MA International Relations in Historical Perspective

One conference, various security perspectives

A comparison of the Dutch and Romanian perspectives on security in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1970-1974

Anneleen Mesker, 5718023
Supervisor: dr. Laurien Crump
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Abstract

This thesis compares the perspectives on European security of the Netherlands and Romania, as portrayed in the negotiations leading to the formulation of the CSCE Helsinki Accords, between 1970 and 1974. This research uses a comparative historical primary source analysis in combination with a more theoretical security studies approach. In this way, this thesis forms conclusions on multiple levels. First, this thesis compares two states on each side of the Iron Curtain, whereby it follows the line of research of *New Cold War History*, and contributes to a empirical debate on the CSCE in the Cold War. Second, this research shows by comparing two member states of the CSCE that this conference was much more complex than previous research has emphasized and much more than a platform for pan-European dialogue. Moreover, this case study also shows that a theoretical approach, such security studies, needs to be combined with the essential features of historical cases, based on empirical research, in order to enhance the validity and relevance of the outcome.

Keywords: *CSCE, Cold War, New Cold War History, Security Studies, Comparative Historical Method, The Netherlands, Romania*

1. Introduction

As of the beginning of the 1970s European states promoted a conference to facilitate Pan-European dialogue during the Cold War: The Conference for European Security and Cooperation (CSCE).[1] The CSCE had 35 members, which included all European states except Albania -communist, capitalist and neutral- as well as Canada, the Soviet Union and the United States of America (US). European states on both sides of the Iron Curtain wanted to combine defense with détente, and to promote détente beyond the superpowers.[2] The first phase of the CSCE culminated in the Helsinki Final Act, which was signed on 1 August, 1975, in which all its member states claimed to agree on ten mutual principles on European security.[3] Hereby the members of the CSCE wanted '[…] to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and cooperation as well as to rapprochement among themselves and with the other States of the world.'[4] The CSCE is a relevant case study, also to the present, since its successor, the Organization on Security and Cooperation Europe (OSCE), which was founded after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, is not a success just yet. While both organizations are based on the same Helsinki Accords, the CSCE seemed more successful in preserving peace and security in Europe. With so many members, of so many ideological backgrounds, it almost seems impossible that all the CSCE members had the exact same perceptions on European security. Therefore, this thesis will look into the different perceptions on European security of Romania and the Netherlands in the negotiations leading to the formulation of the Helsinki Accords, between 1970 and 1974, and compare those two perceptions, to show that the conference was much more complex than the agreement on the ten principles in the Helsinki Accords on first sight show.

The ten principles in the Helsinki Accords served to encourage pan-European dialogue and encourage the states to promote security and cooperation.[5] While there were ten principles in the formulation of European security, previous research focused mostly on the seventh principle, on human rights. In this way previous scholars have put too much emphasis on one aspect of the ten principles of European security instead of all the principles at once. Sarah Snyder is one of the

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[1] Jussi Hanhimäki, 'Détente in Europe, 1962-75', in: Melvn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume II: Crisis and Détente* (Cambridge 2010), pp. 198-218, 201.
[2] Laurien Crump, 'Forty-five Years of Dialogue Facilitation (1972-2017). Ten lessons from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe', *Security and Human Rights* 27 (2016), pp. 498 – 516.
[3] The Ten Principles which were formulated in the CSCE Helsinki Accords can be found in the Appendix.
[4] Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *The Helsinki Final Act* (Helsinki 1975), https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act (last viewed, 19-06-2020).
[5] Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *The Helsinki Final Act* (Helsinki 1975), https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act (last viewed, 19-06-2020).

historians with this singular focus. She focused only on the Western NATO perspective on the CSCE, and the influence of Western ideas of human rights on the formulation of the Helsinki Accords. She emphasized solely the role of the view of the Western states on human rights on the CSCE, and did not research the influence of other factors, such as national interests or the role of other alliances in her research or even other factors in security at all.[6] This thesis however, focuses on all the principles of European security as formulated in the Helsinki Accords and therefore sees human rights as a part of security, not as its main feature. While human rights were a new and important factor in the CSCE, because human rights were never a part of security before, this does not mean that human rights should be the main focus of research on the CSCE. This thesis therefore takes a new angle in the already existing research on the CSCE, without a main focus on human rights, but on European security with all principles, and on states from both sides of the Iron Curtain to grasp the complexity of the CSCE. The insight in the complexity of the CSCE is also relevant to show why the CSCE was successful, and the OSCE is not.

The Netherlands and Romania are selected for this new empirical approach since they represent two extreme member states on the opposing sides of the Iron Curtain. The Netherlands was a prominent western ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the European Community (EC). In this way the Netherlands is an excellent case study that gives a good insight in the various dynamics of NATO as well as the EC, in relation to cooperation with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As a member of both the EC and NATO, the Netherlands wanted to unite all Western states with their policy in the CSCE. So, while the Netherlands was a free member of the Western community, and could propose its own objectives on European security, the Netherlands chose to commit to the objectives of the Western bloc, to take on a mediator role and unite the West.[7] While the Netherlands had the freedom to choose its own policy, but adapted to the policies of the Western bloc, Romania did the opposite. Romania was expected to adapt to Warsaw Pact policy on European security, but did not do so. For Romania, the main objective was to break the unity in the Warsaw Pact with their actions in the CSCE. Hence, this would mean more independence for Romania itself in the Warsaw Pact, and more specifically from the Soviet Union. For Romania, its main objective was to break hegemony in Europe.[8] It also used the CSCE in order to do so. This did, however, not mean that Romania was abandoning its communist perspectives and

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[6] Sarah Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (Cambridge 2011), 19-27.

[7] Laurien Crump, Lenna Lammertink, Eva Zeilstra, 'Ferm, doch onopvallend. Nederland en de Conferentie over Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa (1973-1983)', in: *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 132 (2019) 2, pp. 257-279, 276.

[8] Elena Dragomir, 'The perceived threat of hegemonism in Romania during the Second Détente', *Cold War History* 12 (2012) 1, pp. 111-134, 120-122.

ideals, since Romania remained an oppressive communist state. Because of these contrasting backgrounds, policies and objectives, it is very interesting to compare the two states in their perspectives on European security, because it would tell a lot about the complexity of the CSCE, with all its different members.

This comparison between two ideologically opposing states is new in the historiography that already exists on the CSCE. Much of the literature that has been written on the CSCE focused mainly only on the Western side. Historian Angela Romano was one of those writers, because she focused on the influence of the West on the Helsinki Accords of the CSCE. She stated that the Western states succeeded in their goals to delegitimize the Brezhnev Doctrine and to implement human rights into the Helsinki Accords, by the negotiations on the ten principles. According to her, the Western states influenced the proposals for the ten principles in the first basket to such extent that they managed to reach all their goals.[9] She drew her conclusion however on research of primary sources of only the Western side of the Iron Curtain and focuses again only on the singular principle of human rights, which is why she did not benefit from the full empirical opportunities that the opening of Eastern archives offers. This thesis will give a more complete picture of the situation in the CSCE, since it will address primary sources of both sides of the Iron Curtain. It will do so by analyzing primary sources of both the Netherlands and Romania, which represent both sides of the Iron Curtain.

The primary sources that this research will analyze, are thus coming from multiarchival research. Hereby I follow the line of the *new cold war history*, which claims that accurate research on the Cold War is doing multi-archival research on both sides of the Iron Curtain to get the full picture of the Cold War and all its elements.[10] This thesis is following this line of research by doing research into two different archives, to represent both the Netherlands and Romania in full depth. By doing research into these smaller members of the two bipolar blocs, this thesis can also shine its light on the role of smaller states within the ideological blocs. To do a representative analysis of the view of the Dutch government on European security, research into the National Dutch Archive is necessary. The sources that have been analyzed are from assigned CSCE committees of the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministerial committee of the Dutch government in general. These sources will give a full insight in the opinion, views and interests of the Dutch government, since these documents were secret at that time. They were thus only meant for internal use, and will show the honest opinion of the Dutch government on the topic of European security in the CSCE. For an analysis of the Romanian opinion on European security the archive of the Parallel History Project on

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[9] Angela Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente. How the West shaped the Helsinki CSCE* (Brussels 2009), 40.
[10] John Lewis Gaddis, *We now know. Rethinking Cold War history* (Oxford 1997), 189.

Cooperative Security (PHP) is used. This archive consists of translated documents of both the general Warsaw Pact meetings (PCC), and the national meetings of the Romanian government on European security. By using both the Romanian opinion and the internal Romanian opinion on European security, this research can give a full insight in the perception on European security in the CSCE of Romania.

This thesis will research two states and their perspectives on European security, by analyzing primary sources from archives which contain sources from both sides of the Iron Curtain. By focusing on European security, this thesis will also go beyond the past historical focus on human rights. This thesis therefore focuses on the concept of security, with the ten principles as its basis. While the CSCE was held to preserve European security in the first place, this was not the focus of many previous studies. Therefore this thesis will also have a security studies focus, next to its historical analysis. This means that the research will be historical, but that the concepts and discussions in security studies on security and security communities will be taken into account.

Field of study

Within security studies research dynamics of cooperating on the same principles of security, like an organization as the CSCE, has hardly been researched. Because dynamics and interplay between states in such a cooperation did not fit within the theories that are used within security studies. Security studies is mainly theory based and looks into case studies to prove it does or does not apply to this theory. In the 1950s Karl Deutsch came up with a concept to describe groups of actors that have become so integrated with each other that they will not fight each other physically anymore, but solve their disputes in some other way.[11] According to Deutsch this so-called security community is territorial: it could refer to nations, regions or blocs.[12] The assumption of the territorial security community is based on the Cold War thinking of blocs that face outside threats. But it also challenges the idea of realist security in the way that it focuses also on the unity of ideas and assumptions of security, and not only on the outside threats.[13]

In the late 1980s and 1990s there was a lot of change in the field of security studies. The usual bipolar security image of the Cold War declined. This image was found to be inadequate to

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[11] Mary Kaldor, *Global Security Cultures* (Cambridge 2018), 14.
[12] Kaldor, *Global Security Cultures*, 21.
[13] Emmanuel Adler, Michael Barnett, 'Security Communities in theoretical perspective', in: Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds) *Security Communities* (Cambridge 1998), pp. 3-28, 4.

explain the changes that were going on in international politics, which brought new security issues. The so-called *new security studies* were based on the constructivist turn in international relations, which was more focused on social theory and saw international security as their new objective of study. This meant that security studies became more based on the idea of forming theories than on actual practices. The key to understand security was interpreting culture and identity, and therefore more focused on forming security theories.[14] Because the new security studies are so inclined with theories, it lost its sense of what makes a case study unique. This can be seen in the new forms of the concepts of security communities that emerged after this cultural turn.

With the cultural approach to security, a new approach to groups of actors with the same ideas on security was constructed as well. This concept was called a security culture, with more emphasis on the similar ideas of security. This concept can be described as 'the sum of the beliefs, values and practices of institutions and individuals that (1) determine what is considered to be a danger or insecurity in the widest sense and (2) how and by which means this danger should be handled'.[15] Contrary to the Deutschian definition of security community, this definition of the concept of security culture does not only include entities that are territorially linked, but regards a security culture as a concept that includes ideas and identity.

The debate between the two concepts of security culture and security community as the best way to research security issues, is still relevant in the present day. A revisit of the definition of security community of Deutsch by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, constructs a combination of the two terms. These two political scientists formed a new framework of study around this concept of security community and formulated the concept in a more defined way.[16] To do so, they redefined the term community as well. In this way Adler and Barnett intended to overcome the Deutschian idea that a community can only be territorial.[17] They name three characteristics of the concept of community, to show that a community is not only territorial. First, members of a community have shared identities, values, and meanings. Second, members of a community have many-sided and direct relations. Finally, communities demonstrate a degree of reciprocity, that shows long-term interest and altruism.[18] The CSCE was thus never a security community nor a security culture, since

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[14] Peter Burgess, 'Introduction', in: Peter Burgess (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of New security Studies* (London, 2010), pp 1- 4, 2

[15] Christopher Daase, 'On Paradox and pathologies: a cultural approach to security', in: Gabi Schlag, Julian Junk and Christopher Daase (eds) *Transformations of Security Studies: Dialogues, Diversity and Discipline* (Abingdon 2016), pp. 82 – 93, 82-83.

[16] Adler, 'Security Communities in theoretical perspective', 5.

[17] Emmanuel Adler, 'A Framework for the study of security communities', in: Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds) *Security Communities* (Cambridge 1998), pp. 29-65, 32.

[18] Adler, 'A Framework for the study of security communities', 31.

the member states had in no way shared identities, values and meanings, because of the great variety of states with different ideologies and objectives in the CSCE.

What other historians tried to do however, was to fit the CSCE in a framework that they formulated beforehand. Hereby these historians based their theory on the notion that the states within such a culture or community are all likeminded, which makes it a self-fulfilling prophecy. By implying this, the research on these concepts of security studies have a teleological basis, in which researchers only research groups of states that seem to be having the same ideas on security in the first place. The political analyst Ki-Joon Hong has attempted to analyze the CSCE through a security studies perspective. He viewed the CSCE however from a theoretical angle as well, and tried to prove that the CSCE was a security regime, which was a relatively new concept in security studies.[19] His research and his literature were in this way rather teleological in its arguments. Since he formulated his theory on the security regime before he looked into primary sources, he also had a theoretical angle in the case study of the CSCE. Therefore, he is not case oriented at all, but his source analysis is led by the theory that he tries to prove and does not focus on the uniqueness of the CSCE as an organization that formed principles of security with very different member states, that are not necessarily likeminded.[20]

By doing research on the CSCE as a multipolar and multi-ideological organization, this research strives to approach security not from a theoretical or teleological approach, but form conclusions on the basis of case oriented research, on a basis of historical primary source analysis into the dynamics in the construction of the CSCE. This research is therefore combining two strands of academic research, historical research and security studies, which makes it possible for this thesis to contribute to two debates: on the one hand the empirical debate of doing research on the CSCE as an organization on security and not on human rights, and on Romania and the Netherlands as two states on either side of the Iron Curtain, and on the other hand the more theoretical debate in security studies, by overcoming the teleological shortcoming of theoretical research by doing historical primary source analysis.

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[19] Ki-Joon Hong, *The CSCE Security Regime Formation: From Helsinki to Budapest* (Leuven 1996), 91.
[20] Hong, *The CSCE Security Regime Formation*, 92.

Methodology and focus

The method that this research will use is a comparative historical analysis. This means that this research will compare the two abovementioned states in their ideas and perceptions on European security, according to four themes that summarize the objectives of the ten principles. Hereby the analysis can be more effective and less extensive than it would be with analyzing them with all the ten principles at once. By dividing the ten principles in four themes, this research is making sure that all factors of security are being researched. These four themes will be used for an analysis of the perceptions and ideas of Romania and the Netherlands on European security. The first theme is military security. This theme combines the principles that are about the use of force, settlement of disputes, respectively principles number II, V and VI. These principles are all about the abstinence of military force or the threat of it, which could harm the peace and security in Europe. The second theme used for the analysis is sovereignty and independence. The principles that are combined in this theme are about sovereignty, territory and non-intervention, principle numbers I, III, IV and VI. The third theme used in this thesis is human rights. Principle numbers VII and VII are combined in this theme, since they concern respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and self-determination. The last theme has the subject of preservation of Détente. Principles IX and X require continuation of cooperation between the members and the participation under international law.[21]

To compare the two states, this thesis uses the contrast oriented comparative theory, explained by Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers. They define three different variants of the comparative historical method: macro-causal analysis, parallel demonstration of theory and comparative history as the contrast of contexts. In this thesis the last variant of the comparative historical method is applied to compare the objectives and ideas of the Netherlands and Romania on European security. This form of comparative history tries to 'bring out the unique features of each particular case included in their discussions, and to show how these unique features affect the working-out of putatively general social processes.'[22] This variant of the comparative method tries to show the complexity of each case, and not generalize in theories. Also, this method does not strive to create new generalizations with this approach.[23] While this thesis is trying to show the complexity of the CSCE by looking at multiple member states, the use of comparative history as the contrast of contexts is the most accurate method to use. Also, this thesis is moving beyond the single use of the

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[21] Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *The Helsinki Final Act* (Helsinki 1975), https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act (last viewed, 19-06-2020).
[22] Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, 'The Uses of Comparative history in Macrosocial Inquiry', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22 (April 1980) 2, pp. 174-197, 178.
[23] Skocpol and Somers, 'The Uses of Comparative History', 181.

security studies approach, as mentioned before, for which this method is also ideal, since it goes beyond the application of theory alone. While the comparative history as the contrast of concepts is approaching cases from a more macro-historical, this research tries to be more case oriented in the way that it is looking into the complexities of the overarching CSCE.

The Romanian and Dutch perspectives on security are first viewed in separate chapters. These chapters will both have the same structure, so that the comparison, which is done in the conclusion, can be based on the same research and information. The chapters will first look into the national perspective on security, which will be analyzed on the basis of a primary source research into the four themes that define security. Hereby one can see very clearly the differences in the national perspectives on security as they presented them. After this, both chapters will zoom out to the national position of the two states in their alliances and ideological blocs. This position will tell a lot about why they formulated their national perspective in this way, especially in relation to their superpowers. Last, both chapters will look into the way in which both states positioned themselves in the CSCE and how they saw the platform as an opportunity for their own national objective. During both chapters there will also be an analysis and view on the security studies debate, on the concept of security community and whether that can be used in this case study. Before going into the analysis of the Dutch and Romanian perspectives on security, this thesis will give a historical overview of the context of this period and the positions of both states in the world of the Cold War.

2. Historical and Theoretical overview

Introduction

Before doing a detailed historical source analysis of Romania and the Netherlands to look in depth at their perspectives on European security, this chapter takes a dive into the context wherein the negotiations took place. More specifically, this chapter will give a clear insight in the factors that had influence on the policies of Romania and the Netherlands towards the CSCE. By showing the two very different contexts and national circumstances, this chapter shows that the two states are worth researching and most of all worth comparing. The context of both states is also necessary to understand their role, strategies and priorities in the CSCE, and to give a better insight what these were based on.

Globally, the conditions to construct an organization for European Security were positive at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. During this period, several other forms of cooperation at the highest level emerged, and dialogue on security was promoted. In 1968 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed by several western as well as eastern states, with the intention of stopping further expansion of nuclear power in the world. The treaty, that was supported on a global scale, was surveyed by an inspection team.[24] The global mentality of cooperation and dialogue also had an influence on the European states that wanted to maintain European détente, for which they constructed the CSCE. The conditions to start a European conference on security thus seemed beneficial, both on the Western as on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain. However, there was also still a lot of rivalry and competition between the two blocs and within, which also had a great influence on the construction of the CSCE. Therefore this period can be summarized as a period where there was more dialogue than before, but also a period where the rivalry and competition did not totally disappear.

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[24] Hong, *The CSCE Security Regime Formation*, 92.

The Netherlands and its context

For the Netherlands there were several contexts and factors that it needed to keep in mind, during the negotiations of the CSCE. Since the Netherlands was a member of both NATO and the European Community (EC), it needed to revaluate its policy constantly. The membership of the US had a great influence on the policy of NATO. The superpower had a leading position in NATO and was reluctant to collaborate with the SU and its allies on European security. The US, Great Britain and France were of the opinion that the unity in the alliance of NATO should not be influenced by the dialogue made in the CSCE.[25] Also, the US did not want to influence the Mutual and Balances Force Reduction talks (MBFR) on disarmament that were held in Vienna, in which the US saw more potential.[26] Famously describing the stance of the US towards the construction of the CSCE was the statement of US national security advisor Henry Kissinger, saying that 'they could write it in Swahili for all I care'.[27]

The other prominent international organization in Western Europe, the European Community (EC), gained more political and economic influence, by enlarging its amount of members with Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark in 1973 to nine members. Especially the accession of Great Britain had great influence on the course of policy in the EC. The accession of such a prominent Atlantic ally of the US was only possible with the resignation of Charles de Gaulle as president of France and the coming of a pro-European British government. The British wanted to bring the alliances of NATO and the EC closer together, but that did not mean that they were only favoring the opinion of the US. As a matter of fact, the British saw their membership of the EC as an opportunity to enlarge their own international position and reputation. In order to do so, they needed a stronger Western Europe at their side, to have some leverage in the international field, which they wanted to achieve by supporting the EC and the Western European objectives in the CSCE.[28] With the accession of especially Great Britain, there was another large and influential member in the EC to which the other members needed to adapt. The Netherlands was a long term advocate for the membership of Great Britain, ever since the start of European collaboration. The Netherlands saw collaboration

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[25] Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente*, 106.
[26] Ibidem, 106.
[27] J. Hanhimäki, 'Henry Kissinger: Vision or Status Quo', in F. Bozo, P. Ludlow et al. (eds), *Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945–1990* (New York, 2012), 202.
[28] Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente*, 151-152.

between the EC and the Atlantic allies as the main priority of their policy in the EC. Therefore it was very pleased with the accession of Great Britain to the EC.[29]

Ever since the trade friction the EC had with the US during the 1960s, its members had a community feeling, and were seeing the benefits of collaboration within Europe, which influenced the willingness to collaborate through the CSCE.[30] Most members of the EC were willing to cooperate in the CSCE, and were forming a bloc with each other in these negotiations. Because of the growing influence and cohesion in the EC, its members were very determined in the negotiations and wanted to hold one line as the EC. That the EC wanted to form its own united policy is clear from the formulation of a European Political Cooperation (EPC), which actually was a EC foreign policy, in 1970. At the end of 1969 the EC members already agreed on enlarging their cooperation on security at the The Hague Summit. There they declared that they would make a report for potential foreign policy cooperation.[31] The idea for the EPC was to do a proposition for European integration, to promote cooperation on security, and to formulate a general policy towards European security and the CSCE in particular.[32]

This policy was not related to the policy of NATO, since the EC members had more progressive ideas on the promotion of European security. The EC members wanted to be more independent as individual states, and wanted to protect the EC from being lost in the negotiations between the superpowers, for which they needed to formulate their own policy on European security. For the European states détente was an opportunity to improve the life of European citizens in the short term, for which they increased the economic and social cooperation between them. This should also make the European states as a bloc more accessible for negotiations with Eastern Europe, in the long term, and to even influence them with the democratic values. This particular strategy was contradictory to Nixon's strategy to further strengthen the bipolar system, instead of opening multipolar dialogue. The EC members also sought more international recognition of their unity by formulating a joint foreign policy. However, with the rise of détente and the united foreign policy of the EC towards détente and European security, the cooperation between the EC members and the rest of NATO declined. There was friction with the standpoints of the US as a superpower towards European security, but also on economic trade, which made cooperation harder during the

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[29] Mathieu Segers, 'Nederland en de Europese Integratie', in: Jacco Pekelder, Remco Raben, Mathieu Segers (eds) *De Wereld volgens Nederland. Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek in historisch perspectief* (Utrecht 2015), pp. 83-107, 95.
[30] Hong, *The CSCE Security Regime Formation*, 93.
[31] *Communiqué of the meeting of Heads of State of Governments of the Member States at the Hague 1 and 2 December 1969*, Archive CVCE, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/final_communique_of_the_hague_summit_2_december_19
[32] Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente,* 80.

1970s. [33] For these reasons the nine members of the EC needed to reformulate their policies constantly, in regard to the policy of NATO and other European states.

The Netherlands felt the influence of the friction between the two alliances with regard to European security. Not only because the Netherlands was a member and founder of the EC, but also because the Netherlands was a members of NATO.[34] This meant that The Netherlands was positioning itself very carefully between two alliances that were in some ways having the same ideological standpoints, but that were also having different priorities in the negotiations on the CSCE, because of the membership of the US in NATO. The presence of the superpower had an influence on the policy of NATO, which was more bipolar and military oriented, and asked of its members to be stick to the policy of NATO. The Dutch greatly valued the opinion of its superpower, and always wanted to form a conclusion on its policy after meeting with NATO.[35] This policy was however most of the time conflicting with the guidelines that the EC members discussed in the EPC, which had a more specific focus on political cooperation. The Netherlands saw itself as a mediator between the alliances, to keep the bloc together.[36] In this way the position of the Netherlands seems somewhat ambiguous and was sometimes perceived by the other states as stubborn or even irritating.[37] The Netherlands was thus constantly maneuvering to make compromises between the two alliances and keep the cooperation going, and this while the Netherlands also wanted to stay loyal to their superpower, the United States.

Romania and its influences

The context wherein Romania operated on the other side of the Iron Curtain was in the 1960s occupied with a struggle for influence. In the communist sphere of influence China got a more prominent place in communist politics. When China produced nuclear weapons, it could grow to a prominent international player, who could attract other smaller communist states, just like the Soviet Union could. In this way China became a threat to the Soviet Union, with its other form of

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[33] Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente*, 80-81.
[34] Ibidem, 154-155.
[35] Nationaal Archief, Den Haag (after this: NL-HaNA), 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1483, Verzonden Codebericht 17 november 1972, afkomstig van ministerie van BZ, bestemd voor Ambassade Helsinki.
[36] Crump, Lammertink, Zeilstra, 'Ferm, doch onopvallend', 276.
[37] Floribert Baudet, 'It Was Cold War and We Wanted to Win': Human Rights, "Détente," and the CSCE', in: Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nuenlist (eds), *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75* (London, 2008), pp. 184–91.

communism and a fast growing economic influence in the world.[38] Romania wanted to benefit from this situation, to fight the monopoly of the Soviet Union in the communist bloc. The Romanian First Secretary, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, had an objective as of the beginning of the 1960s to decrease the influence of the Soviet Union on their policies.[39] A visit to China could help the Romanians to stand up against the Soviet Union, and gain more scope to maneuver in the Warsaw Pact. In their meeting the Chinese and Romanian delegates discussed the internal relationships in the communist world and the influence of the Soviet Union on the Warsaw Pact and their own states. Both agreed that the Soviet Union was striving to create bloc domination, which the Chinese called "social imperialism", which should be diminished.[40] Romania was thus in its foreign policy searching for ways to weaken the influence of the superpower, the Soviet Union, on other Warsaw Pact members. This also had influence on the general position of Romania in the Warsaw Pact. The Romanian standpoint on several issues, for example the intervention in the Prague Spring of 1968, was different. While the Netherlands was trying to keep the bloc together, Romania was trying to break it apart.[41] This position of the Romanians also had an effect on the first negotiations and discussions on European security in the Warsaw Pact.

With the 1966 Bucharest Declaration and the 1969 Budapest Appeal Warsaw Pact members tried to draw up a general line of policy towards European security, with a focus on relaxation. In the Bucharest Declaration of 1966, all the members of the Warsaw Pact formed a declaration in which they agreed that European security should be promoted and that steps towards relaxation in Europe should be taken. The Warsaw Pact members agreed that 'they declare that as long as the North Atlantic bloc exists, and aggressive imperialist circles encroach on world peace, the socialist countries represented at this meeting maintaining high vigilance, are fully resolved to strengthen their might and defense potential.'[42] The steps and ideas in the declaration were thus mainly taken on the assumption that NATO was the alliance in Europe that did not take security seriously and that the Warsaw Pact had to take the first steps in relaxing the tensions. Therefore the measures in the

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[38] Sergey Radchenko, 'The Sino-Soviet Split', in: Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War.Volume II: Crisis and Détente* (Cambridge 2010), pp. 349-372, 352-356.

[39] Laurien Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered. Inquiries into the Evolution of an Underestimated Alliance, 1960-1969* (Utrecht, 2014), 157.

[40] Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (after this: PHP), Record 27 File 1684, *Report by the Third Secretary of the Bulgarian Embassy in Pyongyang, Yankiev, to Bulgarian Ambassador Yancho Georgiev, Concerning Nicolae Ceausescu's Visit to China*, 22 June 1971.

[41] Dragomir, 'The perceived threat of hegemonism in Romania', 120-122.

[42] *Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact on the strengthening of peace and security in Europe (Bucharest, 5 July 1966)*, Archive CVCE, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/declaration_of_the_political_consultative_committee_of_the_warsaw_pact_on_the_strengthening_of_peace_and_security_in_europe_bucharest_5_july_1966-en-c48a3aab-0873-43f1-a928-981e23063f23.html

declaration itself are mainly directed at alleged Western actions that were threatening peace and security in Europe, such as military basis on foreign territory and the increase in military strength of both German States.[43] For Romania, the declaration was a step in the good direction, but they objected multiple times on the declaration, which ultimately had many drafts.[44] Finally, the general standpoint of the Bucharest Declaration was generally in line with their national policy towards European security: 'We believe that this declaration corresponds, in general lines, with our point of view. Of course, there are things that could have been better, but being a declaration of seven different countries all positions had to be represented.'[45] The Romanians saw the declaration as a good basis to start negotiations with the other European states, and agreed with the general line of policy.

Three years later the Budapest Appeal on European security was drawn up by the members of the Warsaw Pact. In this appeal they expressed their wish to unite the effort of all European states for the consolidation of European peace and security through a conference on European security.[46] The Warsaw Pact members stated that all European states should cooperate to prevent military confrontation and the arms race. To do so, all European states should strengthen the economic, political and cultural relations, which could be created through a European security system, for which the Warsaw Pact members proposed a meeting with all interested European states, to define the questions that should be on the agenda.[47] The Romanian delegation however wanted to expand the provisions in the Appeal even more. The Romanians 'proposed the inclusion in the Appeal of express provisions concerned with the use of force or threatening with force, pressure, and demonstrations of force, as well as military maneuvers in the territory or on the borders of other states.'[48] This proposal was in order to limit the Brezhnev doctrine, for which the Romanians feared that this doctrine would increase the Soviet hegemony.[49] However, this Romanian proposal was not accepted by the other participants, so that the Romanian delegation had to accept the formulation of the appeal as formulated in the final appeal. The policy of the Romanians regarding the limitation of military force on foreign ground was thus more progressive than of the other Warsaw Pact members.

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[43] *Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact on the strengthening of peace and security in Europe (Bucharest, 5 July 1966)*, Archive CVCE, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/declaration_of_the_political_consultative_committee_of_the_warsaw_pact_on_the_strengthening_of_peace_and_security_in_europe_bucharest_5_july_1966-en-c48a3aab-0873-43f1-a928-981e23063f23.html

[44] Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered,* 187.

[45] PHP, *Minutes of the Romanian Party Politburo Meeting, Report on the PCC Meeting by the General Secretary of the PCR (Nicolae Ceausescu)*, 12 July 1966.

[46] PHP, *Public Appeal for a European Security Conference*, 17 March 1969.

[47] PHP, *Public Appeal for a European Security Conference*, 17 March 1969.

[48] PHP, *Romanian Circular Letter on the PCC Meeting*, 19 March 1969.

[49] Dragomir, 'The perceived threat of hegemonism in Romania', 120-122.

Their stance against the objectives and the agenda of the future CSCE was therefore different and more open towards to the Western European states than of the other Warsaw Pact members. This was in some way also a good instrument to decline the domination of the Soviet Union and stand up against their firm grip on the Warsaw Pact. The independent policy towards the CSCE was however not only constructed to reduce the influence of the Soviet Union, but was also directed at preserving European Détente, by proposing more dialogue among all the European states.[50]

After the Western states accepted the Budapest Appeal for a European security conference, the preparatory talks for the construction of the CSCE started in Dipoli on the outskirts of Helsinki in 1970. With these preparatory talks the guidelines for negotiations and the construction of the conference were set-up, so that the real negotiations in the CSCE could be most effective. Finally, on July 3, 1973 the CSCE started in Helsinki, and lasted until the Final Accords were signed on August 1, 1975.[51] The Final Act consisted of different subjects that were divided into four 'baskets', which led the stages of the negotiations, that took place from 1972 till 1975. The four baskets had topics that were concerned with different parts of security and cooperation: the first basket was concerned with questions relating to security, the second with questions of cooperation in economics, science, technology and the environment, the third on the improvement of human context and communication, and the fourth basket was on the ideas of planning further meetings.[52]

The negotiations on these baskets laid the basis for the later cooperation between the European states in the organization of the CSCE, that existed until the end of the Cold War. In the first basket, the ten principles were set up that should define European security and the ways in which it should be preserved, to maintain European Détente. What is also unique in these principles, is that human rights are an essential element among other principles that define security. Until now, human rights were not seen as an factor that could influence European security.[53] The way in which human rights should be defined, was however one of the harder points of discussion between Eastern and Western European states, which the coming comparison will show. This research will therefore look into the Romanian and Dutch perceptions of European security in general on the basis of the ten principles of the first basket that are divided in four themes to give a full perception of security. This research will give a better insight in the dynamics and interplay of the negotiations leading to these ten principles on European security. As this context shows a comparison between Romania and the Netherlands is worthwhile, because of their different contexts. This counts for the

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[50] PHP, File 59, *Summary No. 10 of the Executive Bureau of the CC of the RCP*, 20 May 1970.
[51] Crump, 'Ferm, doch onopvallend', 261.
[52] Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *The Helsinki Final Act* (Helsinki 1975), https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act (last viewed, 19-06-2020).
[53] Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente,* 40.

relationship of the states with their superpower, their alliances and the position in their own bloc. These contexts have direct influence on how the states formulated their perspective on security, and are worth comparing.

3. The Dutch perspective

Introduction

This chapter will deal with the Dutch perspective on security as the Dutch government displayed it in negotiations on the CSCE, from September 1972 to November 1973. This chapter is very important in this thesis, since it shines light on the Dutch perspective on security with an emphasis on the four themes as formulated in the introduction of this research. On the other hand, this chapter will also show the intentions and strategies of the Dutch behind this perspective on security in relation to NATO and the EC. This analysis will therefore show the complexity and dynamics in the perspective on security of the Dutch in the CSCE, and with other member states. Firstly, this chapter will show the national perspective on European security as formulated by the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs Max van der Stoel in 1973. After that, this perspective on security will be compared to the policies on European security of NATO and the EC, which shows the broader agenda of the Dutch in the CSCE and their objective in their active participation.

Dutch perspective on European security

The Dutch government had no particular focus in its vision on European security, with one goal or one line of policy that was fully focused on one theme of security. However, the Netherlands made it very clear that they had the view that the European individual should be at the center of the negotiations on European security. In this way, according to the Netherlands, the politicians constantly had to keep in mind that they serve the individuals of the state, and have the right to act on their behalf.[54] For the Dutch individual rights were very important, and did always came back as the main focus of their policy on other themes. The Dutch saw the rights of individuals as the main goal of the negotiations on European security: every European individual needed to have the same rights and freedoms, regardless of their ideological background or place of residence.[55] The Dutch saw the implementation of individual rights in whole Europe as their main ideological goal. For the Netherlands human rights were thus individual human rights, where individuals all over Europe should have equal rights and freedoms. In its search for these individual rights, minister of Foreign Affairs, Max van der Stoel, emphasized the importance for self-determination and respect for human rights and individual freedoms.[56] The emphasis on the theme of human rights is strongly visible here, and seems to be the basis of the Dutch policy.

This however, did not mean that human rights were the only focus in the Dutch vision on European security, like several Dutch historians claim.[57] The Netherlands was also really positive on the theme of preservation of détente, through rapprochement and the continuing cooperation with the East, that was facilitated by the construction of the CSCE.[58] For the Netherlands the cooperation

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[54] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Ontvangen Telexbericht, Afkomstig van ambassade Helsinki, Bestemd voor Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Speech by mr. Van der Stoel during the first phase of the CSCE, 5 juli 1973.
[55] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Ontvangen Telexbericht, Afkomstig van ambassade Helsinki, Bestemd voor Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Speech by mr. Van der Stoel during the first phase of the CSCE, 5 juli 1973.
[56] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1550, Persbericht Max van der Stoel Europese Veiligheidsconferentie in Helsinki, 29 juni 1973.
[57] See, among others: Floribert Baudet, '"It was the Cold War and we wanted to win". Human rights, détente and the CSCE', in Mastny, Wenger e.a. (eds), *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75* (London 2008), pp. 183-198, and H.W. Bomert, *Nederland en Oost-Europa: meer woorden dan daden. Het Nederlands Oost-Europa beleid, geanalyseerd binnen het kader van het CVSE proces (1971-1985)* (Utrecht 1990), pp. 96-98.
[58] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1550, Persbericht Max van der Stoel Europese Veiligheidsconferentie in Helsinki, 29 juni 1973.

should also entail cultural cooperation and cooperation on the humanitarian field.[59] To facilitate this cooperation, the Dutch were well aware that there had to be a firm basis of trust between the two blocs, for which the formulation of principles in the CSCE was great progress.[60] However, for the Dutch, the individual rights were in this matter also important. The Dutch were convinced that to reach trust and understanding of each other, individuals should be able to travel freely through whole Europe. Hereby, individuals could learn of each others culture and respect them.[61] So in their support for the theme of preservation of détente, individual rights were also important for the Netherlands and even an essential feature to even reach this preservation of détente through cultural cooperation.

The Dutch objectives relating to European security were however not only focused on the "softer" side of security, with cooperation, rapprochement and human rights. The Netherlands was also specifically concerned with "hardcore" security, which showed in the promotion of the inviolability of frontiers, discussions on parallel force reduction and respect for sovereignty.[62] The Dutch wanted military security to be formulated very clearly, so that every member state had the same conception of this concept in the formulation of the principles.[63] This was strongly related to the will of the Netherlands to diminish the Brezhnev doctrine, which the Dutch saw as a strong violation of the sovereignty of states, but also as a strong violation of the individual human rights.[64]

Negotiations on military security were important to the Dutch, which was also visible in their support of the talks at the MBFR conference, which took place at the same time.[65] The theme of sovereignty and independence was also vital for the policy of the Netherlands. The Dutch were very much concentrated on the specific formulation of the inviolability of frontiers. This formulation of inviolability was one of the main discussion points for the Dutch in the negotiations on the principles. The formulation was directed at the prevention of foreign interventions or invasions in European

[59] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Ontvangen Telexbericht, Afkomstig van ambassade Helsinki, Bestemd voor Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Speech by mr. Van der Stoel during the first phase of the CSCE, 5 juli 1973.
[60] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1550, Persbericht Max van der Stoel Europese Veiligheidsconferentie in Helsinki, 29 juni 1973.
[61] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1550, Persbericht Max van der Stoel Europese Veiligheidsconferentie in Helsinki, 29 juni 1973.
[62] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1550, Persbericht Max van der Stoel Europese Veiligheidsconferentie in Helsinki, 29 juni 1973.
[63] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1550, Persbericht Max van der Stoel Europese Veiligheidsconferentie in Helsinki, 29 juni 1973.
[64] Crump, Lammertink, Zeilstra, 'Ferm, doch onopvallend', 262.
[65] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Ontvangen Telexbericht, Afkomstig van ambassade Helsinki, Bestemd voor Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Speech by mr. Van der Stoel during the first phase of the CSCE, 5 juli 1973.

states, which could damage the European security system.[66] As said before, the Dutch emphasis laid hereby again mostly on the individual rights of states and its inhabitants. This however did not mean that the Netherlands was only focused on the preservation of human rights or soft security. The Netherlands also saw the need for force reduction and especially inviolability of frontiers, to achieve these individual rights. The Netherlands thus used all themes of security in order to achieve its goal of European security for all its individual inhabitants, and emphasized that a combination of political and military aspects was necessary for the achievement of European security.

Dutch perspective on European security in relation to NATO and the EC

Dutch perspective in line with the Western bloc

The Dutch focus on the combination of military and political objectives was part of the dual strategy that the Netherlands was following in the preparatory talks. As a member of NATO as well as the EC, the Netherlands wanted to implement both approaches in its foreign policy. By focusing on the theme of military security, with parallel force reduction as the ultimate goal, the Netherlands wanted to stay in line with of NATO. NATO saw the CSCE as an opportunity to challenge the Soviet Union in the military spectrum, which influenced the Dutch line of policy to a great extent.[67] For the Netherlands, NATO was the most important alliance to keep in line with: especially when it came to military and security issues, NATO was decisive. During the talks, the Netherlands also constantly consulted with the EC members, which was a politically and economically based organization. The consultation with the EC however only created guidelines for the Western European policy, which were not binding, while NATO's policy was. This is why the Dutch were more concerned with the policy of NATO, instead of the EC.[68] For the EC cooperation and the preservation of détente was the core of their policy. The general goal of all members of the EC was to promote European integration, by transcending the Iron Curtain.[69] By promoting principles of cooperation and integration, the

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[66] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Ontvangen Telexbericht, Afkomstig van ambassade Helsinki, Bestemd voor Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Speech by mr. Van der Stoel during the first phase of the CSCE, 5 juli 1973.

[67] Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente, 154.

[68] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Verzonden Codebericht 17 november 1972, Afkomstig van Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Schmelzer, Bestemd voor ambassade Helsinki, 17 November 1972.

[69] *Communiqué of the meeting of Heads of State of Governments of the Member States at the Hague 1 and 2 December 1969*, Archive CVCE, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/final_communique_of_the_hague_summit_2_december_19 (Last viewed: 24-06-2020)

Netherlands promoted the EPC. By explicitly proposing that political and military objectives had to be combined in the agenda of the CSCE, the Netherlands thus wanted to make sure that the policies of NATO and EC were both being represented in its foreign policy.[70]

The Dutch foreign policy was a realistic combination of objectives of the EC and NATO, which shows the loyalty of the Netherlands towards both alliances. The emphasis of the Dutch policy was mostly on the themes of human rights and sovereignty, while the Netherlands also had more attention for the theme of preservation of détente. Because of the emphasis on both organizations, the policy of the Dutch was a combination of harder military standpoints and promotion of European political integration. The Dutch approach to the CSCE could have seemed somewhat ambiguous.[71] It however does show the complexity of the position and policy of the Netherlands in the CSCE, where the Dutch were trying to remain loyal to both organizations the best they could in combining all themes of security at once and proposing a combination of political and military concepts. Their policy was chosen to increase their margins for maneuver, in the Western bloc. By choosing to adapt to NATO and the EC, the Netherlands hoped that the two organizations would get off its back, so that it, as a smaller state, had more room to maneuver and construct their own policy.[72] The way in which the Dutch behaved according to European security was thus mostly a choice to benefit its own position, as a smaller state.

The Netherlands viewed the CSCE as the perfect opportunity to achieve its foreign strategy that should benefit the position of the West. This, because the CSCE was the first multilateral organization whereto every European state, East, West and neutral, could participate. The conference facilitated a clear pan-European dialogue in which every state was able to equally vote and propose ideas on European security and cooperation. This was thus an opportunity for a relatively small members of the ideological blocs, like the Netherlands to actively participate in an organization on security.[73] This is why the Netherlands wanted to have such an active role in the organization, as a mediator between the EC and NATO and as a prominent promotor for the Western ideals. In this way, the Dutch hoped to succeed in its foreign strategy, that would benefit the position of the West.

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[70] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Ontvangen Codebericht 2 februari 1973, Afkomstig van Ambassade Helsinki, Bestemd voor Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2 februari 1973.
[71] Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente, 155.
[72] Laurien Crump, Susanna Erlandsson, 'Introduction: smaller powers in Cold War Europe', in: Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson (eds), *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe. The Influence of Smaller Powers* (New York 2020), pp. 1-11, 2.
[73] Crump, 'Forty-five Years of Dialogue Facilitation', 501.

This perceived loyalty of the Dutch even made them abandon their own more progressive standpoints regarding European security. For the Netherlands it would be an option to solely maintain defensive forces in Europe, instead of offensive ones.[74] By only preserving defensive forces, it would be possible to maintain European security and anticipate on any military offensive in Europe, from either side of the Iron Curtain. The Netherlands did not want to propose this idea in the CSCE. Since the members of NATO had declared that they were not in favor of this idea. The Netherlands was therefore hoping that other, mostly Eastern European states, would do such a proposal, so that the Netherlands could in some way support those initiatives and could indirectly pursue its own objective.[75] The idea of other historians that the Netherlands was unwilling to open up the discussion and compromise their views in the presence of the East, is therefore in this case not true.[76] The Netherlands was definitely willing to open up the discussion and even support Eastern European states with the same policy on security. However, the fact that the Netherlands could not propose these ideas of reduction of forces on their own, shows that the Dutch choice of loyalty towards the Western European alliances of the Netherlands was greater than the objective to pursue their own agenda. The Dutch position in the alliances was therefore not as unique as many scholars claim it to be, but the Dutch adapted to their alliance.[77]

This shows that in the negotiations on European security and cooperation in the CSCE the Netherlands was willing to abandon its own national policies, to contribute to the structure of the alliances. The Dutch position in the alliances falls into the new cold war history debate on the position of smaller states in the Cold War, which were either respecting their agency and acting according to their own foreign policy or acknowledging the structure of the alliances and acting according to that policy. As a small country the Netherlands deliberately chose to adapt to the policies of NATO and the EC, to create some room for maneuver in the Western bloc, while constantly keeping hold of the focus on the theme of individual human rights as the basis for their policy. Therefore the position of the Netherlands shows that smaller states were indeed adapting to the structure of the ideological blocs, but that they were doing so, to reach their own national goals.[78]

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[74] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Verzonden Codebericht, Afkomstig van Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Van der Stoel, Bestemd voor Geneve CEVS-delegatie, CEV-Militaire Aspecten, 5 oktober 1973.

[75] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Verzonden Codebericht, Afkomstig van Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Van der Stoel, Bestemd voor Geneve CEVS-delegatie, CEV-Militaire Aspecten, 5 oktober 1973.

[76] Crump, Lammertink, Zeilstra, 'Ferm, doch onopvallend', 279.

[77] Baudet, '"It was the Cold War and we wanted to win"'.

[78] Crump, Erlandsson, 'Introduction: smaller powers in Cold War Europe', 2.

As the negotiations on the CSCE continued, the Netherlands was more positive about the CSCE's success to achieve European security and preserve European détente. Although the Netherlands stayed critical on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, this did not mean that the Dutch were negative on the continuation of the CSCE altogether, like Angela Romano is suggesting. She states that the Netherlands was very firm on ideological standpoints, which held them from being willing to open dialogue with the East.[79] This analysis shows that while the negotiations continued, the willingness of the Netherlands to open dialogue and have faith in the positive end of the CSCE grew significantly. During further negotiations the Netherlands kept promoting the freedom of individuals and the combination of political and military aspects, to maintain the connection between the EC and NATO in its perspective on security and succeed the Dutch foreign strategy.

The Netherlands prefers unity

For the Dutch, their perspective on security was an instrument to pursue their foreign strategy. The Netherlands was constantly worried that either of the organizations would lose its leverage in the negotiations of the CSCE, which could possibly damage the position of the whole Western bloc. Because of this anxiety the Netherlands strongly condemned states that were damaging this position by their own foreign policy, for example the French. This delegation was constantly not following the line of policy of the EC, which irritated the Netherlands to a great extent. Where the Dutch delegation wanted to implement only Western ideas in the principles of the CSCE, the French were willing to compromise with the Soviet Union. The Netherlands wanted the CSCE to be a conference of trust and peaceful change for Europe. Where every state would, in principle, respect the UN document on self-determination and equal rights.[80] While the Netherlands did not want to compromise on this matter, the French did. For the French, and specifically French president De Gaulle, their definition of European security was another instrument to pursue their own long-term national policy of breaking the hegemony of the superpower in Europe. [81] To do so, the French, contrary to the Netherlands, did oppose the policies of the West and tried to compromise and approach the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact members. This explains to a great extent to why the Netherlands was so annoyed by the position of the French: because it was the most

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[79] Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente*, 154.
[80] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Verzonden Codebericht, Afkomstig van Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Van der Stoel, Bestemd voor Geneve CEVS-delegatie, CEV Beginsel inzake Zelfbeschikking, 22 november 1973.
[81] Janet Bryant, 'France and NATO from 1966 to Kosovo: Coming full circle?', *European Security* 9 (2000) 3, pp. 21-37, 22.

opposite policy on European security. Because the Dutch were the only state that objected on this attitude of the French, they had to let go of their objections in this case, in order to remain the unity.[82] Hereby it becomes explicitly clear that the Netherlands was supporting the less progressive definition of the principles on self-determination and equal rights, to reach its national goal of unity in the Western bloc.

To unite the Western bloc, it was not only necessary to compromise with the other Western allies on their perspective of security, but also to position the Western bloc in the general Cold War. This is why it was crucial to also oppose the Western bloc to the Eastern bloc, and show the fundamental differences between the blocs and the ways in which the Western bloc could change the Eastern bloc.[83] The Dutch had a negative image of the objectives of the Soviet Union in the CSCE. The Netherlands stated that they were convinced that the Soviet Union wanted to keep the negotiations as short as possible and with minor detailed discussions, in order to only sign documents that had no meaning.[84] Also, the Netherlands and the other members of NATO were persuaded that they had an advantage in the negotiations on the CSCE. According to the Dutch, it seemed as if the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact members had no plan or policy on European cooperation and security, and on how the organization should be constructed. The Dutch were convinced that the Soviet Union and its allies were not able to compete with the Western proposals on security and cooperation and that the Soviet Union did not even think through some of the subjects on the agenda.[85]

Not only did the Netherlands show the weaknesses of organization of the Soviet sphere of influence, the Dutch also wanted to put emphasis on the weaknesses of its ideology. By calling for principles on the respect for freedom for all individuals in Europe, despite their political, economic and social systems, the Dutch government claimed that not all political, economic and social systems respected those freedoms.[86] Hereby they claimed indirectly that communism did not do so, and that communism was thus not respecting the human rights of its citizens. The Dutch also stated that every state had the right to change their socioeconomic systems if they wanted to, and that they

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[82] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Ontvangen Codebericht, Afkomstig van Geneve CEVS-delegatie, Bestemd voor Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, CEVS Principes mensenrechten, 4 december 1973.

[83] Crump, Lammertink, Zeilstra, 'Ferm, doch onopvallend', 278.

[84] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Ontvangen Codebericht 20 september 1972, afkomstig van ambassade Londen, Huydecoper, bestemd voor Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Den Haag, 20 September 1972.

[85] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Ontvangen Codebericht 20 september 1972, afkomstig van ambassade Londen, Huydecoper, bestemd voor Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Den Haag, 20 September 1972.

[86] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1550, Persbericht Max van der Stoel Europese Veiligheidsconferentie in Helsinki, 29 juni 1973.

could not be stopped by interference of other states.[87] This call for the principle of inviolability of frontiers, was a way to directly limit the implementation of the Brezhnev doctrine by the Soviet Union. By asking for this principle the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact members would not be able to military engage in the internal affairs of other Warsaw Pact states, which the Brezhnev doctrine allowed when a state would cease to become socialist. Hereby the Dutch government wanted to show that the Western bloc had the best ideology and values, and that these thus needed to be promoted in the CSCE. The promotion of these principles on the inviolability of frontiers and respect for freedom for all individuals as parts of the themes of sovereignty and independence, show that the choice of the Netherlands to promote these principles was part of a larger national policy of uniting the Western bloc, to create more room for maneuver in the Western bloc, but that it was also driven by an ideological drive to construct human rights for every European citizen.

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[87] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Ontvangen Telexbericht, Afkomstig van ambassade Helsinki, Bestemd voor Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Speech by mr. Van der Stoel during the first phase of the CSCE, 5 juli 1973.

Conclusion

The perspective of the Netherlands on security was in the basis focused on the rights and freedoms of individuals, which translated into the promotion of principles of self-determination, inviolability of frontiers, freedom of travel and parallel force reduction. This emphasis on the rights of individuals comes from the Dutch perception of human rights in general, which they see as individual rights, and as very important component of their foreign policy. This analysis also showed another emphasis on principles of sovereignty and independence, which was aimed at diminishing the Soviet Brezhnev doctrine. For the Netherlands the seventh on human rights was therefore a win for the Dutch perception on European security.

However, The Dutch also had a different agenda, which was focused on the preservation of the Western position in the European Cold War and thereby creating more room for maneuver. The Netherlands had a interbloc perspective, which was based on a bipolar mindset that had to promote the ideology of its own bloc and criticize the ideology and ideas of the other. The Dutch thus used their perspective on security as an instrument to reach this higher and deeper strategy and keep unity in their bloc to achieve this. Therefore the Dutch compromised several times on their own ideas on security in the CSCE and played an active role in the CSCE to judge the other bloc. The platform of the CSCE was in this way used by the Netherlands to promote its own foreign policy of Western ideals and unity.

By using its perspective on security to constantly compromise with the other Western states, the Netherlands wanted to create a Western bloc that was united in its perspective on security. It thus seems as if the Netherlands was trying to create a security community, wherein all members have the same ideas, values and practices of security. However, by constantly compromising to the other members, the Netherlands shows that in reality it did not have the same perspective on security, and that the Western bloc could not have been a security community in this case study. Also, NATO and the EC were in some ways so different in their perspectives, for example the French, that the Western bloc as a whole could not be a security community. What the Netherlands thus wanted to create, was almost impossible. However, the Dutch tried at its best to be a mediator between the Western organizations with a different view, so that the position of the whole Western bloc should not decrease. For the Netherlands the negotiations in the CSCE were thus a means to the end, in reaching their strategy of unity in the Western bloc, reaching more room to maneuver and also creating more individual freedoms for all peoples of Europe.

4. Romanian perception of security

Introduction

This chapter will deal with the Romanian perspective on security as the Romanian displayed it, from 1970 to June 1973. The findings in this chapter are very important for the comparison between the Romanian and Dutch perspectives on security. This chapter will shine its light on the perspective on security, with an emphasis on the four themes of security, as formulated in the introduction of this thesis. Also, this chapter will show intentions and strategies behind the Romanian perspective on European security, which will give a deeper insight in the dynamics within the Warsaw Pact in general and specifically related to the CSCE. The analysis of the Romanian perspective will show that the Warsaw Pact was a more complex alliance, than usually considered. First, this chapter will show the national Romanian perspective on European security as formulated by the Romanian government in several meetings at the beginning of the 1970s. After that, this chapter will compare this Romanian perspective with the general perspective of the Warsaw Pact and its members. This chapter will thus to show the deeper strategies and intentions behind the Romanian perspective on European security in the CSCE.

Romania and European security

As of the beginning of the 1970s, the Romanians had a very clear view on how European security and cooperation should be established. For Romania, it was obvious from the start that the reduction of arms in Europe would directly contribute to the establishment and preservation of peace on the continent.[88] The Romanians claimed that the arms race had to come to an end, to eventually finish competition and the Cold War in Europe. It seemed that for the Romanians that the theme military security was the basis of their policy on European security, and was essential to reach peace and security in Europe. This was thus also the main theme that the Romanian delegation promoted in the CSCE. Military security was in some sense the starting point where the Romanians started their perspective on European security. Also, the Romanians had a quite extreme opinion, in relation to other Warsaw Pact members, to reach full military security. They were of the opinion that the dissolution of the military alliances was inescapable, to reach full peace and security in Europe.[89]

However, in the CSCE, the Romanians did not only see the importance of military security. Romania also praised the efforts to call for principles on equal rights and respect for sovereignty and independence of all CSCE members.[90] For Romania sovereignty and independence for all states was very important. The support for principles on principles of sovereignty and independence came from the anxiety that Romania had against the Brezhnev doctrine. After the invasion of four Warsaw Pact states in Czecho-Slovakia in August 1968, Romania wanted to assure that this would never happen on Romanian soil. Romania also emphasized many times that all member states of the CSCE should have the same rights, whether they were small or neutral.[91] Romania laid herein the focus on rights for states, which they related to human rights. For Romania human rights were focused on the position of individual states in the international system, and not on individual citizens. This was also to benefit the position of Romania itself, which was a relatively small power in Europe. It was however for Romania not beneficial to have individual human rights, because this would mean that the communist government had to implement these nationally, and it did not want other states influencing their internal affairs. To have equal rights for all states, Romania wanted the CSCE to be a democratic conference where all states should be able to have an equal vote and wanted that the

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[88] PHP, *Summary No. 10 of the Executive Bureau of the CC of the RCP*, Bucharest 20 May 1970.
[89] PHP, *Summary No. 10 of the Executive Bureau of the CC of the RCP*, Bucharest 20 May 1970.
[90] PHP, *Summary No. 10 of the Executive Bureau of the CC of the RCP*, Bucharest 20 May 1970.
[91] PHP, *Speech by Nicolae Ceausescu at the Meeting of the Political Consultative Meeting in Prague*, 25 January 1972.

principle of equal rights for all states would be included in the principles of the CSCE.[92] The promotion of the principles of equal rights for states was in this way thus an instrument for Romania to achieve more independence as a smaller state in Europe and the Warsaw Pact.

Also, the Romanian delegates were promotors of a firm system of security and collaboration in Europe, to effectively preserve détente in the future. The normalization of the relationships between the European states was very important for Romania in their goal of reaching a system of peace and cooperation in Europe. Hereby it was essential for the Romanians that there was a respect for the equality of all European states and a respect for each others independence and sovereignty.[93] This was again to maintain its own position as a participant in the CSCE and Europe in general. To reach such a system of collaboration, there had to be a climate of collaboration, understanding and peace in Europe, which could be developed during the CSCE. According to the Romanians this was directly linked to the measures of disarmament, whereto all European states should cooperate.[94] This, because disarmament would decrease the threat of a foreign invasion, for example by the Brezhnev doctrine.

The Romanians were thus not only focused on principles on military security, with disarmament and the dissolution of military blocs, but also on the theme of sovereignty and independence, more indirectly on the preservation of détente through the construction of a system of cooperation in Europe with the collaboration of all European states and the principles on equal rights for all states. The promotion for principles on equal rights, military security and European cooperation were however all directed at creating more independence and sovereignty for Romania itself. Through the CSCE the Romanians could gain a more prominent position in Europe, but ultimately gain more independency in the Warsaw Pact, which was a long term strategy of the Romanians as of the beginning of the 1960s.

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[92] PHP, *Report on the 21-22 May 1973 Meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Countries' Deputy Foreign Ministers*, 21 May 1973.

[93] PHP, *Speech by Nicolae Ceausescu at the Meeting of the Political Consultative Meeting in Prague*, 25 January 1972.

[94] PHP, *Intervention of Comrade George Macovescu at the meeting of January 15 of the Moscow Conference*, Moscow, 15 January 1973.

Romanian and its search for independence

As of the beginning of the 1960s, has tried to limit the influence of the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact.[95] The pursuit of reaching more independence in the Warsaw Pact was most clearly emphasized by the Romanian Declaration of Independence in 1964, wherein Gheorghiu-Dej proclaimed to be more independent from their alliance leader.[96] The Soviet Union was for the previous events very suspicious towards the Romanian government from the start of the CSCE. This also had something to do with the lack of support the Romanian government gave to the Soviet Union when it intervened Czechoslovakia in August 1968 along with four other Warsaw Pact members to suppress the protests in the Prague Spring.[97] The First Secretary of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, stated in 1970 that Romania did always agree with the policy of the Warsaw Pact during meetings on European security, but that it did not implement it in its own foreign policy.[98] In fact, Brezhnev stated that 'the position of Romania is opposed to the position of the Socialist countries' and that 'there are issues in which Romania did not act in common and even acted demonstratively.'[99] He goes on by accusing the Romanians of putting too much emphasis on the Romanian prestige in Europe and too little on the objectives of the socialist states, and that therefore the Romanian delegation did violate several Warsaw Pact agreements on European security.[100]

The perspective and policy of the Warsaw Pact on the CSCE was constructed at a meeting of all party leaders in Prague in January 1972. The Prague Declaration of peace, security, and collaboration in Europe formulated some goals that would serve as guidelines for the policy of the Warsaw Pact members regarding European security and cooperation. It was therefore a follow-up conference on the Bucharest Declaration of 1966 and the Budapest Appeal of 1969. The goals of the Warsaw Pact regarding European security were 'to increase the attraction exerted by the ideas promoted by the socialist countries, to contribute to the course of action directed towards détente in Europe, to facilitate the organization and convening of the Conference with the utmost speed'.[101]

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[95] Laurien Crump, 'Nederland en het Warschauwpact', in: Jacco Pekelder, Remco Raben, Mathieu Segers (eds), *De Wereld volgens Nederland. Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek in historisch perspectief* (Utrecht, 2015), pp. 107-128, 113.

[96] Laurien Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered*, 157.

[97] Cezar Stanciu, 'Crisis management in the Communist bloc: Romania's policy towards the USSR in the aftermath of the Prague Spring', *Cold War History* 13 (2013) 3, pp. 353 – 372.

[98] PHP, 'Summary no. 10 of the Executive Bureau of the CC of the RCP', 20 May 1970.

[99] PHP, 'Summary no. 10 of the Executive Bureau of the CC of the RCP', 20 May 1970.

[100] PHP, 'Summary no. 10 of the Executive Bureau of the CC of the RCP', 20 May 1970.

[101] PHP, 'Note regarding the presentation of the Soviet draft document relating to European security to be adopted at the Prague Conference of the Consultative Political Committee of the countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty', 14 January 1972.

These goals show that the Warsaw Pact saw the upcoming CSCE on the one hand as an opportunity to spread its sphere of influence. On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact also wanted to make sure that the CSCE would become a success in preserving détente, which would give the Warsaw Pact members an equal position with the West in negotiations on European security, since equal dialogue would be facilitated. The goals and objectives mentioned in this document are based on a resolution on European security by the Soviet Union, which would be later acknowledged by the other Warsaw Pact members. The principles proposed in this resolution were mostly directed at preservation of détente and sovereignty, which was translated in the proposal of inviolability of boundaries and the concept of peaceful coexistence.[102] The Soviets wanted the issue of disarmament of the reduction of arms to be discussed separately from the conference on European security.[103]

The Romanian perspective on European security was however in some ways more extreme than this Prague Declaration, and the resolution of the Soviet Union. Romania was more interested in extremer statements on disarmament and the extreme dissolution of military alliances and more explicitly in the interests of smaller states, through their support of equal rights for all states. It seems as if the Romanians were taking the proposals of the Warsaw Pact a step further. Romania was going against the policy of the Soviet Union by promoting issues of disarmament and reduction of forces in Europe. By doing so, Romania was on the one hand trying to break loose from the structure of the alliance of the Warsaw Pact, but was on the other hand choosing to agree with the Warsaw Pact promotion of equal rights for all states in the CSCE. This brings this analysis to a debate on the Romanian position that is concerned with the degree of independence or autonomy of Romania in the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. In this debate there are two major lines of interpretation. The first line states that Romania was independent or autonomous from Moscow in its international affairs.[104] This line of interpretation assumes that Romania acted out of agency in the Warsaw Pact and that it dictated its own foreign policy in the Cold War. According to the other line of interpretation, Romania's perceived independence or autonomy was a simulation, which represented a strategy designed by the Soviets, 'a 'diversionist instrument' meant 'to mislead the western states'.'[105] This line of judgement estimates that Romania was an essential part of the structure of the Warsaw Pact and that its foreign policy was thus dictated by the Soviet Union as a

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[102] PHP, 'Note regarding the presentation of the Soviet draft document relating to European security to be adopted at the Prague Conference of the Consultative Political Committee of the countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty', 14 January 1972.
[103] PHP, 'Note regarding the presentation of the Soviet draft document relating to European security to be adopted at the Prague Conference of the Consultative Political Committee of the countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty', 14 January 1972.
[104] Dragomir, 'The perceived threat of hegemonism in Romania', 112.
[105] Ibidem, 112.

part of the greater approach of the Warsaw Pact. This thesis claims that the Romanians, by strongly opposing its perspective to the Soviet perspective, made use of its more independent position in the CSCE, to gain more independence. While on the other hand it was using its position to deliberately support the Warsaw Pact policy in its call for equal rights for all states, which would also favor the individual position of Romania in the CSCE. Romania was well aware that they always 'reserved the right to read the revised document and, if necessary, submit its own proposal to the security conference' in order to implement their own perspective on European security, to oppose the Soviet Union wherever they could or to support initiatives that were in their interests.[106]

For the Romanians the CSCE was the perfect multilateral platform in which they could actively advocate its strategy, with their own initiatives on security. This, because it was an organization that supported pan-European dialogue and where all states, even the Eastern European and neutral states, had a vote and were invited in the process of reaching European security.[107] In the CSCE the Romanians had some leverage over the Soviet Union in which it could freely propose its own more extreme and opposing ideas on European security. The CSCE gave Romania more room to maneuver in this sense. Also, because also all the other European states were listening, the CSCE was an interesting platform for Romania. This meant that Romania could get support from Western European or other Eastern European states in its promotion for principles of equal rights and sovereignty, which was in some ways similar to the perspectives of Western states, apart from the fact that Romania was supporting principles on the equal rights for states, and not individuals. Romania did propose its extreme ideas on the respect for borders and disarmament in the CSCE as soon as the meetings started, in order to gain support and to directly open the attack on the Soviet Union.[108] The CSCE was thus an European platform where Romania got the room to maneuver, so they could propose their own initiatives on European security, that would benefit their long-term strategy of gaining more independence from the Soviet Union.[109]

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[106] PHP, 'Report on the 21-22 May 1973 Meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Contries' Deputy Foreign Ministers', 21 May 1973.

[107] Laurien Crump, 'Forty-five Years of Dialogue Facilitation (1972-2017). Ten lessons from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe', *Security and Human Rights* 27 (2016) pp. 498 – 516.

[108] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1540, Ontvangen Codebericht 2 februari 1973, Afkomstig van Ambassade Helsinki, Bestemd voor Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Den Haag, 2 februari 1973.

[109] Crump, Lammertink, Zeilstra, 'Ferm, doch onopvallend', 261.

Romania's *intrabloc* strategy in the CSCE

The different Romanian perspective on European security seems to be a part of a greater *intrabloc* strategy, where the Romanians deliberately chose to take another perspective or stance on several issues than the Soviet Union, which should give Romania more sovereignty and independence in the Warsaw Pact. While in the other hand, Romania chose to support principles on equal rights for individual states, to increase their room to maneuver. This strategy was part of the general Romanian anxiety of hegemony. The Romanians had a problem with hegemony in the general sense, and not specifically with the Soviet Union.[110] This is also why Romania proposed principles that would benefit its own position in the Warsaw Pact and of other smaller states in Europe. In order to come as close to this objective, the Romanians promoted principles of disarmament and reduction of forces in the CSCE. This would directly decrease the possible military threat to smaller states, by for example diminishing the Brezhnev doctrine.

Romania also saw the support for principles on cultural cooperation with other smaller European states as an opportunity to succeed in the intrabloc strategy of gaining more independence and sovereignty in the Warsaw Pact. This is why Romania supported Western proposals for cultural cooperation between the two spheres of influence. This support would not only improve the tactical position of smaller states, but it would also go directly against the stance of the Soviet Union and possibly even undermine its power in Eastern Europe.[111] It was namely afraid that this cooperation between European states would affect the socialist mindset of the Eastern European states.[112] Therefore the Soviet Union was positive on implementing principles that would improve mutual trust and stability in Europe, but did not support principles on direct cultural cooperation.[113] Precisely because of this Soviet anxiety for Western influence, Romania was supporting cultural cooperation, in its objective to decrease the influence of the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact and most importantly on Romania itself.

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[110] Dragomir, 'The perceived threat of hegemonism in Romania', 120-122.
[111] PHP, 'Discussion Note Meeting George Macovescu and Kuznetsov', 15 January 1973.
[112] NL-HaNA, 2.05.313, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief, 1965-1974, inventarisnummer 1550, Persbericht Max van der Stoel Europese Veiligheidsconferentie in Helsinki, 29 juni 1973.
[113] PHP, 'Discussion Note Meeting George Macovescu and Kuznetsov', 15 January 1973.

Conclusion

The perspective of Romania on European security was mostly focused on its objective of gaining more sovereignty and independence in the Warsaw Pact and declining the influence of the hegemon in the Eastern bloc, the Soviet Union. This meant that the focus of the Romanian perspective of security was mainly based on opposition to the perspective of the Soviet Union. Therefore the Romanian perspective on security was partly directed at improving Romanian sovereignty in a more direct way through principles of sovereignty and independence, and on the other hand directly opposing the Soviet Union, for example with the support of disarmament and cultural cooperation. Romania was going against the policies on European security of the Soviet Union, and choosing to promote equal rights together with the Warsaw Pact, to succeed in its intrabloc strategy of getting more room to maneuver.[114] Romania was therefore using its perspective on security in the CSCE as an instrument to reach its personal agenda, because it was only directed at its own alliance and only promoting principles that would help this cause.

By acting according to this intrabloc strategy of breaking up the alliance, Romania was actually doing so already. The opposition of Romania against the perspectives on security of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union already made the Warsaw Pact less influential in Europe and less powerful in the Cold War. This diverged perspective on security also undermined the Warsaw Pact as a security community. While the Soviet Union wanted to create a general Warsaw Pact policy on European security, so that all members had the same ideas, beliefs and practices on security, Romania was already undermining it at the very beginning of the CSCE negotiations by not totally adapting to it. It not only ensured that the Soviet Union did not get more influence in the Warsaw Pact itself, but the Romanian perspective on security also undermined the authority of the alliance. This meant that the idea that the Warsaw Pact would have been a security community, since all member states are geographically in the same region, and have the same ideology, does not fit in this case. The strategy of Romania and its actions were therefore a self-fulfilling prophecy. By not adapting to the Warsaw Pact idea of European security, the Romanians were undermining the Warsaw Pact through their own actions, and were reaching their national policy of gaining more room to maneuver.

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[114] Crump, Erlandsson, 'Introduction: smaller powers in Cold War Europe', 2.

5. Conclusion

Two small states, two different strategies

In this thesis both the Romanian and the Dutch perspective on European security have been analyzed, through a historical primary source analysis of sources that gave a firsthand view on the national policies on the coming Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe of 1973. This thesis analyzed the perspectives on security through the formulation of four themes of security, which made this thesis a combination of historical and security studies research. Hereby the complexity of this particular case study has been shown, which also gives room to make a observation on theories of security studies.

On the theme of military security, Romania and the Netherlands differed quite a bit. Romania's primary focus was to secure military security, through disarmament and the reduction of forces. The proposition of Romania on this matter was somewhat extreme, even in relation to Western states. For Romania this extreme stance was a way to oppose the policy of the Soviet Union and create more room to maneuver in the CSCE for itself. The Netherlands on the other side also seemed to have had some more extreme visions on disarmament in Europe. But while Romania chose to propose those principles itself, the Netherlands on the other hand chose to withhold itself from such propositions and only saw itself able to support other states that would propose principles of disarmament, such as Romania. The Netherlands hereby chose to deliberately adapt to the military policy of NATO, and did not pursue in its own opinion on military security. So, while for Romania the theme of military security was a way to oppose the superpower, the Netherlands saw it as a way to show loyalty to the Western alliance.

For both Romania and the Netherlands the theme of sovereignty and independence was quite important. Both states wanted to limit the Brezhnev doctrine as much as possible. For the Netherlands this urge was partly based on the will to contrast the Western bloc with the ideology and practices of the Eastern bloc and specifically the Soviet Union, to show the strength of the Western bloc and keep it united and also curtail Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Romania on the other hand was more concerned with directly limiting the possibility of Soviet troops invading in their sovereign state, under the guise of the Brezhnev doctrine. For Romania the limitation of the Brezhnev doctrine through the promotion of principles on sovereignty and independence was directed at decreasing possible threats to their national soil, while the Netherlands was occupied with the positioning of its bloc in general.

The objectives behind their promotion for principles on sovereignty and independency were linked to why both states pushed for the implementation of human rights. However, their ideas on what human rights were, differed immensely. The perception of human rights of the Netherlands was based on the idea of equal rights and freedoms for all individuals, all over Europe, regardless of their nationality. The Netherlands hereby wanted to show that not only the Brezhnev doctrine was a violation of human rights, but that all Warsaw Pact members were not taking these rights into account. The CSCE was a platform in which the Netherlands could push individual human rights. For the Netherlands the ideological component on human rights was also vital. The Netherlands saw it as their obligation to bring individual human rights to the East as well. Romania on the other hand, was not in favor of individual human rights at all. Their definition of human rights was directed at equal rights for states, instead of equal rights for individuals. The strategy behind this was the objective to gain a more independent position as a smaller state in Europe. The CSCE was for Romania therefore a platform where they could gain more room for maneuver. So, while both states supported principles on human rights, their idea of what these human rights were supposed to be were very different, hence their contrasting strategies behind their support.

The contrasting strategies behind their support for specific principles was also visible in their promotion of principles on the theme of preservation of détente. While both states supported principles on this matter, specifically on the support of cultural cooperation, they had different strategies behind their support. For the Netherlands the principles on the preservation of détente were a way of encouraging European integration and thereby supporting the guidelines of the EPC. Hereby the Netherlands wanted to transcend the Iron Curtain and make cooperation on several levels possible. Romania on the other hand was promoting European détente again to gain more national leverage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and thereby gain more independence. But, also saw it as a way to, for example, trade with the West, which could benefit its economy. Détente was for Romania thus partly an element in their strategy and partly a goal in itself.

By comparing both states on the basis of the four themes of European security, this thesis shows that while both states were small states in their ideological blocs, this does not mean that they both had the same objectives to create more room to maneuver. For Romania their room to maneuver was hard to achieve. Their position in the communist bloc made it hard to even pursue its own agenda in the first place. For Romania the CSCE was a platform wherein it finally got the leverage on the Soviet Union that it wanted in order to pursue their goal of independence from the Soviet Union. The CSCE was the opportunity for Romania to openly undermine the unity and power of the Warsaw Pact, by way of supporting and proposing several principles on military security, equal rights and sovereignty. The policy on security of Romania in the CSCE was hereby an instrument to

succeed its greater intrabloc strategy. The Netherlands also used the CSCE to pursue its internal agenda. With its more independent and freer background the Netherlands used the CSCE on the other hand to tie itself down to both NATO and EC objectives. In this way the Netherlands sought a way to combine military and political objectives. This is contrary to what previous literature states, which only emphasize the Dutch promotion of human rights.[115] The Netherlands saw itself, by way of being a participant in both NATO and the EC, as a mediator in the Western bloc, so as to unite the bloc in its policy on European security. In line with the Dutch interbloc strategy, the Netherlands was constantly compromising its own national policy on security with the policies of other Western members, to form one bloc against the Warsaw Pact. While Romania was using its perspective on security to break its bloc apart, the Netherlands was using it to unite it.

So, while both states had a very diverse national agenda behind their participation in the CSCE, this comparison on the basis of four themes of security shows that the CSCE was not simply used as a platform to start pan-European dialogue, as Laurien Crump is suggesting[116], but that it was also used as a platform for smaller states to pursue internal strategies. A question that you could ask after this observation, is whether the different ideological backgrounds of the two smaller states had an influence on their different objectives in their national strategies? The short answer, that this thesis can give to this question is: no. Because the strategies of France in NATO and the EC is very much comparable to the position of Romania in the Warsaw Pact, since both states opposed their superpowers in their policies on European security. However, much more research is needed on this topic, and even another historical comparison, in order give an insight on this matter.

What this historical comparison shows, is that the CSCE was not simply a conference that facilitated dialogue between almost all European states, the Soviet Union, the US and Canada. It was not simply a conference where every state had the equal right of proposing ideas on European security and cooperation. The CSCE was also a platform where smaller European states, either communist or capitalist, got the opportunity to influence their superpower and change their individual position in their ideological blocs, by way of pursuing their national strategy in the CSCE. It is therefore also fair to say that the CSCE is a far too complex case study to fit into a singular security studies concept or theory, as Ki-Joon Hong is trying to do.[117] This case study shows that the creation of a definition of a concept such as security community and doing research on a case with a theory as starting point, cannot reveal all objectives and strategies of individual states, since the concept only focuses on the final practices or statements made by states, which does not show not their deeper

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[115] Baudet, 'It Was Cold War and We Wanted to Win'.
[116] Crump, 'Forty-five Years of Dialogue Facilitation'.
[117] Hong, *The CSCE Security Regime Formation: From Helsinki to Budapest*.

strategies or objectives. This research also shows that the CSCE specifically is not a straightforward security community where all its members have the same ideas, values and perceptions on security, but that the case of the CSCE is much more complex and not simply grasped in a concept such as security community. The theories on security on the other hand have helped to direct this historical research in a new historical strand of research, since historical research and security studies have hardly been combined. Therefore the theory on security studies on the other hand helped to remain focus on one element of the case study.

The conclusion of this thesis is therefore twofold: on the one hand this thesis concludes on the basis of this specific case study of the CSCE, that the conference was much more complex than just a facilitation of pan-European dialogue, by giving smaller states the room to maneuver and the opportunity to pursue their own national agendas. Herein the CSCE is an example of a conference in which smaller states were able to stretch 'their margins for maneuver', as Crump and Erlandsson define this concept,[118] which has not been concluded before. On the other hand, this thesis can draw a greater conclusion on the basis of this first observation, namely that the urge of security studies to fit organizations and conferences on security in previously defined concepts and theories, has its limits. Therefore this thesis does the suggestion of further research on security conferences and organization on the basis of a historical analysis, which can show the real internal complexity of the specific case study, instead of framing it in a concept or theory. This historical comparison of the perceptions on security of Romania and the Netherlands did thus not only show the complexity of the CSCE as a conference in a empirical debate, but has also lead to a conclusion and a suggestion for further research in a theoretical debate.

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[118] Crump, Erlandsson, 'Introduction: smaller powers in Cold War Europe'.

Appendix

Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States

The participating States,

Reaffirming their commitment to peace, security and justice and the continuing development of friendly relations and co-operation;

Recognizing that this commitment, which reflects the interest and aspirations of peoples, constitutes for each participating State a present and future responsibility, heightened by experience of the past;

Reaffirming, in conformity with their membership in the United Nations and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, their full and active support for the United Nations and for the enhancement of its role and effectiveness in strengthening international peace, security and justice, and in promoting the solution of international problems, as well as the development of friendly relations and cooperation among States;

Expressing their common adherence to the principles which are set forth below and are in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their common will to act, in the application of these principles, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

Declare their determination to respect and put into practice, each of them in its relations with all other participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development, the following principles, which all are of primary significance, guiding their mutual relations:

I.   *Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty*

The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.

Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have equal rights and duties. They will respect each other's right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other States in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present Declaration. They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.

II.   Refraining from the threat or use of force

The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present Declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

Accordingly, the participating States will refrain from any acts constituting a threat of force or direct or indirect use of force against another participating State.

Likewise they will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights. Likewise they will also refrain in their mutual relations from any act of reprisal by force.

No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes, between them.

III.   Inviolability of frontiers

The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.

Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.

IV.   Territorial integrity of States

The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States.

Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force.

The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal.

V.   Peaceful settlement of disputes

The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger international peace and security, and justice.

They will endeavour in good faith and a spirit of cooperation to reach a rapid and equitable solution on the basis of international law.

For this purpose they will use such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice including any settlement procedure agreed to in advance of disputes to which they are parties.

In the event of failure to reach a solution by any of the above peaceful means, the parties to a dispute will continue to seek a mutually agreed way to settle the dispute peacefully.

Participating States, parties to a dispute among them, as well as other participating States, will refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation to such a degree as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and thereby make a peaceful settlement of the dispute more difficult.

VI.   Non-intervention in internal affairs

The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.

They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating State.

They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State.

VII.   Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.

Within this framework the participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and wellbeing necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States.

They will constantly respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and will endeavor jointly and separately, including in co-operation with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them.

They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field.

In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfil their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.

VIII.   *Equal rights and self-determination of peoples*

The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.

By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.

The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle.

IX.   Cooperation among States

The participating States will develop their co-operation with one another and with all States in all fields in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In developing their co-operation the participating States will place special emphasis on the fields as set forth within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, with each of them making its contribution in conditions of full equality.

They will endeavor, in developing their co-operation as equals, to promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighborly relations among themselves, international peace, security and justice. They will equally endeavor, in developing their cooperation, to improve the well-being of peoples and contribute to the fulfilment of their aspirations through, inter alia, the benefits resulting from increased mutual knowledge and from progress and achievement in the economic, scientific, technological, social, cultural and humanitarian fields. They will take steps to promote conditions favorable to making these benefits available to all; they will take into account the interest of all in the narrowing of differences in the levels of economic development, and in particular the interest of developing countries throughout the world.

They confirm that governments, institutions, organizations and persons have a relevant and positive role to play in contributing toward the achievement of these aims of their cooperation.

They will strive, in increasing their cooperation as set forth above, to develop closer relations among themselves on an improved and more enduring basis for the benefit of peoples.

X.   Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law

The participating States will fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law, both those obligations arising from the generally recognized principles and rules of international law and those obligations arising from treaties or other agreements, in conformity with international law, to which they are parties.

In exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their laws and regulations, they will conform with their legal obligations under international law; they will furthermore pay due regard to and implement the provisions in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.

All the principles set forth above are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.

The participating States express their determination fully to respect and apply these principles, as set forth in the present Declaration, in all aspects, to their mutual relations and cooperation in order to ensure to each participating State the benefits resulting from the respect and application of these principles by all.

The participating States, paying due regard to the principles above and, in particular, to the first sentence of the tenth principle, "Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law", note that the present Declaration does not affect their rights and

obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other agreements and arrangements.

The participating States express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of co-operation among them in all fields. They also express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of political contacts among them which in time would contribute to better mutual understanding of their positions and views.

The participating States declare their intention to conduct their relations with all other States in the spirit of the principles contained in the present Declaration.

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