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Gender, Genocide and the UN
Gendered Approaches to Srebrenica 1995-2017



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Abstract

This thesis argues how a gendered approach can strengthen the response of the United Nations to genocide (and ethnic conflict), using the atrocities at Srebrenica in 1995 as a case study. This year, 2020, marks 25 years since the genocide of 8,000 Bosniak men and the rape of dozens of women at Srebrenica. However, the gender dynamics of genocide, encompassing both men and women as gendered subjects, remains an understudied aspect of the events that happened at Srebrenica. The thesis discusses how gender dynamics shaped the genocide at Srebrenica. Moreover, several UN resolutions, reports, and judgments from the international trials on Srebrenica will be analyzed to show to what extent a gendered approach to the atrocities was missing. Lastly, based on the answers to the previous questions, the thesis will discuss how a gendered approach can help the international community, and the UN specifically, improve their response to genocide and ethnic conflict.

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Introduction

This year, 2020, marks 25 years since the horrible events at Srebrenica in July 1995. The genocide of thousands of men and deportation of thousands of women and children was the epitome of the Bosnian War, an ethnic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) during 1992-1995. Bosnia was originally part of the Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, which started to fall apart following the death of President Josip Broz Tito in 1980. After Tito's death, nationalism arose within the six republics in the federation, starting in Serbia with the rise to power of nationalist leader Slobodan Milosević, but quickly spreading to other ethnic groups as well.¹ Bosnia, an independent republic since 1992, housed a multitude of cultural, economic, religious and ethnic groups.² Ethnic tensions between the three main ethnic groups - Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), Croats and Serbs - started to divide and weaken the Bosnian leadership in 1989. A long economic crisis after the dissolution of Yugoslavia left many people in Bosnia dissatisfied with the current political situation.³ Especially the people in rural areas and smaller communities grew more and more displeased.⁴ The media further exacerbated the divide, magnifying ethnic differences and sentiments of nationalism.⁵ Moreover, the Bosnian leadership failed to adequately address the growing nationalism; the system was failing. This proved a favourable backdrop for the ultimate the Bosnian Serbs to plan their ultimate goal of starting a campaign to submit parts of Bosnia to a 'Greater Serbia'.⁶ In the plan, a new partitioned Bosnia would have regions allocated to homogeneous ethnic groups, either Serbs or Croatians.⁷ In order to achieve this, these regions needed to be 'ethnically cleansed' of the third group, the Muslim Bosniaks, and so they became a target of "conquest, murder and expulsion".⁸ The reason for targeting Muslims specifically is long-rooted in history and beyond the scope of this introduction.⁹ Around 100,000 people were

¹ Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy* (London, 2003), 96.

² Olivera Simić, 'What Remains of Srebrenica? Motherhood, Transitional Justice and Yearning for the Truth', *Journal of International Women's Studies* 10 (2009) 4, 222.

³ Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 106.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 102-3.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 106.

⁷ Carla Dahlman and Gearóid Ó Tuathail, 'The legacy of ethnic cleansing: The international community and the returns process in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina', *Political Geography* 24 (2005), 575-6.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 577.

⁹ For further reading on the deeper causes of ethnic divides in Bosnia, I suggest Neven Andjelic's book *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy* (London, 2003).

murdered, 65% of which were Bosniaks.¹⁰ It was one of the most violent conflicts on European soil since World War II.

Although it was a violent conflict in many regards, the conflict particularly stands out due to the systematic use of rape and sexual violence of Bosnian women. Rape happens in most wars, but the international and domestic attention given to this aspect of the conflict in Bosnia was unprecedented.¹¹ The crime was committed by all sides, but in general, Muslim women were targeted and Serbian forces formed the majority of the perpetrators.¹² The number of victims is disputed, ranging from 20,000 to 50,000.¹³ In almost all cases, “the victims are of a different nationality from the perpetrator, that is, women have been singled out for humiliation on account of their nationality”.¹⁴ According to Amnesty International, a possible reason for the uncertain number is that many women were reluctant to report or even speak openly about their rape experiences. It is common for rape survivors to repress their memories of rape and feel degraded, ashamed or afraid of the social stigma following talking openly about sexual violence.¹⁵ The rape was systematic; in many cases women were deliberately held captive for the purpose of sexual abuse.¹⁶ These cases of rape were part of the Serbs’ larger strategy of ‘ethnic cleansing’. The women would be raped, forcibly impregnated and held hostage to the point where abortion became impossible. As children carry the ethnicity of their father, the Serbs thus tried to ensure that the Bosniak population would be diminished.¹⁷ Victims would in some cases be executed after the rape.¹⁸ Evidently, systemic rape was a deliberate war tactic used during the Bosnian War.

Despite the widespread attention for systematic rape during the Bosnian War, the gender dynamics of genocide remains an understudied aspect of the events that happened at Srebrenica. A popular research subject has been the memorialization of the victims of the

¹⁰ BBC, ‘Bosnia war dead figure announced’ (21 June 2007),

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6228152.stm> (23 September 2020).

¹¹ Inger Skjelsbæk, ‘Victim and Survivor: Narrated Social Identities of Women Who Experienced Rape During the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, *Feminism & Psychology* 16 (2006) 4, 373.

¹² Amnesty International, ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and sexual abuse by armed forces’, AI Index: EUR 63/01/93 (1993), 5.

¹³ Adam Jones, ‘Gender and Ethnic Conflict in ex-Yugoslavia’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17 (1994) 1, 115.

¹⁴ Amnesty International, ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina’, 8.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁷ Jones, ‘Gender and Ethnic Conflict’, 118.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

events, for example.¹⁹ Other scholars have focused on Srebrenica as a ‘safe area’ and whether the UN and the Dutch government carry responsibility for the genocide.²⁰ The Srebrenica area became an enclave for Bosniak refugees when the Serbs started their attacks, eventually hosting thousands of people.²¹ The area had officially been declared a ‘safe area’ by the United Nations in 1993, which meant that the UN demanded the area to be “free from armed attack or any other hostile act”.²² The refugees were put under the protection of the international community, a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) represented by a Dutch peacekeeping force (Dutchbat).²³ In July 1995, Serb nationalist forces entered the enclave, organized the forced transfer of women and children, and murdered approximately 8,000 male Bosniaks.²⁴ In addition, many women were subjected to rape and sexual abuse.²⁵ The 150 lightly armed Dutch soldiers were no match to 2000 heavily armed Serbs who occupied the town.²⁶ The International Court for Justice ultimately judged that the massacre at Srebrenica could be categorized as genocide, for which Serbia and Montenegro were held responsible.²⁷ Afterwards, ‘het Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie’ (NIOD – the Dutch Institute for War Documentation) compiled an in-depth report on the events at Srebrenica.²⁸ The report was commissioned by the Dutch government when it became clear that other countries and organizations involved with the events at Srebrenica were not prepared to collaborate on an

¹⁹ Diana Kontsevaia, ‘Mass graves and the politics of reconciliation: construction of memorial sites after the Srebrenica Massacre’, *The University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology* 21(2013) 1, 15-31; Janet Jacobs, ‘The memorial at Srebrenica: Gender and the social meanings of collective memory in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, *Memory Studies* 10 (2017) 4, 423-439; MS Craig Evan Pollack, ‘Intentions of burial: Mourning, politics, and memorials following the massacre at Srebrenica’, *Death Studies* 22 (2003) 1, 125-142.

²⁰ Isabelle Delpla, Xavier Bougarel, and Jean-Louis Fournel, *Investigating Srebrenica: Institutions, Facts, Responsibilities* (Berghahn Books, 2012); Olivera Simić, “‘Pillar of Shame’: Civil Society, UN Accountability and Genocide in Srebrenica”, in: *Transitional Justice and Civil Society in the Balkans*, ed. Olivera Simić and Zala Volčič (New York: Springer, 2013), 181-199.

²¹ Simić, ‘What Remains of Srebrenica?’, 222.

²² UN Security Council (UNSC), Security Council resolution 819, 1993, resolution 16 April 1993, S/RES/819 (1993), available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/819>.

²³ Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD), ‘Srebrenica: een ‘veilig’ gebied: Reconstructie, achtergronden, gevolgen en analyses van de val van een *Safe Area*’ (report NIOD, Amsterdam, 2002), 9, <https://www.niod.nl/nl/srebrenica-rapport/rapport>.

²⁴ Delpla, Bougarel, and Fournel, *Investigating Srebrenica*, 1.

²⁵ Selma Leydesdorff, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide: The Woman of Srebrenica Speak* (Indiana University Press, 2011), 166.

²⁶ Simić, ‘What Remains of Srebrenica?’, 223.

²⁷ ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)’, International Court of Justice, accessed 25 October 2020, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/91_198-201.

²⁸ NIOD, ‘Srebrenica: een ‘veilig’ gebied: Reconstructie, achtergronden, gevolgen en analyses van de val van een *Safe Area*’ (report NIOD, Amsterdam, 2002).

investigation into the events.²⁹ Not gender dynamics, but the question of accountability regarding the UN and the Dutch government have dominated scholarly attention on the subject of Srebrenica.

Remarkable about the events at Srebrenica is the division of gender with regard to the forms of violence: in general, specifically *men* were murdered whereas *women* were deported (and in many cases, raped). Srebrenica was not the first instance in history where men were targeted exclusively for murder; many other examples can be found, note especially Adam Jones's work on this subject.³⁰ However, it was the first instance where it was widely covered by media and came to international attention on a large scale.³¹ Using the atrocities at Srebrenica in 1995 as a case study, this thesis argues how a gendered approach can strengthen the response of the United Nations to genocide (and ethnic conflict). To answer this research question, the thesis discusses how gender dynamics shaped the genocide at Srebrenica. Moreover, several UN resolutions, reports, and judgments from the international trials on Srebrenica will be analyzed to show to what extent a gendered approach to the atrocities was missing. Lastly, based on the answers to the previous questions, the thesis will discuss how a gendered approach can help the international community, and the UN specifically, improve their response to genocide and ethnic conflict.

Several scholars have developed gender theories in the field of international relations (IR). The development of research regarding the role of gender within IR coincided with the second wave of feminism, characterised by Margaret Walters as the political expression of women with different racial, class, national and regional background, acknowledging the different needs of different women.³² During this time, the notion of the patriarchy as a political institution first emerged.³³ 'Patriarchy' is the "the predominance of men in positions of power and influence in society, with cultural values and norms favouring men".³⁴ The idea of a male dominance of norms in politics and international relations subsequently also permeated IR and security studies. In the 1980s, Cynthia Enloe was among the first to advocate for an IR theory

²⁹ Ibid., 9.

³⁰ Adam Jones, 'Gendercide and Genocide', *Journal of Genocide Research* 2 (2000) 2, 185-211.

³¹ Skjelsbæk, 'Victim and Survivor', 373.

³² Margaret Walters, 'Second-Wave Feminism: The Late 20th Century', *Feminism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2005), 77.

³³ Ibid., 83.

³⁴ OED Online, 'Patriarchy', (June 2005), <https://www-oed-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/view/Entry/138873?redirectedFrom=patriarchy#eid> (9 January 2020).

viewed through a feminist lens in her ground-breaking book *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*.³⁵ Enloe suggests that IR has been told from a male perspective that excludes women.³⁶ J. Ann Tickner concurs, stressing the need to retell the foundational stories of IR from a non-Western and feminist perspective.³⁷ In another article, Tickner observes the difficulty of uniting IR and feminist theory as disciplines, as IR theory “builds on an ontology of inter-state relations that sees states as unitary rational actors operating in an asocial international environment”, whereas feminist theory “comes out of an ontology of social relations, particularly gender relations which starts at the level of the individual embedded in hierarchical social, political, and economic structures”.³⁸ Despite the efforts by the scholars mentioned above, feminist theory has not gained a firm foothold yet in the IR landscape.

However, although they are often mentioned within the same breath, there is a distinction between gender theory and feminist theory. Many scholars wishing to research gender in IR have critiqued feminist scholars for being too normative. For example, R. Charli Carpenter has offered criticism on several books on IR and gender.³⁹ She argues that feminist criticism fails to engage in dialogue with non-feminist scholars and that, despite being about gender, they focus too much on the female experience.⁴⁰ Furthermore, she poses that framing gender analysis as feminism deters some IR scholars from engaging with gender at all.⁴¹ Adam Jones concurs with Carpenter; he contends that feminist scholarship is too normative and calls for a more nuanced investigation of the gender variable.⁴² Both make a valid point about the gender variable’s lack of the inclusion of male-specific sufferings during conflict. Gender research should go beyond female perspectives alone. However, it should also be noted that the female experience still tends to be understated or even ignored, especially in the field of IR, which is why special focus on the female experience is not unwarranted. In addition, paying attention to female suffering does not automatically dismiss the existence of male suffering. Nevertheless, it is true that a comprehensive gender research into the Srebrenica genocide that

³⁵ Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (University of California Press, 2014).

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 31-32.

³⁷ J. Ann Tickner, ‘Retelling IR’s foundational stories: some feminist and postcolonial perspectives’, *Global Change, Peace & Security* 23 (2011) 1, 5-13.

³⁸ J. Ann Tickner, ‘Feminist Responses to International Security Studies’, *Peace Review* 16 (2004) 1, 44.

³⁹ R. Charli Carpenter, ‘Gender Theory in World Politics: Contributions of a Nonfeminist Standpoint?’, *International Studies Review* 4 (2002) 3, 153-165.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 153-4.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 156.

⁴² Jones, ‘Gender and Ethnic Conflict’, 115-34.

includes both men and women as gendered subjects is still missing. As Elissa Helms remarked, research tends to focus “attention and resources on women war victims”.⁴³ Helms also misses a more comprehensive gender approach on the Bosnian war, an approach where the complexity of gender is acknowledged and men too are included as gendered beings.⁴⁴ This paper will therefore attempt to fill this gap and focus on the gender dynamics of the Srebrenica genocide, aiming to include both men *and* women as gendered subjects. The term gender theory will therefore be used in preference over feminist theory.

Special attention in this research will be given to Joan W. Scott, who has developed a framework of gender as a category of historical analysis. Although her paper was published as early as the 1980s, Scott also noticed that gender had become a synonym for ‘women’.⁴⁵ Moreover, historical scholars, when using gender as an analytical lens, often reinforce the binary opposition of men/women and assign to this a timeless, ahistorical, quality.⁴⁶ Scott calls for a refusal of such a binary opposition and a theorization of gender as an analytical category.⁴⁷ Political history especially had been practically void of gender analysis as it “has been seen as antithetical to the real business of politics”.⁴⁸ With regard to international politics, she mentions the relation between masculinity and national strength and security, and the exclusion of women from high politics.⁴⁹ As mentioned before, this has changed over the years: more has been written about gender in relation to (international) politics. However, the focus on women within gender has not changed. Scott’s framework is still useful today as her theory is not overtly normative and leaves room for the inclusion of both male and female experiences. In Scott’s own words: “Gender is one of the recurrent references by which political power has been conceived, legitimated, and criticized.”⁵⁰ This paper will attempt to challenge the men/women binary, use gender as an analytical framework to shed light on the events at Srebrenica and investigate how gender as an analytical framework can improve the UN’s response to genocide.

⁴³ Elissa Helms, ‘Gendered Transformations of State Power: Masculinity, International Intervention, and the Bosnian Police’, *Nationalities Papers* 34 (2006) 3, 343.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 466.

⁴⁵ Joan W. Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’, *The American Historical Review* 91 (1986) 5, 1056.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 1064-65.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 1065-66.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 1070.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 1073.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

Numerous articles have been written about gender, peacebuilding and conflict resolution.⁵¹ For example, Sophie Richter-Devroe has criticized the ways in which women have been included in conflict resolution (CR) processes in reference to Palestinian peace efforts.⁵² In addition, she is critical of incorporating culturally specific gender roles into CR approaches, proposing the term ‘contextualized gender norms’ to avoid a monolithic conceptualization of culture and gender-discriminatory stereotypes.⁵³ Lastly, Richter-Devroe offers suggestions for including gender approaches in CR. For example, she mentions the difference between practical gender interests such as access to basic needs (e.g. childcare, healthcare and food), and strategic interests aimed at “strengthening women’s feminist consciousness and their bargaining power to confront social and political discrimination”.⁵⁴ Many NGOs tend to work on and fund strategic interests exclusively.⁵⁵ According to Richter-Devroe, prioritizing practical gender interests could yield more domestic support as access to basic needs is often limited during conflict.⁵⁶ She also argues that female political activism should be broader conceptualized, including passive nonresistance, without resorting to the stereotypical binary where women are passive victims.⁵⁷ Richter-Devroe provides solid criticism on the tendency to define gender and culture as monolithic rather than complex. However, she still focuses almost exclusively on women and their role in conflict resolution, rather than the role of gender dynamics as a whole. Moreover, she focuses more on NGOs than official international political institutions such as the United Nations.

Furthermore, referring to the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, Jayne Rodgers has identified the ways in which men and women are affected differently by war and how this fact is often disregarded by the international community when they intervene in conflicts.⁵⁸ She proposes four approaches to better incorporate gender in interventions: involve organizations which are specialized in women rights’ issues; put greater emphasis on “initiatives taken by groups within conflict zones”; take into account the testimonies of female victims of war; and lastly, include

⁵¹ Elisa Von Joeden-Forger, ‘Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention’, *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 7 (2012) 1, 89-107; Lene Hansen, ‘Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security’, *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 3 (2001) 1, 66-7.

⁵² Sophie Richter-Devroe, ‘Gender, Culture, and Conflict Resolution in Palestine’, *Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies* 4 (2008) 2, 30-59.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 37-41.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 41-42.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 47-51.

⁵⁸ Jayne Rodgers, ‘Bosnia, Gender and the Ethics of Intervention in Civil Wars’, *Civil Wars* 1 (1998) 1, 108-9.

men and children in the gender equations. Gender should be looked at as a long-term factor as attention to gender during the conflict will be beneficial even after the conflict ends.⁵⁹ Although Rodgers's recommendations are certainly helpful, they are still largely focused on humanitarian aid for women. Moreover, the article is from 1998 and looking at Srebrenica with more retrospective knowledge should give a fresh perspective on the recommendations given by Rodgers. This paper will elaborate specifically on the last two recommendations and apply these to the case of genocide. It will use testimonies from survivors to include a human element to the research of high politics and goes on to research the discourse of reports, resolutions and other official documents to identify that this human element is exactly what is missing from reporting gender issues in genocide (if these issues are included in the discourse at all). Moreover, the paper will look at gender as a whole, including both women and men as gendered subjects. Building onto these existing theories, the aim of the research is to find out how a better understanding of the gender dynamics of genocide can be used by the international community to strengthen their peacebuilding initiatives in cases of genocide.

In order to give a rounded answer to the research question, this paper will consist of three parts. In the first part, I will argue that gender was a decisive factor in the Srebrenica massacre. To support my argument and to add a human element, I will provide examples from testimonies from both male and female Srebrenica survivors. In the second part, I will contrast these examples with three different responses from the United Nations: the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council during and after the massacre in 1995; the report written a few years after the war by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999; and finally the judgment from the International Court for Justice from 2007 and statements from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, whose final judgment was given in 2017.⁶⁰ These responses were chosen as they show the immediate response as well as the response a few years later when there had been time for reflection. I will demonstrate that these examples lack attention for the gender aspect of the Srebrenica massacre. In the third and final part, I will contend that a better understanding of gender dynamics of conflict can be used to strengthen the response from international organizations like the UN to genocide. The conclusion will

⁵⁹ Ibid., 112-3.

⁶⁰ UNSC, Security Council resolution 1004, 1-2; UNSC, Security Council resolution 1010, 1-2; Annan, 'Report of the Secretary-General', 1-113; 'Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro', ICJ; 'International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia', United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, accessed 25 October 2020, <https://www.icty.org/en>.

summarize my findings, acknowledge the limitations of my research and give suggestions for further research on this subject.

Chapter 1

Rape and Murder: How Gender Shaped the Genocide at Srebrenica

In this chapter, the gender dynamics of the genocide at Srebrenica will be analyzed, looking at the experiences of male and female victims, and male perpetrators. In the analysis, I want to avoid reverting to a man/woman binary, which has traditionally been reinforced in gender research.⁶¹ In conflict situations, this binary often means that men are essentialized as aggressors and women as victims.⁶² Although many scholars have already challenged the idea of women as victims, the essentializing of men as aggressors has not been challenged in a similar way. I therefore want to add to the gender research on Srebrenica by challenging the ‘men as aggressors and women as victims’-binary through analyzing the motivations of Serb soldiers who raped and murdered at Srebrenica, focusing on the notions of masculinity within the nationalist Serbian army. I will complicate this view by adding the dimension of men as victims. By doing so, I will shed new light on the gender dynamics of the violence at Srebrenica.

During the Bosnian War, the Serb party followed an ethnic cleansing policy, attempting to stop Bosniak reproduction. One of the tactics mentioned before was the systematic rape and forced impregnation of Bosniak women. Another tactic was the genocide of thousands of men at Srebrenica. Helen Fein has categorized four possibilities for stopping or appropriating reproduction of an ethnic group during genocide: first, killing both men and women; second, killing men and enslaving women, thus preventing reproduction; third, enslaving both men and women, thus preventing reproduction; or fourth, killing men, enslaving women, and sexually appropriating them by keeping them as concubines or assimilate them to become wives.⁶³ The Srebrenica genocide seems to fall in the second category. Although not enslaved, Bosniak women were separated from their male relatives and deported. Before deportation, many women were raped by Serb soldiers. Furthermore, the genocide was gender-specific as thousands of Bosniak men were murdered.

This chapter will research both women and men as gendered subjects of genocide. Scholars have often focused on women’s experiences and less on men’s experiences. However, as will become apparent in the analysis of the events at Srebrenica, men and women face different gender-specific challenges during genocide. Studies on men as gendered subjects of

⁶¹ Scott, ‘Gender’, 1065-66.

⁶² Richter-Devroe, ‘Gender, Culture, and Conflict Resolution’, 48.

⁶³ Helen Fein, ‘Genocide and gender: the uses of women and group destiny’, *Journal of Genocide Research* 1 (1999) 1, 43.

conflict tend to become competitive in their argument for research on men as victims of genocide. For example, Adam Jones argues that male suffering has been decisively bigger than female suffering in genocide. He cites Errol Miller who contends that male domination of men has been more severe than male domination of women.⁶⁴ Furthermore, he argues that there have been “staggering demographic disproportions” between mass killings of men vs women.⁶⁵ These statements are problematic, because they brush over the many specific ways in which women suffer in genocidal circumstances, for example sexual violence. This paper aims to take a more nuanced approach to gender dynamics of genocide.

A reversion to traditional norms

After the fall of the socialist federation, the former Yugoslav societies, including Serbian society, started to revert to patriarchal values and traditional views of masculinity and femininity. These ideas of masculinity and femininity ultimately shaped the mentality of the Serb soldiers who participated in rape and genocide. Aleksandra Sasha Milićević identifies three succeeding periods of changing gender norms in Serbia. The pre-socialist period was patrilocal and patrilineal: men were glorified as warriors and women’s roles were negligible, only portrayed of being of importance when in the role of mother.⁶⁶ In fact, women were equated to children and the mentally ill and therefore needed to be controlled and protected by men.⁶⁷ During the socialist period, promoting gender equality was part of socialist ideology and women gained rights such as property rights, the right to vote, reproductive rights and access to education and employment.⁶⁸ However, although there was progress for women’s rights in general, full gender equality was not achieved; women often still worked in lower-paid professions and “remained largely responsible for domestic duties”.⁶⁹ After the fall of socialism in Yugoslavia, an economic crisis ensued and due to women’s emancipation, man’s role as protector and provider eroded. As a consequence, men started to feel inadequate and “in a way economically emasculated”.⁷⁰ Hence, the backlash against communism was paired with a backlash against all the rights women had gained during the regime.⁷¹ Against this

⁶⁴ Jones, ‘Gendercide and Genocide’, 187.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁶⁶ Milićević, ‘Joining the War’, 270.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 269.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 270.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 271.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

backdrop, patriarchal values and traditional gender norms were reinforced from the 1980s into the 1990s.

The reversion to patriarchal values was further propagandized by Serbian political elites and media, linking traditional gender norms to ethnicity and militarist nationalism. The reinforcement of traditional masculine and feminine identities during war was not a new phenomenon and has been studied by several researchers before, see for example the introduction of Nicola Cooper and Stephen McVeigh on this subject.⁷² The connection between gender and ethnonationalism during the Yugoslav wars has already been made by Milićević (mentioned above) Patricia Albanese, Miranda Alison, and Wendy Bracewell.⁷³ As economic resentment was high after the death of President Tito, political leaders found that appealing to nationalism would give them popularity and power.⁷⁴ They would turn minor differences between ethnic groups into “a monstrous fable”, where their own people were “blameless victims” and the other “genocidal killers”.⁷⁵ For the Serbs, ethnonationalist propaganda started to gain momentum in the late 1980s, when demographic numbers showed that Albanians had a much higher birth rate in Kosovo than the Serbs.⁷⁶ It was framed as a “demographic war”, the goal of the Albanians supposedly being to ethnically cleanse the province.⁷⁷ Propaganda in the media would show Albanian men raping Serb women, “symbolically presented as the violation of all Serbs”, thereby sharpening ethnic boundaries.⁷⁸ Women were blamed as they were the “biological reproducers of the nations” and had failed in this duty.⁷⁹ Going back to traditional gender norms was presented as the solution. Women’s true purpose was to bear children, and men were glorified as warriors, who should protect their women and go to war.⁸⁰ Traditional masculine identities were even more strengthened within the army. Propaganda promoted hyper-masculinity, framing war (including killing and raping) as “an exciting male

⁷² Nicola Cooper and Stephen McVeigh, ‘Introduction: Men at war – masculinities, identities and cultures’, *Journal of War and Culture Studies* 5 (2012) 3, 245-248.

⁷³ Milićević, ‘Joining the War’, 265-287; Patricia Albanese, ‘Nationalism, War, and Archaization of Gender Relations in the Balkans’, *Violence against Women* 7 (2001) 9, 999-1023; Miranda Alison, ‘Wartime sexual violence: women’s human rights and questions of masculinity’, *Review of International Studies* 33 (2007), 75-90; Wendy Bracewell, ‘Rape in Kosovo: masculinity and Serbian nationalism’, *Nations and Nationalism* 6 (2000) 4, 563-90.

⁷⁴ Albanese, ‘Nationalism, War, and Archaization’, 1005.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Milićević, ‘Joining the War’, 271.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 272.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Albanese, ‘Nationalism, War, and Archaization’, 1007.

⁸⁰ Milićević, ‘Joining the War’, 272.

adventure”.⁸¹ In military culture, this hyper-masculinity was celebrated and set outside the norms of civil society; for example, violence was socially acceptable.⁸² As a result, there was a “heightened sense of male empowerment and entitlement”.⁸³ With this mindset, the Serb soldiers came to Srebrenica.

The female victim

During the chaos of the Serb occupation of Srebrenica, women were victims of many abuses. In order to give a full representation of the gender dynamics of the events at Srebrenica and challenge the ‘men as aggressors and women as victims’-binary, I will first shortly elaborate on the women of Srebrenica. Four survivors’ testimonies will be analyzed here; three from Selma Leydesdorff’s *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide*, who were at the Dutch-protected compound in Potočari (near Srebrenica) during the attack, and one from the Balkan Transitional Justice programme from the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, a network of NGOs from Southern and Eastern Europe. One of the testimonies is from ‘Munira’, who witnessed multiple rapes of other women.⁸⁴ Another woman, ‘S’ was attacked by a group of Serb soldiers whilst fetching water for her ill father. She was hit and lost consciousness before being raped. She realized she was raped from the pain she felt after she woke up.⁸⁵ ‘Hamra’ also remembered nothing from being raped. She was led to a tent by four soldiers who promised her and her children food. In the tent, she was attacked and raped in front of her children.⁸⁶ In the testimony given to the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, ‘H.M.’ recalls being taken by Serbian forces to a house, where a military police officer forced her to undress and perform oral sex on him.⁸⁷ These are only four testimonies out of many as rape and abuse of women was widespread during the massacre.

Researching the gender dynamics of rape as a war crime is complex. According to Leydesdorff, many survivors wanted to talk about what happened, but at the same time often found it difficult and extremely emotional.⁸⁸ The subject of rape is often surrounded by shame,

⁸¹ Albanese, ‘Nationalism, War, and Archaization’, 1010.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 1011.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 1011.

⁸⁴ Leydesdorff, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide*, 157.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 169-70.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁸⁷ Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, ‘Srebrenica Anniversary: The Rape Victims’ Testimonies’, Balkan Transitional Justice, 11 July 2014, accessed 2 October 2020, <https://balkaninsight.com/2014/07/11/srebrenica-anniversary-the-rape-victims-testimonies/>

⁸⁸ Leydesdorff, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide*, 141.

which makes victims hesitant to talk about what happened to them. This is partly due to cultural norms: H.M. describes Srebrenica as a small, patriarchal village.⁸⁹ Where male soldiers were absolved of social norms during war, these norms continued to apply to women, who were “judged by their ability to maintain their chastity”.⁹⁰ Moreover, social norms prescribed that virtuous virgins produce a nation and victims of sexual abuse were therefore blamed for failing to protect this responsibility.⁹¹ As a consequence, sometimes houses of rape survivors who spoke openly about their experiences were burnt down.⁹² Janine Natalya Clark, whose research will be discussed later in the chapter, also encountered shame during her interviews with rape survivors. All interviewees regarded what happened to them as extremely shameful, to the point where some of them did not even want to admit that they were raped.⁹³ Most survivors wanted to stay anonymous; the rape victims whose testimonies are described above either use a pseudonym or only their initials. Many never spoke publicly at all about what happened to them.⁹⁴ Thus the same gender dynamics that are being researched can also be the reason why the gender dynamics of rape can be difficult to research in the first place.

Despite its association with ethnic cleansing, the circumstances of Srebrenica suggest that the rapes happened more as an act of humiliation than as a genocidal act. Although according to Munira rape was “the order of the day”, it was also less systematic than during the rest of the war.⁹⁵ During the Bosnian war, many women were forcibly impregnated by Serb soldiers in rape camps and then detained, making the option for abortion impossible.⁹⁶ In these detainment camps, older women would often be separated from the younger women, specifically for the purpose of raping the younger women.⁹⁷ However, the women at Srebrenica were detained in the enclave only for a short period of time, before being deported to other regions. So even if they did get pregnant from the raping, there was no guarantee that the pregnancy would not be terminated. Furthermore, not all women who were raped were of childbearing age. H.M. was 45 years old when she was raped, an age where most women are not fertile anymore.⁹⁸ It is more likely that women were raped to “intimidate, humiliate, and

⁸⁹ Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, ‘Srebrenica Anniversary’.

⁹⁰ Albanese, ‘Nationalism, War, and Archaization’, 1014.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 1013-4.

⁹² Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, ‘Srebrenica Anniversary’.

⁹³ Janine Natalya Clark, ‘Untangling Rape Causation and the Importance of the Micro Level: Elucidating the Use of Mass Rape during the Bosnian War’, *Ethnopolitics* 16 (2017) 4, 392-3.

⁹⁴ Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, ‘Srebrenica Anniversary’.

⁹⁵ Leydesdorff, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide*, 157.

⁹⁶ Jones, ‘Gender and Ethnic Conflict’, 118.

⁹⁷ Clark, ‘Untangling Rape Causation’, 404.

⁹⁸ Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, ‘Srebrenica Anniversary’.

degrade women” and ‘damage’ or ‘taint’ them to prevent them from sustaining “the purity of the ethnic group”.⁹⁹ This was done with the objective of highlighting the impotence of the men in the group to protect the women.¹⁰⁰ I will elaborate more on motives for abuse in the next section on the perpetrators of rape.

Much research has been done on the gender dynamics of rape as a war crime and several scholars have challenged the one-sided view of women as victims in conflict. Rape victims are often presented in a reductive way, as survivors and mothers only. As Janet Jacobs argued, the women from Srebrenica are primarily remembered as “tragic figures of motherhood”, symbols of “a particular kind of female survivor, one who personifies the norms of patriarchy in which women represent traditional maternal values of family and domesticity.”¹⁰¹ Jacobs noted the importance of these maternal tropes in the memorialization of women’s experiences and the lack of a memorialization of the mass rape.¹⁰² In Leydesdorff’s testimonies, she also often emphasizes the women’s identity as survivors and mothers. Munira, for example, is highlighted as one of the most prominent faces of the organization Mothers of Žepa and Srebrenica and a mother whose son was taken away from her.¹⁰³ In Hamra’s testimony, it is stressed that she had a baby 40 days before the events at Srebrenica and that the rape she endured happened in front of her children.¹⁰⁴ Both women are foremost mothers in their testimonies. Moreover, Olivera Simić has argued that victims of Srebrenica use the rhetoric of victimhood and motherhood to gain political mobilization and justice.¹⁰⁵ Due to the scope of this paper, I will not further elaborate on women as victims. Instead, I will focus on challenging the role of men as aggressors as fewer scholars have commented on this.

The perpetrator

Research into the gender dynamics of rape has often led to oversimplifications and the reinforcement of a ‘men as aggressors and women as victims’-binary. In accordance with Joan W. Scott, I contend that an oversimplification like this is unhelpful for the purpose of researching gender. The men-women binary needs to be questioned rather than reinforced.¹⁰⁶ Crucially, the male perspective as the perpetrator of rape also needs to be taken into account,

⁹⁹ Albanese, ‘Nationalism, War, and Archaization’, 1013.

¹⁰⁰ Albanese, ‘Nationalism, War, and Archaization’, 1013.

¹⁰¹ Jacobs, ‘The memorial at Srebrenica’, 432.

¹⁰² Jacobs, ‘The memorial at Srebrenica’, 423-439.

¹⁰³ Leydesdorff, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide*, 157.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 171; 173.

¹⁰⁵ Simić, ‘What Remains of Srebrenica?’, 220-236.

¹⁰⁶ Scott, ‘Gender’, 1064-65.

not to provide excuses for the deeds of rapists or trivialize what women have experienced, but to fully understand the gender dynamics of a gender-based crime like rape. Lene Hansen has identified three possible theories that explain why mass rape was a common war tactic during the Bosnian War.¹⁰⁷ However, although her theories are useful for explaining wartime rape on a structural level, it does not explain why Serb soldiers engaged in rape at the particular place and at a particular time. Hansen's theory also lacks analysis of Serb cultural notions on masculinity and war, which is needed to understand the circumstances under which the Serb soldiers acted. Her theory therefore needs to be complicated with a context-based explanation, for which Janine Natalya Clark has provided a useful framework. Combining Hansen's and Clark's theories together with how Serb notions of masculinity shaped the abusers' view of gender relations and ethnicity will give a sufficient analysis of mass rape at Srebrenica both on a structural and a context-based level. Unfortunately, testimonies from the perpetrators of war crimes are difficult to find. The analysis therefore needs to be drawn as much as possible from survivor testimonies. Nevertheless, in order to understand the gender dynamics of Srebrenica, an understanding of the behavior of the Serb soldiers who raped women and how this is shaped by gender is warranted.

The stories of perpetrators, especially those in the media, reinforce the stereotype of the man as the aggressor. According to Albanese, the mass media tried to present the abusers as "crazed and mentally deficient".¹⁰⁸ However, studies show that most men who are abusive "do not suffer from clinical pathologies".¹⁰⁹ How, then, do we explain mass rape without essentializing the perpetrators to aggressive, uncontrollable beasts? On a structural level, Lene Hansen given three suggestions. In the first, rape is seen as a traditional element of Balkan warfare. Balkan culture is rendered traditionally brutal and violent, holding onto hatred eternally. This view is rejected by Hansen because it "calls the uniformity of the Balkans into question by marking a differentiation between 'threatening men' and 'vulnerable women'".¹¹⁰ In the second, the brutality of the war was assigned to Serbia/Yugoslavia specifically, instead of Balkan culture in general. It suggests that Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian cultures were all homogeneous, separated and fundamentally different from each other.¹¹¹ However, survivors' testimonies indicate that this is not necessarily the case. Predrag Pašić from Sarajevo recalls

¹⁰⁷ Hansen, 'Gender, Nation, Rape', 55-75.

¹⁰⁸ Albanese, 'Nationalism, War, and Archaization', 1001.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Hansen, 'Gender, Nation, Rape', 61-2.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 63.

different ethnicities living and mixing together peacefully before the war.¹¹² Lastly, rape is seen in the context of ‘Balkan patriarchy’, a traditional acceptance of wartime rape as something soldiers are entitled to. Critics of this view contend that this essentializes men as having biological, internalized drive for sex, and women as non-violent, non-combatant and inherently different from men.¹¹³ All of these theories do not come to a clear conclusion and do not satisfactorily explain why the Serb soldiers engaged in warfare rape at Srebrenica in particular.

In order to understand rape without reverting to stereotyping and oversimplification, a context-sensitive approach is needed. I will therefore complicate Hansen’s views with those of Clark, who researched the causal level of mass rape during the Bosnian war with the aim of explaining rape in a particular context. She has identified five causal factors for the mass rapes: revenge (personal, mirroring or event-triggered), the desire to humiliate, opportunism, group dynamics and entitlement.¹¹⁴ Most of these factors are also relevant for the events at Srebrenica, as is evident from the testimonies of the survivors. Opportunism, “the feeling that everyday constraints were off” and feeling powerful, was a certainly factor.¹¹⁵ As mentioned before, Albanese noted that, especially during the Yugoslav wars, war is mainly a masculine pursuit, which promotes a hyper-masculinity and creates a military culture that condones violence.¹¹⁶ The women at Srebrenica were vulnerable, detained at the enclave and separated from their male relatives: an easy target for the Serb soldiers who felt that the rules of civil society did not apply. Moreover, the desire to humiliate was a big motivation for the Serb soldiers. They used derogatory names and taunted their victims, for example calling ‘S’ a “filthy *balinkura* [Muslim woman]” and mocking her fragile, thin body.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, from Hamra’s story it appears that group dynamics, which offers a feeling of anonymity and security, were also part of the soldiers’ motivation to rape.¹¹⁸ Hamra remembered that the group of soldiers who entered the tent were drunk and laughing, which apparently feeling secure, untouchable and even entertained.¹¹⁹ Lastly, entitlement, believing that one has a right to sex with a particular woman¹²⁰, was particularly evident from ‘H.M.’’s testimony. The 20-year-old soldier who

¹¹² ‘The Courage to Dream: Predrag Pašić’, Remembering Srebrenica, 8 June 2018, accessed 6 October 2020, <https://www.srebrenica.org.uk/survivor-stories/the-courage-to-dream-predrag-pasic/>.

¹¹³ Hansen, ‘Gender, Nation, Rape’, 66-7.

¹¹⁴ Clark, ‘Untangling Rape Causation’, 388-410.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 401.

¹¹⁶ Albanese, ‘Nationalism, War, and Archaization’, 1011.

¹¹⁷ Clark, ‘Untangling Rape Causation’, 401; Leydesdorff, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide*, 169.

¹¹⁸ Clark, ‘Untangling Rape Causation’, 402.

¹¹⁹ Leydesdorff, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide*, 172; Clark, ‘Untangling Rape Causation’, 403.

¹²⁰ Clark, ‘Untangling Rape Causation’, 403.

raped her used the following excuse: “I been in the field for a month, I have no woman, I want to...”.¹²¹ It implies that not having had sex for a month entitles him to raping her at that moment. Revenge was the only causal factor that was not evident from the testimonies. It could be that the rapes were a response to specific events, but this is not clear.

It is important to note that soldiers used similar tactics and had similar motivations for the genocide of the Bosniak men. This is particularly evident from ‘Witness O’'s experience, who was transported in a truck with other prisoners from Srebrenica to a school at an unknown location and put in classrooms. The soldiers took the prisoners outside in groups to be shot. Witness O was shot in his chest and arm, but he survived. In the classrooms, the soldiers would humiliate the Bosniak men by cursing their “*balija* [derogatory term for Muslims] mothers”.¹²² This humiliation would go on even after the men were killed. The soldiers would mock the dead bodies, saying “your government will be exchanging you even if you’re dead” and joking “look at this guy, he looks like a cabbage”.¹²³ Moreover, they were opportunistic, asking the men to hand over their valuables before loading them into the trucks. Revenge was also a motivation. The prisoners were told that “Srebrenica was always Serb. It always was, and always will be Serb.”¹²⁴ This suggests that the murder of the Bosniaks was revenge for them ‘taking’ the land from the Serbs. The perpetrator-victim relationship and how the perpetrators would treat the victims did not necessarily differ per gender.

Some survivors deny that the perpetrators were solely responsible for their crimes, rather blaming Serbian political leaders and the mass media for ‘misleading’ the soldiers in their militarized nationalist propaganda. The causes of rape are related to these underlying, structural factors. As ‘Witness O’ remarked at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: “And if I had the right and the courage, in the name of all those innocents and all those victims, I would forgive the actual perpetrators of the executions, because they were misled.”¹²⁵ Another victim, a woman who was physically abused by her husband after he returned from war, also refused to outright blame her husband for his actions as “he had been a victim too” of the war, fighting, killing, and losing control.¹²⁶ The Serb soldiers were ‘brainwashed’ in a way by militaristic nationalist propaganda to assume a hyper-masculine

¹²¹ Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, ‘Srebrenica Anniversary’.

¹²² ‘Witness O’, The United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (court testimony 13 April 2000), accessed 7 October 2020, <https://www.icty.org/sid/184>.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Albanese, ‘Nationalism, War, and Archaization’, 1016.

identity.¹²⁷ To a significant extent, the rape of women at Srebrenica should be understood in the context of the rhetoric of Serbian politicians and media, who successfully appealed to the soldiers' masculinity to incite them to rape (and murder). They convinced the Serb soldiers that rape was part of warfare; that Serbs were fundamentally different from the other Bosnian ethnic groups; and that as a soldier during war, you were sexually entitled to any woman you choose.

The male victim

The biggest example of male victimization at Srebrenica was the genocide of thousands of Bosniak men. Helen Fein has made a distinction between gender-neutral genocide and gender-specific genocide, where the former "seeks to destroy everyone regardless of gender" and the latter destroys only males (a genocide targeting only females has not yet occurred).¹²⁸ Most genocides in history seem to fall into the first category. For example, during the Rwandan genocide of 1994, both Tutsi women and men were murdered in equal measure.¹²⁹ During the Holocaust Jewish men and women were also equally targeted for murder.¹³⁰ Moreover, during the genocidal regime of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia from 1974-1979, men, women and children alike were killed.¹³¹ During the Srebrenica massacre, around 8,000 male Bosniaks were killed, whereas (most) women lived and were transported elsewhere.¹³² This is not to say that women were not murdered at all during the Bosnian conflict: Adam Jones has cited several incidents where women too were murdered on a mass scale.¹³³ However, contrary to the genocide at Srebrenica these actions were not gender-specific. The target group would be coincidentally comprised of women, for example because men were already incarcerated or murdered at another time.¹³⁴ The number of people killed is also much lower compared to Srebrenica, a few dozen rather than a few thousand.¹³⁵ As it was a specific form of violence directed at a specific gender, the murder of the Bosniaks at Srebrenica can be categorized as gender-based violence against men.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 1010.

¹²⁸ Fein, 'Genocide and gender', 43.

¹²⁹ Christopher C. Taylor, 'A Gendered Genocide: Tutsi Women and Hutu Extremists in the 1994 Rwanda Genocide', *POLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 22 (1999) 1, 42.

¹³⁰ Sara R. Horowitz, 'Gender, Genocide, and Jewish Memory', *Prooftexts* 20 (2000) 1-2, 159.

¹³¹ Alexander Laban Hinton, 'Why Did You Kill? The Cambodian Genocide and the Dark Side of Face and Honor', *The Journal of Asian Studies* 57 (1998) 1, 94.

¹³² Delpla, Bougarel, and Fournel, *Investigating Srebrenica*, 1.

¹³³ Jones, 'Gender and Ethnic Conflict', 118.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

The majority of the academic literature on the Bosnian War has focused on the female victims. Leydesdorff's *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide* is full of stories of women who survived.¹³⁶ Multiple academic articles look at women who memorialize the male family members they lost, for example Olivera Simić's article or Elissa Helms' chapter in *Retracing Images* on women as the image of innocent victims and domestic beings.¹³⁷ The perspective of the male survivors has been discussed less. The difficulty of researching the genocide of men versus researching the mass rape of women is that there are, for obvious reasons, no first-hand accounts from people who were murdered. The only testimonies available are from survivors of the genocide. To analyze male victimhood, I will use the testimonies of three male survivors of Srebrenica: aforementioned 'Witness O', who testified in front of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) against Bosnian Serb Army commander Radislav Krstić; and Hasan Nuhanović and Hajrudin Mesić, whose testimonies can be found on the website of Remembering Srebrenica (a British charity that commits itself to keeping the memory of Srebrenica alive). The testimonies suggest that the male victimhood does not necessarily completely differ from female victimhood. Using the testimonies, I will demonstrate that men are also domestic beings in their victimhood, an image traditionally distributed to women. Moreover, I will illustrate that men were also subject to gender-based (sexual) violence.

Although the image of the mothers of Srebrenica as survivors is popular in the memorialization of the massacre, men too have lost family members. Their victimhood reinforces their role as a domestic being. Male Srebrenica survivors are therefore victimized both as survivors of genocide and as the brothers and sons who lost their family members. Hajrudin Mesić was the only one out of five brothers to survive the genocide Srebrenica.¹³⁸ He still has nightmares about the war and feels the pain and missing from losing his brothers every day.¹³⁹ The loss of his brothers inspired him to speak out about what he endured during the war.¹⁴⁰ Hasan Nuhanović, who translated for the UN at Srebrenica, was forced to translate the order for his family to leave the UN base at Potočari. To this day he does not know what exactly

¹³⁶ Leydesdorff, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide*.

¹³⁷ Simić, 'What Remains of Srebrenica?', 220-236; Elissa Helms, 'Bosnian Girl: Nationalism and Innocence Through Images of Women', *Retracing Images* (Brill, 2012), 195-222.

¹³⁸ 'Hajrudin Mesić', Remembering Srebrenica, 27 June 2016, accessed 7 October 2020, <https://www.srebrenica.org.uk/survivor-stories/hajrudin-mesic/>.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

happened to them.¹⁴¹ Nuhanović went on a campaign to find out what happened to his family. It took him ten years of appealing to different parties before his father was identified by the International Commission for Missing Persons and his brother and mother five years later. He has established a Memorial Centre at the place where his family is buried.¹⁴² Although women are traditionally seen as domestic beings, particularly as mothers, Hajrudin and Hasan prove that men, too, could be domestic beings. They were victimized in the same way, losing their families. They were fierce in their pursuit of finding out what happened to their loved ones. Looking at men in the role of victims and reinforcing their position as domestic beings challenges the ‘men as aggressors and women as victims’-binary.

Moreover, men also suffered from sexual violence during the Bosnian war. This happened on all sides of the war. Several of Clark’s male interviewees revealed that they were forced to engage in sexual acts with other male prisoners. For example, a male Serb who was imprisoned in a camp was made to have oral sex with a Serbian orthodox priest.¹⁴³ Another man witnessed fathers and sons being forced to perform sexual acts on another.¹⁴⁴ Interestingly, in both these examples, the victims were forced to rape each other rather than being raped by soldiers themselves, exacerbating the humiliation even more. According to Miranda Alison, “male to male rape is a highly masculinized act for the perpetrator and his audience, whilst the victim is feminized.”¹⁴⁵ The victims are ‘feminized’ in their disempowerment and deeply humiliated. This kind of feminization of male victims also happened at Srebrenica. For example, in Leydesdorff’s book, ‘S’ described witnessing an old man whose genitals were cut off, thereby literally emasculating him: “An old man was sitting nearby. A Chetnik waved his knife and cut off his genitals.”¹⁴⁶ Although less widespread than sexual violence against women, men were also victim to sexually violent acts and not just perpetrators.

In this chapter, I have challenged the ‘men as aggressors and women as victims’-binary. Whereas many scholars have focused on challenging the view of women as victims, my contribution has specifically focused on the male side of gender, looking at the male perpetrators of rape and murder, and male victimhood. In doing so, I have shed new light on

¹⁴¹ ‘The Courage to Speak Out: Hasan Nuhanović’, Remembering Srebrenica, 8 June 2018, accessed 7 October 2020, <https://www.srebrenica.org.uk/survivor-stories/the-courage-to-speak-out-hasan-nuhanovic/>.

¹⁴² ‘Hasan Nuhanović’, Remembering Srebrenica.

¹⁴³ Clark, ‘Untangling Rape Causation’, 400.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Alison, ‘Wartime sexual violence’, 81.

¹⁴⁶ Leydesdorff, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide*, 168.

the gender dynamics of the violence at Srebrenica. In the next chapter, the findings from this chapter will be contrasted with several UN resolutions, reports and judgments regarding the events at Srebrenica. The aim this chapter will be to assess to what extent and how the UN took the gender dynamics of genocide into account in their response.

Chapter 2

United Nations Documents: A Lack of Gendered Approaches?

In this chapter, I contend that the UN failed to acknowledge the role of gender dynamics in the events at Srebrenica based on a historical overview over some UN documents regarding Srebrenica. As was evident from the testimonies from survivors, gender dynamics played an important role in the unfolding of the atrocities that happened at Srebrenica. Notions of masculinity shaped the Serb army and gender-based violence against men and women was widespread. Moreover, thousands of Bosniak men lost their lives in a gender-specific genocide. All these atrocities happened whilst the civilians of Srebrenica were under the protection of the UN, represented by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Dutchbat. Surprisingly, the image from the official UN statements differed markedly from the image sketched by survivors of the event as initially, the UN hardly took a gendered approach. To support my argument, I will conduct an in-depth analysis of two UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions in order to show their immediate response; the report compiled by then Secretary General Kofi Annan to show the response a few years later; and the ICTY's Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which includes a part on Srebrenica to show the legal repercussions of the events. As these documents were compiled at different times during the events and trials relating to Srebrenica, they show how (gendered) approaches to the atrocities evolved since 1995.

Multiple studies have investigated gendered approaches in international responses to conflict. Few have looked at the UN and Srebrenica specifically and analyzed UN documents on Srebrenica through a gender lens. Most studies focus more broadly on humanitarian response or the role of women in conflict resolution (CR) rather than gender as a whole. For example, Sophie Richter-Devroe has looked at conflict resolution and gendered approaches and criticizes incorporating culturally specific gender roles into CR approaches.¹⁴⁷ Hereby Richter-Devroe aims at women specifically, arguing that their role as victims should be approached more critically as they are not always as passive as they are often presented to be.¹⁴⁸ Elisa von Joeden-Forgery's article focuses on the UN, arguing how a gendered understanding of genocide can offer tools for an early warning system for the UN, the International Criminal Court, human rights organizations, etcetera.¹⁴⁹ However, in contrast to this paper, she focuses on women exclusively and does not give an analysis of UN gendered

¹⁴⁷ Richter-Devroe, 'Gender, Culture, and Conflict Resolution', 30-59.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 47-51.

¹⁴⁹ Von Joeden-Forgery, 'Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies', 89-107.

approaches to peacebuilding and genocide in their documents. Analyzing these documents gives crucial insight into whether (and to what extent) gender dynamics were incorporated in the assessment of the events at Srebrenica both during and after it took place.

During the fall of Srebrenica: UN resolutions 1004 and 1010

Looking at the resolutions produced by the UNSC during the fall of Srebrenica, it is immediately noticeable that gender-based violence was not a concern at the time. Even more surprising, at first the resolutions did not focus on violence against the civilian population at all. UN resolution 1004 from 12 July 1995 was adopted right after the fall of Srebrenica, on the day that the women and children were first separated from their male relatives. The content of this resolution focused on “the lack of essential food supplies and medical care” and on members of Dutchbat who were taken captive by the Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁵⁰ Subsequently, the demands put forth were to respect the safety of Dutchbat personnel and allow access to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian agencies “in order to alleviate the plight of the civilian population”.¹⁵¹ Although there is some concern for the wellbeing of the civilian population, there is no condemnation of rape or other abuses which were happening at Srebrenica. It must be said that at this point, the separation of men and women did not start until the evening. The UNSC was therefore probably not completely informed of the situation at Srebrenica. However, as Von Joeden-Forgery pointed out, many women and girls were raped in the days preceding the evacuation of women and children.¹⁵² As we know from the testimonies, rape was the order of the day and often happened openly in front of others.¹⁵³ It is unlikely that the Dutchbat personnel did not know that these atrocities were taking place. Indeed, it has been acknowledged by the UN that there had been problems with reporting from the field, causing incomplete or inaccurate information.¹⁵⁴ In any case, reporting atrocities like gender-based violence did not seem to be a priority for the UN personnel that was present.

Resolution 1010 of 10 August 1995, adopted a month after the previous resolution, showed more concern for the civilians who were stuck at Srebrenica, but still failed to acknowledge that murder and rape had taken place. At this point, it was well-known that men had been killed: the UN Secretariat wrote to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Bosnia that the accounts from the refugees on the atrocities that had taken place

¹⁵⁰ UNSC, Security Council resolution 1004, 1.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁵² Von Joeden-Forgery, ‘Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies’, 102.

¹⁵³ Leydesdorff, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide*, 157.

¹⁵⁴ Annan, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, 106-7.

were “widespread and consistent”.¹⁵⁵ The Dutchbat personnel did not witness the mass killing, but they definitely “were aware of some sinister indications”.¹⁵⁶ In combination with reports from refugees, there was no reason to doubt that a massacre had taken place (although the number of victims might still have been illusive). Moreover, they knew that it was men who were being killed as the women and children had been separated and deported. Yet there was no explicit word of the massacre in resolution 1010. The resolution expresses concern for the “grave violations of international humanitarian law in and around Srebrenica and at the fact that many of the former inhabitants of Srebrenica cannot be accounted for”.¹⁵⁷ There is no mention of murder or rape. There is also no acknowledgement that men specifically were murdered. ‘Violations of international humanitarian law’ is a vague term and is not clarified further. It therefore remains unclear what these violations entail. Looking at other resolutions, for example UN resolution 912 from April 1994 regarding the Rwandan genocide, the UNSC is slightly more specific, naming atrocities such as death and displacement of civilians. However, here too gender-based violence or rape is not mentioned.¹⁵⁸ In addition, although the UNSC condemns the Bosnian Serb party for not granting the International Committee of the Red Cross access to displaced persons, they do not condemn them for these ‘violations of international law’.¹⁵⁹ So a month after the events, when there had been reports confirming that murder and rape happened, there was still no acknowledgement of what exactly happened by the UNSC.

Shortly after the war: 1999 report from the United Nations Secretary-General

The UN was heavily criticized for the events at Srebrenica, as they could not live up to their promise to protect the citizens who stayed at the UN ‘safe area’. In 1999, Kofi Annan published a detailed report including an assessment on the events of Srebrenica, dating from the establishment of the ‘safe area’ on 16 April 1993 until the Dayton Peace Agreement of 15 December 1995.¹⁶⁰ At this point, more information on what happened was available than when the resolutions were produced, as the trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had started and testimonies from perpetrators, survivors and Dutchbat personnel

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 85.

¹⁵⁶ Annan, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, 103.

¹⁵⁷ UNSC, Security Council resolution 1010, 1.

¹⁵⁸ UN Security Council (UNSC), Security Council resolution 912, 1994, resolution 21 April 1994, S/RES/912 (1994), 2, available at [https://undocs.org/S/RES/912\(1994\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/912(1994)).

¹⁵⁹ UNSC, Security Council resolution 1010, 1.

¹⁶⁰ Annan, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, 1-113.

came in. The report gives a good overview of how the events unfolded and how the UN reacted to this. Annan's report has been the subject of research by some scholars. For example, Manuel Fröhlich has analyzed multiple reports from peacekeeping missions undertaken by the UN.¹⁶¹ The extent to which the report dealt with the gender dynamics underlying the events at Srebrenica or gender-based violence has not been extensively researched yet. Like the resolutions, Annan's report disregards the role of gender in the events at Srebrenica and fails to challenge harmful gender stereotypes.

Firstly, the report reinforces 'men as aggressors and women as victims'-binary. In the explanation of the origins of the Bosnian war and the type of warfare that was used, men are equated with combatants. For example, the Secretary-General speaks of "several thousand men" who "were engaged for three and a half years" and "several thousands of combatants were killed", effectively equating the combatants on the battlefield with men.¹⁶² Later in the report, in the part on the fall of Srebrenica and the Bosniak men that were killed on the 13 July, the Bosniak soldiers again appear to be exclusively men. The report speaks of "between 4,000 and 5,000 Bosniac males" who were detained in various locations.¹⁶³ The report paraphrases General Mladić, who tells the UN military observers that "there were 'several hundred' bodies of dead Bosniac soldiers".¹⁶⁴ It could be that the report was merely echoing General Mladić and the Serb army in their view that all men of combat age are potential future soldiers.¹⁶⁵ However, as Aleksandra Milićević pointed out, there were also good female soldiers in the Serbian army.¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, Mladić was not quoted directly in the report. The idea that men constitute 'soldiers' or 'combatants' is therefore not challenged, even though not all combatants are men and not all men are combatants. Moreover, this stereotype is further reinforced by defining women by their victimhood and status of non-combatants. The report recalls the "evacuation of non-combatants from Srebrenica" to which the Bosnian Government was opposed as they saw it "as designed to empty the town of its women and children".¹⁶⁷ In addition, when the women, children and elderly were separated from "the area of combat activities", the Serb soldiers claimed they wanted to keep the men to "be questioned as

¹⁶¹ Max Fröhlich, 'Keeping Track of UN Peace-keeping - Suez, Srebrenica, Rwanda and the Brahimi Report', *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online* 5 (2001) 1, 185-248.

¹⁶² Annan, 'Report of the Secretary-General', 9.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 78.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ Jones, 'Gender and Ethnic Conflict', 121.

¹⁶⁶ Milićević, 'Joining the War', 279.

¹⁶⁷ Annan, 'Report of the Secretary-General', 18.

prisoners of war”.¹⁶⁸ This effectively places women outside the domain of ‘combat activity’ and reinforces that only men are the subject of war worth questioning. Of course, the report largely reiterates the motivations of the Serb army. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the ‘men as combatants and women as non-combatants’ stereotype is also not challenged.

Secondly, there is a severe lack of attention for the gender-based violence at Srebrenica. The report focuses on the actions of Dutchbat and the mass executions, treating gender-based violence as a by-product of chaos. This echoes one of the structural explanations Lene Hansen has given for rape during the Bosnian war, where rape is accepted as a traditional part of warfare, and reinforces the ‘men as aggressors and women as victims’-binary.¹⁶⁹ Rape is mentioned only a few times in the report and usually only in a list of other atrocities. For example, displaced persons from Srebrenica have told “stories of the killings [...] and the abductions and rapes”.¹⁷⁰ Another example is a Dutchbat soldier’s testimony to a member of the press, telling them that “some women have been raped”.¹⁷¹ Aside from this testimony, few other Dutchbat members in the report mention rape, even though survivor testimonies have indicated that rape happened often and openly.¹⁷² In addition, rape was an important tool for ethnic cleansing. This is touched upon by the Secretary-General in the final assessment. Here he admits that “mass killings, rapes and brutalization of civilians” were used to the effect of ethnic cleansing and that the Serbs aimed to “depopulate coveted territories in order to allow them to be repopulated by Serbs”.¹⁷³ However, the assessment does not go into further detail about the aims and consequences of rape and gender-based violence or how the Dutchbat team handled rape. Moreover, sexual violence against men is not considered at all.

Lastly, the report also does not comment on the underlying gender dynamics that shaped the Serb army. The only testimony included in the report is the testimony of a Croat soldier, Dražen Erdemović, who expressed remorse for the murders he committed.¹⁷⁴ The reader of the report is encouraged to “bear in mind” that the Croat was the “only individual who participated in the executions from 14 to 17 July who has surrendered himself”.¹⁷⁵ Testimonies from Serb soldiers are not included in the report. The UN Secretary-General therefore suggests in the report that none of the other soldiers were remorseful. More

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 74.

¹⁶⁹ Hansen, ‘Gender, Nation, Rape’, 66-7.

¹⁷⁰ Annan, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, 83.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 85.

¹⁷² Leydesdorff, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide*, 157.

¹⁷³ Annan, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’, 106.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 80-81.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 80.

importantly, the report does seek a deeper explanation for the origins of the (military) culture of the Bosnian Serbs which caused these soldiers to commit genocide and gender-based violence. The assessment merely touches upon Serb motivations and the failure of the UN to understand their war aims.¹⁷⁶ In less than a page-long assessment, the Serb's actions are denounced as "brutally aggressive military and paramilitary Serb operations".¹⁷⁷ The Secretary-General even admits that the Secretariat and Member States knew that "the safe areas were not truly 'safe'".¹⁷⁸ However, the failure to comprehend and act upon the Serb army's aims and brutality is put with a failure of intelligence-sharing.¹⁷⁹ This is only a superficial explanation: no attempt is made at a deeper explanation for the Serb motives, let alone an analysis of the Serb's army underlying (gender) dynamics and motivations.

Legal repercussions: gender-based violence during the trials

As early as 1993, the United Nations established a special tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The purpose of the tribunal was to deal with the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s and its mandate stretched from 1993 until 2017, when the last trial was finished.¹⁸⁰ Over the years, thousands of witnesses have appeared in the court and numerous individuals have been tried. In addition, in case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN's official judicial organ, has judged the extent to which the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has been violated. Moreover, the ICJ judged whether Serbia and Montenegro must assume state responsibility in this.¹⁸¹ The proceedings were started in March 1993 and the final judgment was given in June 2007.¹⁸² Official judicial institutions have dealt with the aftermath of the Bosnian war and the genocide at Srebrenica for over two decades. Having established that the UN paid little attention to how gender shaped the events at Srebrenica initially, it is useful to look at the legal repercussions of the conflict in order to investigate whether gender eventually received a more prominent consideration.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 106-7.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 106.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 106-7.

¹⁸⁰ 'International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia', UN ICTY.

¹⁸¹ 'Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro', ICJ; 'Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide', the United Nations, 12 January 1951, accessed 29 November 2020, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocities-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf.

¹⁸² Ibid.

As explained in the previous chapter, the genocide of approximately 8,000 Bosniaks was a gender-specific genocide and can therefore be regarded as a form of gender-based violence. However, the judgments from the ICJ do not mention the gender-specific element of the genocide, whereas the judgment from the ICTY does. According to Doris E. Buss, the Serbs attacked men specifically, knowing that, according to patriarchal conventions, the whole community would then be destroyed even if women, children and the elderly are still alive.¹⁸³ The fact that men were killed thus comes from a patriarchal idea that they are the core of a community, which is why this strategy constitutes genocide. The ICJ's judgment in 'Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro' does not mention the fact that men were targeted specifically.¹⁸⁴ The ICJ thereby foregoes gender dynamics, an important aspect of the genocide at Srebrenica. In contrast, the ICTY has acknowledged the gender-specific element of the genocide. In the case against Radislav Krstić, a General Major in the Bosnian Serb Army who was present at Srebrenica, the fact that the victims were male is mentioned numerous times when citing the investigation of mass graves in which the bodies from the mass killings were dumped.¹⁸⁵ The Trial concludes that Krstić "shared the genocidal intent to kill the men".¹⁸⁶ The trials therefore show some progress in acknowledging that gender mattered in the genocide at Srebrenica.

Although rape was not on the agenda when the UNSC resolutions were adopted or in the report from the Secretary-General, the Bosnian war has been the first occasion where it has been prosecuted as a war crime.¹⁸⁷ The ICTY has defined 'rape' as a crime against humanity, as "a grave breach of the Geneva Convention", and "as a violation of the laws and customs of war".¹⁸⁸ As such, it has been prosecuted in several trials.¹⁸⁹ For example, Krstić was found responsible for the abuses the civilian population who fled to Potočari underwent, including rape.¹⁹⁰ In addition, the Trial Chamber has linked the rape at Srebrenica to "the ethnic cleansing

¹⁸³ Doris E. Buss, 'The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law', *Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice* 25 (2007) 1, 18-19.

¹⁸⁴ 'Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro', ICJ, 159-190.

¹⁸⁵ Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, IT-98-33-T, The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, (court case, The Hague, 2 August 2001), 71; 74; 78; 79; 82; 84; 89; 90; 179.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 225.

¹⁸⁷ Hansen, 'Gender, Nation, Rape', 55-6.

¹⁸⁸ 'Landmark Cases', United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, accessed 25 October 2020, <https://www.icty.org/sid/10314>.

¹⁸⁹ The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 'Update Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia', (statute ICTY, The Hague, September 2009), 6.

¹⁹⁰ 'Landmark Cases', ICTY.

campaign”.¹⁹¹ Moreover, the ICTY acknowledged Bosnian Muslim society to be traditionally patriarchal, thus using gender considerations as a part of their judgment.¹⁹² This is not wholly uncontroversial; as Buss remarked, the Trial Chamber suggests that through killing the men, the whole community is destroyed, even when women, children and elderly are still alive.¹⁹³ Gender, ethnicity and patriarchy are rendered as static and self-evident: women do not constitute the community, but “are merely the biological reproducers” and hence, without men the community disintegrates.¹⁹⁴ These implications are worthy to be discussed and challenged. However, trying rape as a crime against humanity and incorporating notions like ‘patriarchy’ in the trials constitute an important first step towards using gender as a tool to gain a better understanding of the events at Srebrenica.

When it comes to sexual violence against men, the story is altogether different. As shown before, sexual violence against men was not considered at all in either the resolutions or the report from the Secretary-General. Looking at the legal prosecutions, male sexual violence has been recognized, but defined differently than gender-based violence against women. The mutilation of male genitals and rape were judged as “a form of torture” rather than a crime against humanity, by which rape of women has been defined.¹⁹⁵ Augusta Del Zotto and Adam Jones have also noticed this discrepancy in their paper on male-on-male sexual abuse, citing the indictment of Dusan Tadić and Goran Borovnica who enforced sexual mutilation and rape of prisoners.¹⁹⁶ These cases were presented as examples of torture and not as rape or sexual assault.¹⁹⁷ However, all these examples come from sexual violence committed at detention camps. As shown in the previous with the example of the man who was castrated, sexual violence also happened at Srebrenica.¹⁹⁸ There are no examples of the prosecution of male sexual violence in connection with Srebrenica. Rape and sexual abuse are still a taboo in many places and victims are often forced to keep quiet about their experiences.¹⁹⁹ For this reason, there might be numerous other cases of male sexual violence that may have gone unnoticed.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, IT-98-33-T, 29.

¹⁹³ Buss, ‘The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape’, 18-19.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 19.

¹⁹⁵ ‘Landmark Cases’, ICTY.

¹⁹⁶ Augusta Del Zotto and Adam Jones, ‘Male-on-Male Sexual Violence in Wartime: Human Rights’ Last Taboo?’ (congress paper, the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), New Orleans, LA, 23-27 March, 2002), 10

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 10.

¹⁹⁸ Leydesdorff, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide*, 168.

¹⁹⁹ Del Zotto and Jones, ‘Male-on-Male Sexual Violence in Wartime’, 3.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that sexual violence against men is tried on different terms than sexual violence against women.

Lastly, although many men died with the fall of Srebrenica, there were also male survivors of the genocide who deserve consideration. Looking at the judgment from the ICTY, the losses suffered by the male survivors are overshadowed by those of women and children. In the judgment of Krstić's trial, the court expresses sympathy for the women and children who survived. Many have not been able to return to Srebrenica and move on with their lives because they do not know the whereabouts or what exactly happened to their male relatives.²⁰⁰ This assertion emphasizes women as victims, and as domestic beings and family members. However, as shown in the testimonies of Hajrudin Mesić and Hasan Nuhanović in the previous chapter, the surviving men felt a similar pain from losing family members and have been fierce in pursuing justice for them.²⁰¹ The statement completely forgoes this fact, thereby reinforcing the 'men as aggressors and women as victims'-binary.

In this chapter, I gave an historical overview of UN responses to the Srebrenica genocide. I demonstrated that UN resolutions 1004 and 1010, as well as the report by the Secretary-General, which was published only a few years after the massacre, failed to consider the important role that gender played during the siege of Srebrenica. However, this changed with the trials of the crimes committed at Srebrenica. There, genocide was acknowledged to be gender-specific. Furthermore, important steps were made with regard to the rape of women. For the first time it was prominently persecuted as a crime against humanity, a breach of the Geneva Convention and a breach of the customs of war. In addition, the notion of patriarchy was used to explain the dynamics behind the genocide. Nevertheless, male rape victims were still treated differently from female rape victims and rape concerning men was seen as a form of torture rather than a crime against humanity. Moreover, there was little recognition for the men who survived the genocide as domestic beings who have lost family members. In several instances in the resolutions, the report and the legal documents, the 'men as aggressors and women as victims'-binary is therefore still largely reinforced. In the next chapter, I will further investigate the implications of the lack of gender in UN documents and provide suggestions for how gender as an analytical tool of conflict can strengthen the response from international organizations like the UN to genocide.

²⁰⁰ Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, IT-98-33-T, 252.

²⁰¹ 'Hajrudin Mesić', Remembering Srebrenica; 'Hasan Nuhanović', Remembering Srebrenica.

Chapter 3

The Inclusion of Gender in UN Responses to Genocide

In the previous chapters, I established that gender dynamics have shaped events at Srebrenica in 1995, basing my argument on testimonies of survivors. Moreover, I contended that UN documents, for example UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) 1004 and 1010, were practically void of gender considerations. Legal documents of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) did incorporate a gendered approach, although notions of masculinity and male victims were still largely overlooked. The resolutions, reports *and* legal documents could therefore have benefitted from better gendered approaches. In this last chapter, I will investigate how gendered approaches to conflict in UN documents have evolved after the Bosnian War ended and how these approaches can be improved with regard to genocide and ethnic conflict in particular.

To support my argument, I will first draw attention to UNSC resolution 1325, a thematic resolution on the subject of ‘women, peace and security’. Moreover, I argue that bringing a more individualistic, gendered, private history into to political discourse will offer new perspectives on the crime of genocide. There was a discrepancy between the lived experiences of survivors and the focus of the discourse of the UN. This phenomenon is not new: Joan W. Scott has already commented on this discrepancy between “domestic, private history and official, national history” in 1984.²⁰² Moreover, Jayne Rodgers also stressed the importance of using the testimonies of victims, although she points to female survivors in particular, whereas my argument points to all survivors.²⁰³ Lastly, I contend that including men as gendered subjects, both from a perpetrator and a victim perspective, will enrich the gendered approach. I will build on several studies on UN policy or gender and conflict, for example those from Nadine Puechguirbal, Laura Shepherd, Elisa Von Joeden-Forgery, and Laura Sjoberg.²⁰⁴ The ultimate aim is to contribute to research on the improvement of gendered approaches to peacebuilding initiatives relating to genocide and ethnic conflict.

²⁰² Joan W. Scott, ‘Women and War: A Focus for Rewriting History’, *Women's Studies Quarterly* 12 (1984) 2, 4.

²⁰³ Rodgers, ‘Bosnia, Gender and the Ethics’, 113.

²⁰⁴ Nadine Puechguirbal, ‘Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325: A Textual Analysis of UN Documents’, *International Peacekeeping* 17 (2010) 2, 172-187; Laura Shepherd, *Gender, Violence and Security: Discourse as Practice* (Zed Books, 2008); Von Joeden-Forgery, ‘Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies’, 89-107; Laura Sjoberg, *Gender, War and Conflict* (Polity Press, 2014).

Gendered approaches in the UN after Srebrenica

In the last two decades, there have been increasing efforts to include gender in UN discourse and practices. After the Bosnian War, gender was put firmly on the UN agenda for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. In 2000, UNSC resolution 1325, a thematic resolution on women, peace and security was published, calling attention to the role of women as victims of conflict and as actors in peacebuilding efforts.²⁰⁵ UNSCR 1325 was a result of a debate between the UN Security Council and several NGOs that focused on gender, conflict and peacebuilding. The NGOs addressed “gender-specific conditions and acts that women experience in war” and “the undervalued, underutilized leadership women demonstrate in conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and rebuilding war-torn societies”.²⁰⁶ The most important points in UNSCR 1325 call for an “increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions”; the incorporation of “a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations” and field operations; increased gender-sensitivity training for member states and their military and civilian police personnel; and for the parties in armed conflict to “take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence”.²⁰⁷ At the time, UNSCR 1325 was hailed as a breakthrough in the battle for more recognition on women’s issues in peace and conflict.

After the Bosnian War and with the adoption of UNSCR 1325, some important developments in gender inclusion in peacebuilding and genocide prevention have been achieved, especially when it comes to including women. For example, in the trials of the Bosnian War and subsequent tribunals rape of women was persecuted as a war crime, a crime of genocide and a crime against humanity.²⁰⁸ Moreover, mass rape during the Bosnian War helped put women rights on the agenda, as survivors were asked to testify before diplomats at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, a precursor to UN resolution 1325.²⁰⁹ This happened before the Bosnian War ended and the genocide at Srebrenica in 1995 took place. UNSCR 1325 and following resolutions on gender-based violence have also had positive

²⁰⁵ UN Security Council (UNSC), Security Council resolution 1325, 2000, resolution 31 October 2000, S/RES/1325 (2000), 1-4, available at [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1325\(2000\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1325(2000)).

²⁰⁶ Felicity Hill, Mikele Aboitiz, and Sara Poehlman-Doumbouya, ‘Nongovernmental Organizations’ Role in the Buildup and Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325’, *Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 28 (2003) 4, 1255.

²⁰⁷ UNSC, Security Council resolution 1325, 2-3.

²⁰⁸ Von Joeden-Forgery, ‘Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention’, 91.

²⁰⁹ Torunn L. Tryggstad, ‘Trick or Treat? The UN and Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security’, *Global Governance* 15 (2009), 546.

results in calling attention to the gender-specific challenges that women particularly face in conflict. Torunn L. Tryggestad argued that UNSCR 1325 set in motion several developments when it comes to gender and the advancement of women's rights in conflict resolution. Many UNSC resolutions referred to UNSCR 1325 and the resolution was expanded by other resolutions, for example UN resolution 1820 on sexual violence.²¹⁰ Furthermore, all UN departments, funds, and programs committed themselves to a system-wide plan for following up and reporting on initiatives that are relevant to the resolution.²¹¹ In addition, a gender advisor has been appointed to all peace operations after 2000.²¹² Yet, when it comes to participation of women in peace processes, women still constitute only 4.8% of military peacekeepers 10.9% of the police units in peacekeeping missions in 2020.²¹³ Hence, UNSCR 1325 had positive consequences for women in conflict, but it has not been an overwhelming success.

For this reason, criticism from scholars on the ways in which gender has been included in UNSC resolutions, reports and other official documents continued. UNSCR 1325 and its implementation have been under great scrutiny by feminist scholars in particular. For example, Nadine Puechguirbal made a comparative study of ten reports from the UN Secretary-General on peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Timor-Leste, Darfur, Sudan, Nepal, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Kosovo.²¹⁴ Puechguirbal concludes that the reports include gender in varying degrees: some frame gender-based violence as a security concern, others do not specify gender when referencing to gender-based violence and some reports do not mention gender at all.²¹⁵ Generally, in the reports gender is equated with women and they reinforce the 'men as aggressors and women as victims'-binary. They present an essentialist view on women as victims or as mothers.²¹⁶ In her critique, Puechguirbal touches upon notions of masculinity, particularly when commenting on "the masculinist language of UN peacekeeping documents".²¹⁷ Nevertheless, her research still focuses mainly on women and tries to challenge notions of femininity such as victimhood and motherhood, rather than the 'male as aggressors' part of the binary.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 550.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid., 551.

²¹³ 'Women in Peacekeeping', United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 13 November 2020, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/women-peacekeeping>.

²¹⁴ Puechguirbal, 'Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325', 173.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 175.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 175-6.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 173.

The stereotyping of women in UN discourse is a recurring critique. Laura Shepherd's research focuses on "concepts of gender, violence, security and the international" by analyzing how "these concepts are (re)presented and (re)produced in a particular discursive context."²¹⁸ In other words, Shepherd analyzed UNSCR 1325 and related UN documents to explore concepts of "(gender) violence and (international) security" and how these concepts can be reconceived.²¹⁹ Shepherd even contends that UNSCR 1325 has failed.²²⁰ Furthermore, in her analysis of UNSCR 1325, Shepherd has remarked that women are inherently associated with motherhood.²²¹ Furthermore, Shepherd also shortly comments that not regarding gender as relational has been problematic in policy discourse.²²² This is reflected in UNSCR 1325 as it mentions 'gender' in its text, but does not explicitly position men in this sphere.²²³ Separating 'gender' from 'women' is therefore still an issue. In short, Puechguirbal and Shepherd have both reached similar conclusions to mine in the analysis of UN documents, in that the documents reinforce the 'men as aggressors and women as victims'-binary. However, they both still focus mainly on the 'women as victims' part of the binary and their analysis of the role of men and masculinity in conflict is short and not particularly nuanced. Certainly, it is important to acknowledge and stressing that women have specific needs and roles during genocide and other atrocities. Nonetheless, as I have shown in the previous chapters, including men as gendered subjects can contribute greatly to both scholarly and the international community's understanding of genocide. Moreover, researching men as gendered subjects of ethnic conflict, both as perpetrators and victims, contributes to challenging the 'men as aggressors and women as victims'-binary.

In general, real structural changes in the UN as an institution when it comes to gender are still forthcoming. Srebrenica is not the only conflict where gender-related issues were not a priority; to this day there remains a tendency to postpone gender-related work in emergency situations, buried in the moment by 'real' issues and 'real' life saving.²²⁴ Indeed, as explained in the previous chapter, reporting gender-based violence did not seem a priority during the events at Srebrenica. It was not explicitly mentioned as a direct threat in UNSCR 1004 and 1010 nor in the testimonies from Dutchbat soldiers reiterated in the report of the Secretary-

²¹⁸ Shepherd, *Gender, Violence and Security*, 4.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 115-6.

²²² *Ibid.*, 120.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 117.

²²⁴ Puechguirbal, 'Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325', 179.

General. The UN has been heavily criticized for their lack of decisiveness during the siege of Srebrenica and their failure to actively engage with the reports of survivors and Dutchbat personnel on the crimes that were happening at Srebrenica contributed to this indecisiveness. The non-governmental organization ‘Mothers of Srebrenica’ even started a court battle in 2008 before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the UN and the Dutch government as the responsible parties for the actions of Dutchbat. The plaintiffs claimed that the UN bore responsibility for not preventing the crimes at Srebrenica and needed to pay compensation to the victims, a battle which was eventually lost.²²⁵ In order for gender-based violence to be acknowledged and subsequently dealt with in seriousness, it needs to be named explicitly in the discourse of UN resolutions on conflicts themselves and not vaguely alluded to.

Victims need to be central in the narrative on genocide. As Von Joeden-Forgery has remarked, by focusing on the political elites, who primarily consist of men, the experiences of victims who live through genocide are largely ignored, “lost in a sea of abstractions”.²²⁶ She further argues that looking at the testimonies from survivors unveils that many aspects of conflict and genocide are permeated with ideas about gender from the perpetrators of violence, both about the perpetrators themselves and about their victims.²²⁷ However, statistical reporting strategies often brush over this, ignoring “the narrative link between atrocities”.²²⁸ By this she means that gender is usually only included in numbers, for example that “X number of men were killed, and X number of women raped”. Alternatively, Von Joeden-Forgery suggests that gender should be used as a narrative link, assessing more extensively how gender, genocide and gender-based violence are related.²²⁹ As shown in the case study of Srebrenica, survivor testimonies uncover these gendered aspects of genocide. Integrating these testimonies into peacebuilding initiatives regarding ethnic conflict with genocidal tendencies can therefore offer important insights to how genocide develops. Although gender is now mentioned in peacebuilding reports, it can still be better mainstreamed.

Including men as gendered subjects

The gendered approaches in UN documents still lack important aspects that can deepen the understanding of genocide. For example, as mentioned above, there have been few attempts to include men as gendered subjects in gendered approaches to genocide. Traditionally, the

²²⁵ Simić, “Pillar of Shame”, 183.

²²⁶ Von Joeden-Forgery, ‘Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention’, 96.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

introduction of a gender perspective has been done to promote gender equality and diminish the marginalization of women.²³⁰ Von Joeden-Forgery acknowledges the importance of unearthing men as gendered subjects, but only focuses on the argument “that (civilian) men suffer the worst fate because they are so often targeted for direct killing”.²³¹ Ultimately, she dismisses this argument on the grounds that focusing on male suffering would marginalize women’s experiences further and she does not further comment on men as gendered subjects.²³² In doing so, Von Joeden-Forgery does exactly what she criticizes in including men as gendered subjects, namely “casting men and women as two opposing sides within a single victim group”.²³³ She hereby reduces the value men as gendered subjects can have in understanding the crime of genocide. I argue that although promoting gender equality remains an important objective, acknowledging the influence of notions of masculinity on genocide in UN documents can offer a better understanding of how genocide develops. Herein I concur with Laura Sjoberg, who researched gender dynamics in war and conflict. According to Sjoberg, “in order to understand how men and masculinities subordinate women and femininities” it is important to understand men as gendered subjects as well.²³⁴ Not only can this contribute to understanding the relational aspect of gender, but also to the understanding of genocide as a process.

As shown in the first chapter, notions of masculinity played an important role in the Bosnian War. A reversion to traditional gender roles and a propagation of these gender roles by the media and Serb political elites contributed greatly to the mobilization of the population to support the war. Furthermore, a rhetoric based on notions of hyper-masculinity, creating a culture of male empowerment and entitlement, was used in politics and the military to appeal to men to become soldiers. In many countries, masculinity and the military are inherently connected. Sjoberg gives the example of President Bush of the United States of America and President Hussein of Iraq in 1990. They were at the opposite side of a conflict and had to a certain extent a different view on what constitutes the ideal soldier, but they agreed on one thing at least: that men should fight wars and that “the measure of masculinity is military prowess”.²³⁵ In the case of Serbia, these notions of masculinity had direct influence on the conflict, it’s ethnic cleansing policy and the ensuing genocide. Men were appealed to as

²³⁰ Sjoberg, *Gender, War and Conflict*, 149.

²³¹ Von Joeden-Forgery, ‘Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention’, 90.

²³² Sjoberg, *Gender, War and Conflict*, 60.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Sjoberg, *Gender, War and Conflict*, 61.

protectors, a traditionally masculine role.²³⁶ The fable they were fed by the political elites was one where the Serb nation was under threat by the Albanians in Kosovo at first and the Bosniaks in Bosnia later.²³⁷ From the soldiers' point of view, eliminating this threat meant protecting their family and nation. A similar process could be seen in the Rwandan genocide, where the orchestrators of the genocide drove young Hutu men to kill Tutsi's by promoting "idealized masculinities" and referring to killing as "work".²³⁸ Yet, as touched upon in the previous section, notions of masculinity have largely been missing from UN resolutions, reports and other documents assessing genocide, even in thematic resolution on gender and peacebuilding, such as UNSCR 1325. Ultimately, incorporating notions of masculinity in reports and resolutions on genocide can also be used in processes towards more effective implementation of peacebuilding operations in ethnic conflict.

Moreover, dismissing the influence of notions of masculinity also leads to ignoring the ways in which these notions can negatively impact men. Contrary to the 'men as aggressors and women as victims'-binary, not all men dream of being a soldier; expectations about masculinity are used, consciously or subconsciously, to motivate men to join the war and commit atrocities.²³⁹ Perpetrators of war crimes should not be absolved of responsibility or accountability nor should female experiences of war be trivialized. Nonetheless, war and notions of masculinity have put great pressures on men. Forced conscription of male combatants - women have only been included in drafts recently - is still considered legitimate and civilian men fleeing conscription are barely protected by the humanitarian community.²⁴⁰ Several testimonies from Srebrenica have confirmed that the perpetrators were misled by their leaders, referring to the (gendered) propaganda that moved them to genocide.²⁴¹ Others pointed out that the perpetrators can also be victims of the war, driven out of their mind by the pressures of being a soldier, the fighting and killing.²⁴² In the resolutions, reports and legal documents, these considerations have been missing. Including men as gendered subjects in gendered approaches in UN resolutions and reports will lead to more understanding on the specific problems men face in relation to their gender, for example forced conscription.

²³⁶ Milićević, 'Joining the War', 272.

²³⁷ Ibid., 271.

²³⁸ Caroline Williamson, 'Genocide, masculinity and posttraumatic growth in Rwanda: reconstructing male identity through *ndi umunyarwanda*', *Journal of Genocide Research* 18 (2016) 1, 42.

²³⁹ Sjoberg, *Gender, War and Conflict*, 82.

²⁴⁰ Carpenter, 'Recognizing Gender-Based Violence', 91.

²⁴¹ 'Witness O', ICTY.

²⁴² Albanese, 'Nationalism, War, and Archaization', 1016.

Lastly, incorporating men as gendered subjects in UN resolutions and reports can also shed light on the specific ways in which male civilians are victims of conflict, for example in the case of sexual violence. There is a general tendency to compare male and female experiences in a competitive way, where female victimhood has received more attention as they are thought to constitute the majority of victims of conflict.²⁴³ Especially with regard to sexual violence, NGOs have traditionally focused primarily on the victimization of women when lobbying at the UN for better policies on these crimes.²⁴⁴ As discussed in the previous chapter, sexual violence against men has been tried on different terms than sexual violence against women. UNSCR 1004 and 1010 and the Secretary-General's report on Srebrenica have not commented on sexual violence against men at all. Nonetheless, the scarce research that has been done on male victims of sexual violence suggests that their experiences are similar to female victims. As Sarah Solangon and Preeti Patel have argued, sexual violence against men has severe consequences for the mental, physical and social well-being of the victims. Similar to gender-based violence against women, this includes feelings of shame and humiliation, and ostracization from their community.²⁴⁵ According to R. Charli Carpenter, the consequences of not recognizing sexual violence against men includes a lack of physical and psycho-social assistance for male victims of such abuses.²⁴⁶ Validating male victims' experiences and encouraging them to talk about it can help the return of self-confidence and dealing with trauma.²⁴⁷ Naturally, there are also differences between gender-based violence against women and gender-based violence against men. For example, rape can be used as a tool of genocide, attacking women specifically as the biological reproducers of a nation.²⁴⁸ However, cases of genital mutilation such as castration can also serve as a tool of genocide in the sense that it prevents reproduction.²⁴⁹ Moreover, just because the number of men that fall victim to sexual violence is significantly smaller than the number of women does not mean that they suffer less or that they deserve not to be mentioned at all.

In gender research, it has been suggested that women constitute the largest number of victims in conflicts. Certainly, this is the case in some conflicts. Regarding sexual abuse,

²⁴³ Shepherd, *Gender, Violence and Security*, 115-6.

²⁴⁴ Del Zotto and Jones, 'Male-on-Male Sexual Violence in Wartime', 5.

²⁴⁵ Sarah Solangon and Preeti Patel, 'Sexual violence against men in countries affected by armed conflict', *Conflict, Security & Development* 12 (2012) 4, 421.

²⁴⁶ R. Charli Carpenter, 'Recognizing Gender-Based Violence Against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations', *Security Dialogue* 37 (2006) 1, 95.

²⁴⁷ Del Zotto and Jones, 'Male-on-Male Sexual Violence in Wartime', 3.

²⁴⁸ Von Joeden-Forgery, 'Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention', 91.

²⁴⁹ Solangon and Patel, 'Sexual violence against men', 429.

women undoubtedly are in the majority of victims and it is therefore entirely justified that this issue receives attention and is high on the agenda of the UN. Nevertheless, in the case of male victims of sexual violence, it must be noted that many cases go unnoticed because they are rarely reported or talked about.²⁵⁰ Moreover, Puechguirbal contends that due to a lack of accurate data, it is difficult to prove that women constitute the majority of victims and that “sometimes more male non-combatants are victims of mass killing than female non-combatants”.²⁵¹ Jones concurs, citing several instances where men specifically seemed to be the targets from mass killings, for example in Kosovo, East Timor, India, Colombia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sri Lanka, Peru, and Iraqi Kurdistan.²⁵² As Sjoberg remarked in reference to US deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan, notions of masculinity in conflict situations often prescribe that all men of military age are targets as all these men are considered combatants.²⁵³ As was the case with Srebrenica, where the massacre was gender-specific and targeted men of combat age as they were seen as potential future soldiers.²⁵⁴ I want to stress that this is not a competition for who is the biggest victim. However, if men are to be taken more seriously as gendered subjects during genocide, it is important to look at the gender-specific ways in which they are victimized.

As argued in the second chapter, both the resolutions 1004 and 1010 and the report have not commented further on or problematized the fact that only men were massacred for being men and therefore being equated to potential combatants by the Serb army. Later resolutions focus exclusively on women as victims of conflict and gender-based violence. Even so-called ‘thematic resolutions’, focusing on a theme rather than a specific conflict, most notably resolution 1325 on gender, fail to include men as gendered subjects.²⁵⁵ UNSC resolutions encompassing either both men and women as victims or men as victims specifically are still lacking. According to Solangon and Patel, policy guidelines from the UN have focused on women and girls and men are overlooked in most UN frameworks, most notably their resolutions.²⁵⁶ As argued before, gender should generally be better mainstreamed in UN peacebuilding reports and resolutions, not just in thematic resolutions. However, especially including men as gendered subjects is still missing and would be an important step in

²⁵⁰ Del Zotto and Jones, ‘Male-on-Male Sexual Violence in Wartime’, 2.

²⁵¹ Puechguirbal, ‘Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325’, 176.

²⁵² Jones, ‘Gendercide and Genocide’, 185-211.

²⁵³ Sjoberg, *Gender, War and Conflict*, 62.

²⁵⁴ Jones, ‘Gender and Ethnic Conflict’, 121.

²⁵⁵ Tryggestad, ‘Trick or Treat?’, 543.

²⁵⁶ Solangon and Patel, ‘Sexual violence against men’, 431-2.

acknowledging that men can be victims of gender-based violence too. Particularly in the case of genocide, where men are more likely to be targeted for murder, this greatly helps with putting in place a framework to better understand and anticipate on the crime in ethnic conflicts.

Looking at the role gender in conflict, important lessons can be drawn from the events at Srebrenica. In the last years, gendered approaches to peacebuilding have seen important progress, partly due to thematic resolutions such as UN resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. However, thematic resolutions like UN resolution 1325 also reinforce harmful stereotypes as women are still categorized mainly in terms of victimhood or their role as mothers. Moreover, a broader approach to gender, including the role of notions of masculinity, is still lacking. In addition, attention for gender-based violence still tends to focus on women exclusively, brushing over the specific ways in which men are targeted due to their gender, especially in the case of genocide.

I therefore argue for three important improvements in UN policy on peacebuilding and genocide, especially regarding their resolutions and reports. Firstly, the UN needs to put survivors back into the narrative when explaining conflict and gender issues; secondly, a gendered approach should encompass gender *as a whole*, looking at both women *and* men as gendered subjects of genocide, and looking broadly at the impact of gender dynamics on conflict, including issues of masculinity; and lastly, gender issues should be better integrated in UN reporting, not only as a consideration in thematic resolutions or reports. The goal of including men as gendered subjects in gender issues in UN resolutions and reports is to offer a better understanding of conflict, and genocide particularly. Subsequently, the international community can use these learnings to strengthen their peacebuilding initiatives in ethnic conflict.

Conclusion

In this paper, I argued that a gendered approach can strengthen the response of the United Nations to genocide (and ethnic conflict). I have given three important suggestions to achieve this: firstly, the UN needs to include a victim perspective when explaining conflict and gender issues in reports; secondly, a gendered approach should encompass gender *as a whole*, looking at conflict from the perspective of both women *and* men, and looking broadly at the impact of gender dynamics on conflict; and lastly, gender issues should not only be a consideration in thematic resolutions or reports specifically designed for calling attention to gender issues. These suggestions have been based on case study of the genocide at Srebrenica in 1995. Testimonies from survivors of the genocide and scholarly research demonstrated that these events were shaped by gender. Notions of masculinity, which were promoted by Serb political elites, gave soldiers a sense of entitlement to sexual violence and allowed them to exert excessive violence, resulting in mass rape and the gender-specific genocide of approximately 8,000 Bosnian men. Women and men were therefore victim to a gender-specific forms of gender-based violence.

Although the testimonies from survivors of Srebrenica show the gender dynamics of the events, the response of the UN to the genocide did not sufficiently reflect this. Looking at UN Security Council resolutions 1004 and 1010 regarding Srebrenica, both the rape and genocide that took place were not mentioned explicitly. After the Bosnian War ended, the UN was heavily criticized for their failure to protect the civilians at the Srebrenica 'safe area'. Nevertheless, similar to UN resolution 1004 and 1010, the report published by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 reviewing the events at Srebrenica failed to take a gendered approach to the events, but rather reinforced the 'men as aggressors and women as victims'-binary. The trials of the war crimes of Srebrenica and their corresponding judgments show more consideration for the role gender played at the unfolding of the massacre. For example, the Bosnian war has been the first occasion where rape has been persecuted legally as a war crime. Nonetheless, men as victims of genocide were still underrepresented: sexual violence against men was still tried under different terms than sexual violence against women, and women and children received far more sympathy for losing family than male survivors of the genocide.

More recently, there have been attempts by the UN to include gendered approaches in their peacebuilding initiatives. In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted UN Security Council resolution 1325, a thematic resolution on women, peace and security. However, the resolution and its implementation have been under great scrutiny by feminist scholars as it perpetuates

the stereotype of women as victims. Special attention for men as gendered subjects has been largely lacking. It is important to include men as gendered subjects into gendered approaches for several reasons. Firstly, notions of masculinity have a massive influence on mobilizing men to go to war. These notions also have drawbacks for men themselves, for instance when men do not want to go to war but are drafted through forced conscription. Furthermore, men are more likely to fall victim to gender-specific genocide. In addition, men as victims of sexual violence are often still missing in UN frameworks on gender-based violence. These considerations should be taken into account in efforts to support war survivors.

Further research into improving gendered approaches in peacebuilding and genocide prevention initiatives must continue to challenge limited notions of femininity and masculinity, such as the 'men as aggressors and women as victims'-binary. The gender dynamics of genocide are complex and should be treated as such. Due to the scope of this paper and the thorough analysis of UN documents, the paper drew heavily on one case study about Srebrenica. A comparative analysis of how gender shaped other genocides would create an even stronger argument for a more comprehensive gendered approach. In addition, more data and statistics should be gathered on the topic of sexual violence against men in conflicts. This might be difficult due to the stigma around the topic and the reluctance of victims to speak openly about their experiences. Yet it is crucial for compiling better research on the subject. Moreover, further research could investigate practical ways in which these can reinforce the implementation of genocide prevention protocols and programs in ethnic conflicts. Lastly, future studies of the Bosnian War could focus more on the perpetrators of rape and murder. Due to limited resources, I could not conduct an in-depth analysis of testimonies of convicted perpetrators or interview (ex-) soldiers of the Bosnian War. Such an analysis would provide better insight into the gender dynamics of conflict from the perpetrator point of view. Although the gendered approach to peacebuilding has received more attention in the last couple of decades, there remains a tendency to postpone gender-related work in emergency situations, as gender issues are still not regarded 'real' issues. This is a shame. As can be seen from the example of Srebrenica, gender as an analytical tool can shed important light on genocide. Using this valuable information can be greatly helpful for peacebuilding initiatives in ethnic conflicts that could end in genocide.

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