

The five day war that shocked the world:

An analysis of the peace process of the Russo-Georgian war.

Bachelor thesis



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'Putin Planned to Topple the President of Georgia and 'Hang Him by the b***', Says Nicolas Sarkozy's Chief Advisor', *Daily Mail* (14 August 2008) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1043776/Russia-Georgia-agree-ceasefire-negotiated-Sarkozy.html>



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Russia and Georgia Both Agree to Ceasefire Negotiated by Sarkozy', *Daily Mail* (13 August 2008) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1043776/Russia-Georgia-agree-ceasefire-negotiated-Sarkozy.html>.

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Supervisor: Dr. Christ Klep

Word Count: 8639.

25 January 2017

Abstract

This thesis offers an analysis of the peace process during and after the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and its effect on the political relation between Russia and the European Union. In the war, Georgian forces attacked the Georgian province of South Ossetia in the night of 7 August. Russia soon invaded with the purpose of assisting the Ossetians in their defence. Russia defeated the Georgian forces and advanced in the direction of Tbilisi. To stop the Russian forces, French president Nicolas Sarkozy as President of the European Council mediated a ceasefire between the Russian and Georgian presidents. Aiming to give a complete analysis, this article starts with a brief overview of the academic debate on peacekeeping theory. The cosmopolitan conflict resolution theory is used as a framework in this thesis to give a better understanding of the peace process. In the following chapter, the peace process and the roles of the actors of the war are discussed. Finally the role of the EU as a mediator and the way its mediation influenced the relation between Russia and the EU are evaluated.

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Introduction

On the night of 7 August 2008 at 23.35 p.m. Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili gave orders to his army to attack Russian forces. He finished the phone call with one last order: "Minimize civilian casualties."¹ Russian forces had been seen moving into Georgia in the small town of Java in the Georgian province of South Ossetia and also in the Roki-Tunnel, on the Russian-Georgian border. When Saakashvili set the attacks on Russian forces into motion, he got Georgia in a war it could never win. Russia's forces, deployed in Georgia, were three times the size of the Georgian army. In less than a day, Russia was able to control parts of Georgia. In less than a week, Russian troops were on their way to Tbilisi, ready to invade the capital of Georgia. Was this possible because Georgia's army was not well organised or because Russia's military was very strong? United States diplomat Ronald Asmus argued that Georgian forces were not numerous and that they were not ready to fight.² Still, Russia had to be well prepared if it was able to take control of South Ossetia, and perhaps even of Georgia. The decades old issue of how powerful Russia really is, continues to be problematic, which is why research on the international relations of Russia is important.

The invasion in Georgia was Russia's first interstate war after the Cold War. Tensions between the two countries were tangible and a couple of times visible ever since this war ended. During the Cold War Georgia was part of the Soviet Union and after the Cold War ended, an autonomic Georgian republic was established. Separatist provinces South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia called for a state of their own at the same time Georgia became autonomous. This led to an armed confrontation in 1992 with sporadic Russian intervention.³ To prevent any future tensions from escalating into violent confrontations, two commissions were set up: the Joint Control Commission and the Joint Peacekeeping Forces. Both consisted of Georgian, Russian and Ossetian peacekeepers.⁴

The relationship between Georgia on the one side and South Ossetia, supported by Russia, on the other remained tense. The accumulating threats coming from Russia led to the decision that Saakashvili made on 7 August around midnight. Russia increased its military preparations, covering them up as peacekeeping actions, sent arms to the separatist forces and deployed more forces of its own. To Saakashvili it became clear what Russia was planning: Russia was slowly trying to annex South Ossetia and Georgia's other separatist province, Abkhazia.⁵ To Saakashvili it was of utmost importance not to lose his two provinces in order to maintain territorial integrity and his position as president. Saakashvili thus felt compelled to attack Russia when it entered Georgia, not only to protect

¹ Ronald Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, (Palgrave Macmillan 2010) p. 19.

² *Ibidem*, p. 31.

³ International Crisis Group, 'Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia', *Europe Report N^o159* (26 November 2004), p. 4.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

⁵ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, p. 25.

his people but also the two provinces.⁶ Which of these two Saakashvili prioritized has been a topic of discussion, but Asmus argues that his goals were reflected in his orders. In his phone call on 7 August Saakashvili emphasized to minimize civilian casualties. This order is relatable to the way the Georgian forces acted, as they had to fight defensively, protecting Georgian villages around the Tskhinvali.⁷

Russia claimed multiple legitimizations for its intervention, starting with the protection of South Ossetians against a possible Georgian genocide. Russian authorities claimed that 2000 Ossetians had been killed during the first few hours of the war alone. Another more credible justification, one that president Medvedev emphasized in conversations with Western leaders, is the death of Russian peacekeepers, which would give Russia a legitimate right to respond.⁸ Russia's war aims however were, according to critics, very different from its 'official' legitimizations. These were not the protection of Ossetians or the unresolved status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. American historian Jeffrey Mankoff argues that the real aims were above all to sabotage Saakashvili's aspirations of becoming a NATO member. With this aspiration, Georgia started to turn westward, becoming a threat for Russia. The EU and NATO on the other hand started to extend their borders more eastward, so Russia felt an upcoming threat from the West.⁹

The five-day Russo-Georgian war ended as abruptly as it started. A month later a ceasefire agreement was signed that was mediated by the European Union. Debatable is to what extent the European Union could mediate impartially, as it surely does have interests in the region, being a wealthy and Eastwards-expanding power. So would the EU mediate as an interested party making use of its power or as a neutral facilitator ignoring its own interests?¹⁰ And how would the peace process and its outcome influence the relations between Georgia, Russia and the European Union?

These questions led me to my topic of research. Mediating in a conflict is a difficult job to take on, especially when Russia is involved. Research on how this process took place is thus of importance. My intention is to answer the question as to what extent the European-driven conflict resolution process of the Russo-Georgian war has influenced the political relationship between the European Union and Russia. In answering the research question, the goal of this thesis is to contribute to analyses of the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian war. In order to give a clear answer, I will develop three lines of analysis. In the first chapter I will explain existing conflict resolution theories. Next in this chapter I will give a closer look to the cosmopolitan peacekeeping theory explained by conflict resolution theorists Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, which will serve as a framework for the remaining part of the research. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall are much cited in

⁶ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, p. 30.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 39.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 41-43.

⁹ Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*, (Lanham 2009), p. 183.

¹⁰ Tuomas Forsberg and Antti Seppo, 'The Russo-Georgian War and EU Mediation', *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st century*, (2011) p.123.

articles on peacekeeping, as together they have written a renowned book on conflict resolution.¹¹ In the second chapter I will elaborate on the first month of the peace process and the actors involved. Finally in the last chapter I will then evaluate the peace process as a whole and also the role of the European Union.

The main study that I have used to obtain detailed information about the Russo-Georgian war itself is Ronald Asmus' *A Little War that Shook the World*. The book is authoritative on the topic and it is much cited in studies on this war. Complementary to this book, I will use other secondary literature that I will critically study to come to a clear analysis of the conflict and its peace process. Next to this I will use documents of the European Union, such as formal reports on the war and peace agreements. International Crisis Group has written very elaborate and clear analytical articles on the conflict situation in Georgia, which I will use as well. In order to create a complete view on what happened, I will use interviews with president Medvedev that were held two weeks after the war. Acknowledging that I have mainly used western-oriented sources, I want to stress that my intention is to give a clear analysis that shows all sides of the story.

¹¹ Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, (Cambridge 2011).

Chapter one – Theoretical framework

Peacekeeping is a complex phenomenon which is in constant development. Differing opinions on this topic keep the academic debate lively and in this chapter the main elements of the debate will briefly be explained. The cosmopolitan conflict resolution theory will be elaborated, which will serve as an instrument to help understand the conflict resolution process of the Russo-Georgian war. In this process, the EU acted as a mediator to guide the negotiations. Therefore in the final part of this chapter, the role of a mediator in a conflict is discussed. The theory of Thomas Princen will be used in discussing this, as his book on intermediaries in conflicts is an authoritative study on this topic.

1.1 – The academic debate

Four peacekeeping models are present in the academic debate on peacekeeping: the (quasi-) realist, the pluralist, the solidarist and the cosmopolitan.¹² These models do not exclude each other and cannot be classified in a way that one model is better than the others. They are a framework in which peacekeeping can be explained and understood.

Realists argue that the UN is not necessary and prefer to use stabilization forces instead of peace operations in conflicts. These forces offer military support for stability and security in cases where international security and peace is threatened.¹³ Realists perceive the world as an international system of states, in which a state's priority is its own interest and the state is organized around military power.¹⁴ Pluralists, such as international relations professor David Chandler, discuss that the world consists of a society of states who share a mutual interest in sustaining reasonably ordered and predictable relationships between states.¹⁵ This society of states does not contain enough states to count their ideas as universal. Therefore values of sovereignty should be respected and peacekeeping has to be done by the UN.¹⁶ Solidarists believe that the world is an international community that has to protect universal humanitarian values. When a government is contested or proves to be incapable of protecting its citizens' basic rights, the international community, together with non-state actors, has the right to intervene. This intervention has to be internationally approved and its main task is to protect the civilians of that specific country/region.¹⁷ The newest contribution to the peacekeeping debate adds to this view that the intervention has to reflect global prevailing norms. This contribution is the cosmopolitan view.

¹² Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, (Cambridge 2011), p. 163.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 164.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 268.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 268.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 165.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 165.

1.2 – Cosmopolitan conflict resolution

Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall use the term cosmopolitan in relation to conflict resolution “to indicate the need for an approach that is not situated within any particular state, society or established site of power, but rather promotes constructive means of handling conflict at local through to global levels in the interests of humanity”.¹⁸ The need for this new approach is a result of the globalizing world, argue Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall.¹⁹ Local conflicts are having more and more influence on world politics. Effects from interstate or intrastate conflicts are felt far outside of the area of conflict. Borders are virtually extended due to high speed communication systems, that enable the spread of ideas and beliefs across the whole world. Because of this rapid flow of ideas, conflicts are not only experienced on a local level, but on global level as well. Conflict resolution will become more complex, because not only does it need to take into account the actions of local actors, but also those of global actors. How can conflicts be resolved when they cross borders and have worldwide actors? How will international parties be tried? What institutions have the right to intervene?

In cosmopolitan conflict resolution, peacebuilding has to be upgraded from a regional and national level to a global level. Traditional peacekeeping has its focus on three areas of interest: humanitarian aid, protection from violence and enabling negotiations and political tasks that are necessary to settle the conflict. Cosmopolitan conflict resolution adds a fourth area, cultural peacekeeping. Culture is not only playing a big role on micro- and mesolevel (the way locals and peacekeepers work together), but on macrolevel as well. The macrolevel reflects how the cultural context of peacekeeping can be legitimized through political ideas.²⁰ Not only the ideas of key actors should be reflected in peace operations, but also the prevailing ideas and norms on a global scale. It is about drawing on cultural and cross-cultural beliefs that enable conflict resolution to happen and to sustain peace in a non-violent way.²¹

Next to executing peacebuilding on a global level, global security is also necessary. Global security, as an aspiration of the UN, is about providing universal protection for civilians threatened by conflict.²² Global security is guided by norms of global culture as well. These norms, mostly western concepts and ideas of the modern liberal-market-democracy, legitimize interventions when civilian security is threatened.²³ Bringing together people from all over the world, cosmopolitan conflict resolution wants to open new political spaces in which civilians from all over the world can approach and influence the transnational actors of violent conflict. But this can only be achieved if there is a deep

¹⁸ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, p. 265.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 265.

²⁰ Tom Woodhouse, 'Peacekeeping, Peace Culture and Conflict Resolution', *International Peacekeeping*, 17 (2010) 4, p. 490-491.

²¹ *Ibidem*, 492.

²² Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, 'Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and the Globalization of Security', *International Peacekeeping* 12 (2005) 2, p. 148.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 150.

engagement not only with civilians of western countries, but also with civilians from non-western countries/areas. These civilians will bring their own norms and practices. Together with the western norms, they can fulfil the idea of cosmopolitan conflict resolution.

1.3 – The role of a mediator

Intervening in a conflict can be done through force or negotiations, or a combination of the two. If conflicting interests between the actors prevail, force will be used to try to settle the interests. But when shared interests gain of importance, it is more likely that the actors will negotiate an agreement. The growing influence of regional conflicts on global politics increases the necessity for external parties to intervene. Intervention can be done with military means, which is often costly and not always productive.²⁴ But if the actors are interested in resolution through negotiation, the intervention will call for a less violent way such as mediation.

In his book *Intermediaries in International Conflict* economist Thomas Princen draws a distinction between two types of mediators: the neutral mediator and the principal mediator. A neutral mediator has no interest in the conflicted interests and simply wants to assist the negotiations to reach a common agreement.²⁵ It will not bargain with one or more parties, simply because it has no interest or capacity in doing so. Whereas a principal mediator has an agenda during negotiations, the neutral mediator has no interest in the result other than facilitating an agreement between the conflicting actors. Bargaining is only done between those actors and the neutral mediator acts as a trustworthy party that can provide useful information.²⁶

A principal mediator does have (indirect) interests and has capabilities to assist in the negotiations. In the Russo-Georgian war the European Union partly acted as a principal mediator, because it had indirect interests. These were preventing further escalation between Georgia and Russia and trying to keep peace with Russia. In the case of an indirect interest, such as the EU had in this conflict, the mediator also has resources to add, argues Princen.²⁷ Instead of direct negotiations, a principal mediator can take multiple paths in order to reach an agreement. Next to direct bargaining, the mediator can have side negotiations with both parties, which Princen calls three-way bargaining. Here the mediator bargains with both parties separately and the two conflicting parties have their own negotiations as well.²⁸

The principal can negotiate and influence by means of power, whereas the neutral influences the changes in perception of interaction. It is however rarely possible to discern pure types of mediators. Princen suggests thus that a combination of both is the best way to reach a stable agreement, because both are needed. The principal has the capabilities

²⁴ Thomas Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict*, (Princeton 1995), p. 3.

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 20.

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 25-26.

²⁷ Ibidem, p. 20.

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 23.

that can be necessary to pressure both parties to an agreement. The neutral on the other hand may well be needed, because a trustworthy negotiator can prevent that one of the parties is more disadvantaged over the other.²⁹ In the Russo-Georgian peace process, the EU appeared to act both as a principal and a neutral mediator. In chapter 3.1 I further explain this role of the EU as a mediator.

²⁹ Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict*, p. 31.

Chapter two – the peace process

The costs of the short war were high on both ends: 238 Georgians were killed, nearly 1500 were wounded and over 100.000 were displaced. The number of Ossetian casualties is disputed and Russian sources declared that almost 20.000 refugees crossed the Ossetian border into Russia.³⁰ To prevent any further casualties, international leaders reacted quickly. This chapter discusses the quick reaction and also the actors that played a part in the conflict resolution process. Then I will elaborate on the initiatives developed in Georgia during the aftermath and finally the cosmopolitan conflict resolution theory will be applied to the peace process.

2.1 – The draft of a ceasefire agreement

Coincidentally, when the war started, most political leaders were gathered for the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing. Sarkozy, being president of the European Council, soon arranged a meeting in Beijing with Russian prime-minister Vladimir Putin to discuss possible solutions to the conflict. Putin was not cooperative and refused French mediation. Sarkozy however felt the urgency of solving the conflict and opened talks with president Medvedev. His response was positive.³¹ On 12 August Sarkozy travelled to Moscow to negotiate a ceasefire. A few days earlier, on 9 August, the French minister of foreign affairs Bernard Kouchner and Finnish foreign minister Alex Stubb, who represented the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), had travelled to Tbilisi to start drafting the ceasefire.³²

Negotiations about the ceasefire were difficult. The first draft for a ceasefire was drawn up in Georgia, but the French government immediately turned it down because the draft contained too many points Russia would never agree on. Sarkozy attempted to draft a new ceasefire in Moscow with Putin and Medvedev, but failed to produce a new document. The differences between the leaders were too big. Sarkozy however knew that he would never be able to reach an agreement that would meet all the demands of France and the European Union. He thus decided, together with the French government, that it was necessary to focus on the two most important issues: stopping the Russian forces from advancing in Georgia and saving Tbilisi.³³ These two goals formed the base for the Six-Point agreement that followed out of the negotiations.³⁴ This agreement held six principles for a ceasefire, agreed on by Sarkozy and Medvedev and later also signed by Saakashvili. The case on territorial integrity of Georgia is not mentioned in the agreement, so naturally both Saakashvili and Medvedev demanded an explanation. Sarkozy's explanation for this was: "We can try to resolve all issues now and end up achieving no result at all, or we can try to restore peace and attempt through dialogue to find a long-term solution and that is what

³⁰ Oksana Antonenko, 'A War with no Winners', *Survival*, 50 (2008) 5, p. 25.

³¹ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, p. 192-194.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 198-199.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 200.

³⁴ The Six-Point agreement can be found in the appendix on page number 29.

we have tried to do.”³⁵

Sarkozy’s first and foremost aim in the ceasefire process was the cessation of violence and stopping the Russian forces from advancing. Ending the fighting in a violent conflict is called ‘negative peace’ in peacebuilding theory. Next to negative peace, there is also ‘positive peace’. Whereas negative peace is about ending armed conflict, positive peace goes further and focusses on the root causes of the conflict. By redressing those root causes and helping to recreate the state, a more sustainable peace can be established.³⁶ The Six-Point Plan focusses on the cessation of violent conflict, which is of course imperative in achieving a ceasefire. During the first negotiations, Sarkozy noticed that the only result he could get was negative peace. But in his comment on the topic of territorial integrity, he left room for positive peace, but further talks needed to follow in achieving this. In the third paragraph of this chapter I will elaborate on the attempts of achieving positive peace in the peace process.

The Six-Point Plan did lead to the ending of violence in Georgia. It was however not because the agreement was the result of brilliant international cooperation and negotiation. The Six-Point Plan was poorly written, vague and ambiguous.³⁷ Because of these ambiguities and flaws, Saakashvili had not signed the plan during Sarkozy’s visit in Moscow and Tbilisi. The Georgian president had asked for time to reflect, which he did not have since Russian troops were only a few hours from Tbilisi. So both France and Georgia turned to Washington to help in closing the deal. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice travelled to Tbilisi to draft a side letter that would fill in the open and ambiguous gaps of the Six-Point Plan. All the issues were worked through and some edits were made, but eventually Rice saw her role as to convince Saakashvili to agree on a somewhat flawed, but necessary agreement.³⁸

Even when Georgia had agreed on the plan, it could be interpreted differently as to how to implement it. Moscow was hoping for a regime collapse in Georgia and it did everything possible to make this happen. The vague Six-Point Plan enabled Russia to keep their forces in Georgia. To exploit the situation, Russia undermined Georgia’s territorial integrity by recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states on 26 August. In an interview with the French television station TF1, president Medvedev justified this step by saying that he wanted to prevent further killing and bloodshed by Georgia’s bloody aggression. Medvedev argued that he still held territorial integrity as a fundamental principle but he made this decision “to protect these people’s interest and to give to give them the chance to realise their right to self-determination.”³⁹ In Medvedev’s view, Georgia failed to protect its own citizens and by attacking them, Saakashvili had irreparably

³⁵ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, p. 201.

³⁶ Charles Call and Elizabeth Cousens, ‘Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies’, *International Studies Perspectives* (2008) 9, p.3.

³⁷ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, p. 201.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 209.

³⁹ ‘Transcript of Interview with TF1 with President Medvedev’, (Sochi 26 August 2008) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/1229> (viewed of 7 January 2017).

damaged its own territorial integrity.⁴⁰ This thus, according to Medvedev, legitimizes the move to declare the two provinces independent. In the end Sarkozy achieved two goals: ending the violent conflict in Georgia with Saakashvili's government still standing and avoiding a new Cold War. But he failed to convince Moscow to return to the status quo ante⁴¹ and Georgia lost Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russian control.⁴²

A week later, on 3 September 2008, a resolution 'on the situation in Georgia' was drafted by the European Parliament. In this resolution the events of the short war and the period preceding the war are summarized. After this summary, the demands and expectations of the European Parliament as to what was to happen are defined.⁴³ Together with the Six-Point Plan, this resolution formed the basis for further negotiations that followed in Geneva.

2.2 – Actors in the peace process

International reactions on this war were quite unanimous: the violation of Georgia's territorial integrity by Russia was widely condemned. Poland, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, The United Kingdom and the United States all expressed their support for Georgia and strongly condemned Russia's attack on Georgia. Italy on the contrary decided to side with Russia, because it wanted to avoid an anti-Russia front. Germany and France abstained from choosing sides.⁴⁴ France had chosen to take a neutral position, since it led the peace process as president of the European Council. The question as to why the European Union wanted to lead the peace process is important to answer, because it is important to take into account the relationship between the mediator and the conflicting parties.

Both Georgia and Russia were content with France leading the peace process. The US chose to abstain from the peace process, because it wanted to avoid a confrontation with Russia and to prevent a second Cold War, as mentioned before. The US also abstained because it had a close relationship with Georgia, which the US and Russia did not have. Russia preferred European support in the conflict, just like the OSCE, that was already present in the area of conflict because of earlier peacekeeping missions. Georgia did not want the UN or OSCE as mediator, as Russia was a member-state in both organizations. Georgia preferred the US or NATO, because the country had a more favourable position

⁴⁰ 'Achieving a Ceasefire and Normalising the Situation in the Region Would Require the Withdrawal of All Georgian Armed Forces from South Ossetia and the Signature of a Legally Binding Agreement between Georgia and South Ossetia Committing Both Sides Not to Use Force, (10 August 2008) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/44421> (viewed on 9 January 2017).

⁴¹ Status quo ante is short for status quo ante bellum, which refers to the situation in a country before a war or armed conflict occurred.

⁴² Amus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, p. 214-215.

⁴³ 'European Parliament resolution of 3 September 2008 on the situation in Georgia (2009 / C 295 E/08)', Georgia P6_TA (2008)0396, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 4 December 2009, C295 E/2.

⁴⁴ Katrin Bennhold, 'Differences Emerge in Europe of a Response to Georgia Conflict', *International Herald Tribune*, 12 August 2008, <https://web.archive.org/web/20080821011829/http://www.ihf.com/articles/2008/08/12/europe/diplo.php> (viewed on 5 January 2017).

with both. Russia on the other side wanted the US and NATO to stay out of the conflict, since both are leading actors in western policy. For Russia it was a moral victory that the US did stay out. Russia considered the EU, under French presidency, would suit best because France was considered to be a strong, less partisan and experienced country in the international community.⁴⁵

When looking at the roles of both Georgia and Russia during the peace process, a difference in behaviour among both is noticeable. First and foremost, Putin was reluctant about negotiations in the beginning. Saakashvili on the other hand knew negotiations were necessary for the wellbeing of Georgia. He had initially hoped for US or NATO support in the conflict, so negotiations was the best he could get.⁴⁶ The Six-Point Plan was drafted by Sarkozy and Medvedev, Saakashvili's only role was to sign it. He did not want to sign the first draft, so after a few adjustments and some convincing from the US Secretary of State he eventually did.

In the peace process one could speak of an asymmetrical relationship between Moscow and Tbilisi. The EU did what it could to assist in an honest peace process. Russia however is a powerful state with the means to put pressure on key elements during the peace process, the difficult case of territorial integrity in the Six-Point Plan for example. Georgia and the EU both wanted to include this issue, because both wanted to return to the status quo ante. Medvedev however did not agree with this point of view, because, in his words, he wanted to protect the Russian people and peacekeepers from Georgian aggression and possible genocide.⁴⁷ Territorial integrity was, as we now know, left out of the plan, but in the international community it was seen as the most important issue that had to be solved. Russia's powerful status made this difficult to solve, because France and the EU did not want to use hard power, knowing that the EU-Russia relationship was at stake.

2.3 – Positive peace in Georgia?

As mentioned above, positive peace is about rebuilding a country and its institutions and to focus on the root causes of the conflict, in order to create sustainable peace. The EU tried to establish positive peace with what Forsberg and Seppo call "the most important tool of EU conflict management in the field": the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (hereafter EUMM).⁴⁸ Before the EUMM came to life, there were other peacekeeping missions in Georgia that had started in the nineties: the OSCE Mission to Georgia that has operated for over 15 years in Georgia and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), which also started in 1993. Neither of these missions were extended after the war in 2008, because Russia did not give its permission. So from the summer of 2009

⁴⁵ Tuomas Forsberg and Antti Seppo, 'The Russo-Georgian War and EU Mediation' *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st century*, (2011) p. 133.

⁴⁶ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, p. 205.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 221.

⁴⁸ Forsberg and Seppo, 'The Russo-Georgian War and EU Mediation', p. 128.

onwards, the EUMM was the only international observer mission in Georgia.⁴⁹

The priorities in the mandate of the EUMM were fourfold. First it wanted to ensure that there would not be a return to hostilities. Second, it wanted to help the local communities living on both sides of the borders with Abkhazia and South Ossetia to return to their normal and safe lives. Third, the EUMM wanted to build confidence among the conflicting parties and finally it wanted to acquaint Georgia with EU policy.⁵⁰ To this day, the EUMM has been patrolling day and night in the unstable zones of Georgia. A formally accepted mission in all zones, it has not been recognized by the provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which makes that the EUMM has no access to the territories that need it the most.

The mission was initially authorised for only twelve months, but it has recently been extended for the sixth time.⁵¹ It is now effective until 14 December 2018.⁵² The Six-Point Plan is the basis of the mission and the reason why there are troops on the ground. Results of stabilisation on the ground are tangible, but a lot of progress still has to be made on confidence building. South Ossetia and Abkhazia do not allow EUMM members on their territory, which contributes to the lack of confidence between the government of those provinces (supported by Russia) and the Georgian government.⁵³

In the autumn of 2008 and the summer of 2009, the international community feared that hostilities in the area of South Ossetia would recur.⁵⁴ The fact that this did not happen shows that the mission is effective to a certain degree. One can thus speak of a negative peace in Georgia. The situation in Georgia is relatively stable, but the EUMM is necessary to try and obtain positive peace.⁵⁵ They are trying to rebuild the Georgian institutions, by supplying knowledge of European Policy to create a stronger Georgian government. Positive peace has thus not returned to the country that has been unstable since the end of the Cold War.

2.4 – Cosmopolitan conflict resolution

In chapter 1.2 I discussed the newest contribution to peacebuilding theory: cosmopolitan conflict resolution (CCR). The aim of CCR is to take into account the norms and ideas of cultures from all over the world and to upgrade peacekeeping to a global level. This new approach is necessary, because the globalizing world makes that local conflicts have global

⁴⁹ Ibidem, p. 128.

⁵⁰ European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, 'Our Mandate' https://www.eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/mandate (viewed on 2 January 2017).

⁵¹ European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, 'Factsheet' https://eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/EUMM%20Factsheet%20ENG%202016.pdf (viewed on 3 January 2017).

⁵² European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, 'Georgia: EU Monitoring Mission mandate prolonged for two years,' 12 December 2016 https://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/5683/?year=2016&month=12 (viewed on 3 January 2017).

⁵³ EUMM, 'Factsheet'.

⁵⁴ Ibidem.

⁵⁵ Ibidem.

effects. And the Russo-Georgian war is such a local war that has impact on the international community, if only because of Russia's influence as a major power on world politics.

The first example of this global effect was the fact that the Russo-Georgian war was the first interstate war Russia was engaged in since the end of the Cold War. Russia is a country with substantial power, so naturally any interstate war involving Russia would stir up the international community. Very few countries suspected Russia or Georgia to engage in a direct conflict with each other. The fact that it did happen was worrisome for other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).⁵⁶ One of the true reasons as to why Russia attacked Georgia was because Georgia was becoming a viable candidate for NATO membership and Russia wanted to prevent this at all costs.⁵⁷ Putin views NATO as a threat and he said that he would take "adequate measures" were Georgia to become a member.⁵⁸ With regard to Russia's aims, this conflict on a national scale in Georgia did have global consequences. These aims were to punish one nation for its NATO ambitions, to warn other countries with the same ambitions, especially Ukraine, and to humiliate NATO by showing its ineffectiveness.⁵⁹ In the Russo-Georgian war Russia could demonstrate its overwhelming use of force when it perceived a threat and it also showed the dangers for other CIS-states that consider becoming a member of NATO.

A second aspect of the global effects of the war is the great amount of reactions that followed. After the war broke out, France immediately approached Russian leaders because it felt the urgency for an immediate ending of hostilities. It believed that a new cold war had to be prevented at all costs. The United States did not intervene in the conflict, in order to prevent a threat of a new Cold War.

When looking at the resolution process, multiple actors were involved. Foremost, there was the European Union with French leadership. The OSCE also played a big role in the peace process. These two organisations are European-orientated, whereas CCR asks for global norms in conflict resolution. There were no non-western actors in the peace process, but this was simply because they had no direct interests in the conflict. The EU tried to find a solution that would suit everybody's interests best, which was a difficult task since it had to take into account the interests of a great power.

A difference between CCR and other types of conflict resolution, is that in CCR civilians also play a big role in peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping is done by UN soldiers, but CCR aims for a tight cooperation between those peacekeepers and civilians. Tight cooperation is necessary, because the global norms and rules that are reflected in CCR intervention do not always reflect the ideas of civilians on the ground. These ideas should

⁵⁶ The CIS is the Commonwealth of Independent States, a confederation of post-Soviet Union countries in which their independence is recognized, also by Russia. Georgia was part of the CIS until the Russo-Georgian war.

⁵⁷ Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, p. 217.

⁵⁸ Stephen Blank, 'What Comes After the Russo-Georgian War? What's at Stake in the CIS', *American Foreign Policy Interest* (2008) 30, p. 381.

⁵⁹ International Crisis Group, 'Russia vs Georgia: the Fallout', *Europe Report N°195* (22 August 2008), p. 10.

not be marginalised, so CCR mediates between global and local levels.⁶⁰ The EUMM seems to agree on this, because over 200 civilians assist in monitoring the region.⁶¹

By analysing the peace process according to CCR, it becomes visible that the conflict had a major impact on the world. Russia showed its force and made clear that its army was not to be underestimated. This big impact resulted in a quick resolution process: within a few days a ceasefire was signed and within a month a resolution was drafted by the European Parliament.

In this chapter we have seen that global actors tried to mediate in the local conflict. Mediation turned out to be a tough job, but the EU did its best to draft an agreement that would reflect the ideas of both parties. The ideas of Russia and Georgia could not always be met, which turned out disadvantageous for Georgia. Despite this position of Georgia, negative peace was established, which was the most important matter at the time and therefore can count as a substantial result of the peacekeeping process.

⁶⁰ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, p. 236.

⁶¹ European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, 'Factsheet', https://eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/EUMM%20Factsheet%20ENG%202016.pdf (viewed on 2 January 2017).

Chapter three – Evaluation of the peace process

In this chapter I will evaluate the peace process. First I will evaluate the role of the EU in the peace process and also how they functioned as mediator. What type of mediator was the EU? Did they look after the various interests of different actors? Was the EU able to create a stable situation in the post-war areas? My intention is to answer these questions in this chapter.

3.1 – The European Union as mediator

In chapter 1.3 I have discerned two types of mediators: the neutral and the principal mediator. The neutral mediator acts merely as a messenger to facilitate a common agreement. This agreement is based on the interests of the conflicting parties and it does not reflect any interests of the mediator. If there is a principal mediator, the outcome will reflect (some of) the interests of the mediator. This mediator has resources to coerce or make promises in order to reach its goal.

Forsberg and Seppo argue that the EU has security, economic and normative interests in the Caucasus area, which includes Georgia. As for security, general stability in the region was their goal. It had economic interests in its energy supply and normative interests concerning human rights and democracy promotion.⁶² Also the European Commission stressed the importance of a resolution. The resolution was in the EU's own interest because, if the EU had a stable relationship with Russia, it could pursue its own interests better and it could have a unified stance towards Russia in order to be more influential.⁶³ This would give reason for the EU to act as a principal mediator. The EU did act as such, but only in a limited way. During the peace process it tried to influence Russia by freezing negotiations on their relationship after the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) ended,⁶⁴ which was more a symbolic act than an actual threat. The EU did not want to take tough measures such as economic sanctions to quicken the process of the withdrawal of Russian forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Another way in which the EU acted as a principal mediator was in their promotion of Georgia's territorial integrity.⁶⁵ The EU however never used hard power to protect Georgia's territorial integrity, but I will return to this later.

Forsberg and Seppo argue that the EU acted mostly as a neutral mediator, despite European interest. During the crisis and peace negotiations they did not publicly put blame on any party for the outbreak of the war. They sponsored a fact finding mission to examine the causes of the conflict. By installing a Swiss diplomat as the head of the mission, the will for impartiality was emphasized. A ceasefire was achieved based on the interests of Georgia and Russia and it was not influenced by European interests.⁶⁶

⁶² Forsberg and Seppo, 'The Russo-Georgian War and EU Mediation', p. 129.

⁶³ Commission of the European Communities, 'Communication From the Commission to the Council: Review of EU-Russia Relations', {SEC(2008) 2786} Brussels, 5 November 2008, p. 5.

⁶⁴ The PCA is a legal basis for the relations between the European Union and Russia.

⁶⁵ Forsberg and Seppo, 'The Russo-Georgian War and EU Mediation', p. 131.

⁶⁶ Ibidem, p. 130.

As Princen explained in his book *Intermediaries in International Conflict*, a mediator seldom is either a neutral or a principal mediator. European mediation in the Russo-Georgian war eventually turned out to be neutral as well as principal. The EU did have interests in the negotiations on the one hand. For example, it had frozen negotiations on an individual level with Russia and strongly promoted territorial integrity. But on the other hand, it had refrained from blaming any side and the EU did sponsor a fact finding mission. After the negotiations under European mediation ended, the EU helped to continue interaction between Russia and Georgia, by organising the Geneva negotiations. Many of these negotiations on the security and stability in Georgia have been held after 15 October 2008. The participants were the EU, the OSCE, the UN together with the Georgian government, Russia, the US and Abkhazian and South Ossetian authorities.⁶⁷ So the EU helped round up the initial negotiations and assisted in further negotiations to ensure that both parties lived up to the agreements.

3.2 – Critiques against the EU as conflict manager/mediator

The European Union acted swiftly and impartially as a conflict manager. The overall reactions from the international community to the management of the peace process were positive. However, points of critique on which the EU could improve as a conflict manager have followed as well. The EU as an organisation was not very familiar with complex conflict resolution, as this was mainly a task of the UN and the OSCE. The idea of the EU as conflict manager was met with doubt in the international community, as the latter still remembered of EU failure in the Balkans in the 1990s.⁶⁸

The EU is an organisation that represents 28 European countries (at the time 27), and it has to take into account the interest of every member state. In times of conflict, consensus on the conflict situation has to be reached among the member states, which makes it difficult for the EU to come to a decision. In the Russo-Georgian war, the member states were divided on how to react to Russia. Italy, France, Belgium and Germany on the one hand were eager to maintain good relations with Russia. Central European countries like Poland and Estonia and also The Netherlands and Britain on the other hand wanted to show Moscow that its aggression had costs. France and Germany however did not want to create a long term animosity, because Russia had an important energy and trade relationship with Europe.⁶⁹ This division within the EU resulted in insufficient action towards Georgia until the outburst of the war, but still without having a solid and strategic foreign policy on Russia.⁷⁰ Another weakness of the division between EU member states is whether the same results would have been obtained if another, maybe smaller and weaker, member

⁶⁷ Dov Lynch, 'ESDP and OSCE', in: Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (ed), *European Security and Defense Policy: The First Ten Years (1999-2009)* (Paris 2009), p. 140-141.

⁶⁸ Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff, 'The EU as a Conflict Manager? The Case of Georgia and its Implications', *International Affairs*, 86 (2010) 1, p. 97-98.

⁶⁹ Steven Erlanger, 'E.U. Treads Gingerly in Georgia Crisis', *The New York Times* (25 August 2008) <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/26/world/europe/26russia.html> (viewed on 5 January 2017).

⁷⁰ Whitman and Wolff, 'The EU as a Conflict Manager?', p. 96.

state had been president of the EU.⁷¹ France is a strong country and has a long history with Russia, which made France capable and reliable as a mediator in this war. Not all member-states in the EU however are as experienced as France in conflict management, or can offer strong mediation. Therefore it is questionable if another EU country could have acted as quick and strong as France did. In other words, is the EU capable to act as conflict mediator at all times, or is it dependent on the presiding country?

France together with Russia created the content of the Six-Point plan, which was not received positively in the international community. Diplomats complained that the content was vague, ambiguous and poorly written.⁷² It was important that that the plan was quickly drafted, because the Russian forces had to be stopped from advancing towards Tbilisi.⁷³ The document contained no specific times or locations, it did not address the different types of Russian forces and the fifth point, on the withdrawal of Russian forces, was the most contested.⁷⁴ In short, these examples and more show that France had not been concrete enough during the draft of the ceasefire agreement. The ambiguity in the points led to confusion about the obligations of the countries, something Russia abused by letting their forces stay in Russia longer than there was initially agreed on.

Georgia had lost Abkhazia and South Ossetia, something the international community considers a failure of France. Next to the difficulties in the negotiations on territorial integrity, there are two other reasons why it was not mentioned in the Six-Point Plan. First is the fact that Russia had more influence on the outcome of the Six-Point Plan, because it was drafted by Sarkozy and Medvedev during Sarkozy's stay in Moscow. So only after Medvedev agreed on all points, was it sent to Georgia. Saakashvili, as mentioned in chapter 2, had no choice but to sign it if he did not want Russian forces on his doorstep. The second – and related – reason why Sarkozy left territorial integrity out was because he wanted to remain on good terms with Russia. He was aware of the importance of a good relationship with Medvedev, because Russia and the EU have an interdependent bond in terms of trade and energy. Russia is a "key geopolitical actor, whose constructive involvement in international affairs is a necessary precondition for an effective international community."⁷⁵

The key geopolitical position that made Russia indispensable in global politics was again seen in the global financial crisis of 2008. The EU and Russia are economically interdependent, so when the financial crisis occurred and Georgia was more or less stable again, negotiations between the two were more on this crisis rather than on Georgia.⁷⁶ The EU had finished their job as mediator and could focus on the future of Russia and the EU.

After the negotiations in August 2008, the Geneva talks followed. Up until today

⁷¹ Ibidem, p. 97.

⁷² Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World*, p. 201.

⁷³ Ibidem, p. 202.

⁷⁴ The Six-Point Plan is found in appendix nr. 2, on page 29.

⁷⁵ Commission of the European Communities, 'Review of EU-Russia Relations', p. 3.

⁷⁶ Forsberg and Seppo, 'The Russo-Georgian War and EU Mediation', p. 128.

they are regularly held to evaluate the situation on the ground in the areas of conflict. Despite its vagueness, the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008 is still used years after the conflict in the Geneva talks, to keep all parties in check.⁷⁷ Based on this agreement and their own experiences, all parties express what has to improve and discuss the status quo during these talks. In the talks of July 2015 it appeared that the talks were felt to have had positive results. Georgia called the negotiations prior to the ones of July 2015 “constructive” and Russia thought they were “sharp, but substantial”.⁷⁸ It thus appears that despite the negative peace in Georgia, the situation in the post-conflict areas are still not stable enough, for the peace talks continue. These talks are considered constructive by the two main actors, Georgia and Russia. All the parties that negotiated the ceasefire agreement are included, including the US and the UN. Together they will have a long road ahead to establish a stable and secure region, but considering the productiveness of the Geneva talks, there is hope.

3.3 – The Russo-Georgian war: a war without winners?

Russian researcher Oksana Antonenko argues in her article ‘A War Without Winners’ that no party came out winning after the conflict, but that they all lost in their own ways. The European Union had failed at first, because it was unable to prevent the war from happening. Brussels and also Washington had neglected the frozen conflict in Georgia, assuming it would remain frozen.⁷⁹ Despite this failure, the EU did help in containing the conflict. Georgia has lost the most in this conflict. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are their biggest losses. They are controlled and recognized as independent regions by Russia, even though the international community (apart from three other countries) still views the provinces as Georgian. It remains very unlikely that Georgia will ever return to the status quo ante. Russia failed to depose Saakashvili, but Saakashvili’s goal of his country becoming a NATO member has never been more unlikely to be fulfilled. Georgia is too unstable to become a member, but more important, one of the main causes for the start of the war was the wish of becoming a NATO member. NATO will thus rethink any possible decision on membership for CIS countries, wanting to avoid Russian aggression. Even though South Ossetia and Abkhazia have realised their dreams of becoming independent states, they are not as independent as they would wish to be. First because both are dependent on Russia for financial support. And second because no other state besides Russia (and Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru) recognizes them as independent, so they continue to be isolated from the world.⁸⁰

Antonenko argues that besides their wins, Russia is also a loser. The economic losses were immense since Moscow had spent over 16 billion dollars on the war in the first week,

⁷⁷ ‘Statement of the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the OSCE, Mr. Paata Gaprindashvili, of the Eleventh Round of the Geneva International Discussions’, Vienna PC.DEL/591/10, 21 June 2010, p. 2.

⁷⁸ ‘At Geneva Talks Russia Says Georgia’s NATO Integration Poses Security Threat to Region’, *Civil Georgia* (Tbilisi 2 July 2015) <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28403> (viewed on 5 January 2017).

⁷⁹ Antonenko, ‘A War Without Winners’, p. 29-30.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 33-34.

foreign investors had taken money out of Russian companies and the Russian stock market lost over 40% of its value. It was however not facing an economic crisis, like the rest of the world did. Furthermore Moscow had lost trust from post-Soviet countries. Antonenko thus argues that there are no winners in this war. I however argue that Russia is the state closest to being a winner. By invading South Ossetia, Moscow damaged the territorial integrity of Georgia. By taking control of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia and recognizing them as independent states, Russia hit Georgia hard. Russia definitely lost trust of other CIS countries and the West, but Russia made its way back into the international community as a major power, showing off its forces in Georgia. Based on status of a country, I argue that Russia has won the war. But Russia also shook the world, because the post-Cold War order, an order assuming Russia and the West could settle differences in a peaceful way, has been challenged.⁸¹

⁸¹ Ibidem, p. 32.

Conclusion

During the month after the Russo-Georgian war intensive peace talks were held with European mediation. Different scholars have criticized this mediation of the EU and in this thesis the argument of Forsberg and Seppo on EU mediation is explained. They argued that the EU mostly acted as a neutral mediator, but also that the EU had certain interests during the peace process. The presence of both types of mediators matches with Princen's theory on conflict mediation. Princen argued that a mediator in a conflict situation rarely acts either as a principal mediator or a neutral mediator and he suggested that a combination of the two would work best. In the case of the Russo-Georgian war, I agree with Princen that a combination of neutral and principal mediation worked well. At the time of the war a peace agreement was necessary to prevent Russia from taking over Georgia. The EU initiated the peace process through talks instead of force. Mediation through talks is usually seen as neutral mediation, but interests of the EU are reflected in this decision as well. The EU did not want use force, in order to keep up their relationship with Russia.

The EU did condemn Russia's use of force and its declaration of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but did not impose any sanctions. In the review on EU-Russia relations of the European Commission a stable relationship with Russia was stressed. Only then the EU could pursue its interests better and could it be more influential. The necessity of a stable relationship was also stressed by president Medvedev. In interviews with both CNN and TF1 he mentioned that he wanted to avoid a second Cold War at all costs, but that it was up to Europe how the relation between the two would be maintained.⁸²

The EU recognized the importance of Russia as a partner, because Russia and the EU were economically interdependent. Europe needed Russian energy for its member states and Russia needed the European market. More importantly, the global financial crisis of 2008 had an impact on both Europe and Russia, so when stability in Georgia had more or less returned, negotiations between Russia and the EU focused on this crisis rather than on Georgia.

The Russo-Georgian peace process has shown that mediation of the EU was not as impartial as scholars like Seppo and Forsberg argued it to be. The EU wanted to uphold their relationship with Russia, which resulted in great Russian influence during the draft of the Six-Point Plan and the fact that there were no consequences for Russian violation of territorial integrity. In the end, the ulterior motive of the EU was to keep up their relationship with Russia. This raises doubts about EU mediation, because to what length can the EU be called a neutral mediator? Moreover, the EU's behaviour makes the concept of a neutral mediator contested, because it shows that neutral mediation can contain interests of the mediator. One can even argue that complete neutral mediation is hardly possible or that it is non-existent. I argue that every mediator will have least one interest:

⁸² 'Transcript of Interview with TF1 with President Medvedev', and 'Transcript of Interview with CNN with President Medvedev', (Sochi 26 August 2008) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/1227> (viewed on 8 January 2017).

protecting itself. Guiding a peace process should not be disadvantageously for the mediator. It is thus questionable if a mediator can facilitate fully impartial in drafting a peace agreement. So perhaps the concept of neutral mediation has to be reconsidered.

Mediation that is as neutral as possible matches with the idea of cosmopolitan conflict resolution. As we have seen, CCR wants to take into account norms on conflict resolution from all over the world, not only prevailing western norms. As the name says it, in cosmopolitan conflict resolution multiculturalism is promoted in a peace process and thus takes into account the interests of all parties involved. In CCR, mediation should result in a peace process that fits the interests of the conflicting parties and not only the interests of western policy makers. So does CCR as a model function well enough in analysing a peace process?

The idea that a local or national war has global influence is stressed in CCR . With today's high speed communication system this idea should not be neglected. The five day war might not seem very influential due to its shortness, but it was the first interstate war Russia was involved in since the Cold War. A fitting resolution to the conflict had to be found. This resolution was initiated by a western institution with western ideas, which might lack 'multiculturalism' as CCR prescribes a peace process to be. In CCR it is criticized that past conflict resolution were too western oriented. Each conflict needs a fitting solution for all actors in a conflict. In the case of the Russo-Georgian peace process, the agreement did not fit everyone's interests, but as we have seen in this thesis it was the best outcome possible. So CCR as a model can help in clarifying a peace process and as this model develops, it will become more influential.

The years following the peace process have not been very eventful for Georgia. Negative peace has returned, but there still is a long way to go before positive peace will be reached. Russia on the other hand has changed over the years and so did its foreign policy. Nowadays Russia is involved in multiple crises, such as those in Ukraine and Syria. These crises have led to an aggravation in the EU-Russia relationship. The peace process after the Russo-Georgian war however did not have much influence on their relationship. Seeing the EU's friendly behaviour towards Russia during this period, one can wonder if the war brought any damage to the relationship between the two at all. This behaviour might have given Russia the idea that it had an exceptional position. Eventually the Russo-Georgian war gave Russia with a greater military status in the international community than before.

When Saakashvili gave his order that night of 7 August, the world observed the consequences in shock. Russia emerged stronger from this war and was even on relatively good terms with the EU. While it had shaken the world, with regard to the impact on the international community the little war remained just that: little.

Further research on this topic

In this thesis I have researched to what extent the relationship between Russia and the EU has changed in the peace process of the Russo-Georgian war. This relation did not change significantly, mostly because the EU wanted to uphold their relationship. This thesis is for the greatest part supported by European and American sources. So in order to get a fully

image of the war, it is necessary to show how Russian scholars reviewed European mediation. For further research I thus suggest that an analysis should be made of Russian sources on the Russo-Georgian war and how European mediation is viewed. The way the war is framed by the Russian government is also necessary to research, since both Medvedev and Putin played significant roles in the peace process.

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Appendices

1. Map of Georgia



¹ 'Georgia Pulls out of S Ossetia', *BBC News* (10 August 2008)
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7552012.stm>.

2. Six-Point Plan

The principles to which the parties have subscribed are as follows:

1. Not to resort to force;
2. To end hostilities definitively;
3. To provide free access for humanitarian aid;
4. Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;
5. Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping forces will implement additional security measures;
6. Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.⁸³

⁸³ Council of the European Union, 'Press Release (C/08/236)', Brussels 12453/08, 13 August 2008.