Akratic Citizens: Flagging Motivation as a Threat to Deliberative Democracy…and What to Do About It

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Abstract

This thesis project covers two connected, yet distinct research questions. First, what is a motivational deceptor, and how does it interfere with a deliberative democratic political process? Secondly, which programs and policy options are available to combat these interferences? Corresponding to the first question, the primary goal of this project is to clarify the concept of a motivational deceptor, and to explore its political implications. To achieve this, I construct an argument by analogy, and compare motivational deceptors to cognitive deceptors. By structuring the argument in this way, I am not only able to better clarify the key ingredients of motivational deceptors, but it also sets up a discussion of their political implications in chapter 2. Regarding the second question, I will propose three ameliorative programs to combat motivational deceptors. These proposals are adaptations of the already established nudge, boost, and brace program, only with a motivational twist.

Contents

Introduction

Recently, modern democracies have been plagued by proliferating levels of citizen dissatisfaction. This trend manifests in the hearts and minds of citizens in a number of ways: political alienation from a group of out-of-touch elites, social fragmentation between the left and the right, increasing levels of economic inequality, concerns about individual rights, and the perceived corruption of politicians (Rosenberg 2007). Declining rates of voter turnout, disaffection from political institutions, and political cynicism regarding the trustworthiness of politicians are all very clear and easily identifiable indicators of citizen dissatisfaction (Warren & Pearse 2008). Across the globe, citizens of democracies believe that many of their politicians are corrupt, untrustworthy, that they cater to special interest groups disproportionately, and that in general governments are inefficient, wasteful, and ultimately ineffective at advancing the public good (Pew Research Center 2019).

Some politicians, political theorists, and even magazines like *The Economist* have called for democratic governments across the globe to embrace more deliberative forms of democracy (Cohen 1997; Cohen & Rogers 2003; Goodin 2008; Davidson & Elstub 2013; Rosenberg 2014; The Economist 2019). The hope is that by doing so, modern democracies would then have a chance to jumpstart institutional change that has otherwise stagnated, and it would have the potential to restore some of people's trust in the system. Supporters argue that in the multicultural societies of today, increased citizen participation in deliberative practices would help them better understand one another, and therefore by working together, a stronger sense of community could be developed over time (Rosenberg 2014). On the other hand, others have advocated for different solutions which would involve less citizen participation, and an elevated role for experts on certain areas where voter ignorance and irrationality is particularly abundant (Brennan 2016; Jones 2020). This literature would appear to cast doubt on the feasibility of more deliberative forms of democracy, and specifically citizen's ability to participate in the political sphere in a rational and effective way.

What we can say for certain is that today we have a much greater understanding of the obstacles standing in between the current system and the successfulness of deliberative democratic programs. Owing to dual process cognitive theory (Section 1.1), and the heuristics and biases literature we have greater insight into the uniqueness of human cognition, the widespread bias that negatively

impacts our ability to think rationally, and the mental environment which can either scaffold or stifle our rational capacities (Heath 2014). Cognitive obstacles which are pervasive in one's external environment are called *cognitive deceptors* (See 1.3). These deceptors routinely give rise to cognitive misfires (Heath 2014, 170), and cause notable deviations from the standard of rationality. The political implications of this literature are significant: political science research has shown high levels of ignorance, and misinformation among voters in modern democracies. Voters are likely to exhibit irrational tendencies and indulge beliefs which suit their biases rather than challenge them. With implications as serious as this, it is no surprise that there has also been significant discussion in the literature about programs and strategies to ameliorate these cognitive obstacles. Three research programs have offered strategies to combat these hurdles: the nudge program (Thaler & Sunstein 2008; Sunstein 2016), the boost program (Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig 2017), and the brace program (Heath 2014; Brennan 2016; Blunden 2019).

Alongside cognitive deceptors, I argue that motivational deceptors can also stand as obstacles to effective citizen participation in deliberative democratic programs. Citizen participation in various kinds of deliberative programs requires different kinds of skills: some are cognitive, while others are motivational. Cognitive deceptors cause deviations in rationality and therefore make it more difficult for citizens to display sufficient degrees of cognitive skill that would otherwise be necessary for their effective participation. In an analogous way, motivational deceptors cause deviations in motivation and therefore make it more difficult for citizens to display sufficient degrees of motivation which would otherwise be necessary for their effective participation in the same deliberative programs. That being said, motivational obstacles have not attracted the same attention in the contemporary literature as their cognitive counterpart. There are two main differences between cognitive and motivational obstacles that I believe account for this discrepancy. Firstly, it can be difficult to adequately separate cognitive and motivational aspects of a given case, and therefore examples must be nuanced and particular. Secondly, the motivational side of the problem is more controversial. In the cognitive case, one can fall back on the assumption that people ought to believe that it is better to be rational than irrational, and therefore when cognitive deceptors cause increased levels of irrational tendencies, ameliorative measures to combat them are perceived as largely positive and are less controversial. Motivational deceptors are far more controversial because one must establish a motivational standard with which to judge the corresponding deviations. Unlike the rational standard, a motivational standard is more subjective, and therefore inherently more controversial.

In this thesis I will attempt to answer two connected, yet distinct research questions. First, what is a motivational deceptor, and how does it interfere with a deliberative democratic political process? Secondly, which programs and policy options are available to combat these interferences? I will argue that in an analogous way to cognitive deceptors, motivational deceptors, as their own distinct concept, are worthy of greater attention given that they too can undermine programs of deliberative democracy. The goal of this project is not to disparage efforts of other academics researching cognitive deceptors and the corresponding ameliorative programs. Instead the two goals of this project are to first clarify the concept of a motivational deceptor, and secondly to examine several measures aimed at overcoming motivational obstacles to deliberative democracy. This project can be broken down into four parts:

1) Clarifying the concept of a motivational deceptor. Motivational deceptors are pervasive in our external environment, and they can sap, block, or misdirect one's effort in an analogous way to cognitive deceptors which give rise to irrational tendencies.

2) There are substantial political implications surrounding motivational deceptors. Effective participation in deliberative forms of democracy would require citizens to have a combination of cognitive, and motivational skills. Much like cognitive deceptors, which stand as obstacles to the acquisition and deployment of the cognitive skills citizens required for deliberative democracy, motivational deceptors stand as obstacles to the acquisition and deployment of the motivational skills citizens require for deliberative democracy.

3) There are several strategies for combating cognitive deceptors such as nudging, boosting, and bracing programs. Strategies for combatting motivational deceptors can be adapted from these established programs.

4) There are two challenges that future researchers of this topic may have to contend with. The first is the problem regarding the motivational standard. While in this project I employ programs of deliberative democracy from which I derive a motivational standard, motivational deceptors exist and can be discussed in other contexts as well, which raises concern given that the motivational standard stands relative to the end-goal of the program. If the program would be one of epistocracy, there would be a very different motivational standard. The second problem is a systemic implementation problem. As you will see, the very problem this project aims to clarify/address has the potential to undermine the implementation of any solution to that problem.

By fulfilling each of these aspects of the project, I hope that I am able to clarify the concept of motivational deceptors, adequately explain their political implications as obstacles to deliberative democracy, and posit several possible solutions adapted from established programs. This project is not meant to be the final note, but instead the goal is to shed light on motivational deceptors and bring them into the conversation. My hope is that this project will lead to further discussion, and ultimately public policy aimed specifically at motivational deceptors.

1. The Environment, Deceptors, and Deliberative Democracy

Before turning to motivational issues, I must begin elsewhere to develop an understanding of *deceptors*. In recent decades there has been an influx of research in psychology, empirically informed philosophy, and cognitive science which holds that human cognition can be reasonably modeled by dual-process theory (Stanovich 2004; Evans 2008; Heath 2014). This research, along with the relevant literature in cognitive biases detail the ways in which human cognition consistently deviates from rationality. This research also outlines the substantial role of the external environment in the determination of whether cognition is rational or not. The external environment will play a key role in my discussion of deceptors, and ultimately my suggestion that analogously to cognitive deceptors, motivational deceptors also stand as obstacles to programs which would seek to improve democratic citizen participation. In this chapter I will detail the background research in psychology which has inspired empirically informed philosophers in their discussion of deceptors. In section 1.1 I begin with a brief exegesis of dual process cognitive theory, which will lay the cognitivist groundwork for my position. Following that in section 1.2, I turn to some of the different biases that surface as a result of human cognition. I discuss the importance of one's external environment in their ability to think rationally and end the section with several brief examples of different cognitive biases. This section will be vital for my argument, as the external environment is the domain in which deceptors (both cognitive and motivational) proliferate and become ubiquitous. Finally, in section 1.3 I will describe the pertinent details of deceptors, what they are, how they work, and provide several case examples. The case examples share two important roles in this thesis project. On the one hand, they act as explicators to better illustrate the nature of deceptors and cognitive biases. On the other hand, the cases represent three distinct levels of deliberative democracy (distinguished by their demandingness): a minimal level, a medium level, and a high level. I return to these three cases throughout the project, but their role in this section is to show that in an analogous way to cognitive deceptors, motivational deceptors are pervasive in our environment and that they too stand as obstacles to more deliberative forms of democracy.

1.1 Dual-Process Cognitive Theory

Dual-process theory has been proposed in cognitive and social psychological research to account for higher cognition, meaning that it is meant to describe higher cognitive functions such as thinking, reasoning, decision making, and social judgements (Evans 2008, 256). There have been so many contributions to dual-process theories of cognition that they can be difficult to gather together in a general overview (Evans 2008, 257, Table 1; Stanovich 2004, 35-36, Table 2.1). Nonetheless, the distinguishing feature of dual-process theories is the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 cognition (Evans and Stanovich 2013, 225)[1]. While there is some variance in the descriptions of the attributes associated with Type 1 and Type 2 cognition, in general: Type 1 cognition is fast, unconscious, automatic, associative, and intuitive, whereas Type 2 cognition is slow, conscious, deliberative, and requires a high degree effort (Stanovich 2004, 35-36; Evans 2008, 257; Kahneman 2011, 20–21; Evans and Stanovich 2013, 225; Heath 2014, 58). I should note that as much of this research is recent, developments are being made and it may turn out that the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processing is more nuanced and complex than previously described. This does not discredit dual-process theory by any means; however, it does mean that this theory and the corresponding political philosophy literature it inspired will later need further nuance.

In the following section on cognitive biases and the mental environment (1.2) I will be focusing more on Type 1 cognition however, for the purposes of this section it is important to provide a balanced overview of both Type 1/Type 2. Below is a table depicting the general features of Type 1 and Type 2 cognition[2].

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[1] It should be noted that in dual-process theories of cognition, Type 1 and Type 2 cognition has also been referred to as System 1 and System 2 cognition (Evans 2008; Stanovich 2004; Kahneman 2011; Heath 2014). That being said, I prefer to employ Keith Stanovich & Jonathan Evans' terminology (Type 1/Type 2), because Type 1 is actually a comprised of many subsystems (pattern-matching, etc.), and therefore if taken literally, the terms *System* 1/*System* 2 could be misleading (Evans and Stanovich 2013, 224-226).

[2] For further breakdowns of Type 1 and Type 2 cognition see Evans 2008, 257, Table 1; Stanovich 2004, 35-36, Table 2.1; Heath 2014, 58.

Table 1. *Clusters of Attributes Frequently Associated with Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Higher Cognition* (Evans and Stanovich 2013, 225).

Type 1 process (intuitive)	Type 2 process (reflective)
Defining Features	
Does not require working memory, Autonomous	Requires working memory, Cognitive decoupling; mental simulation
Typical Correlates	
Fast	Slow
High Capacity	Capacity Limited
Parallel	Serial
Nonconscious	Conscious
Biased Responses	Normative Responses
Contextualized	Abstract
Automatic	Controlled
Associative	Rule-Based
Experience Based Decision Making	Consequential Decision Making
Independent of Cognitive Ability	Correlated with Cognitive Ability
Evolutionarily	
Evolved Early	Evolved Late
Similar to Animal Cognition	Distinctively Human
Implicit Knowledge	Explicit Knowledge
Basic Emotions	Complex Emotions

In general, Type 1 and Type 2 processing share their respective features according to the breakdown outlined above. On the one hand, Type 1 processing is fast, unconscious, automatic, associative, intuitive, and evolutionarily much older. Type 2 processing on the other hand is much slower, conscious, deliberative, high effort, is distinctly human, and is evolutionarily speaking much

newer. Type 1 processing is also prone to err, as the side effect of increased speed and intuitive thought is often subject to significant cognitive bias. Take the *Marriage Problem* as an example:

Bill is looking at Nancy, while Nancy is looking at Greg.

Bill is married, Greg is unmarried.

Is a married person always looking at an unmarried person?

Answer: A) Yes B) No C) It cannot be determined.

(Heath 2014, 27).

Most people, having read through the *Marriage Problem*, will answer incorrectly and choose C. Their rapid and intuitive Type 1 processing employs a pattern-matching technique which allows one to quickly identify the piece of the puzzle that is missing, namely, the marital status of Nancy. Intuitively, without knowing Nancy's marital status, one believes that they are unable to solve the problem, which means that they would answer C. This is because the correct answer is unintuitive, and it is only afterwards when one realizes that they were mistaken do they return to re-examine the problem more closely. By re-examining the problem via Type 2 processing, one may be able to think about it more abstractly, and entertain several hypothetical scenarios in their mind before concluding. Nancy is either married or unmarried. If Nancy is married, then she happens to be looking at Greg who we know is unmarried. If Nancy is unmarried, then Bill, who we happen to know is married, is looking at her. Therefore, the correct answer to the *Marriage Problem* is A, because regardless of Nancy's marital status, it is always true that a married person will be looking at an unmarried person (Heath 2014, 27-28). Type 2 processing represents a distinct way of thinking about the problem, a more focused and serial sort of processing that offers a different perspective, and perhaps a solution to the problem. This is why most people would have gotten the problem wrong at first glance, but then would be able to solve it after a second focused analytic look.

What the *Marriage Problem* also reveals is that people tend to solve problems with their Type 1 processing first, in an effort to expend as few cognitive resources as possible (Evans and Stanovich

2013, 227; Heath 2014, 30). Like a bureaucracy or customer service center, our brain attempts to solve each problem it is faced with at the lowest possible level, this would be our Type 1 processing (Heath 2014, 30). It is only after we discover that our Type 1 processing errs that we then revisit the problem with our slower and more analytic Type 2 processing. Our brain has developed a whole bag of tricks as we evolved which have helped us to survive, adapt, and overcome past obstacles. For example, one of these "tricks" is called pattern-matching (Heath 2014, 30), which is our brains ability to pick up on and recognize patterns that it perceives. While it can cause cognitive biases such as conformation bias and is potentially harmful, we most likely developed it in an effort to identify members of our ingroup more quickly, thereby warranting a friendly response rather than a hostile or frightful one.

1.2 Cognitive Bias and the Mental Environment

In order to deal with the multitude of tasks that human beings accomplish in our daily lives, we must rely quite heavily on Type 1 cognition. As I mentioned above, Type 2 cognition is a resource that can be used to more closely analyze a problem and develop complex solutions to those problems however, it is also a bottleneck and slows down the whole system when it is employed to work through a task. Our Type 1 cognitive processing on the other hand is constantly working, it never turns off, it underlies all other cognitive functioning, and there is no way to stop it (Stanovich 2004, 112). Type 1 cognition is actually responsible for a substantial portion of one's daily activities, and due to its unconscious nature, it is not usually even thought about. Everything from recognizing a friends face in a crowd, anticipating the trajectory of moving or falling objects, interpreting other people's body language and basic emotions, rapidly determining the appropriate greeting to give given the context, to remembering the lyrics to your favourite song, are all tasks handled by one's Type 1 cognition. Impressively, human beings are able to do several of these tasks simultaneously, due to the parallel nature of Type 1 cognition. Some people are able to exercise expert judgement, where a skill has been developed to the point where it becomes intuitive, they can make very accurate yet incredibly rapid judgements instantaneously. A Go (game) master that can recognize thousands of patterns and is able to make expert moves in response without engaging any higher cognitive function, and experienced fire fighters intuitively know that a burning building is about to collapse and that they need to evacuate (Kahneman and Klein 2009, 516).

However, there is a significant limitation to Type 1 cognition. Type 1 processing is heavily dependent on picking up cues in one's external environment, and these cues in turn generate an intuition which can be acted upon. The problem is that in order for this process to function well, meaning that the intuition generated accurately captures the rational response to a given situation, it requires a *high-validity environment* (Kahneman and Klein 2009, 520). Without such an environment, the accuracy of our intuitive judgements decreases demonstrably and produces intuitions that consistently deviate from rationality. These judgements may deviate from either epistemic rationality (how well one's beliefs map on to the real world), and instrumental rationality (achieving expected utility, given one's beliefs and desires) (Stanovich 2004, 85-92). When human cognitive performance consistently deviates (either epistemically or instrumentally) from what would be rationally expected on a particular task, a cognitive bias is demonstrated (Stanovich 2004, 98). Type 2 processing is also affected by one's external environment, in many instances it acts as scaffolding by supporting and extending one's rational mind in various ways (Heath & Anderson 2010; Heath 2014, 67-71).

Before moving on to cognitive biases, I should clarify what I mean when I talk about high (or low) validity environments. All aspects of the environment which can influence our cognition (Type 1 or Type 2), for better or for worse, can be referred to as the *mental environment* (Heath 2014, 17, 23). Understandably this is a broad definition, but given the number and diversity of elements in our environment that influence our cognition, the term mental environment should likewise be broad and encompassing.

Type 1 cognition is fast, automatic, and unconscious and because of these features its inner workings go largely undetected by the conscious mind. Humans perform hundreds of tasks every day without really having access to, or being able to reflect upon, the reasons our intuitive brain works the way it does. We automatically know which way to twist bottle lids, we can recognize our friend's face in a café window, and those of us that use computers for work can type without looking at the individual keys. Our Type 1 processing is only so successful in high-validity environments, the problem is that it is not usually possible to know if one is in such an environment or not. As I mentioned above, Type 1 cognition picks up on cues in one's external environment, but we are largely unaware of which cues are picked up on specifically, we are therefore unable to reflect upon them with our conscious mind.

Moreover, our Type 1 processing is evolutionarily old, which is not troublesome *prima facie*, however, considering that many Type 1 features developed in the environment of early adaptation

(EEA), they are in general poorly suited to the technological cosmopolitan society of the modern world (Stanovich 2004, 91-92). In the EEA humans were in the hunter-gatherer stage of development, with relatively small group sizes, and threats to one's survival were ever-present. Stanovich discusses in some detail a few of the biases in Type 1 cognitive processing that would have developed in the EEA to serve a pragmatic purpose:

1. The tendency to contextualize a problem with as much prior knowledge as is easily accessible, even when the problem is formal and the only solution is a content-free rule.

2. The tendency to "socialize" problems even in situations where interpersonal cues are few.

3. The tendency to see deliberative design and pattern in situations that lack intentional design and pattern.

4. The tendency toward a narrative mode of thought (Stanovich 2004, 113-115).

Each of these biases would have been pragmatic adaptations for humans to develop in the EEA. The first would have been helpful because the EEA would have been a high-validity environment, and therefore many of the problems faced would have been highly contextual and one's prior knowledge and beliefs would have been mostly accurate. For the second and third, these adaptations would have helped significantly in predicting the actions of other members of the same species, determining ingroup/outgroup boundaries, and to coordinate group action within the "in" group. The fourth would have been an extremely helpful adaptation that functioned by assigning intentionality to objects in one's environment (good or bad, harmful or helpful, etc.) in order to more quickly categorize them and respond.

The problem is that we are no longer in the EEA, and that our modern world increasingly situates us in low-validity environments which require de-contextualized reasoning, and requires us to suppress and ignore our narrative modes of thought (Stanovich 2004, 124). Consider a situation where an ice hockey referee makes a call that displeases one of the coaches. The coach calls the ref over to the bench, and grows increasingly frustrated until they completely lose their temper and begin an unwarranted onslaught of verbal abuse. The referee is supposed to remain polite, calm, and collected under this assault, despite the fact that every emotional stimuli in his body triggers an emotional or

self-defence evolutionary response. To make this clearer, Stanovich introduces a metaphor which captures the state of our evolutionarily old Type 1 processing situated in the contemporary world: the *sodium vapour lamp* (Stanovich 2004, 134). Sodium vapour lamps (the light source used by old streetlights) give off a spectrum of light which causes our evolutionarily old colour consistency mechanisms to fail. Similarly, there are countless elements in the modern world which differ greatly from those present in the EEA, resulting in the creation of low-validity environments for our Type 1 cognition (Stanovich 2004, 134-138). For example, some of the cognitive equivalents to sodium vapour lamps are the vivid advertising examples we must ignore; the favored hypothesis we must not privilege; and the rule we must follow which dictates that we ignore a personal relationship (Stanovich 2004, 136)[3]. What these examples should indicate is that we are not only biased by uniquely modern situations that deviate from situations present in the EEA, but also in the case of advertising especially, we are also exploitable to third-parties who wish to sell us things (Stanovich 2004, 128-129; Heath 2014, 200-207, 236-244).

This literature gives rise to several significant political implications now that researchers have a more complete understanding of the unique complexity of human cognition. There are many obstacles to rationality, and many aspects of the modern world come together to create low-validity environments which make it difficult and exhausting to be rational. The modern political landscape is a low-validity environment, rife with catchy slogans or misinformation campaigns that placate to voter's biases and create a challenge to the political process. Because of the way representative democracies are set up, with each individual vote having a limited or even insignificant value, it is rational for voters to be ignorant and adopt different beliefs that compliment their biases rather then challenge them[4]. Alongside these dispiriting revelations, there have also been a number of positive programs which have been proposed to combat widespread irrationality: the nudge program (Thaler & Sunstein 2008), the boost program (Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig 2017), or the brace program (Heath 2014; Brennan 2016; Blunden 2019). The nudge program recommends the use of nudges: which are defined as non-coercive interventions in our environment designed to guide our behavior in such a way that one is protected from the harmful effects of our cognitive biases. This program is the elder, and has been around long enough to bear fruit, resulting in several promising policy recommendations which have since been implemented. The boost program on the other hand recommends using boosts:

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[3] For a more extensive list of examples see (Stanovich 2004, 136-137).
[4] A phenomenon referred to as *Rational Irrationality* (Caplan 2004).

which are also non-coercive interventions however, they are aimed at developing people's cognitive competence to prevent them from falling victim to their cognitive biases in the first place. Finally, the brace program recommends using braces: which are similar to nudges and boosts in the sense that they focus on changing one's environment to protect them from harmful biases, however they differ from the other two programs because braces would allow for stronger, and sometimes coercive policy interventions. I will briefly return to these programs later in the project, but the important aspect of their mention for this section is to highlight the important political and philosophical implications of the heuristics and biases literature. While its true that this literature has negative implications for individual's ability to make rational choices, the programs beforementioned are all attempts to employ the same literature in an effort to help individuals be consistently more rational. The problem is that advertising and political campaigns tend to make use of the lessons learned in behavioral science more quickly, forcing the political theorists and policy makers to catch-up.

To summarize, dual-process theory divides our cognitive processing into two types. Type 2 cognition is slow, conscious, deliberative, high effort, serial, and is evolutionarily new whereas Type 1 cognition is fast, unconscious, automatic, associative, intuitive, and is evolutionarily older. Our Type 1 cognition is always active, works in parallel, and is highly accurate in high-validity environments such as the EEA. On the other hand, our modern world is unfamiliar and acts as a sodium vapour lamp. Many elements within create a low-validity environment which cause our Type 1 cognition to systematically deviate and produce biased responses. Worse, we are generally unable to identify these cognitive biases due to us not having reflective access to the inner workings of our Type 1 processing. Before moving on to section 1.3 and my discussion of deceptors, I will first give a few examples of different cognitive biases. Due to space and time constraints I decided to only focus on a few key cognitive biases that will be relevant for section 1.3, however, any other bias that are mentioned below and are not explained here will instead be explained at the time.

Table 2, *Examples of Cognitive Bias* (assembled from multiple sources)

Cognitive Bias	Description	Source
Belief Bias	The tendency to be more inclined to accept the conclusion of an argument if it coincides with their pre-existing beliefs. This is because people tend to bring their prior beliefs and knowledge into their assessment of new arguments and their conclusions.	Stanovich 2004, 91-92; Heath 2014, 137
Confirmation Bias	Shown in the beforementioned *Marriage Problem*, confirmation bias is when people fail to 'think the negative' and instead only try to confirm their own beliefs or hypothesis.	Heath 2014, 131-136
Ingroup-Outgroup Bias	The tendency to categorize people into different groups, often based on the groups most salient features (such as gender or race), as well as social stereotypes. Once this categorization has taken place, one tends to favour groups that they themselves are a constituent of (the ingroup). There is also a tendency to develop negative attitudes towards those in groups one is not a part of (the outgroup).	Buchanan and Powell 2015, 45-46; Heath 2014, 92-101
Availability Bias	The tendency to inaccurately recall the probability or frequency of an event occurring. People tend to believe that an event has a higher probability of occurring or that it occurs more frequently if they can recall more instances of that event in their own lives (like divorce, speeding tickets, etc.) or if that event is more salient (or memorable, such as a tragedy or natural disaster).	Kahneman 2011, 126-135;
Myside Bias	The tendency to evaluate evidence in such a way that is biased towards one's own beliefs. To fairly evaluate evidence, one must be objective, and myside bias is problematic because it is an obstacle to that objectivity and prevents one from putting aside their prior beliefs. For example, smokers would be less likely to acknowledge the fact that second-hand smoke negatively effects one's health. Similarly, American Football linebackers will be less likely to acknowledge the latest research on minor concussions in sports.	Stanovich, West, and Toplak 2013, 259-261

1.3 Deceptors as Obstacles to Deliberative Democracy

Returning for a moment to the sodium vapor streetlamp example that Stanovich uses to explain the effect of the modern world on our evolutionarily old Type 1 cognition; many of the unnatural features of the modern world, the ones that confuse our rapid and intuitive problem solving

heuristics, have actually been invented or become ubiquitous because of their ability to cause cognitive misfires and mislead us (Heath 2014, 170). This is not an accident, it is not a mere by-product or the cost of significant technological advancement, it is their central purpose. Heath refers to these features of our environment as *deceptors* (Heath 2014, 171). A *deceptor* is a term used to identify and group together features of one's mental environment which routinely cause cognitive misfires (Heath 2014, 170-171). Before going into further detail about which features of our environment qualify as deceptors, and how they work, I will first offer a few different examples of common cognitive deceptors, each being a deliberate attempt trick us and exploit our intuitive Type 1 processing.

Consider, for example, the weekly pizza deals at one's favourite local pizza place. On Tuesday nights, they are offering two small pizzas (each 12 inches in diameter) with three toppings each, for the exact same price as they are offering one large pizza (18 inches in diameter) also with three toppings. Of course, this is a fantastic deal, right? Two small pizzas are much larger than a large pizza, and assuming that a hungry customer would always want more food for the same price, any hungry customer should go for the deal and buy the two small pizzas instead of the large. The problem is that intuitively, the two smaller pizzas seem incredibly appealing in a number of ways. Firstly, they are labeled as items "on sale" (or on offer), and therefore should be discounted. Secondly, there are two pizzas instead of one, and to top that off, each pizza is 12 inches, and since 12+12=24, it makes sense that the two pizzas would in fact deliver the hungry customer more value for their money. Unfortunately, this is a trick developed by many clever owners of pizzas places, the large pizza being 18 inches in diameter has a significantly larger surface area than two small 12 inch pizzas, therefore the customer ought to go for the large instead. The area of a circle is calculated by πr^2, and if one was to actually do the math, they would quickly discover that the two smaller pizzas have a combined surface area of about 226 inches squared, whereas the singular large pizza has a surface area of about 254 inches squared. Mathematics aside, the intuitive appeal of the two small pizzas from the weekly deal will exploit a perceptual bias and cause a cognitive misfire for the hungry patron, resulting in them incorrectly paying the same price for less pizza.

A further example of cognitive deceptors at work is 24 hour news media coverage. Many news networks cover the news 24 hours a day, most days of the week, and the result is oversaturation of coverage or the sensationalization of headlines. Deceptors of this kind take advantage of availability bias (see Table 2). People will tend to believe an event has a higher probability of occurring or that an event is more widespread than it may actually be given that they view multiple cycles of the 24 hour

news and see the story repeated over and over again. In a similar, yet slightly different vein, news that is consumed through the medium of social media also can manifest as a deceptor. Social media sights curate one's news feed to the preferences of the user. The longer one uses the social media site, the more information it is able to gather, and the result is a newsfeed chalked full of stories one might want to click on and read. Unfortunately, this deceptor exploits one's confirmation bias (see Table 2) by filling their news feed with headlines and articles that reaffirm their beliefs instead of challenging them.

As you can see, cognitive deceptors are numerous, and the systematic deviations from rationality that they cause on an individual level has many economic and political implications. In an analogous way, there are certain features of one's external environment that sap, block, or misdirect one's motivation. These *motivational deceptors* share many similarities with their cognitive counterpart, including many of the problematic political implications. Before breaking down motivational deceptors and their similarities to cognitive deceptors, we should first understand what the literature says about the important elements which makeup *deceptors*.

There are several key components of deceptors that make them so effective and ubiquitous. Firstly, a deceptor must cause a cognitive misfire, meaning that it must cause a deviation from rationality (see section 1.2). Secondly, this misfire must be the result of an interaction with human cognitive processing, there must be a causal relationship between the deceptor and human psychology. And finally, the deceptor must have been invented (developed intentionally) or become ubiquitous because of its ability to cause a misfire and because this misfire is caused by an interaction with human psychology. The third condition is the most important, it is the reason that deceptors are so pervasive in our environment, and why environments heavily saturated with deceptors are low-validity environments. Once they are situated and proven to effectively cause misfires, they are by definition difficult to think about (think about via Type 2 processing) as they directly target Type 1 processing, of which we have little to no self-reflective capabilities. Heath identifies three forces that are responsible for the proliferation of deceptors in our environment: a pooling force (once present, deceptors cause misfires thereby making them difficult to eradicate and over time they pool in the environment), a contagion force (deceptors are good at self-reproduction due to their misfire properties), and a pumping force (deceptors can pump people for money, therefore introducing financial incentives for their creation and continued existence) (Heath 2014, 177).

In a very similar way, motivational deceptors share all three key components with cognitive deceptors. Firstly, a motivational deceptor must cause a deviation from the motivational standard. As I will explain in greater detail below, the motivational standard can indeed change, and therefore it is different than the rational standard, however, when examining specific programs (i.e. programs of deliberative democracy), one can conditionally derive the motivational standard from the degree of motivation that would be necessary for the given program to succeed. Secondly, the deviation must be the result of an interaction between the deceptor (as features of one's external environment) and one's motivation. Finally, motivational deceptors are intentionally created or have become ubiquitous in our environment and once entrenched, they are difficult to address owing to the very effects of the deceptor. In the case of cognitive deceptors, they are difficult to think about and target certain portions of our cognition which we have very little to no reflective capabilities to examine. In a very similar manor, motivational deceptors sap, block, or misdirect one's ability to meet certain motivational challenges, which may be necessary for the implementation of public policy aimed at combatting those very deceptors.

When I discuss one's motivation, I assume what has come to be known as *the standard story*, which portrays actions as events that are caused by combinations of one's beliefs, desires, intentions and other motivating factors (Velleman 1992; Davidson 2001). The problem is not merely that people are unable to reflect on their intentions, or that they have divergent desires. The problem is that in the moment, individuals could revise their intentions (Holton 1999), and as I will later show, it takes their exerting *effort* to prepare, maintain, or realign with the correct intention (Velleman 1992; Brent 2012). 'Correct' in this case meaning that it is aligned with the criterion derived from the motivational standard. I will revisit this account and expand on it in section 3.1 to clarify it further, and propose several possible ameliorative programs to combat motivational deceptors interference.

The remaining portion of the chapter will be focused on several case examples that better illustrate the nature of deceptors within the context of the political sphere. More specifically, these cases will focus on different levels of deliberative democracy, where each level represents a more demanding program of deliberative participation on behalf of the individual. This demandingness qualifier will be better fleshed out in chapter 2, but the crucial aspect of it for this chapter is that each of the three levels becomes more demanding to an individual cognitively, as well as motivationally, thus requiring more developed skills (skills which help one interact and deliberate with others). Recall that the purpose of these cases is twofold: they act as explicators to better illustrate the nature of

deceptors, and they also represent three distinct levels of deliberative democracy (distinguished by their demandingness): a minimal level, a medium level, and a high level. I will return to these cases throughout this project. The first case at a minimal level represents the informal interaction between friends and family. While still political, this minimal level is much less formal and structured than the two which follow. There is some debate surrounding what ought to be included as deliberative democracy, and informal interactions like these are often not included as they do not meet the standards of authenticity, inclusivity, and consequentiality (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2010). That being said, I choose to include a minimal category which encompasses even informal discussions for two reasons: i) it will help me demonstrate the fundamental role *civic resolve* plays, and ii) it will also help me to emphasize the various political implications of deceptors (both cognitive and motivational).The second case represents the medium level, where deliberative programs are scaled up and become more structured. This level could include any number of occasions including but not limited to a town hall meeting, a citizen jury, etc. (Elstub 2014, 167). Lastly, there will be a final case which represents a high level of demandingness for the individual, where the deliberative program becomes highly structured, representative, and has major political implications.

It is important to make it crystal clear that these cases, as examples of various levels of deliberative democracy, represent a conditional claim that I make in the outset of this project. Deliberative democracy is but one of the possible directions that one could go when attempting to address increasing levels of citizen dissatisfaction in modern democratic politics, but it by no means represents the only one. As mentioned in the introduction, other political theorists may argue for more epistocratic forms of democracy (Brennan, 2016; Jones 2020) which would see the role of the individual lay-citizen reduced in various ways. In this project I do not even attempt to enter the political debate surrounding these diverging points of view, and therefore my claim is conditional. For those people who see deliberative forms of democracy as the way to go, I aim to clarify what is at stake in a more or less demanding deliberative program. In each of the following cases, the agent in question fails to prepare, to identify, to make intentions, or to follow through on those intentions, and therefore their omission in these cases represent a deviation from the motivational standard. A standard which is derived from the beforementioned conditional claim, and that should be seen as distinct from a generalized failure or deficiency. I do not argue the general case, that anyone failing to attend a demonstration (as in The Case of Kyle) has a motivational deficiency. Instead, the failure comes in the form of a deviation from the behavior citizens need to display for a political program to

meet the demands (either minimum, medium, or high) for a functional deliberative democracy. This point will be expanded on in chapter 2, where I discuss the specific skills that citizen deliberators ought to have on the condition that one supports any of the various deliberative programs.

The Case of Kyle

The first case closely follows a contemporary social movement which is prevalent in the USA however has generated support in many European countries as well. In this case, there is a young man named Kyle, who has just completed his medical degree, and is on his way to becoming a young doctor. Kyle lives in the USA, and is appalled by the recent murder of an unarmed African American man in his hometown. The horrible incident has been dominating the news for weeks, and there are activists calling for the arrest of the officer responsible. Kyle, and several of his friends, many of whom are young political activists, want to attend a demonstration in the town square next week as a counter protest to a KKK rally, and they form an intention to do so. When the day of the event comes, Kyle does not attend, and instead chooses to show his support on social media by *blacking out* his accounts[5]. His friends feel let down, especially since he clearly supports the cause, as demonstrated by his social media accounts. In this case there is a rational and motivational standard which Kyle's behavior could be judged against. The rational standard would be judged based on Kyle's epistemic and instrumental rationality, and in this case, assuming that Kyle genuinely does want to attend the demonstration but does not, there is a deviation occurring. Likewise, a functional deliberative democracy would need citizens to meet minimal demands in this case, but those demands would include attending the demonstration. Therefore, by not attending the demonstration, it could be judged that Kyle's behavior represents a deviation from the motivational standard. What might have prevented Kyle from attending that demonstration and caused him to show support on social media instead?

On the one hand, there could be a number of cognitive deceptors which have stood as obstacles to Kyle's participation in the public demonstration. Kyle may possess the mistaken belief that the protests will turn violent, as he has been watching the news of similar protests in other places and they always show violence and confrontation (availability bias). Perhaps he does not believe that protesting in person can lead to real political change, or have any real world consequences other than wasting his afternoon. It is also possible that Kyle does not know how to handle the uncomfortable

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[5] "Blacked out" refers to the trend wherein social media users change their profile pictures or timeline photos so that they are all black, thus symbolising their support for the black community against the oppressive systemic racism present within police departments and other state institutions.

situation. Racism is an uncomfortable topic, and Kyle being Caucasian himself feels somewhat to blame. He has trouble accepting some responsibility without also accepting part of the blame, despite the fact that he believes in the cause. There could also be a misfire along the lines of ingroup bias, where Kyle may believe that his attendance is unwelcome or out of place given his different skin colour. This is a mistaken belief as these contemporary social movements are generally welcoming to everyone, but regardless, it is at least possible that someone like Kyle may feel unwelcome given the salient differences that would allow others to easily identify him with the out-group.

Despite these numerous examples of different biases and cognitive deceptors, they do not account for every possible explanation. It is possible that Kyle had no mistaken beliefs and his cognitive processing is otherwise normatively successful, but for another reason entirely he did not go, and instead chose to remain at home. I believe this possibility would represent the akratic citizen perfectly, someone who knows what they ought to do, and should be correctly motivated to do so given their intentions, yet when the time comes, they fail to follow through. This is an example of motivational deviation, or more specifically in this case I believe we could attribute this deviation to misdirected effort. By blacking out his accounts on social media, Kyle has demonstrated his support for the cause, and in return he gets to feel as though he has contributed to a solution. In an analogous way it is a similar phenomenon as "sending thoughts and prayers" to the victims of horrific gun violence instead of fighting for (and voting for) meaningful change. Certain aspects of social media in this case come together as the motivational deceptor. It provides Kyle a different and more effortless alternative outlet to show his support. It has caused Kyle to deviate from the motivational standard, which in this case would require him to attend the demonstration and actively engage those whom he disagrees with.

The Case of Noah

In my second case, there is a man called Noah, who is attending a town hall meeting where the provincial government is staging a discussion about their plans to overhaul the provinces sexual education program for its primary schools. As a single father with two young daughters, Noah worries about being able to give his children the right information, and wants to be able to rely (at least partially) on the schools new plan for assistance. He forms the intention to not only attend the town hall meeting, but to participate and ensure that his daughters will be getting the information that they need. Right from the get-go the meeting is dominated by an ultra-conservative and religious woman who believes in only teaching abstinence. On top of this, it becomes clear almost just as quickly that

the moderator of the town hall meeting is poorly equipped to handle this woman, and is allowing her to single-handedly derail the meeting with her own agenda. The meeting concludes some time later, and Noah is left feeling very disappointed that the school system does not seem be able to offer him the support that he and his daughters need. As there was in the first case, there is both a rational, and a motivational standard which Noah's behavior can be judged against. The rational standard here is that given Noah's belief (that he will not be able to provide the information his daughters need alone and will require the schools assistance), his action (or lack there of) during the town hall meeting represents a deviation from what would be instrumentally rational in this case. Likewise, a functional deliberative democracy would need citizens to meet certain demands, but in this case those demands would include Noah's active participation in the town hall meeting. The question once again is, what was preventing Noah from more actively engaging in the deliberation himself during the town hall meeting?

Like in the first case I discussed, there are several biases and cognitive deceptors that may be used to account for Noah's lack of active participation. It is possible that he has a mistaken belief that he would be perceived as a pervert or a deviant in some way if he advocates strongly for a more in depth sexual education for his young daughters. There is also a level of shame and embarrassment that accompanies this as he would have to admit to the shortcomings of his own knowledge in order to make his case effectively, which can be very embarrassing in front of the whole town. Additionally, he could be suffering from availability bias, as the anti-sexual education advocates tend to be some of the loudest and most present (and by extension the most salient) members in attendance. They also appear more frequently on the news, they call in to radio programs, and they are seen protesting in great numbers outside of schools with a more liberal sexual education program. It may appear to Noah that they have more support in town than they actually do, owing to the groups salience in the public and the media.

Now it is true that these conditions as described could also stand as obstacles to one's ability to think rationally, take for example the sheer difficulty to form coherent sentences and clearly express one's thoughts in any instance of a high-stress and anger fueled situation. What I am trying to get at with this case is different, it is not what prevents an individual from thinking rationally, but instead what prevents an individual from engaging in that argument altogether. It could be the knowledge that one will not be able to think straight, but it could also be the distinct phenomenon wherein one has no mistaken beliefs about the situation, and knows that it requires their active participation, but still

chooses to abstain from any deliberative action. In this case, the sensitivity of the subject matter, coupled with the entire town's presence at the debate, and further catalysed by the conservative women speaking loudly in opposition to any sexual education all combine and leave Noah in an emotionally charged and stressful situation. These strong motivating forces could sap away Noah's motivation, and cause him to alter his intention in the moment (Holton 1999), thereby causing his omission and the deviation from the motivational standard. This is a failure on Noah's part, as it would be his responsibility to follow through on his previously held intentions for the sake of the deliberative program, and to voice his concerns about the sexual education his daughters will receive from school. That being said, it is not necessarily his fault entirely, as a change to the structure of the event, a better moderator, taking written questions beforehand, or any other ameliorative measure could have been taken to overcome the obstacle created by deceptors. Alone, one would require a high degree of motivational skill to adequately prepare for and maintain their resolve in the face of such motivational factors. These skills must be cultivated, and supported to be employed sufficiently to overcome motivational deceptors that would otherwise sap away one's motivation and prevent them from participating more successfully.

The Case of Laura

The final case I want to articulate represents the highest level of demandingness that deliberative programs might require in a modern democracy. It also is the perfect example to demonstrate a third type of motivational deceptor, one that fosters uncooperative attitudes. In this case, there is a women in her mid fifties called Laura. Laura is a nurse in downtown Toronto, and has been for nearly thirty years. She was selected at random to be a part of the first Ontario Citizens Assembly (CA) which will discuss electoral reform, specifically they will discuss whether or not to abolish the first-past the post system which has been in place for many years. It will be similarly structured to the 2004 citizens assembly which took place in British Columbia, where the assembly heard from many experts, multiple accounts of the relevant evidence, other members of the public, and even had meetings with people who were not involved at all in order to gauge the scale of public support (Pearse 2008; Warren 2008). At the end of the assembly, they must deliver a collective recommendation (by an overwhelming majority of the assembly), and not only advise the government on what options will be put to referendum, but also how those options are worded. Laura, who was once keen to participate given the importance of her role as a representative, is now not so keen to participate, and this feeling is compounded when after the first session it appears clear to her that

many citizens are more concerned with passing blame around. Specifically, the older citizens selected blame the continued use of this frustrating system on the younger generation for their lack of political interest and their entitlement. At the same time, a larger group of younger people in their 20s and 30s have expressed their displeasure with the older generation for not changing the practice years ago, and being to slow to accept political change in general. Because of this ill sentiment going around, and Laura being on the edge of the two groups, she is hesitant to participate, and says very little in the first meeting of the CA. As in the first two cases, there is a rational and motivational standard which Laura's behavior can be judged. Laura really does want to participate in the CA, and if she believes (as she should) that to fulfill her representative duty she must speak up in the CA, her action (or lack there of) during the CA represents a deviation from what would be instrumentally rational. Similarly, a functional deliberative democracy would need citizens to meet certain demands and in this case those demands would include Laura's active participation in the town hall meeting. By failing do to so, her behavior represents a deviation from the motivational standard. The question then is, what are the obstacles standing in Laura's way which might prevent her from participating effectively in this CA?

Similar to my previous two examples, Laura's behavior can be explained by several biases and cognitive deceptors at work. There will be news coverage of the assembly, and many people sharing their opinions outside of the CA, which may give her and her co-deliberators a false impression of public support one way or another. This would be availability bias, a misfire caused by a media deceptor and the oversaturation of 24 hour news. Also, Laura could have a pre-existing opinion about the first past the post system, or even more unfortunate, she could have political motivations for keeping the system as is, given that experts determine that it is the only reason her preferred political party continues to have the success it does. If she examines the evidence under the influence of her own biased opinion without finding a way to separate the two, she may fall victim to belief bias or even myside bias (See Table 2). There are also obstacles which could arise from the other members within the CA, especially if two major age demographics are passing blame back and forth. She may agree with the position taken by the younger generation, and yet not want to identify with them because she belongs to the older generation, which is being criticized (ingroup bias).

Furthermore, there are motivational deceptors which in combination with cognitive deceptors which work to foster non-cooperative attitudes. Like I said above, the cognitive side is a combination of myside bias as well as in-group bias/solidarity. It is very possible that being stuck in a collective action problem such as this will foster non-cooperative attitudes. The sort of attitudes that one has

for someone they despise, where no matter the consequences, individuals on both sides will fail to cooperate. Even if the CA has excellent moderators or organizers that can structure the meetings in such a way that the participants clearly understand the importance of their cooperation with each other, it would still be extremely difficult for the two groups to override their dislike for one another and move towards consensus. The strictly motivational side of things compound this complicated situation, wherein political campaigns and advertising from various interested parties could be used to promote such biases that have divided the CA. The intentional attempt on any group's part to develop contempt within the randomly selected members of the CA would qualify as a motivational deceptor. It causes a deviation from the motivational standard, by interacting with one's available effort (blocking it by fostering uncooperative attitudes), and its origin is a third party attempting to interfere on a motivational level. Uncooperative attitudes are powerful motivating forces and tend to be an overwhelming force for many people, no matter how dire the consequences are. I recognise that this motivational deceptor is more difficult to separate from the strictly cognitive side of things than the others, but nonetheless is important for understanding motivational deviations on the part of participants in CA, and other collective action problem scenarios.

To conclude, a recent trend in empirically informed philosophy, heavily influenced by work in psychology and behavioral science has show that one's ability to think rationally depends significantly on their external environment. Cognitive deceptors, as features of one's external environment, contribute to consistent and predictable deviations from what would be rational. This irrationally has severe political implications; political power in modern representative democracies is justified by the popular support of citizen voters, who we now know are nowhere near as rational as they ought to be when making important decisions such as which party to vote for. However, efforts to combat citizen dissatisfaction, such as introducing more deliberative forms of democracy, must also overcome the obstacle cognitive deceptors pose. I argued that in an analogous way to cognitive deceptors, motivational deceptors also stand as obstacles to deliberative democratic programs. They are similar to cognitive deceptors in that they share the three fundamental ingredients of a deceptor, but represent their own category because they are distinctly motivational, opposed to cognitive. In the next chapter, I will delve deeper into the political implications of deceptors, both cognitive and motivational, by exploring various examples of deliberative democracy and more specifically the skills citizens participating in these programs ought to have in order for the program to function.

2. Citizen Deliberators, Skill Clusters, and Political Implications

Recall from the previous chapter, where I outlined cognitive deceptors, and argued that analogously to them, motivational deceptors can also undermine deliberative democratic programs. By the end of the chapter, I had identified three examples of motivational deceptors: i) those which misdirect one's effort, ii) those which sap motivation through affectual overload, and iii) those which foster uncooperative attitudes. The focus of this chapter will be to examine the political implications of motivational deceptors more closely. These deceptors, coupled with their cognitive counterpart, serve as obstacles to programs which would aim to improve the political life in modern democracies. One such program is deliberative democracy, which can come in several different varieties. In this chapter I will more closely examine how motivational deceptors interfere with the background motivational skills and abilities citizen participants require for the success of various deliberative democratic programs.

Firstly, I will identify the relevant background skills that would be required of good citizens in a deliberative democracy. These skills can be loosely separated into three categories: i) individual cognitive, ii) collective cognitive, and iii) motivational. It is true that these categories will have some overlap, that they are interconnected, and that they will often be difficult to adequately distinguish from one another, but I choose to separate them regardless as they will shine a more focused light on one's motivational skillset. Secondly, I cluster the skills into three groups, each corresponding to a different level of deliberative democracy, and therefore each demanding a different skillset. To avoid confusion, let me make clear, that each cluster will include several skills from the categories listed above, with the most demanding levels of deliberative democracy subsequently requiring a greater amount of background skills. In the final section of this chapter I will return to the previously tabled conversation about the political implications surrounding motivational deceptors and the deviations they can cause. By this section I will have made clear how there are several distinct motivational skills, at least one of which is necessary for all three of the levels of deliberative democracy that I distinguish. This section speaks to the importance of this project; motivational deceptors can cause individuals to deviate from the motivational standard, which in turn have dire implications for deliberative democratic programs.

2.1 Skills, Abilities, and the Citizen Deliberator

Before I begin with outlining the specific skills and abilities a that a citizen would require for a functional deliberative democratic program, I first want to make note of two important things. As was true in the pervious chapter, a central aspect of this chapter is the conditional claim that what follows is only the case if one subscribes to or supports deliberative democratic programs as an ameliorative strategy for the problems faced by modern representative democracies. My aim is to show how various skills, abilities, and one's performance of those skills and abilities can be undermined by motivational deceptors. It is not to develop an argument in support of deliberative democracy itself. Secondly, there is a distinction to be made between a task, the skill or ability necessary to carry out that task, and the instance of performance of that skill or ability in an effort to complete a given task. When I mention a specific skill or ability below, I not only reference one's capacity to exercise it, but also their active performance of that skill in a deliberative arena. The kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy not only has the capacity for various skills, but exercises them in instances where a deliberative task requires them to do so. I will later qualify this claim by clustering the skills into three categories, each corresponding to various deliberative programs with different degrees of demandingness. There I will identify foundational skills that are required for each cluster, as well as specific skills that would only be required by a more demanding cluster.

Deliberation can generally be thought of on the level of community, as deliberation requires the engagement of two or more individuals, and because the topics of deliberation (for example, primary school education reform) are often community focused. There is however a cognitive burden imposed on individual participants, and I begin my discussion of the background skills citizen deliberators require in the face of these burdens.

To begin with, deliberations require the use of a shared body of evidence. It is important that citizen participants both understand how evidence is collected, and how sub-par methods of evidence collection can distort ones perception of that evidence (Rosenberg 2014, 99). It is important that one also possesses the ability to integrate that evidence in such a way as to form a coherent understanding of the context, including but not limited to the relevant agents, influencing forces, and potential resources involved. Without an adequate understanding of evidence collection and the ability to integrate that evidence, one would lack the foundation necessary for many forms of meaningful deliberation.

Additionally, the sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy would be able to guard against personal prejudices. Being able to distinguish one's personal or cultural beliefs and the logical implications of the relevant evidence (Rosenberg 2014, 99). In other words, an openness to newly presented evidence, which is very important for more involved forms of participation such as Citizen Assemblies (CA) like that of the 2004 British Colombia CA, that involve a learning/presentation of the evidence step at the outset (Warren & Pearse 2008). Related to this skill and equally as important, is an awareness of the institutional design of deliberative structures itself, and how they might in turn effect the outcome (Pearse 2008). Understanding when deliberation is actually democratic, who gets to participate, what form that participation takes, and who gets to set the agenda, could be an important consideration (Lang 2008; Moscrop & Warren 2016).

In a more abstract sense, it is also important for the sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy to be able to think at a reasonable level of abstraction, so they are able to entertain hypothetical solutions, the probability of their success, and the potential consequences of their implementation (Rosenberg 2014, 99). This by no means implies that a citizen ought to be a savant when it comes to abstract thinking, however, it would be beneficial to many deliberative situations to be able to 'think-through' a solution's possible implications, and its feasibility[6] (Southwood 2018). Finally, the kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy is rational as they can identify their values and pass sound judgement on a wide range of issues (Cohen 1997, 74; Cohen & Rogers 2003, 241; Rosenberg 2014, 99). To do this, one must be able to weigh their intuitive and reasoned thought, be able to consider both short and long-term goals, and to understand basic moral principles and how they would be brought to bear in a given situation. It is only then that one's judgement could be said to best reflect their values, and therefore be rational.

It is clear from this list of background skills that the cognitive burden placed on an individual deliberator is substantive, but deliberation at various levels, especially those more demanding, is also a collective activity requiring individual's to come together in a meaningful way, stay on task, and reach a rational decision as a group. Therefore, a citizen operating in a more demanding cluster must also posses some or all of the following background collective cognitive skills, in addition to the individual cognitive ones.

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[6] See cost-based & probability based accounts of feasibility (Southwood 2018).

One of the overarching ingredients of successful deliberation between a collective group of individual agents is one's communicative competence. The sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy can use their ability to talk in order to collaborate with others (especially those with a different view than oneself), come to clear understanding of the problem, and arrive at a common belief in how to solve it (Rosenberg 2014, 99). In order to do this however, one must first understand the value of talk in the first place. Talk is valuable not only for enhancing one's personal understanding of a set of facts or situation, but also for learning from and cooperating with others. The goal of course being that over the course of deliberation, a shared understanding will manifest, and this will lead to a mutually satisfying decision on how to proceed with a solution. Corresponding to the effectiveness of this process, is trust. More specifically one's trust in their fellow deliberators, that they are similarly committed to the process, and thus will accept the outcome in good faith (Cohen 1997, 72; Cohen & Rogers 2003, 242). Courts in most western countries use the same logic to offer their legal proceedings legitimacy.

The sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy must be able to show adequate levels of respect to all others involved in the deliberative process (Cohen 1997, 69; Cohen & Rogers 2003, 242; Ratner 2008, 149; Rosenberg 2014, 100). Being respectful is intentional, it takes both practice, and skill to get right. It is not enough to simply have a mutual respect for one's fellow deliberators, but experts, moderators, mediators, witnesses, etc. must be respected and taken seriously as well. Part of this means that deliberators should not think of others involved in the process as mere means to some end, or as merely necessary partners in a deliberative exercise. Instead, all members of a deliberative process should be treated with respect, and as autonomous agents with their own thoughts, beliefs, and values.

Similar to this skill, is the recognition and valuing of time. The kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy must have the time to deliberate in the first place, but they ought to also recognize that others involved in the process, from their fellow deliberators to the experts and moderators all sacrifice some of their time to the deliberative process. It is important one values their time, and that they see the value in sacrificing some of it to participate in deliberations. Without this skill, deliberations can quite easily be seen as a waste of time, because the process in an of itself can be quite time-consuming, and in the case of the 2004 British Colombia CA, their recommendation was not even taken up due to its failure to capture 60% of the popular vote in referendum (Warren & Pearse 2008, 6-7).

Another background skill that is important for the sot of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy is that they appreciate the limits of their understanding and perspectives (Cohen & Rogers 2003, 241; Rosenberg 2014, 100). Individuals approach a deliberative situation with their own perspective, and this perspective, even after evidence is presented in the learning phase, does not necessarily represent the whole truth of any given situation. Because of this, one's beliefs, even if informed by the relevant evidence and expert testimony, are not universally shared. People's intuition can vary deepening on different situations, life experience, or for any number of reasons and it would be incorrect to assume that having heard the same story, that every individual will form the same paradigm. I should note that the same skill also would need to apply to individual moral judgement. Especially in pluralistic societies such as Canada, deliberators may have preferences and values that may heavily influence their perspectives. A failure to recognize the importance of this skill will with all likelihood result in overconfidence in one's own perspectives as well as a closed-mindedness regarding the views of others. If deliberation is to move beyond mere strategic negotiation to cooperative collaboration and effective communication, then this is will be a foundational requirement (Stone et al. 1999). It is also important that one resists the classroom temptation to play the devil's advocate. If one has a conflicting opinion or a critical remark it should of course be voiced, however, one should avoid doing so merely as a devil's advocate. Citizen deliberation is not equivalent to the classroom in a university, where students would be encouraged to think critically for the purposes of developing critical thinking skills. Owing to the plurality of citizens and their wide variety of perspectives and cultural influences, differing opinions will be raised by those who actually have them.

Furthermore, good deliberation would also require participants to be able to recognize the distinctness of their own reasoning. Everyone reasons in different ways, relying on different assumptions, and thinking at different levels of abstraction. The resulting of a failure on a individuals part to take the diverse reasoning styles and capabilities of others into account, would likely amount to the two parties 'talking past' one another (Rosenberg 2014, 100). In order to get on the same page and come to a decision that satisfies a group of agents, which is the goal for any productive deliberation, they cannot talk past each other. This skill speaks to the comprehensibility (Ratner 2008, 145) of individual deliberators, but also the recognition that even if you are very clear and comprehensible, an additional obstacle (the diversity of individual's reasoning capabilities) remains a friction. Similarly, individual deliberators are differently motivated. People are social actors with their

own personalities and as such they may participate in deliberations for a variety of reasons (Rosenberg 2014, 101). Whether one is motivated politically, economically, socially, or emotionally, the kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy is aware of how their individual needs and social norms may interfere with their ability to adequately express themselves, respond to others, and to understand the inconsistent motivation of their fellow deliberators.

To ensure that deliberative exercises are productive in the requisite way, the sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy ought to also possess an ability to understand the claims of others (Rosenberg 2014, 101). People interpret and judge claims that others make quite differently, and not only does that lead deliberators down ultimately unproductive tangential pathways, but it severely hinders other's ability to respond in kind. For example, when one is in a colloquium or seminar meeting environment, one of the problems that slows down discussion is when there is a misunderstanding of claims. If I was to ask a question of the presenter, it is important that they understand what I am asking, that I in turn understand the answer they give, and that the other participants understand both claims so they may respond and can join in on that aspect of the discussion. Deliberations are no different, and whether you want to agree with someone and add to their claim, or disagree with that person by raising a point of contention, it is important to establish a common ground where claims can be accurately assessed. To be productive, deliberators must also be able to persuade one another through arguments, testimony, and narratives (Rosenberg 2014, 101). Arguments, testimony, and narratives give justification to the claims one makes, which can than be accepted or contested by other individual deliberators. What this means is that speakers must provide reasons to back up their claims. Whether those reasons take the form of a well thought out argument, whiteness testimony, or narratives which provide much needed context, the important part is that deliberators move away from voicing mere opinions and move to the formulation of persuasive assertions backed up by reasonable justifications.

There are also a few background skills the sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy ought to possess that are non-cognitive. I have thusly separated them into a third category which I referred to as motivational. As I mentioned before, the background skills in this category may have some overlap with the other two categories. That being said, there are some significant differences between the beforementioned skills and those discussed below. The most notable difference is that many of the skills in this category actively influence the performance of other

skills and abilities, meaning that they play a significant role in one's capacity to carry out a task, and thereby will be shown to hold a foundational role in the clusters of preconditions discussed below.

To begin with, I believe that *Civic resolve* is the most foundational motivational skill of all. Civic resolve is in fact necessary for all levels of deliberative democracy, and I would go further and claim that it is necessary for any deliberation to take place whatsoever. It is meant to describe the phenomenon where one exerts an *effort* to actually seek out and engage with others in a deliberative fashion. It is one thing to have the required cognitive or collective skills and a sufficient amount of background knowledge to engage with a topic, but it is another thing entirely to actually form the intention to do it and follow through on that intention. Civic resolve ensures that an individual's intention stands resolute and that they persevere in the performance of an appropriate deliberative action. It is like deciding to get into better shape by increasing one's levels of exercise. From the standpoint of health, it is the right thing to do, and they would know that the long-term effects will far outweigh the short-term costs. One might have also joined a running group in their community, and maybe even made a few friends in that group that encourage them to go. But when that alarm rings at 6am in the morning, they still have to get up, put their shoes on, and get out that door. Now it is true that deliberation and other political participation is somewhat different and therefore perhaps not perfectly comparable to exercise, but the phenomenon is the same. One can have the cognitive capabilities, and the skills to successfully interact with the collective deliberative body, but they still need the civic resolve to ensure that they are successful in the performance of a given task.

There may also be a temptation to equate civic resolve with a kind of *civil courage*, which is defined as a heroic act, where one acts bravely to take a stand in response to a social or political situation that they believe to be unjust in some way. For example, Martin Luther King Jr. could definitely be described as someone who possessed civil courage. However, civic resolve is different than civil courage in two very important senses: it is not heroic or extraordinary, and it does not require one to take a stand against a social or political injustice. As is the title of this project, I am specifically concerned with the akratic citizen, the one who knows what they ought to do, forms an intention to do it, and perhaps even has the skills to do so successfully (or at least has the capability to acquire those skills), but when the time comes to exercise them, for whatever reason, they fail to follow through with their intentions with a 'meh' or a shrug of their shoulders. This citizen is more common than some more liberally minded political theorists might want to concede, but I do believe the problem to be widespread enough to warrant further investigation. Therefore, civic resolve is to be

31

defined in this project as the exertion of effort in a self-regulatory move, to ensure that one follows through on their intentions and actively participates in deliberative undertakings with others, both in an informal or formal setting; and it is crucial for the citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy, no matter how demanding (or effortless) the various levels of deliberative democracy can be.

A second motivational skill that the sort of citizen required for a functional deliberative democracy ought to possess is a degree of *emotional forbearance*. I wanted to include one's affectual dispositions in this category because they are not strictly cognitive. Emotions are incredibly motivating, and contribute to one's attitude, which coupled with their desire and other motivating factors combines to form an intention, which then results in an action. Whether we are talking about an overreaction out of fear or an omission of action due to extremely high levels of anxiety, both can influence our mood, our attitude towards others, and our productivity. Therefore, it is important for a deliberator to display some degree of self-mastery. To clarify this claim further, I do not believe that all citizen deliberators need to be self-discipline experts or that they should try to approximate the emotionless *Vulcans* of Star Trek. In fact, it may be a necessary and informative part of the deliberative process to hear the emotional suffering of those affected by a policy that is being discussed in a town hall meeting or CA. But there is a distinction between one's awareness of the delicacy of a topic, and their emotional reaction to it. Owing to the advancements in behavioral science, we now have a better understanding of how the brain works, and what we have discovered is that a much larger percentage of our thinking takes place at the intuitive (Type 1) level, which is rapid, associative, pragmatic, low effort, prejudicial, and automatic (Heath 2014, 58). This is relevant because affect and emotion are elements of personal experience, and therefore play a prejudicial role in how one defines particular events and the associations they evoke (Rosenberg 2017, 2). In an age where news tends towards the sensational, and vital conversations (such as those concerning institutionalized racism in police departments) can be uncomfortable to say the least, the sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy should possess emotional forbearance, which will help them prepare for the anticipated affective influence of a given situation, and to weather that influence thus minimizing its effect on their intentions and the performance of their actions.

Lastly, at the higher levels of deliberative democracy, capacities for empathy and perspective-taking can become a necessary ability for the kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy to be sufficiently motivated (Rosenberg 2014, 100). I want to avoid the use of the term

caring here as it is a potentially problematic term for a number of reasons, most notably its subjectivity. It is not strictly clear what exactly it means to care for someone, or which corresponding actions ought to be taken given that one does in some way care for another. In this case, *empathy* more closely captures the nature of this skill. One would have to be able to understand/share in the feelings and perspectives of others. There may of course be other motivating factors for some people, and at lower levels of deliberative democracy there surely are less burdensome motivating factors, but at the higher levels, which require a great deal more time and energy, this motivation may be necessary to reach the desired levels of participation and consensus.

To summarize these skills for the next section (2.2) where they will be clustered based on the different levels of deliberative democracy, I would direct you to table 2 below.

Table 2.

Individual Cognitive	Collective Cognitive		Motivational
Understanding adequate methods of evidence collection	A communicative competence	Understanding the value of talk and viewing it as a worthwhile time commitment	Civic resolve
The ability to integrate well sourced evidence	Trust in the process, and one's fellow deliberators	Mutual respect for all those involved in the deliberative process	Emotional Forbearance
An openness and willingness to accept new evidence even if it contradicts one's paradigm	Understanding the subjectivity of perspectives amongst one's fellow deliberators	The ability to resist the classroom temptation to play the 'devil's advocate'	Capacities for empathy and perspective-taking
An awareness of institutional design, the bias, and the structure of deliberative arenas	Recognition of the distinctness of one's own reasoning (in an effort to explain oneself in a comprehensible way to others who may reason differently)	A recognition that others approach deliberation with different motivations (social, political, etc.)	
The identification of one's own values leading to a rational judgement	The ability to understand the claims of others (to avoid talking past one another)	The ability and openness to be persuaded by arguments, testimony, and narratives provided during deliberation	

2.2 Skill Clusters and Case Examples

Not every level of deliberative democracy will require the same background skills and abilities of citizen deliberators. Naturally, the higher levels, by which I mean the levels of deliberative democracy that require the most time, energy, and commitment, will therefore require a more

comprehensive set of skills than the lower levels. As I mentioned in the outset, this section will cluster the skills around three different levels of deliberative democracy and provide case examples for explanatory support. I cluster the skills in this way for several important reasons. Firstly, I aim to remain neutral with regard to the different diagnoses of the specific form of deliberative democracy that would be necessary to address increasing levels of citizen dissatisfaction. Whether one thinks that there is an urgent need for a highly demanding or minimally demanding form of deliberative democracy; either way, there will be shortcomings given the prevalence of deceptors and the general unwillingness to meaningfully invest in ameliorative nudging, boosting, and bracing programs. Secondly, by dividing programs of deliberative democracy up in this way I will be better able to explore some of the nuances in the different skills each level would require of their citizen participants. Lastly, and when coupled with the three case examples provided in 1.3, this division allows me to shine a spotlight on the foundational motivational skills at the heart of this project.

The minimal cluster of background skills will be focused on smaller scale deliberations such as those that involve a handful of participants at most. Many of these deliberations will be informal and personal, as opposed to the more formal and moderated interactions of a town hall meeting or CA. Likewise, the goal of this minimal level of deliberation differs from higher levels as it is not focused on consensus. Instead, it is focused on increasing levels of engagement between individual deliberators and getting them to seek out deliberative opportunities while engaging with people in their community, family, social circles, etc. By engaging with others, individuals are forced to reflect upon challenges to their beliefs and reasons which in turn cause their positions to develop (Cohen 1997, 77; Cohen & Rogers 2003, 242). This minimal cluster corresponds to The Case of Kyle. I began by giving several examples of the various biases and cognitive deceptors that may have interfered with his cognitive capabilities. In addition to these obstacles I argued that a motivational deceptor could also be the cause. Kyle's social media presence offered him an avenue to present a supportive stance for the social movement, however, it also interacted directly with his motivation as it misdirected his efforts away from attending an important demonstration to counter protest the KKK. From the list of skills above, I propose that only a few of the skills are necessary for this minimal level of deliberative democracy.

At the minimal level it would be important for the sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy to possess some cognitive capabilities. They do not need to be a master of all of them, but for example, having a basic understanding of the relevant evidence is crucial.

35

Not only does one need to be aware of some degree of evidence surrounding a given topic, but it would help greatly to have sufficient knowledge coming from reputable sources to be able to sift through any untrustworthy information. For example, if Kyle knows that there is a good chance the demonstration is a counter protest to a KKK rally, which draws a more conservative base, it may be a good idea to understand where those individuals are coming from, and where they are getting their information. Understanding that many conservative individuals at the rally may get their information from NRATV, Fox news, or other conservative new networks may allow Kyle to not only better understand them, but also to engage and communicate with them more effectively. On that note, there are a few *cognitive collective* skills that would be invaluable as well. The kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy must understand the value of talk, and view engaging in deliberation on any topic as a valuable use of their time. Deliberations require time, and varying degrees of energy. If one does not value deliberation as a valid use of time and energy, it naturally follows that they will be less inclined to engage in deliberation in the first place, especially if they must be the ones to initiate it during a peaceful demonstration.

In addition to these cognitive skills, the sort of citizen required for a functional deliberative democracy would also posses some fundamental motivational skills. In the minimal cluster, one ought to posses at least a low degree of emotional forbearance, and civic resolve. Regarding emotional forbearance, as I said above, one does not need to be an expert of self-control. That being said, having the ability to engage with someone that frustrates you, intimidates you, triggers you, or that affects you in some negative way is vital. It is important for Kyle to not be hindered by any anxiety, insecurity, or be intimidated by individuals at the KKK rally. Likewise, Kyle ought to face the uncomfortable subject of racism (and unconscious racial bias) without fear of persecution or blame. I introduce a small degree of nuance here though, where I distinguish a higher and lower level of emotional forbearance. Deliberations at the minimal level are informal, and emotional outbursts, triggers, and instances of anxiety will likely be more frequent. The important aspect of this skill is the awareness of any affectual influences, so that one can adequately prepare themselves, therefore minimizing their dominance as motivational factor. Finally, and perhaps most foundationally, the kind of citizen required for a functional deliberative democracy must possess civic resolve. Even if one possesses all other skills mentioned in this cluster, without a degree of civic resolve they will not be able to regulate their intentions in a satisfactory way, and they will not initiate or take that step and put themselves in a position where they will have to deliberate. As the case example clearly showed, Kyle has a wide

variety of social media outlets where he could quietly show support without exhausting too much effort or engaging in any deliberation at all, and without a degree of civic resolve, no amount of knowledge and understanding will be enough for him to go out and initiate the deliberation in the appropriate arena.

A medium cluster of background skills will correspond to a more involved level of deliberative democracy. Recall the example I outlined in the previous chapter about Noah and the town hall meeting to discuss the future of a schoolboard's sexual education program. Moreover, I would like to include several examples of mini-publics[7], as more formal settings for deliberation that I believe would also fall into this medium category I have created. These cases vary in their level of formality, citizen participation, internal structing, learning stages, budget, degree of mediation, and they typically involve little to no informal deliberation between individuals. Deliberative democratic programs that correspond with this medium cluster require a citizen to possess the following skills.

Firstly, the kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy at this medium level would require a wider range of cognitive skills and abilities to engage with their fellow deliberators more successfully. While the minimal cluster prescribed a basic understanding of solid evidence and its sources, the medium level will require the ability to integrate that evidence. The goal of medium level of deliberative democratic programs is consensus (Cohen 1997, 75), and programs are structured in a more formal way. What this means is that one ought to also posses an openness and willingness to accept new evidence even if it contradicts one's paradigm, and be able to adequately identify one's own values so that they may judge the topic of deliberation rationally. Regarding the collective dynamics and the skills necessary to deal with a larger group of individual deliberators, it will be important for the citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy to have developed a communicative competence. This will include the ability to make their claims understood to others as well as being able to understand and interpret the claims of others to avoid the awkward and time consuming phenomenon of 'talking past' one another. That being said, in some of the deliberative programs, as is clear from my previously mentioned case examples, some of these programs are mediated or have moderators to help move the process along. Additionally, the kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy ought to have a mutual respect for

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[7]Mini-publics are democratic innovations which are comprised of lay citizens and are structured in such a way to allow for small groups to deliberate effectively, while simultaneously being large enough to roughly represent the public. Some examples of Mini-publics include citizen juries, consensus conferences, planning cells, deliberative polls, and citizens assemblies (Davidson & Elstub 2013, 374-378; Elstub 2014, 167-169).

everyone involved in the process, from their fellow deliberators to the mediators steering discussion. Trust in the process will also be important given that the consensus reached could in fact lead to tangible political change. As for the motivational skills, the same civic resolve is required as was the case in the minimal cluster. In addition, a different degree of emotional forbearance is also necessary due to the larger group size, and potentially having to publicly stand up and challenge the offensive views of one's fellow deliberators. To make my position clear, I believe that all of the collective skills mentioned in table 2 are important for the citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy at this level. Understandably, not every single skill will apply to every deliberative program, but I intend for this medium cluster to act as a catch-all set, defined more by what is not in it that what is.

Finally, the highest cluster of skills that the sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy ought to have will include all of the skills from the minimal and medium clusters. Furthermore, there will be two additional skills that should be part of one's repertoire only at a more involved level of deliberative democracy, and therefore ought to be included in the highest skill cluster. Firstly, the sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy ought to be aware of the institutional design of the deliberative program. The reason for this is because in a CA, it is often possible for members to set their own agenda, and otherwise determine/change the structure of the program (Lang 2008; Pearse 2008; Warren 2008; Elstub 2014;). With this power, the sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy must take up the responsibility of inclusivity, of protecting minority voices, of fairness, and egalitarianism (Cohen 1997, 69). Alternatively, they must be aware of their mandate, and what specifically has been asked of them. For example, in the case of the 2004 British Colombia Citizens Assembly, participants had to choose between several possibilities of electoral reform, and their mandate was to choose the best possible option, not the most likely option to succeed in a referendum (Pearse 2008, 71-72). A second skill that is necessary, and the only skill in table 2 which has yet to be mentioned: the kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy should care. Deliberative programs at this level are the most time consuming and energy-taxing. Participants are expected to act as citizen representatives, meaning that they will be deliberating on behalf of their fellow citizens who are not present during the process (Warren 2008). Genuinely empathizing and understanding the perspectives of others concerns can become a necessary ability for the kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy to be sufficiently motivated to participate in this way, and to give the required

time and energy to the program (Rosenberg 2014, 100). In this case, not only could motivational deceptors stand as obstacles to an individual meeting the motivational standard, but this would represent a case where one's ordinary motivation would not be sufficient and perhaps would need to be scaffolded or extended in some way to meet the challenge of a more involved program.

2.3 Political Implications and Motivational Skills

Returning very briefly to the discussion of political implications of deceptors, which emerged from the heuristics and biases literature described in the pervious chapter. Citizens in modern democracies across the globe are becoming more dissatisfied with their government, they believe their politicians are untrustworthy, and that they care very little about the actual needs of their constituents choosing to instead attend to the needs of various special interest groups and large donors (Pew Research Center 2019). One of the possible solutions to this problem is to introduce more deliberative elements to modern democracy which could stimulate citizen enthusiasm, jumpstart institutional change, and restore much needed trust in the system (Cohen 1997; Cohen & Rogers 2003; Goodin 2008; Davidson & Elstub 2013; Rosenberg 2014). However, in 2.1 and 2.2 I have demonstrated that across various levels deliberative democracy, there are certain fundamental skills that citizen participants must have in order for informal deliberation or any deliberative program as a whole to be successful. In table 2 I broke down the specific skills one might need to be the kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy, and I then examined three clusters of deliberative democracy that each require a different collection of skills: a first level which represented informal interaction between individuals, a second and more demanding level which included town hall meetings and various mini-publics such as citizen juries, and the final example was a CA which represents the most demanding set of skills for citizen participants without adopting a fully deliberative system.

Cognitive deceptors make it difficult for individuals to be rational, and like in Stanovich's sodium vapor example, they create a low-validity environment, which causes various cognitive misfires resulting in predictable individual irrationality. Importantly, they interfere with the cognitive skills that the kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy would require. There are cognitive skills required for each of the three clusters of deliberative democratic programs, and while one does not need to master each skill, several of them, including the ability to evaluate the sources

of evidence, are crucial for even the most minimal level. Recall table 2, the individual cognitive skills are largely focused on assessing evidence, belief formulation, and evaluating one's own values. By impeding these skills, cognitive deceptors have the ability to undermine the deliberations of individuals and groups, which in turn will limit the success of deliberative democratic efforts to improve the satisfaction of citizens in modern democracies.

In an analogous way, motivational deceptors have the potential to undermine deliberative democratic efforts. Underlying the three clusters of deliberative democracy that I mentioned above is perhaps one of the most fundamental skills, civic resolve. One can possess correct beliefs about the world, have all of the required cognitive and collective skills to interact with a deliberative body in a meaningful way, but still fail to act in an appropriate way that aligns with the motivational standard. Civic resolve plays a crucial, non-cognitive role in motivation and without it, any other cognitive or collective skills will not themselves move an individual to actively engage with others on a deliberative democratic level. In addition, motivational deceptors can undermine the other motivational skills I identified. There are countless features in our environment which actively make it difficult to persevere: people can be triggered, consumed by anger, held back by anxiety, or even misdirect their efforts to the wrong audience, all of which cause individuals to deviate from the motivational standard.

Clearly both cognitive and motivational deceptors have similar political implications, they both contribute to citizen dissatisfaction and the stagnation of progress in modern democracies across the globe, and they also both have the potential to undermine deliberative democratic programs. What is interesting is the different attention that they have received by political theorists. The heuristics and biases literature have been informing works in political philosophy for almost two decades now, with various theorists and programs which not only identify consistent deviations to rationality (and the effects on voter irrationality), but also the ways in which this can be curbed or avoided altogether. The means to overcome such obstacles are crucial for any political process, and they are exacerbated when it comes to political processes that demand even more of citizens (i.e. deliberative democratic programs). Three programs stand out of the literature, the nudge program (Thaler & Sunstein 2008; Sunstein 2016), the boost program (Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig 2017), and the brace program (Heath 2014; Brennan 2016; Blunden 2019).

Motivational deceptors on the other hand, have not received the same attention from political theorists, despite their ability to undermine the same political processes that cognitive deceptors do. There may be several reasons for this: it is sometimes difficult to separate the distinctly motivational

aspects from the cognitive ones, and there is some controversy surrounding the motivational standard, and how people ought to be motivated (See section 3.3). Because motivational deceptors have been shown to be problematic to the political process in a way analogous to cognitive deceptors, I would argue that despite their controversial nature, they deserve more attention from political theorists than they currently receive. In the next and final chapter of this project I will discuss several programs for combatting motivational deceptors, some of which can be adapted from the nudging, boosting, and bracing programs.

3. Motivation, and Ameliorative Programs

The previous two chapters concern the first goal of this thesis project: to clarify the concept of a motivational deceptor. I explained that analogously to a cognitive deceptor, a motivational deceptor is a feature of one's environment which interacts causally with our motivation, causing consistent and reasonably predictable deviations from the motivational standard. They are also extremely difficult to do anything about, because in order to combat them, one must overcome the very hurdles fabricated by the deceptors themselves. This phenomenon has allowed both cognitive and motivational deceptors to proliferate and become ubiquitous in the environment, which as I described in the second chapter, has significant political implications for deliberative democratic programs. Having outlined the specific skills the kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy would require given three different levels of deliberative programs (differentiated by their level of demandingness on the individual citizen), I was able to identify several fundamental skills that are necessary for even the most minimal level. Some of these skills were cognitive, and some were motivational. What this means is that both cognitive and motivational deceptors, by undermining an individual's ability to acquire and make use of these fundamental skills, pose a substantial problem to the success of any deliberative democratic program.

I switch focus now to the second goal of the project: to examine several measures aimed at overcoming obstacles to deliberative democracy, which were created by motivational deceptors. The first two chapters represent an effort to better understand a concept, while this chapter's sole focus is to explore the possibilities of what can be done about it. In this chapter I begin in 3.1 by more closely examining the characterization of motivation, as one should be very clear about what it is that they are trying to mend. In addition to the standard story, I agree with Michael Brent who claims that the standard story is missing a vital element, which he identifies as a distinctive kind of *effort* (Brent 2012). Following that, I will briefly outline the nudge, boost, and brace programs that are designed to alleviate some of the irrational tendencies caused by human cognitive processing and cognitive deceptors. While these programs will not be perfectly adaptable to combat motivational deceptors, they represent a reasonable place to begin the process of developing a specific solution. I will build upon the three programs by adapting them where possible to target motivational deceptors and deviations from the motivational standard. The positive programs I propose in this section will be somewhat speculative,

as I will attempt to begin the process of developing several modified programs that could be expanded upon later. Lastly, in the final section of this chapter, I will elaborate on two distinct problems that any future program aimed at combatting motivational deceptors must overcome: a problem of the motivational standard, and an implementation problem. Both problems represent significant obstacles, but they should not be insurmountable.

3.1 Characterizing Motivation

Before moving into a more in-depth discussion concerning positive programs that could be used to overcome biases and deceptors, I must first expand on the account of motivation I provided early on in chapter 1. I did not expand my story in chapter 1 as I did not believe it necessary, and thought that it might even distract from the main argument I was trying to make: that analogously to cognitive deceptors, motivational deceptors can undermine various political processes. That being said, given the additional information I outlined in chapter 2 regarding the motivational skills proper citizen deliberation ought to have, such as *civic resolve*, I believe it necessary to update that initial story, and articulate how it all fits together coherently.

To begin with, the background assumption in my discussion of motivation comes from the *Humean theory of motivation*. The important aspect of this view that I adopt as a background assumption to my understanding of the concept is that belief alone is insufficient to motivate an individual agent (Rosati 2016). The Humean theory appears to be the dominant view in the literature, and I find several arguments in its favour compelling. One popular argument in favour of it is that if beliefs were sufficient for motivation, one would expect that those with congruent beliefs to be motivated in the same way. For example, suppose two people share a moral belief that they ought to cutback on their meat-eating habits to curb the emission of greenhouse gases, why does one becomes a vegetarian and the other feels no inclination to do the same? Now to be fair, anti-Humean's could argue that this discrepancy in motivation is due to subtle differences in belief between the two individuals in question. A second argument, which I find more compelling than the first, has to do with the status of desires in the Humean theory. The idea is that belief and desire differ conceptually based on how they fit onto the world. When one formulates a belief, that belief will reflect a perception of some aspect of the world, where facts standing contrary to that belief count against that belief. Desires on the other hand are the opposite, and facts about the world do not need to count against them. There are many more

arguments, both in favour of and against the Humean theory of motivation. While I accept the Humean theory, specifically the idea that belief alone is insufficient for motivation, I understand that the debate with the anti-Humean's is an unsettled matter, and one that I deliberately want to avoid delving too deep into.

Building on the Humean theory of motivation, I turn now to *the standard story*, an account I briefly referenced in the first chapter (section 1.3), which portrays actions as events that are caused by combinations of one's beliefs, desires, intentions and other motivating factors (Velleman 1992; Davidson 2001). Again, in keeping with a Humean theory, belief alone is not sufficient for motivation, and is only part of the story. The important addition made by the standard story is the status of *intentions*. An intention commits an agent to an action, and the role of intentions has two important aspects, a reason-centered commitment, and a volitional commitment (Bratman 1987). The reason-centered commitment is the reason that once formed, and intention should not be revised unless new and relevant information comes to light. The volitional commitment on the other hand is a motivational one, wherein intentions are supposed to cause actions, and therefore control them rather than merely influence them. In this way it is fundamentally different than a desire. A desire still needs to be weighed against other conflicting desires, whereas having formed an intention, one does not normally need to return to the consideration of pros and cons (Bratman 1987).

Missing from the standard story, is a clarification regarding the exact role of the individual agent responsible for a given intention (Velleman 1992, 463). The standard story taken on its own appears to portray a *passive* relationship between the agent and the actions that they perform having judged the relevant motivational factors and formed an intention (Brent 2012, 22). One way this is conceivable is to make a distinction between first and second order desires like Harry Frankfurt does when discussing his analysis of a person (Frankfurt 1988, 12-15). On his account, it is possible that one's beliefs and desires can cause a corresponding intention in spite of them and without their participation. Like an addict whose first order desires may cause them to take a drug despite their second order desire to abstain, in this case they may be more accurately described as helpless bystanders than an active contributor (Frankfurt 1988, 17-18; Velleman 1992, 463). On the other hand, one might suggest that agents can take a more *active* role in relation to their actions, especially noticeable in cases where it could be said that a given individual is showing incredible strength of will (Brent 2012, 22). A good example of such a case would be a marathon runner in the final mile of their race (Brent 2012, 20). In this example, there is an individual who believes marathon running will help

them lead a healthier lifestyle, and they possess a burning desire to lead a healthier lifestyle. This individual, having considered the competing reasons that either supported or opposed their participation in a marathon and the accompanying months of training, judged that the motivational factors in support were stronger than those in opposition. Therefore, an intention to train for/eventually participate in the Boston Marathon (a roughly 26 mile marathon) was formed, resulting in their departure on an ambitious training plan. On the day of the race everything was going smoothly until the final mile, where pain and exhaustion set in, and the individual in that moment judges that instead of finishing the race, they should stop running. In spite of this judgement, they are able to buckle down, work through the pain, find the necessary energy, and ultimately finish the race. They are able to resist reconsidering their intention to finish the race, displaying tremendous strength of will. This phenomenon raises two important questions. Firstly, if intentions commit an agent to action, how can we explain an agent's ability to persevere and finish the race? Secondly, when is it acceptable to reconsider an intention? In this project I unfortunately only have the space to investigate the first question, and I leave a discussion of the latter question to another project[8].

Regarding the first question, a skilled agent is able to take a more active role in relation to their actions, and can exert *effort*. This effort allows them to resist the temptation to reconsider their intentions, and follow through on their originally intended action (Brent 2012, 21). It is a distinct kind of effort with a very specific function, it enables the agent to initiate, control, or sustain their intentions in the performance if a given action (Brent 2012, 23). Returning to the example of a marathon runner, the effort the runner exerts in the final mile is able to help them overcome a judgement that would tempt them to reconsider their intentions, which would otherwise result in them failing to complete the race. The reason that I say a "skilled agent" is required to demonstrate this kind of effort, is because it takes certain skills to form and employ an intention, much like it takes skill to inform and employ the beliefs one has (Holton 1999, 241). Also, by discussing effort as a skill in this way, it allows me to point to a crucially important connection between this section and the pervious chapter. Recall the discussion of *civic resolve* (section 2.1), I described the motivational skill as the exertion of effort in a self-regulatory move, to ensure that one follows through on their intentions and actively participates in deliberative undertakings with others, both in an informal or formal setting. This is a foundational skill, without which the three levels of deliberative democracy that I outlined are subsequentially

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[8]For a more thorough discussion on the reconsideration of intentions, and weakness of will see (Holton 1999; Holton 2004).

undermined. The sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy requires civic resolve as a skill so that they are able to exert the kind of effort necessary to initiate, control, or sustain their intentions to participate in deliberative democratic programs. Civic resolve is what separates the kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy and the akratic citizen, and therefore attempts to ameliorate one's motivation must often find a way to support this skill.

3.2 …And What to Do About It

There are several programs which I have previously mentioned that are used to combat the negative effects of biases, and cognitive deceptors: nudges, boosts, and braces. Looking more closely at these three programs offers a unique perspective into how one might combat deceptors. I argued that motivational deceptors undermine the political process in an analogous way to cognitive deceptors, and I believe that the same is true of the possible ameliorative programs. I argue that the programs for combating motivational deceptors can be adapted from the programs used to combat cognitive bias and deceptors.

As I mentioned before, nudges are the brainchild of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. Building off of the heuristics and biases literature outlined in section 1.1, they recognized that one's external environment had the power to influence their behavior via their Type 1 processing. The environment in which people make decisions is called the choice architecture, and the structure of the choice architecture could influence Type 1 processing in various ways both positively and negatively (Thaler & Sunstein 2008, 3). A nudge is defined as: "any aspect of choice architecture which alters people's behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives" (Thaler & Sunstein 2008, 6). The important thing about a nudge is that it must not be costly to implement (i.e. Simply rearranging a shelf in the grocery store), and it must be easy to avoid or opt out of (i.e. changing a retirement savings plan from opt-in signup to opt-out). Nudges are noncoercive, which is a major selling point. In addition, they can be fairly easily justified given that they are so easily opted out of, and the fact that other parties will also attempt to influence the choice architecture, only without the best interests of the individual in mind.

The boosting program is significantly different than the nudging program, however they share one similarity in that they are both noncoercive. Ralph Hertwig and Till Grüne-Yanof is a much more recent development in the literature, but notably they do not share the same interpretation of the

heuristics and biases literature that promoters of the nudge and brace programs do (Hertwig & Grüne-Yanof 2017, 974-976). I do not have the space to go into detail concerning the background psychological literature of different kinds of boosts, but I can outline the general program and its likeness to the nudge program without doing so. Hertwig and Grüne-Yanof about human being's cognitive capacities and ability to be rational than Thaler and Sunstein do, and that is reflected in the difference in the programs they each promote. Boosts are designed to "foster people's cognitive and motivational competences", the goal is to either to develop new competencies or enhance already existing the competencies people have (Hertwig & Grüne-Yanof 2017, 979-981). One such way is to train people to have particular skills and develop specific competencies, but again the goal of a boost is to attempt to ensure that people do not fall victim to their biases in the first place, or at least less so than they would originally before the boost. They are noncoercive like nudges, however, unlike nudges they require the ongoing consent and active participation from individuals involved, making the boost program much more salient yet at the same time more demanding (Hertwig & Grüne-Yanof 2017, 982).

To help differentiate nudges and boosts even further, I will turn to an example of saving for one's retirement. Because people tend to suffer from *present bias*, meaning that they tend to prefer present benefits over future ones, many people have trouble saving for retirement. A nudging program, in an effort to get individuals to better save for retirement, might automatically enroll them in a retirement savings program. This would mean that the individuals enrolled would need to opt out of the program if they did not want to be enrolled, rather than opt into it if they did want to be enrolled. The result would likely be a greater number of people enrolled in the program, as people are less likely to opt out, even if it costs them very little time or effort. On the other hand, a boosting program would try to develop an individual's competency in order to increase the likelihood that they will enroll in the program themselves. This could take the form of self-reflective exercises which aims to bridge the gap between one's present and future self. Instead of taking advantage of biases as the nudge program would in this case, a boost program would attempt to develop the competencies of people so that they can overcome their present bias. The key difference is that if effective, this single boosting program would help individuals in other areas where they might also suffer from present bias, such as staying in school, or following a healthy lifestyle comprised of diet and exercise. If the boost is successful, the competencies developed can be deployed in multiple areas of one's life, whereas a nudge only helps in the specific situations they are designed for.

Finally, the brace program, which is a fairly new trend in the literature which has emerged from several sources including Joseph Heath's *Enlightenment 2.0* and Jason Brennan's *Against Democracy*. Recall the discussion of one's mental environment in chapter 1, the heuristics and biases literature can make the prospects of individual reasoning hopelessly bleak. Braces are designed to influence one's environment in a positive way that supports individual reasoning. They do not fix the bugs in one's on-board competencies, but they do aim to do two things: i) to counter the negative effects of cognitive deceptors which undermine one's ability to be rational, and ii) to support Type 2 cognition by designing environments that are more user friendly and actually conducive to reasoning. Braces best defined as policies that aim to influence one's environment, using regulation, coercion, kluges, bans, mandates, technology, etc. to scaffold and support their Type 2 cognition and prevent deceptors from causing misfires (Blunden 2019, 25). It should be noted that braces are not an attempt to develop long-lasting changes to one's competence, and in the event that a brace policy was removed, it should be expected that the benefits that came with the policy would also disappear. Not only does this effectively differentiate the brace program from the boost program, but it shows that braces are not an attempt to actually fix the problems of people's underlying cognitive competencies. Braces also differ from the nudge program in several important ways. Firstly, braces can be coercive, especially in the cases where they are deployed to combat cognitive deceptors, which may involve regulating private enterprise or banning a certain practice. Secondly, it is sometimes the case that braces can be deployed to scaffold people's Type 2 cognition, which could allow them to reason more effectively. Heath provides a perfect example of a brace which takes the form of an institutional design acting as a *kluge*. A kluge is a solution to a problem that gets something to work or achieves a favourable outcome without actually eliminating the underlying problem (Heath 2014, 62-63). For example, institutions like the legal system or peer review for academic articles are intentionally designed in an adversarial way because individuals have a horrifically difficult time seeing their own mistakes, let alone the biases that led to them. People tend to believe that they would be able to detect their own biased thinking through introspection, yet this is not the case, as introspection is nowhere near as powerful as people assume (Heath 2014, 143). The most powerful check on people's own biased thinking is therefore other people, and their wiliness (or eagerness even) to point out the mistakes of others. This kluge has not managed to get rid of the different biases effecting individual cognition, instead the institution has been designed in such a way that allows us to work around these biases.

These three programs are all tailored to address cognitive bias and deceptors, however, I believe that several of the programs, if properly adapted, could make a good starting point to discuss the possibility of ameliorative programs to combat motivational deceptors.

Beginning at the end, I will first propose an adapted bracing program which I call *Motivational Bracing*. Bracing programs are already well situated to handle motivational deceptors, as the domain in which they function will remain the same. As mentioned above, bracing programs aim to influence one's external environment in two ways: i) in a negative way that rids the environment of harmful deceptors, and ii) in a positive way by designing an environment that is conducive to the reasoning. Motivational braces will similarly have two goals. Firstly, they will have a negative program which aims to rid one's environment of deviation-causing motivational deceptors which undermine our one's ability to successfully participate in deliberative democratic programs. Secondly, they will have a positive program which will be to design an environment in such a way as to support one's ability to resist irresolute reconsiderations of their intentions. Remember the goal of a brace is not to enhance one's skill level, but merely to help create a more user friendly environment where the motivational skills they possess are more effective.

To give an example of how motivational braces might work, I want to return to The Case of Laura, from chapter 1. Laura in this example occupies a difficult position, as she is drawn into the argument between the younger and older generations, and she is subject to political advertising from third parties that oppose the citizens assembly. A motivational brace in this case could aim to influence the environment in either a negative way (by ridding the effects of a harmful deceptor) or in a positive way (by changing the environmental design to support individual motivational skills). A brace aiming for the negative program could target the political advertising. A policy intervention in the form of a regulation or ban on certain political advertisements and news coverage while the CA is ongoing would help rid the participant's environment of the harmful effects of a motivational deceptor. On the other hand, motivational braces could take the form of a positive program as well, and aim to redesign the structure of the CA to better stifle the uncooperative attitudes manifesting between the younger and older generation. By designing the CA in such a way as to break up the salient groups (young and old) and instead propose that competing teams of mixed ages compete to "argue" for one side or another against another group presenting arguments for a different position. The hope would be that by creating a more salient group than age, and pitting them against each other in an adversarial system (in the way that our courts do), the CA will: i) hear multiple competing arguments and get to the

49

bottom of their deliberations more quickly, ii) create a strong cooperative motivating force to compete well against the other group, and not be made to look foolish or unprepared. In both of these approaches, the motivational skills of the individuals are not changing, or being enhanced. Instead, the problems are being bypassed and the motivational skills that they do possess would be able to be more effective.

Moving on to a second potential program for combatting motivational deceptors, I would turn now to the nudge program outlined by Thaler and Sunstein. What this program is at its core is a noncoercive attempt to influence one's environment by manipulating their choice architecture in an effort to influence people's behavior in one way or another. What I want to suggest here is that one could design a program adapted from nudges as long as the two factors i) its noncoercive nature, and ii) the manipulation of one's choice architecture, are maintained. For the purpose of this project I will call this program *Motivational Nudging*. The idea of motivational nudging will be to reframe the motivational factors one takes into consideration when forming their intentions. This program will be non-coercive, and will aim to change an individual's *motivational architecture* in such a way as to nudge them in a more favourable direction.

One of the ways in which this program could work would be to *flavour* certain factors and their origins, so that they carry different weight when factoring into the formation of an intention. Flavour is normally defined as a distinctive taste of a food or drink, and what I mean by flavouring something in this case would be to find a way to have certain motivational possibilities leave either positive or negative impressions on an individual. For example, recall The Case of Kyle, from the first chapter. Kyle supports the contemporary social movement, and has several options to express that support. When the time came to get out their and join his friends at the demonstration, he instead posted to social media and blacks-out his accounts. By doing so, Kyle's effort has been misdirected. He had formed an intention to show his support by attending the demonstration with his friends, but when the time came to exert effort (his civic resolve) to follow through on that invention, he instead misdirected this effort allowing his intention to be revised resulting in a different action in show of support. A motivational nudge in this case would flavour Kyle's intention formation in such a way that certain actions seem more deserving of effort than others, and hold a higher status or priority than others. Motivational nudges in this case would ultimately come down to a channelling of energies, where one's effort could be appropriately channelled into a direction that aligns with the motivational standard, while still maintaining its non-coercive status as it can be avoided without too much work.

The final program I will propose here is adapted from the boosting program and as such I have elected to call it a *Motivational Boost*. Just as boosts are designed to foster people's cognitive competencies, a motivational boost will aim to foster and strengthen people's motivational competencies. This can be done by building on the existing abilities individuals have, or it could take the form of developing new abilities altogether. I do not believe this program to be entirely new, as some individuals, like Olympic athletes, marathon runners, and power lifters, have spent years of their lives boosting their motivation. They spend this time developing their motivational skills and abilities so that when they come down to that last mile, or they try to long-jump farther than anyone else in the world, they are able to successfully deploy their motivational skills, exert the required effort to resist the temptation to reconsider their intentions, and ultimately persevere in their chosen field. Returning to a moment now to The Case of Noah from chapter 1, Noah forms an intention to not only attend a town hall meeting to discuss the sexual education his two daughters will receive from school, but he also intends to actively participate by asking questions and making comments. Owing to a number of affectual influences, Noah's finds himself unable to overcome the fear and anxiety of speaking out in front of the whole town on such a sensitive topic, and against such a fierce opponent to the kind of education he wants for his daughters. A helpful motivational boost in this case would be one that found a way for Noah to be less afraid to speak out in a town hall meeting. This would involve Noah developing several skills including his civic resolve, and his emotional forbearance. To do this, Noah might have to practice these skills, often they are difficult for individuals to adequately deploy as they are not skills that are used very often in our modern representative democracies. For those people who see deliberative forms of democracy as the way to go, perhaps increasing the opportunities one has to practice this skill would be beneficial. Also, training an awareness of the affectual interference Noah might experience would also be important. If he knows what to expect, and has experienced similar situations before, the chances that his motivational skills will fail should decrease. Lastly, a motivational boosting program could focus on expanding the skills Noah has to participate in deliberative endeavours more effectively. This could take the form of the development of an ability to flag deceptors in one's environment that negatively influence the performance of his intended actions. Effectively this would amount to Noah becoming more skilled in identifying certain deceptors.

There are two important things to note about the motivational boost program. Like in the boost program, a motivational boost would require one's consent, and their active participation. As is

the case with learning any skill or ability, you get out of it what you put into it. Also, and more importantly, the skills that Noah could foster would be multi-purpose. By training himself to be less afraid to speak up in town hall meetings, Noah is developing a skill that will translate over to other deliberative arena's as well, thereby increasing the diversity of his abilities and the effectiveness of the motivational boost.

3.3 Challenges: Standard of Motivation and Implementation

In this, the final section of my thesis project, I want to articulate 2 distinct problems that I encountered while conducting my research. The first problem I want to identify is the problem of the motivational standard. Motivational deceptors are largely analogous to their cognitive counterpart in that they undermine deliberative democratic programs in similar ways, however, they are not alike in one very important aspect. One can justify nudges, boosts, and braces to combat bias and cognitive deceptors as they actively make people behave in an irrational way. The underlying assumption is that being rational is always better than being irrational, and this is especially true in the case of the political sphere and in a modern democracy. Any program that combats irrationality has a strong normative foundation based on this fact. A standard is a useful tool with which one can judge and easily identify deviations. In the case of the rational standard, it is very easy to judge deviations to it, and identify areas where irrationality is particularly high. The adapted programs I proposed in 3.2 cannot fall back on such concrete foundations, as they instead rely on the motivational standard. As I alluded to before, the standard of motivation has to first be justified before one can determine when there has been a deviation from that standard, and then formulate ameliorative programs to combat it. If citizens, faced by the same dissatisfaction with their political institutions and politicians decided that instead of going in a deliberative route, they ought to instead go in an epistocratic route (Brennan 2016; Jones 2020), then that decision would then makeup the motivational standard. Deviations would then be judged on the basis of this new assumption, and all ameliorative programs that follow would be judged against it. If the program would be one of epistocracy, there would be a very different motivational standard. On that account, deviations in motivation would be judged against the necessary levels of motivation needed by lay-citizens under the assumption that epistocracy was the way to go.

The way in which I have attempted to deal with this problem has already been discussed at some length in chapter 1 and 2. One can conditionally derive the motivational standard from the

degree of motivation that would be necessary for the given program to succeed. For those people who see deliberative forms of democracy as the way to go, I aim to clarify what is at stake in a more or less demanding deliberative program. A standard that is derived from this conditional claim should be seen as distinct from a generalized failure or deficiency, and that is why I am careful to speak in terms of 'deviations'. I do not argue the general case, that anyone who fails to attend a demonstration (like in The Case of Kyle) has a motivational deficiency. I instead argue that their failure in this case comes from a deviation. A deviation from the behavior of the kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy. Relating to that point, by dividing deliberative democracy up into minimal, medium, and high levels, my aim was to remain neutral regarding the different possible diagnoses of the specific form of deliberative democracy that would be necessary to address increasing levels of citizen dissatisfaction. The hope was that maintaining this neural stance I could simultaneously discuss motivational deviations under a wide variety of deliberative programs without committing to any specific one. This stance also allowed me to highlight the foundational skills that are shared by each of the three levels.

A second problem that I encountered over the course of this project is an implementation problem. Assuming one had decided on a motivational standard, and had come up with several concrete proposals for different programs which would combat motivational deceptors in various ways. The question is, how do they implement these programs if they need the support of the people who require the very programs that are proposed to be adequately motivated to offer their support. The problem is a bootstrapping problem. To make an analogy, because I have not made enough of those in this project yet, imagine the phenomenon of locking one's keys in their car. In order to unlock their car and get into it, they need the keys, but in order to get the keys they must already be in the car. The problem circles around and around, much like the implementation problem facing modern democracies propositioned by a political theorist's new ideas. Their policy ideas rely on public support to influence a democratic government to implement the programs, but that support requires the programs to be in place already. Specifically, in the case of motivation, let us assume that we wanted to pass a motivational brace policy to regulate certain kinds of political ads that target a citizens assembly while the CA is ongoing, but in order to implement that policy, it must first be recommended by a CA and then put to a referendum. In this case the policy is unlike to pass, as the very feature it is trying to address is undermining its implementation. This problem could be especially problematic for

those people who see deliberative forms of democracy as the way to go, as the more deliberative democracy becomes, the more influence individual citizens would have over policy implantation.

The way that I see it, there are two potential responses to a problem like this, however, they are both somewhat unsatisfying. I do not believe that either would fully solve the problem, but they could be a start. The first possible response could be that that future developments in the motivational programs I proposed could lead to an answer. The correct combination of motivational boosts, coupled with motivational nudges (where boosts will prove ineffective), and motivational braces (when a more coercive approach is needed) could create a scenario where individual motivation is sufficiently scaffolded, resulting in a jumpstart to the process of democratic implementation. Even the implementation of a few policies that ameliorate individual's motivation could be enough to dramatically increase this process.

A second way one could go about solving an implementation problem could be to change their background assumptions and approach the problem from an epistocratic political paradigm. If lay-citizens had less influence over the implementation of policies, and experts, who may not require the policies to meet the motivational standard, see their influence over policy implementation grow, it could represent a way around this problem. Because experts would see their influence over policy implementation grow, and because they do not rely on additional policies to meet the motivational standard, it is possible that they could implement policies that would benefit the motivational competencies of lay-citizens. There are two problems with this response however, and the first is that in an epistocratic system, where experts might have a more substantial influence over policy implementation, what reason would there be to improve the motivational competencies of lay-citizens? Their role in the system would change, and they would not be required to meet the same motivational standard as the experts. Also, by attempting to solve the problem in this way, one falls back into the problem of the motivational standard, where they need to justify a particular route (deliberative, epistocratic, etc.) before proceeding to develop a motivational standard and implementing specific ameliorative programs. As I said, neither of these two responses to the implementation problem is particularly satisfying, but I see no good alternative at the moment.

Conclusion

I believe this thesis project, at its conclusion, has had mixed results regarding the successfulness of its two objectives. Recall that in the outset, I proposed two research questions. First, what is a motivational deceptor, and how does it interfere with a deliberative democratic political process? Secondly, which programs and policy options are available to combat these interferences? The first two chapters of this project were devoted to answering the first question. The goal was to clarify the concept of a motivational deceptor, and explore its political implications. The goal of the final chapter was to address the second research question and to initiate a discussion about potential ameliorative programs which could combat motivational deceptors and other deviations from the motivational standard.

Beginning in the first chapter, I outlined the background heuristics and biases literature, which gives remarkable insight into the uniqueness of human cognition and our ability to think/behave rationally. This explanation served two purposes in this project. The first was to give a detailed account of one's mental environment, which can dramatically influence our ability to be rational; either positively via scaffolding efforts, or negatively through the formation of low validity environments and various cognitive deceptors. The second reason was that it allowed me to articulate Heath's understanding of *deceptors*, which play a central role in the project. *Deceptor* is a term used to identify and group together features of one's mental environment that routinely and predictably cause cognitive misfires, or what can be characterized as systemic deviations from the standard of rationality. I used this research as the foundation for my own argument, taking the form of an argument by analogy. I argued that in an analogous way to cognitive deceptors, motivational deceptors also have the potential to undermine the political process, albeit they target an individual's motivation rather than their rationality.

The political implications of this literature are well documented, and it has been argued that cognitive deceptors have the ability to undermine aspects of the political process, particularly aspects of that process that rely on the rationality of individuals (Heath 2014; Brennan 2016; Jones 2020). In an analogous way, motivational deceptors undermine certain motivational aspects of the political process, by misdirecting one's available effort, by stifling one's motivation through affectual overstimulation, or by fostering uncooperative attitudes between individuals in a deliberative setting.

55

To give a concrete example of how motivational deceptors actually undermine specific political processes, I outlined several levels of deliberative democracy, arranged in order of their demandingness, and argued that each of these levels had corresponding skills that the sort of citizen required for a functional deliberative democracy ought to have in order to participate successfully in the program. It was important for me to distinguish between these three levels of demandingness so that I could discuss the specific skills participating citizens required, while remaining neutral with regard to the different diagnoses of the specific form deliberative democracy that would be necessary to address increasing levels of citizen dissatisfaction.

Building off the three examples of motivational deceptors given in chapter 1, the second chapter delved deeper into the specific skills the sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy ought to possess. By framing the problem in this way, I was able to identify several foundational skills that I believe were necessary for the success of even the least demanding programs. The foundational skill at the heart of the project was identified as *civic resolve*. Civic resolve is defined in this project as the exertion of effort in a self-regulatory move, to ensure that one follows through on their intentions and actively participates in deliberative undertakings with others, both in an informal or formal setting; and it is crucial for the kind of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy no matter how demanding (or effortless) those programs can be. It is one thing to have the required cognitive or collective skills and a sufficient amount of background knowledge to engage with a topic, but it is another thing entirely to form an intention, and follow through on that intention while resisting the temptation to reconsider it.

After clarifying the concept of motivational deceptors, I turned my attention to the various ameliorative programs with which to combat them. I began by characterizing individual motivation, in an effort to be clearer about how one's beliefs, desires, and intentions combine and translate into action. After sufficiently clarifying my position, I argued that *the standard story* of motivation was missing a key component, the *effort* which can be exercised by an agent to resist the temptation to reconsider their intentions and persevere in an action that aligns with the standard of motivation. In terms of deliberative democracy, where the motivational standard is determined by the motivational skills the sort of citizen that is required for a functional deliberative democracy ought to have in order for their deliberations to bear fruit, the *effort* an agent can exert translates into *civic resolve*. However, motivational deceptors have the unique ability to sap, block, or misdirect one's available effort, as demonstrated by the three examples which I continued to return to throughout this project.

In an effort to hypothesize possible ameliorative programs to combat motivational deceptors, I first turned to the examples of programs which target individual's bias and cognitive deceptors. My hope was that new programs which specifically targeted motivational deceptors could be adapted from existing programs in the literature. I found that the brace program needed little to no adapting and was already well suited for the task given its focus on the features of one's external environment. The nudge program was also a prime candidate, however, it needed slight adaptation to be better suited for motivational concerns. Lastly, I proposed a motivational boosting program, which was adapted from Ralph Hertwig and Till Grüne-Yanoff's boosting program. I believe that for me to judge the success of these proposed programs at this point would be premature, as future, and more extensive research would be needed to adequately develop those proposals into working theories.

Ultimately, I believe I was slightly more successful in addressing the first research question of this thesis project than I was at the second. Motivational deceptors are a distinct concept, and yet share many similarities with cognitive deceptors, making them somewhat difficult to distinguish at times. They have clear political implications, which, while not as widespread as their cognitive counterpart, still pose a serious threat to the implementation of deliberative democratic programs at each level I identified in chapter 2. The programs I proposed in the final chapter represented preliminary research and speculation into what could possibly become a viable research topic for the future. Adapting the programs took some creativity, and I am not yet sure how closely the motivational proposals resemble their pre-adapted counterparts; however, I would have to develop each proposal to a much greater degree before I was confident in their viability as policy options.

The adapted programs I propose and the project as a whole were not without their controversies. There could be debate as to how I decided to separate the levels of deliberative democracy, and how their demandingness could be judged in several different ways. The same could be said for the clusters of skills I articulated in chapter 2. I anticipate future discussions about why certain skills are included in certain clusters, and why others were not. Also, as I mentioned in the final section of the thesis, there are two main problems that must be overcome in future research depending on the direction it takes. Firstly, the problem of the motivational standard is the most foundational and controversial problem I came across. In this project I attempted to bypass this problem by falling back on a conditional claim to a deliberative democratic paradigm. Under this conditional claim, the standard of motivation could be determined by the motivational necessities of the various deliberative democratic programs. This is a problem that is not shared by the literature associated with cognitive

deceptors given that they can fall back on the much less controversial claim, that it is always better being rational rather than irrational. Finally, I identified an implementation problem. This problem is a bootstrapping problem, where the very programs that would nudge, boost, or brace one's motivational prospects are needed in order to implement those programs in the first place. I offered two possible solutions to this problem, and while I do not believe that either sufficiently solves it, I see no good alternative at the moment.

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