

Between Principles and Pragmatism

The Role of the Netherlands at the 1986-1989 Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation Europe (CSCE)

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to investigate what the role of the Netherlands was at the 1986-1989 Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It attempts to do so by combining empirical historic source analysis with a conceptual approach that uses elements from classic and liberal intergovernmentalism. In doing so, this thesis will uncover the dynamics of West-West (EC-12 and NATO) cooperation and the Western struggle for internal cohesion. This thesis argues that despite their strong, principled defence of human rights, the primary goal of the Netherlands was to promote West-West cooperation and cohesion. By focusing on the Dutch proposal for a mechanism that aimed to improve implementation of human dimension provisions of the CSCE, this thesis demonstrates how Netherlands balanced principles and pragmatism, with the latter proving to be the most important. The Dutch continuously pushed the boundaries of their influence by exploring their margins for manoeuvre within the Western bloc and within the CSCE. They attempted reconcile the different Western views, while at the same time directly appealing to East European countries and Neutral and Non-Aligned countries for support for Dutch ideas. The limit was reached when Dutch manoeuvring started to seriously threaten West-West cooperation instead of facilitating it. Accordingly, the Dutch let go of their firm grip on the Western human dimension proposal and reached a compromise with their Western allies.

Introduction

In the past decade, Pan-European security and human rights have been compromised repeatedly. Events such as the Russian invasion of Crimea in Ukraine, the renewed military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the recent massive demonstrations against the Russia-backed dictatorship in Belarus even appear to herald the coming of the Second Cold War. If we think back to the end of the Cold War some thirty years ago and compare it to our current situation, one striking difference stands out. In those days, European countries prevented direct conflict by discussing security and human rights within the Pan-European framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). According to Soviet diplomat Yuri Kashlev, the CSCE functioned as ‘safety-valve for the hot-pot of international relations.’¹ Nowadays, the CSCE’s successor, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has lost its function as a fail-safe for preventing conflict in Europe. While today the OSCE pales in comparison to cooperative bodies such as the European Union (EU) and NATO, in the 1980s the CSCE existed *alongside* NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the European Community (EC) as a forum for multilateral cooperation, encompassing *all* of Europe. Clearly, there are lessons to be learned from the CSCE about effective Pan-European security and cooperation in times of increased tensions. The CSCE and its role during the Cold War have been the subject of extensive research, historically as well as in recent times. To contribute to a truly novel approach to the CSCE and the Cold War, the main aim of this thesis is to examine the role that the Netherlands played during the 1986-1989 Vienna CSCE Third Follow-up meeting, particularly within the human dimension (human rights and other humanitarian issues), analysed from an intergovernmentalist perspective.

The approach that this thesis takes is innovative for several reasons. Firstly, despite renewed interest in the CSCE, many scholars still focus on the early CSCE period and the significance of the Helsinki Final Act (HFA), stressing the fact that the prominence of human rights within the HFA was a Western victory.² This approach disregards the fact that the CSCE process continued to be a forum for Pan-European dialogue on a multitude of topics, well into the early 1990’s. Subsequent CSCE meetings produced concluding documents which revised or amended the HFA. Secondly, scholars have traditionally approached the Cold War from an

¹ Joeri Kasjlev, ‘The CSCE in the Soviet Union’s Perspective’, *NA*, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, jhr. mr. J.L.R. Huydecoper van Nigtevecht, 1957-1996, Z238, inv. nr.9, 30.

² For example: Michael C. Morgan, *The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018) and Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder (eds.), *The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights 1972-1990* (New York: Berghahn, 2019).

East-West dichotomous perspective. This is often accompanied by a strong focus on superpower relations. More recent scholarship, dubbed New Cold War History, stresses that the Cold War was not merely a bipolar struggle between the superpowers.³ Research into the CSCE fits more into this trend of New Cold War History, because East and West were not monolithic blocs. Moreover, there was a third group within the CSCE: the Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries (N+N). Recent CSCE scholarship has started to delve into the intricacies of intra-bloc dynamics and the individual positions of participating states, particularly within the Eastern bloc.⁴ Research has already revealed that Warsaw Pact countries held views that differentiated from Soviet positions more than has been assumed in the past.⁵ Within the Western bloc it was equally true that intra-bloc relations were not always harmonious and consensus was not always reached without struggle. This was particularly evident during the NATO crisis during the 1981-1983 Madrid CSCE Follow-up meeting.⁶ Thirdly, the CSCE is perfectly suitable for research into West-West relations from the perspective of one country because decision making was based on unanimity and individual smaller countries could play a role, even if only by blocking decision-making.⁷ Smaller powers on either side of the Iron Curtain such as the Netherlands sought ways to turn the constraints of the Cold War into opportunities, often with success. These countries looked for the margins within which they could exert their own influence, often by adding important nuances to greater Cold War developments.⁸ The specific choice for the Netherlands will be justified further below. Finally, applying the conceptual lens of intergovernmentalism to CSCE research provides an entirely new approach to a topic that is generally studied using only an empirical historical research method. This thesis integrates historical primary source research into a combined classic and

³ See John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

⁴ See for example: Anna Locher, 'Introduction: Shaping the Policies of the Alliance – The Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Pact, 1976-1990, in Anna Locher ed., *Records of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs* (Zurich, 2002) and Laurien Crump and Leon Grundmann, "'Enemies of détente'? Eastern European Strategies in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Belgrade and Madrid, 1977-1983", *East European Journal of Diplomatic History*, 4-5 (2017-2018) 187-212.

⁵ Crump and Grundmann, "'Enemies of détente'?", 191.

⁶ Douglas Selvage, 'The politics of lesser evil: The West, the Polish crisis, and the CSCE review conference in Madrid, 1981-1983' in Leopoldo Nuti (ed.) *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev 1975-1985* (Routledge, 2008) 41-52.

⁷ Alice Němcová (ed.), *CSCE Testimonies – Causes and Consequences of the Helsinki Final Act 1972-1989: OSCE Oral History Project. Ambassador Edouard Brunner of Switzerland* (Prague Office of the OSCE Sekretariat, 2013) 100-102.

⁸ Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson, 'Conclusion: Shedding a new light on Cold War Europe, in Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson (eds.), *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: the Influence of Smaller Powers* (London: Routledge, 2019) 250.

liberal intergovernmentalist conceptual framework. This method will be explained in greater detail below.

Before discussing academic debates and theory, the choice for the Vienna meeting of the CSCE process and the choice for a focus on the Netherlands will be justified further. Within the CSCE, 35 countries participated on equal footing: 33 European countries, including the Soviet Union, as well as Canada and the United States. Through the CSCE process, European security became a Pan-European, multilateral matter and human rights were directly linked to security.⁹ The CSCE should be understood as an ongoing process rather than an institution. The agenda of every CSCE meeting consisted of four main items, dubbed ‘baskets’ in CSCE jargon. Basket I concerned ‘Questions related to security’, subdivided into ‘Principles of relations between participating states’ and ‘Confidence-building measures’. Basket II covered ‘Cooperation in the fields of economics, of science and technology, and of the environment. Basket III contained ‘Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields’ and finally, Basket IV concerned ‘Follow-up to the conference’. It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to cover all these topics. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the ‘human dimension’ of the CSCE, which covered the human aspects of Basket I (particularly Principle VII: Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief) and all of Basket III. The fact that follow-up was a core part of the CSCE reinforces the fact that the CSCE was an ongoing process. It was a thread that ran throughout the Cold War, rather than a series of separate meetings and milestones. Additionally, instead of viewing the CSCE as a diplomatic bubble separate from the ‘real world’, it can instead be conceptualized as a *lens* through which we can view the Cold War. The Vienna meeting was not a mere reflection of geopolitics, it was a part of geopolitics in its own right. The meeting has been characterized as ‘a milestone on the journey to better East-West relations’¹⁰ and the concluding document has been deemed ‘a turning point in the consideration of human rights’.¹¹ Those accomplishments of the CSCE process stand tall next to other geopolitical ‘turning points’ such as Mikhail Gorbachev’s revolutionary reforms from the mid-1980s onwards.¹² Moreover, the Vienna meeting occurred at a time just before another turning point in history, when Warsaw Pact

⁹ Laurien Crump, ‘Forty-five Years of Dialogue Facilitation (1972-2017), Ten Lessons from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’, *Security and Human Rights*, 27 (2016) 498, 502.

¹⁰ Stefan Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986-1989: A turning point in East-West relations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) 136.

¹¹ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 89, 102.

¹² Archie Brown, ‘The Gorbachev revolution and the end of the Cold War’ in: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume III: Endings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 244-245.

countries were able to reform and be free from the Soviet yoke from 1989 onwards.

There are three main reasons for a focus on the Netherlands in this thesis. Firstly, the Netherlands is a country with both strong historical European roots as well as solid historical transatlantic ties. They were both a founding member of the European Community (EC) and a loyal NATO ally. This position between NATO and the EC could potentially mean that the Netherlands was able to function as a bridge between the two groups within the CSCE framework. This bridge function is further reinforced by the fact that the EC had increased its coordination of foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s through European Political Cooperation (EPS), which the Netherlands had somewhat reluctantly agreed to.¹³ At the same time however, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek, in office from 1982-1993, has been characterized as one of the most transatlantic-oriented Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministers ever.¹⁴ This again underlines the duality of the Dutch position between the EC and NATO. Secondly, the Netherlands has an international reputation for being an outspoken proponent of universal human rights. In fact, many of the successes of Dutch foreign policy in the 1980s were related to human rights, disarmament, and development policy.¹⁵ This makes the perspective of the Netherlands a fruitful approach to research into the human dimension at the 1986-1989 Vienna meeting. According to Stefan Lehne, who was part of the Austrian delegation to Vienna, the Netherlands was a ‘hardline’ delegation. This hardline attitude indirectly contributed to ‘a turning point in the consideration of human rights’ in the concluding document of the meeting.¹⁶ However, we must keep in mind that a hardline stance in pursuit of one’s interests does not necessarily mean the Netherlands played a major role the meeting. A small power’s stubbornness could be disruptive rather than productive.¹⁷ This brings us to the third reason for a focus on the Netherlands. This focus directly contributes to recent scholarship on the ‘margins for manoeuvre’ and influence of smaller powers during the Cold War.¹⁸ Clearly, the Dutch perspective is uniquely suitable to research the 1986-1989 Vienna CSCE meeting. By focusing on the human dimension, this thesis will uncover West-West dynamics as well as the individual approach of the Netherlands towards the CSCE itself. Did the Dutch simply toe the Western

¹³ Duco Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld: de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland*. 6th edition (Houten: Spectrum, 2016) 321.

¹⁴ Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 347.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, 345.

¹⁶ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 89, 102.

¹⁷ Němcová, *CSCE Testimonies*, 100-102.

¹⁸ See Crump and Erlandsson, *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe*.

line, or were they able to pursue their own interests and participate as an equal partner, as stipulated in the very first core principle of the CSCE?

There is an ongoing academic debate that focuses on the role of the Netherlands within the CSCE process. This has been researched from different perspectives, with roughly three different conclusions. In international historiography the role of the Netherlands in the CSCE is scarcely mentioned on its own. When the Dutch are mentioned, their role does not seem particularly significant. Michael Morgan categorizes the Dutch as ‘NATO maximalists’ along with Canada.¹⁹ NATO maximalists not only emphasized NATO’s collective defence, they also wanted NATO to stabilize Europe’s political situation and for NATO to act as a crisis manager. This implies a relatively large role for the United States and Canada in European security affairs. From this perspective, Dutch interests did not play a distinct role in the CSCE. Additionally, John Maresca, a senior US diplomat who was at the Helsinki conference, described the attitude of the Dutch delegation as merely ‘stubborn’.²⁰ Historiography from a national perspective provides different insights. Floribert Baudet has painted a markedly different picture of Dutch involvement in the CSCE from 1972-1989. He argued that the Netherlands contributed disproportionately to the CSCE despite being a small country. According to Baudet, the Dutch were strong, principled defenders of human rights.²¹ This staunch, even stubborn defence of human rights and the image of the Dutch as pioneers of human rights has also been noted by H.W. Bomert.²² Moreover, Baudet argues that the Dutch stressed Eastern compliance with human rights clauses of the CSCE documents. In doing so, the Dutch contributed to driving a wedge between East European countries and the Soviet Union.²³ Finally, Baudet argues that the Netherlands chose a more radical strategy than their Western allies at the 1986-1989 Vienna meeting. They tried to ‘reach for the stars’ to score a Dutch success and achieve balanced progress in the CSCE.²⁴ Laurien Crump, Lenna Lammertink and Eva Zeilstra have revised this view by using recently declassified government sources and by reinterpreting old sources. According to them, the Dutch played a much smaller

¹⁹ Morgan, *The Final Act*, 175.

²⁰ John Maresca, *To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975* (Duke University Press, 1985) 90.

²¹ Floribert Baudet, *Het heeft onze aandacht. Nederland en de rechten van de mens in Oost-Europa en Joegoslavië, 1972-1989* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2001) 90-93.

²² H. W. Bomert, *Nederland en Oost-Europa: meer woorden dan daden. Het Nederlands Oost-Europa beleid, geanalyseerd binnen het kader van het CVSE proces (1971-1985)* (Utrecht, 1990) 96-98.

²³ Floribert Baudet, “It was Cold war and we wanted to win”. Human rights, détente and the CSCE’, in Mastny, A. Wenger e.a. (eds.), *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75* (New York and London, 2008) 183-198.

²⁴ Floribert Baudet, ‘The origins of the CSCE human dimension mechanism. A case study in Dutch Cold War policy’, *Helsinki Monitor* 12:3 (2001) 196.

role than Baudet assumed. After analysing the Dutch role in the CSCE from 1973-1983 they conclude that the Dutch role in these meetings is best described as ‘firm, but inconspicuous’.²⁵ They claim that human rights were never a goal itself. Despite noble intentions, human rights were a pragmatic means of achieving other goals and serving other interests. They argue that instead more attention should be given to the Netherlands as bridge-builder between Western countries in NATO and the EC.²⁶ Crump et al did not yet deal with CSCE meetings after 1983. This thesis seeks to continue revising earlier historiography by researching the CSCE meeting at Vienna. Vienna is specifically relevant in this historiographical debate because unprecedented gains for human rights were made. Only after researching the entire CSCE process will we be able to draw final conclusions about the role of the Netherlands in the CSCE.

There is also academic debate about the significance of the Vienna meeting in the perspective of the entire CSCE process (1972-1995). On the one hand, the Vienna meeting is viewed as a turning point in East-West relations, specifically with regards to human rights, by scholars such as Lehne and Leatherman and to a lesser degree by Esterik and Minnema. Lehne, echoed by Leatherman, argued that the Vienna CSCE meeting was a turning point in East-West relations, specifically due to significant results for human rights and humanitarian issues as well as military questions.²⁷ Esterik and Minnema put less emphasis on Vienna as a clear turning point. They were realistic about the CSCE’s weaknesses and compared concurrent geopolitical developments, such as suppression of protests in Eastern Europe, to developments within the meeting. However, they did note that the process at Vienna gave people hope and the opportunity to hold their governments accountable.²⁸ On the other hand, Sarah Snyder has questioned whether Vienna was such a sharp turning point by looking at the progress that was in fact made during the four interim working group meetings from 1984-1986. Even though these meetings did not produce any concluding documents (except Stockholm), Snyder argues that these meetings laid the groundwork for Vienna. She points to ‘dialogue among the delegates’ and ‘the first signs of progress toward resolving individual human rights and human

²⁵ Laurien Crump, Lenna Lammertink en Eva Zijlstra, ‘Ferm, doch onopvallend: Nederland en de Conferentie over Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa (1973-1983)’, *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 132:2 (2019) title, 257-9, 276.

²⁶ Crump et al., ‘Ferm, doch onopvallend’, 278.

²⁷ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, subtitle, 137 and Janie Leatherman, ‘Conflict Transformation in the CSCE: Learning and Institutionalization’, *Cooperation and Conflict* 28:4 (1993) 418-419.

²⁸ Chris van Esterik and Hester Minnema, ‘The Conference that Came in from the Cold; A General Survey of the Course of the Vienna follow-up Meeting in Particular from the Point of View of the Human Dimension of the CSCE’, in A. Bloed and P. van Dijk (eds.), *The Human Dimension of the Helsinki Process: The Vienna Follow-up Meeting and its Aftermath* (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) 26-29.

contacts cases' as evidence for this argument.²⁹ Therefore, Snyder argues the turn had started in the years prior to the Vienna meeting. The phrase 'turning point' implies a distinct break from the past. Research into the Vienna meeting from the perspective of the Netherlands, particularly related to human rights, can reveal whether the meeting itself was indeed perceived as a milestone.

As was mentioned above, the CSCE is usually studied through an empirical method based on primary sources and secondary literature. However, this thesis is not only based on extensive primary source research, it also views the CSCE through a conceptual lens. It has been stressed above that the CSCE was a Pan-European process in which the participating countries were equal on paper. Therefore, this thesis will combine elements from classic and liberal intergovernmentalism to build its argumentation. Intergovernmentalism provides useful concepts for CSCE research for several reasons. First, a core tenet of classic intergovernmentalism is that converging national interests are determining factors in European integration.³⁰ Similarly, clashing interests can inhibit convergence or even cause divergence. Second, classic intergovernmentalism argues that national governments are the primary actors in an integration process.³¹ Both of these elements are applicable to the CSCE. While the CSCE was not an integration process, it was a Pan-European *convergence*. Through the CSCE, all European governments converged on issues such as military security, human rights, science and economics. Moreover, this thesis partly focuses on intra-Western bloc relations, which occurred within different intergovernmental frameworks such as the EC and NATO.³²

On top of these elements of classic intergovernmentalism, this thesis borrows from liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) its three-stage framework for analysis. Liberal intergovernmentalism originated with Andrew Moravcsik's 1993 work *The Choice for Europe*.³³ Moravcsik has identified three stages of decision-making within European institutions to analyse European integration outcomes: (1) national preference formation, (2) intergovernmental bargaining and (3) institutional choices.³⁴ These three stages of decision-

²⁹ Sarah B. Snyder, 'The foundation for Vienna: A reassessment of the CSCE in the mid-1980s', *Cold War History* 10:4 (2010) 495, 503-504.

³⁰ Van Meurs, et al., *The unfinished history of European integration* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008) 94-95.

³¹ Van Meurs et al., *The unfinished history*, 93.

³² See Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 324-325. While the EC was arguably not entirely intergovernmental, European foreign policy was coordinated through European Political Cooperation (EPC) which was decidedly intergovernmental in nature.

³³ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Cornell University Press 1998).

³⁴ Marieke Kleine and Mark Pollack, 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56:7 (2018) 1495-1501.

making will be applied to the Vienna CSCE meeting. To make this theory suitable for an analysis of the CSCE, the framework will have to be slightly altered. The CSCE was not an institution, so the outcomes of the Vienna meeting did not result in *institutional* choices. It did however result in a concluding document with clear provisions that all 35 states agreed to pursue.

Moravcsik's three-step logic is particularly useful for analysing the Vienna meeting because the meeting can be divided into three chronological parts that each cover one of LI's analytical steps: (1) the opening phase of the meeting, including the preparatory meeting (23 September to 6 October 1986) and the first phase of the Vienna meeting (4 November to the end of December 1986), (2) the negotiation phase, during which the majority of proposals were submitted and negotiations on these proposals started (27 January 1987 to early May 1988), and (3) the results of the meeting (mid-May 1988 to mid-January 1989).³⁵ These three parts will give the thesis its structure as each chapter will cover one of the three periods, and each period in turn covers one stage of the theoretical framework.

As was mentioned above, this thesis focuses on the human dimension. Nevertheless, in the CSCE all topics were connected because equal progress across all Baskets was a core value of the CSCE. Therefore, developments on other CSCE topics such as military security will be briefly mentioned when relevant. The first chapter will be concerned with 'preference formation' before the meeting as well as positioning during the opening phase of the meeting, which lasted from 4 November until the 19 December in 1986, after which the five-week Christmas break started. Several questions arise: how were the Dutch plans for the meeting formed, how did the Netherlands position itself in the opening phase of the meeting, and which national interests were pursued? The formation of interests and positioning before and during CSCE meetings was partly determined in CSCE-working groups within EC and NATO frameworks. Similarly, Warsaw Pact ministers also met before and during CSCE meetings to discuss topics and positions.³⁶ However, this did not eliminate the ability of individual countries to attempt to pursue their own interests within their respective cooperative blocs.

The second stage of the analysis begins on 27 January 1987, when the second round of the Vienna CSCE meeting commenced. Formally, the implementation debate had nearly ended, and the meeting moved towards proposing new CSCE provisions. In practice, the West continued to discuss implementation throughout the entire meeting. The various phases of the

³⁵ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, v-vi.

³⁶ Locher, 'Introduction: Shaping the Policies of the Alliance', 4-5.

meeting tended to flow into each other and strict regulation was impossible.³⁷ From February to March 1987, a large number of proposals for the Vienna concluding document were submitted and negotiated over a period of nearly two years. As the meeting went on and difficult negotiations about proposals occurred, the positions and attitudes of countries changed due to the complex dynamics and negotiation process within the CSCE. This dynamic ‘intergovernmental bargaining and negotiating’ process from the end of January 1987 to May 1988 will be the subject of the second chapter, with a particular focus on Western intra-bloc discussions.

Negotiations entered a new stage in May 1988. The N+Ns presented their draft of the concluding document, which eventually led to the ‘endgame’ of negotiations. This final phase of negotiations and the results of the meeting will be discussed in chapter three. Again, there will be a particular focus on intra-bloc developments because bloc-wide positions had to be agreed upon before East, N+N and West could converge on a final concluding document. This chapter also evaluates Dutch goals that were established before and during the meeting. We can analyse whether the Netherlands was able to pursue its interests and to which degree they succeeded.

The three-part structure of this thesis reflects the combination of historical research methods and a theoretical approach. This combination can prove to be fruitful for research that combines the disciplines of international relations and history.³⁸ Therefore, this combined approach makes a twofold contribution to academia. First, this thesis contributes to historiography on the CSCE process and the role and influence of small powers such as the Netherlands during the Cold War. Second, it contributes to international relations research into international forums that deal with multilateral issues related to security and human rights. Current-day European conflicts and the spectre of a New Cold War strongly suggest that these issues are ever-important. The next section will discuss the way in which primary sources and secondary literature will be incorporated into the theoretical framework.

Aside from the theoretical approach that has been explained above, this thesis also features extensive historical research into new primary sources and secondary literature. Secondary literature will be used to provide the geopolitical context and developments at the beginning of each chapter. To get a more in-depth look at the Dutch role within the 1986-1989 Vienna CSCE meeting, it will be necessary to consult novel primary sources. Because of the

³⁷ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 88.

³⁸ Paul W. Schroeder, ‘History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit’, *International Security* 22:1 (1997) 73-74.

three-stage framework and chronological order of this thesis, each chapter will make use of sources in a chronological manner. The time period covered by each chapter has been specified above. Previous research into this period is largely based on official, public documents and the personal experiences of people who attended CSCE meetings. Literature that chronicles the Vienna CSCE meeting therefore uses footnotes very sparingly.³⁹ It is now possible to review these works by making use of recently declassified government archives. In fact, this thesis is based on the recent opening up of Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives from the late 1980s, including code rapports and EC communication (COREU).⁴⁰ These primary sources will be the main source of new insights into the topic of this thesis. These archives will reveal information about the CSCE process that was previously confidential, significantly expanding the pool of available resources. Ministerial archives will uncover the CSCE process from start to finish, including contact between civil servants and diplomats over the years, rather than focusing on milestones such as opening statements or the final concluding documents of CSCE meetings. Secondary literature about the CSCE and specific literature about the Vienna meeting will be incorporated into the thesis to make it complete and coherent.

To conclude, this introduction has made clear that research into the 1986-1989 Vienna CSCE meeting from the Dutch perspective is both novel and necessary. It will shed a new light on West-West relations, the CSCE, and the development of European multilateralism leading up to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In turn, this might teach us some lessons on how multilateral dialogue about Pan-European security, human rights and cooperation can be an effective way of channelling tensions within Europe. Perhaps these lessons will prove to be of value to the OSCE, which is struggling to be as effective as its predecessor.

³⁹ See footnotes in Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting* and Esterik and Minnema, 'The Conference'.

⁴⁰ Code rapports archive, 1986-1989 CSCE, *Archives of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter: DMFA)*, archive Z299, inv. nrs. 938-947, 2017-2020 and The Hague and COREU message archive, 1985-1989, DMFA, inv. nrs. 7505, 7506, 7510, 7512, 7514, 7515, 8897.

Chapter 1. The Dutch Proposal: Trying to Kill Two Birds with One Stone

1.1 Introduction

I consider it important to hold as firmly as possible to our own proposals, which can truly bring improvement, in casu the Dutch and American proposals. Also for reasons of tactical nature, it seems important to hold on to them as long as possible.⁴¹

Hans van den Broek, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 9 December 1986.

Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek perfectly captured the Dutch approach to the Vienna CSCE meeting. This chapter will show how the Netherlands planned to make a principled effort to truly improve the lives of humans in Eastern Europe, while at the same time serving pragmatic foreign policy goals. In broader terms, this chapter seeks answers about how Dutch plans for the start of the meeting were formed, how they decided to position themselves, and which Dutch interests were pursued in the early part of the Vienna meeting. In those answers, both principles and pragmatism will become apparent. Chronologically, this chapter covers the preparatory meeting, which took place from September 23rd to October 6th, 1986, and the first phase of the Vienna meeting, from November 4th, 1986 until the end of January 1987. At the preparatory meeting, the 35 participating states agreed on the organization and structure of the Vienna meeting. The meeting would have a plenary session as well as five working bodies that covered Baskets I, II and III, the Mediterranean and the follow-up of the conference. In the first phase of the Vienna meeting, the implementation debates started in each of these bodies. In these debates, the extent to which all countries complied with previous CSCE commitments was discussed. However, the implementation debate was also used to test the waters and find opportunities for new proposals. Eastern countries tried to push the meeting towards the negotiation phase by introducing their proposals for the concluding document very early on in plenary sessions.⁴² Behind the scenes, the Netherlands and other Western countries were also preparing proposals but they did not introduce them until late January and early February 1987, the official end of the implementation debate. The EC-12 wanted to use the implementation debate to draw attention to previous commitments instead of immediately

⁴¹ Outgoing code rapport, 'menselijke dimensie post-wenen [human dimension post-vienna]', 9 December 1986, *DMFA, Z299, inv. nr. 2017*, The Hague. Original quote: 'Ik acht het van ferm belang om zo vast mogelijk te houden aan de eigen voorstellen, die werkelijk enige verbetering kunnen brengen, i.c. het Nederlandse en Amerikaanse. Ook om redenen van tactische aard lijkt het van belang zo lang mogelijk daaraan vast te houden.'

⁴² Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 100.

moving towards new proposals.⁴³ Nevertheless, the process of preparing proposals already revealed some of the diverse Western interests that would compete throughout the meeting. Consequently, identifying Dutch interests is the necessary first step for an intergovernmentalist analysis. Before focusing further on the initial phase of the Vienna meeting, the first section of this chapter will construct the international context within which the meeting started. This section covers the historical international context in the mid-1980s by discussing Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's ascent to power, West European foreign policy and the state of Pan-European disarmament and human rights inside and outside of the CSCE process. These topics all came together within the CSCE, as will be explained below.

1.2 Historical International Context

It is impossible to discuss Europe in the second half of the 1980s without mentioning Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his reforms, which were of revolutionary dimension. *Glasnost* (openness) about Soviet problems and *perestroika* (restructuring) of society would have a major impact on Pan-European relations. After all, ending the Cold War was one of Gorbachev's principal aims.⁴⁴ Gorbachev became in charge of the Soviet Union in March 1985, but indications of his fresh thinking surfaced in late 1984, when he spoke to members of British Parliament. There, he expressed his ideas about foreign affairs such as 'new political thinking' and Europe as 'our common home'.⁴⁵ Once in power, Gorbachev rigorously and swiftly changed the Soviet top foreign policymakers. He replaced veteran foreign minister Andrej Gromyko with Eduard Shevardnadze, who had no foreign policy experience but was a close, like-minded ally to Gorbachev.⁴⁶ These changes directly relate to the CSCE. The CSCE received renewed attention and support from Gorbachev shortly after he consolidated his power. The idea of a common European home was based to a large extent on Gorbachev's desire to turn the CSCE framework into the main structure of European security. Moreover, Shevardnadze's first trip abroad as foreign minister was to participate in the CSCE Vienna meeting.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, Gorbachev's rise to power itself did not constitute a direct turning

⁴³ Incoming code rapport, 'soviet voorstel inzake bijeenkomst in moskou inzake 3^e mand aangelegenheden/ evaluatie van cvse-delegaties der twaaf [soviet proposal on conference in moscow on 3rd basket affairs/ evaluation of csce-delegations of the twelve]', 2 December 1986, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 398, The Hague.

⁴⁴ Brown, 'The Gorbachev revolution', 248

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, 246-7

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 249.

⁴⁷ Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas S. Blanton and V.M. Zubok, *Masterpieces of history: the peaceful end of the Cold War in Europe, 1989* (Budapest and New York, Central European University Press, 2010) 10.

point for international relations. East-West differences persisted into 1986.⁴⁸ Many Western governments remained cautious and even sceptical of whether Gorbachev's foreign and domestic policies represented genuine new thinking.⁴⁹

European Political Cooperation (EPC), the coordination of foreign policy within the European Community, was codified in February of 1986 with the signing of the Single European Act. This occurred just after Spain and Portugal accessed to the EC on January 1st of 1986. The Single European Act came into effect on July 1st, 1987, but EPC had already been developed and put in practice from 1970 onwards. In 1986, the twelve EC countries agreed that EPC should be limited to intergovernmental consultations and where possible, the formulation of a common stance in international forums. Moreover, it was agreed that EPC focused on political and economic aspects of foreign policy rather than military security issues (unless these defence matters were directly related to political and economic aspects).⁵⁰ Thus, on the one hand EPC could function in Vienna as a way of taking a common stance on political and economic issues. On the other hand, the intergovernmental nature of EPC and the partial exclusion of military security issues meant there was significant wiggle room for national interests of EC countries. This was especially relevant for the Netherlands. The Dutch were reluctant and sceptical towards EPC because they feared it would affect NATO competences.⁵¹

Disarmament and human rights were prevalent topics in international relations both inside and outside the CSCE process. From 1984 to 1986, four interim CSCE meetings were held in Stockholm, Ottawa, Budapest and Bern. In the past, these meetings were considered unsuccessful due to a lack of substantive concluding documents. Recently, it has been argued that these meetings laid significant groundwork for the Vienna meeting.⁵² Focusing on disarmament, the Stockholm Conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe (CDE) did produce a concluding document. The document included unprecedented confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) which contributed to greater openness and predictability, laying the groundwork for future arms control negotiations.⁵³ Moreover, the Stockholm document appeared at a moment in time where other avenues of arms control such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and

⁴⁸ John W. Young, 'Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979–1989', in: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume III: Endings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 303-4.

⁴⁹ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 36-7.

⁵⁰ Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 324-325.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, 322-323.

⁵² Snyder, 'The foundation for Vienna', 493-494.

⁵³ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 27. Lehne directly quoted detailed provisions for five different CSBMs.

Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction (MBFR) negotiations were narrowed. US President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and the 1986 US decision to cease observing the limits of the unratified Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II) treaty worsened this stalemate.⁵⁴ US-Soviet summits at Geneva (November 19-21, 1985) and Reykjavík (October 11-12, 1986), did not produce further substantive progress.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the 1986 Stockholm document contributed to an atmosphere of guarded optimism in Vienna. The situation around human rights was less optimistic. The 1985 Ottawa Experts Meeting focused only on human rights but despite interactive discussions on human rights, the talks did not lead to greater compliance with existing provisions in CSCE documents nor did they produce a new document.⁵⁶ The same can be said for the meetings in Budapest (1985) and Bern (1986), which dealt with culture and human contacts respectively.⁵⁷ However, these three meetings too laid part of the groundwork for Vienna. During these meetings, Western and neutral countries shifted towards a focus on compliance with existing CSCE agreements instead of a focus on producing new concluding documents.⁵⁸ This chapter will demonstrate that this trend continued into Vienna. Outside of the CSCE, a positive trend owed to Gorbachev's new thinking was that in the middle of 1986 the Politburo almost entirely stopped arresting political dissidents.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, at the beginning of the Vienna meeting there were numerous cases of serious human rights violations in Europe.⁶⁰

In retrospect, we can see that the period leading up to November 1986 did not yet herald the monumental changes of the end of the decade. While the Cold War was in a period of European détente⁶¹, the West remained reserved about Soviet reforms. Within Western Europe, coordination of foreign policy was codified in February 1986. However, EPC excluded most military matters. The Stockholm CDE provided a hopeful impulse to dialogue on arms control,

⁵⁴ Matthias Peter, 'Saving Détente: The Federal Republic of Germany and the CSCE in the 1980s', in Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder, *The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972-1990* (New York: Berghahn, 2019) 290.

⁵⁵ Young, 305.

⁵⁶ Snyder, 'The foundation for Vienna', 498-499.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, 499-501

⁵⁸ *Idem*, 493.

⁵⁹ Rosemary Foot, 'The Cold War and human rights' in: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume III: Endings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 462.

⁶⁰ Esterik and Minnema, 'The Conference', 2-3. The authors provide six examples of serious human rights violations at the time. This list is not exhaustive and very Eastern-focused, but it gives an indication of the state of human rights across all of Europe.

⁶¹ J. Hanhimäki, 'Détente in Europe, 1962-75', in M. Leffler and A. Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume II: Crisis and Détente* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 198. European détente, as opposed to superpower détente, meant a relaxation of East-West tensions in Europe in response to the excesses of bipolar relations.

but discussions outside of the CSCE process were at a stalemate. Progress on human rights topics seemed to be falling behind progress on matters of European security that was made in Stockholm. This is the context in which Dutch diplomats prepared for the start of the Vienna meeting.

1.3 Preparing for the Meeting

In the months before the successful conclusion of the Stockholm meeting in mid-September 1986, the 35 participating countries started preparing for Vienna. This section will focus on Dutch preparations leading up to the start of the meeting to identify Dutch interests. Code rapports sent from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the delegation in Vienna and vice versa will be used to analyse Dutch preparations and Dutch positioning for the meeting.

Most communication from Vienna to the Dutch Ministry in The Hague was signed by the leader of the Dutch delegation in Vienna: Johan Hendrik (Hans) Meesman. Meesman had been part of the delegation at the 1981-1983 CSCE meeting in Madrid. Additionally, he had twelve years of experience working within NATO. He would later become Dutch ambassador to the United States (1990-1993).⁶² His career indicates a transatlantic orientation, similar to Foreign Minister Van den Broek. On the 10th of October, 1986, Meesman sent a code rapport from Vienna to The Hague with suggestions for Dutch positioning for each topic that was placed on the agenda for Vienna.⁶³ The preparatory meeting for Vienna had concluded four days prior, on the 6th of October. The delegations had found swift agreement on the organizational and structural framework during this two-week preparatory meeting. By contrast, the preparatory meeting for Madrid had lasted nine weeks. Organizationally, the Vienna meeting largely followed the precedents set at Madrid, allowing for a much shorter preparatory period.⁶⁴ Meesman's rapport reveals another major difference between Madrid and Vienna. He noted that the Dutch delegation consisted of diplomats with little (recent) CSCE experience, except for himself and the military advisor. It remains unclear why the Netherlands chose to send diplomats with little CSCE experience. Perhaps they deployed a less experienced delegation that would be more dependent on input from The Hague or perhaps the CSCE became less of a priority to the Dutch. Meesman requested instructions on how the Netherlands ought to position itself on topics that he himself was less versed in, such as culture and

⁶² Prabook, *Johan Hendrik Meesman*, online biography. Retrieved from: https://prabook.com/web/johan_hendrik.meesman/1457851
Last accessed: 6-10-2020.

⁶³ Incoming code rapport, 'cvse implementatiedebat/nederlandse standpuntbepalingen [csce implementation debate/dutch positioning]', 10 October 1986, *DMFA, Z299, inv. nr. 938*, The Hague.

⁶⁴ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 85.

education.⁶⁵ He also outlined suggestions for the focus of Dutch interventions during the implementation debate. Interventions required substantive examples which could demonstrate (the lack of) implementation of CSCE provisions. The document reveals a focus on the human dimension. In Basket I, Meesman suggested a focus on Principle VII: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Netherlands explicitly linked this principle to *détente*. There was a particular focus on issues on which East European compliance was deemed to be lacking, such as religious freedom, political prisoners, and freedom of speech.⁶⁶ Other Basket III issues such as human contacts, culture and education were also eligible subjects for Dutch interventions in the plenary implementation debate.⁶⁷ All in all, the Dutch focus on the human dimension was not new. The Netherlands were self-conscious about the ‘traditional Dutch positioning as human rights protagonist’.⁶⁸

Going into the implementation debate, the Netherlands had the clear over-arching goal of addressing the implementation of previous CSCE commitments before moving towards new provisions. They wanted to pursue a balanced CSCE process with equal progress in each Basket, especially in view of the very recent progress in the military realm at the Stockholm meeting. Therefore, the Netherlands emphasized topics related to the human dimension in the preparation of interventions. The next section will feature an analysis of Dutch developments during the implementation debate. This will reveal how a focus on the human dimension served multiple goals and interests.

1.4 The First Phase of the Vienna Meeting

On the 4th of November 1986, the Vienna CSCE meeting was opened in the majestic Hofburg palace. In accordance with the relatively favourable international climate, the opening speeches of the Foreign Ministers of all 35 participating states were more optimistic than they had been at previous CSCE meetings. However, this optimism waned as soon as the Foreign Ministers left, and the CSCE returned to business as usual. Across all working bodies, fierce discussions and frequent clashes occurred, particularly about the human dimension.⁶⁹ An analysis of the eight-week long implementation debate reveals the sharpening of Dutch aims in this early stage

⁶⁵ Incoming code rapport, 10 October 1986, *DMFA*.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁸ Outgoing code rapport, ‘gedragslijn t.a.v. de joodse minderheid in de su [line to take towards the jewish minority in the su]’, 18 November 1986, *DMFA*, *Z299*, *inv. nr. 2017*, The Hague. Original quote: ‘...de traditionele nederlandse opstelling als voorvechter van de mensenrechten.’

⁶⁹ Alexis Heraclides, *Security and Co-operation in Europe: The Human Dimension, 1972-1992* (Portland and London: Frank Cass, 1993) 82-83.

of the meeting. In other words, we find out what the Netherlands wanted to focus on going forward into the next phase, during which the 35 countries would introduce, discuss, and negotiate the proposals for the concluding document.

1.4.1 The Implementation Debate: General Developments

Contrary to Western hopes, the general goal of restoring the balance of the CSCE process was jeopardized immediately. From the start of the meeting, there were several distractions during plenary sessions and different interests within the Western bloc that compromised the focus on the human dimension and implementation of CSCE provisions. Firstly, the coordinated Western attempt to emphasize the human dimension at the public opening of Vienna was overshadowed by public attention for the aftermath of the Reykjavík summit (October 11-12, 1986), which focused on matters of military security.⁷⁰ On top of this, in the first week of Vienna several (mostly Eastern) countries called for an immediate follow-up to the CDE, which was not even implemented yet. Among these countries was Greece, a NATO ally which diverged from the others on this point. Additionally, France pleaded for incorporating all conventional disarmament talks into the CSCE framework instead of the bloc-to-bloc approach favoured by the US.⁷¹ Clearly, while the West agreed to focus on the human dimension, there was still enough room for manoeuvre for individual Western countries.

Secondly, the surprising Soviet announcement at the start of the meeting of a proposal for a conference in Moscow on ‘human contacts, information culture and education’ similarly distracted attention away from the critical rhetoric of Western speakers.⁷² Initially, Western countries had diverging responses to the proposal. The EC-12 compromised between the negative assessment of hardliners France and Great Britain versus the more positive assessment by moderates such as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Belgium.⁷³ The Netherlands was also grouped with the ‘hardliners’ who considered the proposal a Soviet propaganda ploy without substance.⁷⁴ However, internal communication reveals that the Netherlands took a reserved but constructive approach to the proposal, which would have to comply with Western conditions if the conference in Moscow were to actually happen.⁷⁵ This was put to practice

⁷⁰ Incoming code rapport, ‘de eerste twee weken/sowjet optreden nieuwe stijl [the first two weeks/soviet performance new style]’, 15 November 1986, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 938, The Hague.

⁷¹ Incoming code rapport, 9 November 1986, *DMFA*.

⁷² *Ibidem*.

⁷³ Incoming code rapport, ‘soviet voorstel inzake bijeenkomst in moskou inzake 3^e mand aangelegenheden/ evaluatie van cvse-delegaties der twaalf [soviet proposal on meeting in moscow on 3rd basket affairs/ evaluation of csce-delegates of the twelve]’, 2 December 1986, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr 938, The Hague.

⁷⁴ Heraclides, *Security and Co-operation in Europe*, 85-86.

⁷⁵ Outgoing code rapport, ‘menselijke dimensie nederlandse en deense voorstellen [human dimension csce dutch and danish proposals]’, 26 November 1986, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 2017, The Hague.

during a bilateral visit to Moscow by Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers and Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek around the 20th of November 1986. Van den Broek secretly ensured Shevardnadze that the Netherlands would take a ‘constructive approach’ to the Soviet proposal.⁷⁶ The Netherlands possibly hoped that despite being known as a human rights hardliner, their constructive approach towards the Soviet proposal would positively surprise the Soviets. Evidently, the Netherlands combined their outward appearance as a principled defender of human rights with a pragmatic approach to international relations behind the scenes. The EC-12 decided not to outright disregard the Soviet proposal until more details were revealed. They concluded that in any case, an agreement to a Basket III meeting in Moscow ‘would be contingent on evidence of real and substantial progress in Soviet implementation of the humanitarian provisions of the final act.’⁷⁷

To conclude, it became clear during the implementation debate that the West would not be able to draw full attention to the necessity of Pan-European compliance with existing CSCE provisions on the human dimension. Their focus was weakened by developments around military security, which dominated public attention and caused internal Western division. The Soviet proposal for a Basket III conference in Moscow further distracted the attention away from implementation. Initial Western responses were diverse, but they eventually agreed to wait and see how the Soviet proposal would develop. Meanwhile, all 35 participating states were preparing their proposals. During this process, the countries would determine how they wanted to pursue their interests during the meeting. These preparations premeditated the clashing of Western interests which, following liberal intergovernmentalism, would occur during the ‘intergovernmental bargaining’ stage of the meeting. Therefore, the next section focuses on this preparation process, through the lens of the Dutch human dimension proposal.

1.4.2 Behind the Scenes: the Dutch Proposal

Instructions from The Hague in this period strongly focused on the human dimension. Most of this was specifically related to the Dutch flagship proposal that aimed to improve implementation of CSCE provisions on the human dimension.⁷⁸ This proposal will be used here to demonstrate the development of Dutch aims, and how the Netherlands navigated the intricacies of intra-Western relations to pursue their interests.

⁷⁶ Outgoing code rapport, 9 December 1986, *DMFA*. Original quote: ‘constructieve houding’.

⁷⁷ Incoming code rapport, 2 December 1986, *DMFA*.

⁷⁸ See *DMFA* archive Z299, inv. nrs. 2017-2018, The Hague. The Dutch delegation in Vienna faithfully reported on a regular basis, multiple times per week. Instructions or information from The Hague arrived on an irregular basis, when necessary.

While the Netherlands would refrain from officially presenting their proposal until the very end of January 1987, the idea had already been floated in the Dutch opening statement.⁷⁹ In this first phase, the proposal was fleshed out and it was frequently discussed with Western allies inside and outside of the CSCE.⁸⁰ Western responses to the proposal were generally positive. Many other Western countries had also been preparing proposals that focused on the human dimension, to rebalance the CSCE process. Interestingly, this did not lead to a uniform Western-bloc approach. For example, when Denmark pressed early on for bilateral coordination of the Dutch and Danish proposals, the Netherlands preferred to hold firm to their own proposal.⁸¹ The Dutch feared that early coordination would lead to early compromise, which would dilute the Dutch proposal and weaken their position. The Dutch considered the Danish proposal ‘lighter’, while the Dutch proposal had a much stronger focus on improving compliance with CSCE provisions. Proposals by non-EPC ally the United States and N+N country Switzerland were considered to be ‘heavier’, in line with the Dutch proposal.⁸² The view that the Dutch and American human dimension proposals could ‘truly improve’ the CSCE process more than other Western proposals was held on to firmly throughout this phase of the meeting.⁸³ Another example of this was the case of the French proposal of a conference on the human dimension in December 1986. This proposal was considered by several of the EC-12 to be more likely to succeed during negotiations in the later stages of the meeting. However, the Netherlands did not consider this a valid reason to no longer pursue their own proposal. They sternly continued their own course.⁸⁴ The above demonstrates that while the West generally agreed on a uniform focus on the human dimension, there was considerable heterogeneity in the specific approach that the countries preferred. This led to a relatively diverse list of Western human dimension proposals.⁸⁵ Clearly, there existed heterogeneity and complexity within the

⁷⁹ Incoming code rapport, ‘menselijke dimensie/nederlandse en deense voorstellen [human dimension/dutch and danish proposals]’, 19 November 1986, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 938, The Hague.

⁸⁰ Outgoing code rapport, ‘cvse/ nederlands mensenrechteninitiatief [csce/ dutch human rights initiative], 1 December 1986, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 2017, The Hague. In this document, The Hague requests that Meesman disseminates the concrete proposal among his EPC and US colleagues because of their positive initial reactions to the Dutch idea.

⁸¹ Incoming code rapport, 19 November 1986, *DMFA*.

⁸² Ibidem. A key difference was that while the Danes envisioned a semi-permanent *conference* to further discuss stronger implementation of CSCE provisions, the Dutch wanted to create a *mechanism* to put actual pressure on countries to comply with CSCE provisions.

⁸³ Outgoing code rapport, 9 December 1986, *DMFA*. Original quote: ‘werkelijk enige verbetering’.

⁸⁴ Ibidem.

⁸⁵ Incoming code rapport, ‘cvse bijeenkomst: westelijke voorstellen [csce meeting: western proposals]’, 10 December 1986, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 938, The Hague.

Western bloc that can be revealed by having a closer look at intra-bloc relations during the various phases of CSCE meetings.

With that heterogeneity in mind, here I will analyse how the Dutch insistence on holding firmly on to its proposal was partly driven by their own tactical considerations. First, the Netherlands pursued an individual strategy that ensured that the Western bloc would present strong proposals on the human dimension. The Dutch proposal had broader Western support than the American proposal, which suggested on-site human rights inspections. At the same time, the Dutch implementation-focused proposal was received positively by the United States because the Americans had started emphasizing implementation rather than creating new provisions during the interim meetings between Madrid and Vienna.⁸⁶ The Dutch were conscious of their position and how to utilize it. Foreign Minister Van den Broek stressed the ‘tactical interest’ of supporting the heavy American human dimension proposal. He expected the US proposal to fail, which would make the Dutch proposal more likely to gain EC-12 support as a strong and viable alternative.⁸⁷

Secondly, the Netherlands tried to ensure future East European engagement with the Dutch proposal. If the US proposal failed during negotiations, the Dutch proposal would seem more appealing to the East. The Netherlands incorporated this into their strategy. They openly supported the American proposal and wanted it to be the first Western proposal to be submitted come February. They expected the Eastern countries to outright refuse this proposal because of its intrusive character. The Dutch proposal, less intrusive but still relatively strong, would then follow as the second proposal. By Dutch estimation, the East would potentially view it as an acceptable second option, behind the American proposal.⁸⁸ This strategy was already pursued during the bilateral visit by Lubbers and Van den Broek to Moscow in November 1986. In return for a constructive approach towards the Soviet proposal, the Dutch Foreign Minister expected Shevardnadze to adopt an equally constructive stance towards the Dutch proposal.⁸⁹ This bilateral visit demonstrates both the Dutch strategy as well as the fact that the developments at Vienna did not occur in a diplomatic vacuum.

Thirdly, during Christmas break, The Hague urged the Dutch delegation to ‘lobby with allied and like-minded countries’ to generate more broad support for the Dutch proposal. The

⁸⁶ Snyder, ‘The foundation for Vienna’, 503.

⁸⁷ Outgoing code rapport, ‘cvse/ voorstel 12 inzake menselijke dimensie [csce/proposal 12 on human dimension]’, 30 January 1987, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 2018, The Hague. Original quote: ‘taktische belangen’.

⁸⁸ Outgoing code rapport, 26 November 1986, *DMFA*.

⁸⁹ Outgoing code rapport, 9 December 1986, *DMFA*.

instructions also encouraged bilateral contacts with N+N countries because the Netherlands was afraid that a lighter Austrian-Swiss proposal would be used by Eastern countries as an acceptable compromise, sweeping aside the American and Dutch proposals.⁹⁰

In conclusion, the Netherlands attempted to navigate the West, the East and the N+N countries primarily by holding firm to their own proposal for the human dimension. This firmness is part of what Baudet called the ‘radical strategy’ of the Netherlands, which allowed the stubborn small state to ‘score a Dutch success’: the implementation-focused human dimension proposal.⁹¹ However, that ‘Dutch success’ in Vienna should also be seen in terms of their ability to bridge Western differences, reminiscent of the role of the Netherlands in Madrid.⁹² In this phase of the meeting, the Netherlands held the middle ground between the EC-12 and NATO and they were able to reconcile the different approaches that existed within the West. However, aside from building West-West bridges in this early phase of the meeting, the Netherlands attempted to play all sides by at the same time appealing bilaterally to the East and N+Ns.

1.5 Conclusion

Following the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, this chapter has shown that Western countries had considerable room to determine and pursue their own interests in the first phase of the Vienna meeting. Naturally, countries could take common positions when their interests converged. However, predetermined interests clashed continuously and often converged only after much West-West deliberation.

The Dutch had two initial goals: a principled defence of the human dimension and, pragmatically, bridging the gap between Western allies. They bridged the gap by presenting the Dutch proposal as an acceptable compromise between the lighter and heavier Western human dimension proposals. Additionally, the prioritization of the human dimension served multiple aims. First, the Netherlands, like other Western countries, wanted to rebalance the CSCE process after the success in the military dimension at Stockholm. However, the human dimension was overshadowed by military security affairs at the start of the meeting. Moreover, the Soviet human dimension proposal distracted attention away from the Western focus on

⁹⁰ Outgoing code rapport, ‘presentatie gemeenschappelijk (eps) voorstel inzake de menselijke dimensie [presentation common (epc) proposal on the human dimension]’, 22 January 1987, *DMFA, Z299, inv. nr. 2018*, The Hague. Original quote: ‘...contact op te nemen met bondgenoten en gelijkgezinden teneinde steun voor ons voorstel te verkrijgen’.

⁹¹ Baudet, ‘The Origins of the CSCE Human Dimension Mechanism’, 196.

⁹² Crump, *Ferm doch onopvallend*, 276.

implementation of human dimension provisions. Secondly, a clear goal emerged: pursuing the Dutch proposal, which included a mechanism to monitor compliance with CSCE provisions in the human dimension. The Western emphasis on compliance with existing CSCE provisions originated from the 1984-1986 interim meetings and continued at Vienna. However, aside from the genuine concern about implementation of CSCE provisions in the human dimension, the Netherlands pragmatically used their proposal to bridge the differences between the EC-12 and NATO by positioning the proposal between other Western light and heavy human dimension proposals. Still, the Dutch were unwilling to dilute their principled proposal for the sake of swift and smooth intra-Western agreement. Aside from their bridge-building function, the Dutch tried to play all sides and set their proposal up for success by approaching the Soviet Union, Austria, and Switzerland. In other words, they were exploring the boundaries of their margins for manoeuvre within the CSCE.

This chapter demonstrated how Western positioning on topics in the CSCE was reached through a dynamic process of frequent clashing of interests within the heterogenous Western bloc. The Netherlands explored their margins for manoeuvre by attempting to bridge the gaps within the West and by approaching all sides. This Dutch combination of principles and pragmatism was reminiscent of Dutch diplomacy at the Madrid CSCE Follow-up meeting, approximately five years earlier.⁹³ This dual approach to the human dimension earned the Netherlands a reputation as human rights hardliner going into the negotiation phase of the Vienna meeting. An analysis of the negotiation phase will reveal how they continued to try to combine principles and pragmatism.

⁹³ *Ibidem*, 276.

Chapter 2. Cracks in the Alliance: Challenges to Western Cohesion

2.1 Introduction

So it seems the meeting is steering towards a phase in which the merits of one's own proposals and those of other countries will be debated ... We know from experience that thorough staff work is a prerequisite for maintaining any cohesion among Western delegations, whose perspectives here and there sometimes differ widely.⁹⁴

Hans Meesman, head of Dutch delegation, 28 February 1987.

While the 35 participating states were still submitting the last of their record-number of proposals, Meesman concluded that the Vienna meeting was entering its next phase.⁹⁵ This chapter will argue that he was in fact correct in his estimation that cohesion among Western countries could not be taken for granted. Accordingly, questions about how the Netherlands would continue to navigate the Western bloc in this phase will be answered here. Perhaps Dutch pragmatism could repair the cracks that appeared in the Western bloc. However, what then became of Dutch principles? Throughout the first phase, these were not easily abandoned; a balance had to be found. Therefore, step two of this thesis' intergovernmentalist analysis constitutes a close look at the dynamic of the 'bargaining and negotiation' process of the CSCE Vienna meeting. This chapter covers the period from the start of discussion and negotiation of proposals in February 1987, until the beginning of May 1988, just before the N+Ns presented their draft of the concluding document, which eventually led to final rounds of negotiations. The final phase of negotiations and the results of the meeting will be discussed in chapter three. The analysis will focus on the Western human dimension proposal (WT19), which was for a large part based on the Dutch proposal that was discussed in the previous chapter. Despite the general Western pursuit of a stronger human dimension, reaching consensus on WT19 became a struggle due to competing interests. Before focusing on the Netherlands, the first section of this chapter will again briefly cover international developments. This will construct the context in which the next phase of the Vienna meeting happened.

2.2 Historical International Context

In 1987 and the first half of 1988, several geopolitical developments occurred outside of the

⁹⁴ Incoming code rapport, 'cvse vervolgbijeenkomst/tweede ronde/ vijfde week [csce follow-up meeting/second round/ fifth week]', 28 February 1987, *DMFA*, inv. nr. 938, archive Z299, The Hague. Original quote: 'Zo lijkt de bijeenkomst aan te sturen op een fase waarin gedebatteerd zal gaan worden over de merites van eigen en andermans voorstellen ... Ervaring leert dat grondig stafwerk een vereiste is voor bewaren van althans enige cohesie onder de Westerse delegaties, wier invalshoeken hier en daar soms ver uiteenliggen.'

⁹⁵ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 100. In total, 156 proposals were submitted, with the majority coming from East European countries.

CSCE process that had an impact on the Vienna meeting, which again emphasizes that the meeting was an integral part of the geopolitical context at the time. In general, the anticipated changes within the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc from 1985 onwards were now expected to have a positive impact on negotiations in the CSCE. In 1987 and 1988, the Soviet Union's new approach to diplomacy was put to practice, resulting in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and a positive Soviet view of the UN.⁹⁶ Western scepticism of Soviet reforms started to make way for cautious optimism. In the summer of 1988, Gorbachev emphasized the right for each country to choose its own political and economic system.⁹⁷ However, the international dimension of glasnost and perestroika arrived late in Vienna, lagging behind developments in Moscow, as the Dutch observed in late 1987.⁹⁸ Glasnost and perestroika had a similar delayed effect on some of the Warsaw Pact delegations in Vienna. At the end of 1987, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia appeared 'less influenced by new thinking' than the Soviets themselves, causing 'clear disagreements within their own camp'.⁹⁹

The stalemate of disarmament talks outside of the CSCE process was broken on the 8th of December 1987, when Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in Washington.¹⁰⁰ The signing of the INF Treaty, a major diplomatic achievement, was directly related to the CSCE process. The Treaty was a victory for superpower détente. It required both superpowers to dismantle their short-range and intermediate-range nuclear delivery systems by 1991. The Treaty also had an impact on détente in Europe. However, European détente as opposed to superpower détente could not be maintained by only progressing on military security issues. It required progress in the realm of human rights as well, similar to how the West stressed equal progress across all CSCE Baskets. In fact, the CSCE itself perpetuated European détente because it provided Europe with a platform for dialogue, especially in times of increased bipolar tensions.¹⁰¹

There was no human rights equivalent to the INF Treaty in 1987-88. Nevertheless, human rights were discussed extensively during the US-SU Washington summit in early December 1987. The Soviets emphasized the international dimension of perestroika and noted

⁹⁶ Roberts, 'An "incredibly swift transition"', 521.

⁹⁷ Brown, 'The Gorbachev revolution', 245, 253.

⁹⁸ Incoming code rapport, 'derde vervolgbijeenkomst/vierde ronde [third follow-up meeting/fourth round], 20 December 1987, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 942. Even after the Washington summit, Meesman noted a hardening of Soviet positions on the human dimension.

⁹⁹ Incoming code rapport, 20 December 1987, *DMFA*. Original quote: 'De delegaties van bulgarije, roemenie en tsjechoslowakije lijken minder dan die van de sowjet unie de invloed van het nieuwe denken in moskou te hebben ondergaan.' and 'duidelijke meningsverschillen in eigen kamp.'

¹⁰⁰ David W. Kearns, *Facing the Missile Challenge: U.S. Strategy and the Future of the INF Treaty* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2012) 11.

¹⁰¹ Crump, 'Forty-five Years of Dialogue Facilitation (1972-2017)', 504.

the human rights-related changes that were currently under way in the Soviet Union. Among these changes were measures to prevent abuse of psychiatry for political suppression, amnesty for 30.000 prisoners since October 1987, a commitment to reduce the amount of death penalty sentences, and new legislation to improve the legal position of churches.¹⁰² Aside from these promises, there were additional positive developments regarding human rights in Europe. For example, in 1987-88 the Soviet Union slowly stopped jamming major Western broadcasts. Broadcasts by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Voice of America were allowed as early as January and May 1987. Broadcast signal jamming completely ceased by the end of 1988, allowing for a freer flow of information across Europe.¹⁰³ Freedom of information, an integral part of the fundamental right of freedom of expression, was also one of the subjects discussed in Basket III of the CSCE under 'information'. An all-encompassing ban of radio jamming seemed an ambitious Western goal at the start of the Vienna meeting.¹⁰⁴ However, due to the evolving geopolitical context of the end of the 1980s, jammers were disabled before the Vienna meeting had even concluded.

In 1987-8, the optimism with which the Vienna meeting had started was still fragile. There was significant progress on nuclear disarmament due to the signing of the INF Treaty in December 1987. Again, progress on the topics related to the human dimension did not run parallel to military security issues. In fact, progress on the human dimension stagnated and Western delegations remained sceptical of the 'new thinking' of East European delegations in Vienna. However, the stagnation in this phase of the Vienna meeting cannot entirely be attributed to the reluctance of the Eastern bloc to adopt Western conceptions of the human dimension. The rest of this chapter will show that intra-Western disagreements and a lack of internal cohesion prohibited the start of proper CSCE-wide negotiations about the concluding document. Despite these difficulties, the Netherlands continued to pursue a strong human dimension text whilst trying to unite the Western bloc.

2.3 Submitting the Western flagship Human Dimension Proposal WT19

On the 4th of February 1987, several different Western human dimension proposals were

¹⁰² Incoming code rapport, 'top reagan-gorbatsjow: briefing navo-caucus door ambassadeur zimmermann [top reagan-gorbachev: briefing nato-caucus by ambassador zimmermann]', 13 December 1987, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 942, The Hague.

¹⁰³ Serge Schmemmann, 'SOVIET UNION ENDS YEARS OF JAMMING OF RADIO LIBERTY', *New York Times*, 1 December 1988.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/01/world/soviet-union-ends-years-of-jamming-of-radio-liberty.html>

Last accessed: 13-10-2020.

¹⁰⁴ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 167.

submitted in six different clusters. The focus here is on the proposal that would become the most important Western flagship: the ‘Proposal on the Human Dimension of the Helsinki Final Act’, more commonly known as WT19.¹⁰⁵ WT19 was a joint proposal that consisted of two parts: a four-stage mechanism on human rights (based on the Dutch proposal) and a conference on to the human dimension (the French proposal). The four stages of the mechanism were (1) an obligation for states to reply to requests for information by other states, individuals, and NGOs regarding human rights issues; (2) if the information was not sufficient, states could request obligatory bilateral meetings to examine and try to resolve these cases; (3) notifying the other states of the human rights issue; (4) a special meeting of all 35 states could be called by the initiator of the mechanism to discuss and resolve specific human rights issues or cases. Attendance by the state against which the mechanism was set in motion was compulsory.¹⁰⁶ As will be explained below, paragraph 4 about ‘a special meeting’ would prove to be the most controversial in both East and West. The ‘conference’ part of the proposal envisioned a meeting and a conference. The date and location of the meeting were to be decided in Vienna. Its objectives were to evaluate the mechanism, to review the human rights and human contact situation, and to consider new measures to improve implementation of human dimension provisions. At the conference, the measures recommended during the meeting would be adopted.¹⁰⁷

The previous chapter demonstrated the early difficulties of West-West cooperation. These differences did not simply disappear after the implementation debate. Western countries continued to clash throughout the meeting. In fact, in the days before WT19 was submitted, the contents of the proposal were still being heavily debated among the Western countries. The EC-12 argued that the conference part of WT19 was necessary to ensure the success of the implementation mechanism. The Soviets desired a human dimension conference (CHD) in Moscow, known as WT2. WT19 left the possibility of a CHD in Moscow open. The US also wanted a CHD, but not in Moscow. However, the twelve considered it unlikely that both the implementation mechanism and a conference, held in the West, would survive negotiations.¹⁰⁸ A West-West compromise was reached, which stipulated that the meeting proposed in WT19 would not end until the date and place of the future conference were agreed upon by all participants. The Netherlands was ‘not enthusiastic’ about this compromise. The Hague

¹⁰⁵ Heraclides, *Security and Co-operation in Europe*, 91.

¹⁰⁶ Baudet, ‘The Origins of the CSCE Human Dimension Mechanism’, 191.

¹⁰⁷ Heraclides, *Security and Co-operation in Europe*, 90-91.

¹⁰⁸ Incoming code rapport, ‘voorstel 12 menselijke dimensie [proposaal 12 human dimension]’, 2 February 1987, *DMFA, Z299, inv. nr. 938*, The Hague.

questioned whether it made sense in practice to continue the meeting until consensus about the conference was reached.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, the Netherlands agreed to the amendments to WT19 ‘in the interest of good coordination with the other Western countries, particularly the US’.¹¹⁰ Notably, this was the first example of the willingness of the Netherlands to make pragmatic concessions on matters of principle to improve Western cohesion.

In April 1987, at the end of the phase of submitting proposals, Meesman noted that within the West ‘differences of position came to light that definitely go further than tactical considerations’.¹¹¹ In other words, diverging interests blocked the formation of a united Western front with a clear position. Within the EC-12, there were roughly two opposing positions. The FRG, supported by several partners such as Ireland and Portugal, wanted a swift conclusion of the Vienna meeting and they would be satisfied with a ‘non-result’ on the human dimension.¹¹² The Netherlands, supported by France and Denmark, wanted to pursue substantive progress in the human dimension, strongly disagreeing with suggestions to weaken WT19 to make it ‘more negotiable’.¹¹³ These differences can be explained by looking at West German and Dutch interests. Bonn’s main goal in the CSCE process was to ‘save détente’ by keeping the East-West dialogue alive and by easing tensions in Europe.¹¹⁴ Accordingly, the FRG at no point pressed for human dimension provisions that could antagonize Eastern Europe. After all, the FRG was in an exposed position on the East-West fault line. The Netherlands, much less exposed, aimed for progress in the human dimension and tried to bridge the gaps within the West, even at the cost of East-West friction. Outside of the EC-12, the US had similar high demands concerning the results on the human dimension, although they also favoured a swift conclusion of the Vienna meeting.¹¹⁵ These large differences of both principles and tactics within the Western bloc made substantive CSCE-wide negotiations on WT19 impossible at this stage. As of yet, there was no clear, agreed-upon Western position to negotiate with.

The Netherlands insisted on retaining a strong emphasis on implementation of human dimension provisions in the version of WT19 that was submitted. Moreover, the Dutch seemed

¹⁰⁹ Outgoing code rapport, ‘cvse/amerikaanse amendementen op voorstel 12 menselijke dimensie [csce/american amendments to proposal 12 human dimension]’, 3 February 1987, *DMFA*, Z299, *inv. nr. 2018*, The Hague. Original quote: ‘ik ben echter niet enthousiast over dit voorstel.’

¹¹⁰ Outgoing code rapport, 3 February 1987, *DMFA*. Original quote: ‘in het belang van een goede coordinatie met de overige westelijke landen en met name met de vs’.

¹¹¹ Incoming code rapport, ‘derde vervolgbijeenkomst/tweede fase (indiening voorstellen) [third follow-up meeting/phase two (submitting proposals)]’, 8 April 1987, *DMFA*, Z299, *inv. nr. 940*, The Hague.

¹¹² Outgoing code rapport, ‘eps werkgroep cvse/brainstorming 27/28 maart 1987 [eps working group csce/brainstorming 27/28 march 1987]’, 31 March 1987, *DMFA*, Z299, *inv. nr. 940*.

¹¹³ Outgoing code rapport, 31 March 1987, *DMFA*.

¹¹⁴ Peter, ‘Saving Détente’, 294.

¹¹⁵ Incoming code rapport, 8 April 1987, *DMFA*.

to hold a principled but stubborn position on the mechanism. However, the Dutch position was not devoid of pragmatism. While other Western countries had outright refused the possibility of a CHD in Moscow, the Netherlands maintained a constructive, tactical approach to this Soviet proposal (WT2). This kept open the possibility of conceding on WT2 during negotiations instead of weakening WT19 to make it more acceptable to the Eastern bloc. Despite the lack of meaningful CSCE progress on the human dimension throughout 1987, the Netherlands continued to explore options for increased Western coordination of WT19, while maintaining a strong proposal. An investigation of the next period shows how the West tried to overcome the continuous challenges of West-West cooperation.

2.4 Challenges to Western cohesion on WT19

Analysis of the Dutch sources from the rest of 1987 reveals the intricate challenges that West-West cooperation was subject to. After all proposals were submitted, negotiations were supposed to start. However, the West first had to reach agreement on the texts that they wanted to enter bloc-to-bloc negotiations with. This turned out to be the biggest challenge, and it put Dutch principles and pragmatism to the test.

In the summer of 1987, the Western position on the military security dimension finally developed during a NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavík. This in turn made Western coordination of WT19 an even bigger priority, to safeguard a balanced CSCE progress.¹¹⁶ Clearly, the common Western interest of balanced progress across all Baskets was never out of sight, even in times of discord. During an EPC meeting in July 1987, the twelve discussed a French non-paper that argued for non-exclusion of social rights in the conference aspect of WT19, which at that point only included the classical civil and political rights. The non-paper was not put on the agenda, but the Netherlands forced the discussion by bringing it up during the meeting. The twelve reached a ‘completely unambiguous, Dutch-desired conclusion’, which was a ‘relative rarity’ in this forum.¹¹⁷ The non-exclusion of social rights in the follow-up aspects of WT19 favoured the Netherlands because the West could now ‘concede’ the inclusion of social rights to the East during negotiations. This made WT19 more negotiable without weakening its core: better implementation of human dimension provisions. This small step in the direction of Western cohesion shows that Western convergence was possible despite the

¹¹⁶ Outgoing code rapport, ‘westelijk voorstel inzake de menselijke dimensie wt19 [western proposal on human dimension wt19]’, 25 June 1987, *DMFA, Z299, inv. nr. 2018*, The Hague.

¹¹⁷ Outgoing code rapport, ‘westelijk voorstel over menselijke dimensie (wt19). Franse non-paper over follow-up aspecten [western proposal on human dimension (wt19). French non-paper on follow-up aspects]’, 23 July 1987, *DMFA, Z299, inv. nr. 2018*, The Hague. Original quote: ‘... and, a relative rarity in this forum, led to a completely unambiguous and Dutch-desired conclusion.’

differences in the Western bloc. Moreover, the Dutch manoeuvre during the EPC meeting actively improved EPC coordination of WT19, without weakening the desired human dimension mechanism.

Despite these positive signs, Dutch insistence on a strong WT19 was challenged several times throughout the rest of 1987. This put severe pressure on the Dutch balance between principles and pragmatism. France often initiated these challenges to WT19. In September 1987, France shifted West-West dynamics by suddenly changing their position on a CHD in Moscow. In EPC-discussions in Brussels, France circulated an amendment to WT19.¹¹⁸ It proposed three human dimension follow-up conferences instead of one. The first conference would be in Paris, the second elsewhere in the West, and the third would be in Moscow. Importantly, they also slyly submitted a much weaker alternative to paragraph 4 of the proposal (the compulsory special meetings). The latter was dismissed because the Netherlands pointed out it went directly against earlier NATO agreements. The former was however open for consideration by all except Ireland and Portugal. The twelve agreed to discuss the French amendments with NATO delegates.¹¹⁹ However, no consensus was reached within NATO because Canada, America and Portugal objected. Whereas the Portuguese had failed to block EC consensus, they succeeded in doing so within the NATO framework. At the core of this issue was whether a human dimension conference should be held in Moscow. In any case, a CHD in Moscow would be subject to detailed conditions.¹²⁰ From the Dutch perspective, 'French eagerness to make WT19 sellable (and secure a conference in Paris) had dealt its expected damage' because 'friend and foe' now knew that there was no consensus about paragraph 4 within the West.¹²¹ Moreover, Norway and the US explicitly expressed their concerns to the Netherlands that EC-12 decisions on WT19 would be presented as *faits accomplis* to NATO allies.¹²² These two NATO countries clearly considered the Netherlands to be a bridge between NATO and the EC. Their worries were unfounded as the French amendments were set aside for the moment. However, the damage had been done.

¹¹⁸ Outgoing code rapport, 'cvse werkgroep 8-9 september, westelijk voorstel inzake de menselijke dimensie (wt 19) [csce working group 8-9 september, western proposal on the human dimension (wt 19)], 10 September 1987, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 2018, The Hague. France had sent a different representative to Brussels to present their remarkable about-face on this topic.

¹¹⁹ Outgoing code rapport, 10 September 1987, *DMFA*.

¹²⁰ Incoming code rapport, 'westers voorstel over de menselijke dimensie (wt 19) [western proposal on the human dimension (wt 19)], 3 October 1987, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 941, The Hague.

¹²¹ Incoming code rapport, 'derde vervolgbijeenkomst., vierde ronde, eerste week [third follow-up meeting., fourth round, first week]', 26 September 1987, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 941, The Hague. Original quote: '... dat Franse ijver om wt.19 verkoopbaar te maken (en conferentie in Parijs zeker te stellen) reeds de verwachtbare schade heeft aangericht.' and 'vriend en vijand'.

¹²² Outgoing code rapport, 26 September 1987, *DMFA*.

This period of intergovernmental bargaining demonstrated the fragility of Western cohesion. Western interests did not converge easily and a Western compromise on WT19 appeared to be out of reach. Warsaw Pact cohesion was also imperfect, but at least they were united in their refusal to cater to Western demands. At the same time, pressure mounted on the N+Ns to start producing compromise drafts before Christmas.¹²³

2.5 Western unity against all odds

By the end of 1987, the Netherlands seemed to be a stubborn factor preventing Western cohesion on WT19. Still, they continued to pursue paragraph 4, with some success. During bilateral consultations in Moscow in early December 1987, Dutch Director-General of Political Affairs Henry Wijnaendts obtained Soviet promises to study WT19 once more. Yuri Deryabin, head of the Soviet CSCE department, also promised to instruct the Soviet CSCE delegation to be more flexible towards the West.¹²⁴ While Soviet resistance to paragraph 4 was decreasing, the Dutch were pressured from both EC-12 and NATO sides to ease their grip on WT19. This pressure even came from like-minded human rights protectors Canada, Denmark and Norway, and the US.¹²⁵ In December, the FRG and Norway asked the Netherlands to consider a negotiable version of paragraph 4.¹²⁶ This could then lead to a common Western position on WT19, which would be presented to Austrian coordinator Rudolf Torovsky, responsible for drafting an East-N+N-West compromise text on the Principles aspect of Basket I.¹²⁷ In response however, Meesman urged The Hague to ‘in the short term hold or get our most important Western partners (EPC and possibly the US) on a common line acceptable to the Netherlands’ to prevent paragraph 4 from disappearing from the N+N compromise draft.¹²⁸ The Netherlands again stubbornly managed to weather this storm. Going into the Christmas break, the Dutch proposal had survived a year of intra-Western discord, while only at times managing to bring the West closer together.¹²⁹

In early 1988, pressure mounted on the West to come to an internal agreement on its texts. As a result, pressure increased on the Netherlands to reconsider its position as well. The

¹²³ Incoming code rapport, ‘cvse/vierde ronde/elfde week [csce/fourth round/eleventh week]’, 5 December 1987, *DMFA, Z299, inv. nr. 942*, The Hague.

¹²⁴ COREU message, ‘csce bilateral consultations with head soviet mfa/csce department yuri deryabin on monday 7 december 1987’, 9 December 1987, *DMFA, inv. nr. 7515*, The Hague.

¹²⁵ Baudet, ‘The Origins of the CSCE Human Dimension Mechanism’, 193.

¹²⁶ Incoming code rapport, ‘westelijk voorstel menselijke dimensie (wt.19) [western proposal human dimension]’, 3 December 1987, *DMFA, Z299, inv. nr. 942*, The Hague.

¹²⁷ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 114-115.

¹²⁸ Incoming code rapport, ‘westers voorstel menselijke dimensie (wt.19) actie [western proposal human dimension (wt.19) action]’, 5 December 1987, *DMFA, Z299, inv. nr. 942*, The Hague.

¹²⁹ Baudet, ‘The Origins of the CSCE Human Dimension Mechanism’, 193-194.

Netherlands had to brace itself during EPC CSCE discussions. The FRG pleaded for more Western flexibility on WT19, which most of the twelve agreed to. The West Germans had assumed the six-months presidency of the EC and, according to the Netherlands, would continue to try to ‘cut out the heart of WT19’, which prevented better implementation of human dimension provisions.¹³⁰ To the FRG, paragraph 4 was merely a bargaining chip during negotiations.¹³¹ Nevertheless, the Germans could not sway the twelve. In March 1988, during a special ministerial meeting in Brussels, it became clear that paragraph 4 was still widely supported by the EC-12.¹³² The biggest obstacle for a negotiable WT19 was a hardened British refusal of a potential CHD in Moscow, but they too supported a strong WT19. *En marge* of the ministerial meeting, the Netherlands made a significant pragmatic concession to the FRG. The Dutch let the Germans know that if it became necessary during endgame negotiations, the Netherlands were willing to let go of the problematic ‘compulsory attendance’ aspect of the *ad hoc* special meeting that was described in paragraph 4 of WT19.¹³³ This concession demonstrated that the Netherlands prioritized Western cohesion over maximal human dimension progress. Interestingly, it turned out that the widespread support for paragraph 4 on ministerial level in Brussels was not clear to all EC-12 negotiators in Vienna. The twelve therefore agreed to properly instruct their delegations in Vienna about WT19.¹³⁴ While the West sometimes complained that the Soviets were much less flexible in Vienna than they were in Moscow, the West also had positional discrepancies between their capitals and delegations. This also goes to show that there were multiple different layers of intergovernmentalism to Western cooperation that were not by always commensurate. In this case, intergovernmentalist bargaining among delegates in Vienna did not match intergovernmentalist bargaining in among foreign ministers in Brussels.

Finally, in the spring of 1988, a draft concluding document with substantive human dimension provisions seemed to be within reach. For the moment, the gap within the West had been bridged, in part due to the pragmatic Dutch willingness to compromise during the

¹³⁰ Outgoing code rapport, ‘eps werkgroep cvse 18-19 januari/wt 19 [eps working group csce 18-19 january/wt 19]’, 20 January 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, *inv. nr.* 2019, The Hague.

¹³¹ Outgoing code rapport, ‘eps werkgroep cvse 10 en 11 maart/voorbereiding buitengewoon ministerieel eps-overleg inzake menselijke dimensie op 22 maart a.s. [eps working groep csce 10 and 11 march/preparations special ministerial meeting on human dimension on 22 march]’, 14 March 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, *inv. nr.* 2019, The Hague.

¹³² Outgoing code rapport, ‘buitengewoon ministerieel cvse-overleg inzake wt 19., brussel, 22 maart 1988 [special ministerial csce-meeting on wt 19., brussels, 22 march 1988]’, 23 March 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, *inv. nr.* 2019, The Hague.

¹³³ Outgoing code rapport, 23 March 1988, *DMFA*.

¹³⁴ Outgoing code rapport, 14 March 1988, *DMFA*.

endgame. The Netherlands had high hopes for the draft concluding document. After all, the West and N+N_s had reached a ‘broad degree of consensus on the main points in the human dimension’.¹³⁵ This consensus was reached only after a dynamic intergovernmental bargaining process of internal clashes and negotiations within the West. Throughout this process, the Netherlands refused to change course and kept pursuing a strong WT19 to bring the West together. The Dutch had done so since the very start of the Vienna meeting, and in May 1988 it seemed like the mechanism was within reach. The emphasis on human rights appeared more and more as a means to an end rather than an end in itself.

2.6 Conclusion

The drawn-out internal negotiation period discussed in this chapter reveals how much effort it took to develop bloc-wide positions before 35-wide negotiations were even possible. In accordance with the liberal intergovernmentalist framework of this thesis, national interests within the West continued to clash during dynamic intra-bloc negotiations about WT19. ‘The West’ was made up of diverse countries and West-West cooperation was a dynamic process. Interests were transformed on different levels during this process: from the national level, to the EC-12, and finally to NATO. Eventually, this led to a common Western position that each country could reasonably agree upon. This common position should therefore be seen as the outcome of a process of contesting Western interests.

After the implementation debate officially ended, the West agreed that WT19 was their flagship proposal for the Vienna meeting. However, agreement on its details was not easily reached. The intergovernmental character of Western cooperation (EPC and NATO) meant there was considerable room to pursue national interests. The Dutch-German contrast regarding the necessity of substantive human dimension progress was a clear example of the room for manoeuvre that existed in the West. Intra-Western dynamics of this period nevertheless also demonstrated the willingness of Western countries to be flexible on WT19. The EC-12 were continually looking for ways to reach agreement on WT19, even if that meant that member states had to abandon earlier positions. For example, France’s change of heart about a possible CHD in Moscow opened new ways of thinking about WT19, but it also painfully exposed the struggle for Western cohesion. After all, France’s pursuit of a Paris CHD conference, a prestigious project, was a clear national interest. Nevertheless, after EC-12 agreement was reached, coordination with NATO allies was the next hurdle for achieving cohesion. For

¹³⁵ Incoming code rapport, ‘cvse/3^e vervolgbijeenkomst/zesde ronde/tweede week [csce/3rd follow-up meeting/sixth round/second week]’, 28 April 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 943, The Hague.

example, Portugal successfully re-raised concerns about a CHD in Moscow in the NATO caucus, after the country had unsuccessfully voiced these concerns in EPC discussions. This chapter has shown that multiple levels of intergovernmentalism were at play within the West: from Dutch bilateral consultations with the Soviets, to the NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavik, to the ministerial meeting in Brussels. These levels came together in the CSCE. Throughout all of this, the Dutch were under great pressure from their allies. They nevertheless still tried to look for their margins of manoeuvre on these different levels of intergovernmentalist cooperation. The Netherlands held on to the strategy that they had pursued from the beginning: holding on to the mechanism to eventually bring the West together and to achieve substantive progress on the human dimension.

Overall, the balance between principles and pragmatism leaned towards principles during this period. In the first chapter, it was clearer how the Dutch pursuit of the implementation mechanism served West-West cooperation and how the Netherlands tried to play all sides of the CSCE. Still, over time and under pressure from the West, small pragmatic concessions were made by the Netherlands in this period. On the brink of a draft concluding document, the West finally reached consensus on the human dimension, albeit still only in broad terms. With endgame negotiations in sight, the West-favoured implementation mechanism seemed to be within reach, partially owed to the Dutch strategy of steadfastness on paragraph 4.

Chapter 3. Reaching the Limits of Dutch Influence

3.1 Introduction

The events of the past weeks have revived the fear that, despite all statements that the quality of the product is more important than the time it takes to manufacture it, the West will have difficulties in turning its good position into a correspondingly good result of negotiations. The threat to that Western position comes from the West.¹³⁶

Hans Meesman, head of Dutch delegation, 5 August 1988.

In May 1988, the N+N compromise draft concluding document, although received positively in the West, led to internal disagreements on how to proceed with final negotiations of the concluding document.¹³⁷ Meesman recognized that even though Western cohesion was continuously yet gradually improving throughout the negotiation process, Western unity in Vienna would remain a challenge until the end. With that in mind, this chapter will focus on the final rounds of negotiations, including the endgame bloc-to-bloc negotiations, and the result of the Vienna meeting. During endgame negotiations, East, West and Neutrals had to converge to reach a concluding document. That CSCE-wide process would prove to be another source for intra-bloc discord in the West, as this chapter will demonstrate. This chapter will be the final step of this thesis' analytical LI framework. Here, the final clashes of interests will be analysed, and the outcomes of the entire process can be assessed. This allows us to evaluate to what extent Dutch goals had been attained and whether their strategy had been successful. In this period, the West finally managed to reach consensus on the specifics of how the mechanism and human dimension conferences should be included in the concluding document. This did not go smoothly because several issues, such as the possibility of a CHD in Moscow, remained controversial. This prevented the Western ranks from definitively closing and intergovernmental bargaining continued into late 1988. Accordingly, the Dutch balance between principles and pragmatism was put to the test a final time. In May 1988, the Netherlands suffered an immediate setback because paragraph 4 had been entirely omitted from the N+N draft. Regarding the military aspects of the CSCE, Western consensus was equally hard-fought.¹³⁸ It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to go into further detail, but this serves

¹³⁶ Incoming code rapport, 'cvse/evaluatie zesde ronde bij aanvang technische onderbreking [csce/evaluation sixth round at the start of technical break]', 5 August 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 945, The Hague.

¹³⁷ Outgoing code rapport, 'eps-werkgroep, cvse 25-26 mei/wt19 [epc-working group, csce 25-26 may/wt19]', 30 May 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 2019, The Hague.

¹³⁸ The many code rapports that discuss the military security aspects of the CSCE and West-West clashes over military issues warrant individual analysis beyond the scope of this thesis. The US and France in particular

as a reminder that the human dimension was not the only contested area of Western cooperation. Before the analysis of Dutch diplomacy in Vienna continues, the first section of this chapter will once more be dedicated to constructing the context of this final period.

3.2 Historical international context

The context of this period is similar to that of the previous chapter. The changes within the Soviet Union continued throughout 1988 and into 1989, ultimately leading up to end of the Soviet system. Inside the CSCE, developments on the terrain of human rights seemed to be heading in a West-favoured direction with the inclusion of new provisions in the human dimension. Outside of the CSCE, significant progress on issues of human rights and human contacts was made through bilateral relations. Throughout the Vienna meeting, many individual bilateral cases had been resolved, especially between the US and the Soviet Union. In the latter half of 1988, bilateral cases were directly linked to CSCE progress. The US demanded all bilateral cases, mostly family reunions, to be resolved in return for support for a CHD in Moscow.¹³⁹ These positive developments stand in shrill contrast with events that occurred in Czechoslovakia and the GDR in January 1989. While the successes of Vienna were being celebrated by the delegates, a peaceful demonstration marking the 20th anniversary of the self-immolation of student Jan Palach was brutally beat down by police in Prague. Palach's suicide had been an act of protest against the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In Leipzig, demonstrators who called for more freedom were arrested.¹⁴⁰ These events served as a painful reminder that changes in the geopolitical realm were not always able to cause immediate improvements to the lives of people in the 'real world'.

Aside from geopolitical developments that occurred outside of the CSCE, this section also focuses on the disarray that was visible among the Warsaw Pact delegations in Vienna. These two things were related because broader changes within Eastern Europe such as Gorbachev's reforms were the source of this disarray. Meesman's reports revealed that failing Warsaw Pact cohesion became even more noticeable in the second half of 1988 than before. Amongst the delegations in Vienna, there were rumours of 'stormy Warsaw Pact meetings.'¹⁴¹ Romania turned out to be particularly disruptive to Warsaw Pact unity and by extension the

clashed several times throughout the meeting. See for example Incoming code rapport, 'cvse plenaire, relatie cst-cvse [csce plenary, relation cst-csce]', 19 November 1988, *DMFA, Z299, inv. nr. 945*, The Hague.

¹³⁹ Incoming code rapport, 'cvse/zesde ronde/achtiende week na de hervatting [csce/sixth round/eighteenth week post resumption]', 29 December 1988, *DMFA, Z299, inv. nr. 945*, The Hague.

¹⁴⁰ Esterik and Minnema, 'The Conference', 28.

¹⁴¹ Incoming code rapport, '3^e vervolgbijeenkomst/zesde ronde/zesde week [3rd follow-up meeting/sixth round/sixth week]', 27 May 1988, *DMFA, Z299, inv. nr. 944*, The Hague. Original quote: 'In de wandelgangen doen geruchten de ronde over stormachtige wp-vergaderingen.'

entire meeting because of their extremely negative position towards the draft concluding document.¹⁴² Romanian dissent was not novel. In fact, since the 1960s Romania had often followed an independent course, deviating from the other Warsaw Pact states. At times, Romania would be outright obstructionist within the alliance.¹⁴³ Clearly, Romanian intransigence hardened after the changes that Gorbachev had initiated in 1985, which were discussed in both previous chapters. For the West, one positive consequence of Warsaw Pact turmoil was that the Polish and Hungarian delegations informally reached out to the West in this final phase of the meeting. They signalled their sympathy for the N+N draft, which demonstrated their willingness to compromise instead of blocking negotiations. However, at no point did they consider abandoning their Warsaw Pact allies. Moreover, they tried to push the West to make some concessions to make the document more appealing to the rest of the Warsaw Pact.¹⁴⁴

As the Vienna meeting moved towards final negotiations for the concluding document, the changes in East-West relations that had been underway since 1985 were starting to become more and more visible. The lives of many people in Europe were improving, but decisive change, particularly related to human rights, was still far away. On the level of alliances, these changes caused confusion within the Warsaw Pact near the end of the Vienna meeting. This is the context in which CSCE delegates proceeded with negotiations for a concluding document.

3.3 *The fate of paragraph 4*

In general, the N+N draft document was positively received by the West as an acceptable 'bottom-line' and basis for negotiations.¹⁴⁵ Before the draft, the West had finally agreed on a version of WT19 that explicitly included paragraph 4, the compulsory ad-hoc special meetings of the human dimension mechanism. However, paragraph 4 was entirely left out of the N+N draft. Despite the intergovernmental character of EPC, the German EC presidency could arguably have used its influence to ask Austrian coordinator Torovsky to include the paragraph in the N+N draft, but the previous chapters have already demonstrated the FRG's willingness

¹⁴² Incoming code rapport, 'cvse/zesderonde/roemeens standpunt t.a.v. n.n.a.-slotdocument [csce/sixth round/romanian position towards n.n.a.-concluding document]', 7 June 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 944, The Hague.

¹⁴³ Locher, 'Introduction: Shaping the Policies of the Alliance', 12.

¹⁴⁴ Incoming code rapport, 27 May 1988, *DMFA*. 'Sommigen hunner gaat de nna-tekst duidelijk te ver ... Polen en Hongaren laten bovendien doorschemeren dat het stuk voor hen grosso modo aanvaardbaar is [To some of them the NNA-text goes too far ... Poland and Hungary have signalled that the document is more or less acceptable to them.]'

¹⁴⁵ Incoming code rapport, 'cvse/menselijke dimensie van het helsinki proces (voorheen wt.19) [csce/human dimension of the helsinki process (previously wt.19)]', 19 May 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 943, The Hague.

to push paragraph 4 aside. The omission of paragraph 4 was a defeat for Dutch principles because the Netherlands had held on to paragraph 4 throughout the entire Vienna meeting. However, they recognized that the West would now have to compromise and look for an alternative to paragraph 4. After all, the Netherlands had already informally signalled their willingness to compromise to the FRG earlier in 1988.

EC-12 delegates in Vienna could not reach consensus on an alternative to paragraph 4. The delegates left it to the 25-26 May 1988 EPC CSCE working group in Brussels to decide. Discussions in the working group resulted in two viable alternatives for paragraph 4: 1) a Dutch proposal to make the special meetings of all 35 voluntary instead of compulsory and 2) a German-Belgian proposal for a special working body that would discuss unresolved cases that were initiated through the mechanism, but only *en marge* of CSCE follow-up meetings and the Conference on the Human Dimension.¹⁴⁶ The EPC working group in Brussels could not reach consensus either, both options were kept open. The Hague begrudgingly mentioned that despite what was mentioned in the EPC *rapport oral*, maintaining both the first and the second option was only supported by Britain and the FRG. This ‘biased rendering’ of the report was implicitly attributed to the German EC presidency.¹⁴⁷ This time however, the final Western decision would be taken within the NATO caucus. In June 1988, the German-Belgian proposal was adopted within NATO, with Dutch consent. In the previous chapter, we saw how Portugal was able to challenge EC-12 consensus by re-raising its concerns within NATO. The above shows that the opposite was equally possible and that the NATO framework could facilitate Western cooperation instead of complicating it. This time, the EC-12 were unable to reach consensus. Instead, Western consensus was reached on NATO-level. Despite the fact that this meant the defeat of paragraph 4, the Dutch felt that the human dimension mechanism in its current state was in accordance with what they had originally intended with their proposal in December 1986.¹⁴⁸ While the mechanism had lost some of its ad-hoc flexibility, it was still a large step in the direction of improving implementation of human dimension provisions. Therefore, the Netherlands were willing to ease their firm grip when absolutely necessary. Dutch principles had reached the limit of what was attainable in Vienna. The Netherlands would not prevent the West from finally agreeing on the mechanism part of the human dimension chapter of the concluding document. This position constituted a new bottom-line with regards to the mechanism, as was made clear to N+N countries in the Council of Europe meeting in June

¹⁴⁶ Outgoing code rapport, 30 May 1988, *DMFA*.

¹⁴⁷ Outgoing code rapport, 30 May 1988, *DMFA*.

¹⁴⁸ Baudet, ‘The Origins of the CSCE Human Dimension Mechanism’, 194.

1988. Nevertheless, the Austrian representative expressed his concerns about ‘the disturbing inability of both East and West to close the ranks and focus only on the main points’ as the meeting was approaching July 31st, another unlikely deadline.¹⁴⁹

The N+N draft document opened a new avenue for ‘dissenting’ Western countries, particularly the FRG, to once more bargain for a weaker alternative to paragraph 4 of the human dimension mechanism. This time, the Netherlands pragmatically conceded paragraph 4 because they would not stand in the way of Western cohesion. The Dutch were sufficiently satisfied with the common Western position on the human dimension that would be the basis for the East-West negotiations about amendments to the N+N draft that were still to come. The final episode of paragraph 4 showed that at times, Western differences were amplified because of the CSCE’s particular process of reaching a concluding document through mediation of the N+Ns. Nevertheless, this time Western consensus was final. The Netherlands were satisfied with the result of intergovernmental bargaining about the mechanism: EC-12 and NATO had reached agreement on a strong human dimension mechanism that balanced the CSCE process. This victory was complete when the East Europeans accepted the revised version of the mechanism after the West dropped the paragraph on the role of NGO’s.¹⁵⁰ Meanwhile, differences within the other CSCE Baskets were similarly diminishing in late 1988, especially after a final French-American dispute in the military area had been overcome in December.¹⁵¹ However, intergovernmental bargaining among Western allies was not yet finished. Regarding the human dimension aspects of the meeting, one final source of Western disagreement remained: the follow-up part of the human dimension chapter, including the possibility of a Conference on the Human Dimension in Moscow.

3.4 The follow-up aspect of the human dimension: the final hurdle

The proposal for a CHD in Moscow had been the first surprise of the Vienna meeting. Responses from the West had been mixed and a decision had not yet been reached. The Netherlands had taken a constructive approach to the original Soviet proposal. In general, the West agreed that a conference focusing solely on the human dimension was essential to restoring the balance to the CSCE process, which was the main shared interest of Western countries.¹⁵² However, they had not yet agreed on a location and agenda for this conference. In

¹⁴⁹ Outgoing code rapport, ‘cvse-overleg in het kader van de raad van europa, 17 juni 1988 [csce-meeting in council of europe-framework]’, 20 June 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, 2019.

¹⁵⁰ Baudet, ‘The Origins of the CSCE Human Dimension Mechanism’, 194.

¹⁵¹ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 130.

¹⁵² Heraclides, *Security and Co-operation in Europe*, 81.

any case, a Moscow conference would only be considered if the human rights situation in the Soviet Union improved significantly.

Throughout 1988, the West noticed that the Soviets themselves had showed less interest in pursuing this conference. Perhaps the Soviets did not want to appear as *demandeur*, because a demanding position meant they would likely have to compromise elsewhere to acquire Western agreement to a conference in Moscow. Nevertheless, the UK, supported by Portugal, tried to get rid of the idea of Moscow as host of this conference in June 1988.¹⁵³ They were unsuccessful, but Western consensus about the details of a CHD was still lacking. The US was particularly wary of a fruitless conference and a ‘Moscow document on human rights.’¹⁵⁴ Things changed in July 1988 when France’s idea for three subsequent conferences was revived by Austrian coordinator Rudolf Torovsky. One conference would take place in Paris, the next in Copenhagen.¹⁵⁵ Geneva and Valetta were proposed as location for the third conference, but Moscow remained a possibility too. In this case, the N+Ns had been successful in stimulating West-West cooperation and moving the meeting forward.

These carefully positive developments were interrupted by a damaging French-German manoeuvre that broke the Western ranks. On 22 July 1988, they blindsided their allies by announcing that the two countries would accept the N+N draft without further changes. Their EPC allies, now under Spanish presidency, were surprised by this ‘deliberate attempt to break EPC solidarity.’¹⁵⁶ The main reasoning behind this move was the continuing Western impasse with regards to the military aspects of the N+N draft. Additionally, contrary to other Western countries such as the US, France and Germany were willing to continue into August without a break.¹⁵⁷ Things swiftly calmed down, and the EC-12 attempted to reconcile their differences. They agreed to focus on their main goal: ‘a substantive and balanced concluding document.’¹⁵⁸ The Western countries also agreed that they would propose a technical break from the 5th of August until the 29th of August. Nevertheless, the damage had been done and the Netherlands feared that the Warsaw Pact countries would try to capitalize on these signs of renewed Western discord. Meesman questioned how the West would try to bring France and Germany back in

¹⁵³ Outgoing code rapport, 20 June 1988, *DMFA*.

¹⁵⁴ Incoming code rapport, ‘westelijk voorstel menselijke dimensie [western proposal human dimension]’, 12 June 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 944, The Hague.

¹⁵⁵ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 172.

¹⁵⁶ Incoming code rapport, ‘nieuwe frans-duitse alleingang [new french-german solo]’, 22 July 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 944, The Hague. Original quote: ‘... dat fransman hiermee willens en wetens de eps-solidariteit zou doorbreken.’

¹⁵⁷ Incoming code rapport, 22 July 1988, *DMFA*.

¹⁵⁸ Incoming code rapport, ‘interruptie vervolbijeenkoms [interruption follow-up meeting]’, 28 July 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 944, The Hague.

line without challenging Western solidarity further.¹⁵⁹ Clearly, France and Germany felt like this move away from cohesion was in their best interest. Bonn possibly hoped that this manoeuvre would keep East-West dialogue alive and even facilitate convergence, which contributed to their main goal of easing tensions in Europe.¹⁶⁰ This again demonstrates that Western cohesion in the CSCE was constantly subject to change, especially under the pressure of expectations about East-West convergence on a concluding document.

After the meeting resumed, Soviet demands for a CHD in Moscow resurfaced. The Soviets were not afraid to question the entire human dimension chapter if this demand was not met. Western positions remained largely unchanged: Western flexibility towards a CHD in Moscow depended on 'Soviet behaviour at home and in Vienna.' Britain's persisting refusal, perhaps owed personally to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's steadfastness, remained an exception to this.¹⁶¹ However, in November 1988, the US managed to gain Western support for a list of concrete demands that would be presented to the Soviet Union in Vienna and in Moscow. For example, they demanded that bilateral cases such as Jewish emigration from the SU be resolved, and the elimination of radio jamming. If fulfilled in the short term, the West would agree to Moscow as the location of the third CHD. Even London cautiously agreed to support this move.¹⁶² Clearly, the US move had successfully improved Western cohesion on the human dimension. The Soviet response took longer than expected but the sources reveal the bilateral work that was being done behind the scenes to fulfil the Western demands.¹⁶³ Moreover, Western demands may have accelerated the process of the end of Soviet jamming of Western broadcasts in November 1988.¹⁶⁴ Finally, in early January of 1989, the West formally agreed to a Moscow CHD. Final agreement about the human dimension section of the concluding document was reached after the West abandoned a paragraph about the role of NGO's in the mechanism.¹⁶⁵ After the final obstacles related to other sections of the concluding document were resolved, the concluding document was accepted on the 15th of January 1989.¹⁶⁶

¹⁵⁹ Incoming code rapport, 5 August 1988, *DMFA*.

¹⁶⁰ Peter, 'Saving détente', 294.

¹⁶¹ Incoming code rapport, 'cvse/zesde ronde/6^e week na de hervatting [csce/sixth round/6th week after resumption]', 7 October 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, *inv. nr. 945*, The Hague.

¹⁶² Incoming code rapport, 'conferentie menselijke dimensie: bijeenkomst in moskou/beweging in vs opstelling [conference human dimension: meeting in moscow/movement in us position]', 9 November 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, *inv. nr. 945*, The Hague.

¹⁶³ Incoming code rapport, 'cvse/zesde ronde/achtiende week na de hervatting [csce/sixth round/eighteenth round after resumption]', 29 December 1988, *DMFA*, Z299, *inv. nr. 945*, The Hague.

¹⁶⁴ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 129.

¹⁶⁵ Baudet, 'The Origins of the CSCE Human Dimension', 194-195.

¹⁶⁶ Incoming code rapport, 'cvse slotdocument [csce concluding document]', *DMFA*, Z299, *inv. nr. 947*, The Hague.

In a final report, Meesman reflected on the results of the meeting. He emphasized that the unprecedented progress in the human dimension was by no means expected at the start of the meeting. Still, some Western wishes were not yet fulfilled so there was still much work to be done in the CSCE process. In the end, the crucial element for success in Vienna had been ‘the changed Soviet attitude.’¹⁶⁷ However, according to Meesman, this change of attitude did not apply to the entire Warsaw Pact. He was wary about actual implementation of the Vienna concluding document in Warsaw Pact countries such as Romania, unknowingly foreshadowing the violent end of communism in Romania later that year.¹⁶⁸ Finally, while the Netherlands successfully introduced and pursued the human dimension mechanism in Vienna, it was not specifically considered a Dutch success. The success was owed to the West as a whole. Moreover, the actual practice of the mechanism would require further Western coordination. In the words of Hans Meesman: ‘Implementation of CSCE agreements is a matter that affects us all.’¹⁶⁹

The above analysis of the final phase of the Vienna meeting revealed that the Netherlands played a relatively minor role compared to Dutch proactivity during earlier rounds of intergovernmental bargaining. Nevertheless, Western cohesion was still crucial for the successful conclusion of the Vienna meeting. Despite yet another damaging French-German *Alleingang*, other countries too recognized the importance of cohesion. The N+Ns made a successful move by reviving the French three-conference proposal, which stimulated intra-Western discussions. The United Kingdom finally changed position on a CHD in Moscow, similar to earlier Dutch pragmatic compromises on paragraph 4. After the Soviet Union fulfilled the list of Western demands, the West agreed to hold the third CHD in Moscow. This opened the way to a successful conclusion of the meeting with unprecedented gains for human rights in Europe as a result.

3.5 Conclusion

After a long period of intergovernmental bargaining and bloc negotiations, the Vienna concluding document was finally accepted. During this process, reaching agreement between East and West was not the only challenge. Intra-bloc consensus was equally hard-fought, if not more so.

¹⁶⁷ Incoming code rapport, ‘cvse., 3e vervolgbijeenkomst., een kanttekening ten besluit [csce., 3rd follow-up meeting., a final side note]’, 23 January 1989, *DMFA*, Z299, inv. nr. 947, The Hague.

¹⁶⁸ Incoming code rapport, 23 January 1989, *DMFA*.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibidem*.

Through the lens of intergovernmentalism, we can view the outcomes of the Vienna meeting regarding the human dimension in the perspective of the initial goals and interests of the Netherlands. From the start, the Netherlands had pressed for substantive human rights provisions. In this last phase, significant Dutch concessions on paragraph 4 opened the way to considerable success for human rights and improved West-West cooperation. First, the West reached a common position on the human dimension after the Netherlands abandoned paragraph 4. This allowed the countries to focus on the last remaining human dimension issue: the CHD in Moscow. Secondly, the consultative mechanism became a reality, alongside substantive human dimension provisions on human contacts, information, and more in the final concluding document. These results share two important characteristics: more openness between and within participating states and a better East-West understanding of human rights.¹⁷⁰

The importance of Western cohesion and cooperation was never out of sight. The Netherlands emphasized this multiple times throughout the meeting. Nevertheless, Western consensus was achieved only after repeated clashes of interests during intergovernmental bargaining. In this final phase, Dutch interests clashed with the rest of the West to a point where the Dutch position threatened West-West cooperation instead of stimulating it. This led to Dutch concessions to promote cohesion and cooperation. The French-German *Alleingang* was another striking example of the continuous clash of interests between Western countries. This manoeuvre exposed internal Western differences and damaged the Western position and cohesion in the CSCE. Moreover, this was not the first time that a French manoeuvre threatened to damage the Western position. In this final phase of the Vienna meeting, the Western bloc would bend, but it did not break.

On the other side of Europe, the change in Soviet thinking and subsequent improved East-West relations were very positive signs. However, the changed Soviet attitude caused confusion and even discord within the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, Shevardnadze famously called the Vienna meeting ‘a watershed’ and ‘a major step in the development of the common European process’.¹⁷¹ Admittedly, this should not be viewed as a direct indication of the sudden Eastern bloc changes of late 1989 and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union. This instead indicated that the Soviet Union, with its reforms going full speed ahead, hoped to be integrated in the common home of Europe. The next and final section of this thesis will attempt to draw

¹⁷⁰ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, 151.

¹⁷¹ Heraclides, *Security and Co-operation in Europe*, 106.

final conclusions about the role of the Netherlands in Vienna through the lens of liberal intergovernmentalism, as well as broader conclusions about the CSCE and the end of the Cold War.

Conclusion

According to Yuri Kashlev, the head of the Soviet delegation, the communist regimes in Eastern European countries would have fallen much later without the achievements reached in Vienna.¹⁷² Certainly, from the perspective of the end of the Cold War, several shifts in East-West relations were already noticeable during the 1986-1989 meeting. Firstly, Soviet new political thinking arrived late in Vienna, but when it did arrive it became a major contributing factor to the successful conclusion of the meeting. The Soviet Union fulfilled extensive Western demands regarding human dimension issues, signalling their willingness to cooperate. East-West relations improved and resulted in more openness and a better common understanding of human rights. Despite these positive signs, the Vienna meeting from this perspective in no way indicated that the Soviet Union would disintegrate almost three years later, at the end of 1991. Similarly, Gorbachev's dismantling of the Soviet system was never intended to cause the entire Soviet bloc to fall apart. However, there were significant side effects to the changed Soviet attitude that did indicate Eastern bloc decay. In Vienna, the most noticeable side effect was increased confusion and even disarray within the Warsaw Pact. To a certain extent, the Eastern bloc was internally diverse, similar to the Western bloc. For example, new Soviet thinking in Vienna was by no means automatically practised by all Warsaw Pact countries. This exacerbated divisions within the Warsaw Pact, ranging from a hardened Romania to Poland and Hungary slightly leaning towards the West. From this perspective, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact was accelerated by the effects of Soviet new political thinking in Vienna. Accordingly, while Stefan Lehne concluded that the Vienna meeting itself was 'a turning-point in East-West relations',¹⁷³ this thesis concludes that the meeting was merely a milestone in the broader ongoing process of changing East-West relations. Additionally, another crucial side effect of the new Soviet attitude was that the Eastern bloc appeared less and less as a clear-cut common Western enemy.

The changing East-West dynamic and the diminishing idea of a common enemy had an impact on intra-Western relations. In Vienna, Western differences and internal clashes continuously came to light because the focus shifted from reaching East-West compromise to improving Western cooperation and cohesion. This thesis has shown that a liberal intergovernmentalist lens helps us to analyse the intra-Western difficulties on the road to

¹⁷² Yuri Kashlev, quoted in Sarah B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 214.

¹⁷³ Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting*, subtitle.

Western cohesion. The theory's emphasis on predetermined, clashing national interests and the three-step framework allowed us to chronologically analyse the arduous process of West-West cooperation in the CSCE, from the perspective of the Netherlands. It showed us that the Western bloc was internally diverse and different interests competed within the bloc. Moreover, through intergovernmental bargaining in the West, even a small power such as the Netherlands could pursue its interests and add a nuance to CSCE progress.

In general, the Western goal of rebalancing the CSCE process, which required substantive human dimension provisions in the concluding document, was also a main aim of the Dutch delegation. Nevertheless, the heterogeneous Western countries pursued different strategies towards this common aim, which allowed them to pursue additional often-conflicting interests. The Dutch proposal for a human dimension mechanism that was designed during the implementation debate revealed the Dutch strategy and their interests. Aside from noble intentions to improve human rights across Europe, the proposal tactically served the pragmatic goal of bridging the gap in the West between countries that were the most fervent human rights supporters (such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom) and countries that were content with less stringent human dimension provisions (such as the FRG). The Dutch held on to this strategy throughout the meeting. Accordingly, the Dutch tension between principles and pragmatism remained visible in the Dutch government sources. In the first phase of the meeting, the Dutch interplay between principles and pragmatism was perhaps most prominently visible: principles served pragmatism.

As the meeting progressed, Western countries were able to pursue their interests on different levels due to the intergovernmentalist nature of Western cooperative frameworks: EPC and NATO. Western countries were heterogeneous, and so were these intergovernmentalist institutions. This thesis demonstrated how those different levels of intergovernmentalism interacted with each other and came together in the CSCE. Moreover, this thesis has shown that an individual country could use this to their benefit in the CSCE. For example, when an EPC member state had failed to sway EPC partners and conceded its position, the country could re-raise their concerns within the NATO framework, which again caused a clash of interests. Sometimes, this could successfully change the Western position, as was the case with Portuguese concerns about a CHD in Moscow. During the middle phase of the meeting from late January 1987 to early May 1988, the Netherlands firmly held to its strategy and for a long time the Dutch refused to weaken paragraph 4 of the human dimension mechanism. This resulted in repeated clashes, even with like-minded allies, who attempted to sway the Dutch delegation to concede. The Dutch strategy seemed to endanger Western cohesion instead of

facilitating it. However, when viewed through the combined classic and liberal intergovernmentalist lens, these clashes were simply part of the intergovernmental bargaining process between Western countries. In the spring of 1988, winds blew favourably in the direction of the Netherlands. After a special ministerial EPC meeting, the West agreed to maintain paragraph 4 and it seemed that both a strong human dimension and strong Western cohesion were secured, partly owed to the Dutch strategy. The special ministerial meeting demonstrated the importance of the CSCE process to the EC-12 and the fact that the CSCE was firmly embedded in broader geopolitics. Nevertheless, the intergovernmental bargaining phase was not yet completed.

The N+N draft concluding document reignited Western discussions about paragraph 4 in May 1988. This reveals a dynamic that was particular to the CSCE. Draft documents were supposed to bring East and West closer to endgame negotiations, but they could have the side-effect of causing renewed intra-bloc disagreement, extending the meeting and delaying further CSCE-wide negotiations. Accordingly, intra-Western clashes continued in the summer of 1988 and after a final stand, the Netherlands folded their cards and pragmatically conceded paragraph 4 for the sake of Western cohesion. However, before the meeting ended, Western cohesion in the human dimension was put to the test yet again due to individual countries pursuing their own interests. The French-German manoeuvre was a painful example of how the pursuit of national interests could damage Western cohesion. Finally, British and American concessions that allowed for a CHD in Moscow demonstrated the willingness of the West to take a common position for the endgame of negotiations. During the endgame, there was sufficient momentum in the East (because of the changed Soviet attitude) and the West (because of Western cohesion) to converge and to reach agreement on a concluding document. From the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, intergovernmental bargaining had ended, and an outcome had been reached. This outcome was the final sum of all different interests that had competed over the years. For the Netherlands, the mechanism in its final form was not entirely what they had wanted, but it was an acceptable, substantive result for the human dimension of the CSCE. More importantly, Western cohesion had been achieved. This result shows that when push came to shove, Dutch principles were conceded in favour of pragmatism.

The above shows that liberal intergovernmentalism helps us understand how Western cohesion on the human dimension was reached after years of clashes of interests that took place within different frameworks of Western cooperation. The process of clashing interests was not a zero-sum game because ultimately, intra-bloc cohesion and cooperation were goals by themselves. The outcome of intergovernmental bargaining transcended national interests.

Additionally, this thesis demonstrated that individual smaller countries were actively able to play a role within the CSCE and within their cooperative blocs. The Dutch introduced the idea of a human dimension mechanism to strengthen the human dimension and the Dutch were at times able to use their position between the EC-12 and NATO to bring them closer together to close the Western ranks. To do so, the Netherlands did not pursue a maximalist option that could have amounted to a prestigious Dutch success. Instead, they made several key pragmatic concessions, most importantly by conceding paragraph 4 of the mechanism. Despite being characterized as a stubborn human rights hardliner, Dutch willingness to make concessions on 'their' human dimension mechanism demonstrated that promoting West-West cooperation and cohesion was in fact the primary aim of the Netherlands in the CSCE. Accordingly, by making those pragmatic concessions, the Netherlands moved closer to that aim. This conclusion directly contributes to recent insights into the influence of smaller countries during the Cold War.¹⁷⁴ In Vienna, the Netherlands looked for their own 'margins for manoeuvre' and utilized that space by pushing for improvement in the human dimension as well as improving West-West cooperation. Accordingly, Dutch manoeuvring reached its limits when it threatened Western cohesion rather than facilitating it. Although the Dutch were unable to individually change the broader course of the Cold War, they added a significant nuance to Cold War developments by pursuing their principled and pragmatic interests in the CSCE. From the Dutch perspective on the Cold War, the emphasis of this individual, small state was on West-West cooperation instead of East-West antagonism in Pan-European perspective.

If we take a step back, we can now place the Vienna CSCE meeting in the perspective of the entire CSCE process. This analysis of the Vienna meeting has shown that the CSCE was not merely a forum where the Cold War played out in bipolar terms. Within the CSCE, a considerable amount of time and effort was dedicated to intra-bloc negotiations before negotiations *en 35* could be properly initiated. Additionally, the N+Ns were a third 'pole' that exerted their influence on the process through mediation and draft documents. At times, the N+Ns stimulated the Western countries to form a common position, despite Western internal divisions. The Dutch concession of paragraph 4 in favour of Western cohesion was a prime example of this. Within the blocs, the interests of their respective countries continuously competed and intra-bloc relations changed as a result of developments within the CSCE. In practice this meant that different Western institutions such as EPC and NATO were at times separately active within the CSCE, further complicating the idea of a monolithic Western bloc.

¹⁷⁴ See Crump and Erlandsson, *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe*.

For example, it took considerable time and effort to form a cohesive, common Western position during both the Madrid and Vienna CSCE meetings. During both meetings, the Netherlands attempted to build a bridge between the EC-12 and NATO, ultimately conceding their principles in favour of West-West cooperation. The Dutch actively pursued their human dimension proposal but when push came to shove, the Netherlands had reached the limits of their influence and folded their cards. Human rights were hard-won but frequently served as a means to an end rather than an end in itself.

At first glance, these conclusions are similar to those of Crump, Lammertink and Zeilstra, who concluded that the Netherlands primarily functioned as a West-West bridge-builder and that they played a minor role in the CSCE process from 1973-1983.¹⁷⁵ The Vienna meeting confirms that the strong, proactive Dutch attitude towards human rights was primarily based on pragmatic considerations such as ensuring Western cohesion. Accordingly, these conclusions contradict Baudet and Bomert, who primarily characterized the Netherlands as principled human rights defenders in the CSCE.¹⁷⁶ According to Baudet, this stance contributed to driving a wedge between the Soviet Union and the rest of the Warsaw Pact.¹⁷⁷ This thesis has shown that those strong Dutch principles in fact served pragmatic, tactical goals. Additionally, driving a wedge between the Soviet Union and the rest of the Warsaw Pact was not a Dutch goal in Vienna. The sources used in this thesis have shown that the main cause of the rift between the Soviets and their allies came from within the Soviet Union itself, following Gorbachev's revolutionary changes from 1985 onwards. In sum, this thesis has successfully built upon the recent new insights into the role of the Netherlands in the CSCE.

However, this thesis has also uncovered a new element to this role. Aside from the Dutch role as West-West bridge builder, chapter one in particular demonstrated how they pushed the boundaries of their individual influence within the different intergovernmentalist frameworks. The Netherlands cunningly supported the heavy American human dimension supporting while in fact hoping for its failure, so that the Dutch proposal would earn the favour of both the EC-12 and NATO as acceptable alternative. The Netherlands also tried to play all sides of the CSCE by repeatedly approaching the Soviet Union as well as Switzerland and Austria to gather support for their proposal. Nevertheless, as the meeting went on, the Netherlands appeared less and less able to balance both West-West cooperation and an opportunistic pursuit of national interests inside and beyond the Western bloc. As was mentioned above, the Netherlands

¹⁷⁵ Crump, 'Ferm, doch onopvallend', 278.

¹⁷⁶ Baudet, *Het heeft onze aandacht*, 90-93 and Bomert, *Nederland en Oost-Europa*, 96-98.

¹⁷⁷ Baudet, "'It was Cold War and we wanted to win'", 195.

ultimately made several pragmatic concessions to facilitate West-West cohesion.

Finally, this thesis demonstrated that the CSCE was not a mere diplomatic bubble nor an ‘indoor recreation centre for diplomats.’¹⁷⁸ It was firmly embedded in the geopolitical context of the Cold War. The CSCE was extensively discussed *outside* of Vienna, for example during EPC and NATO meetings, and even the Council of Europe. The primary sources used in this thesis have shown that discussions within those intergovernmental frameworks occurred frequently on the level of civil servants and sometimes on the level of foreign ministers. Warsaw Pact countries similarly prepared and discussed CSCE developments during meetings of their foreign ministers.¹⁷⁹ Moreover, CSCE issues were discussed during bilateral meetings and summits. We have seen that the Netherlands specifically discussed Dutch and Soviet human dimension proposals during bilateral visits. Additionally, the CSCE was used to resolve individual bilateral cases such as family reunions. In the end, the results of the CSCE meeting in Vienna were more than a diplomatic achievement in service of tactical goals. Because of the improvements in the human dimension, the CSCE had the potential to significantly improve the lives of all Europeans.

On a final note, the conclusions of this thesis might provide suggestions for the present-day OSCE. The OSCE appeared powerless in the face of recent issues and even armed conflicts in Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh and Belarus. One major difference between then and now is that Pan-European dialogue has paradoxically decreased after the Cold War. It seems like Russia is now considered as ‘different from the West’, outside of NATO, on the periphery of Europe.¹⁸⁰ While the former Warsaw Pact countries apart from the Soviet Union were absorbed by the EC and NATO, Russia was and is excluded. The EU and NATO have far outgrown the OSCE, whereas the CSCE was more on par with these institutions. Moreover, in the CSCE, *all* European countries were included in the dialogue and negotiations. Concluding documents were Pan-European accomplishments. Additionally, the CSCE was a living, dynamic process within which continuation was secured through subsequent follow-up and interim meetings. These meetings and their concluding documents became milestones in the journey to better security and cooperation in Europe. The OSCE on the other hand has lost some of this flexibility through its institutionalization. Meanwhile, Russia appears eager to involve itself in the

¹⁷⁸ Esterik and Minnema, ‘The Conference’, 28.

¹⁷⁹ Locher, ‘Introduction: Shaping the Policies of the Alliance’, 4-5.

¹⁸⁰ Crump, ‘Forty-five Years of Dialogue Facilitation (1972-2017)’, 508-9.

peaceful resolution of the conflicts such as the one in Nagorno-Karabakh.¹⁸¹ While this trilateral solution does not indicate a re-multilateralization of European security, it does indicate that perhaps we are not on the brink of a Second Cold War after all.

¹⁸¹ BBC News, 'Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia sign Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal', *British Broadcasting Corporation*, 10 November 2020.
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