Universiteit Utrecht

THE GAME:

Strategic Tactics used by Informal Individuals to Ensure the Provision of Aid to Migrants in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2018-2020.

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Abstract

'The Game' is a playful term used by migrants transiting Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to describe the precarious and strategic endeavors taken to to cross illegally from BiH through Croatia and further into the Schengen Zone. In this game, migrants play numerous times, facing harsh police pushbacks to BiH if they *'lose'*. *'Winning'* only occurs by reaching their desired destination. Formal and informal actors play a type of game, the management and provision of aid to migrants within BiH. This is the subject of this thesis. This thesis describes the complications formal actors face in providing aid to migrants, and then delivers an assessment of the strategic actions of informal volunteers to ensure aid provision when formal systems are unable. The ethnographic data presented in this thesis is a result of qualitative, mixed-method research conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in winter 2020, that cumulated in two case studies: Sarajevo and Tuzla. The analysis conducted on this research, draws on, and contributes to academic literature on migration studies, formal and informal organizations, hybrid governance and volunteerism. Results are examined in three ways. First, an institutional analysis is made assessing the restraints and complications formal actors face in providing aid to migrants. Second, an assessment is made of the strategic actions informal volunteers' take to deliver aid when formal systems inadequately do so. Third, this thesis will analyze informal volunteer actions using three typologies of behavior: *substitutive, complimentary,* and *reformative.* I conclude that the inadequate care provided by formal actors is not due to incapacity of institutions in BiH, but an unwillingness to compromise, coordinate or take responsibility for the migrants. To avoid this, states use a tactic of *implicit delegation* to defer responsibility of care to the informal sector for migrants.

Keywords: Migrant, Refugee, Asylum, Humanitarian Aid, Formal, Informal, Camps, Transit States, Volunteer, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans, Weak States, Post-Conflict States, Migration, Containment, Mobility, Neglect, Unwillingness, Legitimacy, Hybrid, Substitute, Complement, Reform

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Glossary

The Game: the term migrants use to describe the process of illegally crossing to the EU

BiH: Bosna i Hercegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

    RS: Republika Serbska (Republic of Srpska)

    The Federation: The Federation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

TRC: Transit Reception Center

DRC: Danish Refugee Council

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

EU: European Union

IOM: International Organization for Migration

IO: International Organization

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

NFI: Non-Food Items

Bosnian: This refers to a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and does not denote a particular regional ethnic group.

IRC: International Red Cross and Red Crescent Foundation

Introduction

In 2020, the border between Bosnian and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia was one of a significant way migrants entered without inspection into the European Union. Increased border monitoring and harsh pushbacks by Croatian police have left the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and humanitarian aid organizations to bear the brunt of providing care for the migrants that remain there (Border Violence Monitoring Network). However, the government and these organizations often lack the ability to effectively provide resources and services for its own citizens, let alone host a new migrant population (Bennett, 2016).

In the research presented here, I will examine the role of informal volunteers in providing aid to migrants, in the absence or inadequacy of formal services. I identify three tactics used by informal organizations to to ensure vital humanitarian aid is provided to migrants in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2018-2020: *substitutive* (fill gaps of service*)*, *complementary* (work with existing formal systems) and *reformative (*challenge the formal system).

This is due to its weakened political and welfare institutions as a result of the recent break up of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars that followed, leaving the political and welfare systems in BiH in disarray (Bennett, 2016). Bosnia & Herzegovina should be of particular interest to EU policymakers and academics because of its strategic location on Croatian's border (an EU state). These high-risk factors make the area susceptible to a resurgence of conflict, and therefore should receive substantial consideration, particularly in conflict and human rights studies.

The analysis conducted on this research and presented in this paper, draws on, and contributes to academic literature on migration studies, formal and informal organizations,

hybrid governance and volunteerism. Contemporary migration research generally uses a state-centric, structural-based lens to discuss containment, police, border guards, bureaucrats, sovereignty violations. These approaches neglect to analyze migration through the lens of fragmentized aid distribution arrangements, including the informal sector. Moreover, European Union (EU) states, in the Balkan region such as Greece, Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia, have received large amounts of attention in empirical migration studies (see Tazzioli 2018; Garelli, Sciurba and Tazzioli, 2017; Kasparak, 2016; Andersson, 2014); however, mobility struggles in non-EU states in-between have received little analysis (Mitrović et al., 2020, p. 6; El-Shaarawi and Razsa, 2018; Kurnik and Razsa, 2020; Minca, Šantić and Umek, 2018). However, this literature often overlooks the informal sector's role in this interaction, which I will address here.

The empirical data presented in this thesis stems from ethnographic field research conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in winter 2020. This research consisted of a qualitative mixed-method approach comprised of observations, participant observations, participant observations, digital ethnography, and informal and formal interviews, cumulating in two case studies: Sarajevo and Tuzla. Through the evidence presented in this paper, I will attempt to answer the following question:

How do informal volunteers substitute, complement and reform the formal sector to ensure aid to migrants in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2018-2020?

To answer this, I will divide this thesis into six chapters. Chapter 1, presents a literature review incorporating relevant theory on migration, aid distribution, volunteers and informal studies. Then, in Chapter 2, discusses the methods I used in collecting and analyzing the data

presented later in this discussion. The following section, Chapter 3, provides background

context to understand the case study. Finally, in Chapters 4 and 5, I present empirical

evidence to examine this research question. To adequately answer this question, I break down

empirical evidence gathered into two sub-sections, Chapter 4: *Institutional Analysis*, and

Chapter 5: *Strategic Individual Conduct*. It is important for the informal sector needs to be

studied in combination with formal systems to understand the situational realities (Radniz,

2011, p. 352) of service and aid delivery to migrants.

Chapter 4 examines the following contextual sub-questions:

- What types of aid is provided by the formal sector?

- Are constraints that limit the establishment and maintenance of humanitarian aid to

  migrants?

- Is the aid provided by the formal sector is satisfactory and accessible for migrants?

Data presented in Chapter 4 will be analyzed in Chapter 6, using literature surrounding

containment and formal control over spaces migrants occupy and traverse, parallel structures

of operation, and the informal sector's emergence, which is discussed in hybrid governance

literature.

Following an explanation of these contextual sub-questions, I determine if there are

alternatives to migrants' formal sector to receive assistance. I propose that many of these

absent needs are substituted or complemented by informal volunteers in BiH. Chapter 5 will

analyze how these informal volunteers interact with and impact these formal systems tasked

initially with meeting those needs. As a framework, I developed three typologies to explain

these informal actions and behaviors with the formal sector: *complimenting*, *substituting*

and *reforming*. This typology is derived from existing typologies put forth by Lauth (2000)

and Helmke and Levisky (2004) that examine informal *institutions* in relation to formal systems.

Chapter 6: *Discussion*, brings existing theory presented in Chapter 2, together with the data presented in Chapters 3-4. Through careful analysis, the research presented here posits several conclusions. First, the formal sector's established and proposed facilities and services (or lack thereof) were inadequate to care for migrants, resulting in large numbers of migrants to remain living on the streets without access to resources and services. This inadequate care is not due to formal actors' incapacity, but an unwillingness to compromise, coordinate or take responsibility for the migrants; states use a tactic of *implicit delegation* to defer the responsibility of care to the informal sector for migrants. I conclude with further recommendations to study migration in BiH.

Chapter 1: Theory

This section will discuss various theoretical debates encompassing migration studies that shaped the framework for this thesis. Due to the complexity of migratory behavior, one single migration theory is unlikely to be useful (Castles, 2010; Massey, et al., 1998 in Bakewell, 2010, p. 1692). The existing theory about aid deliverance to migrants encompasses three main topics. The first theoretical body addresses **Structural Control:** *Migration Management Tactics.* The second category of literature reflects on the **Formal Sector**, which is sub-divided into *Hybrid Formal Arrangements*, and *Alternative Formal Aid Sources.* The third category reviews literature on the **Informal Sector**. This category is broken-down into these sub-sections: *Emergence Informal Institutions, Informal Institutional Actions,* and *Informal Volunteers.*

My final theoretical section will propose my own framework regarding informal volunteer behaviors. In this category I reflect on the emergence of a framework using a combination of literature on informal institutions, and informal volunteers. My analysis will examine the interplay between these theoretical debates and will be discussed further in the data and analysis chapters below.

Ontology

The relationship between agency and structure in relation to migration is reflected in migrants' (in)ability to navigate or circumvent institutional restrictions. Academics that use structure-based approaches argue that power resides with social and structural institutions, thereby restricting individuals' actions. Individualist approaches denote that individuals are free-agents and possess the ability to influence the institutions (Demmers, 2017, p. 126-27).

In 1984, Anthony Giddens proposed an alternative approach, reconciling the segregation of these two ontologies. He argues that structure and agency are mutually constitutive entities; structure shapes individuals' actions and is additionally shaped by individuals' actions in response. Migration studies academics have attempted to use Giddens' proposed theory within their work; however, struggle to balance structure and agency effectively. The applicability of this theory has been criticized as to its applicability to empirical studies. (Bakewell, 2010, p. 1700). If agency and structure cannot be separated, it is impossible to explore the relationship between the two in order to apply it to empirical research. (Gregson, 1989 in ibid., p. 1696). This debate struggles to look at the broader social structures that influence migration patterns beyond the individuals' decision making (Bakewell, p. 1690). This *joint-agency* (Kurnik and Razsa, 2020), I propose, is not only between the state and migrant, but also the informal volunteers and migrants, producing a trident of leverage. This triage of relations between informal volunteers, formal institutions, and migrants can be seen in *Figure 1* below.

Terminology

The concept of 'g*ames'* represent this interplay of structure and agency quite well. They are played with overarching rules each player must follow, however the game cannot continue without individual actions making them both enabling and constraining. The two types of games, finite and infinite are played for different purposes. A finite game is played for the purpose of winning, and infinite game for the purpose of continuing the play (Carse, 2013, p. 3). Finite games are played with every move calculated to achieve the end goal, where as for infinite games, every move presents new opportunities (Carse, 2013, p. 11, 58).

In this thesis, I use the term *formal sector* to denote official or registered institutions such as governments, international organizations (IOs), and international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In contrast, the *informal sector* refers to groups or individuals who operate without formal consent or acknowledgment of federal authorities' legitimacy. Barbara Misztal defines informality as "a form of interaction among partners enjoying relative freedom in interpretation of their roles' requirements." (2000, p. 8). This sector includes non-registered NGOs and *informal volunteers,* which assist beneficiaries without obligation or attachment to official formal organizations. These informal volunteers are also referred to as *spontaneous volunteers, emergent volunteers* (Twigg and Mosel, 2017), and *non-government volunteers* (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010) to existing literature.

Trident of Leverage

In the case of migrants in Bosnia and Herzegovina, informal volunteers perform a mediary role by influencing both migrants through direct aid provision, by influencing the formal sector by complementing, supplementing, and reforming the existing formal systems. In my case, formal and informal actors were interdependent on each other while simultaneously attempting to undermine and bypass authority figures (Gidden, 1984; Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010, p. 1124). Using this model, I propose a theory that examines the junctions between the formal sector's strength and capacity to deliver aid, the emergence of informal actors in weaker formal systems, and how the informal response enables or encourages migrants' agency.

Figure 1: Trident of Leverage

Structural Control: Migration Management Tactics

Empirical literature examining the relationship between formal structures and migrants often characterizes the migrant in two ways: agent-less or retaining minimal autonomy. These agent-less depictions characterize migrants as dependent on the host country institutions for survival (see Agamben, 1998; Nyers, 2006; Turner, 2015; Dicken, 2010). The second category acknowledges migrant's limited agency in the face of structural constraints; however, debates the degree of capacity (Tazzioli, 2018; Ellermann, 2010; Bully, 2014; Ramadan and Fregonese 2017; Walters, 2008; Kasparek, 2016; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Kasparak, 2016). In both depictions, migrants and asylum seekers are often portrayed as victims of formal structural violence, appealing to humanitarian compassion and philanthropy (Feldman and Ticktin, 2010).

Structure-based theoretical perspectives in migration studies stem from Gregory Agamben's *'State of Exception'* (1998). In this theory, Agamben examines the institutional control of refugee camps, which reduces migrants to *'bare life,'* merely maintaining and managing basic biological needs and existence (Agamben, 1998; p. 6). This concept of

institutional control is furthered in literature examining the impact of spatial management in

formally controlled refugee camps (see Davies and Isakjee, 2005; Ek, 2006; Gregory, 2006;

Minca 2015b; Ramadan and Fregonese).

Structure-based literature has been dismissed in migrant academic circles as

inconclusive in understanding the complexity of social and political arrangements that enable

migrants to possess agency (Walters 2008; Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017). Critiques accuse

structuralists of oversimplifying the migrant experience by assuming complicit compliance

with institutional regulations (Casas-Cortes et al., 2014, p. 71; also see Ellermann, 2010),

where 'things are always done to them, not by them' (Walters, 2008, p. 188). This

disempowerment dismisses the complex sovereignty arrangements within refugee camps and

the refugees' political agency (Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017, p. 1951). This first body of

literature fails to acknowledge transit spaces between migrants' home country and their final

destination, focusing only on long-term refugee camps.

The second body of literature within a structural viewpoint departs from the spatiality

of the camp to discuss migrants' limited capacity to maneuver within state-centric

institutional zones of control (Tazzioli, 2018; Ellermann, 2010; Bully, 2014; Ramadan and

Fregonese 2017; Walters, 2008; Kasparek, 2016; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Kasparak,

2016). Migration and crisis management academics that attempt to explain that states with

strong structures and institutional controls still allow room for the agency (Kasparek, 2016;

Ellermann, 2010; Tazzioli, 2018; Bakewell, 2010). Kasparek and Tazzioli note room for

minimal *spacial disobedience by migrants* within these formally controlled zones through the

choice of country to apply for asylum (Tazzioli, 2018, p. 2765).

Other authors acknowledge the migrant's limited agency; however, it depicts this

agency as an illusion. They claim that even with this observable agency through migrants'

movement, the state still retains control over the migrants indirectly using the tactic

of *containment through mobility*, which denotes disrupting and redirecting these migrants'

movements (Tazzioli, 2017; Kasparek, 2016; Minca, 2015a). These authors' discussions differ

by in the distinct spacialties the state controls through this tactic; borders (Tazzioili, 2020;

Andersson, 2014), passages and corridors (Kurnik and Razsa, 2020; Papadopoulus,

Stephenson and Tsianos, 2008; Kasparek, 2016) informal camps (Minca, 2015).

This approach shows the development of theory encompassing migration and opens

discussion into how agency and structure can exist simultaneously within spacial compounds

and zones like camps and corridors. It indicates a shift in migration literature as it presents

migrants as mobile, not stationary, as previously discussed literature suggests. This literature

discusses the formal sector's ability to control or contain migrants but does not address the

formal sector's responsibility to provide care for the migrants. Although these critiques satisfy

this previous assumption by examining other formal spaces of control, they over-assume

formal institutions' strength.

Formal Sector

Hybrid Formal Arrangements

Tazzioli, Minca, Kasparek use theories and empirical research on western, democratic states

in their analyses, which fails to address the complexities of sovereignty arrangements and

political structures in many countries (Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017, p. 959; also see

Radnitz, 2011, p. 351; Maestri, 2017; Ellermann, 2010; Gregory, 2006; Martin, 2015).

Additionally, they do not evaluate the level of state strength and those states' effectiveness in

providing welfare services. This assumes that states impacted by migration situations have robust and effective functioning institutions (Radnitz, 2011).

A state's strength in relation to its capacity and effectiveness to deliver goods is essential to examine. (Paul, 2010, p. 5). Radnitz states that strong formal governance "should be able to meet citizen demand for public goods and provide equable opportunities without the need for ad-hoc arrangements that may be inefficient and ineffable," if developed and appropriately maintained (Radnitz, 2011, p. 368). In contrast, a weak formal state is explained by Paul as possessing "low capacity to develop an implement policies in order to provide collective goods such as security, order, and welfare to its citizens as legitimate and effective manner, untrammeled by internal or external actors." (Paul, 2010, p. 5) Helmke and Levitsky argue that informality exists in democratic states and authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, but their function takes on different roles in response to the state effectiveness to provide services (2004, p. 728).

Alternative Services and Resources

Although limited migrant agency to navigate institutional constraints is acknowledged within the above literature, these structure-based assumptions fail to acknowledge that formal organizations are not the only aid source for individuals. State-centric approaches to examining migrants' agency fail to recognize the role of additional formal actors in the humanitarian field, as well as informal volunteers' and organizations' roles. These actors supplement and coordinate with state welfare services and can be vital players in determining structural deficiencies to reform existing practices.

Some authors, such as Ramadan and Fregonese, acknowledge the role international organizations such as the International Office of Migration (IOM) play within camps, but place them in a separate category from state institutions. Their role is seen as a parallel

governance structure, whereas multiple partially sovereign actors operate to govern camps (Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017; pp. 959). Agamben, and perhaps other structuralists, would argue that humanitarian organizations should not be separated from state institutions, but rather included in the same category because they "maintain a secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight" (Agamben 1998, pp. 133-34). However, this again assumes humanitarian organizations coordinate effectively with the state and ignore the political realities in many countries (Radnitz, 2011, p. 351; Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017, p. 951).

Humanitarian assistance literature (see Spearin 2001; Hilhorst and Jansen 2010), examining how humanitarian aid organizations distribute aid, but fails to explore aid deliverance complexity. Through the informal sector's omission in their analysis, this literature seems to imply that humanitarian aid is only administered within formal spaces; this is not always the case. If the formal sector cannot provide sufficient assistance for migrants, how are migrants meeting their needs? Radnitz, while examining state capacity, not humanitarian assistance, examines this issue. He states that only state capacity or state strength to evaluate how states are able to, fail to, or undermine abilities to deliver services, to see how informal systems influence the formal systems in aid provision (2011). He examines how informal politics can function and play a significant role in formal frameworks. These examples analyze states' ability to provide collective goods or undermine collective goods' provision to those within their borders (ibid., p. 352).

Informal Sector

Emergence of Informal Institutions:

Hybrid governance literature provides a theoretical context to the relationship

between the formal and informal sectors in enervated states. Academics in this field conclude

that there is a correlation between state neglect and the emergence of informal institutions

(see Boege et al., 2009; Bagayoko, Hutchful and Luckham, 2016; Helmke and Levitsky,

2004). Boege et al. further surmises that state's *unwillingness* may be a factor in states ability

to deliver security and other basic services (2016: 9), in turn encouraging people to turn to

other entities for support (ibid.: 8). When placed in migration contexts, this literature directly

opposes the previous structure-based migrant control theories by demonstrating with

empirical evidence that migrants self-organize and create informal parallel structures of

governance to substitute where formal structures are not meeting individuals' needs (see Stel

2017; Jansen, 2018; Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017). This literature body assumes that

democracies rely on formal institutions, and non-democratic states operate using informal

institutions. (Radnitz, 2011, p. 354). This should be examined further through empirical

studies to determine how informal institutions interact with different state types (Radnitz

2011, p. 354).

Informal Institutional Actions

Lauth proposed that informal institutions conduct *complementary*, *substitutive*, and

conflicting actions toward democratic states (2000, p. 25). Helmke and Levitsky, stemming

go further than Lauth to divide typologies by the effectiveness of institutions, instead of state

type. They propose that *complementary* and *accommodating* actions in states are the result of

effective state institutions; and *competing* and *substitutive* actions in states with ineffective institutions (2004, p. 728).

Complementary informal institutions described by Lauth and Helmke and Levitsky are quite similar. They determine co-existing structures that mutually reinforce and support each other (Lauth, 2000, p. 25), fill gaps, and address contingencies not dealt with by formal rules (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 728). Substitutive types are described as functionally equivalent institutions (Lauth, 2000, p. 25) that achieve what formal institutions are designed but fail to achieve (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 729).

Lauth and Helmke and Levitsky describe competing typologies slightly differently. Lauth describes it as when two systems of rules are incompatible and displace each-other (Lauth 2000, 25-26). This could be supported by hybrid-governance literature examining states with little to no functioning government; however, this seems improbable in semi-democratic countries. Lauth also stated that informal institutions can exert considerable pressure on formal institutions' function, acting as both a constraining force and a resource (Lauth, 2000, p. 26). Based on this, Helmke and Levitsky suggested *competing* informal institutions could *induce* officials to provide the public goods that are formally obliged to provide (2004, p. 729). In my theoretical framework, I redefine this category as *reformative.*

Both Lauth, and Helmke and Levitsky, clearly specify their informal typologies as applicable only to institutions (Lauth, 2000, p. 23; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, pp. 726-728), excluding individuals and organizations (Radnitz, 2011, p. 354), which neglects individual agency of informal volunteers within this relationship. "They may involve the strategic action of individuals acting outside formal institutions, who share common goals but behave improvisationally in a single-shot game." (Radnitz, 2011) Therefore, I will redefine these categories to examine volunteers in the informal sector and their relation to the state.

Informal Volunteers

Existing institutional informal literature (above) examines the political implications and effectiveness of informal institutional actions on the state (Radnitz, 2011; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Lauth, 2000). However, it does not recognize the individual's role in their analysis; individuals are a vital part of operational structures and conduct activities independently outside of the system while being influenced by it at the same time (see Giddens, 1984).

Literature produced analyzing volunteers generally discusses a volunteer's ability to perform effective and immediate emergency services in humanitarian or crisis situations (Twigg and Mosel, 2017; Romzek, LeRouz, Johnston, Kelpf, Piatak, 2013; Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010), in conflicts and natural disasters, but lacks analysis on *refugee* informal volunteer assistance. My analysis here, contributes to this theoretical and empirical gap to explain how informal volunteers, in emergency refugee situations, relate to the state while simultaneously providing aid to benefactors.

My theoretical framework attempts to merge these two entities of literature, the formal sector to migrant relations, as well as informal and formal institutional ties. Instead of examining the formal sector's role in migrant agency and assistance, as many authors have previously, I will expand on informal-based literature. The informal sector must be examined in migrant literature, especially in less developed states, because their efforts not only directly impact aid provision to migrants in the absence of effective formal assistance, but also impact the formal sector.

Theoretical Framework

I redefine the typologies of informal institutions posited by Lauth (2000) and Helmke and Levitsky (2004) to develop a framework to explain how informal individual actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, impact aid deliverance to migrants in three ways: c*omplementary* (working with the system), *reformative* (challenging the system) and s*ubstitutive*, (filling voids in the system).

Substitutive

The substitutive category of informal volunteers in this framework is supported by hybridity literature which indicates informal institutions emerge in weak or fragile states.

Complementary

In complementary informal actions, informal volunteers work within the existing formal system. These systems do not work against the existing formal systems but maneuver within and around these systems strategically.

Reformative

Reformative informal actions aim to change the existing formal systems by offering alternative completing services and aid deliverance.

In *Figure 2* below, the shades of gray indicated on the arrows indicate the level of direct service and resource provision to migrants, suggesting that effective institutions are able to provide aid to migrants. In contrast, ineffective institutions are insufficient in the provision of services and resources. In this figure, the three typologies I propose:

complementary, reformative, and substitutive, are positioned on a line with a gradient. This

indicates varying service levels by informal volunteers displaying different levels of action

and services by informal actors concerning aid deliverance's effectiveness by formal

institutions.

FIGURE 2:
**IMPACT OF INFORMAL VOLUNTEERS AND
INSTITUTIONS IN RELATION TO MIGRANT AID
DELIVERANCE**

Chapter 2: Methodology

From 18 February to 13 March 2020, I conducted ethnographic field research in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). I used qualitative mixed-method research strategies to carry out this research, which comprised of observations, participant observations, digital ethnography, and (in)formal and interviews.

Conducting research using only observations lacks depth and contextual understanding. Similarly, solely conducting interviews neglects situational context. These research techniques used independently may produce analyses that contain bias and simplistic standpoints. Mixed-method research techniques, on the other hand, combine interviews and observations allowing the researcher to enhance comprehension of the research material. Participant observation methods were also used to examine delivery mechanisms of aid distribution and interactions between migrants and volunteers in BiH. My mixed-method techniques' culmination generated two case studies: Sarajevo and Tuzla; each of which was analyzed through coding, which can be seen in more detail in my analysis section below.

Observations

During my research, I found that writing field notes in a notebook while conducting observations drew suspicion and inherent bias from migrants and locals toward me, altering the environment that I was monitoring. Consequently, I changed my notetaking device to continue writing them on my phone.

On the streets of Sarajevo, I often observed how locals and migrants interacted with each other. In Tuzla, I followed a group of informal EU citizen volunteers as they determined

how to deliver aid effectively to migrants in BiH. I accompanied and observed this group for five days as they met with local volunteers and NGOs involved in distributing aid to migrants. I observed their interactions with local individuals, migrants, and representatives of organizations they encountered.

Participant Observation

In several instances throughout my research, I conducted participatory research techniques to understand how organizations and individuals delivered food and non-food items (NFI) to migrants. I occasionally participated in an *indirect* supporting role. This included carrying supplies, loading vans with aid materials, performing crowd-control during distributions, organizing distribution items prior to distribution, and collecting trash left behind by migrants. I attempted to refrain from assisting in *direct* NFI distributions to migrants in order to maintain my role in observing the management and coordination of these distributions. In several situations, I removed myself from the situation to consider how my participation affected the data produced.

By using this participant observation method, I was able to increase my access to information and networks. In Tuzla, a local volunteer referred to observers coming to view the situation as a safari, "I'm not saying about you. We call it safari… Other people just ask questions and waste my time. You came today and wanted to help that's different." (Čupo, 2020) This participation was also a chance for me to observe organizations' constraints, the direct interactions between migrants and volunteers, and discrepancies between organizational rhetoric and volunteer action.

Participant observation requires the researcher to insert themselves directly into the setting and participate in the events taking place. It strengthens relationships and builds trust with interviewees and volunteers. The researcher's choice of such immersion in the research

setting requires constant awareness and acknowledgment of the researcher's own position and identity (Coffy, 1999, p. 36). Although I cannot assume a full understanding of the participant's experiences, this participation provided me with situational context and enhanced networking opportunities.

Digital Ethnography

Social media has become a vital platform for humanitarian aid organizations to communicate with regional actors, update donors, and solicit funding to continue operations and coordinate services for relief for migrants. Throughout my research, I used open-source information, including reports and public social media posts, and online newspapers covering migrant issues.These digital resources often broadcast updated information about the migrant situation in BiH and regionally, which became a vital resource for me when COVID-19 prevented my return to BiH to continue research.

Interviews

Participant Access

I was connected to several volunteers in Bosnia and Herzegovina through an asylum seeker I had contact with who had built networks with BiH local volunteers when he passed through BiH in 2019. A recommendation from him, strengthened trust between me and those I interviewed and observed for my research. "It's important who recommends someone, and I see now he (Sharify) is right when I meet you…When he recommends someone we give a bit more, we try to help because of the connection." (Čupo, 2020) This strategic networking, combined with my participant observation practices, curtailed the "stigma associated with an outsider's status" that many researchers face in unfamiliar research domains (Johnson et al.,

2006, p. 114). Discussions with one individual often led to additional recommendations and connections with others in the migrant aid network, resulting in a snowball effect.

My research was conducted through interviews with various local and international representatives from NGOs, international organizations, and informal organizations and informal conversations with migrants and EU and US expats living in BiH. This diverse network gave me a better understanding of the complex situation unfolding in BiH. Despite interacting with a variety of actors, the participants interviewed were mainly active volunteers in the grassroots humanitarian sector. Interviews with formal actors, such as BiH and EU government officials, police, and employees from additional international organizations, had been planned for the secondary stage of my research. This plan, however, was interrupted when COVID-19 interrupted my research, which will be discussed more below.

Topics, Duration and Format

My interview questions comprised questions about motivations for volunteering, interactions between organizations, organizational management, and aid delivery mechanisms. Through these questions, I attempted to establish what types of individuals and organizations provide migrant assistance in BiH, evaluate their structure and operations, and the nature of the relationships between them. Interviews were conducted through video calls, in person, and personal communications using common social media platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger. Formal interviews were often recorded using my cell phone. This allowed me to interact with the participants more fluidly and engage within the conversation without note-taking delays. On average, formal interviews lasted around 1 hour. Informal interviews were not recorded and lasted between 10 to 45 minutes.

Informal Interviews

Informal interviews were conducted to identify common themes and situational context about the refugee situation. They provided the groundwork necessary to help me practice interview techniques, and formulate structured questions for subsequent interviews. The majority of those I talked to understood my research goals. Although unstructured, informal data can only be used generally, these unstructured, informal interviews allowed me to better understand the participant's motivations for volunteering, and perceptions of migrants, locals and other volunteers.

Formal Interviews

Those who consented to a formal interview were informed of my research intent, and offered a copy of my research proposal and resume, which most declined. As a precaution, I carried copies of these materials to distribute if requested. Interviewees were asked if they consented to recording the interview. No participants refused to record, although several became hesitant or paused in the middle of our conversation to reassess the information they provided was accurate, politically correct, or would not upset their donors if published.

In several instances, when the interviewee or I were not comfortable recording, or unable to record due to the background noise in the recording environment, I took notes in a notebook. These notes were transcribed within days of the interview by filling in details from what I remembered from that conversation. Thus, those interviews are not transcribed verbatim and cannot be quoted directly.

All interviews and notes were conducted in English. This limited access to some locals and migrants who may have been willing to speak about the situation but were unable due to language constraints. Interviews were recorded using a phone recording application and transcribed along with observations using the software program Evernote.

Limitations

Ethical Considerations

Due to my previous experience working with NGOs and migrants, as a paralegal, English

teacher, and youth volunteer, I acknowledge that some bias may have been present in my

research. With this in mind, I regularly reflected on my own potential bias while analyzing

the situation. With this in mind, and my status as an American conducting research for a

Dutch university, I cannot make claims for migrants, nor BiH locals, however attempt to

interpret their ideas to the best of my ability.

Data Limitations:

Three individuals who participated in formal interviews during my research, did not offer

their surnames for publication. They have been cited using their first name only: Admir,

Mohammed, and Baktash.

The research presented in this thesis examines the various formal and informal aid

dispersed to migrants in the *entry* and *mid-points* of their journey through BiH; however

excludes two major regions in analysis. I focused my research on the border with Serbia

excluding data on the secondary entrance point for migrants, Montenegro. Furthmore, this

data excludes sufficient analysis on the exit points of this migration route within the Una-

Sana Canton. This region is a vital for Balkan migration studies, as the varying routes

throughout the Balkans funnel through BiH and converge on this region. Large numbers of

migrants congregate here, living on the streets and are in desperate need of medical

assistance, accommodation, food and NFI. Additional research on these regions was

infeasible due to research constraints related to COVID-19, which cut my field research short

and complicated accessibility issues. Therefore, by excluding these two points, my research only partially addresses the complex web of migration assistance within BiH.

COVID-19

My original research trajectory was unexpectedly interrupted due to the increasingly rapid spread of the virus, COVID-19 in March 2020. Conspiracy theories spread through BiH locals and among migrants speculating that Americans were behind the creation and dispensation of the virus, as an American citizen, this conjecture thrust my role as a researcher into question. Therefore, I refocused my attention on building relationships with locals and organizations to strengthen my legitimacy as a researcher and dispel rumors.

Closures of borders, businesses, and organizations due to virus fears, prompted many international volunteers to flee home, leaving a wide gap in essential services for migrants on the streets. Organizations that continued to provide services to migrants during the pandemic restricted access for non-essential personnel due to concerns of potential transmission of the virus to migrants. These elements disbursed my established network of interview participants globally, and made in-person interviews within BiH nearly impossible, except through social media. Further, after returning to the Netherlands, global travel restrictions that persisted for months after prevented me from returning to BiH to resume my research. I attempted to mediate these concerns by conducting contact with my network digitally and observing social media pages that provided frequent updates on the situation in BiH.

Analysis

Following transcription of field notes and interviews, I used the coding software MaxQDA to conduct thematic analysis on my transcribed interviews and observation notes. I then reflected on the patterns within these codes. Participant observation techniques greatly

facilitated my ability to analyze my results with appropriate context. Following

categorization of my data, I then compared them with the existing academic literature

surrounding migration. The existing literature guided me in determining my ontological

perspective and theoretical lens to interpret my research data further.

Although I interviewed a variety of individuals throughout my fieldwork: locals,

migrants, diaspora, and informal and formal volunteers, I decided to focus my research

analysis on the relationship between the formal and informal actors. After reviewing existing

empirical and theoretical research, I concluded a gap existed in migration volunteer studies to

examine the role informal volunteers have on the formal sector. Therefore, I chose this as my

empirical focal point. The information gathered through this field research produced two

interesting case study analysis which are discussed in the Results chapter below.

Chapter 3: Context

Migration through the Balkans

The 'Balkans Migration Route' is the standard term used to describe the path through the

through the Balkan states into Europe, taken by migrants between 2015-2020. Migrants

taking this route, hoped to enter into the European Union to claim asylum or seek

employment. This route existed under-the-radar prior to 2015, although it made its debut in

the global spotlight by large scale migration movements in 2015 (El-Shaarawi and Razsa,

2019, p. 94). At its peak in 2015, 800,000 migrants traversed this region. (Beznec et al., 2016;

Minca et al., 2018). The route was officially declared closed in March 2016, when legal

means for migrants to travel in this region were eliminated (Minca et al., 2018). This

declaration removed *lawful* means to immigrate to the EU but did not thwart this migration;

rather, prompted migrants to modify their methods and trajectory into the EU.

In 2017, Serbia was the primary state from which migrants attempted to enter the EU.

The route bypassed Bosnia and Herzegovina completely. This changed at the end of 2017,

resulting in a massive influx of migrants attempting to enter Croatia by way of BiH. Serbia

remains a large actor in migration on this route; however, its role has shifted from *exit state* to

a *transit country*, and with BiH assuming this role.

There were two frequented routes taken by migrants through the western Balkans in

winter 2020, both filtering through Bosnia and Herzegovina. Migrants entered BiH illegally

through the borders with Serbia and Montenegro.[3] Migrants entering from Serbia continued

to the nearby town of Tuzla to access humanitarian services and resources. Then they

continued, some making a pit-stop in the capital, Sarajevo, and then continued by public

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[3] This thesis will focus on entry from the Serbian border, and excludes analysis on the border crossing near
Montenegro due to research constraints.

transportation toward Una-Santa Canton, an area located on the border with Croatia. From

there, they attempt to exit BiH and cross illegally into the EU, often on foot. *Figure 3*

(Caritas.eu, 2019) below displays the routes taken into, within, and from BiH.

FIGURE 1: 2019 MIGRATION ROUTES THROUGH BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA

(Migrant Routes Through Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2019)

Despite the arrival of 23,859 migrants in 2018 to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fattori and

Picard, 2020), only 1,353 claimed asylum. (Bosnia and Herzegovina Migration Profile 2019,

p. 59). Comparable trends continued in 2019 with 29,196 arrivals, but only 2,356 asylum

claims (ReliefWeb, 2020).

These numbers indicate that migrants transit through BiH, but do not want to stay

long-term. When asked why migrants did not seek asylum in BiH, many indicated that they

experienced a fear of deportation, lack of government support, and lack of potential career or

educational opportunities in BiH (Sharify, 2020; Baktash, 2020). Several migrants, including

Mohammed (2020) expressed enthusiasm for the culture and people of BiH and indicated a

willingness to stay in BiH if economic or welfare opportunities were available for him; however they did not see a future there, and therefore intended to continue to the EU (ibid.).

Transit Reception Centers

Transit Reception Centers (TRCs), are open refugee camps, allowing migrants transversing the Balkans to receive access to accommodation, resources and services while not inhibiting their ability to continue their journey. In December 2019, 15,783 migrants and asylum seekers were living in TRCs throughout the Western Balkans. 51.5% (8,128) of these migrants were accommodated in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IOM, 2020).

In March 2020, there were six TRCs run by International Organization for Migration (IOM), and two asylum seeker centers run by the BiH government. (See *figure 2 b*elow) Four of the IOM reception centers for transit migrants (Sedra, Miral, Ušivak, Bira) were located in Una-Sana Canton and two in Sarajevo. It is important to note no centers have been established near the entry points along the border with Serbia in the Republic of Srpska or near the city of Tuzla (Monthly Situation Report- February 2020). In March 2020, the TRCs were reported to be at full capacity (Rozić, 2020), the effects of which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

FIGURE 2:
FORMAL RECEPTION CENTERS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

(UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 2020)

Historical, Economic and Political Context

The break-up of Yugoslavia left the Balkan region with poorly functioning institutions and

economies. BiH faces high corruption, unemployment and poverty as it struggles to

strengthen state institutions and social welfare systems in order to provide opportunities and

services for their citizens (Sanfey and Milatovic, 2017). The decentralized and complex

structure of the government of BiH, hampers economic policy coordination and reform, while

excessive bureaucracy discourages foreign investment (Cia.gov, 2019). Coordination, bureaucratic complexities, and ethnic identity issues (Bennett) impede effective formal service and resource provision within BiH.

The current government configuration was developed to establish peace in the region following the war that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. This war, fueled by the rise of ethno-nationalism, lasted from 1992-1995. The Dayton Accords (1995) signed by warring parties, effectively ended this conflict, and established the political system that 'functions' today. Not only did this agreement cease hostilities, but it led to a decentralization of power which rearranged the political and ethnic demographics of the country. In *Figure 2* above, you can see outlines separating the administrative regions of the Federation of BiH, Republic of Srpska and Brčko District. (Gavrić, Banović and Barreiro, 2013).

Oversight of most government functions are the responsibility of the entities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srbska, both operating under independent constitutions that manage government institutions. Regions are divided into cantons, where municipal governments manage police, education and laws within each region under entity supervision. This country retains, not one but three presidents; one from each of the major ethnic groups in the country which rotate every eight months (Bennett, 2017, pp. 85-92.).

The Dayton Accords was intended to be a temporary means to establish peace until a formal government power sharing agreement could be established (ibid., p. 85); however, twenty-five years later, it still defines the government structures. The combination of a poorly coordinated government with high rates of corruption and lack of ability to strengthen welfare and economic opportunities for its residents has created a *paralyzed state* (ibid.) instead of a fully functioning one.

Chapter 4: Institutional Analysis

Empirical research, according to Giddens, should be conducted on two levels; an institutional analysis to examine the operation of rules and resource distribution; and second, an analysis examining the strategic conduct of individuals (1984, pp. 288-89). Here, I distinguish between between formal institutions and individual formal actors within those institutions.

Formal actors conduct behaviors and actions with the goal purpose of 'winning', which the results of these actions is reflected on the institution as a whole. In the case of formal actors in BiH, I surmise it is to successfully deflect responsibility of care for migrants as we will see below. This type of game is referred to as a *finite game* (Carse, 2013, p. 3). This creates a complicated relationship between formal and informal actors as they have different aims in resource provision to migrants.

Following Giddens' suggestion, in the subsequent two chapters, I will conduct an institutional analyst the formal sectors' aptitude to deliver aid to migrants in BiH, followed by a individual analysis on informal volunteers' strategic conduct to address gaps expressed in the formal system.

Formal Impasse

The formal sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a strong ability to constrain migrants. This is due to fragmented coordination and conflicting viewpoints over migration aid deliverance. Formal actors obstructed aid provision for migrants in two ways; obstruction of implementation, and deflection of responsibility.

The border between Serbia and Republic of Srpska (RS), was the primary point of entry into Bosnia and Herzegovina that migrants used during 2019-2020 (Rozić 2020; Lepirica 2020; Sharify 2020). Despite this, border police faced a shortage of manpower and

specialist equipment which hampered their ability to stop migrants from crossing illegally into BiH at this point. According to Franka Vican, spokeswoman for the state border police, 1,000 additional police were needed to adequately guard the 600 kilometer-long border (Kovacevic, 2020d). Even with this clear urgency for additional border resources, the Minister of Security, Milorad Dodik,[4] refused to allow the Federation of BiH military to assist the State Border Service in preventing the illegal border crossings BiH (Bljesak.info 2019).

Furthermore, appeals from IOM to establish Transit Reception Centers or approve other additional formal international humanitarian aid within RS was rejected (Rozić, 2020). Apart from this, Dražan Rozić (2020), Emergency Coordinator for IOM, stated that police are unofficially organizing transport from the villages near the Serbian border to the entity border between RS and the Federation. Furthermore, after migrants are pushed along to the Federation and funneled into the city of Tuzla, where they must register with the Service for Foreigners' Affairs[5] (Dzafic, 2020). Without registration, migrants are unable to receive medical treatment or accommodation in Transit Reception Centers (TRCs) or private accommodation (Dzafic, 2020; Sancak, 2020).

Similar to RS, Federation entity and regional politicians did not make sufficient efforts to provide facilities for the migrants in the Tuzla region (Vasilj, 2020; Čupo, 2020). The mayor of Tuzla, Jasmin Imamović repeatedly denied responsibility for caring for the migrants, placing sole responsibility on the government entities (Bljesak.info 2019; Vasilj, 2020; Selma 2020). This led to the establishment of an informal refugee camp outside the train station in Tuzla. At its peak, the informal camp hosted over 350 migrants, and many

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[4] Presidential representative for the RS and one of three presidential representatives for all of BiH.

[5] The office in Tuzla is the only registration office in the north-east of BiH.

more migrants resided in abandoned buildings and private accommodation throughout the

town (Vasilj, 2020; Čupo, 2020). Municipality government officials mirror the deflection of

responsibility that occurs in RS. This neglect of border management combined with

unwillingness to take responsibility for the humanitarian aid demand as a result of this

neglect, created a severe gap in security and formal humanitarian assistance in this region.

IOM in BiH provided funding to operate TRCs, but perspective new center locations

must first be authorized by the BiH government (Rozić, 2020; Muzička 2020). Locals,

federal politicians, and IOM officials struggled to find suitable locations to build new

accommodation centers or gain approval to maintain, renew or increase current facilities'

capacity. Dragan Mektić, Minister of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, explained this

struggle in an interview done by the newspaper Klix; "The problem was RS, they would not

hear about the reception center. The situation is the same in the Federation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. No local community gives us a location." (Klix.ba, 2019) Officials determined

a new camp was necessary to house migrants, however after searching for a suitable location

for a new camp in Una-Sana Canton, even with five-six viable locations that could rapidly be

converted to migrant facilities, the local community opposed and impeded the conversion of

these places into reception centers (ibid.).

In March 2020, local ethnic Serbian identity group: Committee for the Protection of

Serb Rights opposed the opening of Lipa camp, filing a criminal complaint against Bihac

mayor Sufret Fazlic for advocating the site. Djordje Radanovic, the chairman of the group

said that, "Bringing migrants from Bihac to Lipa would further worsen the situation in the

village and discourage the possible return of Serbs[6] because local authorities have not yet

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[6] Many people fled the region during the Yugoslavian conflict, and others left due to the poor economic situation in the country (Mahmutovic, 2020).

provided them with basic necessities for a normal life."After the war, few Serbs returned to this region, and those who did face difficult conditions, and fear that the migrants' arrival will make their lives even more difficult (Kovacevic, 2020a).

Locals and politicians are not the only ones opposing new proposed site locations, IOM and EU officials also debated the government over the adequately of new camp proposed sites. One government proposed space for a new camp, Lipa was deemed unlivable according to IOM and EU standards and was described by IOM official Dražan as being "like the surface of the moon." It lacked the capacity to install electricity, sewage systems or roads easily to make the camp functional. Additionally, it was located far from any roads or town that could enable transport and materials to the location easily[7] (Rozić, 2020). IOM, EU delegates, and BiH officials negotiated throughout the year over this proposed location (Lepirica, 2020) with little progress. These delays led to a gap in essential services for migrants in the interim.

Existing camps received pushback through pressure to close existing facilities without having the foresight to provide adequate immediate alternatives (Muzička, 2020; Rozić, 2020). Dražan Rozić suggested the municipality unofficially sent inspectors to pressure the private owners of the housing complex where the camps are held to stop renting to IOM.

Vučjak 'camp'[8], is one example of this phenomenon. It was closed in December 2019 as a result of activist and international political pressure, which was founded on severe humanitarian health and safety concerns and the camps close-proximity to the border. Its position in a hazardous location and lacked adequate sanitation facilities and services for

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[7] The camp was 22 kilometers from the nearest town, also limiting migrant access to shop such as supermarkets and pharmacies to supplement their needs.

[8] The 'camp' consisted of a space in the forest to which migrants were forcibly brought by police in an attempt to clear them from city streets (Mitrović et al., 2020, pp. 81-84).

migrants9. After this camp closed, other reception centers, already running at capacity, were

given short notice to restructure and accommodate hundreds of additional migrants (Rozić

2020; Muzička, 2020; Mitrović et al., 2020, pp. 81-84).

Outside the small village of Ključ in Una-Sana Canton, canton officials erected a

police point along the border between the two entities. Ironically, this village's name reflects

the situation that has unfolded at the checkpoint. *'Ključ'* can be translated to '*key*' in the local

language. At this checkpoint, police intercepted six buses daily as they make their way

toward the border with Croatia, and only removed the migrant passengers from the buses.

After migrants were removed, the buses continued on to Bihać, the intended destination of

most migrants. Unfortunately, police have deemed migrants, do not possess the right *'key'*

and therefore cannot gain entrance to this area.

This checkpoint, being 100 kilometers from Bihać, is nowhere near the migrants

intended location; (RTVUSK, 2019; Lepirica, 2020). From here, they must find an alternative

route to Bihać. Many choose to continue on foot through the forests, taking care to do so

covertly. However, they must do so discreetly for if detected they would be returned by police

to the checkpoint (Lepirica, 2020). Migrants who attempted to go forward into Una-Sana

Canton were returned by canoton police, however, they also are unable to go back the way

they came, because the RS police set up a checkpoint as well prevent migrants from returning

(Kovacevic, 2020b). According to Jelena Sesar, Amnesty International's Balkans researcher,

this political impasse puts migrants at risk, "The authorities should be working to find

solutions to accommodate and support several thousand people outside of official reception

centres, rather than targeting them and leaving without protection." (Kovacevic, 2020b)

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9 The camp was located on a prior garbage dump with methane gas pockets underneath which could be triggered
easily causing an explosion. Additionally, it was surrounded by minefields left over from the Yugoslavian War.
Red Cross was the only actor providing assistance in this camp (Muzička 2020).

I witnessed two such police returns during my observations; one of them was a group of young Afghan migrants who had walked thirty kilometers that day, but had been reported to police by locals, and transported back to the the checkpoint. They tried again after several days, vowing this time to be more inconspicuous. As migrants are removed from the buses, International Red Cross (IRC) was at the scene to administer medical care and food and NFI distributions. Sanilla Lepirica, a long-term Red Cross volunteer in Ključ, expressed frustration over the government's failure to provide basic aid at the checkpoint or support the IRC in doing so (2020).

According to the UN Interagency Response to Mixed Movement Monthly Situational Report, in March 2020, there were 6,557 migrants within formal accommodation centers, and between 2,000 and 3,000 people outside (Monthly Operational Updates March 2020, 2020). By May 2020, despite the opening of Lipa camp, the number of migrants on the streets remained high, between 1,400 and 2,300 (Monthly Situation Report-May 2020, 2020, p. 1). I hypotheses this indicates two two things: full accommodation facilities, and a lack of desire to reside at these centers.

Politicians continually blame each other for causes of the internal migrant crisis because there is a lack of unified federal actor to blame. (Kovacevic, 2020b). This leaves municipal-level governments to manage the situation themselves. Amnesty International forewarned that 'if authorities at all levels do not find suitable facilities in all parts of the country to accommodate refugees and migrants' then "Bosnia could expect an imminent humanitarian crisis (ibid.).

Formal Sector

Migrants expressed disinterest in staying in formal camps for four main reasons; remote distance, quality of services and resources available, and safety concerns. Although these camps officially do not restrict migrants' ability to move in and out freely, the camp's remote location may restrict migrants' movement and accessibility to resources and networks.

After the outbreak of COVID-19 in March 2020, processing was expedited to operationalize two camp sites for migrants as it was deemed essential to centrally accommodate migrants previously on the streets to minimize spread of the virus (Kovacevic, 2020c). Lipa was one of these centers that was rapidly set up. However, upon opening, the camp remained inadequate as Drazan predicted; no sewage or running water and meals with low nutritional value (Transbalkanska Solidarnost, 2020). Lipa camp has been operating at full capacity; nevertheless, police continue to bring migrants to the overflowing center. (BiH Coordination Meeting Notes June 2020, 2020) With no spaces for migrants in the camp, migrants are returned onto the street, or compete for minimal or sub-par resources.

Baktash (2020), an Afghan migrant who spent three months living an abandoned building near Croatia's border in autumn 2019, described to me the numerous attempts he made to go to receive accommodation in a camp in Una-Sana Canton, but they refused to accept him. One camp rejected him because the camp was intended to accommodate minors, and his registered age was over the cut-off to receive accommodation there. Another reception center turned him away because they were at full capacity. "They told me to go live on the streets; even they didn't allow me to take a shower." (Baktash, 2020) The only camp with available space for him was outside Sarajevo, which, as he explained, was not a viable option for him due to its distance from the border. If he went there, he explained, he would

have had no way or additional money to return to the border to attempt his journey to the EU

to be reunited with his family, who had already received asylum in Germany.[10]

Although formal services are offered to migrants in official institutions, not all of the

centers provide adequate services and resources. Some of the camps are reported by migrants

and EU officials to have poor services and remote distances from BiH cities. Major

complaints included inadequate access to electricity and internet access[11], hygiene facilities,

and poor food quality and remote locations minimizing access to stores to supplement their

NFI and food needs (Operational Update, 2019).

Migrants express security and safety concerns within reception centers as well.

UNHCR reported the TRCs did not provide adequate legal guardianship for unaccompanied

minors nor specialized shelter victims of violence, abuse or exploitation (Monthly Situation

Report-February 2020, 2020). Dan Song, a long-term volunteer on the streets of Sarajevo,

reported that some Moroccan migrants their organization works with on the street, expressed

that they feel they don't feel safe in the camps, due to discrimination from camp officials and

other residents (2020).[12] Reports of assault from the private security officers hired to protect

migrants in the camps (Vasilj, 2020) were also reported. Migrant concerns over safety, poor

hygienic facilities and overcrowded center were only exasperated during the COVID-19

outbreak. "Those outside of camps live in hiding, in constant fear of being sent to an

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[10] After walking for ten days through the mountains and forests of Croatia, Slovenia and Italy, Baktash eventually found his way to Germany thereafter. He has been reunited with his mother and younger brother and awaits a decision on his asylum application.

[11] Migrants in transit face an uncertain future and retain little or no support network as they live in new country, and many experienced traumatic events. Access to internet is a vital resource for migrants. It allows migrants to temporarily escape ease the present difficulties they face (8/19/20 Sharify). Additionally, internet is also a key resource for migrants as it allows them to plan their upcoming journey into the EU, network with smugglers, organize financial transactions to pay for their daily expenses and travels, as well as remain in contact with their family.

[12] Dan noted there are often conflicts between the North African and South Asian migrants inside as well as outside the camps. Within camps, he stated that Afghan and Pakistani migrants make up around 60% of residents, which makes the North African migrants uncomfortable.

overcrowded camp where the risk of infection would be much higher." (Clancy, T. in care-international.org, 2020)

Conditions within Blazuj camp[13][14] are untenable, with the previously mentioned population doubling and all systems and services being overstretched. We observe that several hundred migrants still choose to stay outside of camps (and in fact, many repeatedly escape Blazuj after being transferred there by foot back to their squats), but their ability to source their own basic survival needs is more limited than ever before. They report lack of services, fears for their own safety inside camp, and fear of contracting COVID-19 by being forced into overcrowded and unsanitary facilities. (Fresh Response, 2020)

The available TRCs are not able to support the large numbers of migrants requesting beds (Mitrović et al., 2020). This, combined with the poor conditions that facilities provide, makes them unappealing for migrants, resulting in large numbers of migrants living on the street. These shortcomings and inability to provide basic accommodation, safety, services, and resources in and outside camps also encouraged substitutive actors' growth to meet these needs. However, difficult.

After COVID-19 became a concern in March-April 2020, informal distributions were banned in Sarajevo and Tuzla pushing aid further underground, and making it more difficult for informal volunteers to reach migrants living on the streets. "Migrants who have stayed in Tuzla and have not been given accommodation are left completely alone on the streets, parched and starving," reports a local CARE partner organization. (Care-international.org,

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[13] Blazuj camp was opened in 12 December 2019 and is located outside Sarajevo (Blažuj Temporary Reception Centre Site Profile May 2020, 2020).

2020). A field study by CARE, a Swiss NGO also reported that in Tuzla, more than three-quarters of migrants did not have sufficient access to potable drinking water, or wash facilities (ibid.). Levels of adequate service provision inside and outside the camps is inadequate in BiH. In Tuzla and Sarajevo, the informal sector rose quite differently in response. The informal actors responses in these two cities will be discussed below.

Chapter 5:

Informal Conduct: Typologies of Aid Provision

In early 2020, I witnessed three ways informal organizations interacted with the formal
systems in place to provide aid and services to migrants in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
substitutive, *complementary,* and *reformative*. Each role has a different relationship with the
formal sector and a different method of delivering aid to migrants in which I will expand on
below.

Substitutive

When humanitarian crisis situations occur, informal volunteers are often the first responders.
(Twigg and Mosel, 2017). Volunteers identify Substitutive informal activities are conducted
to fill gaps in formal systems where state structures are weak or lack the ability to accomplish
what formal institutions were intended, but fail to achieve (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p.
729).

In 2018, as the migrant influx began into BiH, few formal camps or organizations
existed in central BiH to assist migrants, and most migrants slept on the streets. Small groups
arose in Sarajevo and Tuzla arose to provide services to migrants out of the lack of
government assistance or support for migrants although did so either covertly or openly with
different effects.

In Tuzla, the formal humanitarian aid sector was slow in provision of medical
assistance and food delivery to migrants (Čupo, 2020). Even after several services were
established, those provided were insufficient to meet the growing demand (Vasilj, 2020;
Čupo, 2020; Lepirica, 2020; Dzafic, 2020). Local volunteers arose to attempt to fill resource
and services voids and became key actors in migrant assistance. One example of this was a

local butcher, that arrived one day who I was told by migrants, continually provided hamburgers, juice, and water to migrants on Sundays because the formal sector was absent on this day.

I accompanied Selma, a Bosnian diaspora living in Norway that had returned to BiH to assist the migrants. She encountered a newly arrived group of eleven migrants outside the foreigner registration office: the Service for Foreigners' Affairs in Tuzla. She quickly evaluated their needs, determined they needed clothes and shoes, purchased these items nearby, and returned to distribute them. This was strategically completed away from the bus station to avoid fights and free-rider issues.

Other individual volunteers distributed donations directly outside Tuzla's bus station. I witnessed as individuals dispensed money, food, and non-food items (NFI) such as tents, blankets, sleeping bags, shoes, and clothes to migrants camping at the station. The individual volunteers from the EU that I accompanied began their distribution of aid in Tuzla by handing out blankets, tents, shoes, and other NFI materials to migrants individually at the bus station; however, they quickly learned, and I observed, that this method was problematic as fights erupted and opportunistic migrants received items when others had nothing. They shifted their tactics to perform a more complementary role, which will be expanded on further below.

Formal volunteers and several migrants expressed frustration with the way informal volunteers conducted distributions at the Tuzla bus station. They reported that fights broke out directly following these distributions; "How many times do we have to say this, you cannot come to the bus station start giving away. Okay, blanket… shirt, socks, clothes… see who doesn't have (one) and give (it) to them on the side." (Vasilj, 2020)

These substitutive efforts can also have a direct negative effect on the formal sector. Large direct donations from NOIs independent of established organizations and systems disrupt statistics for formal organizations that determine donor funding.

When we do it this way (tracking distributions) we have proof how much we give and use this data to send to donors to get more funding. This is something local volunteers don't understand… donors are more assured when they have statistics and numbers about what types of need there are at certain times, of resources are being distributed, how much and to whom.

(Vasilj, 2020)

From the first arrivals of migrants in 2018 to early 2020, Sarajevo lacked formal services to migrants on the streets of Sarajevo. From 2018 to mid-2019, Aid Brigade, an informal organization, became a key actor on Sarajevo's streets attempting to full the distinct humanitarian aid gap seen there. This organization ran a community center and medical clinic with psychological support staff, organized food distribution in the streets (600 meals daily), provided emergency transportation to doctor or dentists, and coordinated with Border Violence Monitoring Network to gather reports of police violence against migrants. They also conducted squat support in the winter, which included preparing abandoned buildings into livable spaces for migrants (Ykema, 2020).

In Fall 2018, Aid Brigade attempted to shift their informal role from a substitutive organization to a formal organization by filing for official NGO status with the BiH government. However, in May 2019, their application was denied and the police immediately came to their center to shut down all services and operations to migrants. "We just got kicked out by the government, and they obviously did not take over the responsibilities to look after refugees and migrants themselves (Ykema, 2020).

This prominent informal organization's disbandment left the humanitarian aid community in shock and produced a significant cavity in service and resource provision to street migrants that other informal volunteers and organizations struggled to fill over the following year. These informal actors, that remained or emerged after the shutdown, provided services in a more covert, small-scale manner following this event. The informal sector conducts small-scale distributions in unpredictable locations and times to avoid the government's detection and potential shutdown like happened to Aid Brigade.

Kamila Hassen, (2020) an informal volunteer in Sarajevo, recalled a concerning interaction she had with a local when they were distributing NFI to a small group of migrants in March. The local woman was upset about their choice of location to distribute because across the street was a gym where border security guards frequented, and that there was a local lawsuit against informal actors and any problems that may arise by Kamila's group distributions would be blamed on the local volunteers. 'You want to help, but you do not know what the best way'.

Another informal volunteer who began working with an organization that arose after Aid Brigade closed, and preferred to remain anonymous, cautioned, "If you are unregistered… you can do what you want, but if you attract attention, you can be kicked out of the country, or they can use your lack of official status to stop you working." (Anonymous, 2020) Kamila's experience, combined with this statement and desire to remain anonymous, reflects the fear and hesitancy that lingers among informal volunteers in Sarajevo after Aid Brigade was dismantled.

Complementary

Complementary informal actions describe actions informal volunteers take in conjunction or consultation with the existing formal system. They can play a role in making formal

structures more effective or as a basis for future formal institutions. (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 728). Informal actors in BiH donated materially and provided advice to the existing formal systems. Donations were done with or without consultation or alongside formal operation.

Although IOM did not have an established presence or TRC location in Tuzla, IOM began financially supporting and encouraging local informal operating volunteers in Tuzla from mid-2019, to formalize their volunteer actions, resulting in the establishment of two NGOs there (Mitrović et al., 2020, p. 87). These organizations arose from informal actors and through complementary services with IOM, which demonstrates Helmke and Levistky's notion that complementary informal systems can be foundations for future formal institutions (2004, p. 728).

Two organizations, Collective Aid in Sarajevo and the Medical Accommodation Center in Tuzla, hired a local lawyer to stay up-to-date on the rapidly changing state regulations and improve legitimacy and relations with the local community (Collective Aid, 2020). The info they received was shared within the BiH informal and formal volunteer network to improve volunteer community's services. (ibid.). This change led to greater networking and service provision within the informal sector and allowed them to complement the existing formal systems.

At the informal camp at the Tuzla bus station, assistance was maintained and directed by informal actors since the first wave of the migrant crisis. Formal actors arose to regulate assistance to migrants. The informal and formal actors began planning distributions and other services around daily NGO meal distributions to better centralize services and resources to migrants. This allowed for greater coordination, distribution monitoring by informal actors, and centralized care.

International volunteers backed by EU private-donor networks and NGOs also contribute financially to NGOs in BiH. An example of this is a group of Norwegian and German informal volunteers I accompanied in their distribution efforts. After discovering a method of individual distribution was unsustainable, and had led to fights between migrants at the Tuzla bus station, they decided to work through established volunteers to distribute donations; "We don't want to provide duplication of services or a mess, in the future, we will coordinate through you." (Kvernbekk, 2020) This group began donating directly long-term volunteers and organizations or inquiring about which materials they could distribute independently to continue providing effective aid to the migrants independently. They purchased items migrants or organizations requested, such as a punching bag and fruit, sweets, and soft drinks to a medical accommodation center sponsored by BiH NGO Pomozi.ba.

When the informal organization Aid Brigade was dissolved the organization's volunteers returned home, yet continued to advocate and support migrants and other organizations remotely. In addition to redistributing their remaining resources to other organizations in Sarajevo, former Aid Brigade volunteers disseminated operational and situational knowledge compiled while working in BiH. They also redirected former contacts and donors to formal organizations such as Compass42, which had risen to fill the aid and service void that developed due to this organization being disbanded.

 Some organizations welcomed donations from informal individuals, however noted they sometimes received inappropriate donations for the needs of their benefactors. This was a result of donations being provided directly to organizations without asking what the needs were (Admir, 2020; Vasilj, 2020, Roy-Brouard, 2020). Blanche, Volunteer Coordinator for

the House for All[15] expressed frustration about their overflowing donation room filled with unusable items when they lacked donations in vital areas, "We have pasta for a year. We don't need pasta, we need rice!…One time we got a thousand bottles of shampoo that everyone in the center hated. (It) took up a lot of space in the house." (Roy-Brouard, 2020) Other organizations, who worked mainly with thin, adult male migrants, noted they received many donations for women and children, mens clothing that was too large to fit the benefactors (Collective Aid, 2020), or unsuitable shoes and jackets for the daily challenges migrants faced[16] (Lepirica, 2020). To combat this waste, informal organization: Collective Aid restructured their services to redistribute excess NFI to areas that needed them in the community (Collective Aid, 2020).

In addition to informal individuals coordinating with formal organizations to distribute resources in Tuzla and Sarajevo, they also lend advice and financial support. Although not always entirely beneficial, conducting support through existing formal organizations offered informal individuals increased legitimacy to navigate relief efforts in the spotlight. This collaborative method of distribution led to less duplication and more effective financial and resource management for formal and informal actors.

Reformative

Reformative informal actions aim to change existing formal systems through expanding substitutive alternative services into the role of activists. In BiH, informal actors challenge existing formal systems in two ways: using media to bolster community support to pressure the government to take action and forcing the formal sector to confront the gaps the informal is able to fill through their substantive efforts.

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[15] House for All was a private accommodation center for families, funded by the Hastor Foundation and located outside Sarajevo (Roy-Brouard, 2020).

[16] These challenges included living outside in the elements and walking far distances (Baktash, 2020).

In the absence of formal institutional assistance since the influx of migrants began

arriving in Tuzla in 2018, informal volunteers assumed and successfully performed the role

of welfare providers for the provision of basic human services. However, in March 2020 this

suddenly changed. After years of government inaction and ineffective formal humanitarian

aid, compounded by the overwhelming increasing needs of migrants, informal volunteers

decided to halt their services. In doing so, they hoped the situation would reach a breaking

point which would force the government to intervene (Čupo, 2020; Lepirica, 2020). Informal

Tuzla volunteers issued a group statement on 4 March 2020, explaining their decision;

> Due to the difficult situation, lack of resources and failure to find a solution by the
>
> authorities…today the work of volunteers at Tuzla bus and train station officially
>
> stops…In two years, we have done too much work instead of those who should be
>
> doing it. Due to a lack of understanding of the government… we made such a
>
> decision… It has simply become impossible to respond to the most basic needs. [17]

<div align="right">(Oslobodjenje.ba, 2020)</div>

This action produced an immediate reaction from the formal sector. Two weeks later, on 12

March 2020, the local Tuzla government together with IOM issued an order to clear the

informal camp and transport migrants to Blažua camp in Sarajevo (Rozić, 2020; Anon, 2020).

IOM led monthly coordination meetings in Sarajevo also acted as a platform for

NGOs and non-registered organizations to voice concerns and motivate government or

international organizations efforts to conduct their services more efficiently. Tim Clancy, who

ran the Medical House in Tuzla, expressed frustration over the lack of speed and capacity of

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[17] Zbog teške situacije, nedostatka resursa i nepronalaska rješenja nadležnih a uz sve to povećanog broja migranata koji svakodnevno pristižu u Tuzlu o čemu smo kontinuirano proteklih dana izvještavali, danas i zvanično prestaje rad volontera na tuzlanskoj autobuskoj i željezničkoj stanici…. Za dvije godine smo uradili i previše posla umjesto onih koji bi to trebali raditi. Zbog nerazumijevanja vlasti, politike, ali i pritisaka od strane pojedinih građana donijeli smo takvu odluku. Također, bitno je napomenuti da je na ovu odluku uticao i povećan broj ljudi u pokretu. Jednostavno je postalo nemoguće odgovoriti na najosnovnije potrebe.

larger organizations particularly when the resources they have at their disposal verses the informal sector are taken into consideration. "Actions speak louder than words—we push them to do their jobs better by being hands-on in the field and getting the job done that needs to (be done)."(Clancy 2020) He further indicated that if informal organizations want to influence the processes, they must be seen, heard and recognized (ibid).

The informal sectors effective substitutive actions demonstrate to the formal sector that it is possible to accomplish small efforts with limited resources when decisive and effective action is taken, rather than delays in paperwork and bureaucracy (Clancy 2020). Clancy surmised that this competition, fear that these organizations and individuals are doing a better job than them, forced them rethink their role in the situation and try harder to meet migrants needs. Tim Clancy further discussed that this citizen led activism was the "beauty of the volunteer movement is that the informal sector has brought back a level of love and solidarity to humanitarian work that often gets lost in the policies and procedures of those with a predominantly top-down approach."

Chapter 6: Discussion

Informal volunteers exist as long as they are useful— their existence is based solely on effectiveness, whereas formal institutions are guaranteed by state agencies (Lauth, 2000, p. 24). Informal volunteers arise to strategically interact with the formal institution using three types of actions: *substitutive*, *complementary* and *reformative*. Their behavior with these actions is not only provision of care to migrants, but the purpose of continuing to be useful. This type of behavior depicts an *infinite game*, which denotes a game played for the sole the purpose of continuing the play (Carse, 2013, p. 3).

Formal actors conduct behaviors and actions with the goal purpose of 'winning', which in this case is to successfully deflect responsibility of care for migrants. This type of game is referred to as a *finite game* (Carse, 2013, p. 3). This creates a complicated relationship between formal and informal actors as they have different aims in resource provision to migrants. Migrants, on the other hand play two separate games simultaneously, with the goal to win by achieving their destination, the EU, and continuing to receive access to services and resources to sustain their preparation to achieve their finite game goal.

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This thesis aimed to answer the question:

How do informal volunteers substitute, complement and reform the formal sector to

> ***ensure the provision of aid to migrants in Bosnia and Herzegovina from***

> ***2018-2020?***

To answer this question, it was imperative to conduct an assessment of the actions, abilities, and results of aid provision and migration management led by the formal sector. This analysis was essential to determine if the formal sector possessed the ability to authorize and

implement humanitarian aid to migrants in BiH. In Chapter 3: *Institutional Analysis*, I

presented evidence that suggests that the formal sector in BiH did not demonstrate a strong

ability to manage, contain, or care for migrants. This inability resulted from disjointed

coordination, political disputes, and conflicting attitudes about management and

responsibility for the migrants.

Coordination Problems

Formal actors in BiH impeded and avoided formal aid provision for migrants, as they refused

or prolonged negotiations over proposed locations for the creation of new migrant reception

centers. Formal actors in these areas also denied responsibility to manage the situation in

their area causing severe neglect for basic migrant needs. The formal sector has the resources

and influence to implement change. However, latency in the bureaucratic processes and

political disagreements between actors leads to severe delays and access to basic human

needs, such as medical care, shelter, food, and clothing, all essentials for human survival. his

bureaucratic obstruction impacts macro and large-scale projects such as creating camps and

increasing capacity. This disruption subsequently had a direct effect on the smaller scale

formal resource distribution efforts.These political disputes create a formal service stalemate

that resulted in a gap of vital needs to migrants in and outside of reception centers.

Twigg and Mosel support this claim by saying that formal responses can be delayed

by coordination issues between organizations, indecisive or delayed reactions by officials, or

overwhelmed and unable to manage effectively the vast needs created by the situation (2017

p. 446).

Agamben, and other agent-less structural authors would argue that these coordination issues and delays are a method of control by the formal structures, reducing migrants to a bare-life (Agamben, 1998, p. 6). Bauman says that refugees, having left their home of origin are stripped of their identity and possess a 'social nakedness' that is defined by a lack of social definition, rights and responsibilities (2002, p. 116 in Diken 2004, p. 88).

Structural Control:

Migration Management Tactics: *Containment through Mobility*

The border between BiH and Serbia, faced daily breaches borders by illegal migration This is evident by the numbers of migrants arriving in the Monthly Situational and Operational Updates reports published by the United Nations. (see February, 2020; March 2020; May 2020). In the Republic of Srpska, refusal of additional military support from its neighboring entity to assist in managing this border, as well as refusal to provide humanitarian organizations or establish migrant reception centers in the region, funnel migrants toward the neighboring entity. Consequently shifts the responsibility for migrant support to neighboring entities. Refusal to care for migrants in Tuzla encourages migrants to seek care elsewhere or return to their home countries18 (Čupo, 2020; Vasilj 2020; Lepirica, 2020).

In Ključ, Una-Sana Canton police established a checkpoint on the RS and Federation border restricting migrants from traveling in either direction. This checkpoint reflects a internal political dispute, rather than an attempt to control the migrants. This dispute is over the unwillingness to take responsibility to care for migrants. Migrants are not constrained by walls or force, and often continue their journey; however if caught by police, they will be

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[18] IOM provides financial assistance if migrants choose to return to their home countries (Bih.iom.int., n.d.).

returned to this checkpoint. It is not a method to contain, but rather tactic to deter and redirect migrant travel methods and itineraries, to avoid caring for them.

These examples clearly depicts Tazzoili's description of *tactics of deterrence* (p. 2773) and broader tactics of *containment through mobility*, used by states to scatter and redirect migrants within their borders (Tazzioli, 2018, p. 2767). As shown through previous examples, the situaion in Ključ demonstrates the not only the state tactics but how *neglect and deflection of responsibility* is also used as a tool in this redirection process.

Hybrid Formal Arrangements

Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) and Ramadan and Fregonese (2017) discuss how state emergency and welfare responses responsibilities with weak states or in crisis situations that diminish normal capacities of states are often delegated to other formal partners (such as UNHCR (IOM) or NGOs), (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010, p. 1124; Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017 p. 954). Ramadan and Fregonese demonstrate through empirical evidence that refugee camps existing in Lebanon possess various hybrid arrangements to provide services, including an informal sector that emerged from state neglect and depreciated legitimacy shown through state inability to provide security or resource provision for residents in the camp settings (2017).

I hypothesized that states with weak abilities to manage and support migration flows through government procedures, retain control over migrants through strong aid disbursement. However, my results did not support this hypothesis. Rather, they indicated that, even with delegation of services to IOM and other formal NGOs, BiH still failed to produce strong formal welfare provision systems for migrants. Twigg and Mosel propose that when needs are not filled by formal organizations, this may be because they are overwhelmed by the high demand for services and resources triggered by a crisis or perhaps 'their

structures and capacities are insufficient to respond adequately' (Twigg and Mosel, 2017 p. 446).

Expanding upon the idea of delegation between formal actors, I propose that formal actors delegate to the informal sector as well. The neglect or unwillingness of formal actors, which causes the informal sector to emerge, could be seen as an *implicit delegation*, to informal actors. Formal actors may do so because informal volunteers are not hampered by bureaucratic procedures and institutional delays and able to respond immediately to emergencies (ibid; Hassen, 2020). Determining motivations for neglected responsibilities is difficult to substantiate, but nonetheless demands further research.

Hybrid governance theory discusses the incapacity of formal institutions to conduct basic welfare services in failed or weak states. Boege et al. surmises that *unwillingness* may be a factor in state's ability to deliver security and other essential services (2009, p. 9), and in turn encouraging people to turn to alternative entities for support (ibid. p. 8). My results and theory reflect Boege et al.'s premise that the lack of adequate care for migrants in BiH is not due to incapacity to accomplish the tasks they are responsible for, but out of *unwillingness* to do so (ibid., p. 3). Although, I go further to specify this as *unwillingness to take responsibility*, and also an *unwillingness to compromise or coordinate* with other formal actors to conduct effective services.

Differences in fear and level of services delivered in Tuzla and Sarajevo are reflected in the state's ability to follow through with consequences and invoke compliance from individuals (Ellermann, 2010, p. 5; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). In Sarajevo, the fear of being punished for improper informal distribution tactics, limited the ability for increased informal assistance. In Tuzla, state neglect implies compliance and consent to the informal sector activities.

Alternative Services and Resources:

Challenges to Formal Aid Provision

Despite opening the Lipa camp in April 2020 to increase formal assistance capacities, a large number of migrants still remained on the streets (Monthly Operational Updates March 2020; May 2020). To explain why, I proposed that either there was an additional need for accommodation facilities or lack of desire to reside at these centers. My research indicated a combination of factors made services unappealing and often inaccessible for migrants; camp facilities were indeed full or unable to host migrants, *forcing* migrants to live on the streets; and services provided at the centers were inadequate, resulting in migrants *to choose* to live outside the reception centers.

Emergence of the Informal Sector

The formal sectors' delays, neglect, and poor quality of care for migrants created a gap of basic human needs and welfare services for migrants. Although, if the formal sector in BiH is not meeting the needs of migrants, are alternatives actors able to provide those needs? The answer to this is yes; my data indicated this lack of basic services, encouraged the growth of a robust informal sector in Tuzla, and a more covert one in Sarajevo. In these locations, informal volunteers provided NFI, food, shelter and monetary contributions directly to migrants. I initially concluded that informal volunteers emerge based on neglect and limited capacity of formal systems; however, I realized that it is much more complicated than that. Hybrid governance theory supports the claim that there is a direct correlation between state neglect and the emergence of informal institutions (and therefore volunteers). (Boege et. al., 2009); Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017).

Informal Actions

In Tuzla and Sarajevo, the informal sector rose quite differently in reaction to these formal inadequacies. To this effect, I concluded that informal volunteers interacted with the formal systems in three ways to address gaps in migrant needs by conducting: *substitutive*, *complementary* and *reformative* activities. This analysis will concisely discuss each of these typologies within my two case studies: Tuzla and Sarajevo. For each typology below, the discussion will be guided by these sub-questions: Why do actors use each method? What conditions led to this type of action? How do informal actors use these methods to deliver aid?

Substitutive

Informal substitutive methods describe actions the informal individual undertakes to fulfill an unmet need that the formal sector was designed, but unable or unwilling to fulfill. Lauth determines that a substitutive typology determines that formal and informal (systems) are functionally equivalent to each other (Lauth, 2000, p. 25).

Helmke and Levitsky, theorize that substitutive informal activities are conducted to fill gaps in formal systems where state structures are weak or lack the ability to accomplish what formal institutions were intended, but fail to achieve (2004, p. 729). The substitutive category of informal volunteers in this framework is supported by hybridity literature which indicates informal institutions emerge in absent or weak states (Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017; and Stel, 2017) leading to the rise of a strong informal sector in Tuzla.

Tuzla and Sarajevo both saw an absence of the formal sector in the first year of the migration crisis, however possess very different conditions that led to the rise of informal substitutive distribution methods. Informal volunteers directly provide assistance to migrants

in these locations, substituting services and resources that should be provided by the formal

sector. In Tuzla, even after several formal services (medical, food) were introduced, they

were insufficient to meet the growing demands (Vasilj, 2020; Čupo, 2020; Lepirica, 2020;

Dzafic, 2020). Therefore, informal actors dispensed money, NFI, and food directly to

migrants at the centralized bus station and Foreigner Affairs registration office. No

accommodation facilities or wash facilities were created for the hundreds of migrants living

in the informal camp outside the Tuzla bus station. In both Tuzla and Sarajevo, interviews

revealed that informal individuals invited migrants to stay in their homes, or rented private

rooms *to* (Sancak 2020) and *for* (Dzafic, 2020) migrants to ensure this need was fulfilled.

In Sarajevo, a centralized informal organization attempted to meet migrants needs in

the early days of the crisis. After police shut the organization down in May 2019, a massive

void was left where they had provided NFI and food support, as well as psychological and

medical services for street migrants, that was not filled by the formal sector. After Aid

Brigade shut down, other informal actors altered their informal distributions to avoid police

detection (Ykema, 2020; Anonymous, 2020; Hassen, 2020).

However, substitutive services can also be detrimental to the formal sectors ability to

further assist migrants. Substitutive direct donations to migrants from NOIs independent of

established organizations and systems were reported to disrupt crucial statistical data sets

formal organizations used statistics used to justify operations and solicit additional funding

from donors (Vasilj, 2020; Admir 2020). Direct donations also often led to theft and

aggressive altercations within camps following these distributions (Vasilj, 2020; Admir,

2020). Lack of formal accommodations for migrants outside the already full-capacity camps,

and lack of centralized informal aid distributions and assistance, made aid deliverance to

migrants difficult for both formal and informal sectors.

Complementary

Complementary actions are behaviors that informal actors undertake alongside formal actors to facilitate or support mutual objectives. Lauth describes complementary informal institutions as co-existing side by side, reinforcing formal systems (2000, p. 25). In contrast, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) describe complementary *institutions* as filling gaps and addressing contingencies not dealt with by formal rules. They would argue this type of distribution should be a separate category; however, in my research, this theme was not prevalent enough to segregate it from the complementary category.

Complementary individual volunteers in BiH adhere to Helmke and Levistky's idea of informal institutions facilitating the pursuit of personal goals within the formal framework (728). Complementary and accommodating informal institutions result from *effective formal institutions*, and substitutive or competing informal institutions emerge where state structures are weak or lack authority (*ineffective formal institutions*) (728).

In both Tuzla and Sarajevo, individuals demonstrated complementary activities through donations of money and NFI materials directly to NGOs and more established actors distributing aid to migrants. They did so both by consulting with these established actors and without. In Tuzla, various aid distributors began coordinating donations around meal distributions to centralize and coordinate aid deliverance (Muzička, 2020). IOM began financially supporting and encouraging several local informal volunteers after mid-2019 to formalize their volunteer actions (Mitrović et al., 2020, p. 87). This mutual support between the two sectors is described by Helmke and Levitsky; where informal institutions can "play a role in making formal practices more effective or as a foundation for future formal institutions." (2004, p. 728)

In addition to informal individuals coordinating with formal organizations to distribute resources, they also lend advice and financial support. After being disbanded, Aid Brigade redistributed their remaining resources and redirected their former donor network to existing and emerging formal and informal actors continuing to assist migrants. They also disseminated vital operational management and contextual specific knowledge they had acquired through long-term operations in BiH.

Informal volunteers expressed motivations to use this type of aid distribution in order to avoid duplication of services and reduce fights and disruptions within the camp and ensure aid reached those who needed it (Kvernbekk, 2020). In Tuzla, Sarajevo, and throughout BiH, providing donations through existing formal organizations offered more legitimacy to informal actors to deliver aid. This collaborative distribution method led to less duplication and more effective financial and resource management for formal and informal actors.

Reformative

Helmke and Levitsky suggested *competing* informal institutions as a classification in which suggested informal institutions could *induce* officials to provide the public goods they are formally obliged to provide (p. 729). I would redefine this as reformative rather than competing, where reformative is defined as informal actions aim to change existing formal systems by expanding substitutive alternative services into the role of activists. My empirical research did not indicate that informal individuals or organizations competed with the formal sector, but instead often challenged the government to seek action and reform by providing an example.

In Tuzla, the formal sector's ongoing neglect, combined with the increase in migrant need, created severe exhaustion and frustration by the informal volunteers assisting there. Lack of formal support or recognition of informal volunteers, limited resources and failure of

the authorities to find a solution to the ongoing crisis caused informal volunteers to halt their

services in Tuzla (bljesak.info., 2019).

Sarajevo, as the capital of BiH, hosts the headquarters and administrative buildings

for most formal organizations conducting responses to the migrant's situation in BiH.

Therefore, it provides access for communication and coordination. Coordination meetings are

held monthly to report activities and situational updates and identify issues for BiH groups to

participate in. This provides a forum for discussions for informal (and smaller formal) actors

to reproach formal actors for conducting what they see as inadequate responses.

Radnitz says that in countries with deep structural issues and corruption, and

institutional norms permit or encourage subversion policymaking, the "creation of islands of

efficiency" may be necessary to create shock and wipe the slate clean (p. 367) BiH volunteers

are 'islands of efficiency' in providing an alternative option with less bureaucratic obstacles,

political drama, and deflection of responsibility. Their ability to deliver services when formal

actors are unable, provide a model and basis for current and future institutions on operational

capabilities (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 728)

In BiH, informal actors challenge existing formal systems by confronting the formal

sector directly and indirectly. They do so by highlighting the formal sector's impotence and

exhibiting informal volunteers aptitude to accomplish the same tasks. This is demonstrated in

Tuzla, where informal volunteers, who had provided the majority of humanitarian assistance

to migrants for years, abruptly discontinued their informal efforts in March 2020. This

cessation of activities, and the aftermath that ensued, emphasized the severity of the formal

sectors neglect and thereby forcing them to take decisive action to control the situation.

In Sarajevo, monthly coordination meetings for actors providing migrant assistance in

BiH acted as a forum for informal actors and organizations to directly address the formal

sector. They used this opportunity to shame formal actors that were consistently limited by

bureaucratic constraints. They were able to shame them and have their concerns heard by

demonstrating the possibility of accomplishing small relief efforts with limited resources

(Clancy, 2020). These smaller organizations are able to accomplish much more on the

grassroots level than formal organizations because they don't have the rules and restrictions

that get in the way of delivering quick and immediate assistance (Hassen, 2020).

Conclusion

I concluded TRC service and resource provision and center capacities were inadequate to care for migrants, both *forcing* migrants to live on the streets, and resulting in migrants *choosing* to live on the streets. I conclude inadequate care is not due to incapacity, but unwillingness to compromise, coordinate or take responsibility for migrants. When the state is not meeting need, informal sector arrises. I proposed that states engage in *implicit delegation* to informal actors, through neglect and unwillingness to *care for migrants* informal actors. Compliance from state ability to follow through with consequences, limits levels of volunteering.

Now that the context as to why informal actors emerge and the relationship to the state,

we can reflect on the original research question:

How do informal volunteers substitute, complement and reform the formal sector to

ensure the provision of aid to migrants in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2018-2020?

Informal volunteers directly *supplemented* migrant needs by substituting goods and services that formal systems were intended but *unable* or *unwilling* to fulfill appropriately. They did so by providing services, food, money, NFI, and accommodation for migrants in Sarajevo and Tuzla. Informal individuals conducted complementary behaviors by directly donating resources or money to formal actors and lending advice and networking support. IOM reciprocated complementary services in Tuzla by encouraging informal actors to formalize their actions. Working with the formal systems in place, reduces duplication of services and transaction costs for all actors involved.

Informal volunteers sought to reform existing systems by attempting to induce formal systems to provide services they are designed to deliver. They indirectly reform the formal

sector in Tuzla by abruptly discontinuing all informal services to migrants, with the expectation that the state would step-in when the situation became dire enough. In Sarajevo, informal actors directly confronted the formal sector in coordination meetings to report migrant assistance efforts. They also indirectly confront these actors in these meetings by demonstrating their ability to perform in instances where the formal sector was unwilling or unable to.

Actions of informal volunteers who assisted migrants in Tuzla and Sarajevo from 2018-2020, arose from the formal sectors' unwillingness to conduct or cooperate with other formal actors. In their actions, informal actors used substitutive, complementing or reformative practices in a multitude of ways. Lauth, advancing a structure-based ontology, sees informal (systems) and rules as rigid because individuals involved reproduce rules shaping future behavioral expectations and thereby change in informal (systems) change is likely to be an "extremely lengthy" process (p. 24). However, informal (systems) "*do* change —and often quite quickly" (Helmke and Levisky 2004, p. 732). My research indicated that volunteers' behaviors were not confined to using only one of these typologies; rather, they demonstrated fluidity in their types of behaviors. Volunteers changed their methods depending on the context, resource availability, and service demands, or change their minds about the effectiveness of their previous methods of distributions.

Informal institutions should not be neglected because their existence persists even when formal structures emerge or change, continuing to alter how formal actors behave (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Radnitz, 2011, p. 353). In situations where actors are committed to 'collectively beneficial outcomes,' these goals serve to create better-performing systems of aid deliverance and can help to reduce transaction costs to provide goods that formal institutions should, but do not deliver. (Radnitz, p. 367)

Implications of Findings

Radnitz said that informality will remain an undeniable component and sometimes opponents of states, although policy that seeks to reform or recast informal institutions is more likely to succeed than one that seeks to eradicate them (p. 368). The results of these findings should redirect formal actors such as states, NGOs, and informal actors and migrant studies academics to reconsider alternative actors involved in migrant aid provision when analyzing formal actors efficiency. Understanding *why* informal actors engage with volunteer activities and *how* they operate in relation to formal institutions can help policymakers and academics create more informed analyses and policies. Specifically, these theories can inform policymakers on how to *regulate* and reduce supplementary and reformative conduct, and *encourage* more complimenting behaviors of informal participation by increasing the effectiveness and coordination efforts of existing institutions. Doing so would thereby reduce the need for reformative or substitutive volunteers to emerge.

Limitations of Analysis

In my analysis, I acknowledge that I do not discuss in depth what a *weak state* is, nor how *legitimacy* as a factor in determining formal institutions' capacity to deliver aid to migrants. Empirical data to support these theoretical claims would have required additional fieldwork that I did not have access to due to time and situational constraints.

Reflecting on my proposed ontology I recognize that I have leaned toward to a more individualistic centric agency within the structure vs. agency debate. Bakewell cautions to avoid overplaying the 'hyperactivity of agency' in migrant research (Bakewell 2010, p. 1700), and would critique me for leaning more heavily in this direction.

Further Research

Further research developing from this thesis on informal volunteer migration aid provision should be done in the following areas:

- Possible ways to integrate informal volunteers and organizations into the formal sector activities to regulate or monitor them more effectively.

- The role of social media in aid distribution and coordination between actors, donors, and migrants.

- Accountability and legal issues surrounding formal and informal volunteer services to migrants.

- The relationship between businesses selling key humanitarian aid resources and the humanitarian aid organizations and individuals that purchase them to distribute to migrants. Some of these organizations profited greatly from these services.

- The perception of locals and diaspora from BiH, on asylum seekers desire to live and work in the EU, and the dual desire expressed by citizens from BiH and other Balkan state to do the same.

- My research could be extended to examine exactly how the informal sector enables the agency of migrants, which was not explicitly or succinctly explained here.

Furthermore, a discourse analysis should be conducted on identity politics in relation to the migration crisis. I noticed a continuance, (or maybe resurgence), of similar antagonistic ethnic-religious identity-based discourse with locals and politicians. This discourse advanced accusations that Bosnian politicians strategically wanted to keep and assist migrants in BiH, in order to offset religious and ethnic national demographics. Further research needs to be

done to examine this discourse in relation to discus previous conflict, and potential future

implications of use.

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APPENDIX

Interview Questions

Motivation

- ***What motivates formal and informal actors to assist migrants?***
- Do Bosnia and Herzegovina's historical conditions of particular national and local contexts encourage formal institutions to interact with non-state actors in refugee camp settings?
  - Do coordination efforts correlate with historical/emotional value or to instrumental reasoning to the actors in involved?

Interaction

- **Do organizations have a relationship with each other?**
  - How do informal organizations interact with other informal organizations?
    - Do the two parties interact with each other directly or indirectly?
  - How do formal organizations interact with other formal organizations?
    - Do the two parties interact with each other directly or indirectly?
  - How do informal organizations interact with formal organizations?
    - Do the two parties interact with each other directly or indirectly?
  - How are coordination strategies enacted and negotiated with other actors, networks and institutions?
  - How do coordination efforts contribute to provision of human security (freedom of fear, freedom of want, and freedom of indignity) among camp residents?
  - What other actors, networks and institutions are excluded from the coordination efforts?

Delivery

- ***How are services delivered to migrants?***
- Do resident's perceptions of these institutions control their ability to protect citizens, provide collective goods, and satisfy need for physical security, welfare and well-being?
- What barriers inhibit individuals from gaining access to goods and services?
- Are services and resources being distributed equally?
- How do the individual residents attempt to influence/incorporate/adapt/contribute to the coordination of resources?
- How do formal rules, informal constraints and the enforcement characteristics of both inhibit/constrain institution's ability to deliver services effectively?

Management

- ***How are organizations formed, structured and managed?***
- What formal and informal structures widely accepted as legitimate in the refugee camps?
- How do they share authority, legitimacy and capacity across the formal/informal divide?
- How does a group negotiate legitimacy as an authority figure in the camps?
- How is control over material facilities negotiated within hybrid systems of governance?
- How is control over activities of camp residents managed through hybrid systems of governance?
- Who accepts ethical responsibility for actions taken?

- How do publicly recognized rules, regulations and standards, or implicit practices, social understandings, networks of interaction, and socially sanctioned norms of behavior constrain institutions coordination efforts?
- How must multiple state and non-state providers adapt to shifting camp populations (deportations, new arrivals, relocation)?
- How do institutions exert authority to regulate society?
- What humanly devised rules of the group and state regulate interactions between formal and informal organizations?
- Do these organizations establish contiguous, and clearly bounded territories?
- How are these institutions formed?
- Are there gaps in formal institutions that form justifications to create informal systems?

NGOs
- Organizational structure
  - coordination
  - who assisting
    - motivation to assisting?
  - who funds your organization?
  - how are locals reacting to your services?
    - Have you seen the local reaction change since 2015?
- where are migrants staying (formal and informal)?
  - What are the conditions there?
  - What other options do they have for housing?
- What barriers do they have to claiming asylum in BiH?
- Are there any institutions or organizations that you see as hurting migrants?

Government
- What policies are in place to assist in the migrant crisis?
- Is there sufficient capacity in the reception centers?
  - If so, why aren't migrants using it?
  - If not, what are the barriers?
- What organizations provide services to migrants
  - Do you informally or formally work with them?

Locals
- What would the impact be if the migrants stayed here?
- What is the government doing for the migrants?
- Are there limitations to being able to help?

Perceptions:
- of the volunteers who come to help migrants?
- Of the organizations that help migrants
- of the migrants?
- Has this perception changed over the last 5 years?

Interactions:
- Have you met/talked to any of the migrants?

- What was the experience?
- Was the experience good or bad?
- What organizations do you see helping the migrants
- Do locals help migrants?
- Why do they help/not help?
- Where do they come from?
- Where do the migrants live while here?
-

Local Business:
- *Economic Impact:*
- Does this help the local economy or hurt?
- Population drain
- Do you see the Bosnians doing this as different than the migrants here now?
- Have the migrants impacted…
- your/other businesses?
- Tourism?
- Do you see more NGO and IO volunteers coming as a result and engaging in tourism activities?
- *Interactions*:
- Have you met/talked to any of the migrants?
- What was the experience?

NGO Workers
- What services do you provide to the migrants?
- Do you coordinate with
- other organizations,
- the government
- local informal groups?
- Reasons for coordination or not?
- What legal and bureaucratic barriers exist?
- Organizational policies
- Government policies
- Where does your funding come from?
- Where are your volunteers from?

Situational:
- Housing:
- Where do migrants stay?
- What are the conditions there?
- Barriers to providing housing
- Food:
- What food distribute
- Do the migrants seem happy with your services?
- What are your perspectives on the informal organizations: NGIs and locals?

- What is the organization

- How are they helping
- Where are volunteers from
- Do you use refugees as volunteers?
- Government policies that limit work
- How choose how to give services?
- How avoid discrimination/preferential treatment?
- Coordination with other groups?
- Local reactions to refugees
- To organizations and NGO workers?
-
- **Informal Volunteers:**
- Who is helping refugees here?
- How do they help?
- Who do they work with?
- How is the government involved in the situation?
- Have you had issues with the migrants and your staff? Or police and your staff?
- How do you prioritize which migrants to assist?
-
- **Migrants**:

Basic Info:
- Where are you from?
- Where are you living?
- Why do you sell napkins?
- How much do you earn every day?
- Where is your target destination?
- Did you study/work in your home country before coming?
- Why did you leave your home country?
- How did you get here?
- What is the most difficult part here for you?
-

Organization Interactions:
- Who is helping you here?
- What services do they deliver?
- Are there problems with how they do it? (decisions on who receives materials)
- Do the organizations distribute NFI fairly?