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From a Policy of Non-Interference to Proactive Engagement

How the Securitisation of Oil Supply Chains Has Challenged China's Non-Intervention Principle in the Cases of Sudan and South Sudan

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Abstract

For half a century, the 'Five Principles of Coexistence', which emphasise respect for territorial sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of other nations, were treated as customary in the People's Republic of China's (PRC) foreign policy. However, in recent years, China has engaged in actions inconsistent with its non-intervention standard. Such a shift is well observed in the PRC's relationships with Sudan and South Sudan. Since 1989, Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs) have played a pivotal role in developing the region's oil infrastructure and refining capabilities. As China's relations have developed – through the oil industry, trade, security, diplomatic cooperation, and infrastructure projects – the boundaries of Beijing's national commitment to non-intervention has strained. Focusing on China's oil interests in the region, this paper aims to understand how and why Chinese foreign policy has shifted from non-interference to pro-intervention in the case studies of Sudan and South Sudan using the analytical frameworks of securitisation theory and fragmented authoritarianism. Through document analysis, evidence was collated to answer the following research question: *How has the securitisation of oil supply chains contributed to the PRC's transition from a traditional policy of non-interference in domestic sovereign affairs to one of proactive engagement in the case studies of Sudan and South Sudan between 1989 and 2020?* From a theoretical perspective, securitisation in authoritarian contexts has been underdeveloped conceptually, and greater emphasis needs to be put on the fragmentation of decision-making in the PRC. On an empirical level, this paper may provide valuable insights as to how the PRC might navigate its foreign policy in similar crisis diplomacy incidents in future.

Keywords: Chinese foreign policy, energy security, securitisation, fragmented authoritarianism

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List of Abbreviations

African Union (AU)
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Central Military Commission (CMC)
China Development Bank (CDB)
Central Military Commission (CMC)
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)
Communist Party of China (CPC)
Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC)
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
Copenhagen School (CS)
European Union (EU)
Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM)
Forum of Chinese-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC)
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
International Energy Agency (IEA)
International Oil Companies (IOCs)
Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (JMEC)
Justice & Equality Movement (JEM)
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)
Ministry of Defence (MOD)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
National Islamic Front (NIF)
National Oil Companies (NOCs)
National Supervisory Commission (NSC)
People's Liberation Army (PLA)
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
People's Liberation Army Air-Force (PLAAF)
People's Republic of China (PRC)
Private Security Companies (PSCs)
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
Sudan People's Liberation Movement - North (SPLM-N)
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army - in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO)
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A)
Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF)
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)
United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
US Energy Information Administration (EIA)

Introduction

“Non-interference does not mean standing by when people of a country are facing disaster.”¹

– Ma Qiang, Chinese Ambassador to South Sudan

0.1 The Principle of Non-Intervention

In 1953, Zhou Enlai, the first Premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), was tasked to negotiate a set of principles to govern relations with the Republic of India. Having ‘stood up’, in the words of Mao Zedong, to a century of humiliation in 1949, the country needed a foreign policy philosophy that expressed its newfound independence in world affairs.² These negotiations culminated in the signing of the Panchsheel Treaty in 1954, which would be the first time that the ‘Five Principles of Coexistence’ (和平共处五项原则) were codified in Chinese foreign policy. The principles included:

- (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- (2) mutual non-aggression;
- (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs;
- (4) equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; and
- (5) peaceful co-existence.³

The following year, the principles were adopted at the 1955 Bandung Conference and in 1982, they were enshrined into the preamble of the Chinese constitution.⁴ Ever since their conception, Beijing has emphasised its adherence to the Five Principles. As recently as 2018, President Xi Jinping echoed China’s commitment in his ‘five-no’ approach delivered at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), stating that there would be ‘no interference in African development; no interference in African countries’ internal affairs; no imposition of China’s will

¹ Ma Qiang, 2014, quoted in Obert Hodzi, *The End of China’s Non-Intervention Policy in Africa* (Geneva: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 195.

² Ankit Panda, ‘Reflecting on China’s Five Principles, 60 Years Later’, *The Diplomat*, China Power, 26 June 2014, <<https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/reflecting-on-chinas-five-principles-60-years-later/>> [Accessed 10 June 2020].

³ The Government of the Republic of India and The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, ‘The Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India’, (Peking: Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 1954) <https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Agreement_on_Trade_and_Intercourse_between_the_Tibet_Region_of_China_and_India> [Accessed 5 March 2020].

⁴ M. Duchatel, O. Brauner & Zhou Hang, *Protecting China’s Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift away from Non-interference*, 41 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014), p. 14; Aidoo, Richard, and Steve Hess, ‘Non-Interference 2.0: China’s Evolving Foreign Policy towards a Changing Africa’, *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 44, 1 (2015):107–139 (p. 110).

on African countries; no attachment of political strings to assistance to Africa; and no seeking of selfish political gains in investment and financing cooperation with Africa'.⁵ Similarly, China's 2019 Defence White Paper committed to 'developing friendly cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence', claiming that 'China is opposed to interference in the internal affairs of others'.⁶ Even when it comes to events specifically in Sudan and South Sudan, the focus of this paper, Chinese officials have maintained their commitment. When Foreign Minister Wang Jiechi was asked what message he wished to convey to the people of South Sudan during his visit in 2011, he responded:

'We hope that the establishment of the diplomatic ties between us will be a new starting point for the promotion of the China-South Sudan friendship and cooperation on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence'.⁷

For years, these principles have been used as a 'political weapon' to prevent meddling in China's internal affairs.⁸ They allow China to maintain affinity with developing countries through painful memories of humiliation and oppression by western powers, which supports China's grand narrative as a 'developing power struggling to maintain its national grandeur'.⁹ The principles have also been used as a 'soft power tool' to support China's outward expansion. China's no-strings attached approach to trade, aid and investment has attracted the support of regimes resistant to good governance and liberal democratic reforms pushed by western initiatives.

However, the boundary between interference and diplomacy was never defined clearly, which has left some flexibility for reinterpretation.¹⁰ Non-interference (不干涉原则), as M. Duchatel, O. Brauner & Zhou Hang have argued, seems to in some cases cover 'intervention' (创造性介入).¹¹ Consequently, synonyms for intervention such as 'constructive involvement', 'creative involvement' and 'capacity building' have started to be used in policy circles to justify a more proactive Chinese foreign policy.¹² As Harry Verhoeven contends, China is no longer 'merely a

⁵ Xinhua, 'Full text of Chinese President Xi Jinping's speech at opening ceremony of 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit', *Xinhua*, 3 September 2018 <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/03/c_129946189.htm> [Accessed 15 March 2020].

⁶ State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 'China's National Defense in the New Era', (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2019).

⁷ Al-Masier, 'A written interview with China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi', *Al-Masier*, 9th August 2011 <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1243662.shtml> [Accessed 4 April 2020].

⁸ China Institute of Contemporary International Relations quoted in Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 7.

⁹ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 7.

¹⁰ International Crisis Group, *China's Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan*, Asia Report No. 288 (Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2017), p. 3.

¹¹ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 1.

¹² *Ibid*, p. 18.

passive spectator’, but ‘an increasingly active participant’ in the foreign affairs of other countries.¹³

Such a shift is well observed in the PRC’s relationship with Sudan and South Sudan. Since 1989, Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs) like the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) have played a pivotal role in developing the region’s oil infrastructure and refining capabilities. As China’s relations have developed – through the oil industry, trade, and diplomacy - the boundaries of Beijing’s national commitment to non-intervention has strained.

Lenience towards non-intervention has been mirrored in the PRC’s actions. This has particularly been the case since 2007, where China actively mediated to end the Darfur conflict, and doubly since 2011 – the year of South Sudan’s independence – where Chinese officials worked to defuse trade disputes between Sudan and its counterpart over oil pipeline transit fees.¹⁴ The onset of the 2013 South Sudan Civil War multiplied potential security threats, and as such, Chinese NOCs and the government formulated a variety of pragmatic responses to protect their interests. Such responses, to name a few, included: drafting a ‘Five-Point Plan’ for peace; the placement of over 1000 Chinese peacekeepers to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS); and the employment of private security companies (PSC’s) by Chinese NOCs. Such actions act against the very spirit of the Five Principles.

0.2 Aims and Research Puzzle

To summarise, this paper aims to understand why and how Chinese foreign policy has shifted from one of non-interference towards pro-intervention in the case studies of Sudan and South Sudan. The research begins with the assumption that Chinese interference there has been deeply interconnected to the PRC’s ‘energy security’ strategy, particularly its quest to secure access to oil supply chains. From these assumptions, we can derive the following research puzzle:

How far has the securitisation of oil supply chains contributed to the People’s Republic of China’s transition from a traditional policy of non-interference in domestic sovereign affairs to one of proactive engagement in the case studies of Sudan and South Sudan between 1989 and 2020?

¹³ Harry Verhoeven, ‘Is Beijing’s Non-Interference Policy History? How Africa is Changing China’, *The Washington Quarterly*, 37, 2 (2014): 55-70 (p. 59).

¹⁴ Luke Patey, ‘Learning in Africa: China’s Overseas oil Investments in Sudan and South Sudan’, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 26, 107 (2017): 756-768 (p. 762).

0.3 Significance

From a theoretical perspective, the question is relevant as there is a growing body of literature concerning securitisation theory in authoritarian contexts. Though efforts have been made by some scholars to transport securitisation theory to non-western political settings, greater emphasis needs to be put on the fragmentation of decision-making in contexts such as the PRC. This paper, therefore, attempts to marry together the concepts of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’, Bo Kong’s concept of ‘Two Chinas’ and securitisation theory, as explained in the next chapter, to better understand the nexus between the Chinese NOCs and decision-makers in the state apparatus.

On the paper’s empirical significance, its conclusions may provide valuable insights as to how China might navigate its foreign policy in the region in future. This is especially pertinent considering recent developments, such as the deposition of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, and the unsteady peace agreement between warring factions in South Sudan in February 2020. Whether these developments will push China towards further military and diplomatic engagement or towards complete withdrawal is up for debate. Moreover, China’s engagement with the region, in the words of International Crisis Group, has been ‘a foreign policy experiment’, and one of the few cases where we have seen ‘intervention with Chinese characteristics’.¹⁵ China’s response in Sudan and South Sudan, therefore, may provide clues as to how China might react in similar crisis diplomacy incidents where the government, NOCs and Chinese investors have interests at stake such as in Yemen, Nigeria, Angola, Kazakhstan and Iraq. As China begins to flex its muscles on the international stage, increase its military capabilities, and expand its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) such research has important policy implications. To avoid a ‘Thucydides Trap’, an understanding of Chinese decision-making – particularly with regards to energy security – is imperative, as tensions continue to escalate between the United States of America (US) and the PRC.¹⁶

¹⁵ International Crisis Group (2017).

¹⁶ The ‘Thucydides Trap’ is a term coined by American political scientist Graham T. Allison which essentially maintains that ‘when one great [hegemonic] power threatens to displace another, war is almost always the result’. See Graham T. Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?* (New York: Mariner Books, 2017).

0.4 Essay Structure

This structure of this paper will be as follows.

Chapter one will introduce the analytical framework of securitisation. In arguing that traditional Copenhagen School (CS) securitisation is insufficient to explain the process in an authoritarian context, the chapter will reconceptualise the theory and fuse the framework with Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton's concept of 'fragmented authoritarianism'.

Chapter two will describe the qualitative methodology used in this paper and discuss its limitations and design.

Chapter three will assess the perceived and empirical importance of oil to the 'Two Chinas', how oil shortages resulted in the overseas expansion of the NOCs in the 'Go Out' strategy, and the importance of Sudan and South Sudan to China's energy security. It will describe the power dynamics between the CPC government and NOCs to determine how far the NOCs can be considered 'securitising agents' to a CPC government 'enabling audience'.

Chapter four will identify the by-products of the 'Go Out' strategy, namely, an influx of Chinese citizens, export goods, and investment projects – and how these interests further entangled the Chinese government and the NOCs into Sudan and South Sudan's internal affairs.

Chapter five will analyse whether there have been objective security threats to the securitising actors' interests in the region and, in turn, will determine the 'resonance' of moves to securitise oil supply chains. Chapters five and six will examine the success of securitisation in the Sudans by identifying circumstances where securitising actors have been granted special privileges to deal with threats to their interests. Whilst chapter five looks for 'extraordinary measures' in the diplomatic sphere, chapter six identifies them in national security policy, legislation and regulation.

Chapter seven will offer a prediction as to how China may engage in the region in future.

The research concludes with a synthesis of this paper's findings.

Chapter I

The Theoretical Framework

Securitisation in a 'Fragmented Authoritarian' Model

1.1 The Securitisation Debate

To research the outlined puzzle statement, it is necessary to provide an overview of securitisation theory. This analytical framework is applicable to the case as its purpose is to provide a basis to understand how a matter is moved from the political process to the security agenda. It shows how, if successful, securitising actors can use 'extraordinary measures' and break 'normal' political rules to shift the question into an area of 'special politics'.¹⁷ In my case, the theory can be applied to explore how threats to oil supply chains (and therefore oil shortages) have been securitised by the CPC and Chinese NOCs in Sudan and South Sudan, which has legitimised the use of 'extraordinary measures' – namely, a move away from China's traditional norms of non-intervention (Figure 1).

To understand the relevance of securitisation to this paper's empirical complication, it is necessary to review its foundational underpinnings and core concepts. Securitisation first gained prominence in Ole Wæver's *On Security*, which was later elaborated in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998), by Wæver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde. These authors – and their ideas – are known collectively as the Copenhagen School (CS). They argue that an issue (or referent subject) is securitised when it is presented as posing an existential threat to a referent object. Referent objects are entities 'that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival'.¹⁸ Their multi-sectoral approach suggests that the process can take place in five categories of security dynamics: military, political, economic, environmental and societal.¹⁹ A securitising actor (the agent with abilities to present and define threats) puts the security threat to an audience through a discursive speech act – also known as a 'securitising move'.²⁰ An issue can only become securitised if it is accepted by the relevant 'audience'. If successful, the audience collectively agrees on the nature of the threat and the securitising actors can use 'extraordinary measures' to neutralise

¹⁷ Barry Buzan, O. Wæver & Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 24-5.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. viii.

²⁰ Ole Wæver, 'Securitisation and desecuritisation' in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86.

it. 'Normal' political rules are then broken which constrain behaviour and the question shifts into an area of 'special politics'.²¹

Security in this interpretation is a self-referential practice: only by labelling something as a security issue does it become one, irrespective of whether there is a 'real' threat or not.²² The CS build upon Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman's work, who contend that the relationship between the individual and society is somewhat dialectical.²³ As Wæver echoes: 'security is seen neither objective nor subjective, but rather as an intersubjective practice'.²⁴ Precisely because of its intersubjectivity, Thierry Balzacq states that 'the possibility of designating something as a security issue exists in any sector of social life'.²⁵ In this sense, 'energy security', a term which will be used in this paper, can be seen as a subsidiary component of the wider theory of securitisation.

However, these broader ontological points are deeply contested. They raise questions of who can 'speak security' and whether those who that have this ability can determine the success of the securitising move. The CS maintain that security occurs in a traditional military context with existential threats largely concerning state, societal, governmental and territorial survival.²⁶ Political leaders, they reason, hold greater defining power and are the articulators and designators of threats due to their position within a social hierarchy.²⁷ The discursive, illocutionary 'speech act', as Wæver argues, 'is the act' of security.²⁸ It is a political choice by self-serving elites to legitimise extraordinary measures and accrue more power.²⁹ CS theorists thus stress the *performative* aspect of security as the configuration of context, for, if an issue to be securitised, the securitising actor must convince its audience that the referent object is indeed threatened.³⁰ Security language, therefore, does not just offer an interpretation of reality but can create new realities.³¹ Utterances *do things*.

²¹ Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, pp. 24-5.

²² Ibid., pp.24; 32.

²³ Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Washington: Anchor Books, 1966).

²⁴ Wæver, p. 51; Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, p. 31.

²⁵ Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard & Jan Ruzicka, 'Securitization revisited: theory and cases', *International Relations*, 30, 4 (2016), 494-531 (p. 498).

²⁶ Ralf Emmers, 'Securitisation' in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. Alan Collins, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 109-125.

²⁷ Matt McDonald, 'Securitisation and the Construction of Security', *European Journal of International Relations*, 14, 4 (2008), 563-587 (p. 568).

²⁸ Wæver, p. 55.

²⁹ Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, p. 25.

³⁰ Emmers, p. 114.

³¹ McDonald, pp. 566-68.

1.2. The Incompatibility of CS Securitisation to Authoritarian Societies

However, traditional CS securitisation theory is – as some scholars posit – unsuited to non-western contexts. Barry Buzan & Lene Hansen, for example, have identified its ‘Western/Eurocentrism’ as a flaw.³² Using Kyrgyzstan as a case study, C. Wilkinson builds upon this analysis. She asserts that the CS’s argument that security occurs through a discursive, illocutionary ‘speech act’, is inappropriate in contexts where there are limitations to speech.³³ Pinar Bilgin adds that ‘further insight [is needed] into insecurities by people and social groups in different parts of the world’.³⁴ In light of such criticisms, this paper will reconceptualise securitisation theory, building on revisions made by scholars to better operationalise it in an authoritarian context.

To begin with, great debate surrounds the question of what evidences successful securitisation in an authoritarian context. As mentioned, CS scholars use elements of speech act theory, proposing that people ‘interact with the language they use by infusing it with illocutionary forces’.³⁵ These forces are used to produce perlocutionary effects (the desired causal action of the speech act) which ‘can affect the feelings, attitudes, and subsequent behaviour of the hearer(s)’.³⁶

However, critics of this approach have noted that presenting security as an illocutionary ‘speech act’ is inappropriate in contexts where securitisation might take place through action rather than words.³⁷ Instead, scholars of the ‘practice-oriented approach’, suggest that successful securitisation is manifested in ‘concrete measures’.³⁸ This is stated by Rita Floyd, who suggests that ‘successful securitisation is the implementation of security policy into practice’, and echoed by Balzacq, who argues that policy tools can promote ‘certain perceptions of threat’.³⁹ Balzacq adds that there are ‘symbolic attributes’ within policy instruments that can communicate a securitising actor’s ‘collective perception of problems’.⁴⁰ Consequently, Maria Julia Trombetta proposes that

³² Barry Buzan & Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

³³ C. Wilkinson, ‘The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitisation Theory Useable outside Europe?’ *Security Dialogue*, 38 (2007), 5–25; Wæver, p. 55.

³⁴ Pinar Bilgin, ‘The “Western-Centrism” of Security Studies: “Blind Spot” or Constitutive Practice?’, *Security Dialogue*, 41, 6 (2010), pp. 615-22 (p.620).

³⁵ Juha. A.Vuori, *How to do Security with Words: A Grammar of Securitisation in the People’s Republic of China* (Turku: University of Turku, 2011), p.66.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Wæver, p. 55; Wilkinson, pp. 5–25.

³⁸ A. Ghisseli, ‘Diplomatic Opportunities and Rising Threats: The Expanding Role of Non-Traditional Security in Chinese Foreign and Security Policy’, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 27, 112 (2018), 611-625 (p. 613).

³⁹ Rita Floyd, ‘Extraordinary or Ordinary Emergency Measures: What, and Who, Defines the ‘Success’ of Securitization?’ *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29, 2 (2016): 677-694 (p. 688); Balzacq, ‘A Theory of Securitisation’ (2011), p. 15.

⁴⁰ Balzacq, ‘A Theory of Securitisation’ (2011), p. 15.

insecurity can be fostered in mundane ‘everyday practices’ of bureaucrats and security professionals – and measured through actions which neutralise existential threats.⁴¹ Tangible changes in Chinese foreign policy not articulated in the public domain such as institutional changes, military deployments and other provisions can therefore be seen as evidence of successful securitisation.⁴² This paper will follow this line of argument, though, it will be reasoned that there is still some utility in analysing communicative actions, which can reveal a great deal about the values, beliefs, intentions and assumptions of the securitising actors.

Moreover, by equating securitisation to the speech act, ‘sociological turn’ scholars argue that the CS offer a state-centric, elite-focused and zero-sum understanding of security, which does not truly address the act’s embedded context.⁴³ Whilst they agree that discursive practices may be important in explaining how some security issues originate, they argue that many security threats develop with ‘little if any discursive design’.⁴⁴ Building on the concept of ‘resonance’, Balzacq agrees that ‘facilitating conditions’, including regime type, are crucial in determining the success of a ‘securitising move’.⁴⁵ However, for Balzacq, the historic and cultural context has a decisive effect not only on the reception of securitising motives by the audience, but also on the perception of those who utter them.⁴⁶ This ‘externalist’ approach still views security as intersubjective, but acknowledges how objective features of the world can empower and disempower security actors.⁴⁷ This is of utility to this paper as it enables the researcher to study how objective real-world threats – such as attacks against Chinese oil facilities – could influence the success of the securitising move. Security, hence, is not entirely a social construction.

In incorporating the importance of the act’s embedded context, this demands a reappraisal of the role of the audience. The CS, for example, believe the success of a securitising move depends on audience acceptance (perceived as the ‘general public’), however, this is insufficient in authoritarian societies where the unsymmetrical relationship between citizen and state means authorities have strict control over information dissemination and ‘can bull-doze a securitisation discourse into the public domain without [...] negotiation’.⁴⁸ Consequently, the research will build

⁴¹ Maria Julia Trombetta, ‘Fueling Threats: Securitization and the Challenges of Chinese Energy Policy’, *Asian Perspective*, 42 (2018): 183-206 (p. 188).

⁴² Ghisseli, ‘Diplomatic Opportunities and Rising Threats’, p. 613.

⁴³ McDonald, p. 583.

⁴⁴ Thierry Balzacq, ‘A Theory of Securitisation: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants’ in *Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, ed. by Thierry Balzacq (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 1.

⁴⁵ McDonald, p. 567.

⁴⁶ Balzacq, Léonard & Ruzicka, p. 503.

⁴⁷ Thierry Balzacq, ‘The ‘Essence of securitisation: Theory, ideal type, and asociological science of security’ *International Relations*, 29, 1 (2015), 103-113 (p. 109).

⁴⁸ Joseph Chinyong Liow (2006: 52) referenced in Vuori (2011), p.110.

on Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert's re-conceptualisation of the audience which suggests that 'securitisation acts can have various and parallel audiences'.⁴⁹ This is a sentiment echoed by sociological-approach scholars such as Mark Salter, who have disaggregated the audience into different groups including popular, elite, technocratic and scientific settings.⁵⁰ The success of securitisation is still highly contingent upon the securitising actor's ability 'to identify with the audience's feelings, needs and interests', however, Salter's revision provides some much-needed depth: some audiences, in his conception, are more receptive to arguments and some are more powerful than others.⁵¹ In this way, securitisation is not entirely 'self-referential', but a strategic process that 'occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances' including the 'psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction'.⁵² As M. C. Williams notes, this means that not all securitising moves will be 'socially effective', as not all actors are equally as powerful to make claims.⁵³ This has been expanded by Balzacq, who has suggested that emphasis should be put on a context-specific 'enabling audience', which empowers the securitising actor with the authority to act.⁵⁴ This could switch depending on the securitising move.

1.3. Securitisation in a 'Fragmented Authoritarian' Model

Balzacq and Salter's reinterpretation of context and the audience is useful for operationalising securitisation in an authoritarian context. Juha Vuori, for example, uses Balzacq and Salter's analysis in conjunction with Lene Hansen's concept of 'silence' to apply the framework to the PRC. Originally used in reference to honour killings of women in Pakistan, Hansen argued that there are some situations where it is not possible to speak about a security issue, as this would increase threats to the individual – hence creating 'silence'.⁵⁵ Similarly, in the PRC, Vuori suggests that the CPC hold a monopoly over security, as their authority is required to bring about a security reality – thus creating 'silence'.⁵⁶ The paramount leader, he adds, has a key role in the 'trickle-down effect' of official propaganda and in security construction, but still needs 'to appeal to the masses

⁴⁹ Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert, 'Reconceptualizing the audience in securitization theory', in *Understanding Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, ed. by Thierry Balzacq (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 57-76 (p.60).

⁵⁰ Mark B. Salter, 'Securitisation and Desecuritisation: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 11, 4 (2008), 321-349 (p. 324).

⁵¹ Balzacq, 'A Theory of Securitisation' (2011), p. 9.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁵³ M. C. Williams, 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization in International Politics', *International Relations Studies Quarterly*, 47, 4 (2003), 511-531 (p.514).

⁵⁴ Balzacq, Léonard & Ruzicka, p. 500.

⁵⁵ L. Hansen, 'The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 29 (2000), 285-306 (p. 285).

⁵⁶ Vuori (2011), p. 12.

for support'.⁵⁷ On the other hand, he admonishes, even in the most despotic regimes, securitising actors 'need people to do their bidding', as 'all societies require some form of ritual', even if this only depends on 'favourable beliefs of some key figures in the polity'.⁵⁸ Despite contextual variations, he reasons, securitisation follows the same logic. The difference is that in authoritarian societies, securitising moves can easily switch from the direction of the public to the elites depending on the context.⁵⁹

However, Vuori's interpretation does not account for the fragmentation of decision-making in the PRC. As Lieberthal & Lampton have contended in their original work *Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post Mao China*, economic and fiscal power in the PRC is highly decentralised, disjointed, and based upon consensus politics, requiring negotiation and bargaining across numerous bodies of state.⁶⁰ For the sake of brevity, this paper argues that there are two competing securitising groups which shape energy decision-making in the PRC, though this is clearly a simplified, lo-fi resolution representation of what is undoubtedly a highly complex and multi-faceted decision-making system.⁶¹ On one hand, there are the Chinese NOCs, which, since the break-up of the Ministry of Energy in 1988, have become decentralised and vertically integrated companies with operational autonomy and responsibility for their own survival.⁶² On the other, there is the state energy decision-making apparatus, though in reference, these actors will be interchangeably referred to as the 'government' or the 'CPC government', as Party and state are deeply intertwined.

Bo Kong has labelled these collectives as the 'Two Chinas', which have separate interests and motivations.⁶³ Whilst these actors might be united in action, their reasons for protecting oil supply networks are not always mutual. For NOCs, their interests revolve around profit and market with threat tied to financial risk and corporate survival. For the CPC government, regime and Party survival are the root of energy security concerns. Consequently, they have separate, though interrelated, perceptions of and means to respond to threats. Whilst they share an understanding of the referent subject, referent objects are not always shared (see Figure 1). It is the

⁵⁷ Juha. A. Vuori, 'Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitisation: Applying the Theory of Securitisation to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders', *European Journal of International Relations*, 14 (2008), 65-100 (p. 180).

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid (2011).

⁶⁰ Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton, *Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post Mao China*, (University of California Press, 1992), pp. 8-9.

⁶¹ G. Leung, A. Cherp, J. Jewell, & Y-M Wei, 'Securitization of energy supply chains in China', *Applied Energy*, 123 (2014), 316-326 (p. 319).

⁶² Bo Kong, 'China's Quest for Oil in Africa Revisited' *SAIS*, 1 (2011), 1-26 (p.5).

⁶³ Ibid.

interactions between these actors, how they shape security, and ultimately how they alter foreign policy which are the pivotal questions that emerge from my empirical complication.




Figure 1: Referent Subjects & Objects

Because of their semi-autonomy and influence, G. Leung, A. Cherp, J. Jewell, & Y-M Wei have suggested that the CPC government should be viewed as an audience to NOC ‘securitising agents’. They argue that energy decision-making operates within a ‘feedback loop’, where NOCs ‘are naturally keen to amplify both the vitality and vulnerability of oil supply’ in order to keep the security issue on the government agenda.⁶⁴ This paper has attempted to incorporate the ‘feedback loop’ into the securitisation process (see Figure 2). Perhaps this logic could be best understood by envisaging the following process: the NOCs construct a threat; this is accepted by the enabling audience – in this case multiple actors within the CPC government; these separate divisions of government perceive the threat based, in part, on the rhetoric and practices of the NOCs; this is accepted or rejected individually by separate branches of government; government actors contest definitions of energy security threats in interactions between themselves; they create a negotiated definition of threat, based partly on their position within the government dominance hierarchy; and energy security policy is altered.

In this ‘fragmented authoritarian’ model, aside from the division between the semi-autonomous NOCs and CPC government, various arms and departments of the state could therefore be interpreted as a combination of securitising actors and enabling audiences, who negotiate and contest energy security decisions and threat perceptions between themselves. However, to fully explore all potential securitising actors and audience interactions within the CPC

⁶⁴ Leung et al., p.23.

government would demand an in-focus scrutinization of the many departments and regulatory authorities of the polity, alongside an analysis of their structures, hierarchies and decision-making capabilities. Though this paper attempts to understand the power dynamics between some of these institutions, such a rich analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Scholars have devoted entire books to the topic – and the model continues to be expanded to include, for example, non-state actors and civil society groups by scholars such as Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard.⁶⁵

This paper has also made the theoretical choice to ignore the CPC’s enabling audience in the model. Once a definition of threat has been negotiated and agreed upon in various interactions between arms of government, due to the government’s monopoly on power and its limitations on speech, it does not need the approval of a wider audience to successfully securitise an existential threat. At this point, the CPC government is free to use ‘extraordinary measures’ through policy, discourse and practical actions to neutralise a security threat. A criticism of this approach is that it muddies the distinction between securitising moves and successful securitisation. However, this captures how matters can be moved to the security agenda without discursive design.




Figure 2: Complex securitisation process in a ‘fragmented authoritarian’ regime

⁶⁵ Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard *Chinese Politics as Fragmented Authoritarianism: Earthquakes, Energy and Environment* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).




Figure 3: Simplified securitisation process in a ‘fragmented authoritarian’ regime

1.4. Sub-Questions

From the identified academic and theoretical debates, this paper aims to answer the following sub-questions:

1. *Who are the securitising actors/ audiences and what are their interests in Sudan and South Sudan?*
2. *How are energy security decisions negotiated and contested between the CPC government and NOCs?*
3. *Do objective security threats to Chinese energy operations in Sudan and South Sudan exist in empirical reality and how does this enhance the ‘resonance’ of the securitising move?*
4. *Has the securitisation of oil supply chains been successful in Sudan and South Sudan and what ‘extraordinary measures’ can be identified?*

As shown, securitisation remains deeply contested in more ways than shown in this brief overview. How objective threats against Chinese oil facilities might affect the ‘resonance’ of the securitising move and the securitising actor’s perception of threat, alongside the defining power that the CPC government and NOCs bring to their interactions, fits into a broader ontological debate between ‘social turn’ scholars and the post-structuralist CS.

Chapter II

Methodology

In this section, the research methodology and its consistency with the nature of the research puzzle will be discussed. This will include details of the research design and data collection methods.

2.1. Ontology and Epistemology

In any research project, it is important to ensure that the research strategy is compatible with the ontological and epistemological nature of the research puzzle. To justify the chosen research methodology, this chapter will briefly address this compatibility concern. Ontologically the analytical frame of securitisation finds itself within the meta-theory of social constructivism. Constructivists are by nature diametrically opposed to structural realists: power, in the former's view, is not conceived through concrete material, but combined with discursive power. Individuals, therefore, have agency in the construction of social realities. However, there is an inherent ontological paradox here: whilst securitisation is an 'intersubjective practice', where threats can be entirely socially constructed, the question of who can define security – and whether a security policy is implemented – largely depends on the securitising actor's position within a social structure and their position relative to the audience.⁶⁶ Furthermore, by following the 'sociological turn', the securitising move's success is partially dependent on its consistency with empirical reality. The ontological nature is therefore, on the one hand, structurationist, centring on the relational interactions between agency and structure.⁶⁷ On the other hand, the research puzzle is ontologically discursive, concerning itself with meanings and symbols, highlighting how threats are perceived. Epistemologically, the research puzzle is primarily interpretivist: researchers of this tradition seek out and interpret people's meanings and interpretations. Consistent with the discursive interpretive stance of my research, a qualitative research strategy, including document analysis and process-tracing, was selected as most appropriate.

2.2. Research Design

In order to answer the research puzzle identified in the introduction, a 'specific research design' had to be constructed to analyse evidence.⁶⁸ Document analysis, a form of qualitative research in

⁶⁶ McDonald, p. 568.

⁶⁷ Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (California: University of California Press, 1984).

⁶⁸ C. C. Ragin, & , L. M. Amoroso, *Constructing Social Research. The Unity and Diversity of Method* (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2019), p. 24.

which documents are interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning around an assessment topic, was employed as an investigation strategy.⁶⁹

2.2.1. Sampling

As Mason suggests, to ensure relevant data is collected, it is important to determine sampling parameters based on the ‘who, what, when and where’ of the research design.⁷⁰ Regarding the ‘who’ and ‘what’, the research focuses on the interactions between the CPC government and the three leading Chinese NOCs: CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC. In terms of ‘where’, data collection took place in the Netherlands using primary and secondary sources found on the internet, however, the research concerns events specifically in South Sudan, Sudan and China. In terms of ‘when’, the research focuses on the period between 1989 and 2020, beginning the year that Chinese NOCs first engaged with Sudan. In order to properly test the hypothesis that oil supply chains have been securitised, it was necessary to demonstrate how, over an extensive timeframe, threats to oil had been rendered into new policies and actions.

2.2.2. Data Collection

In this paper, the principles of Altheide and Schneider’s Qualitative Analysis were followed, which requires the researcher to observe the topic through in-depth examination of the relevant primary documents and secondary literature to confirm its suitability to the research question.⁷¹ A ‘purposive sampling’ method was also employed, which is an efficient means of diagnostically extracting and intentionally selecting empirical data pertinent to the research puzzle to develop a comprehensive data set.⁷² To ensure findings were accurately corroborated, multiple sources were utilised to lower selection bias and triangulate findings across mediums. In total, roughly seventy online newspaper reports, twenty special reports, fifty journal articles, and twenty government documents were analysed.

Following the research puzzle stated in the introduction, the research was divided into three distinct phases:

⁶⁹ G. A. Bowen, ‘Document analysis as a qualitative research method’, *Qualitative Research Journal*, 9, 2 (2009), 27-40.

⁷⁰ J. Mason, *Qualitative Researching* (London: SAGE Publications, 2018), pp.52-3.

⁷¹ David L. Altheide & Christopher J. Schneider, *Qualitative Media Analysis* (London: SAGE, 2013), pp. 10-14.

⁷² H. Boeije, *Analysis in Qualitative Research* (London: SAGE Publications, 2010), p. 195.

Phase One: Securitising actors and audiences, their interests, and how discourses of threat are articulated, negotiated and contested

In line with sub-questions one and two, phase one mapped out the ‘who’ and ‘why’ of my research asking at the outset, who are the securitising actors and their audiences, what are their interests in the Sudans, and how are security threats negotiated between them?

To understand China’s oil interests in Sudan and South Sudan, it was necessary to understand the importance of oil to the functionality of the PRC. For oil consumption information, reports were read by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). The importance of Sudan and South Sudan to China’s energy security strategy were outlined in a number of rich historical texts including Large (2011), Patey (2014, 2017), Hodzi (2019) and Brosig (2020), who have all documented the expansion of Chinese NOCs overseas.⁷³

Phase one also studied the power dynamics between the ‘Two Chinas’ and how their discourses and interests are negotiated and contested in a ‘fragmented authoritarian’ model. An illuminating scholar on this topic has been Nana De Graaf, who used biographical and organisational mapping techniques and social network analysis to bring to light the revolving door between the government and the NOCs.⁷⁴ Scholars such as Kong (2011), Andrews Speed (2012), Leung et. al. (2014) and Sorensen (2019) have also been able to interview former NOC employees and Chinese officials to determine the NOCs’ influence on decision-making.⁷⁵

⁷³ See Malte Brosig, ‘A Role Model for Africa or Exceptional Engagement? Assessing China’s South Sudan Experience’, *Journal of Contemporary China* (2020), 1-16; Luke Patey, ‘Learning in Africa: China’s Overseas oil Investments in Sudan and South Sudan’, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 26, 107 (2017), 756-768; Luke Patey, *The New Kings of Crude: China, India, and the Global Struggle for Oil in Sudan and South Sudan* (London: Hurst & Company, 2014); Obert Hodzi, *The End of China’s Non-Intervention Policy in Africa* (Geneva: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); and Daniel Large, ‘Enemies into Friends’, in *Sudan Looks East: China, India & the Politics of Asian Alternatives* (London: Boydell & Brewer, 2011), pp. 157-175

⁷⁴ See Nana De Graaf, ‘China Inc. goes global. Transnational and national networks of China’s globalizing business elite’, *Review of International Political Economy*, 27, 2 (2019), 208-233; ‘Global Networks and the Two Faces of Chinese National Oil Companies’ *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, 13 (2014), 539-563; ‘Oil elite networks in a transforming global oil market’, *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 53, 4 (2012), 275-297; *Towards a Hybrid Global Energy Order State-owned oil companies, corporate elite networks and governance* (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2013).

⁷⁵ See Camilla T. N. Sorensen, ‘That Is Not Intervention; That Is Interference with Chinese Characteristics: New Concepts, Distinctions and Approaches Developing in the Chinese Debate and Foreign and Security Policy Practice’, *The China Quarterly*, 239 (2019): 594-6; Leung et. al. (2014); Andrews-Speed, Phillip, ‘Do Overseas Investments by National Oil Companies Enhance Energy Security at Home? A View from Asia’ in *Oil and Gas for Asia: Geopolitical Implications of Asia’s Rising Demand*, NBR Special Report (Singapore: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012); and Kong (2011).

Phase Two: Documenting the ‘resonance’ of the securitising move and understanding the empirical reality of threats to interests in Sudan and South Sudan

This phase aimed to answer research sub-question three, relating to the ‘resonance’ (the credibility, salience and consistency with empirical reality) of moves to securitise oil supply chains. This was of significance, as, according to ‘sociological approach’ scholars the more ‘resonant’ a securitising move, the more likely successful securitisation will occur. This information was predominantly collated through numerous local and African newspapers such as the *Sudan Tribune*, *Africa Daily*, and *Quartz*; Chinese sources such as *People’s Daily*, *Xinhua* and *South China Morning Post*, and from websites such as the official UNMISS and FOCAC webpages. NGO reports such as from International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Global Witness and Amnesty International were also used to understand the complex network of violence in Sudan and South Sudan.

Phase Three: Identifying ‘extraordinary measures’ and successful securitisation

The third phase aimed to ask how successful the securitising move has been in legitimising the use of extraordinary measures in this paper’s case study, and whether the securitising actors have been granted special privileges in dealing with the security issue. As the ‘practice-oriented’ approach in securitisation theory suggests, these measures can be manifested in concrete changes and actions, such as amendments in national security policy, legislation, regulation and security practices. A combination of documents was utilised to answer this question: Chinese legislation; White Papers; FOCAC Beijing Action Plans; UN troop contributions; African Union (AU) and UN position papers; official statements. As this paper suggests that the communicative actions of decision-makers can reveal the values, beliefs, and intentions of those with defining power, transcripts of speeches and other verbal or written communications were also used.

2.2.3. Analysis

Once sources were scrutinised on their relevance and reliability, their content were coded systematically into nodes on NVivo in line with the components of securitisation theory and the aforesaid sub-questions, which were adjusted and changed as the project developed. Though the key nodes generally followed the sub-questions, these nodes were then also scored down into their constituent parts. For example, for ‘Securitising Actors’, sub-nodes were created for Chinese NOCs, the CPC leadership, and the relationship between both actors. Below the sub-nodes, sub-sub nodes were integrated into the structure whilst reading through relevant sources and literature. For example, for the ‘Perlocutionary Effects’ node, sub-nodes included ‘Military Developments’,

and underneath, sub-sub nodes included ‘UNMISS’, ‘Private Military Contractors’ etc. Replicant ideas were merged to create a more cohesive, logical and orderly node structure in a second round of coding, which generally form the basis of this paper’s sub-headings.

Figure 4: Initial Codebook (node) structure

Codebook 1: Securitising Actors & Audiences	Codebook 2: Resonance	Codebook 3: Extraordinary Measures
<p>The CPC Government</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Structure and organisation ❖ Defining power capabilities ❖ Articulations of energy security ❖ Interests <p>NOCs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Structure and organisation ❖ Defining power ❖ Articulations of energy security ❖ Interests <p>Interrelationship between NOC and the CPC/ Government</p>	<p>Historical and political context</p> <p>Empirical security threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Threats against Chinese oil facilities in Sudan and South Sudan 	<p>Economic</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Development aid ❖ Corporate Responsibility Strategies <p>Military/ Security</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Peacekeeping ops. ❖ National Security Policy ❖ PSCs & Militia Co-option ❖ Arms manufacturers <p>Diplomatic</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Foreign Policy ❖ UN Sanctions ❖ Mediation and Negotiation <p>Legal</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Legislation changes ❖ Security regulation

2.3. Limitations

However, this paper is limited in several ways. For one, there is disagreement as to the veracity of various statistical data including the extent of China’s oil consumption, its energy investments abroad, and oil imports from Sudan and South Sudan. Whilst claims can be made about state decision-makers perception of energy security, data inconsistencies make it difficult to compare these perceptions against empirical facts. This has also made it harder to assess the real (rather than the imagined) importance of the Sudans and of oil in general to China’s energy security.

Moreover, due to the nature of the regime, the availability of data on high-level decision-making and negotiation between departments in the highest levels of office is not freely available, though, as noted, several sources have offered insights. This has meant that the paper does not contain any original findings from first-person interviews. Rather, it is reliant on testimonies made by NOC bureaucrats and government officials in interviews with academics to determine the relationship between the ‘Two Chinas’ making it difficult to conclude whether the CPC government can be considered an ‘enabling audience’ of the NOCs.

Chapter III

The ‘Two Chinas’

Competing Interests in the Energy Sector and the Importance of Oil

This paper’s puzzle statement assumes that China’s diplomatic and military interference in Sudan and South Sudan is as a consequence of the securitisation of threats to oil supply chains. This chapter will explain the perceived and empirical importance of oil, how its deficiency poses an ‘existential threat’ to the ‘Two Chinas’, and the importance of the Sudans to China’s energy security strategy. It will also describe the power dynamics between the CPC government and NOCs. First the interests of the CPC state will be explored.

3.1. An Introduction to Energy Security

To understand the importance of oil to China, it is necessary to define the concept of ‘energy security’. Daniel Yergin has suggested that energy security refers to the ‘availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices’ in ways that do not jeopardise national values and objectives.⁷⁶ Christian Winzer, alternatively, proposes the term ‘energy supply continuity’, suggesting that all energy security definitions share an ‘absence of, protection from or adaptability to threats that [...] have an impact on the energy supply chain’.⁷⁷ Chester adds that energy security has a ‘polysemic nature’: its definition depends on energy source, timeframe, country and continent.⁷⁸ This essay will combine Yergin and Winzer’s interpretation with Chester’s polysemic analysis, creating a context-specific definition based on China’s unique geography and history. The following section will provide a brief history of Chinese oil consumption and its perceived and objective importance.

3.2. The PRC and its Oil Consumption

After Mao’s death in 1976, China’s protectionist trading policies were replaced by Deng Xiaoping’s market-reforms beginning in 1978, resulting in a huge productivity boom.⁷⁹ Deng’s profit incentives to rural enterprises and small private business resulted in the mass migration of millions from their farms into the factories. The pace of urbanisation has been astounding: only around

⁷⁶ Daniel Yergin, *The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World* (New York: Penguin, 2011), p.2.

⁷⁷ Christian Winzer, ‘Conceptualizing energy security’, *Energy Policy*, 46 (2012): 36-48 (p. 41).

⁷⁸ Lynne Chester, ‘Conceptualising energy security and making explicit its polysemic nature’, *Energy Policy*, 38 (2010), 887-895 (p. 887; p. 892).

⁷⁹ Zulu Hi & Mohsin S. Khan, ‘Why Is China Growing So Fast?’ in *Economic Issues*, 8 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997) <<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues8/index.htm>>.[Accessed 25 April 2020]

18% of the population lived in cities in 1978, compared to 59% in 2017.⁸⁰ With these reforms, by 2009, China was the world's largest exporter and by 2013, it was also the world's greatest trading nation.⁸¹ However, China's energy consumption has skyrocketed in parallel: consumption doubled between 1994 and 2000, and again between 2000 and 2008.⁸² Such exponential growth has meant that since 2011, China has become the world's largest energy consumer.⁸³

Oil has played a substantial role in China's modernisation and urbanisation – although it is by no means China's main energy source. Coal, which represented 59% of overall consumption in 2018, represents a much larger percentage than oil, which represented 19% in the same period.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, oil is still highly important to the PRC. For one, it plays a crucial role in the heavy industry sector which used 71% of China's oil for the manufacturing of steel and automobiles. In 2009, China overtook Japan as the largest auto manufacturing nation and today, according to the International Organisation of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, China produces around 28% of automobiles worldwide.⁸⁵ Oil is also highly important for the transport and military sectors, particularly for air travel, which has tripled commercially between 1990-2002. Moreover, as the Chinese middle class grow, so has car demand, and thus diesel and petroleum.⁸⁶ As of the end of 2019, according to the Ministry of Public Security, the number of cars in China exceeded 250 million from just over 75 million a decade earlier.⁸⁷ Oil also enables China to continue its huge export drive to the West, responsible for a third of China's GDP, which continues to be essential for China's economic development, urbanisation, and social stability.

⁸⁰ China Daily, 'China's economic development in 40 years', *China Daily*, <<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/chinaecoachievement40years/index.html>> [Accessed 10 June 2020].

⁸¹ Investopedia, 'What country is the world's largest exporter of goods?', *Investopedia*, 21 October 2018 <<https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/011915/what-country-worlds-largest-exporter-goods.asp>> [Accessed 15 June 2020].

⁸² J Jiang & J. Sinton, 'Overseas Investments by Chinese National Oil Companies: Assessing the Drivers and Impacts', *International Energy Agency Energy Papers*, No. 2011/03, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011).

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Statista, 'Breakdown of primary energy consumption in China 2018, by energy source', *Statista*, 15 November 2019 <<https://www.statista.com/statistics/331709/china-primary-energy-consumption-breakdown-by-energy-source/>> [Accessed 15 July 2020].

⁸⁵ International Organisation of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, '2019 Production Statistics', *International Organisation of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers* < <http://www.oica.net/category/production-statistics/2019-statistics/> > [Accessed 10 May 2020].

Note: in 2019, the total number of automobiles produced was 91,786,861. China produced 25,720,665 of those.

⁸⁶ US Energy Information Administration, 'China' (2015), 1-36 < <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/CHN> > [Accessed 15 December 2019] (p. 4).

⁸⁷ Gasgoo, 'China's private car parc exceeds 200 mln for first time', 10 January 2020 <<http://autonews.gasgoo.com/m/Detail/70016758.html>> [Accessed 30 April 2020]; Statista, 'Car parc in China from 2009 to 2019', 24 March 2020 <<https://www.statista.com/statistics/285306/number-of-car-owners-in-china/>> [Accessed 30 April 2020].

Hence, oil shortages present an ‘existential threat’ to the state and could have abject effects to the legitimacy of the CPC. Whilst oil is by no means China’s principle energy source, it is crucial to important sectors of the economy. Yet, China has not been able to keep up with its own oil demand. By 2011, China was the second-largest oil consumer worldwide behind the US, by 2013, the largest net importer of petroleum, and by 2017, the top crude oil importer.⁸⁸ The PRC’s shift from oil exporter to importer has accordingly reinvigorated and intensified anxieties stemming from China’s traumatic history of oil dependency.

3.3. Historic Trauma and The Need for Self-Sufficiency

Since the Maoist era, energy self-sufficiency has been an integral component of Chinese national security. Such ideas have been moulded by painful historical experience. During the Korean War in the 1950s, the US imposed an embargo, leaving the nation reliant on the USSR for oil. However, in the 1960s, following the Sino-Soviet split, the USSR also stopped its exports to China, which at the time accounted for around half of China’s consumption. A further oil embargo from the US in the 1960s and 1970s left China reliant on its domestic supplies. Such experiences have created the perception that oil imports are unreliable and leave the country vulnerable to subversion from hostile international actors.

These experiences highlighted the need for energy self-sufficiency, and, for many years, following the discovery of the Shengli, Liaohe and Daqing oilfields, China was able to make this ambition a reality. As much as 97% of energy demand was satisfied at home between 1978 and 2004 – and China was even able to export oil abroad.⁸⁹ However, by the 1990s, China’s domestic capacity began to wane and NOCs failed to find in-country replacement sources. In 1997, for example, Daqing was declining in production capacity around 2.6% each year. This presented an ‘existential threat’ to the CPC.

3.4. Import Dependence and the ‘Go Out’ Strategy

With insufficient domestic supplies, by 1993, China was forced to become a net importer. Historic fears re-emerged, and Chinese officials became suspicious of buying oil off the international market as it would leave prices vulnerable to the global economy. This fear was confirmed in 1999 when international oil prices rose dramatically from \$15 dollars a barrel to \$25 in 2001, to \$30 in

⁸⁸ US Energy Information Administration, ‘China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest crude oil importer in 2017’, 31 December 2018 <<https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37821>> [Accessed 20 February 2020].

⁸⁹ Bo Kong, *An Anatomy of China’s Energy Insecurity and Its Strategies*, Office of Scientific & Technical Information, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, US Department of Energy, PNNL-15529 (2005), 1-57.

2003.⁹⁰ By 2003, China was paying around \$540 million extra for every dollar increase in barrel prices.⁹¹

Energy security fears were also exacerbated by suspicions that western powers might contain China. Of particular concern has been the Strait of Malacca, a crucial shipping channel between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra which transports 80% of Chinese oil imports, and has the capacity to be choked by potentially hostile powers such as India.⁹² As the Strait is patrolled by US and South-East Asian Navy vessels, this has exacerbated fears of a blockade.⁹³ Concerns were only reified by western reactions to Chinese attempts to acquire assets on the international market. For example, in 2005, when CNOOC tried to buy US oil company Unicol, their bid was prevented by the US House of Representatives based on the allegation that China was seeking to lock up energy supplies.⁹⁴ Likewise, the US cruise missile attack on al-Shifa plant in Khartoum, and further threats to bomb Sudan's oil infrastructure in 2002 – predominantly built by CNPC – may have had a similar effect.⁹⁵ Such actions only confirmed the concerns of Chinese analysts that oil to the Americans was a strategic geopolitical commodity, and 'it was not difficult to argue that China should treat oil in the same way'.⁹⁶

With this came several government policies to incentivise overseas investment, so Chinese NOCs aggressively expanded their overseas operations to acquire equity oil.⁹⁷ In 1996, the year China became a net crude oil importer, President Jiang Zemin called for companies to 'Go Out' and invest. Three years later, the 'Go Out' strategy was formally adopted by the CPC and further codified in the 10th Five Year Plan (2001-2005).⁹⁸ By 2005, China was importing 3 million barrels a day, accounting for half of its total consumption to cope with huge industrialisation efforts.⁹⁹ This strategy was recommended by government analysts at the State Planning Commission, the State Economic and Trade Commission, and the Development Research Centre.¹⁰⁰ It was expected

⁹⁰ Michal Meidan, 'The Implications of China's Energy-Import Boom', *Survival*, 56, 3 (2014), 179-200.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² H. I. Sutton, 'Could The Indian Navy Strangle China's Lifeline In The Malacca Strait?', *Forbes*, 8 July 2020 <<https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/07/08/could-the-indian-navy-strangle-chinas-lifeline-in-the-malacca-strait/>> [Accessed 9 July 2020].

⁹³ Leung et al.

⁹⁴ Ronald Dannreuther, 'China and global oil: vulnerability and opportunity', *International Affairs*, 97, 6 (2011), 1345-1364.

⁹⁵ Luke Patey, *The New Kings of Crude: China, India, and the Global Struggle for Oil in Sudan and South Sudan* (London: Hurst & Company, 2014), p. 110.

⁹⁶ Leung et al., p. 24.

⁹⁷ Meidan.

⁹⁸ International Crisis Group (2017), p.3.

⁹⁹ Yergin, p.3.

¹⁰⁰ Meidan, p. 189.

that should China find itself unable to buy oil, this was a means to guarantee access to supplies.¹⁰¹ Likewise, in 2006, the NDRC determined that oil would be acquired through NOC overseas investments, and that by creating foreign oil bases, this would eliminate market risk.¹⁰²

3.5. The Role of Sudan

As China was a latecomer on the global oil market, had limited experience in securing oil contracts, and had a significant technological disadvantage compared to other international oil companies (IOCs) this meant that the Chinese NOCs were forced to compete and secure investments in countries where there were low levels of western competition. Sudan fit the bill well: the coup d'état of 30 June 1989, which saw the government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and President Ahmed al-Mirghani overthrown and replaced by a totalitarian Islamic dictatorship led by military officer Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, resulted in country-wide implementation of Sharia Law and a string of human rights abuses and war crimes. By 1992, US oil-giant Chevron, had packed up its operations following an attack on one of its oil facilities. With the security situation deteriorating, and political pressure mounting from NGOs, many other western oil companies such as Talisman, Lundin and OMV followed suit.¹⁰³ By 1993, Sudan had been labelled a 'state sponsor of terrorism' by the US, having provided residence to notorious 'terrorist leaders' such as Osama bin Laden. Faced with international sanctions, mounting inherited debt and a protracted civil war, the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Khartoum turned to Beijing.¹⁰⁴

For China, Sudan was an opportunity for its NOCs to tap into an oil market with little competition. As such, when Al-Bashir visited Beijing in 1995 and made an official request for Chinese participation in Sudan's oil sector, CNPC quickly got to work.¹⁰⁵ In September 1995, CNPC purchased Block 6 with a government loan, and a year later, secured a primary stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). This handed CNPC 'Sudan's highest yielding oil concessions: Blocks 1, 2 and 4 in Unity State'.¹⁰⁶ In 2000, CNPC also won a 41% share in Petrodar Operating Company (Blocks 3 & 7); in 2005, a majority holding in Block 15; and in 2007, Block 13.¹⁰⁷ Chinese oil operations were initially of huge importance to both the CPC and

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Malte Brosig, 'A Role Model for Africa or Exceptional Engagement? Assessing China's South Sudan Experience', *Journal of Contemporary China* (2020), 1-16 (p. 7).

¹⁰⁴ Daniel Large & Luke Patey, *Sudan Looks East: China, India & the Politics of Asian Alternatives* (London: Boydell & Brewer, 2011), p. 10.

¹⁰⁵ Linda Jakobson & Zha Daojiong, 'China and the Worldwide Search for Oil Security', *Asia-Pacific Review*, 13, 2 (2006), 60-73 (p. 66).

¹⁰⁶ Patey & Large, p. 17.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

the NOCs. During the 1990s, Sudan provided China with supplies when domestic oil capacity was depleting. For a time, Sudan was China's sixth largest oil provider. In 2007, it was churning out around 470,000 barrels a day (bpd) and held some 6.7 billion barrels in reserve.¹⁰⁸

However, the country's real importance was in acting as a launching pad for further oil and construction operations. Sudan became the centre of CNPC's internationalisation strategy: in 2000, the company only had a small number of international investments, mostly located in Sudan and Kazakhstan with a combined production of 140,000 bpd, yet, by 2013, Chinese NOCs were operating in 42 countries worldwide with a combined capacity of 2.1 million bpd.¹⁰⁹ Sudan was also the first location that CNPC built an oil refinery – the Khartoum Refinery Complex – proudly referred to as CNPC's 'pearl on the African continent'.¹¹⁰ CNPC's success story in Sudan, as Luke Patey argues, 'broke the taboo' that Chinese NOCs could not operate overseas.¹¹¹

3.6. Corporate Interests and the NOCs

However, it would be a mischaracterisation to suggest that the NOCs had no agency in their ventures overseas. As Bo Kong explains, there are 'Two Chinas' with competing interests in the PRC: the market and profit oriented NOCs and the CPC government.¹¹² Whilst these actors might sometimes be united in action, their perceptions of existential threat and their reasons for safeguarding access to oil supply networks are not always mutual.

Prior to Deng Xioping's 'opening up' reforms, the economy was dominated by central planning and state ownership – including China's NOCs. However, following the restructuring of the Ministry of Energy in 1988, which was broken up and replaced with three decentralised oil companies (CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC - also known as the 'Three Barrels'), these NOCs have been able to enhance their autonomy. Each of these companies have been granted responsibility for different sectors of the upstream/ downstream operations of the oil and gas industry: CNPC manages onshore upstream assets, Sinopec focuses on distribution, refining and petrochemicals, whilst CNOOC develops offshore oil and gas assets.¹¹³ The 'Three Barrels' were also vertically integrated and made public on the international stock market to encourage efficiency and

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 10.

¹⁰⁹ Patey, (2017).

¹¹⁰ Ibid., (2014).

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Kong.

¹¹³ US Energy Information Administration (2015).

competition. As such, the oil companies had two competing aims: to maximise profit and to secure oil for the state.

Accordingly, as Andrew-Speed argues, the NOCs principal motivation to expand overseas was to ensure corporate survival, given the limited long-term hydrocarbon resources at home.¹¹⁴ NOCs, therefore, began scouting for overseas opportunities even before the ‘Go Out’ policy was announced.¹¹⁵ In 1995, seven years before the ‘Go Out’ strategy was codified in the 10th Five Year Plan, future CNPC CEO Zhou Yongkang announced CNPC’s desire to expand overseas production to 20 million tonnes by 2010.¹¹⁶ In Sudan, it was also the oil giants who were the first to conduct oil diplomacy with members of the al-Bashir government. In July 1995, CNPC President Wang Tao met with the Sudanese oil minister in Beijing.¹¹⁷ The international expansion of the NOCs operations was, therefore, a moment where the interests of the ‘Two Chinas’ aligned.

Whilst overseas oil in Sudan and South Sudan were important to the government’s energy security strategy, arguably, energy operations there mattered more for CNPC. For one, the region hosts CNPC’s largest foreign operation, and for around a decade, made up 40% of the company’s overseas production.¹¹⁸ According to sources, CNPC had invested around \$7 billion by 2012 and is said to hold ‘plurality or majority stakes in three of the five largest oil consortia’ there.¹¹⁹ This includes a 41% stake in Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC) and a 40% stake in GNPOC.¹²⁰ In comparison, Sudan and South Sudan only accounted for 5.5% of China’s oil imports and 2.6% of its consumption between 1999 and South Sudan’s independence in 2011.¹²¹ Today, neither Sudan or South Sudan are one of China’s top ten oil importers.¹²²

In fact, there were many reasons why overseas expansion in Sudan was in the NOCs’ interests. CNPC’s investments in Sudan were crucial for the expansion and development of its oil subsidiary service companies such as the Great Wall Drilling Company, China Petroleum Material and Equipment Corporation and the China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation (CPECC).¹²³ By 2014, CNPC’s subsidiaries were involved in engineering and construction projects

¹¹⁴ Andrews-Speed (2012), p. 35.

¹¹⁵ Patey (2014), p. 91.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Brosig, p. 7.

¹¹⁹ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 31.

¹²⁰ Hodzi, p. 185.

¹²¹ Patey (2014), p. 91.

¹²² Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 31.

¹²³ Patey & Large, p. 17.

in 73 countries.¹²⁴ According to Zhou Jiping, former CEO of CNPC who served in Sudan during the 1990s, ‘machinery, equipment and other products’ constituted 135 per cent of the company’s initial investment in GNPOC.¹²⁵ Moreover, prior to Sudan, the NOCs and its subsidiaries had little overseas experience, technological skill or knowledge of petroleum contracts.¹²⁶ By operating overseas, this provided them with technical and risk experience, which was expanded through joint operations with IOCs like Malaysia’s Petronas and Canada’s Talisman.¹²⁷ Many subsidiaries only entered Sudan for overseas experience: CPECC, for example, built Sudan’s first oil pipeline from the southern oilfields to the Red Seas, but made no profit.¹²⁸ In addition, NOCs were able to increase their autonomy and reduce oversight from the government.¹²⁹ Production costs were also lower, there were better oil discovery rates, and it was cheaper to ship oil from overseas to China than from the Xinjiang oilfields in far western China.¹³⁰ Finally, in the 1990s, China’s oil industry desperately needed to offset its workforce or risk laying off a substantial number of employees from China’s waning oilfields.

These ulterior motives, profit-driven interests, and threats shaped by corporate logic have often put the NOCs at odds with the government. Whilst sometimes, corporate motives can be pursued concurrently with the national interest, sometimes corporate motives alone win out. For example, frequently NOCs will compete against one another, as the more high-quality assets a company acquires, the more likely it is to obtain diplomatic and financial support from the government. Such logic is actioned even though this does little to enhance the PRC’s overall energy security and lowers the return rate for the winning bidder. For example, Sinopec outbid CNPC in Sudan for the construction of a 1,385-mile pipeline in Block 3 and Block 7 and refused to withdraw even after calls from Chinese diplomats and the China International Contractors Association to stand down.¹³¹ The fact that much of the oil produced overseas by NOCs is not shipped directly back to China, but sold on the international market to the highest bidder further underlines this point. This allows NOCs to avoid price controls on equity oil in the Chinese domestic market and receive higher rates.¹³² In 2007, one study shows that Chinese NOCs sold around 40% of their overseas oil production on the global market.¹³³ Starker estimates from De Graff suggest that only

¹²⁴ Patey (2017).

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.114.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 759.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 761.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.113.

¹²⁹ De Graff (2013), p. 163.

¹³⁰ Patey (2014), p. 92.

¹³¹ Chih-shian Liou, ‘Bureaucratic Politics and Overseas Investment by Chinese State-Owned Oil Companies: Illusory Champions’, 49, 4 (2009), 670-690, (p. 680).

¹³² Andrews-Speed (2012), p. 35.

¹³³ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 23.

around 10-15% of oil is shipped directly back to China.¹³⁴

Such actions challenge the dominant narrative that Chinese NOCs are operating as part of a ‘mercantilist’ strategy for the CPC government to ‘lock up’ global oil supplies.¹³⁵ Conversely, such behaviour substantiates the claim that ‘existential threat’ for the NOCs is anchored to adversarial forces which could negatively affect their profit margins, curtail their internationalisation, or prevent access to oil resources – which, in certain circumstances, can include other Chinese NOCs. The referent object is less clear: for NOCs, sometimes the primary referent object can be the state, but more often, the referent objects are the NOCs themselves, with corporate survival taking precedence. Obviously, these objects are interrelated. State survival, as chapter four will detail, is hugely important to the NOCs corporate strategy, as the state provides them with extensive financial support to enhance their competitiveness. Either way, whilst the ‘Two Chinas’ have a mutual interest in maintaining oil supply access, their motivations are not always shared.

3.7. The ‘Feedback Loop’

Precisely because of the Chinese government’s energy security paranoia, this facilitated the development of well financed, hugely competitive and influential NOCs, which were well-placed in the political apparatus to ensure that their corporate interests were met. Whilst this paper has demarcated the NOCs from the central government, the ‘Three Barrels’ are all still closely tied to the state. Even as publicly trading companies, CNPC and Sinopec retain their ministerial rank in the State Council, the highest administrative body in China, though CNOOC maintains a lower-ranking bureau.¹³⁶ Energy experts at the 16th Party Congress in 2002 even urged the State Council to set up supra-ministerial bodies to curtail their influence.¹³⁷

As Lieberthal & Lampton describes it, China’s political system can only be described as ‘fragmented authoritarianism’, whereby decision-making is highly decentralised, disjointed and based on consensus – often bargained and negotiated between multiple bodies.¹³⁸ Whilst the Party remains the overarching authority, bargaining occurs ‘horizontally, across organs of the same level, and vertically within bureaucratic systems’.¹³⁹ This is also true of the government’s inefficient

¹³⁴ De Graff (2013), p. 163.

¹³⁵ Ibid. (2014), p. 540.

¹³⁶ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 23.

¹³⁷ Median, p. 193.

¹³⁸ Lieberthal & Lampton, p. 8.

¹³⁹ N. Grunberg, ‘Revisiting Fragmented Authoritarianism in China’s central energy administration’, in *Chinese Politics as Fragmented Authoritarianism Earthquakes, Energy and Environment*, ed. by Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 16.

regulatory authorities, which divide energy governance between fifteen government departments.¹⁴⁰ In this way, each energy governance mechanism could be viewed as a securitising actor or an enabling audience within the wider state structure, though, as this paper does not have the capacity to appropriately review the interactions between these groups, they have been collectively categorised under the umbrella term of the CPC government. Instead, their collective influence in contrast to the NOCs remains the focus of this paper.

Whilst efforts have been made to consolidate energy policy, such as the formation of the National Energy Commission (NEC) in 2010, some scholars argue that the energy bureaucracy remains fragmented. The NEC, for one, is only an ad hoc body with no budget or decision-making power.¹⁴¹ The National Leading Small Group for Addressing Climate Change and Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Work (NLSG) also remains an influential discussion platform, and had bureaucratic affiliation with the State Council.¹⁴² Perhaps the most prominent department is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which is the primary energy policymaking, planning and regulatory authority within the State Council.¹⁴³ Its thirty-two departments cover practically every policy area and it has the power to set fuel prices, approve domestic and international investments, and review oil projects with expenditures over \$200 million.¹⁴⁴ However, officials from the NDRC admonish that the central government is too weak to reign in the NOCs, and that the political influence of the ‘petroleum clique’ exceed those of all the fragmented energy institutions which govern the energy sector.¹⁴⁵ For example, even though the NDRC removed Sudan from their list of preferred countries for oil investment in 2007, CNPC and Sinopec continued to make large investments there.¹⁴⁶

Rather, the central government often relies upon the NOCs for governing their own sectors, which Kong has termed ‘co-governance’.¹⁴⁷ As much technical experience has remained with the NOCs since their restructuring, government officials consult NOCs when establishing

¹⁴⁰ Leung et al, pp. 11-12.

Note: The 15 Minister-level actors highlighted by Leung et al are: ‘State Asset Supervisory and Administration Commission (SASAC), Ministry of Science and Technology (MIIT), Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Commerce (MOC), Ministry of Transportation (MOT), Ministry of Railway (MOR), Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS), State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS), State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) and State Administration of Taxation (SAT)’.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁴² Grunberg, p. 17.

¹⁴³ US Energy Information Administration, (2015).

¹⁴⁴ Patey (2014), p. 98; Grunberg, p. 21.

¹⁴⁵ Leung et al, p. 12.

¹⁴⁶ Linda Jakobson & Dean Knox, *New Foreign Policy Actors in China*, Policy Paper 26 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010), p. 30.

¹⁴⁷ Kong, p. 55.

new policies and laws.¹⁴⁸ For instance, in 1997, when the leadership commissioned a study on energy security, they handed control of this project to CNPC.¹⁴⁹ De Graff has also identified, through organisational mapping techniques, connections between influential state-owned think-tanks such as China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the China Academy of Science (CAS), and corporate leaders in big oil.¹⁵⁰ So, as energy expertise and academia has become dominated by the NOCs and as they play a fundamental role in the Chinese economy, they have become, as Walder terms, ‘too big to fail’.¹⁵¹

Furthermore, Erica Downs has documented how NOC CEO’s are regularly recruited to government positions precisely because of their world economy expertise and credentials as leaders of globally competitive firms.¹⁵² As more former oil executives enter the political fray, this widens the revolving door between the oil industry and government. This has only worked to integrate oilmen into the existing personal patronage networks endemic to Chinese society (known as *guanxi* networks).¹⁵³ Guanxi (关系) – which literally translates to ‘connections’ or ‘relationships’ – is perhaps best understood as social capital. As leaders of the NOCs are also appointed by the Central Committee of the CPC, they also often have direct informal access to top Chinese leaders – and thus plenty of guanxi.¹⁵⁴ The tradition of oilmen crossing over to the Party leadership has, as Patey suggests, allowed NOCs to shape government policy.¹⁵⁵ Zhou Yongkang, for example, who worked in the oil industry for thirty years (in part as CEO of CNPC) gained a seat in the Politburo in 2007 – the ultimate decision-making body in China.¹⁵⁶ Likewise, former Sinopec CEO, Zeng Qinghong, became the Vice President under President Hu Jintao. Far from the government taking the lead, in the run-up to the ‘Go Out’ strategy, influential NOC executives were instrumental in pushing for overseas investment and played a key role in the initial oil deals with the Sudanese government.

Leung et al. postulate that the power imbalance between the ‘Two Chinas’ has created a ‘feedback loop’ whereby the government has become the ‘enabling audience’ of the NOCs securitising moves. Though initially, vulnerabilities in China’s oil supply chain legitimised the need

¹⁴⁸ Patey (2014), p. 98.

¹⁴⁹ Median, p. 181.

¹⁵⁰ De Graff (2019), p. 15.

¹⁵¹ Andrew G. Walder, ‘From Control to Ownership: China’s Managerial Revolution’, *Management and Organization Review*, 7, 1 (2011), · 19-38 (p. 18).

¹⁵² Erica Downs, ‘Business Interest Groups in Chinese Politics: The Case of the Oil Companies’, in *China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2008), 121-141 (pp.131-137).

¹⁵³ Jakobson & Knox, p. 19.

¹⁵⁴ Leung et al, p. 12.

¹⁵⁵ Patey (2014), p. 98.

¹⁵⁶ Jakobson & Knox, p. 19.

to establish powerful energy institutions, powerful interests became vested in the oil sector.¹⁵⁷ This pattern incentivised NOCs to become ‘securitising agents’ to maximise their profits, retain their influence and uphold preferential government treatment. Reliance on oil imports has also made it much easier for NOCs to cast oil supply chain access as a matter of national security.¹⁵⁸ Constantin suggests that this is why the electricity-coal supply chain has not been securitised, but oil has, as electricity can be produced from multiple actors and is governed at a local level.¹⁵⁹ In an interview with the unit which drafted the 2012 Energy White Paper, the members supported this view, explaining that coal problems are ‘short-lived and localised’, which can ‘be solved by ourselves’ unlike oil imports, which can easily be ‘cut off’.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, the real historic trauma of past embargoes and the defensive actions of foreign governments have heightened the CPC’s paranoia. As Leung et al. add, by exorcising ‘painful memories of oil embargoes’ they act as ‘easy prompts’ to portray future energy risk.¹⁶¹ Following the ‘sociological turn’, the consistency between the NOCs securitising moves and empirical reality suggest that the moves are highly resonant to the enabling audience – and thus more likely to succeed. Naturally, Leung et. al. argue, the NOCs have amplified and promulgated these concerns to keep energy threats on the government agenda.

This paper, hence, attempts to synthesise the concepts of the ‘feedback loop’, ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ and the ‘Two Chinas’ into the securitisation process (see Figures 2 and 3). This can be best understood by envisaging a process where: the NOCs construct a threat; this is accepted by the enabling audience – in this case multiple actors within the CPC government; these separate divisions of government perceive the threat based, in part, on the rhetoric and practices of the NOCs; the NOCs securitising move is accepted or rejected individually by separate branches of government; government actors contest definitions of energy security threats in interactions between themselves; they create a negotiated definition of threat, based partly on their position within the government hierarchy; and energy security policy is altered. However, the focus for this paper, as noted, will be on the interactions between the NOCs and CPC government. A key inquiry arising from this is the extent to which the NOCs have influenced energy decision-making.

¹⁵⁷ Leung et al, p. 23.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁵⁹ Christian Constantin, ‘China’s Conception of Energy Security: Sources and International Impacts’, *Working Paper of the Centre of International Relations, University of British Columbia*, No. 43 (2005), 1-40 (p. 6).

¹⁶⁰ Leung et al., p. 17.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

3.8. The ‘Board Over the Board’: Party Influence on NOC Decision-Making

Whilst the influence of the NOCs should not be understated, it would be a mistake to suggest that they are unchallenged by the state. On the contrary, scholars such as Monique Taylor suggest that the capacity of the state has only increased since the 1980s, and that the Party now has the power to impose strategic direction onto the energy sector.¹⁶²

For example, although top managers are appointed by the NOCs board of directors, authority on who is appointed, promoted and dismissed is held by the CPC Organisation Department – with decision requiring ratification from the Politburo Standing Committee.¹⁶³ Chih-shian Liou notes that the recentralisation of the energy bureaucracy through the creation of the NDRC and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) has seen the CPC reinstate some control.¹⁶⁴ New projects, as mentioned, require approval from the NDRC irrespective of who they are funded by.¹⁶⁵ Investments in sensitive countries require permits from the MOFCOM, the NDRC and the SASAC.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, amendments to the Constitution of the CPC in 2012 have legally enshrined the role of ‘Party Committees’, which are groups consisting of senior CPC members that have responsibility for allocating funds inside public and private companies.¹⁶⁷ In 2017, the government also demanded that state companies write an expansive role for the CPC into their articles of association and corporate guidelines.¹⁶⁸

The CPC thus acts as ‘the Board over the Board’: they set out strategic guidelines and top-down directives whilst the NOCs choose how to implement and interpret them.¹⁶⁹ NOCs wield ‘operational power’: they control day-to-day decision making and governance, though there is constant examination as to whether their decisions align with the Party.¹⁷⁰ While the NOCs corporate governance ‘mimics the best practices of the west’, managers are not just evaluated on their general performance, but on subjective measures like ‘improving ideological and political

¹⁶² Phillip Andrews-Speed, ‘Book Reviews: The Chinese State, Oil and Energy Security by Monique Taylor’, *The China Quarterly*, 222 (2015), 547-548 (p. 547).

¹⁶³ Jakobson & Knox, p. 25.

¹⁶⁴ Liou, p. 683.

¹⁶⁵ Eduard B., Vermeer, ‘The global expansion of Chinese oil companies: Political demands, profitability and risks’, *China Information*, 29, 1 (2015): 3-32 (p. 5).

¹⁶⁶ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 36.

¹⁶⁷ Frederica Russo, ‘Politics in the Boardroom: The Role of Chinese Communist Party Committees’, *The Diplomat*, 24 December 2019 <<https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/politics-in-the-boardroom-the-role-of-chinese-communist-party-committees/>> [Accessed 20 May 2020].

¹⁶⁸ Richard McGregor, ‘How the state runs business in China’, *The Guardian*, 25 July 2019, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/25/china-business-xi-jinping-communist-party-state-private-enterprise-huawei>> [Accessed 20 April 2020].

¹⁶⁹ De Graff (2019), p. 13.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

work’, ‘preventing occurrences of mass commotion’ and ‘enhancing Party conduct’.¹⁷¹ In De Graff’s interviews with directors of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), fifteen of those she interviewed expressed that they were forced to undertake a ‘balancing act’ between profit and Party.¹⁷² Some NOC executives have suggested that there is a significant distinction between how oil companies operate at home and abroad. In one interview, Xiaojie Xu, former director of CNPCs overseas investments stressed that:

[CNPC] are really a national oil company at home, but not a national oil company abroad [...] Internationally they are run like an independent oil company [...] they have to make this distinction, at home and abroad’.¹⁷³

Likewise, in an interview between De Graff and Shan Weiguo, CNPC Director Petroleum Market Study, he explained:

‘As a NOC, CNPC must bear responsibility for the nation’s social development and energy security. As an IOC, CNPC is doing business in over forty countries, and must be responsible for all shareholders in the JVs with host NOCs, catering the needs of host governments, using more local employees.’¹⁷⁴

Moreover, as Jiang states, ‘CNPC leadership is a governmental position first and foremost’, though, a top managerial role in any NOC is a stepping stone to a career in the CPC’s higher echelons.¹⁷⁵ However, due to this trend, NOC executives who want to make a political career are hypersensitive to the demands of the CPC.¹⁷⁶

The relationship between the NOCs and the state is thus highly complex, entangled and contradictory.¹⁷⁷ The NOCs act as international businesses, but are tied to the responsibilities of state. This means, sometimes, corporate interests are sacrificed for specific objectives. For example, national security concerns have been used to maintain imports of equity oil through the NOCs. In 2013, CNPC suffered a loss of RBM 42 billion as the government forced CNPC to increase its gas imports at higher prices than on the domestic market.¹⁷⁸ Sinopec and PetroChina

¹⁷¹ B. Jiang, ‘China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC): a balancing act between enterprise and government’, in *Oil and Governance. State-owned Enterprise and the World Energy Supply*, ed. D. Victor, D. Hults and M. Thurber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 397.

¹⁷² De Graff (2019), p. 13.

¹⁷³ Ibid., (2013), p. 168.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Jiang, p. 416; De Graff (2013), p. 166-7.

¹⁷⁶ De Graff (2013), p. 168.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 166.

¹⁷⁸ Vermeer, p. 6.

lost capital when they were instructed to invest in refineries when market prices were depressed.¹⁷⁹ In South Sudan, Chinese diplomats have claimed that CNPC was instructed to stay put and absorb losses during the 2013 Civil War.¹⁸⁰ Whilst these circumstances are not advantageous to the NOCs corporate objectives, they do suggest that they have been somewhat successful in convincing the CPC government of the need to protect access to oil supplies.

Some central control has also been reinstated since Xi Jinping became President in 2012 and began his Anti-Corruption Campaign in 2013, where he sought to taper the political leverage of Chinese NOCs over the government.¹⁸¹ Jinping also established an anti-corruption agency, the National Supervisory Commission (NSC), which replaced the former Ministry of Supervision. According to the China Power Project, reforms to China's anti-corruption institutions is said to have tripled the number of individuals monitored by the government.¹⁸² Purges infiltrated the core of the energy sector's oversight apparatus: seventeen officials were purged from the NDRC, including its deputy-head, officials in the price department, the finance department and the income distribution department.¹⁸³ Astonishingly, corruption charges climbed up to the Politburo – resulting in the purge of the third most senior leader in China, Zhou Yongkang, the former CEO of CNPC.¹⁸⁴ Apart from Zhou, three senior executives were arrested at CNPC and PetroChina alongside Jiang Jiemin, the former chairman of CNPC, and Liao Yongyuan in March 2015, President of CNPC.¹⁸⁵ The most influential oilmen in government and in senior management of the NOCs were replaced with new CPC-approved appointees.

The extent that the NOCs influence has been clipped is uncertain, but the crackdown paralysed their decision-making. This is best demonstrated by the radical changes in their spending behaviour. In Jiang Jiemin's final years at CNPC, for example, the company embarked on a spending spree: 352.5 billion yuan was spent in 2012, which was a 24% rise from 2011.¹⁸⁶ However, following the Anti-Corruption Campaign, senior managers refrained from making major investments abroad. Instead, they echoed sentiments outlined in the new basic principles for

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ International Crisis Group (2017), p. 8.

¹⁸¹ Patey (2017), p. 758.

¹⁸² China Power, 'How does corruption hinder China's development?', *China Power*, 13 December 2018, Updated 13 March 2020 < <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-corruption-development/> > [Accessed 14 May 2020].

¹⁸³ Joseph Fewsmith, 'China's Political Ecology and the Fight against Corruption', *China Leadership Monitor*, 46 (2015), 1-26 (p. 46).

¹⁸⁴ BBC News, 'Charting China's 'great purge' under Xi', *BBC News*, China, 23 October 2017 < <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41670162> > [Accessed 14 March 2020].

¹⁸⁵ Trombetta, (2018) p. 194; Erica Downs, M. E. Herberg & M. Kugelman, 'Asia's Energy Security and China's Belt and Road Initiative', in *NBR Special Report #68* (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), p. 4.

¹⁸⁶ Song Shengxia, 'Under investigation', *Global Times*, 10 September 2013, < <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/810153.shtml> > [Accessed 04 May 2020].

economic reform by the Chinese government, which stressed the need to shift away from an investment driven economy to one characterised by greater domestic consumption. Zhou Jiping, appointed CNPC chairman in 2013, reinforced CNPC's commitments to implementing 'asset-light strategies' which would find balance between expansion, quality and profit.¹⁸⁷ Likewise, Wang Dongjin, appointed PetroChina president in July 2013 echoed that PetroChina would focus on 'profit, quality and sustainable development' at a 'moderate pace'.¹⁸⁸ Such statements signify that the NOCs are beginning to tow the Party line rather than the other way around.

3.9. Chapter Summary

As this paper's research puzzle assumes that oil supply chains have been the primary motivation for Chinese engagement in the Sudans, this chapter attempted to investigate the objective and perceived importance of oil to the 'Two Chinas'. Broadly, it was found that oil has – and continues to be – a decisive force in China's economic growth and urbanisation. Sudan's oil, in particular, was of great importance to the CPC government in the 1990s, as the depletion of domestic oil shortages presented a genuine existential threat to the state's legitimacy, and simultaneously to the NOCs, as without overseas investments, this threatened the very survival of the oil companies. Any moves to securitise oil supply chains more broadly were therefore highly '*resonant*'.

The chapter then analysed the power dynamics between the 'Two Chinas' to determine how successful NOCs might be as securitising agents to a CPC government 'enabling audience'. The NOCs privileged position within the energy apparatus, the *guanxi* of oilmen, the fragmentation of regulatory authorities, and their monopoly on energy expertise suggests that the NOCs would be 'socially effective' to make claims to securitise oil supply chains. Some scholars posit that this has enabled them to keep the issue on the government agenda in a positive 'feedback loop' by negatively amplifying China's traumatic oil import history and containment fears. This framework helps us to understand why Chinese government officials might have been more inclined to intervene to protect energy interests in the case of the Sudans.

As Nyman argues, when the audience repeats the securitising actor's frames, this is one way that successful securitisation can manifest itself.¹⁸⁹ Whilst there are some examples to suggest that that this has been the case with the securitisation of oil supply chains, such as the government's

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ J. Nyman, 'Securitization Theory' in L. J. Shepherd (ed.), *Critical Approaches to Security* (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 59.

replication of NOC policy to invest abroad in the 'Go Out' strategy, due to transparency issues and lack of data, it is difficult to verify the extent of NOC influence on the Chinese government.

Conversely, the NOCs' power to define energy security threats appears to have decreased over time, especially after the 2013 Anti-Corruption Campaign. In general, executives have been forced to act schizophrenically – on one hand, they must respect the Party line and national security objectives, on the other, they must act as profit-driven corporatists. This results in contradictory decision-making. On occasion, NOCs make decisions which are counterintuitive to enhancing China's energy security, and sometimes, NOCs are forced to make decisions which are counterintuitive to profit maximisation. These findings illuminate the divided interests of the 'Two Chinas'. Though they share the aspiration to securitise oil supply chains, their motivations are not always mutual. Whilst the referent object for the CPC has always been the Party and state, for the NOCs, it has been a tug-of-war between national interests and profit maximisation, which shifts to-and-fro depending on the time and context. As NOC behaviour has started to be shaped by government reforms, this suggests that the power of the audience can constrain the moves of securitising actors.

Chapter IV

By-Products and Parallel Securitisations

Investments, Trade and Chinese Citizens

The securitisation of oil supply chains and the subsequent push to acquire overseas equity oil opened the door for further public and private investment, prompting an upsurge in the number of Chinese citizens in Sudan and South Sudan. Whilst oil provides some explanation for Chinese entanglement, to challenge the core assumption of this paper, this chapter will attempt to capture the broader concerns of the ‘Two Chinas’ and establish if they intersect with their oil interests.

4.1. Further Economic Interests

4.1.1. Investments and Infrastructure

Since oil operations began, public and private enterprises have invested in infrastructure projects across the Sudans. To gain a competitive edge above other bidders, a strategy of Chinese NOCs has been to promote package deals in return for overseas oil exports, assets, drilling and extraction rights. As nations were often too poor to pay for NOC services, Chinese investment and construction companies agreed to help rebuild infrastructure and develop extraction capabilities, which would be repaid in oil exports at a fixed price.¹⁹⁰

This technique, known as the ‘Angola Model’, was reliant on the Chinese government’s ability to protect market positions and offer extensive financial support including favourable loans and credit guarantees, political backing, and development aid.¹⁹¹ These loans come predominantly from the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM), responsible for expanding Chinese trade, and the China Development Bank (CBD), which promotes economic and infrastructure development.¹⁹² For example, in 2009, CNPC was given a five-year low-interest \$30 billion loan from CBD to support its overseas acquisitions.¹⁹³ Such oil-for-infrastructure deals have tied development projects to the CPC government’s wider energy security strategy. For example, in South Sudan, information minister Michael Makuei Leuth announced in 2019 that the country

¹⁹⁰ Eric Olander, ‘China’s infrastructure finance model is changing. Here’s how’, *The Africa Report*, 14 January 2020 <<https://www.theafricareport.com/22133/chinas-infrastructure-finance-model-is-changing-heres-how/>> [Accessed 20 June 2020].

¹⁹¹ Monique Taylor, *The Chinese State, Oil and Energy Security* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 153.

¹⁹² Patey (2014), p. 96.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*; Dannreuther, p. 1351.

would provide 30,000 barrels a day to EXIM to pay for Chinese-backed infrastructure projects such as a 244-mile road from Juba to Nadapal.¹⁹⁴

Research shows that China has invested heavily in the Sudans. According to the China Africa Research Initiative, set up by John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, their database confirms that 70 loans have been provided to the Sudans in total since 2000, amounting to \$7.2 billion, with \$2.9 billion spent in the power sector.¹⁹⁵ More recently, as part of its ‘win-win’ cooperation strategy, investments have been made into projects such as the Merowe Dam, the presidential palace, the Upper Atbara Dams Project, Juba International Airport (estimated to cost US \$1.6 billion), Khartoum International Airport, the Sudan Telecommunications Network (through a 200 million euro loan from EXIM Bank) – alongside numerous roads, bridges and railways.¹⁹⁶

However, with greater investment comes greater financial risk. As financial loss is spread across lending institutions (including the policy banks, the government and the NOCs), it is in the interests of involved actors to receive a return on their investments.¹⁹⁷ Though, since 2006, the NOCs have taken a greater burden of risk when the NDRC announced, in a policy report called ‘*Towards a Better Implementation of the “Going Out” Strategy*’, that ‘whoever makes the investment shall make the decision, and whoever earns profits shall assume the risks’.¹⁹⁸ Nevertheless, none involved want a repeat of Libya, where companies were forced to abandon their projects after the NATO intervention against the Qadhafi regime in 2011.¹⁹⁹ According to the BBC, Chinese companies were touted to have lost \$20 billion in assets as a result of the turmoil.²⁰⁰

From these findings, some investment projects seem inextricably linked to the NOCs ability to extract oil, and in turn necessary for the CPC’s energy security strategy, whilst others are entirely disconnected to this end. While oil appears to be the primary ‘securitisation’ in the Sudans, a case could be made that investment projects have been securitised in parallel by NOCs and the

¹⁹⁴ Tim Daiss, ‘China-South Sudan Oil Deal Raises Red Flags’, *Oil Price*, 08 April 2019 <<https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Africa/China-South-Sudan-Oil-Deal-Raises-Red-Flags.html>> [Accessed 21 May 2020].

¹⁹⁵ China-Africa Research Initiative, ‘Chinese Loans to Africa Database’, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies <<https://chinaafricaloandata.org/>> [Accessed 01 June 2020].

¹⁹⁶ Hodzi, p. 186.

¹⁹⁷ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 36.

¹⁹⁸ Adam William Chalmer & Susanna Theresia Mocker, ‘The end of exceptionalism? Explaining Chinese National Oil Companies’ overseas investments’, *Review of International Political Economy*, 24, 1 (2017), 119-143 (p. 124).

¹⁹⁹ Yuwen Wu, ‘China’s oil fears over South Sudan fighting’, *BBC News*, 8 January 2014 <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25654155>> [Accessed 8th May 2020].

²⁰⁰ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 38-39; Wu (2014).

CPC, who do not want a repeat of the Libya experience.

4.1.2. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

Since 2013, Sudan and South Sudan's geographical location – which lies on a vital trade route between Asia, Europe, and Africa - has become important for the development of the 'Belt and Road Initiative', which aims to forge greater connectivity along the old Silk Road through infrastructure, trade, financial and policy coordination and integration.²⁰¹ Apart from providing an overwater link to the Middle East, Port Sudan is of particular importance to the BRI's and has been billed to be the endpoint of the 'Sahelian-Saharan Silk Road' – a bicoastal railway which would connect the Atlantic to the Red Sea. This proposed 10,100 kilometre 'Dakar-Port Sudan' railway would intersect a number of African powerhouse economies such as Nigeria and create an artery for trade and development.²⁰² If successful, as Korybko argues, this would make Khartoum a 'continental gatekeeper' of West-African-Chinese trade.²⁰³ Already, China has begun funding the Cameroon-Chad-Sudan (CCS) component. In 2017, *Sudan Tribune* reported that an agreement was signed between the director of the China Railway Design Corporation and Sudan's Director General of the Railways Authority for China to study the feasibility of a 3,400 kilometre-long Port Sudan-N'Djamena Railway.²⁰⁴

Some scholars have argued that the BRI is another means by which China is enhancing its energy security. Alex He has pointed out that BRI routes largely overlap China's major oil and gas import routes.²⁰⁵ Trombetta has added that bilateral agreements and the development of pipelines, railways, and ports are just another a means 'to acquire access to countries rich in oil and gas'.²⁰⁶ It is no secret that China is planning to enhance Africa's energy production capabilities. According

²⁰¹ Downs, Herberg & Kugelman, p. 1.; Roie Yellinek, 'China and the Sudan Coup', *Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies Perspectives Paper*, 1, 160 (2019), 1-2 <<https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/china-and-sudan-coup/>> [Accessed 12 May 2020].

²⁰² Andrew Korybko, 'The Sahelian-Saharan Silk Road is one of China's Master Plans for Africa', *Katehon*, 23 February 2017 <<https://katehon.com/article/sahelian-saharan-silk-road-one-chinas-master-plans-africa>> [Accessed 17 June 2020].

²⁰³ Andrew Korybko, 'Sudan Is Indispensable To China's Silk Road Vision For Africa', *Oriental Review*, 24 November 2017 <<https://orientalreview.org/2017/11/24/sudan-is-indispensable-to-chinas-silk-road-vision-for-africa/>> [Accessed 17 June 2020].

²⁰⁴ Sudan Tribune, 'Chinese firms to study feasibility of Chad Sudan railway', *Sudan Tribune*, 8 November 2017 <<https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article63949>> [Accessed 17 June 2020].

²⁰⁵ Alex He, 'China and Global Energy Governance Under the G20 Framework', *Centre for International Governance Innovation Papers*, No. 98 (2016), 1-16 (p. 2).

²⁰⁶ Trombetta (2018), p. 192.

to an official report on BRI energy interconnection, \$27 trillion is expected to be spent on energy infrastructure in BRI affiliated countries by 2050 including on oil and gas.²⁰⁷

With the BRI pushed strenuously by the CPC, the Sudans' success holds more than monetary value. It has become a model of 'South-South cooperation, in the words of Politburo member Li Changchun, and a symbol of how China-Africa cooperation can result in 'mutual benefit'.²⁰⁸ The CPC wants to promote, in Foreign Minister Wang Yi's words, the idea that the BRI is 'not China's solo, but a symphony performed by all relevant countries'.²⁰⁹ The Khartoum Oil Refinery, for example, has become a frequent stop for Chinese government officials to demonstrate the benefits of China-Africa cooperation: it epitomises what China can bring to an oil-rich, but poor country.²¹⁰ Reputational costs are therefore on the line – not just to Sudan, but to the BRI initiative, and thus to the CPC's wider energy security strategy. These considerations cannot be overlooked in understanding China's proactive intervention in the region.

4.1.3. Private Business

The NOCs opened the door to the Sudans for a range of businesses, from small and medium enterprises, to independent entrepreneurs, to private construction companies whom brought their equipment from overseas to help with investment projects.²¹¹ Khartoum's eastern suburbs were dubbed 'Chinatown on the Nile' by American diplomats, due to the sheer number of Chinese shops and restaurants.²¹² Sudan also became a popular export destination for manufactured Chinese goods such as textiles, furniture, electronics, cars and materials like steel and cement.²¹³ Since exports began in 1999, they have risen over 640%.²¹⁴ China is now Sudan's top trading partner, accounting for 22% of imports and 76% of exports between 2005 and 2009.²¹⁵ Consequently, Zhong Jianhua, former special representative on African Affairs, has called South

²⁰⁷ Centre for China-Africa Studies, 'China-Africa Energy Cooperation Under the Belt and Road Initiative' *API Working Paper*, No. 1 (2019), 1-12 <<https://www.africapi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/CHINA-AFRICA-ENERGY-working-paper.pdf>> [Accessed 4 April 2020], (p.3).

²⁰⁸ Patey (2014), p. 119.

²⁰⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 'Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, 8 March 2015 <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1243662.shtml> [Accessed 1 March 2020].

²¹⁰ Patey (2014), p. 119.

²¹¹ Large & Patey, p. 20.

²¹² Patey (2014), p.114.

²¹³ Large & Patey, p. 16.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Bank of Sudan, quoted in Large & Patey, p. 14.

Sudan ‘a paradise for investors’.²¹⁶ Trade interests are also at stake if the region descends into chaos.

4.1.4. The Security-Development Nexus

However, it is important to note that trade, investments, and infrastructure projects, including the BRI, fall into China’s ideological belief in the ‘security–development nexus’ or ‘developmental peace’(发展和平).²¹⁷ Outlined in 2011’s White Paper titled *China’s Peaceful Development*, in short, Chinese leaders expect that the prioritisation of economic development and regime preservation will produce stable nations, generating better security.²¹⁸ This is seen as an alternative to the West’s ‘liberal peace’, which has been castigated as an ‘illusory peace’(虚幻和平) by Chinese academics.²¹⁹ Whether ‘developmental peace’ enhances security is beside the point. Through the lens of securitisation, all support from the Chinese government to enhance trade and development in the Sudans can be interpreted as a method to enhance its energy security. As the CPC *believes* this strategy works, and the intention is to improve security, ‘developmental peace’ is arguably another practical manifestation of securitisation.

4.2. Overseas Citizens

More often than not, NOCs bring their own workforces from China for ease of communication, language and culture between managers and workers.²²⁰ Approximately 800,000 individuals in Chinese SOEs work overseas, with CNPC accounting for around 14,000 of those in 2013.²²¹ In part due to an influx of NOC workers, the number of Chinese nationals registered as living in Sudan jumped from 277 in 1993, to around 10,600 in 2010.²²²

This increase in overseas workers has meant that their security has become a diplomatic priority, reflected in numerous Defence White Papers.²²³ The protection of the ‘legitimate rights

²¹⁶ Lily Kuo, ‘There’s at least one place in Africa where China’s “win win” diplomacy is failing’, *Quartz Africa*, 21st November 2017, <<https://qz.com/africa/1111402/south-sudan-china-win-win-diplomacy-struggles/>> [Accessed 23 February 2020].

²¹⁷ Shahar Hameiri, Lee Jones & Yizheng Zou, ‘The Development-Insecurity Nexus in China’s Near-Abroad: Rethinking Cross-Border Economic Integration in an Era of State Transformation’, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 49, 3 (2019), 473-499 (p.473).

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Tom Bayes, *China’s growing security role in Africa: Views from West Africa, Implications for Europe* (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2020), p. 26.

²²⁰ Patey (2014), p. 113.

²²¹ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 41.

²²² Large & Patey, p. 16.

²²³ The 2013 Chinese Defence White Paper declared for the first time that the protection of overseas energy resources and Chinese nationals overseas is a major security concern and a task for the Chinese military.

and interests of Chinese nationals abroad' has also been written into the Chinese constitution. In 2004, Hu Jintao made this explicitly clear in his policy of 'putting the people at the centre' (以民為本).²²⁴ This was reiterated by Foreign Minister Yang Jeichi in 2009, in his article 'Seeking Truth', when he stated that 'the role of the people as the fulcrum of China's foreign policy had to be preserved'.²²⁵ The creation of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), which dispatches police liaison officers to foreign countries to provide 'close bilateral cooperation with local law-enforcement', and the establishment of the Centre for Consular Protection in 2007 suggests that the Chinese government is taking the protection of civilians more seriously.²²⁶ These ideas were reinforced following the emergency evacuation of 35,000 Chinese nationals from Libya in 2011 by the PLA Navy (PLAN), and after the evacuation of 600 citizens from Yemen in 2015.²²⁷ Overseas citizens have also become a greater concern for NOCs, as regulations have been amended so that 'whoever sends personnel overseas is responsible'.²²⁸

However, concerns for overseas citizens cannot be detached entirely from the securitisation of oil supply chains. Overseas workers are crucial to the functionality of NOC overseas oil operations, and, many Chinese citizens have been targeted by rebel groups precisely because of the actions of the NOCs (as will be explored in chapter five). Like trade interests, the security of overseas citizens can be viewed as an interlocking or parallel securitisation process.

4.3. The 'Chinese Dream'

Since Xi Jinping's presidency began, the 'Chinese Dream of Rejuvenation' (中国梦) has been a recurring theme in his speeches, which focus on reversing past humiliations, and restoring China as a 'great power' (世界强国) by 2050.²²⁹ One consequence of nationalist discourse, used as a means of maintaining social cohesion, has been greater criticism from Chinese citizens when the government has been unable to protect Chinese interests. This has been exacerbated by the marketisation of mass media shaped by the Publicity Department, which coordinates the Party's message and censors liberal remarks through news agency's such as Xinhua and People's Daily,

²²⁴ A. Ghiselli, 'Market Opportunities and Political Responsibilities: The Difficult Development of Chinese Private Security Companies Abroad', *Armed Forces & Society*, 46, 1 (2020): 25-45 (p. 429).

²²⁵ Jiechi Yang, 'Weihe shijie heping cujin gongtong fazhan' ['Protecting World Peace, Promoting Common Development'], *Qianshi* [Truth Seeking] 19 (2009) (pp. 22-24).

²²⁶ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 54.

²²⁷ International Crisis Group (2017), p. 6.

²²⁸ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 50.

²²⁹ Camilla T. N. Sorensen, 'The Significance of Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream" for Chinese Foreign Policy: From "Tao Guang Yang Hui" to "Fen Fa You Wei"', *Journal of China and International Relations*, 3, 1 (2015), 53-73 (p. 55).

and also on the state-controlled internet.²³⁰ This, amongst other factors, means that every time Chinese citizens are attacked overseas, patriotic mobs vent their anger on Chinese social media, as such occurrences run in direct contravention to the ‘China Dream’.

The Chinese public, in this way, could also be regarded as an audience to the government’s securitising moves, however, because of the CPC’s monopoly over information and power, these moves are always approved. As the public are subjected to government propaganda which has securitised all non-traditional overseas security threats as existentially threatening to the ‘China Dream’, this creates a negative feedback loop, whereby any politician deemed insufficiently ‘tough’ in defense of Chinese interests is delegitimised.²³¹ The audience, therefore, has agency to disempower decision-makers whose words do not match their actions. Government, even in China, is still held accountable by the public. The CPC government, therefore, is encouraged to intervene overseas in order to placate hyper-nationalistic citizens at home, maintain China’s image as a ‘responsible great power’, and retain legitimacy.²³²

4.4. Chapter Summary

When investments, trade interests and the BRI initiative are linked to the CPC’s conceptualisation of the ‘security-development’ nexus, they can be interpreted as ways to improve regional security and protect oil supply chains. Furthermore, some investment and infrastructure projects were inextricably linked to oil-for-infrastructure deals. However, it would be a fallacy to suggest that all investment projects and trade initiatives were intentionally designed for such purposes, and as such, they can also be interpreted as parallel securitisations which were formulated as by-products of the ‘Go Out’ strategy.

Another by-product of the a ‘Go Out’ strategy has been an influx of Chinese citizens into the region. Whilst workers are necessary for the functionality of oil operations, and their safety can be connected to oil interests, they too can be perceived as a parallel securitisation. Great pressure is on the government from Chinese nationalists to protect Chinese interests abroad, including citizens and oil interests, as otherwise grand narratives such as the ‘Chinese Dream’ could be cast into doubt, thus threatening the legitimacy of the CPC.

²³⁰ Andrew Scobell & Scott W. Harold, ‘An “Assertive” China? Insights from Interviews’, *Asian Security*, 9, 2 (2013), 111-131 (p. 118).; Jakobson & Knox, p. 7; Suisheng Zhao, ‘Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: the strident turn’, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 22, 82 (2013), 535-553.

²³¹ Scobell & Harold, p. 118.

²³² M. Hirono, Y. Jiang & M. Lanteigne, ‘China’s New Roles and Behavior in Conflict-Affected Regions: Reconsidering Non-Interference and Non-Intervention’, *The China Quarterly*, 239 (2019): 573-593 (p. 584).

As this chapter has shown, both the Chinese government and the NOCs have supplementary reasons for preventing Sudan and South Sudan from deteriorating into chaos. As such, the Chinese government might be more willing to employ 'extraordinary measures' to protect them.

Chapter V

Extraordinary Measures and the End of Non-Intervention

Empirical Threats and Successful Securitisation in Sudan and South Sudan

As examined, the ‘Two Chinas’ have independent and overlapping motivations in protecting oil supply chains with the purpose of ensuring the survival of separate and shared referent objects. They also have several supplementary interests, such as the protection of overseas citizens and investments, which can be connected to China’s energy security concerns. This chapter will discuss how far objective threats exist in the Sudans to these interests and therefore how ‘resonant’ securitising move(s) have been. It will also highlight measures taken by the NOCs to ‘foster a sense of insecurity’, and the ‘extraordinary measures’ used by the Chinese government in the Sudans which evidence successful securitisation.

5.1 Extraordinary Measures, Audience Acceptance and Successful Securitisation

To fit our case back into the theoretical framework, it is helpful to define what is meant by successful securitisation, however, this demands us to revisit the ‘feedback loop’ model.

In chapter two, it was suggested that securitisation of energy in the PRC works when: the NOCs construct a threat; this is accepted by the enabling audience – in this case multiple actors within the CPC government; government actors contest and negotiate definitions of energy security threats between themselves in securitising actor-audience interactions (based, in part, on their position in the government dominance hierarchy); and energy security policy is altered. Because of word constraints, this essay ignores the contestations between competing government securitising actors. Instead, it groups these actors under the umbrella term of the CPC government and focuses on their interactions with the NOCs.

This model has interesting repercussions on what accounts as successful securitisation. Traditionally an issue is securitised when an audience agrees on the nature of a threat and supports extraordinary measures. In the outlined model, securitising moves made by the NOCs must be approved by the CPC government enabling audience. However, for it to become security policy, security definitions must first be negotiated in various interactions between various arms and departments of the CPC government. Once successfully negotiated, due to the government’s monopoly on power and limitations on speech, it does not need the approval of a wider audience

to use ‘extraordinary measures’ to neutralise a security threat. This chapter will, therefore, primarily focus on those ‘extraordinary measures’ utilised by the CPC government.

Successful securitisation then, can be analysed by finding occurrences where securitising actor(s) have been granted special privileges in dealing with the security issue outside the realm of ‘normal politics’. In this case, that would be how far the Chinese government has shifted China away from non-intervention towards proactive engagement to neutralise existential threats. Following the ‘practice-oriented approach’, this paper suggests that successful securitisation can be manifested in ‘non-verbal expressions of security’, ‘concrete measures’, or the implementation of security policy into practice’, which can promote ‘certain perceptions of threat’.²³³

This chapter will also explore the reality of empirical threats to Chinese government and NOC interests in the region, which will reveal the ‘resonance’ of NOC securitising moves to securitise oil supply chains. Sociological approach scholars suggest that ‘facilitating conditions’ such as historic and cultural context are crucial in determining the ‘resonance’ – and thus the success of a ‘securitising move’. These factors have a decisive effect not only on the reception of securitising moves by the audience, but also on the securitising actor’s perception of threat.²³⁴

5.2.Sudan’s Civil Wars

As noted, because of China’s latecomer status on the global oil market, NOCs were forced to operate in high-risk environments. In 2009, out of the forty-four countries where CNPC had invested overseas, nearly half were regarded as high risk, including Sudan and South Sudan.²³⁵ However, the region has been a hotbed of violence since Sudan’s independence in 1956. Four months before power was to be ceded from the Anglo-Egyptian administration, the First Sudanese Civil War began, lasting seventeen years with the aim of regional representation in the South. Historically, business has been located in the North with the South not receiving its fair share of resources.²³⁶ Political, cultural and religious cleavages existed between the two factions, with those in the South, represented by the Anya-Nya Movement, identifying with the Christian animist black Africans in sub-Saharan and East Africa, and those in the North identifying with Arab Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa.²³⁷ In 1983, after the South Sudan Autonomous Zone was abolished and an Islamic State was declared, fighting re-emerged between the Khartoum

²³³ Ghisseli (2018), p. 613.

²³⁴ Balzacq, Léonard & Ruzickal, p. 503.

²³⁵ Patey (2017), p. 763.

²³⁶ Paalo Ashaba & Adu Gyamfi, ‘State Fragility, Regime Survival and Spoilers in South Sudan’, *Kervan – International Journal of Afro-Asiatic Studies*, 23, 1 (2019): 77-99 (p. 77).

²³⁷ Hodzi, p. 171.

government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) led by John Garang. The Second Civil War would last from 1983-2005. Instability borne out of ethnic, religious, economic and other identitarian cleavages, and the conflict which emerged from these divisions engendered a hostile environment which would existentially threaten Chinese NOC oil operations when they began to engage in the region in 1989. This volatile historical context has added to the 'resonance' and credibility of NOC moves to securitise oil supply chains in the region.

5.3. China and the Second Sudanese Civil War

When Chinese NOCs entered Sudan, they found themselves embroiled in a bloody civil war between the SPLM/A and the Khartoum government. When Chinese NOCs expanded their investments and oil revenue surged, the Khartoum government reaped the financial benefits and increased its military budget. China's NOCs, in this way, provided al-Bashir and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) with the resources to effectively wage war against the SPLM/A.²³⁸ Patterns of conflict also tended to follow oil development on the ground, as campaigns of forced civilian displacement by the SAF and proxy militias often preceded oil extraction and infrastructure projects.²³⁹ Whilst rebel commanders such as Deng Awou stated that 'the suffering of the [South Sudan] people is on the hands of the Chinese', Zhang Dong, China's ambassador to Sudan, believed China was acting in accordance with its non-intervention principle, stating 'China never interferes in Sudan's internal affairs'.²⁴⁰

China also became Sudan's major weapons supplier, accounting for 58% of arms imports in Sudan between 2001-12, and equipping the SAF with aircraft, helicopters, high-altitude bombs, ammunition, missiles and tanks.²⁴¹ A UN Panel of Experts report documented the prominence of 'Chinese manufactured arms and ammunition in Darfur', and cited the role of the China North Industries Corporation (a.k.a. 'Norinco') in the perpetuation of violence.²⁴² China also assisted in setting up three military weapon factories near Khartoum, and allowed the SAF to use GNPOC airstrips to stage air attacks against the SPLM/A.²⁴³ Whilst in one interpretation, this could be

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Daniel Large, 'Enemies into Friends', in *Sudan Looks East: China, India & the Politics of Asian Alternatives* (London: Boydell & Brewer, 2011), pp. 157-175 (p. 161).

²⁴⁰ Hodzi, p. 175; Zhang Dong quoted in Xinhua, 'Chinese Ambassador: Sino-Sudanese Cooperation in Full Swing', *Xinhua*, 1 February 2007 < <http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/198553.htm> > [Accessed 10 February 2020].

²⁴¹ Hodzi, p. 174.; Large (2016), p. 49.

²⁴² Patey & Large, *Sudan Looks East*, p. 26.

²⁴³ Hodzi, p. 174.

viewed as an ‘extraordinary measure’ and a contravention of China’s non-intervention principle, officials perceived such actions as business as usual.

Accordingly, the SPLM began to go after Chinese citizens, which SPLM leader John Garang considered ‘legitimate targets’ who were no more than ‘mercenaries working for the Islamist regime’.²⁴⁴ CNPC, as the largest investor in Sudan, was targeted specifically.²⁴⁵ As the oilfields were the government’s primary revenue, a military priority of the SPLM was to prevent Khartoum from benefiting from oil sales to pay army salaries, or else to kidnap Chinese workers in a bid to scare the NOCs away. In 1999, a Chinese engineer was kidnapped and a four-man exploration crew in Unity state, which was followed by the kidnapping of twenty-three CNPC oil workers the next month near the Bentiu area.²⁴⁶ On 25th January 2001, a CNPC exploration rig, guarded by hundreds of SAF soldiers, came under attack by rebels at Tamur, resulting in dozens killed.²⁴⁷ In August 2001, the Heglig oil-field, one of Sudan’s largest oilfields located deep in government controlled territory, was attacked by mortar fire.²⁴⁸

Chinese oil installations and citizens in Sudan have been under existential threat ever since the NOCs set foot in Sudan – and securitising moves to enhance oil supply continuity have been ‘resonant’ throughout the SPLM/A-Khartoum conflict. However, whether actions, such as arming the SAF, can be considered ‘extraordinary measures’ to securitise oil supply chains is up for debate if the intentions of the government were – so officials argue – for business purposes only.

5.4. Darfur and the ‘Genocide Olympics’

Security concerns increased in 2003, when al-Bashir began a counterinsurgency campaign in Darfur. CNPC reported 500 security emergencies between 2007 and 2009 alone.²⁴⁹ Like the SPLM, the Justice & Equality Movement (JEM) specifically targeted Chinese oil facilities in South Kordofan province. Whilst Darfur was far away from most CNPC oilfields, SAF soldiers left the oilfields to fight, and some pro-government militias in the South broke away from Khartoum.²⁵⁰ This created a security vacuum whereby dissident rebels felt emboldened in their ability to stage attacks against oil installations. JEM commander Mohamed Bahr Hamdeen, for example, justified an attack against the Defra oil field in October 2007 ‘as a message to the Chinese companies’ for

²⁴⁴ Patey (2014), p. 107.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., (2017), p. 764.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., (2014), p. 110.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 108)

²⁴⁸ Large (2014), p. 109.

²⁴⁹ Patey (2017), p. 765.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 765)

‘help[ing] the government buy weapons’ to ‘kill women and children’.²⁵¹ In December of that year, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim justified another attack at Heglig oilfield, operated by GWDC, as he believed ‘China is trading petroleum for our blood’.²⁵²

In October 2008, JEM kidnapped nine CNPC employees in South Kordofan, however, in a botched rescue attempt by the SAF, five were killed.²⁵³ The 10.18 Incident, as it is known in China, showcases the parallel securitisation of energy and overseas citizens. The killings challenged the CPC’s legitimacy at home as hyper-nationalistic mobs took to social media to criticise the government’s inability to protect Chinese citizens. This led to regulatory reforms to enhance overseas security (explored in chapter six), alongside an assessment mission dispatched by the MFA, MOC and CNPC.²⁵⁴ Following the incident, CNPC also advocated that ‘powerful departments’ such as the PLA needed to be deployed to protect Chinese companies.²⁵⁵ Although the government quickly requested that the Sudanese government protect Chinese interests, it was still unwilling to deploy the PLA and counter its non-intervention principle so explicitly. The incident was primarily a wake-up call to CNPC, as it demonstrated that the Sudanese and Chinese governments could not be relied upon to protect their interests.

Supporting the al-Bashir regime also caused injury to China’s international reputation when, in 2006, human rights activists in the US called on China to help halt the genocide in Darfur, or see the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games be used as a means to highlight China’s complicity. The ‘Genocide Olympics’ campaign, as it became known, gained traction in Hollywood, as well as in the US government, and threatened China’s international reputation at a time when it was trying to rebrand itself as a ‘responsible power’. The CPC were a rock in a hard place: they were constrained by their own non-interventionist policy, but they were also the only P5 power well-placed to constrain al-Bashir in Darfur. Chinese diplomats used phrases such as ‘gentle diplomacy’, ‘active persuasion’ and ‘influence without interference’ to describe how they were able to persuade President Omar al-Bashir to accept UNSC Resolution 1769, which allowed for UN peacekeepers under a UN/AU hybrid mission (UNAMID) in Darfur. However, this marked a significant shift in China’s foreign affairs beyond the realm of ‘normal politics’. Only a few years earlier, in 2005, China had backed Omar al-Bashir in the Darfur conflict, and had abstained from UNSC Resolutions which would impose sanctions on the regime, stating the non-interference principle

²⁵¹ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 31)

²⁵² Ibid., p. 32)

²⁵³ BBC, ‘China’s oil fears over South Sudan fighting’.

²⁵⁴ Large (2009), p. 618.

²⁵⁵ Patey (2017), p. 765.

as their reasoning.²⁵⁶ Zhou Wenzhong, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, summarised government opinion at the time:

‘Business is business. We try to separate politics from business [...] I think the internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose upon them’.²⁵⁷

However, by 2007, Hu Jintao went as far as announcing four principles for resolving the Darfur conflict during his visit to Khartoum. Whilst it could be suggested that the ‘Genocide Olympics’ incident represented a case where the PRC’s desire to be viewed as a ‘responsible power’ trumped its energy concerns, this would not be entirely true. Underneath the progressive veneer, oil operations did not stop, rather, they increased with the NIF in this period. Arguably, diplomatic efforts to end violence in Darfur were ‘extraordinary measures’, used to dampen international condemnation, enable oil operations to continue unabated, and promote China’s narrative as a ‘responsible great power’ simultaneously. Diplomacy, in this way, was instrumentalised to enhance energy security.

5.5. The CPA and the Courting of Juba

China’s non-intervention principle came under greater strain after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 between the SPLM and the NIF. The Agreement saw the creation of a semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan in Juba, marked the official end of the Second Sudanese Civil War, and paved the way for the South’s independence.²⁵⁸ Up until 2005, China had had no official political contact with the SPLM.²⁵⁹ However, the CPA changed all of this: the agreement conferred political legitimacy onto the SPLM, transforming it from a rebel movement into a political party. The CPA also established a three-president Government of National Unity which included al-Bashir as President, and John Garang, leader of the SPLM, as Vice President. Within the terms of the power-sharing agreement, Hodzi has argued that this made it ‘politically and legally possible’ for Beijing to become an external partner of the SPLM without contravening its non-intervention principle.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁶ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 31.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 32.

²⁵⁹ Large, ‘Enemies into Friends’, p. 158.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 165.

Swiftly, the Chinese government developed its bilateral relationship with the SPLM. As early as March 2005, an SPLM delegation was visiting Beijing to discuss ‘economic cooperation’.²⁶¹ By 2007, future President Salva Kiir met with Hu Jintao and conveyed his intentions for the South’s secession under the guidelines of the CPA’s Referendum clause.²⁶² During the meeting, multiple sources have recalled that he bluntly presented a map to Chinese officials indicating that 75% of Sudan’s oil reserves were located in the South.²⁶³ Whilst the CPA Agreement protected oil contracts signed prior to its signature, there was no guarantee of what would happen if the South gained independence.²⁶⁴ In the Southern Sudan Legislative assembly on his return, Kiir is on record as to have proclaimed: ‘At least China is now aware that most of the oil produced in Sudan is from Southern Sudan’.²⁶⁵ Following this meeting, the government engaged more with the SPLM, and the following year, China promptly opened a consulate in Juba.²⁶⁶

However, much like the ‘Go Out’ strategy, Chinese business and the NOCs took the lead in developing economic and trade relations. In 2008, for example, the governor of the Upper Nile region met with CNPC representatives – and CNPC agreed to contribute to a number of infrastructure projects in the state capital, Malakal.²⁶⁷ Daniel Large has called these first Chinese entrepreneurs in the South, ‘unofficial business diplomats’.²⁶⁸ Separate securitising actors thus devised their own strategies to ensure the security of oil in anticipation of the South’s secession.

When independence was declared for the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GoRSS) in 2011, China was one of the first to recognise its sovereignty, and on the very same day, China signed a Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations.²⁶⁹ Within a month, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi paid a visit to newly independent South Sudan, and the first SPLM delegations to visit Beijing following independence arrived in April 2011 and October 2011.²⁷⁰ However, between 2005 to 2011, the Chinese government played a dangerous game: on one hand, the government did not want to sour its relations with Khartoum, on the other, the

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² The Government of The Republic of Sudan and The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Sudan People’s Army ‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Chapter I: The Machakos Protocol, Signed at Machakos, Kenya on 20th July 2002’ (Machakos, Kenya: Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2002) <<https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/comprehensive-peace-agreement-between-government-republic-sudan-and-sudan-peoples>> [Accessed 5 March 2020].

²⁶³ Large (2016), p. 37.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., ‘Enemies into Friends’, p. 168.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Hodzi, p. 179.

²⁶⁷ Large, ‘Enemies into Friends’, p. 170.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 166.

²⁶⁹ Hodzi, p. 181.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

Chinese did not want to jeopardise relations with a future Juba government and risk losing oil access. Whilst Hodzi suggests that this did not put them at odds *legally* with their non-intervention tradition, far from respecting territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Chinese government actively courted representatives from both sides prior to the South's independence. If these actions can be deemed 'extraordinary measures' is contentious, however, diplomacy, again, was employed to enhance the CPC's energy security.

5.6. The Oil Shutdown of 2012

As Chinese officials feared, independence did not bring about stability - and the oil sector found itself in the middle of a dispute between Sudan and South Sudan. The governments could not agree on sharing oil revenue: whilst the South controlled 75% of the oilfields, the North held all the refineries and pipelines to distribute to the world market. South Sudan had wanted a complete geographic separation of resources, with full ownership of Southern oil and an agreement to pay pipeline fees at 'international rates' to Sudan, however, Sudan wanted five years compensation for losing Southern revenue.²⁷¹ The South seceded without agreement, but the presidents decided to continue practices as normal, with back payments made once a later agreement was achieved.²⁷² Despite this, Sudan quickly felt the loss of the South's oil revenue and instructed port workers to load Sudanese tankers with southern oil.²⁷³ This was not taken well by the GoRSS, which shut down CNPCs operations and halted oil production between January 2012 to March 2013 in reprisal. As an accident of geography, the location of many oilfields was along the border between the two nations, and so, at the height of the dispute, the SPLM occupied Heglig/ Panthau oil field from the Sudanese.²⁷⁴

In response, the Chinese government used diplomatic measures in attempt to resolve the situation. President Kiir visited China in April 2012, at the invitation of Hu Jintao.²⁷⁵ China's special envoy to Africa, Liu Guijin, was also sent to Khartoum and Juba to solve the impasse.²⁷⁶ However, the government was restricted by its commitment to non-intervention and put the onus on the international community and local actors. President Hu reinstated how, for China, 'the top priority is to actively cooperate with the mediation efforts of the international community and halt

²⁷¹ Laura James, *Fields of Control: Oil and (In)security in Sudan and South Sudan* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2015), p. 43.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 44.

²⁷⁵ Embassy of the PRC in South Sudan, 'Sino-South Sudan Political exchanges', *Embassy of the PRC in South Sudan*, 23 November 2012, <<http://ss.chineseembassy.org/eng/sbgx/zjjw/>> [Accessed 25 April 2020].

²⁷⁶ Patey (2017), p. 763.

armed conflict in the border areas²⁷⁷ Wang Yi could only say:

‘We always believe that the North and the South are inextricably interdependent, and hope to see that the two sides will [...] stick to the peace option’.²⁷⁸

Perhaps the Chinese government’s neutrality stemmed from the sensitivities of the actors’ involved. At the very nadir of the dispute, the Juba government had accused a top oil manager, Liu Yingcai, head of the CNPC-led Petrodar consortium, of colluding with the Khartoum government to divert southern oil – and he was subsequently expelled for ‘non-cooperation’.²⁷⁹ In such a tinderbox political climate, where being perceived to favour either party could have dire consequences to Chinese energy interests, conceivably it was regarded as safer to promote local and international mediation efforts. Though the issue was clearly on the security agenda, the tools at the government’s disposal were limited considering the complicated inter-state context.

The shutdown was finally resolved in September 2012, when a Cooperation Agreement was signed which agreed for production to be restarted the following April. South Sudan also agreed to a transitional financial arrangement of \$3 billion to compensate Sudan and a negotiated transit fee for using Sudan’s pipelines.²⁸⁰ However, the ordeal had disastrous consequences for the Chinese NOCs and handed them their largest loss of revenue since they began operating overseas.²⁸¹ As the EIA reports, exports from Sudan and South Sudan to China dropped from 260,000 bbl/d in 2011 to zero by April 2012, and only increased to a reduced level of 164,000 bbl/d in 2014.²⁸² Wells were shut down so quickly that congealing crude oil nearly damaged the pipelines.²⁸³ Chinese NOCs expressed outrage as they were made to renegotiate their oil contracts held by Sudan with South Sudan, though these new agreements ruled out restitution payments for a stop in oil production and ‘left open the possibility of Sudan imposing transit fees on the NOCs’.²⁸⁴ As Chinese diplomats, who were called upon to mediate by the NOCs, were unable to prevent the shutdown, the incident showed the NOCs the limits of government intervention.

²⁷⁷ Hodzi, p. 184.

²⁷⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press’ (2015).

²⁷⁹ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 33; China Dialogue, ‘China’s uncomfortable diplomacy keeps South Sudan’s oil flowing’, *China Dialogue*, 26 November 2012, <<https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5378-China-s-uncomfortable-diplomacy-keeps-South-Sudan-s-oil-flowing>> [Accessed 09 May 2020].

²⁸⁰ Patey & Large (2014), p. 8.

²⁸¹ Patey (2014), p. 272.

²⁸² US Energy Information Administration, p. 10.

²⁸³ China Dialogue, ‘China’s uncomfortable diplomacy keeps South Sudan’s oil flowing’.

²⁸⁴ Brosig, p. 8.

CNPC thus, in parallel with government efforts, took its own actions to safeguard its corporate interests and offered a compensation package to Sudan in return to reopen the pipeline.²⁸⁵

5.7. Oil and Patronage in South Sudan

In 2016, oil signified around 99% of South Sudan's exports, most of which has been directed to Chinese companies, and as such, China's investment was (and remains) critical to the endurance of the South's political economy.²⁸⁶ Tensions had emerged within the SPLM even prior to independence, with disputes over how to appropriate the \$13 billion in allocated oil revenues. As De Waal notes, actors challenging President Salva Kiir's incumbency wished to 'reorder the hierarchy of kleptocracy in their favour'.²⁸⁷ This was achieved through a 'big tent' strategy, where the co-option and loyalty of community militia and leaders would be bought through oil money. Cash reserves were diverted away from public services and instead dedicated to regime protection and clientelist patronage networks.²⁸⁸

The nexus between the structures of the army and the party are therefore highly interconnected, which has cultivated a culture whereby power lies in the hands of men with guns, predicated on the assumption that 'violence would be rewarded with government positions yielding rent'.²⁸⁹ This has only incentivised armed actors to capture oil resources, and created competition to act as 'oil police' for oil consortia. This may explain why in 2011, the SPLA enlisted 240,000 soldiers and 90,000 militia in a country with a population of just 12 million – and why demobilisation programs, by and large, have failed.²⁹⁰ As Pinaud notes, the military elite which found itself in power following the War of Independence 'established [their] hegemony through the capture of resources during the war'.²⁹¹ As De Waal adds, this has meant that 'South Sudan achieved independence as a kleptocracy'.²⁹²

The militarisation of the state has also induced the normalisation of looting, pillage and rape by soldiers and unit commanders – and because many public officials are themselves ex-military men who's power rests on the allegiance of the very forces responsible for such atrocities,

²⁸⁵ Patey (2017), p. 763.

²⁸⁶ Brosig, p. 6.

²⁸⁷ Alex De Waal, 'When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: Brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan', *African Affairs*, 113, 452 (2014): 347-369 (p. 365).

²⁸⁸ Ashaba, Paalo & Gyamfi, p. 83.

²⁸⁹ Large (2016), p. 37.

²⁹⁰ Brosig, p. 5.

²⁹¹ Clement Pinaud, 'South Sudan: civil war, predation, and the making of a military aristocracy' *African Affairs*, 113, 451 (2014), 192–211 (p.193).

²⁹² De Waal, p. 358.

accountability mechanisms are defunct. It is little surprise that South Sudan was ranked 179th (out of 198 countries) in Transparency International's Corruption Perception's Index in 2019 and 186th (out of 189) in the UNDP Human Development Index.²⁹³

Paradoxically, the NOCs sit in the epicentre of this problem. By financing corrupt officials through oil revenue, who, in sequence, finance violent militias which compete for oil rent, this has only worked to foster an unstable political environment whereby a drop in the market value of oil, a decrease in oil production, or a spat between the military and political elite could existentially threaten CPC and NOC interests. Unless these root causes are addressed, then the 'resonance' of any securitising moves to securitise oil supply chains will continue to remain high.

5.8. China and the South Sudanese Civil War

In December 2013, the security situation deteriorated when infighting began between factions loyal to President Kiir and Vice-President Machar, resulting in South Sudan's descent into civil war. The AU Commission of Inquiry of South Sudan later found that a gunfight within the Presidential Guard sparked the violence, which was interpreted by Kiir as confirmation that his Vice-President was attempting to lead a coup against him.²⁹⁴ The arrest of senior SPLM officials quickly split the Party and escalated tensions.²⁹⁵ Having barely escaped arrest, Machar declared himself leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army - in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO).²⁹⁶ The political power struggle rapidly developed an ethnic character, as tensions between Nuer and Dinka groups were instrumentalised by ethnic entrepreneurs, intent on inciting violence for their own parochial interests such as economic, social and political advantage.²⁹⁷

As the conflict escalated, Reik Machar sent his militia forces to occupy the oilfields of Upper Nile and Unity States (representing 80% and 20% of oil production) to deprive Salva Kiir oil rent and to pay for the wages of his own patronage network. Violence broke out at the Thar Jath Oilfield in Unity after Major General James Koang's 4th Division mutinied from Machar's command, resulting in a number of fatalities among local oil workers and security staff.²⁹⁸ Multiple

²⁹³ Transparency International, 'Corruption Perceptions Index', *Transparency International* <<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi>> [Accessed 30 June 2020]. Note* Sudan did not fare much better, ranking 173rd respectively;

United Nations Development Programme, '2019 Human Development Index', *United Nations Development Programme* <<http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/2019-human-development-index-ranking> [Accessed 30 June 2020].

²⁹⁴ Large (2016), p. 39.

²⁹⁵ Hodzi, p. 184.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Ashaba, Paolo & Gyamfi, p. 91.

²⁹⁸ James, p. 38.

armed clashes also broke out in the capital of Upper Nile state, Malakal, in February 2014 and April 2015. The city has a strategic importance as a gateway to the Adar-Yale and Gumri oil installations, which were evacuated of non-essential staff.²⁹⁹ To fight the rebels, the Juba government used oil-backed loans to ‘rearm, provide armaments to allied forces and support Uganda’s troop deployments’.³⁰⁰

Once more, oil operations were forced to stop production. This included the total shutdown of the GPOC consortium in the Unity oilfields, which had only restarted production earlier that year.³⁰¹ In December 2013, CNPC announced an evacuation of ninety-seven of its workers, though more followed in later months, who were airlifted to safety from UN bases.³⁰² Security of oil workers were a great concern, especially after the kidnapping of two Chinese during an attack on Kanar oil field in April 2014 and four DAR petroleum workers in March 2017.³⁰³ Some installations were wholly destroyed, and for others, the shutdown was so quick that there was damage to machinery and severe oil leakages.³⁰⁴ In Unity Field, the EIA found damage to oil storage tanks and although the government were able to retake the Toma South and Unity fields in March 2014, damage to the export pipeline prevented restarting production.³⁰⁵ Consequently, production dropped by over 20% and, in Unity State alone, there were losses of around 45,000 barrels a day.³⁰⁶ By March 2014, oil production nationwide was at 166,500 bpd, which reduced to 140,000 bpd in 2015.³⁰⁷ Furthermore, around one-hundred Chinese companies were operating on major infrastructure projects in December 2013, all of which found their operations threatened. For example, an envisioned 100,000 bpd facility at Thangrial in Upper Nile state, and in Bentiu in Unity State, were delayed indefinitely.³⁰⁸ Whilst the conflict threatened the CPC’s energy security, it had a greater effect on the NOCs corporate interests. In early 2016, when crude oil prices dipped below \$30 a barrel, CNPC was losing \$2 million per day.³⁰⁹

The CPC political elite were quick to exert diplomatic pressure. Officials repeatedly,

²⁹⁹ Luke Patey, ‘South Sudan: fighting could cripple oil industry for decades’, *Sudan Tribune*, 28 January 2014, <<https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49741>> [Accessed 10 May 2020].

³⁰⁰ International Crisis Group, *Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts*, Report 223 (Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2015), p. 20.

³⁰¹ James, p. 38.

³⁰² Luke Patey, ‘South Sudan: fighting could cripple oil industry for decades’.

³⁰³ Ibid.; Denis Dumo, ‘South Sudan says will boost security in oilfields after kidnappings’, *Reuters*, 21 March 2017 <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-oil-security/south-sudan-says-will-boost-security-in-oilfields-after-kidnappings-idUSKBN16S2BU>> [Accessed 12 February 2020].

³⁰⁴ Hodzi, p. 185.

³⁰⁵ James, p. 38; US Energy Information Administration, p. 11.

³⁰⁶ Hodzi, p. 185.

³⁰⁷ Large (2016), p. 40.

³⁰⁸ James, p. 38; Hodzi, p. 185.

³⁰⁹ International Crisis Group (2017), p. 8.

through discursive acts, proposed that the warring parties must come to an agreement and commit their soldiers to protect Chinese lives and businesses. The intended perlocutionary effects of such statements were to ensure that China's energy and related interests were protected. For example, Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng, in a call with South Sudan's Minister of Foreign Affairs in April 2014, voiced concern for the 'Chinese enterprises doing business in South Sudan'.³¹⁰ He 'hoped' the government would 'protect the safety of lives and properties of Chinese people and enterprises'.³¹¹ In an interview with *Al Jazeera* in August 2014, Wang Yi put forward his own four-point proposition to resolve the conflict, arising from talks with South Sudan's Foreign Minister. This included 'a ceasefire', 'an inclusive political dialogue', a call from the international community to 'intensify efforts for peace talks', and to 'improve the humanitarian situation in South Sudan'.³¹² Again, Wang Yi took the opportunity to request that the GoRSS take 'concrete and effective measures to protect the lives and properties of the Chinese nationals in the country'.³¹³ In May 2015, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs put the CPC's energy security concerns more bluntly, stating: 'both sides have the responsibility to protect oil infrastructure in South Sudan, as oil is a critical resource in its reconstruction and economic development during the country's peaceful transition period'.³¹⁴ These discursive acts from political heavyweights within the CPC can be understood as 'extraordinary measures' which run against China's non-interference norms. As such, they evidence the successful parallel securitisations of oil, business, infrastructure and Chinese citizens in South Sudan.

These statements were reinforced by practical action. Less than two weeks after the conflict arose, Zhong Jinhua, China's Special Envoy to South Sudan and African Affairs Representative, arrived in Africa, travelling regularly as a 'go-between' in Juba, Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Beijing.³¹⁵ On Jinhua's role, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying stated that he was in South Sudan to, 'enhance communication and coordination with all the relevant parties and jointly

³¹⁰ Ministry of Commerce People's Republic of China, 'Minister Gao Hucheng Holds Telephone Talks with South Sudan's Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation on Bilateral Ties and Cooperation', *Ministry of Commerce People's Republic of China*, 16 April 2014 <<http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201404/20140400553492.shtml>> [Accessed 9 March 2020].

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 'Wang Yi: Stability and Development Are in the Fundamental Interests of all Ethnicities in South Sudan', *Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka*, 9 January 2014 <<http://lk.china-embassy.org/eng/zgxw/t1116502.htm>> [Accessed 9 March 2020].

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Xinhua, 'China urges immediate cease-fire in South Sudan', *Xinhua*, 22 May 2015 <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-05/22/content_20795765.htm> [Accessed 10 January 2020].

³¹⁵ Hodzi, p. 188.

push for restoration of stability in South Sudan'.³¹⁶ Jinhua participated in early negotiation talks between the SPLM and SPLM/A-IO in January 2014, which resulted in the first ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire was monitored closely by Chinese diplomats in Ethiopia and South Sudan who also helped convince the Kiir government to release thirteen SPLM members accused of plotting a coup in 2013.³¹⁷ In a carrot-and-stick approach, Chinese mediators were able to use economic leverage over South Sudan. Although EXIM Bank had pledged finances for three or more projects, money was withheld until there was confirmation that the bank might get a return.³¹⁸ Speaking on this experience, Zhong Jinhua admonished that his and the diplomats role in mediating the 2014 ceasefire signified 'a new chapter for Chinese foreign affairs', which, as Hodzi suggests, implies that conflict resolution might be a common practice in the future.³¹⁹ However, Jinhua's role can only be viewed as 'extraordinary measures' which ran counter to the spirit of the Five Principles.

The Chinese government also threw its support behind regional processes led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – an eight country trading bloc for the Horn of Africa – who mediated the first fifteen months of peace talks.³²⁰ In 2015, it announced a 'revised, expanded mediation' called IGAD-PLUS which accepted support from the AU, UN, PRC, US, UK, EU, and Norway.³²¹ The efforts of IGAD-PLUS resulted in the first (of many) 'Cessation of Hostilities Agreement' signed by both parties in 2014. China also became a participant of South Sudan's Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (JMEC) with a role to oversee the peace agreement under a 'three-party (China, Africa and the West) multilateral framework'.³²² Such mechanisms allowed China to operate under its mantra of 'African solutions to African problems' in a bid to buttress the notion that China is a non-interventionist power.³²³

³¹⁶ Voice of America, 'China sends envoy to South Sudan to push peace talks' *Voice of America*, 27 December 2013 <<http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-china-sends-envoy-south-sudan-push-peacetalks/1818388.html>> [Accessed 2 May 2020].

³¹⁷ Ibid., p. 188; International Crisis Group (2017), p. 14.

³¹⁸ Ibid., p. 17.

³¹⁹ M. Martina, 'South Sudan marks new foreign policy chapter for China: Official', *Reuters*, 11 February 2014 <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-southsudan-idUSBREA1A0HO20140211>> [Accessed 12 March 2020].

³²⁰ IGAD is an eight-country trading bloc containing countries from the Horn of Africa, the Nile Valley and the African Great Lakes. Member states are: Djibouti (founding member, since 1986) Ethiopia (founding member, since 1986) Somalia (founding member, since 1986) Eritrea (admitted 1993, withdrew 2007, readmitted 2011), Sudan (founding member, since 1986) South Sudan (admitted 2011), Kenya (founding member, since 1986) Uganda (founding member, since 1986). For further information, see Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 'About us: History', *Intergovernmental Authority on Development* <<https://www.igad.int/about-us>> [Accessed 25 June 2020].

³²¹ International Crisis Group (2015), p. i.

³²² Ibid., (2017), p. 23.

³²³ Brosig, p. 10.

Perhaps China's greatest contribution to the IGAD process was when Yi and Chinese officials organised a 'special consultation meeting' in Khartoum in January 2015 with representatives from the SPLM/A-IO, the Juba and Khartoum governments, IGAD mediators, and the Ethiopian Foreign Minister.³²⁴ The meeting concluded with a Five-Point Plan, echoing Yi's earlier four-point proposition. The plan secured commitments from all parties to implement an agreement, enhance the humanitarian response, support the IGAD process, and – importantly for China - 'ensure the safety of all personnel and assets of all countries and international entities operating in South Sudan'.³²⁵ Whilst some scholars have dismissed the Five-Point Plan, Zhong Jinhua considered the meeting a 'ground breaking initiative', as it was the first time that the Chinese government had called upon other countries to resolve conflict in another country.³²⁶ Up until that point, China had always worked to support the government authority, however, South Sudan showed a case study whereby China had been willing to engage with non-governmental parties to a conflict. These efforts can thus be seen as 'extraordinary measures' designed to reduce insecurity with the primary aim of protecting China's oil supply chains and citizens.

Reaction to China's role in the IGAD process has been mixed. South Sudan's Foreign Minister Barnaba Benjamin 'welcomed' China's facilitation and praised its 'constructive' role to resolve the conflict.³²⁷ Sudan's Foreign Minister reiterated this sentiment:

'China [...] is working seriously and sincerely to end the conflict [...]. It is acting on the base of its international responsibility and not to achieve any other purposes.'³²⁸

Conversely, several IGAD officials and Ugandan and Norwegian diplomats have remarked that China has been a 'nuisance'. Many mediators felt that China was simply present to protect their oil investments and gather intelligence on developments in South Sudan.³²⁹ Others have accused China of providing funds to both warring sides to guarantee the security of their oil infrastructure. There is some evidence to support this view. For example, when Machar took the Unity and Upper Nile state oilfields, this compelled Chinese representatives to convene an urgent meeting with him

³²⁴ The full title of the meeting was called 'Special Consultation in Support of the IGAD-led South Sudan Peace Process'. As Daniel Large notes, it featured 'Tedros Adhanom, the rotating chair of the IGAD Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Seyoum Mesfin, Chairperson of the IGAD mediation team on South Sudan, Barnaba Marial Benjamin, South Sudan's Foreign Minister, and Taban Deng Gai, the SPLM-IO's Chief Negotiator. It also featured President Bashir'. See Large (2016), p. 45; International Crisis Group (2017), p. 11.

³²⁵ Large (2016) p.45.

³²⁶ International Crisis Group interview, Zhong Jianhua, then special representative of the Chinese government on African affairs, Beijing, 8 March 2016., in International Crisis Group (2017), p. 12.

³²⁷ Hodzi, p. 190.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Ibid., p. 193.

and his rebel forces. Sources, including International Crisis Group, have alleged that a clandestine agreement was made between the SPLM/A-IO, the Khartoum government and Chinese officials at the Addis Ababa Hotel in Ethiopia to guarantee the protection of Chinese oil operations and infrastructure.³³⁰ If true, this would be a clear violation of China's non-intervention principle and a prime example of the CPC government employing 'extraordinary measures' to protect energy interests.³³¹

Halts to China's arms exports, however, indicate that the CPC government had an interest in ensuring that the IGAD process would succeed. Despite a declaration in 2013 by China's ambassador that weapons would not be sold to any side of the conflict, Norinco was found months later to have supplied a shipment in June 2014 of small arms and light weapons to President Kiir worth \$38 million.³³² Far from enhancing China's energy security, this only undermined China's mediation role. By supplying the SPLA, the SPLM-IO drew attention to the incident as a partisan move in support of Kiir. In response, the Chinese government declared a moratorium on all weapons sales to South Sudan. However, arms shipments were not stalled in Sudan – and the Khartoum government quickly began to funnel weapons to anti-SPLA groups in the South. In 2016, the Conflict Armaments Research group documented that 1,300 boxes of ammunition were captured from the rebels in Unity State, where two Chinese peacekeepers had been killed earlier that year.³³³ Ironically, many Chinese-made weapons ended up in the hands of rebel groups which were responsible for damaging the investments and impeding the operations of the NOCs.³³⁴ Norinco's arms deals were not aligning with the government's mediatory role to, as the *South China Morning Post* put it, 'help resolve a rebellion in South Sudan which 'threatens Beijing's oil investments'.³³⁵ Whilst the moratorium signified an effort on behalf of the CPC government to promote peace – and in turn protect oil and related interests – despite the CPC's influence, this was not enough to stop the Sudan and South Sudan governments and Chinese SOEs from using their agency to pursue their own interests. Norinco's corporate objectives, like the NOCs, prioritised profit margins. Therefore, despite the moratorium, Norinco allegedly sold arms to

³³⁰ International Crisis Group (2017), p. 12.

³³¹ Hodzi, p. 187.

³³² Eric Olander, 'China Halts Arms Sales to South Sudan (Wait, What?)', *The China-Africa Project*, 5 October 2014 <<https://chinaafricaproject.com/podcasts/podcast-china-africa-south-sudan-arms-sales/>> [Accessed 20 July 2020]; Amnesty International, 'UN: South Sudan arms embargo crucial after massive Chinese weapons transfer', *Amnesty International*, 17 July 2014 <<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/07/un-south-sudan-arms-embargo-crucial-after-massive-chinese-weapons-transfer/>> [Accessed 20 July 2020].

³³³ The East African, 'Caught between Juba and Khartoum: The double 'game' of China', *The East African*, 1 August 2016 <<https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/magazine/caught-between-juba-and-khartoum-the-double-game-of-china-1353220>> [Accessed 21 July 2020].

³³⁴ Patey (2014), p. 273.

³³⁵ Hodzi, p.192.

South Sudan again in 2015.³³⁶ As Large acknowledges, the incident ‘dramatically illustrated the mixed, contradictory role of a Chinese engagement made up of multiple actors’.³³⁷

Following the breakdown of the IGAD negotiated ‘Cessation of Hostilities Agreement’ in 2015, UNSC Resolution 2206 was passed unanimously on 3rd March 2015, which agreed to impose targeted sanctions on belligerents in South Sudan, and for the warring parties to establish a Transitional Government of National Unity.³³⁸ Again, this was an ‘extraordinary measure’ for China, which had, up until this point, rejected sanctions, even during the Darfur crisis where the government was under huge international pressure to acquiesce. It is possible that China’s concessions on sanctions may have been brokered as a quid pro quo for the provision within UNSC 2206 which instructed ‘both parties to immediately implement’ the China-mediated Five-Point Plan (including a commitment to protect Chinese lives and infrastructure).³³⁹ On the other hand, agreeing to sanctions may have simply been seen by Chinese diplomats as a pragmatic means of expediting the peace process and reinforcing the CPC’s narrative of China becoming a ‘responsible world power’. China’s UN representative, Liu Jieyi, stated that the Resolution sent ‘a unanimous message to the parties aimed at helping IGAD in its push for a speedy breakthrough in the political negotiations’.³⁴⁰ Yet, China would later abstain on Resolution 2428 adopted in July 2018, which would implement an arms embargo on South Sudan on the basis that ‘sanctions should serve only as a means, not an ends to themselves’.³⁴¹

In any case, Chinese involvement with IGAD and the UN can be construed as evidence of the successful securitisations of threats to oil supplies, citizens, and related interests. On one hand, perhaps the CPC government had a sincere aspiration to end the conflict in South Sudan. It therefore engaged with the IGAD process and supported UN efforts as a means to improve regional security with the effect of neutralising threats. On the other hand, perhaps the CPC only engaged in IGAD to gather intelligence and protect oil investments, and only supported sanctions so that the Five-Point Plan would be incorporated into UNSC 2206. However, both these narratives suggest that the CPC government had the same aim: to securitise threats against their

³³⁶ Lily Kuo, ‘China’s largest weapons manufacturer is allegedly selling arms to South Sudan—again’, Quartz Africa, 26 August 2015 <<https://qz.com/africa/488342/chinas-largest-weapons-manufacturer-is-allegedly-selling-arms-to-south-sudan-again/>> [Accessed 20 July 2020].

³³⁷ Large (2016), p. 41.

³³⁸ United Nations Security Council, ‘Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan’, S/PV.7396, 3 March 2015 <<https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7396>> [Accessed 12 March 2020].

³³⁹ Large (2016), p. 42.

³⁴⁰ United Nations Security Council (2015).

³⁴¹ Brosig, p. 11.

interests in the region. In either case, the CPC government used ‘extraordinary measures’ for this very purpose.

Finally, on 17th August 2015, Riek Machar signed the IGAD-mediated agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan on behalf of the SPLM-IO, followed by President Kiir on 26th August.³⁴² The agreement committed the warring factions to a power-sharing agreement and a permanent ceasefire.³⁴³ However, the peace would be short lived. In the midst of a severe economic crisis and plummeting oil prices, fighting again erupted in the capital in 2016: tanks and helicopters surrounded rebel forces; soldiers rampaged through Juba’s streets; and Riek Machar fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo on foot.³⁴⁴ By 2017, around one million had fled to neighbouring Uganda.³⁴⁵ In September 2018, the two parties once again signed a peace deal and agreed to a ceasefire. After extensive stalling over state boundaries and security arrangements, alongside mediation from Pope Francis himself at Vatican City, finally, in February 2020, the warring sides struck a unity deal, Machar returned as Vice-President, and a new coalition government was formed.³⁴⁶

5.9. Chapter Summary

Throughout the time-period that China has engaged in the Sudan region, it has been marred by conflict. Whilst some years have been more peaceful than others, corruption and underlying societal divisions have meant that the NOCs – at all times – operate on top of a house of cards, which could collapse into a state of lawlessness at any given time. This means that there is some objective truth to claims that the ‘Two Chinas’ interests in the region have been existentially threatened. In consequence, the Chinese government – pressured by NOCs – have undertaken ‘extraordinary measures’ outside of the realm of ‘normal politics’ to neutralise existential threats. Whilst plenty of evidence here suggests that oil supply chains were a primary concern of the CPC government and NOCs, ‘extraordinary measures’ must not be divorced from supplementary

³⁴² Large (2016), p. 46.

³⁴³ Intergovernmental Authority on Development, ‘Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, 17 August 2015’ (Addis Ababa: IGAD, 2015) <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/final_proposed_compromise_agreement_for_south_sudan_conflict.pdf> [Accessed 25 March 2020].

³⁴⁴ Justin Lynch & Robbie Gramer, ‘Diplomats Fear a Collapse of South Sudan’s Latest Peace Deal’, *Foreign Policy*, 5 March 2020, <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/05/south-sudan-peace-deal-diplomats-fear-collapse/>> [Accessed 27 April 2020].

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

interests identified in chapter four, namely the protection of citizens, trade, and China's desire to be viewed as a 'responsible world power'.

It also appears that as the Sino-Sudanese relationship has developed, so has China's use of conflict mediation and sanctions. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the Chinese government resisted measures which might undermine the sovereignty of the Sudanese government, however, it appears that foreign policy decision-makers have come to understand that in incentivising government actors to foster peace through the tools of diplomacy and economic leverage, this, logically, would have the effect of diminishing threats against its interests. For example, whilst initial efforts to enforce sanctions against the Sudanese government were rejected, China has since endorsed or abstained on UN resolutions to enforce sanctions and send UN peacekeepers to the region. Likewise, China has played a proactive diplomatic role in the South Sudan Civil War, even leading a mediation effort of its own with non-governmental actors like the SPLM/A-IO. Such initiatives must be viewed as 'extraordinary measures', evidencing the successful securitisation of threats to oil supply chains, citizens and trade.

However, the Chinese government has not always been successful in using diplomacy and mediation to neutralise threats to energy and related interests. In 2012, when a dispute emerged between the Sudans over oil pipeline transit fees, the government was unable to prevent the Juba government from shutting down CNPC's operations. Likewise, in 2013, the government was also powerless to stop rebel forces from decimating the production capacity of Unity state. Clearly, there are limits on intervention, and so, limits to the NOCs securitising moves on the Chinese government. Despite calls from NOCs to deploy the PLA to protect oil facilities, the government has, so far, been unwilling to contravene its non-intervention principle so explicitly.

Ultimately, South Sudan broke the taboo in Chinese foreign policy to engage in the mediation processes of foreign states. This has been reflected in government documents such as the FOCAC 2018 Beijing Declaration, which states that 'China will continue to play a constructive role in providing good offices and mediation of African hotspot issues', indicating that mediation could become a permanent device used in foreign policy in future.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Beijing Declaration-Toward an Even Stronger China-Africa Community with a Shared Future', 12 September 2018, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* <https://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t1594324.htm> [Accessed 25 February 2020].

Chapter VI

Extraordinary Measures and the End of Non-Intervention: Part II

Successful Securitisation in National Security Policy, Regulations and Military Developments

This chapter will investigate what military, bureaucratic and policy changes have been taken by the ‘Two Chinas’ to improve the security of their interests in Sudan and South Sudan. Following the ‘practice-oriented approach’ to securitisation, based on the effectiveness and utility of actions, as well as discourse, in neutralising existential threats to oil supply chains (and related interests) in the Sudans, an inference will be made as to whether such policy decisions *may* have considered such threats – and hence, whether such actions can be considered evidence of successful securitisation.

6.1. National Security Policy and Legislation

As Balzacq suggests, policy tools can promote ‘certain perceptions of threat’ – and therefore changes to policy and legislation can be viewed as measures which move security threats from the political to the security agenda.³⁴⁸ Subsequently, it is significant to note that the role of the military in protecting overseas interests has steadily increased in national security policy. This new strategic direction was perhaps first articulated in Hu Jintao’s ‘New Historic Missions’ speech in 2004 and its accompanying Defence White Paper. Jintao stated that the military needed to protect ‘China’s sea lines of communication, rescue PRC citizens at risk in unstable environments, protect China’s overseas investments, and ensure stability in regions important to China’s economic and security interests’ – like the Sudans.³⁴⁹ Over the years, Defence White Papers have restated these commitments. The 2019 Defence White Paper, most recently, called on the military ‘to safeguard China’s overseas interests’, which were stated to be ‘a crucial part of China’s national interests’.³⁵⁰

Similarly, the 2015 National Security Law prioritised the protection of ‘overseas Chinese citizens, organisations and institutions’ as one of the PLAs strategic tasks.³⁵¹ This was followed by the December 2015 Anti-Terrorism Law, which permitted the PLA to get involved in anti-

³⁴⁸ Floyd, p. 688; Balzacq, ‘A Theory of Securitisation’ (2011), p. 15.

³⁴⁹ Phillip C. Saunders, ‘Beyond Borders: PLA Command and Control of Overseas Operations’, SF No. 306, Centre for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1-11 <<https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-306.pdf>> [Accessed 25 July 2020].

³⁵⁰ China’s National Defence in a New Era (2019).

³⁵¹ ‘National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China’, <<https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/2015nsl/>>

terrorism operations overseas.³⁵² The officer in charge of the CMC's Legal Affairs Bureau confirmed that this legislation would allow the PLA to go abroad for 'peacekeeping operations, [...] maritime escorts, and military operations to protect China's overseas interests.'³⁵³

Energy security has also been explicitly addressed in security policy. In the 2012 Energy White Paper, a section was dedicated to the subject, which called for 'tightening administration of the energy sector' to safeguard the country's energy security'.³⁵⁴ It also called the security of 'energy and resources' as an 'imminent issue'.³⁵⁵ Article 21 of the 2015 National Security Law also maintained that energy was an issue of national security, and as such, the law called for the improvement of 'security protection measures' to guarantee 'the sustainable, reliable and effective provision of resources and energy sources necessary for economic and social development'.³⁵⁶

Policies and laws explicitly referencing the need for energy security infer that oil supply chains have been securitised, paving the way for greater PLA involvement in neutralising threats overseas. However, how far events in the Sudans swayed such decisions is impossible to determine – and likely nominal when considering China's energy concerns elsewhere. More importantly, how far energy security concerns have shaped policies relating to the general protection of overseas interests is unclear in comparison to, say, the protection of Chinese citizens. However, all these policies have had the effect of further enhancing China's capabilities to neutralise threats to energy and related interests in the Sudans.

6.2. Restructuring the PLA

The military has also gone through extensive structural changes to improve its overseas capabilities. In September 2015, it demobilised 300,000 PLA personnel to de-emphasise its army-centrism and placed greater importance on air and sea projection.³⁵⁷ This is part of a wider bid to fully modernise the military by 2050. For the PLA Air-Force (PLAAF) this has meant that it has developed long-range strike capabilities, transitioned from territorial defence to offensive operations, and improved its capabilities for 'strategic early warning, air strikes [...] strategic

³⁵² Ben Blanchard, 'China passes controversial counter-terrorism law', *Reuters*, 28 December 2015 <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-iduskbn0ua07220151228>> [Accessed 25 July 2020].

³⁵³ Ghisseli, 'Diplomatic Opportunities and Rising Threats', p. 624.

³⁵⁴ Leung et al., p. 20.

³⁵⁵ Ghisseli (2020), p. 433.

³⁵⁶ National Security Law of the People's Republic of China.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.; Alessandro Arduino, *China's Private Army: Protecting the New Silk Road* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 78; James Char & Richard A. Bitzinger, 'A New Direction in the People's Liberation Army's Emergent Strategic Thinking, Roles and Missions', *The China Quarterly*, 232 (2017), 841-865 (p. 852).

projection, and integrated support'.³⁵⁸ Likewise, for the PLA Navy (PLAN), this has meant 'speeding up the transition of its tasks from defence on the near seas to protection missions on the far seas'.³⁵⁹ Since 2014, the PLAN has also enhanced its abilities to carry out long-range manoeuvres and conduct operations in all terrains.³⁶⁰ Energy security concerns have arguably played a role here, as reflected in the 2012 Energy White Paper, which suggested that 'marine transportation of petroleum' is becoming an 'ever-greater security risk'.³⁶¹ Since 2008, the PLAN has also increased its power-projection capabilities in the Gulf of Aden, conducting numerous anti-piracy operations to protect vessels transporting goods including oil from Africa to China.³⁶² These threats relate to oil supply chains more widely, however, are still relevant for the case at hand.

The PLA has also expanded its 'Military Operations Other Than War' (MOOTW) capabilities, first called for in the Central Military Commission's (CMC) 2008 Defence White Paper to improve emergency rescue capabilities, international peacekeeping and counter terrorism.³⁶³ Accordingly, in June 2009, the PLA opened the Huairou Peacekeeping Center, and in 2011, the MOOTW Research Centre, where analysts focus on dealing with social unrest, international peacekeeping and infrastructure protection.³⁶⁴ Similarly, the CMC has established an Overseas Operation Office operating under the War Operations Department, to push forward the 'normalisation of military operations abroad'.³⁶⁵ Training programs have been modified to match new strategic priorities and are 'routinely conducted on unfamiliar terrain [...] against opposing forces whose actions are not predetermined' – much like tactics of Sudanese rebel groups.³⁶⁶ The PLA has also enhanced its long-distance military exercises. In 2017 participants travelled 5900 kilometres in Xinjiang – a similar distance between China's overseas base in Djibouti and the PLA's Western Theatre Command airfields.³⁶⁷

Furthermore, in 2017, a logistics facility designed to hold 10,000 troops was opened in Djibouti

³⁵⁸ China's National Defence in a New Era (2019).

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ China Military Online, 'PLA marines complete winter training in Xinjiang's Gobi Desert,' *China Military Online*, 5 February 2016, <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-02/05/content_6898590> [Accessed 15 July 2020]; Char & Bitzinger, p. 856.

³⁶¹ Leung et al., p. 17.

³⁶² Ghisseli, 'Diplomatic Opportunities and Rising Threats', p. 621.

³⁶³ Roy Kamphausen, David Lai & Andrew Scobell, *The PLA At Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military?* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010) <<https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2079.pdf>> [Accessed 12 March 2020].

³⁶⁴ Ghisseli (2018), p. 620.

³⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 624.

³⁶⁶ Char & Bitzinger, p. 849.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 856.

to ‘address deficiencies in overseas operations and support’.³⁶⁸ It has been described by the PLA as a support facility for peacekeeping operations in South Sudan to ‘replenish [...] soldiers and resupply [...] fuel and food’.³⁶⁹ According to Stratfor, a US-based intelligence platform, the facility has at least eight aircraft hangars.³⁷⁰ In November 2018, Chinese forces also began conducting live fire exercises (for the first time on foreign soil) and helicopter evacuation simulation exercises.³⁷¹ The Djibouti base presents a significant departure from the established notion that China should not post its military overseas on a long-term basis.³⁷² It is symbolic of China’s growing engagement in peacekeeping operations on the continent and could be used to stage further missions into Sudan and South Sudan.

Whilst it would be difficult to claim that these structural and strategic military changes are exclusively ‘extraordinary measures’ to neutralise threats to oil supply interests, they can be perceived as a component of the successful securitisation of overseas security threats more generally – which includes those to interests in the Sudans. A move towards overseas offensive and MOOTW operations also suggests that China is gearing towards greater overseas intervention in future.

6.3. Peacekeeping and the PRC

China has become the largest P5 troop contributor to UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) and has sent troops to both the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).³⁷³ In 2007 and 2008, China sent 315 engineering personnel to serve with UNAMID, followed by a helicopter detachment and 140 troops in May 2017.³⁷⁴ From just 340 troops in 2013, as of May 2020, China has sent twenty-two office staff, five experts, nineteen police and 1039 contingent troops to UNMISS.³⁷⁵ According to Defence

³⁶⁸ China’s National Defence in a New Era (2019).

³⁶⁹ Arduino (2018), p. 79; Char & Bitzinger, p. 857; Brosig, p. 3.

³⁷⁰ Stratfor, ‘Looking Over China’s Latest Great Wall in Djibouti’, *RealClear Defense*, 28 July 2017

<https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/07/28/looking_over_chinas_latest_great_wall_in_djibouti_111921.html> [Accessed 10 July 2020].

³⁷¹ Paul Nantulya, ‘Chinese Hard Power Supports Its Growing Strategic Interests in Africa’, *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*, 17 January 2019 < <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chinese-hard-power-supports-its-growing-strategic-interests-in-africa/>> [Accessed 20 May 2020].

³⁷² Sorensen, (2019), p. 608.

³⁷³ Brosig, p. 3; Cho Sunghee, ‘China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations since the 2000s’, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 28, 117 (2019), 482-498 (p. 482)

Note: China became the second largest contributor to the budget for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) providing around 10% of the budget (10.29%) for 2016. This was also the result of rapid consecutive increases from 3.93% in 2012, and about 6.64% during 2013–2015.

³⁷⁴ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 32; Cho, p. 483.

³⁷⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘Troop & Police Contributions’, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, 30 June 2020 < <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>> [Accessed 5 July 2020].

Commander Wang Zhen, these combat troops have been heavily equipped with ‘drones, armoured infantry carriers, antitank missiles, [and] mortars’.³⁷⁶ Whilst this makes up less than 10% of UN personnel in UNMISS, the significance of China’s contribution should not be understated, as South Sudan represents the first occasion where China has sent large contingents of combat troops to a UN mission under a Chapter VII mandate.³⁷⁷ Likewise, Chinese nationals have managed to inhabit high ranking leadership positions within UNMISS, including General Zhang Yijun, Deputy Force Commander of UNMISS, and Major General Chaoying Yang, who formally took responsibility as acting Head of the UNMISS Force in November 2016.³⁷⁸

There is some evidence to suggest that China’s UNMISS contributions have been motivated by energy security concerns. According to *Foreign Policy*, owing to the insistence of Chinese diplomats in closed-door negotiations with key UN powers, the protection of oil installations was added into the wording of the UNMISS mandate in return for assurances that China would deliver a battalion of 850 additional peacekeepers.³⁷⁹ The final wording of the mandate thus stated that UNMISS would: ‘deter violence against civilians, including foreign nationals [...] in areas at high risk of conflict including [...] oil installations’.³⁸⁰ However, even if true, Chinese peacekeepers have been unable to realise this objective. According to diplomatic sources, China had initially wanted its peacekeepers ‘to be deployed in the key oil provinces’ of Upper Nile and Unity state, but rather, they have been concentrated in Wau and Juba.³⁸¹ Chinese troops have instead undertaken logistical, engineering and support roles, helping create a 600,000 square-metre protection of civilians area in Juba.³⁸² Whilst such responsibilities may not directly enhance China’s energy security, they are strengthening China’s soft power, the PLA’s combat experience, and provide an opportunity to,

³⁷⁶ Xinhua, ‘China sends infantry battalion for UN peacekeeping’, *Xinhua*, 22 December 2014 <http://www.chinadailyasia.com/nation/2014-12/22/content_15205971.htm> [Accessed 5 July 2020].

³⁷⁷ Brosig, p. 13.

³⁷⁸ United Nations Mission in South Sudan, ‘MAJOR GENERAL CHAOYING YANG TAKES RESPONSIBILITY AS ACTING HEAD OF UNMISS FORCE’, *United Nations Mission in South Sudan*, 11 November 2016 [Accessed 21st April 2020]

³⁷⁹ Colum Lynch, ‘U.N. Peacekeepers to Protect China’s Oil Interests in South Sudan’, *Foreign Policy*, 16 June 2014 <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/16/u-n-peacekeepers-to-protect-chinas-oil-interests-in-south-sudan/>> [Accessed 19 June 2020].

³⁸⁰ United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 2459: Adopted by the Security Council at its 8484th meeting, on 15 March 2019’, S/RES/2459, 15 March 2019, p.5.

³⁸¹ Hodzi, p. 194.

³⁸² United Nations Mission in South Sudan, ‘CHINA, UNMISS INAUGURATE NEW PROTECTION SITE IN JUBA’, *United Nations Mission in South Sudan*, 29th May 2014 [Accessed 21st April 2020].

as Chinese Ambassador to South Sudan H.E. Hua Ning has noted, ‘demonstrate China’s responsibility as a major great power’.³⁸³

6.4. Regional Actors

Through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which has met every three years since 2000, the CPC has worked to improve African security in initiatives like the China–Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, established in 2012.³⁸⁴ Peace and security was further elevated as one of eight ‘major initiatives’ outlined for Sino-African relations between 2019–21 in the FOCAC 2018 Beijing Declaration titled *Toward an Even Stronger China-Africa Community with a Shared Future*.³⁸⁵ The Declaration pledged to ‘support the leading role of the AU and Africa’s sub-regional organisations in peace-making, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives’ and ‘support African solutions to African problems and challenges’.³⁸⁶ Part of the \$60 billion finance deal pledged by Xi Jinping was promised to be spent on this endeavour.³⁸⁷

Many states also joined the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum and the China-Africa Law Enforcement and Security Forum, where they pledged to ‘strengthen exchanges of intelligence’ and protect Chinese nationals and economic infrastructure.³⁸⁸ These efforts can be viewed as a part of Xi Jinping’s ‘new phase in military diplomacy’, which, as confirmed by the MoD in 2018, intends to further cooperation with African countries on ‘personnel training, logistics, peacekeeping, health care and relief operations’.³⁸⁹ To operationalise these plans, the CMC has expanded the capacity of its Office for International Military Cooperation.³⁹⁰ Since 2012,

³⁸³ Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, ‘H.E. Hua Ning, Chinese Ambassador to South Sudan, Visits Wau’, *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, 14 August 2019, <https://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx_4/hpaq/t1688644.htm> [Accessed 17 April 2020].

³⁸⁴ Chris Alden & Daniel Large, ‘On Becoming a Norms Maker: Chinese Foreign Policy, Norms Evolution and the Challenges of Security in Africa’, *The China Quarterly*, 221 (2015), 123-142 (p. 131).

³⁸⁵ Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, ‘Xi meets press as FOCAC Beijing Summit concludes’, *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, 5th September 2018, <https://focacsummit.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxyw_1/t1591921.htm> [Accessed 17 April 2020]; Bayes, p. 18.

³⁸⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021)’ (Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2018), para. 6.1.3.

³⁸⁷ Shannon Tiezzi, ‘FOCAC 2018: Rebranding China in Africa’, *The Diplomat*, 5 September 2018 <<https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/focac-2018-rebranding-china-in-africa/>> [Accessed 20 April 2020].

³⁸⁸ Ibid., para 6.1.6; Mail & Guardian, ‘China’s Expanding Military Footprint’, *Mail & Guardian*, 24 October 2018 <<https://mg.co.za/article/2018-10-24-chinas-expanding-military-footprint-in-africa/>> [Accessed 1 April 2020].

³⁸⁹ Mail & Guardian; Shannon Tiezzi, ‘3 Goals of China’s Military Diplomacy’, *The Diplomat*, 30 January 2015 <<https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/3-goals-of-chinas-military-diplomacy/>> [Accessed 29 May 2020].

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

over 10,000 personnel have travelled from abroad to study at one of China's twenty military colleges such as the PLA National Defence University.³⁹¹

China has also supported regional UN-affiliated initiatives. In his 2015 UN Assembly address, Xi Jinping announced the donation of \$100 million to develop the AU's African Standby Force' and the 'African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis'.³⁹² The PLA has even trained an 8000 strong 'Standby Force/ Vanguard Brigade', which has been placed at the UN's disposal for rapid deployment in Africa.³⁹³ A UN Peace and Development Trust Fund was also established to assist over fifty programs in peacekeeping, anti-piracy and counterterrorism.³⁹⁴ Between 2016-17, \$11 million was allocated to the Fund to 'build African capacity to train police and soldiers' and support the AU's 'Silence the Guns' initiative.³⁹⁵ As Hodzi has argued, China's commitment to peace and security in Africa 'signified a growing recognition that [...] armed conflicts threatened its economic interests'.³⁹⁶ It seems likely that conflicts, like those in the Sudans, played a part in such calculations.

6.5. Government Regulations, Risk Management and Private Security

Several internal bureaucratic changes have also enhanced the CPC government's capabilities to neutralise overseas threats. For one, the Department of External Security was established by the MFA, which has been responsible for coordinating policy response in terrorist cases overseas, and a ministerial-level Small Group for Coordination on External Emergencies was established in the same year.³⁹⁷ Regulations have also been issued to improve the risk-assessment facilities of overseas companies. For example, in 2010, a revised notice by the State Council stated that Chinese enterprises must 'commission a professional security organisation to conduct a security risk assessment' to 'minimise security risks abroad' before investing in high-risk countries.³⁹⁸ In June 2012, the State Council also adopted a MOFCOM text which called for greater 'foreign labour service cooperation', instructing enterprises to inform consular authorities of their overseas

³⁹¹Nantulya (2019).

³⁹² Mail & Guardian.

³⁹³ Centre for China-Africa Studies, 'China-Africa Energy Cooperation Under the Belt and Road Initiative'; Nantulya (2019)

³⁹⁴ Mail & Guardian.

³⁹⁵ Michael Kovrig, 'China Expands Its Peace and Security Footprint in Africa' *International Crisis Group*, 24 October 2018 < <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/24oct18-china-expands-its-peace-and-security.pdf> > [Accessed 19 June 2020].

³⁹⁶ Hodzi, p. 186.

³⁹⁷ Ghisseli (2018), p. 619; Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 45.

³⁹⁸ Chinese State Council, 'Regulations for Chinese Enterprises and Personnel Security Management Abroad', *Chinese State Council*, Adopted 13 Aug. 2010, <http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfg/zcfb/dwtz/201303/1741680_1.html> [Accessed 29 March 2020].

activities.³⁹⁹ Overseas staff must also be trained in security, crisis response, and first-aid before deployment, including basic self-defence training and body searching for weapons.⁴⁰⁰

However, many NOCs employed academics, consultants and researchers to improve risk-assessment capabilities prior to government regulation. Sinopec currently possesses an in-house think-tank with the capabilities to monitor real time political threats.⁴⁰¹ Similarly, CNOOC ‘provides country analyses and travel guides for employees travelling to high-risk areas’.⁴⁰² CNPC has also established its own Anti-Terrorism and Overseas Security Office, which, by 2007, staffed 160 analysts, alongside a Global Resources and Strategy Research Department in 2009 to improve international risk analysis.⁴⁰³ CNPC’s early warning prevention system requires that each subsidiary abroad establish an emergency security division and command centre.⁴⁰⁴ High-risk countries like Sudan and South Sudan are also obliged to provide daily reports on the local security situation and quarterly societal and community risk assessments.⁴⁰⁵ Such actions can be seen as securitising moves by the NOCs to foster a sense of insecurity and move threats to oil supply chains onto the security agenda. However, due to the high expense, as Arduino notes, only a small number of Chinese SOEs have the capacity for such capabilities.⁴⁰⁶

Due to the failure of local government forces, militias and the Chinese government to always protect oil installations in the Sudans, some NOCs have outsourced their security to private security companies (PSCs). Some figures suggest that the sector has grown in China from a value of US\$2.4 billion in 2005 to US\$11.5 billion in 2015.⁴⁰⁷ Private security firms have around 3,200 professionals contracted to Chinese companies overseas⁴⁰⁸ Security-related activities accounted for 3-5% of CNPC’s budget for investments in risky countries – and, according to *China Economic Weekly*, CNPC has spent around US\$3.3 billion on security between 1993 and 2017.⁴⁰⁹ However, there are only a handful of Chinese PSCs which operate overseas, as they are forbidden under Chinese law to carry or purchase weapons or conduct gun training, which has affected their

³⁹⁹ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 43.

⁴⁰⁰ Ghisseli, ‘Market Opportunities and Political Responsibilities’, p. 31.

⁴⁰¹ Arduino (2018), p. 83.

⁴⁰² Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, 2014: p. 37.

⁴⁰³ Ghisseli, ‘Market Opportunities and Political Responsibilities’, p. 33; Patey (2017), p. 766.

⁴⁰⁴ Patey (2017), p. 766.

⁴⁰⁵ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 37.

⁴⁰⁶ Arduino (2018), p. 83.

⁴⁰⁷ Ghisseli, ‘Market Opportunities and Political Responsibilities’, p. 26; Alessandro Arduino, *Security Privatisation with Chinese Characteristics: The Role of Chinese Private Security Corporations in Protecting Chinese Outbound Investments and Citizens* (Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2015), p. 6)

⁴⁰⁸ Interview, CNPC official, 13 January 2016 in Patey (2017), p. 766.

⁴⁰⁹ X. Jia, ‘Zhongqi haiwai anbao xuyao duoshao “wujing.”’ *China Economic Weekly*, 28 August 2017 <<http://www.ceweekly.cn/2017/0828/203229.shtml>> [Accessed 20 March 2020].

competitiveness⁴¹⁰ Chinese PSCs, therefore, often train local guards and engage in joint ventures with western PSCs like G4S and Control Risks.⁴¹¹ Some western companies, such as Frontiers Resource, established by Blackwater founder Erik Prince, have been developed with the ‘specific aim of offering security packages to Chinese enterprises investing in Africa’.⁴¹²

For the CPC government, the use of PSCs has meant that it can avoid putting its troops at risk, especially in circumstances where foreign military presence has been forbidden by host governments.⁴¹³ PLA researchers have therefore suggested that PSCs must complete those tasks that the army is not capable of.⁴¹⁴ Chinese academics like Zhao and Li have correspondingly called on Chinese PSCs to become ‘the fourth service of the armed forces’.⁴¹⁵ This, as Arduino states, would protect China’s ‘peaceful rise’ narrative and create a ‘gap between contracting governments and final employers’.⁴¹⁶ Whilst Chinese academics have perceived this as a loophole in the non-interference principle, the use of PSCs appear to be in direct contravention of the Five Principles. However, the Chinese government has even provided economic support for businesses operating in dangerous countries that wish to buy security and insurance products.⁴¹⁷ The NOCs use of PSCs – and the support they receive from the Chinese government – can be viewed as further evidence of ‘extraordinary measures’ and the successful securitisation of oil supply chains in the Sudans.

6.6. Humanitarian Aid and Corporate Social Responsibility

The poor management of NOC oil extraction projects in the Sudans has, as a 2007 UN Environment Programme stated, created ‘widespread and intense dissatisfaction’ from local populations.⁴¹⁸ Deep-seated grievances exist towards NOCs from tribes like the Missiriya in Abyei, who assert historical claims over lands forcibly expropriated for oil extraction. Deforestation, cattle deaths and water contamination are said to be the causes of the kidnapping and killing of four Chinese oil workers in 2008 by their tribesmen.⁴¹⁹ Multiple reports from human rights

⁴¹⁰ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 55.

⁴¹¹ Ghisseli ‘Market Opportunities and Political Responsibilities’, p.34.

⁴¹² Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 55.

⁴¹³ Arduino (2018), p.106; Daniel Kramer, ‘Does History Repeat Itself? A Comparative Analysis of Private Military Entities’, in *Private Military and Security Companies*, ed. T. Jäger & G. Kümmel (Berlin: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007).

⁴¹⁴ W. He, Y. Wan, & J. Tan, ‘Zhuanjia: Ke yindao you shili zhongguo baoan qiye baohu haiwai liyi’, *China News*, 20 April 2016 <http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2016/04-20/7841285.shtml> [Accessed 12 June 2020]; Ghisseli, ‘Market Opportunities and Political Responsibilities’, pp. 35-6.

⁴¹⁵ Q. Wang, ‘Wang qiang: Jiaqiang Jingwai Anbao Xuyao Duoceng Fangfan’, *Global Times*, 4 June 2016 <<http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/201606/9008758.html>> [Accessed 12 June 2020].

⁴¹⁶ Arduino (2018), p. 104.

⁴¹⁷ Y. Ke, S. Li, K. Zhao, F. Yu, & X. Li, ‘Siyang baoan gongsi: Zhongguo haiwai anquan de gongjice gaige’, *Charbar Institute*, (December 2015) quoted in Ghisseli ‘Market Opportunities and Political Responsibilities’, p.34.

⁴¹⁸ James, p. 48.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

organisations have cited water pollution as a consistent source of animosity. A study by Sign of Hope and African Water Ltd found that contaminated groundwater from the damaged Thar Jath oilfields could negatively affect the water supplies of 180,000 to half a million people in South Sudan.⁴²⁰ Similarly, DAR Petroleum Operating Company has been accused of dumping toxic chemicals in the bush which has led South Sudanese lawmakers to threaten to shut down their operations.⁴²¹ Malpractice of NOCs has therefore had a detrimental effect on their security.⁴²²

To counter this, NOCs have engaged in ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR) programs, aimed at improving local relations. For example, after the 2008 attacks, CNPC set up a number of medical clinics, and, in 2012, began a partnership with British NGO Saferworld to improve dialogue between CNPC and local civil society.⁴²³ With Saferworld, CNPC has been able to establish its own company-wide guidelines on corporate responsibility overseas. Since 2006, CNPC has also annually produced a CSR report documenting its philanthropic efforts to further local development.⁴²⁴ These have included funding health clinics, hospitals, schools, scholarships, providing vocational training, and addressing local environmental concerns.⁴²⁵ Overseas NOC workers have also been encouraged to learn local languages, culture and customs.⁴²⁶ Some see this multi-stakeholder approach as a cynical extension of the NOCs risk management strategy. In short, by enhancing the NOCs public image, they would experience a ‘positive payoff’ in overseas security and mitigate political and security risks.⁴²⁷

In a similar vein, the Chinese government has stepped up its humanitarian aid commitments. Since 2007, China has provided nearly \$37 million in humanitarian assistance to the region.⁴²⁸ \$17 million of this has been used to support the World Food Programme emergency response to the deteriorating food security situation in conflict-affected Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁰ Al Jazeera, ‘Soaked in oil: The cost of war in South Sudan’, *Al Jazeera*, Humanitarian Crises, 4 March 2015, <<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/03/soaked-oil-cost-war-south-sudan-150302102747401.html>> [Accessed 21 March 2020].

⁴²¹ Al Jazeera (2015) ; James, p. 52.

⁴²² China Dialogue, ‘China’s uncomfortable diplomacy keeps South Sudan’s oil flowing’.

⁴²³ Ibid.

⁴²⁴ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 38.

⁴²⁵ Patey (2017), p. 767.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ Duchatel, Brauner & Hang, p. 38.

⁴²⁸ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Financial Tracking Service’, *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs* <https://fts.unocha.org/data-search/results/outgoing?USgeYears=2013%2C2014%2C2015%2C2016%2C2017%2C2018%2C2019%2C2020&locations=46&f%5B0%5D=destinationLocationIdName%3A%22211%3ASouth%20Sudan%22&search_type=directi> [Accessed 29 June 2020].

⁴²⁹ United Nations Mission in South Sudan, ‘CHINA CONTRIBUTES \$5 MILLION TO WFP FOR PEOPLE AFFECTED BY CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN’, *United Nations Mission in South Sudan*, 23rd November 2015,

Likewise, the Chinese Embassy in South Sudan has continued to facilitate cooperation between Chinese and local universities, and has supported cultural exhibitions to highlight Chinese contributions to South Sudan.⁴³⁰ As mentioned in chapter four, the CPC government is a great believer in the ‘security-development nexus’, and thus, any effort made to prioritise economic development is believed to produce stable nations, generating better security.⁴³¹ This is arguably another practical manifestation of securitisation.

6.7. Chapter Summary

Several military, bureaucratic and policy changes have been taken by the ‘Two Chinas’ which can be viewed as ‘extraordinary measures’ designed to enhance China’s capabilities to neutralise threats to energy and related interests in the region. Evidence suggests that China’s role in UNMISS, CSR and humanitarian efforts, and support for PSCs, were shaped by energy security concerns in the Sudans, however, China’s regional security efforts through FOCAC and the UN Peace and Development Fund reflect China’s desire to protect its wider interests across Africa. NOCs have also taken their own actions to protect their interests and foster a sense of insecurity through the creation of their own risk-analysis programs and the hiring of PSCs.

However, seismic policy changes, such as the inclusion of overseas threats in national security policy, the structural and strategic changes to the PLA, and government regulations are clearly informed by a plethora of causal factors. Whilst they may significantly reduce energy security threats, this outcome does not guarantee that protecting energy interests overseas, especially in the Sudans, was the primary concern in such decision-making or even the intended consequence of such an action. For example, military modernisation may make the PLA better prepared to counter threats to energy interests in the Sudans, but such a policy could be informed by other factors like competition with the US for global hegemony, or a desire to protect Chinese citizens. A weakness in this analysis is its inability to ascertain the exact *intentions* surrounding the actions of the securitising actors. Nevertheless, based on the effectiveness of actions in neutralising existential threats, it was possible to at least make inferences as to whether such policy decisions *may* have considered such threats.

<<https://unmiss.unmissions.org/china-contributes-5-million-wfp-people-affected-conflict-south-sudan>> [Accessed 21st April 2020].

⁴³⁰ United Nations Mission in South Sudan, ‘CHINESE PEACEKEEPERS HOST CULTURAL EXHIBITION IN WAU’, *United Nations Mission in South Sudan*, 17th August 2012 [Accessed 21 April 2020]; Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, ‘H.E. Hua Ning, Chinese Ambassador to South Sudan, Visits Wau’, *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, 14 August 2019, <https://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx_4/hpaq/t1688644.htm> [Accessed 17 April 2020].

⁴³¹ Ibid.

Policies and laws which have developed the PLA's overseas role (including provisions to protect energy interests abroad), alongside structural and strategic changes to enhance the military's overseas capabilities, suggest that China is shifting away from the Five Principles and gearing up for more intervention campaigns in future.

Chapter VII

Epilogue: The Future of Chinese Engagement in Sudan and South Sudan

With al-Bashir ousted in 2019 and a tenuous coalition agreement negotiated between warring factions in South Sudan in early 2020, this following pages will offer a short description as to the current importance of Sudan and South Sudan to the ‘Two Chinas’, and a forecast as to how they might engage there in future.

7.1. The Diversification of Operations

As noted in chapter three, during the 1990s, Chinese NOCs deliberately sought markets that had been shunned by IOCs, as they did not have the capabilities to compete. However, 9/11 and the Second Gulf War intensified the need for diversification, as, at the time, the Middle East housed around half of Chinese oil imports.⁴³² Consequently, China’s country suppliers have risen from just five in 1989, to thirty-two by 2005, to fifty by 2010, with an estimated value of US \$80 billion.⁴³³ Furthermore, since the Anti-Corruption Campaign, the NOCs have been encouraged to foster sensible and more risk-adverse investment strategies in diversifying their international portfolio. This has been confirmed in a study by Chalmers & Mocker who found that NOCs now prioritise regime stability in their investment decisions over all other factors.⁴³⁴ As NOCs now also have the economic clout and experience to target higher-quality assets, they have started to invest in competitive markets. CNOOC, for example, were able to acquire Canadian oil company Nexen in 2012 for US\$15.1 billion, whilst CNPC purchased a stake in Encana for US\$2.2 billion.⁴³⁵ Accordingly, Sudan and South Sudan are simply not as relevant as they once were to the NOCs corporate interests – or to the CPC government’s energy security concerns.

7.2. Political and Economic Turmoil

Ongoing disorder in Sudan and South Sudan is also testing the NOCs will to carry on their operations. Though a power-sharing government was established in South Sudan, well-informed observers have little confidence that the peace will hold. As Payton Knopf, former head of the

⁴³² China Power, ‘How is China’s energy footprint changing?’ *China Power*, 15 February 2016, Updated 19 March 2020. < <https://chinapower.csis.org/energy-footprint/> > [Accessed 10 June 2020].

⁴³³ US Energy Information Administration, p. 10; Jakobson & Daojiong, p. 63; Dannreuther, p. 1346.

Note: Africa provides 1.4 million bbl/d (22%) of China’s oil exports, though this is offset by the Americas with 667,000 bbl/d (11%), Russia and the former Soviet Union with 778,000 bbl/d (13%), and the Asia-Pacific region with 127,000 bbl/d (2%).

⁴³⁴ Chalmers & Mocker, p. 137.

⁴³⁵ US Energy Information Administration, p. 9; Patey (2014), p. 272; Patey (2017), p. 764.

UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan, has said, ‘there is no reason to suggest that the same power-sharing agreement that has failed so many times will work’.⁴³⁶ Root causes of the conflict, such as land disputes, resource access, and forced displacement remain unsettled, and the reintegration of rival factions under a unified command will be a daunting task.⁴³⁷ During the first three months of 2020, the UN ominously reported 658 deaths as a result of continuing intercommunal violence.⁴³⁸ UNHCR reported in September 2019 that around 2.24 million refugees live in neighbouring countries, 1.7 million are internally displaced and six million are facing starvation following fighting in the agricultural heartlands.⁴³⁹

Meanwhile, in Sudan, the deposition of Omar al-Bashir in a military coup in 2019 has put China’s bilateral ties in jeopardy. Whilst the Chinese FM spokesperson Luo Kang has stated, ‘no matter how the situation changes, China will remain committed to maintaining and developing friendly relations and cooperation with Sudan’, such sweeping political change raises concerns as to the status of oil bids, investments and contracts negotiated with the al-Bashir regime.⁴⁴⁰ Likewise, disgruntled communities in the Darfur borderlands continue to pose a threat to the oilfields.⁴⁴¹ The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an alliance group of Darfur rebels, continue to kidnap Chinese workers and attack oil installations in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile.⁴⁴²

Both countries have also incurred significant debts to China, however, both countries are themselves economically paralysed. Sudan’s economy has contracted 5 out of the past 9 years.⁴⁴³ Similarly in 2015, to cover its own fiscal shortfall, the GoRSS approved a \$500 million loan from the Qatar National Bank in return for oil, at a time when government revenue was practically zero and hard currency reserves were close to depletion.⁴⁴⁴ This action risked, as Global Witness

⁴³⁶ Okech Francis, ‘Oil Industry Revival in South Sudan Hinges on Fragile Peace Pact’, *Bloomberg*, 25 October 2019 <<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-25/oil-industry-revival-in-south-sudan-hinges-on-fragile-peace-pact>> [Accessed 3 March 2020].

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

⁴³⁸ Al Jazeera, ‘South Sudan leaders reach key deal on control of states’, *Al Jazeera*, 17 June 2020 <<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/south-sudan-leaders-reach-key-deal-control-states-200617162203652.html>> [Accessed 21 June 2020].

⁴³⁹ UNICEF, ‘UNICEF South Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report: May 2020’, *UNICEF*, 3 July 2020 <<https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/unicef-south-sudan-humanitarian-situation-report-may-2020>> [Accessed 16 April 2020]; BBC News, ‘South Sudan declares famine in Unity State’, *BBC News*, 20 February 2017 <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39025927>> [Accessed 16 April 2020].

⁴⁴⁰ Yellinik (2019); Irana Slav, ‘CNPC, ONGC May Leave Sudan’s Oil Industry’, *Oil Price*, 2 August 2019 <<https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/CNPC-ONGC-May-Leave-Sudans-Oil-Industry.html>> [Accessed 21 June 2020].

⁴⁴¹ James, p. 36.

⁴⁴² Ibid., p. 37)

⁴⁴³ Okech Francis, ‘South Sudan Cuts Interest Rate, Reserve Ratio to Buffer Economy’ *Bloomberg*, 28 April 2020 <<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-28/south-sudan-cuts-interest-rate-reserve-ratio-to-buffer-economy>> [Accessed 21 June 2020].

⁴⁴⁴ James, p. 33.

described, ‘selling South Sudan’s future to pay for today’.⁴⁴⁵ As expected, between August 2015 and August 2016, the World Bank found that inflation had risen by 730%.⁴⁴⁶ South Sudan is therefore even less likely to repay its debts in future.

Moreover, the two countries have been affected by depressed oil prices in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. With planes not flying, shipping slowing, and cars off the road, there is too much oil on the market – and nobody wants to buy any.⁴⁴⁷ This has been particularly destabilising for South Sudan: as oil accounts for over 90% of revenue, the government has been unable to pay civil servants nor its clientelist patronage networks.⁴⁴⁸ To make matters worse, some analysts believe regional oil production has probably peaked. Sudan is now a net importer of oil, and its production is expected to fall to 100,000 bpd in a decade.⁴⁴⁹ South Sudan’s might drop to the same level by 2030.⁴⁵⁰

The situation has been worsened by damage caused in the South’s Civil War, which has disenchanted investors. The decline of oil production, which in 2019 was still only 200,000 barrels a day, has resulted in serious financial loss for NOCs.⁴⁵¹ Consequently – as the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker has recorded – China has not invested any money into Sudan since 2014, and only 250 million into South Sudan since 2017.⁴⁵² In fact, some NOCs are actively retreating from the region. In 2019, CNPC exited a joint venture in Blocks 2A and 4 with ONGC and Petronus as its output had not been paid by the Sudanese government since 2011.⁴⁵³ The unstable environment has meant that Chinese business operations have reportedly halved and only around 500 Chinese expatriates still reside in the region (compared with 10,000 in 2012).⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁴⁵ Emma Vickers, ‘Bad Credit for South Sudan’, *Global Witness*, 2 April 2015 <<https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/bad-credit-south-sudan/>> [21 June 2020].

⁴⁴⁶ De Waal, p. 4; Ashaba, Paalo & Gyamfi, p. 83.

⁴⁴⁷ Patti Domm, ‘The oil industry has never been in a crisis quite like this and many producers will not survive’, 20 April 2020 <<https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/20/the-oil-industry-has-never-been-in-a-crisis-quite-like-this-and-many-producers-will-not-survive.html>> [Accessed 17 June 2020].

⁴⁴⁸ Sudan News Agency, ‘South Sudan President Admits Inter-Communal Fighting Threatens Country’, 10 July 2020 <<https://www.msn.com/en-xl/news/other/south-sudan-president-admits-inter-communal-fighting-threatens-country/ar-BB16A0By>> [Accessed 11 July 2020].

⁴⁴⁹ James, p. 25.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁵¹ Xinhua, ‘South Sudan says to boost crude output by over 15,000 barrels’, *Xinhua*, 8 October 2019 <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/08/c_138454196.htm> [Accessed 12 March 2020].

⁴⁵² American Enterprise Institute (2020).

⁴⁵³ Sanjeev Choudhary, ‘ONGC, its partners likely to exit oil blocks in Sudan’, *Economic Times*, 2 August 2019 <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/ongc-its-partners-likely-to-exit-oil-blocks-in-sudan/articleshow/70490872.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst> [Accessed 12 March 2020].

⁴⁵⁴ Brosig, p.9.

On the other hand, some developments suggest the reverse. For one, oil production has resumed in Blocks 1, 2 and 4 in South Sudan since 2019 – with Unity oilfield reopened and Paloch scaled up.⁴⁵⁵ Some CNPC contracts in Blocks 2, 4 and 6 have even been extended for six years, and the Chinese ambassador has been in talks with the South Sudanese petroleum minister to discuss boosting exploration.⁴⁵⁶ New discoveries were also made by CNPC in the northern oilfields of Upper Nile State in 2019, with its estimated value ranging from 5.3 million to 300 million bpd's.⁴⁵⁷

7.3. The End of Oil?

However, China's commitments to cut carbon emissions and enhance its renewable capacity, first codified in the 2005 Renewable Energy Law, suggest that China's energy interests are changing more broadly.⁴⁵⁸ China has taken the lead in renewables and is the largest 'producer, exporter and installer of solar panels, wind turbines, batteries and electric vehicles'.⁴⁵⁹ For 9 out of the last 10 years, China has taken the title of 'top investor in clean energy' and, in 2017, China accounted for more than 45% of global green energy investment.⁴⁶⁰ Consequently, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) predicts that China is set to become a 'renewable energy superpower'.⁴⁶¹

Climate change concerns, pollution complaints and technological breakthroughs have also led the CPC to rework its energy security strategy. In the 2008 Climate Change White Paper, for example, writers outlined how it was in China's self-interest to generate clean energy, which would

⁴⁵⁵ Bloomberg (2019); China National Petroleum Company, *2019 Annual Report* (Beijing: China National Petroleum Corporation, 2019)

<<https://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/2014enbvfgme/202007/02e6080b1729423c975cd6652a9272a8/files/8db982d1633d48608f9186e47d63b589.pdf>> [Accessed 26 June 2020].

⁴⁵⁶ Reuters, 'UPDATE 1-South Sudan signs extends oil exploration, production deals for 3 blocks', *Reuters*, 10 September 2018 <<https://www.reuters.com/article/southsudan-exploration-idUSL5N1VW2KS>> [Accessed 18 April 2020]; Xinhua, 'South Sudan, China explore closer cooperation in oil sector', *Xinhua*, 3 October 2019 <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/03/c_138446540.htm> [Accessed 18 April 2020].

⁴⁵⁷ Kallanish Energy, 'CNPC makes oil discovery in South Sudan', 23 August 2019 <<https://www.kallanishenergy.com/2019/08/23/cnpc-makes-oil-discovery-in-south-sudan/>> [Accessed 18 April 2020]; Bloomberg (2019).

⁴⁵⁸ Renewable Energy World, 'China Passes Renewable Energy Law', *Renewable Energy World*, 3 September 2005 <<https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/2005/03/09/china-passes-renewable-energy-law-23531/>> [Accessed 18 April 2020]

⁴⁵⁹ Dominic Dudley, 'China Is Set To Become The World's Renewable Energy Superpower, According To New Report', *Forbes*, 11 January 2019 <<https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2019/01/11/china-renewable-energy-superpower/>> [Accessed 26 June 2020].

⁴⁶⁰ Charlie Campbell, 'China Is Bankrolling Green Energy Projects Around the World', 1 November 2019 <<https://time.com/5714267/china-green-energy/>> [Accessed 26 June 2020]; International Renewable Energy Agency, *A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation* (Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency, 2019), p. 28.

⁴⁶¹ International Renewable Energy Agency, p. 28.

reduce the country's dependence of energy imports and generate energy self-sufficiency.⁴⁶² The energy sector, therefore, seems to be moving away from oil. In the 2012 Climate Change White Paper, the government pledged that non-fossil fuel energy would only make up 20% of China's supply by 2030.⁴⁶³ Similarly, in the National Energy Administration's 13th Five-Year Plan, which set pollution targets, an energy consumption cap was introduced.⁴⁶⁴ Finally, in 2019, the NDRC and Energy Foundation China delivered the conclusions of its 'China Oil Consumption Cap and Policy Research Project' – a policy road map to enable China to 'leap out of the Oil Age into a clean energy future'.⁴⁶⁵ The report stated that China would 'reach an oil consumption peak of 720 million tons by 2025' at the end of the 14th Five-Year Plan if the caps the NDRC presented were followed.⁴⁶⁶ Under the oil cap pathway, China's consumption would then 'drop to 600 million tons by 2035 and 420 million tons in 2050'.⁴⁶⁷ Fu Chengu, a former chairman of Sinopec, chaired the project, noting that the oil cap was a measure that must be taken immediately, as, in his words, 'oil consumption has had a serious impact on China's environmental protection, energy security and high-quality economic development'.⁴⁶⁸ Likewise, there has been a shift in markets which have traditionally relied on diesel and gasoline. In 2016, China surpassed the US as the largest electric car market, with sales in China representing 40% of global demand.⁴⁶⁹ At one industry forum, deputy industry minister, Xin Guobin, said his ministry has begun 'research on formulating a timetable to stop production and sales of traditional energy vehicles'.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶² The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 'White paper: China's policies and actions on climate change', *The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China*, 29 October 2008 <http://www.china.org.cn/government/news/2008-10/29/content_16681689_5.htm> [Accessed 29 June 2020].

⁴⁶³ The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 'China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change', *The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China*, 21 November 2012 <http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7172407.htm> [Accessed 29 June 2020].

⁴⁶⁴ Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 'The 13th Five-Year Plan For Economic And Social Development of the People's Republic of China 2016-20', *Central Committee of the Communist Party of China*, 2016 <https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/201612/P020191101481868235378.pdf> [Accessed 29 June 2020].

⁴⁶⁵ Alvin Lin & Barbara Finamore, 'Reduce China's Coal and Oil Use', NDRC, 10 March 2020 <<https://www.ndrc.org/resources/reduce-chinas-coal-and-oil-use>> [Accessed 26 June 2020].

⁴⁶⁶ Liu Zhihua, 'Report: China's oil consumption to peak by 2025', *China Daily*, 17 October 2019 <<https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201910/17/WS5da81492a310cf3e35571149.html>> [Accessed 26 June 2020].

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., 'China's oil consumption to peak by 2025', *China Daily*, 25 October 2019 <<https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/188/159/230/1571977539462.html>> [Accessed 26 June 2020].

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ Joe McDonald, 'China to ban petrol and diesel cars, state media reports', *The Independent*, 10 September 2017 <<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-petrol-diesel-car-ban-gasoline-production-sales-electric-cabinet-official-state-media-a7938726.html>> [Accessed 25 June 2020].

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

7.4. The Future

Apart from a few successful oil discoveries, it appears that the Sudan region is becoming less relevant to both the NOCs and the CPC government. Though the country has a wider importance to the BRI (see chapter four) and to China's 'win-win' and 'south-south cooperation' narratives, clearly, the ongoing turmoil is proving too much for some NOCs, who saw their production capacity decimated during the 2012 Oil Shutdown and South Sudanese Civil War. The region simply is not worth their hassle, especially considering the financial duress both Sudan governments have put on Chinese lending institutions, and how successful the NOCs internationalisation and diversification strategies have been. In Africa alone, Nigeria, Angola, Ghana and Equatorial Guinea offer high quality assets with much less risk attached.⁴⁷¹

At the same time as the NOCs' influence has been deteriorating following the Anti-Corruption Campaign, China's energy security strategy has been moving towards renewable energy. Whilst China will be reliant on oil for at least the next half a century, in the long-term, it seems that the importance of petrostates like the Sudans will decline. Their continuing importance to China may depend on their receptivity to China's green initiatives, which have been fused into the BRI and FOCAC. The FOCAC Beijing Action Plan for 2019-21, for example, promised African states that China would 'support the development of renewable energy' and explore 'sustainable ways of energy cooperation'.⁴⁷² The same conference also saw the launch of the African Energy Interconnection Sustainable Development Alliance, with finance for projects connected to the initiative to be prioritised by China's national development banks.⁴⁷³

⁴⁷¹ Mikkal E. Herberg, 'Asia's National Oil Companies and the Competitive Landscape of the International Oil Industry' in *Asia's Rising Energy and Resource Nationalism: Implications for the United States, China, and the Asia-Pacific Region*, Special Report #31 (Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), p. 35.

⁴⁷² Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021), para. 3.4.2.

⁴⁷³ Jill van de Walle, 'China's Empty Promises of Green Energy for Africa', 26 September 2018 <<https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/chinas-empty-promises-of-green-energy-for-africa/>> [Accessed 26 June 2020].

Chapter VIII

Conclusion

For half a century, the ‘Five Principles of Coexistence’, which emphasised respect for territorial sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of other nations, were treated as customary in the PRC’s foreign policy. Using the analytical framework of securitisation theory, this paper sought to investigate whether the securitisation of oil supply chains has contributed to the PRC’s transition from a traditional policy of non-interference to one of proactive engagement in the case studies of Sudan and South Sudan. It intended to add to the existing empirical literature relating to ‘intervention with Chinese characteristics’ and respond to the lacuna regarding the application of securitisation theory to the fragmented authoritarian context of the PRC. As such, the following research question was proposed: *How has the securitisation of oil supply chains contributed to the PRC’s transition from a traditional policy of non-interference in domestic sovereign affairs to one of proactive engagement in the case studies of Sudan and South Sudan between 1989 and 2020?*

To explore this question, chapter three sought to assess the perceived and empirical importance of oil to China, alongside the importance of Sudan and South Sudan to China’s energy security. Using EIA reports, it was found that oil has – and continues to be – a decisive force in China’s economic growth and urbanisation. Using historical accounts composed by Large, Patey and Hodzi, it was found that Sudan’s oil was of great importance to the CPC government in the 1990s, as the depletion of domestic oil shortages presented a genuine existential threat to the state’s legitimacy, and simultaneously to the NOCs, as without overseas investments, this threatened the very survival of the oil companies. Sudan also provided a launching pad for the internationalisation of the NOCs operations and, for around a decade, represented 40% of CNPC’s overseas revenue. These findings illuminated divisions in NOC and CPC interests: though they shared the aspiration to securitise threats to oil supply chains, the referent object for the CPC has always been the Party and state foremost, whilst for the NOCs, it has been a tug-of-war between national interests and profit maximisation.

Having found that NOCs and the CPC government (or as Kong terms them, the ‘Two Chinas’) have separate, though interrelated, perceptions of and means to respond to threats, the paper attempted to map this concept – and Lieberthal & Lampton’s ‘fragmented authoritarian’ model – to the securitisation process in the PRC. Unlike other scholars who have applied securitisation to authoritarian societies, such as Vuori and Wilkinson, this paper’s interpretation

rallied against the hypothesis that the authoritarian state is a monolithic institution with a monopoly of power. Rather, it was argued that government decision-making is fragmented and could be influenced by actors outside the central government. For brevity, it was the interaction between the ‘Two Chinas’ which formed the focus of this paper, though clearly there are further divisions that exist within the CPC government. An analysis of the interactions between government bodies like the NDRC and the NEC would be an excellent topic for future research.

Following the ‘sociological turn’, chapter three then investigated the power dynamics in the interactions between the key actors to determine whether the NOCs can be considered ‘securitising agents’ to a collective CPC government ‘enabling audience’. It was found that the NOCs privileged position within the energy apparatus made them a ‘socially effective’ actor to make claims to securitise oil supply chains. Using Leung et al.’s concept of the ‘feedback loop’, it was suggested that NOCs have been able to keep energy issues on the government agenda by prompting officials of China’s traumatic history as an oil importer and amplifying fears of Chinese containment and international market fluctuation. As these claims were credible and consistent in empirical reality, they therefore had greater ‘resonance’, contributing to our understanding of why government officials were more inclined to intervene to protect energy interests in Sudan and South Sudan. However, greater investigation is needed to document the securitising moves of the NOCs on the CPC government, especially following the Anti-Corruption Campaign, which has seen the oilmen’s influence decline. Whilst there are examples of NOC involvement in the construction of government energy policy, due to transparency issues and lack of data, it was difficult to verify the extent of their influence.

To challenge the principle assumption of the research puzzle that oil supply concerns were the cause of China’s shift towards intervention in the Sudans, chapter four identified the by-products of the ‘Go Out’ strategy, namely, an influx of Chinese citizens, export goods, and investment projects. Whilst these interests could be, in some way, linked to China’s energy security strategy, it was argued that they could also be interpreted as parallel securitisations. This further complicated the ‘fragmented authoritarian’ model: whilst NOCs might have a monopoly over the energy sector, threats to overseas citizens seem to have been securitised with some influence from the NOCs, but more as a result of immense pressure from hyper-nationalistic citizens to fulfil the ‘Chinese Dream’. The role of the Chinese public in influencing foreign policy decision-making would be another excellent topic of further research.

Chapter five analysed whether there have been objective security threats to the ‘Two Chinas’ interests in Sudan and South Sudan to determine the ‘resonance’ of securitising moves. It

found that ‘resonance’ has fluctuated over time, however, due to underlying societal divisions and corruption, the region has remained volatile. NOCs have, therefore, always operated in hazardous conditions, however, their operations have come under existential threat on multiple occasions, such as the oil shutdown of 2012 and the South Sudanese Civil War. In consequence, the Chinese government – pressured by NOCs – have undertaken ‘extraordinary measures’ outside of the realm of ‘normal politics’ during crisis events to neutralise existential threats to oil supply chains and related interests. What the interests of the ‘Two Chinas’ have in common is their threat source (or referent subject), namely, rebel groups and warring militias who have persistently targeted NOC operations or competed for oilfields to become ‘oil police’. In line with the ‘practice-oriented approach’ to securitisation, ‘extraordinary measures’, and thus successful securitisation, were illustrated as actions or measures which challenged the basis of China’s non-intervention principle. Whilst chapter five looked for ‘extraordinary measures’ in the diplomatic sphere, chapter six did so by identifying changes in national security policy, legislation and regulation.

Chapter five found that as the Sino-Sudanese relationship developed, so did China’s willingness to use measures which interfered in the domestic affairs of Sudan (and later South Sudan). In the 1990s and early 2000s, this included partisan support to the Khartoum government during its conflict with the SPLM. Following the ‘Genocide Olympics’ campaign, this involved using ‘influence without interference’ diplomacy to convince al-Bashir to a UN peacekeeping mission. During the South Sudanese Civil War, Chinese diplomats endorsed or abstained on UN resolutions to enforce sanctions and send UN peacekeepers to the region. They also played a major mediatory role, engaging with non-governmental actors like the SPLM/A-IO. Government documents such as the FOCAC 2018 Beijing Declaration suggest that the taboo has been broken in China to engage in further mediation and conflict resolution. These findings on China’s ‘foreign policy experiment’ in Sudan and South Sudan, therefore, offer some insight as to how ‘intervention with Chinese characteristics’ may work in similar crisis diplomacy incidents in future where the government, NOCs and Chinese investors have interests at stake.

Significantly, measures to neutralise these threats have not always been successful – such as the CPC’s diplomatic response to the 2012 oil shutdown – and so, there are clearly still limits to intervention, and in turn, limits on the NOCs securitising moves. For example, despite calls from the NOCs to deploy the PLA to protect oil facilities in South Sudan, the government has, so far, been unwilling to contravene its non-intervention principle so explicitly. However, as chapter six has found, this might change in the future. Policies and laws which have legitimated an overseas role for the PLA – including provisions to protect energy interests abroad – alongside structural

and strategic changes to enhance the military's overseas capabilities, suggest that China is gearing up for a greater interventionist role in foreign affairs. Again, whether such policy changes are a consequence of threats to oil supply chains in the Sudans – or even oil supply chains globally – is impossible to determine from the available evidence. Rather, such 'extraordinary measures' are the product of myriad contributing factors. What can be said is that China has incorporated energy security into its national security policies, and that the CPC government has engaged in actions on several occasions which run in contravention to the Five Principles of Co-existence – such as its support for the NOCs use of PSCs.

In answer to the puzzle statement, the securitisation of oil supply chains did play a great role in the PRC's transition from a policy of non-interference from proactive intervention in the case studies of Sudan and South Sudan. Oil was one of the principal motivations for the 'Go Out' strategy. In the case of the Sudans, the great influx of trade, investments and overseas citizens – which would later require protection from the 'Two Chinas' – would have never been possible without the NOCs, who opened the door to the region. Whilst evidence points toward oil interests as the primary motivation for many of the CPC's interventionist actions, it has not always been possible to separate these concerns from those parallel securitisations identified in chapter four. As mentioned, the NOCs operations in the Sudans were clearly more important in the 1990s than today since NOCs have diversified their international portfolio's and China has shifted further towards renewable energy.

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Appendix A – Plagiarism Declaration
Declaration of Originality/Plagiarism Declaration
MA Thesis in Conflict Studies & Human Rights
Utrecht University
(course module GKMV 16028)

I hereby declare:

- that the content of this submission is entirely my own work, except for quotations from published and unpublished sources. These are clearly indicated and acknowledged as such, with a reference to their sources provided in the thesis text, and a full reference provided in the bibliography;
- that the sources of all paraphrased texts, pictures, maps, or other illustrations not resulting from my own experimentation, observation, or data collection have been correctly referenced in the thesis, and in the bibliography;
- that this Master of Arts thesis in Conflict Studies & Human Rights does not contain material from unreferenced external sources (including the work of other students, academic personnel, or professional agencies);
- that this thesis, in whole or in part, has never been submitted elsewhere for academic credit;
- that I have read and understood Utrecht University’s definition of plagiarism, as stated on the University’s information website on “Fraud and Plagiarism”:

“Plagiarism is the appropriation of another author’s works, thoughts, or ideas and the representation of such as one’s own work.”
(Emphasis added.)⁴⁷⁴

Similarly, the University of Cambridge defines “plagiarism” as “... *submitting as one’s own work, irrespective of intent to deceive, that which derives in part or in its entirety from the work of others without due acknowledgement. It is both poor scholarship and a breach of academic integrity.*” (Emphasis added.)⁴⁷⁵

- that I am aware of the sanction applied by the Examination Committee when instances of plagiarism have been detected;
- that I am aware that every effort will be made to detect plagiarism in my thesis, including the standard use of plagiarism detection software such as Turnitin.

Name and Surname of Student:

Title of MA thesis in Conflict Studies & Human Rights:

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Signature	Date of Submission

⁴⁷⁴ <https://students.uu.nl/en/practical-information/policies-and-procedures/fraud-and-plagiarism>

⁴⁷⁵ <http://www.plagiarism.admin.cam.ac.uk/what-plagiarism/universitys-definition-plagiarism>