990 – December 2004

Permanent Five Abstention Record: Jan. 1989 - Dec. 2004

	Jan. 1989 - Dec. 1993	Jan. 1994 - Dec.1999	Jan. 2000 - Dec. 2004
France	0	2	3
PRoC	18	24	5
Russia/USSR	3	18	3
U.K.	0	0	0
U.S.	2	2	5

*(Y-axis: Number of Abstentions; X-axis: Periods)*

Figure 5) Permanent Five UNSC Member Abstention Record: January 1989 – December

2004

Conclusion - Overview of the Epoch of Engagement

The 1990s saw a continuation of Xiaoping's policies of modernisation and normalisation of relations with the West that had been started in the 1980s. The PRC had little to lose domestically by aligning itself with the West's voting patterns and this is reflected by the lack of nonparticipation and abstention votes during the 1980s. One way it did lose out, was through losing face on its principles of sovereignty, but this had been deemed as secondary to a position that could harm its modernisation process. [172]

The events of Tiananmen in 1989 saw severe critique towards the PRC and shone a spotlight on the role of the CPC regime leading to sanctions and denouncements from the wider international community thrusting the country into a period of international isolation. [173] Given the PRC's new found principles of putting the national interest ahead of all other ideologies meant that the PRC committed to contributing to UNPKO in spite of conflicts over principles, in hopes to charm the international community. This charming process resulted in gains in soft power. As such, PRC UNPKO personnel contributions first occurred under UNTAG in 1989 with similar commitments continuing for the rest of the period.

In contrast, the PRC's voting preferences had drastically shifted by the start of the 1990s too. As seen in Figure 4, the re-emergence of the use of abstentions in its voting strategy displayed a new approach to the UNSC. However, unlike in the early 1970s, during the 1990s and early 2000s, the abstention vote was not accompanied by the use of nonparticipation votes. Moreover, the PRC exercised its right to veto on two separate occasions in 1997 and 1999 respectively, showing an authority to impose its own agenda on the UNSC voting proceedings that had not been seen since 1972. Data reinforcing this view can be seen when viewing Figure 5, which like Figure 4, shows a reassertion of PRC principles during the period as the PRC was responsible for the highest number of abstentions among the P5 by a considerable margin during this period. What appears clear from the data is that when PRC UNPKO personnel contributions started at the end of 1989, the PRC undertook a new approach to voting proceeding at the UNSC, while not having changed its foreign policy considerably compared to the 1980s. An explanation posited for this new

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[172] Zhongying, Pang. "China's Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping"., In, *International Peacekeeping*, (Vol. 1, Iss. 1, 2005), pp.89-90.
[173] Fravel, M. Taylor. "China's Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Operations Since 1989". In, *Asian Survey.* pp.1109-1110.

phenomenon can be found when the soft power benefits that engaging personnel in UNPKO are understood. In the case of the PRC, UNTAC proved to be one of the main sources of soft power generation, particularly among its neighbours, and it explains the change in voting strategy.

Conclusion

In an endeavor to comprehensively analyse the PRC's move from an isolationist state to one that was heavily engaged at the UNS, this thesis's aim was to spot a shift in position from the PRC in relation to its voting preferences, its attitude to sovereignty, and its soft power gains, over the course of more than three decades.

By dissecting the PRC's foreign policy into four phases, from 1971-1976, 1977-1981, 1982-1989 and 1990-2004, a linear progression of a positional shift from being isolationist to engaged, is more readily evident.

The PRC that took up the China Seat at the UNSC in 1971 was substantially different from the PRC that occupied it by the end of 2004. Mao's strategy of isolationism which was personified as *Liangge quantou daren* (fighting with two fists) set a precedent in the 1970s that would see the countries UN Permanent Representative Huang Hua attempt to purposefully convey PRC ideals and principles at the UNSC, while simultaneously leaving a small footprint.[174] The 1970s saw the PRC stay on the periphery of the UNSC, a "mainstream international system dominated by Western power, a system that almost completely denied the PRoC its legitimacy".[175] By the mid-2000s, the PRC was one of the main players in the UNSC. 2004 saw the PRC achieve the accolade of largest contributor of UNPKO personnel among all P5 members and was ranked 15th out of all contributing nations.[176] Moreover, only five years prior, the PRC completely derailed a UNPKO in Macedonia on what it saw as a job well done according to its principles of peacekeeping and sovereignty rights.[177] In 1977 the PRC had permanent membership in 21 international organizations, by 2003 it was a member of 298.[178] While in the early 1970s, the PRC was a minor player in proceedings at the UNSC, by the end of the 21st century, it openly dictated its agenda upon the members of the council, on a wide range of issues. The PRC's position had shifted so much that now it openly viewed the UNSC as "a critical organ for promoting its developing global strategy".[179] The PRC's

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[174] Cheng, Joseph Yu-shek, and Shi Zhifu. *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Duiwai GuanxiShigao (1949-1964) (A History of the Foreign Relations of the PRC, 1949-1964)*. pp.301-316.

[175] Wang, Hongying and James N. Rosenau. "China and Global Governance". In, *Asian Perspective*. (Volume 33, Number 3, 2009), p.9.

[176] Data sourced via; United Nations. *Troops and Police Contributors – December 2004: Summary of Contributions to peacekeeping operations Dec 2004.*, p.1. Via, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/december2004_2.pdf., [Accessed: 30/5/2019].

[177] United Nations, Security Council. *3982nd Meeting*. S/PV.3982, (February, 25th, 1999)., pp.6-7. Via, *https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3982*. [Accessed: 6/08/2019].

[178] Wang, Hongying and James N. Rosenau. "China and Global Governance". p.22.

[179] Lei, Xui. *China as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council*. (Freidrich Ebert Stiftung; Global Policy and Development; International Policy Analysis; April, 2014), p.5.

shift from an isolationist power to one that engages in the UNSC was substantial. It went from a state that was disinterested, obstructive and protectionist, to a fully engaged, agenda-setting and significant member, on-par with the other P5 in influential terms.[180]

Deng Xiaoping's modernization reforms sidelined the principle of sovereignty in the 1980s, in favour of pursuing other issues of national interest. As Kenneth Waltz famously quipped, "The socialization of nonconformist states proceeds at a pace that is set by the extent of their involvement".[181] Xiaoping's reforms and flexibility on ideological principles laid the groundwork for real change to occur to the degree it did by the end of 1989.

The PRC's position as a conformist to the UNSC agenda, having abandoned the voting strategy of the decade prior that used abstentions and nonparticipation to promote its agenda, is in sharp contrast with the PRC shown engaging with the UNSC during 1990-2004. The research of this thesis highlights the watershed moment for PRC UNSC engagement as coming in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protests. The international isolation that the PRC experienced as a result forced the country to display a commitment to the international community regarding the main issue that it had previously differentiated itself – UNPKO. PRC UNPKO personnel contribution was initially used as damage control, however, the soft power benefits that pertained from engaging in this institution gave it a basis upon which it could start to reassert its own agenda on principles it considered of upmost importance in the UNSC. Consequently, while it was initially Tiananmen that forced the PRC to engage with UNPKO missions, soft power generated influence caused it to stay engaged, and even begin to associate itself with.

An additional factor beyond the main three reasons for this shift – a change in attitude to the issue of sovereignty after Tiananmen, increased soft power, modernization reforms - was the greater influence that the individuals themselves in the CPC had on the PRC's position.

This is apparent when looking at the qualitative assessment of primary sources, in speeches and UNSC meeting minutes, alongside the quantitative data of the voting preferences. Namely, Huang Hua's international prestige prior to the PRC's admission effected the PRC's voting pattern with the use of abstentions to a larger extent during the 1970s than it was initially assumed possible. Likewise, Qin Huasun's rhetoric and speeches

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[180] Kurlantzick, Joshua. *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World*. (London;New Haven, CT;: Yale University Press, 2007), p.110.
[181] Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p.128

in the UNSC during the 1990s gave the PRC further influence beyond that of what a specific vote type could generate. Lastly, Deng Xiaoping's bold modernization reforms which were formative in changing the PRC's position regarding sovereignty and took the PRC away from older Maoist ideals. However, the role of individuals is less formative when compared with the three main principles outlined above.

Overall, this thesis has outlined how the PRC's UNSC position shifted between 1971-2004 from isolationism to engagement. Measuring voting pattern data allowed an image of the PRC in the international community to be constructed. By including the addition of UNPKO personnel contributions as an independent variable, it has been possible to pinpoint a distinct period and watershed moment with Tiananmen in 1989 when the PRC's attitude to the principle of sovereignty changed. Lastly, it is because of the soft power gains from these UNPKO that this position was maintained, and the PRC of 2004 is an engaged member state of the UNSC.

Further research and limitations of the study

A number of avenues for further research open up on the basis of the research laid out in this thesis. While shifting PRC attitudes towards UNPKO and the sovereignty debate were the focus of discussion for this thesis, further research could look into how the PRC's economic rise also effected its position within the UNSC. The PRC accounted for 13 percent of world growth in output over 1995–2004, with GDP growth averaging 9.1% annually, leading the PRC to be the 5th largest economy in the world by 2005.[182] Additionally, Lee Shin-wa acknowledges the increasing importance of soft power on guiding proceedings on the world stage.[183] Given UNPKOs ability to generate soft power, the way in which nations are engaging with them in a contemporary setting could shed further light on the impact soft power had and continues to have on UNSC proceedings. For example, in 2019, the PRC was specifically thanked for its contributions to peacekeeping and infrastructure creation by South Sudan's Defence Minister as part of the ongoing UNMISS UNPKO.[184] This came after the PRC abstained from voting for two resolutions that would further impose and extend sanction

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in South Sudan and in the aftermath of a PRC-South Sudanese economic and technical cooperation agreement signed earlier that year.[185]

A notable point of conflict from this thesis is the use of soft power as an explanation for increased UNPKO involvement. Nye's research offers a detailed analysis of US soft power capabilities, however, it offers little in the way of theoretical models that can be readily applied to other nations.[186] This ambiguity consequently means measuring soft power generation by other nations requires unconventional measurements to further supplement Nye's soft power theory.[187] This thesis measured soft power in relation to the success of UNPKO personnel contribution and their correlation with voting data at the UNSC. Additional research could further track digital content and media assessments relating to ongoing UNPKO operations and how these appear to effect nation's diplomatic approach in institutions such as the UNSC. This has proven difficult in relation to the PRoC given the nature of the CPC regime with its censorship of digital media and information regarding the process behind CPC policy implementation.

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