



Universiteit Utrecht

Securitization and the discourse on migration in Poland

An analysis of PiS's discourse on migration in Poland and the EU

Weronika Zofia Fay (6882641)

Supervisor: Dr. Daniel Brett

MA Thesis 2019/2020

International Relations in Historical Perspective

Words: 16,874

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION	5
ACADEMIC DEBATE.....	7
ACADEMIC AND SOCIETAL RELEVANCE.....	8
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	9
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND METHOD.....	10
THEORY	12
CONSTRUCTIVISM	12
SECURITIZATION THEORY.....	15
SECURITIZATION OF IMMIGRATION.....	18
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS.....	20
HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS OF MIGRATION	23
Post-1945	23
Post-1989	24
Post-2004	25
SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE 1989 TRANSITION	27
MODERN MYTHOLOGIES	30
DOMESTIC DISCOURSE ANALYSIS	34
CASE STUDY INTRODUCTION.....	34
“AN ATTEMPT TO DESTROY EUROPE, OUR CULTURE, OUR TRADITION”	36
“HISTORY HAS PROVED US RIGHT”	40
“POLAND CAN DECIDE WHO WE WANT AND NOT WANT”	42
“POLAND IS NOT PART OF THE EUROPEAN CHOIR”	45
SUMMARY OF RESULTS.....	48
INTERNATIONAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS.....	50
“THESE ARE ALSO MIGRANTS”	50
“THE TERROR WAVE IS CONNECTED WITH MIGRATION”	52
“I RESPECT THE DIVERSITY OF EUROPEAN STATES, BUT...”	55
“WE DON'T WANT ANYONE FORCING ANYTHING ON US AGAIN”	57
SUMMARY OF RESULTS.....	60
CONCLUSION	62
BIBLIOGRAPHY	66
PRIMARY SOURCES	66
SECONDARY SOURCES	70

Abstract

The Polish Law and Justice (PiS) party, has been in office since 2015. Within a short time, it introduced several changes that altered Poland's image at home and abroad. One of the first symptoms of Poland's systemic change was its apathetic response towards the EU-wide resettlement scheme, following the migration crisis in 2015. Since then, PiS politicians have adopted a discourse that opposes immigration, in contravention of EU values and laws.

By examining discourse used by PiS politicians in Poland and among EU-audiences, the thesis attempts to discover how the government explains its migration policies in different environments. The main hypothesis this thesis assumes is that the two discourses vary in the methods used to securitize immigrants, the ways in which a constructivist identity is created, and the use of historical and social myths about Poland.

The topic analyzed in this paper is of academic importance as it sheds light on how discourse affects political action, and what role it plays in the international relations between state and organization (Poland and the European Union).

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Daniel Brett, whose academic expertise and profound knowledge on Poland guided me throughout the process of writing this thesis. His feedback and advice helped me to critically approach the topic of migration discourse, and inspired me to better understand its sources. I would also like to thank my family, whose involvement and interest in politics have motivated me to pursue such an academic path.

I

Introduction

During its five years in power (2015-2020), the Polish government, ruled by members of the conservative Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) party, has altered the course of the country's domestic and international policies. Its change in the judiciary system, control of public television, and limitation on women's abortion rights are just some of the topics that stirred media attention, and evoked concern among EU policymakers over the rule of law. Gradual democratic backsliding has caused growing hostility between Warsaw and Brussels, and has remade the government into a semblance to the Orbán administration in Hungary.

In such a setting, the topic of migration in Poland is political at its very core. Because historical and geopolitical processes have rendered Poland almost entirely homogeneous in terms of ethnicity, the "multicultural" norm, as seen in western Europe, is entirely foreign to Polish society. Polish leaders prefer it that way. The largest ethnic minority in Poland are Ukrainians. However, with their cultural proximity and status as temporary workers (usually in low-skilled, physical or seasonal jobs)¹, their presence in Poland is innocuous. The public takes notice, as does political discourse, of the few, but more visually distinctive, migrants from the Middle East and Asia².

Owing to these factors, most parties on the Polish political scene have had an ambivalent attitude towards migration, traditionally involved in the departure of Poles rather than receiving immigrants³. Even parties considered liberal-centrist are opposed to the large-scale admission of migrants. The Civic

¹ Skoczyńska-Prokopowicz, Barbara, 'Foreign Labour Migration of Ukrainians to Poland: Statistical Research from the Perspective of Ukrainian Studies', *Zeszyty naukowe Politechniki Śląskiej*, no. 122, (Gliwice 2018), p. 198.

² Koss-Goryszewska, Maryla, Pawlak, Mikołaj, 'Integration of Migrants in Poland: Contradictions and Imaginations', in: Kucharczyk, Jacek, Mesežnikov, Grigorij, *Phantom Menace: The Politics and Policies of Migration in Central Europe*, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, (2018), p. 170.

³ Jaskułowski, Krzysztof, *The Everyday Politics of Migration Crisis in Poland. Between Nationalism, Fear and Empathy*, (Warsaw 2019), p. 36.

Platform, PiS's main opposition, struggles to adopt a decisive approach to migration for fear of losing support. PiS has no such worries, for the majority of its voters support the idea of a homogeneous state.

The migration discourse in Poland has changed under PiS's rule. Domestically, the government has taken an offensive position against migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, and opposed the EU-wide migrant resettlement schemes in 2015. By contrast, the discourse PiS presents before EU-policymakers and audiences is defensive, as Polish statesmen search for understanding and forbearance of the state's unyielding policies. As Maryla Koss-Goryszewska and Mikołaj Pawlak point out, the increased public interest in migration as an issue resulted from the migration crisis in Europe in 2015, and not from a visible influx in migrants⁴. It is therefore unclear, why, in the absence of large-scale immigration to Poland, the government's discourse is directed against immigrants, and why it differs so greatly between the domestic and EU audiences.

Starting with the events of the migration crisis, which considerably affected Europe in 2015, this thesis will present the instruments used by the Polish government's discourse on migration in order to unravel the discrepancy between PiS's domestic and EU-oriented discourse. The research will be focused around the following question:

Research question: How does PiS explain its migration policies to domestic and EU audiences?

Hypothesis: PiS creates its discourse based on a constructed form of identity. To construct this identity, PiS uses as instruments socio-historic myths and securitization of migration. PiS's discourse within Poland is highly securitized, based on EU-Poland antagonism, mythologization, while its discourse to the EU is less intense in all three categories.

To answer the overarching question, a series of auxiliary sub-questions will be

⁴ Koss-Goryszewska, Maryla, Pawlak, Mikołaj, 'Integration of Migrants in Poland...', p. 169.

researched in the following chapters:

Chapter II: How are constructivism and securitization theory useful in discursive building of state identity and security threats?

Chapter III: What historical and societal factors influence the social perception of migration in Poland?

Chapter IV: How does PiS's domestic discourse frame migration?

Chapter V: How does PiS's EU-directed discourse frame migration?

Academic debate

While drawing on previous academic findings on Polish migration history and policies, this thesis is focused specifically on the analysis of PiS's political discourse regarding migration. The current debate on the Polish migration discourse is still limited. Due to its recent character, the topic has been researched from a few angles, but has not been exhaustive.

One of the first positions on PiS's foreign policy and discourse was assumed in 2016 by four Polish academics. Their report signals that the objectives of PiS's foreign policy is to reverse the "Europeanization" shift, instigated by previous governments, through a discourse of Euroscepticism and opposition to future European integration⁵. What is crucial for PiS's policy is the reevaluation of the post-1989 order, which was at the time judged as the path leading to "Westernization". Picking up on discontent with several aspects of Poland's transformation, PiS turned it into a viable political program, disassembling the "myth of the west", undermining the EU's mainstream policy⁶. The report signals the strengthening of PiS's soft power influence, which discredits efforts to cooperate with or obey the EU⁷. The thesis will expand on

⁵ Balcer, Adam, Buras, Piotr, Gromadzki, Grzegorz, Smolar, Eugeniusz, 'Change in Poland, but what change? Assumptions of Law and Justice party foreign policy', Stefan Batory Foundation, (2016), p. 2,

<https://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Otwarta%20Europa/Change%20in%20Poland.pdf>.

⁶ Ibid., p. 5.

⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

this factor, as it will play a crucial role in the migration discourse presented in subsequent chapters.

Michał Krzyżanowski argues that the Polish discourse on migration shifted in 2015, as PiS ascended to power⁸. While migration was almost non-existent in the political debate prior to 2015, Krzyżanowski finds that the roots for the subsequent discourse lie in historically durable patterns of an anti-Semitic definition of the “other”, a factor present in the Polish public sphere for centuries⁹. Equally crucial, his analysis signals that efforts to politicize the issue of migration were taken by PiS at the very beginning of their term, in the fall of 2015. Krzyżanowski posits that the discourse shift was a carefully implemented strategy, which made use of existing socio-historical contexts.

Piotr Cap went a step further in conducting critical discourse analysis of PiS politicians’ statements on migration, identifying threat-building patterns. His work distinguished three levels of discursive subjects – “us”, “them”, and “us and them”, finding that the intensity of anti-immigration discourse changed over time as the party’s support fluctuated¹⁰. His analysis provides insight on immigration discourse as a policy tool – a topic that will be further researched in this thesis.

Academic and societal relevance

As demonstrated, the current state of the academic debate on the Polish immigration discourse has yet to be expanded. While most current research concentrates on the domestic aspect of PiS’s discourse, the innovative character of this research lies in its attachment to the international ramifications of the party’s policy. This thesis intends to build on contemporary understanding of Polish immigration discourse, inquiring: why does the Polish stance on

⁸ Krzyżanowski, Michał, ‘Discursive Shifts in Ethno-Nationalist Politics: On Politicization and Mediatization of the “Refugee Crisis” in Poland’, *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies*, vol. 16, nos. 1-2, (2018), p. 78.

⁹ Ibid., p.80.

¹⁰ Cap, Piotr, ‘Aspects of threat construction in the Polish anti-immigration discourse’, in: Viola, Lorella, Musolff, Andreas, *Migration and Media. Discourses about identities in crisis*, John Benjamins Publishing Company, (2019), p. 132.

immigration matter, and how is it important in light of the European Union and current processes.

Many researchers analyzing the European Union use constructivist theory to describe positive developments within the EU – the creation of supranational institutions, the EU identity as a normative power¹¹, or the gradual overlap of national strategic cultures¹². This thesis presents a novel approach, using constructivism to point to a negative phenomenon. By analyzing Polish immigration discourse and linking domestic and international discourse together, this paper will broaden the existing research on relations between member states and the EU, especially regarding discourse and its impact on mutual relations.

From a societal point of view, this analysis will uncover discursive measures commonly used by politicians, and shed light on how language can serve as a political instrument.

Theoretical framework

To understand the construction of the migration discourse employed by PiS, three dimensions will be used for the analysis of specific statements: securitization theory, constructivism, and social myths. Securitization theory will help to distinguish how immigration is conflated with a threat, and how stakeholders use the topic of migration to create urgency in their policy. Constructivism will be instrumental in establishing what vision of migration and immigrants PiS creates in its statements, how PiS frames Poland, and Poland's position in the world. The last component, social myths, will lead to assessing how contextually rooted myths about Poles and Poland are used to strengthen the immigration discourse. The analysis will follow the critical discourse analysis

¹¹ Checkel, Jeffrey, 'Constructivist Approaches to European Integration', in: Jorgensen, Knud Erik, Pollack, Mark, Rosamond, Ben, *The SAGE Handbook of European Union Politics*, Sage Publications, (2007), p. 3, <http://www.follesdal.net/projects/ratify/TXT/Checkel-SageHandbookChapter.pdf>.

¹² Dyson, Tom, Konstadinides, Theodore, *European Defence Cooperation in EU Law and IR Theory*, Palgrave Macmillan, (London 2013), p. 114.

methodology, searching for linguistic dimensions, context, and the social practice of researched statements.

Empirical evidence and method

Analyzing securitization discourse employed by the PiS party will focus on the timeframe of September 2015 to April 2020, which contains events surrounding the Polish response to the EU's resettlement system in 2015. Choosing a wide period for analysis is intentional as it helps to prove that the phenomenon was contrived as a long-lasting strategy. Investigating individual statements over nearly five years will answer the overarching question: how does PiS explain its migration policies to a domestic and EU-oriented audience?

The sources and choice of actors analyzed in this part were carefully selected. Out of over 130 statements by PiS politicians on immigration between 2015 and 2020, eight met the conditions to be analyzed and presented in this thesis. The findings were divided into two groups: statements issued to Polish viewers, and statements issued in an international context (addressed to a foreign public audience, foreign media or foreign government officials or heads of states). This ensures that statements were in some way present in the political debate and discourse of both Poland and other EU member states, and could therefore be subject to scrutiny and generate a response from stakeholders. From the collected statements, the statements that most directly revealed a worldview or intentional discursive strategy of the speaker were selected for analysis. Such a choice is instrumental in the context of the subject of this thesis. The author appreciates an inevitable bias that arises from an individual perspective and decisions made from that perspective regarding the selection of sources to be analyzed. However, the author attempted to reduce it by selecting statements that contained all three analyzed components – securitization, constructed identity, and myths.

Two main sources of information were chosen: media outlets and official statements (issued or disseminated by state institutions). Regarding media outlets, only major television and radio broadcasters were considered, with a preference for public outlets (TVP, Polskie Radio). This demonstrates a maximal

outreach of statements and helps to prove that politician's words are meant to reach a wide audience. The second type of sources considered are parliamentary and governmental statements (mainly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chancellery of the Prime Minister). Though not widely disseminated, they are primary sources for media outlets therefore also reaching a public audience. The statements were chosen by the author on a qualitative basis to best illustrate the argument of this thesis. Sources in Polish and French were translated by the author into English.

Speakers were intentionally selected from various hierarchical levels of the government and party (Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, but also by lower-rank politicians in PiS). This ensures a wider variety of voices and allows to trace the coherence of the discourse disseminated to different audience groups.

II

Theory

The following chapter will introduce and expand on the theories of constructivism and securitization, forming the basis for analysis in subsequent chapters. Discourse analysis will be presented at the end as the method for conducting the following research. This chapter will be instrumental in establishing how constructivist theory and securitization theory are useful in a discursive building of state identity and security threats, thereby answering the supporting research question.

Constructivism

The core object of constructivist inquiry is an analysis of “social facts” – intangible notions such as independence, sovereignty, rights¹³. Constructivists posit that these notions mean nothing in themselves, but are granted meaning by people who in turn abide by those given meanings. Constructivism therefore focuses on analyzing how the socially constructed meanings and realities affect international relations, and politics in particular¹⁴.

Constructivism considers states as its principal actors, and introduces structures as intertwining and intersubjective elements binding different states¹⁵. Intersubjectivity, a term coined in constructivism, is used to describe a collective understanding of political reality, through common norms, views, and discourse¹⁶. As intersubjective structures naturally vary, so do relations inside

¹³ Finnemore, Martha, Sikkink, Kathryn, ‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics’, *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 4, (2001), p. 393.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Wendt, Alexander, ‘Collective identity formation and the international state’, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Cambridge University Press, (1994), p. 2.

¹⁶ Barkin, J. Samuel, Sjoberg, Laura, ‘International Relations’ Last Synthesis?: Decoupling Constructivist and Critical Approaches’, Oxford Scholarship Online (2019), p. 17, <https://www-oxfordscholarship->

and between states. Constructivism posits that states and the international system are inherently prone to change¹⁷. Contrary to realists, constructivists argue that the identity of states is exogenous¹⁸, and therefore constantly affected by a variety of factors, which mold it – hence excluding any predetermined and absolute state interests, as the realist school described them.

Constructivists argue that the identity (and interests) of states are effects of systemic structure¹⁹. Such structures are determined largely by shared norms, understandings, and knowledge²⁰. In this view, world phenomena only acquire a certain meaning if states grant them that meaning themselves. What can further impact the identity and subsequent actions of states are “formative historical experiences”²¹, which Tom Dyson and Theodore Konstadinides consider as crucial in the forming of state-wide policies, security included.

Constructivism posits that states possess corporate identity, comprising of the intertwining of resources, constituent individuals, and shared beliefs and institutions, which form a sense of a collective among its individuals²². That identity, unique to each state, creates four main interests:

1. “physical security (and differentiation from other actors),
2. ontological security (stability in relation to other actors),
3. recognition as a state by others,
4. development (a need to ameliorate the quality of life)”²³

As each state’s corporate identity varies, so do their interests. Constructivists argue that identity is a precondition for action, and in that sense is prior to any interaction that states pursue²⁴. Identity building focuses on defining who we

com.proxy.library.uu.nl/view/10.1093/oso/9780190463427.001.0001/oso-9780190463427-chapter-3.

¹⁷ Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality*, Cambridge University Press, (2002), p. 38.

¹⁸ Wendt, Alexander, ‘Collective identity formation...’, p. 2.

¹⁹ Wendt, Alexander, ‘Constructing International Politics’, *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1, MIT Press Journals, (1995), p. 1.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

²¹ Dyson, Tom, Konstadinides, Theodore, *European Defence Cooperation...*, p. 114.

²² Wendt, Alexander, ‘Collective identity formation...’, p. 2.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

are, what we want, what motivates us to act in relation to other states²⁵. It can be viewed as collective when concentrating on inter-group similarities, oppositional – when trying to differentiate oneself from a different group, or complex – where several identities coexist²⁶. Constructivists argue that identity forms state interest, which is the drive for political action and interaction with other states²⁷.

Ideas form the backbone of social life and, as an extension, of international relations. Wendt posits that comparing the value of power and interest as opposed to the value of ideas is axiomatically wrong, because ideas form the purpose of both power and interest, therefore establishing their perception in a given structure²⁸. Without the conceptualization of power as desirable, its value would presumably not even be up for debate.

The primary operating factor within the constructivist paradigm is language. Language is defined not as an instrument for communication, but as a tool that creates and alters social relations²⁹. As a result of continuous practice, language can become an institutionalized foundation for the creation of context and meaning of human interaction³⁰. Constructivist academics assert that language is not merely descriptive. Jef Huysmans states that language does not represent an “extradiscursive reality”³¹, questioning the mechanical purpose of language as well as the existence of an “objective” world as a point of reference. Constructivism points to a performative quality of language³²: the mere act of speaking creates a reality in itself. This effect can be compared to the binding nature of verbal consent, as it is perceived in the act of marriage or taking an oath. Constructivists point to language as a highly influential tool in social life and international relations.

²⁵ Barkin, J. Samuel, Sjoberg, Laura, ‘International Relations’ Last Synthesis?...’, p. 9.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Wendt, Alexander, ‘Constructing International Politics...’, p. 2

²⁹ Huysmans, Jef, ‘Defining social constructivism in security studies: the normative dilemma of writing security’, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Vol. 27, Sage Publications, (2002), p. 44.

³⁰ Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations...*, p. 151.

³¹ Ibid., p. 45.

³² Ibid.

As outlined in the introduction, the “problem” with migration in Poland is multi-faceted, but prevails as an identity issue. With notions of ethnicity so strongly linked to territorial borders, migrants are often perceived as invaders. This characterization often becomes the underpinning for linking migration with questions of security through political discourse. As this thesis will analyze the practices of PiS in establishing an anti-immigration discourse in Poland and the EU-sphere, the most appropriate theoretical concept for this task is constructivism. Constructivism, focused on the value of individual perceptions and identity as guides for action, is best for assessing how anti-immigration discourse is disseminated. Constructivism further simplifies the analysis of the given problem by asserting that states act according to their perceived and current interests, which shift over time³³. With PiS’s policy of dissociating itself from previous Polish governments and adopting a new state identity – both internal and in relation to the EU – constructivism provides the most fitting theoretical structure for the argument made in the thesis.

The constructivist theory has limitations. Though it dissociates itself from realism, critics state that it may be quite similar as it recognizes a default reality as a starting point for the theory³⁴. Moreover, some researchers charge constructivism with “selection bias”, as most constructivist studies choose to focus on positive aspects of the theory, such as norms of human rights or environmental protection, etc., disregarding the negative (but still prevailing) rules that exist in contemporary society³⁵. Taking note of the latter, this thesis will strive to avoid selection bias by arguing that constructivism can explain negative phenomena of power abuse, as is the case with securitization.

Securitization theory

The main concept of international security studies has been the realist school –

³³ Farrell, Theo, ‘Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program’, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2002), p. 52.

³⁴ Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations...*, p. 254.

³⁵ Jung, Hoyoon, ‘The Evolution of Social Constructivism in Political Science: Past to Present’, *SAGE Open*, (2019), p. 8,
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2158244019832703>.

of “national” or “international” security³⁶. This view posits that the state, as the default actor of security studies, experiences a constant external threat, which in some way encompasses the use of force on either side³⁷. While the traditional notion of security revolves around issues of physical security and is therefore tied to threats of violence, those factors are being rendered obsolete with the development of the European Union³⁸. Critical security studies posit that the term “security” should be reevaluated in regards to the contemporary world. While military conflict and violence, which used to pose the biggest threat to societies, are no longer omnipresent, other unorthodox threats are emerging. The economy, technology, and ethnicity are now considered areas of potential disruption.

The securitization theory emerges from the critical security school in recognizing the relative character and quality of current threats to societies and states. It intends to prove that in politics, nothing in itself is a danger. Issues are made into security problems by defining them as such³⁹. Securitization researchers challenge the perception that objective threats to security exist, and point to their relative quality. There are two branches within the securitization theory: one that sees the locus of securitization in linguistic practices, and the other, understanding securitization it as the effect of practices, social context, and power relations⁴⁰. While both complement each other and offer comprehensive argumentation, this thesis will focus on the postulates of the linguistic approach for further analysis, as it will be more explanatory to the topic at hand.

This approach to securitization is strictly linked to the constructivist view of language. It posits that securitization is a process in which certain issues

³⁶ Buzan, Barry, Hansen, Lene, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, (2009), p. 21.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Jakniūnaitė, Dvilė, ‘Critical Security Studies in the 21st Century: Any Directions for Lithuanian Security Studies?’, *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review*, Vol. 12, (2013-2014), p. 36.

³⁹ Balzacq, Thierry, ‘A theory of securitization: Origins, core assumptions, and variants’, in: Balzacq, Thierry, *Securitization Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, Routledge, (London 2010), p. 1.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

become security threats through linguistic practices⁴¹. Security can be perceived as one of many social structures, and as such, it can be created and altered by language. Huysmans argues that a mere articulation of a given factor as a threat creates a security structure. The social perception of security in a state is molded by language in the media (and the factors it introduces as “dangerous”), by a plethora of social movements articulating or polemicizing with a specific “threat”, and state institutions, the police and the military, which all share “security knowledge” with the public⁴². Articulations of security problems are not verified in terms of their factual accuracy, nor do they need to be. Researchers suggest that the practice of naming a factor a security threat implicates its existence in the discourse⁴³. Whether or not it is justified by tangible proof is an entirely different, but somewhat irrelevant, matter⁴⁴.

Ole Wæver argues that “security” must be understood primarily as “national security”⁴⁵. Security problems inherently threaten the sovereignty of states and imply that extraordinary measures must be taken by state officials to combat those problems⁴⁶. Wæver notices that in practice this means that by naming something a security issue, politicians and stakeholders may automatically exercise a special right to handle certain matters⁴⁷. The danger is that securitization can be abused by stakeholders wishing to gain influence or power over aspects of public life. Hence, Wæver’s statement that “something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so”⁴⁸. The mere articulation of the word “security” by a stakeholder is already a securitization act as it moves a particular issue into the security structure, which enables the usage of new instruments of power by the stakeholder⁴⁹. However, a full securitization act requires both the establishment of a “threat” and political action that intended to

⁴¹ Jakniūnaitė, Dovilė, ‘Critical Security Studies...’ p. 37.

⁴² Huysmans, Jef, ‘Defining social constructivism...’, p. 44.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 45.

⁴⁴ Jakniūnaitė, Dovilė, ‘Critical Security Studies...’, p. 37.

⁴⁵ Wæver, Ole, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in: Lipschutz, R. D., ed., *On Security*, Columbia University Press, (1995), p. 3,
<https://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/assets/pdf/Waever-Securitization.pdf>.

⁴⁶ Wæver, Ole, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization...’, p. 6.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 7.

conquer it while pushing the boundaries of legality in a given state⁵⁰. Researchers point to the accumulation of security problems in contemporary politics as a result of defining “security” as a positive phenomenon⁵¹. This leads to an abuse of power and a misconception of what it means to achieve security in a state. Wæver argues that security and insecurity are not antipodes⁵². Perceiving them as such reinforces the misused conception of security. Rather, security should be viewed as the incapability of political stakeholders to deal with state issues under normal circumstances⁵³.

Securitization of immigration

The phenomenon of cultural identities clashing with domestic order is not a novel concept and has been present throughout history, even without large immigrant influxes. However, researchers point to a recent development in structures linking terrorism, immigration, drugs, and asylum with national and international security⁵⁴. This process is a multi-faceted continuum created by a variety of agents (state institutions, social activists), the effect of which creates the social perception of immigration as a security issue⁵⁵. In many immigrant receiving countries the public is already known to believe in the migrants’ detrimental impact on job stability, public safety, and national identity⁵⁶. This means that stakeholders’ attempts at securitization usually find a receptive audience in some fraction of society⁵⁷.

Ariane Chebel D’Appollonia and Simon Reich illustrate that the securitization of immigration usually results in establishing distinctions between

⁵⁰ Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole, de Wilde, Jaap, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner, (London 1998), p. 25.

⁵¹ Wæver, Ole, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization...’, p. 8.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Jakniūnaitė, Dovilė, ‘Critical Security Studies...’, p. 38.

⁵⁴ Huysmans, Jef, ‘Defining social constructivism...’, p. 41.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 42.

⁵⁶ Messina, Anthony, ‘Securitizing Immigration in the Age of Terror’, *World Politics*, Vol. 66, no. 3, (2014), p. 539,
<https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1123&context=facpub>.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 540.

the nationals and the “outsiders”⁵⁸. Analyses of attitudes toward migrants among European nationals prove unequivocally that immigrants are both presented and regarded as threats to the European economy and individual nationalities⁵⁹. Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich have distinguished four main threats identified in the European security discourse:

1. “threat to national security due to often longer border lines,
2. threat to civil and political life due to an increased number of noncitizens,
3. threat to religious, racial and ethnic rights in societies,
4. threat to economies’ capabilities to thrive under a larger demographic, threat to the welfare state”⁶⁰.

Such a diverse range of potential threats makes it easy for many threats to fall into the realm of the security discourse. The interaction between physical safety, economic stability and national identity makes immigration a particularly vulnerable issue, easily manipulated and exploited for other purposes.

For the Polish case, securitization theory offers not only a framework for analysis, but also provides insight into the creation of migration discourse in terms of power abuse. With a relatively low migration inflow in comparison to other EU states, the development of strong anti-immigration security discourse in Poland is compelling. Securitization theory will enable links between the discourse and factors such as national identity, perception of foreigners, or the promulgated immigration facts, all of which are effects of a specifically oriented strategy. This should help in assessing how the domestic strategy plays into Poland’s stance on migration within the European Union.

The securitization theory, as all academic approaches, has not escaped criticism. Recent studies have called it Eurocentric, as its primary interest is European states. Some academics point to its “methodological whiteness” due to a focus on securitization among political elites in Europe, while disregarding

⁵⁸ Chebel D’Appollonia, Ariane, Reich, Simon, ‘The Securitization of Immigration. Multiple Countries, Multiple Dimensions’, in: Chebel D’Appollonia, Ariane, Reich, Simon, *Immigration, Integration and Security. America and Europe in Comparative Perspective*, University of Pittsburgh Press, (2008), p. 2.

⁵⁹ Bilgic, Ali, ‘Securitization of Immigration and Asylum: A Critical Look at Security Structure in Europe’, University of Lund, (2006), p. 2.

⁶⁰ Chebel D’Appollonia, Ariane, Reich, Simon, ‘The Securitization of Immigration...’, p. 2.

other non-European systems⁶¹. Among other limitations of the securitization theory lies the danger of the infinitude of meanings that “security” holds. Sufficiently argued, almost anything could be perceived as a “threat”, rendering the study of securitization obsolete⁶².

Critical Discourse Analysis

One widely used methodology to map the application of the securitization theory is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). It stems out of the notion that language impacts processes within politics and society, and is ultimately one of the strongest tools for creating images of power and identity⁶³. This particular inquiry into securitization helps to identify and interpret meanings of individual securitization attempts to couple them with cultural and social contexts, thus explaining their success or failure. CDA as a methodology is critical as it identifies and attempts to battle unequal power relations, which manifest themselves, according to CDA, through the creation and dissemination of different discourses⁶⁴.

Discourse analysis is an appropriate tool for the Polish immigration debate due to its focus on cultural and social contexts of the created discourse. With PiS politicians attempting to securitize the impact of immigrants in Poland, this methodology will help assess the scope of the phenomenon, distinguish its constituent parts, and hopefully estimate how Polish discourse differs from the EU-oriented discourse on immigration.

To conceptualize discourse, there needs to be a common understanding of what it represents. For this analysis, the paper will adopt the explanation that

⁶¹ Howell, Alison, Richter-Montpetit, Melanie, ‘Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School’, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 51, No.1, (2020), p. 5.

⁶² Charrett, Catherine, ‘A Critical Application of Securitization Theory: Overcoming the Normative Dilemma of Writing Security’, International Catalan Institute for Peace, (Barcelona 2009), p. 37,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884149.

⁶³ Larsen, Henrik, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe*, Routledge, (2005), p. 14.

⁶⁴ Jorgensen, Marianne, Phillips, Louise, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, Sage Publications, (2002), p. 57.

language assumes different meanings, depending on how people grant and perceive them. A discourse groups certain values and meanings transmitted by texts⁶⁵. In this case, texts should be understood not merely as written or spoken words, but also signs, symbols, pictures⁶⁶. Discourse analysis does not delineate an a priori collection of sources for analysis – different case studies will demand an entirely different set of sources⁶⁷. This means that it can point to an emerging theory. In such types of analyses it is common that the collection of sources cannot be outlined at the very beginning, but rather is demarcated during the research. By defining a rigid collection of sources up front, the researcher may run the risk of prematurely defining the boundaries of the analyzed subject⁶⁸.

The first objects of demarcation are individual attempts at securitization. Thierry Balzacq, identifies two criteria which qualify any given attempt:

1. “the issue is present in the public debate or has caught the eye of public attention,
2. the issue permeates the political system, it stimulates political, legal action, or public opinion”⁶⁹.

Once these issues are identified, specific manifestations of securitization can be scrutinized. CDA’s primary point of interest is language and its impact on the creation of context and action. Recognizing that discourse is the mediator between linguistic practice and social action, CDA researchers argue that all three elements interact with each other, forming an inseparable causal chain⁷⁰. Building off these concepts, CDA distinguishes each element as a separate level of analysis:

1. “the level of the text, where the use of language is strictly analyzed,
2. the level of discursive practices, which looks at discourses used or referred to in linguistic practice,

⁶⁵ Larsen, Henrik, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis...*, p. 14.

⁶⁶ Jorgensen, Marianne, Phillips, Louise, *Discourse Analysis...*, p. 56.

⁶⁷ Balzacq, Thierry, ‘Enquiries into methods...’, p. 41.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 42.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 32.

⁷⁰ Jorgensen, Marianne, Phillips, Louise, *Discourse Analysis...*, p. 62.

3. the level of social practice, which assesses how a particular use of discourse fits into societal practice, how does it impact it, what is its societal context"⁷¹.

Such distinctions will allow this thesis to track how linguistic practices shape the PiS party's securitization of immigration in Poland and among an EU audience. Through an analysis of particular statements of PiS politicians it will be possible to link it with a discourse or a system of discourses, which then will provide a deeper understanding of the particular statement and set it within a wider debate⁷².

There are limitations of using discourse analysis, especially at the level of international relations. Researchers argue that discourse is often insufficient to explain concrete political decisions⁷³ and falls short of analyzing the impact of shared notions and ideas on the practical choices of politicians dealing with foreign relations⁷⁴. Nevertheless, where it cannot provide in-depth explanations, discourse analysis succeeds in mapping and investigating relevant discourse figures which may impact policy decisions.

⁷¹ Jorgensen, Marianne, Phillips, Louise, *Discourse Analysis...*, p. 62.

⁷² Balzacq, Thierry, 'Enquiries into methods...', p. 43.

⁷³ Jorgensen, Marianne, Phillips, Louise, *Discourse Analysis...*, p. 62.

⁷⁴ Larsen, Henrik, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis...*, p. 21.

III

Historical and Cultural Factors of Migration

This chapter will summarize the background of migration from Poland since the 19th century and expand on migration to Poland in the period after the second world war up to recent years. Next, the chapter will explore two factors that, according to the thesis' hypothesis, largely impact the contemporary discourse on migration – the transition period and social myths.

Post-1945

Historically, Poland has sent, rather than received, migrants. Mass waves of emigration began around 1860-1890, when Poland was under partition between Austria, Prussia and Russia⁷⁵. Rural underemployment led to many Poles in the countryside migrating to more developed states (Germany, the United States)⁷⁶. Migration from the second half of the 19th century up to the second world war has formed most of the contemporary Polish diaspora. Migrants who left Poland during that period were motivated by either political or economic pressures⁷⁷. Between 1871 and 1913, close to four million Poles emigrated from all three regions of partitioned Poland⁷⁸. After the second world war, the migration policy in Poland shifted entirely. Due to political changes and border reconfigurations, over 4 million Germans and half a million Ukrainians were expelled. In 1968, Poland's Communist authorities used the USSR's pro-Arabic rhetoric to launch an anti-Semitic campaign and expel the remaining Jews still residing in Poland⁷⁹.

⁷⁵ Iglicka, Krystyna, 'Mechanisms of migration from Poland before and during the transition period', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 26, no. 1, (2000), p. 61.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Zubrzycki, Jerzy, 'Emigration from Poland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', *Population Studies*, vol. 6, no. 3 (1953), p. 248.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 252-257.

⁷⁹ Stola, Dariusz, 'Anti-Zionism as a Multipurpose Policy Instrument: The Anti-Zionist Campaign in Poland 1967-1968', *Journal of Israeli History. Politics, Society, Culture*, vol. 25, no. 1 (2006), p. 180.

The post-war homogeneity of Poland was a deliberately implemented strategy. The Communist Party took advantage of wartime resentments and was right in calculating that a population purge would secure stronger support for the party⁸⁰. Aiming to establish an ethno-nationalist vision required the expulsion of previous inhabitants and relocating Poles from the East to populate the annexed lands. This strategy proved especially potent, as it drew upon the desire of Poland becoming a nation-state⁸¹⁸². Additionally, as pre-war Poland was populated by many minorities, the strategy played into xenophobic sentiments of many Poles. As Krystyna Iglicka illustrates, during the communist era, Poland's migration policies were extremely repressive to drive away potential immigrants⁸³. The subsequent lack of a comprehensive immigration strategy and laws set the scene for Poland's transition in 1989.

Post-1989

Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Poland was faced with a need for a new legal framework, including migration laws. The factors that largely impacted migration laws in other European countries, namely the need for workforce, or a sudden influx of immigrants, had no impact on the development of Poland's new framework. What did shape it was the sudden systemic change: an immediate need for regulating migration, and the political goal of joining the European integration process⁸⁴. Starting in 1990, Poland implemented basic migration laws, such as establishing border controls, conditions for entry and transit, defining an asylum policy⁸⁵. The results of the liberalized policies augmented the

⁸⁰ Service, Hugo, *Germans to Poles. Communism, Nationalism and Ethnic Cleansing after the Second World War*, Cambridge University Press, (2014), p. 126.

⁸¹ Kozdra, Jan Ryszard, "What sort of Communist are you?" The struggle between nationalism and ideology in Poland between 1944 and 1956', (2017), p. 57, <https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/1955>.

⁸² Since 1795, Poland was under partition for over 120 years and could not be considered a political state, despite an existent national identity.

⁸³ Iglicka, Krystyna, 'Mechanisms of migration from Poland...', p. 62.

⁸⁴ Iglicka, Krystyna, 'Poland', in: Triandafyllidou, Anna, Gropas, Ruby, *European Immigration: a sourcebook*, Ashgate Publishing, (2007), pp. 263-264.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 264.

rate of immigration to Poland between 1989 and 2003⁸⁶. In the first five years after the transformation process (1990-1995), migration was doubling almost each year, to reach over 35,000 permanent immigrants⁸⁷. This came as a big change, because in the 1980s, the average immigration reached approximately 1,500 migrants a year⁸⁸.

Because of such changes, securitization attempts began to resurface in the public sphere. While the European integration process helped to instigate or accelerate many positive outcomes regarding migration, it also fueled a harmful discourse. Krystyna Iglicka points out to the fact that at the beginning of the 1990s, immigrants arriving in Poland were characterized as a potential threat to the country, and reports on their criminal activity were ubiquitous⁸⁹. Iglicka notes, however, that since the second half of the 1990s, attitudes softened, as media and the public opinion found that the number of incoming migrants was not as high as it might have seemed in the first years of the decade⁹⁰.

Post-2004

As a result of Poland's accession to the European Union in 2004, immigration to Poland rose each year^{91 92}. EU law obliged Poland to adopt the universal asylum law and alter conditions of entry and stay for EU citizens. This comprised other changes, such as the formalization of migrant rights on the Polish labour market,

⁸⁶ 'Main directions of emigration and immigration in the years 1966-2018 (migration for permanent residence)', Statistics Poland (9.07.2019), <https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/population/international-migration/>.

⁸⁷ Grzelak-Kostulska, Elżbieta, Hołowiecki, Marcin, Szymańska, Daniela, 'Migracje stałe do Polski w okresie transformacji ustrojowej' (Permanent migration to Poland during the transition period), in: Szymańska, Daniela, *Ruchliwość przestrzenna ludności w okresie przemian ustrojowych*, (Toruń 1998), pp. 182-183.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 183.

⁸⁹ Iglicka, Krystyna, 'Poland...', p. 274.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ 'Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship', Eurostat (5.03.2020), <https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>.

⁹² Except 2005, when a slight diminishment occurred, in comparison to 2004, <https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>.

where their presence has grown rapidly since 2005⁹³. Between 2006 and 2010 the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy introduced concessions to foreigners from former USSR countries (first: Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, later also Moldova, Georgia and Armenia) for legal seasonal work, without the need to obtain a formal work permit⁹⁵. Amongst these groups, it is the Ukrainian immigrants that overwhelmingly outnumber all other migrants, with an estimate of 1,000,000 working Ukrainians in 2015⁹⁶. Their presence, however, is somewhat ephemeral, as Polish law allows them to work and reside in Poland for allocated periods of time⁹⁷. Anne White suggests that by maintaining such a short-sighted policy, Poland risks being stuck in a state of “permanent temporariness”, where migrants never achieve a state of complete integration, and continue to support the informal economy⁹⁸.

Since 2012, Poland has been annually recording over 200,000 immigrants in the country⁹⁹. Despite this, it lacks a universal integration policy – a fact that White considers common in states that do not identify as “immigration countries”¹⁰⁰. The lack of any large-scale integration policy may stem from ignoring symptoms of cultural and ethnic diversification within the Polish society¹⁰¹. Poland has conducted only two short term integration programs, directed at refugees and repatriates¹⁰². Both of these categories do not represent

⁹³ Iglicka, Krystyna, ‘Poland...’, p. 265.

⁹⁴ White, Anne, ‘The impact of migration into Poland by non-Poles’, in: White, Anne, Grabowska, Izabela, Kaczmarczyk, Paweł, Slany, Krystyna, *The Impact of Migration on Poland*, UCL Press, (2018), p. 218.

⁹⁵ ‘Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania’ (Polish migration policy – the present state and proposed action), Ministry of the Interior and Administration, European Migration Network Poland, 20 July 2011, <https://www.emn.gov.pl/>.

⁹⁶ White, Anne, ‘The impact of migration into Poland...’, p. 214.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 221.

⁹⁹ ‘Immigration by persons’, Eurostat (5.03.2020), <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00176/default/line?lang=en>.

¹⁰⁰ White, Anne, ‘The impact of migration into Poland...’, p. 219.

¹⁰¹ Grzymała-Kazłowska, Aleksandra, ‘The role of different forms of bridging capital for immigrant adaptation and upward mobility. The case of Ukrainian and Vietnamese immigrants settled in Poland’, *Ethnicities*, vol. 15, no. 3 (2015), p. 468.

¹⁰² Ibid.

the majority of immigrants in Poland. What may hinder any development is the fact that the largest immigrant populations in Poland come from former USSR countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus), and individual Asian countries (China, Vietnam)¹⁰³, both of which tend to self-isolate in the Polish social sphere.

At the same time, Poland practices liberal policies for economic migrants. Aside from numerous concessions granted to immigrants from its Eastern border, in 2011 illegal migrants or migrants whose refugee status had been refused, were granted amnesty and the right to work without a permit for a fixed period of two years¹⁰⁴. The liberal nature of Polish immigration laws may stem from the perception of migrants in Poland and affect their position in the country. The overwhelming majority of migrants in Poland are economic migrants¹⁰⁵. Polish law favors temporary economic migration to long-term residence for other reasons (e.g. marriage)¹⁰⁶. This maintains a circular and temporary migration flow, using economic migration as a complementary tool for sustaining and boosting the Polish economy¹⁰⁷.

Social effects of the 1989 transition

Discussing Polish migration policy, or any policy that is societally relevant, it is impossible to omit the political transition in 1989. Most of the topics that stir public attention in today's Poland are the aftermath of the transition period and the changes it entailed. The sudden political change brought by the first free elections in 1989, and the subsequent decommunization of the state was a change that affected not merely the political structures of power, but the daily

¹⁰³ Tyrowicz, Joanna, 'The influence of economic migration on the Polish economy', mBank – CASE Seminar Proceedings no. 149, (2017), p. 32, https://www.case-research.eu/files/?id_plik=5315.

¹⁰⁴ Fihel, Agnieszka, Kaczmarczyk, Paweł, Stefańska, Renata, 'Recent Trends in International Migration in Poland', *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 1, no. 1, (2012), p. 72.

¹⁰⁵ Tyrowicz, Joanna, 'The influence of economic migration on the Polish economy...', p. 32,

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ 'Polityka migracyjna Polski' (Polish migration policy), Ministry of the Interior and Administration, 10 June 2019, pp. 5-6, <https://interwencjaprawna.pl/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Polityka-migracyjna-Polski-wersja-ostateczna.pdf>.

life of citizens. As joining the Western community of countries and embracing their ideology was a primary goal of the first democratic political elites¹⁰⁸, their main points of concern were economic and political factors. Questions of the societal impact of transition were either superficially assessed or ignored in the democratization euphoria. As capitalism took hold of the market and the communist work ethos changed, private firms started to value individual employee productivity, a notion that was irrelevant in the previous system¹⁰⁹. State-owned enterprises, factories and institutions were dissolved or privatized, rendering millions of people unemployed. Consequentially, one-third of Poles became dependent on state social benefits¹¹⁰. Very quickly, employment evolved from a “right” to a “privilege”¹¹¹, and became the main source of insecurity and disenchantment with the supposedly superior political system. The main groups excluded from the new system were poorly educated, low-income workers and peasant farmers. Their limited transferrable skills made them vulnerable to unemployment and a decrease in living conditions and social status¹¹². Increased social stratification harbored inequality and exclusion. In the first five years after transition, poverty increased, and in 1998 half of households lived in conditions below the social minimum¹¹³.

The transition entailed not only structural changes, such as employment, privatization, and democratic political institutions but also a discursive change: the “discourse of real socialism” was slowly combatting the “discourse of embryonic capitalism”, as phrased by George Kolankiewicz¹¹⁴. Each one contained a contradictory vision of life in transitioning Poland: from

¹⁰⁸ Ramet, Sabrina, ‘Trajectories of Post-Communist Transformation: Myths and Rival Theories about Change in Central and Southeastern Europe’, *Perceptions*, vol. 18, No. 2, (2013), p. 65.

¹⁰⁹ Rondinelli, Dennis, Yurkiewicz, Jay, ‘Privatization and Economic Restructuring in Poland: An Assessment of Transition Policies’, *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, vol. 55, no. 2, (1996), p. 154.

¹¹⁰ Kolankiewicz, George, *Towards a Sociology of the Transition. Rights, Resources, and Social Integration in Poland*, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies, (2000), p. 30,
<https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/24830/2/SSEES0031.pdf>.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 24.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 93.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 96.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 19.

understanding the individual's position in society (collectivism to individualism), the relation to the state (public to private), to Poland's position and mission in the world (mythologized view of a martyred, but glorified Poland, versus a futuristic outlook on Poland as an international actor)¹¹⁵. Changing the system meant a change in the constructivist identity: the new reality overturned previous norms, which resulted in a loss of identity among those who earned a sense of purpose and achievement through the previous system¹¹⁶. Pensioners had no place in the new reality: excluded from participating in the changes, deemed obsolete and irrelevant to the creation of a modern capitalist state, their social degradation stimulated a sense of nostalgia for the old system¹¹⁷. Resurfacing neo-communist parties (SLD) made of former political elites appealed to supporters of the previous system, promising an increase in social reforms for the poor¹¹⁸. Forced premature retirement during the first days of the transition impeded a large fraction of Poles from reaping the benefits of democracy, and also fostered a sense of exclusion and resentment towards new political elites, and the new discourse of capitalism¹¹⁹. The better one adjusted to the new reality, the more one was likely to succeed in democratic Poland.

The mainstream view of the Polish transition as an upward and positive movement is not shared by the entire population. On the contrary, it is the view of a minority, occupying strategic and influential positions in the country, that the life of Polish citizens, on the whole, has improved or simplified after the reforms in 1989. Societal and economic hardships fueled the dissemination of popular myths, strengthening the identity of those, who feel hurt and excluded by democratic Poland, and all of the values that it represents. Awareness of these myths is what explains the popular support of PiS, along with its controversial migration policies.

¹¹⁵ Kolankiewicz, George, *Towards a Sociology of the Transition...*, p. 19.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹¹⁷ Kwiatkowski, Piotr, Kosicki, Piotr, 'Collective Memory and Social Transition in Poland', *International Journal of Sociology*, vol. 36, no. 4, (2006-2007), p. 5.

¹¹⁸ Rondinelli, Dennis, Yurkiewicz, Jay, 'Privatization and Economic Restructuring in Poland...', p. 153.

¹¹⁹ Kolankiewicz, George, *Towards a Sociology of the Transition...*, p. 31.

Modern mythologies

At the heart of modern myths lies the constructivist notion that people possess certain identities that help them understand themselves and take action. A myth is a perception of a people about themselves. It has no interest in historical accuracy or facts¹²⁰. In this sense, it exists outside of the sphere of worldly perception, as it appeals to identity, both individual and communal. A myth unifies a community and establishes boundaries between that which belongs to “us” and that which is foreign¹²¹, thereby creating the basis for social action based on shared identity¹²².

With Polish sovereignty being undermined by various political factors for the majority of the previous 200 years, Poles were forced to look for symbols of identity outside of politics¹²³. Throughout Poland’s turbulent history, there emerged several myths which still resonate throughout the public opinion and affect political action. A history abundant in defeats, captivity and imposed violence is the primary factor inducing the spread of myths about a heroic past, glorifying uprisings and revolt against stronger oppressors¹²⁴.

The myth of Poland as *antemurale Christianitatis* (Bulwark of Christendom) is one that captures public imagination. Born out of 16th and 17th century Turkish and Tartar invasions of Poland, the myth gained relevance after 1683, when the Polish king Jan III Sobieski defeated the Ottoman army in the battle of Vienna, thus allegedly saving Christian Europe from Islamization. Norman Davies argues that the myth of Poland as the defender of Christianity and, by extension, Europe, was exceptionally persuasive, and was later employed

¹²⁰ Schöpflin, George, ‘The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths’, in: Hosking, Geoffrey, Schöpflin, George, *Myths and Nationhood*, Routledge, (New York 1997), p. 19.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 20.

¹²² Ibid., p. 21.

¹²³ Józefik, Barbara, Sz wajca, Krzysztof, ‘Polish myths and their deconstruction in the context of Polish-Jewish relations’, *Archives of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy*, (2011), p. 36.

¹²⁴ Ágh, Attila, ‘Cultural War and Reinventing the Past in Poland and Hungary: The Politics of Historical Memory in East-Central Europe’, *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, vol. 45, (2016), p. 33.

as a moral obligation when Communist forces occupied the state¹²⁵. Its view of Poland as a rampart against a foreign force or culture still echoes in the contemporary discourse on immigration.

A second, but perhaps even more potent myth is that of the miracle at Jasna Góra, a monastery in southern Poland, which resisted the Swedish invasion in 1655. Guarded by the Black Madonna icon, the fort resisted several months of siege before the Swedes retreated from Poland¹²⁶. Recognizing the divine intervention that brought about such an unlikely victory, King John Casimir crowned the Virgin Mary as the “Queen of Poland”¹²⁷. Since then, the notion of Polish national identity began to incorporate a religious aspect: Polishness and Catholicism became inextricably linked together. Being a pious Christian meant that one was a patriot. The myth of Poland being guarded by the Church has resurfaced and strengthened in several strategic moments of Polish history, but most notably during the Communist period when the Polish Church was the main opposition to the political authorities¹²⁸. Choosing to be Catholic in an atheist system was therefore not merely a personal choice, but a twofold political statement: one of resistance against a foreign repressive power, and one of national affiliation. Aside from tradition rooted in centuries-long practice, myths such as being guarded by the Virgin Mary, contribute to establishing a religious national identity. The implications of such a narrative may be benign in homogenous circumstances, such as during the Communist period, when Poland was hardly inhabited by national minorities. However, in cases such as the migration crisis, myths such as these can have serious political implications – a refusal to take in Muslim refugees by Poland is just one example¹²⁹.

¹²⁵ Davies, Norman, ‘Polish National Mythologies’, in: Hosking, Geoffrey, Schöpflin, George, *Myths and Nationhood*, Routledge, (New York 1997), p. 145.

¹²⁶ Davies, Norman, ‘Polish National Mythologies’..., p. 146.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Stachowiak, Paweł, ‘Polish transformations of 1988-1989. Political authorities, opposition, the Church’, in: Pająk-Piątkowska, Beata, Rachwał, Marcin, *Hungary and Poland in Times of Political Transition. Selected Issues*, Adam Mickiewicz University, (Poznań 2016), p. 112.

¹²⁹ ‘Why Will Poland not take in any Muslims?’, Al Jazeera, 8 November 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/upfront/2019/11/won-poland-muslims-191108004853741.html>.

The third and most prevalent myth in the Polish collective imagery is the myth of Polish suffering, which is fully encapsulated in the history of the many Polish uprisings. As most of them were directed against foreign rule: 1830 and 1863 against the Russian occupation, 1944 against the Nazis, 1980 against Communist authorities, few resulted in any kind of liberation or victory. Nonetheless, their legitimization in classic Polish literature and works of art immortalized and glorified stories of the heroic, but tragic Polish nation¹³⁰. Consequently, revolt and sacrifice, became synonyms of patriotism and defending Poland, regardless of their costs¹³¹. Not only did this myth rationalize and praise death for the good of the state, it also imposed onto Poland the role of the victim among other nations. This entailed a narrative of innocence and self-pity, employed in situations of defeat, ultimately leading to a rationalization of Poland's predicament and "special" situation in the world¹³².

What fails to enter the mythology of Polish discourse is the emigration of Poles abroad, which intensified in the 19th and 20th century as Poles fled war, political and religious persecution, and hostile economic environment. Poles who emigrated because of failed Polish insurrections in 1831 and 1864 were de facto nationalists yearning to express their political views in more welcoming states. Those who fled during the Communist period were either forced by the regime or searching for political and economic freedom in the West. Nevertheless, the myth of Polish emigrants is absent from the discourse and is rarely brought up as an argument for liberalizing current policies and softening xenophobic attitudes.

While historically distant, the discursive myths and history of the Polish transition help to explain what makes the Polish public susceptible to anti-immigration discourse dispersed by the PiS party. The transition period, with large-scale unemployment and economic exclusion of certain groups, resulted in a deep social divide between the winners and losers of the new system. This process intensified, as the winners of the transition pushed for closer ties with

¹³⁰ Davies, Norman, 'Polish National Mythologies'..., p. 149.

¹³¹ Józefik, Barbara, Szwejca, Krzysztof, 'Polish myths and their deconstruction...' p. 36.

¹³² Ibid.

the EU¹³³, which represented many of the values that guided policymakers after 1989. In light of these changes, identity myths resurfaced in a new form. Pointing to foreign powers (EU) once again undermining Poland's sovereignty¹³⁴, the discourse presented heightened relations with the West as abasement, and Poland's role, once again, as victim. National mythology reinforced notions of historic revolts, perceiving taking a stand against the EU as an act of patriotism and defending the state. Furthermore, the EU's reluctance to favor Christian values over "multiculturalism" strengthened the myth of Catholicism as a central pillar of Polish identity. Consequently, the discourse of growing discrepancies between Poland and the EU resulted in disenchantment with the "West" and "Western" values, thus reducing the incentive to comply with EU regulations.

As a result of the negative ramifications of the transition on many groups, the public became aware of what kind of economic and political consequences result from "westernization" in Poland. Well-known threats such as unemployment, poverty and violence, became tied to new, securitized ones, such as increased immigration of culturally and religiously distant foreigners. With financial and social security being undermined for many in 1989, the narrative of migrants as a threat became potent. Since many considered themselves robbed by the democratic elites in 1989, who was to say that immigrants would not be the next group to strip them of their jobs, houses and earnings?

¹³³ Ágh, Attila, 'Cultural War and Reinventing the Past in Poland and Hungary...', p. 33.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 34.

Domestic discourse analysis

The following chapter will introduce the case study and proceed to analyze the discursive practices employed by PiS officials to address the domestic public on the issue of immigration to Poland. Specific statements will be analyzed in accordance with the theories introduced earlier: securitization, constructivism, and social myths. This detailed analysis of the chosen statements will illustrate how PiS's domestic discourse frames migration.

Case study introduction

As a result of war, oppression, economic stagnation, and worsening life conditions in the Middle East, Europe has experienced an unprecedented increase of third-country nationals requesting protection or the right to settle in Europe¹³⁵. Crossing the Mediterranean by boat is the most common route to Europe, if not entirely safe. Between 2013 and 2014 the number of those emigrating by sea has almost quadrupled, according to Human Rights Watch, from 60,000 to at least 219,000¹³⁶. Attempting to organize a legal framework to contain the influx of migrants, the European Commission has devised two resettlement schemes in September 2015, recommending that EU Member States pledge to admit a total of 40,000¹³⁷ and 120,000¹³⁸ persons entering Italy

¹³⁵ 'Commission Recommendation of 8.6.2015 on a European resettlement scheme', Brussels (8.6.2015), p. 2, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/asylum/general/docs/recommendation_on_a_european_resettlement_scheme_en.pdf.

¹³⁶ 'The Mediterranean Migration Crisis. Why People Flee, What the EU Should Do', Human Rights Watch, 19 June 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/19/mediterranean-migration-crisis/why-people-flee-what-eu-should-do>.

¹³⁷ 'Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece', EUR-Lex, 15 September 2015, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AJOL_2015_239_R_0011.

¹³⁸ 'Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece', EUR-Lex, 24 September 2015, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015D1601>.

and Greece. Participating states pledged to indicate the quota of immigrants it can admit at least once every three months¹³⁹. In March 2016, an additional EU-Turkey Statement was issued, whereby the EU States committed themselves to resettle a Syrian from Turkey for every Syrian readmitted by Turkey from Greece¹⁴⁰. While the Commission agreed on full participation by all member states in both initiatives, its progress report in 2017 revealed that several states, including Poland, did not participate in any of the programs¹⁴¹. Due to the lack of compliance with EU resettlement measures, the Commission initiated an infringement procedure against Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in June 2017. At the close of the 2015 resettlement scheme, in September 2017, the Commission presented a new replacement scheme: to relocate 50,000 vulnerable persons, especially from North Africa and the Horn of Africa, until October 2019¹⁴². The scheme was based on voluntary pledges rather than a mandatory quota system. According to some analysts, the position of the Visegrad Group (V4 – Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia), which was critical of the mandatory nature of resettlement schemes, directly impacted the Commission's proposal for voluntary participation in the 2017 scheme¹⁴³. Participation in the new scheme became an opportunity for financial benefit (EUR 10,000 for each resettled immigrant), rather than a legal obligation¹⁴⁴.

¹³⁹ 'Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece', EUR-Lex, 15 September 2015, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AJOL_2015_239_R_0011.

¹⁴⁰ 'Legislative Train Schedule. Towards a new policy on migration', European Parliament, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-urgency-resettlement-scheme>.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Duszczyk, Maciej, Podgórska, Karolina, Pszczółkowska, Dominika, 'From mandatory to voluntary. Impact of V4 on the EU relocation scheme', *European Politics and Society*, (2019), p. 2.

¹⁴⁴ Statement on Twitter of EU Commissioner for Migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos, @Avramopoulos, 27 September 2017, accessed 2 June 2020, https://twitter.com/Avramopoulos/status/912991035554492416?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E912991035554492416&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.euractiv.com%2Fsection%2Fjustice-home-affairs%2Fnews%2Fcommission-moves-from-mandatory-refugee-relocations-to-voluntary-resettlement%2F.

In April 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union upheld the charges of violation of EU law by the three countries, stating that they did not fulfill their mandatory obligations resulting from decisions adopted by the Council regarding the resettlement of migrants from Italy and Greece¹⁴⁵. With the relocation timeframe for both schemes ending in September 2017, the Commission has exhausted its methods to force compliance on the three non-participating states. Building on this, the Polish government's statement asserted:

*"The refusal to comply with the resettlement scheme was motivated by the need to protect Poland's internal security and safeguard it from uncontrolled migration. The ultimate goal of the governmental policy is to guard the safety of our citizens"*¹⁴⁶.

This justification is the starting point for a retrospective analysis of discursive practices condoning the use of securitization measures to justify a policy that defies EU law.

"An attempt to destroy Europe, our culture, our tradition"

Beata Szydło, as the first Prime Minister of the PiS government from 2015 to 2017, was the state representative and spokesperson during the peak of the migration wave and talks on containment measures in Brussels. It is therefore unsurprising that she issued many statements on the Polish stance toward EU-imposed legislation, explaining it to the general public and the opposition party (Civic Platform). The chosen statement is part of Szydło's speech in the Sejm (lower house of Parliament) on May 24th 2017.

¹⁴⁵ 'Judgment in Joined Cases C-715/17, C-718/17 and C-719/17 Commission v Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Court of Justice of the European Union', 2 April 2020, <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-04/cp200040en.pdf>.

¹⁴⁶ 'Komunikat Centrum Informacyjnego Rządu w związku z wyrokiem TSUE w sprawie relokacji uchodźców' (Message from the Government Information Centre about the ECJ verdict on refugee relocation), Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland, 2 April 2020, <https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/komunikat-centrum-informacyjnego-rzadu-w-zwiazku-z-wyrokiem-tsue-w-sprawie-relokacji-uchodzcow>.

"I would like to talk to you about recent events, especially in the light of the terrorist attack in Manchester, where innocent people were killed. This time, the terrorists crossed a line, they killed the most innocent, the most helpless of all – children. Do you condone this? Do you want to make Poland helpless as well?

(...)

We will not allow for our children to be threatened to go to the club, school or playground. We will never condone it.

(...)

If you don't yet realize, that the terrorist threat is a fact that can inflict upon each European state, and that Poland should aim to prevent it, then you are going hand in hand with those who aim their guns at Europe, at all of us. It needs to be stated clearly once and for all: this is an attempt to destroy Europe, our culture, our tradition.

(...)

Being part of the European Union does not entail concurring with its political correctness, it is taking responsibility when Brussels elites, scared and blinded by political correctness, cannot. We do not agree with this, and we will continue to state – be it here, by the Vistula, in Brussels, or in any other place – that we must protect our safety, because it is a fundamental matter. We must recognize threats and efficiently oppose them. Instead of fear, we must face what is being fixed against us with responsibility and efficacy"¹⁴⁷.

Szydło has used a variety of linguistic phrases which securitize the image of migrants. The frequent use of "threat", as a characteristic of both the immigrants and the current state of Europe, portrays the image of a Europe under the Islamic siege. According to Huysmans' theory, framing an issue as a "threat" or "security

¹⁴⁷ 'Premier Beata Szydło: Nie ma nic cenniejszego niż bezpieczeństwo ojczyzny i naszych obywateli' (Prime Minister Beata Szydło: There is nothing more valuable than the safety of our nation and our citizens), Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland, 24 May 2017, <https://www.premier.gov.pl/multimedia/wideo/premier-beata-szydlo-nie-ma-nic-cenniejszego-niz-bezpieczenstwo-ojczyzny-i-naszyc.html>.

problem” makes it one¹⁴⁸. By employing a combative style in her speech through expressions such as: “Protect our safety”, “attempt to destroy Europe”, “aim guns at Europe”, “terrorist threat”, she creates a black-and-white, simplified image of the problem. By conflating terrorists with immigrants, the Prime Minister portrays immigrants as threatening the safety of “our” (European) citizens. Drawing upon the example of the terrorist attack in Manchester, where 23 people died, with over a hundred wounded, Szydło not only establishes a causal effect between the growing number of immigrants in the United Kingdom and its growing number of terrorist attacks. She also illustrates the effect of the UK’s migration policy with a heart-wrenching example of deceased children – an effect that was undoubtedly calculated to render an emotional response. By portraying the Manchester tragedy in symbolic terms “an external attack on our most helpless group of citizens”, she calls for a response and retribution in the form of increasing national security measures – a desired effect of securitization attempts, according to Wæver’s theory¹⁴⁹.

The speech reveals several aspects of constructivist identity. Using plural first-person pronouns (“we will never condone it”, “we must protect our safety”, “what is being fixed against us”), Szydło creates a notion of a shared front against the ostensible intruder, a front based on a common nationality. She promotes an oppositional identity, which, according to Barkin and Sjöberg, helps to dissociate one group from another¹⁵⁰. The “us” gains legitimacy because of the “them”, therefore united action against the enemy should be the primary concern of the protective state. Szydło refers to “the West” in a double capacity: as individual states, negatively (or even tragically) affected by the rising immigration, and as the “Brussels elites” – an amorphous group standing behind EU legislation. According to Szydło’s message, the West has failed in both capacities – as receiving states who were unable to contain the immigration flows and brought terrorism and disruption to its own people, and as a normative international power, paralyzed in the consequences of its own risky policies. The rhetorical question “Do you condone this? Do you want to make Poland helpless as well?”

¹⁴⁸ Huysmans, Jef, ‘Defining social constructivism...’, p. 45.

¹⁴⁹ Wæver, Ole, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization...’, p. 6.

¹⁵⁰ Barkin, J. Samuel, Sjöberg, Laura, ‘International Relations’ Last Synthesis?...’, p. 9.

refers to the Parliamentary opposition. The delegates are being put on the spot: agreeing with the EU's policies is wanting Poland to suffer attacks similar to those in the West. Establishing that Brussels elites were irresponsible in their liberal immigration policies and minimal integration measures, gives Polish statesmen the right to counteract, at the cost of being "politically incorrect". In speaking of political correctness, Szydło refers to an existing discourse in the Polish public sphere, popular among opposition circles (political parties, media, activists) who associate the PiS party with promoting a conservative Catholic worldview and advancing a restricted immigration policy. The Prime Minister implicitly suggests that the EU's policy of political correctness has inflicted more harm than good, thereby delegitimizing Brussels' authority. Szydło creates a distinction between traditional Europe based on Christian values, which she refers to, and modern Europe, devoid of those values. As contemporary EU policies are detrimental to EU states, Poland should aim to protect old European values and traditions, which have gone astray under Brussels elites.

Beata Szydło is the only female speaker in this analysis. While gender-specific issues are not present in her speech, it is worth noting that she is the only speaker to touch upon questions of family life and the safety of children as a viable argument against lifting immigration restrictions. That this topic is not part of speeches made by male politicians hints towards a gender-biased political discourse in Poland.

The speech refers to the myth of Poland under siege, which resulted from a plethora of invasions and occupation periods in Polish history. In the case of the immigration threat, the endangering element is the dissemination of Islamic culture, which has once been averted by King Sobieski in the Battle of Vienna. The threat of culturally and religiously distant migrants reignites the fear of an imminent danger about to destroy European culture. As the bulwark of Christendom, Poland has a historic legacy of resisting foreign and religious invasion, and should recognize its obligation to once again defend Europe¹⁵¹. Szydło has also made use of the myth of the river Vistula, which for centuries has had special meaning for Polish culture. The longest river in Poland, the Vistula reaches its Southern and Northern borders, passing two of Poland's capitals,

¹⁵¹ Davies, Norman, 'Polish National Mythologies...', p. 145.

Cracow and Warsaw. The river's figurative role was instated and reinforced by legends such as the miracle of the Vistula, when Virgin Mary was believed to appear over the river, helping Poles to defeat Soviet forces in an unlikely victory in 1920. In her speech, Szydło refers to the Vistula to strengthen its mythological impact, underlining that the land by the Vistula will once again defend its safety, as it has done for centuries.

“History has proved us right”

Michał Dworczyk, Chief of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister since December 2017, under Mateusz Morawiecki (Szydło's successor), issued a similarly focused statement on PiS's stance on migration in an interview for TVN24 on January 2nd 2018. TVN24 is a commercial news channel owned by the TVN Network, ranked second in audience share among private television networks in Poland¹⁵². Asked about the government's stance on migration, Dworczyk replied:

“As for migration, especially illegal migration, the stance of PiS remains the same as in 2015. Even before the 2015 elections, we pointed out the dangers and problems of the situation that has emerged in Europe. We are consistent in our beliefs. Moreover, history and the European Union prove us right. The EU's migration policy has failed. As a result, our position on illegal migration will not change”¹⁵³.

Though brief, this statement implicitly describes the stance of the ruling party. Pointing towards the “dangers” and “problems” that Europe has faced due to a more open immigration policy, Dworczyk suggests that Poland would be endangered too, if it liberalized its policies. He touches upon the recurring theme of the EU's failure – a helpful figure in highlighting Poland's success. The speaker

¹⁵² Kurdupski, Michał, ‘Krótszy czas oglądania telewizji w 2016 roku. Polsat wyprzedził TVP1 (raport)’ (Shorter screen time in 2016. Polsat has outrun TVP1), Wirtualnemedi.pl, 3 January 2017, accessed 4 June 2020, <https://www.wirtualnemedi.pl/arttykul/krotszy-czas-ogladania-telewizji-w-2016-roku-polsat-wyprzedzil-tvp1-raport>.

¹⁵³ “Rekonstrukcja rządu się uciera” („The government reconstruction is gaining acceptance”), TVN24, 2 January 2018, accessed 4 June 2020, <https://tvn24.pl/polska/rekonstrukcja-rzadu-sie-uciera-michal-dworczyk-w-jeden-na-jeden-ra802886-2319851>.

portrays the party's clairvoyance: back in 2015, when European states were eagerly welcoming immigrants, oblivious of their danger, PiS politicians warned of the consequences of such policies. According to this rhetoric, Poland has escaped the immediate hazard that an inflow of migrants would pose to the state's security. Defining the situation in 2015 as a "threat" allowed the party to portray their lack of compliance with EU regulations as a justified extraordinary measure to avoid potential disruption, as described by Wæver¹⁵⁴.

The constructivist aspect of Dworczyk's statement relies on the notion, frequently employed by PiS politicians, of a struggle between the righteous Polish government and corrupt Western European or EU elites, forcing their policies and worldviews on Poland. Politicians creating the discourse focus on creating a sense of oppositional identity, as described by Barkin and Sjöberg¹⁵⁵. In this case, as Dworczyk underlines, it is the EU that has failed in its mission to ease the crisis. In light of its current impotence, the formerly criticized stance of Poland on immigration seems to have won the symbolic struggle. While unpopular among progressive circles in Brussels, the Polish policy, as Dworczyk reiterates, remained unchanged and became proof for many that the EU has recognized its initial stance on the issue. Stating that "the European Union proved us right", Dworczyk refers to the transition from mandatory to voluntary resettlement schemes, viewing it as an amendment to the 2015 EU policies. This, while plausible, was never expressed explicitly by EU representatives, who charged Poland just three months earlier (June 2017) for noncompliance with the Commission's previous scheme. In this light, the Commission's actions toward Poland can hardly be interpreted as an expression of wrongdoing and repentance, which greatly undermines the statement that "the European Union proved us right".

Dworczyk's statement implicitly refers to a common myth in the PiS rhetoric that "history proves us right". The party's discourse is closely linked to a historical narrative, as it is rooted in the post-communist order in Poland and its

¹⁵⁴ Wæver, Ole, 'Securitization and Desecuritization...', p. 6.

¹⁵⁵ Barkin, J. Samuel, Sjöberg, Laura, 'International Relations' Last Synthesis?...', p. 9.

unjust division into winners and losers, as described by Kolankiewicz¹⁵⁶. PiS's main message was to reduce that inequality by appealing to the "losers" – both financially (through diverse social aid), but also discursively – by acknowledging and deepening the feeling of harm and defilement that previous governments have ignored. Thus emerged the rhetoric of amending historical wrongs and, by extension, on being "on the right side of history". Dworczyk alludes to that in his statement: while PiS's policy was unpopular, history proved that it was a prudent choice from a state's perspective. Further, it justifies the policy to the party's supporters, who may identify themselves as part of the quest to amend injustices from the country's past. Accepting immigrants would, in this context, be considered a mistake to be rectified in the future.

"Poland can decide who we want and not want"

Another example of creating an anti-migration discourse is a speech from Beata Szydło's successor, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. A week after the European Council summit on June 29th 2018, when member states established the rule of voluntary participation in the relocation schemes¹⁵⁷, Morawiecki traveled to Silesia visiting the historical Jasna Góra Monastery, before arriving in Katowice's Youth Culture Center, to speak to the city's citizens. Critics noted that the majority of his audience was composed of party officials, while few citizens were inside¹⁵⁸. The Prime Minister spoke, among other topics, about his recent victory on the immigration issue in Brussels:

"We want to make sure that Poland can decide who we want and not want to admit, and what the dominating culture in Poland will be. And this is

¹⁵⁶ Kolankiewicz, George, *Towards a Sociology of the Transition...*, p. 96.

¹⁵⁷ 'European Council Conclusions', European Council, 28 June 2018,

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/20180628-euco-conclusions-final/>.

¹⁵⁸ Watoła, Judyta, 'Premier Mateusz Morawiecki w Katowicach mówił głównie do PiS, bo dla innych zabrakło miejsca' (Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki spoke to PiS members in Katowice, there were no free spaces for citizens), *Gazeta Wyborcza Katowice*, 8 July 2018, accessed 5 June 2020, <https://katowice.wyborcza.pl/katowice/7,35063,23650772,premier-mateusz-morawiecki-w-katowicach-mowil-glownie-do.html>.

what we have effectively fought for during the European Council summit. This was achieved in spite of the strong Western European coalition, which wanted to force us to admit refugees in separate contingents. We told them, that it will depend only on us.

(...)

The European Council summit ended with a conclusion that there will be no forced relocation schemes, and that all matters regarding the refuge system require a consensus, which means that they concern Poland as well, therefore no changes will be implemented without the Polish consent. We have achieved an enormous success, and realized all of our goals”^{159 160}.

The selected fragment is not as transparent as some of the other analyzed speeches. Securitization is used covertly - barely noticeable - making it all the more powerful. In stating that Poles should decide “who we want and not want to admit”, Morawiecki hints that welcoming certain people, along with their cultures and traditions, is not beneficial for Poland. The second part of the sentence is a seemingly logical statement: “and what the dominating culture in Poland will be”. An inattentive listener may mistake this statement for a logical consequence of the first part of the sentence. What it purports, however, is that immigrants might attempt to alter the “dominant culture” in Poland, or change it altogether. It is therefore visible how Morawiecki alludes to one of the threats identified by Chebel D’Appollonia and Reich¹⁶¹, namely a threat to civil life due to an increase of noncitizens. The primary focus of the state, should therefore be to preserve the vague concept of the “dominant culture” threatened by culturally alien potential immigrants.

¹⁵⁹ ‘Morawiecki: chcemy dbać o to, żeby państwo polskie decydowało o tym, kogo chcemy przyjmować, kogo nie chcemy’ (Morawiecki: we want to assure that Poland can decide who we want to admit, and who we don’t), TVN24, 9 July 2018, accessed 6 June 2020, https://tvn24.pl/wideo/z-anteny/morawiecki-chcemy-dbac-o-to-zeby-panstwo-polskie-decydowalo-o-tym-kogo-chcemy-przyjmowac-kogo-nie-chcemy,1750103.html?playlist_id=31421.

¹⁶⁰ ‘Premier spotkał się z mieszkańcami Katowic’ (The Prime Minister met with citizens of Katowice), Onet Śląsk, 8 July 2018, accessed 6 June 2020, <https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/slask/mateusz-morawiecki-spotkal-sie-z-mieszkancami-katowic/11khtzp>.

¹⁶¹ Chebel D’Appollonia, Ariane, Reich, Simon, ‘The Securitization of Immigration...’, p. 2.

The rhetoric used by Morawiecki is constructivist. Portrayed as a battle of forces between Poland and the “strong Western European coalition”, the Polish oppositional identity gains merit in the discourse about EU policies being forced upon Poland – a notion commonly used by PiS¹⁶². The Prime Minister underlines the uneven relation between Brussels’ stakeholders and Poland, pointing to the forced nature of relocation schemes as arbitrarily imposed mechanisms. European Council negotiations are being presented as a symbolic battleground of the malevolent Western member states and righteous Poland, defending its basic rights and values. An evident symptom of that is the need to reiterate the relevance of Polish rights within the EU: all matters regarding immigration concern Poland, and will not be implemented without Polish consent. PiS politicians commonly speak of the Polish membership in the EU as second-tier and subordinated to the interests of Germany or France. Morawiecki himself noted Brussels’ “disregard for national sovereignty” as a dangerous flaw of the EU¹⁶³. Recognizing the Polish success in battling this injustice is therefore salient, as it strengthens the notion of reclaiming Poland’s rights in the international system.

Regarding the mythological aspect of Morawiecki’s discourse, one specific historical legacy is relevant – that of the Polish nobility, which enjoyed wide political rights granted by Polish kings since the late fourteenth century¹⁶⁴. In 1505 the nobility passed a law during a parliamentary gathering in Radom, stating that no laws can be passed by the king without the nobles’ consent (in Latin: *nihil novi nisi commune consensu*). The law became known as ‘nihil novi’ and was henceforth commonly used to invoke the proud tradition of Polish nobility. Morawiecki refers to this myth implicitly, stating that “no changes will be implemented without Polish consent”, which symbolically claims that just as Modern Age nobles, Poland, too, will not succumb to a more powerful entity, be it

¹⁶² Barkin, J. Samuel, Sjöberg, Laura, ‘International Relations’ Last Synthesis?...’, p. 9.

¹⁶³ Morawiecki, Mateusz, ‘Poland’s vision for Europe’, Politico, 30 April 2019, accessed 7 June 2020, <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-vision-for-europe-mateusz-morawiecki/>.

¹⁶⁴ Kowalska-Pietrzak, Anna, ‘History of Poland During the Middle Ages’, Institute of History, University of Lodz, (2015), p. 77, <https://core.ac.uk/reader/71989082>.

a king or the European Union. ‘Nihil novi’ apotheosizes the tradition of protest against a higher power, encouraging individuals to take pride in such action. Hinting towards this myth, Morawiecki rightly assessed the symbolic importance of the fight for personal freedoms and used it to justify his actions on the political scene in Brussels. What is more, the symbolism of the Jasna Góra Monastery, as explained by Norman Davies¹⁶⁵, strengthens the overall message of Morawiecki. Visiting a memorial site associated with a victory against a foreign power reinforces the Prime Minister’s words about Poland’s stance on an imposed EU regulation. A visit to Jasna Góra is a subtle, yet visible message that Poland, with its rich history of defending the country from intruders will not fall prey to an unwanted EU policy.

“Poland is not part of the European choir”

The following statement was made by Ryszard Czarnecki, a PiS member, former vice-president of the European Parliament and current member of Parliament in the European Conservatives and Reformists Group. The interview was conducted by Polskie Radio 24 (Polish Radio 24), a news radio station launched by the Polish national radio broadcaster, Polskie Radio, on October 11th 2018, while consultations were held regarding the UN Global Compact for Migration, a non-binding agreement providing basic legal provisions aimed to simplify migration supervision. When asked about the United States and Hungary, who have already refused to sign the pact, Czarnecki stated:

“This is linked to a certain sensitivity of those countries towards illegal migration, especially of Muslims from outside of Europe, and to the EU’s attempts to squeeze those migrants in. Migration processes are a fact. However, every state has the right to its own policy in this respect. Fortunately, Poland is not part of the imprudent and thoughtless European choir, which has praised the multicultural state, disregarding its massive societal, religious and cultural problems.

(...)

¹⁶⁵ Davies, Norman, ‘Polish National Mythologies...’, p. 146.

Our policy will be in accordance with the will of the Polish nation, which does not want immigrants from the outside of Europe, and the subsequent antagonisms, rising crime rates and terrorist attacks that go with it. I repeat, every state has the right to form the shape and course of its migration policy. We can admit Poles and other Christians from former Soviet republics. They would integrate and assimilate much easier in our society”¹⁶⁶.

Czarnecki’s statement is highly securitized. Affirming that multicultural societies possess “massive social, religious and cultural problems” is an attempt to strengthen the association of migration with general social disruption. It hints at two commonly used threats distinguished by Chebel D’Appollonia and Reich: the threat to civil and political life, and the threat to religious, racial and ethnic rights¹⁶⁷. The statement asserts that immigrants give rise to a constant clash of religious or cultural values, which by extension is a claim that states possess a dominant religion or culture, which cannot be in any way challenged. The assumption that migration leads to “rising crime rates and terrorist attacks” is a continuation of associating migration with criminal and terrorist activity. As a result of such an image of migration, Czarnecki justifies Poland’s controversial policy of disagreeing with the United Nations, in the name of defending Poland’s safety. The extraordinary circumstances, therefore, grant politicians the special right to handle this matter, as interpreted by Ole Wæver¹⁶⁸. Though going against the current of the UN might not seem like a prudent political strategy, in this case it is justified by a higher cause, according to Czarnecki, and allows Polish statesmen to take pride in their actions.

The deputy’s statement is a result of PiS’s constructed rhetoric. As outlined before, the party situates itself on the opposite side from Western European ‘political correctness’, and often calls it the source of the EU’s failure.

¹⁶⁶ ‘Ryszard Czarnecki: Polska ma prawo do własnej polityki migracyjnej’ (Ryszard Czarnecki: Poland has the right to its own migration policy), 11 Polskie Radio 24, October 2018, accessed 7 June 2020, <https://www.polskieradio24.pl/130/5925/Artykul/2200898,Ryszard-Czarnecki-Polska-ma-prawo-do-wlasnej-polityki-migracyjnej>.

¹⁶⁷ Chebel D’Appollonia, Ariane, Reich, Simon, ‘The Securitization of Immigration...’, p. 2.

¹⁶⁸ Wæver, Ole, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization...’, p. 6.

His statement echoes the constructivist oppositional identity¹⁶⁹ that PiS politicians often employ. In this case, Czarnecki refers to the “imprudent and thoughtless European choir” guided by its blind infatuation with multicultural states. Recognizing the threats that immigration posed early on, unlike other European states, PiS can now take pride in their swift action and lack of compliance with EU rules. This discourse only exacerbates the notion of EU elites being oblivious to contemporary challenges, which in turn galvanizes Polish decision-makers to disregard the EU as a normative power and play by their own rules. What was crucial in the context of this statement was the role of Donald Trump, a declared inspiration for the Polish government¹⁷⁰. Trump refused to sign the pact early on, which encouraged other leaders to follow¹⁷¹. PiS’s foreign policy mission has been to strengthen Poland’s relations with the USA while distancing itself from the EU. Underlining the right of each state to create its own migration policy, Czarnecki plays into the constructed discourse according to which EU member states may disregard institutional directives, in the case of a higher aim, i.e. defending Poland’s security.

Czarnecki’s statement refers to a common myth discretely. Pointing to Poland’s sensitivity towards “illegal migration, especially of Muslims from outside of Europe”, he brings up the *Antemurale Christianitatis* tradition dating back to Turkish invasions in the 17th century and King Sobieski’s battle of Vienna. According to George Schöpflin, myths are vital instruments in creating a sense of a shared identity, while distinguishing one group from others¹⁷². The long history of Polish apprehension regarding the Muslim culture and religion is, therefore, an element of Poland’s identity building, which may serve to explain

¹⁶⁹ Barkin, J. Samuel, Sjoberg, Laura, ‘International Relations’ Last Synthesis?...', p. 9.

¹⁷⁰ ‘Donald Trump w Polsce: Szydło: Nie boi się mówić jasno i wyraźnie tego, co mówi i PiS’ (Donald Trump in Poland: Szydło: He is not scared to state his opinions loudly and clearly, just like PiS), Newsweek Polska, 5 July 2017, accessed 9 June 2020, <https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/polityka/donald-trump-w-polsce-szydlo-trump-mowi-to-co-pis/nc1q6cr>.

¹⁷¹ Noack, Rick, ‘Why so many nations are suddenly following Trump out of the proposed U.N. migration pact’, The Washington Post, 4 December 2018, accessed 9 June 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/12/04/why-so-many-nations-are-suddenly-following-trump-out-un-migration-pact/>.

¹⁷² Schöpflin, George, ‘The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths’..., p. 21.

its validity among PiS politicians and supporters in the 21st century. Furthermore, the myth of Catholicism being inextricably linked to Polish traditional values and various events in Polish history, finds its place in PiS's discourse as well. Czarnecki mentions that Christian migrants, especially those from post-Soviet states would have an easier time assimilating in Poland. Pointing to such groups is a clear message that only culturally related immigrants are welcome. However, the Polish law's preference for Ukrainians as low-wage seasonal workers¹⁷³, and relatively low number of other CEE state nationals, proves that the "open-arms" rhetoric used by Czarnecki only serves to keep up appearances. It is also a signal to PiS supporters that the government will defend them against "rising crime rates and terrorist attacks", as long as it refuses to be subordinate to lawmakers in Brussels.

Summary of results

The domestic discourse presented in this analysis differs from speaker to speaker, but certain dominating aspects remain. All speakers securitize the dangers that migrants themselves inflict on Europe and, potentially, Poland. While Szydło vivifies her speech with an example of a recent terrorist attack, others are more subtle (Morawiecki, Czarnecki), pointing to cultural and religious barriers, which effectively hinder the civil, cultural and political status quo. The language used by the speakers emphasizes threats by creating a simplified, black-and-white vision of European security. Despite their differences, all four speakers justify resorting to extraordinary measures to deal with the unprecedented danger they describe in their statements.

Similarly, all of the analyzed statements present a constructed view of the political reality of Poland, where Polish identity, true to national and patriotic values is considered opposite to the EU multiculturalism. All statements present migration as a threat that can be avoided – some explicitly say the EU is oblivious

¹⁷³ Kindler, Marta, Kordasiewicz, Anna, Szulecka, Monika, 'Care needs and migration for domestic work: Ukraine-Poland', International Labour Office, (Geneva 2016), p. 15,
http://www.un.org.ua/images/documents/4524/wcms_503749.pdf.

and criticize its praise of the politically correct multicultural policy. Others point to the fact that PiS had recognized the danger of increased immigration years ago, but its warnings had gone unnoticed or were criticized by Brussels policymakers, who only now realize the problems it has created. What is most visible, however, is that all speakers except for Prime Minister Morawiecki openly criticize the EU immigration policy, calling it blind, cowardly or a failure. The difference of the constructed rhetoric between Szydło and Morawiecki is also worth noticing – while the former used a highly Eurosceptic tone, openly criticizing EU policies, the latter is more conciliatory, a change that reflects the immigration scheme's transition from compulsory to voluntary.

All speakers reference popular myths in different ways. While Szydło and Czarnecki explicitly talk of defending Poland from foreign oppressors, and invoke the myth of the Vistula (Szydło) and *Antemurale Christianitatis* (Szydło, Czarnecki), Morawiecki and Dworczyk subtly reference the traditions of Polish nobility, as well as the social effects of transition.

What should be observed is the visible dependency between political rank and the boldness of official political statements. The higher in political hierarchy, the more subtle the message. While Czarnecki may be able to speak frankly about the threat that immigrants pose to Polish society, Morawiecki must phrase it in a much more subtle manner. In this respect, the various statements presented in the above analysis differ in tone and intensity, but reference similar threats, contexts and myths.

V

International discourse analysis

This chapter will analyze statements concerning migration made by Polish officials in an international context. The structure of the analysis will follow the structure of the previous chapter. First, securitization aspects of the speech will be extracted and scrutinized to demonstrate how the use of language creates and presents immigration as a threat. Second, constructivist aspects of the discourse will be traced. Lastly, the references to myths and symbols made by speakers will be studied, to discover how they affect the ultimate point of the statement. This will help to establish what the main instruments are when dealing with a foreign audience, which, in turn, will answer the research question for this chapter.

“These are also migrants”

The following statement was issued by Witold Waszczykowski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2015 to 2018, serving under both Prime Ministers of PiS – Beata Szydło and Mateusz Morawiecki. In August 2017, Waszczykowski was the guest of BBC World News program HARDtalk, hosted by British-Sudanese journalist, Zeinab Badawi. Among issues such as rule of law in Poland, and the Polish-EU relations, Badawi interrogated Waszczykowski on the roots of PiS’s immigration policy. Waszczykowski stated:

“We already have a large number of migrants coming from the Eastern part of Europe. Only last year we issued more than 1,200,000 visas for the Ukrainians, about half a million visas for Belarusians.

(...)

These are also migrants. I don’t know why the migrants coming from the Middle East and North Africa are supposed to be better evaluated and better taken care of by institutions than migrants coming from, also touched by war activity, Ukraine. We are a country that is open for migration, but we disagree with the mechanism of taking decisions about migrants and refugees.

(...)

75% of the Polish population is accepting the policy of the government not to accept the decision of the EU to relocate by force (or resettle by force) people from North Africa and the Middle East. We don't want to commit suicide as politicians, as a government, to go against the public sentiment.

(...)

We discussed this issue, the problem of migrants and refugees for instance, last year in Poland during the visit of Pope Francis. Pope Francis visiting us, delivered a speech in Krakow in the Wawel castle, and he mentioned there are many ways to support, to help, to assist refugees and migrants. And he didn't mention that Poland is supposed to accept thousands of people from Syria or from the Middle East"¹⁷⁴ ¹⁷⁵.

Waszczykowski, as Foreign Minister, is very careful about using securitizing statements in his interview for the British and international public. Over the entire program, he does not call immigrants or refugees a threat of any kind. Instead, justifying the party policy, he recalls that 75% of the population perceives immigration as a security breach, which threatens the safety of the state. As pragmatic politicians, Waszczykowski argues that pushing against the public would be an imprudent political strategy. By stating that the issue is a security problem for a tangible amount of society, Waszczykowski substantiates measures taken by the government to counter EU policies, even though they countered EU law. In this regard, Wæver's theory¹⁷⁶ on securitization as means to abuse power is pertinent.

When defining Poland's identity Waszczykowski is subtle in differentiating Poland from the European Union. Framing it as oppositional identity, as defined by Samuel Barkin and Laura Sjoberg¹⁷⁷, the Foreign Affairs Minister seeks to establish an image of Poland that counters the one

¹⁷⁴ 'HARDtalk Witold Waszczykowski Minister of Foreign Affairs Poland b090f9zr original', YouTube, 13 August 2017, accessed 10 June 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVuLjTgigFE>.

¹⁷⁵ 'HARDtalk, Witold Waszczykowski', BBC World News, 9 August 2017, accessed 10 June 2020, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/n3ct2kkn>.

¹⁷⁶ Wæver, Ole, 'Securitization and Desecuritization'..., p. 6.

¹⁷⁷ Barkin, J. Samuel, Sjoberg, Laura, 'International Relations' Last Synthesis?...', p. 9.

disseminated in foreign media and Brussels. He defines Poland as a country that is “open for migration” and gives factual examples of the number of Ukrainian and Belarusian immigrants that were granted the right to live in Poland. While these numbers are indisputable, Waszczykowski fails to acknowledge the difference between war-torn Middle East and North Africa, and Poland’s Eastern post-Soviet neighbors. The statement “they are also migrants” is a way to mask the obvious differences. The Minister wants to convey that Poland has done its share of accepting foreigners, and therefore cannot be expected to admit even more. Though he does not explicitly criticize the European Union institutions for their immigration policies, his remarks are subtly visible in the argumentation he gives against admitting migrants from further regions. Nevertheless, the Minister’s rhetoric is defensive, rather than offensive in regards to the EU, as it does not blame the latter for opening Europe to migrants – an instrument used by many speakers in the domestic discourse.

Waszczykowski does not explicitly reference any myth, but instead recalls Pope Francis and his visit to Poland to the Wawel castle, a symbolic landmark in Kraków, for centuries the residence of Polish kings. The myth of the authority of the Pope, in matters far surpassing religion, has its roots in the pontificate of John Paul II, whose role as a political guide and inspiration for the Polish workers’ protests in the 1980s cannot be understated. In this case, the Minister justifies the Polish policy, using the Pope’s words as proof that Poland is exempt from EU-wide legislation. While this may be a strong argument for Poles at home, the myth does not hold its ground on the international scene and sounds either absurd or even theocratic. Relying on religious figures in political dilemmas undermines the argument that the Foreign Minister is ultimately trying to make.

“The terror wave is connected with migration”

The following statement was made by Andrzej Duda, President of Poland since 2015, in Valletta, Malta, where he attended the summit of the Arraiolos Group – an association of EU member states with a parliamentary or semi-presidential system. During a debate on 15th September 2017, concerning the issue of security and the migration crisis, President Duda stated:

"If the EU continues to base itself in internal and external contacts on far-reaching political correctness, which I would rather call naivety, then we will not solve the problem. What we need is cooperation and solidarity, which is necessary to take decisive actions.

(...)

The growing terror wave is connected with migration. There is evidence so rather no one in Europe can have doubts.

(...)

It is necessary to conduct a tough identification policy of these people, and we are ready to cooperate in this field. I would like us to solve this crisis through decisive action, I hope that it will be a lesson for the future, that there are issues that can be foreseen, and events that can be countered with an action plan at any moment"^{178 179}.

The President's speech bears a highly securitizing tone. Duda links the growing number of terrorist attacks with the rising immigration rates in Europe, basing the statement on ostensible evidence, which he does not identify, but only refers to. The connection made by the President, regardless of its factual validity, refers to the discourse on immigration as an existential threat to societies, as explained by Huysmans¹⁸⁰. Though he does not state explicitly that terrorism "derives from" migration, but suggests it "is connected" instead, the statement is an act of securitization because it facilitates the justification of special measures to combat immigration – as described by Wæver¹⁸¹. By drawing the line from immigrants to terrorists, Duda unifies the image of migrants, disregarding individual traits, circumstances and reasons for emigrating. This way, he justifies

¹⁷⁸ 'President: Terror wave undoubtedly connected with migration', Prezydent.pl, 15 September 2017, accessed 12 June 2020, <https://www.prezydent.pl/en/news/art,560,president-terror-wave-undoubtedly-connected-with-migration.html>.

¹⁷⁹ 'Prezydent: nie mam wątpliwości, że fala terroryzmu wiąże się z migracją' (President: I have no doubt that the terrorism wave is connected to migration), Polish Press Agency (PAP), 15 September 2017, accessed 12 June 2020, <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news,1085501,prezydent-nie-mam-watpliwosci-ze-fala-terroryzmu-wiaze-sie-z-migracja-.html>.

¹⁸⁰ Huysmans, Jef, 'Defining social constructivism...', p. 45.

¹⁸¹ Wæver, Ole, 'Securitization and Desecuritization...', p. 6.

Poland's hostile policy, while maintaining an outward appearance of concern for the safety of Polish citizens.

The President's statement directly refers to the intersubjective identity – a collective understanding of political reality, as defined by constructivists, Barkin and Sjoberg¹⁸² – already seen in previous examples. Duda openly criticizes the EU for its political correctness and naivety, echoing Prime Minister Beata Szydło's words in Parliament in May of the same year¹⁸³. In doing so, he refers to a discourse which defines Polish identity as oppositional to the European Union¹⁸⁴. The latter is portrayed as slow-paced, inattentive to contemporary challenges and blinded by certain political norms. The President juxtaposes this image of the EU with the image of Poland as shrewd, decisive and realist. By framing the actors in such a way, he then proceeds to claim that the aforementioned "crisis" needs to be "solved". This implicates that measures taken by the Polish government, such as screening and sending troops to EU borders¹⁸⁵, should be implemented. According to the President's discourse, Poland's readiness and eagerness to help outweighs its reluctance to admit immigrants and is therefore presented as a better strategy, opposite to the EU's naive and inefficient scheme.

Regarding the myths used in Andrzej Duda's statement, there are no direct references to commonly used symbols. This may derive from the fact that speaking in an EU-environment, to EU politicians and diplomats, Duda did not need such an instrument for his message. A lack of mythological references may also be an indication of the conceptualized strategy of PiS, which matches the discourse to the recipient audience. In this case, mentioning Polish historical symbols or figures, which refer to a common cultural identity, would prove inefficient and would be misunderstood by an audience unfamiliar with their context.

¹⁸² Barkin, J. Samuel, Sjoberg, Laura, 'International Relations' Last Synthesis?...', p. 17.

¹⁸³ p. 36.

¹⁸⁴ Barkin, J. Samuel, Sjoberg, Laura, 'International Relations' Last Synthesis?...', p. 9.

¹⁸⁵ 'President: Terror wave undoubtedly connected with migration...', Prezydent.pl, 15 September 2017.

“I respect the diversity of European states, but...”

The next statement is one made by Jacek Czaputowicz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs since January 2018, replacing Witold Waszczykowski in Prime Minister Morawiecki's government. The new Foreign Affairs Minister visited France in April 2018, where he was interviewed by *Le Figaro*, a conservative daily newspaper, with the second-largest readership in France¹⁸⁶. The Minister talked about French and Polish involvement in NATO, his views on Macron's vision of Europe, and the Polish attitude towards the EU migration scheme. Czaputowicz stated:

“We think that the migration problem should be resolved on the spot, at its source – by helping states in the region such as Lebanon to receive refugees, by supporting the Turkish mechanism of limiting migration flows, by assisting Libya in protecting the European border. Poland is not a stranger to immigration, as it admits over one million Ukrainians, forty thousand of which are from Donbas. Apart from that, we have admitted 2700 migrants from Western Europe. But they don't want to stay in Poland, where the average living standard is relatively low.

LF: Do you have an impression that the Polish opinion is being heard by Western Europe, especially by Germany?

Yes, as Angela Merkel has affirmed that there are numerous ways of dealing with this crisis and that the Polish point of view should be heard and taken under consideration. There is a change. But the West and the East continue to have differing opinions on this question. Poland, as other states from Eastern Europe, was completely closed during the Communist regime. It is normal, then, that the level of tolerance towards such differences varies from that in the West. Poland is not a multiethnic society. The government is trying to reflect the society's anxiety and fears. Personally, I respect the diversity that Western European states profess, just as I respect Angela

¹⁸⁶ ‘Portfolio’, *Le Figaro*,
<https://www.internationalmediasales.net/international/portfolio/detail/le-figaro/>.

Merkel's gesture of openness towards migrants. But the Polish society needs more time to accept such diversity"¹⁸⁷.

The securitization tactic employed by Czaputowicz resembles that of his predecessor, Witold Waszczykowski¹⁸⁸. Both ministers used the public's fear and apprehension towards migrants as means of securitization, which fits in perfectly with the theory of Huysmans, who asserted that a merely defining something as a threat, regardless of its actual validity, creates a securitizing discourse¹⁸⁹. In this case, Czaputowicz tries to distinguish himself from the public opinion, revealing his personal view on the subject. However, drawing on the homogeneity of the Polish society, he attempts to explain the public's anxiety with historical facts: Poland has been kept a homogenous state for decades, which is why an increased number of incomers would undermine the feeling of public safety. In a subtle manner, Czaputowicz's statement implies that migrants induce a disruption to public safety, and should be kept at bay as long as the Polish society is not ready.

The statement creates an oppositional identity and uses it to distinguish differences in opinions and histories between two groups – Western and Eastern Europe. According to constructivists, differing identities can point to a subsequent difference in behavior¹⁹⁰. Czaputowicz underlines the historical circumstances that had led to a diverging policy towards immigration in the present. It is discernible that Czaputowicz wants to underline Poland's efforts to deal with the migration crisis. Aside from presenting Poland's views on foreign aid to third states, he also signals that Poland is not as closed at the West portrays it – aside from a million Ukrainians, it has also admitted 2700 other immigrants. What he failed to reveal, however, was that the migrants were not part of any EU relocation scheme, but were returned to Poland as the country of

¹⁸⁷ Lasserre, Isabelle, 'Jacek Czaputowicz: <Il fait résoudre le problème de l'immigration à la source>', Le Figaro, 5 April 2018, accessed 20 June 2020, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2018/04/05/01003-20180405ARTFIG00319-jacek-czaputowiczil-faut-resoudre-le-probleme-de-l-immigration-a-la-source.php>.

¹⁸⁸ p. 49.

¹⁸⁹ Huysmans, Jef, 'Defining social constructivism...', p. 45.

¹⁹⁰ Barkin, J. Samuel, Sjöberg, Laura, 'International Relations' Last Synthesis?...', p. 9.

first entry to the EU, as a result of being deported from other EU member states¹⁹¹. Czaputowicz differentiates the East and West of Europe, and tries to justify Poland's lack of action with numbers of admitted migrants. Just like Andrzej Duda in the previous statement, he presents the European Union as opposed to the interests of Eastern European states. His conciliatory tone, however, proves that he does not want to cause more conflict over this matter.

Czaputowicz refers to the Communist era as a common history shared by Eastern European states. Though he does it in a subtle way, the myth of Soviet oppression is a tool to justify the Eastern states' attitude towards immigrants. The Minister explains to a foreign audience, that years of living under a Communist regime in a homogenous society has in a considerable way affected citizens who perceive such a national composition as the norm. While Western audiences are experiencing the opposite, Czaputowicz tries to soften the image of Polish politicians, describing them as attentive to the society and its fears. Their harsh immigration policy is therefore not an act against people in dire need, but a sign of care and guardianship to their own people.

“We don't want anyone forcing anything on us again”

The last statement analyzed is one of Stanisław Karczewski, a PiS party member, Senator, former Marshall of the Senate (from 2015 to 2019) and current Deputy Marshall of the Senate. In July 2018, Karczewski was interviewed by Deutsche Welle, a German independent international broadcaster. The speaker was asked how the Polish stance on refusing to admit refugees fits into its commitment to Europe:

“Do those who criticize know that more than two million Ukrainians have come to Poland over the past two years? Many politicians in the EU do not

¹⁹¹ ‘Statement on Twitter of Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, @PolandMFA, 11 April 2018, accessed 21 June 2020, https://twitter.com/MSZ_RP/status/984042632899907590?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E984042632899907590%7Ctwgr%5E&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwpolityce.pl%2Fpolityka%2F389790-oswiadczenie-msz-ws-slow-czaputowicza-w-le-figaro-wypowiedz-nie-dot-mechanizmu-przymusowej-relokacji-kopcinska-zostala-zle-zinterpretowana.

know this. It is not a question of quotas or the distribution of migrants, but of choosing the model of society in which we want to live. We see what is happening in the world — in Germany, France — where parallel societies exist that do not want to integrate because they are committed to different values. Poland welcomes Ukrainians because they are very likely to respect our values.

It must be in the interest of all EU countries to better protect the external borders and support the people in their countries of origin.

(...)

And another thing: Poland was on the other side of the Iron Curtain for decades. The Soviet Union forced its will on us. We had to do what they wanted. That's why we don't want anyone forcing anything on us again.

DW: You are comparing Brussels with the Kremlin, though indirectly?

That's your comparison. I'm speaking about historic facts. We Polish people very much love and respect freedom”¹⁹².

The presented statement is cautious in its way of securitizing immigrants. Instead of calling incomers a threat, Karczewski relies on incompatible and “different values” as a euphemism for “foreign” and “unwanted” values that do not fuse well with the Polish society. Drawing on the example of Ukrainians, just as Waszczykowski¹⁹³ and Czarnecki¹⁹⁴ have, the speaker suggests that migrants from the East of Poland are safer to admit, as they will not disrupt civil and political life – one of the main objects threatened by increased immigration, as defined by Chebel D’Appollonia and Reich¹⁹⁵. Karczewski recalls France and Germany as examples of a failure in assimilation policies, which resulted in “parallel societies” living next to each other, but not together as one nation. This argument can be traced to an understated, but critical notion of the homogeneity of Polish society, which in 2019 had the second-lowest share of non-nationals in

¹⁹² Dudek, Bartosz, Biskup, Harald, ‘Polish Senate speaker: We are not anti-Europe’, Deutsche Welle, 24 July 2018, accessed 22 June 2020, <https://www.dw.com/en/polish-senate-speaker-we-are-not-anti-europe/a-44794946>.

¹⁹³ p. 49.

¹⁹⁴ p. 44.

¹⁹⁵ Chebel D’Appollonia, Ariane, Reich, Simon, ‘The Securitization of Immigration...’, p. 2.

the EU member states¹⁹⁶. Seeing as Karczewski is speaking to a foreign audience, he does not expressly call migrants a threat. Instead, he suggests that a transition from homogenous to an ethnically mixed society would result in disruption and a conflict of values in Poland. This, in turn, justifies his call for increased border protection and support for tormented societies in their countries of origin, not in the EU. Without pointing to the source of fear and anxiety among Polish citizens, he tries to explain the Polish policy in terms understandable to a Western European audience which values peacefully coexisting societies. Karczewski's discourse is a way to reverse the problem, presenting it as a domestic matter, where the society is at stake, rather than an international one.

In his interview, Karczewski focuses on the constructivist notion of oppositional identity, described by Barkin and Sjoberg¹⁹⁷. Starting with an accusation towards the EU politicians for their obliviousness on the Polish immigration policy, he focuses on showing the difference between Poland and other member states on this topic. In doing so, Karczewski presents the issue of admitting refugees not in terms of legal compliance with EU regulations, but as a matter of sovereignty and the freedom to shape one's political reality. Discrediting Germany and France, who have failed in their attempts to safeguard their national values, he justifies Poland's attempts to protect its society from division and foreign influence. Defending Poland's stark policy against admitting refugees, Karczewski invokes the two million Ukrainians that live in Poland. While this fact cannot be disputed, the speaker makes no effort to hide the reason behind such a policy: "they are very likely to respect our values". Intentionally creating a discourse of "us" and "them", the speaker unintentionally reveals that prejudice and fear are in fact at the roots of the government's immigration policy.

Regarding the usage of common myths, Karczewski references one particularly potent one, that of Poland under occupation. While he specifically points to the Communist regime in Poland which lasted over 50 years, the myth has its roots in the partition of Poland by Austria, Prussia and Russia in the late

¹⁹⁶ 'Migration and migrant population statistics', Eurostat, 19 June 2020, p. 11, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/1275.pdf>.

¹⁹⁷ Barkin, J. Samuel, Sjoberg, Laura, 'International Relations' Last Synthesis?...', p. 9.

18th century – a stage when the Polish state did not exist for 123 years. The sentiment of living under foreign and imposed rule is one that is historically salient to the Polish experience and omnipresent in cultural references. Recalling the Communist regime's influence over Poland, Karczewski subtly compares it to the position Poland is in with the European Union. While he later denies it, his tone suggests that past suffering has given Poland the right to decide about domestic matters and resist any outside influence. Having endured so much historical damage, considering the Senator's words, Poland has a right to exercise its imminent prerogative: the freedom to make its own choices.

Summary of results

Domestic and international discourse differ significantly. In the case of the latter, securitization statements are visibly less distinct. Except for President Duda, none of the speakers explicitly call immigrants a threat, but merely point to the Polish society as unaccustomed to and fearful of incomers. In this regard their securitization attempts are harder to distinguish but are nevertheless present. What proves Wæver's theory on power abuse as a result or desired effect of securitization is that every speaker analyzed in this chapter attempted to justify the Polish policy on immigration, thereby legitimizing an abuse of Poland's rights as an EU member state.

All four speakers emphasize the constructivist notion of oppositional identity, dissociating values that guide Polish politicians from those employed by other EU member states. At the same time, all four statements accent the historical and cultural differences between Eastern and Western European states, thus presenting the Polish policy as congruent with the peculiarity of the entire region. Czaputowicz¹⁹⁸ explicitly refers to Western European states and their differing approach to immigration, while Karczewski¹⁹⁹ singles out Germany and France, as examples of policy failures that Poland should not follow. Almost all speakers reference Ukrainians, as a group of immigrants welcomed by the Polish society and state. Failing to acknowledge the difference

¹⁹⁸ p. 52.

¹⁹⁹ p. 55.

between migrants from the Middle East and Ukraine, speakers try to shed a more positive light on the negative perception of Polish policies in the EU. While the identities of Poland and the EU are opposed in this discourse, most speakers use a conciliatory tone and avoid attacking the EU for the migration crisis, as was common in the domestic discourse. President Duda is an exception to that. Escaping the correlation between hierarchy and strength of used language, he fiercely condemns the EU for its “political correctness” and “naivety”²⁰⁰, and explicitly describes migrants as the cause of terrorism.

The use of myths varies greatly from the previous part of the analysis. While subtle references are still present in some speeches, others bear no sign of them, which signals that myths can be considered an instrument for communicating with the domestic audience, rather than the EU one. While President Duda and Foreign Minister Waszczykowski don’t invoke any myths, Czaputowicz and Karczewski refer to the myth of the Communist regime in Poland, albeit in two different ways. The first focuses on the impact of socialism in Poland and Eastern Europe on the social demographic. Recalling the restrictive Soviet migration policies, Czaputowicz aims to explain the current homogeneity and resulting xenophobia among Polish society. Karczewski, approaches this myth differently, recalling the long history of Poland being oppressed by foreign powers. As a result of this legacy, he asserts that Poland should now be given the freedom to make decisions by itself.

This part of the analysis demonstrates that all three theories – securitization, constructivism and myths – emphasize the individuality of the Polish nation, using this as a justification of Poland’s policy in the eyes of international observers.

²⁰⁰ p. 50.

VI

Conclusion

While the topic of migration is a controversial issue in most of the European Union member states, it is uncontestable that the PiS government's approach to it is far from neutral. The analysis conducted in this thesis proves that discourse disseminated to a domestic audience significantly differs from that directed to EU policymakers, as the hypothesis had anticipated.

In the second chapter, it was demonstrated that constructivism and securitization theory are useful in building a discursive reality and constructing threats. Examining the constructivist approach to politics revealed that state identity is built based on shared notions and meanings, which are then created and spread through the use of language. Political discourse is, therefore, the effect of a constructed view of the reality of a given identity group. Securitization theory, in turn, explains how certain images are projected as threats through a consistent use of discourses, affecting the public perception of issues. The theory describes how the threat-building strategy can lead to the abuse of power, and points to the menace of employing such a strategy.

The third chapter succeeded in explaining the historical and societal factors that influence the perception of migration in Poland. The historical overview of migration to Poland from 1945 to the present helped demonstrate that the issue was absent both in the discourse and public policies up until 1989, and even then, was loosely defined. As a state with a long history of emigration, Poland had little experience in integration policies. The political transition resulted in mass disenchantment with capitalism, an increased fear for the future, and a sense of betrayal by the state. Such political reality induced the spread of national myths about Poland's link to Catholicism and a sense of victimhood among stronger states. Reinforcing the threat of "westernization", it reintroduced the notion of an external security threat. The historical and discursive changes brought by the transition period and dissemination of popular myths are both factors that influenced the political discourse on migration.

The fourth chapter expanded on PiS's discourse in Poland. Statements dominating the domestic discourse portrayed immigrants as an existential threat to the Polish economy, public safety and national culture. Migrants were presented as outsiders aiming to destabilize the country, rather than people in dire need of help. They underlined the political failure of the EU in battling the crisis, justifying the Polish method of closing borders, and undermining the EU's authority as guardian of Europe's territory. Moreover, the speakers made use of a series of references to Polish history and culture, clearly aimed at mobilizing nationalist attitudes among the public audience, which in turn would lead to support of the government's policy.

The fifth chapter focused on EU-orientated discourse. Here, PiS politicians avoided framing immigrants as a direct threat, blaming their securitizing policy on the Polish public's sentiments. Eschewing their contempt for the EU relocation system, they underlined historical differences between the East and West, hoping to defend their unpopular stance from criticism in Western liberal societies and political circles.

The hypothesis assumed at the beginning of the thesis proved to be correct. The domestic discourse strongly securitized the threat of migration, using historical and mythological references to galvanize the Polish position towards the EU. By contrast, the EU-oriented discourse was more conciliatory, focusing on framing Poland as the victim of European politics in the past. Some speeches to EU actors escaped the correlation described in the hypothesis, however the general difference between the two discourses proves that the initial assumption in the hypothesis was correct.

The ramifications of these findings far surpass the individual case study presented in the analysis. The recent reelection of PiS's president, Andrzej Duda, proves that the party enjoys significant popular support, despite the opposition's best efforts to forge liberal policies. By continuously building up the national identity with symbolic and mythical instruments, repeatedly delegitimizing the authority of the EU, and persistently securitizing the image of migrants, the party becomes almost immune to criticism. The opposition's and Western media's arguments fail to convince PiS supporters who have been continuously told that the West cannot handle migration, and that its societies fall prey to terrorist

attacks. Furthermore, the EU's negative remarks on the Polish migration policy only exacerbate the resentment for the institution and its "imposed" policies, strengthening PiS's mandate to oppose them. This, in turn, leads to a dangerous precedent, in which the party in power becomes resistant to criticism and subordination to binding EU law, which can lead to future abuse of power. While the analysis focused on the specific case study of migration, with the rise of conservative powers in Europe, this phenomenon may reappear in other sectors. A close study of the varied use of language in domestic and international politics provides insight into the very notion of creating the image of power and authority among different actors.

The results of this analysis are of crucial importance to EU policymakers who struggle with adopting an effective strategy towards member states such as Poland and Hungary – both accused of breaching rule of law. The findings demonstrate clearly that PiS policymakers are presenting a two-sided strategy regarding migration, which sets their dispute with the EU at an impasse. A solution that derives from the results of this thesis for the EU, is to engage in a constructive debate on migration with Poland, where its distinct circumstances and position would be heard. With rising abuse of power in EU member states, it is up to the EU to take necessary actions to preserve the existing order and avoid future membership withdrawals resulting from unmet expectations. This is not to say, however, that the EU should accommodate all states' demands for the sake of unity. Retaining its position, it should act as a positive and reinforcing power, guiding member states who have derailed from EU values.

This analysis may serve as a starting point for further research on the use of discourse in shaping policy. Researchers focused on Poland can explore other areas where a discrepancy between domestic and EU-oriented discourse demonstrates how language use drives power abuse on different policy levels. EU-oriented academics may use this analysis as a point of reference for exploring the effect that discursive undermining of the EU's authority has on compliance with EU regulations. The analysis may also initiate projections of the EU migration policy in the future, should conservative governments, such as the Polish one, continue with its stern policies.

It is now possible to answer the research question, posed in the beginning of the thesis, with the conclusion that PiS projects a securitized vision of migration and a constructed, mythologized identity in its discourse on migration. The visible difference in discourses used for the domestic and EU-audiences marks the line of potential disruption that this work attempted to point to.

Bibliography

Primary sources

'Commission Recommendation of 8.6.2015 on a European resettlement scheme', Brussels, 8 June 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/asylum/general/docs/recommendation_on_a_european_resettlement_scheme_en.pdf.

'Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece', EUR-Lex, 15 September 2015, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AJOL_2015_239_R_0011.

'Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece', EUR-Lex, 24 September 2015, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015D1601>.

'Donald Trump w Polsce: Szydło: Nie boi się mówić jasno i wyrażnie tego, co mówi i PiS' (Donald Trump in Poland: Szydło: He is not scared to state his opinions loudly and clearly, just like PiS), Newsweek Polska, 5 July 2017, accessed 9 June 2020, <https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/polityka/donald-trump-w-polsce-szydlo-trump-mowi-to-co-pis/nc1q6cr>.

Dudek, Bartosz, Biskup, Harald, 'Polish Senate speaker: We are not anti-Europe', Deutsche Welle, 24 July 2018, accessed 22 June 2020, <https://www.dw.com/en/polish-senate-speaker-we-are-not-anti-europe/a-44794946>.

'European Council Conclusions', European Council, 28 June 2018, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/20180628-euco-conclusions-final/>.

'HARDtalk Witold Waszczykowski Minister of Foreign Affairs Poland b090f9zr original', YouTube, 13 August 2017, accessed 10 June 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVuLjTgigFE>.

'HARDtalk, Witold Waszczykowski', BBC World News, 9 August 2017, accessed 10 June 2020, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/n3ct2kkn>.

'Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship', Eurostat, 5 March 2020, <https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>.

'Immigration by persons', Eurostat, 5 March 2020, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00176/default/line?lang=en>.

'Judgment in Joined Cases C-715/17, C-718/17 and C-719/17 Commission v Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Court of Justice of the European Union', 2 April 2020, <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-04/cp200040en.pdf>.

'Komunikat Centrum Informacyjnego Rządu w związku z wyrokiem TSUE w sprawie relokacji uchodźców' (Message from the Government Information Centre about the ECJ verdict on refugee relocation), Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland, 2 April 2020, <https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/komunikat-centrum-informacyjnego-rzadu-w-zwiazku-z-wyrokiem-tsue-w-sprawie-relokacji-uchodzcow>.

Kurdupski, Michał, 'Krótszy czas oglądania telewizji w 2016 roku. Polsat wyprzedził TVP1 (raport)' (Shorter screen time in 2016. Polsat has outrun TVP1), Wirtualnemedi.pl, 3 January 2017, accessed 4 June 2020, <https://www.wirtualnemedi.pl/arttykul/krotszy-czas-ogladania-telewizji-w-2016-roku-polsat-wyprzedzil-tvp1-raport>.

Lasserre, Isabelle, 'Jacek Czaputowicz: „Il fait résoudre le problème de l'immigration à la source”', Le Figaro, 5 April 2018, accessed 20 June 2020, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2018/04/05/01003-20180405ARTFIG00319-jacek-czaputowiczil-faut-resoudre-le-probleme-de-l-immigration-a-la-source.php>.

'Main directions of emigration and immigration in the years 1966-2018 (migration for permanent residence)', Statistics Poland, 9 July 2019, <https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/population/international-migration/>.

'Migration and migrant population statistics', Eurostat, 19 June 2020, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/1275.pdf>.

Morawiecki, Mateusz, 'Poland's vision for Europe', Politico, 30 April 2019, accessed 7 June 2020, <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-vision-for-europe-mateusz-morawiecki/>.

'Morawiecki: chcemy dbać o to, żeby państwo polskie decydowało o tym, kogo chcemy przyjmować, kogo nie chcemy' (Morawiecki: we want to assure that Poland can decide who we want to admit, and who we don't), TVN24, 9 July 2018, accessed 6 June 2020, https://tvn24.pl/wideo/z-anten/morawiecki-chcemy-dbac-o-to-zeby-panstwo-polskie-decydowalo-o-tym-kogo-chcemy-przyjmowac-kogo-nie-chcemy,1750103.html?playlist_id=31421.

Noack, Rick, 'Why so many nations are suddenly following Trump out of the proposed U.N. migration pact', The Washington Post, 4 December 2018, accessed 9 June 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/12/04/why-so-many-nations-are-suddenly-following-trump-out-un-migration-pact/>.

'Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania' (Polish migration policy – the present state and proposed action), Ministry of the Interior and Administration, European Migration Network Poland, 20 July 2011, <https://www.emn.gov.pl/>.

'Polityka migracyjna Polski' (Polish migration policy), Ministry of the Interior and Administration, 10 June 2019, <https://interwencjaprawna.pl/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Polityka-migracyjna-Polski-wersja-ostateczna.pdf>.

'Premier Beata Szydło: Nie ma nic cenniejszego niż bezpieczeństwo ojczyzny i naszych obywateli' (Prime Minister Beata Szydło: There is nothing more valuable than the safety of our nation and our citizens), Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland, 24 May 2017, <https://www.premier.gov.pl/multimedia/wideo/premier-beata-szydlo-nie-ma-nic-cenniejszego-niz-bezpieczenstwo-ojczyzny-i-naszyc.html>.

'Premier spotkał się z mieszkańcami Katowic' (The Prime Minister met with citizens of Katowice), Onet Śląsk, 8 July 2018, accessed 6 June 2020, <https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/slask/mateusz-morawiecki-spotkal-sie-z-mieszkancami-katowic/11khtzp>.

'President: Terror wave undoubtedly connected with migration', Prezydent.pl, 15 September 2017, accessed 12 June 2020, <https://www.prezydent.pl/en/news/art,560,president-terror-wave-undoubtedly-connected-with-migration.html>.

'Prezydent: nie mam wątpliwości, że fala terroryzmu wiąże się z migracją' (President: I have no doubt that the terrorism wave is connected to migration), Polish Press Agency (PAP), 15 September 2017, accessed 12 June 2020, <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news,1085501,prezydent-nie-mam-watpliwosci-ze-fala-terroryzmu-wiaze-sie-z-migracja-.html>.

'"Rekonstrukcja rządu się uciera"' („The government reconstruction is gaining acceptance”), TVN24, 2 January 2018, accessed 4 June 2020, <https://tvn24.pl/polska/rekonstrukcja-rzadu-sie-uciera-michal-dworczyk-w-jeden-na-jeden-ra802886-2319851>.

'Ryszard Czarnecki: Polska ma prawo do własnej polityki migracyjnej' (Ryszard Czarnecki: Poland has the right to its own migration policy), 11 Polskie Radio 24, October 2018, accessed 7 June 2020, <https://www.polskieradio24.pl/130/5925/Artykul/2200898,Ryszard-Czarnecki-Polska-ma-prawo-do-wlasnej-polityki-migracyjnej>.

Statement on Twitter of EU Commissioner for Migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos, @Avramopoulos, 27 September 2017, accessed 2 June 2020, https://twitter.com/Avramopoulos/status/912991035554492416?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E912991035554492416&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.euractiv.com%2Fsection%2Fjustice-home-affairs%2Fnews%2Fcommission-moves-from-mandatory-refugee-relocations-to-voluntary-resettlement%2F.

Statement on Twitter of Ministry of Foreign Affairs', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, @PolandMFA, 11 April 2018, accessed 21 June 2020, https://twitter.com/MSZ_RP/status/984042632899907590?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E984042632899907590%7Ctwgr%5E&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwpolityce.pl%2Fpolityka%2F389790-oswiadczenie-msz-ws-slow-czaputowicza-w-le-figaro-wypowiedz-nie-dot-mechanizmu-przymusowej-relokacji-kopcinska-zostala-zle-zinterpretowana.

'The Mediterranean Migration Crisis. Why People Flee, What the EU Should Do', Human Rights Watch, 19 June 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/19/mediterranean-migration-crisis/why-people-flee-what-eu-should-do>.

Watoła, Judyta, 'Premier Mateusz Morawiecki w Katowicach mówił głównie do PiS, bo dla innych zabrakło miejsca' (Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki spoke to PiS members in Katowice, there were no free spaces for citizens), Gazeta Wyborcza, 8 July 2018, accessed 5 June 2020, <https://katowice.wyborcza.pl/katowice/7,35063,23650772,premier-mateusz-morawiecki-w-katowicach-mowil-glownie-do.html>.

'Why Will Poland not take in any Muslims?', Al Jazeera, 8 November 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/upfront/2019/11/won-poland-muslims-191108004853741.html>.

Secondary sources

Ágh, Attila, 'Cultural War and Reinventing the Past in Poland and Hungary: The Politics of Historical Memory in East-Central Europe', *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, vol. 45, (2016).

Balcer, Adam, Buras, Piotr, Gromadzki, Grzegorz, Smolar, Eugeniusz, 'Change in Poland, but what change? Assumptions of Law and Justice party foreign policy', Stefan Batory Foundation, (2016),
<https://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Otwarta%20Europa/Change%20in%20Poland.pdf>.

Balzacq, Thierry, 'A theory of securitization: Origins, core assumptions, and variants', in: Balzacq, Thierry, *Securitization Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, Routledge, (London 2010).

Barkin, J. Samuel, Sjoberg, Laura, 'International Relations' Last Synthesis?: Decoupling Constructivist and Critical Approaches', Oxford Scholarship Online (2019), <https://www-oxfordscholarship-com.proxy.library.uu.nl/view/10.1093/oso/9780190463427.001.0001/oso-9780190463427-chapter-3>.

Bilgic, Ali, 'Securitization of Immigration and Asylum: A Critical Look at Security Structure in Europe', University of Lund, (2006).

Buzan, Barry, Hansen, Lene, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, (2009).

Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole, de Wilde, Jaap, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner, (London 1998).

Cap, Piotr, 'Aspects of threat construction in the Polish anti-immigration discourse', in: Viola, Lorella, Musolff, Andreas, *Migration and Media. Discourses about identities in crisis*, John Benjamins Publishing Company, (2019).

Charrett, Catherine, 'A Critical Application of Securitization Theory: Overcoming the Normative Dilemma of Writing Security', International Catalan Institute for Peace, (Barcelona 2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884149.

Chebel D'Appollonia, Ariane, Reich, Simon, 'The Securitization of Immigration. Multiple Countries, Multiple Dimensions', in: Chebel D'Appollonia, Ariane, Reich, Simon, *Immigration, Integration and Security. America and Europe in Comparative Perspective*, University of Pittsburgh Press, (2008).

Checkel, Jeffrey, 'Constructivist Approaches to European Integration', in: Jorgensen, Knud Erik, Pollack, Mark, Rosamond, Ben, *The SAGE Handbook of European Union Politics*, Sage Publications, (2007), <http://www.follesdal.net/projects/ratify/TXT/Checkel-SageHandbookChapter.pdf>.

Davies, Norman, 'Polish National Mythologies', in: Hosking, Geoffrey, Schöpflin, George, *Myths and Nationhood*, Routledge, (New York 1997).

Duszczyk, Maciej, Podgórska, Karolina, Pszczółkowska, Dominika, 'From mandatory to voluntary. Impact of V4 on the EU relocation scheme', *European Politics and Society*, (2019).

Dyson, Tom, Konstadinides, Theodore, *European Defence Cooperation in EU Law and IR Theory*, Palgrave Macmillan, (London 2013).

Farrell, Theo, 'Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2002).

Fihel, Agnieszka, Kaczmarczyk, Paweł, Stefańska, Renata, 'Recent Trends in International Migration in Poland', *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 1, no. 1, (2012).

Finnemore, Martha, Sikkink, Kathryn, 'Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 4, (2001).

Grzelak-Kostulska, Elżbieta, Hołowiecki, Marcin, Szymańska, Daniela, 'Migracje stałe do Polski w okresie transformacji ustrojowej' (Permanent migration to Poland during the transition period), in: Szymańska, Daniela, *Ruchliwość przestrzenna ludności w okresie przemian ustrojowych*, (Toruń 1998).

Grzymała-Kazłowska, Aleksandra, 'The role of different forms of bridging capital for immigrant adaptation and upward mobility. The case of Ukrainian and Vietnamese immigrants settled in Poland', *Ethnicities*, vol. 15, no. 3 (2015).

Howell, Alison, Richter-Montpetit, Melanie, 'Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 51, No.1, (2020).

Huysmans, Jef, 'Defining social constructivism in security studies: the normative dilemma of writing security', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Vol. 27, Sage Publications, (2002).

Iglicka, Krystyna, 'Mechanisms of migration from Poland before and during the transition period', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 26, no. 1, (2000).

Iglicka, Krystyna, 'Poland', in: Triandafyllidou, Anna, Gropas, Ruby, *European Immigration: a sourcebook*, Ashgate Publishing, (2007).

Jakniūnaitė, Dovilė, 'Critical Security Studies in the 21st Century: Any Directions for Lithuanian Security Studies?', *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review*, Vol. 12, (2013-2014).

Jaskułowski, Krzysztof, *The Everyday Politics of Migration Crisis in Poland. Between Nationalism, Fear and Empathy*, (Warsaw 2019).

Jorgensen, Marianne, Phillips, Louise, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, Sage Publications, (2002).

Józefik, Barbara, Szwejca, Krzysztof, 'Polish myths and their deconstruction in the context of Polish-Jewish relations', *Archives of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy*, (2011).

Jung, Hoyoon, 'The Evolution of Social Constructivism in Political Science: Past to Present', *SAGE Open*, (2019),
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2158244019832703>.

Kindler, Marta, Kordasiewicz, Anna, Szulecka, Monika, 'Care needs and migration for domestic work: Ukraine-Poland', International Labour Office, (Geneva 2016),
http://www.un.org.ua/images/documents/4524/wcms_503749.pdf.

Kolankiewicz, George, *Towards a Sociology of the Transition. Rights, Resources, and Social Integration in Poland*, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies, (2000), <https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/24830/2/SSEES0031.pdf>.

Koss-Goryszewska, Maryla, Pawlak, Mikołaj, 'Integration of Migrants in Poland: Contradictions and Imaginations', in: Kucharczyk, Jacek, Mesežnikov, Grigorij, *Phantom Menace: The Politics and Policies of Migration in Central Europe*, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, (2018).

Kowalska-Pietrzak, Anna, 'History of Poland During the Middle Ages', Institute of History, University of Lodz, (2015), <https://core.ac.uk/reader/71989082>.

Kozdra, Jan Ryszard, "'What sort of Communist are you?' The struggle between nationalism and ideology in Poland between 1944 and 1956', (2017),
<https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/1955>.

Krzyżanowski, Michał, 'Discursive Shifts in Ethno-Nationalist Politics: On Politicization and Mediatization of the "Refugee Crisis" in Poland', *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies*, vol. 16, nos. 1-2, (2018).

Kwiatkowski, Piotr, Kosicki, Piotr, 'Collective Memory and Social Transition in Poland', *International Journal of Sociology*, vol. 36, no. 4, (2006-2007).

Larsen, Henrik, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe*, Routledge, (2005).

'Legislative Train Schedule. Towards a new policy on migration', European Parliament, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-urgency-resettlement-scheme>.

Messina, Anthony, 'Securitizing Immigration in the Age of Terror', *World Politics*, Vol. 66, no. 3, (2014), <https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1123&context=facpub>.

Ramet, Sabrina, 'Trajectories of Post-Communist Transformation: Myths and Rival Theories about Change in Central and Southeastern Europe', *Perceptions*, vol. 18, No. 2, (2013)

Rondinelli, Dennis, Yurkiewicz, Jay, 'Privatization and Economic Restructuring in Poland: An Assessment of Transition Policies', *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, vol. 55, no. 2, (1996).

Schöpflin, George, 'The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths', in: Hosking, Geoffrey, Schöpflin, George, *Myths and Nationhood*, Routledge, (New York 1997).

Service, Hugo, *Germans to Poles. Communism, Nationalism and Ethnic Cleansing after the Second World War*, Cambridge University Press, (2014).

Skoczyńska-Prokopowicz, Barbara, 'Foreign Labour Migration of Ukrainians to Poland: Statistical Research from the Perspective of Ukrainian Studies', *Zeszyty naukowe Politechniki Śląskiej*, no. 122, (Gliwice 2018).

Stachowiak, Paweł, 'Polish transformations of 1988-1989. Political authorities, opposition, the Church', in: Pająk-Piątkowska, Beata, Rachwał, Marcin, *Hungary and Poland in Times of Political Transition. Selected Issues*, Adam Mickiewicz University, (Poznań 2016).

Stola, Dariusz, 'Anti-Zionism as a Multipurpose Policy Instrument: The Anti-Zionist Campaign in Poland 1967-1968', *Journal of Israeli History. Politics, Society, Culture*, vol. 25, no. 1 (2006).

Tyrowicz, Joanna, 'The influence of economic migration on the Polish economy', mBank – CASE Seminar Proceedings no. 149, (2017), https://www.case-research.eu/files/?id_plik=5315.

Wæver, Ole, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in: Lipschutz, R. D., ed., *On Security*, Columbia University Press, (1995),
<https://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/assets/pdf/Waever-Securitization.pdf>.

Wendt, Alexander, 'Collective identity formation and the international state', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Cambridge University Press, (1994).

Wendt, Alexander, 'Constructing International Politics', *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1, MIT Press Journals, (1995).

White, Anne, 'The impact of migration into Poland by non-Poles', in: White, Anne, Grabowska, Izabela, Kaczmarczyk, Paweł, Slany, Krystyna, *The Impact of Migration on Poland*, UCL Press, (2018).

Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality*, Cambridge University Press, (2002).

Zubrzycki, Jerzy, 'Emigration from Poland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', *Population Studies*, vol. 6, no. 3 (1953).

PLAGIARISM RULES AWARENESS STATEMENT

Fraud and Plagiarism

Scientific integrity is the foundation of academic life. Utrecht University considers any form of scientific deception to be an extremely serious infraction. Utrecht University therefore expects every student to be aware of, and to abide by, the norms and values regarding scientific integrity.

The most important forms of deception that affect this integrity are fraud and plagiarism. Plagiarism is the copying of another person's work without proper acknowledgement, and it is a form of fraud. The following is a detailed explanation of what is considered to be fraud and plagiarism, with a few concrete examples. Please note that this is not a comprehensive list!

If fraud or plagiarism is detected, the study programme's Examination Committee may decide to impose sanctions. The most serious sanction that the committee can impose is to submit a request to the Executive Board of the University to expel the student from the study programme.

Plagiarism

Plagiarism is the copying of another person's documents, ideas or lines of thought and presenting it as one's own work. You must always accurately indicate from whom you obtained ideas and insights, and you must constantly be aware of the difference between citing, paraphrasing and plagiarising. Students and staff must be very careful in citing sources; this concerns not only printed sources, but also information obtained from the Internet.

The following issues will always be considered to be plagiarism:

- cutting and pasting text from digital sources, such as an encyclopaedia or digital periodicals, without quotation marks and footnotes;
- cutting and pasting text from the Internet without quotation marks and footnotes;
- copying printed materials, such as books, magazines or encyclopaedias, without quotation marks or footnotes;
- including a translation of one of the sources named above without quotation marks or footnotes;
- paraphrasing (parts of) the texts listed above without proper references: paraphrasing must be marked as such, by expressly mentioning the original author in the text or in a footnote, so that you do not give the impression that it is your own idea;
- copying sound, video or test materials from others without references, and presenting it as one's own work;
- submitting work done previously by the student without reference to the original paper, and presenting it as original work done in the context of the course, without the express permission of the course lecturer;
- copying the work of another student and presenting it as one's own work. If this is done with the consent of the other student, then he or she is also complicit in the plagiarism;
- when one of the authors of a group paper commits plagiarism, then the other co-authors are also complicit in plagiarism if they could or should have known that the person was committing plagiarism;
- submitting papers acquired from a commercial institution, such as an Internet site with summaries or papers, that were written by another person, whether or not that other person received payment for the work.

The rules for plagiarism also apply to rough drafts of papers or (parts of) theses sent to a lecturer for feedback, to the extent that submitting rough drafts for feedback is mentioned in the course handbook or the thesis regulations.

The Education and Examination Regulations (Article 5.15) describe the formal procedure in case of suspicion of fraud and/or plagiarism, and the sanctions that can be imposed.

Ignorance of these rules is not an excuse. Each individual is responsible for their own behaviour. Utrecht University assumes that each student or staff member knows what fraud and plagiarism



entail. For its part, Utrecht University works to ensure that students are informed of the principles of scientific practice, which are taught as early as possible in the curriculum, and that students are informed of the institution's criteria for fraud and plagiarism, so that every student knows which norms they must abide by.

I hereby declare that I have read and understood the above.

Name:

Wenonika Fay

Student number:

6882641

Date and signature:

13/08/2020

WFay

Submit this form to your supervisor when you begin writing your Bachelor's final paper or your Master's thesis.

Failure to submit or sign this form does not mean that no sanctions can be imposed if it appears that plagiarism has been committed in the paper.