



Utrecht University



The Women's Movement in Palestine: A Journey from the *First Intifada* and the Oslo Peace Accords to Modern Day Fragmentation and Loss

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Home University: Utrecht University- Gender Studies Department

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Main Supervisor Approval: __Prof. dr. Sandra Ponzanesi



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Abstract

Reviewing the journey of the women's movement in Palestine, this research focuses on three events: The First Intifada (1987-93), the Oslo Peace Accords (1993-95), and finally the work of the movement after the peace agreement (1995 onwards). This project provides an analysis of the current day situation of the Palestinian women's movement by first understanding how the past has played a role in forming the present. Arguing that the women's movement in Palestine today is one that is deeply fractured and weak, the three chapters of this research project demonstrate how this weakness unraveled temporally. During the First Intifada, the women's movement started losing its momentum by aligning itself with an inherently masculine movement; namely the national resistance movement. Further, the Oslo agreement failed Palestinian women by excluding them from the process in its entirety, just as transitional justice theories historically failed to truly include women. This research examines the "secularism myth" (Braidotti et al. (2014)) that was employed by the Palestinian Authority as a new approach aimed at attracting foreign aid. It proposes an urgent need for a postsecular debate within Palestinian politics in order to achieve a discourse that is free from the secular/ religious binary, allowing space for true gender equality and woman empowerment to ultimately emerge. The PA was a favorable receiver of Western aid, allowing universal feminist agendas to established INGOs programs which sought to liberate and empower Palestinian women. Targeting women through these highly funded programs, obstructed the way in which the women's movement operated in Palestine. To overcome this challenge, this research project ends by making a second proposition to use Mohanty's (2002) "anticapitalist transitional feminist practice" as a way forward in order to break away from dependence on a globalized feminist discourse, and to go back to creating an authentic Palestinian feminist voice that calls for liberation from all layers of oppression.

I, the undersigned, declare the originality of this work conducted by myself for the completion of my Master's Degree in Women and Gender Studies (GEMMA). The total word count for this document (without footnotes, references, and abstract) is 23,143 words.

Linda Jaber 

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Introduction

The journey of the women's movement in Palestinian memory and history is fraught with events that shaped its work since inception and impacted its growth up to this day. Although it was marked as one of the oldest women's movements in the region during the last century, first established in the early 1920s (Zalatimo, 1998, p. 184), today we see the women's movement, manifesting in the work of its three generational activists, taking a less of an impactful position in a patriarchal Palestinian society dominated by men. The movement began with the charitable work of middle-upper class women (first generation), and was later organized into work committees in the late 1960s and 1970s (second and third generations). The second generation started organizing its work into committees, however, they remained mainly focused on charity (Kawar, 1996, p.103). It wasn't until the 1970s that the organized women's work became politicized, and later intertwined into the national resistance movement (ibid). When I speak of the women's movement in Palestine therefore, I refer to the work that has been done by three generations of activists (delineated in chapter 1), the youngest of which continues its work mainly in government and NGO work in Palestine today (ibid). Thus, in this research project, I will examine the journey of the Palestinian women's movement as it intersects with major historical events. These events have shaped the work of the women's movement and have likewise been impacted by its contribution and struggle. The three fundamental time periods which I will explore are: The First Intifada (1987-93), the Oslo Peace Accords (1993-95), and finally the work of the movement in the aftermath of the peace agreement (1995 onwards).

The Oslo peace agreement imposed a global neoliberal approach to the Palestinian struggle and resistance, which was adopted on the ground by an elitist few forming an unstable government. This government consisted of many men fighter comrades, and a lesser number of women fighters and activists, who had been part of the national resistance movement during the first Intifada. The importance of this project stems from the fact that it will create an analysis of the current day situation of the Palestinian women's movement by first understanding how the past played a role in forming the present. Although this topic has been extensively tackled by many researchers before, what my contribution offers is a rounded and temporal analysis that investigates the impact of the three major time periods mentioned above in order. Prior researchers have discussed women activism in Palestine during each of these time periods separately without making a conclusive

connection of how each phase led to the next, and finally birthing the ailed movement that exists today. Moreover, in examining the Oslo Peace Accords through processes of Transitional Justice (TJ), which created the foundational discourse for a precarious peace plan in Palestine, I am contributing to the small number of studies (such as those written by Dudai (2007), Netz-Zehngut (2012), Kontorovich (2013), and Khoury (2016)) that examine transitional justice mechanisms within the Palestinian Israeli conflict (Browne, 2017, p. 487). The reason for this scarcity is attributed to scholars, and international politicians alike, who view the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as one that is fluid and ongoing, especially challenging when examined alongside the failure of international law (ibid, p.489). This view, contrary to mine and the studies mentioned above, have deterred many from reviewing mechanisms of transitional justice during the Oslo Accords in Palestine.

In light of the above, this research project will argue that the women's movement in Palestine today is one that is deeply fractured and weak. Its weakness is first rendered, as demonstrated in *Chapter One*, in the fact that it connected the struggle of women's liberation with the national resistance movement during the first Intifada; a movement that has nationalized masculinity (Massad, 1995, p. 469). Palestinian nationalism is implicated in a narrative that relies on normative metaphors of gender, sexuality and identity, where heterosexual structures of power were a center stone in the discourse of the nationalist project (ibid, p. 477). A fight for women's rights within such an inherently hyper-masculine movement could not reap any benefits. In fact, it damaged many of the fruits that had already been seeded through the grassroots work of the women's movement before it joined its work with that of the national resistance movement. Instead of connecting itself to an fundamentally masculine movement, women's activism could have continued in its endeavor to fight colonialism and patriarchy, through what Holt & Jawad (2013) refer to as "a well-established female tradition" of resistance, or *Jihad*, which extends from the time of the prophet of when women used to participate in armed conflict (p.144). This female tradition of Arab women participation in war and fighting, was interrupted in history due to the normalization of patriarchal systems of power in the region. However, it was later revived with women's activism in the Middle East and North Africa against Western colonization.

Women, in the Arab World, participated in the resistance against colonization in Algeria, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. In Palestine too, the Palestinian women's movement saw itself as an extension of this resistance tradition and likewise participated in the fight against Israeli

colonization. However, they soon realized that their fight against external oppression had to be mirrored by a resistance against oppression that came from within. Sabbagh, (1998) confirms, as Palestinian women “fight colonial occupation, they become conscious of their own oppression within a patriarchal culture” (p. 18). Frantz Fanon, anticolonialism theorist and psychologist, wrote extensively on the psychological impacts of colonization on the colonized, specifically in the context of the Algerian revolutionary war against French colonization (1830-1962). He explains that when unable to face the power or accept the worldview of the colonizer, the colonized reverses anger and helplessness inwards (White, 2007, p. 858). Patriarchy is one form of how this anger is directed inwards towards less powerful individuals, such as women. Women in this case become oppressed by the men who in turn are oppressed by the colonizer, who also oppresses colonized women. Women are served a double oppression as a result. However, as Fanon explains, women find their way to join in the fight against colonization to restore their “right to exist as autonomous human beings” from both colonial and patriarchal powers (ibid, p.859-860).

Furthermore, I will explore in *Chapter Two* how the women’s movement in Palestine was impacted by the Oslo peace period which coincided with the surge of the Global Feminist movement. In order to fully understand the context of the woman’s movement in Palestine today, one must always refer back to a contentious time in Palestinian modern history, the Oslo Peace Accords. The Oslo Accords, which were initiated in 1993, marked a time that changed the fabric of Palestinian society on multiple levels, including political, economic, and civil society. During the negotiation process that led to the delivery of the Oslo Accords, Palestinian women, who had up to that point been hugely involved in national politics and activism, were mainly absent from participation. Looking at the Oslo process as a botched process of transitional justice, I will parallel feminist advocacy to reform theories of transitional justice. Theories of transitional justice added women and gender to its legal standards and process in hopes that this would achieve the reform to its canon and practice, as called for by critical feminists (Bell & ORourke, 2007, p.25). This is helpful in analyzing the experiences of Palestinian feminists advocating for women participation in the negotiation, transition process, and new government established as a result of the Oslo accords. Similar to transitional justice, the Oslo Peace Accords offered a transitional period of 10 years, that allowed Palestinian and Israeli sides to halt any armed confrontation and to negotiate a bilateral consensus on permanent peace. Thus, by reviewing women’s role and status during the conflict prior to the Oslo Accords, I will argue that the Oslo peace agreement failed Palestinian

women by excluding them from the process in its entirety just as transitional justice theories historically failed to truly involve women and gender issues in the process of transitional peace and mechanisms of justice. Finally, in this chapter, I analyze the establishment of the “secular-nationalist” Palestinian Authority (or PLO government) through debates of post-secularism (Scott (2009), Butler (2008), Braidotti et al. (2014), Lybarger (2007)). I examine the “secularism myth” (Braidotti et al. (2014)) that was employed by the PA as a new approach aimed at attracting foreign donor aid for women empowerment programs. I end this chapter by proposing a need for a postsecular debate within Palestinian politics in order to achieve a discourse that is free from the secular/ religious binary allowing space for true gender equality and woman empowerment.

The new approach adopted in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords which focused on attracting foreign aid at any cost drastically changed the Palestinian relationship to resistance- now that after Oslo, Palestinians became less of a people resisting Israeli colonization and more of a ‘semi-state’ that was negotiating peace while maintaining an Israeli military occupation. To examine the process of change, I will discuss, in *Chapter Three*, the effect of ‘White’ and ‘Globalized’ feminism on the Palestinian women’s movement and how it has contributed to weakening the impact of its work in Palestine. I use the terms White or Global Feminism to describe the canon which was criticized by postcolonial, transnational, Third World, and Chicana feminists (such as Mohanty 1991, Spivak 1988, and Flores 2000 amongst others) for its lack of representation, homogenous approach, and implicit colonialist discourse. Yuval-Davis (1997) gives a time frame of when she calls a First and Third world woman feminism began a “non-dialogue” (p. 117). She explains that since the rise of second-wave feminism in the West (during international conferences of the 1970s and 80s), First world feminists would call for the liberation of women as their primary and only goal, while third world women respond to the necessity of liberation from colonization as a nation first (ibid). This dialogue of the deaf, as Yuval-Davis (1997) refers to, is the gap which I will examine its impacts on the work of the Palestinian women’s movement.

To do so, I will draw parallels with a relevant experience of the Global LGBTQ movement and how it negatively impacted LGBTQ movements in the Third World. The Oslo peace accords facilitated the proliferation of a universalized white feminist agenda because it accepted immense amounts of international aid for so-called “state-building” projects. Through positioning itself as a secular government, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was a favorable receiver of Western donor

aid and at that time made the promise of empowering women and achieving gender equality in Palestine. They allowed global feminist agendas to manifest their work across Palestinian cities, villages, and refugee camps through newly established International NGOs (INGOs) and programs which sought to liberate and empower Palestinian women. Targeting women through these INGO highly funded programs, obstructed the way in which the women's movement operated in Palestine. Development of a Palestinian woman's agenda had to be understood within this new context, and away from the grassroots initiatives that formed the foundation of the women's movement's work in the 1970's and 80's of the past century. Thus, the Global feminist movement contributed to the fragmentation of the women's movement in Palestine through the NGOization¹ of its work. The introduction of the donor community, which makes up the backbone of the Palestinian economy to this day, meant that the original discourse of a Palestinian woman's movement (which focused on resistance, liberation, steadfastness, and right of self-determination as part of a collective national front against an occupying colonial power) had to change to a globalized 'modern' discourse focusing on individual woman's liberty (Kuttab, 2008, p.109). The effects of this change were, and remain to be, detrimental to the woman's movement and to the feminist voice in Palestine. I end this chapter by proposing Mohanty's (2002) "anticapitalist transitional feminist practice" as a way forward which Palestinian feminists today can benefit from in order to break away from their dependence on a globalized feminist discourse.

Finally, in order to establish this conclusion and to help my reader understand where modern day fragmentation of the women's movement stems from, my research project will investigate the journey through which the efforts of the women's movement have had to travel. Evidently, the project will attempt to answer the following questions: How did the geopolitical events in the 1980s-90s impact the Palestinian women's movement and lead to its fragmentation and loss? What did the Palestinian women's movement look like in the 1970s and 80s, prior to the Oslo Peace agreement in Palestine, specifically during the time of the first Intifada? What role did the Oslo Peace Accords play in the exclusion of women from political participation and in bringing around a Global feminist movement and discourse to Palestine? How did this discourse impact the Palestinian women's movement? And what role did International women NGOs play in the

¹ A term widely used within Palestinian colloquial language referencing the transformation of women's issues from grassroots organizations on a local level to donor-controlled projects implemented through multiple international and local non-governmental organizations (NGO's), guided by foreign financial aid and agendas that push forward a "universal" and human-rights based approach to women's issues. The term was first coined by Sonia Alvarez (1999) and was brought to the Palestinian context by Jad Islah (2007).

changing of the social, political, and national dynamics of the women's movement that existed prior to Oslo?

Methodology

For my research project, I have used secondary data to research the women's movement during the three eras identified in the introduction above. This literature review helped me create a comprehensive understanding of the temporal development of the women's movement in Palestine. I began this review through searching online libraries using key words such as: the women's movement in Palestine, women and resistance in Palestine, Palestinian women activists, women and the national resistance movement in Palestine, and so on. From this research, I was able to select articles and books that have discussed and analyzed the topic from a historical point of view. As a result, I was able to identify three political events in Palestinian history that I noticed had impacted the work of the women's movement in Palestine. Once these time periods were set, I was able to refine my research words to search deeply within the literature written on each time period. Therefore, I started using key words such as the women's movement and the first Intifada, women in the first intifada, the women's movement and the Oslo Accords, and women NGOs in Palestine...etc. As I delved deeper into researching each time period, I noticed connections to the theories and academic readings I had done throughout my Master's program. I quickly realized that I could use theories of Transitional Justice, postsecular debates, postcolonial studies and critical feminist writings to help me analyze the journey of the development, and deterioration, of the women's movement in Palestine, specifically as it intersects with the defined political and historical events.

Guiding my research was the question that intrigued my mind as I was learning about the women's movement in Palestine: why has the force and impact of the woman's movement changed/ weakened over the years? Having spent my formative years in Palestine, I was bothered by the local discourse within my network of friends and family on the women's movement's work while constantly reminiscing on a glory that seemed bygone. This feeling has hunted me since graduating my undergraduate studies from Birzeit University- the birth place of many Palestinian women activists. Therefore, I decided to study the chronological development of the women's movement to understand its journey and what geopolitical impacts have caused its work to dim. It is my believe that the work of women's movement in Palestine across the years must be read and understood within the context of the historical moment during which the beginning of deterioration took place. Further, it is especially important to me that I research this topic, because I plan on

returning to Palestine upon finalizing this degree to work on women's issues projects and programs. I wanted to investigate the scene before I did so, to make sure that I am an active agent with informed decisions on how I can bring the knowledge from my degree into the fieldwork of organizing for women's rights in Palestine.

To organize my research, I used a form of a Synthesis Matrix that I created on an Excel Sheet which worked as a visual representation of the ideas I was finding in my research. I started my matrix with a row for each time period I had identified early on in my research: Before and during First Intifada, Oslo Accords, aftermath of Oslo. These time periods acted as themes under which I would collect ideas and quotes that felt were building up answers to my questions of how and when the deterioration of the women's movement's work had happened. To add complexity to the matrix, I inserted columns for the theoretical framework I chose to use, which included 4 main columns: Transitional Justice, Post-secular debates, Postcolonial Studies and feminist critical literature, as well as secondary data and literature on the topic. Under the time periods, I included information and quotes I retrieved from my research on literature about the women's movement in Palestine (including interviews with activists). The matrix looks something like the below:

Time Period	Literature Review	Transitional Justice	Post-Secular debates	PC Studies
1st Intifada	Argument/ Intervention	Argument/ Intervention(s)	Argument/ Intervention(s)	Argument/ Intervention(s)
Source 1	Quotes			
Source 2	Quotes			Quotes
Source 3	Quotes			Quotes
Source 4...etc.	Quotes			
Oslo Accords				
Source 1	Quotes	Quotes	Quotes	
Source 2	Quotes	Quotes	Quotes	
Source 3	Quotes	Quotes	Quotes	

Source 4...etc.	Quotes	Quotes	Quotes	
Aftermath of Oslo				
Source 1	Quotes			Quotes
Source 2	Quotes			Quotes
Source 3	Quotes			Quotes
Source 4...etc.	Quotes			Quotes

As demonstrated above, the theoretical framework of this project depends on three main pillars: Theories of transitional justice in order to understand and analyze the Oslo Peace Accords agreement, discussions within postcolonial studies and critical feminist literature to entangle the paper's arguments on neoliberalism, NGOization and post Oslo "modern" society, and finally, I draw on discussions that have already been made on the topic through published literature in order to situate my discussion and to insure its robust contribution to extending existing narratives. In my tackling of transitional justice theory (Browne (2017), Bell & ORourke's (2007), Borer (2009), Garcia-Godos, J. & Lid, K. (2010), and Lemaitre, J., & Sandvik, K. (2014)), I incorporate it through the critical lens of feminist scholarship that have highlighted the need for transitional justice theory to include women. This framework is helpful in understanding how women were excluded during the negotiation, and later the implementation, of the peace agreement. Their exclusion after the instatement of the new government was covered by a secularist debate often echoed by the PA in order to set itself apart from its religious rival; Hamas. The PLO (composed of mainly Fateh members) marketed a secularist government to the West because it knew secularism there was perceived as a hub to advocate for gender rights. In playing on the cords of secularism to increase its donor funds, the PA weakened true efforts for women progression and liberation. To arrive at this conclusion, I analyze secularism in Palestine through debates of postsecularism (Scott (2009), Butler (2008), Braidotti et al. (2014), Lybarger (2007), and propose a post-secular debate as an essential tool to achieve gender equality in Palestine.

Finally, to investigate the impact of the Oslo Peace Accords on the Palestinian society, specifically in relation to women and the NGOization of the women's movement, I refer to

discussions within postcolonial studies which critically engage with topics of ‘Western’ influence over non-white ‘third world’ countries. Literature from post-colonial studies is specifically helpful in analyzing the impact of the global feminist movement on the women’s movement in Palestine. It acts as a lens through which I can gradually build my argument on the increased fragmentation of the women’s movement since the first Intifada. Finally, perspectives and discussions on the topic of the Oslo agreement, the *first intifada* and the women’s movement in Palestine by various writers such as Kuttab (2008), Jad, (2007, 2010, 2018), Allabadi (2008), Mohamad (2001), Sabbagh (1998), and Dajani (1993), amongst others, were analyzed as secondary data to form my main argument on the fragmentation and loss of the women’s movement in Palestine. I will not use primary data in this research because women activists have been interviewed multiple times over the years. In fact, Kavar (1996) comments on the “ease” of the 46 prominent women activists she interviewed as she starts one with a first generation activist Samiha Khalil, “She Spoke with the ease of someone who had been interviewed many times.” (p. 9). As such, I have decided to instead critically engage with these interviews by incorporating their perspectives within my research and to help me delineate the journey of the women’s movement across the three time-periods I specify.

Chapter 1: The Palestinian Women's Movement and The Struggle for Liberation During the *First Intifada*

“In the collective memory of the Palestinian women's leadership, the national question was never separated from the woman's question.” (Kawar, 1996)

In 1987, thirty-nine years after the *Nakbah*² and twenty years after the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the first Palestinian national uprising against the Israeli occupation—namely the *First Intifada*—was ignited. The first Intifada was a people's revolution against their occupier and their resistance against the oppression that they have endured. In the few years prior to the first Intifada, Palestinians came to realize through a subsequent of political events that liberation had to be achieved from the inside, ending “the myth that liberation could come from outside” (Qumsiyah, 2010, p. 134). Repression by the Israelis intensified between the years 1982-87, where Israeli forces “committed atrocities, ranging from shooting civilians in cold blood to home demolitions, deportations, collective punishment and beatings,” as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity which were all well obscured through “quasi-legalistic structures” (ibid). In response to these atrocities, Palestinian national resistance grew in face of it culminating in 1987 with the *Intifadat Al-Hijara* (Uprising of Stones), or what is known as the first Intifada. The killing of three unarmed citizens near Al-Bureij Refugee camp on October 3rd, 1987 launched a nationwide demonstration and strike that continued for months on end and expanded to all cities, villages and refugee camps inside and outside of the Green Line³ (ibid). The brutal attack and killings of demonstrators and citizens by Israeli military forces, coupled with the political unrest regarding the Palestinian cause in the international arena, were met with stone-throwing youth (age 8-20 years old) which gave this Intifada, and that whole generation of Palestinians, their name (*atfal AlHijara- Children of stones*). During the first year only of this intifada, 204 Palestinian were killed, half of them children, with zero fatality on the Israeli side (ibid, p. 137).

² Nakbah (Catastrophe in Arabic) is the 1948 exodus of Palestinians as a result of Israeli war, where over 700,000 people fled their homes and towns and became refugees around the world.

³ The green-line is the 1949 Armistice Line and an internationally recognized borderline which separates pre-1967 Israel from the occupied Palestinian Territories. https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/palestineremix/green_line.html

Six years from the start of the first Intifada, the Oslo Peace Accords⁴ were signed to end the so-called conflict. During the Intifada, Palestinians organized their resistance through a national movement that inevitably recruited most Palestinians within Palestine and outside of it into some sort of a political framework. The movement took the form of popular mobilization in mass protests, strikes, civil disobedience and communal food cooperatives. Prior to the first Intifada, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza had been living for years under the oppressive civil administration and military occupation of Israel. Palestinians would pay taxes and receive services from this administration which controlled all aspects of social, economic and political life, while simultaneously practicing armed subjugation against them. During this time, Palestinians developed strong civil society organizations to support the needs of the Palestinian people. Palestinians in the 1970's and 80's of the past century enjoyed a very active civil society, abundant with engaged organizations, unions, movements, societies, councils, amongst which were a number of vigorous women's organizations (Jad, 2010, p.83). The Women's Work Committee was founded in the late 1970's to unite this work under one organized agenda that elevated women's social status in the Palestinian society through increasing her education and facilitating her work outside the home, through setting up day care centers for example. (Hiltermann, 1998, p. 48). This committee later became the stem from which factional women's committees emerged in the following decade representing the general political factionalism within the Palestinian resistance movement itself (ibid).

In her book investigating woman leadership in the history of the Palestinian struggle, Amal Kavar (1996) interviews 46 of the most prominent Palestinian feminists who have played a pivotal role through their activism in the movement before, during, and after the first Intifada. Kavar asserts that although Hanan Ashrawi remains to be the most familiar figure to a Western audience due to her role as a spokesperson for the Palestinian delegation in the early 1990s, and her multiple appearances on Western news channels as a commentator on the struggle even up to this day, many other women leaders are widely acknowledged for their activism within the local context in Palestine (IX). Kavar (1996) in her book delineates the three generations of Palestinian women's leadership which were formed by different, but connected, political eras. The first generation is called by the younger two other generations the "mothers' generation." They became leaders

⁴ The Oslo Peace Accords were a set of peace agreements signed between the Palestinians and Israel in 1993 and 1995. A second Intifada ignited in 2000, marking the end of a 7-year semi peace period.

through their work in women's charitable societies and are represented by four main women (Salwa Abu Khadra⁵, Samira Abu Ghazaleh,⁶ Issam Abdel Hadi,⁷ and Samiha Khalili⁸) who were seen as activists during the 1948 Nakba and the establishment of Israel (ibid, p. 2). Their role remained as caregivers and extended well into the 1950s, but they mainly constituted middle- and upper-class societal work.

However, in witnessing the Nakba during their adult lives, this generation paved the road for the coming two generations to break away from charitable work and into nationalist politics (ibid, page 5). In'am Abdel Hadi asserts in her interview, "It was not that women of the older generation did not go to the nadawat [symposium] or read the new poetry, for these activities were common in Arab intellectual life, but that the younger generations were more fortunate to have their youth during a time of expanding educational opportunities. They found themselves in university settings where new thinking was explored on a scale never before experienced in the history of the Arab world" (ibid, p.13) At the occurrence of the Nakba, this generation endorsed the very early transition of any Palestinian struggle, including women struggles, into *the Palestinian cause* (Al-Qadiya in Arabic). The second generation represents the era during which women were influenced by regional sentiments of Arab nationalism, led by the voice of Egyptian President at the time Jamal Abdel Nasser, and leftist ideologies which found their way into Palestine through communist literature in the 1950s-60s of the last century (ibid). This generation forms the base of women who assumed leadership positions in the PLO (such as Hanan Ashrawi⁹, Sulafa Hijawi¹⁰) and their legacy was the transformation of the General Union of Palestinian Women into a mobilization organization that included thousands of women (ibid). During this generation, Palestinian women in refugee camps were involved in women societies works and activism for the first time. The third and final generation was born in the 1950s and they include women leaders who became politicized as a result of the 1967 war or Naksa. These women do not all live within the borders of Palestine, but are spread out throughout the region, as the case is with most Palestinians, yet they continued to work from abroad on advocating Palestinian women rights

⁵ 1948 refugee; one of the first cadres of Fateh and the general secretary of the Women's Union (Kawar, 1996).

⁶ 1948 refugee; founder of Women's Union branch in Egypt, Palestinian Women's League (ibid).

⁷ Longtime president of the Women's Union and secretary of the Arab Women's Union (ibid).

⁸ Founder and president of Ina'sh Al Usra Society, a Prominent Palestinian women's society organization (ibid).

⁹ Hanan Ashrawi is a Palestinian member of the women's movement, an activist, a scholar former minister and member of the legislative council. In the 1991 she was a spokesperson to the Palestinian Peace Negotiation delegation in Madrid Peace Conference.

¹⁰ Sulafa Hijawi served as an advisor to late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and had founded Iraqi branches of the PLO's Women's and Writer's Unions (ibid).

and increased participation in leadership positions (ibid). According to Kavar (1996), the women in this generation self-define as feminists, departing from strict class categorization (p. 104).

In the wake of the six-day-war in 1967, or the Naksa¹¹ as Palestinians call it, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were coercively annexed by the state of Israel, ending the Jordanian rule over the West Bank and the Egyptian one over Gaza. To fill-in the vacuum, grassroot organizations and popular committees started to emerge in the early 1970's to alleviate the severe social and economic living conditions caused by the occupation. Amongst these newly established committees were women committees that materialized out of the Palestinian Woman's Movement. According to Hanan Ashrawi, the Palestinian Women's Movement is one of the oldest women's movements in the Arab World established in the 1920's in the form of "charitable organizations in which middle-class women would help rural women" (Zalatimo, 1998, p. 184). The movement during that time as such, was a classed-movement which heavily relied on charitable society work. Nonetheless, although the Palestinian society during that time was definitely a male-dominated patriarchal one where men led civil, political and cultural lives while women assumed subordinate and supportive roles, it still followed a liberal tradition -especially in its urban cities- where women enjoyed access to education and travel, as well as a freedom that was unparalleled in neighboring Arab societies (Ibid). However, despite this relatively openminded and multicultural environment, the women's movement's work continued along traditional lines in the form of philanthropic organizations working through normative gender roles, away from any real political engagement (Ibid). It wasn't until the early 1970's that the women's movement slowly and gradually became more politicized in its work. Ashrawi asserts, "In 1967 the shock of the occupation, like the shock of the dispossession, led to the emergence of a more politically aware women's movement" (Zalatimo, 1998, p. 185). Political engagement for women meant equal participation to men in national activities including, "demonstrations, congresses, memoranda to the government, arms smuggling, meetings with government officials, fundraising, support to prisoners, and aid to the wounded (Kuttab, 2009, p. 104). While conducting these national activities, "women were able to assert a feminist agency and autonomy from the male nationalist project and the colonizers' imposition of neo-traditional customs" (ibid).

¹¹ Arabic word for 'Setback.' Over 400,000 Palestinians were displaced as a result of the 1967 war.

This political awareness of Palestinian women activists in the 1970s did not only happen because of “the shock of the occupation.” In other words, the shock did not occur in a vacuum. Globally, women organizations were growing in number organizing internally within different countries and connecting on an international level through a transnational women’s movement. The United Nations (UN) facilitated cooperation between local women organizations spread across the world through its international conferences. In 1975, the UN announced a Decade for Women (1975-85) where they focused on increasing global gender equality. By the year 1995, over 40,000 people met at the Fourth Global Conference on Women in Beijing, growing the number of women organizations from just a few emerging in mainly Western countries in the late 1800s (Paxton et al., 2006, p. 899). A growing international network of organizations as Paxton et al. (2006) research, allows for a similar international eco-system where global norms can be conformed, agreed upon, and structured (p. 900). Within this ecosystem, the international women’s movement was able to promote a global discourse on gender inclusion and female rights which in turn spread enthusiasm towards increased women participation in economics and politics across nations (ibid). This enthusiasm is transmitted through cooperation with UN agencies as previously mentioned, but also through the proliferation of women international NGOs. In the 1970s, Paxton et al. (2006) demonstrate, Women’s International Nongovernmental Organizations (WINGOs) “exploded” in numbers, “changing from steady to exponential growth” (ibid). Nonetheless, they remind us, “The mere existence of a transnational network capable of diffusing global norms does not ensure that this network will benefit women or even address their concerns.” (ibid). Benefiting from this international context existing outside of Palestine, the women’s movement within Palestine saw it crucial to likewise increase its political engagement in the 1970s. However, “global norms” were still not yet imposed on social movements within Palestine. Although women activists were reading and benefiting from Western feminist literature in forming their movement, it was not until the 1990s that “global norms” on gender equality and women empowerment were powerfully intervening in the work of the women’s movement in Palestine through the sudden rise of international women NGOs in Palestine, following the Oslo Accords.

Social movements in Palestine prior to that time worked through an agenda that was responsive to the local social and national needs, and within this context the national women’s movement in Palestine emerged. According to Kuttub (2008), it emerged “through a decentralized

framework of women's activism which supported and mobilized grass-roots organizations and acted as a legitimate representative to Palestinian women in general" (p. 104). In 1978, the women's movement in Palestine became less of a group of scattered and individualized charitable organizations working on different agendas and more of a unified national movement working within the political and national framework for resistance. On March of that year, The Union of Palestinian Women's Working Committees (UPWC) was established, uniting different women's groups into one popular front (Kamal, 1998, p. 83). The success of this union caused the establishment of 3 other unions: The Union of Working Palestinian Women's Committees (1980), the Union of Palestinian Women (1981) and the Union of the Women's Committees for Social Work (1982). Membership in these unions were in the thousands within just a few years, expanding their work well beyond the impact that philanthropic organizations had in the previous years (Kamal, 1998, p. 83). By the time the first Intifada began in 1987, the women's movement had been working through a number of organizations such as "a general union, committees affiliated to political parties, independent women's NGOs, charitable societies and women's studies and research centers," all of which worked to bring women's issues to the forefront of Palestinian politics (Allabadi, 2008, p.181).

Consequently, during the two decades prior to the Oslo Peace Accords, the women's movement in Palestine was a "a genuine democratic movement, emerging in its decentralized structures, to respond to the needs of the national struggle and to promote women's consciousness around national and women's issues" (Kuttab, 2008, p.103). The woman's movement in Palestine established its work during the first Intifada through its relation to the national resistance against Israeli occupation of Palestine. On a political level, women were equal participants to the men in the fight against the occupation and received a status in society that empowered them beyond the limitations of the patriarchal structure. It was the main aim of feminists within the Palestinian society during that time, who were grounded in socialist political orientation, to mobilize women around "the dual issues of national rights and women's rights" (Allabadi, 2008, p.182). Ashrawi stresses, "Since we had to deal with women's issues immediately, this meant that we could no longer postpone the conflict; for a conflict postponed is a conflict lost. There was no such thing as a primary or secondary conflict, all social issues had to be dealt with simultaneously with national issues" (Zalatimo, 1998, p. 186). Women during the Intifada, were mobilizing along the same lines

of the national resistance movement. Women's liberation for them meant that they were also free from the occupation. They worked with political popular committees initiating projects, making decisions, and taking on responsibility, as well as participating in the fight on the ground against armed occupation forces. Kuttab (2009) explains, "women had to prioritize the national dimension as part of their vision to improve the Arab women's status, which was embedded in their concept of the role of the nation-state. This view was not based on conceptualizing gender roles, or factors of internal oppression, but rather women perceived it as the means to and end result of social change or "reform", where achievement becomes linked to the struggle for building a nation-state" (p. 107).

However, as Nira Yuval-Davis (1997) argues, nationhood is constructed around notions of both womanhood and manhood (p. 1). Women reproduce conceptions of the nation "biologically, culturally, and symbolically, yet they remain "hidden" from any nationalist phenomena" (p. 2). This is mainly due to the private/ public divide within civil society, where the building of a nation state is located within the public sphere, a space where women are non-existent. Women occupy the private sphere and thus their exclusion from the public arena leads to an exclusion from any nationalist or political discourse (ibid). Early on, Palestinian women realized that they had to challenge this dichotomy and to demand for inclusion. They believed that their political engagement would work simultaneously to dissolve patriarchal oppression and exclusion. Jehan Al-Helou¹² in an interview, recounts her story with her father while living in diaspora in Beirut: "Once my father didn't want me to travel abroad. I was going with a delegation. I had to argue and argue and he was apparently afraid for me. And then I said, "I don't have any brothers. I feel very bad I was born a girl." And my father—he was rather democratic—said, "Why?" He was hurt. And I said—maybe this was tactical,"—If I was a boy I would just say I am going because I have graduated from the university." Imagine that I still had to...And if I was a boy that is all he would have told his father. And he said, "No." And he laughed. And I laughed. And that was it, and I travelled. You see, I think every one of us had to struggle on two fronts" (Kawar, 1996, p. 22).

What this period highlights, as compared to the Women's movement's work prior to the establishment of the unions in 1978, is that women from all walks of life were now partaking in the political and social struggle for liberation. Women in rural areas and refugee camps were no

¹² Leader of the Women's Union in the 1970's and top female cadres in Fateh- PLO's armed resistance group. (Kawar, 1996, p. 21).

longer mere receivers of services from charitable organization, they were now active members in the unions participating in the struggle for independence. Kamal (1998) describes, “The novel methods [unions] have used include organizing women in districts and residential areas in all cities, villages, and camps, as well as developing a national organization. This national structure is flexible enough to recruit women from all social and economic walks of life” (p. 83). This experience, which was formed during the short years prior to the Intifada, proved to be of fundamental value to the national mobilization against the occupation in the early years of the uprising. Women’s committees “lent their organizing and leadership experience” to the popular committees in villages, refugee camps and city neighborhoods that were emerging throughout the country in the wake of the Intifada (Hiltermann, 1998, p. 43). Nevertheless, the women’s movement succeeded in maintaining a fight for women’s rights along the fight for independence during the Intifada. In the years of the early nineties, women committees marked some significant achievements including, “running a domestic violence hotline, and [...] actively campaigning on issues of violence against women, as well as working on issues of democracy and representation” (Allabadi, 2008, p.182). The committees continued to deal with social issues that were relevant to the day-to-day lives of the Palestinian women, such as divorce, dowry, social and economic independence...etc., even amidst political unrest and conflict (Zalatimo, 1998, p. 185). During the Intifada, they were doing this hand-in-hand while they organized mobilization with popular committees as part of the national resistance movement against the occupation.

Nadje Al-Ali & Latif Tas (2018), in their article studying the Kurdish women’s movement and its relationship to the Kurdish nationalist and political movement in Turkey, argue that in the “contexts of anti-colonization and anti-occupation struggles,” a link between national and women’s liberation is unbreakable (p. 453). They further explain that while many Western feminists (Enloe 1989; McClintock 1996; Parker and Yaeger 1992) view nationalism as a means for governments to advance and reinforce patriarchy, feminists in the global south have been involved in various ways in the struggle for women’s rights along the same lines of the national struggle for liberation (p. 454). Fanon (as cited in White 2007), gives the example of Algerian women and their fight against French colonizers. Women, as Fanon explains, through their participation in the armed revolution were able to reconstruct their “feminine identities and family relationships” in ways that caused positive change to patriarchal traditions (p. 860). However, Al-Ali & Tas (2018) exhibit in their review of academic discourse on this topic, that research

(including that on Palestine) demonstrates how even in the strongest attempts to maintain feminist claims within national movements, women are always eventually sidelined and their issues dismissed. In the case of Algeria for example, which Fanon extensively studies, Algerian feminists have written in criticism of his analysis accusing him of overstating the relationship between the liberation of women and national liberation (ibid). Because men turned to revolution against the colonizer through the formation of a national identity that is nostalgic to a time before colonization where they had power over the domestic (i.e. power of men over women), women were not equal participants in the fight against colonialism (p. 862). This proximate experience, both in time and location, could have provided Palestinian women with noteworthy future insights to learn from before they organized their efforts in alignment with the national resistance movement.

Palestinian feminists, as they were creating the unions and positioning their struggle for rights within the context of the national liberation, were aware of this literature and of the regional examples where this alignment had failed. Ashrawi proclaims that in the early 1970s, members of the women's movement were meeting and reading feminist literature to decide on a Palestinian women's agenda and on a way forward for the movement (Zalatimo, 1998, p. 185). Hilterman (1998) additionally argues, "[Palestinian] activists repeatedly reminded their peers of how Algerian women, who had played so important a role during the revolution, had fared following Algerian independence in 1962" (p. 47). Zalatimo (1998) in her 1992 aforementioned interview with Ashrawi likewise referred to the Algerian example in her questions to Ashrawi. She asked Ashrawi what measures the woman's movement, whom Ashrawi had been an active part of and had played a fundamental role in the establishment of the unions, was taking into consideration in order to avoid the pitfalls of the Algerian model. Ashrawi answered with confidence that this will not be replicated in Palestine, and that the awareness created in the years of the 1970's and 80's around women's issues would not fall victim to traditional and patriarchal ways of living (p. 189). This confidence, however, becomes more moderate in another interview that Ashrawi gives just four years later in 1996 (3 years after the signing of Oslo, whereas the previously cited interview was conducted one year prior to the roll-out of the treaty). Ashrawi in this later interview, speaks of how women's efforts to ensure women's rights were rarely legitimized through written law (Kawar, 1996, p. 111). Instead, the Working Women's Committees in the 1990s would organize campaigns against Palestinian companies to fight for working women's rights such as equal pay and International Women's Day as a paid leave (ibid). Companies would abide to avoid the

cacophony brought about by a visit of vocal women leaders, rather than be deterred by law. Ashrawi participated in one of these successful campaigns and reflects calling, “We waged this as a feminist struggle rather than as a political group struggle.” In the end, these successes were all symbolic without the mandate of law, but they were occasions—admittedly on a small scale—for the women's leadership to present a unified front on behalf of women's interests” (ibid). Admitting the small scale of these wins, and their inability to be pushed within government, exposes the incremental defeats that the work of the women’s movement had suffered after linking itself to the national liberation movement- and later the government that was formed out of it.

Although Al-Ali & Tas (2018) do not argue against the experiences discussed by feminists on the failure of women movements to attain their rights when linking them with the national liberation movement, they do assert that within the Kurdish example it is difficult to measure tensions between feminism and nationalism without an empirical approach on the nuances of the context. While the Palestinians’ struggle for liberation has not ended to this day, we are still able to assess, from the experience of the historical moment of the first Intifada, whether or not the approach of the women’s movement’s agenda at that time to link the national and feminist struggle together has reaped any benefits. Since the end of the first Intifada and the signing of the peace accords, Palestinians have been able to experience self-rule, even if a disabled one. The role of women during the peace negotiation, peace signing, and later on the creation of the Palestinian government provides ample room for arguing that this interlinkage that the women’s movement had created unfortunately failed beyond the time period of the first Intifada. The active and equal role that women played during the first Intifada, allowed them hope to believe that they would be able to continue participating on equal terms in political and economic arenas. This hope is clearly visible in Ashrawi’s responses in the interview she gave in 1992 during the negotiation for the Oslo peace Accords, in which she was an active player. As such, when the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was instated in government as a direct result of the Oslo Accords, women expected to maintain that role and hoped to push gender issues further along with the newly established government body. However, the Palestinian Authority (PA), which was now the official ruling arm of the PLO, was too engaged in “state building” (Jad, 2010), that issues of women and gender were not on their radar. Restoring notions of patriarchy and hypermasculinity, women were “dishonored by participating in the struggle against occupation, which until this time had been condoned” (Allabadi, 2008, p.185).

Joseph Massad (1995) explores how masculinity as a colonial model is figured in the Palestinian discourse on nationalism. Palestinians, he argues, understand nationalist agency in masculine terms. Nationalism, and its gendered narratives, emerged through European thought and was proliferated through colonialism to the colonized world (p. 467). The colonized world, as such, was implicated in the same gendered narrative of nationalist agency, although it understood itself in opposition to European nationalism (p. 467). White (2007) likewise analyzes the interconnectedness between nationalism and masculinity in her examination of Fanon's claims regarding the psychological benefits of violent revolution. She explores the concept of nationalism and how it is formed within colonial rule. She explains that nationalism is a place for the colonized man to regain his lost power and self-worth, that which was stolen from him through the violent oppression of the colonizer which renders the colonized as less-of, inferior, and invisible (p. 862). Nationalism in this sense is understood as a location for the colonized to restore self-autonomy, to restore the rights of men, and that often includes nostalgic feelings for a past that men romanticize about where they used to control land and women (ibid). Further, White (2007) stresses as she discusses the experience of African woman participation in national struggles against colonization, "Unlike many African men, African women's opportunities to express and act on their gender-specific grievances were hampered by their exclusion from public spaces and from early meetings of revolutionary organizations" (p. 863). Fanon thus missed one major dimension of the colonized psychology and that is: most nationalisms have gendered and patriarchal underpinning (ibid). This for White (2007) explains why the active role that women played in the anticolonial revolution, did not lead to gender parity within the newly independent nations (p. 864).

In Palestine, tradition is reinterpreted through a narrative of masculine agency that is implicated in modernity, class, and coloniality. Therefore, Massad (1995) argues, masculinity became nationalized in the Palestinian context and through it the gender roles of national agents were established (p. 469). Following the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, as a form of Palestinian nationalist leadership, a nationalist fervor gradually accumulated giving way to what Massad refers to as "the project of gendering" (p. 470). Within this context, Palestinian nationalism defined gender roles in opposition to one another (female-male), and simultaneously both of them in relation to the nationalist project (thus disidentifying from a colonial nationalism) (p. 470). Massad (1995) eloquently posits,

Struggling against the Israeli occupiers and colonizers is not only an affirmation of Palestinian nationalist agency, it is also a masculinizing act enabling the concrete pairing of nationalist agency and masculinity (the two being always already paired conceptually) and their logical inseparability within the discourse of nationalism. Resisting occupation therefore can be used to stage masculine acts as it performs nationalist ones. Through this national anti-colonial resistance, a new figuration of masculine bodies is mapped out on the terrain of the national struggle, one that becomes the model for Palestinian nationalist agency itself. (p. 480)

What Massad (1995) is asserting here, similar to White's (2007) argument regarding African nationalism, is that Palestinian nationalism is constituted and implicated in a narrative that relies on normative metaphors of gender, sexuality and identity, and thus it cannot by any chance allow for a discourse that is ungendered. Heterosexual reproduction of the family was, for Massad, a center stone in the discourse of the nationalist project (p. 477). Nationalism and nationalist agents are "always already masculine" because Palestine is a women/ a mother who has been raped by Zionist colonizers (p. 477). Nationalist agents are defending their honor when fighting against the colonizers and as such, they cannot be understood outside the performance of their masculine identity.

Furthermore, Massad describes how in the political discourse of the PLO, women are perceived to guard the survival and lives of the Palestinians because they are the source of reproduction. He asserts, "The specificity of Palestinian women's bodies is significant in these texts only when reproduction is considered" (p. 475). Women are referred to as mothers, sisters and daughters with metaphors related to soil which produces "manhood, respect and dignity" (p. 474). Massad cites the Declaration of Independence (1988) as it congratulates Palestinian women for their roles as mothers (ibid). The metaphor of reproduction extends to describe women's suffering as a miscarriage, "Women's suffering at the hands of the occupier is exemplified in miscarriages- their failure to produce more nationalist agents" (Ibid, p. 475). In other words, Massad (1995) is affirming what feminists, reviewed by Al-Ali & Tas (2018), have argued in that feminist goals cannot be attained through an implication with the national struggle, because any nationalist discourse is inherently gendered. If the constitution of a nationalist identity is comprised in masculine terms, then the assumption that it would at any given time facilitate any form of gender equality is consummate to assuming that patriarchy is a means to achieve women liberation.

This is where I disagree with Al-Ali & Tas's analysis of the Kurdish example because although it may be evident that in the present moment the women's movement is able to gain strength through a nationalist discourse, I do believe that inevitably sticking to this discourse will bestow the same fate on the Kurdish women's movement as the one faced by the Palestinian one after Oslo.

Cohn (1993), similarly makes the argument that any discourse on conflict and war is always gendered. Women, when present, are set at the margin of the masculine war, they symbolize domesticity, safety, and care- a metaphor of the homeland being protected (p. 1). Yuval-Davis (1993) eloquently agrees, "This feeling of loyalty to 'one's boys' serves a central role in the experience of the fighting men. Whatever the context and scale of the war, it is the 'war riors' camaraderie', often also referred to as 'male bonding', which is almost universally emphasized by whoever discusses what makes soldiers able to withstand the tremendous efforts and suffering involved in warfare (p. 108). Arrizon (2014), further explores how the gendered relations of power, in her example of the U.S army, produce invisible terrorism, manifesting in the form of rape and sexual violence, against female soldiers within the military institution (p. 181). The cause of this gendered war, or of gendered terrorism as she calls it, is the hypermasculinity, male hegemony, and the culture of violence that are infused within this institution (p. 183). It is an institution that reinforces systems of inequality that are inherent in the military and thus in warfare. A simplified discourse of war cannot communicate the complexity of how war and conflict are discoursed without an understanding of gender, and without understanding that war and gender are both "mutually constitutive" (Cohn, 1993, p. 1). War does not happen at a distance, where women are nonexistent. Women are part and parcel of the war experience and an understanding of their diverse experiences within it cannot happen in gendered terms.

The first Intifada is a time in Palestinian history where conflict, gender, and nationalism intersected. While Massad (1995) clearly demonstrates how nationalism in its Palestinian form is gendered, hence could not have been a productive vehicle to achieve women liberation, Cohn (1993), Yuval Davis (1993), Arrizon (2014) amongst many others, shows us how discourses on conflict also marginalize the woman experience and gender it within heteronormative terms. It is not this marginalization per se that would limit women's fight for equal rights, rather it is the connection of the struggle for liberation to the struggle for women's rights that would do so. In imagining that the outcome of this joint struggle is a unified form of liberation, where a liberation

of the colonized subject is connected to the liberation of the female colonized subject, creates an inevitable ground for a distortion of the multiple levels of suppression that women face. Nonetheless, it creates an added burden that would increase the weight tiring the woman's consciousness with emotions of guilt and betrayal when she is targeting the performed masculinity of male comrades. When the national psyche around liberation is inherently formed, as demonstrated above, around this notion of performed masculinity of the nationalist agent, then any holding back on that performance, or any questioning against it, is automatically hindered by internal emotions of guilt or external accusations of betrayal. Ware (2014), examines how public sentiments on warfare are nationalized through the racialized and gendered construct of the "soldier-worker-citizen" (p. 48). Being a soldier and participating in national warfare, consummate to being part of the national resistance movement in the Palestinian example, bestows upon soldiers a status of "supercitizenship" (ibid). Any opposition to this status, its ideology, or any of its beholders becomes "a form of disloyalty to the national state" (ibid). Thus, it is my argument that this tying of the Palestinian women's movement to that of the national struggle is one of the three major factors contributing to its fragmentation and loss of momentum in today's Palestinian society. The second is related to the signing of the Oslo Accords and the establishment of a Palestinian government which will be discussed in the next chapter of this project, and the third, explored in Chapter 3, is caused by the coinciding surge of the Global Feminist movement, which overlooked the intersectional needs and experiences of different women in different parts of the world allowing for transnational and Third World Feminist voices to arise.

It is important before I move forward with this project to establish what is meant by nationalism being gendered or war and conflict constituting a gendered discourse. I mainly rely with this on Carol Cohn's (1993) - Founding Director of the Consortium on Gender Security and Human Rights and most recognized for her work on gender in global politics specifically conflict and security issues- clarification in that,

Gender is not simply a set of ideas about male and female people and their proper relations to each other; gender is, more broadly, a way of categorizing, ordering and symbolizing power, of hierarchically structuring relationships amongst different categories of people, and different human activities symbolically associated with masculinity and femininity (p. 3)

Therefore, any institutions, activities, relationships whether political, social, economic or else, are gendered when they are understood through structural power relations that place symbolic ideas about gender at its center. Produced gender associations, as such, become a system of power that organizes and constructs meanings, conceptions, and behaviors, with and about reality. This is what Cohn (1993) refers to as “coding” (p. 12). War is associated with terms which are “coded masculine” in systems of meaning and power. Likewise, Massad (1995) argues that nationalism, like colonialism, is also associated with meanings and metaphors that code as masculine. The women’s movement during the first Intifada was fighting an impossible war of multi-faceted gendered discourses in an attempt to destroy these layers and triumph over the compound hegemonies subjugating its freedom. As we will see in the coming chapters, this attempt failed miserably, and one cannot merely simplify the causes of this failure to a miscalculation on the women’s movement’s part by associating its struggle with a national one. It must be read and understood within the context of the historical moment during which the beginning of deterioration took place. The end of the first Intifada did not happen in a random point in time. It happened simultaneously as the Global Feminism, as defined in the introduction, was kicking strong. The flourishing of this movement, following the UN Decade for Women (1975-85), and the signing of the Oslo Peace Agreement simultaneously contributed to the fragmentation of the women’s movement in Palestine.

Chapter 2: The Oslo Peace Accords and the Establishment of a Patriarchal Palestinian Government

“We told them what is the difference between us and you. Is it in the effort? To be committed to our cause and leave other matters aside is more difficult for the woman because she leaves the comforts of the home and has to stand up to the restrictive barrier created by her family.” (Kawar, 1996)¹³

In 1993, after years of secret negotiations between Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, the United States headed by President Bill Clinton at the time, mediated the first peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis, launching the start of the notorious Oslo peace process. Prior to the Oslo Accords, Israel refused to recognize any Palestinian counterpart and insisted on negotiating with Jordanian and Egyptian leadership as representatives of the Palestinian people. However, the Oslo Peace Accords brought unprecedented official international recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which mainly constituted of Fateh¹⁴ members- previously considered by Israel as a terrorist group. The PLO at the time was led by prominent Palestinian figure and national leader Yasser Arafat, who remained the president of Palestine until his death in 2004. The peace treaty brought with it a temporary end to the period of fighting between Palestinian resistance groups, such as Fateh, Hamas¹⁵, and the Popular Front¹⁶ (Jabha Sh'beya), and the Israeli army, a period that is known as the first Intifada (uprising). The peace process commenced with the signing of the first Oslo Accords (I) in 1993 and was later followed by the signing of the second agreement (Oslo II) in 1995 in Taba, Egypt. The parties, in the negotiation and agreement process, agreed on a five-year interim period during which both Palestinian and Israeli sides would continue to negotiate in order to establish a permanent peace agreement ending the Israeli/ Palestinian so-called conflict once and for all. However, at the end of the 5-year

¹³ Palestinian woman activist and PLO leader, Abu Khadra, recounts her confrontation with Fateh members in 1968, including Yasser Arafat, in an interview with Kawar 1996.

¹⁴ Fateh was founded in 1959 by Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, and Khalil Al-Wazir as a secular nationalist group to resist Israeli occupation. Fateh members were great supporters of the Oslo Peace Accords and benefited highly through the acquisition of government seats in the PLO once the Palestinian Authority was established.

¹⁵ Hamas was founded in 1987 by Ahmad Yasin as an Islamist resistance group to fight the occupation with a religious ideology different to that of Fateh's secular approach. Hamas is seen as an arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. Today, Hamas has taken control over the Gaza Strip in Palestine, while the West Bank remains mainly loyal to Fateh.

¹⁶ Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was founded in 1967 by George Habash as a secular socialist revolutionary group to fight Israeli occupation. The PF follows Marxist-Leninist ideology and has retrieved in influence across Palestine with the global retrieval from socialist to capitalist systems of power.

transition period, not only did the Oslo Accords miserably fail in achieving its five-year goal of realizing a bilateral consensus on permanent peace, but also the PLO failed its people on a local level by reinstituting a patriarchal, crippled, government that was based on exclusion. As a result, in the year 2000, the second Camp David¹⁷ talks failed, rekindling a second Intifada¹⁸. Since that rebirth, the Palestinian leadership has been holding on a string fighting to legitimize its existence, both locally and internationally. Mohamad (2001) asserts, “The main challenge facing the PA in the territories would perhaps remain connected with its ability, or the lack of it, to create an entity that could address Palestinian quest for independence, democracy, social justice, and economic prosperity. The success or failure of the Palestinian leadership to achieve these goals will determine the future destiny of the peace process” (p. 49). Nevertheless, despite its huge political and national failures, the Oslo Peace Accords failed Palestinian women the most.

Looking at the Oslo process as a botched process of transitional justice, in this chapter I will first contribute to the scarce literature that examines the peace process in Palestine during the Oslo Accords through theories of transitional justice. Further, I parallel feminist advocacy to reform theories of transitional justice -by the adding of women and gender to its legal standards and process- with the experiences of Palestinian feminists. These feminists have advocated for women participation in the negotiation, transition process, and new government established as a result of the Oslo accords. I argue that the Oslo agreement failed Palestinian women by excluding them from the process in its entirety and by restoring archaic notions of patriarchy, which had been previously blurred, or even uprooted, during the conflict of the first Intifada. The efforts of defying patriarchal systems within the Palestinian government took place through the monumental unreciprocated contribution of the women’s movement to the national resistance movement. Ashrawi commends the effort of the women’s movement in mobilizing politically in the 1970s and 80s during their work with the national resistance movement: “I think they are more successful than we think they are because they have managed to reach women in remote areas, women who were hitherto neglected, who were not part of the nationalist or feminist movements. And by creating work opportunities, by getting them involved, by giving them the channels, the avenues

¹⁷ The first Camp David Talks took place during the late 1970s, paving the path for the realization of the Oslo Peace Accords almost 15 years later. The second talks meant to achieve Oslo’s goal of a permanent peace plan.

¹⁸ The second Intifada, also known as Al-Aqsa Intifada, was ignited in September 2000 by the invasion of Israeli Prime Minister at the time Ariel Sharon with 2000 armed soldiers to the Aqsa mosque. The Intifada lasted for 8 years.

for self-expression and decision-making, they have politicized women even beyond their wildest dreams—because women were ready.” (Kawar, 1996, p. 109)

The Oslo Peace Accords, as such, transferred the Palestinian people “from” a state of resistance and political unrest “to” a state that one can loosely refer to as peace. Bell and ORourke (2007) provide an in-depth analysis of transitional justice theory, as well as a detailed explanation of how critical feminists have criticized the shortcomings of these theories. I rely on their work to draw initial definitions of transitional justice, and then elaborate using the works of other scholars. Further, in reviewing their analysis of feminist critique against theories of transitional justice, I am able to draw parallels of gender exclusion from the Palestinian peace process; the Oslo Peace Accords. First, Bell and ORourke (2007) define Transitional Justice, “as a package of measures which societies emerging from violent conflict use to pursue accountability” (p. 24). However, they then continue on to explain that the discussion around transitional justice has moved on to include reference to “post-1990 moves from authoritarian to liberal regimes,” and later in recent years it faced the “normalization” of being associated with “exceptionalism, the justification of international intervention and even US hegemony” (Bell & ORourke, 2007, p.24). Garcia- Godos et al. (2010) zoom in on this definition a bit further by defining transitional justice as consisting of “institutional initiatives for dealing with past atrocities in societies emerging from authoritarian regimes or armed conflict,” they assert that transitional justice “usher[s] in a new era of national reconciliation and peace” (p. 487). Similarly, the Oslo Peace Accords created an illusionary end to the Palestinian struggle, changing the relationship dynamics between Palestinians and Israelis from one based on resistance against the occupation and its practiced injustices to one based on negotiation and peace, chaperoned by “international intervention,” and based on UN resolutions.¹⁹ On a more straightforward note nonetheless, Browne (2017) in a recent contribution to the literature on transitional justice- specifically as the book states, through its pursuit of the road less-travelled of discussing the case of Palestine - defines transitional justice as,

A set of processes for fragile societies to consider following emergence from a sustained period of conflict. It seeks to engender a climate of trust and mutual understanding through

¹⁹ The UN has issued countless resolutions concerning Palestine since its notorious 1947 Resolution which divides Palestinian land between Jewish newcomers and Palestinian inhabitants (51%/49% respectively). The 1947 resolution was rejected at the time by the Arab world leading to the 1948 war on Palestine and the establishment on Israel. Today, some of the most important resolutions on Palestine include the illegality of Israeli settlement expansion on Palestinian land and the illegality of the separation wall. <https://www.un.org/unispal/data-collection/un-resolutions-and-decisions-on-palestine/>

emphasis on disclosure of truth amongst former enemies, safeguarding the rights of victims and survivors, prioritizing redress for victims (either symbolically, materially or both) and ensuring institutional reform, all of which may in turn aid and assist in strengthening the foundations of precarious peace processes (p. 489).

I have chosen to extensively define transitional justice before I move further in this chapter in order to establish the grounds for how important, yet neglected, transitional justice is for the discussion on peace in Palestine, especially as it relates to the failure of the Oslo Peace Accords and the failure to transition to “peace” thereafter.

Unlike what mechanisms of transitional justice propose, the Oslo Peace Accords lacked a major element from its process as defined above, and that is “accountability”. The peace agreement of the Oslo Accords did not touch on issues of holding Israel, the side with the dominating power, accountable for its war crimes and massacres committed against Palestinians living in Palestine and in neighboring refugee camps and countries, especially women. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the UN General Assembly have each issued condemnation of Israeli violation of international law (Browne, 2017, p. 498). These condemnations (although more advisory than judicial orders) have come as a result of the effort of Palestinian political government, instated as of Oslo, to appeal to the international community in its seeking of accountability and justice (ibid). Efforts of this government to score real successes for accountability are due to two main reasons: first, Israel refuses to recognize any jurisdiction from the ICJ, and second, because the PLO’s concerns in taking a humanitarian approach to seeking justice is viewed as more of a step to achieving statehood status rather than to actually request redress for the victims (ibid, p. 501). Instead, a grassroots movements approach (such as BADIL, Sochrot, and Visualizing Palestine) have acted in both Palestine and Israel in order to preserve the experience of Palestinian struggle through memory-recall and the safeguarding of a marginalized Palestinian narrative (ibid, p. 490). Browne (2017) asserts, “Grassroots transitional justice mechanisms dedicated to memorialization and preservation of historical fact may help to provide some form of symbolic redress for victims” (ibid). The grassroots transitional justice mechanisms that Browne (2017) refers to, include local initiatives that employ mechanisms of transitional justice in order to document injustices Palestinians have faced, or continue to face, under occupation. The purpose of this documentation, is to make sure that these injustices are not rendered forgotten, and thus push towards an important transitional justice mechanism and that is accountability. Visualizing Palestine, for example, is a

grassroots organization founded and run by Palestinian youth to document Israeli injustices towards Palestinians using infographics. These infographics are disseminated online and through social media in order to raise awareness on these injustices and push for international pressures for accountability.

Kawar (1996) in her book counts one third of the women leaders and activists she interviewed in the early 1990's who had experienced Israeli torture in interrogation and imprisonment, two whom experienced sexual torture and one witnessed the beating of her fifteen-year-old daughter by an Israeli soldier to get a confession (p. 26). Instead of fighting for accountability on such violations, the Accords dodged the need to achieve justice by feeding the greed of political elitists in the diaspora with a promise of self-rule (Jad, 2010, p.82). In a post-Oslo climate where fear and mistrust dominate, Browne (2017) asserts, justice-related issues have been sidelined by international diplomacy and complacent peace negotiators who were bargaining deals of peace at the cost of Palestinian justice (p. 497). Women, who are usually the most affected by conflict and war (Bell & ORourke (2007), Borer (2009), Lemaitre & Sandvik (2014)), were served a double injustice as a result. First by the Israeli army and its violation of their human rights, and then by the PLO which established a new government that not only diminished their role in the 'national struggle,' but also violated their civil rights through exclusion from real political participation. Furthermore, even when the struggle is similar for both women and men in conflict, the impact on women is different, "due to their pre-existing socio-economic and legal status, as well as the gender constructions in patriarchal societies" (Lemaitre & Sandvik, 2014, p. 245). When the PLO was instated as a direct result of the Oslo Accords, women expected to maintain the active role they had played in Palestinian politics prior to the peace agreement and had hoped to push gender issues further along with the newly established government.

The women's movement was fervent in claiming citizenship rights assuming that the future is bringing political stability where they are able to fulfill national, political, and social rights under the establishment of the PA (Jad, 2018, p. 26). Amal Khriesheh²⁰ in her interview with Kawar (1996) asserts, "We not only want simply political rights but also to use political rights to get our social rights. She (the woman) should have the right to choose who she marries and divorces, whether to finish her education. She should have the right—let me call it—to practice her humanity" (p. 104). However, what Jad (2018) argues is that concepts of citizenship apply when

²⁰ Activist and leader of the Union of Working Women's Committees in the 1990s.

the state has complete sovereignty (p. 28). In the case of Palestine, the Oslo Accords only granted the PLO a reduced state of sovereignty and that is over the Palestinian people. The PLO took this minimal power granted to them as an opportunity to create a nationalist Palestinian state within the borders defined by Israel. Yuval-Davis (1997) nevertheless emphasizes, nationalist projects that focus on citizenship make notions of state sovereignty and fixing territory core concerns in its agenda (p. 21). In the case of the Palestinian Authority, sovereignty was limited by the interests of the negotiating side with more power; Israel. As a result, within this quasi-state scenario, women activists limited their selves to a narrow definition of rights in their jump to request equal citizenship rights from a the newly established non-sovereign government (Jad, 2018, p. 28). This has led to further marginalizing women's rights and has caused secular woman's groups to "abandon their historically successful focus on grassroots mobilization and activism" (Jad, 2018, p. 26).

Additionally, the woman experience in armed conflict is not only different when compared to men but also their experience compared to each other is not homogenous. Victims of conflict and war, although they all share the lived experience of violation of their human rights, differ in terms of how they are affected by the dynamics of this experience and in its impact on their lives. In examining the process of initiating transitional justice in Colombia as a period to terminate conflict between armed groups there, Garcia- Godos et al. (2010) speak of this difference in the experience of victims. They discuss how other factors such as the victim's background can affect their experience, "In the context of the TJ process, the 'victims of the Colombian armed conflict' are often referred to in generic terms, as a single group [...] Common to all victims is that they have experienced at least one form of human rights violation, yet their backgrounds and way of dealing with their victimization may be completely different" (p. 494). Likewise, women in conflict- such as the Palestinian women during their struggles with occupation- may have all faced violation in varying degrees, but intersections of class, religion, location and others affect the nature and impact of this experience on their lives and future. Kavar (1996) speaks of this intersection in her examination of the 1948 war on Palestine. Palestinians working as farmers prior to 1948 on owned or leased land were predominantly illiterate and have experienced the worst hit by this war (p.8). Palestinian farm labor was not absorbed in saturated Arab neighboring countries, thus most of the Palestinian peasant class, which consisted of both men and women farm laborers,

were confined to UNRWA²¹ governed refugee camps across the Arab region with minimal resources and opportunity for citizenship rights (ibid).

Many of the other more-educated younger generations within Palestine were able to become professionals and workers building the infrastructures of the rich oil-countries in the Arab world (Kawar, 1996, p.8). Educated Palestinian women became teachers, nurses...etc. in these countries while their husbands worked in petrol fields. Other well-educated women who witnessed the war as part of the first generation of women activists in Palestine, fled the war to neighboring countries where they became renowned intellectuals, professors, or held leadership positions in the PLO (Ibid, p. 9). While they had left the location of the struggle; i.e. Palestine, they remained politicized and connected to that struggle even as they lived in the Diaspora. In'am Abdel Hadi in her previously mentioned interview tells of how she remained committed to the "Palestinian cause" even while attending university in Damascus: "There were popular movements throughout my school years. I remember participating in all the thinking that came out of the people. I studied at the Syrian university and, at that time, we had lots of weight. The students used to be able to remove a government. I mean the climate was very politicized, and there were political parties: the Ba'ath, the communists and the Arab Nationalists Movement. Although I didn't join any of the parties, I remained full of enthusiasm" (ibid, p. 15). Meanwhile, within the refugee camps, the Palestinian peasant class lived dire conditions while receiving aid provided by UNRWA in the form of food, medical, and education services, as well as services provided by the charitable work of the middle- and upper-class women societies which extended from 1950s- 1970s (ibid, p. 9). Unveiling impacts of war on women from different class structures, Kawar (1996) confirms, "Charitable work, however, was traditionally perceived as non-political enterprise. Posing no threat to the social and political power structures, it was safe for women in the middle class" (p. 5).

Pettman (as quoted in Borer (2009)) argues that women, contrary to common belief, lead active political lives during wartime and conflict through taking-on various roles (p. 1171). Helou recounts women's participation in the Israeli-backed raids of the Lebanese army on Fateh camps, "I saw it with my own eyes in 1969 when women in the camps—when the Lebanese army attacked—they faced the tanks. ...ordinary women and probably illiterate. And they were not

²¹ The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees. It was created in 1949 to support the relief and human development of Palestinian refugees.

organized; there weren't any cadres at that time anyway. I mean, that shows how deep is the national issue inside the woman" (Kawar, 1996, p. 41). Abu Ali on the other hand speaks of how women were part of the political atmosphere that fueled consciousness of the injustice that had been done to Palestinians since 1948, "When I grew up, I began to have strong awareness that the presence of Israel in the region is doing great oppression and injustice to the Palestinian and Arab individual and that it is an obstacle to our progress as a society. It was a threat to me especially after 1967 happened and I was still at university. I felt what is the use of my education if, at any moment, someone will come sweep the country and occupy it. And I might die." (ibid, p. 16). However, regardless of the magnitude of their participation and effect in conflict, women "are routinely pushed back into the private sphere when the fighting is over, their contributions erased" (p. 1171). After the end of a conflict, women do not participate in any roles related to state-building, politics, or even military (Borer, 2009, p.1171).

One of the reasons that Pettman theorizes as to why women are reassigned domestic gendered roles in society after the war has ended, is that states granted with power are not always conceded with full control over their territory or their people (as quoted in Borer, 2009, p. 1171). Thus, new governments "faced with immediate legitimacy crises [...] tend to quickly prioritize state survival and defense, which often translates into intensified militarization. When this occurs, gender transformation policies are either postponed or abandoned altogether" (Borer, 2009, p. 1171). Unfortunately, however, it has been the tendency that dismissing gendered power relations before and during conflicts to likely cause their dismissal after the transition has been made to a post-conflict time (Borer (2009) p. 1172). Respectively, the Palestinian Authority, which was now the official ruling body derived from the PLO, was too engaged in "state building" (Jad, 2010) during Oslo, that issues of women and gender were not on their radar. With sovereignty over its people only, with no rule over land, resources, security, economy...etc., the Palestinian Authority became a civil administration government working to rule Palestinians on behalf of the occupation. The costs of this civil administration were quickly paid for by donor aid (Jad, 2010, p. 84), a price that Israel previously paid for in the form of civil administration services for the Palestinian people as an Occupation power. Bell & ORourke (2007) further elaborate on this point in their article when they discuss how during the transition to peace, time is spent focusing on the formation of the new government and the division of territory which leads to the classification of all other social issues (including gender) as "secondary, or not at all" (p. 25).

Similar to Palestinian feminist efforts with Oslo, feminists working with transitional justice theory criticized its exclusion of women and gender both through the legal standards that mechanisms of transitional justice rely on and through the process of their design (Bell & ORourke, 2007, p.25). As a matter of fact, the exclusion happens even one step before. The negotiations that give birth to mechanisms of transitional justice are also exclusive of women, “The processes that produce contemporary transitional justice mechanisms tend to be negotiated by state and non-state protagonists to the conflict and by international mediators who are overwhelmingly male” (Bell & ORourke, 2007, p.25). Women in negotiation, although most affected by conflict, become mere “pawns of peace” as Bell & ORourke (2007) put it. Likewise, Palestinian women were also for the most part absent from the negotiation process that led to the delivery of the Oslo Accords, “Palestinian women were also excluded from the crucial stages of the peace process, including the Oslo and Cairo agreements. As a result, the outcomes of the Oslo Accords were designed by men and neglected women’s specific concerns” (Allabadi, 2008, p.185). This partially explains why the “accountability” element mentioned above is missing from the negotiation of peace during the Oslo process. Ignorant of women’s suffering (social, political and sexual violence), the men negotiating the agreement focused on the acquisition of rule, framing it as a ‘national cause,’ pushing any other topic off the negotiation table. When women were present in the negotiation process, they were expected to also put aside any concerns for gender equality and instead call for the national rights of Palestinians, delineated by the PLO at the time as gaining sovereignty over the small land designated to Palestinians.

On a similar note when looking at the criticism against transitional justice theory, feminist scholarship has addressed the shortcoming of transitional justice in representing women and gender in the legal standards and processes through advocating for women participation in decision making (Bell & ORourke, 2007, p. 30). Their arguments have surrounded three important pillars to reform transitional justice mechanisms. First, to add women to transitional justice which involves including women in the negotiation that breeds the mechanisms of transitional justice, and second, to include gender-specific experiences and needs to the conversations surrounding transitional justice which allows the emergence of a different set of priorities (Bell & ORourke, 2007, p.30). Chinkin (as quoted in Bell & ORourke (2007)) asserts, “the failure to include [women’s] views and ideas can lead to an impoverished understanding of peace and security that focuses on militarism and power supported by force” (p. 30). The third and final argument is to

add feminism to the debates of transitional justice theories, which means delivering long-term feminist transformation and bringing in visible social change (Bell & ORourke, 2007, p.30). In other words, the representation of women alone is not enough to guarantee the inclusion of women. Feminist transformation calls for a real inclusion of women, one that guarantees women's active participation in the "reconsidering and reshaping of end goals" (Bell & ORourke, 2007, p. 34), i.e. women should be involved in forming the argument for the pivotal question in transitional justice: During the transition, we are transitioning "from" which present "to" what future?

Palestinian feminists also advocated for the inclusion of women and gender into the political agendas of the Palestinian Authority. Amidst the political chaos during the transition at that time, women were facing a new challenge of injustice, this time from their previously fellow resistance fighter comrades. During the peace interim period, the national attitude towards women participation in the 'national struggle' against occupation had changed. Abu Khadra describes in her interview a meeting held in Damascus with Fateh members where she voiced concern on behalf Palestinian women activists: "We want to understand why do you discriminate against us? Every one of you knows us here in front of you. Are we not committed? In the first place we have difficulties as it is and, in the second, we see that our movement does not believe in the struggle of the woman. Is the woman, in the final analysis, a fragile flower that is only an image in this movement or is she an indivisible part of the popular revolution?" (Kawar, 1996, p. 37). Restoring notions of patriarchy and hypermasculinity, women were "dishonored by participating in the struggle against occupation, which until this time had been condoned" (Allabadi, 2008, p.185). With the rise of Islamist movements and the decline of the leftist communist party, women were deprived of their empowered persona and were pushed off the streets and into the private space of their homes.

The revival of these traditional attitudes urged prominent Palestinian women and feminists, who had mistakenly believed they would be voted into government without the need of the quota system, into action. Believing that their role and sacrifice during conflict would win them equal seats in government by the voting elections, these women miscalculated the tragedy that had befallen the culture of feminism in Palestine during Oslo. When Yasser Arafat took control over the Palestinian Authority, he refused to call for new local elections, which were mandated by the United States and other donor funders, out of fear of the power of the oppositional Islamic party, Hamas (Jad, 2010, p. 82). Arafat succeeded in dodging the presidential public elections and instead

used the “National Consensus” to appoint him as the national leader and president, excluding in the process both the Islamist party Hamas and the leftist Palestinian Communist Party (Jabha Sha’beyeh), each for a different reason (Jad, 2010, p. 82). Another group excluded from representation within the new government were women. When women failed to receive votes from the masses during legislature and parliament elections without the use of a quota system, they mobilized to pressure for its attainment. Jad (2010) asserts, “The ‘progressive’ ideology of the Marxist–Leninist organizations in the PLO made them more receptive to women’s pressures, but did not alter their classical Marxist stand on gender: women are oppressed but first the national and class struggle must rid the people of colonialism and then of capitalist exploitation” (p. 84). However, despite its lack of a “gender vision” or a true “political project for social change,” the PA was heavily dependent on donor aid which required them to adhere to women’s pressure (Jad, 2010, p. 83).

After the disappointing results of the first legislative elections in 1996, less than 5% of winners were women- 5 out of 88 members (Jad, 2010, p. 84), women activists formed a coalition led by the General Union of Palestinian Women to lobby the PA to introduce the quota system. Their success in lobbying for the quota system is aided by two main factors, first the pressure from donor communities, and second Khadija Habashneh a prominent feminist who was “part of the old PLO structure” and also led the coalition while having access to both media and the PA leadership (Jad, 2010, p. 84). As a result, a policy introducing 20% of member seats to women was established (Jad, 2010, p. 85). Nonetheless, this success did not come without setbacks. The quota system was introduced in stages, in 1998 the quota system was introduced in local councils by adding one woman to each council which resulted in an inclusion of only 1.7% of women in local councils. (Jad, 2010, p. 84). It was not until 2005 that the local election law for councils introduced a 20% quota for women (Jad, 2010, p. 84). However, despite increased participation, it seemed that gender issues and social change for women’s progression were not being truly included in important political or social conversations taking place at that time (Jad, 2010, p. 83). The “Where is gender?” aspect of feminist scholarship against transitional justice is perfectly put into play here.

Another aspect problematizing the women quota system is Kinship (Jad, 2010), and the inclusion of women based on criteria other than qualification. Kinship played a dual role in hindering the effectiveness of the quota system in advancing women’s rights and gender issues in the conversations and decisions made by the new government. Kinship has a positive effect when

it allowed women with access to the PA through a male relative to be supported and welcomed within the establishment (Jad, 2010, p. 85). A two-edged sword, however, because this access meant that women without it were being left out. Another shortcoming of this positive effect is that qualification did not rise to the importance of kinship and familial relations when it came to running for elections. Besides, Kinship also had another prominent negative effect. Kinship obstructed the participation of women from rural and conservative families that often adhere to traditional customs and patriarchal norms that confine women to the boundaries of their homes (Jad, 2010, p. 85). To this day, kinship in many cases remains an important factor in attaining a leadership position in government in Palestine and elsewhere in the region. Feminists across the Middle East have criticized the role of kinship in advancing women participation in social, economic, and political lives and have considered it a source of both nepotism and clientelism (Jad, 2018, p. 27). Accordingly, despite its attempts to further women participation and push for gender issues into the political sphere in the 1990s, the quota system did not prove to be a success if standing alone. A true political and social buy-in of women and gender issues have to be put in place. A mission that Palestinian women activists and feminists continue to strive to achieve through lobbying a so-called secular government; the PLO. Scott (2009) asserts, the discussion around secularism in Europe associates it with gender equality and modernity positioning it in opposition to religion which then is associated with gender repression/ backwardness. The PLO in 1996 used the same logic that Scott (2009) problematizes in Europe today to win the election and come into power as the newly established Palestinian Authority. This logic, again, was not innocent. It was one that was birthed from a profound understanding of how the ‘West,’ viewed the Palestinian people and how the PA could leverage that perception for the benefit of their main goal at that time: building a national Palestinian state. Everything else, including efforts for women rights, were mere devices to arrive at this end goal.

Yuval-Davis (1997) proclaims that nationalist projects vary only in their level of exclusionary and are more often than not based on other ideologies such as socialism and/or religion (p. 21). Lybarger (2007) in his book *Identity and Religion in Palestine*, explains how nationalism in Palestine is defined and understood through its entanglement with religion (p. 2). The three major political factions in Palestine, Fateh, Hamas, and Jabha Sha’beyeh (Popular Front)- although the latter has lost much of its support base- manipulate associations or disconnections with secularism in order to stay relevant within the political sphere depending on

the time and audience. If secularism is popular in addressing an international audience, then it is used as a reference point for political discussions for example. Fateh is the oldest and most recognizable faction, which became as previously described a legitimized government and representative of the Palestinian people through the negotiation and implementation (and later failure) of the Oslo Peace Accords. Fateh markets itself as “secular nationalists,” seeking a nonreligious democratic state that views its parliament as a diverse constituency representing spheres of religious and non-religious members (Lybarger, 2007, p. 3). Hamas, on the other hand, was founded as part of the regional Islamist wave, basing its premise on fighting the Israeli occupation through armed conflict and not through peace negotiations as presented by the PLO. Hamas also calls for an Islamists culture and state that builds its law on Islamic Sharia. Its popularity fluctuates on the basis of the collective Palestinian sentiment towards the successfulness or failure of peace talks (Lybarger, 2007, p.5). Whenever peace talks would offer hope (such as that of the early 1990s), Hamas lost its popular base. When they fail, Fateh would lose for Hamas as evident in the infamous 2006 elections.²² Thus, it is fair to say that within the Palestinian context, the religious and the political are profoundly intertwined to the extent that political factors are associated to degrees of religiosity, or the lack thereof.

Butler (2008) confirms, “the question of what time this is, already divides us” (p.1). The opposition created by the PLO split the resistance movement in Palestine, which up to the peace talks had been operating, despite its intrinsically different belief systems, for one common goal; the liberation of Palestinian land from Israeli colonization. In announcing that it was “time” to end conflict, to create peace, Oslo announced that it was time to divide the Palestinians. This divide nonetheless can be reconciled through engaging in a postsecular debate that moves forward beyond the limited definition of PLO’s secularism. Today, and since the 2006 election and Gaza coup, Hamas governs the Gaza Strip which is geographically detached and distant (another divide) from the West Bank where the PLO government is established. Gaza is an open-air prison, associated with war, poverty, conservatism, backwardness, women oppression. Ramallah,²³ in opposition, is the center of modernity, prosperity, woman “emancipation” where sleeveless shirts and short skirts are allowed, where bars and night clubs are a testament to modernity. Scott (2009), similar to

²² In 2006, Hamas vastly won government elections overthrowing the power of the PLO. However, the international community refused to recognize Hamas as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people despite its democratic wining. Donor aid stopped and the PLO refused to leave. As a result, Hamas started a coup and was successful in taking over government in Gaza by force, leading to a government separation between the West Bank and Gaza which remains to this day.

²³ “Temporary” capital of Palestine where the PA is headquartered.

Butler (2008), argues that in Europe secularism is used as a measuring device to assess whether Muslim values are “compatible with political democracy” or not (p. 1). He further adds that, “The most frequent assumption is that secularism encourages the free expression of sexuality and that it thereby ends the oppression of women because it removes transcendence as the foundation for social norms and treats people as autonomous individuals, agents capable of crafting their own destiny” (p.1).

Corresponding to the argument that Scott (2009) makes against the belief that secularism inherently centers around the equal status of men and women, I argue that the secularism that the PLO invoked was also one that deceptively centered around this equality. The secularism that the PLO aimed to self-identify with, is the secularism that carries with it underlying meanings of progress and modernity. Braidotti et al. (2014) in the introduction to their book discussing the turn towards post-secular discourses, speak of a ‘secularization myth.’ This myth according to them has become prominent in ‘Western’ theoretical and intellectual discourses, as well as in cultural and social ones (p.1). The myth understands secularism through its direct connectedness to progress and modernity, framing religion as the binary opposite delineating backwardness (p.1). Scott (2009) as previously mentioned likewise problematizes the oppositions that are created in discourses on secularism: “modern/traditional; secular/religious; sexually liberated/ sexually oppressed; gender equality/ patriarchal hierarchy” (p.1). In Palestine, Oslo added to these oppositions by creating a political binary of Fateh and Hamas. Fateh is the modern, the secular, the sexually liberated, and Hamas is the opposite. With the resurgence of religion in recent years, however, Braidotti et al. (2014) argue, the ‘myth of secularization’ has been put into question through critical postsecular discussions that aim to dismantle the binary opposition between secularism/ progress and religion/ backwardness. Further, Braidotti et al. (2014) assert, “The postsecular turn seeks to provide a counter-discourse to the myth of secularism by developing a variety of critiques of the myth grounded in discussions on the current political, social, and technological condition in which Europe, in particular, and the Western world more generally, finds itself” (p. 1).

The PLO nonetheless, played on the prominence of the ‘secularization myth,’ and recreated it within the Palestinian context for political gains. However, as Talal Assad (2003) argues, secularism is “neither singular in origin nor stable in its historical identity” (p. 25). Thus, the religious and the secular are not “essentially fixed categories” and one does not precede the other

(Assad, 2003, p.26). On the contrary, both of these concepts are entangled on multiple layers overlapping in many of their meanings, histories and understandings. What this demonstrates is that the new reality established after Oslo did not understand the true needs for the Palestinian woman emancipation. For the PLO, a call for secularism, for woman emancipation, was their indicator of “progress” and of modernity in order to attract Western money. Butler (2008) on the other hand stresses, “hegemonic conceptions of progress define themselves over and against a premodern temporality that they produce for the purposes of their own self-legitimation (p.1). Progress as such is understood as Butler (2008) describes it to be as a linear, singular understanding that connects progress to freedom, modernity, and inevitably secularism. Thus, to become secular, is to become civilized. In the Oslo case, it meant that in order to deserve peace, the Palestinians had to modernize, to become secular. This is why the PLO was empowered to achieve government, while Hamas was subsided despite its increasing popularity at the time. Butler (2008) states,

It would appear that both the secular frame and the civilizational mission, itself only ambiguously secular, are figured as the advanced position that entitles itself to bring notions of democracy to those who are characterized as pre-modern, who have not yet entered into the secular terms of the liberal state, and whose notions of religion are invariably considered childish, fanatic or structured according to ostensibly irrational and primitive taboos. (p. 14)

Evidently based on this discussion, I believe that engaging with the discussion on the PLO’s attempt to create a secularist government must be done through the use of postsecularism. Postsecularism in this sense is used as an analytical tool that is able to provide a critical lens to deconstruct the binary that the PLO has engendered within the Palestinian society since its rise to power under Oslo. This binary that remains implicit in all political, social, and cultural discourses within Palestine, puts secularism in one hand as synonymous with the PLO, progress, and gender equality against the other hand which contains Hamas, religion, and female oppression. This binary is further manifested in the West Bank/ Gaza binary and divide which are profoundly integrated in the present culture and nationalist identity of Palestinians today. Although postsecularism has been argued to be vague and unclear, I invoke its use here following Braidotti et al.’s (2014) definition of “the ‘post’ in postsecular does not refer to a condition that could be characterized as ‘after’ secularism in a linear, temporal dimension, but rather to a critical reflection of secularism” (p. 4). Likewise, a postsecular debate in Palestine today would require that we engage critically

with secularism as defined and presented by the PLO in a manner that would not characterize this debate as one existing in the 'after'math of PLO's secularism. Rather, it would be one that engages with debates on how the binary can be dissolved in a way that creates unity within Palestinian discourses of peace. This unity, I believe, would then create the pre-requisite for political reconciliation between government parties and local supporters, and with it a true space for gender equality and woman inclusion in Palestine, one that is free from constraints of exclusion afforded by a secularism that associates Palestinian woman emancipation with the lack of religiosity.

Chapter 3: The NGOization of the Women's Movement and the Surge of the Global Feminist Movement

"We hear about extremists to the degree that they describe their program as anti-men and they have clubs and signs that say 'no men allowed.' I saw that in Europe. We Palestinians, we will never have clubs special for women and celebrations for women only or deviant relations between women and things like that. These demands fundamentally do not suit our society and we will not permit them ever." (Kawar, 1996)²⁴

The years subsequent to the Oslo Accords, which include the time of the *second Intifada* (2000), proved to be a difficult time for women in Palestine as they continued to lead a fragmented life of political and social exclusion affected by a new power over them, the power of the "globalized Empire" (Kuttab, 2008). Eileen Kuttab -a second-generation Palestinian feminist and the Director of the Institute of Women's Studies at Birzeit University- has been vocal in her criticism of the role that the Oslo Accords have played in the institutionalization, professionalization, and hijacking by NGOs, of Palestinian women's issues (Toensing, 2001). She has also echoed many other voices (Hiltermann 1998, Jamal 2001, Browne 2017, Jad 2018, amongst others) that confirm the women's movement's loss of its grassroots efforts after the first Intifada. In her work examining the effect of a globalized feminist agenda on the woman's movement in Palestine, she first analyzes the political and economic impacts of hegemonic powers (The Empire) on the Palestinian local context. Kuttab (2008) relies on Hardt and Negri's (2001) definition of the Empire to build her case in applying it to the Middle East context. She explains that according to them, the empire is a regime of power that "effectively encompasses the spatial totality" that rules over the 'civilized' world without any constriction of temporal or territorial boundaries (p. 100). The Empire manages both a territory and its population and creates the world in which this population must now live (ibid). In the Middle East, Kuttab (2008) asserts, "The recent changes and challenges that face the Middle East can only be viewed in the context of globalization, or what some call the Empire" (p. 99). After the Oslo Accords, billions of dollars poured into Palestine through the PLO government for "state-building." This money, however,

²⁴ Amal Khriesheh talks to Kawar (1996) how women during the first intifada saw that they had to create social change within the Palestinian culture in order to achieve equal rights.

was not innocent. With it came rules and regulations that require strict agenda adherence. In the eight years from 2008-2016 alone, the total amount of donor aid received into Palestine amounted to \$20.5 billion (OECD). Palestinian livelihood depended on this donor money, and thus Palestinian social, political, and economic lives had to be shaped in accordance to the globalized power, or Empire, which was providing this funding.

Consequently, soon after the introduction of a new political and economic power paradigm that focused on globalized agendas, as a result of the Oslo Accords, the woman's movement in Palestine had to adhere to different definitions of woman's liberty and modes of social organizing. Foreign donor funding influence activism for women's rights, and creates a social divide within cultures between those who are able to adhere the new approaches of social change and those who cannot (Costa, 2014, p. 168). Dajani (1993) stresses on this difference between a Western understanding of woman's liberty and a Palestinian one, "Unlike the West, where the women's movement is dominated by feminist issues, in the West Bank, the concerns and activities of Palestinian women are directed within the political framework of the struggle for Palestinian rights and national self-determination" (p.103) The introduction of the donor community, which makes up the backbone of the Palestinian economy to this day, meant that the original discourse of a Palestinian woman's movement that focused on resistance, liberation, steadfastness, and right of self-determination as part of a collective national front against an occupying colonial power, had to change into a globalized 'modern' discourse focusing on individual woman's liberty (Kuttab, 2008, p.109). Jamal (2001) likewise argues that this scattering of the women's movement's scope of work has led to its ultimate fragmentation and alienation from the Palestinian context, "The women's movement is caught in a labyrinth which the broader the scope of its struggle for gender equality, the stronger its internal fragmentation and the broader the resentment to its efforts" (p. 258).

Gayatri Spivak (1988) in her highly recognized article 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' Poses questions regarding whether or not the "subaltern" is allowed a voice to speak. She grapples with such questions as who gets to regulate the people with dominant power? How can the rest of the world speak if they do not have this power? How does the subaltern speak against this power and be heard, not just by other subalterns, but also by those who hold this power? In this piece, she employs the term "the subaltern" to refer to the inferior subject, but makes clear that in the Indian context the subalterns are those who do not compose the colonial elite- such as the peasants and

the Indian middle class (p. 76). Spivak (1988) worries that poststructuralist and postcolonial efforts to give voice to the subaltern, are merely perpetuating the silencing of that voice. She gives the example of the Hindu tradition of burning widows at their husband's funerals and explains that although combating this tradition has saved the lives of many Indian women by the British outlawing this tradition, it has simultaneously presented the West as the civilized culture and the Indian as the barbaric 'Other.' This in turn engages in furthering the Othering of the Indian culture and silencing its members (Spivak, 1988, p. 87). Moreover, she speaks of the works of intellectuals who claim the intention to speak for the subaltern in order to give it voice. She claims that this intention is counterproductive because it creates a homogenous other. Further, she argues that by assuming a "collective identity," the subaltern is similarly participating in the silencing because she reminds us, "One must nevertheless insist that the colonized subaltern subject is irretrievably heterogeneous." (Spivak, p. 82). Spivak (1998) also highlights that third world women are the subaltern "subject" in feminist criticism; "It is well known that the notion of the feminine (rather than the subaltern of imperialism) has been used in a similar way within deconstructive criticism and within certain varieties of feminist criticism" (p. 91). Thus, Spivak (1988) answers her controversial question of whether or not the subaltern is able to speak by noting that even with the voice of the well-intentioned intellectuals, the subaltern cannot speak because they do not hold the power of knowledge; the subaltern is never heard.

In the case of the Palestinian context, women feminists and activists working in Palestine before the Oslo Accords, became the subaltern prior to its signing. They were forced into subaltern mode through the hegemony of globalized agendas that distorted the efforts of the woman's movement and shifted the focus of its work to a discourse that relied on a Western reference for woman liberation and gender rights. Through universalizing the experience of the women suffering, Palestinian women's suffering was lumped into the whole of a global women's suffering and thus efforts shifted to 'Western' agendas that found their way into Palestine through International NGOs. Costa (2014) posits, "In Thailand, as in many countries around the globe, "women" (phuuying) is a term that activists deploy strategically, yet without explicit attention to the diversity it both subsumes and excludes" (p. 167). As evident through the research of postcolonial feminists critical of this global approach, when the subaltern speaks in its own voice, we can avoid the homogenous representation caused by the dominant voice and can simultaneously experience the intersectionality of subaltern identities. Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1991), a self-

described transnational feminist at the time, in her piece *Under Western Eyes* for example strongly criticizes a “monolithic singular” view of third world women (p. 53). She argues that the idea of “sisterhood” between women worldwide overlooks the different complex interactions between the different links of identity and frameworks, and asserts that “sisterhood cannot be assumed on the basis of gender; it must be forged in concrete historical and political practice and analysis” (p. 58).

Another point is discussed by postcolonial feminists in their critique of global feminism which is the othering of the subaltern subject. Spivak (1998) refers to this notion in her example of the eradication of the Indian widow burning tradition by the British colonizers. Mohanty (1991) similarly argues that by imposing the norms of the Western culture, and by exercising power dominance in their discourse, Western feminists are not only portraying third world women as a one homogenous group, but they are also codifying “Others as non-Western and hence themselves as (implicitly) Western” (ibid, p. 52). In their representation Western feminists are misidentifying women from the third world as a singular “powerless” group of people synonymous in their status and experience. International NGOs (INGOs) implicitly join in on this code by entering a local market, in this case the Palestinian, and showcasing power through extensive financial funds that delineate what local NGOs can and cannot work on. INGOs became superior to the local women NGOs because they are the ones with the grants, and they are the ones that uphold the rules of this grant division. For example, Amal Kreisheh comments on the need to create a change within the Palestinian society in a way that is different to that voice of women liberation existing in Europe. She claims, “I don't see the Palestinian women's movement in conflict with the Palestinian man in any of the issues. If we discuss the male, we need to discuss him as part of the oppressive backward society, the whole society. The Palestinian man in general is not the enemy. We hear about extremists to the degree that they describe their program as anti-men and they have clubs and signs that say "no men allowed." I saw that in Europe” (Kawar, 1996, p. 104). Women in Palestine in the 1990s, could not relate to the feminist voice that had been prominent in some second wave feminism which called for a total abandonment of men. Palestinian women, coming out of the first Intifada, still saw their comrade men as counterparts in their struggle (both political and social). Zahira Kamal²⁵ in her interview with Kawar (1996) stresses, “The question sometimes is not a question of the woman and the man. The woman can be more oppressive than the man—I mean of the woman. What is important is the ideas that the woman has” (ibid).

²⁵ Founder and at the time president of the Union of the Women's Action Committees.

Western feminism on the other hand portrayed third world men as a powerful group that practices dominance and oppression over women (Mohanty, 1991, p. 59). In her discussion of the British abolishing the Hindu tradition of burning women, Spivak (1988) likewise portrays how white folks were saving “brown women from brown men” (p. 87). International NGOs in telling Palestinian women what their issues are (through structured women programs and grants), have also imposed this mentality of Western aid helping Palestinian women from the struggles they face with Palestinian men. This aid is further hypocritical, because it skips any mention or assistance for women against any struggles they could face from the Israeli oppression. Mohanty (1991) thus exposes how this tone of representation in the discourse of white Western feminists saving women from non-Western countries carries layers of colonization and power dominance. Frantz Fanon (1967), previously pointed to this strategy in his discussion of the colonial deconstruction of Algerian culture during the century long colonization of Algeria, “Converting the woman, winning her over to the foreign values, wrenching her free from her status, was at the same time achieving a real power over the man and attaining practical, effective means of deconstructing Algerian culture” (p. 39). Women were seen as the “pivot of Algerian” society and unveiling them would mean successfully colonizing Algerian society and culture (Fanon, 1967, p. 40). Mohanty (1991) along similar lines urges in her piece, “it ought to be of some political significance, at least, that the term colonization has come to denote a verity of phenomena in recent feminist and left writings in general” (p.52). What white feminist literature is doing, according to her, is that they are speaking of the experience of the West as the “norm” or the “referent” and are thus occupying a privileged standpoint in their view of the world (p. 56).

Therefore, by occupying “globally privileged subject positions,” Western writers are embedding colonial discourse in their works by producing a “third world” that is only understood in its difference from the privileged Western world (Mohanty, 1991, p.53). She asserts, “it is in the production of this “third world difference” that Western feminisms appropriate and “colonize” the constitutive complexities which characterize the lives of women in these countries” (p. 54). Said (1978) in his widely circulated book *Orientalism* has established the base of this argument for postcolonial feminists as he demonstrates how knowledge is not produced innocently (p.35). Said (1978) posits that the way in which humans produce and acquire knowledge is motivated by their end goals and interests of why this knowledge is produced in the first place. He affirms that this knowledge does not exist independently but rather within a discourse that is consistent in

producing representations of the 'Other' (p.19). He explores how one type of discourse, namely orientalism, has played a role in producing knowledge and images in the Western memory and imagination about the Orient and the Oriental subject. The West/ Occident, as Said (1978) explains, cannot produce knowledge about the Orient/ the Muslim/ the Middle East, in separation from its colonial history and presence in that region, nor outside its modern-day interest and imperial dominance of the people and culture there (p.19). Ahmed (2007) on the other hand, explains how a history of colonization plays into the power relations allowing white bodies to be superior at birth, "bodies are shaped by histories of colonialism, which makes the world 'white', a world that is inherited, or which is already given before the point of an individual's arrival [...] Such histories, we might say, surface on the body, or even shape how bodies surface" (p. 153). She speaks of "whiteness" as a phenomenology and its ability to change experiences of bodies and allows them to 'take up space,' she says, "whiteness could be described as an ongoing and unfinished history, which orientates bodies in specific directions, affecting how they 'take up' space" (Ibid, p.149). Ahmed (2007) stresses, "In the case of race, we would say that bodies come to be seen as 'alike', as for instance 'sharing whiteness' as a 'characteristic', as an effect of such proximities, where certain 'things' are already 'in place' (p. 155).

Chicana feminist, Lisa Flores (2000) in her piece *Reclaiming the Other: toward a Chicana Feminist Critical Perspective* refuses the imperialist subjection and othering practiced in discourse, and calls for a decolonization of their voice by calling on Chicanas to speak up for themselves and refuse to be continuously othered by Western feminists. In other words, Flores (2000) is calling for the "reclaiming" of the "Other" that was imposed on Chicanas by Western discourse. She affirms, "one important practice of decolonization is replacing silence with voice" (Flores, 2000, p. 693). Flores (2000) thus explains that in order to rid themselves from this colonial oppression that exists in white feminism, women of color must speak for themselves, "For women of color, the best sources about our lives, experiences, and histories often come from other women of color" (p. 690). She further adds that by speaking up and ensuring their agency, they are countering mainstream narratives of the Chicana experience, "Chicana feminists can become the cultural scribes, using their own narratives to counter mainstream stories and to record their histories and knowledge" (p. 692). She reminds the reader that by regaining that ownership, we are giving voice to those who were absent from the previous writings in history, "by allowing us to look into their personal lives, Chicana feminists remind us of their mothers and grandmothers, absent in the

history books” (Flores, 2000, p. 697). This is similar to the argument duCile (1994) makes when she questions the sense of entitlement white feminists have had over the works of the black experience, and calls for ownership to be repositioned in the hands of the true voices and the true owners of these narrated experiences, namely other black women (p. 601).

Evidently, as these two feminists are demonstrating in their argument, Palestinian feminists after Oslo did not have to succumb to the fate of double colonization, one by Israel and the other by the discourse of woman emancipation imposed on them through INGOs. They could have, like Flores urges, refused rewriting grant proposals and shifting their local agendas to ones that match the requirements of international donor projects. Palestinian women feminists after Oslo, could have refused the Western narrative for women struggle and held on to the authenticity of the woman voice that was stemming from the grassroots work of women in cities, villages, and refugee camps. Had that been the case, our present-day reality of women organizing would not be as irrelevant to the local reality and thus would not be as dismissed as it is today within Palestinian society. This dismissal is further heart-aching when one considers the enormous contribution and impact Palestinian women have had throughout the history of Palestinian struggle as demonstrated in the previous two chapters. Ponzanesi (2017), on the other hand, poses important postcolonial critical questions to explore how the female identity of postcolonial subjects is constructed in stories told by the media. Postcolonial studies Ponzanesi argues, offer “critical tools for exposing, studying and interrogating the ongoing legacies and discursive operations of the empire” (p. 97). Postcolonialism can give a voice to the subalterns silenced by colonization (ibid). However, one important ingredient for this tool to work is, Ponzanesi stresses, “awareness to oppression,” which allows resistance to “colonial hegemony” (ibid). This awareness is what Palestinian feminists are urged, by this research project, to attain in order to break away from the hegemony imposed on them by the NGOization of their efforts. In this sense, I am joining Costa’s (2014) call to increase women’s empowerment opportunity through first achieving “heightened self-reflexivity and attention to difference amongst activists” (p. 171); in this case, within Palestine.

Nevertheless, it is crucial that we examine the hegemonic globalized power, manifesting in internationally funded women programs in this context, through its link with national and regional “tools” that give it the support it needs to dominate local economic, political, and social lives (Kuttab, 2008, p.100). This is why, it very important that we recognize the need of a “political commitment of postcolonial critique” (Ponzanesi, 2017, p. 104) by the PA in order to assure that

the voice of marginalized Palestinian women is visible and heard. Kuttab (2008) argues that “without a national ‘link’, the imperial powers cannot expand or ‘globalize’ the world” (ibid). Within the Palestinian context, Kuttab assures, this “political paradigm” of the Empire has been instated through the Oslo Accords. Jamal (2001) explains the role of the new political paradigm enforced by the PA, or what he calls the “new institutional structure of the PA,” where a new matrix of domination was fused with new mechanisms of gender relations to produce the exclusion of Palestinian women from positions of authority (p. 258). The Oslo Accords allowed “the domination of neoliberal paradigms over local and regional political and economic frameworks” (Kuttab, 2008, p.101). Peace initiatives became a “tool of subjugation” over the Palestinian people and allowed multinational cooperations such as the World Bank to regulate the Palestinian economy after Oslo (ibid). The PLO, hungry for power, legitimacy, and stability, became an inevitable “secular” partner in the Oslo Peace treaty, allowing it to become an international representative of the Palestinian people.

The PA, as Jamal (2001) examines, was criticized for its economic and social policies because they were formed not in the best interest of social justice within Palestine, but in accordance with instructions from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (p. 264). Real development should have been based, according to critics of PA policies after Oslo, on self-reliance, self-rule and self-expression of the Palestinian people (ibid). Instead, Kuttab (2008) makes clear that, the PA became the local “link” allowing hegemonic powers to dominate the Palestinian reality:

Global political and economic schemes cannot sustain themselves or succeed without the help and support of the internal forces of the national regimes, and/or the local elite being integral part of, or an extension of, the new liberal ideological frameworks. Similar to its Arab counterpart, the Palestinian local elite represents the interests of small groups of nationals who have employed political space to develop personal agendas and portfolios that do not in any way include or reflect people’s aspirations, or work toward the achievement of people’s democratic and national rights. These conditions were created in the early 1990s, after the Israeli–Palestinian Declaration of Principles of 1993, or the Oslo Agreement. (p.101)

Hasso (1998) in his research on Palestinian women’s political participation posits that women’s presence within political parties came as a result of a profound belief that Palestinian self-

determination required to a certain extent a “proof of civilizational worth or modernity to the international community” (p. 9). DFLP in an interview with Hasso asserts, “putting women in a leadership position would open for it [the DFLP] a marginal space in international work that is wider than having male leaders” (ibid). Hasso thus uses Rosemary’s argument to analyze that in an international conflict- like the Israeli Palestinian one- women are used as symbols to show the international world that “even women” are playing their part in ending the conflict (ibid). This according to Rosemary Ridd (as cited in Hasso), juxtaposes “the seemingly conflicting notions of the protected female and the militant woman). Accordingly, the change that was created as a result of the Oslo peace accords affected the way in which the woman’s movement operated in Palestine. Development of a Palestinian woman’s agenda had to be understood within this new context and away from the grassroots initiatives that formed the foundation of the woman’s movement’s work in the 70’s and 80’s of the past century.

Massad (2002) parallels the experience of the gay movement with that which he refers to as “white Western woman’s movement” (p.361). Massad (2007) has argued that the “Gay International” ²⁶ has created a rise in homonationalism in the Arab/Muslim world, causing repressive campaigns against LGBT+ groups to increase (p. 185). Similar to Massad’s (2002) argument regarding the “universalization” of gay rights which “has appropriated the prevailing U.S. discourse on human rights in order to launch itself on an international scale” (p.361), Kuttab (2008) argues that the universalization of human rights as woman’s rights “indict these rights as a feminist imperialism that disrespects religion and culture” (p.109). While Mossad (2002) argues that the effect of what he calls the ‘Gay International’ are counterproductive and are not liberatory (p.363), Kuttab (2008) suffices in pointing out that although universal frameworks may provide a robust action plan, the “irrelevance to authentic culture” will provide motive for people, in this case the Palestinians, to reject anything that is “universal” as being Western, imperial and colonial (p.110). As a result, the institution of universal and global woman’s rights brought about from the international UN conventions through international NGOs working in post-Oslo Palestine to liberate the Palestinian woman were more exclusive than inclusive. The Palestinian woman that was the mother of a martyr, the woman humiliated at checkpoints, the breadwinner of a household

²⁶ Massad (2002) defines the Gay International as the “missionary tasks” whose role is to “protect and advance global human rights,” as well as “the discourse that produces them, and the organizations that represent them” (p. 362)

with multiple children following the death of her husband, could not identify with universal woman's liberty initiatives, because to her 'liberty' meant first and foremost, liberation from the occupation. Dajani (1993) agrees that within this context of struggle against a foreign occupation, one can understand a theme that has been reoccurring within the Palestinian woman's movement, and that is, "a rejection of the western model of female liberation" (p.105).

Consequently, Oslo not only deprived the Palestinian woman of her previous integral role in being part of the national fight against the occupation, fighting equally at the forefront with male counterparts, but it also alienated her. The alienation happened by first pushing her into the domestic role of a housewife/mother, and then asking her to liberate from the local patriarchal culture, all while ignoring the role the occupation and the hegemonic colonization has had in furthering a patriarchal cultural dominance over her.

As a result of this fragmentation, the woman's movement in post-Oslo Palestine weakened and reinvented itself through the projects and programs of international donor community in woman NGO's. Kuttab (2008) affirms, "the most serious internal challenge of all those which have faced the women's movement over the past fifteen years has been the movement's transformation from a grass-roots struggle to an elite movement, and the mushrooming of women-oriented NGOs that undermined the work of mass-based women's organizations" (p.106). This change, according to Kuttab (2008), sustained feminist organizations in Palestine as a women's movement and widened the gap between an elitist feminist group speaking of a woman's experience from a universal lens, and the local Palestinian women that were still reaping the atrocities of both the occupation and the authoritative patriarchal society. A power relation necessarily exists when local women enter NGOs, because they enter "spheres of activism that are simultaneously empowering and exclusionary" (Costa, 2014, p. 167). Despite the efforts of NGO activism for a collective fight for women's rights, Costa (2014) found that in fact factors like education, class, and location are dividing women rather than bringing them together (ibid). The gap created by this power relation also meant that any information relayed in fancy NGO workshops and forums on women's rights was inherently Western and thus refusing it meant preserving a local culture. However, in an attempt to 'preserve' local culture, these women refusing 'liberating NGO ideals' became the label of backward women upholding the patriarchy, while engaged NGO feminists (distinct in their "modern" style of dress and over-professionalism (Kuttab, 2008, p.111)) became a mark for modernity and civilization.

Kuttab's notion here is not novel, it builds on Hasso's (1998) research mentioned above. "Women's appearance, bodies, sexuality and/or social status," according to Hasso (1998), were crucial to Palestinian politics at the time because they were used as "powerful political symbols of modernity" that were thought to strengthen the case of Palestinian self-determination with the international community (p.8). However, while Hasso suffices there with his research finding, Kuttab takes this argument further to elaborate on the dichotomy, that this political strategy on part of the PA, has created between "modernized Palestinian women" and traditional Palestinian women. Again, a parallel here exists with the arguments made by LGBTQ movements in the "Global South" (Rao, 2011), who were faced with challenges over their self-assertion discourse. Rao (2011) points out, that anyone refusing to identify with universal gay rights were "increasingly being characterized as backward and uncivilized" (p.43). Local Palestinian women refusing these universal ideals of liberation were likewise labeled by both 'modern,' 'feminist,' 'NGO working' Palestinian women, and by their Western counterparts who continue to fund projects that only adhered to their international agenda. An agenda that overlooks the true needs and aspirations of Palestinian women within the context of resistance and liberation from an occupation that has been the main pitfall against Palestinian woman emancipation.

Furthermore, Kuttab (2008) and Rao's (2011) arguments here also echo Nayran's (1997) discussion of how Third-World Feminists are accused first by their own communities as being "Westernized" and "Foreign" for speaking with a feminist voice against issues in their society. And second, they are accused of being "inauthentic" if they speak as Third World feminists while occupying a position of privilege in the West and in academia (p. 4). Nayran (1997) on the other hand asserts, "many Third-World feminists confront the attitude that our criticisms of our cultures are merely one more incarnation of a colonized consciousness, the views of "privileged native women in whiteface," seeking to attack their "non-Western culture" on the basis of "Western" values" (Nayran, 1997, p. 3). Kuttab joins the voices criticizing the modern NGOization of women's organizations in Palestine by channeling a similar criticism that Nayran (1997) refuses. The gap created by the NGOization of the women's movement in Palestine, Kuttab (2008) argues, can have "negative impact on Arab women's movements in general and Palestinian ones in particular because the concept of the universal can also refer to the imperial or the international, and therefore be rejected by the people at large as a defense mechanism for cultural protection" (p.110). This limitation was investigated by Jad (2004) where he argued that genuine social change

is better achieved through social movements and not through the developmental trend of NGOs (p. 34). Jad does not disregard the role that NGOs can play in bringing about social change, however, this role cannot be taken for granted as a “healthy” socio-political development (ibid). In this sense, Jad agrees with Alvarez’ (1999) description of NGOs as “convenient surrogates for civil society” rather than a true space for civil society to emerge (p. 193). In the Arab world, Jad (2004) explains, the NGOization of Arab women’s movements has led to discursive binaries of East/ West, and State/ Civil society (p. 35). These binaries are what create the “negative impact” of NGOs that Kuttab (2008) wants to eliminate. While Kuttab is not alone in viewing NGOization within a wider context that favors the global Empire and the proliferation of imperialism (others include Edwards and Hulme 1992, Hann and Dunn 1996, and Hanafi and Tabar 2002), she does propose a solution that breaks away from Jad’s (2004) view of social change only gained through social movements. Kuttab (2008) urges women-oriented NGOs to “choose their own discourse and concepts according to their cultural relevance, and that they be able to establish an alternative discourse that is authentic, supplanting existing patriarchal, traditional discourses of women’s rights while maintaining local legitimacy and viability” (p.110).

Finally, the call for modern woman NGOs in Palestine to adapt their discourse to local contexts simultaneously channels Abu Lughod’s (2001) dilemma in the solution she proposes to refusing the “tradition/ Western modernity divide” (p. 110). In stressing that Said’s (1978) work in *Orientalism* focused on how Western power and domination over the Middle East emerged from a long history of representations about the Orient, Abu Lughod (2001) asks an “uncomfortable question” of how all the work that has been produced by feminist scholarship since *Orientalism* may have contributed to reinstating that power domination (p. 105). Including herself as part of that produced knowledge, Abu Lughod (2001) asks how this scholarship may be simultaneously “[validating] Western liberal values” while combating Western stereotypes of Middle Eastern women as passive, silent and lacking agency (p.105). Abu Lughod (2001) asserts, that this tension will continue to reproduce itself as long as feminist scholarship in the Middle East writes “in and for the West” (p. 105). NGOs in Palestine today are, in a way, operating similar to the Middle Eastern feminist Abu Lughod (2001) is addressing in her piece. Kuttab (2008) affirms, “As Palestinian women are involved in a national struggle for liberation and self-determination, they are also engaged in a democratic struggle against patriarchy and undemocratic governance, and practices that prohibit the realization of social justice and gender equality” (p.114). Thus,

Palestinian NGOs must work to create the “sophistication” needed, as stated by Abu Lughod (2001), to speak about local issues while simultaneously adhering to international donor funding requirements of implementing projects that promote women’s rights in a global context that does not necessarily fit the Palestinian reality. How capable are these organizations in achieving this sophistication will always depend on donor agendas. The question thus emerges; are ‘Western’ donors willing to empower Palestinian women NGOs to close the gap between them and the traditional Palestinian woman, or is it in the best interest of “the Empire” that the divide remains?

Helpful to further widening the scope of this discussion, is Mohanty’s (2002) essay revising her previously cited essay where she shifts the focus of transnational feminist critique from an anticolonial discourse to an anti-capital discourse. She explains that “capital as it functions now depends on and exacerbates racist, patriarchal, and heterosexist relations of rule” (p. 510). Mohanty (2002) speaks about the role that globalization has played in furthering colonial power relations against oppressed people. She engages in her article with the limitations associated with the use of each of the binary references, North/ South, First World or West/ Third World, One Third/ Two Third worlds (p. 507). She explains that when used interchangeably these words together can grasp both the geographical and colonial history associated with First/Third World and also the “metaphorical distinction” of the privileged and none-privileged in relation to the quality of life between the privileged/ dominant/ powerful (the haves) and the poor/ minorities/ dominated (the have-nots) within and across borders. (p. 505). The suffering South thus can exist within the U.S for example through its poor and marginalized societies or through the experiences of indigenous people. Having done that, she reminds us that language is limited and “imprecise” and that it “should not be static” (p. 506). Regardless of which references are used, the point is to highlight the power relations that exist between those who have power and domination and those who fight to be heard. In this case, it is between those who have the privilege of ‘whiteness’ i.e. a North existing in the South, and the powerful and global corporations that capitalize on this perceived privilege. for the purpose of moving on from her discussion in “Under Western Eyes,” which focused on the distinction between “Western” and Third World,” Mohanty (2002) proposes a new direction.

This new direction that she proposes can be very useful in empowering Palestinian women’s activism today, and to help it overcome its lost years of fragmentation. Mohanty (2002) moves on in her article to focus on what she calls “anticapitalist transitional feminist practice” and

calls for a “cross-national feminist solidarity and organizing against capitalism” (ibid, p. 509). Capitalism which gave birth to globalization is acting as a new vessel for the recolonization of poor, marginalized and underprivileged peoples, specifically those from the “Two-Thirds World,” and Mohanty is urging feminist scholars and activists to respond to this “phenomenon of globalization” (p. 515). She asserts, “Globalization colonizes women’s as well as men’s lives around the world, and we need an anti-imperialist, anticapitalist, and contextualized feminist project to expose and make visible the various, overlapping forms of subjugation of women’s lives” (Mohanty, 2002, p. 515). Audre Lorde (2007) in her discussion of difference hits on the role of a for-profit economy in furthering the oppression of groups. She agrees with Mohanty that good in our societies is defined in its ability to bring profit and not in its ability to fulfil human needs (p. 855). It is intrinsic in the system of a profit economy, that parallels Mohanty’s globalized one, to have a group that is dehumanized and deemed as inferior. In this economy, “systemized oppression” is inherent (Lorde, 2007, p. 854). Lorde (2007) asserts, “as members of such an economy, we have all been programmed to respond to the human differences between us with fear and loathing and to handle that difference in one of the three ways: ignore it, and if that is not possible, copy it if we think it is dominant, or destroy it if we think it is subordinate” (p. 855).

Accordingly, local Palestinian women NGOs and activists can break through the cycle of passiveness in which they are currently stuck and choose not to follow the dominant path that is binding their work in Palestine. As Yuval-Davis (1997) argues, globalization does not have to be constructed as an opposite of the local (p. 64). Globalization is often seen as a process of homogenization where Western hegemony is imposed on local communities that import economic, political, industrial, social and cultural means of living through globalization (ibid). Instead we can look at globalization as a process of hybridization where a “mélange of cultures” can exist without one overpowering the other. Although globalization, or the Empire, as demonstrated at the opening of this chapter, have proved within the Palestinian context to create a hegemony over the discourse of women’s liberation, they can be rewired to achieve the desired social change. Relying on Talal Assad’s (1993) discussion on translation, Yuval-Davis stresses that the versions of power which are produced through globalization depend on the modes and conditions under which the translation of global lending has taken place (ibid). Identities through globalization, do not have to be reproduced in a way where the translation of borrowed notions replace old identities. New possibilities can occur through the process of hybridized globalization (ibid). However, for that to

occur, cultural borrowings as Assad (1993) explains have to be voluntary and not imposed (p. 13). I hope that insights from this research project can offer a comprehensive lesson-learned from the past four decades of women activism in Palestine, so that any modern day work is able to clearly see through the past and move forward towards a more independent women's agenda that is free from colonial, patriarchal, and capitalist nuances.

Conclusion

Reviewing the journey of the women's movement in Palestine, this research focuses on three fundamental time periods that have shaped the work of the women's movement and have likewise been impacted by its contribution and struggle. The three periods are: The First Intifada (1987-93), the Oslo Peace Accords (1993-95), and finally the work of the movement in the aftermath of the peace agreement (1995 onwards). As such, this project provides an analysis of the current day situation of the Palestinian women's movement by first understanding how the past has played a role in forming the present. Arguing that the women's movement in Palestine today is one that is deeply fractured and weak, I have laid out in the three chapters of this research project how this weakness unraveled temporally during each of the three historical events abovementioned. During the First Intifada, the women's movement started losing its momentum by aligning itself with an inherently masculine movement; namely the national resistance movement in Palestine. A fight for women's rights within such a hyper-masculine movement could not reap any benefits. In fact, it damaged many of the fruits that had already been seeded through the grassroots work of the women's movement before it joined its work with that of the national resistance movement. As a result, women activists and fighters after the first Intifada were pushed back into the privacy of their homes and off the streets, and certainly away from political organizing.

At the time of the Oslo Peace Accords, women were not part of the negotiation, signing, or roll-out of the Peace agreement. Consequently, women's rights, and Israeli accountability for their violation, were sidelined to allow national interests for state-building and perceived sovereignty to take over all government agendas. Theories of transitional justice, which have been conservatively used in addressing mechanisms of justice and accountability in Palestine, have proved to be helpful in analyzing the experiences of Palestinian feminists advocating for women participation in the negotiation, transition process, and new government established as a result of the Oslo accords. By reviewing women's role and status during the conflict prior to the Oslo Accords, this project argues that the Oslo peace agreement failed Palestinian women by excluding them from the process in its entirety just as transitional justice theories historically failed to truly involve women and gender issues in the process of transitional peace and mechanisms of justice. Further, the establishment of the "secular-nationalist" Palestinian Authority (or PLO government),

as a result of the Oslo Peace Accords, is examined through debates of post-secularism. This research examines the “secularism myth” (Braidotti et al. (2014)) that was employed by the PA as a new approach aimed at attracting foreign donor aid for women empowerment programs. It thus proposes an urgent need for a postsecular debate within Palestinian politics in order to achieve a discourse that is free from the secular/ religious binary, allowing space for true gender equality and woman empowerment to ultimately emerge.

Finally, in reviewing the effect of ‘White’ and ‘Globalized’ feminism on the Palestinian women’s movement the project examines how it has contributed to weakening feminist grassroots work in Palestine. Drawing on parallels with a relevant experience of the Global LGBTQ movement and how it negatively impacted LGBTQ movements in the Third World, the project reviews how the Oslo peace accords facilitated the proliferation of a universalized white feminist agenda. The proliferation occurred because the PA accepted immense amounts of international aid for so-called “state-building” projects. Through positioning itself as a secular government, the PA was a favorable receiver of Western donor aid and at that time made the promise of empowering women and achieving gender equality in Palestine. They allowed global feminist agendas to manifest their work across Palestinian cities, villages, and refugee camps through newly established International NGOs (INGOs) and programs which sought to liberate and empower Palestinian women. Targeting women through these INGO highly funded programs, obstructed the way in which the women’s movement operated in Palestine. The effects of this change were, and remain to be, detrimental to the woman’s movement and to the feminist voice in Palestine. To overcome this challenge, this research project ends by making a second proposition and that is to use Mohanty’s (2002) “anticapitalist transitional feminist practice” as a way forward in order to break away from dependence on a globalized feminist discourse, and to go back to creating an authentic Palestinian feminist voice that calls for liberation from all layers of oppression. These layers necessarily have to include that which is caused by the Israeli occupation, which perpetuates all forms of women oppression and subjugation in Palestine.

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