

The UNTEA-Equilibrium

A Game Theoretical Approach on Dutch Diplomatic Interactions
during the Western New Guinea Dispute in Historical
Comparative Analysis (1949-1962).

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Abstract:

This research aims to provide an answer to why the Dutch government held on to New Guinea from 1949 until 1962 in negotiations with Indonesia. In today's historiography this Dutch clasp on New Guinea is mostly perceived as traumatization after the Dutch lost its holding in the Dutch East Indies. This research opposes the paradigm by stating that the Dutch response was based on rational choices as preferred outcomes were calculated. A game theoretical analysis is used in this research by using the Theory of Moves. This case study argues that the Dutch government took initiative by changing its strategy in providing self-determination for the native population of New Guinea by calculating preferred outcomes and anticipations. In turn the Indonesian government responded to this change of strategy, resulting in international pressure. This pressure led towards a move towards an equilibrium situation as the territory is handed over to the United Nations in 1962.

Keywords: Game theory, Theory of Moves, New Guinea Dispute, self-determination, Western Papua, New Guinea, rational diplomacy.

I. Introduction

1.1 The Stings of Mosquitos

On the 27th of December 1961 the voice of Dutch governor Pieter Platteel could be heard on the radios of the Dutch New-Guinea:¹

You can imagine the situation of the man around whose head the mosquitoes buzz and who is doomed to sit still. In my opinion, this image best describes the feelings of many of you, living in the political tumult around this area. Such a man wants to do something, he wants to go around, but the very first thing he looks for is the mosquito net to put his head around. If one has become irritated enough by all the hum and all those stings, then one will not even see the mosquito net anymore. The events in and around Dutch New Guinea, which we like to call West Papua, are developing quickly and not always pleasant. Especially not because of the ominous and threatening sounds that reach us from the Indonesian side.

This metaphor of stinging Indonesian mosquitos summarizes the Dutch paradigm from 1949 until 1962 on its foreign relations with Indonesia: a constant threat, which had to be pacified by different measures and strategies. This paradigm was the result of deteriorating diplomatic relations due to a dispute about a territory called Western New Guinea. This territory was habited by its native Papuan population consisting of tribes as well as an educated urban population, but also Eurasians (Indian Dutchmen). New Guinea used to be part of the colonial Dutch East Indies (1816-1949). Already since its colonization in the 17th century the territory received a special status from the rest of the Indies despite its low economic activity since it was primarily used as a strategic barrier until 1945. This status became more important when from 1945 until 1949, a diplomatic and armed struggle emerged between the newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch Empire, resulting in both independence for Indonesia and a long-lasting dispute between both nations on the legitimacy of Western New Guinea.

¹ Drooglever and Schouten, "Betrekkingen."

While negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands started as early as 1946, the issue of New Guinea became more important during the so-called Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conferences. During these negotiations an agreement on the transfer of sovereignty is agreed as international pressure and armed struggle called for a solution. However, the conference and a failure to find a compromise on the territory of New Guinea increasingly contributed to rising tensions between Dutch and Indonesian diplomats. This was caused by different interpretations and holding on to own outlooks of both parties on the matter of the ownership of the territory. The strategies on legitimizing the territory as part of its nation primarily stayed the same in the Indonesian case: the nation demanded the handover of the territory on the arguments of geography, nationalism and its historic grounds. This would be achieved by diplomatic pressure if not later by force. The hold on to this strategy was the result of its Indonesian president reign spanning from the early 50s until the late 60s. The Dutch stance on the legitimization of the territory however was subject to a transformation in the late 1950s as governments changed. The Dutch government took initiative to change its strategy in handling the Indonesian hostile pressure.

During the early 1950s, a colonial-type administration was preferred, in which Eurasians would be stimulated to develop and administrate the territory, while incorporating the territory in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. During the late 1950s, when tensions were on its peak, this policy would slowly transform into a policy of developing the territory into its own democratic nation-state in which the native Papuans would administrate the territory.

The diplomatic game between the Netherlands and Indonesia in the case study of New Guinea provides an outlook on the politics and methods of diplomacy in an era of decolonization. This game shows why actors change their diplomatic strategy or remain the same on the basis of a preferred outcome and an anticipation of moves of the opponent. In the case of New Guinea, the Dutch government would commence the game as player I as it took the initiative in changing its strategy in order to break the deadlock of negotiations. This was achieved by providing self-

determination for the Papuan population, which in turn resulted in a hostile diplomatic reaction from Indonesia as player II. This Indonesian reaction resulted in a compromise which was found by agreeing on trusteeship by the UN in the form of the United Nations Temporary Executive Administration (UNTEA) that would take control over the area, ending the dispute after which new diplomatic dynamics would commence between the United Nations and Indonesia.

1.2 Historiography

The deteriorating diplomatic interactions between Indonesia and the Netherlands on the matter of New Guinea have been dominantly described by Arend Lijphart as a traumatic hold on to colonial possessions. Since his publication of *The Trauma of Decolonization* (1966) the primarily viewpoint on the motive of the Netherlands is described as follows: “Holland’s involvement in the bitter struggle with Indonesia over New Guinea was not prompted by Dutch objective interests at all, but wholly and exclusively by its emotional commitment”.² This Dutch emotional attachment during the late 1950s would be:³

“tested against realities. There was a growing awareness that sovereignty over New Guinea was a rather unattractive proposition [...] In a way the events of December 1957 not only caused a revulsion in the Netherlands but also paved the way for greater detachment and less immediate and personal involvement. [...] Undoubtedly the psychological and physical wounds account for Dutch feelings on the New Guinea issue since Holland’s departure in 1962”.

Lijphart argues in his book that the motive to hold on to New Guinea is based on a traumatic experience and broken national pride after the loss of the Dutch East Indies, which in turn influenced policy-makers towards a conservative attitude, ignoring the new geopolitical shift towards decolonization. Lijphart compared this

² Lijphart, *The Trauma*, 291.

³ Lijphart, 193–94; 285.

moral policy with the reaction towards to the decolonization process of the Congo, Angola and Algeria.⁴

While scholars started to contest the views of Lijphart in the beginning of the twenty-first century, the colonial trauma argument is still popularized by scholars like Yehezkel Dror, Nancy Mellerski, Robert P. Winston and Robert James, James Siegel and Audrey Kanin, and Miguel J eronimo and Antonio Costa Pinto.⁵ The argument of emotional attachment was even extended by Danilyn Rutherford by arguing that the Dutch saw New Guinea as an colonial fantasy, ripe to modernize from Stone Age to profitable model colony.⁶ This stance of emotional attachment first became contested by Christopher Penders, who argued that the reaction in the Netherlands was far less dramatic as described by Lijphart. The people traumatized by the loss of the Dutch East Indies were mainly expatriates who had been interned in Japanese camps during World War II.⁷ This can be exemplified by the examples Lijphart uses in his book of certain civilian organizations promoting colonization, like the VKNG and SIKNG, expressing concerns in the Netherlands. These organization which influenced Dutch politics compromised predominantly of Eurasians and advocates on the importance of the Dutch East Indies, like the former prime-minister Gerbrandy. Penders also states that the average Dutchmen had little knowledge on the colonial issues in New Guinea due to the postwar economic condition of the Netherlands. However, the knowledge of the issue on the Papuans was known by the general public and “the grave concerns expressed by politicians and thousands of citizens” did exist according to Penders.⁸ The fear of another war was most apparent to citizens during the dispute according to Elizabeth Buettner.⁹

⁴ Lijphart, 8.

⁵ Dror, *Policymaking under Adversity*, 21.; Winston, Mellerski, and James, *The Public Eye*, 187.; Siegel and Kahin, *Southeast Asia over Three Generations*, 45.; Jer onimo and Pinto, *The Ends of European Colonial Empires*, 107.

⁶ Rutherford, *Living in the Stone Age*, 5.

⁷ Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle*, 440.

⁸ Penders, 441.

⁹ Buettner, *Europe after Empire*, 99.

While Penders already contested the trauma-paradigm, according to most historiography Pieter Drooglever is mostly contributed by contesting Lijphart's views for 'the first time', since Penders does not provide an explanation for the hold on the territory. Pieter Drooglever argues in his book *An Act of Free Choice* (2005) that the Dutch government took hold of the territory for having a true belief in the self-determination of the Papuans, while he also argues that this support was mostly for strategic reasons, thus strengthening Penders' first critique.¹⁰ More recently in 2016, Vincent Kuitenbrouwer argued that the Dutch administration "wanted to break with the colonial period and sought new sources of legitimacy for Dutch overseas involvement", like a nation-state for its indigenous populace, the Papuans.¹¹ This true belief also provides an answer why the Dutch government preferred a compromise with the Indonesian government in support of the creation of a Papuan nation.¹²

While all scholars provide a useful insight in the Dutch diplomatic stance, it does not provide an answer why the paradigm shifted in Dutch diplomatic interactions, especially when self-determination or a model colony in the end were not the result of these interactions. While a compromise was found in the handover of the territory to the UNTEA in 1962. The outcome in form of a compromise does provide an insight in a changing strategy or paradigm in a dispute in which two opposing sides prefer their own outcome. A change had to be made on one of either side in order to resolve the dispute, ruling out the trauma-paradigm of Lijphart since the Dutch government changed their shift towards Papuan self-determination and thus its last colonial possession. This research will support the viewpoints of Kuitenbrouwer, Penders and Drooglever, but will also provide a revision of their paradigm by arguing that the Dutch government's policies were a reaction to the Indonesian hostility. This reaction resulted in a policy-change from a still colonial

¹⁰ Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 144; 166.

¹¹ Kuitenbrouwer, "Beyond the 'Trauma of Decolonisation,'" 321-322.

¹² Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969*, 179-181.

based administration towards an administration focused on Papaun self-determination, all the while using the territory as a ground for negotiations with the Indonesian government. This research will focus on the paradigm-shift in Dutch diplomatic interactions in international politics and will provide an answer to why this shift occurred by focusing on the Dutch-Indonesian diplomatic struggle in the international community and more importantly in its diplomatic interactions with Indonesia, while avoiding arguments of so called trauma, by rationally analyzing action-reaction during the dispute. The change in strategy as I argue was purely strategical.

1.3 Methodology

1.3.1. Classical Game Theory

In order to research the transformation of Dutch diplomatic strategy, I will be incorporating the *non-cooperative game theory* as first theorized by von Neumann and Morgenstern.¹³ The non-cooperative game theory is a mathematical theory of modelling conflict situations in which two opposite sides, with different goals which are mutually opposed to each other act. While the classical game theory had popular impact on entertainment and marketing, the use of game theory also became popular in the analysis of negotiations and diplomacy. “In game theory players are assumed to think carefully about their choices and the possible choices of the other players”, argues Steven Brams.¹⁴ While game theory was already widely applied to military-strategic actions, since the 1990s it also became popular as a tool to analyze diplomatic conflict, like for example the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Iranian Revolution.¹⁵

¹³ Neumann and Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, I-XIV.

¹⁴ Brams, *Negotiation Games*, 1.

¹⁵ Snidal, “The Game Theory of International Politics,” 26-27.; Malici and Walker, *Role Theory and Role Conflict in U.S.-Iran Relations*, 17.

Fig. 1. Classical Game Theory: 2x2 model

		Player II	
		A	B
Player I	A	<u>X2 Y 2</u> (Compromise)	X1 Y2 (Player II wins)
	B	X2 Y1 (Player I wins)	X1 Y1 (Conflict)

The classical game theory consists of 2x2-model, having four possible outcomes in terms of different policies and decisions. In this theory, two players oppose each other, and their actions influence the outcome of the conflict. The payoffs are shown in XX/YY-format, in which the first number is the payoff of player I, and the second number the payoff of player II. If player I chooses option A and player II option B, player II will have a higher payoff of X1Y2, while choosing both A of B, both win or lose (**see fig. 1**). If both players chose options A, a *Nash Equilibrium* or compromise (as underlined) exists forming the best possible outcome for both parties, first described by mathematician John Nash.¹⁶ While this model may be applied in a crisis where both players act rational and with full information of the other players actions and decision-making (*a game of complete information*), it doesn't account into real-life diplomatic interactions.

1.3.2. The Theory of Moves (TOM)

In real-life diplomatic interactions, diplomats anticipate the actions of the opposite side. This anticipation is a direct critique on the classical model by not considering preferences and payoffs.¹⁷ The players play a *strict ordinal game*, in which players rank the outcomes from best to worse (1 to 4). The theory of Moves (TOM) theorized

¹⁶ Nash, "Non-Cooperative Games," 290-291.

¹⁷ Wolfson, *The Political Economy of War and Peace*, 248.


by Steven Brams, allows players to move and countermove within the 2x2-model, changing and evolving its diplomatic strategy over time. In **figure 2** several outcomes are possible based on the six rules posed by Brams:¹⁸

1. Players start in an initial state (1,1-3,3-4,2-2,-4) in a 2x2 matrix.
2. Either player can change its strategy and change the state into a new state in the same row or column as the initial state. The player who switches is called player I.
3. Player II can respond by switching its strategy, moving the game into a new state.
4. The alternating responses continue until one of the players chooses not to switch its strategy. This brings the game into a final state, which is the outcome of the game.
5. Players will not move from the initial state if this move a) leads to a less preferred final state or b) returns the play to the initial state.
6. Players have complete information about each other's preferences and act according to the rules of TOM, taking each action into account of the other players rational choice, as well as its own, based on backwards induction. The player who moves changes the initial state, overriding the player who stays.

A strategic equilibrium can be found when both players prefer the state in which one of the players has the highest payoff and thus preference (**see figure 2**). The eventual outcome of the payoffs is linked to the initial state as posed by rule one as well as the player who makes the first move. This model will provide several outcomes, based on the initial state and its response by the players.

¹⁸ Brams, *Theory of Moves*, 19-34.

Fig. 2. Theory of Moves: 2x2 model



There are four different initial states in the 2x2 model, for example the initial state 2,4 in which player I in starts to change its strategy into a 1,1 outcome (**see figure 3**). Player II will respond by changing its strategy in order to gain a 3,3, to further obtain a 4,2 outcome. If player I decides to blockade access to the 4th state (4,2), the final outcome of the conflict will be 3,3, resulting in a compromise between the two players. In the opposite situation, player II will commence the game. However, since player II has a favorable position it will block a change in strategy to hold its position, leaving it on 2,4 (**see figure 4**). The rational choice depends on the player who starts first, if player II starts, it will lead to conflict, if player I starts it will lead to a compromise, since player II will not move, player I will start, overriding the keeping of player II's strategy. The outcome thus is 3,3 in the case of a starting position of 2,4.

Fig 3. Outcome in initial state 2,4 when Player I starts.

Policy	(I changes strategy)	(II changes strategy)	(I keeps strategy)	(State locked by blockade)
State	(Initial) State 1	State 2	State 3	State 4
Turn	I	II	I	II
Player I starts	2,4	1,1	<u>3,3</u>	4,2
Survivor	3,3	3,3	3,3	2,4

→ 2,4

Fig 4. Outcome in initial state 2,4 when Player II starts.

Policy	(II keeps strategy)	(I keeps strategy)	(II changes strategy)	(I changes strategy)
State	(Initial) State 1	State 2	State 3	State 4
Turn	I	II	I	II
Player II starts	<u>2,4</u>	4,2	<u>3,3</u>	1,1
Survivor	2,4	4,2	2,4	2,4

→ 2,4

While the TOM-method is criticized for its lack of predicting cases in which strategic decisions will take place since the order of the moves and the information of players is unknown.¹⁹ It does however provide a perfect method as historical analysis in the aftermath of a certain conflict, since the information and the order of moves is known to the researcher. Especially in the case of Western New Guinea since its negotiations and changing of strategy form the basis in understanding the outcome, while also having historical sources that provide an insight in the preferences and payoffs of the actors, respectively the Indonesian and Dutch administration. By using the Theory of Moves, the rational progressive historical paradigm can be strengthened by avoiding emotional attachments and rather focusing on preferred outcomes and payoffs.

1.3.3. Historical Comparative Analysis

In order to apply the TOM-method to this ideographic case, I will first argue in which initial state the Western New Guinea Dispute commenced, having the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as players of a diplomatic game. This initial state will be called phase I, which occurred from 1949 until 1954. Phase II and phase III will be respectively be illustrated as state two (1954-1960) and three (1960-1962) and provide a response and an outcome in the crisis, a so-called endgame (**see figure 5**). In order to analyze this mechanism of action-reaction in Dutch-Indonesian negotiations, which Matthew Lange described

¹⁹ Stone, "The Use and Abuse of Game Theory in International Relations," 243.

as a method of process-tracing as a secondary within-method in historical-comparative analysis, period effects (different phases) must be taken into account to analyze the asymmetric causal process that occurred during the dispute.²⁰

Figure 5: TOM-model on the New Guinea Dispute (Dutch side)

State	Phase I (1946-1954)	Phase II (1954 -1961)	Phase III (1961-1962)
Outcomes	2,4	1,1	3,3
Winner	Indonesia (Power display and threats)	Neither side (Preparations for self-determination)	Compromise (Trusteeship of the UN)

End of conflict

This research will therefore focus on an internal comparison of three different phases (states), which are influenced by its respective period and decision-making. The changing of the phases is set in motion by so called breakpoints in which a certain strategy of the two players changes or remains unchanged. By analyzing the phases I will provide an insight in how negotiations during the dispute led to breakpoints in certain stances, plans and decisions of Dutch actors. The views and decisions of these politicians and diplomats will be drawn from four main archival sources: governmental documents, coded messages, speeches and notes from 1946 until 1962, focusing on its influence and illustration of the Dutch decision-making process during macro-negotiations. In this research I will name the territory of Western New Guinea or later named Western Papua just New Guinea in order to avoid any political connection since the area is still subject to political connotations and crises. By focusing predominantly on a macro-scale approach of sources (concerning cabinet-members, diplomats and governors), I will oppose Lijphart's micro-scale approach of sources, that mostly focused on the influence of small non-governmental organizations. By using this method I will provide a new insight in the preferences in pacifying the so called stinging of the mosquitos in New Guinea thus using a rational macro-scale approach towards the decisions of its diplomats to explain that that *the dispute was not focused on a trauma, but on rational choices*.

²⁰ Lange, *Comparative-Historical*, 47-50.

II. Phase One: The Initial State (1946-1954)

2.1. New Guinea before 1946

The first Dutch colonization of Dutch New Guinea occurred through the Dutch East India Company in 1660, which later emerged into the Dutch East Indies (1816-1949). Already at the beginning of the first colonization did the area receive a special status since its administration was exercised from the Moluccas, and not from the island of Java like the rest of the Dutch East Indies.²¹ Since the departure of the Spanish from the territory, leaving the island mostly in Dutch control, the territory was mostly left unwanted and unclaimed for the two centuries to come. The territory mostly functioned as a barrier against unwanted intrusions to preserve the economic-benefitable Moluccan Spice Islands.²² The only claims were made by the Sultanate of Tidore on the northern coastal regions of West Papua and the southern coastal regions by its vassal-states. While knowledge of the regions was scarce by the Dutch administration since its primary function as a barrier, the Dutch did not consider annexing the territory.

In the 19th century the Dutch East Indies was established tightening more control over its territory. As a scholar in the 1870s writes on the situation of New Guinea: “A claim was made by the Sultan of Tidore on the western section of New Guinea as his dependency, and, as this Ruler was a vassal of the Netherlands Government, that section of this island also considered as belonging to the Dutch East Indies. The knowledge of which they had was just as scarce as now”.²³ In 1828 the Dutch government laid first claim on the territory of New Guinea by utilizing the claims of Tidore, and later halved the island in 1848 in accordance with Germany and Britain by using the 141st meridian as border with Germany and Britain who would exploit the other half of the island.²⁴ The western half of the 141st meridian was legitimized by the Dutch in the name of the Sultan of Tidore, who already

²¹ Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, 1.

²² Bone, *The Dynamics*, 12.

²³ Meinsma, *Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Oost-Indische bezittingen*, 248.

²⁴ McConnell, “Bibliographic Control in Papua New Guinea,” 137.

made claims on the territory. At the end of the 19th century the Sultan of Tidore annexed its vassal states, and thus its territory also became legitimate parts of the Indies. Followed by this annexation was the establishment of certain administrative posts in the early years of the 20th century in Manokwari (1898), Fakfak (1898), Merauke (1902), Hollandia (1909), and Sorong (1915). While these administrative posts were established, the influence of the government remained limited and the territory was essentially politically as economically neglected.²⁵ Only during the 1920s and 30s onwards efforts were made despite its low political support to administrate and develop the territory on economic level. During the late 1930s settlements, plantations, mining and oil companies emerged in Western New Guinea.²⁶

Only after World War II, when most places damaged by Japanese air raids did the economy of Western New Guinea slowly start to develop with the establishment of pipelines, mining and new settlements. During the Japanese occupation Indonesian nationalism emerged, leading to a proclamation of independence of the Indonesian Republic on August 17th, 1945. Communications to and from the Dutch East Indies were limited during the war so this sudden proclamation came to a surprise to the Dutch government. Also, during this time did the claims on to New Guinea start to emerge. As its economic potential was not considered highly valuable, the rebuild of New Guinea proved to be a turning point in establishing political interests in New Guinea. However, since New Guinea was less beneficial because of its lacking economy and its harsh landscape did the flag of the Netherlands keep fluttering in some parts of New Guinea, thus was Indonesian nationalism not as strong in New Guinea as in other parts of the Indies.²⁷ As a direct result of the independence process of Indonesia a series of conferences were organized in order to negotiate and design a federal union with the Republic of Indonesia, while also trying to resolve the question of legitimization of Western New Guinea.

²⁵ Rutherford, *Raiding the Land of the Foreigners*, 181.

²⁶ Brookfield, *Colonialism Development and Independence*, 74-75.

²⁷ Moore, *New Guinea*, 193.

2.2. The emergence of conflict

The first conference of the series was held on April 1946 in a hunting lodge in the Dutch national Park de Hoge Veluwe. Prior to this meeting Huib van Mook, the governor-general and former minister of Colonies already spoke with an Indonesian delegation in 1945 in Batavia in the Dutch East Indies, which was against Dutch government policy. During these talks Huib van Mook already drafted a compromise to resolve the issue of Indonesian independence. The contents of this 'Batavian' design was only revealed at the conference in 1946. Mook's draft included the recognition of an independent Sumatra and Java and the establishment of a federal Indonesia as commonwealth of the Netherlands.²⁸ This Batavian design was formulated as a treaty between two nations. A formulation that the Indonesian delegation would use as well during the conference. The phrasing of negotiations in terms of treaties shocked Dutch politicians, since this would suggest that two sovereign nations were to be negotiating and thus the Dutch government would acknowledge Indonesian sovereignty.²⁹ During the conference the design was rejected, not only because of the position of arguing for treaties. The rejection of the design was also influenced by the fact that the first post-war elections were being held in May 1946, which led that the Dutch government would not be able to establish a compromise with the Indonesian delegation since no fully political support was to be achieved before the elections.³⁰ A new government would have more political leverage both in the Netherlands as on the international level.³¹ While tensions rose between the two delegations, during this first conference the status of New Guinea did not contribute to these tensions, since the topic was not considered special.³²

Only at the second conference held in Malino in July was the future of New Guinea mentioned. During the conference representatives of various areas of the

²⁸ Frey, *Dekolonisierung in Südostasien*, 81.

²⁹ Burgers, *De Garoeda en de Ooievaar*, 452.

³⁰ Schermerhorn, *Het Dagboek van Schermerhorn*, X.

³¹ Burgers, *De Garoeda en de Ooievaar*, 452-453.

³² Drooglever and Schouten, *Betrekkingen 1945-1950*, 1988, 14:167.

Indonesian archipelago were invited of whom also Marcus Kaisiepo, a Papuan representative, who also supported the cooperation of the Netherlands and Indonesia. Kaisiepo mentioned the opportunity to decolonize New Guinea by providing self-determination for its native population. This would help the effort in decolonizing the Dutch East Indies, he argued.³³ Another minority group that got more outspoken over the future of New Guinea was the small group of Eurasians that felt threatened by the conditions of an independent Indonesia and felt that New Guinea would be suitable as a new homeland, while holding ties the Netherlands. Questions were already raised in the same year on the sovereignty of the territory and its potential opportunity as 'homeland for Indo-Europeans'.³⁴ Various organizations that supported this cause emerged and became more outspoken over this idea even eventually leading to government policy by December 1946. These advocates of a new homeland became later an important factor for the dominant trauma-paradigm of Lijphart, but as phase I ended its prominence would vastly decline.

During the conference of Pangkalpinang in October 1946, which was designed to collect opinions and stances of minority groups in the independence process, a delegation to represent the Eurasians was also present. This delegation existed of members of various organizations that promoted the idea of a new Eurasian homeland, which argued that it would solve various problems, like overpopulation in the Netherlands, providing a strategic location and would be ethnologically and geographically different from the rest of the Indonesian archipelago.³⁵ During the Pangkalpinang conference it was argued that various parts of the archipelago would be better off by joining the areas to Holland instead of Indonesia and that the emigration of Eurasians to more suitable parts had to be assisted by the government.³⁶

³³ Drooglever and Schouten, *Betrekkingen 1945-1950*, 1988, 5:20.

³⁴ Jones, *Tussen onderdanen, rijksgenoten en Nederlanders. Nederlandse politici over burgers uit Oost en West en Nederland 1945-2005*, 154.

³⁵ Vereeniging Grooten Nederland Actie ter bevordering van Nederlandsche Volksplantingen op Nieuw-Guinea, "Nederlandse Volksplantingen," 1946, 3.

³⁶ Van Wijnen, "Pangkalpinang," 103,109.

2.3. Rising tensions

This idea of different statuses of various parts of the archipelago found its way in the Linggadjadi conference in November 1946. In contrary of the earlier conferences a special commission, the Committee-General of the Dutch East Indies, now was sent to Indonesia to negotiate which compromised of army commander and governor Van Mook, social liberal Wim Schermerhorn, liberal Feike de Boer and catholic Max van Poll. During the conference the United States of Indonesia was recognized compromising of Borneo, the Great East (East-Indonesia) and the Republic Indonesia. Together with the Kingdom of the Netherlands this new state would form the Dutch-Indonesian Union. While these ideas were already expressed at earlier conferences, like at the Malino conference, the status of New Guinea was changed during the Linggadjadi conference. While New Guinea was proposed as part of the new Indonesian state in a province called the Great East during the earlier conferences, it now achieved a special separate status. However, this new agreement made in Linggadjadi had low political support in the Netherlands. Even the parties that initially supported Indonesian independence had second thoughts.

While the Linggadjadi negotiations were discussed in the Dutch parliament, minister Jonkman dealing with colonial affairs openly declared in an official government response in December 1946 that there is a possibility of a special status in a sense that the territory didn't belong to the proposed United States of Indonesia.³⁷ This official response led to a motion in parliament that cooperation would only be accepted if this official government response was included in the agreement.³⁸ As a result the Linggadjadi-agreement was supplemented with a Dutch interpretation, which led to discontent on the Indonesian side. The Netherlands would accept the treaty only if Indonesia would accept its colonial debt and accept the Dutch sovereignty over New Guinea, while Indonesian representatives proclaimed to no longer support Dutch interference in the region.³⁹

³⁷ Wal, *Een aanvechtbare en onzekere situatie*, 23.

³⁸ Tweede Kamer, *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal Bijlagen 1946-1947*, 367.5.

³⁹ Bank, *Katholieken en de Indonesische revolutie*, 224.

These two conditions were essentially later added to the agreement, which led to a Dutch interpretation and Indonesian interpretation.

The stance by the Dutch government on New Guinea was reinforced at the next conference in Denpasar since its position in a future Indonesian state was still held in question.⁴⁰ At this conference Van Mook had to support Jonkman's earlier claims, thus making the negotiations less flexible since the Indonesian delegation became more hostile. Also, the Sultan of Tidore, whose claims were used, had its concerns during the conference since the position of New Guinea was now placed outside his own control of East-Indonesia. While the Dutch government supported federal Indonesian independence, it couldn't yet provide an answer to the question of New Guinea.⁴¹ In February 1947 the status of New Guinea is discussed again when the Indonesian delegation expresses their concerns over the matter that it seems that New Guinea would be outside of the proposed Dutch-Indonesian Union. Wim Schermerhorn however argued that 'the door was just left open' to negotiations with the Eurasian population and the Indonesian delegation.⁴²

2.4. The Round Table Conferences (RTC)

From 1946 until 1949 no real formal decisions were made on the matter of New Guinea, and neither did the strategy of both delegation's change. Both sides did express claims on to the territory in this time period, but Dutch military intervention (*politioenele acties*) locked negotiations on the matter. In 1948 the Renville agreement was signed, resulting in a ceasefire between Indonesian Republicans and the Netherlands. In this agreement the Dutch government, as during the conference of Linggadjati, New Guinea was excepted from a sovereignty transfer.⁴³ In May and June 1949 the Roijen-Roem agreement is signed to end hostilities in order to prepare for further negotiations. In this agreement stood the establishment of a union by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States

⁴⁰ van der Kroef, "Around the Problem of Western New Guinea," 211.

⁴¹ Drooglever and Schouten, *Betrekkingen 1945-1950*, 1988, 6:671.

⁴² Drooglever and Schouten, *Betrekkingen 1945-1950*, 1988, 7:336.

⁴³ Kroef, *The West New Guinea Dispute*, 2-3.

of Indonesia, a transfer of rights and obligations of Indonesia to the United States of Indonesia and an unconditional transfer of sovereignty in accordance with the Renville agreement, thus essentially granting a separate status for New Guinea.⁴⁴

Following the Van Roijen-Roem agreement a new series of negotiations were held in the form of the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conferences (RTC) in The Hague, which were negotiations on the matters of the future of the Indonesian archipelago on military, economic and political level.⁴⁵ The RTC was held from the 23th of August until the second of November. During these negotiations three delegations took part: The Kingdom of the Netherlands, The Republic of Indonesia and the Federal Consultative Assembly (FCA), which represented various states that the Dutch government had formed in the Indonesian archipelago and acted as a committee to design the structure of the United States of Indonesia. While these three delegations negotiated on several matters, a special committee of the United Nations would act as mediator. On the 23rd of August 1949, the conference was formally opened by Willem Drees, elected chairman of the RTC and prime minister of the Netherlands, declaring that “definite principles existed for the guidance of the conference. These principles included: the speedy development of the United States of Indonesia as a sovereign, democratic state on a federal basis; the right of self-determination of the populations; and co-operation in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union headed by the King of the Netherlands. In establishing new relations, however, vagueness and generalities would not suffice; the conference must come to clear agreements and arrangements”.⁴⁶ However, during the RTC some subjects were proven to be harder to resolve in a clear agreement, like the structure of the union, the transfer of debt and more importantly the status of New Guinea.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle*, 43.

⁴⁵ Bogaarts, *Kabinet-Beel*, D:3289.

⁴⁶ Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, *Indonesië in de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties*, 6:206.

⁴⁷ Bank, “Rubber, Rijk, Religie. De Koloniale Trilogie in de Indonesische Kwestie 1945-1949,” 243.

The RTC was split in different committees to discuss various subjects. The status of New Guinea was discussed in the Committee of Political and Constitutional Affairs, which established subcommittees in which one committee particularly discussed the matter of New Guinea.⁴⁸ The fact that New Guinea was discussed in a separate committee apart from various states in the archipelago and the federal state itself, proves that the earlier conferences impacted the status of New Guinea as separate dispute, while also showing that the delegation knew the territory would prove a fierce and controversial debate. This impacted the debate in the sense that its debates were postponed until October, because of its delicacy. During the discussion on the matter the viewpoints of both delegations can be summarized as follows (see fig 6):⁴⁹

Fig 6. Paradigms on the matter of New Guinea during the RTC

	Dutch Delegation	Indonesian Delegation (IND&FCO)*
Main goal	Special status in Kingdom	Integration USI
Arguments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ethnological, religious and sociological no ties with the rest of the Indonesian archipelago. The area is underdeveloped & no essential economic relationship 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ethnological, religious and economic ties with the rest of Indonesian archipelago. Reinforced by the Linggadjati & Renville agreements
Purpose	Create autonomous status through education and economic development.	Create autonomous status by gradually preparing territory for autonomy

* both Indonesian delegations were working together at this point.

These conflicting views on the dispute of New Guinea stayed the same during the RTC. Some alternatives were presented in the form of a trusteeship by the UN in order to assist in obtaining autonomous status.⁵⁰ The Dutch delegation however argued that it would never hand over sovereignty over New Guinea to a third party, and would only negotiate with the federal and Indonesian delegation on the matter.⁵¹ The Indonesian delegation on the other hand kept pressing that the

⁴⁸ Drooglever and Schouten, *Betrekkingen 1945-1950*, 1988, 19:776.

⁴⁹ Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*, 305.

⁵⁰ Bone, *The Dynamics*, 67.

⁵¹ Van Maarseveen, "Overzicht Ronde Tafel Conferentie," n.d., 3.

territory should come in Indonesian hands instead of that of an international organization.

Eventually no real solution was found on the RTC and it was decided that it would remain a Dutch possession for the time being and a solution had to be found in one year. While Indonesian sources recall the Dutch delegation's wish to recognize the area as a dispute, the Dutch delegation tried to get rid of the term dispute.⁵² At the end of the RTC a charter was written including agreements and conclusion of the conference. In article 2 of the charter of transfer of sovereignty of Indonesia it stated that it wasn't yet possible to find reconciliation between the opposing views, and that the status quo "of the residency of New Guinea shall be maintained with the stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia the question of the political status of New Guinea be determined through negotiations between the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands".⁵³ This decision was made on the basis of an informal proposal by the UN committee, and later adopted by the CFO and accepted by the Dutch delegation.⁵⁴ This proposal acted as a compromise, which stated that no mention would be made on the position of the Netherlands in New Guinea. On December 27th the transfer of sovereignty was handed over to the Indonesian Republic, thus granting both countries a year until its deadline.

2.5. The New Guinea Conferences

On the 27th of December 1949, Sukarno became president of Indonesia. During the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, Sukarno gathered support for his cause by collaborating with the Japanese, which led to a hostile opinion of him by the Dutch government. In turn Sukarno was not invited to the RTC; prime-minister Hatta would be chairman of the Indonesian delegation. Following the results of the RTC

⁵² Mrázek, *Sjahir*, 400.; Bone, *The Dynamics*, 68.

⁵³ Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, *Indonesië in de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties*, 6:293.

⁵⁴ Van Maarseveen, "Overzicht Ronde Tafel Conferentie," n.d., 3-4.

and the transfer of sovereignty, both the Dutch government as the Indonesian government began to seek domestic political support on the matter of New Guinea. “Sukarno, meanwhile, tended to side with those who called ‘100 percent merdeka’ [freedom] at any cost. In the 1950s he felt that the Indonesian parliament, whether through inclination of ineptitude, belonged on the concessionary group. In speech after speech he expanded on the need to make West New Guinea part of Indonesia, and to sever the Dutch tentacles that still extended deep into the Indonesian economy”.⁵⁵ In the evaluations of the RTC by the Dutch government concerns are raised on the speeches of Sukarno. Minister of Foreign Affairs Stikker recalls the proposals for a trusteeship of the UN during the RTC, but claims the Indonesians had no positive reaction at the time and meanwhile the proposal lost political support in the Netherlands. Stikker argued “that this matter would become an international battleground in which the Netherlands would not have the most favorable position” and proposes not to assume that New Guinea would remain under Dutch control in the future.⁵⁶

On the 4th of December 1950 the first New-Guinea conference was held in The Hague, in which the same members of the delegations of the RTC returned to negotiate. This time however the UN committee was not invited for reasons of not being able to solve the matter during the RTC, thus it was proposed to settle the matter between the two countries.⁵⁷ However, tensions rose during the second meeting when false information about an agreement was mentioned by the press.⁵⁸ While both delegations held on to the arguments made during the RTC, the Dutch government proposed two plans: 1. a transfer of sovereignty to the Dutch-Indonesian Union, but administration would still be Dutch, and 2. Continuation of negotiations with cooperation of the UN committee. The Indonesian delegation reacts by rejecting the first proposal since it would still maintain its position that New Guinea had to become part of Indonesia. The Indonesian delegation agreed

⁵⁵ Hannigan, *Brief History of Indonesia*, 217.

⁵⁶ Council of Ministers, “Ministerraad,” 6.

⁵⁷ Idenburg and Pringgogido, “Nieuw-Guinea Conferentie Verslag,” 3.

⁵⁸ Bot and Sumardi, “Tweede Informele Pleno-Vergadering,” 2.

with a temporary status quo but would argue for further negotiations.⁵⁹ At the end of the conference, again as in 1949 a deadlock was created. One year after the first conference, another attempt was made to resolve the matter. The earlier proposal of the Dutch delegation was changed by the Indonesian delegation to “some form of administrative co-operation, while reserving the respective positions on sovereignty. This too, was not acceptable to the Dutch”.⁶⁰ Again a deadlock was created as political crisis emerged in Indonesia and the cabinet in the Netherlands fell because of the issue, suspending negotiations until 1954.

2.6. Phase I in the Theory of Moves

From 1946 until 1954 no change of strategies has been made, thus enabling no clear initial state. While the RTC proved beneficial to the Indonesians since sovereignty was transferred, the case of New Guinea remained disputed. It is possible to argue that rule six of TOM doesn't apply to the New Guinea case, however the Dutch and Indonesian governments did make reports on each other's stances, arguments and preferred outcomes, for example the Dutch government was aware that the acquisition of New Guinea would grant the Indonesian Republic political stability and would ensure Sukarno's legitimization of power.⁶¹ Furthermore it would grant legitimization over other territories as the Indonesian Republic invaded the self-proclaimed Republic of South Maluku. This in turn would suppress movements for more autonomy and strengthen Indonesian nationalism.⁶² These political reasons locked an initiative for the Indonesian side since its outcome would influence the rest of Indonesian politics, since Sukarno's policy was mostly based on the unification of Indonesia. While New Guinea remained under Dutch control, its position became more contested in the international community and also its legitimization was not achieved by concessions of Indonesia.

⁵⁹ Bot and Sumardi, “Vijfde besloten plenaire vergadering,” 2-4.

⁶⁰ Singh, “Bases of Indonesia's Claim to West New Guinea,” 8.

⁶¹ Kiveron, “Betekenis van West-Nieuw-Guinea,” 1-2.

⁶² Lijphart, “The Indonesian Image of West Irian,” 10.

Based on the deadlock created during the conference of phase I, I argue that both the Netherlands and Indonesia kept their dominant strategy of 4,2 – 2,4 (see **figure 7**). In order to begin the diplomatic game an initial state has to exist. Since no compromise was found a 3,3 state isn't possible.

Fig. 7. Dutch-Indonesian diplomacy in 1946-1954 (TOM-Model)

P2: Indonesian Representatives

		P2: Indonesian Representatives	
		Annexation strategy	Self-determination strategy
P1: Dutch Representatives	Colonial strategy	<p><u>2,4</u></p> <p>(Best outcome Indonesia)</p> <p>Increasing international pressure towards annexation</p>	<p>4,2</p> <p>(Best outcome Netherlands)</p> <p>Indonesia would lose claim on New Guinea</p>
	Self-determination strategy	<p>1,1</p> <p>(Conflict)</p> <p>Preparation for self-determination of Papuan population</p>	<p>3,3</p> <p>(UN Trusteeship)</p> <p>Neither party would have influence in the territory</p>

Dominant strategies ↑

Furthermore, the deadlock formed during the conferences didn't result in the worst outcome for both parties (1,1), since the Indonesian government could still use international pressure and the Dutch could remain in their strategy of holding on to New Guinea. Neither player won the negotiations since no concessions were made by the other player. The state of 1946 – 1954 could not remain permanent and beneficial to both parties since relations increasingly deteriorated. One can argue both that the situation during this time was beneficial for the Netherlands as New Guinea was still in Dutch hands, but one could also argue that Indonesia had the upper hand as pressure could be used as a tool to negotiate with the Netherlands. In short, one of both parties had to change its strategy. The Dutch government however took the initiative by no longer remaining in its colonial strategy of holding the territory and therefore the initial state can be perceived as 2,4 for the Dutch delegation since a change of strategy was made. In 1954 the

Dutch government started preparing the territory for economic development and self-determination. The Dutch government had chosen this strategy for several reasons. During the RTC it was clear that no UN trusteeship, and thus no compromise would be preferred by the Indonesian delegation, while the Indonesian delegation also pressured for annexation of the territory instead of providing self-determination. As seen in figure 7 the best option in this case was to abandon its colonial strategy and form a strategy of self-determination that the Indonesian representatives probably would not choose, which in turn would provide the loss of claims for both parties, while the Dutch government could still influence the area after independence was created.

III. Phase Two: Action-Reaction (1953-1961)

3.1. Internationalization

From the early 1950s ties between the Netherlands and Indonesia were severed by years of failed negotiations. The Indonesian Republic therefore expressed their wishes to end the Dutch-Indonesian Union, which was executed in The Hague on the 10th of August 1954. Economic and financial agreements of the Union were only abandoned in 1956 when the Dutch-Indonesian Union was legally abolished by Indonesia. During this conference the Dutch government willingly negotiated matters on the ending the Union. At the same time the topic of New Guinea was not reopened since the Dutch government adopted a policy of avoidance.⁶³ On the Indonesian independence day seven days after the 1954 conference on the Union, the Indonesian government made the issue an international crisis by placing the question of New Guinea on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). While internationalizing the matter and abandoning the Union might be considered a change of strategy by the Indonesian government, it did not change much in power play between the nations. The Indonesian government had been nationalizing the claim of New Guinea since 1946, meanwhile the Dutch government slowly realized a change of plan was needed in order to solve the crisis. This plan was based on two factors: 1. bureaucratization and economic development and 2. a preparation for self-determination. While in a sense these plans were already enacted from 1949 onwards, it wasn't the dominant policy of the Dutch Government. From 1954 onwards the Dutch government was pressured by diplomats to abandon its colonial policies and settle the matter by self-determination.⁶⁴

Preparations towards self-determination only began to a concrete form in 1956-1959, economic development and bureaucratization began to take shape from 1954 onwards, providing a basis for a self-determination strategy. This strategy of self-

⁶³ United States Department of State, *US Participation in the UN*, 84.

⁶⁴ Hoge Commissariaat der Nederlanden, "Nieuw-Guinea beleid," 1-10.

determination can be seen as a way to formulate decolonization as mentioned in the UN declaration of Granting of Independence.⁶⁵ However, in the case of New Guinea the self-determination was most based on the right of the Papuan and in addition the Eurasian population to govern its own territory based on a shared space and shared cultural identities.⁶⁶

When in 1954 the Indonesian delegation pressured for new negotiations about New Guinea in the UNGA, it received support to put its issue on the agenda. However, its resolutions in order to incorporate New Guinea did not receive wide international support, since the Dutch still maintained good relations with the Western powers as the Kingdom of the Netherlands was considered a prominent member of NATO. The debate on the issue did not bring Indonesia any closer to annexation of the territory, nor did the Dutch attitude change since no noticeable pressure was exerted on the Hague.⁶⁷ The UNGA debates from 1954 onwards shed light on the arguments made by both parties, yet making the issue more difficult because of these arguments. The Indonesian proclaimed that New Guinea was a rightful part of Indonesia and that the Dutch colonial rule had to end. In turn the Netherlands claimed the territory as their own in order to ensure that the native populations would have the right to self-determination. They argued that if Indonesia would take over the territory its citizens would become Indonesians as at the moment its citizens are Dutch, thus the rights of its citizens would be denied.⁶⁸ This led to low international support since the Western powers and dependencies remained neutral or supportive of the Netherlands, while new members of decolonized states got into a complex situation: choose Indonesia as a tool against colonialism or support self-determination of the Papuans to prevent new colonialism. From 1954 until 1957, resolutions were made by both sides to gain legitimacy, but since two third majority had to be achieved in the UNGA no resolution made it possible to solve the issue even when the issue was every year

⁶⁵ Carley, "Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession," 3.

⁶⁶ Lagerspetz, "National Self-Determination," 1303.

⁶⁷ Brown, "Indonesia's West Irian Case in the UN General Assembly, 1954," 273.

⁶⁸ United States Department of State, *US Participation in the UN*, 87.

since on the agenda.⁶⁹ Again as in 1946-1954, these debates severed the ties between the two states as exemplified by the abolishment of the Dutch-Indonesian Union.

3.2. Economic and Administrative development

Already in 1953, a plan is proposed for economic and administrative developments when the new governor for New Guinea Jan van Baal is appointed to office. This ‘work-plan’ as it was called, had three stages: 1. Identify needs, 2. Acquisition of the fulfillment of necessary materials, tools and personnel and 3. Fulfillment of needs by allocating the material and personnel made available by the acquisition of stage 2.⁷⁰ Essentially Van Baal’s plan was to rebuild New Guinea in three years which was neglected for more than three hundred years, which would start in early 1954. As for its administrative reforms Van Baal proposed the creation of a central governmental apparatus, including several departments on topics such as population, personnel, finance and culture. While a central government would be installed at the same time a policy of decentralization would also be implemented. According to Van Baal the residencies (provincial administrators) had to be given more authorizations to make its own decisions by establishing provincial boards.⁷¹ Over time this new governmental apparatus would have to consist more Papuan administrators. In order to achieve this, Van Baal argued that the Papuan population had to be educated, which would take considerable time. Already in the early 1950s a Dutch government official stated that illiteracy was scarce.⁷² The education of its population was already installed by catholic and protestant missionaries in the form of People’s Schools (*Volksscholen*), after which further education could be followed in the School for Further Education (*Vervolgschool*). These Schools of Further Education would educate Papuans to replace Eurasians in its governmental apparatus by training them to become police officers, teachers and governmental officials, and essentially create a Papuan political elite.⁷³

⁶⁹ Wal, *Een aanvechtbare en onzekere situatie*, 105.

⁷⁰ Van Baal, “Nota werkplan,” 1.

⁷¹ Ministry of Union affairs and Overseas Territories, “Verslag Contact-Commissie,” 4.

⁷² Rutherford, *Raiding the Land of the Foreigners*, 118.

⁷³ Aritonang and Steenbrink, *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*, 359.

In 1949 more than 1000 Dutch and Eurasian men were employed for the Office of Economic and Technical Affairs (*DETA*) to rebuild New Guinea by constructing roads, businesses and houses. Many of these DETA-workers remained in New Guinea as farmers. When Van Baal proposes his economic and administrative reforms many of these DETA-workers changed profession from farmer to bureaucrat. This was the result of the failure of profitable agriculture in New Guinea and the economic attraction of governmental office, which even led to a decline in colonization of Dutchmen.⁷⁴ The office for colonization was subsequently discontinued, breaking with its former policy of colonization from 1946 until 1953/1954, which according to Lijphart proved for traumatization as opportunities of colonialism disappeared.⁷⁵ However these plans were rationally made in order to give the native population a chance at administrating their own territory, thus preventing an increase of Eurasian competition.

While the DETA provided a solid basis for economic activation in the territory, Van Baal proposed a complete overhaul of economic activation in order to establish a more powerful governmental apparatus by modernizing fishing, expanding the export of ironwood, switching to extracting sago (Papuan flower from trees and food staple) by machine and expand urban expansion, in particular in the main city Hollandia.⁷⁶ Furthermore, since the New Guinea landscape proved difficulties for movement plans were made to construct roads, airways, telegraph connections and harbors. These plans were aided by an expansion of the Dutch efforts in mapping the country. Essentially Van Baal's plans were the basis of industrialization of the country in order to compete with the Republic of Indonesia, especially since Indonesia nationalized Dutch enterprises, and provide a solid economic basis in order to educate and prepare for self-determination of its people.

⁷⁴ Bosma, "Late empire builders," 19.

⁷⁵ Lijphart, *The Trauma*, 286-287.

⁷⁶ Van Baal, "Nota werkplan," 7-8.

3.3. Preparations for self-determination

Van Baal's plans provided a framework for self-determination of New Guinea. These plans even included limited participation in its government. His only concerns were that "that some areas are yet still in its stage of building, in which important figures are involved, in which the central government need to remain in full control".⁷⁷ In 1956, when the economic and administrative plans of Van Baal supposed to be in full order a committee of heads of service write a report on the incentive of participation by the population in politics, stating that both the Papuan as the Eurasian population increasingly desired more political participation. Especially the Papuan population had to be involved in order to prevent making them "an object of consideration and moreover, as such place is that no voice can be heard".⁷⁸ As response to the increasing politicization in New Guinea, the committee proposed to form a legislative body. This plan was rejected by Van Baal which in turn proposed a plan to introduce a unicameral representative body, a so-called New Guinea Council (NGC).⁷⁹

While early plans for the NGC were already formed under Van Baal's predecessor Van Waardenburg, it would only become a reality for Van Baal's successor Pieter Platteel, who assumed office of governor in 1958. In the same year the remainder of the Dutch populace was forced to depart Indonesia as diplomatic relations became more hostile and military in nature by threats of war.⁸⁰ Platteel feared that as New Guinea would become Indonesian, the same forced departure would occur, while he had a firm belief the Papuans would support the Dutch cause.⁸¹ Therefore, Platteel believed the Papuan population had to become more involved in political matters and that this involvement had to accelerated by self-determination. A year after his appointment Platteel found another politician who shared his ideas of self-determination for New Guinea in the form of state secretary for New Guinea Theo Bot. This self-determination would be mostly achieved in political

⁷⁷ Van Baal, 5.

⁷⁸ Van Baal, "Nieuw-Guineeraad," 1-3.

⁷⁹ Van Baal, 9.

⁸⁰ Noll et al., *Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2015*, 42.

⁸¹ Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 517.

participation, thus under Platteel regional councils were formed and voted its members by secret ballotage. The most developed regions the Schouten Islands and Japen established their council, followed by Biak, Numfor and Hollandia. In the years that would follow regional councils were established in the rest of New Guinea like Fakfak, Rajah Ampat, Merauke and Dafonsoro.⁸² Not only regional councils would improve political participation in New Guinea.

In 1958 Platteel presents his first plans on creating the NGC. However, the first drafts had low political support in the Netherlands until Theo Bot made adjustments and presented a new plan in April 1960. Its program mirrored the plans made by Van Baal in 1953/1954. Bot proposed the formation of the NGC with advisory powers, which would later transform in a proper parliament. Furthermore, just as Van Baal proposed development in three years, Bot presented a ten-year development plan to prepare the Papuans for self-determination, which had to be achieved in 1970. In addition Papuan regional representation would be extended, Papuan representatives would receive training for council-duty and the remainder of the unexplored area of New Guinea would be administered.⁸³ These plans would form the basis of an emerging Papuan nationalism that would take root in the area in the upcoming years and decades. These plans, in which predominantly the NGC would form a basis of self-determination, politicizing the New Guinea as elections were held in 24 districts of ten to fifteen thousand voters. However, the participation of these elections was only for Dutch subjects (Papuans and Eurasians), excluding an Indonesian minority. Subsequently the elections even saw the emergence of certain political parties, which contributed to the acceleration of political consciousness in New Guinea. The most prominent parties all expressed their wishes to remain under Dutch rule until independence was achieved in 1970.⁸⁴ On the 5th of April 1961, the New Guinea Council, existing of predominantly Papuan representatives was installed under watchful eye of Indonesia and the international community.

⁸² Drooglever, 525.

⁸³ van der Kroef, "Nationalism and Politics in West New Guinea," 38.

⁸⁴ van der Kroef, "Recent Developments in West New Guinea," 280.

3.4. Phase II in the Theory of Moves

In 1954 as a reaction to the abolishment of the Dutch-Indonesian Union, the Netherlands decided to change its strategy towards self-determination for the Papuan population by developing, educating and politicizing the territory, thus a new state of the worst outcome for both countries: the Netherlands would lose an old colonial possession as Indonesia would lose its claim on the territory. While both countries failed to solve the issue in the United Nations, only the preparations for self-determination would change the political course of New Guinea. The establishment of this conflict-phase by the Dutch government forced the Indonesian government to rethink its strategy in handling the dispute. In 1959 the Indonesian government adopted a policy of Confrontation (*Konfrontasi*) by using more military pressure, which in turn would lead to a Dutch reaction of militarizing. By militarizing the Indonesian government wanted to create more international pressure in order to restore its former favorable position which was now contested by the preparations of self-determination.

Fig. 8. Dutch-Indonesian diplomacy in 1954-1961 (TOM-Model)

P2: Indonesia

		Annexation strategy	Self-determination strategy
P1: The Netherlands strategy	Colonial strategy	<p><u>2,4</u></p> <p>(Best outcome Indonesia)</p> <p>Increasing international pressure towards annexation</p>	<p>4,2</p> <p>(Best outcome Netherlands)</p> <p>Indonesia would lose claim on New Guinea</p>
	Self-determination strategy	<p>1,1</p> <p>(Conflict)</p> <p>Preparation for self-determination of Papuan population</p>	<p>3,3</p> <p>(UN Trusteeship)</p> <p>Neither party would have influence in the territory</p>

IV. Phase Three: The endgame (1961-1962)

4.1. Boiling waters

In the early 1960s tensions were rising between the Netherlands and Indonesia as the dispute emerges into a more militaristic nature. During this time president Sukarno gained more power by imposing restrictions on its democratic system and by increasing cooperating with the military high command.⁸⁵ The Indonesian government decided that the time for diplomatic solutions was over and commenced an arms buildup. In addition, in 1959 a policy of Confrontation (Konfrontasi) gets adopted, using military, economic and political force in order to achieve its goals. The arms for its military buildup are produced by the great powers of the Cold War: The USSR and the United States. While the United States initially remained neutral in the dispute, the fear of communism in Indonesia would lead in its involvement in the dispute. This indication of moving away from Dutch support of the dispute has been witnessed as the United States rejected a formal invitation to attend the installation of the NGC in April 1961 in order to remain at good terms with Indonesia.⁸⁶ While Indonesia received military support from the United States for self-defense Sukarno also approached the USSR. The Kremlin was aware that Indonesia wanted to impose its rule on New Guinea and thus began supplying arms in order to gain a foothold in the area and threaten Australia as well.⁸⁷

With growing international military and political influence by Indonesia the New Guinea dispute was reaching a climax. The Dutch were aware of the Indonesian arms buildup and returned its message by investing in the defense of New Guinea. One of its strategies was to send the aircraft carrier *Karel Doorman* to the territory. This policy of “gunboat diplomacy” on the other hand proved to be damaging to the

⁸⁵ Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963*, 287.

⁸⁶ Kivimäki, *US-Indonesian Hegemonic Bargaining*, 138.

⁸⁷ United States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1963*, 1309.

Dutch image as the international community condemned the action.⁸⁸ The aftermath of the Karel Doorman affair, as it would be called in the media, resulted in Sukarno formally broke all relations with the Dutch on the 15th of August 1960.⁸⁹

4.2. Threats of self-determination

Not only a military response of the Dutch government would sever ties with Indonesia, the increasing move towards self-determination threatened Indonesian claims on the territory.⁹⁰ Bot's plans for self-determination predicted that the "Papuanization" of the country would increase from 52 in 1960 to 93 percent in its predicted independence year of 1970.⁹¹ With the installation of the New Guinea Council in 1961 concrete efforts towards the establishment of Papuan nationalism in New Guinea could be enacted. In October 1961 Bot received a coded message which stated that nationalistic feelings indeed were emerging in the region after the establishment of the NGC.⁹² Six days later Bot received another coded message:⁹³

There was almost no oppositional noise towards the living strong feelings on short notice to official recognition and implementation of symbols as a national flag. By members of the council was spoken that the recognition of an own flag (apart from the Dutch flag) as national flag would be a visible redemption of the Dutch promise of own determination and in due course, this flag can become in unchanged form the national flag.

On the first of December the implementation of these symbols became a reality. The NGC of which the majority was of Papuan descend voted to adopt a national anthem, a national flag (The Morning Star) and renamed the territory to West Papua.⁹⁴ The adoption of national symbols was the first concrete efforts towards a

⁸⁸ Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945–1965*, 289.

⁸⁹ Pangestu and Song, *Japan's Future in East Asia and the Pacific*, 45.

⁹⁰ Webster, "Regimes in Motion," 105.

⁹¹ Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969*, 10.

⁹² Platteel, "Coded message 417," 1-3.

⁹³ Platteel, "Coded message 419," 1-2.

⁹⁴ Glazebrook, *Permissive Residents*, 21.

defined statehood. As decolonization swept across Africa, a balance of power provided new support for the Papuan state as the Papuan population's racial identity was asserted by its nationalist advocates as a common identity with the Africans, even going as far as calling New Guinea a New Africa.⁹⁵ It was this establishment of self-determination that would prove to be a breakpoint in the changing strategy of Indonesia as a preferred outcome of Indonesian annexation was perceived increasingly distant.

In September 1961 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns proposed the so called "Plan-Luns", a resolution submitted to the UNGA which would propose a UN trusteeship in the territory in order to form a plebiscite amongst the population in order to establish New Guinea's future political status.⁹⁶ The resolution gained a majority of votes during the UNGA especially from a group of former African colonies who called themselves the Brazzaville group. However, the resolution as many resolutions before failed to gain a two third majority. It was this resolution that ultimately led to the implementation of national symbols and the emergence of nationalism in order to keep the assurances given by the Netherlands that it would not change its promise of self-determination to the Papuan political elite.⁹⁷ In turn Indonesia responded with a plan for a full-scale military operation by issuing the TRIKORA (Three Commands), a military command to liberate New Guinea as Sukarno saw the proto-Papuan state as an increasing danger.⁹⁸ As part of the TRIKORA a full-scale military operation called *Jayawijaya* (Victory over Imperialism) was planned. As small naval skirmishes occurred, and paratroopers landed in New Guinea the premise of war between the Netherlands and Indonesia became ever closer.

⁹⁵ Webster, "Regimes in Motion," 110-111.

⁹⁶ Chinkin and Baetens, *Sovereignty, Statehood and State Responsibility*, 216.

⁹⁷ Van der Veur, "Political Awakening in West New Guinea," 64.

⁹⁸ King, *West Papua & Indonesia Since Suharto*, 139.

4.3. The UNTEA Equilibrium

Operation Jayawijaya would never be enacted as the tension of war raised to a boiling point, forcing the international community to intervene. The United States proposed secret meetings between Indonesian and Dutch delegations in March 1962 in which the diplomat Ellsworth Bunker would be chosen as mediator. These negotiations would take place in Middleburg, Virginia near Washington. The Dutch government was aware that the United States had been more pro-Indonesia since Kennedy was elected president, and thus Luns pressed the case for Papuan self-determination during these meetings. A proposal was presented similar to Plan Luns which proposed to install a interim U.N. administration, Luns demanded that arrangements would be made to assure that Papuan self-determination could be exercised.⁹⁹ The Indonesian delegation rejected this since it would lead to a undesirable outcome as a Papuan state would be created, separate from the rest of Indonesia. As the Indonesian delegation pressured to abandon the negotiations, Bunker saw that a more pro-Indonesian approach had to be made in order to solve the issue. Therefore, he proposed the “Bunker Plan”, which consisted of a two-year period as the United Nations Temporary Executive Administration would oversee the process of self-determination. A compromise was made as U.N. administrators would be replaced after a year by Indonesian officials. The Dutch government was well aware that a chance could exist that the territory eventually would be handed over to Indonesia, but the pressure of war and a belief of self-determination made the Dutch decide to agree to a transfer of its territory.¹⁰⁰ For weeks Luns tried to suppress this agreement since the UNTEA was perceived to be a cover for an Indonesian take-over, but the importance of American support and increasing international pressure made the Dutch cabinet accept the proposal.¹⁰¹ In the end an equilibrium was found in the New York Agreement as both Indonesia and the Netherlands accepted concessions: the Netherlands would handover its territory to the UNTEA which would be taken

⁹⁹ Schaffer, *Ellsworth Bunker*, 97.

¹⁰⁰ Allen, *The Chagos Islanders and International Law*, 229.

¹⁰¹ Baudet et al., *Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali*, 87.

over by Indonesia, who in turn would help the process of self-determination of the Papuan population. As stated in the New York Agreement:¹⁰²

Immediately after the transfer of administration to the UNTEA, the UNTEA will widely publicize and explain the terms of the present Agreement, and will inform the population concerning the transfer of administration to Indonesia and the provisions for the act of self-determination as set out in the present Agreement.

As the agreement was signed, so did the diplomatic dispute end since the UNTEA handed over the territory to Indonesia in 1963. The disappearance of Dutch diplomatic influence became ever clearer as a crackdown on Papuan political activity emerged and a policy of Papuanization was replaced by “Indonesianization”.¹⁰³ Papuan independence would never be achieved by this Indonesian influence. While an equilibrium was established in Dutch and Indonesian preferences, a new diplomatic game emerged in 1963 as a struggle for independence reemerged between the Indonesian government and the Papuan political elite, established by the Netherlands.

4.4. Phase III in the Theory of Moves

Phase III is the result of growing military and political pressure made by the Indonesian government, forcing both the Indonesian as the Dutch government to find a compromise in order to prevent a full-scale war since that would result in the least preferable outcome (1,1). The choice of the UNTEA as a compromise had underlying reasoning for both parties. Prior to the handover of New Guinea in 1963 the Indonesian government had a hostile posture towards the creation of the Papuan state. As anticipated by the Dutch government, Indonesia would in turn start a new diplomatic game with both the United Nations and Papuan nationalist. This time it would be Indonesia as player one, changing its strategy from 3,3 to a preferable 4,2 outcome as the Papuan state would be subject to Indonesian nationalization in the years to come. On the other hand, the Dutch government accepted the New York Agreement in order to peacefully leave from New Guinea as well as receive a guarantee for the Papuans as Indonesia was obliged to conduct

¹⁰² United Nations, “New York Agreement,” 4.

¹⁰³ Kluge, “West Papua and the International History of Decolonization, 1961-69,” 6.

an act of self-determination.¹⁰⁴ Therefore both nations rationally made their choice to resolve the conflict through the New York Agreement Indonesia could gain control over the territory by switching to a false premise of self-determination strategy and the Netherlands would prevent a military and diplomatic disaster by leaving New Guinea. The UNTEA provided a rational solution by acting as an equilibrium (see fig. 9).

Fig. 9. Dutch-Indonesian diplomacy in 1961-1962 (TOM-Model)

		P2: Indonesia	
		Annexation strategy	Self-determination strategy
P1: The Netherlands	Colonial strategy	<p><u>2,4</u></p> <p>(Best outcome Indonesia)</p> <p>Increasing international pressure towards annexation</p>	<p>4,2</p> <p>(Best outcome Netherlands)</p> <p>Indonesia would lose claim on New Guinea</p>
	Self-determination strategy	<p>1,1</p> <p>(Conflict)</p> <p>Growing tensions towards war and the implementation of TRIKORA</p>	<p>3,3</p> <p>(UNTEA-administration)</p> <p>A United Nations Equilibrium</p>

¹⁰⁴ Kluge, 8.

V. Conclusion

The hold on to New Guinea by the Dutch government was based on rational choices and calculations of preferred outcomes. In chapter One I argue that a deadlock was created by failed negotiations on the matter of New Guinea. Both Indonesia as the Netherlands would remain holding on to their dominant strategy. However, during this time ideas were proposed in order to form an equilibrium during the RTC as well as several other proposals to change the first phase. In chapter II I argue that a second phase was reached as the Dutch government replaced its colonial arguments of the establishment of a home-land for Eurasians by adopting a policy of structuring self-determination for the Papuan population. Therefore, the Dutch government took the initiative as player I in the Theory of Moves. While Indonesian pressure was increasing from 1954 onwards, negotiations drew more international interests as internationalization began when the issue was discussed during the UNGA. At this time the first conflict state (1,1). In chapter III I argue that due to this conflict both sides had to make concessions in order to resolve the conflict by agreeing to a equilibrium created by a trusteeship of the UN (3,3), ending the dispute in order to find a balance of preferred outcomes. The reaction of the Dutch government was thus based on a rational principle in order to end hostilities and receive international support for its cause, since a colonial approach was no longer viable in an era of decolonization. This even led to support from other decolonized states for the Dutch cause.

This research mostly based its information on macro-scale archival sources, focusing primarily on diplomacy between two nations, while I critique a scholar who primarily was using micro-scale sources. This difference in source material may be the cause of different interpretations on the arguments for the Dutch reasoning to hold on to New Guinea. I therefore propose that future research has to be done using a two-level game theory as used by Robert Putnam in which both international as domestic dynamics contribute to the formation of diplomatic moves. By using this method both my research as Lijphart's can be combined in a joined effort to shed new light on this diplomatic game. Furthermore, one can argue

that the Theory of Moves could be analyzed polemic. During this research I used sources mostly close to the opinions discussed between high-end diplomats and politicians in order to achieve the order of moves.

While the Dutch government were slowly constructing a Papuan proto-state, the stings of the Indonesian diplomatic reaction would become too much. As Platteel argued in 1961 the events around New Guinea indeed would prove to move too quickly for both the Netherlands as the Papuan state. International pressure would eventually result in a compromise, a UNTEA-equilibrium.▪

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