



Utrecht University

# All Hands on Deck

## A Realist Perspective on EU-China Climate Change Cooperation

© China Daily



### MSc Thesis (30 ECTS)

<b><u>Name:</u></b>	F.P. (Freek) Terberg
<b><u>Student number:</u></b>	6620434
<b><u>E-mail address:</u></b>	f.p.terberg@students.uu.nl
<b><u>Supervisor:</u></b>	Dr. R.E. (Rakhyun) Kim
<b><u>Second reader:</u></b>	Prof. Dr. F.H.B. (Frank) Biermann
<b><u>Word count:</u></b>	13,011
<b><u>Date:</u></b>	2 <sup>nd</sup> of July 2020

**Abstract:**

Over the past decades, the EU and China have increasingly cooperated on the topic of climate change. Numerous studies have been carried out that highlight *institutionalization* and *mutual gains* as factors contributing to this cooperation. Realism, however, an important theoretical tradition, has often been ignored, which limits our understanding of EU-China climate change cooperation. This thesis aimed to fill this gap, by adjusting Contingent and Offensive Realism, traditionally preoccupied with military power, to the topic of climate change. In doing so, this thesis identified new factors that contributed to the emergence and endurance of EU-China climate change cooperation. It found that uncertainty reducing communication strategies aided the emergence of EU-China climate change cooperation. Furthermore, it uncovered that endurance of said cooperation was due, at least in part, to (a) recognition of climate change as a common threat and (b) recognition of cooperation as necessary to reduce the common threat. Through its analysis, this thesis demonstrates the explanatory power of Realist theories for EU-China climate change cooperation, thereby warranting future applications of Realism on related topics.

**Keywords:**

EU-China; cooperation; climate change; contingent realism; uncertainty; offensive realism; common threat; security;

**Acknowledgements:**

I would like to thank Dr R. Kim wholeheartedly for his time and effort to assist me during the research process. His guidance and support were fundamental for the completion of this project. The second reader of this thesis, Prof. Dr F. Biermann, also provided useful feedback during early writing stages, thereby greatly influencing the direction of the thesis. I would also like to thank the people whom I interviewed for sharing their time and expertise on this subject. I am also grateful to Sierk IJsselstein Mulder for providing comments and feedback which improved this last version's quality. Last, I would like to thank Francesco Montesano for his remarks and for providing contact information of potential interview candidates.

# Table of Contents

Abstract: .....	2
1: Introduction .....	6
2: Theoretical framework .....	8
2A: Emergence (Dependent Variable 1) .....	8
2A:1 Reduced Uncertainty (Explanatory Factor 1, Emergence).....	8
2A:2 Cooperation to increase Security (Explanatory Factor 2, Emergence) .....	10
2B: Endurance (Dependent Variable 2) .....	10
2B:1 Common Threat Recognition (Explanatory Factor 3, Endurance).....	11
2B:2 Cooperation to reduce Common Threat (Explanatory Factor 4, Endurance).....	11
3: Methods.....	12
3A: Time-frame and Sources of data .....	12
3B: Research Strategy - Model 1 Discourse-Analysis .....	13
3C: Research Strategy - Hypotheses Testing .....	14
3C:1 Research Strategy: Emergence (DV 1 & EF 1-2) .....	14
3C:2 Research Strategy Endurance (DV1 & EF 3-4) .....	15
4. Findings .....	17
4A: Emergence (DV 1) .....	19
4A:1A Reduced Uncertainty EU (EF 1, Emergence).....	19
4A:1B Reduced Uncertainty China (EF 1, Emergence) .....	20
4A:2A Cooperation as a means to increase Security EU (EF 2, Emergence).....	24
4A:2B Cooperation as a means to increase Security China (EF 2, Emergence).....	24
4B: Endurance (DV2).....	24
4B:1A Common Threat Recognition EU (EF 3, Endurance).....	25
4B:1B Common Threat Recognition China (EF 3, Endurance).....	26
4B:2 Cooperation to reduce Common Threat EU+China (EF 4, Endurance).....	28
5. Discussion .....	29
5A:1 Theoretical implications of findings & future research (EF 1, Emergence) .....	30
5A:2 Theoretical implications of findings & future research (EF 2, Emergence) .....	31
5A:3 Theoretical implications of findings & future research (EF 3, Endurance) .....	32
5A:4 Theoretical implications of findings & future research (EF 4, Endurance) .....	33
5B: Limitations.....	33
6. Conclusion.....	36
Bibliography.....	38
Annex: .....	43

## **Index of Figures:**

Figure 1. Research framework.....	7
Figure 2. Theoretical framework.....	12
Figure 3. Research strategies.....	14
Figure 4. Benign-intentions-communication-tactics of the EU between 1991-2005 based on the discourse-analysis.....	22
Figure 5. Benign-intentions-communication-tactics of China between 1991-2005 based on the discourse-analysis.....	23
Figure 6. Share of Common Threat and non-Common Threat framings in EU documents from 1991 to 2019.....	25
Figure 7. Share of Common Threat and non-Common Threat framings in China's documents from 1991 to 2019.....	27

## **Index of Tables:**

Table 1. The variables for Emergence: summary of operationalization.....	15
Table 2. Applied and adapted framework of security-categorizations.....	16
Table 3. The variables for Endurance: summary of operationalization.....	17
Table 4. Summary of the findings per factor.....	18

## **Abbreviations:**

CC	Climate Change
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CN	People's Republic of China
COP	Conference of the Parties
CV	Control Variable
DV	Dependent Variable
EC	European Commission
ECU	European Currency Unit
EF	Explanatory Factor
ENB	Earth Negotiations Bulletin
ETS	Emission Trading System
EU	European Union
G77	The Group of 77
GHG	Greenhouse Gas's
IISD	International Institute for Sustainable Development
IMMCS	International Military Council on Climate and Security
INC	Intergovernmental Negotiations Committee
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JC	Joint Communication
KP	Kyoto Protocol
PC	Presidency Conclusions
PRC	People's Republic of China
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

# 1: Introduction

One of the world's greatest threats to global security is climate change. It brings about risks of political instability, intra-state conflict, major natural disasters, displacement of people, and threats to critical resources and infrastructure (IMCCS Expert Group, 2020). In order to address climate change, international cooperation is required. In reality, however, rising authoritarianism, fierce global competition and nationalist agendas, among other forces, prevail over joint climate action all too often (IMCCS Expert Group, 2020). Nevertheless, the EU and China cooperate on climate change bilaterally (The European Commission, 2005). The cooperation came into being despite the EU's and China's largely different interests, capacities and attitudes towards climate change (De Matteis, 2010; Schreurs, 2020). **A better understanding of the factors that contributed to the EU's and China's cooperation on climate change could help, therefore, to overcome forces hostile to international climate cooperation.**

Previous research has identified three factors that contribute to the EU-China climate change cooperation. First, the overall institutionalisation of the EU-China bilateral cooperation, which creates patterns of stability and for new areas of cooperation to be identified (Geeraerts, 2019; De Matteis, 2010; Liu, Wu & Wan, 2019; Christiansen, 2016; Cottey, 2018)<sup>1</sup>. Second, the respective roles of both the EU and China in the international community (De Matteis, 2010; Yan, 2018; Yan, 2020)<sup>2</sup>. Third, both recognise that mutual gains and opportunities arise by cooperation (Dorussen, Chistiansen & Kirchner, 2018)<sup>3</sup>.

Whilst these efforts have yielded plausible explanations, they have neglected an important theoretical tradition, Realism, **which when included could help strengthen the EU-China relation according to Holslag (2011)**. As opposed to institutionalism, Realism emphasises unilateral variables as deep sources of security cooperation (Glaser, 2010). **For example, Charles L. Glaser has explained the *emergence* of cooperation as the result of employing uncertainty reducing tactics in the absence of institutions (Glaser, 1995; Glaser, 2010)**. Although the topic of climate change has been discussed in multilateral settings (e.g. the Intergovernmental Negotiations Committee), no such institutional mechanism on climate change initially existed between the EU and China. Therefore, it could well be that Glaser's theory holds explanatory power over EU-China climate change cooperation. **Mearsheimer (1990), another Realist scholar, argues a shared recognition of threats as common contributes to the *endurance* of cooperation.** This factor is neglected in the existing body of EU-China literature but given the threat climate change poses to humankind in its entirety, could very well add to our understanding of the endurance of EU-China climate change cooperation. As these examples show, Realist scholarship has proven its worth by identifying factors that contribute to the emergence and endurance of cooperation. Therefore, applying

---

<sup>1</sup> De Matteis (2010) argues institutions provided stability to the overall EU-China relationship, while also helping as to identify new areas of cooperation such as Climate change cooperation. Similarly, Geeraerts (2019) argues institutions provide the conditions that generate mutual trust and socialization. Whilst Geeraerts (2019) applies Realism, his analysis is limited to Realist factors that cause divergence. Chistiansen (2016), also underlines the importance of institutions in shaping and supporting their bilateral cooperation

<sup>2</sup> De Matteis (2010), argues cooperating bilaterally and engaging in the multilateral climate change regime provided both the EU and China opportunities to gain relevance in international negotiations. Yan (2018), on the other hand, stresses the significant influence both actors yield as to contribute to climate negotiations and addressing climate change as a source of their bilateral engagement.

<sup>3</sup> Dorussen et al. (2018), found that mutual gains rain supreme as an explanatory variable for EU-China security cooperation in general.

these to EU-China cooperation on climate change might complement or even enrich the picture painted by previous scholars. This raises the following questions: *How does Realism explain the emergence and endurance of cooperation? What factors does Realism identify? How do these translate to the topic of climate change?* Transcending theory and methodology, however, the main question then asks: *To what extent these factors occurred in practice?* This thesis seeks to answer the last question with regards to the EU-China bilateral climate change cooperation. **For the sake of clarity, this thesis understands cooperation as having two distinct phases. The first, *emergence*, refers to the phase in which cooperation between actors comes into existence. If successful, this phase is concluded with *emerged* cooperation. The second phase, *endurance*, refers to the continuation or maintenance of the emerged cooperation.**

Drawing on Contingent Realism (i.e. Glaser, 1995; Glaser, 2010) and Offensive Realism (e.g. Mearsheimer, 1990), the thesis first identifies and adapts factors of emergence and endurance from which hypotheses are deduced. **The factors are assumed as contributing to the emergence and endurance of cooperation, based on their respective theoretical traditions. Flowing from the assumption, the thesis analyses whether the factors occurred in EU-China climate change cooperation by carrying out discourse-analysis and semi-structured interviews. By doing so, it is possible to identify whether Contingent Realism and Offensive Realism have value for understanding EU-China climate change cooperation.**

The thesis understands the factors for the emergence of cooperation as (1) the communication of benign intentions concerning climate change cooperation to reduce uncertainty, and (2) the perception of cooperation as a means to increase security. The factors for the endurance of cooperation are understood as (1) the recognition of climate change as a common threat, and (2) the recognition that cooperation is necessary to reduce the common threat. Through its analysis, the thesis found indications of, first, the contributing nature of reduced uncertainty through unilateral actions to the emergence of EU-China climate change cooperation and, second, the contributing nature of both common threat recognition and the recognition of cooperation as necessary to reduce said threat to the endurance of EU-China climate change cooperation.

The thesis is organised as follows (Figure 1). Chapter 1, commences with a literature review of EU-China scholarship in order to identify the knowledge gap (step 1 of Figure 1). Chapter 2 uses Realist literature to deduce and adapt factors for the emergence and endurance of cooperation (step 2). This leads to the creation of a theoretical framework and the deduction of hypotheses. These factors are then used as a guide throughout a discourse-analysis and semi-structured interviews (outlined in Chapter 3 and step 3 in Figure 1), which examine whether the factors occurred in practice and thereby test the relevance of the hypotheses deduced (Chapter 4). Next, in Chapter 5, the findings and the limitations are discussed with regards to the deduced factors and hypotheses (step 4); the theories (step 5); and the overall scholarly understanding of EU-China climate change cooperation (step 6). Finally, in Chapter 6 the conclusions of the thesis are presented.




Figure 1: Research Framework

## 2: Theoretical framework

This chapter outlines the different identified and adapted factors of cooperation from Contingent Realism (Glaser, 1995; Glaser 2010) and Offensive Realism (Mearsheimer, 1990). As briefly outlined in the Introduction, this thesis understands cooperation as having two distinct phases. In the first phase, cooperation comes into existence and is referred to as *emergence*. In the second phase, cooperation is maintained or continued and is referred to as *endurance*. Emergence and Endurance are the respective dependent variables of this study and are discussed in more detail in section 2A and 2B, respectively. The distinction between emergence and endurance is based on, first, the existing literature on EU-China climate change cooperation, and, second, on the corresponding attributes of both Contingent Realism and Offensive realism for either emergence or endurance. Contingent Realism, for instance, identifies factors that apply to the emergence of cooperation, while ignoring factors of endurance. Offensive Realism, on the other hand, although highly suspect on the prospects for the emergence of cooperation, outlines factors that apply to endurance. Overall, on emergence, this thesis is an application of Glaser's (1995; 2010) Contingent Realism, whilst on endurance, this thesis is an application of Mearsheimer's (1990) Offensive Realism.

For both emergence and endurance, different factors are deduced and adapted to the topic of climate change. **In both Contingent and Offensive Realism, these factors contribute to the emergence and endurance of cooperation. By adopting the position of Contingent Realism and Offensive Realism, this thesis assumes these factors should have occurred when analysing EU-China climate change cooperation. The findings of the actual occurrence of these factors is then used to determine the relevance of the deduced hypotheses.**

The remainder of this chapter is structured according to the distinction between emergence and endurance. Section 2A:1 and 2A:2 outline the two factors of emergence. Section 2B:1 and 2B:2 outline both factors of endurance. The chapter is concluded with the theoretical framework (Figure 2, page 12).

### **2A: Emergence (Dependent Variable 1)**

**Emergence is understood as the process of coming into existence, which has two distinct stages.** The first stage refers to the period in which different factors create the circumstances for formalised/institutionalised cooperation to emerge. The second is the end-product of the first stage and is understood as *emerged* cooperation (i.e. formalised/institutionalised cooperation). Glaser's Contingent Realism argues that certain factors create the necessary conditions for cooperation to come into existence, implicitly referring to the emergence of cooperation (Glaser, 1995; Glaser, 2010).

#### **2A:1 Reduced Uncertainty (Explanatory Factor 1, Emergence)**

The first factor for the emergence of cooperation is reduced uncertainty of opponents' motives and is necessary for actors to identify cooperation as bearing fewer security risks than engaging in competition (Glaser, 1995; Glaser 2010).

Most Realists argue that the absence of a world government creates conditions that favour competition over cooperation (Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 1979; Glaser, 1995; Jervis, 1999). These conditions relate to the uncertainty of motives of states, and whether their intentions are benign. While some Realists accept the uncertainty between states as given (e.g.



Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 2000), **Glaser (1995; 2010) argues that an actor may consciously perform actions, in both word and deed, as part of a communicative tactic, which serves to convince the other of the state's benign intentions and thereby to reduce any uncertainty the other might harbour.** Being a reciprocal process, 'signalling' can set a 'positive spiral' into motion (Glaser, 2010, p 68), from which cooperation eventually might emerge (Glaser, 2010). **When the uncertainty of one's motives is reduced, the risks of engaging in cooperation are smaller than the risk of engaging in competition (Glaser, 1995; Glaser, 2010).**

Glaser's Contingent Realism distinguishes three main tactics: (1) *arms control agreement*, (2) *defence emphasis*, and (3) *unilateral restraint* (Glaser, 1995, p. 68). Their militaristic nature reveals Glaser's traditional notions of war and peace, or, in a broader sense, (in)stability between states. As will become clearer in the following paragraphs, this thesis stretches these notions to include the fight against climate change, being a war that unites states against a common enemy.

In this fight, it is not the arms that are destructive and in need of control, but anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), the main cause of climate change (IPCC, 2014a). **Therefore, the first communication tactic is to reach a *GHG emission control agreement*, which obliges the signatories to reduce, stabilise and/or limit the growth of emissions.** This tactic involves four signalling components. First, reaching an agreement, second, signing the agreement, third, ratification of the agreement, and last, the fulfilment of the commitments laid down in the agreement. In this thesis, all four need to be present before uncertainty is reduced.

In a similar vein, Glaser's second tactic, the adoption of a military strategy that *emphasises defence*, bears a striking resemblance to adaptation strategies against climate change. The IPCC defines adaptation as 'the process of adjustment to actual and expected climate and its effects as to moderate or avoid harm' (IPCC, 2014b, p.5). **International actors can do so by fostering their adaptation, and/or by lending support to adaptation efforts of others. This also includes the acceptance of such support by recipient countries, as it shows a willingness to adapt to the problem in need of solving (i.e. climate change).**

The tactic of *unilateral restraint*, the third and last one, refers to a state's unilateral decision to reduce its offensive capabilities. **Translated to climate change cooperation, this tactic corresponds to mitigation strategies, the goal of which is to reduce the intensity of climate change itself, either through curtailing sources of GHG emissions or enhancing the sinks of GHG emissions (IPCC, 2014a).** One can carry out this communication tactic in three ways. First, by unilaterally deciding to reduce (the growth of) GHG emissions. Second, by increasing the relative or absolute amount of GHG emission sinks. Third, by lending support to the mitigation efforts of others, or, for recipient parties the acceptance of support, since both help restrain GHG emissions. Therefore, for the occurrence of signalling-tactics to explain the emergence of EU-China bilateral climate change cooperation, both the EU and China must have signalled motives.

Glaser restricts his theory to the *sending out* of signals. **In the case of climate change, however, attention must also be devoted to their *reception*, which cannot be neutral but is presumed to depend on one's attitude towards climate change, more specifically, towards the actor(s) one holds responsible for causing and addressing climate change.** After all, most emission agreements are reached in a multilateral context, which implies that the division and extent of commitments are based on the lowest common denominator. Therefore, the compatibility of multilaterally agreed commitments with the attitudes held by both the EU and

China is used to contextualise the policy actions. Also, the signal that reducing emissions sends out will only be received by other actors if they see emissions as a contributing factor to climate change. In other words, an actor's benign intentions are only received as such when they are deemed valuable by others. The following hypothesis is formulated based on the above:

**H1:** If uncertainty concerning motives was reduced, then the EU-China climate change cooperation emerged.

### **2A:2 Cooperation to increase Security (Explanatory Factor 2, Emergence)**

The shared perception of bilateral cooperation as a means to increase one's security constitutes the second factor of emergence. It is closely related to the first factor and is based on Glaser's notion that when the risk of competition is greater than the risk of cooperation, security is best assured through cooperation (Glaser, 1995). For Glaser, the risks of cooperation are low when the probability that the opposing actor is benign of nature<sup>4</sup> is 'high enough' (Glaser, 2010, p. 83). High-probability estimates of an actor's benign motives influence a competitor's perception of the risks of cooperation (Glaser, 2010). **In other words, positive perceptions towards cooperation can be achieved through the adoption of communication-tactics that signal benign intentions.**

Once the risks of cooperation are lower than the risks of competition, countries willing to address security issues will engage in cooperation, as it serves their best interest to do so (Glaser, 2010). Even more convincingly, it makes strategic sense to engage in cooperation as it serves one's security interests (Glaser, 2010). Glaser's theory is strategic-choice of nature, which means it prescribes how rational states should and would act under certain conditions (Glaser, 2010). What is important for this thesis, however, is whether climate change prescribed the EU and China to cooperate in order to increase their respective security.

**In this regard, climate change is largely recognised as a threat to all states which cannot be solved by one state alone (e.g. Paris Agreement, 2015; IPCC, 2014a; Ostrom, 2010; IMCCS Expert Group, 2020).** This thesis adopts the position that with climate change, the risks of competition are greater than the risks of cooperation. For Glaser, however, it is an actor's risk perception of engaging in cooperation that influences whether actors partake in cooperation. **For the purpose of this thesis specifically, the perception of both the EU and China that cooperation serves as a means to increase their respective security.** The following hypothesis is formulated based on the above:

**H2:** If both the EU and China perceived cooperation as a means to increase security, then the EU-China bilateral climate change cooperation emerged.

### **2B: Endurance (Dependent Variable 2)**

Endurance is understood as continued cooperation, even when faced with challenges. In a way, it relates to the concept of resilience, which is the capacity of a system to cope with a hazardous event or disturbance whilst maintaining essential function (IPCC, 2014b). Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism follows this concept implicitly, by hypothesising about the capacity of the European cooperative system to cope with disturbances and to maintain its cooperative function (Mearsheimer, 1990). Crucially, from his argumentation two factors can be deduced that safeguarded the endurance of European cooperation during the Cold War: (1)

---

<sup>4</sup> Glaser refers to actors with a benign nature as 'security-seeking states' (Glaser, 2010, p. 83).

the recognition that the threat is common and (2) recognition that the threat cannot be resolved unilaterally (Mearsheimer, 1990). Mearsheimer's views on European cooperation have been the subject of harsh criticism<sup>5</sup>. It is important to note, however, that these critiques are mainly directed at what may be described as Mearsheimer's expectations about stability changes in relation to the threat's nature, rather than at the aforementioned factors. Therefore, they could still hold explanatory power when analysing similar situations.

### **2B:1 Common Threat Recognition (Explanatory Factor 3, Endurance)**

As briefly mentioned, the **first factor for the endurance of cooperation is the shared recognition of climate change being a common threat to both the EU and China**. For Mearsheimer (1990), it is the balance of power logic that created incentives for the endurance of cooperation during the Cold War. More specifically, it was the threat from the Soviet Union that abated concerns about cooperation between states of the European Community (EC), since each additional increment of EC's power reduced the Soviet threat (Mearsheimer, 1990). While this thesis by no means suggests the Cold War is similar to climate change, an important similarity exists. **Both create a bipolar system in which the security of one is influenced by the power of the other. During the Cold War, it was the opponent's military prowess that created the security threat and therewith the necessity to band together. In the fight against climate change, it is the size and intensity of the climate change that creates the security threat. The size and intensity of which can only be reduced if everyone participates, which is to be achieved through cooperation.** Mearsheimer refers to (animosity between) states when writing about threats, an approach this thesis endeavours to develop by acknowledging climate change as a common threat on a global scale. Following Mearsheimer's reasoning and the balance of power logic, cooperation between the EU and China will endure as long as both recognise climate change as a common threat as it forces them to cooperate. The following hypothesis is formulated based on the above.

**H3:** If both the EU and China recognised climate change as being a common threat, then the EU-China climate change cooperation endured.

### **2B:2 Cooperation to reduce Common Threat (Explanatory Factor 4, Endurance)**

**The second factor for the endurance of cooperation is the shared recognition that cooperation is a necessity to reduce the common threat.** Mearsheimer (1990) does not mention this necessity explicitly, but it is clear that for him, the balance of power logic mandated cooperation between Western democracies. Only through engaging in cooperation could they meet the common threat emanating from the Soviet Union. Cooperation serves as the rational choice for states seeking security and ensuring survival (Mearsheimer, 1990). For Mearsheimer, rational states would automatically recognise such security benefits of cooperation. This thesis questions his assumption and interprets such recognition as the last factor for endurance: **that both the EU and China recognised cooperation as necessary to reduce the common threat of climate change.** The following hypothesis is formulated based on the above:

**H4:** If both the EU and China recognised cooperation as necessary to reduce the common threat, then the EU-China climate change cooperation endured.

---

<sup>5</sup> For instance in: Hoffmann, Keohane & Mearsheimer, (1990) and in Russett, Risse-Kappen & Mearsheimer, (1990).

The following figure depicts the theoretical framework based on the specified explanatory factors in this chapter.




Figure 2: Theoretical framework

### 3: Methods

This chapter contains four sections. In section one of this chapter, the used research strategies are specified. Section two outlines the methods used to test the relevance of the deduced hypotheses of emergence, and section three outlines the methods used to test the relevance of the deduced hypotheses of endurance.

#### 3A: Time-frame and Sources of data

The literature review conducted in the previous chapter delineated four hypotheses for cooperation on climate change, two for emergence and two for endurance. To determine the relevance of these hypotheses, this thesis relied on both discourse-analysis and semi-structured interviews. For the discourse-analysis, 521 documents published between 1991-2019 were analysed. Given the sheer number of documents and to ease the analysis, each document was given a particular code. Annex F (pages 49-80) compiles the different sources of the documents; the criteria used to select the documents; the codes assigned to each document; and a table depicting all documents used. Two momentous events delineate the timeframe: the first session

of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in February 1991, and the European Commission's proposal for a Green New Deal on December 11<sup>th</sup>, 2019. **Emergence and endurance are fluid concepts, in the sense that endurance is the successor of emergence. For the sake of clear methodology, this thesis presumed emergence turned into endurance in 2005, when the EU and China formalised their bilateral cooperation through jointly signing the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change. In other words, (presumed) emergence was analysed from 1991-2005, whilst (presumed) endurance was analysed from 2005-2019.**

The discourse-analysis draws on two principal sources of data. First of all, a wide range of key documents from the European Commission, the European Council, the Chinese Government, and the United Nations, including reports, statements, speeches, policy documents and press releases. Taking into account their public and representational character, this thesis used the documents to identify how the actors portray themselves, rather than to determine how much of this image is internalised (Epstein, 2008). The second source of data consists of NGOs reporting on multilateral climate change negotiations within the same timeframe. **Their observations served as a valuable tool to verify the information retrieved from the first body of sources.**

This large set of data was then, so to speak, triangulated with data flowing from the semi-structured interviews. In total, four semi-structured interviews were held, of which two were with senior Diplomats of the European Union; one was with an official of an international organisation; and one was with a Scholar on EU-China climate change cooperation. All interviewees were asked the same five questions, allowing ample space for follow-up questions. Because of confidentiality and privacy issues, the interviewees' names were rendered anonymous<sup>6</sup>. **The power of these interviews lies not so much in scientific logic or numerical truth as in unicity and personal experience. Hence, interview data were used to contrast, compare and contextualise the data extracted from the discourse-analysis.**

### **3B: Research Strategy - Model 1 Discourse-Analysis**

The method of discourse-analysis serves to determine certain narratives, in this case, the *storylines* held by the EU and China on topics such as climate change, cooperation and security. **Discourse analyses are particularly useful because of their ability to reveal transformations or fluctuations** (Hansen, 2006; Biermann et al., 2009). Hansen (2006) differentiates between three different models of discourse-analysis, all serving different purposes. **This thesis adheres to Model 1, as this model is best suited to the examination of identities and perceptions in the foreign policy debate (Hansen, 2006).** Following Hansen, the term discourse refers to an analytical construction that involves both material and ideational factors (Hansen, 2006). In turn, discourse-analysis enables deeper insight into narratives, the 'sequencing, structuring and organisation of signs, codes and events into a coherent order' (Zhang, 2019, p. 5). Provided that international actors have incentives to hide perceptions (Keohane & David, 2016; Bennet & Checkel, 2015), identifying *true* perceptions is a near-impossible task. Instead, this thesis focuses on *expressed* perceptions and recognitions. Expressing perceptions could also very well be considered a sign or code of some sort.

---

<sup>6</sup> A slightly more detailed overview of their field of work is provided in Annex E1 (page 48).

### 3C: Research Strategy - Hypotheses Testing

To determine the relevance of the deduced hypotheses on cooperation, different narratives of interest were identified, an overview of which is depicted in figure 3. These are further elaborated in section 3C:1 and 3C:2.




Figure 3: Research Strategies

#### 3C:1 Research Strategy: Emergence (DV 1 & EF 1-2)

As explained in section 3A, this thesis assumes that emergence transitioned into endurance in 2005, through the signing of the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change. The first objective of the research was to test this assumption by performing a discourse-analysis.

To determine whether the EU and China partook in benign-intentions-communication-tactics which leads to reduced uncertainty (EF1), this thesis analysed the discourse of policy actions on climate change, taken by both the EU and China between 1991 and 2005. **Policy documents and National Reports on Climate Change were compiled to construct a timeline of different communications tactics adopted by the EU towards China and vice versa. Communication tactics are only useful when they actually transmit the desired signals. To account for this, another discursive narrative was introduced and analysed, relating to the attitudes held by the EU and China respectively, on the responsibility for causing and addressing climate change.** As outlined in chapter 2, the identification of these attitudes helped to contextualise the identified signals of benign intentions.

To determine the relevance of the second hypothesis, another discourse-analysis was performed. **To determine whether the EU and China perceived cooperation as a means to increase security, this thesis analysed the expressed perceptions of cooperation between**

**1991-2005 for both the EU and China. All expressions that included the word *cooperation* were collected, analysed and categorised.** This resulted in an overview of the EU's and China's narratives on cooperation in general and bilateral cooperation in particular and allowed insight into the role of security within these narratives.

All data from the discourse-analysis was contrasted, compared and contextualised by using data flowing from the semi-structured interviews. This combined data was then used to determine the relevance of the deduced hypothesis. Table 1 includes a summary of the operationalisations of the factors of emergence.

Table 1

*The variables for the Emergence: summary of operationalization.*

Variable	Operationalization
<b>Emergence (DV1)</b>	Emergence is signified by expressions of willingness to engage in cooperation. Cooperation is considered as emerged when it is formalised/institutionalised, for instance, through an agreement or partnership declaration.
<b>1. Reduced Uncertainty (EF1)</b>	The actual occurrence of reduced uncertainty is determined through the identification of benign-intentions-communication-tactics from 1991-2005 (1A-1C).
<b>1A. Emission agreements</b>	Agreements that either require (1) limitation in the growth of emissions; (2) stabilization of emissions; (3) an absolute emission reduction; (4) relative emission reduction. The agreements can be reached either multilaterally or bilaterally.
<b>1B. Defence emphasis</b>	Actors increasing their adaptation capacity, and/or by providing support to others' adaptation efforts, as well as the acceptance of such support
<b>1C. Unilateral restraint</b>	Unilateral decision/policies that (1) reduce (the growth of) GHG emissions (2) reduce the relative or absolute amount of GHG emission sinks; (3) lend support to mitigation efforts (in terms of financial, technological or capacity-building), or in the case of recipient countries the acceptance of such support.
<b>1E. Control Narrative: Attitudes on responsibility (CV)</b>	Different attitudes determined through expressions by both the EU and China between 1991-2005 on the distribution of responsibility for addressing climate change; and on what/who caused climate change.
<b>2. Cooperation as a means to increase security (EF2)</b>	The narratives of both the EU and China between 1991-2005 on the security benefits of engaging in cooperation in general, and the security benefits of engaging in bilateral cooperation specifically.

*Note:* (DV) refers to dependent variables; (EF) refers to explanatory factor; and (CV) refers to control variables.

### **3C:2 Research Strategy Endurance (DV1 & EF 3-4)**

Here, the first objective of the analysis was to find out, again by means of a discourse-analysis, whether the EU-China climate change cooperation had indeed endured.

Another discourse-analysis was performed to determine the relevance of the third hypothesis, the relation between the EU's and China's recognition of climate change as a common threat and the endurance of their cooperation on climate change. This analysis was divided into two components.

**The analysis of component 1, referred to as *climate change threat framings*, assessed how the effects of climate change were framed.** For example, if a country issues a formal statement in which climate change is linked to global (in)stability, it implicitly acknowledges not only that climate change is a threat, but also that the threat is a common one. Taking such statements into account, this thesis adopted McDonald's (2013) security discourse framework as a tool to categorise expressions on the effects of climate change between 2005-2019. McDonald's framework differentiates between national security, human security, international security and ecological security narratives, the last three of which are understood as referring to common threats. However, the topic of climate change has triggered such a vast and diverse array of expressions, that two more categories were added, based on distinctions made by Hansen (2006). The first new category, *non-security*, allows for the inclusion of low-priority security framings (Hansen, 2006) and their comparison to high-priority counterparts, such as those included by McDonald. While framings of climate change as a common concern do indicate the global nature, the use of 'concern' gives it low-priority. The second new category, *security non-specified*, encompasses security-related framings that are outside McDonald's scope but pertain to common threats, nonetheless. The applied and adapted framework is depicted more specifically in table 2.

**Component 2, referred to as concrete expressions of common threat, exemplifies the common threat recognition by showcasing concrete examples of such recognitions.** The findings of the discourse-analysis were then contrasted, contextualised and compared with the data flowing from the semi-structured interviews. The data was then used to test the third deduced hypothesis.

Table 2

*Applied and adapted framework of climate change threat framings.*

<b>Discourse</b>	<b>Referent</b>	<b>Climate change effects/framings</b>
<b>National security (NCT)</b>	Nation-state (including EU)	<i>Survival; Conflict; sovereignty; economic interests;</i>
<b>Human security (CT)</b>	People	Life and livelihood <i>of present and future generations</i> ; core values; practices and human survival;
<b>International security (CT)</b>	International society	Conflict; global stability; <i>global economy</i> ;
<b>Ecological security (CT)</b>	Biosphere	Challenges to equilibrium associated with contemporary political; social and economic structures;
<b>Non-security (NCT)</b>	<i>Climate change; People; Society</i>	<i>Problem; common concern; challenge; policy issue; environmental problem; potential impact; negative impacts; question of; global issue</i>
<b>Security non-specified (CT)</b>	<i>General expression of security implication</i>	<i>Risks; significant impacts; Dangerous threat; dangerous challenge; catastrophic effects; challenges of significant scale; toughest challenge facing our world; at war with nature; dramatically impacting our lives; protect our planet from it; existential threat; emergency; save our planet</i>

*Note: non-cursive source: McDonald's, 2013, p. 49; in cursive: own additions.*

The last hypothesis relates to the recognition of cooperation as a necessity to reduce the common threat of climate change. Again, the actual occurrence of this factor is determined through performing a discourse-analysis, collecting all expressions that included the term



‘cooperation’, with special attention given to EU-China joint statements. **These expressions were then used to identify the narratives held by both the EU and China on climate change, as to determine whether they have openly recognised the necessity to cooperate. This data was then used to test the fourth, and final, hypothesis.** As with the previous hypotheses, data from the semi-structured interviews were used to contrast, compare and contextualise the data from the discourse-analysis. In table 3, a summary of the operationalisations of the factors for endurance is provided.

Table 3

*The variables for Endurance: summary of operationalization.*

Variable	Operationalization
<b>Endurance (DV2)</b>	Whether the cooperation continuously maintained existence after it emerged, i.e. whether the bilateral climate cooperation between the EU and China was not bilaterally or unilaterally ended because of disputes.
<b>3. Climate change recognised as a common threat (EF3)</b>	<b>Component 1:</b> the identification of expressed security-perceptions on climate change between 1991-2019. Categorised in accordance with table 2. After which the share of each category was determined. When the share of common-threat categories is greater than the share of non-common threat categories for a given period, this is understood as a recognition of climate change as a common threat. <b>Component 2:</b> examples of actual expressions of common threat recognitions. Fit in either of the common threat discourse categories and serve to highlight the common threat recognition.
<b>4. Only through cooperation can common threat be reduced (EF4)</b>	Narratives on cooperation by both the EU and China between 2005-2019, based on expressed perceptions. For this factor to have occurred in practice, both narratives of the EU and China need to continuously include the expressed cooperation as necessary to reduce the threat. In other words, this narrative should be identified starting in 2005, while remaining unchanged until 2019.

*Note:* (DV) refers to dependent variable; (EF) refers to explanatory factors.

## 4. Findings

**The results of the analysis are summarised in table 4 (page 18). The analysis found evidence of 3 of the four explanatory factors in practice, and therewith affirmations of their corresponding hypotheses.** The remainder of this chapter consists of four sections. The first half deals with the hypotheses on the emergence of cooperation (4A). Section 1 starts with the findings on the dependent variable 1 (emergence of cooperation). Section 2 maps out the findings on the first explanatory factor (reduced uncertainty through benign-intentions-communication-tactics). Section 3 maps out the findings on the second explanatory factor (cooperation as a means to increase security). The second half of this chapter, then, tests the hypotheses to the endurance of cooperation (4B). Section 4 starts with the findings on the second dependent variable (endurance of cooperation). Section 5 maps out the findings on the third explanatory factor (common threat recognition), and section 6 maps out the findings on the fourth and last explanatory factor (cooperation recognised as necessary to reduce common threat). Each section is divided into part A (EU) and part B (China).

Table 4  
Summary of the analysis per factor

Variable	Component	EU	China
<b>Emergence (DV 1)</b>	1991-2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Expressed willingness to cooperate with China on CC in 2003.</li> <li>✓ Signed the EU-China Partnership on CC in 2005.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Expressed willingness to cooperate with the EU on CC in 2003.</li> <li>✓ Signed the EU-China Partnership on CC in 2005.</li> </ul>
<b>Reduced Uncertainty (EF 1, Emergence)</b>	Benign-intentions-communication-tactics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Emission Control Agreements</li> <li>✓ Combination of Unilateral Restraint &amp; defence Emphasis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Emission Control Agreements</li> <li>✓ Defence Emphasis</li> <li>✓ Unilateral Restraint</li> </ul>
	Attitudes on climate change	GHG Cause of Climate Change; primarily originated from Developed countries. Developed have the main responsibility to address climate change; Developing may voluntarily contribute.	Emissions from Industrialised countries caused climate change. Developed countries have the main responsibility to address climate change; Developing can do so voluntarily with support.
<b>Cooperation (EF 2, Emergence)</b>	Narrative: Cooperation as a means to increase security	✗ Narrative did not include a direct link of cooperation with its security	✗ Narrative did not include a direct link of cooperation with its security.
<b>Endurance (DV 2)</b>	2005-2019	✓ Cooperation was not unilaterally or bilaterally ended.	✓ Cooperation was not unilaterally or bilaterally ended.
<b>Common Threat (EF 3, Endurance)</b>	Component 1: Climate change threat framings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ 2005-2007: 60,5% of Narrative referred to climate change as Common Threat.</li> <li>✓ 2008-2015: 85,7% of narrative referred to climate change as Common Threat.</li> <li>✓ 2016-2019: 89,6% of narrative referred to climate change as Common Threat.</li> <li>✓ <b>2005-2019: 77,4% of narrative referred to climate change as Common Threat</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ 2005-2015: 52,6% of narrative referred to climate change as Common Threat.</li> <li>✓ 2016-2019: 66,6% of narrative referred to climate change as Common Threat.</li> <li>✓ <b>2005-2019: 56% of narrative referred to climate change as Common Threat.</b></li> </ul>
	Component 2: Concrete expressions CT	✓ e.g. climate change impacts international security and multiplies threats of existing instabilities and tensions.	✓ e.g. climate change threatens the ‘survival and development of human society’ (2008CNPA).
<b>Cooperation (EF 4, Endurance)</b>	Narrative: Cooperation necessary to reduce CT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Multilateral</li> <li>✓ Bilateral</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Multilateral</li> <li>✗ Bilateral</li> </ul>

Note: DV refers to Dependent Variable; EF refers to Explanatory Factor;

#### **4A: Emergence (DV 1)**<sup>7</sup>

The findings show that both the EU and China expressed their willingness to cooperate on climate change in 2003 (2003CNPA; EU-China Summit, 2003). In 2005, this willingness was reified as the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change (2005EUCNB). In this high-level political framework, both the EU and China agreed to strengthen cooperation and dialogue on climate change, on the basis of joint objectives and projects (2005EUCNB). Therefore, this thesis concludes the process of emergence was completed in 2005 when the EU and China reached the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change. The relevance of the hypotheses on emergence was consequently determined from 1991 to 2005 (H1 & H2).

##### **4A:1A Reduced Uncertainty EU (EF 1, Emergence)**

Figure 4 (page 22) shows that the EU pursued two uncertainty reducing tactics: *emission control agreement* and a combination of *unilateral restraint with defence emphasis*. These tactics were in line with China's attitude towards the responsibility for causing and addressing climate change.

##### **Benign-intentions-communication-tactics**<sup>8</sup>

The first uncertainty reducing signalling tactic, that of *emission control agreement*, requires four components to be present: reaching an agreement, signing it, ratifying it, and fulfilling the commitments laid down in it. In 1992, the EU signed the Convention of the UNFCCC, agreeing to the non-binding commitment of stabilising its GHG emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. The EU overachieved this non-binding commitment by reducing emissions by 3.3% between 1990 and 2000 (2004EUPCB). The same tactic occurred in practice again when the EU agreed to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The EU signed this protocol in 1998 and approved it in 2002. China recognised this approval in its address at the 8<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties in 2002. Before 2005, the EU did not fulfil its 2008-2012 commitment. It did, however, signal a 3% reduction in 2004. Furthermore, it outlined and adopted several policies, such as the implementation of the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in 2005. **Overall, ever since 1992, the EU has signalled its benign intentions through emission control agreements.**

The second tactic, a combination of both unilateral restraint and defence emphasis, occurred in practice for the first time in 1996, when the European Parliament allocated 4 million European Currency Units (ECU) to an energy efficiency project in China. The EU took the tactic to a new level in 2001, by allocating 20,6 million euros to mitigation and adaptation projects in China. A year later, the first Chinese Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) project, as outlined under the Kyoto Protocol, was signed in China with the Netherlands, an EU Member State. Figure 4 (page 22) makes very clear that the combined tactic was only intensified over the following years. In 2003, the EU allocated 17,3 million euros to mitigation and adaptation projects in China, and another 20 million was made available for energy efficiency projects in China. In 2004, the EU's budget for mitigation and adaptation projects in China amounted to 8,8 million euros. Aside from purely financial support, the EU also initiated training programs in China, to increase China's capacity in the development of renewable energy (2003), or to train for the implementation of CDMs in China (2003).

Furthermore, in 2004, the EU launched its environmental technologies action plan, which included over eighteen research projects with China, of which 50% focused on the topic

---

<sup>7</sup> An overview of the documents on which this section is based is provided in Annex A1 (page 43).

<sup>8</sup> Idem. Annex A2 (page 43).

of energy efficiency. **Ever since 1996, the EU has signalled its benign intentions through unilateral restraint and defence, massively expanding the scale from 2001.**

#### *China's reception (attitudes)*<sup>9</sup>

Between 1990 and 2005, China continuously pointed to GHG emissions from industrialised countries as the *cause* of climate change. As for *addressing* climate change, it urged developed countries to fulfil their commitments enshrined in the Convention of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. More specifically, China asserted the stabilisation and reduction of GHG emissions, the provision of financial support to developing countries, and the provision of technology transfer to developing countries. Developing countries, such as itself, could themselves decide to take action voluntarily. **China's attitude towards the responsibility for causing and addressing climate change is therefore compatible with the EU's benign-intentions-communication-signals.**

Furthermore, an EU-China climate change relations scholar and two senior European diplomats emphasised that China did acknowledge the leading role and the actions taken by the EU on climate change before 2005. These diplomats, based in Beijing, agreed to the premise that the EU reduced uncertainty by acting upon its responsibilities, a view shared by the scholar. In this regard, the latter highlighted how the EU convinced China of the Clean Development Mechanism's economic potential. Apart from that, one of the diplomats pointed to the importance Chinese officials attach to fulfilling commitments. The EU showing good intentions, he went on to explain, had served as a kick-starter for China's interest in climate change, eventually culminating in the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change. This proves that the EU's benign-intentions-communication-signals were received by the Chinese government. **Summing up, the analysis made clear that the EU engaged in two benign-intentions-communication-tactics which reduced China's uncertainty about climate change cooperation. Thereby affirming the relevance of the hypothesis for the EU.**

#### *4A:1B Reduced Uncertainty China (EF 1, Emergence)*

Figure 5 (page 23) shows that China pursued three uncertainty reducing tactics *emission control agreement; defence emphasis and unilateral restraint*. Moreover, the tactics were in line with the EU's attitude towards the responsibility for causing and addressing climate change. The discourse-analysis revealed the factor did occur in practice, whilst the interviews revealed this was not necessary for the EU as to be willing to partake in cooperation with China.

#### *Benign-intentions-communication-tactics*<sup>10</sup>

The first uncertainty reducing tactic, that of *emission control agreement*, unfolded in 1993 when China ratified the Convention of the UNFCCC. However, the ratification of this Convention did not impose the same non-binding commitment of stabilising GHG emissions on China, as it did on the EU, for non-binding commitment was limited to 'Developed Country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I' (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 7). In other words, even though China partook in every stage required, signing, agreeing, ratification and fulfilling commitments, the agreement itself held no specific commitments to actual emission control. The Convention, however, did entail China's commitment to formulate and implement measures to 'mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and

---

<sup>9</sup> An overview of the documents on which this section is based is provided in Annex A3 & A4 (page 44).

<sup>10</sup> Idem. Annex A5 (page 45).

removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change' (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 5). This implies that by adopting and implementing mitigation and adaptation measures, China would still have been able to communicate its benign intentions through an emission control agreement. However, given these measures' voluntary nature, they were categorized as adaptation and mitigation measures, i.e. tactics of *defence emphasis* and *unilateral restraint*.

Between 1991 and 2003, China pursued these tactics rather half-heartedly by only declaring it had taken measures. **Not until China's National Communication on Climate Change (NCCC) in 2004 did it elaborate on past and future policies and measures (2004CNPA), of which a few are included in figure 5 (page 23).**

More important for the tactic of unilateral restraint are the policies' actual achievements. In its NCCC, China listed several of them. First, China's energy intensity per unit of GDP had dropped by 5,32% annually. Second, through raising energy efficiency, China had achieved 9% total annual energy savings between 1990-2000. Third, it had increased its GHG emission sinks by planting 35 billion trees since 1982. In short, China had implemented policies to improve energy efficiency and communicated these before 2005. China also made steps towards increasing its GHG emissions sinks, which *ceteris paribus* means an overall reduction in emissions. **By doing so, China endeavoured to convince the international community of its ability to reduce emission growth: a demonstration of benign intentions.**

#### *The EU's reception (attitudes)*<sup>11</sup>

The EU's narrative from 1991 to 2005 blamed GHG emissions originating from industrialised countries as *causing* climate change. A slight transformation occurred around 2004 when the EU started to highlight the negative impacts of growing emissions from Developing countries on the overall global mitigation efforts. As for *addressing* climate change, the EU was consistent in asserting that this responsibility lay mainly with developed countries. Whilst the EU argued Developing countries could do their share by improving energy efficiency and thereby reduce the growth of their emissions, the EU stressed the voluntary nature of such contributions and the conditionality of such actions on the provision of support from Developed countries. China's actions, for instance, increasing energy efficiency and its openness to support provision, correspond with the attitudes of the EU. Since this was exactly what happened between China and the EU - China took action, the EU lent support - it may be concluded that **the EU's attitude towards the responsibility for causing and addressing climate change concurs with China's benign-intentions-communication-tactics.**

**However, the semi-structured interviews warn against overestimating their role in the EU's advances towards China as far as climate change is concerned.** Instead, the interviewees stressed that the EU's exhortations and physical assistance were not so much a response to China's communication tactics as manifestations of self-interest. It was the EU, after all, that actively sought to enlist one of the world's biggest polluters in the fight against climate change. Notwithstanding its benign intentions, the interviewees remarked, China took a more passive stance, consistently clinging to the conditionality of its climate action.

**Overall, the factor was identified in practice, but the findings of the semi-structured interviews indicate the actual occurrence of benign-intentions-communication-tactics by China, was not required by the EU. The findings thereby affirm the relevance of the hypothesis. The findings do, however, differ from the assumptions on which this factor is based, which is discussed in more detail in chapter 5 (discussion).**

---

<sup>11</sup> An overview of the documents on which this section is based is provided in Annex A6 & A7 (page 45).




Figure 4: benign-intentions-communication-tactics of the EU between 1991-2005 based on the discourse-analysis.




Figure 5: benign-intentions-communication-tactics of China between 1991-2005 based on the discourse-analysis.

#### **4A:2A Cooperation as a means to increase Security EU (EF 2, Emergence)**<sup>12</sup>

The analysis of over 520 documents, along with the semi-structured interviews, painted a detailed picture of the EU's narrative on climate change cooperation, both in a general sense and with China in particular. It became clear that the EU regarded bilateral cooperation as a way to safeguard China's engagement on the topic of climate change, rather than as a way to increase its security. **Thus, no evidence was found of the second factor occurring in practice.** Nevertheless, the EU did send out a policy document on the outlook of EU cooperation with Asian countries in 2003, stressing the security benefits Asian countries would reap when cooperating with the EU on climate change. Also, the notion that bilateral cooperation can ensure another party's commitment to a topic such as climate change is of paramount importance. All interviewees agreed that China's devotion to fighting climate change depended (and still largely depends) on diplomatic impetus, that is to say, on efforts made by other countries as part of the broader bilateral relationship. **Given no evidence was found of the second factor in practice, the relevance of the second hypothesis for the EU is weakened.** The implications of these findings are discussed in more detail in the discussion (Chapter 5).

#### **4A:2B Cooperation as a means to increase Security China (EF 2, Emergence)**<sup>13</sup>

Similarly, for China, the analysis yielded **no concrete evidence of the second factors' actual occurrence**: references to bilateral cooperation as a means to increase security are absent in the country's narrative between 1991-2005. By contrast, affirming the inequality between developed and developing countries, it focuses on the former's obligation to support the latter in the fight against climate change. China argued, as early as 1991, that its mitigation measures hinged on the support provided by developed countries (1991INCF). It saw this conditionality as the logical consequence of the international economic system's disparity, more specifically the developed countries' larger share in causing climate change. In its first National Communication on Climate Change to the UNFCCC in 2004, China confirmed this stance, whilst also expressing its openness to cooperative mechanisms and dialogues (2004CNPB). In other words, one of China's motivation to cooperate with developed countries was to secure support for intensified climate action. **As with the EU, the lack of evidence of the second factor occurring in practice weakens the relevance of the second hypothesis for China.** The implications of this finding are discussed in more detail in the discussion (Chapter 5).

#### **4B: Endurance (DV2)**<sup>14</sup>

**The findings show the EU-China cooperation on climate change has endured ever since its establishment until now. It has not been unilaterally or bilaterally ended.** Rather, the findings indicate that it has been reinforced overtime and expanded to include more projects and cooperative acts. For instance, in 2013, the EU and China signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which broadened climate change cooperation. Several disturbances, however, challenged the bilateral cooperation's endurance in general. In 2008, for example, China cancelled a summit between the EU and China because the French president had an unofficial meeting with the Dalai Lama. In 2017, the EU and China did not make a joint-statement because

---

<sup>12</sup> An overview of the documents on which this section is based is provided in Annex B1 (page 46).

<sup>13</sup> Idem. Annex B2 (page 46).

<sup>14</sup> Idem. Annex C1 (page 46).



of trade disputes. Nevertheless, the bilateral cooperation on climate change has endured overall.

**4B:1A Common Threat Recognition EU (EF 3, Endurance)**

The analysis of common threat recognition showed that this factor occurred in practice. As outlined in the methodology, this analysis included two separate components: security-discourse categorization and concrete expressions of common threat.

**Component 1: Climate Change Threat Framing**

Whilst examining the EU’s narrative on climate change, all sentences including the term *climate change* were collected and categorised according to the Hansen (2006) and the McDonald (2013) inspired security-discourse framework (Figure 6). The size of each square was based on the share of the discourse category in comparison with that period's total. For instance, the size of the non-security category between 2005-2007 was determined by calculating the number of non-security references and comparing them with the total amount of categorised references between 2005 and 2007. The period of endurance (2005-2019) was split up into three timeframes to highlight major transformations in the narrative. The period of emergence (1991-2004) was included for comparison’s sake.




Figure 6: Share of Common Threat and non-Common Threat framings in EU documents from 1991 to 2019.

Figure 6<sup>15</sup> depicts that from 2001, the EU referred to climate change primarily as a common threat, as opposed to the period before, when it considered climate change a non-common threat most of the times. This was mainly due to a sharp decrease in non-security framings, which constituted the largest share between 1991 and 2001. By 2008-2015, their place had been taken by non-specified security framings, after a striking rise of international security framings over 2005-2007. In other words, the EU increasingly defined

<sup>15</sup> An overview of the documents on which this figure is based is provided in Annex C2 (page 47).

the impact of climate change in terms of conflict, global stability, and the global economy. After 2015, more emphasis was placed on human security, that is to say, on the effects of climate change on current and future generations' lives and livelihood. **Over the entire period between 2005 and 2019, 77,4% of the EU's statements on climate change framed the phenomenon as a common threat.**

#### **Component 2: Concrete recognition of Common Threat**

In addition to counting and categorising climate change threat framing, this paragraph takes a closer look at the language used to express these framings. **Particularly striking, first of all, is the expansion of militant vocabulary ever since 2001, for instance '[we have] unconsciously been at war with nature' (2019EUCOP25C).** Such expressions lend a strong sense of urgency to the narrative, as if, indeed, only joint direct action will prevent disastrous consequences from happening. The EU furthermore directly linked climate change with global security (e.g. 2006EUCOP12C), while recognising the dependency of its security on decisions made by large economies, such as China. Starting in 2008, the EU directly expressed the threat multiplying nature of climate change and instabilities (e.g. 2008EUECA; 2008EUPCA). Another representative example of the many expressions is a statement made in 2016 when the EU stated 'our families, our health, our welfare, our security and our livelihood' depend on our ability to fight climate change (2016EUCOP22L).

**It seems the EU consciously used language that brings to mind images of war and other existential fears, living inside any individual wherever they are located on the earth. As a result, climate change moves from an abstract phenomenon to something far more tangible and comprehensible, yet worrisome still.** It has been framed as a threat equally shared among the earth's inhabitants: a common threat.

The interviews unanimously agreed that **the EU recognises climate change as a common threat and the contribution of such recognition to the endurance of EU-China climate change cooperation. Therefore, the findings affirm the relevance of the third hypothesis for the EU.**

#### **4B:1B Common Threat Recognition China (EF 3, Endurance)**

**The analysis of common threat recognition showed that this factor occurred in practice.** As outlined in the methodology, the analysis included two separate components: security-discourse categorisation and concrete expressions of common threat.

#### **Component 1: Climate Change Threat Framings**

Calculations were performed in the same manner as described in the preceding paragraph. Here, the overarching period of endurance (2005-2019) was divided into two different timeframes that reveal a fundamental transformation in China's narrative. The period of emergence (1991-2004) was included, again, for the sake of comparison. The results of the categorisation are presented in figure 7 (page 27).




Figure 7: Share of Common Threat and non-Common Threat framings in Chinese documents from 1991 to 2019.

As with the EU, China’s narrative concerning the security implications of climate change transformed significantly throughout the period under scrutiny as depicted in figure 7<sup>16</sup>. While initially (between 1991 and 2004), the largest share of framings of climate change were non-security related, from 2005 onwards an ever-increasing share of China’s framings referred to common threat discourse categories. Overall, between 2005 and 2015 over 52% of all framings were common threat-related. This share increased greatly between 2015 and 2019 when over 65% of framings were related to common threats. This was mainly due to an increasingly central focus of human security impacts of climate change, and a decline in non-security framings. **Over the entire period between 2005 and 2019, 56% of China’s statements on climate change framed the phenomenon as a common threat.**

### Component 2: Concrete Recognitions of Common Threat

By 2008, China’s narrative was explicitly characterising climate change as a common threat, as evidenced by statements such as the following, relating the impact of climate change to ‘the survival and development of human society’ (2008CNPA). China maintained this narrative throughout the period analysed (e.g. 2009CNCOP15H; 2018CNPB). In contrast to the EU, China’s language made far less use of militaristic vocabulary, which is not a great surprise, since its narrative scarcely includes metaphors of battles or fights, favouring images of hardship and survival instead: ‘our people are suffering from the adverse effects of CC even as we speak’ (2010CNCOP16B). Nevertheless, this human-centred approach achieves the same effect: climate change is framed as a threat to the survival of all human beings.

The interviews, too, acknowledged that China recognises climate change as a common threat. More importantly, **they saw shared recognition by China and the EU as a vital element for the endurance of their bilateral cooperation on climate change. Thereby**

<sup>16</sup> An overview of the documents on which this figure is based is provided in Annex C3 (page 47).

**affirming both the importance of this factor to understand endured cooperation and the relevance of the third hypothesis in the case of China.**

**4B:2 Cooperation to reduce Common Threat EU + China (EF 4, Endurance)**

**The analysis showed both the EU and China recognised the necessity of engaging in cooperation to reduce the common threat of climate change, thereby confirming the actual occurrence of endurance's second EF. However, a small difference between their respective narratives was found: whereas the EU specifically emphasised the necessity of cooperation with China, China in its commentary refrained from this kind of detail. The EU and China also made joint statements on the topic of climate change, which is referred to as their joint narrative. In it, both expressed the recognition of the necessity of engaging in bilateral cooperation to reduce the common threat of climate change.**

**4B:2A Cooperation to reduce the Common Threat EU (EF 4, Endurance)<sup>17</sup>**

Zooming out from the level of individual documents, it becomes clear that the EU views cooperation as a vital means of transferring technologies and identifying actions which developing countries would be willing to take. As the previous sections have made clear, the EU believes it is only through these processes that developing countries can become allies in the fight against climate change. Specifically, in the case of China, the EU sought to build a sound bilateral relationship not only based on the unilateral provision of development assistance, but also the shared responsibility towards an elusive phenomenon. A striking example of this mentality is the speech given in 2007 by the European Commissioner for External Relations at the Qinghua University in Beijing (2007EUCNC). Addressing an audience of students and policymakers, he illustrated how climate change had turned into a matter of utmost urgency and massive scale, only to be resolved by working together. One of the European diplomats based in Beijing expanded upon this vision, saying that European and Chinese interests on climate change are very closely related. The interviewee expressed that bilateral cooperation on this subject is pragmatic of nature, as it allows for policy diffusion and the provision of support. **All in all, the EU consistently recognised that cooperation was necessary to reduce climate change, meeting the last EF for endurance, thereby affirming the relevance of the last hypothesis for the EU.**

**4B:2B Cooperation to reduce Common Threat China (EF 4, Endurance)<sup>18</sup>**

China's narrative shows a remarkable development in the course of the years of endurance. Between 2005 and 2009, it did not depart from the conditionality of its mitigation and adaptation actions on the provision of support by developed countries, although it remained willing to cooperate as a way of guaranteeing this support. Between 2010 and 2019, however, China moved from this comparatively passive stance to a more proactive approach: instead of quickly designating Developed countries as responsible for causing and addressing climate change, it began to frame cooperation as a means of increasing its *own* capacity to do so. **Furthermore, China recognised the necessity of continuously engaging in multilateral cooperation to reduce climate change. At no point, however, did it consider bilateral cooperation with the EU to be equally important.**

---

<sup>17</sup> An overview of the documents on which this conclusion is based is provided in Annex D1 (page 48).

<sup>18</sup> Idem. Annex D2 (page 48).

In the interviews, it was argued that China's prime motivation to engage in cooperation is to ensure technology transfer and the provision of financial support, which, again, acknowledges the necessity of cooperation to reduce the threat of climate change, thereby, reaffirming the findings from the discourse-analysis. **To sum up, the last factor also may be considered to have occurred in practice, thereby affirming the relevance of the fourth hypothesis for China.**

#### 4B:2C Cooperation to reduce Common Threat EU + China (EF4, Endurance)<sup>19</sup>

Joint statements constitute a special category, given the fact that they usually only come into being when two parties already intend to cooperate, to a greater or lesser extent. **In joint statements between the EU and China, then, cooperation is framed as a prerequisite for reducing the threat of climate change.** Their 2005 joint-narrative described cooperation as a means to address climate change in a rather straightforward fashion. Four years later, however, both leaders went a step further by emphasising the urgency to *deepen* international cooperation. Notably, Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council of China and José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, stated that meeting global challenges called for 'the joint efforts and close cooperation of the EU and China' (2009EUCNB, p. 2-3). Both leaders stressed the need for international cooperation to address climate change again in 2012 whilst also reaffirming their commitment to cooperate on this topic themselves (2012EUCNA, p. 7). In 2015, Donald Tusk, President of the European Commission, and Premier Li Keqiang of the State Council of China agreed that climate changes poses a threat to humankind's existence and that both the EU and China play critical roles in addressing it (2015EUCNA, p.3). Here too, it was concluded that the issue's gravity and pervasiveness called on both sides to work together (2015EUCNB, p. 3).

After the United States of America's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017, the EU and China responded by drafting a joint statement on climate change (2018EUCNB). In the statement, both reiterated the threats of climate change and confirmed their shared commitment to implement the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, they expressed confidence that cooperation on climate change and clean energy would become the main pillar of their bilateral partnership, including the economic dimension.

**As the above demonstrates the last factor of endurance occurred in practice for both the EU and China. Therefore, the findings affirm the relevance of the fourth hypothesis for both the EU and China.**

## 5. Discussion

Previous scholarship on EU-China climate change cooperation has applied Realist thinking to only a limited extent. The same goes for other topics within the realm of climate change cooperation: merely a few academics have availed themselves of Realism's potential. In response, this thesis endeavoured to explore the field by identifying how Realism would explain the emergence and endurance of EU-China climate change cooperation. Four explanatory factors defined by Realism's leading theorists were adapted to fit the topic of climate change. An extensive discourse-analysis then determined whether these factors

---

<sup>19</sup> A detailed overview of the documents on which this conclusion is based is provided in Annex D3 (page 48).

occurred in practice, that is, whether these factors occurred in the case of EU-China relations. The findings of which were then compared and contrasted with data from semi-structured interviews. By doing so, this thesis affirmed or weakened the relevance of hypotheses, and found indications of additional factors contributing to the emergence and endurance of EU-China climate change cooperation. Besides contributing to the overall scholarly attempts to understand EU-China climate change cooperation, this thesis has shown the theories of Glaser and Mearsheimer to be flexible to a certain extent. The thesis showed the military tendency, and centrality of the Cold War in both theories can be translated and adapted to more modern forms of security threats. **Most notably, uncertainty reduction through benign-intentions-communication-tactics (explanatory factor 1) appears to have contributed to the emergence of EU-China cooperation on climate change (hypothesis 1). Common threat recognition (explanatory factor 3) and recognition that the common threat can only be reduced through cooperation (explanatory factor 4) appear to have contributed to the overall endurance of said cooperation (hypotheses 3 & 4).** This chapter proceeds as follows. First, the findings' theoretical implications and areas for future research are delineated per factor. It then concludes by discussing the limitations that affected the research in its entirety.

#### **5A:1 Theoretical implications of findings & future research (EF 1, Emergence)**

Whilst previous research has explained emergence primarily as a function of the institutionalisation of the overall EU-China bilateral cooperation (De Matteis, 2010; Liu et al., 2019; Chistiansen, 2016), the analysis found indications that reduced uncertainty through benign-intentions-communication-tactics can contribute to the emergence of cooperation, even in the absence of bilateral climate change institutions. Crucially, the analysis found that mitigation and adaptation measures, usually enforced with long-term targets in mind, also have more direct effects. After all, the mere decision to take such a measure already signals benign intentions and thus influences other actors in the global arena, an important side-effect that will hopefully favour the case of mitigation and adaptation.

Although Glaser's Contingent Realism implies that both parties are required to reduce uncertainty through benign-intentions-communication-tactics, the semi-structured interviews disproved this premise. For the interviewees made very clear that the EU would also have cooperated with China, had the latter not reduced uncertainty towards the EU. In other words, signalling behaviour does not seem to be reciprocal in nature, which entails that uncertainty of motives is not as equally distributed among all actors as Glaser argued. This could be very well due to the different levels of development and/or the different attitudes towards the responsibility for causing and addressing climate change, given the fact that both China and the EU continuously referred to these differences. by both actors. This observation corresponds with Yan's (2020) finding that disagreement on the distribution of responsibilities for addressing climate change limits the prospects of cooperation. Whilst it seems logical that those deemed responsible are also the ones who have to make the greatest effort to reduce uncertainty, future research could dissect more precisely how attitudes on climate change affect or influence the distribution of uncertainty between international actors.

As for climate change, the distribution of uncertainty could perhaps be tested in light of different notions of equity, for instance, the North/South or Developed/Developing dichotomies. After all, the findings leave no doubt about China's conditionality - having climate action depend on support from Developed countries - and the EU's self-interest in encouraging China to take climate action. It were these circumstances that very probably urged the EU to

provide China with mitigation and adaptation support. The centrality of self-interest coincides with De Cock (2010), who argues that the EU's efforts to improve energy efficiency in China was directly in accordance with the EU's global temperature target of limiting global warming to two degrees Celsius<sup>20</sup>. In other words, attitudes take their shapes within a certain political, social, economic and cultural context. By devoting more attention to context, future researchers might be able to paint a clearer picture of these attitudes, which, in turn, will enrich interpretation and understanding of quantitative data.

Such research might also take a closer look at the development of these attitudes over time, another issue that surfaced whilst carrying out the analysis. The findings suggest that as the EU took more adaptation and mitigation measures, it raised its expectations of others accordingly. Depending on their scope and resonance among policymakers, scientific reports perhaps constitute another driving force behind evolving attitudes. Since these are essentially behavioural issues, future researchers would do well to draw theoretical and methodological inspiration from academic fields like psychology or sociology.

Lastly, uncertainty reduction through benign-intention-communication-tactics was analysed exclusively for the emergence of cooperation. It could well be, however, that continuous engagement in these tactics also contributed to the endurance and/or deepening of cooperation over time. It was not within the scope of this research to make final statements on this matter, further research could provide clarification by delving deeper into the concept of benign-intentions-communication-tactics.

#### **5A:2 Theoretical implications of findings & future research (EF 2, Emergence)**

The actual occurrence of the second factor was not determined: both the EU and China perceived cooperation as a means to achieve gains other than security gains. For the EU, cooperation served as a way to ensure broader global participation on climate change, whilst China utilised its bilateral and multilateral ties to negotiate support for the purpose of its own mitigation and adaptation action. Notwithstanding the absence of explicit security-related phrasing, it can be argued that both the EU's and China's narrative on climate change cooperation referred to security benefits in more indirect ways. For the EU, broader global participation on climate change, i.e. more countries taking mitigation and adaptation measures, could help reduce the severity of climate change, which will undoubtedly result in security benefits. For China, its intentions to take adaptation measures are particularly significant in this regard. Adaptation entails measures that foster a country's ability to cope with climate change in the near and distant future, and thus increase said country's security.

It could well be that the research method used was not suitable to identify such direct links. After all, official narratives also serve political purposes, like persuading other countries to implement policies friendly to one's own interests. Explicitly stating that development assistance is going to contribute to one's national security, to take China as a hypothetical example, would hardly convince others of providing such assistance. Stating instead that support is going to enhance mitigation action, which creates benefits for other countries, is a more convincing argument. As this example highlights, cooperation narratives seem to emphasise benefits for the other party rather than one's own. However, more research is necessary to establish possible differences between cooperation narratives in general and narratives on climate change cooperation in particular.

---

<sup>20</sup> This target was adopted by the EU in 1996; and globally in 2015 when the Paris Agreement was reached (Gao, Gao, & Zhang, 2017)

Crucially, the analysis found that both the EU and China, albeit not specifically on the field of security, said to have gained from cooperation. This seems more in line with Liberalist thinking, as set out by, for example, Dorussen et al. (2018), who argued that, in the case of the EU and China, mutual recognition of cooperation's advantages is sufficient for cooperation itself to take place. The implications are twofold. First, security benefits are not the primary factor contributing to the emergence of bilateral climate cooperation between the EU and China, a compelling argument to alter the hypothesis deduced from Contingent Realism. Second, the perception of cooperation's advantages seem to follow the North/South and Developed/Developing dichotomies on climate change, as described by for instance Gupta and van der Gijp (2010). Further research could establish to what extent an actor's position within these dichotomies influences or shapes its perception on the benefits of climate change cooperation.

### **5A:3 Theoretical implications of findings & future research (EF 3, Endurance)**

The analysis indicated that the recognition of climate change as a common threat contributed to the endurance of EU-China climate change cooperation. Thereby it affirmed the relevance of the third hypothesis, and the overall scholarly attempt to better understand the endurance of EU-China climate change relations.

The findings also demonstrated that China's recognition of climate change as a common threat arrived later than the EU's. This might be explained by comparing their respective languages and cultures. For instance, Schneider & de Meyer (1991) found that differences in culture influence interpretation and responses to language. Imaginably, Chinese government officials may be or may have been more reluctant to use harsh vocabulary. Or perhaps (Mandarin) Chinese as a language is generally less explicit than English. Future research could substantiate or entirely dismiss this speculation by examining the relation between China's attitude on climate cooperation and its language and culture, taking into account that these concepts in themselves are multifaceted and possibly problematic.

Furthermore, the findings challenge Geeraerts's (2019) sole application of Realism to identify factors that cause divergence in EU-China relations. They highlight that Realism can also be used to identify factors that contribute to convergence in EU-China climate change cooperation. This should inspire scholars researching the endurance of cooperation to view Realism not only as a force of divergence but also as a force of endurance. This likely applies to all forms of climate change cooperation, providing ample opportunities for future research.

Through its analysis, the thesis also contributed to the theoretical debate on security issues in general. The Securitisation theory, to take a prominent example, argues that politicians can create a sense of urgency by securitising phenomena<sup>21</sup>, and thereby clothing certain policy actions in legitimacy (Waeber, 1995). On the surface, Offensive Realism's explanatory factors as applied in this thesis reflect a very similar process. After all, both the EU and China securitised climate change as a common threat (albeit slightly differently: the EU used pugnacious framings, while China stressed its victimhood), and since cooperation was portrayed as a means to reduce said threat, it gained legitimacy. Explanatory factors 3 and 4, however, conflict with securitisation processes in two respects. First, Waeber (1995) argues that the act of securitization is decided upon by the people in power, whereas Mearsheimer writes that it is a state's rationality that determines whether phenomena are recognised as threatening.

---

<sup>21</sup> That is, in 'naming a certain development a security problem, the 'state' can claim a special right' (Waeber, 1993, p. 6).



The main difference here is the self-serving purpose of securitisation for politicians versus the self-serving purpose of threat recognition for states and their survival.

Given the global threat climate change poses to the entirety of humankind, confirmed by an overwhelming number of scientific reports, Mearsheimer's view seems to have better value. Nonetheless, this thesis made grateful use of securitisation conceptualizations (e.g. Hansen, 2006) to assist the categorisation of security-framings (e.g. McDonald, 2013). This shows that a combination of these broadly analogous theories offers new tools to analyse common threat recognition, among other security-related topics, which could serve as subjects for further research.

#### **5A:4 Theoretical implications of findings & future research (EF 4, Endurance)**

Overall, the findings on the last factor of endurance indicate that both the EU and China recognised cooperation as necessary to reduce the common threat of climate change. The analysis thereby affirmed the relevance of the last hypothesis. However, minor differences between the EU and China were discovered. For instance, China did not unilaterally state bilateral cooperation was necessary to reduce the common threat of climate change. It did so only jointly with the EU. The EU, on the other hand, did unilaterally express the necessity of engaging in bilateral cooperation to reduce the common threat. Although the scope of this research did not allow for an inquiry into the causes of this difference, at least two explanations seem plausible.

The first has to do with the EU's and China's slightly divergent attitudes, discussed at greater length in the sections above, with the EU encouraging China to take climate action and China asking the EU and all other Developed countries for support. The second focuses on the concept of sovereignty, which has been incredibly pervasive in China's political discourse (Pan, 2010). Sovereignty, for China, is closely related to its external independence (Pan, 2010). It could, therefore, be that China is more reluctant to express, openly and unilaterally, that its ability to reduce climate change depends on particular actors. Although the analysis has made clear that China is definitely not reluctant to stress the conditionality of its enhanced action on the provision of support in general, overt allusions to dependency on particular actors might be limited because of its clear-cut ideas about sovereignty. The narrative of conditionality is a more general one, as it refers to support from Developed countries as a whole, and might therefore better correspond with China's view on sovereignty. Future research on climate change cooperation could refine this rough sketch by devoting more attention to the often paradoxical relationship between the global issue of climate change and national issues like external politics, sovereignty and (in)dependence.

#### **5B: Limitations**

Overall, the generalisability of the results is limited by the scope of the analysis. Although a large number of documents were analysed, these documents were limited to the EU and China. Therefore, the findings cannot be generalised to other forms of bilateral climate change cooperation. Several limitations related to data sources, the explanatory factors, and data collection methods were determined. **All the limitations have been considered while discussing the results, and the limitations do not prevent the provision of answers to the research questions.**

### **5B:1 Limitations - Data sources**

Regarding data sources, four initial limitations were identified. First, for the analysis of China's narrative, the analysis incorporated statements and documents made by the G77 and China in multilateral fora. Although initially, the G77 rallied behind China's positions during climate negotiations (Schreurs & Economy, 1997), it could well be that this changed over time. Therefore, these statements could no longer fully include China's narrative on climate change. To account for this, findings flowing from documents of the G77 and China have been contrasted and compared with findings from purely Chinese documents. In doing so, the impact of the inclusion of G77 and China documents on the reliability and validity of the findings was limited.

Second, it was not feasible to categorise each document in terms of expected importance due to the sheer number of documents. This limitation was accounted for by requiring the findings were supported and confirmed by documents originating from a broad range of sources.

Third, this thesis draws heavily on publicly accessible documents. Although extensive efforts were made to obtain certain documents, not all requests were granted. For instance, it was not possible to attain the minutes of meetings between leaders of the EU and China on climate change. These documents might hold valuable information on areas of disagreement and agreement between the EU and China on climate change. This was accounted for by performing semi-structured interviews, and including a large number of documents, originating from different multi/bi/unilateral fora and sources. However, when these documents become accessible, further research could identify whether these contradict the findings of this research in any shape or form.

Fourth, only a limited number of semi-structured interviews were performed, of which none were with Chinese officials. Although extensive efforts were made to contact Chinese officials, none of these efforts was responded to in any shape or form. Given the urgency of COVID-19 and the occurrence of the National People's Congress of China during the thesis writing period, it was understandable that priorities for Chinese officials laid elsewhere. Nonetheless, this restricts the certainty of the conclusions reached from the semi-structured interviews, as these did not include Chinese perspectives. To account for this, it was decided to limit the usability of findings flowing from semi-structured interviews as to compare, contrast and contextualise the findings from the discourse-analysis.

### **5B:2 Limitations – Theoretical foundation**

Regarding the explanatory factors deduced from Realism, four limitations were identified. First, to perform this research, both the EU and China have been treated and considered as unitary actors. This treatment can be criticised in two broad ways. First, a wide range of narratives and opinions exist within the EU on both cooperation and climate change (e.g. different narratives held by different Member States; and within different Member States). This also applies to China, as several interviewees highlighted that different factions with different views on climate change exist within the Communist Party of China. Second, the EU has changed greatly over time, in both name and Member size. For instance, in the 1990s the EU did not yet fully exist, and its predecessor (the European Community) had 15 Members, rather than the 27 Member States it encompasses in 2020 (The European Union, ca. 2020). Whilst these critiques have merit, it does not limit the validity and reliability of the findings because the analysis was limited to *official narratives*. Official narratives are the narratives held

externally (e.g. in international debates) and can be considered as the narratives that have won the internal debate, thereby making them an actor's dominant external narrative. By adopting such an approach, it was possible to consider and treat the EU and China as unitary actors.

Second, both theoretical approaches have been designed to explain the behaviour of *traditional states*. The applicability of these approaches to explain the behaviour of the EU can, therefore, be limited. For instance, Cini & Pérez-Solórzana Borragán (2009) argue the EU cannot be considered a state in the traditional sense. Some scholars argue the EU is less than a traditional state and more than a traditional international organisation (Christiansen, 2016; Wallace, 1983), while others consider it a neo-medieval empire (Zielonka, 2012) or a quasi-federation (Schmitter, 2000). However, the institutions enshrined within the EU act on behalf of its Member States vis-à-vis China and, therefore, fulfil an important stately function. Moreover, to determine the applicability of Realism on EU-China climate change cooperation, it was necessary to broaden the conceptualization of states in Realism as to include the EU.

The third limitation is the centrality of perceptions and recognitions in EF 2, EF 3 and EF 4. Several scholars within the field of International Relations stress the difficulty of determining actors' true perceptions, as they have incentives to misrepresent themselves (e.g. Keohane & David, 2016; Bennet & Checkel, 2015). Given this difficulty, the thesis analysed *expressed* perceptions and *expressed* recognitions. By doing so, expressions of perceptions were identified as they are, which eliminates the necessity of determining how much of the expressed perception is truly internalised by the speaker (Epstein, 2008). The limitation of adopting this view is that it could well be that the EU and China express climate change as a common threat to the survival of humanity, while not internalizing this view completely. This would render their expressions non-compatible with their true perceptions. While this in itself would limit the reliability and validity of the research, this thesis aimed to account for it by including a large number of documents and comparing and contrasting the findings with data from semi-structured interviews.

The last limitation relates to the potential of overestimating signatories of international agreements (part of EF1). For instance, Thompson (2006) highlighted some signatory states of the Kyoto Protocol used public statements as a tool to convince others to ratify, while simultaneously delaying own ratification effects. To account for this, agreements were only counted as a benign-intentions-communication-tactic, after these were also signed, ratified and its commitments fulfilled.

### **5B:3 Limitation – Data collection methods**

Concerning data collection methods, three limitations were identified. The first is partly caused by the aforementioned limitation of the relatively limited number of performed semi-structured interviews and is closely related to the scholarly debate on the right conceptualisation of causality. For instance, King, Keohane and Verba (1994) argue that social science theories should bring about falsifiable hypotheses concerning the causality between independent and dependent variables. However, given the relatively low amount of interviews, it was not possible to make claims of causality. Rather, the thesis affirmed the relevance of three hypotheses deduced from Realism.

Second, this research is methodologically rich, which limited the fit between the different methodological components. Although this has not limited the reliability and validity of the findings, it has provided lessons for future research. For instance, to employ these methods in a more focused manner.

Third, this thesis combined Hansen's (2006) security categorisation with McDonald's (2013) security framings to determine common threat recognition. Recognition was determined when 51% of the framings were common threat framings. However, it could well be that a more stringent requirement (e.g. 66,67%) would be better suited. If future research indicates a more stringent requirement is better suited, then the findings of EF 3 would be limited in the case of China.

## 6. Conclusion

This thesis followed a Realist theoretical framework that explains the emergence and endurance of cooperation on the basis of four factors: reduced uncertainty of motives; cooperation as a means to increase security; common threat recognition; and cooperation as a necessity to reduce the common threat. In the same chapter, these factors were detached from the sphere of military cooperation and adapted in such a way that they corresponded with a slightly different and far more recent form of cooperation: climate change cooperation. Endeavouring to shed new light on the climate change cooperation between the EU and China between 1991 and 2019, this thesis analysed to what extent four said factors occurred in practice. The analysis found the EU-China cooperation emerged in 2005 and has endured ever since. **The analysis revealed that all but one factor occurred in practice, indicating that they hold explanatory power over the emergence and endurance of EU-China climate change cooperation.**

First of all, both the EU and China engaged in benign-intentions-communication-tactics that reduce uncertainty (EF1), although the semi-structured interviews indicate that China did not strictly need to reduce uncertainty for cooperation to emerge. After all, the EU's interest in China's commitment to address climate change outweighed the potential risks of cooperation. These findings demonstrate that the emergence of EU-China climate change cooperation was not only a function of the overall institutionalisation of EU-China bilateral cooperation, as per institutionalism (e.g. De Matteis, 2010; Christiansen, 2016): uncertainty reduction via benign-intentions-communication-tactics also contributed to the emergence of EU-China climate change cooperation. **Since both the EU and China partook in these uncertainty reducing tactics, the analysis affirmed the relevance of the first hypothesis and highlighted the usefulness of viewing the emergence of EU-China cooperation through a Realist lens.**

The second explanatory factor for emergence (EF 2), however, was not found to have occurred in practice: neither the EU's nor China's narrative on cooperation, which was constructed based on the findings of the discourse-analysis, framed cooperation as a means to increase security. Emergence apparently does not depend on this factor. However, the analysis also uncovered that both narratives did favour cooperation on a broader level, as a way to generate mutual benefit. This suggests that Contingent Realism's focus on security is perhaps too narrow. A more inclusive perception of cooperation, on the part of Realism, might better explain emergence, at least in the case of EU-China climate cooperation. **Since neither the EU nor China framed cooperation as a means to increase their security, the analysis weakened the relevance of the second hypothesis.**

Regarding the first explanatory factor for endurance (EF 3), the analysis found that the EU's and China's shared recognition of climate change as a common threat contributed to the endurance of their climate change cooperation. The data retrieved from the semi-structured

interviewed fully supported this conclusion. **This not only affirms the relevance of the third hypothesis, but also testifies to the merits of approaching the endurance of EU-China climate change cooperation from a Realist perspective.**

The second explanatory factor for endurance (EF 4) further underpins Realism's value, since the analysis showed that the EU's and China's shared recognition that cooperation is necessary to reduce the common threat contributed to the endurance of their climate change cooperation as well. **In this way, it affirmed the relevance of the fourth and last hypothesis.**

**Consequently, the answer to the main research question is that all but one factor occurred in practice.** These three factors make for an interesting addition to those already identified in previous research on the emergence and endurance of bilateral climate change cooperation. They also prove that Realism holds explanatory power over topics outside of its initial scope. In retrospect, China and the EU managed to get all hands on deck, but now their ships need to sail out: as the severity and intensity of climate change increases, both need to take further steps in strengthening their cooperation.

## Bibliography

- Bennet, A. & Checkel, J. T. (2015). *Process tracing: From metaphor to analytic tool*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Biermann, F., Betsill, M. M., Gupta, J., Kanie, N., Lebel, L., Liverman, D., Schroeder, H., & Siebenhüner, B. with contributions from Conca, K., Costa Ferreira, da L., Desai, B., Tay, S., Zondervan, R. (2009). *Earth System Governance: People, Places and Planet. Science and implementation Plan of the Earth System Governance Project* (Report No. 1 IHDP 20). Bonn, IHDP: The Earth System Governance Project.
- Cini, M., & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (2009). *European Union Politics*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Christiansen, T. (2016). A liberal institutionalist perspective on China-EU relations. In: J. Wang, W. Song (Eds.), *China, the European Union, and the international politics of global governance*. (pp. 233-251). London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cottey, A. (2018). The EU-China partnership: institutionalization and the limits of liberal logic. In: M. Telò, D. Chun, & Z. Xiaotong (Eds.), *Deepening the EU-China partnership: Bridging institutional and ideational differences in an unstable world* (pp. 45-54). New York, U.S.A.: Routledge.
- De Cock, G. (2011). The European Union as a Bilateral ‘Norm Leader’ on Climate Change vis-à-vis China. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 16 (89), 89-105.
- De Matteis, P. (2010). EU-China cooperation in the field of energy, environment and climate change. *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 6 (4), 449-477.
- Dorussen, H., Kirchner, E. J., Christiansen, T. (2018). Security Cooperation in EU-China relations: towards convergence? *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 23 (3), 287-304.
- Epstein, C. (2008). *The power of words in international relations: Birth of an anti-whaling discourse*. London, England: The MIT Press.

- Gao, Y., Gao, X., & Zhang, X. (2017). The 2°C Global Temperature Target and the Evolution of the Long-Term Goal of Addressing Climate Change – From the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Paris Agreement. *Engineering*, 3 (2), 272-278.
- Geeraerts, G. (2019). The EU-China partnership: balancing between divergence and convergence. *Asia Europe Journal*, 17 (3), 281-294.
- Glaser, C. L. (1995). Realists as optimists: cooperation as self-help. *International Security*, 19 (3), 50-90.
- Glaser, C. L. (2010). *Rational theory of international politics: the logic of competition and cooperation*. Princeton, U.S.A.: Princeton University Press.
- Gupta, Y., & van der Gijp, N. (2010). *Mainstreaming climate change in Development cooperation: theory, practice and implications for the European Union*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Hansen, L. (2006). *Security as practice: Discourse analysis and the Bosnian War*. London, England: Routledge.
- Hoffmann, S., Keohane, R. O., & Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990). Correspondence: Back to the future, part II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe. *International Security*, 15 (2), 191-199.
- Holslag, J. (2011). The Elusive Axis: Assessing the EU-China Strategic Partnership. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49 (2), 293-313.
- IMCCS Expert Group. (2020). *Report of the Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate on the World Climate and Security*. Retrieved from the Center for Climate and Security, an institute of the Council on Strategic Risks website: <https://imccs.org/report2020/>

- IPCC. (2014a). *Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of climate change*. New York, U.S.A.: Cambridge University Press.
- IPCC. (2014b). *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability – Part A: Global and sectoral aspects*. New York, U.S.A.: Cambridge University Press
- Jervis, R. (1999). Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the debate. *International security*, 24 (1), 42-63.
- Keohane, R. O., David, V. G. (2016). Cooperation and Discord in Global Climate Policy. *Nature Climate Change*, 6, 570-575.
- King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, U.S.A.: Princeton University Press.
- Liu, L., Wu, T. & Wan, Z. (2019). The EU-China relationship in a new era of global climate governance. *Asia Europe Journal*, 17 (2), 243-254.
- McDonald, M. (2013). Discourses of Climate security. *Political Geography*, 33, 42-51
- Mearsheimer, J.J. (1990). Back to the Future: instability in Europe after the Cold War. *International Security*, 15 (1), 5-56.
- Ostrom, E. (2010). A multi-scale approach to coping with climate change and other collective action problems. *Solutions*, 1 (2), 27-36.
- Pan, Z. (2010). Managing the conceptual gap on sovereignty in China-EU relations. *Asia Europe Journal*, 8, 227-243.
- Paris Agreement, Paris, 12 December 2015, United Nations Treaty Series, No. 54113, Chapter XXVII. Retrieved from: [https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg\\_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27](https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27)
- Russett, B. M., Risse-Kappen, T., & Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990). Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European Security. *International Security*, 15 (3), 216-222.



- Schmitter, P. C. (2000). Federalism and the Euro-Polity. *Journal of Democracy*, 11(1), 40-47.
- Schneider, S. C., & de Meyer, A. (1991). Interpreting and responding to strategic issues: the impact of national culture. *Strategic Management Journal*, 12 (1), 307-320.
- Schreurs, M. A. & Economy, E. C. (1997). *The internationalization of Environmental Protection*. New York, U.S.A.: Cambridge University Press.
- Schreurs, M. A. (2020). Climate change politics in the US, China, and the EU: Climate science and the framing of climate action. In: J. Men, S. Schunz, & D. Freeman (Eds.), *The evolving relationship between China, the EU and the USA: A new global order?* (pp. 229-252). New York, U.S.A.: Routledge.
- The European Union. (ca. 2020). *About the EU*. Consulted on the 20<sup>th</sup> of June 2020, on [https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries\\_nl](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_nl)
- The European Commission. (2005). *EU and China Partnership on Climate Change* (Memo No. MEMO/05/298). Retrieved from European Commission website: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO\\_05\\_298](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_05_298)
- Thompson, A. (2006). Management under Anarchy: the International Politics of Climate Change. *Climate change*, 78, 7-29.
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1771, No. 30822, p. 107. Retrieved from: [https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg\\_no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=\\_en](https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en)
- Waever, O. (1995). Securitization and Desecuritization. In: R.D. Lipschutz (Eds.), *On Security* (Chapter 3). New York, U.S.A.: Columbia University Press.
- Wallace, W. (1983). Less than a Federation, more than a Regime: the Community as a Political System. In: H, Wallace et al. (eds.) (1983). *Policy-Making in the European Community*. Chichester, UK: John Wiley.

- Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural Realism after the Cold War. *International Security*, 25, 5-41.
- Yan, B. (2018). Divergences and convergences between the EU and China on post-2020 global climate governance. In M. Telò, D. Chun, & Z. Xiaotong (Eds.), *Deepening the EU-China partnership: Bridging institutional and ideational differences in an unstable world* (pp. 193-203). New York, U.S.A.: Routledge.
- Yan, B. (2020). The EU-China-US trilateral relations in global climate governance: The perspective of China. In: J. Men, S. Schunz, & D. Freeman (Eds.), *The evolving relationship between China, the EU and the USA: A new global order?* (pp. 191-209). New York, U.S.A.: Routledge.
- Zhang, Y., & Orbie, J. (2019). Strategic narratives in China's climate policy: Analysing three phases in China's discourse coalition. *The Pacific Review*, 32, 1-28.
- Zielonka, J. (2013). The international System in Europe: Westphalian Anarchy or Medieval Chaos? *Journal of European Integration*, 35 (1), 1-18.

## Annex:

### Annex A: Explanatory Factor 1 (Emergence)

Table A1

#### *Documents DVI: Emergence*

Years	Documents
<b>1991-2005</b>	1996EUCNA; 1998EUCNA; 1999EUCNA; 2000EUCNA; 2001EUCNA; 2002EUCNA; 2003EUCNA; 2003EUCNB; 2004EUCNA; 2004EUCNB; 2004EUCNC; 2004EUCND; 2004EUCNE; 2004EUCNF; 2004EUCNG; 2004EUCNH; 2004EUCNI; 2004EUCNJ; 2004EUCNK; 2005EUCNA; 2005EUCNB; 2005EUCNC; 2005EUCND; 2005EUCNE; 2005EUCNF; 2005EUCNG; 2005EUCNH

Table A2

#### *Documents EU EF1: Policy Action of the EU*

Years	Documents
<b>1991-2005</b>	1992INC5A; 1996CNCOP2; 1997EUCOP3B; 1998EUPA; 1998EUCOP4C; 1998EUCOP5A; 2000EUCOP6A; 2001EUCOP7B; 2001EUPA; 2001EUPCB; 2001EUPCC; 2002ENBCOP8; 2002EUCOP8A; 2003EUCOP8A; 2003EUCOP9B; 2004EUCNK; 2004EUCOP10A; 2004EUCOP10B; 2004EUCOP10C; 2005EUCNF; 2005EUCOP11B; 2005EUCOP11C; 2005EUCOP11D; 2005EUJCA; 2005EUPCB;
<b>2005-2019</b>	2006ENBCOP12A; 2006EUCOP12B; 2006EUCOP12D; 2006EUCOP12F; 2006EUPA; 2007EUCNB; 2007EUCNC; 2007EUCOP13A; 2007EUCOP13B; 2007EUCOP13C; 2007EUCOP13D; 2007EUJCA; 2007EUPCC; 2008ENBCOP14B; 2008ENBCOP14E; 2008EUECA; 2008EUPCA; 2008EUPCB; 2009EUPCA; 2009EUPCB; 2009EUPCC; 2009EUPCD; 2009ENBCOP15; 2009EUCNC; 2009EUCOP15B; 2009EUCOP15C; 2009EUCOP15E; 2009EUJCA; 2009EUPA; 2010EUPCA; 2010EUPCD; 2010EUCOP16B; 2010EUCOP16E; 2010EUCOP16J; 2011EUPCB; 2011ENBCOP17; 2011EUCOP17A; 2011EUCOP17E; 2011EUCOP17F; 2012ENBCOP18; 2012EUCOP18A; 2012EUEUCOP18B; 2012EUCOP18C; 2012EUCOP18D; 2012EUCOP18F; 2013EUPCB; 2013EUCOP19A; 2013EUCOP19B; 2013EUCOP19D; 2014ENBCOP20A; 2014ENBCOP20E; 2014EUCOP20B; 2014EUCOP20D; 2014EUCOP20G; 2014EUPA; 2015EUCOP21A; 2015EUCOP21B; 2015EUCOP21D; 2015EUCOP21G; 2015EUCOP21K; 2015EUCOP21M; 2015EUCOP21P; 2015EUCOP21S; 2016EUCOP22A; 2016EUCOP22C; 2016EUCOP22D; 2016EUCOP22I; 2016EUCOP22K; 2016EUCOP22L; 2017EUPCA; 2017EUCOP23A; 2017EUCOP23B; 2017EUCOP23E; 2017EUPA; 2018EUCOP24C; 2018EUCOP24D; 2018EUPCC; 2019EUPCB; 2019EUPCC; 2019EUCNC; 2019EUCOP25A; 2019EUCOP25B; 2019EUCOP25C; 2019EUCOP25E; 2019EUJCA;

*Table A3*

*Documents attitude EU EF 1: Responsibility Causing*

Years	Documents
<b>1991-2005</b>	1993INC8; 1997EUCOP3C; 199EUCOP5A; 2005EUCOP11D; 2005EUJCA

*Table A4*

*Documents attitude EU EF 1: Responsibility Addressing*

Years	Documents
<b>1991-2002</b>	1991INCA; 1993INCB; 1993BOD; 1993INC8; 1994EUPCA; 1995ENBCOP1; 1995INC11A; 1997EUCOP3C; 1997EUPCB; 1999EUPCA; 1999ENBCOP5; 2000EUCOP6C; 2000EUPCA; 2001EUPCB; 2002EUCOP8B
<b>2003-2004</b>	2003EUCOP9A; 2003ENBCOP9; 2004ENBCOP10A; 2004ENBCOP10C
<b>2005-2009</b>	2005EUCNE; 2005EUCNG; 2005EUCOP11C; 2005EUCOP11D; 2005EUJCA; 2005EUPCA; 2005EUPCB; 2006EUCND; 2006EUCOP12C; 2006EUPA; 2007EUCNB; 2007EUCNC; 2007EUCND; 2007EUCOP13B; 2007EUCOP13C; 2007EUCOP13E; 2007EUJCA; 2007EUJCB; 2007EUPCA; 2007ENBCOP13B; 2007ENBCOP13C; 2007EUSPA; 2008EUCOP14A; 2008EUCPCE; 2008ENBCOP14A; 2008ENBCOP14B; 2008ENBCOP14C; 2009EUPCA; 2009EUPCB; 2009EUPCC; 2009EUPCD; 2009ENBCOP15; 2009EUCOP15A; 2009EUCOP15B; 2009EUCOP15C; 2009EUCOP15D; 2009EUCOP15F; 2009EUJCA; 2009EUPA;
<b>2010-2015</b>	2010EUCOP16A; 2010EUCOP16B; 2010EUCOP16C; 2010EUCOP16E; 2010EUCOP16H; 2010EUCOP16I; 2010EUCOP16J; 2010ENBCOP16A; 2010ENBCOP16B; 2011EUPCB; 2011EUCOP17A; 2011EUCOP17B; 2011EUCOP17E; 2011ENBCOP17; 2012EUCOP18A; 2012ENBCOP18; 2013EUCOP19B; 2013EUCOP19D; 2014EUCOP20B; 2014EUCOP20C; 2014EUCOP20D; 2014EUCOP20F; 2014EUCOP20G; 2014ENBCOP20B; 2014ENBCOP20F; 2014EUPA; 2015EUPCA; 2015EUCOP21A; 2015EUCOP21B; 2015EUCOP21C; 2015EUCOP21D; 2015EUCOP21E; 2015EUCOP21G; 2015EUCOP21K; 2015EUCOP21M; 2015EUCOP21N; 2015EUCOP21O; 2015EUCOP21R; 2015EUCOP21S; 2015ENBCOP21A; 2015ENBCOP21C;
<b>2016-2019</b>	2016EUCOP22A; 2016EUCOP22C; 2016EUCOP22E; 2017EUPA; 2018EUPCA; 2018EUCOP24C; 2018EUCOP24D; 2018EUPCC; 2018ENBCOP24; 2019EUPCB; 2019EUPCC; 2019EUPCD; 2019EUCOP25B; 2019EUCOP25C; 2019EUJCA

*Table A5*

*Documents China EF1: Policy Action China*

<b>Years</b>	<b>Documents</b>
<b>1991-2005</b>	1994CNPA; 1994CNPB; 1996CNPA; 1996CNPB; 2001CNPA; 2002CNCOP8F; 2002CNCOP8G; 2003CNCOP9B; 2003CNCOP9C; 2004CNCOP10H; 2004CNPB;
<b>2006-2019</b>	2006;CNCOP12B;2006CNCOP12D; 2006CNCOP12E; 2006ENBCOP12E; 2006ENBCOP12A; 2006ENBCOP12B; 2006CNPA; 2007ENBCOP13A; 2007CNPA; 2008CNCOP14D; 2008CNPA; 2009CNCOP15A; 2009CNCOP15D; 2009CNCOP15E; 2009CNCOP15G; 2009CNCOP15I; 2010CNCOP10B; 2010CNCOP16A; 2010CNCOP16G; 2010CNEA; 2011CNCOP17A; 2011ENBCOP17; 2012CNCCOP18A; 2012CNPB; 2012CNPC; 2013CNCOP19B; 2015CNCOP21A; 2015CNCOP21C; 2016CNCOP22A; 2016CNPA; 2017CNCOP23C; 2017CNPA; 2017ENBCOP23; 2018CNPB; 2019EUCNC;

*Table A6*

*Documents attitude China EF 1: Responsibility Causing*

<b>Years</b>	<b>Documents</b>
<b>1991-2005</b>	1991INCC; 1994CNPB; 1995INC11A; 1996CNPA; 1998CNCOP4A; 2001CNCOP6A; 2003CNCOP9B;

*Table A7*

*Documents attitude China EF 1: Responsibility Addressing*

<b>Years</b>	<b>Documents</b>
<b>1991-2008</b>	1991INCB; 1991INCC; 1991INCE; 1991INCF; 1993BOD; 1995ENBCOP1; 1995CNCOP1B; 1995INC11A; 1995INCENB; 1996CNPA; 1996ENBCOP2; 1998CNCOP4A; 1999CNCOP5A; 1999CNCOP5B; 1999ENBCOP5; 2000CNCOP6A; 2001CNCOP7A; 2001CNCOP7E; 2001CNCOP7G; 2001CNCOP7J; 2001EUCOP7B; 2002CNCOP8A; 2002CNCOP8B; 2002CNCOP9G; 2002CNCOP8G; 2002ENBCOP8; 2003CNCOP9A; 2003CNCOP9B; 2003CNCOP9C; 2003ENBCOP9; 2004CNPB; 2004ENBCOP10A; 2004ENBCOP11B; 2004ENBCOP10C; 2005CNCOP11B; 2005CNCOP11F; 2005ENBCOP11C; 2006CNCOP12A; 2006ENBCOP12B; 2006ENBCOP12C; 2007CNCOP13A; 2007CNCOP13B; 2007CNCOP13C; 2007CNPA; 2007ENBCOP13A; 2008CNCOP14A; 2008CNCOP14B;
<b>2008-2011</b>	2008CNPA; 2008ENBCOP14A; 2008ENBCOP14B; 2008ENBCOP14C; 2008ENBCOP14D; 2008ENBCOP14E; 2009CNCOP15A; 2009CNCOP15C; 2009CNCOP15D; 2009CNCOP15E; 2009CNCOP15F; 2009CNCOP15G; 2009CNCOP15H; 2009CNCOP15I; 2009CNPB; 2009ENBCOP15; 2010CNCOP15B; 2009CNCOP16A; 2009CNCOP16B; 2010CNCOP16G;

	2010ENBCOP16A; 2010ENBCOP16B; 2010CNSPA; 2011CNCOP17A; 2011CNCOP17B; 2011CNCOP17C; 2011ENBCOP17;
<b>2012-2015</b>	2012CNCOP18A; 2012CNCOP18B; 2012CNCOP18C; 2012CNPA; 2012CNPB; 2012CNPC; 2012CNSPA; 2012ENBCOP18; 2013CNCOP19A; 2013CNCOP19B; 2013CNCOP19E; 2013ENBCOP19B; 2013ENBCOP19C; 2014CNCOP20A; 2014CNCOP20B; 2014ENBCOP20B; 2014ENBCOP20F; 2015CNCOP21A; 2015ENBCOP21A; 2015ENBCOP21C;
<b>2015-2019</b>	2016CNCOP22A; 2016CNPA; 2016ENBCOP22; 2017CNCOP23A; 2017CNCOP23A; 2017CNCOP23A; 2017CNCOP23B; 2017CNCOP23C; 2017CNSPA; 2018CNCOP24A; 2018CNCOP24B; 2018CNCOP24E; 2018CNPB; 2018ENBCOP24; 2019CNCOP25A; 2019CNCOP25B; 2019CNCOP25C; 2019ENBCOP25;

Annex B: Explanatory factor 2 (Emergence)

Table B1

Documents EU EF 2: Cooperation

<b>Years</b>	<b>Documents</b>
<b>1991-2005</b>	1994EUPCA; 1995EUJCA; 1995EUPCA; 1995EUPCB; 1996EUCOP2A; 1997EUCOP3C; 1998EUCNA; 1998EUJCA; 1998EUPA; 1999EUCOP5B; 2000EUJCA; 2001EUCOP7A; 2001EUPA; 2001EUJCA; 2003EUCOP9B; 2005EUCOP11A; 2005EUCOP11B; 2005EUJCA;

Table B2

Documents China EF 2: Cooperation

<b>Years</b>	<b>Documents</b>
<b>1991-2005</b>	1996CNPA; 1996CNPB; 1998EUCNA; 1998EUCOP4A; 1999CNCOP5B; 2000CNCOP6B; 2001CNCOP7B; 2002CNCOP8E; 2002CNCOP8G; 2003CNCOP9C; 2003CNPA; 2004CNPB;

Annex C: Explanatory factor 3 (Endurance)

Table C1

Documents DV2: Endurance

<b>Year</b>	<b>Documents</b>
<b>2006-2019</b>	2006EUCNA; 2006EUCNB; 2006EUCNC; 2006EUCND; 2007EUCNA; 2007EUCNB; 2007EUCNC; 2007EUCND; 2007EUCNE; 2008EUCNA; 2009EUCNA; 2009EUCNB; 2009EUCNC; 2010EUCNA; 2010EUCNB; 2011EUCNA; 2012EUCNA; 2012EUCNB; 2012EUCNC; 2013EUCNA; 2013EUCNB; 2013EUCNC; 2014EUCNA; 2014EUCNB; 2015EUCNA; 2015EUCNB; 2015EUCNC; 2016EUCNA; 2016EUCNB; 2016EUCNC; 2017EUCNA; 2017EUCNB; 2017EUCNC; 2017EUCND; 2017EUCNE; 2017EUCNF; 2018EUCNA; 2018EUCNB; 2019EUCNA; 2019EUCNB; 2019EUCNC; 2019EUCND;

*Table C2**Documents EU EF 3: Common Threat*

<b>Year</b>	<b>Documents</b>
<b>1991-2001</b>	1991INCA; 1995EUCOP1A; 1997EUCOP3A; 1997EUCOP3B; 1997EUCOP3C; 1997EUPCA; 1998EUCOP4D; 1998EUPCB; 1998EUPA; 1999EUCOP5A; 1999EUCOP5B; 1999EUPCA; 2001EUCOP7A; 2001EUCOP7B; 2001EUCOP7B;
<b>2001-2004</b>	2001EUPCA; 2001EUPA; 2002EUCOP8A; 2002EUCOP8B; 2002ENBCOP8; 2003EUCOP9A; 2003EUCOP9B; 2004EUCOP10A; 2004EUCOP10C;
<b>2005-2007</b>	2005EUCND; 2005EUCOP11A; 2005EUCOP11B; 2005EUCOP11C; 2005EUCOP11D; 2005EUJCA; 2005EUPCA; 2006EUCND; 2006EUCOP12A; 2006EUCOP12B; 2006EUCOP12C; 2006EUCOP12D; 2006EUCOP12E; 2006EUCOP12F; 2006EUPCB; 2006EUPCC; 2006EUPA; 2007EUCNB; 2007EUCNC; 2007EUCNE; 2007EUCOP13A; 2007EUCOP13B; 2007EUCOP13D; 2007EUCOP13E; 2007EUJCA; 2007EUJCB; 2007EUPCA; 2007EUPCB; 2007EUSPA;
<b>2008-2015</b>	2008EUCOP14A; 2008EUECA; 2009EUPCB; 2009EUPCC; 2009EUCOP15B; 2009EUCOP15C; 2009EUCOP15D; 2009EUCOP15E; 2009EUCOP15F; 2009EUSPA; 2009EUPA; 2010EUPCD; 2010EUCOP16B; 2011EUCOP17F; 2011EUCOP17G; 2012EUCOP18A; 2012EUCOP18C; 2013EUCOP19B; 2013EUCOP19D; 2013EUPCB; 2014EUCOP20C; 2014EUCOP20E; 2014EUCOP20F; 2014EUPA; 2015EUCOP21A; 2015EUCOP21B; 2015EUCOP21C; 2015EUCOP21D; 2015EUCOP21G; 2015EUCOP21M; 2015EUCOP21Q; 2015EUCOP21R; 2015EUCOP21S;
<b>2016-2019</b>	2016EUCOP22A; 2016EUCOP22B; 2016EUCOP22K; 2016EUCOP22L; 2016EUCOP22M; 2017EUPCA; 2017EUCOP23A; 2017EUCOP23B; 2017EUCOP23E; 2018EUCOP24C; 2018EUCOP24D; 2018EUNPA; 2018EUPCC; 2019EUPCB; 2019EUPCC; 2019EUPCD; 2019EUCOP25A; 2019EUCOP25B; 2019EUCOP25C; 2019EUCOP25E; 2019EUJCA;

*Table C3**Documents China EF 3: Common Threat*

<b>Year</b>	<b>Documents</b>
<b>1991-2004</b>	1991CNINC2A; 1991INCC; 1994CNPA; 1994CNPB; 1996CNPA; 2001CNCOP7A; 2001CNCOP7B; 2001CNOP7C; 2001CNCOP7G; 2001CNCOP7J; 2002CNCOP8A; 2002CNCOP8G; 2003CNCOP9B; 2003CNCOP9C; 2004CNCOP10A; 2004CNCOP10H; 2004CNPB;
<b>2005-2009</b>	2005CNCOP11F; 2006CNCOP12B; 2006CNPA; 2007CNCOP13A; 2007CNCOP13B; 2007CNCOP13C; 2007CNPA; 2008CNCOP14B; 2007CNCOP14D; 2008CNPA; 2009CNCOP15A; 2009CNCOP15C; 2009CNCOP15D; 2009CNCOP15E; 2009CNCOP15G; 2009CNCOP15H; 2009CNPA; 2009CNPB;
<b>2010-2015</b>	2010CNCOP16A; 2010CNCOP16B; 2010CNCOP16D; 2010CNCOP16G; 2010CNSPA; 2010CNEA; 2011CNCOP17A; 2011CNCOP17B; 2011CNCOP17C; 2011CNCOP17E; 2011CNCOP17G; 2012CNCOP18A; 2012CNCOP18B;

	2012CNCOP18C; 2012CNPA; 2012CNPB; 2012CNPC; 2013CNCOP19B; 2014CNCOP20B; 2014CNCOP20D; 2015CNCOP21A
<b>2016-2019</b>	2016CNPA; 2017CNCOP23A; 2017CNCOP23B; 2017CNCOP23C; 2017CNPA; 2018CNCOP24A; 2018CNCOP24E; 2018CNPB; 2019CNCOP25B; 2019CNCOP25C

*Annex D: Explanatory factor 4 (Endurance)*

*Table D1*

*Documents EU EF 4: Cooperation*

<b>Years</b>	<b>Documents</b>
<b>2006-2019</b>	2006EUPA; 2007ENBCOP13A; 2008EUPCA; 2009EUCOP15D; 2009EUSPA; 2010EUPCA; 2010EUPCC; 2015EUCOP21M; 2015EUCOP21S; 2019EUCOP25E

*Table D2*

*Documents China EF 4: Cooperation*

<b>Years</b>	<b>Documents</b>
<b>2006-2019</b>	2006CNCOP12B; 2006CNCOP12C; 2007CNCOP13C; 2007CNPA; 2008CNCOP14A; 2008CNPA; 2009CNCOP15A; 2009CNCOP15D; 2009CNCOP15F; 2009CNPB; 2010CNCOP16A; 2010CNCOP16G; 2010CNPA; 2012CNPB; 2012CNPC; 2013CNCOP19B; 2015CNCOP21A; 2016CNCOP22A; 2016CNPA; 2017CNCOP23C; 2017CNPA; 2018CNCOP24B; 2018CNCOP24E; 2018CNPB; 2019CNCOP25A

*Table D3*

*Documents EU + China EF 4: Cooperation*

<b>Years</b>	<b>Documents</b>
<b>2006-2019</b>	2005EUCNA; 2005EUCNB; 2005EUCNC; 2005EUCNH; 2006EUCNA; 2006EUCNB; 2006EUCNC; 2007EUCNA; 2008EUCNA; 2009EUCNA; 2009EUCNB; 2010EUCNA; 2010EUCNB; 2011EUCNA; 2012EUCNA; 2012EUCNB; 2012EUCNC; 2013EUCNA; 2013EUCNB; 2013EUCNC; 2014EUCNB; 2015EUCNA; 2015EUCNB; 2016EUCNA; 2017EUCNB; 2016EUCNC; 2017EUCNC; 2017EUCND; 2017EUCNE; 2017EUCNF; 2018EUCNA; 2018EUCNB; 2019EUCNA; 2019EUCNB; 2019EUCND

*Annex E: Overview of the occupations of those interviewed*

Table E1

*Overview of the occupations of those interviewed*

<b>Occupation</b>	
<b>1</b>	A diplomat of the European Union that has worked on EU-China climate change cooperation
<b>2</b>	Another diplomat of the European Union and has worked on EU-China climate change cooperation
<b>3</b>	A scholar on EU-China Climate Change cooperation
<b>4</b>	Highly placed employee of an international organization working on EU-China Development cooperation.



## **Annex F: Selection criteria and Document overview & Codes**

To provide a comprehensive overview of the different narratives held by both the EU and China, documents were selected originating from different fora. These fora are categorized into: multilateral, bilateral and unilateral.

The following multilateral fora were selected: the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (1991-1995); and the Conference of Parties to the Framework Convention for Climate Change (1995-2019). The documents from these fora (336 in total) are primary data such as speeches, political debates, statements, and policy documents. Also included were NGO reports such as the IISD coverage of the Conference of the Parties.

The following bilateral fora were selected: the EU-China Summit (1998-2019); the EU-China Partnership on climate change (2005-2019); and the EU-China ministerial meeting on the environment (2003-2019). The documents from these fora (75 in total) include bilateral negotiations and partnership agreements, speeches, joint-statements, policy documents, and press releases. Also included were EU policy documents about China, and Chinese policy documents about the EU.

The following objects of analysis for unilateral fora were selected: unilateral statements, speeches, policy documents, press releases and memos by ministries (China) or Director Generals (EU) on the topic of climate change between 1991-2019 (in total 110 documents).

All documents fulfil one of the following criteria: (1) related to EU-China climate change relations; (2) includes EU-China environmental cooperation; (3) related to international climate change cooperation; (4) includes climate change mitigation and adaptation action of either the EU/China. These criteria allowed an as wide as possible net to be cast, as to ensure the chance of excluding potentially important documents was as limited as possible.

The Table disclosing all documents starts on the next page.

<b>Code</b>	<b>Reference</b>
<b>Joint Multi</b>	<b>Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (20 items in total)</b>
<b>1991INC1</b>	United Nations. (1991). Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its First session, held at Washington, D.C., From 4 to 14 February 1991. (Report No. A/AC.237/6) Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/196808">https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/196808</a>
<b>1991INCA</b>	United Nations. (1991). Preparation of a Framework Convention on Climate Change: Set of informal papers provided by delegations, related to the preparation of a framework convention on climate change. Note by the secretariat. Addendum 1. (Report No. A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add.1). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1991INCB</b>	United Nations. (1991). Compilation of possible elements for a framework convention on climate change. Note by the secretariat. (Report No. A/AC.237/Misc.2/Rev.1) Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3802065">https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3802065</a>
<b>1991INCC</b>	United Nations. (1991). Set of informal papers provided by delegations, related to the preparation of a framework convention on climate change. Note by the secretariat. Revision 1 to Addendum 4. (Report No. A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add.4/Rev.1) Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1991INCD</b>	United Nations. (1991). Elements related to mechanisms. Brazil, China, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, United Republic of Tanzania, Venuatu and Venezuela: Alternative proposal for Article 22 (Administrative mechanism for financial resources and technology transfer) contained in the revised single text on the elements relating to mechanisms (A/AC.237/Misc.13) submitted by the Co-Chairman of Working Group II. (Report No. A/AC.237/WG.II/CRP.9). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1991INCE</b>	United Nations. (1991). Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe: proposal on the entire section on commitments. (Report no. A/AC.237/WG.I/L.7). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1991INCF</b>	United Nations. (1991). Joint statement of the Group of 77, made by its Chairman (Ghana) at the fourth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change. (Report No. A/AC.237/WG.I/L.8). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1992INC5A</b>	United Nations. (1992). Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of the first part of its fifth session, held at New York from 18 to 28 February 1992. (Report no. A/AC.237/18 (Part I)). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1992INC5B</b>	United Nations. (1992). Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of the second part of its fifth session, held at New York from 30 April to 9 May 1992. Addendum 1. (Report no. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1992INC6A</b>	United Nations. (1992). Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its sixth session held at Geneva from 7 to 10 December 1992. (Report No. A/AC.237/24). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1993INC7A</b>	United Nations. (1993). Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its seventh session held at New York from 15 to 20 March 1993. (Report No. A/AC.237/31). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1993INC8A</b>	United Nations. (1993). Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its eight session held at Geneva from 16 to 27 August 1993. (Report No. A/AC.237/41). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1993INC8B</b>	United Nations. (1993). Matters relating to Commitments – Criteria for Joint implementation. (Report No. A/AC.237/Misc.30) Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>1994INC9A</b>	United Nations. (1994). Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its ninth session held at Geneva from 7 to 18 February 1994. (Report No. A/AC.237/55). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>

<b>1994INC9B</b>	United Nations. (1994). Matters relating to Commitments Criteria for Joint Implementation. Statements from member States on criteria for joint implementation. Note by the interim secretariat. (Report No. A/AC.237/Misc.33). Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>1994INC10A</b>	United Nations. (1994). Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its tenth session held at Geneva from 22 August to 2 September 1994. (Report No. A/AC.237/76). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1994INC10B</b>	United Nations. (1994). Matters relating to Commitment Criteria for Joint Implementation. Comments from Parties or other member States. Note by the interim secretariat. Addendum. (Report No. A/AC.237/Misc.37/Add.1). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1995INC11</b>	United Nations. (1995). Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its eleventh session held at New York from 6 to 17 February 1995. Addendum: part two: recommendations to the Conference of the parties and other decisions and conclusions of the committee. (Report No. A/AC.237/91/Add.1). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1995INCENB</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (1995). Summary of the eleventh session of the INC for a Framework Convention on Climate Change: 6-17 February 1995. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (11). Retrieved from:
<b>1993BOD</b>	Bodansky, D. (1993). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A commentary. <i>Yale Journal of International Law</i> , 18 (451), 451-558

<b>Joint</b>	<b>Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (ENB) (50 Items in total)</b>
<b>1995ENBCOP1</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (1995). Summary of the First Conference of the Parties for the Framework Convention on Climate Change: 28 March – 7 April 1995. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (21). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>1995INC</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (1995). A Brief history of the Framework Convention on Climate Change. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (12). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>1996ENBCOP2</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (1996). Summary of the Second Conference of Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate change: 8-19 July 1996. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (38). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>1997ENBCOP3</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (1997). Summary of the Third Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change: 1-11 December 1997. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (78). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>1998ENBCOP4</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (1998). Report of the fourth Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate change: 2-13 November 1998. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (97). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>1999ENBCOP5</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (1999). Summary of the Fifth Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change 25 October – 5 November 1999. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (123). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2000ENBCOP6</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2000). Summary of the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change: 13-25 November 2000. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (163). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2001ENBCOP7</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2001). Summary of the Seventh Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: 29 October – 10 November 2001. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (169). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2002ENBCOP8</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2002). Summary of the Eighth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: 23 October – 1 November 2002. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (209). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2003ENBCOP9</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2003). Summary to the Ninth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: 1-12 December 2003. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (231). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2004ENBCOP10A</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2004). UNFCCC COP-10 Highlights: Wednesday, 15 December 2004. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (258). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>

<b>2004ENBCOP10B</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2004). UNFCCC COP-10 Highlights: Thursday, 16 December 2004. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (259). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2004ENBCOP10C</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2004). Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: 6-18 December 2004. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (260). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2004IISDA</b>	IISD. (2004). Magazine on the Kyoto Mechanisms – CDM in China: Taking a Proactive and Sustainable Approach. <i>Joint Implementation Quarterly</i> , 10 (3), p. 5. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/climate_chile_joint_imp_oct_2004.pdf">https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/climate_chile_joint_imp_oct_2004.pdf</a>
<b>2005ENBCOP11A</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2005). COP 11 and COP/MOP 1 Highlights: Wednesday, 7 December 2005. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (289). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2005ENBCOP11B</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2005). COP 11 and COP/MOP 1 Highlights: Thursday, 8 December 2005. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (290). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2005ENBCOP11C</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2005). Summary of the Eleventh Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and First Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol: 28 November – 10 December 2005. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (291). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2006ENBCOP12A</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2006). COP 12 and COP/MOP 2 Highlights: Thursday, 16 November 2006. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (317). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2006ENBCOP12B</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2006). COP 12 and COP/MOP 2 Highlights: Wednesday, 15 November 2006. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (316). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2006ENBCOP12C</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2006). Summary of the Twelfth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Second Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol: 6-17 November 2006. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (318). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2007ENBCOP13A</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2007). COP 13 and COP/MOP 3 Highlights: Wednesday, 12 December 2007. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (352). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2007ENBCOP13B</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2007). COP 13 and COP/MOP 3 Highlights: Thursday, 13 December 2007. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (353). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2007ENBCOP13C</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2007). Summary of the Thirteenth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Third Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol: 3-15 December 2007. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (354). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2008ENBCOP14A</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2008). United Nations Climate Change Conference in Poznan: 1-12 December 2008. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (386). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2008ENBCOP14B</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2008). COP 14 Highlights: Thursday, 11 December 2008. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (394). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2008ENBCOP14C</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2008). COP 14 Highlights: Wednesday, 3 December 2008. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (388). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2008ENBCOP14D</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2008). COP 14 Highlights: Tuesday, 2 December 2008. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (387). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2008ENBCOP14E</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2008). Summary of the Fourteenth Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Fourth Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol: 1-12 December 2008. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (395). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>

<b>2009ENBCOP15</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2009). Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7-19 December 2009. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (459). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2010ENBCOP16A</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2010). Cancun Highlights 29 November 2010. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (488). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2010ENBCOP16B</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2010). Summary of the Cancun Climate Change Conference: 29 November – 11 December 2010. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (498). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2011ENBCOP17</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2011). Summary of the Durban Climate Change Conference: 28 November – 11 December. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (534). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2012ENBCOP18</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2012). Summary of the Doha Climate Change Conference: 26 November – 8 December 2012. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (567). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2013ENBCOP19A</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2013). Warsaw Highlights Wednesday, 20 November 2013. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (592). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2013ENBCOP19B</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2013). Warsaw Highlights Monday, 11 November 2013. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (584). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2013ENBCOP19C</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2013). Warsaw Highlights: Tuesday, 12 November. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (585). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2013ENBCOP19D</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2013). Summary of the Warsaw Climate Change Conference: 11-23 November 2013. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (594). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2014ENBCOP20A</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2014). Lima Highlights: Tuesday, 9 December 2014. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (616). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2014ENBCOP20B</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2014). Lima Highlights: Wednesday, 10 December 2014. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (617). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2014ENBCOP20C</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2014). Lima Highlights: Monday, 1 December 2014. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (609). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2014ENBCOP20D</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2014). Lima Highlights: Monday, 8 December 2014. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (615). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2014ENBCOP20E</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2014). Lima Highlights: Saturday, 6 December 2014. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (614). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2014ENBCOP20F</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2014). Summary of the Lima Climate Change Conference: 1-14 December 2014. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (619). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2015ENBCOP21A</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2015). Paris Highlights: Saturday, 5 December 2015. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (638). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2015ENBCOP21B</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2015). Paris Highlights: Monday, 30 November 2015. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (653). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2015ENBCOP21C</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2015). Summary of the Paris Climate Change Conference: 29 November – 13 December 2015. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (663). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2016ENBCOP22</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2016). Summary of the Marrakech Climate Change Conference: 7-19 November 2016. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (689). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2017ENBCOP23</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2017). Summary of the Fiji/Bonn Climate Change Conference: 6-17 November 2017. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (714). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>2018ENBCOP24</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2018). Summary of the Katowice Climate Change Conference: 2-15 December 2018. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (747). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>

<b>2019ENBCOP25</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (2019). Summary of the Chile/Madrid Climate Change Conference: 2-15 December 2019. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (775). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>EU</b>	<b>Multilateral Fora (134 items in total)</b>
<b>1995EUCOP1A</b>	United Nations. (1995). Matters relating to Commitments Review of the adequacy of Article 4, Paragraph 2 (A) and (B). Comments from Parties and other member States. (Report No. FCCC/CP/1995/Misc.1). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1995EUCOP1B</b>	UNFCCC. (1995). Implementation of the Berlin Mandate. Comments from Parties. Note by the secretariat. Addendum. (Report No. FCCC/AGBM/1995/MISC.1/Add.3). Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>1996EUCOP2A</b>	European Commission. (1996). Statement by Mrs Ritt Bjerregaard at the Second Conference of the Parties of the UN – Framework Convention on Climate Change – Geneva, 18 July 1996. (Speech No. 96/195). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_96_195">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_96_195</a>
<b>1996EUCOP2B</b>	UNFCCC. (1996). Implementation of the Berlin Mandate – Proposals from Parties, Note by the secretariat. Addendum. (Report No. (FCCC/AGBM/1996/MISC.2/Add.2). Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>1997EUCOP3A</b>	European Commission. (1997). Mrs Ritt Bjerregaard European Commissioner for Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection: Third Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Kyoto (Japan), 8 December 1997. (Speech No. 97/275). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_97_275">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_97_275</a>
<b>1997EUCOP3B</b>	European Commission. (1997). The Commission adopts Communication on Climate Change – The EU Approach for Kyoto. (Document No. IP/97/829). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_97_829">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_97_829</a>
<b>1997EUCOP3C</b>	European Commission. (1997). Ritt Bjerregaard Member of the Commission responsible for Environment Climate Change – Sustainable Development and the Future of the European Energy Industry: Looking ahead to Kyoto Brussels, 6 November 1997. (Speech No. 97/234). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_97_234">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_97_234</a>
<b>1998EUCOP4A</b>	United Nations. (1998). Matters Related to Decision 1/CP.3 Paragraph 5. Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (clean development mechanism), Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol (international emissions trading). Activities implemented jointly: compilation of submissions by Parties. (Report No. FCCC/CP/1998/MISC.7). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1998EUCOP4B</b>	United Nations. (1998). Second Review of the Adquacy of Article 4.2(a) and (b). Compilation of submissions by Parties. Note by the secretariat. (Report No. FCCC/CP/1998/MISC.6). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>1998EUCOP4C</b>	European Commission. (1998). Speech by Ritt Bjerregaard Member of the Commission responsible for the Environment. Fourth Conference on Climate Change Buenos Aires, Argentina, 12 November 1998. (Speech No. 98/246). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_98_246">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_98_246</a>
<b>1998EUCOP4D</b>	European Commission. (1998). Mr Christos Papoutsis Member of the European Commission responsible for Energy, Enterprise policy and Tourism: The Kyoto Engagement Energy Technology in the Service of Citizen, Society and Environment: Brussels, 1 October 1998. (Speech No. 98/198). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_98_189">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_98_189</a>
<b>1999EUCOP5A</b>	European Commission. (1999). Statement by Margot Walltröm Commissioner responsible for environment. Progress made in dealing with climate change: lessons and challenges. Convention on Climate Change Bonn, 3 November 1999. (Speech no. 99/150). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_99_150">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_99_150</a>
<b>1999EUCOP5B</b>	European Parliament. (1999). Motion for a resolution on Climate change: follow-up to the Fifth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (Bonn, 25 October – 5 November 1999). (Document No. B5-0314/1999). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&amp;reference=B5-1999-0314&amp;language=EN">https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&amp;reference=B5-1999-0314&amp;language=EN</a>
<b>2000EUCOP6A</b>	European Commission. (2000). Margot Wallström European Commissioner for Environment: Statement of Commissioner Wallström to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

	(UNFCCC) the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP-6) The Hague, 21 November 2000. (Speech No.00/446). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_00_446">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_00_446</a>
<b>2000EUCOP6B</b>	European Commission. (2000). Ms. Margot Wallström Member of the European Commission responsible for Environment: Statement of Commissioner Wallström to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change The thirteen Session of the Subsidiary Bodies to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Lyon, 11 September 2000. (Speech No. 00/299). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_00_299">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_00_299</a>
<b>2000EUCOP6C</b>	European Commission. (2000). Ms. Margot Wallström European Commissioner for Environment Statement on the Outcome of the Sixth Conference of the Parties (COP6) – The United Nations Convention on Climate Change: The European Parliament, Brussels, 29 November 2000. (Speech No. 00/476). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_00_476">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_00_476</a>
<b>2001EUCOP7A</b>	European Commission. (2001). Margot Wallström European Commissioner for the Environment Opening speech COP7 Marrakech, 7 November 2001. (Speech No. 01/516). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_01_516">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_01_516</a>
<b>2001EUCOP7B</b>	UNFCCC. (2001). Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action: Statements made in connection with the approval of the Bonn Agreement on the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (Decision 5/CP.6) Note by Secretariat. (Report No. FCCC/CP/2001/MISC.4). Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2002EUCOP8A</b>	European Commission. (2002). Commission welcomes outcome of Climate change conference (COP8). (Press release No. 02/1605). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_02_1605">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_02_1605</a>
<b>2002EUCOP8B</b>	European Commission. (2002). Margot Wallström Member of the European Commission, responsible for the Environment: The European Union approach on climate change: minimizing the economic costs of the Kyoto Protocol EURELECTRIC Workshop: Implementing Kyoto: managing carbon risk to your business, Brussels, 15 October 2002. (Speech No. 02/481). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_02_481">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_02_481</a>
<b>2003EUCOP9A</b>	European Commission. (2003). COP9/Climate Change: All Parties must maintain momentum to tackle the 21 <sup>st</sup> Century’s biggest environmental challenge. (Press release No. 03/1639). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_03_1638">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_03_1638</a>
<b>2003EUCOP9B</b>	European Commission. (2003). Margot Wallström Member of the European Commission, responsible for Environment: ‘Implementing the Kyoto Protocol: where do we stand today?’ – Centre for European Studies & Conferences (CEPS) – 1 <sup>st</sup> Brussels Climate Change Conference Brussels, 20 May 2003. (Speech No. 03/260). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_03_260">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_03_260</a>
<b>2004EUCOP10A</b>	European Commission. (2004). UN Conference on climate change: EU set to keep momentum in the global fight against climate change. (Press release No. 04/1437). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_04_1437">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_04_1437</a>
<b>2004EUCOP10B</b>	European Parliament. (2004). Motion For a Resolution to wind up the debate on statements by the European Council and Commission pursuant to Rule 103(2) of the Rules of Procedure by Karl-Heinz Florenz on behalf of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety on the EU strategy for the Buenos Aires Conference on Climate Change (COP-10). (Document No. B6-0129/2004). Retrieved from: <a href="https://europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&amp;reference=B6-2004-0129&amp;language=MT">https://europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&amp;reference=B6-2004-0129&amp;language=MT</a>
<b>2004EUCOP10C</b>	European Commission. (2004). Stavros Dimas European Commissioner in charge of Environment: The EU’s stance at COP10 Dinner hosted by Commissioner Dimas for EU Ministers plus 3 Buenos Aires, 14 December 2004. (Speech No. 04/542). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_04_542">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_04_542</a>
<b>2005EUCOP11A</b>	European Commission. (2005). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, Responsible for Environment: EU Cooperation with China and India on Climate Change related issues. Side Event in the context of the UN Climate Change Summit, Montreal, 8 December 2005. (Speech No. 05/780). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_780">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_780</a>
<b>2005EUCOP11B</b>	European Commission. (2005). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, Responsible for Environment. Climate Change: Opening Statement at the high level segment of the Eleventh Conference

	of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Montréal, 7 December 2005. (Speech No. 05/769). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_769">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_769</a>
<b>2005EUCOP11C</b>	European Commission. (2005). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, Responsible for Environment, Can Europe deliver on its Kyoto Target? How do we move Europe onto a low-carbon path? European Voice Climate Change Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2005. (Speech No. 05/727). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_727">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_727</a>
<b>2005EUCOP11D</b>	European Commission. (2005). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, Responsible for Environment: Progress in Climate Change Negotiations EU Troika Press Conference, Montréal, 8 December 2005. (Speech No. 05/779). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_779">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_779</a>
<b>2006EUCOP12A</b>	European Commission. (2006). Stavros Dimas European Commissioner for Environment Intervention by Environment. High level segment of the Twelfth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Second Session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Nairobi, 15 November 2006. (Speech no. 06/695). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_695">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_695</a>
<b>2006EUCOP12B</b>	European Commission. (2006). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, Responsible for Environment. EU Statement on deployment of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies and equitable distribution of CDM projects UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Nairobi, 17 November 2006. (Speech No. 06/075). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_705">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_705</a>
<b>2006EUCOP12C</b>	European Parliament. (2006). European Parliament resolution on the European Union strategy for the Nairobi Conference on Climate Change (COP 12 and COP/MOP 2). (Document No. 52006IP0460). Retrieved from: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52006IP0460&amp;from=GA">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52006IP0460&amp;from=GA</a>
<b>2006EUCOP12D</b>	European Commission. (2006). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, Responsible for Environment Climate Change: Montréal and beyond European Parliament Debate, Strasbourg, 16 January 2006. (Speech No. 06/9). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_9">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_9</a>
<b>2006EUCOP12E</b>	European Commission. (2006). Stavros Dimas European Commissioner for Environment Speaking Notes on Press Conference on Kyoto Anniversary Press Conference on Kyoto Anniversary Brussels, 15 February 2006. (Speech No. 06/88). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_88">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_88</a>
<b>2006EUCOP12F</b>	European Commission. (2006). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, responsible for Environment Nairobi: prospects for the future European Voice Comment Forum debate on climate change, Brussels, 30 November 2006. (Speech No. 06/769). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_769">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_769</a>
<b>2007EUCOP13A</b>	European Commission. (2007). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, responsible for environment. Introductory remarks at press conference UN Climate Change Conference, Bali Tuesday 11 December 2007. (Speech No. 07/808). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_808">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_808</a>
<b>2007EUCOP13B</b>	European Commission. (2007). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, Responsible for environment: Speech by Commissioner Dimas at the press conference in Bali today UN Climate Change Conference, Bali Thursday 13 December 2007. (Speech No. 07/820). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_820">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_820</a>
<b>2007EUCOP13C</b>	European Commission. (2007). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, responsible for environment. Opening of Commission side event: Supporting efforts to combat deforestation – the European perspective UN Climate Change Conference, Bali Thursday 13 December 2007. (Speech No. 07/819). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_819">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_819</a>
<b>2007EUCOP13D</b>	European Commission. (2007). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, responsible for environment. GEEREF – Innovative Financing for Clean Energy. UN Climate Change Conference, Bali: Side-event on Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF) Thursday 13 December 2007. (Speech No. 07/821). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_821">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_821</a>



<b>2007EUCOP13E</b>	European Commission. (2007). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, responsible for environment: High level segment of the Thirteenth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Third Session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. UN Climate Change Conference, Bali Wednesday 12 December 2007. (Speech No. 07/812). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_812">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_812</a>
<b>2008EUCOP14A</b>	United Nations. (2008). Fourteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 14) and the fourth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP 4). Statement at the high-level segment by Fredrik Reinfeldt Prime Minister of Sweden. Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>
<b>2009EUCOP15A</b>	European Commission. (2010). Expression of willingness to be associated with the Copenhagen Accord and submission of the quantified economy-wide emissions reduction targets for 2020. (Note No. 5794/10). Retrieved from: <a href="https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&amp;f=ST%205794%202010%20INIT">https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&amp;f=ST%205794%202010%20INIT</a>
<b>2009EUCOP15B</b>	European Commission. (2009). José Manuel Durão Barroso President of the European Commission: Statement of President Barroso at the UN High Level Segment COP 15 Copenhagen, 16 December 2009. (Speech No. 09/583). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_583">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_583</a>
<b>2009EUCOP15C</b>	European Commission. (2009). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, responsible for environment – US and EU leadership for Copenhagen, Brookings Institute and Heinrich Böll Foundation seminar, Washington D.C. 16 March 2009. (Speech No. 09/122). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_122">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_122</a>
<b>2009EUCOP15D</b>	European Commission. (2009). José Manuel Durão Barroso President of the European Commission Speech to the Global Editors’ Forum: From Kyoto to Copenhagen, Copenhagen, 9 October 2009. (Speech No. 09/458). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_458">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_458</a>
<b>2009EUCOP15E</b>	European Commission. (2009). José Manuel Durão Barroso – President of the European Commission – Statement of President Barroso on the Copenhagen Climate Accord COP 15, Copenhagen, 19 December 2009. (Speech No. 09/588). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_588">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_588</a>
<b>2009EUCOP15F</b>	European Commission. (2009). José Manuel Durão Barroso President of the European Commission “The Road to Copenhagen” Green week closing session, Brussels, 26 June 2009. (Speech No. 09/316). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_316">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_316</a>
<b>2010EUCOP16A</b>	European Commission. (2010). Statement by European Commissioner for Climate Action Connie Hedegaard at the opening of the High-level Segment of COP-16/CMP-6 Tuesday 7 December 2010. Retrieved from: <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/mexico/documents/climate_change/20101207joint_high_level_statement_ch_en.pdf">http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/mexico/documents/climate_change/20101207joint_high_level_statement_ch_en.pdf</a>
<b>2010EUCOP16B</b>	European Commission. (2010). Flemish Minister for Environment, Nature and Culture: Opening High-level Segment COP-16/CMP-6, Cancún, 7 December 2010. Retrieved from: <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/mexico/documents/climate_change/20101207joint_high_level_statement_ch_en.pdf">http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/mexico/documents/climate_change/20101207joint_high_level_statement_ch_en.pdf</a>
<b>2010EUCOP16C</b>	European Commission. (2010). Climate Change: Cancún conference must mark significant step towards legally binding climate framework. (Document No. IP/10/1620). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_10_1620">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_10_1620</a>
<b>2010EUCOP16D</b>	European Commission. (2010). European Union welcomes Cancún Agreement as important step towards global framework for climate action. (Document No. IP/10/1699). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_10_1699">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_10_1699</a>
<b>2010EUCOP16E</b>	European Commission. (2010). Climate Change: Questions and Answers on the UN climate conference in Cancún. (Memo No. 10/627). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_10_627">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_10_627</a>
<b>2010EUCOP16F</b>	European Commission. (2010). Connie Hedegaard European Commissioner for Climate Action European Parliament plenary debate on preparations for the Cancún Climate Conference (29 November

	– 10 December) European Parliament plenary debate Strasbourg, 24 November 2010. (Speech No. 10/687). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_10_687">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_10_687</a>
<b>2010EUCOP16G</b>	European Commission. (2010). Commissioner Connie Hedegaard: “It is absurd and unfair that the EU is accused of killing the Kyoto Protocol”. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2010120901_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2010120901_en</a>
<b>2010EUCOP16H</b>	European Commission. (2010). Commissioner Hedegaard: “In Cancún we want to see a balanced set of decisions”. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2010101401_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2010101401_en</a>
<b>2010EUCOP16I</b>	European Commission. (2010). Statement by Connie Hedegaard, European Commissioner for Climate Action, on the outcome of the Bonn climate change talks. (Memo No. 10/364). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_10_364">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_10_364</a>
<b>2010EUCOP16J</b>	European Commission. (2010). Statements by the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, and Connie Hedegaard, European Commissioner for Climate Action on the Cancún Agreement on climate change. (Memo No. 10/673). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_10_673">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_10_673</a>
<b>2011EUCOP17A</b>	European Commission. (2011). Statement at the opening of the high-level segment of COP17 by Connie Hedegaard, European Commissioner for Climate Action. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner</a>
<b>2011EUCOP17B</b>	European Commission. (2011). Statement at the opening of the high-level segment of COP17 by Marcin Korolec, Minister of the Environment, President of the Council of the European Union. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner</a>
<b>2011EUCOP17C</b>	European Commission. (2011). EU looks for progress on substance at Bonn climate talks. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2011060601_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2011060601_en</a>
<b>2011EUCOP17D</b>	European Commission. (2011). EU looks for real progress at Panama climate talks. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2011100301_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2011100301_en</a>
<b>2011EUCOP17E</b>	European Commission. (2011). Durban must deliver a roadmap for climate action by all major economies. (Document No. IP/11/1436). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_11_1436">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_11_1436</a>
<b>2011EUCOP17F</b>	European Commission. (2011). José Manuel Durão Barroso President of the European Commission Thinking like scientists, acting like leaders, Launch of IPCC’s Special Report on Renewable Energy sources and Climate change mitigation (SRREN), Brussels, 16 June 2011. (Speech No. 11/441). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_11_441">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_11_441</a>
<b>2011EUCOP17G</b>	European Commission. (2011). Statement by Connie Hedegaard European Commissioner for Climate Action on the EU’s progress towards meeting its Kyoto Protocol target. (Memo No. 11/672). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_11_672">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_11_672</a>
<b>2012EUCOP18A</b>	UNFCCC. (2012). Statement by Connie Hedegaard and Cofclis Aletraris On behalf of the EU, its 27 Member States, and Croatia at COP18, Doha: Moving Forward together. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines/news/2012-12-04_01_en.htm">https://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines/news/2012-12-04_01_en.htm</a>
<b>2012EUCOP18B</b>	European Commission. (2012). Statement on behalf of the EU and its Member States: The eight session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP8). Opening plenary on 26 November 2012. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2012EUCOP18C</b>	European Commission. (2012). Statement by Sofoclis Aletraris, Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment, Cyprus. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines/news/2012-12-04_01_en.htm">https://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines/news/2012-12-04_01_en.htm</a>
<b>2012EUCOP18D</b>	European Commission. (2012). Doha Climate Conference takes modest step towards a global climate deal in 2015. (Document No. IP/12/1342). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_12_1342">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_12_1342</a>
<b>2012EUCOP18E</b>	European Commission. (2012). Doha Climate Conference takes modest step towards a global deal in 2015. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2012120801_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2012120801_en</a>
<b>2012EUCOP18F</b>	European Commission. (2012). Statement by Commissioner Hedegaard on 25 <sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Montreal Protocol. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2012091401_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2012091401_en</a>
<b>2013EUCOP19A</b>	UNFCCC. (2013). Submission by Ireland and the European Commission on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. Subject: Long-term finance. Retrieved from:

	<a href="https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_and_statements/application/pdf/cop_ltf_eu_19032013.pdf">https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_and_statements/application/pdf/cop_ltf_eu_19032013.pdf</a>
<b>2013EUCOP19B</b>	Council of the European Union (2013). 19th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 19) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 9th session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 9), 39th session of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs 39) and the 3rd part of the 2nd session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2-3) (Warsaw, 11 - 22 November 2013) = Compilation of EU statements. (Note No. 17308/13). Retrieved from: <a href="http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&amp;t=PDF&amp;gc=true&amp;sc=false&amp;f=ST%2017308%202013%20INIT&amp;r=http%3A%2F%2Fregister.consilium.europa.eu%2Fpd%2Fen%2F13%2Fst17%2Fst17308.en13.pdf">http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&amp;t=PDF&amp;gc=true&amp;sc=false&amp;f=ST%2017308%202013%20INIT&amp;r=http%3A%2F%2Fregister.consilium.europa.eu%2Fpd%2Fen%2F13%2Fst17%2Fst17308.en13.pdf</a>
<b>2013EUCOP19C</b>	UNFCCC. (2013). EU Submission on COP agenda item 11c- GCF report 16 November 2013. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2013EUCOP19D</b>	European Commission. (2013). IPCC Science report: climate change, unequivocal, human influence at least 95% certain. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2013092701_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2013092701_en</a>
<b>2014EUCOP20A</b>	UNFCCC. (2014). Statement on behalf of the EU and its Member States: the forty-first session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice Lima, 6 December 2014. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2014EUCOP20B</b>	UNFCCC. (2014). Statement on behalf of the EU and its Member States: the twentieth session of the Conference on the Parties of the UNFCCC and the tenth session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2014EUCOP20C</b>	UNFCCC. (2014). Statement at the opening of the high-level segment of COP20 by Italian Minister Gian Luca Galletti, President of the Council of the European Union. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2014EUCOP20D</b>	European Commission. (2014). Speech at the EP plenary “2014 UN Climate Change Conference Lima”. (Speech No. 14/2165). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_2165">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_2165</a>
<b>2014EUCOP20E</b>	European Commission. (2014). IPCC report highlights need for collective and significant action to keep warming below 2°C. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2014041401_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2014041401_en</a>
<b>2014EUCOP20F</b>	European Commission. (2014). IPCC report on climate impacts: “It’s time to get serious”. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2014033101_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2014033101_en</a>
<b>2014EUCOP20G</b>	European Commission. (2014). EU Climate Action and Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete: “The science is clear. The time to act is now”. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2014110301_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2014110301_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21A</b>	European Commission. (2015). Jean-Claude Juncker at the COP21 Leaders Event – A Climate agreement here and now in Paris. (Speech No. 15/6211). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_15_6211">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_15_6211</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21B</b>	European Commission. (2015). Speaking points by Climate Action and Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete at the press conference preceeding the COP21 Climate Change Conference in Paris. (Speech No. 15/6172). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_15_6172">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_15_6172</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21C</b>	European Commission. (2015). UN talks in Bonn focus on draft text for new global climate deal. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015101601_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015101601_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21D</b>	European Commission. (2015). Bonn climate talks seek to advance work on new global deal. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015052901_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015052901_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21E</b>	European Commission. (2015). UN climate talks resume in Bonn. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015082801_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015082801_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21F</b>	European Commission. (2015). 100 days to Paris – EU Commissioner calls for accelerated progress in climate talks. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015082101_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015082101_en</a>

<b>2015EUCOP21G</b>	European Commission. (2015). Environment Council approves the EU's intended nationally determined contribution to the new global climate agreement. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015030601_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015030601_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21H</b>	European Commission. (2015). President Juncker's State of the Union speech: EU united in leadership on climate change. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015090901_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015090901_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21I</b>	European Commission. (2015). UN climate conference: EU-led ambition coalition growing stronger. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015120902_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015120902_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21J</b>	European Commission. (2015). EU agrees position for Paris climate change conference. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015091801_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015091801_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21K</b>	European Commission. (2015). Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete: EU press briefing, Brussels, 20 August, 2015. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_15_5515">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_15_5515</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21L</b>	European Commission. (2015). EU seeks progress on text of 2015 climate agreement at Geneva talks. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015020601_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015020601_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21M</b>	European Commission. (2015). Historic climate deal in Paris: EU leads global efforts. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015121201_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015121201_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21N</b>	European Commission. (2015). EU Commissioner: Time for step change in UN climate talks. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015090401_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015090401_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21O</b>	European Commission. (2015). EU sets out vision for Paris agreement alongside Energy Union strategy. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015022501_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015022501_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21P</b>	European Commission. (2015). Commission welcomes strong EU commitment to boost climate assistance for developing countries. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_6045">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_6045</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21Q</b>	European Commission. (2015). Paris climate conference: historic opportunity to avoid dangerous climate change. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015112501_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015112501_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21R</b>	European Commission. (2015). Climate action ahead of Paris: Unprecedented global effort but more ambition needed. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015101301_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015101301_en</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21S</b>	European Commission. (2015). Energy Union Package: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: the Paris Protocol – A blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020. (Communication No. (2015)/81final/2). Retrieved from: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2015%3A81%3AFIN">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2015%3A81%3AFIN</a>
<b>2015EUCOP21T</b>	European Commission. (2015). EU Commissioner: Political push needed to bring climate talks to next level. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015102401_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015102401_en</a>
<b>2016EUCOP22A</b>	European Commission. (2016). EU Climate and Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete at the UN Signature Ceremony for the Paris Agreement New York. (Speech No. 16/1533). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_16_1533">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_16_1533</a>
<b>2016EUCOP22B</b>	Parlementaire Monitor. (2016). Statement of His Excellency Laszlo Solymos, Minister of the Environment of the Slovak Republic, on Behalf of the European Union, COP22 High-level Segment, 16 November 2016, Marrakesh, Morocco. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vk98pf3tnkzi?ctx=vhesf063wxu9&amp;v=1&amp;tab=1&amp;start_tab0=300">https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vk98pf3tnkzi?ctx=vhesf063wxu9&amp;v=1&amp;tab=1&amp;start_tab0=300</a>
<b>2016EUCOP22C</b>	European Commission. (2016). Bonn climate conference: good progress to implement the Paris Agreement. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016052601_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016052601_en</a>
<b>2016EUCOP22D</b>	European Commission. (2016). Paris Agreement to enter into force as EU agrees ratification. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_3284">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_3284</a>
<b>2016EUCOP22E</b>	European Commission. (2016). EU seeks progress towards effective implementation of Paris Agreement at UN climate talks. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016051301_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016051301_en</a>
<b>2016EUCOP22F</b>	European Commission. (2016). EU prepares the way for a quick ratification of Paris Agreement. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016061001_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016061001_en</a>

<b>2016EUCOP22G</b>	European Commission. (2016). Speaking points by Climate Action and Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete on the ratification of the Paris agreement. (Speech No. 16/3263). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_16_3263">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_16_3263</a>
<b>2016EUCOP22H</b>	European Commission. (2016). Ministers approve EU ratification of Paris Agreement. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016093001_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016093001_en</a>
<b>2016EUCOP22I</b>	European Commission. (2016). Paris Agreement to enter into force as EU agrees ratification. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016100401_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016100401_en</a>
<b>2016EUCOP22J</b>	European Commission. (2016). Foreign Affairs Council calls for continuing European climate diplomacy following landmark Paris deal. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016021601_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016021601_en</a>
<b>2016EUCOP22K</b>	European Commission. (2016). EU Climate Action and Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete on the follow-up to COP21 at the public session of the Environment Council. (Speech No. 16/586). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_16_586">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_16_586</a>
<b>2016EUCOP22L</b>	European Commission. (2016). Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement – Statement by Miguel Arias Cañete, Commissioner for Climate Action & Energy, European Commission. (Statement). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016111601_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016111601_en</a>
<b>2016EUCOP22M</b>	European Commission. (2016). Commission welcomes entry into force of Paris Agreement ahead of UN climate conference in Marrakech. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016110401_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2016110401_en</a>
<b>2017EUCOP23A</b>	European Commission. (2017). COP23: Cities and local governments for climate action. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/cop23-cities-and-local-governments-climate-action_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/cop23-cities-and-local-governments-climate-action_en</a>
<b>2017EUCOP23B</b>	European Commission. (2017). Statement at the high-level segment of COP23/CMP13/CMA1.2 delivered by Siim Kiisler, Minister for the Environment of Estonia and Miguel Arias Cañete on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/11/16/joint-statement-of-the-estonian-presidency-and-the-european-commission-on-behalf-of-the-eu-at-cop23-un-climate-change-conference/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/11/16/joint-statement-of-the-estonian-presidency-and-the-european-commission-on-behalf-of-the-eu-at-cop23-un-climate-change-conference/</a>
<b>2017EUCOP23C</b>	European Commission. (2017). EU Welcomes steady progress on Paris Agreement implementation at UN climate talks. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/eu-welcomes-steady-progress-paris-agreement-implementation-un-climate-talks_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/eu-welcomes-steady-progress-paris-agreement-implementation-un-climate-talks_en</a>
<b>2017EUCOP23D</b>	European Commission. (2017). EU seeks concrete steps forward for implementing Paris Agreement at UN climate talks. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/eu-seeks-concrete-steps-forward-implementing-paris-agreement-un-climate-talks_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/eu-seeks-concrete-steps-forward-implementing-paris-agreement-un-climate-talks_en</a>
<b>2017EUCOP23E</b>	European Commission. (2017). EU to conclude ratification for second Kyoto Protocol commitment period by end of this year. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/eu-conclude-ratification-second-kyoto-protocol-commitment-period-end-year_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/eu-conclude-ratification-second-kyoto-protocol-commitment-period-end-year_en</a>
<b>2017EUCOP23F</b>	European Commission. (2017). UN climate conference makes progress on Paris Agreement implementation. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/un-climate-conference-makes-progress-paris-agreement-implementation_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/un-climate-conference-makes-progress-paris-agreement-implementation_en</a>
<b>2018EUCOP24A</b>	European Commission. (2018). COP24: EU and allies in breakthrough agreement to step up ambition. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/cop24-eu-and-allies-breakthrough-agreement-step-ambition_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/cop24-eu-and-allies-breakthrough-agreement-step-ambition_en</a>
<b>2018EUCOP24B</b>	European Commission. (2018). COP24 side event: European strategic vision for long-term greenhouse gas emissions reduction. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/cop24-side-event-european-strategic-vision-long-term-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduction_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/cop24-side-event-european-strategic-vision-long-term-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduction_en</a>
<b>2018EUCOP24C</b>	European Commission. (2018). Vice-President Šefčovič at the COP24 – EU Leaders Summit. (Speech No. 18/6646). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_18_6646">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_18_6646</a>
<b>2018EUCOP24D</b>	European Commission. (2018). Statement at the high-level segment delivered by Elisabeth Köstinger and Miguel Arias Cañete on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. (Speech No. 18/4447). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_18_4447">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_18_4447</a>
<b>2019EUCOP25A</b>	European Commission. (2019). Closing statement by the Finnish Presidency and the European Commission on behalf of the EU and its Member States at COP25. (Speech No. 19/6779). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_19_6779">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_19_6779</a>

<b>2019EUCOP25B</b>	UNFCCC. (2019). Statement on behalf of the European Union and its Member States: Opening Plenary of the Ministerial Segment of COP25. Madrid, 10 December 2019. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2019EUCOP25C</b>	Council of the European Union. (2019). Speech by President Charles Michel at the UN climate conference COP25. (Speech No. 781/19). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/12/02/speech-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-un-climate-conference-cop25/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/12/02/speech-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-un-climate-conference-cop25/</a>
<b>2019EUCOP25D</b>	Council of the European Union. (2019). Speech by President Donald Tusk at the meeting on the action for the Amazon. (Speech No. 601/19). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/nl/press/press-releases/2019/09/23/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-meeting-on-the-action-for-the-amazon/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/nl/press/press-releases/2019/09/23/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-meeting-on-the-action-for-the-amazon/</a>
<b>2019EUCOP25E</b>	Council of the European Union. (2019). Speech by President Donald Tusk at the UN Climate Action Summit. (Speech No. 603/19). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/09/23/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-un-climate-action-summit/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/09/23/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-un-climate-action-summit/</a>
<b>2019EUCOP25F</b>	European Commission. (2019). Parties to the Paris Agreement meet in Bonn to move forward on implementation. (Press release). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/parties-paris-agreement-meet-bonn-move-forward-implementation-0_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/parties-paris-agreement-meet-bonn-move-forward-implementation-0_en</a>
<b>China</b>	<b>Multilateral Fora (132 items in total)</b>
<b>1991CNINC2A</b>	United Nations. (1991). Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind: China and Ghana*: draft resolution. (Resolution No. A/C.2/46/L.80). Retrieved from: *On behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of 77.
<b>1993CNCOP1A</b>	United Nations. (1993). Implementation of Decisions and recommendations of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Colombia* and China: draft resolution. (Resolution No. A/C.2/48/L.38). Retrieved from: *On behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of 77.
<b>1993CNCOP1B</b>	United Nations. (1993). Matters relating to Arrangements for the Financial Mechanism and for Technical and Financial Support to Developing country Parties: Group of 77 and China: draft decision. (Report No. A/AC.237/L.18). Retrieved from:
<b>1995CNCOP1A</b>	UNFCCC. (1995). Implementation of the Berlin Mandate, Comments from Parties, Note by the secretariat. Addendum. (Report No. FCCC/AGBM/1995/MISC.1/Add.3). Retrieved from:
<b>1996CNCOP2A</b>	Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (1996). Highlights of the FCCC COP-2 Wednesday, 17 July 1996. <i>International Institute for Sustainable Development</i> , 12 (36). Retrieved from: <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/">https://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/</a>
<b>1998CNCOP4A</b>	UNFCCC. (1998). Second review of the adequacy of Article 4.2(a) and (b). Compilation of submission by Parties. Note by the Secretariat. (Report No. FCCC/CP/1998/Misc.6). Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>1999CNCOP5A</b>	Group of 77 and China. (1999). Statement by Ms. Alison Drayton, head of delegation of Guyana, on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, at the Fifth Session of the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (Speech No. 110299b). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.g77.org/Speeches/110299b.html">www.g77.org/Speeches/110299b.html</a>
<b>1999CNCOP5B</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (1999). Statement by Mr. Wang Zhongyu, State Councillor: at the Special session of the United Nations General Assembly on the Review and Appraisal of the 5-Year Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/smhwj/wangnian/fy00/t29039.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/smhwj/wangnian/fy00/t29039.htm</a>
<b>2000CNCOP6A</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2000). Statement by Ambassador Shen Guofang at the 55 <sup>th</sup> GA Session: Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/smhwj/wangnian/fy00/t29036.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/smhwj/wangnian/fy00/t29036.htm</a>
<b>2000CNCOP6B</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2000). Statement by H.E. Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China, at the Millenium Summit of the United Nations. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/smhwj/wangnian/fy00/t29110.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/smhwj/wangnian/fy00/t29110.htm</a>
<b>2001CNCOP6A</b>	UNFCCC. (2001). Mechanisms Pursuant to Articles 6, 12, and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol: Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol – Modalities and Procedures for a clean development mechanism. Submissions

	from Parties. Note by the secretariat. (Report No. FCCC/CP/2000/MISC.2). Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2001CNCOP7A</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2001). Remarks by Ambassador Bagher Asadi, Chairman of the Group of 77 (Islamic Republic of Iran), at the Plenary Meeting of the COP-7 of the UNFCCC on Agenda Item 4: Input to World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). (Speech No. 110201). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.g77.org/Speeches/110201.htm">www.g77.org/Speeches/110201.htm</a>
<b>2001CNCOP7B</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2001). Statement by Ambassador Bagher Asadi, Chairman of the Group of 77 (Islamic Republic of Iran), at the closing session of the COP-7, UNFCCC. (Speech No. 111001). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.g77.org/Speeches/111001.htm">www.g77.org/Speeches/111001.htm</a>
<b>2001CNCOP7C</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2001). Statement by Her Excellency Dr. Massoumeh Ebtekar, Vice-President and Head of the Department of Environment (Islamic Republic of Iran), on behalf of the Group of 77, High-level Segment, COP-7, UNFCCC. (Speech No. 110701). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.g77.org/Speeches/110701.htm">www.g77.org/Speeches/110701.htm</a>
<b>2001CNCOP7D</b>	UNFCCC. (2001). Implementation of the Buenos Aires plan of action – Statements made in connection with the approval of The Bonn Agreements on the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (decision 5/CP.6). Note by the secretariat. (Report No. FCCC/CP/2001/Misc.4). Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2001CNCOP7E</b>	People's Republic of China. (2001). China willing to make efforts to tackle Climate Change: FM Spokeswomen. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgthsm/t85529.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgthsm/t85529.htm</a>
<b>2001CNCOP7F</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2001). Statement by Ambassador Wang Yingfan, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations on the Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit at the 56 <sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly (19/11/01). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85722.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85722.htm</a>
<b>2001CNCOP7G</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2001). Statement by Ambassador Shen Guofang at the High-level Segment of the Ninth Session of CSD. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/smhwi/wangnian/fy01/t29356.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/smhwi/wangnian/fy01/t29356.htm</a>
<b>2001CNCOP7H</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2001). Statement by Ambassador Shen Guofang, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, in the General Debate at the Second Committee of the 56 <sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly (01/10/01). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85703.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85703.htm</a>
<b>2001CNCOP7I</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2001). Statement by Ambassador Shen Guofang, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, on Item 98 (a): Environment and Sustainable Development: Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 at the 56 <sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t26927.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t26927.htm</a>
<b>2001CNCOP7J</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2001). Spokesperson on the Sixth Session of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties (2001/11/29). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/gjs_665170/gjzzyhy_665174/2594_665176/2603_665194/t15256.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/gjs_665170/gjzzyhy_665174/2594_665176/2603_665194/t15256.shtml</a>
<b>2002CNCOP8A</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2002). Statement by Minister Counselor Marisol Black, Director for International Economic Affairs, Ministry of External Relations on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, on agenda item 87c: Environment and sustainable development: Protection of global climate for future generations of mankind. (Speech No. 111402). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.g77.org/Speeches/111402.htm">www.g77.org/Speeches/111402.htm</a>
<b>2002CNCOP8B</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2002). China Approves Kyoto Protocol. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgjbic/t85571.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgjbic/t85571.htm</a>
<b>2002CNCOP8C</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2002). Speech by Ambassador Wang Yingfan at the Joint Debate of the 57 <sup>th</sup> General Assembly on Agenda: Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization and implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (10/04/02). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85742.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85742.htm</a>
<b>2002CNCOP8D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2002). Speech by Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan at 9 <sup>th</sup> ARF Foreign Ministers' Meeting (06/08/2002). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85733.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85733.htm</a>

<b>2002CNCOP8E</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2002). Speech by H.E. Zhu Rongji, Premier of the State Council of The People's Republic of China at Round Table of World Summit on Sustainable Development (03/09/2002). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85738.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85738.htm</a>
<b>2002CNCOP8F</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2002). Statement by H.E. Mr. Zhu Rongji Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (09/05/2002). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85734.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85734.htm</a>
<b>2002CNCOP8G</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2002). Statement by Ms. Yang Jianmin of the Chinese Delegation "Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind" at the Second Committee of the 57 <sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly (11/14/02). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgjbtc/t85573.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgjbtc/t85573.htm</a>
<b>2002CNCOP8H</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2002). Statement by Ms. Zhang Xiao'an, Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations on "Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Program for the further Implementation of Agenda 21" at the Second Committee of the 57 <sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t29362.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t29362.htm</a>
<b>2002CNCOP8I</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2002). Statement by H.E. Ambassador Wang Yingfan, Permanent Representative of China to the UN, at the 26 <sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers of G77 (09/20/02). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85737.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85737.htm</a>
<b>2002CNCOP8J</b>	China.org (2002). China Ratifies Kyoto Protocol [News Article]. Retrieved from: <a ,5%20percent%20below%201990%20levels.&amp;text='The%20text%20of%20the%20protocol,it%20on%20May%2029%2C%201998"' href="http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/41661.htm#:~:text=">http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/41661.htm#:~:text=",5%20percent%20below%201990%20levels.&amp;text=The%20text%20of%20the%20protocol,it%20on%20May%2029%2C%201998</a>
<b>2003CNCOP9A</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2003). Statement by H.E. MR. M'Hamed El Morabit, secretary of State for the Environment, on behalf of the G77 and China, During the discussion of the Second Round Table of the High Level Segment of COP9 on Climate Change (Milan, 1-12 December 2003). (Speech No. 121003b) Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.g77.org/Speeches/121003b.htm">www.g77.org/Speeches/121003b.htm</a>
<b>2003CNCOP9B</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2003). Statement by H.E. Mr. Mohamed El Yazghi, Minister of Territory Development, Water and Environment, on behalf of the G-77 and China, during the discussion of the First, Second and Third Round Tables of the High Level Segment of COP9 on Climate Change (Milan, 1-12 December 2003). (Speech No. 121003). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.g77.org/Speeches/121003.htm">www.g77.org/Speeches/121003.htm</a>
<b>2003CNCOP9C</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2003). Statement by Ms. Wang Ling of the Chinese Delegation of the Second Committee of the 58 <sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly on Item 94(f) and 94(a). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t40035.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t40035.htm</a>
<b>2003CNCOP9D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2003). Statement by Ambassador Wang Guangya at 58 <sup>th</sup> Session of General Assembly on Secretary-General's Reports on Work of the Organization and Implementation of the Millennium Declaration (10/07/2003). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85762.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85762.htm</a>
<b>2003CNCOP9E</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2003). Statement by Ambassador Zhang Yishan, Deputy Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and Head of the Chinese Delegation, at the Eleventh Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t29355.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t29355.htm</a>
<b>2003CNCOP9F</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2003). Statement by Chinese Permanent Representative Wang Guangya at the 58 <sup>th</sup> General Assembly Session on Reform of the United Nations. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85766.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qqwt/t85766.htm</a>
<b>2003CNCOP9G</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2003). Statement by Mr. Liu Hongyang, Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations, at the Second Committee of the 58 <sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly on Agenda item 95 and item 94(d). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t40036.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t40036.htm</a>
<b>2004CNCOP10A</b>	United Nations. (2004). Qatar:* draft resolution: Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind. (Resolution No. A/C.2/59/L.13). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a>



	*On behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of 77 and China
<b>2004CNCOP10B</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2004). Statement by Mr. Liu Jiang, Vice Chairman of National Development and Reform Commission of China, at the High-level Segment of the 12 session of the Commission on Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t93898.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t93898.htm</a>
<b>2004CNCOP10C</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2004). Comments by the Chinese Delegation on the Issue of Sanitation at CSD12. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t91996.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t91996.htm</a>
<b>2004CNCOP10D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2004). Statement by Ambassador Zhang Yishan, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the twelfth session of the Commission on Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t92000.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t92000.htm</a>
<b>2004CNCOP10E</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2004). Briefing by Ambassador Zhang Yishan, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations on the United Nations Asia-Pacific Leadership Forum: Sustainable Development for Cities at the twelfth session of the Commission on Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t85990.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t85990.htm</a>
<b>2004CNCOP10F</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2004). Comments by the Chinese Delegation on the Issue of Water at CSD12. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t87420.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t87420.htm</a>
<b>2004CNCOP10G</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2004). Statement by Ambassador Shen Guofang at the 12 <sup>th</sup> Session of the High-Level Committee on the Review of technical Cooperation among Developing Countries. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qgwt/t85694.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/gjhyfy/qgwt/t85694.htm</a>
<b>2004CNCOP10H</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2004). Statement by Ambassador Zhang Yishan, at 2 <sup>nd</sup> Committee of UNGA 59 <sup>th</sup> Session on Agenda Item 85: Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t165961.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t165961.htm</a>
<b>2005CNCOP11A</b>	United Nations. (2005). Jamaica:* draft resolution: Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind. (Resolution No. A/C.2/60/L.23). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a> *On behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of 77 and China
<b>2005CNCOP11B</b>	United Nations. (2005). Jamaica:* revised draft resolution: Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind. (Resolution No. A/C.2/60/L.23/Rev.1). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/">https://digitallibrary.un.org/</a> *On behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of 77 and China
<b>2005CNCOP11C</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2005). Statement by Chinese Deputy Permanent Representative Ambassador Zhang Yishan at the Intergovernmental Preparatory Meeting for the CSD13 on Sanitation. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t185500.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t185500.htm</a>
<b>2005CNCOP11D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2005). Statement by Mr. Wang Guangtao, Minister of Construction of China, at the High-level Segment of the 13 <sup>th</sup> session of the Commission on Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t192765.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t192765.htm</a>
<b>2005CNCOP11E</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2005). Statement by Deputy Permanent Representative Ambassador Zhang Yishan at the Intergovernmental Preparatory Meeting for the CSD13 on Water. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t185499.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t185499.htm</a>
<b>2005CNCOP11F</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2005). Statement by Wang Qi, Adviser of the Chinese Delegation at the 60 <sup>th</sup> Session of the UNGA on Item 52: Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t219642.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t219642.htm</a>
<b>2006CNCOP12A</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2006). Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by Mr. Marthinus van Schalkwyk, Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism of the Republic of South Africa, at the

	opening of the high level segment of COP 12 and COP/MOP2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Nairobi, 15 November 2006). (Speech No. 111506). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.g77.org/Speeches/111506.html">www.g77.org/Speeches/111506.html</a>
<b>2006CNCOP12B</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2006). Statement by Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Liu Zhenmin on Item 53 "Sustainable Development" of 61 <sup>st</sup> UNGA Session. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t277618.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t277618.htm</a>
<b>2006CNCOP12C</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2006). Statement by Mr. Du Ying, Head of the Chinese Delegation at the Ministerial Dialogue with Business Leaders on the occasion of the High-level Segment of the CSD-14. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t251564.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t251564.htm</a>
<b>2006CNCOP12D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2006). Statement by Mr. Du Ying, Head of the Chinese Delegation at the Ministerial Interactive Dialogue at CSD 14. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t251565.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t251565.htm</a>
<b>2006CNCOP12E</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2006). Statement by Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the UN Ambassador Zhang Yishan at 14 <sup>th</sup> Session of Commission on Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t250274.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t250274.htm</a>
<b>2007CNCOP13A</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2007). Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations at the Joint High Level Segment of the Thirteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Third session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Bali, Indonesia, 12 December 2007). (Speech No. 071212). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=071212">www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=071212</a>
<b>2007CNCOP13B</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2007). Statement by Ambassador Attiya Mahmood of Pakistan on behalf of G77 & China at the opening session of 13 <sup>th</sup> Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Bali, Indonesia, 3 December 2007). (Speech No. 071203). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=071203">www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=071203</a>
<b>2007CNCOP13C</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2007). Statement by Mr. LIU Zhiyong, Chinese Delegate, at the 62 <sup>nd</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly, on Agenda Item 54 "Sustainable Development". Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t376575.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t376575.htm</a>
<b>2008CNCOP14A</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2008). Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by H.E. Amb. Dr. John W. Ashe, Permanent representative of Antigua and Barbuda to the United Nations, at the Joint High-level Segment of the UNFCCC COP/14/CMP4 (Poznan, Poland, 11 December 2008). (Speech No. 081211). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=081211">www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=081211</a>
<b>2008CNCOP14B</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2008). Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by Ambassador Diann Black-Layne, Antigua and Barbuda, at the opening plenary of the UNFCCC COP14/COP MOP4 (Poznan, Poland, 1 December 2008). (Speech No. 081201). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=081201d">www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=081201d</a>
<b>2008CNCOP14C</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2008). Statement by Ms. Bai Yongjie, Counselor of the Chinese Mission to the UN at the Roundtable on "Environmental Sustainability" of the UN High-level Event on Millennium Development Goals. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t515680.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t515680.htm</a>
<b>2008CNCOP14D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2008). Statement by Dr. Liu Yuyin, the Chinese Delegate, on Agenda Item 49: "Sustainable Development" at the Second Committee of the 63 <sup>rd</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t519882.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t519882.htm</a>
<b>2009CNCOP15A</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2009). China's position and comment on COP15. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cedk/eng/zd/gx/t646842.htm">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cedk/eng/zd/gx/t646842.htm</a>
<b>2009CNCOP15B</b>	Hu Jintao. (2010). COP 15 – International calls for Action. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences/copenhagen-climate-change-conference-december-2009/statements-and-resources/International-calls-for-action">https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences/copenhagen-climate-change-conference-december-2009/statements-and-resources/International-calls-for-action</a>

<b>2009CNCOP15C</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2009). China's Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t568959.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t568959.htm</a>
<b>2009CNCOP15D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2009). President Hu Jintao's Speech at the Opening Plenary Session of the United Nations Summit on Climate Change "Join Hands to Address Climate Challenge". Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t606111.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t606111.htm</a>
<b>2009CNCOP15E</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2009). Remarks on Foreign Policy and Climate Change by Ambassador Luo Linquan at Pireaus University "China's Diplomacy: for strong nation and Harmonious World". Retrieved from: <a href="http://gr.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t632973.htm">gr.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t632973.htm</a>
<b>2009CNCOP15F</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2009). Statement by Ambassador ZHANG Yesui at the UN General Assembly Informal Meeting on Climate Change. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t628154.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t628154.htm</a>
<b>2009CNCOP15G</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2009). Statement by Counsellor Li Kexin at the 63 <sup>rd</sup> GA Informal Thematic Debate on the Question of Energy. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t568396.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t568396.htm</a>
<b>2009CNCOP15H</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2009). Statement by Dr. Liu Yuyin, Chinese Delegate, on Sustainable Development at the Second Committee of the 64 <sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t624473.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t624473.htm</a>
<b>2009CNCOP15I</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2009). Verdant Mountains cannot stop water flowing; eastward the river keeps on going – Premier Wen Jiabao at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t648773.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t648773.htm</a>
<b>2010CNCOP15B</b>	Department of Climate Change, National Development & Reform Commission of China. (2010). Letters from H.E. Mr. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the Government of China to H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations and H.E. Mr. Lars Lokke Rasmussen, Prime Minister of Denmark. (Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a> ).
<b>2010CNCOP16A</b>	People's Republic of China. (2010). Speech at the High Level Segment of COP16&CMP6 Delivered by Vice Chairman Xie Zhenhua National Development and Reform Commission, P.R.China, Cancun, Mexico, Dec.8 <sup>th</sup> , 2010. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1392191/FULLTEXT02.pdf">http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1392191/FULLTEXT02.pdf</a>
<b>2010CNCOP16B</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2010). Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by H.E. Mr. Abdulrahman Fadel Al-Eryani, head of delegation of the Republic of Yemen, at the Joint High-level segment of the Sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties of the Climate Change Convention and the Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties serving as a Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP16/CMP6) (Cancun, Mexico, 7 December 2010). Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2010CNCOP16C</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2010). Speech by Dr. Zheng Guoguang, Administrator of the China Meteorological Administration at the Theme Event on "China Green and Future". Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgthsm/t707636.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgthsm/t707636.htm</a>
<b>2010CNCOP16D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2010). Speech by H.E. Ambassador He Yafei at the Theme Event on "China, Green and Future". Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgthsm/t707637.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgthsm/t707637.htm</a>
<b>2010CNCOP16E</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2010). Statement by Ms. Dong Zhihua, Counselor of the Permanent Mission of China at the High-level Meeting on Small Island Developing States. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t756997.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t756997.htm</a>
<b>2010CNCOP16F</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2010). Statement by Mr. Wang Qun of the Chinese Delegation at the 2010 ECOSOC Substantive Session under Item 13 (a) Sustainable Development and (e) Environment. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t719260.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t719260.htm</a>
<b>2010CNCOP16G</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2010). Statement by H.E. Ambassador He Yafei at the Geneva Dialogue on Climate Finance. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgthsm/t739232.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgthsm/t739232.htm</a>

<b>2011CNCOP17A</b>	UNFCCC. (2011). Statement of Minister Xie Zhenhua (pronounced Shieh Gen-Hwa) of China. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2011CNCOP17B</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2011). Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by H.E. Ambassador Mr. Alberto Pedro D' Alotto, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, at the Joint High-level Segment of the Seventeenth session of the Conference of the Parties of the Climate Change Convention and the Seventeenth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP 17/CMP 7) (Durban, South Africa, 6 December 2011). Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2011CNCOP17C</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2011). Statement by H.E. Ambassador Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, at Security Council's Open Debate on Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Impact of Climate Change. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t849980.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t849980.htm</a>
<b>2011CNCOP17D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2011). Statement by H.E. Ambassador Wang Min, DPR of the People's Republic of China to the UN, at the 2 <sup>nd</sup> Inter-Sessional Meeting of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t887892.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t887892.htm</a>
<b>2011CNCOP17E</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2011). Statement by Ms. Dong Zhihua, Counselor of the Chinese Delegation at the Second Committee of the 55 <sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t873260.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t873260.htm</a>
<b>2011CNCOP17F</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2011). National Submission of the People's Republic of China on the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t877006.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t877006.htm</a>
<b>2011CNCOP17G</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2011). Statement by Mr. Wang Qun, Chinese Delegate at the GA interactive dialogue on Harmony with Nature under panel 'Ways to Promote a Holistic Approach to Sustainable Development in Harmony with Nature'. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t818199.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t818199.htm</a>
<b>2011CNCOP17H</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2011). Speech by Mr. Zhu Lieke, Vice Minister of State Forestry Administration of China at the High-Level Segment of UNFF9. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t792268.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t792268.htm</a>
<b>2012CNCOP18A</b>	People's Republic of China. (2012). Statement by China on behalf of Brazil, India, South Africa and China at COP18, 26 November 2012, Doha, Qatar. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2012CNCOP18B</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2012). Statement on behalf of the G77 and China at the opening plenary of the 18 <sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC Doha, Qatar, 26 November 2012. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2012CNCOP18C</b>	UNFCCC. (2012). Joint* Opening Statement on the opening Plenary session of 18 <sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a> *On behalf of: Argentina, Philippines, India, China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Dominica, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>2012CNCOP18D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2012). Statement by H.E. Ambassador Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations at the General Debate of the Second Committee of the 67 <sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t977684.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t977684.htm</a>
<b>2012CNCOP18E</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2012). Statement by Counselor Dong Zhihua of the Chinese Delegation at the Second Committee of the 67 <sup>th</sup> Session of the UNGA on Agenda Item 20: Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t988064.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t988064.htm</a>
<b>2012CNCOP18F</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2012). Statement by Mr. Wang Qun of the Chinese Delegation at the General Segment of the 2012 Substantive Session of the Economic and Social Council under Agenda Item 13(a) "Sustainable Development". Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t955487.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t955487.htm</a>
<b>2013CNCOP19A</b>	UNFCCC. (2013). China's Submission on Long-term Finance. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>

<b>2013CNCOP19B</b>	UNFCCC. (2013). Speech on the High Level Segment of Warsaw Climate Change Conference by H.E. Xie Zhenhua, Head of Delegation, Vice Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission, People's Republic of China. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2013CNCOP19C</b>	UNFCCC. (2013). Draft Decision on Long Term Financing under the Convention. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2013CNCOP19D</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2013). Proposal by the G77 and China on a draft decision on agenda item 3 of COP (Forum and work programme on the impact of the implementation of response measures), Warsaw, 19TH Conference of the Parties. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2013CNCOP19E</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2013). Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by Minister for Women, Social Welfare and Poverty Alleviation, Dr. Jiko Luveni, UNFCCC High-level segment of the 19 <sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties and 9 <sup>th</sup> session of Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Poland, Warsaw, 19 November, 2013. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2013CNCOP19F</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2013). Statement by Ambassador Wang Min at the First Meeting of the Sustainable Development Goals Open Working Group. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1021536.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1021536.htm</a>
<b>2013CNCOP19G</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2013). Statement by Ambassador Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations at the 4 <sup>th</sup> Meeting of SDGs OWG. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1051606.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1051606.htm</a>
<b>2013CNCOP19H</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2013). Statement by Ambassador Wang Min of the Chinese Delegation on the statement made by the Administrator of UNDP at the Second Regular Session of the Executive Board of UNDP, UNDFPA and UNOPS. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1075245.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1075245.htm</a>
<b>2014CNCOP20A</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2014). Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by Ambassador Rene Orellana, Chair of the Group of 77 and China at the Closing Plenary of the 20 <sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties (COP20) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Lima, Peru, 13 December, 2014. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2014CNCOP20B</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2014). Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by Ambassador Rene Orellana, Chair of the Group of 77 and China at the Opening Plenary of the 20 <sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties (COP20) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Lima, Peru, 1 December, 2014. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2014CNCOP20C</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2014). Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by ambassador Rene Orellana, Chair of the Group of 77 and China, at the Closing Plenary of the 41 <sup>st</sup> Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA41), Lima, Peru, 6 December, 2014. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2014CNCOP20D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2014). Statement by the Troika of China, Indonesia and Kazakhstan at the Ninth Meeting of the Sustainable Development Goals Open Working Group. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1135968.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1135968.htm</a>
<b>2014CNCOP20E</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2014). Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations at the General Debate of the High Level Segment of ECOSOC. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1172666.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1172666.htm</a>
<b>2014CNCOP20F</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2014). Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations at the Ministerial Dialogue of the High Level Political Forum On Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1172306.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1172306.htm</a>
<b>2015CNCOP21A</b>	UNFCCC. (2015). Work together to build a Win-Win, Equitable and Balanced Governance Mechanism on Climate Change. Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China, at the Opening Ceremony of the Paris Conference on Climate Change. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>

<b>2015CNCOP21B</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2015). Statement by South Africa on behalf of the Group of 77 and China – Opening of the High-level Segment of COP21/CMP11 – Monday, 7 December 2015, Paris. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2015CNCOP21C</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2015). Li Keqiang Announces Chinese Government will Submit intended Nationally Determined Contributions on Climate Change. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/xwlb_664406/t1278280.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/xwlb_664406/t1278280.shtml</a>
<b>2016CNCOP22A</b>	Xie Zhenhua. (2016). Implementing the Paris Agreement, Consolidating mutual Trust, Making greater contribution to Global Green and Low-carbon Development – Statement by Mr. Xie Zhenhua, Special Representative on Climate Change Affairs of China at the HLS of Marrakech Conference on Climate Change. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2017CNCOP23A</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2017). Statement of the Group of 77 and China delivered by H.E. Maria Fernanda Espinosa, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility of Ecuador, and Chair of the G77 and China at the High level segment of COP 23 (Bonn, 16 <sup>th</sup> November 2017). Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2017CNCOP23B</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2017). Statement on behalf of the G77 and China by Mr. Walter Schuldt, Deputy Special Representative of the Chair of the G77 and China for Climate Change, at the Closing Plenary of COP23, CMP13 and CMA1-2 (Bonn, Germany, 17 November 2017). Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2017CNCOP23C</b>	Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN. (2017). Speech delivered by Ambassador H.E. Mr. Liu Jieyi on High Level Event entitled Climate Change and the Sustainable Development Agenda. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1448377.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1448377.htm</a>
<b>2017CNCOP23D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN. (2017). Statement by Ambassador Wu Haitao at the High-level Symposium of Global Energy Interconnection: advancing the Sustainable Development Goals. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1507007.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1507007.htm</a>
<b>2017CNCOP23E</b>	Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN. (2017). Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi at the Ministerial Meeting of the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1478945.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1478945.htm</a>
<b>2017CNCOP23F</b>	Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN. (2017). Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi During the ECOSOC Special Session on ‘Innovations in Infrastructure Development and Promoting Sustainable Industrialization’ on behalf of the BRICS Group. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1466764.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1466764.htm</a>
<b>2018CNCOP24A</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2018). Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by ambassador Wael Aboulmagd, Chair of the G77 and China for the Climate Change Process, at the Joint Opening Plenary of the 24 <sup>th</sup> Session of the COP to the UNFCCC (COP24); The 14 <sup>th</sup> Session of the CMP; and the third part of the 1 <sup>st</sup> Session of the CMA, Katowice Poland, 2018. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2018CNCOP24B</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2018). Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by Ambassador Wael Aboulmagd, Chair of the G77 and China for the Climate Change process, at the Joint Closing Plenary of APA 1-5, SBI and SBSTA 48, May 10, 2019, Bonn. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2018CNCOP24C</b>	Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN. (2018). Statement by Ambassador MA Zhaoxu at the opening briefing of the Security Council on the maintenance of international peace and security: root causes of conflict – the role of natural resources. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/thematicissues/other_thematicissues/t1604985.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/thematicissues/other_thematicissues/t1604985.htm</a>
<b>2018CNCOP24D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN. (2018). Statement by Ambassador Ma Zhaoxu at the Ministerial Meeting of the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1578839.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1578839.htm</a>
<b>2018CNCOP24E</b>	Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN. (2018). Statement by Ambassador Ma Zhaoxu at Security Council debate on Climate-Related Security Risks. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/thematicissues/other_thematicissues/t1576729.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/thematicissues/other_thematicissues/t1576729.htm</a>

<b>2019CNCOP25A</b>	People's Republic of China. (2019). Statement by China on behalf of BASIC at the Opening Plenary of COP25. Retrieved from:
<b>2019CNCOP25B</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2019). G77 and China Statement for the Opening of the COP25 High Level Segment Delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Palestine Dr. Riad Al-Malki. Retrieved from:
<b>2019CNCOP25C</b>	Group of 77 and China. (2019). Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by H.E. Minister Adalah Atira, Minister of Environment Quality Authority of State of Palestine on behalf of the G77 and China, at the Joint Opening Plenary of COP25, CMP15, CMA2, Madrid, Spain. Retrieved From:
<b>2019CNCOP25D</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2019). Statement by Mr. Xu Zhongsheng, Counselor of the Chinese Delegation at the 18 <sup>th</sup> Plenary of the 74 <sup>th</sup> General Assembly on Agenda Item 64 (a). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1711306.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/sfz/t1711306.htm</a>
<b>EU-China</b>	<b>Bilateral (75 items in total)</b>
<b>1996EUCNA</b>	European Commission. (1996). EU-China Energy Working Group approved. [Press release No. 96/1242]. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_96_1242">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_96_1242</a>
<b>1998EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (1998). Joint-Statement 1 <sup>st</sup> EU-China Summit. On file with author.
<b>1999EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (1999). Joint-Statement 2 <sup>nd</sup> EU-China Summit. On file with author.
<b>2000EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2000). Joint-Statement 3 <sup>rd</sup> EU-China Summit. On file with author.
<b>2001EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2001). Joint-Statement 4 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_01_312">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_01_312</a>
<b>2002EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2002). Joint-Statement 5 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/72250.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/72250.pdf</a>
<b>2003EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2003). Joint-Statement 6 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/77802.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/77802.pdf</a>
<b>2003EUCNB</b>	EU-China. (2003). Minutes of the Meeting between Mrs. Margot Wallström (Commissioner for Environment, European Commission) and Mr. Xie Zhenhua (Minister, State Environmental Protection Administration, China): Initiation of the EU-China Dialogue on Environmental Policy at Ministerial level. On file with author.
<b>2004EUCNA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2004). Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing Meets with Mr. Javier Solana. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t80278.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t80278.shtml</a>
<b>2004EUCNB</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2004). Hu Jintao Meets with President of the European Commission. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t85413.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t85413.shtml</a>
<b>2004EUCNC</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2004). Opening New Phases of China-EU Friendly Cooperation: Li Zhaoxing Talks about the Achievements of Premier Wen Jiabao's Visit to Europe. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t174793.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t174793.shtml</a>
<b>2004EUCND</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2004). Premier Wen Jiabao Meets with Javier Solana. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t80256.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t80256.shtml</a>
<b>2004EUCNE</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2004). Premier Wen Jiabao Meets with President of EU Commission Jose Manuel Barroso and Representative of Experts to Attend China-EU Think Tank Roundtable Conference. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t173847.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t173847.shtml</a>
<b>2004EUCNF</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2004). Premier Wen Jiabo Holds Talks with President Romano Prodi of the European Commission. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t84655.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t84655.shtml</a>

<b>2004EUCNG</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2004). State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan Meets with Mr. Solana. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t80279.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t80279.shtml</a>
<b>2004EUCNH</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2004). Wen Jiabao holds talks with the President of the European Commission. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t97483.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t97483.shtml</a>
<b>2004EUCNI</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2004). Wen Jiabao: Arm Sales Embargo against China is a Legacy of the Cold War. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t173843.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t173843.shtml</a>
<b>2004EUCNJ</b>	EU-China. (2004). Joint-Statement 7 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. (Report No. 15065/04). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/82998.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/82998.pdf</a>
<b>2004EUCNK</b>	European Commission. (2004). Loyola de Palacio Vice-President of the European Commission, Commissioner for Transport and energy: Energy issues in the European Union and the importance of promoting China-EU energy cooperation: EU-China Energy Conference on EU-China Energy relations, Brussels, 25 May, 2004. (Speech No. 04/267). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_04_267">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_04_267</a>
<b>2005EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2005). Joint-Statement 8 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. (Report No. 12642/06). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/90951.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/90951.pdf</a>
<b>2005EUCNB</b>	EU-China. (2005). EU and China Partnership on Climate Change. (Memo No. 05/298). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/international/cooperation/china/docs/joint_declaration_ch_eu_en.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/international/cooperation/china/docs/joint_declaration_ch_eu_en.pdf</a>
<b>2005EUCNC</b>	EU-China. (2005). EU-China Dialogue on Energy and Transport Strategies: Memorandum of Understanding. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2005_mou_eu_china_energy_transport_strategy_s.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2005_mou_eu_china_energy_transport_strategy_s.pdf</a>
<b>2005EUCND</b>	European Commission. (2005). Stavros Dimas Member of the European Commission, Responsible for Environment Renewable Energy Policy in the European Union, The Beijing International Renewable Energy Conference, Beijing, 7 November 2005. (Speech No. 05/665). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_665">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_665</a>
<b>2005EUCNE</b>	European Commission. (2005). Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood policy: The EU, China and the Quest for a Multilateral world, Brussels, 04 July 2005. (Speech No. 05/414). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_414">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_414</a>
<b>2005EUCNF</b>	European Commission. (2005). José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission – The EU and China: painting a brighter future together, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 15 July 2005. (Speech No. 05/444). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_444">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_444</a>
<b>2005EUCNG</b>	European Commission. (2005). Peter Mandelson, European Commissioner for Trade – The EU and China: Partnership and Responsibility in the Global Economy, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, 24 February 2005. (Speech No. 05/105). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_105">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_105</a>
<b>2005EUCNH</b>	EU-China. (2005). Minutes of the Meeting between Mr. Stavros Dimas (Commissioner for Environment, European Commission) and Mr. Xie Zhenhua (Minister, State Environmental Protection Administration, China): Policy Progress and Strengthening Mechanism of Dialogue. On file with author
<b>2006EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2006). Joint-Statement 9 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. (Report No. 12642/06). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/90951.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/90951.pdf</a>
<b>2006EUCNB</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2006). China-EU Partnership on Climate Change: Rolling Work Plan. Retrieved from:



	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/tyfls_665260/tfsxw_665262/t283051.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/tyfls_665260/tfsxw_665262/t283051.shtml</a>
<b>2006EUCNC</b>	EU-China. (2006). Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China and The European Commission on Cooperation on Near-zero Emissions Power Generation Technology through Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/nzec/docs/nzec_mou_en.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/nzec/docs/nzec_mou_en.pdf</a>
<b>2006EUCND</b>	European Commission. (2006). Peter Mandelson EU Trade Commissioner – Europe and China: partnership, competition and leadership, Tsinghua University Beijing, 7 November 2006. (Speech No. 06/658). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_658">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_658</a>
<b>2007EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2007). Joint-Statement 10 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. (Report No. 16070/07). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/97355.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/97355.pdf</a>
<b>2007EUCNB</b>	European Commission. (2007). José Manue Barroso President of the European Commission – The EU and China: shaping the future together, Chinese Communist Party Central School, Beijing, 27 November 2007. (Speech No. 07/759). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_07_759">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_07_759</a>
<b>2007EUCNC</b>	European Commission. (2007). Joaquín Almunia European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, The European Economy and China – Common Challenges and Shared Solutions, Qinghua University, Beijing, 18 September 2007. (Speech No. 07/543). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_543">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_543</a>
<b>2007EUCND</b>	European Commission. (2007). Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy – The EU and China – Moving Forward, Renmin University, Beijing, China 18 January 2007. (Speech No. 07/18). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_18">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_18</a>
<b>2007EUCNE</b>	European Commission. (2007). Danuta Hübner, European Commissioner responsible for Regional Policy “Regional Policy in a global world” – 2 <sup>nd</sup> EU-China High-level seminar on regional Policy, Brussels, 8 October 2007. (Speech No. 07/604). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_604">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_604</a>
<b>2008EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2008). Minutes of the 3 <sup>rd</sup> European Commission – China Dialogue on Environmental Policy at Ministerial Level, Beijing, 24 April 2008. On file with author.
<b>2009EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2009). Joint-Statement 11 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. (Report No. 10234/09). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107965.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107965.pdf</a>
<b>2009EUCNB</b>	EU-China. (2009). Joint-Statement 12 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. (Report No. 16845/09). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/111567.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/111567.pdf</a>
<b>2009EUCNC</b>	European Commission. (2009). Benita Ferrero-Waldner European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy: Europe and China: A Strategic Dialogue. (Speech No. 09/270). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_270">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_270</a>
<b>2010EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2010). Joint-Statement 13 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. (Report No. 14577/10). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/116908.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/116908.pdf</a>
<b>2010EUCNB</b>	EU-China. (2010). Joint-Statement on Dialogue and Cooperation on Climate Change. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/international/cooperation/china/docs/joint_statement_dialogue_en.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/international/cooperation/china/docs/joint_statement_dialogue_en.pdf</a>
<b>2011EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2011). Joint-Statement 14 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. (Report No. 6474/12). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/127967.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/127967.pdf</a>
<b>2012EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2012). Joint-Statement 15 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. (Report No. 14022/12). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/26292/132507.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/26292/132507.pdf</a>
<b>2012EUCNB</b>	EU-China. (2012). Joint Declaration on the EU-China Partnership on Urbanisation. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20120503_eu_china_joint_declaration_urbanisation_en.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20120503_eu_china_joint_declaration_urbanisation_en.pdf</a>
<b>2012EUCNC</b>	EU-China. (2012). 4 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Policy Dialogue on Environment: Minutes of the Meeting between Mr. Janez Potocnik (Commissioner for Environment, European Commission) and Mr. Zhou Shengxian (Minister, Ministry of Environmental Protection, China), Brussels, 8 <sup>th</sup> February 2012. On file with author
<b>2013EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2013). EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. Retrieved from: <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/eu-china_2020_strategic_agenda_en.pdf">http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/eu-china_2020_strategic_agenda_en.pdf</a>

<b>2013EUCNB</b>	EU-China. (2013). EU-China Joint Declaration on Energy Security. Retrieved from: <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/131121_eu-china_joint_declaration_energy_security_en.pdf">http://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/131121_eu-china_joint_declaration_energy_security_en.pdf</a>
<b>2013EUCNC</b>	EU-China. (2013). Minutes of the Fifth EU-China Environmental Policy Dialogue. On file with author.
<b>2014EUCNA</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2014). Statement by Ambassador Wang Min at the Security Council Briefing on Cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/thematicissues/other_thematicissues/t1130689.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/thematicissues/other_thematicissues/t1130689.htm</a>
<b>2014EUCNB</b>	EU-China. Joint-Statement 16 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. [Press release]. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_13_1099">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_13_1099</a>
<b>2015EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2015). Joint-Statement 17 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23732/150629-eu-china-summit-joint-statement-final.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23732/150629-eu-china-summit-joint-statement-final.pdf</a>
<b>2015EUCNB</b>	EU-China. (2015). EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23733/150629-eu-china-climate-statement-doc.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23733/150629-eu-china-climate-statement-doc.pdf</a>
<b>2015EUCNC</b>	European Commission. (2015). China and EU make the case for emissions trading. [Press release]. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015120501_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015120501_en</a>
<b>2016EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2016). 18 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit in Beijing. [Press release]. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/AC_16_3700">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/AC_16_3700</a>
<b>2016EUCNB</b>	EU-China. (2016). EU-China Roadmap on energy cooperation (2016-2020). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/FINAL_EU_CHINA_ENERGY_ROADMAP_EN.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/FINAL_EU_CHINA_ENERGY_ROADMAP_EN.pdf</a>
<b>2016EUCNC</b>	EU-China. (2016). Minutes of the 6 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Ministerial Dialogue on Environment Policy. On file with author
<b>2017EUCNA</b>	Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. (2017). Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi at the Security Council Briefing on Cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/thematicissues/other_thematicissues/t1461946.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/thematicissues/other_thematicissues/t1461946.htm</a>
<b>2017EUCNB</b>	The State Council of the People's Republic of China. (2017). List of Outcomes of the 19 <sup>th</sup> China-EU Summit. Retrieved from: <a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/news/2017/06/04/content_281475676073214.htm">english.www.gov.cn/premier/news/2017/06/04/content_281475676073214.htm</a>
<b>2017EUCNC</b>	European Commission. (2017). EU-China Summit: Moving forward with our global partnership. [Press release]. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/eu-china-summit-moving-forward-our-global-partnership-2017-jun-02_en">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/eu-china-summit-moving-forward-our-global-partnership-2017-jun-02_en</a>
<b>2017EUCND</b>	EU-China. (2017). EU-China Leaders' Joint Statement on Climate Change and Clean Energy. [Leaked version; statement was not delivered]. On file with author.
<b>2017EUCNE</b>	EU-China. (2017). Work Plan 2017-2018 on the EU-China Roadmap on Energy Cooperation. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/workplan_2017-2018_of_the_eu-china_roadmap_on_energy_cooperation.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/workplan_2017-2018_of_the_eu-china_roadmap_on_energy_cooperation.pdf</a>
<b>2017EUCNF</b>	European Council. (2017). Remarks by President Donald Tusk after the EU-China summit in Brussels. (Document No. 832/17). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/02/tusk-remarks-eu-china-summit-june/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/02/tusk-remarks-eu-china-summit-june/</a>
<b>2018EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2018). Joint-Statement 20 <sup>th</sup> EU-China Summit including annex on climate change and clean energy. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36165/final-eu-cn-joint-statement-consolidated-text-with-climate-change-clean-energy-annex.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36165/final-eu-cn-joint-statement-consolidated-text-with-climate-change-clean-energy-annex.pdf</a>
<b>2018EUCNB</b>	EU-China. (2018). EU-China Leaders' Statement on Climate Change and Clean Energy. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/news/20180713_statement_en.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/news/20180713_statement_en.pdf</a>
<b>2019EUCNA</b>	EU-China. (2019). Joint-Statement 21 <sup>st</sup> EU-China Summit. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39020/euchina-joint-statement-9april2019.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39020/euchina-joint-statement-9april2019.pdf</a>
<b>2019EUCNB</b>	EU-China. (2019). Joint Statement on the Implementation of the EU-China Cooperation on Energy. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/joint_statement_on_the_implementation_of_the_eu-china_cooperation_on_energy_en.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/joint_statement_on_the_implementation_of_the_eu-china_cooperation_on_energy_en.pdf</a>
<b>2019EUCNC</b>	European Commission. (2019). EU Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Cañete and China's Special Representative on Climate Change Xie Zhenhua: meeting in New York at the UN

	Climate Action Summit. Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/eu-commissioner-climate-action-and-energy-miguel-arias-cañete-and-china's-special_en">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/eu-commissioner-climate-action-and-energy-miguel-arias-cañete-and-china's-special_en</a>
<b>2019EUCND</b>	EU-China. (2019). Minutes of the Seventh EU-China Environmental Policy Dialogue. On file with author.
<b>2020EUCNUNA</b>	United Nations Treaty Collection. (2020). Chapter XXVII Environment: 7. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 9 May 1992). Retrieved from: <a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&amp;chapter=27&amp;Temp=mtdsg3&amp;clang=en">https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&amp;chapter=27&amp;Temp=mtdsg3&amp;clang=en</a>
<b>2020EUCNUNB</b>	United Nations Treaty Collection. (2020). Chapter XXVII Environment: 7. A Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto, 11 December 1997). Retrieved from: <a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-a&amp;chapter=27&amp;clang=en">https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-a&amp;chapter=27&amp;clang=en</a>
<b>China</b>	<b>Unilateral (30 items in total)</b>
<b>1990CNPA</b>	China.org (1990). Summary of the 8 <sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan (1991-1995). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/157625.htm">www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/157625.htm</a>
<b>1994CNPA</b>	People's Republic of China. (1994). The Choice of Implementing a Sustainable Development Strategy. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/environment/e-2.htm">www.china.org.cn/e-white/environment/e-2.htm</a>
<b>1994CNPB</b>	China Daily (1994). China's Agenda 21 – White Paper on China's population, Environment, and Development in the 21 <sup>st</sup> Century. Adopted at the Executive Meeting of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 25 March 1994. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010census/2010-08/20/content_11182543.htm">www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010census/2010-08/20/content_11182543.htm</a>
<b>1996CNPA</b>	Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China. (1996). Governmental White Paper – Environmental Protection in China. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgzfbps/t176940.htm">www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgzfbps/t176940.htm</a>
<b>1996CNPB</b>	People's Republic of China. (1996). Report on the Outline of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) for National Economic and Social Development and the Long-range Objective to the Year 2010 (Excerpts). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/95e/95-english1/2.htm">www.china.org.cn/95e/95-english1/2.htm</a>
<b>2001CNPA</b>	People's Republic of China. (2001). The National Tenth Five-Year plan for Environmental Protection. Retrieved from: <a href="https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc11939/m1/2/">https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc11939/m1/2/</a>
<b>2001CNPB</b>	People's Republic of China. (2001). Report on the Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2001). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Special_11_5/2010-03/03/content_1690620.htm">www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Special_11_5/2010-03/03/content_1690620.htm</a>
<b>2003CNPA</b>	People's Republic of China. (2003). China's EU Policy Paper. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t27708.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t27708.shtml</a>
<b>2004CNPA</b>	People's Republic of China. (2004). The People's Republic of China Initial National Communication on Climate Change. PRC: Beijing. Retrieved from: <a href="http://en.ccchina.org.cn/Detail.aspx?newsId=38734&amp;TId=107">http://en.ccchina.org.cn/Detail.aspx?newsId=38734&amp;TId=107</a>
<b>2004CNPB</b>	The World Bank. (2004). <i>Clean Development Mechanism in China: Taking a proactive and Sustainable approach</i> . Washington, D.C.: the World Bank
<b>2005CNPA</b>	National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC). (2005). <i>Measures for operation and management of clean development mechanism projects in China</i> . Beijing: NCCCC
<b>2006CNPA</b>	Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's Republic of China. (2006). The National Eleventh Five-year Plan for Environmental Protection (2006-2010). Retrieved from: <a href="https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc11938/m2/1/high_res_d/The%20National%20Eleventh%20Five-year%20Plan%20for%20Environmental%20Protection(2006-2010)-ENG.pdf">https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc11938/m2/1/high_res_d/The%20National%20Eleventh%20Five-year%20Plan%20for%20Environmental%20Protection(2006-2010)-ENG.pdf</a>
<b>2007CNPA</b>	People's Republic of China. (2007). China's National Climate Change Program (June 2007). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t626117.htm">www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/economicdevelopment/climatechange/t626117.htm</a>
<b>2008CNPA</b>	People's Republic of China. (2008). White Paper: China's policies and actions on climate change. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.ccchina.org.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File419.pdf">http://www.ccchina.org.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File419.pdf</a>
<b>2009CNPA</b>	People's Republic of China. (2009). China's National Defense in 2008: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, January 2009, Beijing. Retrieved from: <a href="https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/2008DefenseWhitePaper_Jan2009.pdf">https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/2008DefenseWhitePaper_Jan2009.pdf</a>

<b>2009CNPB</b>	People's Republic of China. (2009). China's legislature endorses Climate Change Resolution. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Special/CombatingClimateChange/2009-08/28/content_1516242.htm">www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Special/CombatingClimateChange/2009-08/28/content_1516242.htm</a>
<b>2010CNEA</b>	APCO Worldwide. (2010). China's 12 <sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan: how it actually works and what's in store for the next five years. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.export.gov.il/UploadFiles/03_2012/Chinas12thFive-YearPlan.pdf">http://www.export.gov.il/UploadFiles/03_2012/Chinas12thFive-YearPlan.pdf</a>
<b>2010CNSPA</b>	Yu, Q. (2010). August 27). China's former climate Ambassador: People are born equal. The China Dialogue. Retrieved from <a href="https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/ch/3792-China-s-interests-must-come-first-">https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/ch/3792-China-s-interests-must-come-first-</a>
<b>2012CNPA</b>	People's Republic of China. (2012). The People's Republic of China National Report on Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: <a href="http://download.china.cn/en/pdf/development2.pdf">http://download.china.cn/en/pdf/development2.pdf</a>
<b>2012CNPB</b>	People's Republic of China. (2012). Second National Communication on Climate Change of the People's Republic of China. Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/chnnc2e.pdf">https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/chnnc2e.pdf</a>
<b>2012CNPC</b>	People's Republic of China. (2012). China's twelfth five-year plan – Part I: Transforming growth patterns, create a new scenario for scientific development. Retrieved from: <a href="https://cbi.typepad.com/files/full-translation-5-yr-plan-2011-2015.doc">https://cbi.typepad.com/files/full-translation-5-yr-plan-2011-2015.doc</a>
<b>2012CNPD</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2012). China's Policy Paper on the EU: Deepen the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-Win Cooperation. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzcs/t1143406.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzcs/t1143406.shtml</a>
<b>2012CNSPA</b>	Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America. (2012). Full text of Hu Jintao's report at 18 <sup>th</sup> Party Congress. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm">http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm</a>
<b>2014CNSPA</b>	Xi J. (2014, May 21). President Xi delivers keynote speech at 4 <sup>th</sup> CICA Summit. The China Org. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-06/03/content_32561159.htm">http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-06/03/content_32561159.htm</a>
<b>2015CNPA</b>	POLITICO & the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union. (2015). The EU and China: 40 Years of Friendship. POLITICO: Brussels. Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Eu-China-special_reportv9.pdf">http://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Eu-China-special_reportv9.pdf</a>
<b>2016CNPA</b>	People's Republic of China. (2016). The 13 <sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China (2016-2020). Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Beijing. Retrieved from: <a href="https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/policyrelease_8233/201612/P020191101482242850325.pdf">https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/policyrelease_8233/201612/P020191101482242850325.pdf</a>
<b>2016CNSPA</b>	Xi, J. (2016). July 1). President Xi's speech at the 95th anniversary of the China's Communist Party. The Xinhua News. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-07/01/c_1119150660.htm">http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-07/01/c_1119150660.htm</a>
<b>2017CNSPA</b>	Xie, Z. (2017). The high-end interview of China's climate ambassador Xie Zhenhua. The Southern Metropolis Daily. Retrieved from <a href="https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD00002017031330113.html">https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD00002017031330113.html</a>
<b>2018CNPA</b>	Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union. (2018). China's Policy Paper on the European Union (December 2018). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.chinamission.be/eng/zywj/zywd/t1623330.htm">http://www.chinamission.be/eng/zywj/zywd/t1623330.htm</a>
<b>2018CNPB</b>	People's Republic of China. (2018). The People's Republic of China Third National Communication on Climate Change (December 2018). Retrieved from: <a href="http://en.ccchina.org.cn/archiver/ccchinaen/UpFile/Files/Default/20190920153532866874.pdf">http://en.ccchina.org.cn/archiver/ccchinaen/UpFile/Files/Default/20190920153532866874.pdf</a>
<b>EU</b>	<b>Unilateral (80 items in total)</b>
<b>1994EUPCA</b>	European Council. (1994). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 9 and 10 December 1994 in Essen. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>1995EUPCA</b>	European Council. (1995). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 26 and 27 June 1995 in Cannes. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>1995EUPCB</b>	European Council. (1995). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 15 and 16 December 1995 in Madrid. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>1995EUJCA</b>	European Commission. (1995). Communication of the Commission: A long term policy for China-Europe Relations. (Report No. COM(1995) 279/ final). Retrieved from: <a href="http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/com95_279_en.pdf">http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/com95_279_en.pdf</a>
<b>1997EUPCA</b>	European Council. (1997). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 16 and 17 June 1997 in Amsterdam. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>

<b>1997EUPCB</b>	European Council. (1997). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 12 and 13 December 1997 in Luxembourg. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>1998EUPCA</b>	European Council. (1998). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 15 and 16 June 1998 in Cardiff. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>1998EUPCB</b>	European Council. (1998). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 11 and 12 December 1998 in Vienna. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>1998EUPA</b>	European Community. (1998). Second Communication from the European Community under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. (Report No. SEC(98)1770). Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>1998EUJCA</b>	European Commission. (1998). Communication from the Commission: Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China. Report No. COM(1998) 181 final. Retrieved from: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1998:0181:FIN:EN:PDF">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1998:0181:FIN:EN:PDF</a>
<b>1999EUPCA</b>	European Council. (1999). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 3 and 4 June 1999 in Cologne. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>1999EUPCB</b>	European Council. (1999). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 10 and 11 December 1999 in Helsinki. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>2000EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2000). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 7, 8 and 9 December 2000 in Nice. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>2000EUJCA</b>	European Commission. (2000). Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – on the Implementation of the Communication ‘‘Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China’’. (Report No. COM(2000) 552 final). Retrieved from: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0552:FIN:EN:PDF">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0552:FIN:EN:PDF</a>
<b>2001EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2001). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 23 and 24 March 2001 in Stockholm. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>2001EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2001). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 15 and 16 June 2001 in Göteborg. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>2001EUPCC</b>	European Council. (2001). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 14 and 15 December 2001 in Laeken. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>2001EUPA</b>	European Commission. (2001). Commission Staff Working Paper: Third Communication from the European Community under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. (Report No. SEC(2001) 2053). Retrieved from: <a href="https://unfccc.int/documents">https://unfccc.int/documents</a>
<b>2001EUJCA</b>	European Commission. (2001). Communication from the Commission: Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships. (Report No. COM(2001) 469 final). Retrieved from: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0469:FIN:EN:PDF">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0469:FIN:EN:PDF</a>
<b>2002EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2002). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 15 and 16 March 2002 in Barcelona. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>2003EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2003). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 20 and 21 March 2003 in Brussels. (Report No. 8410/03). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/</a>
<b>2003EUJCA</b>	European Commission. (2003). Commission Policy Paper for transmission to the Council and the European Parliament: A maturing partnership – shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations. (Report No. COM(2003) 533 final). Retrieved from: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003DC0533&amp;from=EN">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003DC0533&amp;from=EN</a>
<b>2004EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2004). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 17 and 18 June 2004 in Brussels. (Report No. 10679/04). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2004EUPCB</b>	European Commission. (2004). Kyoto Protocol: What is the Kyoto Protocol. (Memo No. 04/43). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_04_43">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_04_43</a>
<b>2005EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2005). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 22 and 23 March 2005 in Brussels. (Report No. 7619/05). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2005EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2005). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 15 and 16 December 2005 in Brussels. (Report No. 15914/05). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2005EUJCA</b>	European Commission. (2005). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:

	Winning the Battle against global Climate Change. (Report No. COM(2005) 35 final). Retrieved from: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52005DC0035">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52005DC0035</a>
<b>2006EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2006). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 23 and 24 March 2006 in Brussels. (Report No. 7775/06). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2006EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2006). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 15 and 16 June 2006. (Report No. 10633/06). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2006EUPCC</b>	European Council. (2006). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 14 and 15 December 2006 in Brussels. (Report No. 16879/06). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2006EUPA</b>	European Commission. (2006). Communication from the Commission: Fourth National Communication from the European Community under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (Report No. SEC(2006) 138/2). Retrieved from: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0040&amp;from=EN">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0040&amp;from=EN</a>
<b>2006EUJCA</b>	European Commission. (2006). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – EU-China: Closer Partners, growing responsibility. (Report No. COM(2006) 631 final). Retrieved from: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0631&amp;from=EN">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0631&amp;from=EN</a>
<b>2007EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2007). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 8 and 9 March 2007 in Brussels. (Report No. 7224/07). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2007EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2007). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 21 and 22 June 2007 in Brussels. (Report No. 11177/07). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2007EUPCC</b>	European Council. (2007). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 14 December 2007 in Brussels. (Report No. 16616/07). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2007EUJCA</b>	European Commission. (2007). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Limiting global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius – The way ahead for 2020 and beyond. (Report No. COM(2007) 2 final). Retrieved from: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0002&amp;from=EN">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0002&amp;from=EN</a>
<b>2007EUJCB</b>	European Commission. (2007). Press Release, 2785 <sup>th</sup> Council Meeting – Environment – EU objectives for the further development of the international climate regime beyond 2012. (Report No. 6272/07). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_07_25">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_07_25</a>
<b>2007EUSPA</b>	European Commission. (2007). Andris Piebalgs Energy Commissioner, Oil and gas geopolitics Speech at the Lisbon Energy Forum 2007, Lisbon, 2 October 2007. (Speech No. 07/586). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_586">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_586</a>
<b>2007EUSPB</b>	European Commission. (2007). Andris Piebalgs Energy Commissioner – Turkmenistan and the EU: Why we need an increased co-operation in the Energy Field Speech at the 12 <sup>th</sup> Turkmenistan International Oil and Gas Conference in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, 15 November 2007. (Speech No. 07/720). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_720">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_07_720</a>
<b>2008EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2008). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 13 and 14 March 2008 in Brussels. (Report No. 7652/08). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2008EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2008). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 19 and 20 June 2008 in Brussels. (Report No. 11018/08). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2008EUPCC</b>	European Council. (2008). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 15 and 16 October 2008 in Brussels. (Report No. 14368/08). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2008EUPCD</b>	European Council. (2008). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 11 and 12 December 2008 in Brussels. (Report No. 17271/08). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2008EUPCE</b>	European Council. (2008). Council Conclusions on preparations for the 14 <sup>th</sup> session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 14) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 4 session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP4) (Poznan, 1 to 12 December 2008). 2898 <sup>th</sup> Environment Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 20 October 2008. Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/envir/103479.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/envir/103479.pdf</a>
<b>2008EUECA</b>	European Commission. (2008). Climate Change and International Security: Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council. (Report No. S113/08). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf</a>

<b>2009EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2009). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 19 and 20 March 2009 in Brussels. (Report No. 7880/09). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2009EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2009). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 18 and 19 June 2009 in Brussels. (Report No. 11225/09). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2009EUPCC</b>	European Council. (2009). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 29 and 30 October 2009 in Brussels. (Report No. 15265/09). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2009EUPCD</b>	European Council. (2009). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 10 and 11 December 2009. (Report No. EUCO 6/09). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2009EUPA</b>	European Commission. (2009). Fifth National Communication from the European Community under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (Report No. COM (2009) 667). Retrieved from: <a href="https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ddfa4478-b889-43be-9eae-7653413f8499/language-en">https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ddfa4478-b889-43be-9eae-7653413f8499/language-en</a>
<b>2009EUJCA</b>	European Commission. (2009). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen. (Report No. COM(2009) 39 final). Retrieved from: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52009DC0039">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52009DC0039</a>
<b>2009EUSPA</b>	European Commission. (2009). Andris Piebalgs Energy Commissioner EU Energy and Climate Policy. Speech at the 7 <sup>th</sup> Doha Natural Gas Conference, Doha, 11 March, 2009. (Speech No. 09/102). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_102">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_102</a>
<b>2010EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2010). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 25 and 26 March 2010 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 7/10). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2010EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2010). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 17 June 2010 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 13/10). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2010EUPCC</b>	European Council. (2010). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 16 September 2010 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 21/10). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2010EUPCD</b>	European Council. (2010). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 28 and 29 October 2010 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 25/10). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2011EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2011). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 4 February 2011 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 2/11). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2011EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2011). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 23 October 2011 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 52/11). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2012EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2012). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 1 and 2 March 2012. (Report No. EUCO 4/12). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2013EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2013). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 7 and 8 February 2013 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 3/13). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2013EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2013). Presidency Conclusions (Multiannual Financial Framework): Meeting on 7 and 8 February 2013 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 37/13). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2013EUPCC</b>	European Council. (2013). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 22 May 2013 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 75/13). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2014EUPA</b>	European Commission. (2014). Sixth National Communication and First Biennial Report from the European Union under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (Report No. SWD(2014)1 & SWD(2014)2). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/strategies/progress/monitoring/docs/ec_6nc_en.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/strategies/progress/monitoring/docs/ec_6nc_en.pdf</a>
<b>2015EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2015). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 19 and 20 March in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 11/15). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2015EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2015). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 17 and 18 December 2015 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 28/15). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>

<b>2016EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2016). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 17 and 18 March 2016 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 12/16). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2016EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2016). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 20 and 21 October 2016 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 31/16). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2016EIJCA</b>	European Commission. (2016). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for a new EU Strategy on China. (Report No. JOIN(2016) 30 final). Retrieved from: <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/joint_communication_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_council_-_elements_for_a_new_eu_strategy_on_china.pdf">http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/joint_communication_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_council_-_elements_for_a_new_eu_strategy_on_china.pdf</a>
<b>2017EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2017). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 22 and 23 June 2017 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 8/17). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2017EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2017). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 14 December 2017 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 19/17). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2017EUPA</b>	European Commission. (2017). United4Climate: 7 <sup>th</sup> national Communication & 3 <sup>rd</sup> Biennial Report from the European Union under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (Report NO. C(2017) 8511). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/strategies/progress/monitoring/docs/c_2017_8511_en_0.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/strategies/progress/monitoring/docs/c_2017_8511_en_0.pdf</a>
<b>2018EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2018). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 18 October 2018 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 13/18). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2018EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2018). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 13 and 14 December 2018 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 17/18). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2018EUNPA</b>	European Council. (2018). Note from Presidency: A Clean Planet for all: A European strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy – Transport aspects. (Report No. 11140/19). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/40553/a-clean-planet-for-all_policy-debate.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/40553/a-clean-planet-for-all_policy-debate.pdf</a>
<b>2018EUPCC</b>	European Council. (2018). Outcome of Proceedings: Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy (26 February 2018). (Report No. 6125/18). Retrieved from:
<b>2018EUEPA</b>	European Parliament. (2018). European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on the State of EU-China relations. (Resolution No. 2017/2274(INI)). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0343_EN.html">https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0343_EN.html</a>
<b>2019EUPCA</b>	European Council. (2019). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 21 and 22 March 2019 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 1/19). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2019EUPCB</b>	European Council. (2019). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 20 June 2019 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 9/19). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2019EUPCC</b>	European Council. (2019). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 17 and 18 October 2019 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 23/19). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2019EUPCD</b>	European Council. (2019). Presidency Conclusions: Meeting on 12 December 2019 in Brussels. (Report No. EUCO 29/19). Retrieved from: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/</a>
<b>2019EIJCA</b>	European Commission. (2019). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The European Council, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The European Green Deal. (Report No. COM(2019) 640 final). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european-green-deal-communication_en.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european-green-deal-communication_en.pdf</a>
<b>2019EIJCB</b>	European Commission. (2019). Joint Communication to the European Parliament, The European Council and the Council: EU-China – A strategic outlook. (Report No. JOIN(2019) 5 final). Retrieved from: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf</a>