



INTERPRETING FINLAND'S COLD WAR NEUTRALITY –

re-assessing Western academic literature

Roosa Heikura
6088236
r.e.heikura@students.uu.nl
BA Thesis, GE3V18003
Irina Marin
30.3.2020
Word count: 11 905
Pages: 42

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	2
INTRODUCTION	3
1. "RYSSÄVIHA" – THE ROOTS OF RUSSOPHOBIA IN FINLAND ...	8
1.1 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY HATRED	9
1.2 FRIENDLY NINETEENTH CENTURY	10
1.3 PEACEFUL INDEPENDENCE	11
1.4 TWENTIETH CENTURY CONFLICTS	12
2. SELECTION OF WESTERN VISIONS OF FINNISH NEUTRALITY	15
2.1 IMMEDIATE POST-WAR YEARS	16
2.2 THE AGREEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE	17
2.3 THE NIGHTFROST CRISIS	19
2.4 THE DECADE OF APPEASEMENT AND DÉTENTE.....	19
3. FINNISH INTERPRETATIONS OF HER NEUTRALITY	21
3.1 IMMEDIATE POST-WAR YEARS	21
3.2 AGREEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE	23
3.3 THE NIGHTFROST CRISIS	24
3.4 THE DECADE OF APPEASEMENT AND DÉTENTE.....	26
4. MISCONCEPTIONS.....	28
4.1 STATUS OF NEUTRALITY	28
4.2 WESTERN LENS	32
4.3 FORGETTING INDIVIDUALITY.....	34
4.4 GENERAL CAUSES	34
CONCLUSIONS.....	37
BIBLIOGRAPHY	39
LITERATURE.....	39
SOURCES	41

ABSTRACT

Despite Cold War being over for decades now, the topic of Finland's neutrality seems to constantly attract attention from both Finnish and international audiences – no wonder, since the matter offers almost endless possibilities for varying interpretations and discussions. During the Cold War, Finland's neutrality was not always taken as serious as it should have been taken in the Western world. It was expected that Finland would fall under communism as the majority of Eastern European countries previously had. When this did not occur, Finland was claimed as "exceptional," and the causes behind her exceptionality were speculated. "Finlandization" gained footing in the Western analyses, which were often regarded as inaccurate in Finland.

This research will analyze these inaccuracies which are still present in some of the Western academic literature. The goal will be to contrast these mistaken interpretations with Finnish interpretations to highlight the inaccuracies. Through a detailed literature analysis of Western academic literature, a selection of sources was picked to represent the fragment of literature consisting of three misconceptions, which were detectable throughout the sources. Additionally, the possible reasons behind these misconceptions will be established in detailed analysis. It is essential to recognize that despite the generally high level of Western scholarship on Finland, a fragment of the available sources contain inaccuracies that need to be addressed, and preferably corrected. Thus, this will be the main aim of this research.

INTRODUCTION

“Neutrality is rather like virginity. Everyone starts off with it, but some lose it quicker than others, and some do not lose it at all. Unlike virginity, however, neutrality once lost can sometimes be recovered, albeit with difficulty.”¹ Roderick Ogley’s statement regarding neutrality can be applied to a multiplicity of European countries throughout the twentieth century, yet Finland is slightly different – a relatively small country, whose efforts to remain neutral throughout the twentieth century conflicts, especially the Cold War, eventually turned out to be successful. Despite sometimes obliged to extend the limits of her neutrality, Finland remains among a handful of European states that have managed to maintain neutrality during the twentieth century.

In the course of this research, Western academic literature on Finland’s Cold War neutrality will be re-assessed by first identifying three misconceptions occurring in some of the literature. They will then be highlighted through a comparison between the Western academic sources and their Finnish equivalents. The comparative method has been chosen to illustrate the presence of the misconceptions, and to contrast them with the interpretations in the Finnish sources. Finally, the misconceptions will be analyzed, and possible reasons for their existence will be established. However, the purpose of this research is by no means to claim that all Western academic literature contains misconceptions, but rather to examine to what extent and why these misconceptions have come into being. The Western sources employed in this research were chosen through close reading of relevant literature – sources that did not contain any misconceptions were left out. From the chosen sources it was possible to detect clear similarities which eventually formed the three selected misconceptions.

The research will be based on both primary and secondary sources, yet it is essential to note that a majority of the secondary literature has been treated similarly to primary sources for various reasons. First, majority of the chosen Western sources have been published during the Cold War, thus they can be treated as primary sources. Secondly, some of the Finnish secondary literature is based on political records that were contemporary with the Cold War. And, finally, some Finnish authors have derived their analysis from their own experiences, deploying old

¹ Roderick Ogley, *The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 1.

journals and diaries. Additionally, documents from Moscow and CIA archives as well as presidential speeches are utilized in this research.

Which features then differentiate Finland from the others and make her case worth researching? Finland is by no means the only neutral European state, nor it is the most successful in terms of fulfilling the traditional Western criteria of neutrality. Austrian scholar, Wolfgang Mueller, spells out this criteria as follows: “In Western theory and practice, neutrality is defined as a state of nonparticipation in war, including the refusal to lend the own territory to foreign military, and of impartiality toward belligerent countries.”² As Finland fails to fully fit into this definition, she simultaneously fails to fit into the description of “permanent neutrality” – as demonstrated by Switzerland– which gained popularity before the Cold War.³ This Western definition clearly differs from the definition of neutrality Finland herself chose to utilize, as here defined by former Finnish politician, Ralf Törngren, “When I write of Finland’s neutrality I mean a policy of maintaining the security of the country by keeping it outside the conflicts of interests of the big powers, rather than by aligning it with one big power or a group of powers against each other. This idea of neutrality is not the product of abstract thought nor is it imported from elsewhere: it has grown out of the soil of Finnish history.”⁴ Adding an important element and completing the definition of the main idea of Finnish neutrality policy, is a former Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson, who states that, “Finland is not neutral in terms of ideology. There is no symmetry in her relations with the Western world on the one hand and the socialist countries on the other. These relations are structurally different.”⁵

Thus, to shortly indicate what makes Finland worthy of attention, are the consistent Western tendencies to interpret Finland’s Cold War neutrality without widening their scope of analysis to include Finland’s own assessment of her neutral stance. These kind of interpretations together with Finland’s geopolitical location in the immediate proximity of the Soviet Union and their lengthy common history, produce patterns of misconceptions and superficial analysis, which can be difficult to repair.

² Wolfgang Mueller, “Two Differing Concepts of Neutrality,” in *A Good Example of Peaceful Coexistence: The Soviet Union, Austria, and Neutrality, 1955-1991* (Austria: The Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2011), 41.

³ Mueller, “Two Differing Concepts of Neutrality,” 41.

⁴ Ralf Törngren, “The Neutrality of Finland,” *Foreign Affairs* 39 (1961): 4, 602.

⁵ Max Jakobson, “Substance and Appearance: Finland,” *Foreign Affairs* 58 (Summer, 1980): 5, 1042.

It is necessary to bring forth some Western scholars whom have previously researched Finnish history. To mention a few, David Kirby and Fred Singleton stood out as the most accomplished academics on the field, their publications ranging from books to academic articles, which all provide a considerable amount of knowledge of different phases of Finnish history. Kirby has specifically focused on Finland's twentieth century history, whereas Singleton has conducted an extensive amount of research on the topic of Finland's Cold War affairs, especially Finlandization.⁶ In addition to Singleton and Kirby, another noteworthy scholar with significant contributions to Finnish Cold War history is Brian Faloon, whose articles offer extensive and insightful analysis on the topic of Finland's Cold War neutrality.⁷

Despite the efforts of these established scholars and their contributions, it is still relatively easy to find publications that contain misconceptions regarding Finland's Cold War neutrality, and thus, those sources form the essence of the analysis here. The chronology of the chosen sources is rather unambiguous – all were published during the Cold War, ranging from late 1940s to early 1980s, therefore accurately depicting the Western mindsets at the time. Based on the examination of these sources, three dominant misconceptions were chosen for the analysis: indecisiveness of Finland's neutrality status; interpretation through Western concepts and definitions; and tight grouping of Finland and other Eastern European countries. The authority level of this research will mainly remain at the academic level and not proceed to political or diplomatic level, although some academic sources have been produced by former diplomats and some politicians are quoted at some parts during the research.

At this point it is essential to shortly define the position of Finnish scholars who operate and publish within the "Western" world instead of Finland. As it will later become evident, one of the issues behind the misconceptions in the Western academic literature is the language barrier. As Max Jakobson has argued, "...the difficulty of gaining recognition and understanding on her [Finland's] own terms, as an autonomous actor rather than a function of the policies of others, is compounded by the language curtain that conceals the innermost life of the Finnish people from

⁶ See: David G. Kirby, *Finland in the Twentieth Century* (London: Hurst, 1979); Fred Singleton, "Finland's Functioning Finlandisation," *The World Today* 41 (1985): 11; Fred Singleton, "The Myth of 'Finlandisation'," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 57 (Spring, 1981): 2; Fred Singleton, "Finland Between East and West," *The World Today* 34 (1978): 8.

⁷ See: Brian S. Faloon, "The Dimensions of Independence: The Case of Finland," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 1 (1980): 2; Brian S. Faloon, "Aspects of Finnish Neutrality," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 1 (1982): 3.

outsiders.”⁸ Thus, as Finnish scholars naturally master the language, they will not be included on the Western side during the analysis, despite where they are situated.

Additionally, a definition of a few essential terms and concepts seems necessary. As utilized from here on, the term “Western” is to indicate American and British scholars, whom were situated within the Western bloc as defined by the bipolar Cold War framework roughly from 1945 until 1991. As the Western bloc was focused around the United States, academic literature written by American scholars is in the essence of the analysis, yet some sources from British scholars are included as well. Due to the leading position of these two entities, this decision was possible to be made without compromising the reliability of the research.

The concept of “Finlandization” has been one of the most controversial topics when discussing Finland’s Cold War affairs, and therefore it requires some further explanation. Originally derived from Western Germany politics regarding *Ostpolitik* in the 1950s, the term “Finlandization” was not initially referring to Finland – instead, it was used as an indication to articulate the fear of Western European countries being forced in the same kind of compliant position as Finland was in regard to the Soviet Union. As the Finnish-Soviet relations continued to grow increasingly complicated, Western observers soon adapted the term to specifically denote Finland’s position. As this became the new norm, Western observers increasingly felt that they should clarify how things were in Finland at the time, which, naturally, was the perfect soil for misconceptions and superficial knowledge to grow.⁹

Finlandization was interpreted in two different ways in the West – it was either seen as a purely negative thing, where Finland had little to no autonomy over her international and domestic matters, or it was perceived positively as a clever strategy that was adapted out of free will without Finland compromising her sovereignty.¹⁰ Despite the latter being endorsed by famous American diplomats, such as Henry Kissinger and George F. Kennan, the former was the most prominent way of interpretation among Western Europeans and Americans.¹¹ This simplified, rather black-and-white interpretation is necessary to keep in mind in the later chapters.

⁸ Jakobson, “Substance and Appearance: Finland,” 1034.

⁹ Timo Vihavainen, *Kansakunta rähmällään: Suomettumisen lyhyt historia* (Keuruu: Otava, 1991), 10.

¹⁰ Vihavainen, *Kansakunta rähmällään: Suomettumisen lyhyt historia*, 11.

¹¹ Matti Pesu, “Suomettumisen ABC,” *The Ulkopolitist*, February, 2017, <https://ulkopolitist.fi/2017/02/16/suomettumisen-abc/>, accessed on February 4, 2020.

Differing from the Western interpretations, Finns themselves perceived Finlandization plainly as a foreign policy strategy, which reached its peak in the 1970s.¹² Although seemingly simple, the interpretation deemed nuances – generally Finland was more focused on the positive and sometimes ignored the fact that she was stretching the limits of her neutrality in order to successfully maintain the strategy.¹³ As Matti Pesu argues in his article, “Suomettumisen ABC,” – “Finlandization possessed a paradoxical feature: if taken too far, it undermined the aims of the foreign policy, which simultaneously was being protected by the very same strategy.”¹⁴

The importance of this research will become evident in the course of it, but a few points should be made already. Being a native Finnish speaker allows me to engage with the subject at a different level than if the analysis would only rely on English sources. When conducting this type of research, it is of crucial importance to be able to implement the original national sources which would otherwise be concealed behind a curtain of incapability to understand the language. Therefore, by being able to fully utilize Finnish sources, it will also be possible to contrast and challenge the misconceptions still prevailing in some of the Western academic literature. This is crucial, not only for the sake of ensuring the reliability of academic literature, but also for the sake of Finland, since – after all – historians should strive to reconstruct the past in its full diversity, and to do justice for the subject rather than continuously rely on existing unilateral explanations which sometimes lack of the nuances of history. By introducing and employing both Finnish and English sources in this research, those nuances will be highlighted, which, hopefully, will eventually help to widen the scope of the existing Western academic literature even further. As Jakobson has previously articulated the issue, “The view of the world underlying influential analyses of international relations reflects primarily the interests and aspirations of the great powers. Smaller nations are treated as objects of policy, statistical units in categories of states classified in terms of their relationship to their respective protectors or oppressors...”¹⁵

¹² Vihavainen, *Kansakunta rähmällään: Suomettumisen lyhyt historia*, 12.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Pesu, “Suomettumisen ABC.”

¹⁵ Jakobson, “Substance and Appearance: Finland,” 1034.

1. "RYSSÄVIHA" – THE ROOTS OF RUSSOPHOBIA IN FINLAND

Before moving further, it is essential to assess the long history of Finland and Soviet Union or Russia – in order to truly grasp the complex nature of their relationship during the Cold War, a brief overview of their common history needs to be completed. In this chapter a necessary background for the tense Cold War situation will be established, and answers to how did the relations grow so complex will be presented.

Naturally, this process has been centuries long, shaped both by physical events as well as differing attitudes and presuppositions of people in both countries. Finnish historian Timo Vihavainen uses a term "ryssäviha" in his book, *Ryssäviha: Venäjän pelon historia*, to describe the authentic way for Finnish people to describe their feelings toward their Eastern neighbor ever since the turn of the nineteenth century.¹⁶ He states that although the term is coined from the universal term "russophobia," it needs to be treated separately from its European counterpart as it depicts a specific national phenomena instead of a multi-national one.¹⁷ Vihavainen also argues that "ryssäviha" has been a nationwide phenomenon for centuries now – in fact, according to him, the feeling of "ryssäviha" dates back for over a century prior to the term itself.¹⁸

While establishing the necessary background of Finnish-Soviet relationship, the study of Vihavainen about the roots of "ryssäviha" will be utilized together with physical events to create the required context. To be able to grasp the most essential parts of the centuries long common history, I have decided to make a distinction between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which will be advanced through chronologically. Additionally, both periods are marked by revolutionary historical events, which will grow to affect the Cold War relations later on. Although the main focus will be twentieth century, a brief overview of relevant historical occurrences of previous centuries will be provided to strengthen the cohesion and to create a sense of complexity which prevails the Finnish-Soviet relations.

¹⁶ Timo Vihavainen, *Ryssäviha: Venäjän-pelon historia* (Helsinki: Minerva Kustannus Oy, 2013), 19.

¹⁷ Vihavainen, *Ryssäviha: Venäjän-pelon historia*, 19.

¹⁸ Ibid, 19.

1.1 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY HATRED

In the beginning of the Great Northern War in 1700, Finland was still a part of the Swedish kingdom – she did not yet have any self-regulatory power nor a strong national identity – however, this would soon start to change as a result of the war.¹⁹ As a part of Sweden, Finland suffered her own share – heavy war recruitments, increased taxation, loss of essential possessions, and plague all took a toll on Finland.²⁰ Yet, the worst was yet to come.

The war had been characterized by extreme violence both in the battlefield and against civilians and Finland was no exception.²¹ When Russia entered Finland in 1713 and temporarily occupied her territory until the end of the war in 1721, the gruesome reality of “the era of Russian occupation” quickly became painstakingly clear.²² Although the era was originally known as the era of Russian occupation among contemporaries, it later received the name “Isoviha” or “the Great Wrath” from historians – this name is still currently commonly used in Finland when referring to the occupation.

Kustaa H. J. Vilkuna summarizes the main aspects of the terror in his book, *Viha: Perikato, katkeruus ja kertomus Isostavihasta*, as follows; “The period of persecution, i.e. the period of Russia rule stayed as a part of people’s life for decades since tens of thousands had fled to Sweden and tens of thousands had been captured as slaves to Russia, and tens of thousands had been killed and tortured, thousands of women had been raped and tens of thousands of buildings had been burned down. And those who had stayed at home had been harassed and robbed.”²³ As Vihavainen and Vilkuna both argue, “The wounds of the years of the Russian persecution... had not yet healed in Finland in the late eighteenth century... the image gained of the Russians during those years still made its impact, and all the more decisively in 1808-1809 when Russia finally conquered Finland.”²⁴

¹⁹ Seppo Zetterberg, *Suomen Historian Pikkujättiläinen* (Porvoo: WSOY, 2003), 264.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid, 271.

²² Ibid.

²³ Kustaa H. J. Vilkuna, *Viha: Perikato, katkeruus ja kertomus Isostavihasta* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2005), 562.

²⁴ Vilkuna, *Viha: Perikato, katkeruus ja kertomus Isostavihasta*, 562.

1.2 FRIENDLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

Another remarkable era in the history of Finnish-Soviet relations started with the Finnish War in 1808-1809, which resulted in Russia acquiring the territory of Finland from Sweden. Professor of Political History, Jorma Kalela argues in his essay "Miten Suomi syntyi?," that Russia was eager to add Finland under its rule because Finland did not pose a threat to it – not politically, geographically, or militarily.²⁵ Instead, Finland could be utilized as a shield against possible future attacks from the West.²⁶

Tsar Alexander I granted Finland autonomy in 1809. According to Kalela, this was made possible by the personal interests of Alexander – by providing Finland good living conditions and awarding them with rights, he ensured their support and loyalty in case of a counter-attack from Sweden.²⁷ Additionally, supporting Alexander's reformation, was the fact that Finnish upper class acknowledged that their separate position was more secured within the Russian empire than within rapidly democratizing Sweden.²⁸ In his article, "Taistelu autonomiasta," Timo Soikkanen has quoted a letter written by Alexander, "When organizing the Finnish affairs, my genuine intention has been to give this nation a governmental essence so it would not think of itself as being conquered by the Russian empire, but rather that it has been joined into Russia with a careful consideration of its own benefit."²⁹ Additionally, Alexander ordered that all official matters regarding Finland were to be presented directly to him instead of having to go through Russian bureaucracy.³⁰ He also granted a freedom of religion; ended the mandatory military collections; allowed Finland to keep its own incoming resources, which helped to establish a public economy and to create a budget; and established a parliament.³¹ Thus, generally, the new conditions created for Finland were fair and well received within the country.

An abrupt change occurred at the change of the century – Vihavainen describes the 1899 February manifesto, "a dramatic split between Finland and Russia."³² Since the 1860s, Russians

²⁵ Jorma Kalela, "Miten Suomi syntyi?," in *Suomalaisen yhteiskunnan poliittinen historia*, ed. Mari K. Niemi and Ville Pernaa (Helsinki: Edita Prima Oy, 2005), 1.

²⁶ Kalela, "Miten Suomi syntyi?," 2.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ (My translation) of Timo Soikkanen, "Taistelu autonomiasta," in *Suomalaisen yhteiskunnan poliittinen historia*, ed. Mari K. Niemi and Ville Pernaa (Helsinki: Edita Prima Oy, 2005), 6.

³⁰ Zetterberg, *Suomen Historian Pikkujättiläinen*, 369.

³¹ Ibid, 371.

³² Vihavainen, *Ryssäviha: Venäjän-pelon historia*, 183.

had been expressing their dissatisfaction with the special status Finland enjoyed under their rule – nationalism was increasing in Russia and people were acting accordingly.³³ The content of the manifesto was rather straightforward – it stated that Finland had become too different from its motherland, Russia, and the two had to be united more tightly.³⁴ Needless to say, this caused outrage and worry among the Finns – they considered the manifesto as a betrayal.³⁵

According to Vihavainen, almost immediately after the declaration, a consistent resistance against everything Russian gained popularity in Finland – the aim was to spread national thinking and to distance the people from Russia and the Tsar.³⁶ Thus, it can easily be argued that Finland was not willing to be “russified” and therefore constants attempts to do so only strengthened the gap between the two.

1.3. PEACEFUL INDEPENDENCE

Stepping into the twentieth century, the state of the relations remained rather inflamed throughout immediate years before Finland’s declaration of independence in December 1917. Despite the strained relations with Russia, Finland’s path to independence was relatively peaceful – it did not involve a physical struggle or a war, which might be surprising considering the on-going World War I. After the first Russian revolution in February 1917, the idea of independence gained support of the majority in the Finnish parliament, yet, the execution only occurred after the second revolution in October 1917.³⁷ The declaration of independence issued by the senate was accepted on December 6th, 1917 by the parliament – however, the declaration was made quietly to avoid any international disputes, especially with the East.³⁸

While Russia was focusing on its own domestic turmoil, Finland faced some internal issues as well and was drifted into a civil war in January 1918. Shortly, the war was waged for the leadership and control of Finland – the participants were divided into two camps, Finnish Whites and Finnish Reds, former of which was supported by the German empire and the latter by Russia and the communists.³⁹ According to Vihavainen, the civil war was initially an outburst of “ryssäviha,” and it

³³ Zetterberg, *Suomen Historian Pikkujättiläinen*, 537.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 543.

³⁵ *Ibid*.

³⁶ Vihavainen, *Ryssäviha: Venäjän-pelon historia*, 183.

³⁷ Jorma Kalela, “Suomi ja Eurooppalainen vallankumousvaihe,” in *Suomalaisen yhteiskunnan poliittinen historia*, ed. Mari K. Niemi and Ville Pernaa (Helsinki: Edita Prima oy, 2005), 3.

³⁸ Zetterberg, *Suomen Historian Pikkujättiläinen*, 597.

³⁹ *Ibid*, 603.

was fought in order to permanently free Finland from the Russian rule.⁴⁰ He argues that the hatred manifested itself as violence, which was “a slap in the face for the forces behind the Finnish democracy and independence.”⁴¹ The reason why the extensive violence was so shameful lies in the violent past with Russia, which still hadn’t been forgotten, yet forgiven.

1.4. TWENTIETH CENTURY CONFLICTS

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Finland had already had difficulties balancing between building a nation state and strengthening national identity while remaining cautious about their giant Eastern neighbor, newly formed Soviet Union. It was no secret that since early 1918, Soviet Union always had the intent and willingness to join Finland into its territory – a newspaper article was published in March 1918 in *Pravda*-magazine, an eager supporter of the Communist Party, in which it was publicly stated that the Soviet Union was actively planning on joining Finland and Poland into its territory.⁴²

After the war broke in Europe in September 1939, Finland observed the Baltic countries making agreements with the Soviet Union and silently prepared for her turn, which eventually came in October when Finnish officials were invited to Moscow.⁴³ Going into the meeting, Finland had already decided to remain politically neutral, and therefore the Soviet demands for access to her Western-side islands to safeguard Leningrad, were denied.⁴⁴ The consequences of this decision were almost immediate; on November 26th the Soviet Union staged a scene in Mainila, a village close to Finnish-Soviet border, where it accused Finland of shelling the village in order to gain a practical reason to wage a war. On November 28th Soviet Union unilaterally terminated the non-aggression pact signed back in 1932; and on November 30th it cut all diplomatic ties with Finland and started the first attack.⁴⁵

Despite suffering severe losses and having to face heavy war reparations, Finland managed to successfully defend her independence. Vihavainen argues in his book that the main reason why Finland was able to successfully fight the enemy superior to her, and win against all the odds was

⁴⁰ Vihavainen, *Ryssäviha: Venäjän-pelon historia*, 201.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Timo Vihavainen, Ohto Manninen, Kimmo Rentola and Sergei Zuraljov, *Varjo Suomen yllä: Stalinin salaiset kansiot* (Jyväskylä: Docendo, 2017), 12.

⁴³ Zetterberg, *Suomen Historian Pikkujättiläinen*, 693.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

specifically “ryssäviha” and the feeling of unity it brought to Finnish people.⁴⁶ He states that, “Finland had an ‘ideal opponent’ in the Winter War. The enemy was considered as alien and arrogantly untruthful, and therefore there was no doubt about the justification of the fighting.”⁴⁷

Having barely recovered from the first war, Finland was dragged into another one in the summer of 1941, when Soviet Union attacked her again. This might have partly been an unlucky consequence of Adolf Hitler’s declaration of war toward the Soviet Union, in which he stated that Germany will fight with Finland on its side – in his declaration Hitler disregarded Finland’s announcement to remain politically neutral despite Germany’s attack against the Soviet Union.⁴⁸ Throughout the war, Finland was uncomfortably balancing between East and West – a struggle which would also continue into the future.

Vihavainen continues to apply his arguments of the unifying power of “ryssäviha” when considering the Continuation War – according to him, Finland was familiar with the conditions under Russian rule and she was not intending to go back to that anymore.⁴⁹ This decisiveness, or even stubbornness, might have been the decisive factor of retaining independence – even Vyacheslav Molotov has stated that Finland was not sovietized mainly because Finns are ‘an extremely stubborn nation’.⁵⁰ This stubbornness, known in Finland as “sisu,” has since then become a standard description of Finnish character – essentially everything is possible, even having to overcome struggles that at first might seem impossible to overcome.

Reaching 1945 and the beginning of the Cold War, tensions between Finland and Soviet Union had reached an all-time high – two wars had just been fought, yet lots of issues and disputes were left unresolved. Officially, as she had done during World War II as well, Finland announced that she would remain politically neutral within the bipolar Cold War framework. Balancing between East and West would continue to be Finland’s biggest diplomatic issue, and her foreign policy would continuously need to adapt to the abrupt turns of international affairs. Essential to take with from this chapter is the development of Finnish-Russian relationship, ranging from violent occupation to freedom of autonomy, from peaceful independence to two unexpected wars. These different feelings – hatred, distrust, and friendliness – will later come to characterize the Cold War relations as well. The presence of “ryssäviha” can be traced throughout the common history, and

⁴⁶ Vihavainen, *Ryssäviha: Venäjän-pelon historia*, 235.

⁴⁷ (My translation) of *Ibid*, 236.

⁴⁸ Zetterberg, *Suomen Historian Pikkujättiläinen*, 708.

⁴⁹ Vihavainen, *Ryssäviha: Venäjän-pelon historia*, 257.

⁵⁰ (My translation) of *Ibid*, 258.

the concept remains as influential as ever. Complexity of this “love-hate” relationship will be at the essence when moving forward with the analysis.

2. SELECTION OF WESTERN VISIONS OF FINNISH NEUTRALITY

When examining the chosen Western academic literature on Finland's Cold War neutrality, the different patterns of misconceptions quickly became apparent – however, as touched upon in the introduction, the purpose of this research is not to denigrate any academic work specifically, but to simply indicate points of improvement. Max Jakobson has also addressed this specific issue in his article, "Substance and Appearance: Finland," as follows, "Since Finland on the whole has been successful in her efforts to keep out of the quarrels between the great powers, there has been no incentive for those who make policy or influence opinion in the leading capitals of the world to follow Finnish affairs; their knowledge about the country tends to be superficial and fragmentary."⁵¹ The main agenda of this chapter is not yet to analyse the "why" but rather the "how" the fragmented part of the Western academic literature perceived Finland's political neutrality and position during the Cold War years.

Majority of the sources employed in this chapter have a few other things in common, despite the obvious. First, they all seem to derive a majority of their information from English sources written by Finnish academics, which instantly strikes as problematic. This is not to say that the quality of the English sources produced by Finnish academics would be low, but rather to point out that there is not nearly enough of them to establish a full research based on them. This observation contributes to Jakobson's argument, as research conducted in a way described above will be left fragmented and superficial because of the knowledge obtained will be second-rate.

Another noteworthy observation is that in a large number of articles and especially books, Finland is not being analyzed as an independent case, but rather as a part of a bigger unity of states or other geographically defined areas. For example, Tom Buchanan associates Finland with other neutral European countries, Austria and Yugoslavia, in his book *Europe's Troubled Peace: 1945 to the Present*, while scholars like Arthur Spencer and Phillip A. Petersen discuss Finland as a fixed, yet different, part of Scandinavia.⁵² Such associations might seem logical considering the shared neutrality status, but a shared idea of neutrality does not directly mean the motives,

⁵¹ Max Jakobson, "Substance and Appearance: Finland," *Foreign Affairs* 58 (Summer, 1980): 5, 1034.

⁵² See: Tom Buchanan, *Europe's Troubled Peace: 1945 to Present*, second ed. (Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2012); Arthur Spencer, "Soviet Pressure on Scandinavia," *Foreign Affairs* 30 (1952): 4, 651-659; Phillip A. Petersen, "Scandinavia and the 'Finlandization' of Soviet Security," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 38 (1991): 1, 60-70.

means, or even definitions of it are unilateral – i.e. Austria was permanently neutral at the time, whereas Finland’s neutrality rested on a whole different notion. Max Jakobson has also expressed his opinion on such definite associations, “The pattern from which Finland is believed to have deviated is constructed from the course of events in countries with which Finland never has had much in common. No wonder some Western writers continue to keep alive the myth that Finland’s survival was the result of Stalin’s sentimental attachment to the place where he had met Lenin for the first time!”⁵³

Before moving on to the analysis, a structure of the narrative will be established as follows – to ensure the clarity of the analysis and to highlight the misconceptions, the narrative is divided into four different parts: immediate post-war years and the peace treaty; the 1948 Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance; 1958 Nightfrost Crisis; and the 1970s, known as the years appeasement and détente.

2.1 IMMEDIATE POST-WAR YEARS

As Europe was approaching the end of World War II in the fall of 1944, Finland had already signed a temporary armistice agreement with the Soviet Union. The harsh conditions of the agreement did not go unnoticed, and as the war was officially over, the terms were incorporated into the Paris Peace Treaties, signed by the Allied Powers in February 1947.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, the whole Western world was filled with anticipation as they kept wondering what would happen to Finland as the Soviet Union increased its influence in Eastern Europe – this, combined with the harsh conditions of the peace treaty, made Finland’s future seem rather gloomy to them. According to Fred Singleton, the Soviet Union demanded Finland to pay over \$300 million in war reparations; to disarm and deport all German troops from the Finnish soil; to annex Petsamo to Soviet Union and rent Porkkala area (a peninsula close-by Helsinki) for the coming 50 years as a Soviet military base; to demilitarize the Åland Islands and drastically limit the size of its armed forces; and to not to manufacture or possess atomic weapons.⁵⁵ Additionally, the Soviet Union demanded that Finland would suppress all – to Soviet standards – fascist organizations and political parties and increase

⁵³ Jakobson, “Substance and Appearance: Finland,” 1037.

⁵⁴ Fred Singleton, *A Short History of Finland*, revised edition (Cambridge: United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, 2006), 132.

⁵⁵ Singleton, *A Short History of Finland*, 133.

the influence of the anti-fascist parties, such as the Communist Party, which had been previously suppressed within the Finnish political field.⁵⁶

A significant part of Singleton's analysis is focused on the formation of the political parties and the parliament – similarly to Arthur Spencer, who devotes almost a whole article to the changes within Finland's domestic political field during the post-war years. After a detailed description of the formation of parliament and party activities in general, Spencer gives the reader an impression that the changes were made to please the demands of the Soviets – in one occurrence, he states that, "It [formation of the parliament] was generally interpreted as a move toward more cordial relations with Russia."⁵⁷ Depicting the Western attitude toward Finland – as defined in the introduction regarding Finlandization – Spencer compares the Finnish achievement of successful state rebuilding to wizardry by stating that, "The Finns of old were famed as wizards – and there has been more than a touch of wizardry in the way the Finnish people have rebuilt their country since the war."⁵⁸ Even the title of Spencer's article, "Finland Maintains Democracy," speaks for the Western surprise when Finland managed to remain independent after the war instead of becoming a satellite state of the Soviet Union.

2.2 THE AGREEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION, AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

When Finland in 1948 signed the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union, the Western observers were intrigued as this treaty was seen as the seal of Finland's fate under indefinite Soviet dominance. However, as Singleton points out in his book, "It [treaty] is short, consisting of only eight articles and it appears on the face of it to be a simple and straightforward document. Yet it has given rise to much misinterpretation and has been used as a basis for the misconception known as 'Finlandization' which certain western politicians and journalists have used as a code word for subservience to the Soviet Union."⁵⁹ This Western misconception addressed by Singleton, is one of the two dominant Western misinterpretations of Finlandization, which were explained in the introductory chapter. Supporting this perspective is Efrain Karsh, a British-Israeli scholar, who clearly expresses his views of the FCMA and on how Finland was subdued under the Soviet pressure in his article "Finland:

⁵⁶ Ibid, 134.

⁵⁷ Arthur Spencer, "Finland Maintains Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 31 (January, 1953): 2, 306.

⁵⁸ Spencer, "Finland Maintains Democracy," 301.

⁵⁹ Singleton, *A Short History of Finland*, 138.

Adaptation and Conflict.” He states that, “...this Treaty, which laid the foundation of Finnish-Soviet postwar relations, constitutes the best proof of Finland’s integration within the Soviet defence system... Treaty gave the Soviet Union some genuine leverage over Finland... thus providing the Soviet Union with a useful instrument for applying political pressure.”⁶⁰

Shortly, the main aspects of the FCMA Treaty stated that Finland had the desire and right to remain outside the conflicting interests of the Great Powers, and therefore to remain neutral; if either country is attacked by Germany or other threats, the other should defend the other; both parties are required to maintain international peace and security in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations; neither country will join an alliance or any coalition against the other; and that each will refrain from interfering the internal affairs of the other and that both will equally contribute into developing the relationship between the two.⁶¹

Singleton himself takes the opposite stance of Karsh in his interpretation of Finlandization – in addition to his earlier quote, Singleton argues that, “In fact it [FCMA] is based on a realistic assessment of mutual interest, between two countries of unequal size of power, which in no way infringes the sovereignty of the smaller partner.”⁶² According to the CIA Intelligence Report from 1972, “The Finnish experience has demonstrated that it is not necessary for the Soviets to actually employ their tools of leverage in order to gain advantages... the very existence of these points of purchase, no matter how remote the possibility of their use, has created a state of mind in Finland which is now as important as the leverage weapons themselves: the Finns tolerate a considerable Soviet influence over their national destiny...”⁶³ Thus, the CIA recognizes that despite not using any physical force against Finland, the Soviet Union has considerable leverage over her, which affects her ability to make completely independent decisions.

⁶⁰ Efrain Karsh, “Finland: Adaptation and Conflict,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 62 (Spring, 1986): 277.

⁶¹ Singleton, *A Short History of Finland*, 139.

⁶² *Ibid*, 138.

⁶³ Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Report, “‘Finlandization’ in action: Helsinki’s Experience With Moscow,” August, 1972. In *Special Collection: The Caesar, Polo, and ESAU Papers*, no. 5077054e993247d4d82b6aa0, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5077054e993247d4d82b6aa0>, accessed on January 26, 2020.

2.3 THE NIGHTFROST CRISIS

After the FCMA and the spreading of Finlandization, some of the Western scholarship has continuously applied these views on events between Finland and the Soviet Union. Doubts regarding Finland's neutrality were yet again raised due to two crises occurring within a few year time span – especially the Nightfrost crisis in 1958, followed by the Note crisis in 1961. As Brian Faloon puts it, “The west retained doubts about the viability of the Finnish neutrality in 1958 (when the Soviet government expressed its displeasure, successfully, at the leadership and composition of the Finnish government) and in 1961 (the ‘Note’ crisis, when a potential rival presidential candidate to [current president] Kekkonen stepped down voluntarily in the national interest).”⁶⁴ Considering the significant influence especially the Nightfrost Crisis seemed to have on the Western observers regarding Finland's neutrality, the lack of academic literature on the topic was surprising. No available sources were devoted to this crisis, as it was merely briefly mentioned as side note to state that the Western belief to Finland's neutrality continued to waver as Faloon stated. This inattention should be kept in mind when proceeding further in this research.

2.4 THE DECADE OF APPEASEMENT AND DÉTENTE

According to the chosen sources, the 1970s brought appeasement and a considerable amount of freedom to Finland – generally everyone viewed the détente as a good thing for her. Fred Singleton stated in his article, “Finland Between East and West,” that “Détente, to which Finland has made its own distinctive contribution, has provided it with opportunities to act as a bridge builder and to explore possibilities for East-West co-operation in economic, social and political fields.”⁶⁵ Some of the Western scholars seem to be less doubtful regarding the status of Finnish neutrality when coming to the 1970s, similarly to Singleton who continuously talks about “the concept of Finland as the link between East and West” – a link that, according to him, exceeds beyond the economic matters.⁶⁶

Despite the atmosphere of freedom, Brian Faloon voices some future concerns regarding the state of Finnish neutrality – according to him, “Two issues that are likely to exercise the Finns in the 1980s are the extent to which they can remain insulated from major questions of international

⁶⁴ Brian Faloon, “Aspects of Finnish Neutrality,” *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 1 (1982): 3, 9.

⁶⁵ Fred Singleton, “Finland Between East and West,” *The World Today* 34 (August, 1978): 8, 329.

⁶⁶ Singleton, “Finland Between East and West,” 330.

tension and their ability to retain the inviolability of their territory with limited resources in a context of rapid change in military technology.”⁶⁷ The CIA Intelligence Report also remains cautious regarding Finland’s ability to integrate more closely with the West – when it was written in 1972, no definite decisions had yet been made, and therefore “...Soviet silence and hints of approval are not the equivalent of final acceptance. The Finns have tended to be optimistic about the ultimate Soviet attitude because they have to be.”⁶⁸

Thus, to conclude the main points of the chapter, it should be noted how the emphasis is heavily placed on establishing interpretations according to which Finland had lost, partly or fully, her neutrality which affected her sovereignty as well. These interpretations do not take all the necessary information into account, but rather utilize their own views of Finlandization and neutrality. As some necessary background information is left out, the course of events is automatically simplified to fit the desired framework of interpretation. The following chapter will show that the difference truly lies in the details.

⁶⁷ Faloon, “Aspects of Finnish Neutrality,” 12.

⁶⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Report, “‘Finlandization’ in action: Helsinki’s Experience With Moscow,” August, 1972. In *Special Collection: The Caesar, Polo, and ESAU Papers*, no. 5077054e993247d4d82b6aa0, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5077054e993247d4d82b6aa0>, accessed on January 26, 2020.

3. FINNISH INTERPRETATIONS OF HER NEUTRALITY

While the previous chapter was dedicated to analyzing specific Western academic sources and the way they portray Finland and her position as a neutral country under the Soviet influence, this chapter will establish the same storyline from the viewpoint of Finnish academics. The lay-out of the chapter will mirror the previous one to ensure a fair comparison between the two academic narratives.

It was effortless to find literature in Finnish, which is of course natural – hundreds, if not thousands of books and other publications have been made available to the public to access, which truly depicts the fact that the issue of neutrality is very much acknowledged, read, and researched in Finland. Finland's neutrality and Cold War position in regard to the Soviet Union has thus been widely covered from many different angles by multiple renowned historians, which provides a solid base for this research.

3.1 IMMEDIATE POST-WAR YEARS

The academic literature from both sides seems to agree at least on one thing – the immediate post-war years were extremely challenging for Finland, as she was trying to balance between East and West while preserving independence. However, according to the Finnish academic sources, the reality of Finland did not correspond to the interpretations presented in the chosen Western academic sources. Although the threat of occupation and pressure from the Soviet Union was very real, not at any point did Finns begin to think of their sovereignty as a result of wizardry or anything like it, nor did they think they've completely – or partly – lost their sovereignty as suggested in some of the Western literature.⁶⁹ Finland's sole purpose during the "years of danger" in 1944-1948 was to remain independent, while simultaneously retaining her neutrality and cordial relations with both East and West – Finlandization did not yet play a role during this period as it only gained popularity mainly during the late 1950s onwards.⁷⁰

What the Western academic literature fails to showcase are the various ways of coercion Stalin targeted Finland with in order to gain leverage – acknowledgement of these factors might have

⁶⁹ Efraim Karsh, "Finland: Adaptation and Conflict," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 62 (Spring, 1986): 2.

⁷⁰ Timo Vihavainen, *Kansakunta rähmällään: Suomettumisen lyhyt historia* (Keuruu: Otava, 1991), 23.

helped to justify the lenience Finland occasionally displayed toward the Soviet Union. According to Jukka Seppinen, Stalin was very aware of the fact that other great powers, the United States and Great Britain, were strictly against Soviet occupation of Finland – therefore, in the Tehran conference of 1943, Stalin reassured his fellow leaders Roosevelt and Churchill that he had no intention of occupying Finland.⁷¹ However, this promise did not exclude the fact that Stalin wanted Finland to be ruled by the communists, or at least by men he considered pro-Soviet – this vision remained as his main agenda regarding Finland until his death in 1953.⁷² In order to keep the imports coming in from the United States and Great Britain, Stalin needed to act as discreetly as possible and other means than a direct occupation or revolution to control Finland.⁷³

In the meeting Stalin assured the others that he was willing to negotiate with Finland regardless of the current leadership of the country, while in reality he heavily disliked the current president Ryti because of his personal ties to Germany, and was already secretly promoting Paasikivi.⁷⁴ With the help of the Soviet leaders of the Allied Commission, which was established in 1944 to ensure that the demands of the peace treaty were being followed accordingly, Stalin was able to put pressure on the current Finnish parliament and get his message through – in order to remain friendly with the Soviet Union, “a more friendly parliament” needed to be nominated.⁷⁵ To endorse his message, Stalin himself declared that if this change was not conducted accordingly, the Soviet Union was to be left under the impression that Finland remained belligerent against it and was still to be associated with Germany.⁷⁶ In reality this was not true – Finnish army had already started fighting the Germans in order to drive them out of Finland; they had abolished over 400 organizations as stated in the peace treaty; and they had taken measures to keep track of all German and Hungarian citizens still in the country.⁷⁷ Still, this was not enough to Stalin as he solely wanted – and needed – Paasikivi to step up as the leader, and therefore, during the autumn of 1944, a new parliament was formed and Paasikivi was appointed as the new prime minister.⁷⁸ After his appointment, Paasikivi started to endorse “a fresh face”-policy, which encouraged people to elect new faces to the parliament on the 1945 elections – eventually, all the leading positions

⁷¹ Jukka Seppinen, *Vaaran vuodet: Suomen selviytymisstrategia 1944-1950* (Helsinki: Minerva Kustannus Oy, 2008), 11.

⁷² Seppinen, *Vaaran vuodet: Suomen selviytymisstrategia 1944-1950*, 12.

⁷³ *Ibid*, 13.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 26.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 27.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 27.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 33.

were filled with fresh faces, except for president Mannerheim, who had been involved in both Winter and Continuation wars as an army leader.⁷⁹ After facing slight pressure both from the new parliament as well as the Soviet Union, Mannerheim announced his resignation in February 1946 and Paasikivi was elected as his follower almost directly.⁸⁰

While the turmoil within Finland's domestic political field is acknowledged in the chosen Western academic sources, the nuances of it are not articulated to an appropriate extent that would allow the reader to grasp the reality of the drastically complicated situation. In addition to bypassing these reasons, it seems that the immediate post-war era has been partly viewed through the lens of Finlandization in the West – something which seems to be contributing to the inaccuracies present in the literature.⁸¹ It seems questionable to extensively apply the concept of Finlandization to analyze events before the 1950s, when the term itself had not been yet acknowledged or enforced actively by the contemporaries.

3.2 THE AGREEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION, AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

In drastic contrast to the Western academic literature's stance on the FCMA Treaty, which for the major part deems the treaty as a negative thing – a sign-off of a sovereignty even – majority of the Finnish academics view it as a positive thing.⁸² The FCMA was viewed as a great accomplishment during the difficult “years of danger,” strengthening the Finnish neutrality. Yet, however, it is openly acknowledged by many scholars that the treaty did put a strain on Finland's relations to the Western world. Max Jakobson argues in one of his books that the official name of the treaty was to be blamed for this as it was quite misleading – he states that the article of “mutual assistance” has been continuously misinterpreted as a commitment of automatic defense from both sides if one of them is attacked in any way.⁸³ According to him, the treaty did not compromise either Finland's neutrality in any way, but rather gave it a unique, personal touch.⁸⁴ Despite the Western perceptions of Finland being predestined to eventually fall under communism or only being a single function of the Soviet foreign policy, Jakobson characterizes the

⁷⁹ Ibid, 99.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 101.

⁸¹ Arthur Spencer, “Finland Maintains Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs* 31 (1953): 2.

⁸² Efraim Karsh, “Finland: Adaptation and Conflict,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 62 (Spring, 1986): 2.

⁸³ Max Jakobson, *Pelon ja toivon aika: 20. vuosisadan tilinpäätös II* (Keuruu: Otava, 2001), 59.

⁸⁴ Jakobson, *Pelon ja toivon aika: 20. vuosisadan tilinpäätös II*, 59.

significance of the treaty by stating that it did “cut the wings off from communism” in Finland.⁸⁵ Seppinen offers support to Jakobson’s experiences and interpretations by arguing that in addition to above, signing the treaty emphasized the difference of Finland’s position in comparison to other Eastern European countries – Finland was the only one allowed to keep its old, non-communist social order in place and continue to develop in her own terms.⁸⁶ It is, however, generally acknowledged in the literature that although the FCMA was perceived as a stepping stone to strengthening neutrality from the 1950s onwards and to expanding Northern integration, it simultaneously was indeed the sole factor restricting Finland’s more close integration to the Western world – yet, this sacrifice was to be made in order to retain neutrality and sovereignty. Therefore, as Pekka Visuri states in his book *Suomi kylmässä sodassa*, “It [the treaty] was not a typical military alliance agreement, but above all Finland’s commitment to defend its own land in the event of a foreign attack... However, it was acknowledged that in a crisis situation written articles would not weigh as heavily as prevailing political and military power relations.”⁸⁷

3.3 THE NIGHTFROST CRISIS

Shortly, the 1958 Nightfrost crisis was about how the Soviet Union pressured the freshly elected Finnish parliament to resign despite the fact that it had been democratically established through a public vote.⁸⁸ According to Paavo Rantanen, who is the first Finnish scholar to write a complete book on this issue, the Soviet scheme was to be successful only with the help of various levels of Finnish political authorities, including the Communist Party and even the President, whom all had differing motivations behind their actions.⁸⁹ This observation already drastically contradicts the assumption that Finland was being subjugated under the Soviet Union. Rantanen also notes that the Finnish public response to the crisis and especially to the acts of their own politicians was for the most part negative, as they were considered traitors – however, many of the politicians involved considered their actions conducted with Finland’s best interests in heart and mind.⁹⁰ He acknowledges that whatever the motives might have been, the consequences of the Soviet pressure were long-lasting – Finlandization began to increasingly take over the Finnish foreign

⁸⁵ Ibid, 61.

⁸⁶ Jukka Seppinen, *Vaaran vuodet: Suomen selviytymisstrategia 1944-1950*, 311.

⁸⁷ (My translation of) Pekka Visuri, *Suomi kylmässä sodassa* (Helsinki: Otava, 2006), 94.

⁸⁸ Paavo Rantanen, *Yöpakkaset 1958: Hyppy suomettumiseen* (Jyväskylä: Atena Kustannus Oy, 2019), 13.

⁸⁹ Rantanen, *Yöpakkaset 1958: Hyppy suomettumiseen*, 14.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 14.

policy when the Soviets were allowed to interfere Finland's domestic affairs, and to some extent disable the Finnish democratic parliamentary system.⁹¹

The Nightfrost crisis is important to be viewed as a part of the tumultuous Cold War world – major international crises and tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States were reflected into the Finnish-Soviet relations as well. When the tensions ran high internationally, the Soviet Union had the tendency to make sure that it had Finland within its grip out of a fear of Western influences spreading too far into Finland. The Soviet concern was strengthened by the fact that the leader of the parliament, prime minister K.A. Fagerholm was considered being “too friendly” toward the West, and that the Communist party was left out of the new parliament.⁹² Kimmo Rentola has argued in his book, *Niin kylmää että polttaa*, that the crisis occurred because of all the four main areas of Soviet interest were pointing towards it – foreign policy interest, according to which Finland was to be kept closer due to the tensions in Germany; economic interest, because Finland's economic relations to the West had strengthened significantly while the Soviet part of Finland's exports had decreased; ideological interest, which called for the communists to be a part of the Finnish parliament; and finally, Soviet inquiry interest, through which it wanted to limit and control the anti-Soviet movements in Finland and simultaneously ensure that KGB's work would not be interrupted.⁹³

Eventually, the Soviet pressure occurred on multiple levels – on a political level, when they pulled their ambassador away from Helsinki without any formal notice and stated that there would not be a need for such a position to be held; on an economic level, when they pulled away from the negotiations considering a new canal and an investment loan; and on a societal level, when they continuously used mass media to publish propagandist articles.⁹⁴

The Nightfrost crisis is far more nuanced than it is depicted to be in the Western academic literature where it is generally not acknowledged at all – it has left its marks to the Finnish society and to Finnish-Soviet relations, and it has proved to be a sore subject to talk about in Finland. It is also seen as an important turning point in the Finnish foreign policy strategy, which contained the issue of neutrality – it can be marked as a start of increased Finlandization in the way Finns experienced it.

⁹¹ Ibid, 15.

⁹² Ibid, 76.

⁹³ Ibid, 183.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 88.

3.4 THE DECADE OF APPEASEMENT AND DÉTENTE

Unlike in the Western academic literature, the late 1960s and the 1970s were not only considered as the years of freedom and appeasement in Finland – in fact, the late 1960s European conflicts were yet again reflected into the Finnish-Soviet relationship as an increase in tensions. Finland was facing a dilemma as a result of the 1968 frictions in Central Europe – Europe seemed to be more divided than ever before, the West remaining as a place of economic integration whereas the East was ruled by visions of Soviet tanks in Prague.⁹⁵ It was thus expected that Finland’s relationship with the Soviet Union would yet again strain to some extent.

Despite the increased tensions, the Soviet Union was still interested in appeasement with the West, and after making it extremely clear to Finland that the YYA Treaty was still binding, thus changing sides would not be an option – as Pekka Visuri describes it, the tense situation made possible for Finland to act as “a gate-opener” toward the Western world.⁹⁶ In 1969, Finland’s current president Kekkonen started laying the ground work for an appeasement, which eventually led to the signing of the Helsinki accords as a final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held in 1975 in Helsinki. The main agenda of the Helsinki accords was to improve the relations between the Communist bloc and the West, however, they were not binding as the accords did not hold a treaty status.⁹⁷

The Finnish efforts for reaching a détente between the two blocs were not definite, mainly due to the increasingly deteriorated Soviet stance toward Finland’s neutrality. After a change of leadership in mid-1960s, the Soviet attitude became more undisputed regarding the ideological differences as well as the on-going power struggle between East and West.⁹⁸ The Soviet Union also became more aware of the economic appeal of the West, and was not pleased when Finland announced her participation in a project attempting to tie the Nordic countries more tightly together through economic cooperation and freedom of movement.⁹⁹ As a result of these factors, the Soviet Union began to actively attempt on restricting the neutrality of Finland by pressuring to change the definition of it to merely fit the loose definitions of the FCMA – additionally, as a result of the growing pressure, president Kekkonen was required to sign a 20-year extension of the

⁹⁵ Pekka Visuri, *Suomi kylmässä sodassa*, 224.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 225.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 226.

treaty, over five years before the deadline.¹⁰⁰ Despite these actions, and the change of wording on Finland's neutrality stance, the West seemed to increasingly perceive Finland again as a neutral country, which naturally seemed suspicious to the Soviets.¹⁰¹ As an exchange for being granted a place in the European Economic Community (EEC), Finland was required to stretch the limits of neutrality, and engage in negotiations about a military cooperation with the Soviet Union – however, both of the negotiations in 1974 and 1978 ended from the behalf of Finland stating that the FCMA would be respected, but no closer military cooperation was desired.¹⁰²

The Western academic literature addresses the success of Finland's efforts on reaching détente between the two super powers, but fails to shed light on the sacrifices and struggles Finland was forced to overcome in order for the détente to occur. It is acknowledged to some extent in the chosen Western literature that Finland's position became increasingly difficult during the late 1970s and 1980s, when the international tensions were on the rise again.¹⁰³ However, in reality, the Finnish position did not drastically change since it had been challenging throughout the 1960s-1970s.

Finally, to shortly re-state the main points of the chapter, when assessing Finland's Cold War neutrality, the nuanced background should be taken into consideration as it offers explanations for Finland's leniency toward the Soviet Union and refutes the claims of infringed sovereignty. The simply black-and-white explanations offered in some of the Western sources is thus not applicable. Additionally, it is essential to acknowledge that the main function of Finland's foreign policy, including neutrality, was security – occasionally compromises were required to preserve this aim. Western and Finnish academics seem to also disagree on the benefits of grouping Finland together with Eastern Europe to assess her neutrality – i.e. Max Jakobson and Ralf Törngren are quite adamant on the uselessness of these associations. Lastly, while the détente brought temporary appeasement to international relations, the Finnish-Soviet relations continued to intensify outside of the public scrutiny – a detail, which is often overlooked by the Western observers.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid, 239.

¹⁰³ Brian Faloon, "Aspects of Finnish Neutrality," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 1 (1982): 3, 11.

4. MISCONCEPTIONS

After a comparison of two differing perspectives on Finland's Cold War neutrality, the misconceptions are clearly detectable throughout the chosen Western academic sources, continuously highlighted by more nuanced Finnish academic literature. Considering the amount of elaborate Western scholarship on Finland, the drastic contrast between the chosen sources seem unacceptable.

In this chapter the three chosen misconceptions, as stated in the introduction, will be dealt with in more detail. The focus will be placed on these three occurrences since it has become unambiguously clear that they dominantly prevail over the chosen Western academic sources. It has become clear that these misconceptions and the possible factors behind them cannot be dealt with exclusively, and therefore they will play an equally essential role in the following analysis. In order to fully grasp the reality of the misconceptions, it is essential to start by acknowledging their roots as well as the possible reasons why have they come to existence in the first place. This particular approach is employed due to the substantial influence and interconnectedness of the various factors – as it will become clear during the rest of the chapter, one of them cannot be addressed without acknowledging the other ones, as they seem to be connected in various different ways, yet having separate connotations. Therefore, the analysis will proceed through evaluating one misconception at a time and simultaneously establishing an adequate background for each before moving to the next one. By doing so, it will become apparent how interconnected and complicated all these different aspects and the relations between them truly are – so much so, that the causality forms a full circle.

4.1 STATUS OF NEUTRALITY

First misconception dealt with is justifiably the Western tendency, throughout the examined sources, to view Finland's Cold War neutrality as a constantly changing status instead of a continuous foreign policy line as Finland herself had announced in the beginning of World War II.¹⁰⁴ Despite Finland never giving up her neutrality, let alone sovereignty, the dominant view within the Western academic literature deems that Finland had at least partly, if not fully lost her

¹⁰⁴ Pekka Visuri, *Suomi kylmässä sodassa* (Helsinki: Otava, 2006), 27.

neutrality during the tumultuous 1940s and 1950s – and, to some, with the neutrality went some of her sovereignty. As Max Jakobson has accurately stated, “The ups and downs in Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War were reflected, sometimes as if by a distorting mirror, in changes in Western attitudes toward Finland.”¹⁰⁵

To bring up some examples from the academic sources included in this research, scholars like Efraim Karsh, Arthur Spencer, and Walter Laqueur were all quite vocal in their articles about the fact that Finland had indeed compromised her neutrality, and as a result, lost some of her sovereignty.¹⁰⁶ Karsh based his arguments on the contents of the YYA Treaty, Spencer was analyzing Finland’s domestic political events of the immediate post-war years, and Laqueur vocalized his interpretations of Finlandization – however, the core of their argumentation was discredited by the Finnish academic literature in chapter 3. Essentially this argumentation was that Finland took varying measures to satisfy Soviet demands and orders instead of staying in control of her own decisions and independence.¹⁰⁷ Laqueur’s argumentation was perhaps the most aggressive of them all, as he stated that, “The term ‘Finlandization’ – meaning that process or state of affairs in which, under the cloak of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the sovereignty of a country becomes reduced – has entered the political dictionary despite the protests of Helsinki...”¹⁰⁸

In addition to scholars who claimed the loss of – some – sovereignty as a result of the loss of neutrality, there were other academics who did not argue for loss of sovereignty, only the loss or infringement of Finland’s neutrality. Their arguments were more lenient than the ones introduced above, yet they do enhance the misconception of wavering status of Finnish neutrality with their arguments as well. For example, John Lukacs and Kent Forster provided this sort of argumentation in their essays, Lukacs stating that, “That treaty [FCMA], the result of the Soviet victory in the second World War, established the limitations of an independent Finnish foreign policy and,

¹⁰⁵ Max Jakobson, *Finland in the New Europe* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 84.

¹⁰⁶ See: Efraim Karsh, “Finland: Adaptation and Conflict,” *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 62 (Spring, 1986): 2, 265-278; Arthur Spencer, “Finland Maintains Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs* 31 (January, 1953): 2, 301-309; Walter Z. Laqueur, “Europe: The Specter of Finlandization,” *Commentary*, December, 1977, <https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/walter-laqueur/europe-the-specter-of-finlandization/>, accessed on March 13, 2020.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Walter Z. Laqueur, “Europe: The Specter of Finlandization,” *Commentary*, December 1977, <https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/walter-laqueur/europe-the-specter-of-finlandization/>, accessed on March 13, 2020.

indeed, certain conditions for Finnish independence itself.”¹⁰⁹ Another noteworthy point is the title of Lukacs’ article, “Finland Vindicated,” which published in 1992 would refer to Finland being exonerated from Soviet Union after its collapse – something that itself is striking enough to enhance the misconception of wavering neutrality.

After the 1961 Note Crisis between Finland and the Soviet Union, Jakobson wrote an article, “Finland’s Foreign Policy”, in which he addressed the issue of the Finnish neutrality – and sovereignty – being questioned. In the article he maintains that, “It has been suggested that as a result of these events Finnish independence and sovereignty have been impaired or limited. I think this is a superficial view. Our freedom of choice as a nation is of course limited by the facts of geography and by the facts of power... in any event, a decision on the future course of Finnish policy remains entirely in the hands of Finland herself.”¹¹⁰ Supporting Jakobson’s argumentation, Ralf Törngren reminds of an important aspect of the Finnish neutrality, which should always be taken into account when assessing its durability, “It [neutrality] is... the means by which Finland traditionally has sought to safeguard her security and thus to protect her national way of life.”¹¹¹

Characteristics enhancing this misconception prevailing over the Western academic literature have been briefly addressed earlier during the research. It has been proved during this research that simplification of historical events or information do negatively affect the quality of academic literature and contribute into the creation of misconceptions. As an example of simplification of historical events is the Nightfrost Crisis of 1958 – in Finland, the Crisis is considered to be extremely important, not only to Finnish history in general, but also to her foreign policy and the development of Finlandization.¹¹² Thus, it is something that cannot be ignored when addressing the issue of Finland’s Cold War neutrality, as it has been a tremendous factor in shaping of it as a part of Finnish foreign policy.¹¹³ Despite this importance stressed by Finnish academics, the crisis is not really dealt with in Western academic literature to an appropriate extent – i.e. even Brian Faloon only addresses the crisis in one sentence, when he states the crisis occurred when the Soviet Union expressed their displeasure at the leaders and the composition of Finnish

¹⁰⁹ John Lukacs, “Finland Vindicated,” *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Fall, 1992): 4, 50.

¹¹⁰ Max Jakobson, “Finland’s Foreign Policy,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 38 (April, 1962): 2, 202.

¹¹¹ Ralf Törngren, “The Neutrality of Finland,” *Foreign Affairs* 39 (1961): 4, 609.

¹¹² Refer to chapter 3, “The Nighfrost Crisis.”

¹¹³ Jukka Seppinen, *Kivi Bolsevikin kengässä: Neuvostoliiton tavoitteet Suomessa 1917-1970* (Helsinki: Minerva Kustannus Oy, 2014), 298.

government, which led to its reformation.¹¹⁴ In reality, as i.e. Paavo Rantanen has showcased in his book, the causes to the crisis were much more complex and occurred within the span of a few years.¹¹⁵ This kind of simplification leads to fragmented knowledge, which again enhances the existing misconceptions – a process which eventually makes the misconceptions persistent enough to be accepted as the truth in some instances.

Also, the presence of incorrect definitions of terms and concepts seems to have heavily contributed into the existence of the misconceptions in the selected sources. As already addressed in the introduction and chapter 2, the misuse of the term Finlandization has heavily affected the Western perceptions of Finland's Cold War position, both within and outside of the scope of academic literature.¹¹⁶ The term itself, not even originally addressed directly to mean Finland, is twofold – it either instructs toward a negative or a positive interpretation, while neither is completely accurate and too simple considering all the necessary gradations. Thus, rather than being a historical reality in Finland, Finlandization seemed to have been a warning of an unfortunate fate of any European country that was foolish enough to trust the Soviets.¹¹⁷

Similarly being often misinterpreted is the term “neutrality,” which has been the core of Finland's foreign policy throughout the Cold War. As established in the Introduction chapter, Finland's position has been constantly evaluated in the Western world through a lens which corresponds to the traditional Western definition of neutrality.¹¹⁸ When Finland did not fit into the mold, which was introduced by an Austrian scholar Wolfgang Mueller, the Western observers gradually started to doubt the viability of her neutrality.¹¹⁹ This has been demonstrated by two Finnish scholars, Juhana Aunesluoma and Johanna Rainio-Niemi in their article, “Neutrality as Identity? Finland's Quest for Security in the Cold War,” as follows, “Suspicion toward neutrality was common on the Western side of the Cold War divide... any fuzziness along the interface zones between the two blocs was seen as a source of undesired unpredictability... In a world ruled by

¹¹⁴ Brian Faloon, “Aspects of Finnish Neutrality,” *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 1 (1982): 3, 9.

¹¹⁵ Paavo Rantanen, *Yöpakkaset 1958: Hyppy suomettumiseen* (Jyväskylä: Atena Kustannus Oy, 2019).

¹¹⁶ Timo Vihavainen, *Kansakunta rähmällään: Suomettumisen lyhyt historia* (Keuruu: Otava, 1991), 39.

¹¹⁷ Max Jakobson, *Finland in the New Europe* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 85.

¹¹⁸ Wolfgang Mueller, “Two Differing Concepts of Neutrality,” in *A Good Example of Peaceful Coexistence?: The Soviet Union, Austria, and Neutrality, 1955-1991* (Wien: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2011), 42.

¹¹⁹ Juhana Aunesluoma and Johanna Rainio-Niemi, “Neutrality as Identity? Finland's Quest for Security in the Cold War,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18 (2016): 4, 54.

hard power, small states were seen as incapable of resisting the external pressures and manipulation... In this light, Finland's neutrality seemed particularly vulnerable."¹²⁰

However, as it has been pointed out earlier, Finland's own definition of her neutrality was slightly different as it had had to be applied to the everchanging political situation. Törngren has substantiated this observation by stating that, "Purists may object that the commitments undertaken by Finland in the Treaty [FCMA] are incompatible with a neutral status... But the Treaty reflects the reality of the Finnish situation. It is indispensable for the creation of the confidence without which the neutrality of Finland would be built on sand."¹²¹ This confidence between Finland and the Soviet Union was essential to the endurance of the Finnish neutrality policy and to successfully ensuring Finnish nations safety. Klaus Törnudd has argued for this observation as well by asserting that, "The word 'confidence' was used in official speeches to signify this trust, and it was in Finland's interest to stress the significance and durability of the prevailing confidence. It was clear that in reality this confidence was not complete. Nevertheless, talking about it and otherwise playing up the importance of the treaty raised the political threshold that the Soviet Union would have had to cross if it had felt compelled to strengthen its military preparedness along its northwestern frontier."¹²² Therefore, it was clear that the main purpose of Finland's neutrality policy was to ensure the safety of her people, as Jakobson has also argued, "Our policy today, as always in the past, can have only one purpose and aim, and that is the preservation of Finnish independence and Finnish freedom. The means used to attain this end must be adapted to circumstances over which we can have only a very marginal control."¹²³

4.2 WESTERN LENS

Stemming from the misinterpretations of Finlandization and neutrality in the Finnish case, next misconception is the issue of Western world viewing international matters through their own perspective by using their own methods and concepts instead of adapting the necessary means for analysis from the country in question. In Finland's case, the issue lies in the fact that the Western observers sometimes forget to assess the importance of the long, shared history between Finland and Soviet Union or Russia. Without taking this long-lasting relationship into account, it is almost

¹²⁰ Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi, "Neutrality as Identity? Finland's Quest for Security in the Cold War," 55.

¹²¹ Törngren, "The Neutrality of Finland," 604.

¹²² Klaus Törnudd, "Finnish Neutrality Policy During the Cold War," *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 25 (Summer-Fall, 2005): 2, 45.

¹²³ Jakobson, "Finland's Foreign Policy," 202.

impossible to accurately evaluate the on-going relations between Finland and Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Soviet Union has been perceived as a traditional enemy for the Western world, both pre- and during the Cold War – it has been perceived as someone that could be collaborated with if necessary, but not truly trusted. Ideological differences between the two sides were so severe that they gradually affected the Western perceptions of Finland as it became increasingly difficult to understand the complicated, yet friendly Finnish-Soviet relations.¹²⁴ Despite the Western skepticism, it has been clear that Finland wanted to retain friendly relations with the Soviet Union, while economically and ideologically identifying with the West. Urho Kekkonen, former Finnish president, addressed this in his 1967 New Year's speech by stating that, "The extensive historical strain within the Finnish-Soviet relations has been so severe that a fatalist would have destined all cooperation as hopeless. But with open-mindedness and trust, the efforts of the two nations and their leaders have beared fruit... policy of friendship will start a new historical era."¹²⁵

The issue is not only the tendency to disregard Finnish-Soviet history and misunderstand their friendly relations, it extends further than that. It seemed to have been thought that as Finland did agree with Soviet politics and suppressed herself under their domination, as Jakobson has described this occurrence, "...their [Finland's] claim of independence had difficulty passing the decibel test often applied by Western commentators: the louder a country condemned the Soviet Union, the greater its independence."¹²⁶ This way, the Western tendency to view matters through their own preferred lens ties itself together with the first misconception, suspiciousness of the permanence of Finnish neutrality status. As if it would have been impossible to imagine a neutral, independent country in Eastern Europe at that time. As Jakobson puts it, "Finland's 'policy of silence' was believed to reveal a limitation of sovereignty, an abdication from the pursuit of national interest. It was, of course, the very opposite: an expression of 'sacroegoismo' of the small nation, a rejection of the claims of ideological solidarity."¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Seppo Zetterberg, *Suomen historian pikkujättiläinen* (Porvoo: WSOY, 2003), 574.

¹²⁵ Urho Kekkonen, "Tasavallan Presidentin Urho Kekkonen juhlapuhe Suomen itsenäisyysjuhluvuoden pääjuhlassa Helsingin jäähallissa 5.12.1967.," in *Urho Kekkonen julkaistu tuotanto*, Nr. 4611, <https://www.doria.fi/handle/10024/8488>, accessed on March 8, 2020.

¹²⁶ Jakobson, *Finland in the New Europe*, 84.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, 85.

4.3 FORGETTING INDIVIDUALITY

Third misconception presented here is the Western way of putting Eastern European countries together as one entity and then addressing their situation instead of treating them as individual countries, despite most of them being under the Soviet rule at the time. The tendency to address Eastern Europe as one entity explains, to some extent, why Finland's fall under communism was so highly anticipated by the Western bystanders. The influence of communism was perceived almost like a domino-effect – after one country would fall, the others would follow. Jakobson has commented on the issue by asserting that, “Ever since the end of the last war [World War II] Western observers seem to have had a great deal of difficulty in fitting Finland into the accepted scheme of things in Europe. The existence of this small, neutral, and practically unarmed nation – a Western democracy – next door to the Soviet Union has appeared to many as something like an Indian rope trick which defies the laws of nature. As a result, whenever anything happens that seems to restore the natural order of things, nobody is very much surprised.”¹²⁸

When Finland did not follow despite a few crises with the Soviet Union, it seemed strange to the Western world. Depicting this, is the phrase of Arthur Spencer, where he compares the efforts of Finland remaining independent to wizardry and claims that it was merely possible considering the long-lasting traditions of ancient wizardry in Finland.¹²⁹ Offering another explanation to this Finnish “exceptionalism” is Törngren, whose solutions seems to be rather simple, “For the pattern from which Finland is thought to have deviated is constructed from the course of events in countries with which Finland never has had much in common. The mystery [of exceptionalism] resolves itself, I believe, when developments in Finland are examined, not in the light of what has happened elsewhere in very different circumstances, but against the background of her own experiences and circumstances.”¹³⁰

4.4 GENERAL CAUSES

Finally, after analyzing each chosen misconception and their immediate causes, it is essential to introduce a few more general triggers that will tie all previously discussed tightly together and complete the circle.

¹²⁸ Jakobson, “Finland’s Foreign Policy,” 196.

¹²⁹ Spencer, “Finland Maintains Democracy,” 301.

¹³⁰ Törngren, “The Neutrality of Finland,” 601.

One of the most obvious reasons behind these misconceptions is the language barrier – it is impossible to interpret Finnish sources without the mastery of the language, and as most of the primary sources on the topic of neutrality are in Finnish, it is understandably difficult for Western academics to get access to them.¹³¹ This is not to say that no Western scholar knows Finnish, but rather to argue that this is the case when considering the chosen sources that constitute of the misconceptions. Building into the issue is the fact that most of the Finnish scholars conduct their researches in Finnish and do not write or publish anything in English, although in some cases it would be necessary. Again, this is not to argue that no Finnish scholar conducts research in English, but to state that in this particular topic the majority of the literature seems to be in Finnish.

Another common factor, as suggested by Hannu Rautkallio, is the geopolitical location of Finland.¹³² According to him, the fairly remote location of Finland has had a twofold negative effect on the Western observers – on one hand, it has affected how Finland’s independence and neutrality were perceived in the West, but on the other hand it has made the Western world to distance themselves from Finland, leaving her to survive the difficult times on her own.¹³³ Yet still, the Western academics have not refrained from writing about Finland’s situation, projecting their interpretations publicly. As Jakobson, once again, argues, “... the West, having failed to support Finland’s democracy when it was threatened, had forfeited its moral right to criticize policies designed to ensure the survival of Finland as a democratic state. But more important, foreign critics tend to project a one-dimensional picture of Finland, failing to distinguish between appearance and substance.”¹³⁴

Additionally, Rautkallio also argues that a lack of big, dramatic events might have been one of the factors behind the development of misconceptions within the Western world.¹³⁵ This might have to do with the fact that Finland’s conflicts with the Soviet Union did not include any military activity since the end of World War II – unlike i.e. the Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia in the late

¹³¹ Widely used primary sources among the Finnish scholars come from different Finnish archives, such as the National Archive or Urho Kekkonen Archive. Additionally, selected sources from the former Soviet archives are granted to Finnish researches to be translated into Finnish only.

¹³² Hannu Rautkallio, *Idässä kiinni, länteen kallellaan: USA ja Suomi 1944-1958* (Jyväskylä: Docendo, 2015), 21.

¹³³ Rautkallio, *Idässä kiinni, länteen kallellaan: USA ja Suomi 1944-1958*, 22.

¹³⁴ Jakobson, *Finland in the New Europe*, 88.

¹³⁵ Rautkallio, *Idässä kiinni, länteen kallellaan: USA ja Suomi 1944-1958*, 24.

1960s – which might have reduced the Western interest toward the Finnish affairs. As a result, the misconceptions were strengthened as not as much new research was conducted any longer.

CONCLUSIONS

This research has shed light on the question of the extent of misconceptions regarding Finland's Cold War neutrality that still prevail in some of the Western academic literature. As established in the introduction, it has become evident on the course of the research process that the majority of the Western academic literature is free of such misconceptions, yet a small part is not – thus, a collection of those sources has been subjected for analysis here. However, despite representing only a fragment of Western academic sources, their influence should not be underestimated since they continue to be widely available to both the academic community and general public.

Therefore, until the misconceptions are detected and explained, they will continue to affect peoples' judgements about Finland's Cold War affairs, especially neutrality.

The findings of this research are evident – three major misconceptions, their immediate causes, and general factors enhancing all three form a circle, which is difficult to break as these different parts continuously feed from each other. Simply, views of indecisive status of Finnish neutrality are triggered by simplification of historical information and the use of incorrectly defined terms and concepts, which has led to some Western observers viewing Finland's affairs through their own perspective instead of including Finland's own assessment into the analysis. The latter has manifested itself as inability to accurately perceive the friendly nature of Finnish-Soviet relations that stems from their lengthy common history – another factor not to be disregarded when conducting a research. Disregarding the common history seems to have led to a tendency to group Eastern European countries together instead of viewing them as separate instances. Additionally, above all this, the language barrier, remote geopolitical location, and lack of dramatic events have all played a role in the formation of these misconceptions.

The relevance of this research is apparent. While some Finnish former diplomats or politicians – later turned to academics or historians – such as Max Jakobson or Ralf Törnngren, have addressed the issue of misconceptions to some extent, the main focus of their assessments have been placed outside of the scope of academic literature. Therefore, a need for a similar research with an academic focus seemed necessary. Their analysis have offered support for the findings made during this research, not the other way around. However, despite this research having provided answers to some questions, such as the nature and possible causes of the misconceptions, it most certainly raises some questions as well, i.e. why Finnish scholarship has not addressed this issue

more extensively before, thus it leaves room for more extensive research. This is something that, perhaps, requires addressing later on.

One thing is certain – the matter of Finnish neutrality will remain under discussion also in the future. However, some Finnish scholars, i.e. Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi, have suggested an alternative perspective on viewing the matter – a view, which has also been emphasized throughout this research: “...Finlandization... should not be seen as the historically most accurate interpretation of Finland’s Cold War neutrality and its meanings. Finland’s historical neutrality needs to be considered from a new, broader perspective, one informed by scholarship, that recognizes neutrality’s multilayered and embedded features and their significance in the creation and durability of Finnish collective identities in the twentieth century and beyond.”¹³⁶

To finalize this research are Klaus Törnudd’s words on whether Finland’s Cold War neutrality should be questioned at all. He argues that, “It is altogether unnecessary to argue whether Finland was ever ‘genuinely neutral’ during the Cold War, considering that neutrality can be measured in many dimensions... in the end, there is no standard against which Finland’s policy during the Cold War years can be compared. Instead, the conclusion should be... ‘It has served us well.’ Finland’s policy of neutrality has successfully fulfilled the tasks set for it.”¹³⁷

¹³⁶ Juhana Aunesluoma and Johanna Rainio-Niemi, “Neutrality as Identity? Finland’s Quest for Security in the Cold War,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18 (2016): 4, 78.

¹³⁷ Klaus Törnudd, “Finnish Neutrality Policy During the Cold War,” *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 25 (Summer-Fall, 2005): 2, 51.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

LITERATURE

Aunesluoma, Juhana and Rainio-Niemi, Johanna. "Neutrality as Identity? Finland's Quest for Security in the Cold War." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18 (2016): 4, 51-78.

Buchanan, Tom. *Europe's Troubled Peace: 1945 to Present*. Second ed. Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2012.

Faloon, Brian S. "Aspects of Finnish Neutrality." *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 1 (1982): 3, 3-12.

Faloon, Brian S. "The Dimensions of Independence: The Case of Finland." *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 1 (1980): 2, 3-10.

Forster, Kent. "The Silent Soviet Vote in Finnish Politics." *International Journal* 18 (Summer, 1963): 3, 341-352.

Hobsbawm, Eric. *The Age of Extreme: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*. London: Michael Joseph, 1994.

Jakobson, Max. "Finland's Foreign Policy." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 38 (April, 1962): 2, 196-202.

Jakobson, Max. "Substance and Appearance: Finland." *Foreign Affairs* 58 (Summer, 1980): 5, 1034-1044.

Jakobson, Max. *Finland in the New Europe*. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998.

Jakobson, Max. *Pelon ja toivon aika: 20. vuosisadan tilinpäätös II*. Keuruu: Otava, 2001.

Karsh, Efraim. "Finland: Adaptation and Conflict." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 62 (Spring, 1986): 2, 265-278.

Kirby, David G. *Finland in the Twentieth Century*. London: Hurst, 1979.

Laqueur, Walter Z. "Europe: The Specter of Finlandization." *Commentary*. December, 1977. <https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/walter-laqueur/europe-the-specter-of-finlandization/>. Accessed on March 13, 2020.

Lukacs, John. "Finland Vindicated." *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Fall, 1992): 4, 50-63.

- Mueller, Wolfgang. "Two Differing Concepts of Neutrality." In *A Good Example of Peaceful Coexistence?: The Soviet Union, Austria, and Neutrality, 1955-1991*. Wien: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2011. 41-76.
- Niemi, Mari K and Perna Ville (eds). *Suomalaisen Yhteiskunnan Poliittinen Historia*. Helsinki: Edita Prima Oy, 2005.
- Ogley, Roderick. *The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.
- Pesu, Matti. "Suomettumisen ABC." *The Ulkopolitist*. February, 2017.
<https://ulkopolitist.fi/2017/02/16/suomettumisen-abc/>. Accessed on February 4, 2020.
- Petersen, Phillip A. "Scandinavia and the 'Finlandization' of Soviet Security." *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 38 (1991): 1, 60-70.
- Rantanen, Paavo. *Yöpakkaset 1958: Hyppy suomettumiseen*. Jyväskylä: Atena Kustannus Oy, 2019.
- Rautkallio, Hannu. *Idässä kiinni, länteen kallellaan: USA ja Suomi 1944-1958*. Jyväskylä: Docendo, 2015.
- Seppinen, Jukka. *Kivi Bolševikin Kengässä: Neuvostoliiton tavoitteet Suomessa 1917-1970*. Helsinki: Minerva Kustannus Oy, 2014.
- Seppinen, Jukka. *Vaaran vuodet? Suomen selviytymisstrategia 1944-1950*. Helsinki: Minerva Kustannus Oy, 2008.
- Singleton, Fred. "Finland Between East and West." *The World Today* 34 (August, 1978): 8, 321-332.
- Singleton, Fred. "Finland's Functioning 'Finlandisation'." *The World Today* 41 (1985): 11, 208-210.
- Singleton, Fred. "The Myth of Finlandization." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 57 (Spring, 1981): 2, 270-285.
- Singleton, Fred. *A Short History of Finland*. Rev. ed. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Spencer, Arthur. "Finland Maintains Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* 31 (January, 1953): 2, 301-309.
- Spencer, Arthur. "Soviet Pressure on Scandinavia." *Foreign Affairs* 30 (July, 1952): 4, 651-659.
- Törngren, Ralf. "The Neutrality of Finland." *Foreign Affairs* 39 (1961): 4, 601-609.
- Törnudd, Klaus. "Finnish Neutrality Policy During the Cold War." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 25 (Summer-Fall, 2005): 2, 43-52.
- Vihavainen, Timo. *Kansakunta rähmällään: Suomettumisen lyhyt historia*. Keuruu: Otava, 1991.

Vihavainen, Timo. *Ryssäviha: Venäjän-pelon historia*. Helsinki: Minerva Kustannus Oy, 2013.

Vilkuna, Kustaa H. J. *Viha: Perikato, katkeruus ja kertomus Isostavihasta*. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2005.

Visuri, Pekka. *Suomi kylmässä sodassa*. Helsinki: Otava, 2006.

Zetterberg, Seppo. *Suomen Historian Pikkujättiläinen*. Porvoo: WSOY, 2003.

SOURCES

Central Intelligence Agency. Intelligence Report. "‘Finlandization’ in action: Helsinki’s Experience With Moscow." August, 1972. In *Special Collection: The Caesar, Polo, and ESAU Papers*. No. 5077054e993247d4d82b6aa0. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5077054e993247d4d82b6aa0>. Accessed on January 23, 2020.

Kekkonen, Urho. "Tasavallan Presidentin Urho Kekkosen juhlapuhe Suomen itsenäisyysjuhlavuoden pääjuhlassa Helsingin jäähallissa 5.12.1967." In *Urho Kekkosen julkaistu tuotanto*. Nr. 4611. <https://www.doria.fi/handle/10024/8488>. Accessed on March 8, 2020.

Vihavainen Timo, et al. *Varjo Suomen Yllä: Stalinin salaiset kansiot*. Jyväskylä: Docendo, 2017.

