

Between Western Terminology and the Eastern Case Study:
Integral Nationalism in *Thoughts of a Modern Pole* by Roman
Dmowski

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Summary

The term “integral nationalism” has been widely acclaimed as a useful tool to describe the increasingly radical, discriminatory and authoritarian movements of the New Right from the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. By conceptualizing it, the American historian Carlton J. Hayes sought to capture the main tenets of the new type of nationalism. However, it is a matter of inquiry whether the concept coined within the Western context can be applied universally – regardless of geographical or cultural differences. For this reason, this thesis will investigate both the benefits and shortcomings of this approach in respect to the ideological developments in Eastern Europe in the early twentieth century. Specifically, in the course of analysis I would like to answer to what extent the historical concept of “integral nationalism” is applicable to the case of Roman Dmowski, a well-known Polish, nationalist thinker.

Firstly, I trace both the political (late nineteenth century France) and historiographical roots of “integral nationalism”. Having looked into Hayes’s understanding of the concept, I highlighted six main elements which provided the thesis with the analytical framework: the collectivist ethos, chauvinism, militarism, contextual differences, relations with the democratic system and the approach towards the traditional elites. Secondly, these elements are tested against the primary source, an influential work by Roman Dmowski “Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka” [“Thoughts of a Modern Pole”] (1903). The outcome of this research reveals which theoretical qualities retain their utility and which of them stand in disagreement with Dmowski’s vision.

Ultimately, the thesis indicates the analytical deficiencies of the concept in the current form and stresses the necessity for further conceptualization of “integral nationalism”, rather than sole reliance on Hayes’s understanding. Moreover, by combining Western terminology with the case of the Eastern European political thinker, it strives for incorporating the history of this region into a wider historiographical debate concerning the ideological development of nationalism.

Introduction

1) Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century: Importance and Development

It nearly goes without saying that political historians formulate analytical categories to capture the main ideas and processes governing politics and society of a particular time. Accordingly, studies of nationalism have brought numerous concepts aimed at revealing the complexity of this political ideology. “Integral nationalism” stands out as the one of great importance since it is used to point towards the more exclusionary and aggressive version of this ideology which emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, since this term was coined in the Western political and academic world it still remains a matter of inquiry to what extent this analytical tool accurately describes the ideological landscape in differing geographical and cultural settings. In this analysis, by looking into different ideological qualities, I would like to consider the applicability of “integral nationalism” to the case of Roman Dmowski – Polish nationalist thinker from the early twentieth century.

a) The Trajectory of Polish Nationalism (1795-1865)

When Roman Dmowski wrote his ground-breaking piece for the Polish national movement: *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka* (“Thoughts of a Modern Pole”) in 1903, no one could possibly deny that nationalism in Europe reached its political heyday. The agenda disseminated by governments, radical ideologues, newspapers and education systems appealed to ordinary people as it had never before. Contrary to common expectations, the unification processes of Germany (1871) and Italy (1861/1871) and the gradual decomposition of the “Vienna Order” did not ultimately resolve the *national question*. The increasing tensions between the nation-states in the West as well as the rising national awareness in the East provided a fertile ground for the further development of nationalism. Admittedly, Western societies and governing elites looked not only for the opportunity to establish sovereign and independent state but struggled for recognition and a ‘just’ place within the European state system. Not least to say that the situation in the East also stimulated the growth of the new nationalist thought. Against the background of the political clashes between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia in the region, matured a much more significant issue, namely the readiness for independence among Poles, Czechs, Romanians, Ukrainians and others.

Especially the case of Poland stands out as the one of great importance. Within the early modern period, the concept of nation (“*Natio Polonica*”) was extensively used in respect to a particularly

privileged group – in Poland and other Eastern European countries - the nobility.¹ However, the eighteenth century brought the disastrous collapse of the Polish state, primarily driven by the long-lasting, aggressive expansion of the neighbouring states - Russia, Prussia and Austria (which enforced the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793 and 1795) and the progressing weakness of the political system. The absence of a sovereign state prompted a redefinition of the national identity and stimulated the ideology of nationalism which became one of the main driving forces behind Polish political and social life, throughout the nineteenth century.² Undoubtedly, the new century opened up new ideological and political opportunities for Poles. This period became the epitome of struggles, uprisings as well as intellectual exploration and, above all, the rise of national awareness.

The famous slogan “For your and our freedom”, which was most probably coined by the Polish historian and politician Joachim Lelewel as a sign of commemoration and solidarity with the Russian Decembrist revolutionaries, neatly encapsulates the main philosophy of the early Polish nationalism which was primarily driven by Romantic ideal.³ Romantic idealism assumed that through the liberation and emancipation of other countries and dismantling the Vienna order established after 1815 a chance for Polish freedom would also emerge: “[T]he Polish nation was the founder-member of the *internationale* of peoples arrayed against the Holy Alliance of monarchs, or, as Marx dubbed it, ‘the immortal knight of Europe.’”⁴ Poles were engaged in insurgencies and conspiracies across the European continent – “Young Poland” becoming a part of “Young Europe” established by Giuseppe Mazzini in 1834 is one example – and made insurrectionary attempts at home (1830, 1846, 1848). Usually, a relatively small group of insurgents attempted on several occasions to inflame national passions from above among the population in the uprisings that were not planned but provoked.⁵ The belief of national fighters in unity among the oppressed nations and nationalism as means to progress the whole humankind, became close aligned with the overarching aura of Romanticism.

¹ Miroslav Hroch, “Is There a Central European Type of Nation Formation” in *Domains and Divisions of European History*, Johann P. Arnason and Natalie Doyle (eds.), (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2010), 128.

² Peter Sugar (ed.), *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, (Washington DC: American University Press, 1995), 9.

³ Aleksandra Julia Leinwand, “Rosja w propagandzie polskich powstań narodowych 1768-1864: Wybrane zagadnienia” [“Russia in the Propaganda of Polish national uprisings 1768-1864: Selected Subjects”], *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, 48 (2013), 18-19.

⁴ Adam Zamoyski, *The Polish Way: A Thousand-year History of the Poles and their Culture*, (London: John Murray Publishers, 1987), 286.

⁵ Zamoyski, *The Polish Way*, 290.

Two events brought the gradual decline of this early form of Polish nationalism. Firstly, the failed Revolutions of 1848 and the persistence of the autocratic regimes proved vividly that there was no chance for a profound change of the European political order. Moreover, the ideologically anticipated unity and cooperation between the oppressed nations turned out to be disappointingly illusory. Secondly, the hopes of the Polish intelligentsia for bringing common people into the national struggle were painfully evaluated by the internal events, namely the January Uprising in the Congress Kingdom (1863-1864). Contrary to widespread expectations, population in the rural areas remained reluctant to become a part of another uprising – passiveness transformed sometimes even into hostility towards independence fighters. Yet, the fatal blow for the early nationalism came from the new generation of thinkers who began to question its main principles. Roman Dmowski, the Polish ideologue and leader of the new nationalist wave, declared a need for regaining strength through cultural expansion, greater social cohesion, and above all leaving behind the sentimental Romantic agenda. From that moment onwards other nations were to be perceived as fierce competitors.

b) Historical Explanations of the Shift of Nationalism in the late Nineteenth Century

This new ideological occurrence was not limited to Poland. Throughout Europe new nationalism emerged, which embraced not only the demand for national sovereignty but also integrity in ethnic, racial and linguistic terms. Within these new developments, different intellectual tendencies, like conservatism, Social Darwinism, Positivism, came together and merged into one form which became increasingly associated with new, radical, pre-Fascist, right-wing movements. The meanings people attributed to nationalism at the beginning of the nineteenth century differed significantly from the ones that emerged one hundred years later: “[A] sharp shift to the political right of nation and flag, for which the term ‘nationalism’ was actually invented in the last decade(s) of the nineteenth century.”⁶ Thus, for Eric Hobsbawm, the civic revolutionary nationalism was surpassed around 1870 by a new form with its special appeal towards ethnicity and language.⁷ Hagen Schulze points towards the social changes that provoked the alignment between elites and national cause: “The more acute the sense of permanent crisis and incessant radical change became, the more unyielding the conservative defensive attitude grew. In the second half of the nineteenth century conservatism began to

⁶ Eric Hobsbawm, “The Rise of Ethno-Linguistic Nationalisms” in John Hutchison and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), *Nationalism*, (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 178.

⁷ Anthony D. Smith, but paraphrasing and describing Hobsbawm’s view, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 91.

make common cause with nationalistic, populist, and ultimately anti-Semitic, so that it, too, ended up as a mass movement.”⁸ Despite different opinions concerning the nature of change, one thing is unquestionably certain – a new ideological and political phenomenon was born.

c) Main Research Question

However, the issue of *how* we should analyse new developments within nationalism is still a matter of ongoing historiographical debate.⁹ The American historian and founding scholar of the modern study of nationalism, Carlton J. Hayes in his book *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (1931) introduced the analytical framework of “integral nationalism”.¹⁰ The concept has been acclaimed as a useful tool to describe the movements of new, reactionary Right from the late nineteenth century, which combined elements of traditionalist conservatism with modern nationalist agenda. For the purposes of this analysis I intend to evaluate the utility of “integral nationalism” by applying it to a case study from Eastern Europe, namely the writings of Roman Dmowski – the ideological father of modern Polish nationalism. During this research I will attempt to answer: *To what extent is the historical concept of “integral nationalism”, introduced for the first time by C. J. Hayes, applicable to the case of Roman Dmowski and Eastern European nationalism of the early twentieth century?*

2) Analytical Framework: Between “Classical Modernism” and “Ideological Approach”

A researcher of nationalism in the late nineteenth century faces not only the multiplicity of events, thoughts and processes but also the overwhelming richness of historical literature. Historians can hardly agree on one underlying way of reasoning in respect to the origins and evolution of nationalism. Here, we encounter a fundamental tension between structural and intellectual approaches towards the past encapsulated in the question: How significant was ideology in forging nationalism?

Since the 1970s the academic discourse related to the study of nationalism has been effectively shaped by a group of scholars labelled as “classical modernists”.¹¹ In this respect, the works of authors like Miroslav Hroch, Ernst Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson stand out

⁸ Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present*, translated by William E. Yuill, (Malden/Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 2004, [1996]), 153.

⁹ Look into 2) Analytical Framework: Between “Classical Modernism” and “Ideological Approach”.

¹⁰ Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, (New York: The Macmillan Company), 1931.

¹¹ Paul Lawrence, *Nationalism: History and Theory*, (Harlow: Routledge 2005), 163.

as the academic input of great significance.¹² At the core of their approach lies the assumption that the structural condition of the nineteenth century made nationalism possible, as Hobsbawm puts it: “The basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its modernity. This is now well understood.”¹³ In this sense, nations began to be perceived as social constructions established by means modernity had on offer such as increased communication, urbanisation, mass education and political participation.¹⁴ Instead of diving into intentions, thoughts and people who stand behind the ideas, scholars overwhelmingly turned their attention towards modernisation, grand social change and dynamics within the political movements. “Classical modernists” such as Eric Hobsbawm attempted to separate or at least downgrade the relation between ideological content and political practice: “First, official ideologies of states and movements are not guides to what it is in the minds of even the most loyal citizens or supporters.”¹⁵ He is supported in these assertions by John Breuilly who states that: “It is to the politics and political contexts of social groups rather than their ideas that we must look to grasp the nature and functions of nationalism.”¹⁶

As it has been indicated above, the focus on far-reaching theories of nationalism has become a durable academic tendency. However, as many other scholars point out that the growing interest in grand theories has outpaced the inquiry of other spheres of nationalism, like the ideological content. As Bruce Haddock rightly assesses: “One of the paradoxes of the recent resurgence of interest in nationalism is that little attention has been devoted to what nationalists actually thought . . . [T]he tendency with nationalism has been to treat the ideology as a phenomenon or symptom to be explained or (more often) explained away.”¹⁷ Furthermore, it should occur to us as self-evident that it is impossible to address nationalism without attention being given to specific nationalist theorists.¹⁸

¹² Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000 [1985]; Ernst Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism. Second Edition*, (Ithaca: Blackwell Publishing, 2006 [1983]); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London/New York: Verso, 2006 [1983]).

¹³ Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 14.

¹⁴ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism* (London/New York: Routledge, 1998), 2-3.

¹⁵ Hobsbawm, *Nationalism Since 1780*, 11.

¹⁶ Anthony D. Smith, paraphrasing John Breuilly, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 86.

¹⁷ Bruce Haddock, “State and nation in Mazzini’s political thought”, *History of Political Thought* 20 (1999): 2, 313.

¹⁸ Haddock, “State and nation in Mazzini’s political thought”, 314.

Michael Freeden convincingly demonstrates that ideologies matter since they represent the meaning of a specific type of thought, action, practice: “At any rate, political facts never speak for themselves. Through our diverse ideologies, we provide competing interpretations of what the facts might mean.”¹⁹ Specifically, the study of nationalism requires a special ability to recreate the passionate attachment of individuals and groups to the concept of nation: “Before we proceed any further, we need to know why so many people think it [is] reasonable to privilege their own society above other societies, and it is that the emotional bond of belonging to a nation acts as a prism through which much of political thinking is filtered.”²⁰ One could hardly imagine uncovering meanings behind certain ideas and actions without looking into the cognitive sphere of individuals and groups. In other words, a more hermeneutical approach allows understanding better the past on its own terms and thus, exploring the areas which remained untouched by the grand theories. That is why, for the purposes of this analysis, I would like to closely align with these scholars who recognize ideological content as an inherent aspect of a comprehensive analysis. Following Michael Freeden, I will consider ideology as a complex combination and cluster of political concepts in sustainable patterns.²¹

3) Relations with Existing Literature: “Integral Nationalism” as an Analytical Concept

Within the realm of nationalism, one of the most crucial realizations is that its ideological qualities evolved over time. In Otto Pflanze’s words: “[Nationalism] has accepted a variety of ideological bedfellows, and has been a source of endless confusion for historians and political scientists seeking an accepted terminology for the practice of their respective crafts.”²² Concepts like “integral nationalism” attempt to describe the qualities of nationalism and capture its transformative nature. Nonetheless, on an analytical level they raise several important questions: Do they accurately represent the content of nationalist thought? Can these terms be applied to all cultural and geographical settings? In *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* Carlton Hayes came up with a typology of nationalism based on the evolutionary process and transition from ideological forms like humanitarian, Jacobin, traditional, liberal towards the integral.²³ Although much of Hayes’s theory has been criticized or even refuted, the terms he introduced to historical research have remained in use: “While much of the analysis

¹⁹ Michael Freeden, *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 2-3.

²⁰ Freeden, *Ideology*, 71.

²¹ *Ibidem*, 51.

²² Otto Pflanze, “Nationalism in Europe, 1848-1871”, *The Review of Politics*, 28 (1966): 2, 129.

²³ Hayes, *The Historical Evolution*, 164.

contained within Hayes's *Essays on Nationalism* is discerning, and many echoes of his ideas are to be found in the research of later theorists, this early work can be criticized."²⁴ "Integral nationalism" is certainly one of them since the concept reoccurs in the most recent publications. This where the importance of the present study lies - the evaluation of the viability of an older theory of nationalism which to that day keeps influencing contemporary scholars.

Apart from the advantages we should also take a closer look at its limitations concerning geographical space and cultural differences. A serious question emerges whether a term coined in the West, primarily related to the developments in France and Germany during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, can be successfully applied to nationalist ideologies in Eastern Europe. For instance, should we treat Charles Maurras and Roman Dmowski as the representatives of the same intellectual tendencies? Western authors placed the works of Dmowski and Eastern European nationalism in general under the same analytical scheme. For instance, Peter Sugar suggests that:

As the nineteenth century progressed, these differences began to diminish, and Eastern European nationalism began to take on the features of the most aggressive and chauvinistic variants evident in Western Europe. The original differences disappeared, and irredentist claims of some nations were refuted with equal vehemence by those whose lands were claimed. This left all the variations of nationalism in Eastern Europe as 'integral nationalism.'²⁵

Norman Davis directly relates the concept of "integral nationalism" to Roman Dmowski: "In the case of Poland this integral nationalism developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Its premier spokesman was one Roman Dmowski and its prime characteristic conviction was that in order to count as a Pole you had to be a Polish speaker and a Roman Catholic."²⁶

In fairness, the term "integral nationalism" has not been used by Polish historiography very often or it is applied in a rather uncritical manner. For scholars like Grzegorz Krzywiec and Roman Wysocki it is quite important to show that Polish nationalism belongs to the broader

²⁴ Lawrence, *Nationalism*, 87.

²⁵ Sugar, *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, 20.

²⁶ Norman Davis, "The Polish Nation, 1793-1921: The Survival of An Idea and An Ideal" in *Nationality and Nationalism in East-Central Europe since the 18th Century* by Foreign & Commonwealth Office Occasional Papers, 12 (1996), 7.

European tendencies and thus, for them Dmowski is by definition an “integral nationalist”.²⁷ Krzywiec attempts to conceptualize his argument by coming up with the notion of “Polish version of integral nationalism.”²⁸ Andrzej Walicki treats the ideologue as an exemplary theoretician of this political tendency whereas Piotr Wandycz states that: “A natural scientist by training, and coming from a poor urban milieu, Dmowski became a herald of integral nationalism in Poland that represented a drastic change in Polish political thought.”²⁹ Only few historians, like Bogumił Grott, identify the potential terminological problem.³⁰ Grott acknowledges that there is an issue with the application of the term “integral nationalism” to Roman Dmowski, however, he does not address its nature. He only limits himself to indicating that early works of the Polish ideologue did not convey an anti-democratic message.³¹

From this historiographical assessment two reasons stand out which justify my inquiry. Firstly, many historians applied “integral nationalism” to their case studies, however, they rarely called into question the term itself. By focusing on Roman Dmowski I would like to evaluate this theoretical framing on the microlevel. Undoubtedly, the term carries certain benefits, as I will indicate in the coming chapters. Nonetheless, equal attention needs to be devoted to the terminological problems it creates. Thus, this thesis attempts to bring forward a more nuanced view which addresses several shortcomings of the concept, once tested against the evidence, namely Dmowski’s ideological essay: *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka* [*Thoughts of a Modern Pole*]. In other words, terminological precision and analytical adequacy constitute the main scope of the research. Secondly, at the core of my research lies the question touching upon the utility of a Western analytical concept (“integral nationalism”) to an Eastern European case study. By stressing the different historical context and distinct ideological features, we gain the

²⁷ Grzegorz Krzywiec, “On the Origins of Polish ‘Integral Nationalism’: The Case of Roman Dmowski (1866-1904)”, *Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i Gospodarczych*, (2007): 64, 45-70; Roman Wysocki, “Redefinicja Narodowego Bohaterstwa Między Polityką A Nauką: Szkic o Współczesnych Dyskusjach Wokół Legendy Romana Dmowskiego”, [“Redefinition of National Heroism Between Politics and Science: A Sketch on Contemporary Discussions Around the Legend of Roman Dmowski”], *HISTORYKA. Studia Metodologiczne*, (2018): 48, 329-345.

²⁸ Grzegorz Krzywiec, “‘Idea w poniewierce’”. Pierwszy artykuł polityczny Romana Dmowskiego”, [“‘An Idea in Misery’: The first political article by Roman Dmowski”], *Archiwum Historii Filozofii I Myśli Społecznej* (2008): 53, 147-166.

²⁹ Andrzej Walicki, “The Troubling Legacy of Roman Dmowski”, *East European Politics and Societies* (2000): 1, 13; Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages*, (London: Routledge, 2001 [1992]), 173.

³⁰ Bogumił Grott, “Na manowcach pozornej komparatystyki: Z powodu książki Romana Wysockiego ‘W kręgu integralnego nacjonalizmu. Czynnny nacjonalizm Dmytra Doncowa na tle myśli nowoczesnych Romana Dmowskiego. Studium porównawcze’”, [“The Astray of Apparent Comparison: Response to the book by Roman Wysocki: ‘In the circle of Integral nationalism. Active Nationalism of Dmitry Doncov in relation Roman Dmowski’s Modern Thought, A Comparative Study’”] *Dzieje Najnowsze* 49 (2017): 1, 252-253.

³¹ Grott, “Na manowcach pozornej komparatystyki”, 252-253.

possibility to include Eastern Europe into wider historiographical deliberations on the theory of nationalism. Pointing towards potential differences between the West and the East does not invalidate our general historical assumptions but rather broadens our view and enriches historiography.

4) Explanation of the Method

The study of ideological content requires a theoretical framework, meaning a historical concept and a clear body of primary sources. However, in this case it is not a straightforward application of “integral nationalism” to a case study. It is the sources that assist in evaluating the analytical concept, rather than the other way around. In this sense I will not be looking for confirmation but for an answer to the question: to what extent does the concept retain its analytical validity when applied to a different empirical source base? Hayes’s concept contains a understanding which to a great extent has persisted to this day. The author assumes that the example of the French nationalist movement of the 1880s and 1890s reflected profound ideological changes in Europe. His meaning of “integral nationalism” consists of several main qualities like: the collectivist ethos (total subjugation of interests of an individual to the interest of a national community), chauvinism (searching for ethnic and cultural integrity), expansionism (sustaining the strength of a nation though subjugating other communities), authoritarianism (proposing non-democratic forms of governance) and the praise of the traditional elites (looking back towards the “glorious days”), which together ought to characterize the new, far-right movements. For the purposes of my research I would like to employ these categories to Dmowski’s political essay to establish the applicability of its analytical features to Eastern Europe. On a methodological level, this will be conducted through a qualitative analysis of writings which reveal Dmowski’s ideological intent. In this sense, the method can be considered as an investigation of the historical term with the use of primary sources.

5) Structure of Research

The research concerning the applicability of “integral nationalism” to the ideological writings of Roman Dmowski consists of four main parts. Chapter One considers the evolution of the main concept by indicating its political origins in the late nineteenth century France. Following that, the meaning attributed to it by Carlton Hayes in his book *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* needs to be addressed and thoroughly analysed. In Chapters Two and Three the theoretical framework meets the Eastern European case study, *Thoughts of a Modern*

Pole by Roman Dmowski as both the benefits and shortcomings of “integral nationalism” are indicted. The conclusion brings together the insights which emerged during the research and strives for an ideological approach towards nationalism which would operate with adequate categories.

Chapter 1: “Integral Nationalism”: From a Political Towards Historical Concept

1) The French Political Doctrine from the late Nineteenth Century

“Perish all the divisive elements!” – demanded the authors of the first issue of Action Française journal on March 21st, 1908.³² Among the people who signed these words was Charles Maurras, the leader and main ideologue of the new French nationalist movement, who at the same time conceptualized the term of “integral nationalism”. The concept itself (“Le Nationalisme integral”) came into light for the first time on March 2nd 1900 in Maurras’s article for *Le Soleil*, in which he argued in favour of merging royalism and nationalism into one form.³³ By doing so, he envisioned the combination of absolute monarchy with modern nationalism as the only way France could regain its power and strength after the catastrophic defeat from 1871, which France suffered at the hands of Prussia.

The “integrity” in Maurras’s thought provides a reservoir of confidence and stability on political and social levels – necessary preconditions for taking over lost provinces: Alsace and Lorraine. Under this ideological scheme, the nation’s interest would come first, before social groups and individuals. This requires gathering around one, absolute sovereign - the king who is the sole guarantor of the nation’s success: “since the monarchical institutions alone satisfied all the national aspirations, all the national ends, as the integral reproduced the sum of all vales of an algebraic function.”³⁴ The admiration for traditional elites like the monarchy, the aristocracy and the clergy was essential since these hierarches had been unleashing the patriotic fervour and provided a sense of political direction for common people. In the reality of rapid secularization and institutional separation between the state and the Church Maurras pushed intellectually for just the opposite. Faith was placed as one of the main tenets of the French identity and ought to reside at the centre of the public life. Consequently, the current republican system of representative democracy should be abolished as it only seeds divisiveness among people and displays weakness to external adversaries. However, not only the system itself poses an existential threat to the French nation. There are groups of people within the society who

³² Henri Vaugeois, Léon Daudet, Charles Maurras Et al., “Le Nationalisme integral”, This text appeared in the first issue of *L’Action Française*, on March the 21st, 1908, Édition électronique réalisée par Maurras.net et l’Association des Amis de la Maison du Chemin de Paradis (2010), accessed on Dec. 4th, 2019.

³³ Athena S. Leoussi (ed.), Anthony D. Smith (consultant advisor), *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, (New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 153.

³⁴ William C. Buthman, *The Rise of Integral Nationalism in France*, (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 269; look also into: Michael Sutton, *Nationalism, Positivism and Catholicism: The Politics of Charles Maurras and French Catholics 1890-1914*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

purposefully weaken its political and economic capabilities. Their false loyalties breach popular solidarity and effectively prevent from reaching a national reinvigoration. Maurras and integral nationalists point towards at least several main enemies: cosmopolitans, liberals, Protestants and Jews.³⁵ To sum up, integral nationalism was a political doctrine which by bringing a new set of ideas reflected a more profound backlash against the tendencies of democratization and the legacy of the Enlightenment in the last decades of the nineteenth century.

2) “Integral Nationalism” as a Historical Concept

a) How Did “Integral Nationalism” Emerge?

It was not until 1931 and the publication of Carlton Hayes’s influential analysis *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* when the concept of “integral nationalism” was addressed in analytical terms. At the core of his peculiar typology of nationalism lies the division into five distinctive forms which represented different strains of political thoughts: humanitarian, Jacobin, traditional, liberal or integral. Hayes substantiated his thesis by combining the descriptions of the most significant thinkers with the investigation of some deeper socio-political context.³⁶ This served to indicate the sweeping evolutionary change of nationalism during the nineteenth century. Like many other historians, Hayes noticed that during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the main characteristics of this ideology evolved: “In the twentieth century, however, particularly in Europe and America, has come clearly to light yet another and novel brand of nationalism, a brand which rather arbitrarily may be designed as ‘integral nationalism.’”³⁷ Especially, a new generation of ideologues played a key part in spreading the brand new agenda: “The philosophy of integral nationalism, whether in Germany or in Italy, in France or elsewhere, can be traced, as we have seen, to groups of intellectuals within the several countries.”³⁸

b) The Main Analytical Qualities of “Integral Nationalism”

One of the most striking aspects to notice is that the American historian directly quotes Maurras while defining his historical concept: “Integral nationalism may be defined in the words of Maurras himself, as ‘exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national

³⁵ Vaugeois, Daudet, Maurras, “Le Nationalisme integral”.

³⁶ Lawrence, *Nationalism*, 88.

³⁷ Hayes, *The Historical Evolution*, 165.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, 224.

integrity and the steady increase of national power – for a nation declines when it loses military might.”³⁹ Arguably, Hayes perceives the events in the late nineteenth century France and its intellectual tendencies as the epitome of “integral nationalism”. The primary difference between the previous forms of nationalism and the “integral” one is the fact that nation-state is no longer a means to achieve universally humanistic goals, but the national sovereignty is the goal in itself.⁴⁰ According to the author, nationalism as an ideology became even more militaristic, aggressive and chauvinist.⁴¹

First and foremost, “integral nationalism” prioritizes the interests of a national community defined in ethnic terms over needs and aspirations of the individual: “It would subordinate all personal liberties to its own purpose . . . All these things it would do ‘in the national interest.’”⁴² The requirement of uniformity can be easily extended from property and material rights to consciousness and political views. Essentially, an individual is reduced to a passive cog in a great machine. Ultimately, “integral nationalism” puts forward a radical version of collectivism which aimed directly at undermining the mainstream liberal principles governing the public life.

Contrary to the wider democratizing tendencies in Europe during the last years of the nineteenth century which encouraged greater political participation, “integral nationalism” proposed just the opposite: “[I]ntegral nationalism is highly illiberal and tyrannical. It would oblige all citizens to conform to common standard of manners and morals and to share the same unreasoning enthusiasm for it.”⁴³ Integral nationalists looked for an inspiration coming from historically discredited political systems, which to their view, were a source of the past glory and stability. For that reason, absolute monarchy or Caesarean version of dictatorship appeared to them as reasonable choices in terms of governance.

In comparison to the earlier types of nationalism, the “integral” form tends to embrace a more exclusionary and discriminatory agenda in respect to both internal and external actors. A chauvinistic attitude in this case testifies to an equation of seeing own nation as superior to others and deep suspicion of ethnic/religious minorities. Carlton Hayes draws attention to the fact that beliefs such as anti-Semitism, racism and ethnical coherence became a new social

³⁹ Ibidem, 165.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, 166.

⁴¹ Ibidem.

⁴² Ibidem.

⁴³ Ibidem.

norm: “[M]asses tend increasingly to evince a chauvinism, an intolerance, and a fanaticism strangely out of keeping with the individualism and internationalism which an older generation of patriots associated with liberal democratic nationalism.”⁴⁴ In other words, altruism and the alleged symbiosis of Europeans from the beginning of the nineteenth century now turned into the menace of hatred between the nations over territory, influence and pride.⁴⁵

Militarism and political expansion stand out as the significant qualities of “integral nationalism” which effectively sustain this political doctrine. Only by embracing openly violent means, one may secure nation’s existence and the right position within the state system: “A cardinal principle of the new integral nationalism which most sharply distinguishes it from all earlier philosophies of nationalism is its admitted and boasted reliance on brute force.”⁴⁶ This particular need for military power derives from the negation of international cooperation. A political compromise was considered as a sign of weakness or unnecessary sentiments: “It is militaristic and tends to be imperialist. In the face of it, a league of nations or any international sense of peace and security is threatened with sterility and destruction.”⁴⁷ As mentioned above, integral nationalists perceived other nations as existential opponents, which clashed within the macroscale Darwinian struggle.

In summary, five elements appear to contribute extensively to Hayes’s meaning of “integral nationalism”: collectivist ethos, authoritarianism in governance, admiration for traditional elites (like the Church and aristocracy), chauvinism in internal relations and militarism and expansionism in the international arena. It is my intention to employ these analytical qualities to the case of Roman Dmowski to establish the utility of the concept in respect to Eastern Europe.

c) Broad Applicability of “Integral Nationalism”?

In the course of his analysis, Hayes dedicates significant attention towards occurrences in France and only then attempted to apply them onto the rest of the Continent. In fairness, he also provides examples of thinkers from Italy and Germany in order to conclude that “integral nationalism” was a pre-Fascist political form. An attentive reader of *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* might quickly realize that the author struggles with establishing the

⁴⁴ Ibidem, 225.

⁴⁵ Ibidem.

⁴⁶ Ibidem, 223.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, 166.

analytical value of “integral nationalism” in respect to other countries. Can we in fact speak of a broader intellectual and political development which encapsulates a variety of conditions? To-that-end Hayes remains rather ambiguous. He is convinced that the qualities of “integral nationalism”, may comprehensibly describe the ideological tendencies across Europe within this time period:

The designation is what Charles Maurras employs to describe the nationalist doctrine of his small and hysterical political party in France . . . but it may conveniently be used, without undue imagination or ambiguity, to indicate certain significant elements in Italian Fascism and even Russian Bolshevism and, curiously enough, in the attitude and behaviour of millions of nationalists throughout the world who do not indulge in much theorizing and who are certainly unaware that they are integral nationalists.⁴⁸

Nonetheless, he does not exclude the possibility of local or regional variations of “integral nationalism”. One of his key realizations entails that we should not overestimate the impact the French intellectual life made on the rest of Europe:

It may seem that in describing the tenets of integral nationalism by reference chiefly to the ideas of four Frenchmen . . . we have at least implied that these Frenchmen have created the doctrine not only in France but also in the other countries. Such a thought, such an implication, is very far from our mind and intentions. We have expounded the philosophy of four Frenchmen because it is peculiarly clear and plain and because it admirably draws together and expresses certain intellectual tendencies which have been common to a large number of nationalists of various countries.⁴⁹

A clear tension is visible between the statements above since the claim of applicability clashes with his awareness of a different historical setting for each nation. What needs to be stressed is the fact that Hayes stretched the concept of “integral nationalism” to describe a whole variety of movements without extensively addressing the geographical and cultural divergence. Not without reservations, but he stands by the universal use of the concept because he assumes that the extent of nuances is limited. In other words, the ideological frames coined in Western

⁴⁸ Ibidem, 165.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, 222.

countries like France, Italy and Germany may have served as a blueprint for other nationalist groups. However, one should be very careful about broad generalization even if the ideology employs the language of universalism or abstraction, as its understanding emanates from particular societies at a specific historical time.⁵⁰ By not expanding the scope of his research to Eastern Europe, he left future generations of historians with the fascinating yet puzzling issue of cultural and geographical limitations of “integral nationalism.”

⁵⁰ Freedon, *Ideology*, 60.

Chapter 2: The Alignments: “Integral Nationalism” and the Case of Roman Dmowski

The core argument put forward by Carlton Hayes refers to the universal use of “integral nationalism” regardless of the specific socio-political context. Following his assumption, the strain of thought moved from the West, especially France, towards the East and provided local and regional intellectuals with an ideological framework for the organization of political action. Since the author primarily focuses on Western Europe, it is of great importance to evaluate the applicability of this concept in respect to the Eastern part of the Continent. The ideological writings of Roman Dmowski appear as a right example since they match the timeframe (the early twentieth century), and contain a new, radical nationalist message. I will argue that Dmowski’s understanding of particular issues such as collectivist ethos, chauvinism and military expansion, come close to the meanings presented by the American historian. These elements I would like to describe as “alignments”, meaning that Hayes’s concept is capable of describing them accurately.

1) Roman Dmowski and the Challenge of “Political Romanticism”

As I have already indicated in the Introduction, Polish nationalism evolved throughout the first decades of the nineteenth century. The catastrophic end of January Uprising in 1865 marked the ideological transition from the nationalism guided by Romantic ideals towards a new form. This was a time when the Russians implemented new repressive measures, as the punishment for Polish independence aspirations: “The tsarist government adopted a policy of systematic destruction of the autonomous institutions of the Congress Kingdom accompanied by brutal repressions of Polish cultural life.”⁵¹ Polish identity found itself under existential threat and the nationalist fervour, which had been inspiring the intelligentsia for years, was now surpassed by apathy and uncertainty. Yet a new generation of thinkers entered the national discourse in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. New circumstances demanded a new ideological approach which would ensure not only independence but also unitary political awareness among Poles.

Against this background, Roman Dmowski (1864-1939), a member of lesser nobility, graduate of biology and zoology in Warsaw, paved his way as a leading theoretician of Polish

⁵¹ Andrzej Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 337.

nationalism. Dmowski became politically active in the early 1880s in the Congress Kingdom (Polish semi-autonomous entity under Tsarist control). By taking his inspiration from other nationalist thinkers such as Jan Ludwik Popławski and Zygmunt Balicki, he began to criticize liberal Positivists, Socialists and especially the concept of “Political Romanticism” – the illusive dreams of cooperation between nations, lack of concrete aims and the insufficient attention towards common people who still remained politically ambivalent and unaware.⁵² As the response to these outdated concepts Dmowski combined his vision of nationalism with the novel Western ideas like Positivism and Social Darwinism which were adapted to the Polish context.

On a political level, he was engaged in founding right-wing, nationalistic entities such as secret Association of the Polish Youth "Zet" (1887) and later the National Democratic Party (1893) of which he became the leader. Despite his long-lasting political competition with another well-known national leader - Józef Piłsudski, Roman Dmowski is considered to be one of the main authors of Polish independence after the First World War. During the Interbellum he remained one of the most influential political figures and the unquestioned father of modern Polish nationalism.⁵³ As Krzywiec puts it: “He was not an adherent to any movement or even trend in Polish nationalist thought; it was Polish nationalism, rather that belonged to him”⁵⁴. He died in 1939 in Drozdowo, Poland.

In 1903 he published a ground-breaking work for Polish national movement which presented a set of ideas for regaining political strength, cultural confidence and eventually independence through a mixture of discriminatory practices, activation of the masses, patriotic education and territorial expansion. This piece of political writing reflects his early convictions, which to a significant extent differ from the views he embraced during the later periods, like the Interbellum. Without a doubt, the thinker followed the assumption that independence requires to be conceptualized before it can be regained. And for that reason, ideas, doctrines, political and cultural visions of the future state rightfully appear to be crucial for understanding the Polish case: “For many of those from beyond Poland who chose to study its history, the ideas counted most. Since modern cultural forms emerged in a setting without political sovereignty,

⁵² Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism*, 338.

⁵³ For more biographical details concerning Roman Dmowski see: Roman Wapiński, *Roman Dmowski*, (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, 1988); Krzysztof Kawalec, *Roman Dmowski. Biografia [Roman Dmowski: A Biography]*, (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, 1996).

⁵⁴ Grzegorz Krzywiec, “Roman Dmowski and Polish Nationalism Until 1939” in *Genealogy of Contemporaneity: A History of Ideas in Poland, 1815-1939*, Bartłomiej Błesznowski, Marcin Król and Adam Puciejda (eds.), (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2015), 185.

ideas seemed to matter more in Poland than in other European countries”⁵⁵ - as Timothy Snyder brilliantly puts it.

2) The Collectivist Ethos

What is nationalism? To that fundamental question Roman Dmowski provides his audience with an answer which at first glimpse stands in agreement with the main qualities of “integral nationalism”: “The object of this patriotism, or more precisely of nationalism, is not a certain set of freedoms that were formerly called homeland, but the nation itself, as a living social organism, having developed on the basis of racial and historical spiritual separateness, its culture, its needs and interests.”⁵⁶ What immediately catches one’s attention is the notions of cohesion and uniformity which became so pivotal for the movements of the New Right. For Dmowski, as well as for the other nationalists, the era of the “liberal individual” clearly ended abruptly:

In this modern understanding of patriotism, the attitude of the individual towards the nation changes completely. It relies on the close relationship of the individual with his society, on treating all his affairs and interests as his own, regardless of whether they are personally close to us, on feeling his harm not only where they personally afflict us.⁵⁷

Alvin Fountain rightly points out Dmowski re-evaluates the position of the “self” in relation to society by undermining the concept of individual rights and praising the unique qualities of the nation as a whole: “[His concept of patriotism] shifted emphasis from the attaining of freedoms and privileges for the individual – the old desire of nobility – to the responsibilities of the individual towards the nation as a whole thus, shifting the idea of nationalism from the mere removal of foreign influence to propagation of the best talents, abilities, customs, and traditions peculiar to the Polish people.”⁵⁸ By implication, the desires, ambitions, passions of the independent “self” are required to merge into one form with the interests of the community. Not needless to say that once combined the interests of the latter receive absolute priority. Thus, no equal treatment is desired nor possible. The individual is taken from the privileged socio-

⁵⁵ Timothy Snyder, “Introduction: In Poland Ideas Always Counted Most” in *Genealogy of Contemporaneity*, 11.

⁵⁶ Roman Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka [Thoughts of a Modern Pole]*, (Lwów: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze, 1904 [1903]), 160

⁵⁷ Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 161.

⁵⁸ Alvin Marcus Fountain II, *Roman Dmowski: Party, Tactics, Ideology (1895-1907)*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 99.

political position and effectively transferred into to the peripheries: “The autonomous ‘I’ could not be sustained within the boorish and brutal urban spaces of contemporary Europe; there was no time to cultivate the self when one had to spend all day worrying about petty problems of survival.”⁵⁹

Moreover, the assertion of subjugation involves also the state apparatus to ensure that the interests of the national community supersede every other: “Public opinion is an expression of moral coercion in this regard, while the state is an actor which deals with the organization of physical coercion.”⁶⁰ Here, we can identify a possibility of constraining the Otherness, whether it is a separate opinion or different religious affiliation. Social integrity requires everyone to fit within the established framework of a New Pole: a man of action, self-conscious politically and uniform culturally. In other words, the best and most talented individuals are required to foster the national cause: “Active individuals who are to change the surrounding, unbearable reality should be passionate idealists, declared dreamers, even fanatics of the new faith. Active people were to instil fanaticism in their supporters.”⁶¹ Following these assumptions a modern Pole can only achieve self-fulfilment by solely acting for the benefit of the nation.

3) Chauvinism and Discriminatory Politics

Chauvinism, the second analytical quality scrutinized by Carlton Hayes, also proves to be present and sound in Dmowski’s ideological writing. For the Polish intellectual the issue of immediate determination of who is a Pole and who is not, alongside the strict ethnic lines, was anything but insignificant. Traditional diversity and pluralism of the Polish state was undermined and presented as a source of social weakness and political indecisiveness. Similarly, to the case of French nationalists, Dmowski willingly points towards the groups which, in his opinion, breached the national solidarity and could not be considered as rightful members of the Polish community.

In the first place, Dmowski identifies cosmopolitans as a group threatening the new nationalist project. The reason for which cosmopolitans are so reluctant to embrace the nationalist agenda, relates to the prioritization of their own wellbeing over the freedom of national community.

⁵⁹ Brian Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth Century Poland*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 194.

⁶⁰ Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 175.

⁶¹ Grzegorz Krzywiec, *Szowinizm po polsku: Przypadek Romana Dmowskiego (1886-1905)* [*Chauvinism, Polish Style: The Case of Roman Dmowski (1886-1905)*], (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Neriton/Instytut Historii PAN, 2009), 155.

Moreover, they operate through deception as they pretend to be patriots only when it suits them: “Many of them even call themselves patriots, thinking that it is enough to feel oppression and be an enemy of slavery. [They are] too weakly connected with society, not sufficiently developed morally, that public interest, the interest of the society to which they belong, to recognize and defend it.”⁶² According to Dmowski, it is even more damaging when they hide their interests behind the façade of ideological internationalism: “[I]nstead of a close, specific society, they place the detached agenda of humanity on the altar with its intangible rights and interests, instead of real value - a fiction that does not harm anything in life, because it does not apply to anything, and gives a nice frame to an ordinary, decent selfish image of life.”⁶³ Here, we encounter the main strain criticism considering cosmopolitanism. As opposed to nationalism, which is existent, real and determined by nature: “[The nationalist circles] recognized that cosmopolitanism was rather a certain state of mind, an artificial, modified consciousness of the disinherited group.”⁶⁴

Jews were the second group particularly targeted for cultivating a separate cultural identity. For centuries Polish Jews exercised a freedom of worship and conscience within their extensive autonomy under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. However, broader exclusionary tendencies of the late nineteenth century did not make Polish society immune to Anti-Semitism. Overall, the new generation of nationalists was tempted to decrease Jews’ social role by imposing policies of cultural assimilation and confining their supremacy in the economic sphere. Thus, Roman Dmowski’s variation of Anti-Semitism combines traditional economic resentment, which had been present within Polish society for centuries, with the brand-new slogans of racial differentiation. The leader of National Democracy stresses that high self-awareness among Jews excludes any fruitful coexistence between Polish and Jewish identities: “This does not mean that we are willing to absorb all the elements that we find on the road. The national organism should strive to absorb only what it can assimilate and turn to increase the growth and strength of the collective body. Jews are not such an element.”⁶⁵ Notwithstanding, he argues that Jewish population is not committed to the Polish national cause since it exercises special privileges and is driven by only one factor – the economic benefit: “In this existence of a large Jewish population, which feels no communion with the people, hence deprived of all

⁶² Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 167-168.

⁶³ *Ibidem*, 168.

⁶⁴ Krzywiec, *Szowinizm po polsku*, 109.

⁶⁵ Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 214-215.

political aspirations, and striving only for the material exploitation of the country and its people.”⁶⁶

Not surprisingly, Dmowski perceives the Anti-Semitic agenda as an act of justified self-defence.⁶⁷ To his judgement, it is the Polish population which suffered greatly at the hands of the expanding Jewish influence. In respect to the past political developments they allegedly conspired with the major regional powers: Russia, Prussia and Austria to severely weaken the Polish state and eventually supported the partitions in the late eighteenth century.⁶⁸ In addition, by hampering the reforming attempts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Jews were thought to be responsible for stagnation in the socioeconomic realm. This accusation, forwarded by nationalists, primarily concerned Jewish dominance in the urban areas and economic spheres, especially in trade and industry, which prevented the Polish middle-class from emerging: “[I]f it was not for them [Jews], a part of the Polish urban population would have been organized as a political force competing with the nobility, as a third estate which played such an important role in the development of European societies and became the main driving forces of the modern social life.”⁶⁹

Jews and cosmopolitans were only the few representatives of groups which were portrayed by Dmowski as the enemies of Polish identity, culture, independence. However, these two specific cases vividly encapsulate the main rationale of “integral nationalism”: pluralism, whether of religion or opinion, breeds ground for a decay and collapse of the nation. By implication, the exclusionary agenda sought to evoke deeply entrenched resentments within Polish society and foster greater unanimity, as Krzywiec rightly points out: “[C]ondensed hostility towards Jews, like other national resentments, became a symbol and a myth around which the political struggle could be focused in the era of mass movements. Such a myth was to restore the unifying sense of the broken community.”⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Ibidem, 45.

⁶⁷ Krzywiec, *Szowinizm po polsku*, 235.

⁶⁸ Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 44-45.

⁶⁹ Ibidem, 45.

⁷⁰ Krzywiec, *Szowinizm po polsku*, 270.

4) Militarism and Expansionism

Integral nationalists were convinced that nations engage in Darwinian-like competition and thus, the only way in which a national community can be sustained is through expansion: “Struggle was part of the world order, not a means of obtaining a specific goal.”⁷¹ In other words, it is the responsibility of the governing elite to secure nation’s position within the state system. As Carlton Hayes indicates in his work, integral nationalists embrace brutal force and military means to expand into new territories (colonialism) or to regain the territories that historically belonged to a certain ethnically defined community.⁷² The territorial lust is also clearly visible in Dmowski’s assumptions since he recognized that borders were anything but firm and stable. However, when it comes to the means of expanding Polish sphere of influence, he did not embrace a military solution.

In spite of his reluctance towards military uprisings, Dmowski’s vision of expansion primarily forwards an increase of cultural and socioeconomic presence: “The concept of civilization expansion, was formulated on the basis of the assumption that Polishness and Poland is everywhere where the ‘Polish spirit’ takes root and settle.”⁷³ In other words, cultural and political activities ranging from founding secret schools, publishing houses, self-help societies to strikes and refusal to pay taxes were expected to ensure the survival of Polish identity.⁷⁴ As Krzywiec rightly indicates there are at least several geographical layers of the anticipated expansionist process.⁷⁵ Without a greater hesitation the Polish ideologue looked towards the territories in the East (Ruthenia, Ukraine), that once belonged to Poland and were taken over by the Russian Empire, as the natural space for Polish expansion: “The lack of independent political existence and the policy of partitioning powers made our location in the borderlands extremely difficult, in countries with a non-Polish population core, once belonging to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.”⁷⁶

The so-called *Kresy* (a Polish term for the Eastern frontiers) turned out to be one of the main cultural battlegrounds where interests of Poles clashed with the emerging Ukrainian national movement and the governing Russian officials. Despite the unfavourable political situation, Dmowski rejected the notion of “national concentration” which implied sole nation-building

⁷¹ Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate*, 211.

⁷² Hayes, *The Historical Evolution*, 223.

⁷³ Krzywiec, *Szowinizm po polsku*, 397.

⁷⁴ Fountain II, *Roman Dmowski*, 88-89.

⁷⁵ Krzywiec, *Szowinizm po polsku*, 384.

⁷⁶ Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 144-145.

efforts in those districts where Poles constituted the majority of population.⁷⁷ Polish influence in Eastern regions would be perpetuated by supporting local minorities of Polish descent: “By letting go of the influence of Polish culture and thereby losing eastern Lithuanian-Ruthenian areas, we would lose most of our former territory and several million undoubted Poles living the same culture as we do.”⁷⁸ Interestingly, Dmowski denies the existence of other nations between Russia and Poland, as he believes that this vast region was open for the cultural expansion of whichever of the two proved to be the stronger. The same approach could have been realized in respect to the Western lands, where German Empire doubled its restrictions on the Polish language, cultural life and economic development in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Where others saw hardships and poor prospects, Dmowski viewed an opportunity for tightening the national organization:

At the same time, the democratization of culture has opened a new field for us in the Western borderlands, in the ethnographically Polish provinces, which were for centuries politically lost and let alone at the mercy of the victorious German culture going eastwards. These western frontiers are the only newly acquired field of national activity in recent times.⁷⁹

Moreover, Dmowski’s deep interest in the success of the British Empire, brought him to a conclusion that Poles should not exclude the possibilities of overseas expansion: “[H]ow unpredictable in their enormity the consequences of the expansion for Polish life would be, if we created a successful Polish-speaking community on the distant land [Brazil], speaking Polish, drawing its spiritual strength from the common treasury of national civilization.”⁸⁰ Dmowski even mentions a specific place where such colonization might take place – Brazil. By taking part in the scramble for the territories in the outer world Poles, could possibly join the first-rate powers and lift the hope for a rebirth: “Even if the creation of the New Poland somewhere on the shores of the South Atlantic, in the Brazilian forests, would prove to be an indestructible fantasy, this deal would give us a new and wide field to overcome the internal rotting and thus, would greatly contribute to the revival our spirit.”⁸¹ One of the crucial realizations emerging from the quotations mentioned above, is that Dmowski’s cultural struggle not only involved necessary means to protect Polish identity (which was indeed challenged by

⁷⁷ Ibidem, 146.

⁷⁸ Ibidem, 145.

⁷⁹ Ibidem.

⁸⁰ Ibidem, 147.

⁸¹ Ibidem.

the occupying powers) but also proposed aggressive stance towards other nationalities.⁸² Although Dmowski rejected military or revolutionary means for the expansion, due to the unfavourable circumstances, he encouraged to express Polish superiority in every other sphere of social activity.

Clearly Dmowski envisioned Polish nation as a dynamic entity which decisively imposes its will upon other weaker societies. Defencelessness does not imply moral purity or innocence; only political and economic strength is honoured and respected.⁸³ The collectivist ethos guarantees that interests of individuals and the national community would be congruent. Chauvinist agenda enforces ethnic and ideological coherence within society whereas the territorial expansions secures survival in the international arena. To conclude, several qualities that Hayes indicates as the essence of “integral nationalism” remain in the close alignment with the political thought conveyed by Roman Dmowski.

⁸² Krzywiec, *Szowinizm po polsku*, 385.

⁸³ Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate*, 217.

Chapter 3: The Discrepancies: “Integral Nationalism” and the Case of Roman Dmowski

1) What Are the Limitations to Hayes’s Argumentation?

Ideologies usually transgress borders of countries, social groups and cultural spheres. To that end, the insights they provide researchers with, usually move beyond one specific country or geographical region. For the sake of a consistent argument, Hayes came up with general qualities of “integral nationalism” after exploring various case studies in Europe. He even sought the notions of national integrity in the twentieth century Soviet Union to substantiate his line of reasoning.⁸⁴ Thus, it is his firm belief that distinct nationalisms in different countries stand in agreement with his categorization of “integral nationalism”: “[T]he attitude and behaviour of millions of nationalists throughout the world who do not indulge in much theorizing and who are certainly unaware that they are integral nationalists.”⁸⁵

Nonetheless, we should keep in mind that ideologies are clusters of political ideas which are deeply influenced by the overarching context. The context, as Michael Freeden rightly indicates carries “cultural constraints” which tie an ideology with a particular time and space.⁸⁶ By the end of the nineteenth century, nationalism was not an exclusively Western idea. This certainly creates the need to broaden the scope of the concept. However, if we compare the trajectories of the ideological development between the West and East several main differences need to be acknowledged. Thus, Hayes’s claims that the universal nature of his concept requires closer examination. By applying his analytical categories (Chapter 1) to the case of Roman Dmowski, I expect to reveal shortcomings of his understanding of “integral nationalism”. Specifically, I will argue that key elements such as contextual differences, relations with the democratic system and the attitude towards the traditional elites, which the Polish ideologue brought forward, do not match with Hayes’s argumentation. The elements which escape Hayes’s definition, I will consider as “discrepancies”.

2) Contextual Differences

One of the analytical elements which certainly deserves further investigation is the assumption that “integral nationalism” is intertwined with the existence of a nation-state. The American historian perceives the rise of nationalism as an evolutionary process inseparably related to a

⁸⁴ Hayes, *The Historical Evolution*, 165.

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁶ Freeden, *Ideology*, 58.

certain stage of political and socio-economic development: “Having reached the goal of liberal nationalism [establishing an independent state] and being flushed with victory, they treated that goal as a starting-point for a continuing race towards integral nationalism.”⁸⁷ Only after succeeding in founding a state, a nation could ideologically move from one phase towards the other. The qualities of “integral nationalism” turned out to be meaningful when nations realized that they were engaged in the survival of the fittest in the international arena: “For, once ‘oppressed’ nationalities had won their independence by force of arms and accorded enthusiastic praise to their generals and soldiers, they came more and more to feel that only force of arms could maintain their independence and insure their rightful place in the prestige in the world.”⁸⁸ Accordingly, Hayes draws his final conclusion and states that “integral nationalism” is directly related to the cases of long-lasting states (France) or newly-established/unified (Italy, Germany) which struggled to gain recognition and political strength between each other in the late nineteenth century: “It [integral nationalism] has to do . . . not with ‘oppressed’ or ‘subject’ nationalities but rather with nationalities which have already gained their political unity and independence. It is applicable, therefore, to the contemporary nations of Europe and America more than those of Asia and Africa.”⁸⁹ Hence, the organized state, with its monopoly on violence and authority, is the sole entity which could enforce the social uniformity and sustain the nation through political and military expansion. Without the coercive apparatus of the state these aims would remain unfulfilled. In this sense, the emergence of “integral nationalism” reflects the socio-political conditions a nation found itself in.

However, the case of Roman Dmowski and Poland vividly indicates that “integral nationalism” can gain political traction among a nation which did not have a sovereign state. Even though Poland was still subjugated to the partitioning forces, Polish intellectual life was eager to embrace new ideas. Contrary to Hayes’s assumptions, Dmowski stresses that nationalist movements may develop regardless of prerequisites like a sovereign state or modern, urban society: “A deep sense of communion with the nation, with its interests and aspirations, does not depend on whether our homeland finds itself in a given development phase and in a given situation, whether we are satisfied with it, but it relies on the ability to manifest itself with equal strength in all conditions, both for a free homeland and for being in captivity.”⁹⁰ Not

⁸⁷ Hayes, *The Historical Evolution*, 227.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, 226.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, 165.

⁹⁰ Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 9.

surprisingly, Dmowski views the new ideological trends within nationalism not as means to strengthen the state but to reinvigorate the nation:

Under normal conditions, a nation creates strength in the form of a state organization, imposing civic obligations on those who do not want to recognize them voluntarily; we do not have this strength and that is why we encounter people disavowing the service to our homeland; but that is why we must strive even more to create a moral force large enough to exert effective force.⁹¹

This moral principle, founded upon the notions of integration and patriotism, should reveal itself primarily in peoples' behaviour. Most actions may be undertaken without the involvement of the state but through conspiracy organisations, cultural institutions which were guided by nationalistic principles. In other words, ideology does not always depend on the social advancement or the presence of an independent state.

3) Relations with the Democratic System

As I indicated in Chapter 1, the French ideologues, who experienced the instability of the III Republic, envisioned a state with centralized organization governed by the monarch at the top. This led Carlton Hayes to conclude that: "Besides, in domestic affairs, integral nationalism is highly illiberal and tyrannical. It would oblige all citizens to conform to common standard of manners and morals and to share the same unreasoning enthusiasm for it."⁹² By tyrannical he means a form of authoritarianism with supreme rule of a powerful individual: a dictator or an absolute monarch. However, this perspective does not necessarily correspond with the Polish case. The writings of Roman Dmowski reveal that the relation between the Polish nationalist thought and the democratic system is much more ambiguous.

For one thing, Dmowski does not perceive the nationalist ideology and the democratic system as always mutually incompatible. In his view, there is a significant difference between the corrupt, Western, liberal democracy and the participatory system which might be developed in accordance with Polish values and circumstances:

In the view of many minds, a similarly understood national stance is against the tasks of Polish democracy.... [However,] the above national position is opposed

⁹¹ Ibidem, 7-8.

⁹² Hayes, *The Historical Evolution*, 166.

only to the principles of West European liberalism, not to the tasks of Polish democracy. This is a big difference. To understand it, one needs to think more closely about the essence of political directions and parties, and their attitude to the nation and state.”⁹³

Self-evidently, he turns his attention in this paragraph towards the possibility of embracing democracy which internalized the guiding nationalist principles. This is to say that Dmowski opposes a specific branch of democracy, the liberal one. “Polish democracy”, as Dmowski puts it, renounces the liberal principles of individualism, the political rule is based upon conscious citizens, willing to sacrifice their wellbeing for the benefit of the nation. Moreover, once the nation becomes ethnically coherent (see excluding “the Other” and the Collective Ethos in Chapter 2) the democratic system gets rid of the factor which primarily drives its political instability: the difference of interests. Ideally, nationally aware Poles would express a uniform will. However, this is impossible if there are still “alien” elements (like Jews) within the society.

Despite the illiberal and collectivist character of Dmowski’s ideology, democracy is presented as an anticipated form of governance. The key to reconcile this contradiction lies within the assumption that democracy is rather a means of achieving nationalist aims but not a value in itself.⁹⁴ Democracy is regarded by Dmowski as an extremely powerful tool of mobilization and rising national awareness. However, unlike the liberal democracy, the institutional capabilities of the system need to protect the uniform national will, rather than every individual.⁹⁵ As Brian Porter rightly points out: “But the National Democrats did not allow this situation to lead them toward radical democracy or popular empowerment: instead, they concluded that democracy was the most effective means to organize politics in the modern era, the most efficient way to discipline the desires of the masses.”⁹⁶ In other words, Dmowski was not necessarily committed to the idea of democracy, but he acknowledged (to what extent willingly is debatable) this was the only way of mobilising the lower classes for the national cause.

⁹³ Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 174.

⁹⁴ Krzywiec, *Szowinizm po polsku*, 174.

⁹⁵ Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 186.

⁹⁶ Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate*, 149.

4) The Criticism of the Traditional Elites

Dmowski, as a representative of the new nationalist wave, was deeply dissatisfied with the leadership of the nobility which for centuries had been guiding Polish political and socioeconomic life. Not needful to say that at the beginning of his career he also maintained a distanced relationship to the Catholic Church. One is quick to realize that the attitude conveyed by *Thoughts of the Modern Pole* is inconsistent with Hayes's theoretical arguments. The American author assumed that the essential part of "integral nationalism" involves the reinvigoration of traditional hierarchies in both symbolical and practical senses (Chapter 1). By implication, the French nationalists desperately wanted to come back to the times of Louis the Saint and Jeanne D'Arc. However, for Dmowski as well as for many other Poles, the political traditions of the premodern era, especially the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, meant nothing more than the epitome of weakness and moral corruption. It needs to be stressed though that within his political essay he did not share his views on other historical periods.

Right from the outset, Dmowski considers the deterioration of national self-awareness and irresponsibility among the nobility as the main factors which brought the collapse of the Polish state. Accordingly, this process was determined by the dysfunctional political system. The blame for the unchecked rule of the upper class, Dmowski ascribes to the regrettable historical process that took place in the Early Modern Age. Contrary to other Western countries, Poland did not develop urban culture and the ethos of citizenry and left the political power in the hands of selfish oligarchy: "When the Enlightened Western countries, growing rapidly in numbers in the last century, adopted the bourgeois culture, work ethic, the right treatments and societal duties, we embraced the noble culture, the culture of non-obligation, abuse, and even more, showing off."⁹⁷ Whilst the nobility remained unchallenged internally by other social groups its morality loosened and private interest prevailed: "The noble culture dragged us in a false direction: political degeneration, the fall of public life, and economic and social stagnation meant that our nobleman, before he could become civilized as the member of the society, began to retreat and remained largely a barbarian."⁹⁸

Moreover, the author forwards the theory in which the Polish nobility intentionally improved their individualistic wellbeing at the expense of national independence. This aspect contributes greatly to Dmowski's general case against individualism (Chapter 2). In his opinion these

⁹⁷ Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 113-114.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, 114.

delegitimised elites are deprived of the right to guide the people. For that reason, within the “new Polish society” there is no place for the persisting, old hierarchies, as Krzywiec rightly points out: “The nationalist thinker believed that as long as the intellectual elite would descend from the nobility, a social layer eroded to its core with an atmosphere of decline, this social apathy and barren helplessness would have no end.”⁹⁹ In other words, Dmowski does not want to reinstate the dominating position of the traditional elites – he intends to take their place together with other nationally conscious members of intelligentsia.¹⁰⁰

Unlike the other issues, the author does not dedicate faith nor the institutionalized Catholic Church significant attention and it seems as if Dmowski avoids intentionally the subject. This is quite surprising since religion and spirituality proved to be essential and stimulating forces of Polish nationalism in the previous decades. Upon Roman Catholicism the Polish national identity was founded especially in opposition to Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia. One reason for Dmowski’s reluctance to elaborate on this particular aspect might be that: “[A]mong a significant portion of the intelligentsia associated with him politically, the attitude towards religion was shaped in a spirit of free thinking, sometimes taking the form of anti-religious fanaticism, and this initially dictated his program abstinence in religious and church matters.”¹⁰¹

Nonetheless, there are a couple of instances where the thinker addresses faith as a source of both individual and communal rebirth: “One of the hallmarks of this period is the awakening of faith in yourself, in the ability of your race, in national character. This faith, like any strong faith, must necessarily be combined with strong illusions.”¹⁰² It can be argued that he willingly considers nationalism as a force substituting the religion or, at least, becoming parallel to the Catholic Church:

[I]t is true that we are still so little socialized, so little politically civilized, that if we want to be ‘good Poles’, we must make patriotism a religion, and every religion must have its holy books; but even the most religious people can illuminate churches with electricity when we burn old wax candles in our national temple.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Krzywiec, *Szowinizm po polsku*, 381.

¹⁰⁰ Balázs Trencsényi, Michal Kopeček, Luka Lisjak Gabrijelčič, Maria Falina, Mónika Baár, and Maciej Janowski, *History of Modern Political thought in Eastern Europe, Volume I: Negotiating Modernity in the ‘Long Nineteenth Century’*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2016), 425.

¹⁰¹ Teodor Místewicz, “Stosunek Romana Dmowskiego do religii i Kościoła” [“The Attitude of Roman Dmowski towards religion and the Church”], *Studia Historyczne*, 32 (1989): 1, 57.

¹⁰² Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 61.

¹⁰³ *Ibidem*, 30.

A strong call for modernity can be sensed in the quote above and there is a good reason to believe that Dmowski flirted with the idea of nationalism becoming the spiritual force of the new century.

Some degree of spiritual inspiration aimed at national reawakening plays a part in his political doctrine. Nonetheless, in respect to the institutionalized faith the thinker remains sceptical. Dmowski was a trained biologist and began his political activity during the time when it appeared that science holds all the answers to both moral and social questions. Thus, he and other representatives of nationalist thought were primarily influenced by secular and positivist intellectual trends.¹⁰⁴ Not needful to say that Dmowski's attitude towards religion would change during the Interbellum period when his political party (*Endecja*) became increasingly aligned with the Catholic Church.¹⁰⁵ However, at the beginning of the twentieth century (although it is not stated explicitly in *Thoughts*) Dmowski heavily criticized the Church for enforcing the loyalty of Poles towards the old hierarchies (which to his mind let down the nation in the previous centuries) and did not counter vigorously enough the attempts of the partitioning powers to erase Polish cultural identity.¹⁰⁶ The Catholic faith is not the dominating quality of Dmowski's nationalism but is recognized as important and subjugated to the general plan of reinstating nation's cultural confidence and political presence.¹⁰⁷ Although the thinker remains skeptical towards institutionalized Catholicism, he certainly acknowledges the need for spirituality and idealism within his ideology.

Even though I have introduced Dmowski's views on these aspects, the question remains: why did he present a different stance in respect to democracy and traditional hierarchies from nationalists in the West? The answer is twofold. Firstly, his ideological choices were driven by rapidly changing political context. The beginning of the twentieth century, and especially the Revolution of 1905, is the time when mass politics gained significance in Poland.¹⁰⁸ Strikes, shutdowns and terrorists acts shook the Tsarist part of Poland. Also in the midst of rising

¹⁰⁴ For more information see: Maciej Janowski, "A Marriage of Convenience: The Roman Catholic Church and Modernity in Nineteenth-Century Europe", *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, 124 (2017), 43-89.

¹⁰⁵ Ewa Maj, "Romana Dmowskiego 'Kościół, naród i państwo'" ["The Church, the nation and the state' by Roman Dmowski"], *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska*, Sectio K: Politologia, 5 (1998), 63-74.

¹⁰⁶ Mistewicz, "Stosunek Romana Dmowskiego do religii i Kościoła", 58-59.

¹⁰⁷ Aneta Dawidowicz, "Demokratyczna geneza nacjonalizmu. Intelktualne korzenie ruchu narodowodemokratycznego", Nikodem Bończa-Tomaszewski, Warszawa 2001: Recenzja" ["The Democratic Genesis of Nationalism. The Intellectual Roots of the National Democratic Movement", Nikodem Bończa-Tomaszewski, Warsaw 2001: A Review"], *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska*, Sectio K, Politologia 13 (2006), 149.

¹⁰⁸ The theme of mass politics appears in: Porter, "Democracy and Discipline in Late Nineteenth-Century Poland", 346-393.

socialist ideology, Dmowski and other nationalists recognized the need for the lower classes to become engaged in the national project: “Poland, knocked down and restrained for a century, is beginning to move again, due to the movement of the mass of the people, young, vital, making money, the first forces awakened from sleep: it is not actually the rebirth of old Poland but the creation of a new one.”¹⁰⁹ Secondly, his reluctance to embrace monarchy or the sole rule of the nobility derived from the fact, that he perceived the previous political system as the source of Poland’s collapse: “Our political abnormality consisted of: 1) the lack of elements capable of political life outside the nobility, and 2) the fact that the nobility, having the exclusive privilege of government, free from competition with other elements, degenerated politically, lost a sense of state interest.”¹¹⁰ These structural and localized occurrences gave a peculiar shape to the new Polish nationalism, envisioned in Dmowski’s ideological writings. All three scrutinized elements: the contextual differences, the relation towards democracy and traditional elites revealed significant differences between the qualities of the Polish nationalist thought and the understanding of “integral nationalism” presented by Carlton Hayes. By implication, they pose an analytical challenge which requires an answer from the theoretical standpoint.

Conclusion

This thesis investigated the applicability of “integral nationalism”, which was defined and introduced by Carlton J. Hayes, to the political essay *Thoughts of the Modern Pole* written by the Polish nationalist thinker Roman Dmowski. By evaluating the Western term with the use of an Eastern European case study I established that “integral nationalism” retains only partial utility as several qualities of Hayes’s interpretation do not match the evidence provided by the primary source. In the current form “integral nationalism” as an analytical tool can hardly become a universal concept. In the course of the analysis the term appeared conceptually too narrow to address profound contextual and cultural differences emerging in the ideological landscape of the early twentieth century Poland. Therefore, it is my belief that this research contributed in respect to two dimensions. Firstly, it stresses the need for further conceptualization of “integral nationalism”, rather than relying on the original meaning provided by Carlton Hayes. Secondly, by looking into the specific case of Roman Dmowski it

¹⁰⁹ Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 124.

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*, 187.

was my intention to bring the Eastern European perspective into wider theoretical deliberations concerning nationalism.

Initially, I introduced the political and historical origins of “integral nationalism” as both a political and historical concept (Chapter 1). I traced its origins back to the late nineteenth century France where new nationalism emerged. In the remaining part of the chapter I discussed the meaning of “integral nationalism” provided by Hayes and identified the main analytical qualities of his ideological category. Secondly, I applied these main ideological qualities to the case study of Roman Dmowski. The analysis revealed that three aspects – the collectivist ethos, chauvinism and expansionism – remain in close alignment with the categories invented by the American historian and serve well to describe Polish nationalism (Chapter 2). Indeed, Roman Dmowski envisioned the Polish nation regaining its strength through a suppression of individualism, which allegedly breached the unity of the national community, discriminatory policies targeting minority groups (cosmopolitans, Jews) and finally, the cultural expansion both to the East and West. However, it is rather difficult to place the other three – the context, relation towards democracy and the traditional elites – within Hayes’s theoretical framework without expanding the meaning of “integral nationalism” (Chapter 3). The commonly accepted version of “integral nationalism” does not include the contextual differences deriving from distinct geographical and cultural settings. More importantly, Dmowski, contrary to Western European nationalists, did not embrace monarchical system as the most suitable form of governance and remained critical of traditional hierarchies (nobility and clergy). To sum up, all three elements in a direct manner expose the limitations of the concept.

Nonetheless, this research does not aim at completely invalidating Hayes’s understanding of “integral nationalism”. Once we realized that the concept maintains several shortcomings, it is legitimate to ask what can be done about them. The strengths and weaknesses of the approach taken by the author neatly encapsulate an important dilemma. On the one hand, historians and political scientists are required to generalize and categorize in order to make sense of multi-layer developments. On the other hand, this approach increases the risk of losing sight of the differences and details which could undermine the overarching theory. Undoubtedly, it is challenging to capture the complexity of ideology by means of a single concept and certainly true that scholars will never agree on the absolutely correct evaluation of a political concept.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ Freedon, *Ideology*, 52.

One way of solving a terminological issue is to compare it to a similar case. For years scholars have debated the value of “liberal nationalism” as a tool to describe nationalist movements from the beginning of the nineteenth century. One group of historians stressed that nationalism has a deep relationship with the rise of the personal liberties and the democratic system.¹¹² Others, however, pointed out that placing nationalism and liberalism under one umbrella is problematic for numerous reasons (tensions between the individual and the collective may serve as an example).¹¹³ In Bruce Haddock’s view the discussion has become too theoretical and consequently he proposes the return to the writings of nationalist thinkers and their careful treatment in order to establish more nuanced and open categories.¹¹⁴

By the same token, the meaning of “integral nationalism” can be widened by including a broader geographical scope. Starting from the premise that the case of France and Action Française does not exhaust all types of this phenomenon, which is not always anti-democratic, in favour of previous hierarchies, and fostering religious extremism. And this is particularly present in the Eastern European developments and neatly encapsulated in the Roman Dmowski’s case: “[W]hile the old conservative “feudal” political direction lost its salience a new, “progressive conservative” ideological modality emerged, using positivist references, while taking some elements from both European conservatism and liberalism.”¹¹⁵

These contextual and ideological variations can be detected if we employ a specific methodological framework. By acknowledging political thought consists of cluster ideas which are not inherently coherent nor universal, it is possible to establish the reasons for which nationalism dominated the political discourse at that time: “The meanings an ideology conveys reflect not only the historical traditions of political discourse, nor only the cultural pluralism of the different contexts in which the ideology is shaped, but can be accessed through the particular patterns in which its constituent political concepts are ordered.”¹¹⁶ In other words, it is necessary to break down complex thoughts into prime factors before formulating a general conclusion. The *Thoughts of a Modern Pole* self-evidently reveals that the author willingly combined concepts and intellectual tendencies coming from the West (i.e. Positivism) as well as from the indigenous cultural background (i.e. Polish exceptionalism). Thus, the ideological

¹¹² One of the most significant proponents of this approach is Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

¹¹³ Gina Gustavsson, David Miller (eds.), *Liberal Nationalism and Its Critics: Normative and Empirical Questions*, (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

¹¹⁴ Haddock, “State and nation in Mazzini’s political thought”, 313-314.

¹¹⁵ Trencsényi et al, *History of Modern Political thought in Eastern Europe*, 319.

¹¹⁶ Freedon, *Ideology*, 52.

approach leaves the main theoretical framework intact while keeping an eye for the detail and local variations.

On the practical level, a more nuanced meaning of “integral nationalism” can be fostered by further academic investigation. In order to fully answer the question concerning the utility of this concept, it would be pivotal to include other nationalist thinkers from Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Russian Empire who embraced the notions of political and social integrity. To conclude, the new form of nationalism brought a new type of mindset which infiltrated the realm of politics, intellectual sphere, and even more importantly feelings of common people.¹¹⁷ Therefore, under no circumstances should the scholars neglect the further conceptualization of the nationalist ideology. Essentially, the strains of nationalist thought from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provide us with the unique view of the new intellectual dynamics that turned out to be guiding political principles of the new century.

¹¹⁷ Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism*, 255.

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