Is Timing Everything?

Forecasting the Ripest Moment for Peace

Sonja Dobson

6727735

Utrecht University

Universiteit Utrecht

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Abstract

This research paper analyzes an under researched segment of peace processes: the timing of negotiations. The timing of peace negotiations focuses on "the ripest moment," applying ripeness and readiness theories, which are included in this paper. However, as those theories are mainly useful in hindsight, this paper goes further to incorporate Stedman's theory of spoilers to develop this study on the timing of negotiations. The components of readiness, motivation and optimism, combined with addressing spoilers in this paper offers a different approach to analyzing the timing of negotiations. Through four cases study of the peace processes in Uganda in 1988, Sierra Leone in 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2009 and South Sudan in 2015, this paper finds that the convergence of motivation, optimism and addressing spoilers is important to successful negotiations. If negotiations are timed for moments where those three components do not converge, it is unlikely they will be successful.

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Finally, to my friends, who have been willing to entertain my ideas and whims about my thesis. Discussing my thesis with those I trust and whose opinions I value was a huge help in developing the final product.

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My rule has been try to learn, try to understand what happened. Develop the lessons and pass them

on.

–Robert S. McNamara[1]

Thousands of peace treaties have been written in response to tens of thousands of wars that have

occurred over the last few thousand years. Most of the peace agreements did not result in

sustainable or successful peace; some even sparked the next conflict (Fry 2019, 194-195). This

phenomenon still exists today. As Mac Ginty sees it, the "peace that prevails is often prefixed with

terms attesting to its compromised quality: "brittle," "fragile," "turbulent," "armed," and so on (Mac

Ginty 2006, 2). Researcher, scholars, practitioners, among others, across the world have noticed this

trend and attempted to explain it. This research paper will tackle one small aspect of a peace process

to better understand why so many peace agreements fail. It aims to explore the question of how the

criteria of timing for instigating peace negotiations during a conflict can be further illuminated by

analyzing four separate peace processes in Africa.

Chapter one delves into the literature on peace processes, the different stages of conflict and

peace processes, negotiations and mediation, and the timing of negotiations. This chapter then goes

on to discuss the theoretical framework for this research through Ripeness theory, Readiness theory,

spoilers and the convergence of motivation, optimism and spoilers to analyze the timing of

negotiations in the case studies through the lens of spoilers. Chapter two presents the methodology,

data collection and selection, and analysis for this paper. Chapter three is the analysis of case studies

of Uganda in 1988, Sierra Leone in 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2009 and South

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[1] Secretary of Defense under Kennedy and Johnson during the Vietnam war. The quotation comes from a film produced towards the end of his life when he looked back, and candidly acknowledged policy errors made.

Sudan in 2015. This chapter focuses on answering the sub questions of what kind of actors were involved in each case and what kind of actors were not involved; and who instigated the negotiations. Chapter four is the discussion of motivations, optimisms and spoilers. This chapter delves into answering the sub questions of how the timing of negotiations differed in each case and their impacts. Finally, chapter five discusses the convergence of motivation, optimism and spoilers on the timing of negotiations and forecasting the timing of negotiations. It concludes that timing is everything, but that the timing of instigating negotiations during a conflict can occur naturally or with external influence. Nonetheless, the convergence of motivation, optimism and addressing spoilers is necessary for the timing of negotiations to have a chance to result in peace.

Chapter 1.1 To Peace or Not to Peace

Research on peace processes have often reviewed and tried to understand what lessons have been learned from previous experience (Lederach 2003, 30). This paper reviews discussion of the timing of selected peace negotiations since the 1980s in order to shed light on how the United Nations (UN), other international organizations, regional organizations, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (among other actors) could approach instigating peace negotiations in current or future conflicts. This literature review will go on to discuss schools of thought, peace processes, and scholars research on negotiations. Peace and peace processes are complicated and to make both easier to understand, scholars have broken them down into different phases or stages. Negotiations and mediation are similarly intricate, and scholars use the different phases or stages of peace to apply different strategies of negotiations and mediation, to attempt to uncover the most effective means of negotiation. This chapter aims to illuminate the literature that finds the timing of negotiations

requires the convergence of expectations that both sides are ready and willing for productive negotiations.

Lehti argues that the scholarly debate on peace mediation and negotiation often concentrates too heavily on critiquing the normative approach to peace. Eriksson and Kostić argue that the research itself on peace mediation is too narrowly focused on certain, easily measured issues (e.g. agreements, amount of violence). They push for more research on the issue of fairness of peace, which is a very subjective factor (Lehti 2019, 68). The focus of peace mediation research on critiquing liberal peace, as opposed to delving into more subjective and difficult to study aspects of mediation, can be seen as stunting the growth of peace research. Lehti strongly supports the notion that liberal peace is the hegemonic norm and, therefore, peace mediation research cannot exist external to it. Peace mediation research (and peace studies itself) should move past critiquing liberal peace and onto understanding how liberal peace can be re-assessed into an effective means of peacebuilding (Lehti 2019, 71).

Lehti's point of view, which this research paper adopts, supports the orthodox literature on peacebuilding. As opposed to the critical, or "hyper-critical," literature on peacebuilding which views the liberal peace as "fundamentally destructive or illegitimate," the orthodox literature seeks to better understand the reasons for the failure of peacebuilding and to reform the current approaches (Paris 2010, 338-339). Paris asserts that the critical literature's claim to abandon or replace liberal peacebuilding with "a non-liberal or post-liberal alternative" is baseless (2010, 340). With no convincing rationale that the liberal peace should be replaced, Paris believes that liberal peacebuilding requires reform and more thorough research on its effectiveness, not on questioning its viability (2010, 340). Paris' approach to peacebuilding is the stance this research takes; a deeper examination of the timing of negotiations to determine their effectiveness, not the questioning of the liberal peace, which is handled by other scholars.

Peace as a concept is complex. It can be anything from no overt violence/war ("negative peace") to aspirations of social harmony (Sambanis 2008, 10). Sambanis describes self-sustaining, participatory peace as what successful peacebuilding should look like, and what the "ultimate purpose" of UN peace operations is (2008, 11). Following the end of a war, a sovereign state would ideally have little to no violence, be undivided, and be on a path of improvement. Self-sustaining, participatory peace requires that a sovereign state can resolve conflicts without resorting to violence and war (Sambanis 2008, 11).

Scholars have time after time observed that peace processes are often failures (Darby and Mac Ginty 2003, 3; David 1999, 26; Gabrielle and Yawanarajah 2019, 1; Lederach 1997, 87; Lehti 2019, 65; Mac Ginty 2006, 2). According to Fry, "peace in fact has never arrived, notwithstanding millions of people over many years who have marched, sung songs, held vigils, attend peace rallies and conferences, written letters to politicians or voted for marginal candidates standing for election in representative bodies to which they are never elected" (Fry 2019, 192). The attempts for peace have been wanting, which could have to do with the fact that there is not a consensus on what peace processes should entail or what a successful peace process might look like (Fry 2019, 192).

Different Stages of Peace Processes

There are several ways to break down peace processes. One way is through a five-phase approach on the key themes and stages in peace processes developed by Darby and Mac Ginty. They outlined these phases by utilizing a thematic approach to peace processes, analyzing several peace processes around the world in one study, instead of the traditional method of studying one peace process or peace initiative in a certain area of the world. These five phases are preparing for peace; negotiations; violence; peace accords; and peacebuilding (Darby and Mac Ginty 2003, 1).

Darby and Mac Ginty also suggest five criteria which are necessary for a successful peace process. First, protagonists must negotiate in good faith; second, all the key actors of the conflict are included; third, the central, underlying issues are addressed during the negotiations; fourth, no actor uses force to reach their goals; and fifth, everyone involved in the negotiations are fully committed to the entire process (Darby and Mac Ginty 2003, 2).The ideas of a thematic approach and the criteria of including all key actors of the conflict are crucial for my analysis on the timing of negotiations.

Yawanarajah developed an alternative way of looking at peace processes: through different phases of conflict, their characteristics, possible strategies, and possible best actors to be utilized during each phase (2016, 8) (See Table 1 in the Annex). The phases of conflict are the prevention environment, the imminent crisis, the early conflict environment, and the late conflict environment. Yawanarajah identifies three main strategies that may be utilized during each phase: communication, manipulation and formulation. Each phase has their own unique set of characteristics and therefore require unique strategies, utilized by different actors, to be deployed to instigate negotiations (Yawanarajah 2016, 6). This is a different approach to Darby and Mac Ginty's, which is focused on the entire peace process itself. Yawanarajah's phases are about one of the stages of a peace process: negotiations.

According to Yawanarajah, "by adopting a strategic approach to mediation and applying the appropriate strategy to a situation to achieve the desired goals, anytime in a conflict cycle can become the right time for a peace initiative" (Yawanarajah 2016, 1). Algar-Faria would agree with this point of view that there is no "single fixed point in time when negotiations are most likely to be successful" (2013, 0). Instead of waiting and grasping for the window of opportunity, ripest moment

for peace can be created. Yawanarajah's point of view is integral to my research, as is the focus on the negotiation stage of a peace process.

Negotiations and Mediation

One of the negotiations and mediation strategies Yawanarajah outlines is the communication strategy, which is meant to help parties re-establish a relationship, dialogue, and direct interaction. Research, analysis, and persuasion are the necessary tools to gather the information and skills which can promote the communication strategy (Yawanarajah 2016, 4). The second, the formulation strategy, recognizes the need for creative, inventive solutions and problem-solving skills which can "imaginatively manage the process" (Yawanarajah 2016, 5). Finally, the manipulation strategy believes that influence and coercion should be utilized which convince the parties that it is more beneficial for all of them to engage in negotiations and sign a peace agreement. The mediator must "even the playing field of the conflict." (Yawanarajah 2016, 5).

Yawanarajah's first phase of conflict, the prevention phase, is characterized by a government in control, but with "seeds of conflict being planted with discriminatory policies and unequal development" (Yawanarajah 2016, 6). In this phase, only communication is identified as a possible strategy, being employed by regional organizations (Yawanarajah 2016, 6-8). The second phase, the imminent violence phase, tension has escalated to the point of violence and parties are preparing for war (Yawanarajah 2016, 6). The phase also only requires a communication strategy, but to be employed as preventive diplomacy by state and international actors (Yawanarajah 2016, 6-8). In the third phase, the early stage of conflict phase, the power balance between the parties is often unknown (Yawanarajah 2016, 6). At this point, to stop the conflict from escalating further, the parties must be convinced through the communication and formulation strategy by mediators to go to the negotiations table to end the conflict (Yawanarajah 2016, 6-8). The fourth and final phase, the late stage of conflict, must be addressed by the communication, manipulation and formulation

strategies by international organizations and actors. At this phase, the conflict is at a stalemate and neither side can win, but likely both sides can continue the conflict (Yawanarajah 2016, 6-8).

Yawanarajah points out that although the manipulation strategy is proven to be the most effective, the communication and formulation strategies are most often used (2016, 5). This seems to be a common thread in peace studies; the most effective strategy is also the most undervalued and underused, as it often requires the most effort (Ruhe 2015, 243). According to Ruhe, mediation research proves the effectiveness of mediation as a conflict management tool. Despite the evidence, "conflict parties agree to attempt mediation only in a limited number of conflicts" (Ruhe 2015, 243). Nevertheless, it would benefit all involved if there was a more thorough assessment of the conflict situation, a well-thought out approach, and an ability of mediators and negotiators to adapt to changing circumstances/phases of conflict until the peace agreement is reached (Yawanarajah 2016, 5).

Another approach to negotiations, the mainstream, international relations approach, is described by Lehti, who quotes the UN Secretary General's report on mediation from June 2017. The UN states that the obligation of the international third party is "to try to identify and seize upon any possible window of opportunity for mediation in order to prevent or manage violent conflict and, eventually, build and sustain peace" (Lehti 2019, 65). Lehti further emphasizes the importance of analyzing negotiation and mediation practices to understand why some peace agreements last longer than others and the general trend of their ultimate failure (2019, 65). A negative note recognized by Lehti on peace agreement failure is, that those negotiated by third parties are more likely to fail and relapse into violence (2019, 65).

The timing of instigating negotiations and their successful outcome rests on the realization that parties are in the right mindset to compromise and work with each other According to Guelke, the timing of peace negotiations is critical because, there is a "symbiotic relationship between negotiations and peace processes" (2008, 63). Guelke argues that this connection is based on two propositions. The first, the parties involved in the conflict must demonstrate a real and obvious commitment to negotiations. And the second is that all parties are intent on a negotiated peace agreement, which is integral to maintain a peace process. Both propositions can vary widely and the relationship between negotiations and peace processes, as the relationship between parties in a conflict, can easily be broken by a misunderstanding and/or violence. Negotiations do not always result in a successful peace process (Guelke 2008, 63).

In contrast to the mainstream international approach to negotiations, Arena and Pechenkina believe in letting a conflict come to a natural end. Instead of instigating peace negotiations at any time, warring parties should be left to "fight it out" between themselves to get to the realization that negotiations are the most beneficial path to peace (Arena and Pechenkina 2015, 1279). Arena and Pechenkina do not support intervention in conflicts due to the unlikelihood of parties reaching a "convergence of expectations about each side's capabilities...unless...one side is defeated outright" (2015, 1280). Therefore, negotiations should be timed for this outright defeat of one side and interventions should not occur during a conflict (Arena and Pechenkina 2015, 1294). Luttwak (1999) also wrote about this point of view, the "premature peacemaking." He argued that negotiations and ceasefires allow warring parties to "reconstitute and rearm their forces," therefore, prolonging and intensifying the conflict (Luttwak 1999, 36). Arena and Pechenkina's view is similar to Luttwak's, let the instance of war create the instance of peace (Luttwak 1999, 44).

Related to Arena and Pechenkina's idea of convergence of expectations, Rothstein developed a "convergence model" to help determine when to instigate negotiations. Rothstein's Convergence Theory focuses on the convergence of three streams of expectations. This model is based on three "streams of influence (Rothstein 2007, 262). First, "key leaders on both sides...must see the need and be willing to risk the consequences" of taking a step towards peace. As well, leaders must have significant control over their parties and be able to make concrete commitments at the negotiating table (Rothstein 2007, 270). Second, a "mutually acceptable compromise agreement' must be evident to all sides to the conflict (Rothstein 2007, 271). Finally, domestic politics play a part in ensuring support for the final agreement (Rothstein 2007, 273). However, Rothstein states that the convergence of these three streams does not guarantee negotiations, it simply would be the window of opportunity to be seized (2007, 277).

Sambanis would find fault with Arena and Pechekina's point of view because he believes that factors which encourage parties to negotiate can also be the reason peace agreements are difficult to implement (and therefore, successful peace is difficult to reach) (2008, 10). If parties engage in a lengthy, destructive war, they may realize that a military victory is not possible and decide to agree to peace. However, the war would have left behind little local capacity and trust between parties which can result in the incapacity to instigate negotiations (Sambanis 2008, 10).

Piombo also finds that converged expectations and willingness to engage in constructive discussions are requirements for successful negotiations. Partly in agreement with Arena and Pechenkina, Piombo argues against intervening too early in the conflict. Piombo finds that initiating negotiations too early will have a negative impact in the long term because early negotiations are likely to overlook the root causes of conflict, focusing only on managing the current violence

(Piombo 2010, 239). This is partially supported by Rothstein, who notes that if or when intervention is necessary should be considered on a case-by-case basis by all the parties involved (2007, 280).

Ruhe also recognizes the uncertainty of practitioners and scholars about "if and how well we can predict the precise timing of mediation and anticipate windows of opportunity for this form of preventive diplomacy" (2015, 243). His main argument is that mediation should "occur most often when conflict intensity increases, but neither conflict party sees a particularly high probability of victory" (Ruhe 2015, 256). This is often during the later stages of a civil war (Ruhe 2015, 244-245).

Arena and Pechenkina, Piombo, Ruhe, and Rothstein all have different points of view on the same concept: convergence of expectations among warring parties. Arena and Pechenkina see the convergence of expectations occurring at the natural end of a conflict (2015, 1279); Piombo sees a possible convergence of expectations during a conflict, but before the end (2010, 239); Ruhe argues that the convergence of expectations is likely to occur when conflict intensity increases but is nearing a stalemate, often during late stage conflict (2015, 256); and Rothstein actually develops a theory to explain his point of view on the convergence of expectations. His expectations are the three streams of influence that he outlines, as discussed above (2007, 262). These ideas of and agreement on the importance of converging expectations is another milestone for this research on understanding a more concrete way to determine when to instigate negotiations during a conflict. Nevertheless, Lederach recognizes that research in the peace field has made advances, including on the timing of negotiations, by learning from past peace processes. His conclusion is that peace practitioners need the ability to pinpoint when the timing is "ripe" for negotiations and mediation (2003, 30).

Chapter 1.2. Ready or Not: Spoilers, Here They Come

Readiness Theory and Spoilers

The timing of negotiations during a conflict is mainly studied through one of two similar lenses: ripeness and readiness (Schiff 2019, 1). Ripeness and readiness theory are based on the notion of a "ripe moment." Readiness theory is an evolution from the ripeness theory but is still underdeveloped. Pruitt developed readiness theory from Zartman's ripeness theory to study the timing of negotiations with more flexibility (2015, 135). According to Rothstein, this idea of a "ripe moment" is too vague and ambiguous because it is simply defined through the idea that "if negotiations occurred, a ripe moment existed; if negotiations did not occur, a ripe moment did not exist" (2007, 262).

This chapter will expand on ripeness and readiness theory, explaining the concepts and short comes of each. Both Ripeness and Readiness Theory are not deemed to be sufficient to "provide peacemakers with an ability to predict the best moment nor to operationally recognize it, except in hindsight" (Yawanarajah 2016, 4). Lehti (2019), O'Kane (2006), Rothstein (2007), and Schiff (2019) all support Yawanarajah's idea that Ripeness and Readiness Theory are only useful in analyzing a conflict after the fact. Nevertheless, the study of the timing of negotiations rests on these ideas, which make them invaluable to this research. Due to the weaknesses of both theories, spoilers will be discussed as a supplemental factor that can be combined with the idea of a ripe moment to produce a more comprehensive analytical approach to the timing of negotiations. This gap in the literature is aimed to begin to be filled by my research on the influence of spoiler influence on the timing of negotiations.

Ripeness theory suggests that "successful conflict resolution depends on an initiative being undertaken at the right moment" (Yawanarajah 2016, 2). Zartman theorizes that this right moment, a ripe moment as he calls it, is when all other options of reaching an acceptable end to a conflict are no longer possible and therefore, parties are willing to alternative ways out of the conflict (2008). The elements that Zartman believes necessary for a ripe moment are a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and a mutually perceived way out. The stalemate is a painful deadlock between equally strong parties who are suffering from the deadlock. The parties realize that it has the potential to become catastrophic if action is not taken to change the situation. The element of a perceived way out occurs when the parties realize negotiations are necessary and recognize that the other parties have the same realization (Schiff 2020, 15). Both sides realize they cannot win, or they are losing, and that it is possible to negotiate an agreement (Pruitt 2015, 123).

Ripeness theory does not have the predictive ability to understand when a situation will become ripe, but a ripe moment is an important concept because it has been the key to successful negotiations in the past. Examples of ripeness being the key to successful negotiations are Sinai in 1974, Southwest Africa in 1988, El Salvador in 1988 and Mozambique in 1992 (Zartman 2008). Sometimes ripe moments are not seized and carried through to fruition, such as in Karabagh in 1994 and Cyprus in 2002 (Zartman 2008). Sometimes, they simply never exist, such as the lack of ripeness between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the 1980s and in Sudan for decades (Zartman 2008). Ripeness theory is focused on two "necessary and constant elements," overlooking other aspects, which are addressed by readiness theory (Schiff 2020, 25).

Readiness Theory

Readiness theory goes further to understand how parties make the decision to enter negotiations (Pruitt 2015, 123). It is rooted in the psychological variables of motivations and optimisms; parties

use their judgement to decide whether the conflict is too costly and risky, and what the outcome of a negotiation could mean (Pruitt 2015, 126).

According to Schiff (2020), Readiness Theory differs from Ripeness theory "in three important aspects." The first, is that readiness takes into consideration the impact of third parties and psychological variables of motivation and optimism, which are not outlined in Ripeness Theory. The second, is that the concepts are variables, as opposed to the stringent requirements of a stalemate and a way out which do not allow for development or changes. Finally, the third, is that Readiness Theory considers alternative reasons for parties to negotiate beyond a mutually hurting stalemate and a way out (Schiff 2020, 26).

Motivation and optimism must exist in some capacity to result in negotiations and are related in several ways (Schiff 2020, 28). Motivation comes from any or all of the following: "a) a sense that the conflict is unwinnable (i.e., a sense of losing creates greater motivation), (b) a sense that the conflict generates unacceptable costs or risks, and (c) pressure from a powerful third party. The stronger the third party and the greater the pressure it applies, the more the parties will try to demonstrate that they seek an end to the conflict; that is, to display an appearance of motivational change" (Schiff 2020, 27). Optimism for a final agreement that "will satisfy one's goals and aspirations without too much cost" is based, to a certain degree, on trusting the other parties (Pruitt, 2007, p. 1529). "The parties' readiness to enter negotiations is due to a push factor such as the cost of war or weariness of troops and a pull factor such as the benefits of peace" (Yawanarajah 2016, 3). The level of optimism can determine the level and influence of motivation. As well, motivation can foster optimism to build a stronger relationship between parties (Schiff 2020, 28).

Readiness can start small, with exploratory prenegotiation (Pruitt 2015, 126), but ideally the optimism for negotiations grows over time and develops into formal negotiations (Pruitt 2015, 134).

In Readiness Theory, the concepts of readiness, motivation, optimism, and perceived risk are considered variables (Pruitt 2015, 135). Therefore, "a greater degree of one element can compensate for a lesser degree of the other" (Pruitt 2007, 1525). As well, the concepts can develop over time, through different stages. With optimism, parties can begin with a working trusting relationship that eventually leads to a mutually agreed framework and instigating negotiations. If there is an urgency to instigate negotiations, that will also impact the timing of negotiations (Pruitt 2015, 135).

Although more developed and applicable than Ripeness Theory, Readiness Theory still needs further research to be able to accurately predict when to instigate peace negotiations during a conflict. I aim to contribute to the theory by exploring the role of the motivation and optimism of participants and spoilers.

Spoilers and Inclusive Negotiations

In relation to why peace agreements often fail, Stedman established the theory of "spoilers" (1997, 5). Spoilers refer to "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it" (Stedman 1997, 5). Peace processes create spoilers "because it is rare in civil wars for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial" (Stedman 1997, 7). In Angola in 1992 and in Rwanda in 1994, spoilers were able to achieve their goal of upsetting the peace process and the result was a massive number of casualties (Stedman 1997, 5).

Spoilers can be either inside spoilers or outside spoilers. Inside spoilers' sign "a peace agreement, signals a willingness to implement a settlement, and then fails to fulfill key obligations to the agreement" (Stedman 1997, 8). Outside spoilers are "parties who are excluded from a peace process or who exclude themselves and use violence to attack the peace process" (Stedman 1997, 8). There are also different types of spoilers depending on their goals and commitment to those goals:

limited, greedy, and total. Limited spoilers have limited goals, but that does not necessarily mean the commitment to those goals are also limited. Total spoilers have a rigid goal of total power (Stedman 1997, 10). Greedy spoilers lie between total and limited spoilers. They have goals which can change depend on cost benefit analysis (Stedman 1997, 11). Different strategies are required to manage different types of spoilers (Stedman 1997, 44). Ahmed (2018, 17) expands on Stedman's theory of spoilers by acknowledging the possibility of regional or international actors becoming spoilers if the peace agreement does not contribute to their own interests.

Stedman identified, categorized, and recognized spoilers in different peace agreements in Rwanda, Cambodia, Angola, and Mozambique (1997, 25-43). His key contribution to the literature on peace agreements is that by identifying who the threats to peace are, and understanding their intentions, spoilers can be deterred (Stedman 1997, 52).

Reiter (2015) has expanded on Stedman's spoiler research by using a "newly constructed cross-national dataset of spoiling following 241 civil war peace agreements in the post-Cold War era" (Reiter 2015, 89). While Stedman is adamant that spoilers are the greatest risk to peace (1997, 5), Reiter finds that spoilers are not as common or effective in trying to disrupt peace or peace processes (2015, 89). However, Reiter acknowledges that termination spoilers (what Stedman refers to as "total spoilers") are a profoundly serious threat to peace, the most serious of any type of spoilers (2015, 92).

Reiter also acknowledges that there is a variation in the impact spoilers may have. Only termination spoilers will end a peace agreement, which is rare, but spoilers can also "prevent or delay the implementation of the commitments in the peace agreement, "raise new questions within a peace process," or "contribute to a stronger peace by forcing changes to the protocols or inclusion of new actors that increase the effectives of the agreement" (Reiter 2015, 91).

With regards to those who are invited to the negotiating table by facilitators and mediators, ensuring the attendance of all parties involved in the conflict is an integral factor in a successful peace agreement (Wanis-St. John 2008, 1). Inviting civil society as well as all the parties negotiating is important (Wanis-St. John 2008, 3). According to Mac Ginty, civil society includes those "community leaders, brave individuals and non-conformists" (Mac Ginty 2014, 561). These types of local actors can be useful in supporting the interventions of international actors and can give the interventions the legitimacy and authenticity required for success (Mac Ginty 2014, 561). As well as local and international actors, regional actors can play a significant role. Mengisteab (2012) finds that "there is a general consensus in the literature that… regional integration has the potential to promote socio-economic development of member countries, to foster both regional and internal peace and to enhance the collective capabilities of members" (Bereketeab 2015, 14). External actors can be integral to a successful peace agreement in many ways, including through "providing aid in restoring communications, altering perceptions, facilitating ideas, and relaying information" (Bercovitch and Simpson 2010, 72).

Some scholars believe that if external actors are not included in a peace process, successful peace negotiations are unlikely. Walter theorizes that this is because warring parties need guarantees from the external actors that the other parties will not engage in violence (Bercovitch and Simpson 2010, 75-76). Parties must be optimistic to agree to and implement a peace agreement through incentives but also motivated through negative repercussions should they fail to comply (Bekoe 2003, 258). Bekoe contemplates that "the ability to sanction each other for non-compliance creates mutual vulnerability" (2003, 259). Additionally, external actors can ensure a stable environment for parties to transition to a peaceful society from one of conflict and war (Bercovitch and Simpson 2010, 76).

Reiter discusses the problems with current research on spoilers, mainly that it is "overly reliant on single case studies" (2015, 89). Existing research on spoilers does not analyze the ultimate impact of spoilers on peace agreements more generally, focusing primarily on cases where spoilers are obvious and had a significant impact (Reiter 2015, 90). As well, since Stedman's paper on spoilers in 1997, definitions have become more general to include any "actions taken to disrupt, undermine, hinder, or delay a peace process" (Reiter 2015, 92). Furthermore, scholars do not universally agree on what stage of a peace process research on spoilers should focus on, but Reiter does advocate for broadening research to include the negotiations phase. Reiter also believes that negotiation, especially continued negotiation, is a beneficial tool in combating termination spoilers (2015, 107).

Through case studies, Stedman shows that "an effective strategy of spoiler management rests first on the correct diagnosis of the spoiler problem" and "the selection of an appropriate strategy to treat the problem" (1997, 44). Stedman's strategies of spoiler management include: inducement, giving the spoiler what it wants; socialization, changing the spoiler's behaviour to adhere to social norms; and coercion, punishing or diminishing the spoilers' capacity to destroy a peace process (Stedman 1997, 12). The strategy selected rests on the correct identification of the spoiler: total, limited, or greedy. According to Stedman, the coercion strategy should be used to defeat total spoilers, the inducement strategy should be used to address limited spoilers' demands, and a long-term socialization strategy should be used to address greedy spoilers. However, depending on the situation, the coercion or socialization strategy can be used with limited spoilers and the inducement strategy can be effective with greedy spoilers (Stedman 1997, 15).

Yawanarajah also advocates for an accurate diagnosis and using the appropriate strategy to ensure any time is a ripe moment for negotiations (2016, 8). By using the same process of diagnosis and strategic approach, negotiations can be ensured to include all relevant actors (especially those

who might be/become spoilers) at the "ripe moment." As well, Reiter focuses on how research on spoilers should focus on how spoilers change throughout different phases of conflict or peace processes, which relates to the phases developed by Yawanarajah and is an area of research that needs further analysis.

Ruhe argues that mediation is the time when it is more likely for rebel groups to splinter due to compromises made during negotiations (2015, 246-247). Because of this risk of spoilers emerging due to rebel groups splitting up and unwilling to compromise, the study of the timing of negotiations needs to take into consideration all actors and sub-actors. By including all actors from the beginning, even those who do not have a huge presence at a given stage in the conflict, the most dangerous spoilers can be discouraged and the potential for negotiations to be spoiled is mitigated (Reiter 2015, 107). Termination spoilers, who are "those actors who use violence or threats or violence in an overt attempt to undermine and terminate a signed civil war peace agreement," are the most dangerous spoilers (Reiter 2015, 92). Termination spoilers are most often outside rebel groups, therefore by including all actors from the beginning the likelihood of termination spoilers emerging during the peace process vastly decreases because there are no outside rebel groups (Reiter 2015, 96).

Furthermore, by including all actors, it is possible there will be more readiness, motivation, optimism or perceived risk (Pruitt 2015, 135). Although more actors could also lead to more opportunity for divergence and more difficulties coming to an agreement, Reiter argues that the act of negotiating is effective in diminishing the likelihood of termination spoiling. Like Stedman's argument on using socialization to address spoilers, Reiter states that "continued negotiations are likely to win over spoilers in the long term" (2015, 107).

Motivation is driven by the realization that continuing the conflict is too costly due to the risks to the parties or because the conflict is at a stalemate that cannot be endured or because of third power pressure. The bottom line is that at a minimum parties need to be motivated to agree to negotiations (Schiff 2019, 7). Optimism rests on the realization that a peace agreement could be beneficial. Optimism rises from a party have lower aspirations, that a working trust can be established and/or that there is evidence of a mutually beneficial and acceptable agreement on the horizon that will be pursued by all parties (Schiff 2019, 7). Parties are utilizing a cost-benefit analysis to decide to engage in negotiations, but this may not always be obvious. Furthermore, it is not only about the warring parties to feel motivated and optimistic. Everyone involved, including the mediators and guarantors, need to feel motivated and optimistic.

Weakness of Hindsight

A major flaw of the current ripeness and readiness models and theories used for studying the timing of negotiations (Schiff 2019, 1), is that they are useful primarily in hindsight. The timing of negotiations is an important, but quite complex concept in peace studies. Much of the literature focuses on two parties and both those parties making the decision to engage in negotiations with the other (Pruitt 2015, 126; Rothstein 2007, 262; Schiff 2019, 7; Zartman 2008).

Furthermore, a key reason peace processes fail is the state of mind of the participants around the peace table. Motivation and optimism can be better understood in terms of parties being psychologically ready (Rifkind and Yawanarajah 2019, 1). Readiness and Ripeness Theories both focus on the idea of conditions being ripe and parties ready. Current academic knowledge strongly focuses on the outside, physical world. By understanding how and why people do what they do, through the context of geopolitical realities, power dynamics and human motivations, mediators and third parties can better prepare parties to accept negotiations (Rifkind and Yawanarajah 2019, 1).

External actors can help warring parties realize what their strengths and weaknesses are to make realistic demands (Rifkind and Yawanarajah 2019, 3).

The timing of negotiations requires a case-by-case approach to forecast at what point during a conflict the opportunity arises or can be created (Rothstein 2007, 280). By combining Readiness Theory and spoilers, this research will attempt to understand how to create the right environment for successful peace negotiations. According to Yawanarajah "there is never an unsuitable time to engage in fruitful peace initiatives" (2016, 1).

Chapter 2. Methodology

The methodological approach taken for this research is a mixed methods analysis using secondary data. It was suitable for this research because the case studies span several decades and different regions in Africa. The cases chosen are for countries that would be difficult, time consuming and expensive to visit within the time constraints of this project, and now impossible due to the COVID-19 pandemic. All sources were from online material due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the closure of libraries.

Mainly qualitative methods will be used to analyze the case studies to develop an understanding of each case and the timing of negotiations. This method allows an interpretation of the themes that emerge pertaining to the case studies under discussion. However, quantitative methods are useful in analyzing measurable data in each of the peace processes and determining which measures are suitable for forecasting the timing of negotiations in the future. The question of when to initiate negotiations is based on quantitative data, but enriching understanding of the timing of negotiations relies more on qualitative methods.

Since peace process research is already saturated with single case study research (especially research on the timing of negotiations and spoilers), several case studies from across Africa were selected for comparison. The collection of data comes from the UN Peace Agreement Database, the PA-X: Peace Agreements Database, the African Peace Agreement Database (University of Antwerp), Uppsala Conflict Data Program, and from online journals, such as *Civil Wars, Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, Journal of Peace Research, Security Dialogue,* and online books.

The selection process began by identifying regions of Africa through their economic and regional organizations. This was the starting point because regional organizations have often been involved in peace processes, in partnership with the UN, and may have different approaches. By choosing case studies from different regions, the data set is more wide-reaching than from a single region. Also, the research and results would have more general applications.

The UN Peace Agreement Database was used to select peace agreements for each of the case studies. The selection covers different time periods, were from different decades, were written in English and related to intra-state conflicts. This database is specifically focusing on the UN's contribution to peace processes and improving their interventions. There have been a lot of agreements negotiated by the UN in Africa, but many were principles, ceasefires, roadmaps, or declarations. The case studies selected were peace agreements, from different decades and regions, and in the end, Uganda in 1988, Sierra Leone in 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2009 and South Sudan in 2015 were chosen.

Uganda in 1988 was an additional case considered. The peace agreement in Uganda in 1988 and the peace process were not negotiated or facilitated by the UN, however the peace agreement was published on the UN Peace Agreement Database. There were several documents published on

the UN Peace Agreement Database, however the only peace agreements were in Uganda, the first in 1985 and the second in 1988. As with Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan these peace agreements were negotiated at the "end" of one conflict, seemed to otherwise meet the criteria for selection. In addition, it extended the period under study and added to an attempt to better understand the evolution of the UN's, and by extension the international community's, approach to negotiations.

The lack of intervention by the UN in Ugnada demonstrates the UN's approach to peace negotiations in 1988: a non-approach. From non-intervention in Uganda to heavy intervention in South Sudan, it shows a trajectory that can be visualized. The negotiations and peace agreement did not end the hostilities in Uganda, and sbsequently, the UN has had to intervene.

Analysis

The cases are broken down into phases, timelines, the actors involved and outcomes. They are analyzed according to the three criteria: motivations, optimism, and spoilers. In this research paper, readiness is the convergence of motivation, optimism, and spoilers. By identifying the motivation, optimism and spoilers in each case study and considering how it might be possible to increase the motivation and optimism of the actors involved, through the analysis of other scholars, this paper tries to understand how to make readiness happen. That is, to create the "ripest moment," rather than wait for it to arrive. Motivations and optimisms are psychological factors that relate to participants states of mind (Rifkind and Yawanarajah 2019, 1). These cannot be assumed, under or overestimated or thoroughly understood, but through the analysis of other scholars, certain conclusions can be made.

Motivations include an assessment of costs or risks, whether the conflict is unwinnable, and pressure from a powerful third party. Optimism is "the possibility of concluding negotiations toward

an agreement that is acceptable to both sides" (Schiff 2019, 7). This optimism stems from believing

the other parties are also interested and motivated to find an end to the conflict (Schiff 2019, 7). The

motivation and optimism of warring parties is often the focus of research on this topic, however the

motivation and optimism of potential spoilers and the idea of spoilers themselves must also be taken

into consideration for the broadest possible picture of the timing of negotiations. Through analyzing

these cases in hindsight and utilizing the phases developed by Yawanarajah (2016) and Darby and

Mac Ginty (2003), this research will come to conclusions on a forecasting model for the timing of

negotiations.

Chapter 3. Case Studies

3.1 Uganda 1988

On December 10 and 11, 1980, elections were held that were won by the Uganda People's Congress.

A couple months later, war began when Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement/Army

(NRM/A) attacked the government's Uganda National Liberal Army (UNLA) (Omach 2009, 3).

At least seven armed groups were involved in the conflict, including the Uganda People's

Democratic Army (UPDA), made up mainly of UNLA soldiers who opposed the NRM/A. They

were formed to combat the NRM/A's arrests and detainment of former UNLA soldiers (Omach

2009, 4).

In August 1986, the UPDA first attacked the NRM/A (Lamwaka 2002, 28). Shortly after,

negotiations were instigated by a civil society "goodwill peace mission," backed by Museveni

(Lamwaka 2002, 29). Then, in December 1986, another armed group was created called the Holy

Spirit Mobile Force (HSM), which would go on to become the Lord Resistance's Army, to fight the NRM/A (Lamwaka 2002, 28). After five years of conflict, the NRM/A was able to overthrow the government and implemented an unstable "victor's peace" in January 1986 (Omach 2009, 3).

From the end of 1987 to March 1988, NRA and UPDA prepared for peace, with discussions being concentrated between the military sides of each group. The negotiations would go on to exclude the political wing of the UPDA, the UPDM. Negotiations began on March 17, 1988 and resulted in the Pece Agreement on June 3, 1988 (Lamwaka 2002, 30-32). (See Table 2 in the Annex for a more detailed timeline with the actors and phases of conflict).

3.2 Sierra Leone 1999

The conflict that ended with the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement began on March 23, 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked Sierra Leone from Liberia. In early 1992, during the late stage conflict, there was a stalemate. Elections were slated for July, but the military overthrew the government in April and formed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).

In early 1994, after the RUF made and lost significant gains, the government declared a unilateral ceasefire. However, the RUF re-grouped and attacked again. At the end of 1994, the government approached the UN to assist in peace negotiations ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.). Late 1995, the first peace process began and on November 30, 1996, the first peace agreement was signed, but never implemented (Hayner 2007, 8).

During this negotiation phase, elections were held and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, leader of the Sierra Leone People's Party became president ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.). Spring 1997 saw the government overthrown by the military again, with the formation of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

The AFRC joined forces with the RUF and took control; early stage conflict renewed (Hayner 2007, 8). Shortly after, regional forces began the fight to restore Kabbah to office. This was successful in March 1998, but the conflict was still in full force. After the RUF invaded Freetown, to be beaten back after only a few weeks, participants began preparing for peace (Hayner 2007, 9). (See Table 3 in the Annex for a more detailed timeline with the actors and phases of conflict).

3.3 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2009

On July 26, 2006, conflict once again was initiated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), led by Laurent Nkunda (Pehle and Schwarz 2015, 1). Not long after, the CNDP signed a Pact of Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region with the government (United Nations, 2009) and agreed to integrate into the national army.

Only five months later, in May 2007, a stronger CNDP, that gained strengthen from training and recruiting in the army, withdrew from the army and resumed the conflict with the government, as well as other rebel groups (Pehle and Schwarz 2015, 2). At the end of 2007, the governments of the DRC and Rwanda signed an agreement to end the conflict in the region (United Nations Security Council, 2007) and participants of the conflict returned to the negotiation table ("Government of DR Congo (Zaire)," n.d.). These negotiations resulted in an agreement signed by the governments of the DRC and Rwanda and 22 rebel groups on January 23, 2008 (Stearns 2012, 40).

The CNDP withdrew from the agreement and requested one-on-one negotiations with the government, which was refused, resulting in renewed late stage conflict ("Government of DR Congo (Zaire)," n.d.). On October 29, 2008, the CNDP declared a unilateral ceasefire (Pehle and Schwarz 2015, 2), but was quickly pulled back into conflict when they were attacked by other rebel

groups. Nevertheless, negotiations were just as quickly initiated by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for the Great Lakes Region, Olusegun Obasanjo. These developed into direct talks at the UN headquarter in Nairobi between the DRC government's and CNDP's delegations ("Government of DR Congo (Zaire)," n.d.).

Nkunda was replaced with Ntaganda as leader of the CNDP and negotiations swiftly resulted in an agreement signed on January 16, 2009 between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, the CNDP, and the Congolese Resistance Patriots (PARECO) (Boshoff 2010, 65). Then, the peace agreement between the CNDP and the DRC government was signed on March 23, 2009, witnessed by representatives of the UN and AU (United Nations 2009, 12) and a peace agreement between the DRC government and other rebel groups was signed (Högbladh 2012, 54). (See Table 4 in the Annex for a more detailed timeline with the actors and phases of conflict).

3.4 South Sudan 2015

Since independence on July 9, 2011, the UN had a peacekeeping mission deployed in South Sudan to ensure a smooth transition after secession from Sudan. Despite the already active peacekeeping mission and peace agreement supporting state building in South Sudan, the world's newest country did not remain peaceful (Day et al. 2019, 32). On December 15, 2013 South Sudan's first civil war began between President Salva Kirr's government forces and then-vice President Riek Machar's Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A) (Wild et al. 2016, 663). Regional (IGAD) and international actors quickly descended to negotiate a peace agreement.

The first phase of the peace process commenced less than a month after violence erupted, commencing on January 4, 2014 (Vertin 2018, 12). On January 23, 2014, the government of South Sudan signed a ceasefire with the SPLM/A (United Nations 2015, 4). It was a remarkable mix of "intensive negotiations, focused international attention, and close cooperation between mediators

and peace process supporters" (Vertin 2018, 12). A week later, the government of South Sudan

signed another ceasefire with another rebel group, the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army,

Cobra Faction (SSDM/A-Cobra Faction) (United Nations Peacemaker, 2014).

The second phase of the peace process commended in February 2014 and lasted until

August 2015 (Vertin 2018, 12), including former detainees, other political parties, civil society,

women's organizations, and faith-based leaders. Despite the ceasefire, violence continued during the

entire process (Vertin 2018, 3). May 4, 2014, another ceasefire was signed between the government

and the SPLM/A, followed by several more agreements to end the conflict (United Nations

Peacemaker 2014; United Nations Peacemaker 2015).

The final peace agreement between the government, the SPLM/A, former detainees, and

political parties was signed by the latter three groups on August 17, 2015, witnessed by several

members of the international community and civil society (United Nations 2015, 51). However,

President Kiir did not sign the peace agreement until nine days later, on August 26, under

international pressure and threat of an arms embargo (Santora 2015). (See Table 5 in the Annex for

a more detailed timeline with the actors and phases of conflict).

Chapter 4. The Paths of Motivation, Optimism and Spoilers

Four decades. Four peace processes. Four country's struggles.

This chapter focuses on identifying the elements of the case studies, which reflect common

patterns that are a foundation to producing the most successful future interventions and

negotiations (Lederach 2003, 31). The criteria are motivation and optimism, which produce

readiness, from Pruitt's Readiness Theory (2015, 126), and addresing spoilers, based on Stedman's

paper from 1997, but informed by Ruhe (2015) and Reiter (2015). In line with Pruitt's theory, motivation and optimism must exist for negotiations to occur, but more of one can offset the lack of another (Pruitt 2015, 135). This chapter will then go on to analyze the individual impact motivation, optimism and spoilers have on the timing of negotiations and how the convergence of the three criteria may be able to inform the timing of negotiations.

Motivation

Motivations to engage in peace negotiations are push factors that include a realization that a loss is more likely than a win, that the cost of conflict is much higher than the cost of peace and being pressured from external actors (Schiff 2020, 27). Motivation and optimism do not exist separate of each other, and both must exist for negotiations to occur (Schiff 2020, 28). The following analysis will first delve into each component separately based on each case study.

The Uganda peace process was a seven-year long process, in the end motivated by the realization on both sides that they could not win and that the conflict was too costly. There was no pressure from external actors because there was no intervention by external actors. According to Lamwaka, the motivations behind the peace negotiations were to end the bloodshed and prevent a worsening humanitarian crisis. The soldiers on both sides of the negotiations felt they had witnessed egregious amounts of suffering and it pushed them towards negotiations (Lamwaka 2002, 29). Motivation was simple and straightforward, but powerful.

The peace process which resulted in the Sierra Leone Lomé Peace Agreement began in early 1999 (Hayner 2007, 9). The governor was motivated by the realization that they were unlikely to defeat the stronger rebel forces with their weak army (Hayner 2002, 9). They were also motivated by increasing international pressures to begin negotiations ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.). As well,

there were societal pressures on the government to end the conflict with the RUF, as the government was blamed for the conflict. "Give them what they want as long as they agree to stop killing us" (Hayner 2007, 7).

The RUF was less motivated to engage in negotiations, as they did not believe that they would be unable to win the war, since they had a stronger army; they did not view the war as too costly, as they had the upper hand; and there was no third-party pressure to negotiate (Hayner 2002, 9). The RUF was much stronger than the government at the time of these negotiations. They controlled two thirds of the country and were not willing to accept peace without full amnesty for crimes committed. Nevertheless, they eventually agreed to negotiations (Hayner 2007, 6).

The motivation resulting in the peace process the led to the DRC's March 23 agreement stemmed from the realization on both sides that they could not win the war (Pehle and Schwarz 2015, 2). Although the CNDP was better organized with stronger morale, the government army could replenish their troops at any time. Therefore, to both sides, it looked like a stalemate (Pehle and Schwarz 2015, 4). Coupled with the continuous international pressures to end the violence, the government was strongly motivated to pursue the one on one negotiations requested by CNDP (Hayner and Davis 2009, 3). However, a key actor in changing the tides of negotiations was neither the DRC government nor CNDP. Rwanda played a major role in this conflict, as well as the peace agreements. The Rwandan government was directly involved with the CNDP then switched sides to the government of the DRC, influencing both sides motivations for negotiations (Boshoff 2010, 66).

In the South Sudanese peace process, both sides did not have a chance to come to the realization that they either could or could not win the war or that it was too costly, as third party pressure to engage in negotiations was formidable. Less than a month after the civil war erupted, a peace process shaped by regional and international actors was underway (Vertin 2018, 12). However,

neither side was that motivated by the external pressure to engage in negotiations; they were forcefully pushed against their will to sign an agreement mainly negotiated by those external actors (Vertin 2018, 12). The lack of motivation was clear when the president of South Sudan did not sign the final peace agreement until nine days after the rebel group, former detainees and political parties signed it on August 17, 2005; and only under intense international pressure and threat of an arms embargo (Santora 2015).

Optimism

Optimism of the parties to engage in peace negotiations are pull factors that include a realization that the likely advantages of peace are more beneficial than the possible advantages of war (Yawanarajah 2016, 3). Optimism rises when a party is willing to compromise through the realization that the other side is also willing to do so and is committed to a mutually beneficial and acceptable agreement (Schiff 2019, 7).

In Uganda, optimism for a mutually beneficial agreement was sparked when the Ugandan government supported a "goodwill peace mission" that was initiated by a civil society group and accepted by the UPDA. This demonstrated both sides were willing to pursue negotiations. The goodwill peace mission concluded that formal negotiations would not include the UPDM political leaders from abroad except for their external coordinator Colonel Wilson Owiny Omoya and that all UPDA soldiers would receive full amnesty. This was accepted by the government and formal negotiations began shortly after (Lamwaka 2002, 29-30).

When the proposed Amnesty Act excluded those who had committed serious crimes such as murder or rape, the UPDA felt less optimism about engaging in peace talks. Optimism dropped again when one of the two UPDA officers engaged in coordinating the peace talks was killed by the

national army shortly after preparations for peace begun. Nevertheless, negotiations prevailed (Lamwaka 2002, 30). A month before the agreement was signed, UPDA's optimism rose when the NRA demonstrated their willingness to cooperate by fulfilling their pledge to replace mobile units with a joint force that focuses on local security issues (Lamwaka 2002, 32). Both sides believed that the other was just as motivated as them to end the bloodshed and this resulted in a successful agreement between the UPDA and the NRA (Schiff 2019, 7), but also resulted in an environment for outside spoilers to flourish.

Optimism for a successful peace agreement with both sides of the Sierra Leone peace process began with the conference in early 1999 to discuss a peace agreement (Hayner 2009, 9). This willingness to attend the conference demonstrated the optimism of both sides for a mutually beneficial agreement. This conference concluded that those who committed the most serious crimes should be held accountable in some way (Hayner 2002, 9), but during negotiations the government was forced to agree to a blanket amnesty (Hayner 2007, 6). This should have increased the RUF's optimism, however, they remained resistant to implementing the peace agreement because they still believed they would pursued legally (Hayner 2002, 23).

Due to UN policy, the UN representative was not allowed to sign off on amnesty for serious international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or other violations of international humanitarian law. He signed the final peace agreement after the leader of the RUF did, making a handwritten notation that the UN would not accept the amnesty in relation to said international crimes (Hayner 2007, 5). This led to the rebels distrusting the agreement. They were afraid of being held accountable for their actions and were slow to implement it (Hayner 2007, 6). The UN not accepting the amnesty in full combined with the lack of clear political ideology or goals of the RUF meant that the RUF was not overly optimistic about a beneficial peace agreement

(Hayner 2007, 5). As such, the peace agreement nearly failed a year after it was signed when the RUF attempted to reignite the conflict (Hayner 2007, 23).

In the DRC peace process, optimism on behalf of the rebel group rose when Ntaganda replaced Nkunda as leader of the rebel group, CNDP, in January 2009. Ntaganda expressed his optimism in negotiating with the DRC government by attending a meeting with PARECO, and the governments of the DRC and Rwanda at the Ilhusi Hotel in Goma (Boshoff 2010, 65-66). Prior to the leadership change, the CNDP was supported by the Rwandan government and therefore not motivated to negotiate. Due to international pressure on the Rwandan government, they chose to pull their support from the CNDP and enter into an agreement with the DRC government. Nkunda was becoming a liability for the Rwandan government and it was no longer worth the risks to support his CNDP (Shepherd 2011, 44-45). Ntaganda was optimistic about immunity and transforming the CNDP into a political party, while CNDP troops joined the national army (Shepherd 2011, 46).

Many negotiation sessions and demonstrations of good faith characterize this peace process. The CNDP, and the governments of the DRC and Rwanda had a common enemy: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). When Ntaganda replaced Nkunda as leader of the CNDP, optimism and an opportunity for a mutually beneficial outcome of negotiations for the CNDP, and the governments of the DRC and Rwanda appeared (Boshoff 2010, 66). This optimism resulted in the March 23 agreement, where the CNDP agreed to integrate into the DRC government's army and all three parties would be joined in the fight against the FDLR (Högbladh 2012, 54).

In the South Sudanese peace process, optimism was virtually non-existent. As both parties were vying for sole power and control of South Sudan, a power-sharing stipulation of the peace

agreement would clearly not appease them (Vertin 2018, 2). The peace agreement forced a return to a power-sharing arrangement which contributed to the beginning of renewed conflict when the president, representing the Dinka ethnic group, accused the vice president, representing the Nuer ethnic group, of planning a coup (Santora 2015). The president of South Sudan was outspoken of his reservations and lack of optimism for a mutually beneficial peace agreement at his signing ceremony on August 26, 2015, as well as previously. Furthermore, on the rebel side, two generals defected and condemned the peace agreement in early August (BBC 2015). Optimism was felt by the international community for this newly created country, but not by those in charge of the country (Vertin 2018, 3).

Spoilers

Spoilers are either inside spoilers who are included in the peace process and sign the agreement, outside spoilers who are excluded from or exclude themselves from a peace process (Stedman 1997, 8) and engage in disrupting, undermining, hindering, or delaying actions that impact a peace process (Reiter 2015, 92). Spoilers cannot always be predicted during negotiations, however according to Reiter, "termination spoiling by outside rebel groups is often anticipated by the parties to the agreement (the outside rebel groups make their opinions known)" (Reiter 2015, 98). To ensure that spoilers do not emerge or that they can be dealt with, all parties involved in a conflict should be included in the peace process to ensure a successful peace agreement (Wanis-St. John 2008, 1). These case studies demonstrate the importance of negotiating with all actors.

The Ugandan Pece Agreement was not the end to the war and violence (Lamwaka 2002, 32). There were many armed groups active and vying for power during the negotiations with UPDM/A, but they were not included (Omach 2009, 4). This peace process also excluded significant actors to the conflict: the UPDM and the HSM. The HSM and a splinter group of the UPDA supported by

the exiled UPDM, continued their own war with the NRM/A government (Lamwaka 2002, 32). In 1989, the NRM initiated secret negotiations with the exiled UPDM and they came to an agreement in 1990 (Lamwaka 2002, 33). Since then, most armed resistances have been defeated or co-opted by the government. However, the HSM turned LRA did go on to terrorize northern Uganda for years after the 1988 peace process (Omach 2009, 8). The UPDM and the HSM were excluded from the negotiations and became outside spoilers.

The Sierra Leone peace process was more inclusive than the Uganda process. It included many third-party actors representing countries, as well as Sierra Leonean society, who had somehow been involved in the conflict (Hayner 2002, 10-11). Nevertheless, the RUF emerged as an inside spoiler. The UN and members of the international community also signed the peace agreement, as witnesses, and therefore can also be considered inside spoilers as their actions, or lack thereof, caused the peace agreement to fail (Ahmed 2018, 17). Though this peace agreement involved a great number of actors, which can reduce the likeliness of spoilers, it is not the only step to address spoilers (Reiter 2015, 107). All actors need to be involved, but they also all need to be motivated and optimistic.

The DRC peace process made several attempts to discourage spoilers. At the beginning of 2008, the governments of the DRC and Rwanda signed peace agreements with 22 rebel groups, including the main adversary, the CNDP. The CNDP became an inside spoiler a month later, when their request to engage in new, bilateral negotiations with the government was denied ("Government of DR Congo (Zaire)," n.d.). However, almost a year later, external actors supported bilateral negotiations between the CNDP and the government, resulting in a peace agreement in early 2009. At the same time, the government signed another peace agreement with other, smaller rebel groups (Högbladh 2012, 54). These agreements and inclusion of all warring parties diminished the

likelihood that any would emerge as a spoiler in the future. Though the spoiler situation was largely addressed, new warring parties constantly emerged, and the DRC was not free from violence (Högbladh 2012, 54).

The spoiler situation in South Sudan was straightforward. Both warring parties who signed the agreement under duress, had been inside spoilers throughout the whole process and reignited full-blown conflict less than a year after the August 2015 agreement (Gamboriko 2019, 26). The ceasefires were constantly broken during the peace process and violence was not halted. Despite the constant presence of both sides as inside spoilers, the situation was not properly addressed and the use of force by the international community could not prevent the spoilers from engaging in conflict (Vertin 2018, 14). Though the peace process was an inclusive one, as the international community included former detainees, other political parties, civil society, women's organizations and faith-based leaders, it was not enough to just include everyone without considering motivations and optimisms (Vertin 2018, 3).

Chapter 5. The Paths Converge

The Timing of Negotiations

These four cases illuminate some important criteria for initiating negotiations. The threat of spoilers is high, and the consequences of their intervention severe. All actors involved in a conflict should be included and able to have a substantial voice that is considered during the negotiations. Outside spoilers are often the more threatening type of spoiler and by including all actors, reduces the possibility of outside spoilers (Reiter 2015, 96). Additionally, the likelihood of insider spoilers decreases with sustained negotiations through motivation to continue and optimism of the outcome

(Reiter 2015, 107). However, these cases also show that including all actors is not the only step needed to address spoilers; there must also be a convergence of motivation and optimism throughout the entire process and all actors.

In the Uganda case, the UPDA and the government were motivated and optimistic about negotiations, which resulted in a successful peace agreement between the two parties. However, not all parties were involved in the negotiations, such as the UPDM and the HSM or key civil society representatives, and the former two became outside spoilers, instigating violence (Lamwaka 2002, 32). Although civil society remained peaceful and the UPDM was negotiated with not long after the Pece Agreement, the HSM-turned-LRA ended up instigating conflict for decades (Lamwaka 2002, 33). If the government had agreed include them in negotiations, there is a possibility that the HSM-turned-LRA would not have become an outside spoiler (Omach 2009, 9).

The Sierra Leonean peace process was an inclusive process headed by the government of Togo and supported by the UN. While the government of Sierra Leone was motivated and optimistic about the negotiations, there are disagreements about whether the RUF's or the international community's lack of motivation or optimism resulted in a delayed peace process (Hayner 2002, 23). An analysis by Conciliation Resources, an independent international peacebuilding organization, concluded that the RUF prolonged the peace implementation process due to lack of optimism about the peace agreement arising from "fear of being brought to justice" and that "their hesitations, misgivings, reluctance to disarm and arrogant behaviour betrayed a deep sense of guilt and unwillingness to face their victims" (Hayner 2002, 23).

According to Hayner, the lack of motivation and commitment of the UN and international community led to slow implementation of the peace process, allowing the RUF to become unmotivated and unoptimistic about the outcome, resulting in their relapse into violence (Hayner

2002, 23). By January 2002 the violence was quelled, over 70 000 combatants were disarmed and the RUF dispersed ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.). After addressing spoilers, motivations and optimisms eventually converged to result in a successful conclusion to the negotiations.

There was an opportunity for these elements to have converged earlier in the conflict, that was not recognized in the moment. Peace talks were held in 1995 and 1996, resulting in a peace agreement at the end of 1996. This peace process was initiated by an NGO until the OAU took charge, but the agreement was never implemented. It included amnesty for the RUF soldiers, but when the RUF refused to allow the UN into Sierra Leone, the conflict resumed. This demonstrates a lack of optimism for the outcome of the peace agreement and external actors pressuring the warring parties to negotiate were not strong enough to motivate the RUF to follow through (Hayner 2007, 8).

Like the Sierra Leone case, the DRC had a situation where motivations, optimisms and addressing spoilers converged, but then fell apart when the CNDP became an inside spoiler due to their motivation and optimism faltering (Stearns 2012, 40). After that, the CNDP was powerful enough to not feel motivated to enter negotiations with the government. That changed when the Rwandan government pulled their support which forced the CNDP to negotiate (Shepherd 2011, 45-46).

In late 2008 and early 2009, the motivation and optimism of the CNDP and the government of the DRC, as well as Rwanda, converged in the realization that negotiations were the most beneficial path to follow for all actors. Potential spoilers were also addressed when the DRC government signed agreements with the smaller rebel groups at the same time as they signed the one-on-one agreement with the CNDP on March 23, 2009 (Högbladh 2012, 54).

In the South Sudanese case, despite the heavy-handed involvement of external actors, the peace process was deemed to be lacking in "preparedness, consent, impartiality, inclusivity and strategy." According to Vertin, the action of external actors was too swift and overlooked the lack of motivation or optimism of both parties (2018, 1). There was little to no motivation or optimism for either warring party to engage in negotiations, and a lot of international pressure. Intense international pressure succeeded in getting the signatures of President Kiir and former vice-President Machar on a peace agreement (Vertin 2018, 14).

Neither side had a chance to come to realizations on motivation or optimism because the negotiations were forced upon them less than a month after engaging in conflict (Vertin 2018, 12). This lack of motivation or optimism, despite the inclusion of many actors, resulted in several broken ceasefires, continuous violence and two inside spoilers reigniting conflict not long after they signed a peace agreement (Gamboriko 2019, 26). The warring parties were not ready, and the international community failed to foster an environment where they might become ready (Vertin 2018, 1).

Forecasting the Timing of Negotiations

Forecasting the timing of negotiations relies on three separate, but integral components: including all actors to decrease the likelihood of spoilers, ensuring the actors involved are motivated enough and optimistic enough to engage in negotiations. These components cannot exist separate of each other, though as previously mentioned, more optimism can offset less motivation and vice versa (Pruitt 2007, 1525). Furthermore, optimism and motivation for negotiations may be manufactured, as discussed by Yawanarajah. Her phases of conflict, explained in chapter two above, offer potential strategies and possible best actors to engage with the warring parties during different stages of conflict. As she states, "some argue that the unripeness of a situation and the lack of readiness of the parties should be no excuse for third party inaction" (Yawanarajah 2016, 8). By utilizing a strategic

approach to mediation and undertaking accurate analysis, Yawanarajah believes the right time for negotiations can be constructed (2016, 8).

This idea can be applied to motivation and optimism. Readiness is the interaction of motivation and optimism. The literature on readiness views the concept in strict, unmalleable terms, based on a world of objective push and pull factors, though they can go through stages of development (Pruitt 2015, 136). Furthermore, there is an idea that when a party is motivated to seek out negotiations, they send signals that should be recognized by external actors (Schiff 2019, 8). This may sometimes be the case, but it reflects the same problem as Ripeness and Readiness theory, that "timing is more important than content" (O'Kane 2006, 268).

Zartman's Ripeness theory faulters in moments where ripeness may exist, but the moment is not seized and therefore does not result in negotiations. It cannot forecast when actions should be taken (Zartman 2008). Instead, it may be beneficial to look at motivation and optimism as content which can be molded into the ripest moment for peace, if need be. The push factors that motivate parties to seek out negotiations are they do not believe they can win, the war is too costly, or heavy third-party pressures (Schiff 2020, 27). These can be manufactured by third parties in cases where they do not exist or are not sufficient.

For example, the RUF was not motivated to engage in negotiations in Sierra Leone but in the end when they tried to spoil the peace, third parties intervened to ensure that their attempts to reignite conflict were quashed. The RUF believed they could win, did not see the war as too costly, and did not have heavy third-party pressures (Hayner 2007, 8). If the RUF was aware of the third parties who supported the government and, therefore, the collective strength of the opposing side, the RUF may not have believed they could win the war. Or if third parties had earlier threatened

actions that would make the war too costly for the RUF, they may have been more committed to the negotiations.

The pull factor that gives rise to optimism for negotiations is the realization that a party will gain more from a peace agreement than from conflict (Yawanarajah 2016, 3). These can be manufactured through third parties threats and guarantees that the outcome of a peace agreement will be better than violence. For example, the CNDP was not overly optimistic about negotiations until the Rwandan government stopped supporting them. Then, there was a leadership change and a renewed commitment to negotiations. This could have been manufactured earlier if the Rwandan government was aware of how their support impacted the CNDP and if they were aware of the desires of those within the CNDP, not just the leader (Boshoff 2010, 66).

In the Ugandan case, motivations and optimism converged and resulted in negotiations which led to a successful peace agreement. However, taking spoilers into consideration did not occur and resulted in the country returning to a state of conflict. In the South Sudanese case, neither main warring party was motivated or optimistic enough about negotiations and while third party pressure was able to get them to sign a peace agreement, they never took the time to manufacture optimism or more motivation. A small amount of motivation and a somewhat inclusive peace process is not enough. While more motivation or optimism can make up for the lack of the other component, having none of one component and very little of the other is not considered to be a convergence of motivation and optimism resulting in readiness (Pruitt 2007, 1525). Furthermore, this demonstrates that third parties facilitating, or mediating negotiations need to foster a better understanding of the motivations and optimisms of the warring parties, or lack thereof.

South Sudanese negotiations stemmed from the first civil war of the world's youngest country whose people had already experienced decades of war and unrest. Third parties facilitating

and mediating the conflict believed that a speedy peace agreement would be best. However, they were more focused on their own "competing national interests and stakes in the outcome" than motivating the main warring parties to realize that peace was more beneficial than war (Vertin 2018, 1). Although there were incentives and pressures utilized, as well as a plummeting economy and possible famine, neither the president's nor former vice-president's factions were convinced of the negotiations (Vertin 2018, 3).

As the UN states, "the success or failure of a mediation process ultimately depends on whether the conflict parties accept mediation and are committed to reaching an agreement" (Vertin 2018, 12). Also, there are many parties to the conflict that needed to be engaged in the negotiations, and they were not (Wild et al., 2016, 668). There was no convergence of spoilers, motivations or optimisms and little understanding of what the motivation or optimisms could be in this situation, as previous attempts to incentivize motivation and optimism failed, and therefore it was the wrong time to engage in negotiations.

The convergence of spoilers, motivations and optimisms cannot occur without a solid understanding of what the motivations and optimisms of each party is, and that they must all be engaged in the negotiations. Motivations and optimisms can occur naturally or through the influence of third parties, but they must be better understood to utilize the convergence of motivations and optimisms alongside addressing spoilers. These case studies have shown that it is important to have an improved understanding of all those involved and can use that knowledge to manipulate the ripest moment for peace if one does not appear.

Conclusion

This research paper offers an insight into the timing of negotiations through the convergence of motivations and optimisms of all actors involved and addressing spoilers. It does so through an overview of the timing of negotiations during a conflict, phases of conflict and peace processes, ripeness theory, readiness theory, and spoilers and an analysis of the peace processes resulting the 1988 Ugandan, 1999 Sierra Leonean, 2009 DRC, and 2015 South Sudanese peace agreements. The finding is that the timing of negotiations should occur at the moment that motivations and optimisms converge, while taking into consideration spoilers, and therefore, including all actors to a conflict. This time for negotiations can either be seized in the moment or, through outside and unbiased assistance, manipulated in cases where motivation and optimism are either non-existent or too low to be useful. By including all actors or having enough motivation or optimism, which may also increase over time, the likelihood of spoilers is diminished. Timing is everything, be it a natural or manufactured time for negotiations.

Readiness theory has been applied and utilized, through the components of motivation and optimism, alongside spoilers to illuminate the criteria of timing for instigating peace negotiations during a conflict in four separate peace processes in Africa. Although scholars have deemed readiness theory to be unhelpful in predicting the timing of negotiations and this research is unable to reveal whether it could be helpful in predicting the timing of negotiations if accompanied by studying spoilers, it opens a new path of analysis. This research could have been bolstered through a case study analyzing a current conflict and utilizing readiness theory and spoilers to predict the timing of negotiations in the present day. That could be a next phase for this field of study.

This research is only a small aspect of peace processes and peace studies. The timing of negotiations is one of the first steps of a peace process, but to improve the overall approach to

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peace processes, more research on other steps are required. Every small aspect of peace processes necessitate further analysis in a similar fashion to this paper: using multiple different case studies to determine similarities, differences and anomalies and attempt to uncover certain patterns. Furthermore, future research that may build off this research on the timing of negotiation should continue to analyze the timing of negotiations and the steps of negotiations, beginning with pre-negotiations and continuing through different stages of negotiations as determined by other scholars. There is plenty of further research to be undertaken in this area and the applications are integral to ensuring sustainable peace in the future. Therefore, there is no time to waste.

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Table 1: Yawanarajah's Table on the Phases of Conflict

Phase	Characteristics	Possible Strategy	Possible Best Actor
Preventing Conflict	Government still in control. The sources of tension are structural, but not urgent.	Communication	Technocrats from development partners and regional organizations.
Imminent Violence	Optimism of outcome is high, but the real information on opponent's battle strength is unknown.	Communication	Interstate: shuttle diplomacy by state actors and international organizations.
Early Stage Conflict	Either clear battlefield asymmetry requiring face saving or battle symmetry where parties are still hopeful for a favourable outcome.	Communication and Formulation	Biased mediators and outcome biased mediators.
Late Stage Conflict	Military symmetry where the parties continue to wage intense war but cannot win; or military asymmetry where a strong government cannot lose but cannot defeat rebels either.	Communication, Formulation and Manipulation	P5 actors, international organizations and the UN/OSCE

(Yawanarajah 2016, 8)

Table 2: Uganda 1988 Peace Process

Phase	Timeline	Actors
Preventing Conflict	December 10-11, 1980	Uganda People's Congress (UPC) won the elections that were neither free nor fair (Omach 2009, 3).
Imminent Conflict	February 1981	Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) instigated guerilla warfare with the government's Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) (Omach 2009, 3).

Early Stage Conflict	January 1986	NRM/A overthrew the government, resulting in an unstable "victor's peace" (Omach 2009, 3).
	1986	At least seven armed groups fighting for control, including the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) (Omach 2009, 4).
	April 1986	NRA began to arrest former UNLA soldiers who had not reported to the army within 10 days of the NRM taking power and place them in concentration camps (Omach 2009, 4).
	July 1986	Uganda People's Democratic Movement/Army (UPDM/A) was formed of mainly UNLA soldiers and they were Museveni's main opposition (Lamwaka 2002, 28). The UPDM/A was fighting back against the NRA's April arrests (Omach 2009, 4).
	August 1986	The UPDA launched their first attack against the NRM/A (Lamwaka 2002, 28).
Preparing for Peace	October 31, 1986	First negotiations were instigated by a civil society "goodwill peace mission" with Museveni's backing (Lamwaka 2002, 29).
Imminent Violence	December 1986	Another armed group was founded to fight the NRM government: the Holy Spirit Mobile Force (HSM) which would eventually become the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (Lamwaka 2002, 28).
Preparing for Peace	May 1987	General Amnesty Act passed, granting former soldiers for crimes committed that were not murder or rape (Lamwaka 2002, 30).
	November 1987-March 1988	NRA and UPDA consulted, building trust for serious negotiations to begin. These discussions were headed by the military side of both groups, completely excluding the UPDM external politicians. This was due to the "soldiers believe[ing] that the politicians, known for their uncompromising attitudes, might obstruct negotiations" (Lamwaka 2002, 30).
Negotiations	March 17, 1988	The first round of peace talks began, and a ceasefire was declared. This meeting, chaired by two elders, was between the NRA and UPDM/A delegation, though the latter was missing their overall commander, Latek (Lamwaka 2002, 30).
	March 18, 1988	A second round of peace talks (Lamwaka 2002, 30).
	March 20-21, 1988	The third round of peace talks went well, excluding the elders. Both parties believed the elders were too intricately connected to the distrustful politicians (Lamwaka 2002, 30). Both armies stated their desire for the politicians to eventually join the negotiations,

		despite rejecting them in the beginning (Lamwaka 2002, 31).
Preventing Conflict	March 31, 1988	A threat to the peace process emerged when a member of the government broadcasted the message "amnesty is expiring 31 March. Run, run for your life" (Lamwaka 2002, 31).
Negotiations	April 6, 1988	One UPDM/A delegation met with Museveni in Entebbe and one UPDM/A delegation toured Kampala to see the developments that had occurred since 1986 (Lamwaka 2002, 31).
	May 8, 1988	UPDM/A replaced Latek with Okello and cut ties with the UPDM external political wing, who had condemned the talks (Lamwaka 2002, 32).
Peace Accords	June 3, 1988	The Peace Agreement between the Ugandan Government and the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) was signed by President Museveni, on behalf of the Government of Uganda, and John Angela Okello, on behalf of the UPDA. It was witness by Bishop Emeritus of Gulu (United Nations 1988, 1-4). It was signed in Pece stadium in front of 5000 people (Lamwaka 2002, 32).
Imminent Violence/Violence	June 1988	Jospeh Kony, leader of the HSM, wrote to the NRA requesting to negotiate peace. These negotiations did not materialize due to a miscommunication resulting in the NRA attacking Kony (Lamwaka 2002, 31).

Table 3: Sierra Leone 1999 Peace Process

Phase	Timeline	Actors
Imminent Violence	March 23, 1991	Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched an attack on Sierra Leone from Liberia, supported by the "warlord-cum-President Charles Taylor" of Liberia ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.).
Early Stage Conflict	Late 1991	Sierra Leonean army gained strength and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia attacked the RUF ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.).
Late Stage Conflict	Early 1992	Stalemate. Neither side willing or able to defeat the other ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.).
Early Stage Conflict	April 1992	The military overthrew the government, becoming the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), and proclaimed that the war would continue ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.).

Violence	July 1992	Elections were meant to be held (but could not be, due to the conflict) ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.).
Late Stage Conflict	Summer-Fall 1992	RUF gained territory and diamond mines ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.).
	October 1992	Most of the RUF's territory retaken by the government ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.).
	Early 1994	Government declares a unilateral ceasefire, believing to have defeated the RUF. But, the RUF regroups and counterattacks ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.).
	April 1994	RUF continues to gain ground and moves into the North ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.).
Preparing for Peace	December 1994	The government goes to the UN for assistance in instigating peace negotiations ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.).
Negotiations	Late 1995	Non-governmental organization International Alert commences the first peace process (Hayner 2007, 8).
	March 1996	Elections held and Sierra Leone People's Party won. Their leader, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah became president ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.).
	Summer 1996	Organization for African Unity takes over the peace process (Hayner 2007, 8).
Peace Accords/Preventing Conflict	November 30, 1996	Abidjan Peace Agreement signed, but never implemented because the RUF would not allow UN peacekeepers or monitors in the country (Hayner 2007, 8).
Imminent Violence	May 1997	Soldiers from the Sierra Leonean army, commanded by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, overthrew the government, forming the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) (Hayner 2007, 8).
Early Stage Conflict	May 25, 1997	The AFRC in alliance with the RUF take control of the government (Hayner 2007, 8).
Late Stage Conflict/Violence	July 1997	Nigerian ECOMOG forces invaded Sierra Leone to restore Kabbah to power ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.).
	March 1998	Kabbah officially reinstated, but the war continues ("Sierra Leone: Government," n.d.).
	January 1999	RUF/AFRC invaded Freetown and went on a two-week killing spree that was ended when Nigeria forces and the government's army were able to take back Freetown (Hayner 2007, 9).
Preparing for Peace	Early 1999	Three-day consultative conference held with political and traditional leaders and civil society to discuss the terms of a peace agreement (Hayner 2007, 9).

Negotiations	April 1999	Lomé peace talks began, including representatives from the UN, OAU, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, the US, the UK and the Commonwealth. The official mediator was the government of Togo (Hayner 2007, 10). Civil society and the private sector were represented by the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, the Human Rights Forum, the Women's Forum, the Labour Congress and many other observers (Hayner 2007, 11).
Peace Accord	July 7, 1999	The Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF was signed by President of Sierra Leone Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and Leader of the RUF Foday Sankoh (United Nations 1999, 31). It was witnessed by President of Togo and Chairman of ECOWAS Gnassingbé Eyadéma; the Presidents from Liberia, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ghana; Minister of State at the Foreign Ministry in Charge of International Cooperation; representative of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary; Special Representative of the UN Secretary General; representative of the OAU; and the representative of the Commonwealth Nations (United Nations 1999, 31-32).

Table 4: Democratic Republic of the Congo 2009 Peace Process

Phases	**Timeline**	**Actors**
Imminent Violence	July 26, 2006	Nkunda formed the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and instigated a new rebellion (Pehle and Schwarz 2015, 1).
Peace Accord	December 15, 2006	The Pact of Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region was signed by the government and the CNDP (United Nations, 2009).
Negotiations	December 2006- January 2007	CNDP meets with the DRC government and agrees to integrate CNDP forces into the national army (Pehle and Schwarz 2015, 2).
Imminent Violence	May 2007	The CNDP withdraws from the national army and the CNDP becomes stronger (Pehle and Schwarz 2015, 2).
Early Stage Conflict	August-December 2007	Fighting resumes between the CNDP, government and other rebel groups ("Government of DR Congo (Zaire)," n.d.).

Peace Accord	November 9, 2007	The Nairobi Joint Communique on a common approach to ending the threat posed to peace and security in both countries and the Great Lakes region was signed by the government of the DRC and Rwanda (United Nations Security Council, 2007).
Negotiations	December 2007	Parties return to the negotiation table ("Government of DR Congo (Zaire)," n.d.).
Peace Accords	January 23, 2008	Peace Agreements were signed at the end of the Goma Conference on Peace, Stability and Development in the provinces of North and South Kivu by the governments of DRC and Rwanda and 22 rebel groups (including the CNDP) (Stearns 2012, 40).
Preventing Conflict	February 2008	CNDP withdraws from the January agreement, insisting on new direct talks with the government. The government refuses to negotiate one on one with the CNDP ("Government of DR Congo (Zaire)," n.d.).
Late Stage Conflict/Violence	August-October 2008	Conflict reignites between the government and CNDP, peaking when CNDP nearly takes Goma (Stearns 2012, 40).
Preventing Conflict	October 29, 2008	CNDP declared a unilateral ceasefire (Pehle and Schwarz 2015, 2).
Imminent Violence	November 4, 2008	Fighting resumes when CNDP is attacked by other rebel groups ("Government of DR Congo (Zaire)," n.d.).
Negotiations	November 2008	Negotiator Obasanjo mediates discussions between the government and CNDP ("Government of DR Congo (Zaire)," n.d.).
	December 9, 2008	The government and the CNDP commence direct talks at the UN headquarters in Nairobi. Though, neither leaders were present ("Government of DR Congo (Zaire)," n.d.).
	January 6, 2009	Nkunda is replaced with Ntaganda as leader of the CNDP and approaches the government with new negotiations ("Government of DR Congo (Zaire)," n.d.).
	January 16, 2009	Ntaganda's CNDP declares a ceasefire after agreeing to integrate into the national army (again) ("Government of DR Congo (Zaire)," n.d.).
Peace Accord	January 16, 2009	The Ihusi Agreement was signed between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, CNDP and the Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (PARECO) (Boshoff 2010, 65).
	March 23, 2009	The Peace Agreement between the Government and CNDP was signed by CNDP President Dr.

| | | Desire Kamanzi and DRC Minister of International and Regional Cooperation Raymond Tshibanda (United Nations 2009, 12). The co-facilitators were Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for the Great Lakes Region Olusegun Obasanjo and the African Union and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region representative, Benjamin William Mkapa (United Nations 2009, 2). Both the co-facilitators were also the witnesses (United Nations 2009, 12). |
| | March 23, 2009 | The DRC government signed an agreement with smaller rebel groups (Högbladh 2012, 54). |

Table 5: South Sudan 2015 Peace Process

Phases	Timeline	Actors
Peacebuilding	July 9, 2011	South Sudan became independent from Sudan (Day et al. 2019, 32).
Imminent Violence	December 15, 2013	The first civil war erupts in South Sudan (Vhumbunu 2018) between President Salva Kiir's forces and then-vice President Riek Machar's forces (Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition- SPLM/A) (Wild et al. 2016, 663).
Negotiations	January 4, 2014	Phase I of the peace process commences on coming to an agreement on the cessation of hostilities (Vertin 2018, 12). Discussion were between the government and the SPLM/A (Vertin 2018, 3).
Peace Accord	January 23, 2014	A Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed by the Government of South Sudan and the SPLM/A (United Nations 2015, 4).
	January 30, 2014	An Agreement on a Cessation of Hostilities was signed by the Government and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Defense Army, Cobra Faction (SSDM/A-Cobra Faction) (United Nations Peacemaker, 2014).
Negotiations	February 2014-August 2015	Phase II of the peace process attempts to come to a final comprehensive political agreement and structural reforms (Vertin 2018, 12). This phase included former detainees, other political parties, civil society, women's organizations and faith-based leaders. Fighting continued during the process (Vertin 2018, 3).
	March 5, 2015	The date that the IGAD led negotiations hoped to have a peace deal by (Nyadera 2018, 74).

Peace Accord	May 4, 2014	A recommitment to the Humanitarian Matters of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed by the Government and the SPLM/A (United Nations Peacemaker 2014).
	May 9, 2014	The Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan was signed by the Government of South Sudan and the SPLM/A (United Nations 2015, 4).
	May 9, 2014	An Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in Jonglei State was signed by the Government and the SSDM/A-Cobra Faction (United Nations Peacemaker, 2014).
	October 20, 2014	The SPLM/A signed a Framework for Intra-SPLM Dialogue (United Nations Peacemaker, 2014).
	January 21, 2015	The SPLM signed an Arush agreement for the reunification of the SPLM (United Nations Peacemaker, 2015).
	February 1, 2015	The Areas of Agreement on the Establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity in the Republic of South Sudan was signed by the Government of South Sudan and the SPLM/A (United Nations 2015, 4).
Negotiations	August 10, 2015	Ugandan President Museveni proposed significant changes to the draft agreements under review (Vertin 2018, 14).
Peace Accord	August 17, 2015	The Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan was signed by Chairman and Commander in Chief of SPLM/A Riek Machar, the representative for Former Detainees and other political parties (United Nations 2015, 51). Stakeholders representing civil society, faith-based leaders, women's bloc and eminent personalities were also present and signed the agreement (United Nations 2015, 52). The guarantors who signed were; the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and Chair of IGAD Hailemariam Dessalegn; IGAD Heads of State and Government, the Presidents of Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya; and the African Union High Level Ad hoc Commitment for South Sudan and African Union Commission representatives from Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa and the Chairperson of the AU Commission (United Nations 2015, 54).
	August 26, 2015	President Kiir signed the peace agreement facing international pressure and threats of an arms embargo from the US (Santora 2015).

MA Thesis in Conflict Studies & Human Rights
Utrecht University
(course module GKMV 16028)

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- that the sources of all paraphrased texts, pictures, maps, or other illustrations not resulting from my own experimentation, observation, or data collection have been correctly referenced in the thesis, and in the bibliography;
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[2] https://students.uu.nl/en/practical-information/policies-and-procedures/fraud-and-plagiarism
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