

**‘We can do this!’ - or Can we? : Stability and Change in the beliefs of European political
leaders throughout the Refugee Crisis**

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Introduction

The significant influx of refugees during the years of 2015 and 2016 posed a new challenge to European political leaders and to the European Union (EU) as a whole. While mass migration to the European continent was not a new problem, neither the EU nor its' member-states were prepared for the magnitude of this refugee wave, as more than 1.2 million individuals submitted asylum claims in the EU (Alexandrescu, 2016; Niemann & Zaun, 2017). However, the Refugee Crisis went beyond an humanitarian crisis as it displayed significant fractures in the EU framework in terms of its' solidarity and cooperation.

A critical point in the crisis was the failure of the existing EU institutional mechanism to deal with asylum - namely, the Dublin Regulation. This regulation places the full responsibility for the asylum claim (and claimant) in the hands of the first safe country they have entered - in most cases, Greece or Italy. However, once refugees enter through the southern European countries or the Balkans, they continue their route to countries on the northern part of Europe, which were in fact their final destination, such as Germany, Sweden and Austria (Bauböck, 2017).

Additionally, the regulation states that european countries receiving the wave of refugees had the right to send them back to the country through which they first entered the Schengen Area (Bauböck, 2018). This means that, for example, Germany could send the incoming wave of refugees in their territory back to Italy, if that was their first country of entry. This entails a massive burden for some EU-member states - especially for transit and receiving countries -, and hindered the functioning of the european asylum framework. Therefore, governments start acting unilaterally given the urgency and the perceived threat of the crisis.

It is especially in moments of crisis that political leaders are put on the center stage. They are expected to develop solutions capable of averting or minimizing the damage of the crisis, they must provide an explanation to what went wrong and rebuild public trust in the new *status quo* (Boin, 't Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 2005). It is important then to understand the role of their beliefs as they have a significant role in steering leaders' policy-making when facing an uncertain environment (Swinkels, 2019). The inclusion and emphasis of elements such as ideas¹ and

¹ Ideas are understood here as causal beliefs that are held by individuals or that are institutionalized and influence on their attitudes and actions (Béland & Cox, 2011). Thus, the terms ideas and beliefs will be used to refer to the more general cognitive process through which political leaders make sense of their surroundings.

beliefs as a fundamental part of the political process is part of the ‘ideational turn’ in the academic literature (Finlayson, 2004).

First, it is necessary to define what beliefs are and how they aid in understanding political decision-making. An individual’s belief system is associated to “the manner in which he perceives, diagnoses and evaluates his physical and social environment” (Holsti, 1976, p.12). They are the foundation of leaders’ worldview. Beliefs provide leaders with a coherent way to structure and make sense of the signals they pick up from the environment, thus shaping the way they define and respond to a certain situation (Holsti, 1976; Boin, ’t Hart, Van Esch, 2012). Therefore, in situations that are too vague and/or ambiguous, political leaders will frame² the issue differently and provide different responses as they each hold their own set of beliefs - which may end up being conflictual with someone else's (Schön & Rein, 1994).

Leaders’ beliefs are central elements to understand the way they make sense of their external environment and make their decisions. It is possible to place them into two main categories: philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs. Philosophical beliefs, also defined as core or fundamental beliefs, are connected to the leader’s assumptions on the nature of the political universe, conflict, among others (George, 1969). They also include basic ontological and normative beliefs - which tend, in general, to be resistant to change (Rein & Schön, 1994). Instrumental beliefs, on the other hand, are seen as secondary or peripheral - consequently, more susceptible to change - and focus on the ends-means relationships (George, 1969). In other words, they are centered on the tactics and construction of the problem of a given policy situation (Schön & Rein, 1994). This distinction is important as belief stability and/or change can take place in different degrees and types of beliefs, which has different implications to leaders’ decision-making.

With regards to the refugee issue, the existing literature on migration and refugee studies identifies two sets of ideas: one approach centered on the protection of refugees’ human rights and the other focused on the preservation of national interests and national sovereignty (Bosniak, 1991). The first approach is based on cosmopolitan and universal (human-rights) values. It perceives refugees as individuals who have had their fundamental rights stripped from them and are

² Schön & Rein (1994) see policy frames as “the underlying structures of belief, perception, and appreciation” (p.23). In this thesis, I recognize the existence of the process of framing, but instead of working with the classification of leaders’ cognitive aspects as frames, I use the concept of belief sets or belief systems.

in the need of protection. The universalist aspect is that as individuals, refugees have inalienable human rights, regardless of their membership to a certain nationality, race, group or ethnicity - and the protection of these rights is a common responsibility held by the entire international community (Boswell, 2000; Lavenex, 2001).

The second approach is connected to the state's national sovereignty. The core idea is that states' power to accept or refuse entry, to expel 'aliens' and to concede nationality, is an integral part of their territorial sovereign power (Bosniak, 1991). Thus, leaders can restrict or refuse the entry of refugees in their territory. Other ideas that are embedded in this approach are the protection of social and economical interests of their nationals and their national identity with shared values, culture and languages (Boswell, 2000; Haddad, 2003). These two sets of ideas show that there are different points of view and perspectives which leaders can adopt when dealing with the refugee issue and in policy-development. However, as leaders adhere to different sets of beliefs/frames - which are highly conflictive with each other -, it becomes difficult to cooperate and develop collective solutions, especially in moments of crises (Rein & Schön, 1994).

A crisis is, in general, "a real-world 'stress test' to the resilience of political systems and the crisis management capacities of leaders" (Boin et al., 2005, p.3). It becomes even more challenging when it involves several states and leaders that need to come together and provide a common solution. This is the case with crises within the framework of the European Union. The EU decision-making process is fragmented between several leaders with vastly distinct ideas and priorities at different levels, rather than monopolized in one actor (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Additionally, European leaders need to deal with different groups of followers, who themselves have different preferences, ideologies and identities such as their fellow european leaders, their national constituencies, fellow party members, among others (Van Esch, 2017). This means that a process of crisis resolution in the European context would theoretically entail a certain degree of belief convergence as leaders recognize that all members are affected by the issue and that cooperating is the best way to solve it (Schramm, 2019).

However, the 'wickedness' of the refugee issue hampers the possibility of belief convergence (Rittel & Webber, 1973). In this type of issue, the parties involved present distinct interpretations of what the roots of the problem are and even of what the problem is. Leaders remain

attached to their core beliefs (or philosophical beliefs) and these tend to remain inflexible even when confronted with facts (Schön & Rein, 1994). Consequently, there is not a straightforward way to address and solve the problem.

After this overview, we are left with a puzzle in terms of leaders' beliefs in crisis management within the EU. The stability of leaders' beliefs, in particular their core beliefs, in moments of crisis is highlighted as a central cognitive characteristic (Renshon, 2008). They tend to be even more inflexible when dealing with issues that are complex and unstructured such as the refugee issue (Schön & Rein, 1994). However, at the same time, European leaders are also under a growing pressure to address the crisis as the influx of refugees kept growing and the public increasingly saw the issue as getting out of control (Bauböck, 2018). Therefore, under certain conditions, beliefs could present significant change (George, 1969). Furthermore, if the decision-making structure is collective, as is the case with the European Union, the viability of achieving a common solution entails the change of some leaders' pre-existing beliefs (Boin et al., 2005).

While belief change can facilitate collective decision-making as beliefs converge towards a certain position, it may also hamper cooperation as beliefs can distance themselves further from one another. Thus, in order to understand how European leaders have managed the Refugee Crisis, it is necessary to explore several elements. First, if belief change takes place, in which manner do these beliefs change? Do they converge into a common perspective or become more distanced?. Second, which beliefs are changing? How big is this change?. Finally, when do beliefs change? Which events are able to trigger belief change and why are they able to do so?. These questions culminate into the following research question, which occupies the center of this thesis: *Why and in which manner do the beliefs of European political leaders evolve throughout the management of the Refugee Crisis?*

In order to address this issue, this study conducts a longitudinal analysis of the Operational Codes of Angela Merkel (Chancellor of Germany) and Viktor Orbán (Prime-Minister of Hungary) throughout the Refugee Crisis. Operational Code Analysis is a method frequently used in the study of foreign policy and political psychology. It contemplates a significant subset of leaders' political beliefs that are relevant in their decision-making (George, 1969). The Operational Code reflects leaders' underlying beliefs, which is one of its' main strengths in comparison

to other methods. Thus, the beliefs measured by the Operational Code are essential to understanding leaders' worldview and, consequently, the diverse sets of ideas they have across different policy-areas. As this technique structures belief systems in terms of their core/philosophical beliefs (e.g. nature of the political environment, conflict and cooperation) and their instrumental beliefs (e.g. best tactics and strategies to achieve political goals), it allows for a more systematic comparison of different leaders' beliefs in a given timeframe (Schafer & Walker, 2006). As a method, the Operational Code also provides a more reliable picture of leaders' beliefs as the analysis of their speech acts's content is automated rather than manual (as is the case with other methods such as Cognitive Mapping).

The results of the Operational Code Analysis have shown that leaders' beliefs remained mostly stable throughout the Refugee Crisis. However, in the case of Angela Merkel, there were two moments in which significant belief change took place. These moments were further analyzed through a qualitative case-study, which focused on understanding the context around belief change and on identifying the conditions that contributed to it. The qualitative study shows that belief change is a complex process that can only to be understood if the general context around it is also taken into consideration. It also draws significant considerations for understanding the EU decision-making process.

The approach proposed in this study provides significant theoretical and methodological contributions. First, the Operational Code Analysis has not yet been used specifically for beliefs in migration nor in a comparative perspective of different leaders regarding the refugee issue. While the existing migration and refugee studies' literature emphasizes the two main frames or ideas that guide leaders' perceptions and policy making (e.g. national interests-centered and human rights-centered), the Operational Code goes beyond the layer of policy-frames and ideas. The Operational Code construct reveals leaders' deeper and more fundamental beliefs, which provide the basis of leaders' frames on refugees and also on other issues (George, 1969). Therefore, it can provide a more comprehensive framework to understand the two frames determined by the migration literature.

Second, the main focus of the existing literature has been on how the two frames determine leaders' decision-making. Meanwhile, there aren't many studies on how these beliefs be-

have within a scenario of uncertainty such as a crisis. While leaders may remain within the realm of one specific frame, there are certain events that can trigger significant belief change. This is where the use of the Operational Code Analysis offers another advantage as it is possible to observe, in a longitudinal manner, the way, extent and which beliefs are able to shift.

Finally, this thesis provides empirical contributions as well. The overview of the two frames on refugee issues shows that the ideas and beliefs of leaders are relevant to understand the policy-making process in that issue-area. However, studies on belief change and belief stability have focused mainly on cases such as the Eurozone crisis, the cold war, or punctual events. Therefore, this thesis can further the insights of the existing belief change literature by exploring whether their assumptions are also valid in the Refugee Crisis, which was a complex scenario that had considerable impacts on the EU framework.

Theoretical Framework

This thesis draws upon insights and concepts from the literature in political sociology, political psychology and the cognitive approach to foreign policy analysis and leadership. This framework is fundamental as it provides a basis to understanding the role of beliefs to leaders - particularly in times of crisis -, their stability and their susceptibility to change, which are elements at the centre of the research question. This section starts with the conceptualization of leaders' beliefs and their role in crises, which is followed by the different types of beliefs and their operationalization in the Operational Code construct. Then, a discussion on belief system's stability and change is included and the chapter ends with my expectations for moments that motivate beliefs change.

Leaders' beliefs during a crisis

The sense of threat, urgency and uncertainty inherent to a crisis pose a scenario in which leaders are called upon to give an answer to the situation (Boin et al., 2005). Doing so, however, is a challenging task. The decisions made by leaders in these moments are highly consequential. Their behavior is being observed by many stakeholders with differing interests and perspectives, such as fellow political leaders and the general public (Schmidt, 2014). At the same time, they do not have certainty regarding the causes of the crisis, the efficiency of proposed solutions nor its' future consequences as the world is inherently complex, contradictory and ambiguous (Renshon, 2008). Thus, political actors do not have complete knowledge neither about the situation they are facing nor about the real costs of a specific action path (George, 1969).

Furthermore, leaders are exposed to a vast amount of information, which exceeds their absorbing and processing cognitive capacities (Renshon, 2008). It becomes necessary to simplify the complexity of the environment to make a decision, specially in moments in which leaders are under time-constraints. One way in which leaders do so is by using heuristic strategies, which involve reducing the effort in decision-making by ignoring certain information, taking less cues into consideration, examining fewer alternatives, among others (Gingrenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).

These heuristic strategies are rooted in the cognitive sphere, where individuals' belief systems are located. Beliefs are the subjective ideas or cognitions individuals have regarding their environment and themselves (Holsti, 1976; Rein & Schön, 1994). In other words, beliefs are the foundation of leaders' worldview and serve as frameworks for analyzing incoming information, eventually leading to their rejection or internalization (Renshon, 2008). These beliefs end up shaping leaders' "[...] perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations" (George, 1969, p.191).

Belief systems are then a key element to understand how leaders cope with the crisis as it influences the way external signals are identified and interpreted (Boin et al., 2005). The external information is sorted and interpreted in a way that is coherent with their belief frameworks (Gingerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). However, this results in the production of an information bias as certain information will tend to be overemphasized and others will be ignored or undermined depending on the belief set at hand (Boin et al., 2012). This illustrates why a crisis can have different diagnosis in terms of its' nature and solutions according to the leader at hand, which is relevant in order to comprehend the different interpretations of the Refugee Crisis by the involved leaders.

Types of Beliefs and the Operational Code Analysis

The Operational Code Analysis is an approach frequently used in the foreign policy analysis literature to assess leaders' beliefs. In order to explain policy-making behavior, it is necessary to understand leaders' worldview and predispositions regarding political action (Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998). In this sense, beliefs are seen as prisms that influence the decision-maker's perceptions, diagnoses, definitions and estimates of their political environment (George, 1969).

The 'operational code' construct operationalizes a leader's belief system. It is important to note that it does not express all beliefs that influence the individual's behavior - instead, it focuses on a (significant) subset of beliefs about political life that are relevant for political decision-making (George, 1969; Renshon, 2008). These beliefs are structured hierarchically, which means that certain beliefs are more essential to the individual than others. George (1969) pro-

vides a framework for the operational code construct in which the belief set is divided into philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs.

Philosophical beliefs refer to the general assumptions leaders have regarding the nature of the political environment, the nature of conflict, their role as a leader, among other factors (George, 1969). In other words, these are the political beliefs that guide the leader's diagnosis of the context around him (as hostile or cooperative, for example) (Schafer & Walker, 2006). These beliefs would correspond to their 'fundamental beliefs' or 'core beliefs', which occupy a central place in their belief system.

Instrumental beliefs are defined as the individual's beliefs about ends-means relationships in the context of political action (George, 1969). They concern the strategies, tactics and methods seen as the most effective to achieve political goals (Walker et al., 1998; Schafer & Walker, 2006). These beliefs can be classified as 'peripheral' or 'secondary' as they are less fundamental for the leaders' definition and diagnosis of the political context. The philosophical and instrumental beliefs are measured in the operational code construct according to the leader's answers to the set of questions in table 1.

Table 1 - Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code

Philosophical Beliefs

P-1 : What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?

P-2: What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?

P-3: Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

P-4: How much control or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one's role in moving and shaping history in the desired direction?

P-5: What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?

Instrumental Beliefs

1-1: What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

1-2: How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

1-3: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

1-4: What is the best timing of action to advance one's interest?

1-5: What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

Source: Adapted from George (1969)

Belief Stability and Belief Change

Besides the hierarchical structure, there is another assumption underlying the Operational code construct - namely, the premise of cognitive consistency. This means that belief systems are assumed to be internally coherent, remain stable over time, follow a hierarchical structure and extend across issue domains for a particular leader (Walker et al., 1998; Renshon, 2008). Even in scenarios of contextual uncertainty, leaders' beliefs have remained rigid (Boin et al., 2012; Renshon, 2008; Van Esch, 2014). It is important to note, however, that while these assumptions have been accurate in the case of some leaders, they still present contradicting results in other cases.

First, the internal cohesiveness of the belief system means that different beliefs are consistent with each other - thus, philosophical and instrumental beliefs should be cohesive. This is possible due to individuals' tendency to take into account new information only when it is compatible with their preexisting beliefs (Gingerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). That is also the rationale behind the temporal consistency of beliefs - if contradictory information is not assimilated, their preexisting beliefs tend to solidify over time and become more resistant to change.

Second, the hierarchical structure means that certain beliefs will be placed on the core of the system (philosophical beliefs) and others will occupy a more peripheral position (instrumental beliefs). Their core beliefs should be more resistant to change as they are considered fundamental for the individual's structuring of their external environment. Meanwhile, peripheral beliefs are more prone to change when faced with new information (Renshon, 2008; Schön & Rein, 1994). This leads to my first expectation³: *If belief change is to take place, it will do so in leaders' instrumental beliefs.*

While leaders seemingly remain attached to their beliefs in moments of crisis, George (1969) recognizes that "even a belief system that reflects well-considered evaluations of past political experience is subject to change under certain conditions" (p.216). Leaders can have learning experiences over time, which entails the shift of their beliefs (Walker et al., 1998). In Operational code analysis, there are three different levels of learning/belief change: simple, diagnostic

³ There has been empirical evidence in operational code research that philosophical beliefs are actually more prone to change than instrumental beliefs, which contradicts the social psychological theories of belief change (Renshon, 2008). Still, this thesis follows the mainstream theoretical perspective that belief systems are organized hierarchically and that shifts takes place mostly in the lower level beliefs (tactical/instrumental beliefs) rather than in higher beliefs (philosophical beliefs) (Tetlock, 1991).

and complex (Tetlock, 1991). Simple learning is seen as changes in instrumental beliefs about the best means to achieve goals; diagnostic learning is tied to changes in philosophical beliefs about the political universe; and complex learning occurs when both philosophical and instrumental beliefs change, which has deeper implications for the way the leader perceives and acts in the political environment (Malici & Malici, 2005). Thus, reiterating my first expectation, *belief change should take place as simple learning*.

It is clear from this overview that leaders' beliefs can change and that they do so in different ways. However, there is one gap in our understanding of belief change. While George (1969) states that even well-rounded belief systems change under certain circumstances, he does not identify or specify what these circumstances or conditions are. It is fundamental to understand them as they can provide insights into why certain beliefs have changed and others did not. While, at this point, it is not yet possible to determine exactly which events are able to trigger which type of change, it is still relevant to inquire into which events can trigger belief change in general. This thesis contributes then by adopting an explorative approach to the existing literature and raises several empirical expectations on what these conditions could look like, which are presented in the next section.

Conditions that trigger belief change

As the research question encompasses the possibility of belief change, there is another aspect to be considered - namely, what can trigger belief change. Leaders' beliefs are connected to their institutional, contextual and personal backgrounds (Swinkels, 2019). As each European leader is part of a different political, economic and social context, I expect that different events will influence the extent to which their beliefs remain stable or shift. The main conditions identified in the literature and that I focus here are peer pressure, public support and public opinion and the perceived severity of the crisis.

The fragmented structure of the EU decision-making creates a two-level negotiation dynamic in which political leaders are constantly trying to conciliate the demands coming both from European audiences (e.g. other political leaders within the Council) and from their domestic constituencies (Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Putnam, 1988). There are two main scenarios that

can follow this conjecture. On the one hand, if a leader's perspective and position differs from the predominant one within the Council, they can end up as an outsider and excluded from the decision-making process (Van Esch, 2014). Therefore, *I expect that leaders will shift their beliefs to adjust to the mainstream position in the EU-level in order to 'keep a seat at the table'*

On the other hand, leaders can feel pressured by domestic political dynamics. In contrast to the previous setting, leaders can be more hesitant to commit to a common European positioning - especially regarding issues such as migration and integration - due to potential electoral consequences (Rauh et al., 2019; Alexandrescu, 2016). An illustrative example is the delay on Angela Merkel's part in approving the 750 billion euro aid during the eurozone crisis due to her concern not to weaken the chances of her party in the state elections (Bulmer & Paterson, 2013). Thus, *a leader is expected to adjust their beliefs to prevent potential electoral consequences.*

Additionally, leaders also adapt and change their position following the national public opinion regardless of facing elections (Toshkov, 2011). A general increase in Euroscepticism, for example, would pressure leaders to shift/adjust their beliefs according to the reaction and preferences of their domestic audience (Swinkels, 2019). Therefore, *I expect belief change to take place when the public support have also shifted.*

Finally, the crisis conjecture could have a role in the longitudinal stability or change of beliefs. A crisis is a significant disruption to the *status quo*, which translates into a sense of uncertainty, threat and the call for urgent action on the part of political leaders (Boin et al., 2005). In particular, the migration issue is frequently framed as an issue that needs to be addressed with urgent and extraordinary measures (Oltean, 2016). If the public perception is that the crisis is worsening and getting out of control, the support to current leaders can be undermined as their performance will be judged as a failure. Thus, *leaders' beliefs change depending on the general perception of the severity of the crisis.*

While all the contextual conditions raised here are expected to trigger belief change based on the existing literature, the way in which they do so has not been previously defined. This raises questions such as: to what extent can these conditions foster different types of belief change/learning? Is it the case that one type of contextual condition is paired to one specific type of change? Is there a pattern of contextual conditions needed to generate belief change?. Therefore,

besides focusing on whether the above mentioned conditions will motivate Merkel's and Orbán's beliefs to change during the refugee crisis, I also pay attention to which types of learning or change takes place. The results from this analysis can further the existing framework on the conditions that underly belief change, thus contributing to the existing literature in the area.

Methods

Case Selection

I have chosen to focus on two European Heads of State or Government. Moments of crisis place the spotlight on the top-level political leaders, who are responsible for ‘making the critical call when it matters the most’ (Boin et al., 2005). This does not mean that there aren’t other actors involved in crisis management. In the case of the Refugee Crisis, both the European Council and the European Commission were involved in the crisis resolution but they did not had a significant role. The Commission didn’t have the mandate to make binding decisions. Their attempts to advocate for mechanisms such as relocation quotas fail drastically due to the opposition by national governments (Buonanno, 2017). The Council called several meetings to discuss possible proposals, but the main measures to solve the crisis surge through the initiative of member-states such as the EU-Turkey migration agreement (Niemann & Zaun, 2017). Therefore, as (national) leaders are the ones making decisions and determining the national and european responses to the crisis, it is their beliefs that we should look into in terms of change or stability.

As this research is interested in the variation (or stability) of leaders’ beliefs, it makes sense to select contrasting cases rather than leaders with the same ideas (Yin, 1994; van Thiel, 2014). Therefore, the two European leaders chosen are the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. These cases present significantly different perspectives on the refugee issue. Merkel emphasized the need of a joint European response to the crisis, involving burden-sharing mechanisms and solidarity among members (Nykänen, 2016). Her narrative reflected a sense of a ‘welcoming culture’ towards refugees (Triandafyllidou, 2018). Meanwhile, Orbán was notorious for his unwillingness to receive refugees and the rejection of any burden-sharing mechanism (e.g. relocation quotas) (Postelnicescu, 2016). Additionally, Merkel’s and Orbán’s beliefs are also under very different contexts. As Merkel had a more prominent leadership role in other EU crises, there were more expectations and demands from both her domestic and european audiences for a stronger response to the crisis (Matthijs, 2016). Meanwhile, Orbán focused mainly on the national interests of his domestic constituency. Thus, it makes sense to expect that the crisis will have different implications for their beliefs.

Operational Code Analysis: measuring beliefs over time

The ideal scenario for analyzing the belief systems of political leaders would be to have direct access to them and inquire their motivations behind certain decisions. However, as that is rarely feasible due to the high-profile of these individuals and the enormous difficulty in obtaining direct access to them, I rely on an ‘at-a-distance’ assessment to study their beliefs. The underlying rationale of these methods is that it is possible to infer an individual’s psychological traits based on their verbal behavior (Schafer, 2000). In other words, what leaders say and how they phrase it can provide insights into his or her ‘state of mind’ (Schafer & Walker, 2006).

While capturing leaders’ beliefs and belief change is a challenging task, there are several methods that were developed to do so. One of the most used approaches is the Operational Code Analysis, which focuses on capturing leader’s underlying ideas of how the political universe works and their propensity to opt for conflictual and/or cooperative strategies in world politics (Walker et al., 1998). The Operational Code construct conveys a subset of political beliefs that the individual has and that are relevant for political decision-making (George, 1969). This belief system is assumed to be hierarchically structured and divided into two types of beliefs - philosophical and instrumental beliefs -, which were explained in more detail on the theoretical framework. These beliefs (and consequently the Operational Code) are operationalized according to the leaders’ answers to the questions on table 2. Each index used to measure the leader’s belief system is explained in more detail below.

The philosophical beliefs (and the questions that measure them) reflect the leader’s underlying worldview and perceptions of himself and of other actors in the political environment. They are operationalized into five indexes. The first one measures leaders’ beliefs on the nature of the political universe (P-1), which indicates how the leader sees other actors’ policies and actions (Schafer & Walker, 2006). This score can range from a more cooperative/friendly perspective to a more hostile one. The second index assesses leaders’ prospects for realizing their fundamental values (P-2), which is connected to P-1. A leader who perceives a more friendly political universe, for example, will be more optimistic about realizing their fundamental values than one that sees the environment as hostile (Schafer & Walker, 2006).

Table 2 - The Operational Code: Operationalizing leaders' beliefs and interpreting them

<i>Type of Belief</i>	<i>Questions</i>	<i>Interpretation</i>
<i>P-1: Nature of the Political Universe (Image of Others)</i>	What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?	-1 (Extremely Hostile) - 0 (Mixed) - +1 (Extremely Friendly)
<i>P-2: Prospects for Realizing Fundamental Values</i>	What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?	- 1 (Extremely Pessimistic) - 0 (Mixed) - +1 (Extremely Optimistic)
<i>P-3: Predictability of the Political Universe (Predictability of Others' Tactics)</i>	Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?	0 (Very Low Predictability/Uncertain) - +1 (Very High Predictability/Predictable)
<i>P-4: Control Over Historical Development</i>	How much control or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one's role in moving and shaping history in the desired direction?	0 (Very Low self-Control) - +1 (Very High self-Control)
<i>P-5: Role of Chance</i>	What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?	0 (Very Low) - +1 (Very High)
<i>I-1: Direction of Strategy</i>	What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?	- 1 (Extremely Conflictual) - 0 (Mixed) - +1 (Extremely Cooperative)
<i>I-2: Intensity of Tactics</i>	How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?	- 1 (Extremely Hostile) - 0 (Mixed) - +1 (Extremely Cooperative)
<i>I-3: Risk Orientation</i>	How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?	0 (High Risk Averse) - +1 (High Risk Acceptance)
<i>I-4: Importance of Timing of Actions a - Between Cooperation and Conflict b - between Words and Deeds</i>	What is the best timing of action to advance one's interest?	0 (Low Flexibility and Diversity) - +1 (High Flexibility and Diversity of tactics)
<i>I-5: Utility of Means a - Reward b - Promise c - Appeal/Support d - Oppose/ Resist e - Threaten f - Punish</i>	What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?	0 (Low Utility) - +1 (High Utility)

Source: Adapted from George (1969); Schafer & Walker (2006)

The third index measures the predictability of future action (P-3), which is the extent in which the leader perceives others as acting in consistent and predictable ways. The fourth index expresses the control over historical development (P-4). The score shows who the leader per-

ceives as the main actor engaging in political action - themselves (higher scores) or other leaders (lower scores). The final index measures the role of chance (P-5), which is tied to the P-3 and P-4 scores. If a leader sees a highly predictable political future and perceives himself as having more control over the events in the political arena, for example, the role of chance is lower (Schafer & Walker, 2006).

The instrumental beliefs (and the questions that measure them) reflect the leader's preferred strategy, tactics and methods. These beliefs are operationalized into five indexes as well. The first index measures leaders' beliefs about the best strategic directions for action (I-1), which can be more conflictual or more cooperative. The second index assesses leaders' beliefs about the intensity of tactics (I-2). Higher scores indicate a stronger belief in the usefulness of cooperative tactics, while lower scores emphasize the usefulness of hostile tactics (Schafer & Walker, 2006). The third index translates leaders' perspective on taking risks (I-3) - they can be more averse (lower scores) or more acceptant of risks (higher scores) (Schafer & Walker, 2006).

The fourth and fifth indexes are divided into sub-items. The fourth index expresses the timing of leaders' actions. The first sub-item measures the diversity of the leader's choices between cooperation and conflict actions (I-4a). In other words, it assesses whether the leader uses only one type of tactics (lower scores), regardless of them being cooperative or hostile, or if they use a combination of several different tactics (higher scores) (Schafer & Walker, 2006). The second sub-item determines the diversity of leaders' actions in terms of words and deeds (I-4b). In other words, it measures the extent in which leaders shift between making threats and/or promises (words) and exercising power through positive and/or negative actions (deeds).

Finally, the fifth index measures leaders' beliefs on the utility of a given tactic in exercising political power (I-5). There are six sub-items divided between cooperative and hostile approaches with different intensities. The most intense are 'Reward' tactics (I-5a) and 'Punish' tactics (I-5f), which translates into the usefulness of cooperative actions and hostile actions, respectively. They are followed by the use of words that communicate 'Promises' (I-5b) and 'Threats' (I-5e), which have a lower intensity. Finally, the means with the lowest intensity level are 'Support/Appeal' (I-5c) and 'Oppose/Resist' (I-5d), in which the leader "invokes authority

[through words] to support or oppose actions between states or other agents in world politics” (Schafer & Walker, 2006, p.31).

The indexes show the way leaders’ philosophical and instrumental beliefs are operationalized from the responses to the questions in table 2. However, as mentioned previously, it is not possible to get leaders’ direct answers to these questions as we don’t have direct access to them. Therefore, leaders’ speech acts - e.g. interviews, press conferences, letters, speeches, private or public statements - are used to infer their beliefs in a particular moment of time (Schafer & Walker, 2006).

The Verbs-in-Context System was the method developed to conduct the content analysis on the selected material. It attributes different weights and scores for each verb according to their reference (self or other), weight (positive or negative) and intensity (between 1 and 3) (Schafer & Walker, 2006). It is possible to do the coding of the verbs by hand, however this would make the research susceptible to reliability issues as the values ascribed to verbs could differ according to the researcher. A software was then developed to automatize the process of content analysis - namely, the Profiler Plus software. This program uses an extensive scheme for the Operational Code, which was developed particularly for at-a-distance assessments of individual’s psychological traits (Levine & Young, 2014; Schafer & Walker, 2006). Therefore, the Operational Code Analysis presents a higher reliability than other methods that rely on the manual coding of the material and makes the research more time-efficient. I have used the mentioned software to analyze the speech acts I collected.

The selection of my material starts with a definition of the timeframe for the speech acts. As this research is concerned with the variation of beliefs throughout the crisis, I have selected speech acts that took place from the beginning of 2015 until the end of 2016. Although this is not a full timeframe of the crisis, these were the two years in which the crisis most manifested itself (Niemann & Zaun, 2017). However, there are some particularities in the selection of material for the Operational Code construct to analyze the Refugee Crisis.

The initial issue with the Operational Code is the general/standardized aspect of the questions measuring philosophical and instrumental beliefs. As the questions were developed to understand political beliefs - and mainly foreign policy beliefs -, the construct could be measuring a

series of beliefs in general. Thus, it would not be possible to discern whether the results provided in the Operational Code are really from leaders' beliefs in migration or if they also include other beliefs. However, Schafer & Walker (2006) point out that leaders' political beliefs can be domain-specific and that the analyzed statements can be constricted to one specific issue area. Therefore, to increase the reliability and internal validity of the study, I have only selected speech acts that explicitly mention the Refugee Crisis.

In order to accurately measure a leader's belief system, the Operational Code Analysis requires each speech act to have at least between 10 and 15 of coded verbs (minimum), which are the main measures for calculating the beliefs' indices (Schafer & Walker, 2006). Speeches containing one or two coded verbs, for example, are too short to be of value. Therefore, besides selecting speech acts that are in the 2015-2016 timeframe and refer explicitly to the Refugee Crisis, I used a threshold of at least 15 coded verbs for the inclusion of a speech act.

The first - and still frequently used - standard for the selection of material for Operational Code Analysis is a minimum length of 1.500 words for each speech act (Renshon, 2008). However, following this standard would cause significant reliability and validity issues to my study. This research focuses on the variation of two leaders' beliefs in a longitudinal approach - thus, a large number of Operational Code measures are needed within a relatively short amount of time (only two years). If the 1.500 word standard would be applied here, there would be too little speech acts per measure, which would in turn make the construct invalid. Therefore, I have opted to use a threshold of coded verbs to enhance the validity and reliability of the study, which is also suggested in the Operational code literature.

In the end, a total of 74 speech acts from Angela Merkel and 51 speech acts from Viktor Orbán were selected. This material consisted of speeches, press statements and interviews publicly available at the government's official website⁴. To increase the internal validity of the Operational Code construct, the material available only in German or Hungarian was translated to English through Google Translate to complement the other documents with official English versions. This approach is frequently used in Operational Code Analysis and, while the analysis of

⁴ In the case of Germany, the speech acts were collected from the [bundeskanzlerin.de](https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de) website. In the case of Hungary, the data was collected from the <https://www.kormany.hu/> website.

the original version is the ideal, the deviation of the results between the original and the translated version is shown to be minimal (Brummer et al., 2020).

The issues with the Operational Code method

While the Operational Code construct has significant advantages in analyzing leaders' belief systems, there are also notable drawbacks that need to be addressed. The first issue concerns the use of leaders' speech acts to assess their beliefs. There are questions regarding whether it is possible to accurately measure these beliefs given that many speeches, press releases and statements are prepared by other individuals and only delivered by the leader, thus making it impossible to capture their internal beliefs (Schafer, 2000). Furthermore, there is the argument that leaders's speeches are developed strategically and with a specific purpose such as gathering support (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016). Therefore, the validity of the study would be undermined.

However, the Operational Code approach does not claim to measure the private beliefs of leaders. Instead, it analyzes the publicly articulated beliefs that are deemed relevant at a certain moment of time (Malici & Malici, 2005). Thus, the method is not weakened by the previous discussion. Additionally, there is empirical evidence that it is not the case that leaders' 'genuine' beliefs are not conveyed public speeches. Renshon (2009) compares the Operational Code measures of J.F. Kennedy based on publicly available material - which would be seen as 'strategic' - and on private material - which would be spontaneous. The results are extremely similar, thus it is possible to capture leaders' belief systems with publicly available information.

There are other issues connected to the reliability and validity of the Operational Code technique for the Refugee Crisis, which have been discussed previously. The questions that operationalize leaders' belief systems were developed with the purpose to measure a subset of political beliefs, and not specifically migration beliefs (Schafer & Walker, 2006). Thus, it would not be possible to affirm with certainty whether the construct was measuring precisely the migration beliefs or if it was measuring more general beliefs. This issue is solved with the restriction on the selection of the speech acts to only those that explicitly addressed the refugee issue. Thus, the construct analyzes the content in a more precise and targeted scope, which increases its' accuracy for the crisis at hand.

Longitudinal Study of the Refugee Crisis

The literature on belief change assumes that there are several circumstances that can contribute to belief change such as shifts in public opinion, domestic political dynamics, peer pressure with fellow EU-leaders, among others (Nykänen, 2016; Swinkels, 2019; Rauh et al., 2019; Toshkov, 2011). While many events take place during the crisis, I have identified and selected specific moments that are most likely to trigger belief change based on the previous theoretical assumptions. While some events are part of the general context of the crisis - and should affect all leaders -, others are connected to the domestic situation in each country. Therefore, there are three timelines that show the points in which each leaders' OP. code is measured.


The first timeline illustrates the main events of the crisis between 2015 and 2016 which may have affected Merkel's and Orbán's beliefs. These two years are selected because they correspond to the period of the largest influx of refugees since World War II, thus representing the more urgent part of the crisis (Niemann & Zaun, 2017). The Lampedusa Shipwreck in April of 2015 is seen as a mark of the start of the Refugee Crisis, as the 800 deaths on sea were widely reported on the news and brought international attention to the issue (Collet & Le Coz, 2018). Thus, in order to understand leaders' beliefs prior to the crisis, the OP. codes should be measured with discourses previous to this episode - but still referring to migration.

The second moment to measure the OP. codes should be after Germany announces the unilateral suspension of the Dublin Agreement in August. This episode demonstrates Merkel taking on the leadership in the resolution of the crisis - even if that meant an open-border policy by Germany - and other member-states that starting 'waving through' refugees to Germany (Buonanno, 2017). The third moment to measure the OP. codes is after the period between the 31st of August and the 15th of September. Several events take place such as the famous '*Wir schaffen das*' statement by Merkel and the episode in Hungary with thousands of refugees trying to follow through to Austria and Germany without a visa (Triandafyllidou, 2017). These two moments show the intensification of belief division between the leaders regarding refugees, as they happen almost at the same time.

The fourth moment to measure the OP. codes is after the 15th of September, when Germany re-instates border controls and the previously advocated 'open-border' approach fails

(Bauböck, 2017). This signals a shift towards a more restrictive view towards refugees. The next moment to measure the OP. codes is after the approval of the EU-Turkey deal, which is seen as the most successful measure taken to manage the crisis as there is a substantial reduction of incoming refugees through Greece (Niemann & Zaun, 2017). Finally, the last moment to measure the OP. codes is after the G7 meeting on migration in May of 2016, which marks the end of most urgent part of the crisis.

Timeline 1 - Measuring Operational Codes of Merkel and Orbán on the Refugee Crisis




The following timelines are specific for each leader as they focus on domestic elements that may influence their beliefs. Additional OP. codes will be measured for each leader when they have not been measured for the same moment in the previous timeline. The following timeline applies to the German case.

The first additional OP. code should be measured after early-January 2016. In this period, several incidents of sexual assaults are reported in New Year celebrations⁵ as being committed by refugees, which is echoed in international media, and several protests take place calling for Merkel to step down. This shows a significant pressure from part of the German society against the welcoming approach advocated by Merkel, which may influence her beliefs - specially as

⁵ Noack, R. (2016, July 11). Leaked document says 2,000 men allegedly assaulted 1,200 German women on New Year's Eve. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/07/10/leaked-document-says-2000-men-allegedly-assaulted-1200-german-women-on-new-years-eve/>

there are upcoming local elections. The second additional OP. code should be measured after the 13th of March. This is when the results for the Saxony-Anhalt, Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Württemberg state elections come out. Merkel's party, the CDU, loses significant support due to her stance on refugees while the populist right-wing party, the AFD, wins votes with an anti-migrant discourse⁶.

Timeline 2 - Additional Operational Codes of Angela Merkel




The third timeline illustrates the events taking place in Hungary. The first additional OP. code should be measured after the extraordinary meeting of the countries in the Visegrad group on the 15th of February⁷. In this meeting, the leaders discussed the challenges in managing the Refugee Crisis - both in an European level and in the Balkan region. This moment displays possible belief convergence towards more restrictive migration measures. The second additional OP. code should be measured after the Hungarian referendum, in which the government encouraged voters to reject the EU relocation plan (Buböck, 2017). This OP code would provide insights into the reinforcement or weakening of Orbán's migration beliefs as there is the public response through votes and the emergence of criticism to Orbán by other European leaders and institutions.

⁶ Deutsche Welle (2016, March 13). German state elections: Success for right-wing AfD, losses for Merkel's CDU. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from <https://www.dw.com/en/german-state-elections-success-for-right-wing-afd-losses-for-merkels-cdu/a-19113604>

⁷ Visegrád Group (2016, February 15). *Joint Statement on Migration* [Joint Statement]. Retrieved from <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-statement-on>

Timeline 3 - Additional Operational Codes of Viktor Orbán



The research is structured then as follows: first, the Operational Codes of Merkel and Orbán from previous to the crisis and their last Operational Code measured are compared to the scores of a ‘norming group’, which corresponds to the mean scores of 164 speech acts given by 30 different world leaders from diverse states (rich, poor, weak and strong). This comparison helps in understanding the profile of Merkel’s and Orbán’s beliefs in a broader perspective as we take the ‘average world leader’ as a reference. Additionally, it is the first step in tackling the research question as it gives a first picture of possible changes and stability in beliefs.

Then, I compare and contrast the leader’s Operational Codes over time to understand the moments of stability and change. In order to interpret whether the belief change is significant or not, each score for a leader’s given index within the Operational Code construct is compared to the overall mean of the leader for that specific trait. I classify the change as significant when the score is higher or lower than one standard deviation (SD.) from the overall mean. Therefore, if there is a small variation but it does not reach the established threshold, their beliefs are considered as stable.

Qualitative Analysis

Although the Operational Code construct is useful for understanding leaders' beliefs in a particular moment of time, they only provide a 'still picture' (Nykänen, 2016). The longitudinal approach shows the behavior of the beliefs systems - namely, the moments of stability and moments of change such as becoming more or less cooperative, for example. However, the Operational Code cannot address part of the research question: why these beliefs have changed or remained stable. Therefore, it is necessary to employ a second method in order to make sense of emerging patterns in leaders' Operational Codes. Thus, I complement the Operational Code Analysis with a qualitative case-study approach.

First, I provide a general overview of the emerging patterns in the Operational Codes of Merkel and Orbán. The longitudinal perspective helps illustrate whether there were mainly moments of stability or if there were moments of significant changes as well. The moments in which the Operational Codes were measured were selected based on the theoretical assumptions on motivating factors to belief change - namely, peer pressure (domestic or in the EU-level), shift on public support and shift on the perceived severity of the crisis. With the Operational Code measures it is possible to observe whether a particular type of contextual change corresponds with the moments of actual belief change or if the beliefs still remain stable.

The theoretical framework also specifies different types of belief change: simple, diagnostic and complex. Therefore, it is important to pay attention not only to when beliefs have changed but also to which types of beliefs have changed - philosophical or instrumental - and to the size of this change. As mentioned previously, change is expected take place on the instrumental beliefs rather than in the philosophical ones.

After the overview, I develop a more in-depth description of the context and processes happening around the leader in the moments or cases in which belief change actually takes place. This case-study adopts a more explorative approach - besides looking into the type of belief change and whether it corresponds to the expected contextual changes, I analyze whether there are other emerging factors that contribute to belief change. Therefore, this research can add to the existing framework on belief change with potential motivating factors that have not been previously explored or providing nuances to the existing factors.

Results

Table 3 shows the scores in each index within the Operational Code construct of Merkel and Orbán in the moments before the crisis and in the last moment in which the Operational Code was measured, as well as the mean scores for the ‘norming group’⁸ composed of different world leaders. This table has two purposes: First, it shows which of Merkel’s and Orbán’s beliefs have changed and in which degree they have done so. Second, it puts Merkel’s and Orbán’s beliefs in a broader perspective as they are compared to an ‘average world leader’. This kind of comparison provides us with a reference point and we have a more precise view of where the leaders stood in terms of their beliefs before and after the Refugee Crisis.

Table 3 - Merkel’s and Orban’s beliefs in comparison to the average leader

<i>Type of Belief</i>	Angela Merkel		Norming Group	Viktor Orbán	
	Before the Crisis (n=6)	May 2016 / End of the Crisis (n = 7)	n = 164	Before the Crisis (n = 4)	October 2016 / After Referendum (n=9)
<i>P1 - Nature of the Political Universe</i>	0.343	0.397	0.301	0.416	0.259
<i>P2 - Realization of fundamental political values</i>	0.135	0.185	0.147	0.160	0.091
<i>P3 - Predictability of political future</i>	0.133	0.211	0.134	0.333	0.174
<i>P4 - Control over historical development</i>	0.228	0.318	0.224	0.276	0.275
<i>P5 - Role of Chance</i>	0.971	0.933	0.968	0.918	0.953
<i>I1 - Strategic Approach to Goals</i>	0.250	0.651	0.401	0.525	0.381
<i>I2 - Tactical Pursuit of Goals</i>	0.158	0.359	0.178	0.292	0.197
<i>I3 - Risk Orientation</i>	0.387	0.348	0.332	0.407	0.290
<i>I4 - Timing of Action</i>					
<i>a - Cooperation/ Conflict</i>	0.358	0.349	0.503	0.475	0.556
<i>B - Words /Deeds</i>	0.511	0.582	0.464	0.338	0.650
<i>I5 - Utility of Means</i>					
<i>a - Reward</i>	0.312	0.554	0.157	0.578	0.425
<i>b - Promise</i>	0.162	0.020	0.075	0.015	0.042
<i>c - Appeal / Support</i>	0.151	0.252	0.468	0.169	0.223
<i>d - Oppose / Resist</i>	0.239	0.125	0.154	0.238	0.162

⁸ The original data for the norming group was obtained from Professor Mark Schafer, Department of Political Science, 240 Stubbs Hall, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5433.

Table 3 - Merkel's and Orban's beliefs in comparison to the average leader

<i>e - Threaten</i>	0.032	0.000	0.034	0.000	0.020
<i>f - Punish</i>	0.105	0.049	0.112	0.000	0.128

Angela Merkel's and Viktor Orbán's beliefs before the Refugee Crisis

Overall, both Merkel's and Orbán's belief systems present more differences than similarities in comparison to the average leader. In the moment previous to the crisis and in terms of their philosophical beliefs, both Orbán and Merkel perceived the nature of the Political Universe as more friendly (P-1) and placed the control over historical development more on themselves (P-4) than the average leader - albeit Orbán in a higher intensity than Merkel. This means that they see world politics as a more cooperative setting and believe that they are the ones taking most action in this environment.

Previously to the crisis, there are also some similarities in terms of their instrumental beliefs and differences in regards to the average leader. Both leaders were more willing to take risks (I-3) and valued tactics and means of 'Reward' (I-5a) and 'Oppose/Resist' (I-5d) more than the average leader - once again, Orbán in a higher intensity than Merkel. This means that they are willing to expose themselves to more risk (by sticking to only one type of tactics/strategy, for example), engaged more frequently on cooperative actions to exercise power, and invoked authority to oppose actions between other actors in the political environment (Schafer & Walker, 2006).

However, the other belief categories were different between leaders and also in comparison to the average leader. Orbán was slightly more optimistic about the realization of his fundamental political values (P-2), saw the political future as more predictable (P-3) and, while still leaning towards the higher end of the scale, perceived chance as having a smaller role in his political trajectory than the average leader. In other words, Orbán's perspective of his external political environment was marked by friendliness, optimism in realizing his fundamental values, predictability and consistency. His instrumental beliefs also tended to be more cooperative. He had a more cooperative strategic approach to his goals and in their tactical pursuit (I-1 and I-2) and

tended to be less flexible in the timing of his actions (I-4) than the average leader - however, he does come close to balancing out cooperative and conflictual tactics (I-4a). Overall, this is a noteworthy image of Orbán as it is very different from the international public perception of him in the crisis.

Merkel, on the other hand, was less optimistic about her prospects of achieving political values (P-2), saw the political future as slightly more unpredictable (P-3), and attributed a greater role to chance in political dynamics (P-5). This translates into a more cautious view towards her political environment, which is marked by uncertainty and unpredictability. In terms of her instrumental beliefs, she had a more conflictual strategic approach and tactic pursuit of her goals than the average leader (I-1 and I-2), however she leaned towards more cooperative approaches in general. She had a smaller propensity to shift between cooperative and conflictual tactics (I-4a) but higher tendency to switch between words and deeds (I-4b). Her instrumental beliefs can be seen as a reflection of her philosophical ones. As her general assumptions on the political universe were more mixed, it makes sense that she prefers to diversify her strategies and tactics.

The Operational Codes of Merkel and Orbán present an intriguing image of these leaders. Overall, Orbán is shown as a more cooperative and positive leader in terms of his perspective on the political environment and on his relationship with other actors than Merkel, which is a surprising result. I believe the main reasons for these differences are the different audiences that the leaders' speeches are destined to and their different content/contexts. Previous to the Refugee Crisis, Merkel was heavily involved in the resolution of the Crimea issue and in the negotiations of the Minsk Protocol (Matthijs, 2016). This was a moment in which her relationship with other actors - Russia, in particular - was marked by tension and uncertainty. Additionally, the German leader was also concerned with the effects of the Eurozone crisis in Greece, which transmitted significant instability for the EU in general. Meanwhile, Orbán highlighted the improvements on the domestic unemployment rates and on the fast economic recovery from the financial crisis. Therefore, it makes sense that his perspective was more positive and optimistic than Merkel's.

The content of these leaders' speech acts also reflects the different audiences they have. In general, even when the speeches and press conferences were only available in German, Merkel addressed a wider audience, often including her fellow European leaders and the European insti-

tutions. The issues she addressed were also not only national but in the EU-level as well. In the case of Orbán, even when the material was accompanied by an English version, the main focus was on his national constituency. When topics connected to the EU were present, he emphasized the role and national position of Hungary.

Angela Merkel's and Viktor Orbán's beliefs after the Refugee Crisis

Orbán entered the Refugee crisis with a more cooperative and friendly perspective about the political environment while Merkel presented a more mixed set of beliefs. However, table 3 also shows their beliefs after the crisis - namely, after the G7 meeting in migration for Merkel and after the national referendum on the acceptance of refugees for Orbán. Several beliefs presented an expressive shift while others remained stable.

Orbán's beliefs on the control over the historical development (P-4) and on the role of chance (P-5) remained stable over the period of the crisis - their scores went from 0.276 to 0.275 and from 0.918 to 0.953, respectively. This means that Orbán perceived others as engaging in political action more frequently than himself and that the role of chance in political dynamics was significant. At the same time, his belief on the predictability of the political future (P-3) went down from 0.333 to 0.174, which means that he saw the political sphere as increasingly unpredictable. Thus, in general, Orbán recognized that a high percentage of political dynamics are unpredictable and can change at any given time.

Orbán's beliefs on the nature of the political universe (P-1) and on the realization of his fundamental political values (P-2) went down from 0.416 to 0.259 and from 0.160 to 0.091, respectively. This means that his perspective on the political sphere became increasingly hostile and pessimistic, which is a very different picture from pre-crisis Orbán. This change can be attributed to the ongoing dynamics between the Hungarian leader and his fellow European leaders. While Orbán had a cooperative relationship with the member-states that shared his position in the refugee issue (e.g. the Visegrád group), he became increasingly isolated by the rest of the EU as he adopted an extremely resistant position in the refugee issue, which made the development of a collective solution very difficult. Thus, there was a prominent tension between Orbán and

‘Brussels’, in which Orbán was constantly vilified to the general audience - hence, a more hostile environment and the pessimism on realizing his fundamental values.

In terms of his instrumental beliefs, the scores of his beliefs on the strategic and tactical approach to goals (I-1 and I-2) went down from 0.525 to 0.381 and from 0.292 to 0.197, respectively. This means that his approach to political action in general became more conflictual. Furthermore, Orbán starts emphasizing more conflictual means such as ‘Punish’, which went from 0.000 to 0.128. At the same time, his orientation towards risk-taking (I-3) went down from 0.407 to 0.290, which expresses a higher reluctance to take risks. On the other hand, the score on the timing of his actions (I-4) went from 0.475 to 0.556 (between cooperative/conflictual actions) and from 0.338 to 0.650 (between words/deeds), which means that Orbán presented a higher flexibility in terms of the tactics he could implement. Therefore, in Orbán’s point of view, the political environment became more hostile, which required a more strategic use of his tactics and shifted his perspective on the actions to be taken.

Merkel’s beliefs, on the other hand, paint a very different picture from Orbán’s. Her scores on the predictability of the political future (P-3) went up from 0.133 to 0.211 and the role of chance (P-5) went down from 0.971 to 0.933, which means that she started seeing the political universe as more predictable and constant. This can be tied to the implementation of mechanisms such as the EU-Turkey Agreement, the creation of hotspots and a temporary relocation system, which reduced significantly the number of incoming refugees and ultimately rebuilt a sense of stability.

Her beliefs on the nature of the political universe (P-1) went from 0.343 to 0.397 and her perspective on the realization of her fundamental political values (P-2) increased from 0.135 to 0.185. This means that Merkel became more optimistic and assumed a more cooperative/friendly perspective on the political universe. Additionally, the score on her beliefs on the control over historical development (P-4) increased from 0.228 to 0.318, which means that she centered more of the political action on herself than on other actors. This is a considerably different picture of Merkel than the one before the refugee crisis and can be attributed to different factors.

One of them is the leadership role assumed by Merkel on the resolution of the crisis. While she did face several challenges such as the domestic backlash due to the incoming wave of

refugees after her '*Wir schaffen das*' speech and the rising popularity of anti-immigration movements and parties, Merkel was indispensable in the resolution of the crisis as she had the initiative to start the negotiations with Turkey, which relieved the pressure of incoming refugee waves on member-states. The consequences of her receptive perspective towards refugees - namely, the backlash in terms of the public opinion and party dynamics -, however, has made her more reluctant to take risks (I-3) as seen by the reduction in the trait's score from 0.387 to 0.348.

In terms of her instrumental beliefs, there was a significant increase in the score of her strategic and tactical approach (I-1 and I-2) to achieving political goals - namely, from 0.250 to 0.651 and from 0.158 to 0.359, respectively. This translates into an expressively more cooperative strategic and tactical approach, which reflects her perception of a more friendly political universe. In comparison to her belief set previously to the crisis, she now enhanced the importance of cooperative means - namely, 'Reward' (from 0.312 to 0.554) and 'Appeal/Support' (from 0.151 to 0.252) - while reducing the emphasis on conflictual means ('Oppose/Resist', which went from 0.239 to 0.125). In other words, Merkel adopted in general a more supportive and collaborative perspective about her environment and in the tactics she opted to use.

The contrast between the leaders' Operational Codes before and after the crisis provides significant insights. First, it engages with the existing theoretical puzzle regarding belief change - namely, the tension between the perspective that leaders' beliefs remain rigid even in crisis and the perspective that, under certain circumstances, beliefs can shift. In the case of the Refugee crisis, the second theoretical approach seems to be supported. Second, the results have shown that our first theoretical expectation does not stand true - not only do the instrumental beliefs change but the philosophical beliefs do so as well. However, it is necessary to further explore whether these shifts take place in a significant magnitude. Finally, the results connect directly with the research question, mainly in terms of in which manner leaders' beliefs have evolved. While the precise way in which they shifted in the context of the crisis will be addressed in the next section, alongside with the size of belief changes, the Operational Codes of Merkel and Orbán previous and posterior to the crisis are able to provide a helpful preliminary sketch of the evolution process.


The belief trajectories throughout the crisis

This section focuses in the way leaders' beliefs have evolved throughout the crisis. Merkel's and Orbán's Operational Codes are measured according to the timelines previously provided and the tables with the detailed results can be found in the Appendixes. Once again, in order to assess the magnitude of the belief change, each score is compared to the leader's overall mean score in that trait. Significant belief change takes place when the score is higher or lower than one SD. from the mean score. As the research is concerned with the trajectory of the beliefs, the results are presented here in a graphical format, which shows a clearer picture of what is happening with the leaders' beliefs after each key event.

Viktor Orbán

The trajectory of Orbán's philosophical beliefs throughout the crisis is shown on Figure 4. While there are certain moments in which significant change takes place, the moments of stability are predominant overall. From the start of the crisis until the incident in which hundreds of refugees were stuck at the Budapest train station, the score on his beliefs on role of chance went from 0.918 to 0.972 (less than one SD.) while the predictability of the political future went down from 0.333 to 0.163 (less than one SD.). This means that Orbán saw the political future as more

Figure 4 - Philosophical Beliefs of Viktor Orbán



and more unpredictable, which is a direct reflection of the increase on the number of incoming refugees taking place at that period. However, from this point until the end of the crisis, these beliefs remain almost completely stable or with very small variations.

Orbán's beliefs on the control over historical development also present a somewhat stable trajectory. Between Merkel's '*Wir schaffen das*' speech and the reestablishment of German border control, the score went from 0.184 to 0.294 (less than one SD.). This is a moment that Orbán perceives himself as more active in the political sphere - which could be a reaction in order to avoid that the massive wave of incoming refugees entered (and stayed) in Hungarian territory. Following the reestablishment of German border control and until the G7 meeting, this belief remained stable (from 0.294 to 0.292, less than one SD.). The score presented means that Orbán, in general, tends to perceive others as engaging more frequently in political action rather than himself - which could be attributed to his focus on his national sphere and lack of coordination with other European leaders.


Finally, we turn to Orbán's beliefs on the nature of the political universe and on the realization of his fundamental beliefs. At first, Orbán's beliefs were more cooperative until the suspension of the Dublin Agreement by Germany. From this point until the Visegrád group meeting, the score of these beliefs went from 0.435 to 0.276 (less than one SD.) and from 0.155 to 0.095 (less than one SD.), respectively. This means that Orbán's beliefs gradually became more conflictual and pessimistic, which is an apparent reaction to the intensification of the incoming refugee wave due to the German 'open-border' policy.

From the Visegrád group meeting until the EU-Turkey deal, Orbán's philosophical beliefs shifted from 0.276 to 0.364 (less than one SD.) and from 0.095 to 0.137 (less than one SD.). This means that his perspective gradually leaned more towards the more cooperative and optimistic approach seen at the beginning of the crisis. However, from the EU-Turkey deal onwards, the scores went down once again from 0.364 to 0.259 (less than one SD.) and from 0.137 to 0.091 (less than one SD.), respectively. This means that Orbán's beliefs turn once again more conflictual, which could be attributed to the tension between him and his counterparts in Brussels in regards to the Hungarian referendum on refugees in October and to the difficulties in coordinating collective action.

We now turn to Orbán's instrumental beliefs, which are depicted in figure 5. I first analyze the beliefs that have presented a more stable trajectory during the crisis. First, his beliefs regarding the utility of means connected to words (namely, 'Promise', 'Appeal/Support', 'Oppose/Resist' and 'Threaten') have remained stable over time. All scores are below 0.250, which means that Orbán tends to favor other tactics, which in this case are connected to cooperative and conflictual actions.

Another belief that remained relatively stable was his tactical pursuit of goals. From the onset of the crisis until the Visegrád group meeting, the score in this trait had only a slight tendency towards more hostile tactics (from 0.292 to 0.140, less than one SD.). However, from this moment until the EU-Turkey deal, the score of this trait went from 0.140 to 0.024 (less than one SD.), which expresses the intensification of his conflictual tactics. This is also materialized in terms of the score of 'Punish' tactics, which went from 0.094 to 0.209 (less than one SD.) in the same timeframe. Given the context - the extension of the crisis for over a year and the lack of a collective solution - it makes sense that Orbán would adopt more hostile tactics and actions in order to, at least, preserve the national security in Hungary. Yet, from the EU-Turkey deal on-

Figure 5 - Instrumental Beliefs of Viktor Orbán



wards, the score on this trait increased from 0.024 to 0.197 (less than one SD.). This means that Orbán started adopting more cooperative tactics to achieve his political goals, which can be a reflection of the relief in the previous pressure of the incoming refugee waves. In terms of his tactics, this is accompanied by the drop in the score of ‘Punish’ tactics, which went from 0.209 to 0.128 (less than one SD.).

On the other hand, Orbán’s beliefs on the strategic approach to goals and risk orientation presented a more diverse trajectory. Until Germany suspends the Dublin Agreement, these beliefs remained more stable while leaning slightly towards a more cooperative perspective as evidenced by the scores that went from 0.525 to 0.573 (less than one SD.) and from 0.407 to 0.507 (less than one SD.), respectively. However, from the suspension of the Dublin Agreement until the EU-Turkey deal, all scores went down from 0.573 to 0.165 (less than one SD.) and from 0.507 to 0.168 (less than one SD.). This is also seen with the score of ‘Reward’ tactics, which went from 0.678 to 0.395 (less than one SD.) at the same time. This means that his strategies became increasingly more conflictual and hostile, hence the decrease in the use of cooperative actions, and he was less willing to take risks. This is coherent with the experiences Orbán had in the course of the crisis as there was a pressing influx of refugees coming to Europe while no common measure was taken due to the uncompromisable positions between himself and the other european leaders.

This picture changes after the EU-Turkey deal as the score of his strategic beliefs went from 0.165 to 0.381 (less than one SD.) and the score of his beliefs on risk orientation went from 0.168 to 0.290 (less than one SD.). Additionally, the score of ‘Reward’ tactics also went from 0.395 to 0.425 (less than one SD.). This means that Orbán starts favoring more cooperative strategies and actions in order to achieve his political goals and became more willing to take risks, which echoes his previously mentioned shift towards a more cooperative tactical approach as well.

Orbán’s final set of instrumental beliefs is the preferred timing of action. From the beginning of the crisis until the EU-Turkey deal, the scores of his propensity to shift between cooperative and conflictual means and between words and deeds (or actions) increased from 0.475 to 0.835 (less than one SD.) and from 0.338 to 0.687 (less than one SD.), respectively. This means

that for the most part of the crisis Orbán had a high diversity in cooperative and conflictual tactics. After the EU-Turkey deal, however, the scores dropped from 0.835 to 0.556 (less than one SD.) and from 0.687 to 0.650 (less than one SD.). This means that Orbán started relying more on the same type of tactics - hence, the reduction in the diversity of tactics -, which based on the previous beliefs are likely to be cooperative tactics.


My objective with this section was to establish an in-depth and detailed image of how Orbán's beliefs evolved throughout the Refugee Crisis, which contributes to answering part of my research question. However, there are certain points that should be stressed. First, while the graphics on Orbán's philosophical and instrumental beliefs illustrate several shifts, in practice none of the scores was higher or lower than one standard deviation from Orbán's overall mean for that specific trait. This means that, in general, it is possible to affirm that Orbán's beliefs remained mainly stable throughout the crisis. However, this does not imply that the shifts described here do not have importance.

Second, it becomes clear that the events taking place in the international sphere - in particular the measures taken by Germany and the meeting of the Visegrád group - were able to influence Orbán's beliefs to a certain extent. A clear example is the shift from his initial cooperative perspective on the nature of the political universe and on the realization of his fundamental values to an increasingly more conflictual and hostile approach when Germany decides to suspend the Dublin Agreement. This is a clear reaction to the consequences of the German 'open-border' policy - namely, the increase on the number of incoming refugees. Therefore, in order to understand leaders' beliefs, it is necessary to take into consideration the dynamics taking place in different levels of context such as the national and international.

Angela Merkel

The variation of Merkel's philosophical beliefs throughout the crisis can be seen in figure 6. While there are many moments of stability, her philosophical beliefs present more moments of significant changes than Orbán's (i.e. more than one standard deviation higher or lower than the average for the index). Additionally, at a first glance, it is possible to see that many of Merkel's beliefs behave in a similar manner.

Figure 6 - Philosophical Beliefs of Angela Merkel



Her beliefs on the role of chance in the political environment went from 0.971 to 0.906 (more than one SD.) between the beginning of the crisis and the suspension of the Dublin Agreement. Simultaneously, her beliefs on the predictability of the political future went up from 0.133 to 0.286 (more than one SD.). This means that, in the beginning of the crisis, Merkel still believed that it could be managed, hence a more predictable future and less room for chance. However, this would only be possible if there was a cooperative stance, as reflected by the increase in the score of her beliefs in the nature of the political environment (from 0.343 to 0.497, less than one SD.) and in the score of the realization of her fundamental political values (0.135 to 0.199, less than one SD.). Thus, Merkel presents here a more friendly and optimistic perception of the political sphere and the resolution of the crisis.

From the suspension of the Dublin Agreement onwards, Merkel's beliefs present changes in different directions. Three of her philosophical beliefs have remained stable until the end of the crisis - namely, her beliefs on the role of chance (from 0.906 to 0.933, less than one SD.), her beliefs on the predictability of the political future (from 0.286 to 0.211, less than one SD.) and her beliefs on on the control over historical development - albeit this one with a small increase after the EU-Turkey deal (from 0.239 to 0.318, less than one SD.). This means that while Merkel recognized the uncertainty of the political future and the big role chance had on the political

sphere, she gradually saw herself as having a more active role in the political universe. This makes sense considering her trajectory in the resolution of the crisis in the EU-level, especially in the negotiations with Turkey.


On the other hand, the scores on her beliefs about the nature of the political universe and the realization of fundamental political values presented similar moments of change. Initially, Merkel's perception of her political environment was more optimistic and cooperative. However, from the suspension of the Dublin Agreement until the "*Wir schaffen das*" speech, both scores went down from 0.497 to 0.312 (less than one SD.) and from 0.199 to 0.141 (less than one SD.), respectively. This decline means that Merkel started perceiving the political universe as more hostile and became more pessimistic regarding the realization of her fundamental values. This can be interpreted as a reaction to the fact that she expected other European countries to follow her initiative of burden-sharing and solidary measures to solve the crisis, but that did not happen.

During the period between the "*Wir schaffen das*" speech and the sexual assault incidents in the New Year's celebrations, the scores on the nature of the political universe and the realization of her fundamental values went from 0.312 to 0.462 (less than one SD.) and from 0.141 to 0.246 (less than one SD.), respectively. This shows a steady recovery on Merkel's optimism and cooperative perspective in general. However, from this moment until the electoral victory of the AFD, these beliefs went from 0.462 to 0.124 (more than one SD.) and from 0.246 to -0.027 (more than one SD.). This expresses Merkel's increasingly hostile and pessimistic perception of the political universe and the realization of her essential values, which can be seen as a consequence of the significant weakening of Merkel's public support at the time. However, after the local elections, her beliefs curiously shift back to a more cooperative stance (namely, from 0.124 to 0.397, less than one SD., and from -0.027 to 0.185, less than one SD.), in which they remain stable until the end of the crisis.

Figure 7 illustrates the several moments of stability and of change in terms of Merkel's instrumental beliefs. I focus first on the beliefs with a more stable trajectory. First, her risk orientation beliefs remain stable over time - albeit with a peak from 0.353 to 0.463 to 0.335 (less than one SD.) between the sexual assault incidents in the New Year's celebrations, the electoral victory from the AFD and the EU-Turkey deal. This means that Merkel became more willing to take

risks as the negative repercussions of the New Year's incidents gradually eroded the support to her more receptive position towards refugees. However, with the results of the elections and the consequent loss of support in her party, Merkel resumes her more cautious position towards risk-taking until the crisis ends.

Figure 7 - The Instrumental Beliefs of Angela Merkel



Second, the scores on Merkel's beliefs on the diversity of tactics between cooperative and conflictual⁹ went from 0.358 to 0.518 (less than one SD.) between the start of the crisis and the suspension of the Dublin Agreement. This means that, in a first moment, Merkel believed that being more flexible in terms of the tactics to use would be the best approach. However, from this moment until the end of the crisis, the score of her beliefs went from 0.518 to 0.349 (less than one SD.), with a temporary (negative) peak between the sexual assault incidents on the New Year's celebrations and the EU-Turkey deal. This means that with the growing pressure on Merkel to take action - both from her domestic and european peers - and with the diminishing

⁹ It is important to highlight that this belief concerns the flexibility of the leader to shift between cooperative and conflictual tactics. Lower scores mean that the leader relies more on only one type of tactics - it does not specify if they are conflictual or cooperative

support to her position, she opts to use only one specific approach when engaging in political action.

Third, her beliefs on the utility of several different means - namely, 'Promise', 'Oppose', 'Threaten' and 'Punish' - did not change to a considerable degree. While they present a general decreasing trend¹⁰, the graph shows that they stabilize over time with scores below 0.150, which means that the value Merkel attributed to these tactics was very low. Thus, even in moments in which the political scenario became more hostile in her perspective, Merkel did not favor conflictual or contentious tactics.

This conclusion can also be reached based on her tactical and strategic approaches to her political goals. From the beginning of the crisis until the electoral victory of the AFD, Merkel's scores on her strategic approach to goals and her tactical pursuit of goals went from 0.250 to 0.778 (less than one SD.) and from 0.158 to 0.361 (less than one SD.), respectively. This means that Merkel increasingly relied on cooperative strategies and tactics to pursue her political goals. This is also echoed by the scores of tactics such as 'Rewards'¹¹, which went from 0.312 to 0.667 (less than one SD.), and 'Appeal/Support'², which went from 0.151 to 0.194 (less than one SD.). While all measures mentioned present a slight decrease after the victory of the AFD, they resume their growth after the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement. Therefore, it is possible to affirm that Merkel preferred to use cooperative means and tactics even in moments in which her perspective on the external environment became more conflictual.

Overall, this section provides a very detailed image and description of the evolution of Merkel's beliefs throughout the Refugee Crisis, which addresses half of my research question. However, there are a few elements that should be highlighted. First, there is a disconnect between the general public perception of Merkel as the one assuming the leadership role in managing the crisis and her perception of who is in the centre of the political action. While there were strong demands for Merkel's active leadership coming from both the domestic and the in-

¹⁰ All changes are lower than one standard deviation from the leader's overall mean in that specific trait. All tactics and means are explained in depth on the Operational Code Analysis section in the Methodology of this thesis.

¹¹ 'Rewards' tactics or means corresponds to the use of cooperative actions to manifest power while 'Appeal/Support' tactics are tied to invoking authority to support certain actors or states (Schafer & Walker, 2006).

ternational arena, it is only in two moments she places herself at the centre of the political action - namely, in the suspension of the Dublin Agreement (in which she had a more optimistic view of the future and the political environment, and expected others to follow her initiatives) and after the EU-Turkey deal.

Second, Merkel's perspective on the nature of the political universe and on the realization of her fundamental political values shifts in many moments between a more friendly/optimistic approach and a more hostile/pessimistic approach. Curiously, this shift is not seen in terms of her strategic and tactical approach to her political goals, which became increasingly cooperative over time. Furthermore, the means or tactics which became more useful to her throughout the crisis were cooperative rather than conflictual - namely, 'Reward' and 'Appeal/Support'. This poses an interesting puzzle as it shows that philosophical beliefs are actually more likely to shift than instrumental beliefs, which has significant implications to the theoretical framework presented in this thesis.

Qualitative Analysis

The main focus of the previous section was on analyzing and illustrating the way in which leaders' beliefs have evolved throughout the crisis, which was one of the main concerns of the research question. The different trajectories for Orbán and Merkel show that the crisis events have affected their beliefs in different manners and to different extents, as I expected previously. Before delving into the moments in which belief change took place and the conjecture around it, it is necessary to assess whether the changes that took place match the expected changes based on the theoretical framework.

There were two main types of expectations in terms of belief change. The first one is connected to the type of beliefs more likely to change. The literature on the cognitive structures and beliefs of leaders asserts that, if belief change would happen, it would do so in terms of secondary or instrumental beliefs. This is connected to the idea that philosophical beliefs are more fundamental to the leader in his assessment of reality, thus becoming more rigid over time, meanwhile instrumental beliefs could change when the individual is faced with new information.

The second expectation is connected to the conditions that could trigger belief change. The literature points to several factors that can contribute to belief change such as shifts in public support, domestic electoral dynamics, peer pressure with fellow EU-leaders (or with party members), perceived severity of the crisis, among others (Swinkels, 2019; Rauh et al., 2019; Toshkov, 2011; Van Esch, 2014). These conditions were the guiding line I have used to select moments in which the leaders' Operational Code should be measured in order to assess whether leaders' beliefs had shifted or remained stable. Table 5 shows the factors expected to trigger belief change, the events selected for each factor and whether significant belief change was triggered for Merkel and/or Orbán.

Unexpected conclusions are drawn from the analysis of the Operational Code data. First of all, in contrast to the expected, philosophical beliefs were the ones to present significant belief change rather than the instrumental beliefs. Thus, instead of simple learning as I had expected, diagnostic learning takes place. This conclusion has also been reached by other empirical studies (e.g. Walker & Schafer, 2000; Feng, 2005; Renshon, 2008), however it still goes against the theoretical conception of hierarchically ordered beliefs and to the centrality of philosophical beliefs.

Table 5 - Theoretical expectations and the actual moments of belief change

<i>Factors</i>	<i>Events</i>	<i>Does (significant) change takes place?</i>	
		Merkel	Orbán
(EU-level) Peer Pressure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Visegrád Meeting* - G7 meeting on Migration 		
Electoral perspectives and consequences	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local elections in Germany with the AFD victory** 	Diagnostic Change: P-1 and P-2 change	
Public Support and Public Opinion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Overflow of refugees stranded in Budapest's train station / Dead boy's body hits the shore in Turkey / "Wir schaffen das" - Incidents in Germany with sexual assault committed by refugees (January 2016)** - Hungarian Elections (reinforcement of beliefs)* 		
Perceived severity of the Crisis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Suspension of the Dublin Agreement by Germany - Reinstatement of German border controls - EU-Turkey Agreement (de-escalation of the crisis) 	Diagnostic Change: P-3 and P-5 change	

*Note: *Events only measured for Orbán; **Events only measured for Merkel*

Second, as shown by the table, many of the conditions expected to trigger belief change did not do so. More strikingly, the Operational Codes of Viktor Orbán throughout the crisis do not demonstrate any significant change¹², which translates into a mainly stable belief trajectory in the crisis conjecture. Orbán's case converges then with the premisses of the Operational Code Analysis - namely that beliefs are internally coherent, hierarchically structured and remain stable over time - as was the case with the other leaders as well (Walker et al., 1998). There are several factors that can help us understand why Orbán's beliefs remained stable. Preserving the Hungarian national identity and ethnic homogeneity, for instance, are core components not only of the political sphere but also of the individual preferences (Oltean, 2016). Therefore, it's clear that Orbán would from the start adopt an anti-immigration position and stick to it, which would be widely supported by his domestic constituency.

¹² There is a small variation within his beliefs but it doesn't reach the established threshold (one SD. from the over-all mean) - thus, we consider that his beliefs remained stable. The only exceptions were his perspective on the predictability of the political future and the role of chance, but these scores are measured previously to the crisis.

On the other hand, Merkel's Operational Codes present significant philosophical belief changes¹³ (or diagnostic learning) in two moments - namely, after the unilateral suspension of the Dublin Agreement and after the electoral results in which her party loses support and the right-wing party AFD wins several seats with a clear anti-immigration narrative. These moments coincide with contextual changes connected to the perceived severity of the crisis and to the electoral perspectives and consequences - which were factors expected to trigger belief change. An interesting element to take into consideration is that Merkel's beliefs were affected by an event placed in the supranational/EU-level and by an event within her domestic framework. Thus, Merkel clearly illustrates the two-level dynamics in which European leaders are inserted in - namely, dealing simultaneously with two political arenas that have different (and many times conflicting) interests and preferences (Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Putnam, 1988).

While the Operational Code results were so far able to inform us of whether and how belief change took place in the Refugee Crisis conjecture - which helps in answering part of the research question -, there is one aspect left to be explored: why were those two moments the only ones able to trigger belief change?. In addition to presenting significant belief change, the shifts took place in terms of different philosophical beliefs and each scenario was centered in a specific realm (domestic or supranational). This calls for an exploratory approach to both cases of belief change in order to understand if there are other possible contextual conditions that could have influenced the behavior of leaders' beliefs, besides the ones identified by the theoretical framework. Therefore, the following sections present case-studies from each moment of significant belief change presented by Angela Merkel in the Refugee Crisis.

The suspension of the Dublin Agreement and the 'Open border' policy

In the year of 2015, there were over 1.8 million irregular border crossings into the EU, which was four times the amount in 2014 and eight times that in 2013 (Matthijs, 2016). The movements of refugees coming from the global south such as Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea and Sudan, in order to escape persecution, conflicts and other atrocities was not a recent phenomena - border coun-

¹³ The only instrumental belief that presents significant change for Merkel (i.e. one SD. from the overall mean) is the measure of the utility of 'Reward' tactics - however, this score is measured previously to the crisis, thus it does not make sense to include it in the analysis.

tries such as Italy and Greece had warned the EU of the increasing numbers in the previous years (Triandafyllidou, 2018). However, the magnitude of the influx in 2015 caught the EU and its' member-states largely unprepared. It was only after the Lampedusa shipwreck in April, considered the single-deadliest accident to take place in the Mediterranean, that the debate on how to deal with the refugee issue and calls for action emerged - specially in terms of the precarious conditions in which these individuals did the crossing (Agustín & Jørgensen, 2019).

Following this incident, several emergency decisions and actions were taken on the realm of the Council and the Commission. The first one was increasing the capacity and budget of the EU External Border Agency (FRONTEX) and the development of more border control and surveillance operations in the Mediterranean (namely, operations Triton and Poseidon) (Carrera et al., 2015). These initiatives aim to both deter smugglers and to rescue ships in distress (Menendez, 2016). The second measure was focused on the establishment of emergency relocation quotas and on the relocation of 40.000 asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy to other member-states (Carrera et al., 2015). However, not only were these actions unsuccessful - until 2016 only 1020 refugees from Italy and 3453 from Greece had been relocated -, they uncovered existing tensions between the member-states in terms of how to deal with this issue (Menendez, 2016).

While there were difficulties in cooperating in the EU-level, the number of incoming refugees in Italy and Greece kept growing - which overwhelmed and essentially promoted the breakdown of their asylum systems, leaving them with no other choice than 'waving asylum-seekers through' (Buonanno, 2017). The Dublin system, which attributed the responsibility of any asylum-seeker to the country through which they entered the Schengen zone, was rendered meaningless. It is possible then to note the quick increase on the perceived severity of the crisis, one of the conditions mentioned to trigger belief change.

In this context, leader Angela Merkel was in an delicate position as Germany was the final destiny of a great part of the refugees entering through Italy and Greece (Matthijs, 2016). However, with the difficulties in getting other member-states to implement the relocation quotas and the lack of implementation of minimum common standards for asylum in the EU, Merkel unilaterally suspends the Dublin Agreement for Syrian refugees. This meant that, in practice, Germany would not be sending asylum-seekers back to their first-country of entry and those that

had not filed applications there could submit their requests in Germany (Niemann & Zaun, 2018). This was dubbed as the beginning of Germany's 'open borders' policy. While the aim of the German decision was to relieve the pressure on the front-line member-states' asylum-systems and as a reaction to the humanitarian crisis in Hungary with the refugees, it quickly became a "pull-factor" to those fleeing the war (Engler, 2016; Sola, 2018).

In terms of the German domestic sphere, Merkel was in a scenario in which she could afford to confidently implement her 'open border' policy. The German economy was one of the least affected by the international financial crisis and was going strong in the onset of the Refugee Crisis - low unemployment rate in comparison to other member-states, growing GDP, among other factors. Just "the fact that the German government could provide almost 22 billion euros for the crisis, while simultaneously generating an annual structural budget surplus in 2016" (Reiners & Tekin, 2019, p.6) is enough proof of the German economic strength at the time. Additionally, considering the aging of the German population's demographic and the growing shortages of skilled labour, the reception of refugees can be beneficial to the German economy on the long-term (Engler, 2016).

Although there was still a division on the reactions of the public, a significant part supported Merkel's humanitarian approach to the refugee issue at that time (Jacob, 2015). Her perspective at the time was very close to her own personal beliefs and values, which stressed elements such as the inviolability of human dignity and the idea of asylum as a fundamental right (Nykänen, 2016). In addition, Germany is in general marked by a '*Willkommenskultur*' (or a welcoming culture), in which several voluntary and civil society initiatives emerge to offer hospitality to the incoming refugees (Gümüs, 2015).

Therefore, it makes sense that Merkel's beliefs perceived the political future as more predictable and a smaller role to chance in the current political dynamics as she had a solid support base in the domestic level. Her expectation was that, by leading through example, her initiative would motivate other leaders of member-states to do the same and to endorse measures of European solidarity and burden-sharing (Niemann & Zaun, 2018). However, this expectation is not materialized into reality - member-states act in their own national interests and the massive number of incoming refugees to Germany also contributes to a shift in the public perception. This

provides a quick explanation into why the scores of predictability of the political future and the role of chance shift to the average once again.

The main factor within the theoretical framework which has a role in Merkel's belief change in this moment is, clearly, the increase on the perceived severity of the crisis. As the situation starts getting out of control and the Dublin scheme starts to crumble under pressure, Merkel is pressured into making a decision. However, there is another interesting factor that plays a role in this shift of her beliefs - namely, the expectations of others.

German governments over the last decades have been proactive in elaborating EU policy in the migration and asylum realm "with an impressive bureaucratic force de frappe and a possibly hegemonic role in brokering intra-EU deals in this domain" (Guiraudon, 2018, p.153). Additionally, in the EU context, Germany - and Chancellor Merkel mainly - has had the leading role in many issues over the last decades such as the situation with Crimea and in the management of the Eurozone crisis. Therefore, Germany can be seen as a major veto player - if not the major player - in the EU framework (Aligica & Savidge, 2020).

As a consequence of the significant leadership role assumed by Merkel over the last years - both in domestic and international/european politics -, other member-states and european institutions have also attributed substantial responsibilities to Germany. Thus, other EU member states could have expected Merkel to take the lead and assume stronger positions in managing the crisis - which would not be expected from another european leader (Nykänen, 2016). This could have contributed to the observed belief change for Merkel - as the crisis scenario worsens, she (as well as her fellow leaders) is pressed into taking urgent action. However, if she occupies a position of leadership - or is expected to occupy this position - and other member-states tend to be inclined to rely on her during the crisis management (Reiners & Tekin, 2019), she starts perceiving the political future as more constant and predictable, therefore with less room for chance.

The electoral consequences of an favorable approach to refugee issues

The effect of the suspension of the Dublin Agreement and the symbolic '*Wir schaffen das*' ('We can do this') speech by Chancellor Merkel was an the enormous wave of incoming refugees to Germany - with around 160.000 arriving in August 2015 and 230.000 in September (Turhan,

2017). While, in the beginning, Merkel had the public support and the structural conditions to stick to her humanitarian approach, the number of refugees was growing faster than the German capacity to process all of them - which resulted in the posterior reinstatement of the border control with Austria (Nykänen, 2016). However, the domestic support to Merkel gradually declined while tensions in the international sphere were still elevated.

The main expectations of Merkel with the suspension of the Dublin Agreement and the implementation of an 'open border' policy was that other members would follow her example, thus enhancing European solidarity and establishing a burden-sharing mechanism (Niemann et al., 2018). However, this did not take place. In particular, the Visegrád group, namely Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, heavily criticized the German policies and argued for stronger measures in order to protect the European borders (Jacob, 2015). While other member-states did not present such an extreme position, they also did not follow on the German example. In practice, European countries entered a 'race to the bottom', in which they claimed not to be able to cope with the circumstances and were in need to adopt emergency measures such as reinstating border controls, building fences, among others (Agustín & Jørgensen, 2019). This process was also intensified after Germany reinstated border controls as well.

It is in this context that scholars define the Refugee Crisis as one that goes beyond the humanitarian aspect - essentially, it became an EU legitimacy crisis as well. The existing institutional mechanisms failed to manage the crisis and there was an evident lack of trust and the reluctance of member-states to cooperate with each other (Agustín & Jørgensen, 2019). The general polarization around the refugee issue also contributed to the difficulties in addressing the crisis within the EU framework. Therefore, with the lack of commitment of other member-states to relocation quotas and the increasingly unstable situation with incoming refugees getting stranded in certain countries and in precarious conditions, Merkel tries to find a solution to reduce the number of incoming refugees, which ended up being the EU-Turkey Agreement. While this was considered as the most efficient measure taken so far as it reduced significantly the number of asylum-seekers in Greece, Merkel was still susceptible to criticism as the EU was now under the risk of possible Turkish demands (Bulmer & Paterson, 2016)

In the domestic sphere, the incoming refugee wave resulting from Merkel's 'open border' policy led to a shift in the party dynamics and also in terms of the public support. Merkel's receptive approach towards refugees was already distinct from the traditional immigration-critical position of her party, the CDU (Mader & Schoen, 2018). As the flow of refugees towards Germany intensified, her position was criticized by many in the conservative side of the party and the Bavarian sister party - the CSU. The CSU, in particular, repeatedly demanded Merkel to make the migration policy more strict and to establish an annual legal cap of 200.000 refugees that would be allowed to enter Germany (Bulmer & Paterson, 2016).

Meanwhile, right-wing nationalist populist movements such as PEGIDA (*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*) and the political AfD (*Alternative für Deutschland*) start gaining traction (Engler, 2016). It is important to note that these movements were not exclusive to Germany - during the Refugee Crisis, there were several nationalistic, anti-immigration and anti-European movements and parties that gained popularity such as the FPÖ in Austria (Postelnicescu, 2016). However, the German case becomes more meaningful as Germany is seen as the motor for European integration. The AfD's anti-immigration narrative benefitted from Merkel's ongoing loss of public and political support. It is estimated that between September 2015 and May 2016 the support to the right-wing party had increased 15% (Reiners & Tekin, 2019).

While Merkel ended up sticking to her values and humanitarian approach, this came at significant political costs. Not only did she become isolated within her own political coalition, she now faced strong political opposition. The rise on the popularity of AfD is also tied to the declining public support to Merkel's receptive approach. This resistance can be seen as a reflex of several events such as the concerns with the ever-growing refugee to German, the Paris terror attacks in December of 2015, which sparked public debate about potential links between refugees and terrorist threats in Germany, among others (Reiners & Tekin, 2019).

Additionally, one event marked a turning point for the popular opinion on Merkel - although it did not result in significant change in terms of Merkel's beliefs. In the New Year's Eve celebrations, there were over 500 reports of sexual assaults and harassment were committed by allegedly a gang of migrants/refugees in Cologne, Hamburg and other German cities (Schramm,

2019; Bulmer & Paterson, 2016). The public support for Merkel kept on eroding as several public manifestations and calls for Merkel to step down take place as a response and her approval rating plummeted to the lowest in four years (Jacob, 2015). The spread of this anti-immigration sentiment can also be seen on the more than 3500 attacks on refugees and refugee shelters in Germany during 2016 (Agustín & Jørgensen, 2019).

The growth of support for the AfD can also be seen as a consequence of the position of the political parties in terms of immigration policy. As mentioned previously, Merkel distances the CDU from its' traditional critical position towards refugees and adopts a more open approach, which in itself created internal tensions among party members and with their coalition partner (CSU) (Mader & Schoen, 2018). The AfD, on the other hand, presents a clear position opposing the government's policies and with a strong anti-immigration and eurosceptic narrative. Therefore, previous voters of the CDU/CSU that have a more critical stance on migration - which can be seen as a consequence on the recent events - will lean more towards the AfD. In the case of the CDU/CSU, the logic is not that simple - Merkel's stance on migration is receptive and open while the parties present different interpretations of the migration policy as well, which can make voters more unsure on which migration policy will come as a result (Mader & Schoen, 2018).

While Merkel did tightened the German refugee policy by simplifying the process of deportation of rejected asylum-seekers and expanding the list of safe countries of origin in the context of the local elections taking place in March 2016, that came too late (Bulmer & Paterson, 2016). The AfD has a significant approval in Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Wurtemberg, and Saxony-Anhalt with 12.6%, 15.1% and 24.3% of the votes, respectively (Schramm, 2019). While the numbers were still offset by the votes to the grand coalition, it was a symbolic mark of the decline in public support.

Therefore, it makes sense that Merkel's perspective on the nature of the political universe and on the realization of her fundamental political values became more hostile and pessimistic. She was under scrutiny not only from other leaders but also from her own constituency. Although it is possible to see that she tried to adapt her strategy and tactics in face of the upcoming elections by making the asylum policy more restrictive, this did not work. Additionally, the rapid de-

cline on public support to her position on refugees - which was essentially connected to her own beliefs and values (Nykänen, 2016) -, the emerging tensions with her fellow party members and the lack of coordination and convergence in the supranational level/EU-level contributed to a conjecture in which she became increasingly isolated.

In the theoretical framework, I raised questions regarding the extent in which the contextual conditions would be able to trigger one specific type of belief change or learning (simple, diagnostic or complex) or if they would promote belief change in general. The qualitative analysis of the moments of significant belief change shows us that the process of change is actually more complex than expected. The belief systems of Merkel and Orbán were operationalized in the same way and measured in the critical points of the crisis, which were selected on the basis of the same factors (e.g. peer pressure, public support, electoral consequences and the perceived severity of the crisis) - yet, while Merkel presents certain moments of significant belief change, Orbán's beliefs did not change at all. Furthermore, the conditions which motivated Merkel's beliefs to change were not able to do so all the time.

In this sense, the main insights of the qualitative case studies is the importance of the overall context in order to understand the stability or change in leaders' beliefs. It is not possible to isolate one specific factor as done in the framework of conditions leading to belief change and to affirm with certainty that those were responsible for shifting leaders' beliefs or that it will always trigger belief change. Instead, the reason why a leader's beliefs have shifted is tied to the combination of different circumstances and dynamics taking place in their domestic and international sphere. In the example about the suspension of the Dublin agreement, Merkel's beliefs were able to change not only because there was the intensification of the perceived severity of the crisis - which was the main condition for selecting the event -, but also because she had the (domestic) public support by her side and due to her central leadership position in the EU.

In conclusion, a framework on the conditions triggering belief change cannot be based on a selection of isolated factors that are expected to (always) cause belief change. Instead, it is necessary to approach the topic in a more holistic perspective as the broader context is essential to understand why leaders' beliefs have evolved in a certain way.

Conclusion

This thesis studied the belief systems of European leaders Angela Merkel and Viktor Orbán in the context of the Refugee Crisis in a longitudinal approach in order to understand how their beliefs have evolved throughout the crisis. In addition, this thesis went a step further in order to inquire why have their beliefs behaved in a specific way, which involved the analysis of the context in which belief change took place. I first reflect upon the theoretical framework and methodology used in the thesis, its' advantages and drawbacks for analyzing Merkel's and Orbán's beliefs. This is followed by a general overview of the main insights of the thesis and its' implications to the EU decision-making.

This thesis was based on insights coming mainly from the cognitive approach to foreign policy analysis and leadership literature. In the core of the literature - and on the assumptions for the Operational Code Analysis -, leaders' belief systems are structured hierarchically. This meant that their philosophical beliefs would occupy the centre - and thus be more resistant to change - while their instrumental beliefs would be peripheral and, consequently, more prone to change (George, 1969). This is a core assumption of the literature. However, the first finding of the research disputes this idea - the results of the Operational Code Analysis show that significant belief change did not take place in terms of leaders' instrumental beliefs, but rather in terms of their philosophical beliefs. This means that instead of simple learning, which is the expected based on the existing literature, only diagnostic learning takes place, which entails a shift on the way the actor perceives his environment (Malici & Malici, 2005). This supports the argument of other authors who have also identified that tactical beliefs tend to actually be more central than philosophical beliefs (e.g. Renshon, 2008). This thesis reinforces the need to rethink the logic behind the structure of political leaders' belief systems as the core aspect of the theoretical framework does not seem to hold true in several occasions.

The objective of the quantitative section of this thesis was to find out how Merkel's and Orbán's beliefs evolved throughout the crisis. The Operational Code Analysis was used as a way to capture their belief systems and to assess whether their variation was significant or not. As a method, the Operational Code allows us to have a reliable image of leaders' beliefs - as those are

inferred from their speech acts based on the same coding scheme - and to compare the constructs over time. However, there are many drawbacks in using such a technique.

First, the philosophical and instrumental beliefs are measured based on the leaders' responses to the ten questions developed by George (1969), which focused on the nature of the political universe, conflict, political goals, tactics and strategies, among other elements. Although it is stated that the construct can be used to assess leaders' beliefs in specific issue-areas or domains, I still doubt whether this is really the case. The generality of the questions tap into leaders' more deep and underlying beliefs, which in general could contribute to the existing frames in the migration and refugees literature. However, this contribution would be highly undermined by the uncertainty whether the beliefs being measured are actually accurate for migration. Additionally, the particularity with the Refugee Crisis lies on its' strong humanitarian aspect - it is about the different definitions of refugees and ultimately of who deserves solidarity -, which cannot be measured by the standardized questions. Therefore, I believe that a possible improvement would be the development of different questions and constructs according to the domain at hand.

A second consideration on the Operational Code Analysis is that it is suited mainly for studies with an extensive timeframe. The literature recommends having at least 10 speech acts per Operational Code in order to provide a full picture of leaders' beliefs (Schafer & Walker, 2006). In my research, for example, that was not possible due to the limited timeframe (2 years) and to the multiple constructs that were measured close to each other. Although other authors have worked with the method with less than 10 speech acts (e.g. Walker et al., 1998; Renshon, 2008; Brummer, 2016), the results of the constructs could be severely affected by the small number of discourses available per construct. Thus, I would recommend those interested in leaders' beliefs in a short timeframe to look into methods such as Cognitive Mapping, which allows you to go more in depth into the content of leaders' beliefs - albeit being more time and labour consuming than the Operational Code Analysis.

Underlying all these elements, the research focused on a specific point in the study of leaders' beliefs - namely, the potential shift and convergence needed for collective decision-making in moments of crisis. This thesis started with the recognition that leaders' belief systems were a core element to understand the management of crises as they steer leaders' decision-making,

especially in uncertain moments. This is a relatively non-problematic point if the crisis affects only one country. However, the Refugee Crisis had a wide scope and several states were affected.

The management of the crisis in the EU was in itself a complex task. Due to the fragmented aspect of the EU decision-making structure, leaders with different beliefs, preferences and institutional contexts need to come together and develop a common solution to the issue at hand (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Therefore, we expected that, under the increasing pressure to address the crisis, the pre-existing beliefs of some leaders would change and converge into a collective decision as they recognized their interdependence and that cooperating would be the best way to move forward (Van Esch, 2014; Schramm, 2019). However, the operational code analysis in this thesis showed that this was not the case.

In fact, the findings in this thesis supports the idea that leaders remain attached to their beliefs during moments of uncertainty (Boin et al., 2005). Orbán's beliefs were entirely stable while only a few of Merkel's philosophical beliefs presented a significant change. This means that belief change is actually a very hard process to take place and is very rare. Furthermore, belief convergence is even harder as leaders beliefs are each under a different context. While Orbán's beliefs did not present a significant change, they did become gradually more hostile as the crisis evolved, for example. This is connected not to specific factors as assumed in the belief change framework but rather it connects to the overall context around the Hungarian leader - more specifically, to the increasing tension between him and other european leaders as he refused to compromise his position, which complicated the collective resolution of the crisis.

While belief convergence did not take place, I still sustain that belief change (to a certain degree) is necessary for the cooperation and development of solutions among EU member-states. The research conducted here shows that the main aggravating factor behind the Refugee Crisis was the lack of coordination and solidarity between the EU member-states. However, belief change can take place in both directions - beliefs can converge or they can grow further apart. If belief convergence is necessary for collective decision-making in moments of crisis, we are left with the following question: are there conditions that can mold leaders' beliefs into converging with each other?. While the answer to this question will not be found in this study, it is an area to be further explored.

The qualitative analysis presented in this thesis highlights the importance of the contextual circumstances around the leader. In order to understand why belief change takes place, it is necessary to provide a full picture of the dynamics around that specific moment - namely, the inclusion of the individual, national and international levels. Furthermore, if we look at the structure of the EU decision-making, it is not possible to understand how a process of crisis resolution takes place based only on supranational dynamics. The interaction between leaders' national and international contexts is central to uncovering their beliefs and preferences at a given time, which in turn gives us a basis to interpret why a given crisis had a more smooth resolution process while others remain in a deadlock.

What my study can offer is a possible framework to explore and analyze leaders' beliefs throughout a crisis in a longitudinal approach, which can also be applied to other foreign policy crisis within the EU. This is useful as an analysis of leaders' beliefs only before and after the crisis are not able to tell us the nuances and shifts during the crisis, which are relevant to capturing a more complete and cohesive image of who the leaders are and how they make sense of reality. Furthermore, it allows us to capture leaders' underlying beliefs and their worldview, which is the basis for any policy frame that will be later constructed and provides nuances to the existing explanations of leaders' belief change in crisis management.

Appendix I

Table 1 - The Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs of Angela Merkel

Type of Belief	Before the Refugee Crisis (n = 6)	August 2015 (n = 5)	Early September 2015 (n = 8)	After the 15th of September 2015 (n = 16)	After January 2016 (n=16)*	Early-March 2016 (n=2)*	Late-March 2016 (n = 13)	May 2016 (n = 7)	Differences of Beliefs (Before/ After Crisis)	Average of Belief Trait	Standard Deviation
<i>P1 - Nature of the Political Universe</i>	0.343	0.497	0.312	0.481	0.462	0.124	0.443	0.397	-0.054	0.424	0.220
<i>P2 - Realization of fundamental political values</i>	0.135	0.199	0.141	0.236	0.246	-0.027	0.214	0.185	-0.05	0.201	0.171
<i>P3 - Predictability of political future</i>	0.133	0.286	0.144	0.180	0.160	0.109	0.177	0.211	-0.078	0.176	0.080
<i>P4 - Control over historical development</i>	0.228	0.344	0.342	0.350	0.328	0.242	0.239	0.318	-0.09	0.309	0.106
<i>P5 - Role of Chance</i>	0.971	0.906	0.945	0.938	0.949	0.973	0.957	0.933	0.038	0.945	0.032
<i>I1 - Strategic Approach to Goals</i>	0.250	0.402	0.533	0.496	0.555	0.778	0.592	0.651	-0.401	0.525	0.354
<i>I2 - Tactical Pursuit of Goals</i>	0.158	0.152	0.209	0.199	0.248	0.361	0.259	0.359	-0.201	0.234	0.199
<i>I3 - Risk Orientation</i>	0.387	0.315	0.326	0.307	0.353	0.463	0.335	0.348	0.039	0.339	0.196
<i>I4a - Cooperation/ Conflict</i>	0.358	0.518	0.467	0.446	0.445	0.222	0.408	0.349	0.009	0.424	0.262
<i>B - Words /Deeds</i>	0.511	0.336	0.515	0.443	0.361	0.500	0.442	0.582	-0.071	0.446	0.283
<i>I5a - Reward</i>	0.312	0.528	0.596	0.554	0.580	0.667	0.594	0.554	-0.242	0.553	0.188
<i>b - Promise</i>	0.162	0.084	0.014	0.058	0.074	0.028	0.054	0.020	0.142	0.062	0.101
<i>c - Appeal / Support</i>	0.151	0.089	0.156	0.136	0.124	0.194	0.149	0.252	-0.101	0.148	0.119
<i>d - Oppose / Resist</i>	0.239	0.172	0.103	0.109	0.145	0.056	0.111	0.125	0.114	0.131	0.152
<i>e - Threaten</i>	0.032	0.048	0.030	0.058	0.021	0.000	0.021	0.000	0.032	0.031	0.076
<i>f - Punish</i>	0.105	0.079	0.101	0.085	0.057	0.056	0.072	0.049	0.056	0.076	0.082

*The columns in gray are the measures of the domestic Operational Code timeline (Timeline 3)

Appendix II

Table 2 - The Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs of Viktor Orbán

Type of Belief	Before the Refugee Crisis (n = 4)	August 2015 (n = 6)	Early September 2015 (n = 5)	After the 15th of September 2015 (n = 9)	February 2016 (n=9)*	Late March 2016 (n = 3)	May 2016 (n = 6)	October 2016 (n=9)*	Differences of Beliefs (Before/ After Crisis)	Average of Belief Trait	Standard Deviation
P1 - Nature of the Political Universe	0.416	0.435	0.329	0.291	0.276	0.364	0.343	0.259	0.157	0.324	0.216
P2 - Realization of fundamental political values	0.160	0.155	0.122	0.133	0.095	0.137	0.162	0.091	0.069	0.126	0.142
P3 - Predictability of political future	0.333	0.245	0.163	0.124	0.165	0.148	0.171	0.174	0.159	0.182	0.112
P4 - Control over historical development	0.276	0.222	0.184	0.294	0.265	0.226	0.292	0.275	0.001	0.261	0.087
P5 - Role of Chance	0.918	0.941	0.972	0.964	0.958	0.965	0.950	0.953	-0.035	0.954	0.028
I1 - Strategic Approach to Goals	0.525	0.573	0.533	0.265	0.358	0.165	0.357	0.381	0.144	0.390	0.364
I2 - Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0.292	0.207	0.153	0.141	0.140	0.024	0.127	0.197	0.095	0.163	0.233
I3 - Risk Orientation	0.407	0.507	0.423	0.200	0.319	0.168	0.273	0.290	0.117	0.318	0.224
I4 - Timing of Action. a - Cooperation/ Conflict	0.475	0.385	0.467	0.671	0.568	0.835	0.643	0.556	-0.081	0.570	0.314
B - Words /Deeds	0.338	0.356	0.468	0.640	0.422	0.687	0.503	0.650	-0.312	0.516	0.296
I5 - Utility of Means a - Reward	0.578	0.678	0.646	0.423	0.530	0.395	0.523	0.425	0.153	0.517	0.204
b - Promise	0.015	0.010	0.023	0.011	0.032	0.053	0.021	0.042	-0.027	0.025	0.039
c - Appeal / Support	0.169	0.099	0.097	0.198	0.117	0.135	0.134	0.223	-0.054	0.153	0.137
d - Oppose / Resist	0.238	0.134	0.081	0.238	0.211	0.209	0.174	0.162	0.076	0.183	0.136
e - Threaten	0.000	0.000	0.016	0.008	0.016	0.000	0.029	0.020	-0.02	0.013	0.029
f - Punish	0.000	0.079	0.137	0.122	0.094	0.209	0.118	0.128	-0.128	0.110	0.124

*The columns in gray are the measures of the domestic Operational Code timeline (Timeline 4)

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