

# The Netherlands and the redesign of European security

The Netherlands, the EC and NATO and the negotiations at the Madrid CSCE conference of 1980-1983

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## Table of contents

Table of contents.....	2
Abstract .....	3
Introduction.....	3
Historiographical debate .....	5
Theoretical framework.....	9
Methodology and sources .....	11
Structure .....	12
Chapter 1 The first year at Madrid.....	13
The formulation of the CDE initiative.....	14
Start of the drafting phase .....	17
The EPC and the continuation of the conference .....	21
Conclusion .....	26
Chapter 2 Madrid CSCE and the impact of the Polish crisis .....	28
The negotiations in autumn 1981 .....	29
Martial law in Poland.....	34
Conclusion .....	36
Chapter 3 Reaching compromise on the final document .....	38
Returning after the 1982 recess.....	38
The Dutch shift from EC to NATO .....	41
End of the conference .....	45
Conclusion .....	47
Conclusion .....	49
List of primary sources .....	53
Bibliography.....	55
Plagiarism form .....	58

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## Abstract

This thesis examines how the Netherlands contributed to competition, cooperation and transfer of ideas between the European Community and NATO during the negotiations about the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) at the Madrid CSCE conference from 1980 to 1983. It shows that the Cold War was more than just a conflict between two superpowers and their allies. It was a complex international order in which small states like the Netherlands and institutions such as the European Political Cooperation (EPC) had significant influence. It also shows that security matters, not human rights, were the driving force behind negotiations at the Madrid conference.

## Introduction

In the autumn of 1980, all European states, except Albania, as well as Canada and the US assembled in Madrid with the hope of improving the cooperation between capitalist, communist and neutral and non-aligned states. They did so under the umbrella of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). It would take about three years before an agreement was reached. It took this long because of the rising tensions between East and West, struggles between the EC and NATO over which alliance took initiatives and discussions about the balance between disarmament and human rights and contacts. All of these issues make the Madrid CSCE conference a subject worth examining. The conference resulted in agreements on improving human rights and a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). The CDE was a conference on disarmament of conventional forces proposed by France in 1979 and agreed on during the CSCE conference in Madrid in 1983. The CDE took place between 1984 and 1986 in Stockholm. The CSCE fostered détente between the Eastern and Western blocs of the Cold War since its inception in 1973. However, by 1980 tensions between East and West were on the rise again after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. This period of increased tensions was known as the Second Cold War. The

CSCE had a special structure because all 35 participating states had the right to veto, even small states. The states had to reach compromises on subjects such as human rights to make progress. This meant that the opinion of the superpowers was as important as that of smaller states like the Netherlands, nuancing the view that the Cold War was a struggle between two superpowers.<sup>1</sup>

Alliances played an important role in coordinating the actions of states. For the West, both the European Community (EC) in the form of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and NATO participated in the Madrid conference. Both the EPC and NATO tried to coordinate the positions of their respective member states, making the conference an example of the overlapping history of these institutions and of European integration in the context of the Cold War. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the nine EC member states formed the EPC, an intergovernmental body in which they tried to coordinate their foreign policy. The CSCE was one of the places where this happened. The Western Europeans aimed to be recognized as an important actor by the Communist bloc, and they also wanted to improve human rights in Eastern Europe in the hopes of more autonomy and liberalization in the long-term.<sup>2</sup>

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, there has been cooperation as well as competition and a transfer of ideas between these institutions and their member states. I aim to get more insight into this overlapping history by examining how the Netherlands contributed to competition, cooperation and transfer of ideas between the European Community and NATO during the CDE negotiations at the Madrid CSCE conference. The Netherlands is an interesting state to focus on because it has always been a strong supporter of both NATO and the European Community and through these multilateral institutions, it could influence the outcome of the Madrid conference, even though it was just a small state. My hypothesis is that the Netherlands tried to form a bridge between these two institutions.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson, 'Introduction: Smaller Powers in Cold War Europe', in *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe : The Influence of Smaller Powers* (Routledge, 2019), 1, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429425592>.

<sup>2</sup> Daniel. Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War : Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity* (London ; I.B. Tauris ;, 2009), 99; Angela Romano, 'The Main Task of the European Political Cooperation: Fostering Détente in Europe', in *Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965-1985*, ed. Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad (Museum Tusculanum Press, 2010), 124.

<sup>3</sup> Laurien Crump, Lenna Lammertink, and Eva Zeilstra, 'Ferm, Doch Onopvallend', *Tijdschrift Voor Geschiedenis* 132, no. 2 (September 2019): 257, <https://doi-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/10.5117/TVGESCH2019.2.006.CRUM>.

## Historiographical debate

When the participating states signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, it was heavily criticised by Western commentators because in their eyes the act conserved and legitimized the Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. Only after the end of the Cold War, this perspective began to change. Former correspondent Richard Davy wrote a key text countering the commentators, in which he argued that the nine members of the European Community together with the neutral and non-aligned countries did not conform to the status quo of Soviet rule over Eastern Europe. Instead, by bringing human rights into the process they tried to overcome it in the long-term.<sup>4</sup> The content of the Helsinki Final Act was divided into four baskets: security, economics, human contacts and follow-up conferences. Human rights were added as a principle of the security basket. In the 1980s, human rights and human contacts together formed the human dimension, this dimension was an important spearpoint for the West.<sup>5</sup> The research on the CSCE-process has in large part focused on the human rights aspect of the Helsinki Final Act.<sup>6</sup>

However, for the East Europeans security, military détente and disarmament were the priority of the East in the CSCE process. By focusing on disarmament, I highlight another part of the puzzle that is often overlooked in the Western perspective.<sup>7</sup> Disarmament is also interesting in the context of European integration because security matters were not a competence of the EC or the EPC, but the EC member states negotiated about the CDE initiative they took during the Madrid conference.<sup>8</sup> Historians Daniel Möckli and Angela Romano have both argued that the nine member states of the European Community formed an effective and unified bloc of their own at Helsinki and Geneva. The states coordinated their actions separately from NATO in the EPC. The CSCE process led to the Nine having more

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<sup>4</sup> Richard Davy, 'Helsinki Myths: Setting the Record Straight on the Final Act of the CSCE, 1975', *Cold War History* 9, no. 1 (February 2009): 17, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740802490380>.

<sup>5</sup> Laurien Crump, 'Forty-Five Years of Dialogue Facilitation (1972–2017): Ten Lessons from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe', *Security and Human Rights* 27, no. 3–4 (16 September 2016): 502, <https://doi.org/10.1163/18750230-02703017>.

<sup>6</sup> For example: Sarah B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (New York, UNITED STATES: Cambridge University Press, 2011), <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uunl/detail.action?docID=691925>.

<sup>7</sup> Laurien Crump and Leon Grundmann, "'Enemies of Détente'? Eastern European Strategies in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Belgrade and Madrid, 1977-1983', *EEJDH*, 2019, 188.

<sup>8</sup> Angela Romano, 'Re-Designing Military Security in Europe: Cooperation and Competition between the European Community and NATO during the Early 1980s', *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire* 24, no. 3 (2017): 445–46, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2017.1282429>.

distinct foreign and security policies.<sup>9</sup> That makes this subject relevant to study considering the current public debate about the expansion of a common foreign policy by the EU.

Angela Romano has also researched how the European community and NATO competed and cooperated in re-designing the military security of Europe in the early 1980s via the CDE. Her article is part of the special issue that develops a new research agenda for cooperation and competition between international organizations in Europe (see the theoretical framework for further explanation).<sup>10</sup> She argues that the CDE was a signature initiative by the governments of the EC member states, which collectively became active in the field of disarmament in this way via the EPC. They wanted to maintain European détente and counter pacifist domestic forces that advocated neutrality. The differing opinion between the Americans and West Europeans on how to engage with the Soviets and constitute the European order made it easier for the EC to maintain its unity around the CDE initiative. The EC innovated the field of disarmament with the CDE initiative.<sup>11</sup> The CDE-initiative led to competition between the EC and NATO over which institution took primacy in the development of the conference. It also led to cooperation and the transfer of ideas from the EC to NATO. This happened because the EC members did not want to marginalize NATO and needed its expertise for the negotiations.<sup>12</sup>

It is important to note that except for Ireland all EC member states were also part of NATO. Romano argues that France, Great Britain and West Germany were the most important states in the reconciliation of transatlantic relations.<sup>13</sup> She studied the relationship between the EC and NATO by focussing on intergovernmental discussions and interactions and the exchange of ideas between organizations using the archives of EC institutions, NATO, France and Great Britain. She did not use Dutch archives. Romano viewed the discussions from the angle of high politics because they deal with military security and related matters, meaning that she regarded governments and high-ranking individuals as the main actors.<sup>14</sup> My research

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<sup>9</sup> Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War*, 99; Romano, 'The Main Task of the European Political Cooperation', 124.

<sup>10</sup> Wolfram Kaiser and Kiran Klaus Patel, 'Multiple Connections in European Co-Operation: International Organizations, Policy Ideas, Practices and Transfers 1967–92', *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire* 24, no. 3 (4 May 2017): 340, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2017.1282431>.

<sup>11</sup> Angela Romano, 'Re-Designing Military Security in Europe: Cooperation and Competition between the European Community and NATO during the Early 1980s', *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire* 24, no. 3 (4 May 2017): 445–46, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2017.1282429>.

<sup>12</sup> Romano, 445–46.

<sup>13</sup> Romano, 460–61.

<sup>14</sup> Romano, 446–47.

will build on Romano's article by examining the Dutch contribution to the CDE. In doing so it highlights the relationship between the EC and NATO and their competition and cooperation using Dutch primary sources. The Dutch point of view gives insight in how a small state that was a founding member of both the EC and NATO perceived the Cold War order and how it tried to act within this order and influence it.

As a small state and member of both multilateral institutions, it is interesting to see how and if the Netherlands had a margin for manoeuvre at the conference and in this way influenced the outcome of the negotiations in order to achieve its own interest. Together with Laurien Crump, Angela Romano has argued that small groups and individual states had room for manoeuvre inside the Cold War order by using the multilateral mechanism of the CSCE to create leverage over the superpowers. This approach, which is called New Cold War History, sees the Cold War as more than just a struggle between two superpowers. It bases its claims on multi-archival research, using sources from the East, the West and other actors. I will focus on which ideas on disarmament Dutch government officials and diplomats brought to the table at the conference and how they used the multilateral mechanisms of the NATO caucus and EPC meeting for achieving these ideas. Thus, my thesis is contributing to New Cold War History.<sup>15</sup>

Focusing on the Netherlands alone does, however, have a pitfall.

Historians examining the actions of one nation state in the CSCE process tend to overemphasize the role that state played in the process. An example of this way of thinking can be found in the Dutch historian Floribert Baudet's chapter 'It was Cold War and we wanted to win'. Baudet argued that the Netherlands played an important role during the Helsinki negotiations because it was very critical of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Dutch delegation wanted to add the right of self-determination to the principles of basket I and they also were one of the biggest supporters of the free movement of individuals, ideas, and information in basket III (human contacts). When it came to human rights the Dutch were perceived as hardliners by the other delegations, and their stance annoyed their Western allies. In Baudet's

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<sup>15</sup> Laurien Crump and Angela Romano, 'Challenging the Superpower Straitjacket (1965-1975): Multilateralism as an Instrument of Smaller Powers', in *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe : The Influence of Smaller Powers*, ed. Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson (Routledge, 2019), 13, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429425592>.

view, the cooperation between the EC member states was not so important. He even states that the Netherlands did not believe in détente.<sup>16</sup>

Laurien Crump, Lenna Lammertink and Eva Zeilstra are critical of both the national and the international historiographical debate. They argue that the Netherlands was more pragmatic and willing to compromise than idealistic in its defence of human rights. First and foremost, the Dutch tried to maintain Western European unity, and human rights were used as a tool to achieve this.<sup>17</sup> At the start of the CSCE process, the Dutch prioritized the EPC, but when superpower détente ended in the late 1970s the Dutch focus shifted to NATO and the US. This shift can be explained by the Netherlands being a reliable ally to the United States for a long time.<sup>18</sup> The Netherlands formed a bridge between the EC and NATO. During the Madrid conference, for example, the Dutch cooperated with the US, the UK and other Western states on human rights and other important issues. Because most of these subjects were sensitive for the negotiations, the Netherlands rarely took the initiative to avoid being the only one confronting the Soviet Union. The Dutch mediated between the Western allies when opinions diverged. The article gives the CDE-initiative as an example of this.<sup>19</sup>

Focusing on the Netherlands and disarmament during the Madrid CSCE is interesting in the context of NATO's dual-track decision. The dual-track decision, on the one hand, modernized NATO's cruise missile arsenal and on the other hand left open the possibility for disarmament talks. Public opinion in the Netherlands and the rest of Western Europe was against the placement of missiles and large protests were held during the early 1980s.<sup>20</sup> It is also interesting to focus on the Netherlands and disarmament because disarmament was a priority for the East in the CSCE process, which leaves the question of how Western states interacted with this.<sup>21</sup> Crump, Lammertink and Zeilstra conclude that the Netherlands had a smaller role in the negotiations at Helsinki than Baudet thinks. However, according to their research, the Dutch were fundamental in aligning the interests of the EC and NATO during the

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<sup>16</sup> Floribert Baudet, 'It Was Cold War and We Wanted to Win': Human Rights, "Détente," and the CSCE', in *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75*, ed. Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, and Christian Nuenlist (London, 2008), 184–91.

<sup>17</sup> Crump, Lammertink, and Zeilstra, 'Ferm, Doch Onopvallend', 257–59.

<sup>18</sup> Kim van der Wijngaart, *Bondgenootschap onder spanning: Nederlands-Amerikaanse betrekkingen, 1969-1976* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2011), 222.

<sup>19</sup> Crump, Lammertink, and Zeilstra, 'Ferm, Doch Onopvallend', 268–70.

<sup>20</sup> Crump, Lammertink, and Zeilstra, 268–70.

<sup>21</sup> Crump and Grundmann, "'Enemies of Détente'?", 188.



Madrid conference.<sup>22</sup> This point differs from Romano, who sees France, Great Britain and West Germany as the bridgebuilders, but does not think the Netherlands played such a role.<sup>23</sup> Crump, Lammertink and Zeilstra focus on the role of smaller states in the CSCE process by mainly looking at human rights, and they only briefly mention the CDE initiative. My research innovates on this article by making this initiative the main object of study.

I aim to build on the articles of Romano and Crump et al. to get a better understanding of cooperation, competition and transfer of ideas between the European Community and NATO and the Dutch contribution to this by examining the archives of the Dutch foreign ministry on the Conference on Disarmament in Europe. By doing this I will show the margin for manoeuvre of a small state on its own and in the multilateral institutions of NATO and the EC. I will employ the method used by Romano when I am studying these primary sources. I will use Crump et al.'s argument that the Netherlands formed a bridge between NATO and the EC as my hypothesis and test this using the sources on the CDE initiative. By doing this my research will contribute to the research agenda of cooperation and competition between international organizations related to European integration and European history after the Second World War, and it will also contribute to New Cold War History.

## Theoretical framework

To answer my research question, I draw upon a special issue of the journal *European Review of History* from 2017 edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Kiran Klaus Patel. This issue focused on placing international organizations in historical perspective by examining competition, cooperation and the transfer of ideas between different international organizations in Europe. These three concepts shed light on the overlapping histories of international organizations, in this instance NATO and the EC, thereby providing a framework for analysing these multilateral institutions and putting European post-war history in a new light.<sup>24</sup> International organizations have been very influential in the transnational transfer of policies between states in contemporary history. Kaiser and Pattel argue that other historians focus too much on the European Union and its predecessors when they study the post-war history of European

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<sup>22</sup> Crump, Lammertink, and Zeilstra, 'Ferm, Doch Onopvallend', 278.

<sup>23</sup> Romano, 'Re-Designing Military Security in Europe', 461.

<sup>24</sup> Kaiser and Patel, 'Multiple Connections in European Co-Operation', 344.

integration. Theories like neofunctionalism have created the teleological notion of European integration as an ever-continuing process towards a federal state. Realism has also been very influential on the existing scholarship, which is mostly focused on decision-making moments like the signing of treaties. The articles in this special issue solve these problems by examining the overlapping activities of international organizations and the way in which these organizations create new policies and practices and transfer these to other international organizations. The articles are also innovative because they not only focus on decision-making moments but also other phases of policy-making: agenda-setting, implementation and policy review, thereby highlighting the intellectual roots of policies. By doing this Kaiser and Patel hope to contextualize the European Union and its predecessors as part of a web of international organizations in post-war Western history.<sup>25</sup>

Ideas, actors and institutions are the three most important vectors of cooperation, competition and transfer among European international organizations discerned by Kaiser and Patel. The articles discuss how ideas are negotiated, stabilized and implemented as policy solutions to economic, social and political problems faced by international organizations.<sup>26</sup> By actors, Kaiser and Patel mean nation states, their governments and the politicians, officials and diplomats working for them, as well as external experts giving advice. This is broader than more traditional diplomatic history and international relations theories like realism, which only focus on the state and its government. Angela Romano's article on the CDE initiative mentioned above is part of this special issue, but she focuses more on the interactions between governments than on how experts and officials influenced policy. By focusing my research on the Dutch foreign ministry, I hope to shed light on the role of experts and officials.<sup>27</sup> The institutional set-up, competences and practices of international organizations are all part of the vector institutions. For my research, this means that when I study the coordination of EC foreign policy in the CSCE process, I should be aware of the rotating presidency of the EPC. This is why, for example, France proposed the CDE initiative.<sup>28</sup>

My focus will be on the negotiations about the CDE-initiative during the CSCE conference in Madrid (1980-1983). I will answer sub-questions, derived from the three most important vectors: ideas, actors and institutions. Which role did the Dutch government

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<sup>25</sup> Kaiser and Patel, 338–41.

<sup>26</sup> Kaiser and Patel, 346.

<sup>27</sup> Kaiser and Patel, 347–48.

<sup>28</sup> Kaiser and Patel, 348; Romano, 'Re-Designing Military Security in Europe', 445.

officials and diplomats play during the discussions on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament? What kind of policy-solutions did they propose and support? Where did they discuss these solutions, NATO or the EC? How were the ideas on disarmament and European security exchanged between institutions?

## Methodology and sources

I answer my research question primarily by using the archives of the Dutch foreign ministry on the Madrid CSCE conference, which can be found in the Dutch National Archive in The Hague. These archives consist of messages sent between the Dutch delegation in Madrid and the Dutch foreign minister in The Hague. They have only recently been disclosed to the public. As described in the theoretical framework, the research will concentrate on the three most important vectors of cooperation, competition and transfer of ideas: actors, ideas and institutions. The actors that I examined are the Dutch delegation and its delegation leaders Frans van Dongen and A.H. Croin. The American and French delegations have also been studied since they were the most involved Western parties for the CDE negotiations. American delegation leader Max Kampelman functioned as the leader of the Western alliance at the conference, and his impact has, therefore, also been taken into account.

The ideas that were studied are, first and foremost, the CDE initiative and its development throughout the conference; the opinions on the CDE in the Western alliance and in the Warsaw Pact and neutral non-aligned (NNA) states; the balance of the CDE initiative with other aspects of the final document such as the human dimension; and the different compromises on the final document suggested by the NNA countries like RM.<sup>39</sup> For the vector institutions, I examined different meetings of the alliances that took place at the conference and outside of it. For the EC, I looked at the meetings of the European Political Cooperation on the level of delegations at the conference and on the ministerial level outside of it. The directors of political affairs of the EC foreign ministries also had meetings about the CSCE in the EPC's political committee (copo). At the conference, NATO had a separate caucus meeting from the EPC to coordinate the actions of its member states with the NATO delegations plus Spain, which wanted to become a member of the alliance. In the later stages of the conference, NATO held informal meetings between the Western delegation leaders in the so-called 'Bolkesjoe' meetings. The CSCE plenary meeting with all delegations and the

discussions at the drafting group for military aspects where the CDE negotiations took place were also examined, as well as the informal meetings which were part of the CSCE negotiation process.

To avoid overemphasizing the role the Netherlands played in the CSCE process, I will contextualize Dutch foreign policy by using other sources. I have used interviews with American delegation member Spencer Oliver and Swiss delegation leader Edouard Brunner to get an American and NNA perspective on the negotiations. I have also consulted online archives such as Documents on British Policy Overseas and the Digital National Security Archive. By using these sources I follow the multi-archival approach of New Cold War History.

## Structure

The structure of my thesis will be as follows: I will start by examining the start of the negotiations in October 1980 and follow them until the first summer recess in July 1981. The next chapter will deal with the impact of the Polish crisis on the negotiations, starting in autumn 1981 and ending with the adjournment of the conference in March 1982. The third and final chapter will deal with the final year of negotiations and show how a compromise was eventually reached. Each chapter will deal with the negotiations about the content of the CDE initiative and how this initiative related to the other parts of the final document like the human dimension. The conclusion will reflect on how the Netherlands contributed to cooperation, competition and transfer of ideas between the European Community and NATO and connect the findings of the research in the Dutch archives to the historiography.

First, let us turn to the origins of the CDE initiative, which illustrate the troubles between the US and its European allies and show what was at stake in Madrid.

## Chapter 1 The first year at Madrid

When the Madrid CSCE conference began in autumn 1980, tensions between East and West had been the highest in years, this period was known as the Second Cold War. In the West, itself tensions were also increasing because of the public resistance to the NATO dual-track decision. West European NATO members had accepted the placement of cruise missiles in their territories in reaction to the Soviets placing SS-20 missiles in Warsaw Pact states. Building up arms was one part of NATO's strategy, the other part of the strategy was advocating for disarmament talks about the missiles on both sides. The placement of missiles led to large public protests in Western Europe in the early 1980s.<sup>29</sup>

This chapter deals with the first year of negotiations. During this time the important actors in relation to the CDE initiative were the French and American delegations. France proposed the initiative on its own and often acted independently from NATO. This can partly be explained by France having opted out of NATO's military structure since the middle of the 1960s. The Americans were waiting for the Reagan Administration to take office before they formed an opinion on the Conference of Disarmament in Europe (CDE). The question if the new administration would support the initiative was very important for all other Western delegations. It determined the actions of the Dutch delegation, its leader Frans van Dongen and liberal foreign minister Chris van der Klaauw (VVD). For the vector ideas, this chapter will examine the different proposals for a disarmament conference made not only by France but also the East and NNA states. The negotiations about disarmament fell under basket I of the Helsinki Final Act, human rights were also of this basket as a principle. The chapter will describe what the Dutch thought of the CDE initiative and what it wanted to achieve at Madrid. Another idea that will be discussed is how the Western delegations thought the duration of the conference would affect their position for reaching the outcomes they wanted. For the vector institutions, this chapter looks at the role of the EPC in support of the CDE initiative. Both the meetings at the conference and the meetings of the political committee (*comité politique, copo*) on the level of the EC's foreign ministers and its directors-general of political affairs will be discussed. By 1981, Greece became a member of the European

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<sup>29</sup> John Young, Odd Arne Westad, and Melvyn P. Leffler, 'Western Europe and the End of the Cold War, 1979–1989', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 296, <https://doi-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/10.1017/CHOL9780521837217.015>.

Community, from then on this thesis will refer to the EC member states as the Ten. In the case of NATO, the caucus meeting with all Western delegations will be discussed.

Angela Romano argued that the EPC took the initiative during the conference in Madrid and more specifically in developing the CDE-initiative. There was also cooperation between the EPC and NATO because Western cohesion was essential for reaching a successful result at Madrid.<sup>30</sup> Sarah Snyder, on the other hand, argued that the NATO delegations worked together under the leadership of American delegation leader Max Kampelman because the international situation fostered Western unity.<sup>31</sup> I will show that there was both competition and cooperation between the EPC and NATO. France independent actions competed with NATO, while the Netherlands built bridges between the two institutions and their member states.

## The formulation of the CDE initiative

Even though the Helsinki Final Act had facilitated a period of détente tensions between the superpowers began to rise at the end of the 1970s. The CSCE follow-up meeting at Belgrade from October 1977 to March 1978 failed to deliver substantial progress and tensions between the US and Soviet Union began to rise after American President Jimmy Carter adopted a tough stance on human rights violations and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan at the end of 1979. Talks about nuclear disarmament also reached an impasse.<sup>32</sup> This was the end of superpower détente and the beginning of the so-called Second Cold War. The EC member states, however, wanted to continue European détente.<sup>33</sup> In an attempt to reinvigorate the disarmament talks, France started to develop the CDE initiative in 1978 under the leadership of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. The starting point of this conference for the French was to not turn it into another place where East and West would oppose each other, which would probably lead to the superpowers determining the course of the conference and France losing its influence. The EPC was involved with developing the initiative from an early stage and the EC member states demanded that the CDE would be linked to the CSCE process. The reason for this was

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<sup>30</sup> Romano, 'Re-Designing Military Security in Europe', 462–63.

<sup>31</sup> SarahB. Snyder, 'The CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance: Forging a New Consensus in Madrid', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies (Springer Nature)* 8, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 56, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794010903534048>.

<sup>32</sup> Romano, 'Re-Designing Military Security in Europe', 450.

<sup>33</sup> Crump, 'Forty-Five Years of Dialogue Facilitation (1972–2017)', 502–5.

that with a disarmament conference related to the CSCE process the Western states could demand concessions on human rights and contacts from the East in return for military détente, which was an important goal of the East. In November 1979, the EPC endorsed the CDE and made it one of its objectives for the Madrid conference.<sup>34</sup> The French CDE initiative consisted of:

a mandate establishing the conditions for negotiations with the objective of agreeing by common accord on meaningful confidence-building measures in the military field. These should be verifiable, applicable to the European continent as a whole and such that, by contributing to the improvement of the security of States, they will create conditions leading later to a process of arms control and reduction within the same geographical framework.<sup>35</sup>

Until the CDE was proposed disarmament negotiations took place between the superpowers and these talks were mostly about nuclear weapons. For Western Europeans, the supremacy of conventional Soviet forces posed a big threat. It was therefore in their interest to start a multilateral disarmament conference that would have politically binding and verifiable agreements about conventional forces encompassing Europe as a whole, including the Soviet Union up to the Ural Mountains.<sup>36</sup>

The CSCE conference in Madrid officially started on 11 November 1980. The month beforehand negotiations had already started on the different working groups that would work out formulations for parts of the concluding document. During this time, the Americans discussed the CDE initiative with the French and in NATO with the goal of achieving agreement over the mandate of the CDE and the package of confidence building measures (CBM's) in order to form a united front at the beginning of the conference. In the French CDE-initiative, the talks would be split into two phases, the first phase would deal with the CBM's, the second phase would be about disarmament. The relationship between the first and second phase of the CDE was a major, though not irreconcilable, difference between the US and France. The US did not want a direct relationship between the two phases, they had three reasons for this: first, there was a fear that this would undermine the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks. Second, there was resistance in the Republican Party towards any kind of

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<sup>34</sup> Romano, 'Re-Designing Military Security in Europe', 452.

<sup>35</sup> European Political Cooperation statements of the Foreign Ministers and other documents 1979, AEI, 80–1, <http://aei.pitt.edu/5581/1/5581.pdf> (accessed on 3 June 2020).

<sup>36</sup> Romano, 'Re-Designing Military Security in Europe', 445–46.

rapprochement with the Soviets after the invasion of Afghanistan. Third, there was resistance from the Pentagon to disarmament.<sup>37</sup>

Not only France had plans for a disarmament conference in Europe, but also Poland, Finland and Sweden among others had plans. For the East, disarmament, military détente and European security were the most important issues in the CSCE. Human rights and other parts of the CSCE's human domain were of no importance to the East. The 'multilateral institutionalisation of European security' was more important to the East than to the West, which means that the West used the CDE as a bargaining chip in order to get its ideas on human rights accepted by the East.<sup>38</sup> On 17 and 18 October 1980, the EPC working group on the CSCE met in preparation of the meeting by the political committee (copo) to discuss the position of the member states in the negotiations. Specific attention was given to when the CDE-initiative should be proposed in order to counter the proposals for a disarmament conference by the East. The West did not want to accept a compromise between the Western and Eastern initiatives on disarmament.<sup>39</sup> This is an example of ideas about CDE being developed outside of NATO at a time when the Americans had not fully supported the CDE yet.

There was support for the French proposal among its West European allies, and the Netherlands would have participated in the submission of the proposal if France had done this in a group.<sup>40</sup> Instead, France submitted the CDE-initiative on its own at the plenary of 9 December 1980 in reaction to the Polish proposal.<sup>41</sup> The Polish proposal had similarities to the French initiative, with a politically binding character, different phases for CBM's and disarmament and a relationship with other disarmament talks. However, there was one major difference with the CDE-initiative, in the Polish proposal the disarmament conference would not be part of the CSCE process.<sup>42</sup> The decoupling of the security and human dimensions was unacceptable for the West.

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<sup>37</sup> 'Received Message, CDE US Opinion, Van Dongen 32', 14 October 1980, Catalogue number 2466, Madrid (1980), Dutch National Archive [hereafter NA], The Hague.

<sup>38</sup> Crump and Grundmann, "'Enemies of Détente'?", 29–30.

<sup>39</sup> 'Sent Message, Meeting of EPC Working Group on CSCE 17 and 18 October, Van Der Klaauw 5', 15 October 1980, catalogue number 3792, Madrid (1980), NA.

<sup>40</sup> 'Received Message, New Proposals- Support by the Netherlands, Van Dongen', 4 December 1980, Catalogue number 2466, received messages Madrid (1980), NL-HaNA.

<sup>41</sup> 'Received Message, the US and the French CDE Proposal, Van Dongen 137', 8 December 1980, Catalogue number 2466, received messages Madrid (1980), NL-HaNA.

<sup>42</sup> 'Received Message, Report of First Round CBM's, Van Dongen 180', 19 December 1980, Catalogue number 2466, received messages Madrid (1980), NL-HaNA.



France proposing the CDE-initiative was coordinated in the NATO caucus beforehand because, at this time, the US was still reserved about the CDE. This was partly caused by the transition to the Reagan Administration which would happen at the start of 1981, delaying any major decision about support.<sup>43</sup> Another reason for the American reservations was the CDE mandate in relation to the second phase about disarmament mentioned above. The Americans instead wanted to focus on the CBM package during the implementation debates before the end of the year. The Soviets rejected this relationship because the proposed mandate area would include European Russia but exclude any American territories, and the Soviets thought this was unfair. The implementation debates also discussed the verification of military exercises or movements as part of the CBM's, meaning at what number of troops the CSCE states should be notified. There was also discussion about the binding character of the CDE.<sup>44</sup> The American attitude left the West Europeans worried about the solidarity and unity within NATO. Together with his British colleague, Dutch delegation leader Van Dongen insisted to the American delegation leader Max Kampelman that American support for the CDE was crucial for the Western position in negotiations and its unity. A lack of American support would have a disastrous effect on public opinion in alliance members like the Netherlands, which were turning against NATO at the time because of the placement of cruise missiles for the dual-track decision.<sup>45</sup>

### Start of the drafting phase

Before the conference in Madrid resumed after the Christmas recess in January 1981, the CSCE working group of the EPC met for a discussion of the proposals that were made at the conference and the tactics that should be used in the next phase. The Ten, including the Netherlands, agreed to continue holding a hard line against the Soviets and not yet focus on a compromise to save the CSCE process. The EPC members were unified around the French CDE-initiative. According to France, it would be important for the entire West to remain steadfast and unify around the proposal in order to show Western public opinion that the

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<sup>43</sup> 'Received Message, the US and the French CDE Proposal, Van Dongen 137', 8 December 1980, Catalogue number 2466, Madrid (1980), NL-HaNA.

<sup>44</sup> 'Report of First Round CBM's, 19 December 1980'.

<sup>45</sup> 'The US and the French CDE Proposal, 8 December 1980'.

Western states were taking European security and disarmament seriously.<sup>46</sup> Dutch delegation leader Van Dongen thought there was good cooperation between the Ten and Fifteen at the end of January 1981.<sup>47</sup> The Netherlands manoeuvred together with the other EC member states in the EPC, a multilateral institution, and in this way contributed to the cooperation and transfer of ideas between the EC and NATO.

In February 1981, there were discussions in both the EPC meeting and the NATO caucus about the strategies and tactics the West should use. Some Western initiatives, including the CDE, were not supported by all Western states. In the EPC meeting, France proposed to create an internal document for proposals that the EC states would negotiate about. The Dutch delegation feared that the French wanted to formulate an independent EPC standpoint with this internal document that would mainly focus on European security. Eight of the ten members states proclaimed that the power of the Western position was its unity. The presidency of the EPC meeting, which was the Netherlands, called independent policies with either an EC or a NATO stamp on it fatal. Because of this, the EPC did not agree on any internal document. French delegation leader Jacques Martin had been in Paris during the EPC meeting, but he was willing to cooperate with the other Western states and hinted at the idea that some of the French delegation members carried out the traditionally more independent French politics.<sup>48</sup>

In the NATO caucus, the Netherlands as president of the EPC meeting, together with the American, British, Canadian, French, Norwegian and West German delegations presented the strategy and tactics the West could follow and a draft of the final document that would be the basis of further negotiations. All these delegations had developed proposals for the final document. These proposals were based on the Western core proposals on human rights and contacts, the CDE and freedom of information. Proposals that still needed a common formulation, among them Western proposals which had not yet been supported by the EC and the EC policies in Basket II. The NATO caucus agreed with these strategies, which made divergence between East and West harder.<sup>49</sup> Although cooperation was maintained and ideas

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<sup>46</sup> 'Sent Message, Meeting EPC Working Group CSCE on 19 and 20 January 1981, Van Der Klaauw 1', 27 January 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA.

<sup>47</sup> 'Received Message, First Impressions, Van Dongen 1', 30 January 1981, Catalogue number #2600, received messages Madrid 1981 (Jan.-May), NL-HaNA.

<sup>48</sup> 'Received Message, Final Phase Madrid Western Approach, Van Dongen 31', 13 February 1981, Catalogue number #2600, received messages Madrid 1981 (Jan.-May), NL-HaNA.

<sup>49</sup> 'Final Phase Madrid Western Approach, 13 February 1981'.

about how to make proposals were transferred between Western institutions, there was also competition between the EPC and NATO as a result of French actions.

However, the strategies and tactics for maintaining Western unity did not last long. The draft version of the final document was not developed further. The Americans made a critical remark about the draft in the CSCE plenary. The Dutch and French delegation leaders had to ask their American colleague to not do this again. To maintain Western unity the Netherlands moved together with the French and criticized the Western superpower. In a message to The Hague, Dutch delegation leader Van Dongen said that due to the negotiations taking a long time some delegations had lost their motivation to get the most out of it. This was dangerous for the West: it had a negative impact on Western unity and Van Dongen feared that delegations would accept sham results in order to make it seem that the Madrid conference had resulted in more than Belgrade.<sup>50</sup>

Both in the meetings of NATO and the EC non-papers were prepared at the beginning of March, which consisted of Western ideas and acceptable elements of other delegations. After the meetings, these non-papers were first spread to the NNA states and later to the Warsaw Pact countries. The Netherlands held the presidency of the EPC meeting and was part of all contact groups at the conference except the one about military aspects. The reason for this absence was that there should not rise the impression that the EC presidency had anything to do with military aspects. For the West, the US, UK, Norway and France were part of the contact group. The EC set the tone in the preparation for the last phase of the negotiations, with the EC member states cooperating in the NATO caucus. The delegations of the other NATO members were sometimes irritated by this, but this never seriously threatened Western unity at the conference.<sup>51</sup>

In March, the negotiations were at an impasse. Soviet leader Brezhnev proposed to add the European part of Russia with its border at the Ural mountains as a concession in the hope of getting the West to make a concession, such as adding the Atlantic Ocean to the mandate area.<sup>52</sup> The US, on the other hand, did not want to accept some of the measures of

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<sup>50</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE Follow-up Meeting Second Phase General View, Van Dongen 41', 23 February 1981, Catalogue number #2600, received messages Madrid 1981 (Jan.-May), NL-HaNA.

<sup>51</sup> 'Received Message, Elements for Oral Report Copo Presidency', 5 March 1981, Catalogue number #2600, received messages Madrid 1981 (Jan.-May), NL-HaNA.

<sup>52</sup> 'Sent Message, Progress of Negotiations, Van Der Klaauw 16', 25 March 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA; 'Sent Message, Developments Military Aspects CSCE, Van Der Klaauw 12', 14 March 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA.

the CDE: naval and air CBM's and prior notification of major military manoeuvres in bordering sea and air areas.<sup>53</sup> Dutch foreign minister Van Der Klaauw did not want to lose American support for the CDE. Therefore, he was against watering down the CDE proposal to make it acceptable for the NNA and Warsaw Pact countries as some of the other Western states like Sweden and Norway wanted. The NNA states did not have a problem with adding naval CBM's to the mandate if this would mean that the mandate area would end at the Ural Mountains.<sup>54</sup>

The Soviet Union tried to exploit the gap between the US and its European allies by emphasizing the lack of interest in a pan-European process by the US. In this way the Soviets frustrated the disarmament talks, making them a 'song without an end'. The Dutch delegation argued that the EC member states should be the ones countering the Soviet actions in order to show this was not true. They favoured the EC over NATO since they also recognised American disinterest in the pan-European process.<sup>55</sup>

The EPC's political committee (copo) proposed that the Ten should leave the conference by the summer of 1981 if the negotiations were still stuck.<sup>56</sup> However, the EC delegations at the conference did not want to agree on this before discussing it with NATO and some NNA countries during the Easter recess.<sup>57</sup> Copo also proposed that experts of NATO and the EC should be involved in the Madrid negotiations. However, Ireland did not want to mention NATO in this proposal since it was not part of this institution.<sup>58</sup>

At the end of the second period of negotiations in mid-April 1981, the American stance towards the CDE was still uncertain. The US still had a problem regarding the formulation of the CDE mandate in relation to the first (CBM) and second (disarmament) phase. Together with the British, they were also against maritime CBM's. Norway, Belgium and West Germany were also more nuanced on this matter. This disunity in the West limited the possibilities for negotiations.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> 'Received Message, Week Report 16-20 March 1981, Van Dongen 89', 20 March 1981, Catalogue number #2600, received messages Madrid 1981 (Jan.-May), NL-HaNA.

<sup>54</sup> 'Developments Military Aspects CSCE, 14 March 1981'.

<sup>55</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE- Second Follow-up Conference a Song without an End, Van Dongen 123', 9 April 1981, Catalogue number #2600, received messages Madrid 1981 (Jan.-May), NL-HaNA.

<sup>56</sup> 'Sent Message, Copo 7 and 8 April, Celer 20', 9 April 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA.

<sup>57</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE- Follow-up Conference Discussion of the Ten after Copo on 8', 11 April 1981, Catalogue number #2600, received messages Madrid 1981 (Jan.-May), NL-HaNA.

<sup>58</sup> 'Sent Message, CSCE/Copo', 9 April 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA.

<sup>59</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE Follow-up Second Phase, Drafting/ Contact Group Security Issues Evaluation Report Last Period, Van Dongen 133', 11 April 1981, Catalogue number #2600, received messages Madrid 1981 (Jan.-

The Dutch delegation leader participated in a meeting about the CDE mandate with the American and French delegation leaders Max Kampelman and Jacques Martin. The Dutch were asked for their input because they were not part of the security contact group for the negotiations, making them useful as a less engaged third party.<sup>60</sup> This was an example of the margins for manoeuvre the Dutch had as a small state, taking the role as mediator in a multilateral discussion between larger states.<sup>61</sup> At the meeting, the delegation leaders discussed the relationship of the CDE to other forums, in particular, the CSCE and the relationship between the first and second phase of the CDE. Van Dongen and Martin advocated a more active Western approach in the formulation of the mandate as the West European states wanted, instead of the more vague alternatives preferred by the US.<sup>62</sup> In their role as mediator, the Dutch supported the French in trying to persuade the US to support the CDE mandate and content because the uncertainty of the American stance limited the Western options for negotiations.<sup>63</sup> The Dutch conceded to the Americans on how the CDE should relate to other disarmament talks because the Americans feared these talks would be inserted into the CDE.<sup>64</sup> This is an example of the Netherlands being a bridge-builder within the Western alliance. By mediating the Dutch hoped to increase Western options and thereby come one step closer to their end goal of a final document with substantial progress in both the security and human dimensions.

## The EPC and the continuation of the conference

The foreign ministers of the European Community met during an EPC meeting in Venlo on 9 and 10 May 1981 to discuss how the conference should be continued. British foreign secretary Lord Carrington said that the West had benefitted from the negotiations with the Soviets now proposing to expand the geographical mandate area for CBM's to the Ural. West German minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was of the opinion that the EC Ten should wait on the

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May), NL-HaNA; 'Received Message, CSCE-Madrid, First Impressions of the Third Phase', 7 May 1981, Catalogue number #2600, received messages Madrid 1981 (Jan.-May), NL-HaNA.

<sup>60</sup> 'Received Message, CDE Mandate, Van Dongen 138', 7 May 1981, Catalogue number #2600, received messages Madrid 1981 (Jan.-May), NL-HaNA.

<sup>61</sup> Crump and Romano, 'Challenging the Superpower Straitjacket', 13.

<sup>62</sup> 'CDE Mandate, 7 May 1981'.

<sup>63</sup> 'CSCE-Madrid, First Impressions of the Third Phase, 7 May 1981'.

<sup>64</sup> 'CDE Mandate, 7 May 1981'.

outcome of the Polish communist party congress on 14 July and the Soviet response to this, before taking a decision on the continuation of the conference. The economic and political situation in Poland started to deteriorate in 1980 and it was the question if the Soviets would intervene. The Ten did not want to give the impression that they wanted to stop the CSCE process or block the CDE. The other foreign ministers agreed with this view, although the French minister wanted to force the Soviet Union to make a clear stance. To make progress in the negotiations the Ten would take an aggressive and positive stance. This meant that new concrete proposals would be formulated for Basket II and III by the Ten in response to the expansion of the CBM mandate. The official response to the Soviet proposal would be prepared in both the political committee of the EPC and NATO. Discussions about this would take place in NATO, and the political directors of the EC member states would inform Ireland about these discussions.<sup>65</sup>

At the conference in Madrid, the delegation leaders of the Ten were unhappy with the conclusions reached in Venlo. The conference almost certainly had to be continued after the congress of the Polish communist party regardless of the Ten not wanting to continue the negotiations. Most delegation leaders thought continuing the negotiations depending on the outcome of the Polish communist party congress did not make sense since the outcome of this congress would have marginal influence over the Soviet decision for an intervention. This meant that the Ten would lose the ability to limit the duration of the conference, turning the tides in favour of the Soviets and their ideas about a conference on disarmament. The delegation leaders were also afraid that public opinion would turn against the EC because it was not reaching a substantial agreement. Furthermore, the American delegation was worried about the tactics and substance of the negotiations by the EC.<sup>66</sup> This episode shows that ideas proposed by EPC's political committee were not always successfully transferred to the conference.

In the EPC's CSCE working group and political committee, the CDE discussion focused on the Western stance on the mandate of the disarmament conference over sea and air space. The NNA countries had proposed a mandate for Europe to the Ural Mountains and the 'adjoining sea and air space'. The assignment of the Ten was to think of a way to have this

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<sup>65</sup> 'Sent Message, Gymnich-Weekend at Venlo on 9-10 May, Celer 22', 12 May 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA.

<sup>66</sup> 'Received Message, Conclusions at Venlo Related to CSCE, Van Dongen 147', 14 May 1981, Catalogue number #2600, received messages Madrid 1981 (Jan.-May), NL-HaNA.

mandate unambiguously formulated. Van Der Klaauw called it useful that the EC states could use a different multilateral institution than NATO for developing a formulation. The West received criticism over its tough stance on human rights from the East because according to them this blocked progress in the area of military security. Dutch foreign minister Van Der Klaauw thought this was unfair since the Warsaw Pact states frustrated the negotiations on everything but military aspects. Since the Netherlands held the EC presidency in the first half of 1981, it determined the agenda for these meetings. By setting the agenda of the EPC meeting and copo, the Netherlands worked towards its own aims for a balanced and substantial final document.<sup>67</sup>

The CSCE working group consisting of the delegation leaders of the EC member states met on 11 June 1981. They discussed if they should make concessions to the Soviets in order to reach agreement on the Soviet Union's territories being part of the CDE mandate. Belgium was the only state which wanted to make real concessions. Ireland and Denmark advocated making cosmetic concessions to stop the deadlock in the negotiations. However, the delegations all agreed with the British view that the Ten should not make a concession before the final phase of the conference since this would be counterproductive in reaching the goal of a substantial and balanced concluding document. The EC Ten decided that further discussion of the CDE mandate area should take place in NATO and should be acceptable to the US.<sup>68</sup> Dutch delegation leader Van Dongen was delighted by this and advised the director-general of political affairs to mention this in the next meeting of the political committee.<sup>69</sup> The next day, 12 June, Van Dongen explained the ideas of the EC Ten at the NATO caucus. The NATO states were remarkably unified over the EC conclusion that not enough progress had been made to balance out the CDE mandate. Canadian delegation leader Rogers stated that the Soviet Union should be made aware that the EC and NATO would not make large compromises over the CDE mandate. The West was unified about the results that should be achieved and was willing to walk away from Madrid with no major results.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> 'Sent Message, EPC Working Group, 11 June, Van Der Klaauw 27', 2 June 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA.

<sup>68</sup> 'Received Message, CVSE Working Group Meeting 11 June 1981, Van Dongen 180', 12 June 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA.

<sup>69</sup> 'Received Message, Preparation 108th Comité Politique CSCE, Van Dongen 181', 12 June 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA.

<sup>70</sup> 'Received Message, Reactions of 16 to CSCE Working Group EPC, Van Dongen 182', 12 June 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA.

At the meeting of the EPC's political committee on 16 June 1981, the directors of political affairs discussed if the conference should be continued after the summer. Negotiations over the CDE mandate were still causing an impasse. The West was searching for an unambiguous formulation for the NNA proposal on adjoining sea and air space. The Dutch and French directors were afraid that the longer the negotiations would take, the less they would benefit the West, but the British, Danish, Irish and West German directors did not think this would be the case. The British feared that public opinion would play a negative role for Western interests in the short term. All EC member states agreed that NATO was the place where the CDE formulation should be worked out.<sup>71</sup>

The French delegation leader Jacques Martin tried to find a compromise on security issues during his speech at the CSCE plenary meeting of 3 July 1981. The core of the compromise lay in the idea that CBM's would not encompass military activities in Europe's adjoining sea and air space if these activities did not have anything to do with activities on land in the mandate area. The speech was prepared in Paris but not discussed in the NATO caucus or EPC meeting. Jacques Martin only consulted his American counterpart Max Kampelman, who was very critical of the speech, since in his view the proposal would be a risk to the Western position in the negotiations if it did not want to discuss the mandate area. The French were concerned about the public opinion of the EC member states turning against the CSCE process because of Western immobility. Martin said to Van Dongen that he did not want to wait until the conflicts in the state department and the Pentagon were resolved.<sup>72</sup>

The US delegation was in an awkward position at this moment. Parts of the Pentagon and State Department in Washington did not want an automatic transition between the CBM and disarmament phase of the CDE, as originally proposed by the French. It also rejected any reference to negotiations about disarmament entirely. In order to maintain Western unity, the American delegation had to go against the instructions of its government.<sup>73</sup> At the meeting of the Ten, the other delegations were positive of the French proposal, although they had wished to be consulted beforehand. At the NATO caucus, Kampelman was very critical of

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<sup>71</sup> 'Sent Message, Meeting of Comité Politique 16 June: CSCE, Celer 30', 17 June 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA.

<sup>72</sup> 'Received Message, Mandate Area CBM's, Van Dongen 212', 3 July 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA.

<sup>73</sup> 'CDE US Opinion, 14 October 1980'; 'Received Message, CSCE Follow-up: Third Phase Military Aspects, Van Dongen 213', 4 July 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA.



the French actions. These actions had for the first time during the Madrid CSCE conference created considerable tension within the Western alliance. The Americans wanted to keep the West unified around the same goals and tactics. The other NATO delegations were not as critical as the Americans, but the West Germans proposed that the alliance should make it appear as if the French stance was the stance of the entire Atlantic alliance. All delegations accepted this, but the Americans were unhappy and kept quiet.<sup>74</sup> By making a proposal without consulting its allies, France maintained control over the CDE-initiative and forced its allies to adopt its stance.

The Soviets tried to increase the divide in the Western alliance. During a plenary session on 15 July 1981, the Soviet delegation leader Ilichev argued for rapprochement between the Warsaw Pact and the EC Ten, after the British delegation leader spoke to the conference in the role of the EC presidency. Both the Norwegian and Dutch delegation leader responded to the Soviet comments by emphasizing that there was no difference between the EC and NATO members.<sup>75</sup>

By the summer of 1981, the CSCE conference in Madrid had been going on for eight months. At the end of July, the conference would go into the summer recess to resume in the autumn of 1981. However, the Western states were unhappy with the impasse on human rights and security. Within the West, both in the NATO caucus and EPC's political committee, there were different opinions on what should be done. The US, France, Belgium, Canada, Portugal and the Netherlands were in favour of suspending the conference until November 1982. Only the US, France and the Netherlands thought postponing the conference would be accepted by the non-Western delegations. The other Western states thought the conference would resume in the autumn of 1981 and that the impasse would probably continue. This would weaken the Western position and lack the coordination to act against this.<sup>76</sup> When the NNA countries proposed to suspend the conference from 28 July until 27 October 1981, all Western delegations except the Netherlands accepted this. In the NATO caucus, Van Dongen was critical of this, because he wanted to continue the conference in August to keep the

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<sup>74</sup> 'Received Message, French Intervention in Plenary of 3 July as Subject of Meeting with Ten and Fifteen, Van Dongen 216', 7 July 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA.

<sup>75</sup> 'Received Message, Preparations for the "Endgame", Van Dongen 228', 15 July 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA.

<sup>76</sup> 'Received Message, Duration of the Madrid Conference, Van Dongen 243', 21 July 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA.

pressure on the Soviet Union, which had failed to make any serious counter-proposals to the CDE-initiative. Suspending the conference now would be bad for the Western position and the CSCE as a credible and balanced process. However, no other Western states wanted to support the Dutch, so the Dutch accepted the NNA proposal to maintain Western cohesion even though they could have used their veto.<sup>77</sup> The Dutch reluctance to postpone the conference showed how serious they were about achieving their aims of a balanced final document with substantial progress on both the military and human dimension. The Netherlands was more principled and less pragmatic than most other Western delegations.

## Conclusion

The period of negotiations from the autumn of 1980 to the summer of 1981 was marked by the rising tensions between the superpowers and the attempt of smaller states to still have progress at the Madrid conference and continue the CSCE process. The French strategy of proposing the CDE-initiative was a way to reinvigorate disarmament talks and act somewhat independently from the US. The French used the EPC to get support for its actions and made proposals of its own during CSCE plenary meetings in order to force the NATO allies to follow its line.<sup>78</sup> This goes against Snyder's idea that the transatlantic alliance played the leading role in determining the Western strategy and proposals.<sup>79</sup> The Americans were on the fence about the initiative, at first because of the transition to a new Administration, and later because the Reagan Administration had issues with the mandate of the CBM's and the relationship between CBM's and disarmament. The Netherlands built bridges between the EC and NATO and more specifically between France and the US. The Dutch were especially active as mediators during the first half of 1981 when they held the presidency of the EPC. The Netherlands undertook these actions in order to achieve its goals at the conference: balanced and substantial progress in both the security and human dimensions. These ideas were the most important vector for the Netherlands in choosing to take actions that enforced cooperation or competition between the EC and NATO and choosing the EPC as the

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<sup>77</sup> 'Received Message, Recess CSCE Conference Madrid, Van Dongen 244', 22 July 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA.

<sup>78</sup> Romano, 'Re-Designing Military Security in Europe', 452.

<sup>79</sup> Snyder, 'The CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance', 56.

multilateral institution for fostering Western cohesion. Thus, there was both competition and cooperation between the EC and NATO.

## Chapter 2 Madrid CSCE and the impact of the Polish crisis

This chapter deals with the negotiations from the resumption of the conference at the end of October 1981 to the large recess from March until November 1982. During this period the negotiations went from almost reaching an agreement at the end of 1981 to almost breaking down by March 1982. In the shadow of the Madrid conference, the economic and political situation in Poland had been deteriorating since 1980. The crisis came to a head on 10 December 1981, when General Jaruzelski imposed martial law on Poland. He banned pro-democracy trade union Solidarity and arrested its representatives. The Reagan Administration feared a Soviet intervention similar to the ones in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The US responded by imposing sanctions on both Poland and the Soviet Union. The West-European allies did not want to go as far as the US since they wanted to maintain détente and the CSCE process. Douglas Selvage called the dispute over the Western responds a 'major crisis' for the transatlantic alliance.<sup>80</sup> Sarah Snyder, on the other hand, argued that the Polish crisis actually fostered unity between the NATO member states.<sup>81</sup> At the same time, hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets in Western Europe against the placement of cruise missiles.<sup>82</sup>

The three vectors actors, ideas and institutions are used again to analyse this period of the conference in Madrid. Looking at the actors, one major change took place, since a new Dutch cabinet was installed in the autumn of 1981. Foreign minister Chris van der Klaauw (VVD), a liberal, was replaced by Max van der Stoel (PvdA), a left-wing politician who had already been foreign minister between 1973 and 1977. Van der Stoel's term as a minister would be short because the coalition of Christian democrats and labour fell apart in the spring of 1982. In the realm of ideas, the negotiations about the CDE continued, but the focus lay no longer only on the geographical mandate of the CDE, but also on a functional criterion. This functional criterion was supported by NATO, meaning that states would warn each other about military activities of their conventional forces in Europe.<sup>83</sup> In large part, the discussions

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<sup>80</sup> Douglas Selvage, 'The Politics of the Lesser Evil: The West, the Polish Crisis, and the CSCE Review Conference in Madrid, 1981–1983', in *The Crisis of Détente in Europe*, ed. Leopoldo Nuti, 2008, 41, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203887165-10>.

<sup>81</sup> Snyder, 'The CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance', 61.

<sup>82</sup> Young, Arne Westad, and Leffler, 'Western Europe and the End of the Cold War, 1979–1989', 296.

<sup>83</sup> 'Sent Message, CSCE Security, Van Der Stoel 41', 5 November 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA.

in Madrid focused on how this criterion related to Europe's adjoining sea and air space, with NATO supporting a mandate for the adjoining territorial waters. Another important idea discussed by both the EC meeting and the NATO caucus at the conference was if the conference should be continued. Striking about this was that the discussion was already heated before martial law was imposed in Poland. When it came to institutions the Netherlands was not the president of the EPC anymore, the UK became president in the second half of 1981 and Belgium succeeded it for the first half of 1982.

### The negotiations in autumn 1981

The new foreign minister Max van der Stoep sent the Dutch delegation instructions before the negotiations resumed. The Dutch aim was a balanced and substantial final document since Van der Stoep was unhappy with the progress towards this aim so far. Therefore, the guideline in negotiations would be maintaining the essential elements for the West and only agreeing to parts of the final document that were improvements on the Helsinki Final Act. These guidelines made the Netherlands a hardliner in comparison with some of its West European allies. However, when it came to the CDE the Dutch approach was somewhat softer. In mid-July 1981, the West had proposed a CDE based on a mandate area 'applicable to the whole continent of Europe and as far as adjoining sea area and air space is concerned to the activities of forces operating there in so far as these activities are an integral part of notifiable activities on the continent'.<sup>84</sup> The Americans were willing to drop the word continent from this formulation as a last bid to reach a compromise and this information was known at the conference. Van der Stoep thought the West should make this concession sooner rather than later, not only to reach a compromise but also to appease NATO member states which had wanted to make concessions earlier. By compromising on the CDE Van der Stoep hoped that the East, in turn, would accept concessions in the human dimension. Van der Stoep's stance was closer to the willingness of the other EC states to compromise on CDE mentioned above than the reserved stance in the Americans. When it came to where the CDE should be held, Van der Stoep was interested in a proposal made by the French in an EPC working group in London to have a preparatory meeting in Helsinki, the opening of the conference in Warsaw

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<sup>84</sup> 'Sent Message, Final Document, Van Der Stoep 37', 16 October 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA.

and the actual conference in Geneva.<sup>85</sup> This was an example of how ideas were transferred between the EPC and NATO.<sup>86</sup> The instructions Van der Stoel gave the Dutch delegation show his influence as an actor on the ideas the Dutch delegation propagate.

When the conference resumed, the US changed the formulation of the CDE mandate from 'the continent of Europe' to 'the whole of Europe'. The West European allies insisted that this change was inevitable for the mandate to be acceptable for the Warsaw Pact countries and to make it possible to be negotiated on terms which were essential to the West. By changing this formulation now, the US would not make it look like a concession.<sup>87</sup>

After the restart of the conference, the Soviet Union put a significant amount of pressure on the negotiations in order to get an agreement on a disarmament conference on its terms. During the first plenary meeting, Soviet vice-minister Ilichev was very critical of the West for not being flexible on security matters, which were the central question of the conference according to him. He declared that, in contrast to the West, the Soviets had been peace-loving and constructive in their approach. The demonstrations against cruise missiles in Europe were proof that the people wanted peace. Therefore, the West should make concessions on the security aspects. At this moment in autumn 1981, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators gathered for protests against the cruise missiles in the Netherlands and other West European countries.<sup>88</sup> According to the vice-minister, the demands of Western and NNA countries on the human dimension of the CSCE process were unjustified and incompatible with the Helsinki Final Act and sovereignty of states in the eyes of Ilichev.<sup>89</sup> The Soviet tactics for negotiations were best summarized by the comment made by a Soviet representative to a member of the Dutch delegation: 'First a CDE, then we will see'.<sup>90</sup> In other words, the main goal of the Soviet Union was adding a military dimension to the Helsinki Final Act. In order to achieve this, the Soviets blocked progress in all drafting groups except for the one on CDE. The Soviets also increased the pressure on the Western Europeans to stop them from demanding substantial progress in the human dimension as compensation for the CDE.

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<sup>85</sup> 'Final Document, 16 October 1981'.

<sup>86</sup> Kaiser and Patel, 'Multiple Connections in European Co-Operation', 347–48.

<sup>87</sup> 'Received Message, Madrid General View, Van Dongen 258', 29 October 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA.

<sup>88</sup> Young, Arne Westad, and Leffler, 'Western Europe and the End of the Cold War, 1979–1989', 296.

<sup>89</sup> 'Madrid General View, 29 October 1981'.

<sup>90</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE Follow-up Drafting Group p Week Report 2-6 November 1981, Van Dongen 268', 6 November 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA, quote in Dutch: 'eerst een EOC, dan zien we wel verder'.

These records clearly showed that for the East disarmament and military détente took priority over any kind of concession on human rights.<sup>91</sup> More and more countries seemed to accept the predominance of the CDE at the expense of human rights.<sup>92</sup>

The Soviet unwillingness to expand the human dimension of the CSCE in order to get a disarmament conference sheds lights on the different interpretations of the Helsinki Final Act in East and West. For the Soviet Union, the Final Act was a recognition of the borders that were established in 1945, legitimizing its sphere of influence over Eastern Europe. In the West, the Final Act was seen as a set of guidelines on which détente between East and West was based with the human dimension being as important as the security dimension. With rising tensions in East-West relations, this Western view of détente and the CSCE process became increasingly less grounded in reality the longer the Madrid CSCE conference took.<sup>93</sup>

On 5 November 1981, France acted independently again to the surprise of its NATO partners by being open to the possibility of expanding the functional criterion to naval and military activity in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean which could be of interest to security in Europe. This expansion would go further than any Western delegation, including the French, had ever proposed to go. NATO had been in favour of a mandate which encompassed Europe's adjoining territorial waters. Just as they did on 3 July 1981, the French tried to find a compromise and force its stance on the rest of the West. Dutch foreign minister Van der Stoel was critical of the French actions since he feared that the East would take this as a sign that it could get more concessions on the geographical mandate from the West. Interestingly, Van der Stoel thought the French actions were useful for further discussion in the NATO caucus about refining the functional criterion. He instructed the Dutch delegation to think about supporting a proposal for easing the functional criterion, meaning that states would need to warn each other about military activities of conventional forces in Europe and outside of territorial waters.<sup>94</sup>

At the next NATO caucus, there was an extensive discussion on what the functional criterion should be related to the adjoining sea and air space. France did not want to specify

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<sup>91</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE Conference Madrid Quo Vadis? Van Dongen 275', 9 November 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA; Crump and Grundmann, "“Enemies of Détente”?", 188.

<sup>92</sup> 'CSCE Conference Madrid Quo Vadis?', 9 November 1981'.

<sup>93</sup> 'CSCE Conference Madrid Quo Vadis?', 9 November 1981'.

<sup>94</sup> 'CSCE Security, 5 November 1981'.

this, whereas the US wanted to specify that the criterion applied to the territorial waters, and the Dutch delegation supported the American stance in the caucus. The discussion resulted in a working document aiming to work out the differences within NATO. To the outside, the West maintained its unity on the CDE by claiming that it was not necessary to specify the definition of adjoining sea and air space.<sup>95</sup>

In contrast to the Dutch delegation at Madrid, foreign minister Van der Stoel preferred the French position on the CDE mandate over the American one. He was prepared to accept adjoining sea and air space going further than the territorial waters as a possible concession in order to reach a compromise at the end of the conference which would mean progress on human rights and contacts.<sup>96</sup> Van der Stoel was a huge proponent of individual human rights and acted in support of his ideas during his years as foreign minister.<sup>97</sup> He thought NATO still needed to discuss many aspects of the CBM's, specifically the relationship with naval activities. This made negotiations in Madrid easier, and, therefore, Van der Stoel was not worried about the problems surrounding the verification of military activities.<sup>98</sup> Under Max van der Stoel the Netherlands moved closer to the EPC position on CDE which was supported by the French and West Germans and away from the American position. This goes against the idea that Van Der Stoel preferred the US over European cooperation.<sup>99</sup> It also shows that the Dutch foreign minister was as an actor a vital vector for determining the Netherlands actions during the conference. The Dutch supported this because it would allow for a balance with the human dimension in which the Dutch also wanted substantial progress.

In relation to the obstruction of progress at the conference caused by the Soviet Union blocking the work of all drafting groups except the one on CDE, Van Der Stoel argued for steadfastness by the West on the essential issues so as not to concede to the Soviets. The Netherlands had to propagate this steadfastness to its NATO allies and the NNA states and work together with all these states to be successful. Van der Stoel was critical of the American strategy on CDE, which he called capitulation to the Soviets. The Western states would not be

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<sup>95</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE Security Nival, Van Dongen 272', 9 November 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA.

<sup>96</sup> 'Sent Message, CSCE Security, Van Der Stoel 42', 10 November 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA.

<sup>97</sup> Crump, Lammertink, and Zeilstra, 'Ferm, Doch Onopvallend', 262.

<sup>98</sup> 'CSCE Security, 10 November 1981'.

<sup>99</sup> Duco Hellema, *Buitenlandse politiek van Nederland: de nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek* (Spectrum, 2006), 299.



able to agree amongst each other to end the negotiations in Madrid without a final document. Ending the dialogue would also hurt the Western position more than it would benefit it. Therefore, it was of the utmost importance to Van der Stoel that the West would maintain the dialogue with the East and had the patience to reach a balanced and substantial result in Madrid. The West needed to be steadfast and aim for its essential proposals to be part of the final document. These were ambitious goals with the rising tensions between East and West.<sup>100</sup> When Max van der Stoel became foreign minister the Dutch focus at the conference shifted from supporting both the CDE and the human dimension to more willingness to compromise on the CDE in order to get progress in the human dimension.

At the start of December 1981, West Germany wanted to continue the CSCE in Madrid. West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher thought that the West was in a better position than the Soviet Union at the conference. In Genscher's view, the West needed to maintain its original demands for the CDE.<sup>101</sup> The West Germans were in favour of achieving the CDE because this would be a part of the disarmament track of NATO's dual-track decision. If an agreement were not reached in Madrid, West Germany's political leaders feared public opinion would turn against the placement of cruise missiles.<sup>102</sup> The West German proposal took place around the same time as the large protests against the placement of cruise missiles in Western Europe and at the start of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks between the superpowers in Geneva. The West German *Bundestag* had voted in favour of missile placement, which led to the Soviets walking out of the INF talks.<sup>103</sup> The Netherlands was in favour of continuing the conference, but it was not a hardliner like West Germany. The Dutch were still prepared to make the above-mentioned concession on the CDE extending to more than territorial waters. For the Netherlands one of the arguments for supporting West Germany was the notion that the CDE was part of a 'comprehensive approach to arms negotiations' which also included the INF talks and new Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which would eventually become the START treaty. In the Dutch view, the West was in a good

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<sup>100</sup> 'Sent Message, Forcast Madrid Conference, Van Der Stoel 43', 10 November 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA.

<sup>101</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE Madrid Position FRG, Van Dongen 305', 4 December 1981, Catalogue number #2601, received messages Madrid 1981 (June-Dec.), NL-HaNA.

<sup>102</sup> Selva, 'The Politics of the Lesser Evil', 48.

<sup>103</sup> Young, Arne Westad, and Leffler, 'Western Europe and the End of the Cold War, 1979–1989', 296.

position in all these negotiations because there was Western cohesion, and leaving Madrid without an agreement on CDE would only hurt this position.<sup>104</sup>

## Martial law in Poland

On 10 December 1981, martial law was imposed in Poland by General Jaruzelski. There was much uncertainty about the situation. Therefore, Dutch foreign minister Max van der Stoel advised the Dutch delegation on 14 December to continue the negotiations without mentioning the situation in Poland, if the situation did not dramatically worsen. By maintaining business as usual Van der Stoel hoped to still reach agreement on a final document.<sup>105</sup> Both the Dutch and American delegation member Spencer Oliver thought that around this time the conference came very close to reaching an agreement.<sup>106</sup> On 16 December, the NNA countries proposed a compromise for the final document called RM.39 which would be the basis of further negotiations.<sup>107</sup> However, when the situation in Poland became clear the negotiations were stopped and the conference adjourned until mid-January 1982.

After the Polish crisis escalated the main discussion in the West was if the conference should be stopped, if there should be a long recess or if it should be continued. The Americans wanted to stop all negotiations until martial law ended. They agreed with their NATO allies that the Western foreign ministers, who would be present at Madrid when the conference would reconvene in mid-January, would condemn the situation in Poland.<sup>108</sup> On 12 and 13 January 1982, the EPC's working group on CSCE discussed how the Polish crisis impacted the Madrid conference and what the Ten's reaction should be, specifically in relationship with NATO. The Danish wanted to wait and see if the situation improved before the conference resumed on 9 February. West-Germany, the Netherlands and Greece wanted to change the Western tactics to 'no business as usual', meaning that the West should maintain its

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<sup>104</sup> 'Sent Message, CSCE, Van Der Stoel 46', 9 December 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA.

<sup>105</sup> 'Sent Message, Poland, Van Der Stoel 48', 14 December 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA.

<sup>106</sup> 'Sent message', 12 december 1981, Catalogue number #3897, sent messages Madrid 1981, NL-HaNA; A Nemcova, ed., 'Interview with Edouard Brunner of Switzerland', in *CSCE Testimonies: Causes and Consequences of the Helsinki Final Act, 1972-1989* (Prague, 2013), 236–37.

<sup>107</sup> Selva, 'The Politics of the Lesser Evil', 41.

<sup>108</sup> Nemcova, 'Interview with Edouard Brunner', 237.

standpoints but refer to the situation in Poland. The Netherlands did not want to stop the conference because it would risk further CSCE follow-up conferences and public opinion might interpret it as using the Polish crisis for stopping the CSCE process. France, the UK and Luxembourg wanted to go further and make proposals directly related to the situation in Poland. These states feared that otherwise, the conference would quickly return to normal again. The main criticism the other NATO members had of making proposals related to the situation in Poland was that they risked being unsustainable and, therefore, would hurt the Western position. Therefore, the 'no business as usual' approach prevailed in the EPC and was adapted by the West as a whole, showing that the Netherlands together with other small states could have a large influence on Western behaviour through the multilateral institution of the EPC.<sup>109</sup>

When the conference resumed on 9 February 1982, the Polish delegation leader held the presidency of the plenary session. With the support of the other Warsaw Pact delegations, he used the power of the presidency over the procedure to end the first session before any of the Western and NNA delegations could speak. The night before he had threatened the Dutch delegation leader Van Dongen with doing this. Although the West was informed of the Polish plan before it was executed, the Western delegations did not think it would actually happen. The obstruction meant that some of the Western foreign ministers who had come to Madrid to address the situation in Poland left without doing this. The Western delegations criticized the Polish actions in the following procedural debate. The EPC and NATO coordinated their reaction with the Belgian delegation leader speaking as EPC president and on behalf of the other Western delegations.<sup>110</sup>

From the incident forward the atmosphere at the conference was hostile. The Soviets tried to achieve a 'business as usual' to stop the CSCE process from being suspended for a few years until a new follow-up conference would be held and to achieve agreement on the CDE. However, the West worked against this by staying silent in the drafting groups and the NNA countries proposed adjourning the conference until the autumn of 1982. The West obstructed

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<sup>109</sup> 'Sent Message, EPC Working Group CSCE, Celer 5', 14 January 1982, Catalogue number #4010, sent messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA; 'Sent Message, CSCE Follow-up Madrid Fifth Phase, Van Der Stoel 5', 3 February 1982, Catalogue number #4010, sent messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA.

<sup>110</sup> 'Received Message, Ministerial EPC Meeting 9 February, Van Dongen 8', 10 February 1982, Catalogue number #2739, received messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA; 'Received Message, Report of CSCE Plenary of 9 February: East European Obstruction, Van Dongen 7', 10 February 1982, Catalogue number #2739, received messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA.

progress in order to not create a 'business as usual' situation but still continue the CSCE process. For a few weeks, the conference was continued without progress in the drafting groups. However, this blockade could not go on forever. In the NATO caucus of 4 March 1982, the Dutch delegation, together with the Danish, proposed that the West should come up with amendments to RM.39 in order to improve the Western position. The other Western delegations did not agree to this, fearing a return to normal.<sup>111</sup> Many of these delegations, including the US, wanted to suspend the conference for two to three years, but the Soviets blocked this possibility.<sup>112</sup>

The Warsaw Pact states acted as if they were the ones striving for peace and a compromise while the Western governments blocked everything in order to influence Western public opinion to put pressure on their governments. For the East reaching agreement on disarmament without any progress in the human dimension seemed achievable. Eventually, the Warsaw Pact states understood that the negotiations would not restart during this session and they agreed to adjourn the conference until 9 November 1982. The Dutch thought this was the least bad option, but they thought that reaching a compromise than on the basis of RM.39 would still be unlikely because of the inflexibility of some Western delegations. The Dutch also lacked confidence in reaching a balanced and substantial final document because they took the lack of progress before martial law was imposed into account. They were also unhappy with the content of RM.39, which only focused on military aspects and left out progress on human rights. NATO should prepare the next session in order to solve any differences between the US and its European allies.<sup>113</sup> These ideas would influence the actions of the Netherlands and its support for NATO and the EPC in the last phase of the conference.

## Conclusion

From October 1981 to March 1982, the main issue during the negotiations on the CDE was the mandate of the confidence and security building measures. In the West, there was

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<sup>111</sup> 'Received Message, Western Stance after Failed NNA Initiative, Meesman 35', 4 March 1982, Catalogue number #2739, received messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA; 'Sent Message, CSCE How Further, Van Der Stoel 9', 5 March 1982, Catalogue number #4010, sent messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA.

<sup>112</sup> 'Received Message, Prospects during Break and Resumption, Meesman 48', 15 March 1982, Catalogue number #2739, received messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA.

<sup>113</sup> 'Prospects during Break and Resumption, 15 March 1982'.

disagreement if the mandate should only apply to the territorial waters of the adjoining sea area or if the mandate should reach further. The US did not want to specify this, France, on the other hand, wanted to make a concession, agreeing to a larger mandate area in order to maintain a favourable Western position for reaching a balanced and substantial final document. This chapter showed that prior to the imposition of martial law in Poland there was already significant disagreement within the West, especially between the EPC states and the US, about the content of the CDE and if the conference in Madrid should be continued. Therefore, contrary to Selvage's stance, the transatlantic alliance was already in a crisis before 10 December 1981.<sup>114</sup> The direct response to the situation in Poland by the West was not more unified than before, instead, the issues continued. This goes against Sarah Snyder's argument that the crisis helped unite the West in the negotiations.<sup>115</sup>

As I have shown, the EPC states were more willing to compromise over the CDE to get concessions on the human dimension from the East, while the US was a hardliner without much interest in disarmament or progress on human rights and contacts. Under the new foreign minister Max van der Stoep, the Netherlands was willing to support a compromise on the mandate area, if this would mean that the essential proposals in the human dimension could be achieved. As an actor, the Dutch foreign minister was a vital vector for Dutch actions at Madrid. The Netherlands moved together with its EC partners using the EPC as the multilateral institution for achieving its aims. The link between the security and human dimension was broadly supported by all West European states, though the Netherlands was more interested in the human dimension than most of its European allies. The EPC competed with NATO because of the balance between security and human dimension, although at the same time there was cooperation between the two institutions and ideas were exchanged for making the CDE acceptable. This cooperation was vital for the successful resumption of the conference after the adjournment of summer 1982.

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<sup>114</sup> Selvage, 'The Politics of the Lesser Evil', 41.

<sup>115</sup> Snyder, 'The CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance', 61.

## Chapter 3 Reaching compromise on the final document

During the last year of negotiations, a few changes took place considering actors, ideas and institutions. Regarding the vector actors, a new cabinet was formed in the Netherlands after the coalition of Christian democrats and labour fell apart. Christian democrat Hans van den Broek (CDA) succeeded Max van der Stoep (PvdA) as foreign minister. The Hague gave clear instructions to its delegation to support Western unity. At the start of 1983, A.H. Croin became the new head of the Dutch delegation at Madrid, replacing Frans van Dongen. In the US, Secretary of State Alexander Haig resigned at the end of June 1982 and was replaced by George Shultz. Considering ideas, the discussion at Madrid in 1982 and 1983 would shift from the mandate of the CDE to the extent to which the CDE was in balance with the human dimension in the final document. Numerous revisions of RM.39 would take place in order to reach a compromise. On the level of institutions, the EC was proposing ideas which complemented the actions of NATO. By studying the vectors, this chapter will show how the EPC made it possible for the US to return to the negotiations and how the Netherlands moved from cooperation within the EPC to cooperation with the US and UK because of its interests in the human dimension. By the end of the conference, however, the Netherlands could not get everything it wanted in this dimension because the final compromise left no room for manoeuvre.

### Returning after the 1982 recess

During the recess between March and November 1982, the United States and its West European allies disagreed on the imposition of sanctions on Poland and the Soviet Union over martial law and on how the Madrid CSCE should be resumed. Reagan unilaterally imposed new sanctions on the Soviet Union on 18 June 1982. The Europeans only wanted to make a tough stance in Madrid and had not imposed any sanctions on the Soviets because in the view of these states this did not have much effect. When the Madrid conference would resume, the Americans did not want to go back to 'business as usual' and discuss the CDE, instead, it wanted to focus on the situation in Poland. The US focused more on its ideological struggle with the Soviet Union than the content of negotiations at the CSCE. The West European states

still aimed at ending the conference with a balanced and substantial final document, which included agreement on the CDE.<sup>116</sup>

At the start of the new session of the CSCE conference in Madrid, the Dutch were critical of the progress that had been made so far towards a concluding document. They said that they wanted the CSCE process to succeed. The Dutch also criticized martial law in Poland.<sup>117</sup> The Dutch delegation was instructed by new foreign minister Hans van den Broek to prioritize the maintenance of Western cohesion to strengthen the Western position. The delegation could take action to promote Western cohesion if it deemed it necessary. Van den Broek supported the EC Ten's amendments to RM.39. These amendments were among other things about free trade unions, Helsinki monitoring groups, freedom of religion and information. They were a reaction to the Polish crisis. The EC member states thought that these amendments were essential for achieving a balanced and substantial final document and, therefore, left little margin for compromise.<sup>118</sup> These EC amendments were adopted by NATO before the conference reconvened, making them an example of the transfer of ideas and cooperation between NATO and the EC.<sup>119</sup> The amendments were discussed and adjusted during so-called 'Bolkesjoe' meetings with CSCE delegation leaders and officials from the ministries of foreign affairs from the NATO states. When the session came to an end in mid-December 1982, delegation leader Van Dongen thought that the way in which the EC amendments were formulated had made it easier for the US to return to the conference because these amendments were formulated in strict terms.<sup>120</sup>

Van den Broek hoped to propose the Western amendments via EC president Denmark with support of the other EC member states. He thought that it would be better if the Americans did not sponsor the amendments because of the high tensions between the US and the Warsaw Pact states. Van den Broek was against the Netherlands proposing the Western amendments on its own, in the case the EC president did not want to do it or if other EC states like Greece and West Germany would not support the EC president proposing the

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<sup>116</sup> Selva, 'The Politics of the Lesser Evil', 45–48.

<sup>117</sup> 'Sent Message, CSCE, Van Agt 12', 2 November 1982, Catalogue number #4010, sent messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA.

<sup>118</sup> 'Sent Message, Resumption Follow-up Conference Dutch Alignment, Van Den Broek 13', 4 November 1982, Catalogue number #4010, sent messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA.

<sup>119</sup> Romano, 'Re-Designing Military Security in Europe', 462.

<sup>120</sup> 'Received Message, Sixth Session CSCE Follow-up Conference Madrid Concluding Observations, Van Dongen 106', 17 December 1982, Catalogue number #2739, received messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA.

amendments. In this case, another coalition of Western states should make the proposal with the support of the Netherlands.<sup>121</sup> In other words, the Netherlands did not want to go it alone but wanted to manoeuvre in either the EC or a coalition of Western states, making use of a multilateral approach.

A few days before the Western amendments would be proposed at Madrid, US Secretary of State George Shultz sent a letter to Van den Broek in which he voiced his support for the amendments. Shultz wanted the West to unify behind a 'principled and constructive approach'. He emphasized that the Americans were still fully committed to the CSCE process but that the Soviets were not. He named repressing Soviet dissidents, invading Afghanistan and intimidating the people of Poland as examples. The Americans wanted to remain steadfast in the negotiations, agreeing to continue negotiations on the CDE mandate if its allies kept supporting the human rights proposals.<sup>122</sup>

When the conference resumed on 9 November 1982, EC president Denmark proposed the Western amendments to RM.39 with the support of all Western states except Spain and Turkey. To have more impact the NATO states proposed the same amendments separately from the EC Ten. Ireland, the EC member state which was not in NATO, did not like this because it would look like the EC was not acting independently from the US. The other EC members convinced the Irish that this was not the case.<sup>123</sup>

By 8 December 1982, negotiations about the CDE mandate had not made much progress. However, there were signals that the Soviet Union wanted to reach agreement on the mandate before the end of the year. The American and French delegation wrote a non-paper about the mandate together.<sup>124</sup> The content of this non-paper led to questions by the other Western delegations in the EPC meeting and the NATO caucus. It was the EC president who asked for an extra NATO caucus to discuss the non-paper before it would be distributed to the non-Western delegations. Most NATO delegations had a problem with the sentence 'whenever these activities constitute an integral part of the ground-force activities on land in Europe' because this would sharpen the Western stance at the moment the Soviets seemed

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<sup>121</sup> 'Resumption Follow-up Conference Dutch Alignment, 4 November 1982'.

<sup>122</sup> 'Sent Message, CSCE Conference Madrid American Stance, Van Den Broek 14', 8 November 1982, Catalogue number #4010, sent messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA.

<sup>123</sup> 'Received Message, Presentation of Western Amendments to RM.39, Van Dongen 49', 9 November 1982, Catalogue number #2739, received messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA.

<sup>124</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE Follow-up Military Aspects, Van Dongen 86', 8 December 1982, Catalogue number #2739, received messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA.



willing to compromise. At the NATO caucus, an American delegation member said that the formulation was an attempt by the joint chiefs of staff to limit the mandate of the CBM's. After hearing this the French criticized the Americans, showing that they were not on the same line, although they had written the non-paper together. Many of the NATO delegations were irritated that France and the US had not mentioned their non-paper earlier.<sup>125</sup> A day later, American delegation leader Kampelman agreed to leave the words 'ground-force' out of the non-paper, making it acceptable to the other delegations and preventing the creation of mistrust between the NATO partners.<sup>126</sup> This situation reinforces Snyder's argument that Max Kampelman fostered unity within the West, although the non-paper also caused irritation, meaning that Kampelman was less of a unifier than Snyder thinks.<sup>127</sup>

After the final meetings in 1982, some progress was made on the military aspects with the Soviet Union accepting the Western approach to military activities in the adjoining sea and air space that was an integral part of activities on the European continent, excluding independent naval and air force activities. The East wanted concessions from the West for this and did not accept the ideas from the Western non-paper.<sup>128</sup>

## The Dutch shift from EC to NATO

After the Christmas recess, a new session started on 8 February 1983. Beforehand, the Dutch delegation was instructed to keep maintaining Western unity. It was advised to mostly do this during the NATO caucus because Canada, Italy, the UK and the US supported Dutch tactics. Some of the EC member states had a different vision for the Western amendments since France and West Germany were more willing to compromise on the human dimension. The main characteristic of the Dutch strategy was parallel progress on disarmament and the human dimension. The Dutch delegation had advocated this policy from the start of the conference and it was instructed that the Netherlands would not favour one over the other.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE Follow-up Zone-Question, Van Dongen 87', 8 December 1982, Catalogue number #2739, received messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA.

<sup>126</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE Follow-up Military Aspects, Van Dongen 92', 9 December 1982, Catalogue number #2739, received messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA.

<sup>127</sup> Snyder, 'The CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance', 56.

<sup>128</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE Follow-up Six Weeks Military Aspects, Van Dongen 103', 17 December 1982, Catalogue number #2739, received messages Madrid 1982, NL-HaNA.

<sup>129</sup> 'Sent Message, Guidelines Upcoming Phase, Celer 3', 8 February 1983, Catalogue number #4129, sent messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

This goes against the idea that the Dutch were hardliners when it came to human rights in the CSCE process.<sup>130</sup> Another example of this can be found in the same document. The US wanted to withdraw some Western amendments in exchange for the release of Soviet dissidents. The Netherlands was against these actions because the CSCE was meant for structural change, not for solving incidental problems. Van den Broek said that the EPC should make this clear to the US, once again showing that a smaller power used the cooperation of an institution to influence a superpower.<sup>131</sup>

By mid-February 1983, the positions on CDE of the West and East had not changed much since autumn 1982.<sup>132</sup> On 23 February, the EC Ten discussed if the time for reaching a compromise on the CDE was near because the East would only make concessions if the mandate was agreed on before the end of the year.<sup>133</sup> Two days later, the sense that the West should think about making concessions also grew in the NATO caucus, with the US being the exception to the situation.<sup>134</sup>

In early March, the NNA states proposed a revised version of RM.39. The Netherlands was critical of this new proposal because the NNA had chosen not to use most of the Western amendments, in the Dutch view succumbing to the time pressure the Soviets had put on. The Dutch delegation was instructed to disapprove of the revised RM.39 during the NATO caucus because there was not enough progress on the human dimension. It was also advised to have a bilateral meeting with Kampelman before the NATO caucus because the American stance would have a big impact on the general Western standpoint. The Dutch thought it would be best if the West took it as the basis for further negotiations which would need to be amended. They did not think other Western delegations would be willing to reject the revised RM.39 altogether and thus moved with the general opinion. The delegation was also instructed to wait with discussing the Western stance until the EC Ten's foreign ministers met during the

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<sup>130</sup> Baudet, "It Was Cold War and We Wanted to Win", 195.

<sup>131</sup> 'Guidelines Upcoming Phase, 8 February 1983'.

<sup>132</sup> 'Received Message, Situation Military Security, Croin 14', 18 February 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>133</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE Follow-up Conference Madrid, Croin 21', 23 February 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>134</sup> 'Received Message, Third Week, Seventh Phase, Croin 27', 25 February 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

next European Council. This shows that the EC still had substantial influence over forming the general Western stance.<sup>135</sup>

The other Western delegations were unhappy when the Dutch proposed to take the revised RM.39 as the basis for further negotiations during a brainstorming session with the NATO caucus. The Dutch did not change their position on the outcome they wanted but because other Western states were willing to compromise they looked like hardliners on the human dimension. Only the UK supported the Dutch opinion after the meeting. Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Spain, France and West Germany all wanted to accept the revised RM.39 with a few modifications, arguing that the Soviets would not want to make more concessions and prolonging the conference would only damage the CSCE process. Canada, Italy, Ireland, Luxemburg, Turkey and the US were unhappy with the revised RM.39. Max Kampelman was very disappointed with the Soviets, stating that 'apparently they couldn't care less'. He asked what use the new compromise was if the Soviets did not even uphold the Helsinki Final Act.<sup>136</sup>

On 23 March 1983, the EPC meeting discussed which parts of the revised RM.39 would need to be improved. Most delegations did not want to demand too many improvements in order not to lose any gains. For the EC Ten, the CDE mandate and an expert meeting on human contacts were minimum requirements for reaching agreement on a final document.<sup>137</sup> The next day, the NATO caucus discussed the same issues and came to the same minimum requirements. However, the delegations had different opinions about which improvements deserved most attention. It was clear to the delegations that the number of improvements should be limited to have the highest chance of success. The US thought five or six improvements were necessary while the other delegations wanted less.<sup>138</sup>

After the Easter recess, the EPC political committee and its working group on the CSCE consulted the delegations on the revised RM.39. To the dismay of the Dutch many member states were of the opinion that the proposal should be accepted because this would help

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<sup>135</sup> 'Sent Message, CSCE NNA Proposals, Celer 12', 15 March 1983, Catalogue number #4129, sent messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>136</sup> 'Received Message, RM.39 Revised, Croin 51', 17 March 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>137</sup> 'Received Message, EPC Meeting 23 March, Croin 59', 23 March 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>138</sup> 'Received Message, Last Caucus Seventh Phase, Croin 61', 25 March 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

restore East-West relations, maintain good relations with the NNA states and would have a positive effect on public opinion in regards to the cruise missile issue. The Dutch delegation needed to oppose the idea that it did not matter if the East did not accept the human dimension of the CSCE. According to foreign minister Van den Broek, if the document was accepted, the CSCE process would lose its quality and turn into a diplomatic exercise. If the EC Ten would accept the revised proposal it would be bad for Western cohesion. The Dutch, therefore, preferred the above-mentioned minimum requirements. Van den Broek also instructed the delegation to take on an active role in the negotiations about Helsinki monitoring groups in order to achieve substantial progress in the human dimension.<sup>139</sup> At this point, the Netherlands moved its support from the EPC to NATO because the EPC did not strive for progress in the human dimension. The Dutch ideas did not change, but the EPC was not the institution where they could achieve their aims anymore.

In the NATO caucus, the Dutch shifted their support for amending the final document from France, West Germany and other EC states to the US and UK, so more in favour of the transatlantic alliance. The other Western delegations thought that the Netherlands, UK and US should follow the majority of states so a compromise could be reached and Western unity was maintained. Dutch delegation leader Croin said that although there was disagreement within NATO, the gap was not unbridgeable.<sup>140</sup> Thus most of the smaller powers in the West used the multilateral forum of the NATO caucus to pressure the Netherlands, UK and US into accepting the compromise, while the Netherlands moved towards the UK and US to reach its own aims in the human dimension.

The negotiations on the content of the CDE mandate were nearing their end by 20 April 1983. NATO experts examined the revised RM.39 and came to the conclusion that it was close to what the alliance could accept.<sup>141</sup> It would take the summer to do so.

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<sup>139</sup> 'Sent Message, CSCE New Round, Van Den Broek 17', 15 April 1983, Catalogue number #4129, sent messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>140</sup> 'Received Message, NATO Caucus 18 April, Croin 63', 19 April 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>141</sup> 'Received Message, CDE Mandate, Croin 66', 20 April 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

## End of the conference

On 17 June 1983, Spain proposed a compromise on the final document based on the revised version of RM.39. It proposed an expert meeting on human contacts in Bern in 1986. With regard to the CDE it proposed to drop the ambiguous word 'such' from the formulation of the mandate and proposed to begin the preparatory meeting for the conference on 25 October 1983 and the CDE itself on 17 January 1984. The West was positive but also cautious not to give a too enthusiastic reaction because it would give the impression that the proposal was coordinated with the West.<sup>142</sup> However, the next week, the German president of the EPC meeting proposed that the Ten would react to the initiative, going against the will of the NATO caucus. By taking a stance with the EC the West Germans hoped to pressure the Soviets into negotiating about the Spanish proposal. In the NATO caucus, the Canadian delegation feared that the Soviets would interpret the EC reaction as a sign of Western divergence and take a tough stance in negotiations. The Netherlands, together with Belgium, was also afraid of this disunity. However, most delegations more or less accepted the proposal.<sup>143</sup> Although Dutch foreign minister Van den Broek did not like some of the content of the Spanish proposal, he also did not want to risk Western unity. Therefore, he instructed the Dutch delegation to accept the EC reaction to the proposal, if they could scrap the third paragraph of the reaction.<sup>144</sup> The EPC caucus accepted the Dutch proposal for deleting the paragraph.<sup>145</sup> On 23 June 1983, all NATO delegations, except the Canadian one, accepted the EC reaction. Most importantly the American delegation would voice its support for the proposal straight after the EC reaction.<sup>146</sup> Once again, the EPC had a very influential role in achieving progress at the Madrid conference as a multilateral institution. The Netherlands as a single actor, on the other hand, did not have room for manoeuvring because Western disunity would only hurt the

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<sup>142</sup> 'Received Message, Spanish Mediation Initiative, Croin 111', 17 June 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>143</sup> 'Received Message, Western Reaction to Spanish Initiative Follow up to My 115, Sizoo 117', 22 June 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>144</sup> 'Sent Message, Instruction Ten Spanish Initiative, Van Den Broek 26', 23 June 1983, Catalogue number #4129, sent messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>145</sup> 'Received Message, Western Reaction to Spanish Initiative, Sizoo 121', 23 June 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>146</sup> 'Received Message, Western Reaction Spanish Initiative, Sizoo 118', 23 June 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

Western position during negotiations about the Spanish proposal. Therefore, it had to accept the positive Western reaction to the proposal.

By the end of June, it became clear to the Dutch that the 'end-game' of the conference had started. Foreign minister Van den Broek instructed the delegation to stop pursuing substantial progress in the human dimension since the other Western delegations wanted to end the conference. The Dutch delegation should keep a low profile during the rest of the negotiations because the Netherlands was not enthusiastic about the developments.<sup>147</sup> The Dutch had to give in on the human dimension to keep the West unified and reach substantial progress in other areas like the CDE. Some key ideas were dropped in order to maintain cooperation. This again points to the fact that the Netherlands was not a hardliner when it came to human rights.<sup>148</sup> The Soviets wanted to end the conference quickly but were not willing to accept the word 'such' from the CDE mandate. The West did not want to move so quickly. Within the West, there was some disagreement on when the CDE should start. West Germany wanted to start on 15 November 1983, but the US, UK, Belgium and the Netherlands wanted it to start in January 1984.<sup>149</sup> After hard negotiations, specifically over the expert meeting on human contacts, an agreement was reached over the final document. All states except Malta accepted it. The West was satisfied with the results; Max Kampelman called it 'a great victory for the West'; press statements by President Reagan and West German foreign minister Genscher would praise the results.<sup>150</sup> However, it took until the end of the summer before the conference consensus was reached because Malta did not want to accept the final document. Mediterranean security was one of the subjects the CSCE also dealt with and the Maltese had problems with navy activities in the Mediterranean. The discussion of Mediterranean security is beyond the scope of this thesis. Eventually, the Maltese were forced to accept the final document when the other 34 countries threatened to exclude them from the CSCE process.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> 'Sent Message, Finishing Negotiations, Van Den Broek 28', 30 June 1983, Catalogue number #4129, sent messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>148</sup> Baudet, "It Was Cold War and We Wanted to Win", 195.

<sup>149</sup> 'Received Message, Soviet Reaction to Spanish Initiative, Croin 127', 1 July 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>150</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE Madrid Finishing Touch, Croin 145', 16 July 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>151</sup> Nemcova, 'Interview with Edouard Brunner', 101.

The conference ended in a negative atmosphere: on 1 September 1983 Korean Air Lines flight 007 was shot down by a Soviet jet fighter. The Soviets denied any responsibility, which led to a new breakdown in East-West relations just as the conference reached an agreement on 6 September. The following days, Western ministers and delegation leaders gave critical speeches. Along with the UK and US, the Netherlands emphasized that acts were more important than words when it came to the process of détente.<sup>152</sup>

## Conclusion

During the last year of negotiations, Dutch foreign minister Hans van den Broek instructed the Dutch delegation to maintain Western cohesion as an actor. For the Dutch, the main goal of the negotiations was finding a balance between the CDE and the human dimension of the CSCE, and they hoped for substantial progress in both areas. In order to achieve this, the Netherlands worked out amendments to RM.39 with the other EC member states in the EPC so that the US could return to the conference in November 1982. However, when some EC members wanted to make some concessions in the human dimension to achieve a compromise on the CDE mandate, the Netherlands shifted its support to the more critical stance of the US and UK. It moved from the EC to the Atlantic alliance because the ideas of the EPC changed. The EPC wanted to compromise to maintain good relations with the NNA states, improve East-West relations and cater to public opinion which was protesting for disarmament and against the placement of cruise missiles.<sup>153</sup> The change for Max van der Stoep to Hans van den Broek did not change the Dutch aims at the conference, the Netherlands was still pursuing the same progress in the human dimension. However, withdrawing support from the EPC meant that the Netherlands lost its room for manoeuvring and obtaining its goals since NATO followed the EPC in accepting the Spanish compromise. By the summer of 1983, the Dutch concluded that they could not achieve more progress in the human dimension by going it alone and that resistance would only hurt the Western position and so they agreed to the compromise on the final document. This shows that the Dutch were more pragmatic on human rights, instead of hardliners as Baudet argues.<sup>154</sup> By accepting the compromise, the

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<sup>152</sup> 'Received Message, CSCE Madrid, Final Declaration of the Ministers, Croin 188', 11 September 1983, Catalogue number #2891, received messages Madrid 1983, NL-HaNA.

<sup>153</sup> 'CSCE New Round, 15 April 1983'.

<sup>154</sup> Baudet, "It Was Cold War and We Wanted to Win", 195.

Netherlands contributed to the cooperation between NATO and the EC instead of going it alone and creating disunity in the West. On the institutional level, the EPC played a very influential role in the return of the US to the conference and in thinking of Western amendments to the NNA proposals for final documents. The EPC members were also the first to accept the Spanish proposal for the final compromise, which means that the role of the EPC during this period is more important than often thought and that in turn, NATO's role was more nuanced than Sarah Snyder thinks since cooperation between the EPC and NATO was important as well.<sup>155</sup> I have shown that the Madrid CSCE was more than just a bipolar confrontation between the East and West. Instead, at the conference institutions like the EPC and actors such as the Netherlands had their own aims and acted accordingly.

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<sup>155</sup> Snyder, 'The CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance', 56; Romano, 'Re-Designing Military Security in Europe', 459–60; Philipp Gassert, 'Did Transatlantic Drift Help European Integration? The Euromissiles Crisis, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the Quest for Political Cooperation', in *European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s*, ed. Kiran Klaus Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 170, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139381857.009>.



## Conclusion

The negotiations at the Madrid CSCE conference were part of a long process. At multiple points in time, it seemed likely that there would be no compromise over a final document. This would leave the CSCE and any form of détente in jeopardy. The premature end of the process was not in the interest of the participating states. The conference sheds light on both the overlapping histories of the EC and NATO and on the margins for manoeuvre by small states like the Netherlands. Patel and Kaiser's theory for studying the cooperation, competition and transfer of ideas between international organizations using the vectors actors, ideas and institutions has shed new light in the developments in Madrid. It has brought out disarmament as an important idea in the CSCE process, it has shown the influence of the EC over the conference and it has put the Dutch actions into a new light. However, this theory might be improved by introducing a new vector into account, which considers events. Much of what happened at Madrid in 1982 and 1983 cannot be understood without the imposition of martial law in Poland.

As this thesis has shown, the discussions on CBM's and disarmament were the driving force behind the developments of the conference. This goes against the idea that human rights and other aspects of the human dimension were the driving force for developments in the CSCE.<sup>156</sup> For many Western states, the CDE was the way to get concessions on the human dimension from the East. Different Western states had different ideas about the balance between the security and human dimensions, with France being more in favour of disarmament, the US not wanting to make too many concessions on security and using the human dimension to criticize the East, and the Netherlands aiming for balanced and substantial progress in both dimensions. The East was only interested in military détente and disarmament and tried to block any progress in the human dimension.

For the Netherlands, it had been the aim throughout the conference to reach substantial and balanced progress on both the military aspects and the human dimension. The Netherlands acted with these *ideas* in mind at the multilateral institutions of the NATO caucus, the EPC meetings and the CSCE plenary meetings during the conference. The Dutch strategy and tactics were in large part determined by who held the office of foreign minister. The minister was, therefore, an important *actor* and vital for understanding Dutch actions. Under

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<sup>156</sup> Snyder, 'The CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance', 60.

Chris van der Klaauw in 1980 and 1981, the Netherlands supported the French CDE initiative together with the other EC states from the start and tried to convince the US to do the same. The US was half-hearted in its support of the CDE, at first because of the transition to the Reagan Administration, later because it had problems with the extension of the mandate for CBM's to the adjoining sea and air space of Europe and with the disarmament phase of the conference.

The American attitude to the CDE influenced the relations within the West from the start of the conference. Using the EPC, the EC member states emphasized the importance of Western unity to the US for the overall success of the conference. In this way, the Netherlands contributed to *cooperation and transfer of ideas* between the EC and NATO. The EPC and especially France often came into conflict with the US in the NATO caucus about the contents of the final document. Therefore, contrary to Selvage's point, the Western alliance was already in crisis before martial law was imposed in Poland, but the crisis became more visible for other states after these events.<sup>157</sup> The Dutch tried to bridge the divide between NATO and EPC and more specifically the US and France. It used its term as EPC president in the first half of 1981 to strengthen the Western alliance.

When Max van der Stoel became foreign minister in the autumn of 1981, the Dutch stance slightly changed. The Netherlands became more willing to compromise on the CDE to make progress on the human dimension. This was more in line with the states in the EPC. The Americans, on the other hand, did not want to make concessions to the East on the CDE. The Netherlands was less focused on maintaining Western cohesion because of its willingness to compromise with the East. In this period, competition between the EPC and NATO was at a high point. The focus on EPC goes against the idea that Max van der Stoel preferred the US over European cooperation.<sup>158</sup>

The Dutch stance returned to maintaining Western unity when Hans van den Broek became the new foreign minister in the autumn of 1982. By 1983, after years of negotiations, the states in the EPC became more willing to compromise on the human dimension to achieve a CDE under Western terms. These states wanted to cater to their public opinion, which was protesting for disarmament, they also wanted to improve East-West relations and maintain

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<sup>157</sup> Selvage, 'The Politics of the Lesser Evil', 41.

<sup>158</sup> Hellema, *Buitenlandse politiek van Nederland*, 299.

relations with the NNA states.<sup>159</sup> The EPC's willingness to compromise goes against the idea that the EC member states were a very important promoter of human rights in the CSCE process.<sup>160</sup> This competed with the Dutch standpoint that human rights needed as much emphasis as disarmament. When this happened the Netherlands shifted its support from the EPC to NATO, since the less compromising stance of the Atlantic alliance was in the Dutch interest. However, soon after this happened the other NATO members, including the Americans, accepted the Spanish compromise on the final document and the Netherlands lost its margin for manoeuvre and could not achieve any more progress in the human dimension. The Dutch decided to accept the compromise as well because Western unity was more important to them than human rights. This shows that contrary to what Baudet believes, the Dutch were not hardliners when it came to human rights.<sup>161</sup>

My hypothesis that the Netherlands built bridges between NATO and the EC was, therefore, true, although it came at the cost of the Dutch aims in the human dimension.<sup>162</sup> The actions of the Netherlands at the Madrid CSCE show a general pattern for how it conducted foreign policy as a small state, by using multilateralism: by cooperating within the EC or NATO with other states the Netherlands was able to influence world politics stretching its margin for manoeuvre.<sup>163</sup> When NATO and the EC competed with each other during the conference, the Netherlands was a bridge-builder working towards the transfer of ideas between institutions, taking on the role as mediator between the US and France in a discussion over the CDE mandate in May 1981 was a great example of the Netherlands using its margin for manoeuvre to influence the outcome of the conference in its favour.<sup>164</sup> When NATO and the EC cooperated successfully the Netherlands margin for manoeuvre diminished, this was the case when all other Western states accepted the Spanish compromise in June 1983.

The significant influence of the EPC in shaping the CDE and making proposals which led to the return of the US to Madrid show that the coordination of foreign policy by the EC member states was in better shape than is often assumed in the historiography.<sup>165</sup> Intergovernmental cooperation in the EPC allowed the EC member states to play a key role in

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<sup>159</sup> 'CSCE New Round, 15 April 1983'.

<sup>160</sup> Romano, 'The Main Task of the European Political Cooperation', 125.

<sup>161</sup> Baudet, "It Was Cold War and We Wanted to Win", 195.

<sup>162</sup> Crump, Lammertink, and Zeilstra, 'Ferm, Doch Onopvallend', 257.

<sup>163</sup> Crump and Romano, 'Challenging the Superpower Straitjacket', 13.

<sup>164</sup> 'CDE Mandate, 7 May 1981'.

<sup>165</sup> Gassert, 'Did Transatlantic Drift Help European Integration?', 170.

the development of the Madrid CSCE conference independently from the Western superpower.<sup>166</sup> An intergovernmental institution, which would resemble the EPC, might be of use for developing a common foreign policy by the EU in the present.

Due to constraints in time and access to the archive related to the Covid-19 crisis, not all relevant primary resources could be consulted. This leaves many interesting paths to be discovered. The National Archives in The Hague have collections on the EPC's relationships with the CSCE, the US and NATO. There are also several collections on EPC meetings about nuclear and non-proliferation questions in the early 1980s. Furthermore, examining the records of the Dutch permanent representative to NATO in Brussels (to which there is limited access) could bring a new perspective on the CSCE and disarmament issues.

The conclusion of this thesis has interesting implications for the historiography of the Cold War and European integration. The Dutch primary sources show how multilateral institutions such as NATO and the EC at a multilateral forum like the CSCE and the small states that operated within these places had an undeniable and important influence over the course of the conference and more broadly the Cold War. This shows that the Cold War was more than just a conflict between two superpowers and their allies. It was a complex international order in which different actors pursued different goals, even if the actors were part of the same bloc.

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<sup>166</sup> Romano, 'Re-Designing Military Security in Europe', 464.

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# Plagiarism form

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Universiteit Utrecht

Faculty of Humanities  
Version September 2014

## PLAGIARISM RULES AWARENESS STATEMENT

### **Fraud and Plagiarism**

Scientific integrity is the foundation of academic life. Utrecht University considers any form of scientific deception to be an extremely serious infraction. Utrecht University therefore expects every student to be aware of, and to abide by, the norms and values regarding scientific integrity.

The most important forms of deception that affect this integrity are fraud and plagiarism. Plagiarism is the copying of another person's work without proper acknowledgement, and it is a form of fraud. The following is a detailed explanation of what is considered to be fraud and plagiarism, with a few concrete examples. Please note that this is not a comprehensive list!

If fraud or plagiarism is detected, the study programme's Examination Committee may decide to impose sanctions. The most serious sanction that the committee can impose is to submit a request to the Executive Board of the University to expel the student from the study programme.

### **Plagiarism**

Plagiarism is the copying of another person's documents, ideas or lines of thought and presenting it as one's own work. You must always accurately indicate from whom you obtained ideas and insights, and you must constantly be aware of the difference between citing, paraphrasing and plagiarising. Students and staff must be very careful in citing sources; this concerns not only printed sources, but also information obtained from the Internet.

The following issues will always be considered to be plagiarism:

- cutting and pasting text from digital sources, such as an encyclopaedia or digital periodicals, without quotation marks and footnotes;
- cutting and pasting text from the Internet without quotation marks and footnotes;
- copying printed materials, such as books, magazines or encyclopaedias, without quotation marks or footnotes;
- including a translation of one of the sources named above without quotation marks or footnotes;
- paraphrasing (parts of) the texts listed above without proper references: paraphrasing must be marked as such, by expressly mentioning the original author in the text or in a footnote, so that you do not give the impression that it is your own idea;
- copying sound, video or test materials from others without references, and presenting it as one's own work;
- submitting work done previously by the student without reference to the original paper, and presenting it as original work done in the context of the course, without the express permission of the course lecturer;
- copying the work of another student and presenting it as one's own work. If this is done with the consent of the other student, then he or she is also complicit in the plagiarism;
- when one of the authors of a group paper commits plagiarism, then the other co-authors are also complicit in plagiarism if they could or should have known that the person was committing plagiarism;
- submitting papers acquired from a commercial institution, such as an Internet site with summaries or papers, that were written by another person, whether or not that other person received payment for the work.

The rules for plagiarism also apply to rough drafts of papers or (parts of) theses sent to a lecturer for feedback, to the extent that submitting rough drafts for feedback is mentioned in the course handbook or the thesis regulations.

The Education and Examination Regulations (Article 5.15) describe the formal procedure in case of suspicion of fraud and/or plagiarism, and the sanctions that can be imposed.

Ignorance of these rules is not an excuse. Each individual is responsible for their own behaviour. Utrecht University assumes that each student or staff member knows what fraud and plagiarism