European Integration in a Historical Perspective: Politicization – A Theoretical Blindspot?

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Abstract

'European Integration in a Historical Perspective: Politicization – A theoretical Blindspot?' picks up the contemporary debate of the relevance of functionalism to theorize European Integration of the 21st Century. To what extend does the phenomenon of politicization of the European Refugee Crisis question the common theoretical understanding of European integration? This central question places the concept of politicization at the centre of this debate. An extensive historiography provides an overview of European Integration theory since the end of WWII. To narrow down the scope of the research, migration is chosen as a focus, highlighting migration policy in regional integration in Europe since the end of the Cold War through primary sources. Providing a narrative framework Syrian political refugees are used as a case study, as they are at the centre of the European migrant crisis of 2015. An empirical secondary analysis of Eurobarometer survey data on public opinion between 1999 and 2019 as well as of the European Elections of 2009, 2014 and 2019 establish a foundation for a discussion on the role of identity, politicization, public perception and policy decision making. At the centre of this deliberation are the established functional theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the novel approach of Post-Functionalism. While the findings support the functional approach, hypothetical indications that require larger scale research seriously question established theories. Politicization, amplified by the internet and new media, could create serious public pressure on policy makers. The regional integration process in Europe however is so rigid and time-consuming that it survives the temporary waves of politicized public preferences. Salience is a fluent concept that can quickly change from one issue to another.

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0. Introduction

In 1995 the Schengen agreement effectively abolished the borders within the European Union.[1] At the same time a common outside border was not established. Two decades later, in 2015, the so-called refugee crisis is considered by many scholars, politicians and individuals to be one of the most threatening problems to the European idea. On a very basic level, this idea is that of European integration, the process of industrial, economic, political, social, legal and cultural amalgamation within Europe.[2] Even before Schengen, European and national security has been and continues to be a frequently reaffirmed policy priority, both within individual countries and on a supranational level.[3] Security is often used as a frame in which migration is viewed, especially in the media and by prominent political figures leaning to the right.[4] Intensified by the development of the internet and its global reach, security itself as well as migration has gone through a politization process in the past two decades. Specifically, the political and public reaction to 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror, marks this process, with rising support for populist anti-immigration narratives. Media, (populist) political parties, voters and activists dominate the debate having politicians, journalists and ordinary people refer to refugees as "floods", "invasions", or "swarms" and considering terrorism, despite limited domestic danger as a major threat to Western society. In general the media and the public debate largely underrepresents the humanitarian aspects of migration and focusses on security implication as a close analysis of the media coverage between 1999 and 2013 shows.[5] While there is a justifiable uncertainty among Europeans to what extent an integration of refugees is possible, the discourse on migration is almost forcefully linked with terrorism and overprioritizes national security and financial costs compared to humanitarian necessities and moral responsibilities. Another fear is that of cultural loss through the apparent incompatibility of the Islamic values with European values. These uncertainties, in combination with a selective rhetoric and changing media landscape away from traditional media and towards online and social media coverage lead to a strong discrepancy between threats and the perception of threats.[6] This kind of politicization of an issue, be it security or migration itself is not considered to be a decisive variable in the traditional theories on European integration. The public in general is largely disregarded as an essential influence.[7]

[1] European Union Council, 'The Schengen Acquis' (Official Journal of the European Communities, 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:239:0001:0473:EN:PDF.

[2] Annegret Eppler, Lisa H. Anders, and Thomas Tuntschew, *Europe's Political, Social, and Economic (Dis-)Integration: Revisiting the Elephant in Times of Crises*, vol. 143, 2016.

[3] Merlingen, Michael. *EU security policy: what it is, how it works, why it matters.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012.

[4] Johannes Wagner, 'Flüchtlinge als Sicherheitsrisiko: Warum Menschen- rechtsverletzungen an den EU-Außengrenzen toleriert werden.', no. 2016 (n.d.): 46.

[5] Wagner.

[6] Michael Gurevitch, Stephen Coleman, and Jay G. Blumler, 'Political Communication —Old and New Media Relationships', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 625, no. 1 (1 September 2009): 164–81, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716209339345.

[7] Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus', *British Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 1 (January 2009): 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123408000409.

All three of the predominant theories on European integration understand the process as a logical approach to fulfil a common interest, which is the basic comprehension of classic functionalism.[8] From this point of departure Neo-functionalism pursues the argument that integration automatically extends the capacity of supranational institutions, while intergovernmentalism argues for nation states as the central elements of integration.[9] Institutionalism accepts the importance of supranational institutions but only to an extend that is permitted by national governments.[10] The departure of this thesis is the neglected role of the European public in the process of political integration as people react with a wicked problem such as migration.[11] The question arises: To what extent does the phenomenon of politicization of the European Refugee Crisis question the common theoretical understanding of European integration?

To answer this question, this paper will first provide an overview of migration in Europe. The common theories of European integration will be introduced and analysed along their relationship to the regional integration process in Europe. A theoretical account of politicization will round this analysis off. In the second chapter post-cold war EU migration policy will be analysed pre and post crisis. A descriptive account of the Civil war in Syria and a focus on Syrian political migrants provides a narrative to look at the EU crisis management in terms of policy decisions on migration. The third chapter will introduce the media and its role of influence on political processes. Chapter four will analyse the role of Identity for the politicization. Social Identity theory will be introduced and discussed in light of the century old divide between Europe and the Orient, multi- and national level governance. Chapter five will move towards an empirical analysis of survey data provided by the Standard Eurobarometer biannual surveys on public opinion in the European Union and on the European Parliament Election.

Subsequently, this paper will use the empirical data analysis as well as the primary source analysis of migration policy in the European Union to take a closer look at the theoretical debate in European integration. The effect of politicization and therefore the role of the public will be discussed as a variable that is largely discounted by the traditional theories. Liberal Intergovernmentalism considered the more established advanced theory will be tested in light of post functionalist criticism. These two frameworks are the central contenders of theory to understand European integration today. The answer to the research question might therefore provide the key for a much larger debate on decision making competences and authority in the European integration process. This paper therefore addresses one of the most urgent political debates in the European Union today and simultaneously points towards a gap in the theoretical understanding of this issue as such. The combination of a selected case, primary sources on European integration, empirical survey data and a historical perspective provide a point of departure for debates on related issues such as migration, terrorism, islamophobia and humanitarian responsibilities by taking the complexity and interconnectedness of these issues seriously.

[8] David Mitrany, 'The Functional Approach to World Organization', *International Affairs* 24, no. 3 (July 1948): 350–63, https://doi.org/10.2307/3018652.
[9] Andrew Moravcsik, 'The European Constitutional Compromise and the Neofunctionalist Legacy', *Journal of European Public Policy* 12, no. 2 (April 2005): 349–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760500044215.
[10] Paul Pierson, *The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 1995).
[11] Brian W Head, 'Wicked Problems in Public Policy', n.d., 19.

0.1 Methodology

This paper aims to analyse current theories on European integration and discuss their feasibility, taking into account the development of theory in the 20th Century and the empirical changes to European integration in the 21st Century. There is no clear line to differentiate these periods but as with many periodical analyses, European integration can be divided into the Cold War period and after. To determine the traditionally relevant theoretical perspectives, it is necessary to create an overview of existing thoughts on the topic of European integration. This thesis will combine three aspects of literature review: Integrative review, theoretical review and historical review. Integrative review creates new frameworks and perspectives by integrating representative existing literature on a topic. Here the established functional theory of Liberal intergovernmentalism, as the prime example of traditional European integration theory, will be used next to the theoretical approach of Post-Functionalism. The latter questions the relevance of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and functional theories in general and aims to create a new theoretical understanding of regional integration, adapted to contemporary challenges. These challenges will be analysed and enable a discussion on the different thoughts on European integration. The style of theoretical review justifies a specific focus on theory and theoretical literature. It helps to establish what theories exist, possible interrelationships and the scope of theories and enables the scholar to develop new hypotheses. Lastly a historical review, which is focussed on examining the evolution of research within an area of scholarship places theories, concepts, or phenomena in a historical context. In combination with a narrative process tracing limited to major EU treaty policy on European integration, this method will sort the different collected information in a logical framework. It allows for a selection and arrangement of the information found.

The discussion of theory will be supported by an empirical secondary analysis of cross-national survey data. The Eurobarometer standard reports between 1999 - 2019 and the post-election reports of the European Parliament Election 2009, 2014 and 2019 will be analysed. A focus will be set on data on public opinion, especially on policy priorities as this adds to the theoretical discussion of politicization in Europe. There are three dimensions on European Integration that are measured differently: Economic integration, political integration and social integration. Political integration has the most straight forward mode of operationalization, as it is based on legal documents like the European Union treaties. Operationalizing social integration or Economic Integration is much more complicated. The latter requires economic models and price- or quantity-based indicators play a role.[12] As this would beyond the scope of this paper the focus will be on political integration and partially on social integration. Social Integration can be measured by many modes including social interactions, communicative space and a common public sphere and European identity.

Birgit Glorius, 'Public Opinion on Immigration and Refugees and Patterns of Politicisation', n.d., 37.

This paper will focus on European identity in relation to migration in Europe due to its relevance for politicization and to the debate on functionalist regional integration theories. Theoretical concepts are highlighted to hypothesise preference building and to understand the essential differences of the major theories pursued today. Migration was chosen as topic central to political debate in Europe. To narrow the scope on the very complex issue of migration, a focus will be set on Syrian political refugees. This provides an example case, which will act as an anchor and point of departure to describe the role of Islam in European identity, the politicization of preference building and the importance of new media in the political processes of European integration policy in the 21st Century. Syrian political refugees represent the largest group of refugees in the migration crisis and are a relevant variable in most aspects of the crisis and its effect on Europe. Without the Syrian war, the migration to Europe might have been manageable, making this case a decisive aspect in political decision making in Europe. Politicization will be discussed along various lines including questions of identity, fact and perception and the role of new media. Then the influence of politicization on European integration will be tested based on empirical and theoretical findings

1. Chapter I: Theories of Regional Integration in Europe

1.1 Migration in Europe

Europe as a popular destination in global migrant flows is historically established. Especially Imperialism, be it that of the antiquity or colonial period created a massive movement of people towards Europe. In the 21st century with conflicts in Africa and the Middle east rising, the number of migrants to Europe increased to crisis level in 2015. A distinction needs to be made between economic migrants and political migrants as there is varying international legislation for these groups. Since the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, international law guarantees political refugees the right to request asylum in a safe country.[13] To narrow the scope this paper will focus mainly on this political migration. Migration is a wicked problem with varying patterns, historical contexts and rational individual decisions.

The history of refugees in Europe is long. Just in the past century, the Balkan Wars (1912-13) and World War I (1914-18) produced millions of refugees.[14] Between 1915 and 1923 Millions of Armenians fled Turkey.[15] In 1923 on mediation of the League of Nations Greece and Turkey who had been at war agreed on the first compulsory population exchange uprooting 2 million people resembling the problems seen today.[16] Starting in 1933 with the election of Adolf Hitler, Jewish refugees started spreading over Europe, a flow intensifying with the years, prompting anti-migrant sentiments in the rest of Europe. Following World War II another vast forced migration removed the 13-14 million strong German population from Eastern and South Eastern Europe and swapped large groups of people in Poland and Ukraine to create a more homogeneous society in both nations.[17] Large refugee waves fled Bulgaria in the 1980s, followed by the massive mass exodus of East Germans and former Soviet bloc citizens after the fall of the Berlin wall and the Soviet Union.[18] The Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s saw 2.7 million people being internally and externally displaced.[19]

[13] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, *Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons and Text of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Resolution 2198 (XXI) Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and Text of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees : With an Introductory Note* (Geneva: United Nations, 1983).
[14] Gilbert Jaeger, 'On the History of the International Protection of Refugees', *Revue Internationale de La Croix-Rouge/International Review of the Red Cross* 83, no. 843 (September 2001): 727–38, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1560775500119285.
[15] Kirisci K, 'Refugee Movements and Turkey.', *International Migration (Geneva, Switzerland)* 29, no. 4 (1991): 545–60.
[16] Raoul Blanchard, 'The Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey', *Geographical Review* 15, no. 3 (1925): 449–56, https://doi.org/10.2307/208566.
[17] Oliver Falck, Stephan Heblich, and Susanne Link, 'Forced Migration and the Effects of an Integration Policy in Post-WWII Germany', *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy* 12, no. 1 (15 May 2012), https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1682.3171.
[18] Theodora Dragostinova, 'Refugees or Immigrants? The Migration Crisis in Europe in Historical Perspective', n.d., 8; Kurt Mills, 'United Nations Intervention in Refugee Crises after the Cold War', *International Politics* 35, no. 4 (1998): 391–424.
[19] C. Levy, 'Refugees, Europe, Camps/State of Exception: "Into The Zone", the European Union and Extraterritorial Processing of Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum-Seekers (Theories and Practice)', *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (1 January 2010): 92–119, https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdq013.

Given the experience of migration in Europe, the current migration crisis is hardly a new phenomenon. With a population of over 750 million people in Europe, 3.9 million forced migrants do not represent significantly.[20] At the same time the migrant population in Europe is relatively low compared to the globally displaced number of people.[21] Social class and chain-migration where refugees seek the assistance of friends and family in the country of destination are important factors to consider.

[20] Phillip Connor and Jeffrey Passel, 'Europe's Unauthorized Immigrant Population Peaks in 2016, Then Levels Off', *Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project* (blog), 13 November 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/11/13/europes-unauthorized-immigrant-population-peaks-in-2016-then-levels-off/.

[21] 'Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Asylum | Data', accessed 20 February 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG.

1.2 Historiography

In the traditional theories on European integration the influence of the public on decision making does not play a decisive role. European integration was a task for the political elite, with a high level of sovereignty being invested in national governments. As this paper intends in its core to analyse the ability of the public to influence policy on European integration, migration is chosen as a topic with the hypothetical capacity to build enough pressure to force the hand of policy makers. To provide a foundation for an analysis and discussion on European integration the following paragraphs will introduce theories of European Integration from Inter and post-war functionalism to 21st Century post-functionalism. These will be embedded in a timeline of regional integration policy in Europe.

1.2.1 Interwar European Integration and Functionalism: David Mitrany

One century ago, following the first World War, the theory of functionalism started shaping the thinking of scholars and policy makers on political integration.[22] The basic idea was that a discrepancy between territorial scale of problems and of political authority would lead to an adjustment of jurisdiction, creating a supranational or intergovernmental authority based on functions and needs opposing the realist idea of the nation state at the centre of power and authority.[23]

According to David Mitrany, the father of functionalism, form follows function.[24] It is not worth the effort to meticulously plan integration on the basis of normative goals but rather start with technocratic solutions. Institutional and contractual solutions would then automatically result from situational functional requirements. Logically, David Mitrany rejected federalism, which, according to him, was either illusory or even harmful in its pursuit of constitutional determination, as it would only shift the problem of the power state to a higher level by constructing a larger state. In contrast, Mitrany took an approach that was consistent with the pursuit of tendentially loose but supra-regional, expansive connections in a world society whose strength would be assured by their material necessity.[25] His examples were institutions such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) within the League of Nations, in which technocratic elites could find fact-oriented solutions. He assumed that the reach of such associations was limited by the requirements of their work, meaning that they had not the intend or the grounds to claim additional power.

These limits were exceeded when supranational authority in the 1950s and 60s interpreted its limits loosely and claimed powers beyond a functional intent.[26] The more refined theory of Neofunctionalism introduced the idea of political and functional spill-over describing the phenomenon that integration leads to further integration in related area. Another theory originating in functionalism is that of intergovernmentalism, which determines national governments as the primary actors in the institutionalized integration process.[27]

[22] Mitrany, 'The Functional Approach to World Organization'.
[23] David Mitrany, 'The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, n.d., 32.
[24] Mitrany, 'The Functional Approach to World Organization'.
[25] ibid
[26] Ernst B. international relations Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economical Forces 1950-1957*, The Library of World Affairs ; 42 (London: Stevens, 1958).
[27] Moravcsik, 'The European Constitutional Compromise and the Neofunctionalist Legacy'.

1.2.2 EU Integration and Neofunctionalism: Ernst B. Haas

Today European integration is particularly related to the European Union (EU). The EU has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established in the Treaty of Paris in 1951/52, and the European Economic Community (EEC), established in the Treaty of Rome in 1957.[28] Other important developments in this period were the 1948 Hague Congress leading to the creation of the European Movement International, a lobbying association that coordinates European integration attempts, the College of Europe a postgraduate institute for Europe's future leaders, and the 1949 Council of Europe.[29] To counterbalance the destructive nationalism of World War II and the anti-democratic power politics posed by the Soviet Union, as well as to strengthening the economic stability and to avoid U.S. American economic dominance, Western European leaders, representing Belgium, Luxembourg, West Germany, France, the Netherlands and Italy, pushed for closer cooperation. With agreements signed in 1952 on the European Defence Community (EDC), later rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954 and on the European Political Community (EPC) that aimed at merging the ECSC and the EDC, decision makers showed interest in regional integration beyond economic cooperation.[30] In terms of passed decisions the Rome treaties reacted to the rejection of the EPC by focussing integration on the area economy.[31]

This quick development of European integration led to the theoretical concept of Neofunctionalism, spearheaded by German American scholar Ernst B. Haas. In his 1958 book *The Uniting of Europe*, Haas explained how cooperation in specific policy sectors leads to a wider political integration, through the so-called spill-over effect.[32] There are two forms of spill-over: Functional spill-over, describing how integration in one policy area creates pressure in related areas; and political spill-over, the creation of supranational governance models. The concept of spill-over renders European integration a process that sustains itself and provides an explanation for the institution that became the European Union.

[28] EU, *Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Paris, 18 April 1951.*, [Great Britain. Parliament. Papers by Command] Cmnd. ; 4863 (London: H.M.S.O., 1972); EU, 'Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community', 1957, 80, https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_3_antlasmalar/1_3_1_kurucu_antlasmalar/1957_treaty_establishing_eec.pdf.

[29] 'History | EMI', accessed 20 February 2020, https://europeanmovement.eu/who-we-are/history/.

[30] EU, 'Treaty to Establish the European Defence Community (Rejected)', 1952, http://aei.pitt.edu/5201/1/5201.pdf.

[31] EU, 'Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community'.

[32] Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*.

1.2.3 EU Integration and Intergovernmentalism: Stanley Hoffmann & Alan Milward

Questioning the applicability of the neo-functionalist spill-over in relation to central national interests such as foreign policy, Stanley Hoffmann championed the approach of Intergovernmentalism in his 1966 book *Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe.*[33] He concluded that the nation state does not become obsolete as it is an adaptable concept and provides the basis for any essential change. Alan Milward iterates that national governments are the driving factor behind European integration and that rather than losing sovereignty in the process they come out stronger on the other end, with a merged sovereignty.[34] According to Intergovernmentalists, European integration is related to shared goals and a slowing of this progress is directly connected to diverging preferences and lacking agreement between national governments.

With the creation of the 'common market' and its inherent free movement of persons, services, foods and capital, in the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the 1960's were marked by an economic growth in member states.[35] This was supported by an abandoning of customs duties and increasing agricultural cooperation. The 1970's saw the first enlargement with the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joining the six founding member states in 1973.[36] This decade marks greats steps forward in European democracy. With the end of the Salazar regime in Portugal in 1974 and the death of General Franco in Spain in 1975, the last right-wing dictatorships in Europe were eradicated, pushing the importance of democratic governance.[37] Since 1979 the European Parliament (EP) is elected every five years through universal suffrage.[38] The EP began as the Common Assembly of in the ECSC, later also the EEC and Euratom under the name European Parliamentary Assembly and is considered the first common institution in the EU. Until at least the 1990's the EP was mostly a forum for discussion and a consultative body. With each consecutive treaty its competences were extended. Today the process of 'ordinary legislative procedure' requires an approval of both the European Parliament and Council of the EU to pass legislation proposed by the European Commission, who has virtual monopoly on the introduction of European legislation into the process.[39]

[33] Stanley Hoffman, *Obstinate or Obsolete?: The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe*, 1966.
[34] Walter Lipgens, Wilfried Loth, and Alan Milward, *A History of European Integration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
[35] EU, 'Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community'.
[36] European Commission and Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, *Enlargement of the European Union* (Luxembourg: Publications Office, 2015).
[37] John M. Merriman and J. M. Winter, *Europe since 1914: Encyclopedia of the Age of War and Reconstruction*, Scribner Library of Modern Europe (Detroit, Mich.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2006),.
[38] Udo Bux, 'The European Parliament: Historical Background', 2019, 4.
[39] EU, 'Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community', 2009, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF.

1.2.4 EU Integration and Institutionalism: Paul Pierson & Mark A Pollack

Providing more nuances to institutions is the theory of institutionalism or new institutionalism, developed in the 1980s and 1990s to understand US Institutions. A subdivision, rational economic historical Institutionalism represented in its origin through Paul Pierson and Mark Pollack was quickly used to describe the European Union and European integration.[40] In Paul Piersons "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis", the author criticises the work of Intergovernmentalist scholar Andrew Moravcsik for focusing only on the grand bargains and ignoring supranational institutional independent existence.[41] According to Pierson this independent existence lead to central policy decisions relating to integration that were largely ignored by national actors. To explain this asymmetric power relations, the scholar describes the EU member states as principal agents that delegate power to supranational institutions or agents. Where Neofunctionalism would speak of an autonomy of institutions and Intergovernmentalism of the superiority and leadership of national actors, Pierson and also Pollack speak of the earlier mentioned independent existence.[42] Supranational entities create gaps, meaning significant differences, between the institutional or political preferences of the member states and the functions of the institutions. Another key aspect of historical institutionalism is path dependency.[43] Pierson makes this a central element of his work, arguing that actors are not fully aware of the future consequences of their actions and that future behaviour is possibly constrained by past choices.

Next to the end of the east-west divide, the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 1980's in Europe were marked by further enlargement with Greece joining in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986.[44] In the same year the signing of *Single European Act* (SEA) provided new fodder to the academic debate on European integration.[45] The treaty, aimed at sorting out the issues of free flow of trade across EU borders, created the 'Single Market' by 1993, transferring essential authority to the supranational level and establishing the freedom of movement of the factors of production, such as capital and labour and of enterprise and services. The single market can be seen as a developed form of the common market. The SEA extended the supranational institutional and substantive law on economic and social policy, environmental protection, science development and technological progress.

Signed in 1992 in Maastricht the *Treaty on European Union* (Maastricht Treaty) also came into force 1993.[46] This treaty, that also led to the creation of a single European currency, officially founded the European Union based on three pillars:

[40] M. A Pollack, 'The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis', *GOVERNANCE -OXFORD-* 9, no. 4 (1996): 429–58.
[41] Pierson, *The Path to European Integration*.
[42] Pollack, 'The New Institutionalism and EC Governance'.
[43] Pierson, *The Path to European Integration*.
[44] European Commission and Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, *Enlargement of the European Union*.
[45] Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community', *International Organization* 45, no. 1 (1991): 19–56.
[46] EU, 'Treaty of Maastricht', 1992, https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf.

(I.) The European Communities pillar dealt with economic, social and environmental policies and comprised the European Economic Community, now named the European Community, the ECSC and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).
(II.) The Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar handled Foreign relations and military matters.
(III.) The Justice and Home affairs pillar presented a platform to cooperate in criminal matters.

After further enlargement with Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, the Maastricht Treaty was amended thrice.[47] In 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the 1995 Schengen Agreement into the legal framework of the European Union and expanded the role of the European Institutions especially in the second and third pillar.[48] The European Parliament gained the ability to block legislative proposals issued by the European Commission and extended attention was provided to social issues, the protection of human rights the fight against discrimination. The Amsterdam Treaty simplified and consolidated the foundations of the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Rome on the Functioning of the European Union, laying the groundworks for future EU enlargement. Building on this foundation the Treaty of Nice decided on the extensive enlargement of 2004 when Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus joined the EU followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.[49] To cope with this extensive development decision making was especially adapted with weighted voting in the council of the European Union, the extension of qualified majority voting and a clarification and extension of the position of the European Commission. The third amendment followed in 2009 with the Treaty of Lisbon after initial efforts to create a European constitution were shut down by referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005.[50] The Lisbon treaty reformed the European Union and gave legal personality to the Community introducing a unified organizational structure that replaced the pillar structure of Maastricht.

Especially important for this paper is the new division of competences established in the Lisbon treaty.[51] On a supranational level, the European Union has competences to realize the EU's goals, foreign policy and safety. Shared competences allow for multi-level governance while communal law takes precedence over national law. The national level retains certain areas of independent decision making. The European Parliament gained new competences in communal legislation, budgetary decisions and political control providing European citizens with a representative right to initiate legislation. At the same time the qualified majority voting system in the Council of the European Union was set to be replaced by double majority voting in 2014, meaning that 55% of the member states representing 65% of the European Union population were necessary to make certain decisions.[52]

[47] European Commission and Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, *Enlargement of the European Union*.
[48] EU, *Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts* (Luxembourg : Lanham, Md: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities ; Bernan Associates [distributor], 1997).
[49] EU, 'Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty in European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts', 2001, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_nice.pdf.
[50] EU, 'Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community'.
[51] EU.
[52] EU.

1.2.5 EU Integration and Liberal Intergovernmentalism: Andrew Moravcsik

In his 1998 book *The Choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht*, Andrew Moracvsik incorporated the liberal bargaining model of preference formation into the Intergovernmentalist basic theory.[53] He argued that the bargaining power of national governments and EU member states are a central element of European integration, including package deals and side bargains. Institutions are reduced to brokers assuring the realization of member states commitments. Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) can be broken down as follows:

1. On the very basic level there is a functional interdependence between European states. In the case of LI this interdependence is issue-specific and therefore cannot be explained by a specific functional pressure. This means that there is no determinable influence based on functional merits. This supports the central role of national governments that choose the strategic policy priorities according to their own functional agenda.

2. There is an asymmetrical interdependence among national preferences determining the decision and action of governments to increase or decrease integration.

3. Common supranational institutions are instruments to "co-ordinate or credibly commit states to the enforcement, elaboration and extension of bargains."[54]

Concentrating on national governments as the central player in the European integration process, Moravcsik focusses on national preferences and state-society relations. The role of the public manifests in social pressures that affect the preference formation due to a tangible or intangible 'issue-specific functional interdependence' within transnational networks and social groups. Depending on the issue, European co-operation can for example affect social groups by resulting in domestic redistribution and institutional disruption. With "the primary interest of governments [is] to maintain themselves in office", preferences are not limited to the content aspects of the governing political party and instead include a range of hypothetical outcomes, described as 'ordering'. They are influenced by the strength of support for an outcome, the 'intensity' and the tolerance for possible failure or the level of 'risk acceptance'. There is also a 'time horizon', meaning a desired time frame of realization and the sensitivity of the relevant social groups to the costs, the so-called 'trade offs'.[55] Highlighting issue-specificity and therefore the values and interests related to a specific issue area is based on the Political Economy approach. This opposes foci on hypothetical national priorities such as nationalism or other concepts of collective identity and sovereignty. Moravcsik affirms his views by pointing at four empirical trends of the 21st Century that support the LI approach:[56]

[53] Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (London: UCL Press, 1998).
[54] Moravcsik 1998.
[55] Moravcsik 1998.
[56] Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preferences, Power and Institutions in 21 st -Century Europe: Preferences, Power and Institutions in 21 st -Century Europe', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 56, no. 7 (November 2018): 1648–74, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12804.

1. Europe did not disintegrate across the board. In areas where no functional progress can be determined, it should be taken into account, that several new Member States had to be integrated into the already existing mechanisms. European integration is divided in different areas and there have been developments in monetary and financial policy, defence and foreign policy as well as migration and enlargement that are fairly unaffected by social pressures or politicized factors.[57] Stability in agricultural support, common trade policy and other core functions of the European Union support this claim and there is no evidence that failures of European policies are related to an overarching anti-European sentiment.
2. Salient issues, that would and have induced negative public sentiment are relatively unchanged. Macroeconomic policy, environment and agriculture and even migration, the 'clearest case of negative public sentiment driving substantive policy change' as an issue has been on governments radar for decades. In addition, LI predicts that negative attitudes towards migration drive right-wing populism rather than negative attitudes toward Europe.
3. Populism is not a majority gaining political strategy. In countries where populist did win a ruling majority such as Italy, active influence on substantive European policy is limited. While they generally stick to their anti-migration views, other Eurosceptic positions are abandoned. Even in more openly problematic governments such as Hungary and Poland changes remain symbolic and on a rhetorical level and outside of migration countries are content with further European integration. Even when referenda point towards a social preference, governments for example in the Netherland or Ireland follow their own different agenda in the end when it comes to substantive policy.
4. Brexit has to be seen as an exception. Britain remains the only country with an intent to leave the European Union and even in this case scholars speak more of a surprise outlier than of a general trend. Euroscepticism is not new to Britain and it has been known for decades to lack the willingness to integrate fully into the European Union. Brexit is therefore not a full-fletched disintegration and the negotiations show that in fact there is a large interest in the British government and parliament to keep most substantial arrangements in place.

[57] Moravcsik 2018.

1.2.6 EU Integration and Postfunctionalism: Liesbeth Hooghe & Gary Marks

We saw that the 1990's and early 2000's were marked by extensive restructuring in Europe, with a variety of challenges presented by the massive enlargement of the European Union. But challenges were not restricted to that. After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the declared 'war on terror' shook the foundations of international law and society.[58] It pushed security to the forefront of policy priority worldwide, despite a relatively small amount of terrorism victims in Western societies.[59] Not long after the introduction of the Euro to replace national currencies, the 2008 world financial crisis marked an economic setback that was immediately followed by the 2010 European Debt Crisis.[60] The latter had several member states unable to repay or refinance their government debt, including most prominently Greece and Ireland but also Spain, Portugal and Cyprus. This led to lasting financial issues in most European countries and extensive support but also requirements by the European Union and more stable member states. In the last decade the economic crisis continued to affect European markets and Croatia joined the European Union as member 28 in 2013. [61] The European elections in 2014 show a rise in Euroscepticism that is even pushed further with the migrant crisis of 2015 and topped by the Brexit Referendum in 2016 and the likely reduction of the EU back to 27 member states.[62]

Put forward by Liesbeth Hooghe and Gary Marks in 2008 Post-functionalism (PF) marks a more novel approach to European integration in comparison to traditional functional theories.[63] Using the analytical method of multi-level governance and focussing on the European Union, the scholars argue that the issue is far more complicated than the rather one-dimensional theories mentioned above suggest. According to them, authority and power is dispersed over several levels of governance. Adding regional and even local levels of sovereignty and authority to the theoretical framework increases the sources and drivers of European integration immensely. The most distinguishing feature of this theory is the central role of politicization. PF sets out to explain the politicization of European issues in three steps:[64]

[58] Wojtek Mackiewicz Wolfe, *Winning the War of Words: Selling the War on Terror from Afghanistan to Iraq* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008).
[59] Hannah Ritchie et al., 'Terrorism', *Our World in Data*, 28 July 2013, https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism.
[60] Beata Farkas, 'The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis in the Old and New Cohesion Member States of the European Union', SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 29 April 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2047804.
[61] Matthias Ruffert, 'The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law', *Common Market Law Review* 48, no. 6 (2011121): 1777–1805, http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=COLA2011070.
[62] Matthew J. Goodwin and Oliver Heath, 'The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left behind: An Aggregate-Level Analysis of the Result', *The Political Quarterly* 87, no. 3 (2016): 323–332.
[63] Hooghe and Marks, 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration'.
[64] Hooghe and Marks.

1. Similar to LI interdependence causes functional pressures to reshape the institutional status quo. This means here that policies at a regional or global level are more functional than national policies, due to the relationship between countries in the EU.
2. Raised 'stakes of the issue' and/or 'the capacity of contending actors to politicize an issue' lead to popular mobilization. This can invoke conflicts in elections and trigger social preferences based on national identity. To be more specific, functional interests and identity concerns possibly pull in different directions. At the foundation of this thinking lies non-rational psychology as an explanation for social preferences. Another driver is sovereignty or the demand for self-rule that is usually sacrificed for the functional demand for transnational authority.
3. The 20th Century European integration process is explained with a politics of permissive consensus, driven by insulated elites. With the end of the Cold War started a period of constraining dissensus with identity as a decisive factor of European integration and even disintegration. The derivative politicization explained in step 1 and 2 has 'disruptive potential' that support this hypothesis.

The most relevant criticism of the Post-Functionalist approach is that it does not (yet) propose a theoretical account or methodology to (empirically) test the influence of social pressures on European integration.[65] In the early 1990's around the same time, Moravcsik first introduced his idea of liberal intergovernmentalism, Liesbeth Hooghe, Gary Marks and Kermit Blank proposed Multi-level governance as a viable alternative to the Intergovernmentalist state-centric governance idea.[66] Here regional integration elevated from being a functional tool of national states to representing one aspect of the "articulation of authority across jurisdictions at diverse scales", describing a polity in which diverse groups on a national and transnational level influence European integration. State-centricity leaned hard on legal authority as a decisive resource but multi-level governance included additional resources such as information, organization , expertise, financial resources and legitimacy.[67] Originally, the authors focussed on the increasingly important role of the European Commission as an example of how a transnational institution gains authority in European policy making demonopolizing state executives. They also described the increasing number of subgroups interested in influencing European integration on various levels.

[65] Moravcsik, 'Preferences, Power and Institutions in 21 st -Century Europe'.
[66] Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank, 'European Integration and the State', n.d., 54.
[67] Marks, Hooghe, and Blank.

Based on this logic Hooghe and Marks developed the post-functionalist approach in 2009 that specifically added identity as a decisive factor for preference building and highlighted the role of the public sphere and of politicization. Here governance is not only understood as a measure to coordinate human activity to achieve collective benefits but also as an expression of community. Governance represents how the community wants to be governed and the community is based on an understanding of itself, an identity. This overcomes functionalism as jurisdictions and institutions can be based on a community preference and therefore do not have to be efficient necessarily especially when they arise from political conflict and constitute a compromise. Scholars have found evidence to support following assumptions aiding the post-functionalist argument:

1. Public opinion on European integration has become more structured in recent years.[68] Before, the public had been mostly excluded as a factor as its interest in European Integration was minimal, not creating political pressure or conflict for decisionmakers.
2. This structured public opinion influences national voting.[69] It has a high degree of salience and it therefore increasingly picked up as a policy priority.
3. Structured public opinion today is connected to conflict and contestation designs in European societies, meaning that political conflict on European level is actively or passively related to public opinion.[70]

[68] Mark Franklin and Cees van der Eijk, 'Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National Elections in Europe', in Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen, eds, European Integration and Political Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 32-50.

[69] Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris, *Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-Term Perspective* (London, 1999), https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446218518; Matthew Gabel, 'European Integration, Voters and National Politics', *West European Politics* 23, no. 4 (2000): 52–72.

[70] Simon Hix, 'Dimensions and Alignments in European Union Politics: Cognitive Constraints and Partisan Responses', *European Journal of Political Research* 35, no. 1 (1999): 69–106, https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00442; Paul Pennings, 'The Dimensionality of the EU Policy Space: The European Elections of 1999', *European Union Politics* 3, no. 1 (2002): 59–80.

1.2.7 Politicization: Pieter De Wilde

As a central element of Post Functionalist thought and crucial to the theoretical debate of European integration, the following paragraphs will focus on politicization. Politicization can narrowly be defined as making something political or highlighting the political aspect of something.[71] De Wilde describes it as an "increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formation".[72] In the case of European governance, he understands politicization as a three-dimensional process involving *increasing salience*, *polarisation of opinion* and the *expansion of actors and audiences interested in EU issues*. Salience refers to the importance that societal actors attest to EU issues in regard to their interests and values. It also includes an aspect of behaviour as a higher importance is accompanied by increasing recourses spend on contesting and influencing EU issues on behalf of societal actors. Polarization relates to preference building and the diverging opinions on what the EU is and does. The last dimension reflects socialization with more societal actors being interested and engaged in the EU. politicization of European Integration therefore: (1) a growing salience of European governance, involving (2) a polarisation of opinion, and (3) an expansion of actors and audiences engaged in monitoring EU affairs.[73]

Post-Functionalist theorists have outlined their understanding of politicization as an influence on European Integration as follows: First, there is a mismatch between the jurisdictional form and the functional efficiency (reform motivation). This creates an issue, with political parties responding to pressures originating in interest groups or the public opinion (issue creation). This determines the choice of arena which can be mass politics or limited to the interest group (arena choice). These arenas each have certain rules (arena rules) and the choice determines if the conflict over the issue is based on identity or distribution, so on an ideological ground or a materialistic (conflict structure). Politicization of European integration, which De Wilde conceptualized, has according to Hooghe and Marks "changed the content, as well as the process of decision making."[74]

[71] 'Definition of Politicization | Dictionary.Com', www.dictionary.com, accessed 20 February 2020, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/politicization.

[72] Pieter De Wilde, 'No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration', *Journal of European Integration* 33, no. 5 (September 2011): 559–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2010.546849.

[73] De Wilde; Pieter De Wilde and Michael Zürn, 'Can the Politicization of European Integration Be Reversed?*: Can the Politicization of European Integration Be Reversed?', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 50 (March 2012): 137–53, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02232.x; Pieter de Wilde, Anna Leupold, and Henning Schmidtke, 'Introduction: The Differentiated Politicisation of European Governance', *West European Politics* 39, no. 1 (2 January 2016): 3–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1081505.

[74] Hooghe and Marks, 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration'.

2. Chapter II: Migration Policy in the 21st Century

In order to analyse and discuss politicization in Europe, a theme that creates the necessary salience to influence regional integration is necessary. The European migrant crisis provides the ideal case, as it is an ongoing crisis allowing to analyse contemporary political changes. The subsequent paragraphs will provide an overview of migration policy on the European level, over the course of the past three decades. Then the crisis in Syria will be described due to its central role in generating a crisis-level situation. Lastly, the political reaction to the crisis will be analysed.

2.1 Post-Cold War EU Migration Policy

In the past 30 years the European Union established foundations for comprehensive migration policy. By the end of the cold war, Justice and Home Affairs were restricted to national decision makers, although small shifts towards supranational competences can be seen in the creation of the Single European Market in 1986 that already declared:

> *In order to promote the free movement of persons, the Member States shall co-operate, without prejudice to the powers of the Community, in particular as regards the entry, movement and residence of nationals of third countries […]*[75]

In 1997 the Dublin Convention came into force.[76] Updated in 2002 and 2013 the current Dublin III Regulation (No. 604/2013) determines that asylum seekers need to apply for asylum in the first European Union Member State they enter with the possibility to have them returned to this country in the case of unapproved further travel within the EU.[77] While migration was included in the Maastricht Treaty already in 1993 it became a part of the third pillar which limited supranational policy harmonization. While the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty provided the grounds of more cooperation in the third pillar, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty discarded this restrictive structure altogether.[78] It not only created more EU competences in foreign policy but also provided the basis for judicial cooperation on migration.[79] This allows European Migration Policy since 2014 to include policies on legal migration, irregular migration, borders, visa, a Common European Asylum System and external dimensions. The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) installed from 2014 onwards promotes the "implementation, strengthening and development" of a community approach to migration related matters. It supports the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) that was initiated on the Tampere Summit in 1999.[80]

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[75] 'SEA' Article 30.

[76] Convention, 'Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities', *International Journal of Refugee Law* 2, no. 3 (1990): 469–83, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/2.3.469.

[77] EU, 'Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person', n.d., 29.

[78] EU, *Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts*.

[79] EU, 'Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community'.

[80] European Commission, 'Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)', Text, Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, 6 December 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/asylum-migration-integration-fund_en.

In 2003 the European Commission recognized the Tampere Summit, that evaluated the Treaty of Amsterdam, as the turning point in the member states commitment to cooperate on immigration and asylum matters.[81] While CEAS was supposed to harmonize national policies on migration, a second phase was planned to create an EU wide system. The 2009 Council Directive 2009/50/EC established the EU Blue Card, a fast-track procedure for skilled immigrants.[82] Following the Tampere Programme was the Hague Programme in 2004. It included decisions on a common European asylum system, legal migration, integration of migrants, the external dimension of asylum and migration policy, and the management of migration flows.[83] A major development in that year was the creation of the European Agency for the Management of External Borders (FRONTEX) to "coordinate operational cooperation between Member States in the management of external borders […]".[84] The creating regulation was amended in 2011 and 2014.[85]

In 2008 the EC Policy Plan on Asylum updated the development of CEAS and established three pillars.[86] Further alignment of national asylum laws, increased cooperation and higher solidarity and responsibility. Around the same period the importance to cooperate with external countries was formulated in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) to allow for increased control over migration.[87] The process continued its development in Paris 2008, Prague 2009, Stockholm 2010, Dakar 2011 and found its way into the Rome Declaration of 2014. With the beginning of the European Migrant crisis in 2015, migration policy had become a continuous point of debate on European level.

[81] EU European Commission, 'Communication From the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions' (Commission of the European Communities, 2003), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003DC0336&from=EN.

[82] Council, 'Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third-Country Nationals for the Purposes of Highly Qualified Employment', n.d., 13.

[83] European Union Council, 'The Hague Programme' (Official Journal of the European Union, 2005), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2005:053:0001:0014:EN:PDF.

[84] Council, 'Council Regulation Establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union' (Official Journal of the European Union, 2004), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2004:349:FULL&from=EN.

[85] EU, 'Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 Establishing Rules for the Surveillance of the External Sea Borders in the Context of Operational Cooperation Coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union', n.d., 15.

[86] EU European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions - Policy Plan on Asylum' (Commission of the European Communities, 2008), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0360:FIN:EN:PDF.

[87] EU European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility', accessed 20 February 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0743&from=EN.

2.2 The Civil War in Syria

Syrian refugees have a special role in the European migrant crisis, commonly referred to as the refugee crisis. Over a million people crossed the Mediterranean Sea in 2015, marking an increase of 300% to 400% compared to 2014.[88] The largest group, almost 50% of the arrivals to Europe were from Syria. The neighbouring Turkey alone hosts 3.6 million Syrian refugees, comparable to the entire European refugee population.[89]

The source of this migrant flow is the ongoing Civil War that followed the Arab Spring protests in 2011 and that is often referred to as a proxy war due to the multitude of international actors involved.[90] Over the years several groups and subgroups were involved in the continuation of this conflict. One of the key players is President Bashar al-Assad. His Ba-athist Syrian Arab Republic is supported by Iran, Russia and the Shia Islamist political party and militant group Hezbollah from Lebanon.[91] On the side of the Syrian Armed Forces are several volunteer groups and militias including the Syrian National Defence Force, the state sponsored militias Shabiha, and Foreign Shia militias, mainly from Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the opposing side, supported by the US, the UK, France, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and the Netherlands is the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, a coalition of groups, formerly known as the Syrian National Council and partially recognized claim to leadership in the country. The coalition has ties to the Free Syrian Army, which was announced in 2011 by a group of defecting officers of the Armed Forces and has been supported by the US and Turkey among others.[92] More examples of fighting parties are the Syrian National Army, backed by Turkey, the Syrian Salvation Government, an alternative opposition government and the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change. Next to these political parties, religious terrorist groups related to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also known as Dā'ash or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) are also active, which constituted the main justification for the United States and a Combined Joint Task Force under its command to place troops on Syrian territory and join the conflict actively.[93] Several countries, including Australia, the Netherlands, Canada, France, Turkey, Saudia Arabia, the UAE and the UK have joined the task force, mainly flying airstrikes.[94] The fight against ISIS pulled further groups into the spotlight, including the Syrian Democratic Forces and its political wing the Syrian National Council an alliance of predominantly Kurdish militias from the north of Syria. This group simultaneously fights against Turkish troops.[95]

[88] UNHCR, 'Global Trends - Forced Displacement in 2015' (The UN Refugee Agency, 2016), https://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf.
[89] 'Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response', accessed 20 February 2020, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113.
[90] Devi S, 'Syria: 7 Years into a Civil War.', *Lancet (London, England)* 391, no. 10115 (2018): 15–16, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)30006-0.
[91] Benedetta Berti and Jonathan Paris, 'Beyond Sectarianism: Geopolitics, Fragmentation, and the Syrian Civil War' 16, no. 4 (2014): 14.
[92] Jonathan Spyer, 'DEFYING A DICTATOR: Meet the Free Syrian Army', *World Affairs* 175, no. 1 (2012): 45–52, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41638991.
[93] Chanchal Kumar, 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) a Global Threat: International Strategy to Counter the Threat' 1, no. 4 (2015): 9.
[94] Kumar.
[95] Zeynep Kaya and Matthew Whiting, 'Sowing Division: Kurds in the Syrian War', *Middle East Policy* 24, no. 1 (March 2017): 79–91, https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12253.

There is serious criticism, regarding human rights violations, directed at all sides of the conflict by the international community and international organizations.[96] According to the UK based monitoring group Syrian Observatory for Human Rights more than 560000 people have died making the Syrian Civil War the deadliest conflict since the Rwandan Genocide in the late 90s.[97] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates the number of refugees at over 50% of the pre-war population of 22 million with 6.6 million people internally displaced and 5.6 million Syrians seeking refuge abroad.[98]

2.3 EU Crisis Management

2.3.1 Humanitarian Crisis – Political Solution

Due to differing bureaucratic procedures and higher chances to a successful outcome, most refugees aim to reach countries like Germany or Sweden. The Netherlands for example is known to have a lenient family reunification policy.[99] Refugees, mostly traveling on foot and with public transport, have to cross several member states that do not provide sufficient or preferred opportunities of asylum. Backed by German chancellor Angela Merkel and German financial minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who coined the motto "Wir schaffen das!" ("We can do it" or "We will be fine") in 2015 the German ministry of migration and refugees (BAMF) twittered that it will ignore the Dublin regulation in the case of Syrian refugees.[100] Meant as a reassurance of humanitarian principles and the resilience of the German society, this moment is seen by many as the beginning of the crisis. At the same time this decision questioned the European rules and regulations in place and therefore the European legal framework.

This was not the only time Syrian refugees are seen as the central representative of the crisis situation. In the (social) media, there is one image that is a specifically memorable representation of the European Refugee Crisis. It shows a Syrian toddler who drowned and washed up on the shore of Turkey.[101] This picture simultaneously exhibits the struggle and danger that refugees take upon themselves to reach Europe, and the failure of the EU to fulfil humanitarian responsibilities. So far there is no solution to forced migration that safeguards the life of desperate refugees.

[96] Gabriele Lombardo, 'The Responsibility to Protect and the Lack of Intervention in Syria between the Protection of Human Rights and Geopolitical Strategies', *The International Journal of Human Rights* 19, no. 8 (2015): 1190–1198.
[97] 'Syria: 560,000 Killed in Seven Yrs of War, SOHR • The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights', *The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights* (blog), 12 December 2018, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=108829.
[98] 'Syrian Arab Republic', OCHA, 30 January 2018, https://www.unocha.org/syria.
[99] Immigratie-en Naturalisatiedienst, 'Family Member of Refugee', web page, accessed 20 February 2020, http://ind.nl:80/en/asylum/Pages/Family-member-of-refugee.aspx.
[100] SWR2, 'Angela Merkels "Wir schaffen das!" im Kontext', swr.online, accessed 20 February 2020, https://www.swr.de/swr2/wissen/archivradio/2015-Angela-Merkels-Wir-schaffen-das,aexavarticle-swr-39442.html; 'BAMF auf Twitter: "#Dublin-Verfahren syrischer Staatsangehöriger werden zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt von uns weitestgehend faktisch nicht weiter verfolgt." / Twitter', Twitter, accessed 20 February 2020, https://twitter.com/bamf_dialog/status/636138495468285952.
[101] Helena Smith, 'Shocking Images of Drowned Syrian Boy Show Tragic Plight of Refugees', *The Guardian*, 2 September 2015, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-of-drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees.

Not directly related to Syria but important for this case was a post-crisis international summit. In November 2015 heads of state of the European and African Union met in Valletta to discuss increasing cooperation on migration among other things.[102] This resulted in the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa over €4 billion to address the root causes for migration.[103] This was quickly followed by the Partnership Framework on Migration an EU cooperation with central African nations.[104]

Most Syrian refugees travel through Turkey.[105] Another summit in Brussels in March 2016 established an agreement between the European Union and Turkey. This colloquial "Turkey deal" aims to discourage refugees from crossing the Mediterranean by sending irregular migrants back to Turkey if they a rejected or fail to apply for asylum.[106] At the same time Turkey receives €3 billion in aid to help migrants and the EU loosened Schengen-Visa restrictions for Turkish nationals.[107] Another €3 billion are used otherwise in this area. Since then, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly used the situation to his advantage, threatening European countries to support refugees traveling to Europe and "open the gates", for example as a response to European criticism regarding the decision of Turkey to occupy the Northern territories of Syria in 2019.[108]

2.3.1 From GAMM to the European Agenda on Migration

In order to discuss EU migration policies in relation to public perception and the European migrant crisis it is important to compare policies before and after the crisis. The following paragraph will describe the legal policy situation on a European level after the crisis in 2015. Later this will be used as the basis to discuss the influence of politicization. The response to crisis brings us back to the Global Approach to Migration drawn up in 2005 and updated in 2011.[109] In the end of 2014 GAMM and its four pillars were the determined the main document of European Union migration policy.[110] The pillars to manage migration were placed in the following rank of priority:

1. Better organizing legal migration, and fostering well-managed mobility;
2. preventing and combatting irregular migration, and eradicating trafficking in human beings;
3. maximising the development impact of migration and mobility;
4. promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of asylum.[111]

[102] 'Valletta Summit Action Plan', 2015, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf.
[103] 'EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa', Text, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa - European Commission, accessed 20 February 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/homepage_en.
[104] European Commission, 'Migration Partnership Framework', 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_ec_format_migration_partnership_framework_update_2.pdf.
[105] 'Eastern Mediterranean Route', accessed 20 February 2020, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/eastern-mediterranean-route/.
[106] EU European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council - Next Operational Steps in EU-Turkey Cooperation in the Field of Migration', 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-166-EN-F1-1.PDF.
[107] Kim Rygiel, Feyzi Baban, and Suzan Ilcan, 'The Syrian Refugee Crisis: The EU-Turkey 'Deal'and Temporary Protection', *Global Social Policy* 16, no. 3 (2016): 315–320.
[108] 'Turkey's Erdogan Threatens to Send Syrian Refugees to Europe - Reuters', accessed 20 February 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-europe-idUSKBN1WP1ED.
[109] European Commission, 'COM(2011) 743 Final'.
[110] European Commission, 'Global Approach to Migration and Mobility', Text, Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, 6 December 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration_en.
[111] European Commission, 'COM(2011) 743 Final'.

In response to the crisis a new document was published. The European Agenda on Migration also encompassed four pillars and has been the foundational document for EU migration policy since:

1. Reducing the incentives for irregular migration;
2. Border management – saving lives and securing external borders;
3. Europe's duty to protect: a strong common asylum policy;
4. A new policy on legal migration.[112]

The following chapter will introduce the media as an influential aspect of European politics. A basic understanding of the media influence on political processes is necessary to follow the discussion on public preferences, identity and politicization in European Integration.

[112] EU European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - A European Agenda on Migration', 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf.

3. Chapter III: The Influence of the Media on Political Processes

3.1 The Internet and its New Politics in Europe

Just as many other political changes in the Middle East and Northern Africa, the Syrian Conflict has a strong root in the Arab Spring protests of 2011.[113] One of the most useful and decisive tools within these widespread anti-government movements was the internet and social media, establishing a direct connection between individual protesters and the world as such. Using platforms such as Youtube, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram, oppressed people had a chance to spread their message to a wider audience and make their voice heard. Social media and the Internet therefore take a crucial position in the Syrian case and need to be looked at from a European perspective to understand their possible influence on European Integration. Five changes are particularly interesting to take into account when looking at this influence.

Technological change in Europe is marked by a decentralization of information, creating both a change in the political landscape and the media landscape.[114] Politically, this decentralization furthers the democratization of politics with a top-down aspect in the liberalisation and diversification of regimes with multiple perspectives. A bottom-up aspect is the mobilization possibilities of citizens such as the Arab Spring effect described earlier.[115] The internet, which is not limited by national borders, allows the creation of transnational interest groups and solidarity, as seen with anti-austerity protests on the left and anti-immigration protests on the right.[116] The change is even more clearly visible in the media landscape. While traditional media and broadcaster where seen as the informational link between politics and citizens, the evolution of social media and the internet allows a more direct connection.[117] At the same time the media influences the political process and society since technology provided for mass media and even more so with the development of a plurality of alternative media sources, a process referred to as mediatisation.[118] While mediatisation challenges the homogeneity of the *demos* from within, globalization challenges it from outside.

[113] Philip N. Howard et al., 'Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media during the Arab Spring?', *Available at SSRN 2595096*, 2011.
[114] Gurevitch, Coleman, and Blumler, 'Political Communication —Old and New Media Relationships'.
[115] Anamaria Dutceac Segesten and Michael Bossetta, 'A Typology of Political Participation Online: How Citizens Used Twitter to Mobilize during the 2015 British General Elections', *Information, Communication & Society* 20, no. 11 (2 November 2017): 1625–43, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1252413.
[116] Francis. DaCosta and Byron Henderson, *Rethinking the Internet of Things: A Scalable Approach to Connecting Everything*, The Expert's Voice in Internet Technologies ([New York, N.Y.]: ApressOpen, 2013).
[117] Gurevitch, Coleman, and Blumler, 'Political Communication —Old and New Media Relationships'.
[118] Hanspeter. Kriesi et al., *Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization*, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

Demographic change is more than merely an aging population, migration and rising challenges to European or Western welfare systems and solidarity. Demographic change is also connected to the younger population that understands technology and the older population that does not.[119] Collective action of the past century, with organizations expected to further the interest of a group, is replaced by online, following a far more individualized logic without the necessity of a collective identity frame or organizational support.[120] This is important to keep in mind when analysing the theories of European Integration that view national governments and supranational organizations as the key players of the integration process. Additionally, the new media allow Echo Chambers, where content is created in the knowledge that it is liked and agreed with by the online community (for example the Facebook group) and Flame wars, the effect of a swarm of negative comments within the political discourse.[121] Both versions leave little space for productive discussion.[122]

The passive information consumers of the past century are replaced by active information producers with the emergence of social media, further stretching the bandwidth of information and disinformation, creating knowledge gaps.[123] According to the media logic theory political communication can only be effective when it taps into social expectations of what is considered appealing media coverage with a hypercompetition among media.[124] This explosion of supply leads to the commercialization of media with enhanced simplification of information and the use of pictures, called tabloidization and through spectacularization, which focussed media coverage on spectacular news instead of comprehensive substantive information.[125]

[119] Jonathan Mellon and Christopher Prosser, 'Twitter and Facebook Are Not Representative of the General Population: Political Attitudes and Demographics of British Social Media Users', *Research & Politics* 4, no. 3 (1 July 2017): 2053168017720008, https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168017720008.
[120] Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg, 'The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics: Information, Communication & Society: Vol 15, No 5', *Information, Communication & Society* 15 (2012): 739–68, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2012.670661.
[121] Stephen Coleman, Deen Freelon, and Edward Elgar Publishing, *Handbook of Digital Politics* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd., 2015).
[122] Bakshy E, Messing S, and Adamic LA, 'Political Science. Exposure to Ideologically Diverse News and Opinion on Facebook.', *Science (New York, N.Y.)* 348, no. 6239 (2015): 1130–32, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa1160.
[123] H. Bonfadelli, 'The Internet and Knowledge Gaps A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation', *EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION* 17, no. Part 1 (2002): 65–84.
[124] Kriesi et al., *Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization*; Andrew Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power*, Second edition., Oxford Studies in Digital Politics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017).
[125] David Rowe, 'Tabloidization: Form, Style and Socio-Cultural Change', *Journalism and Meaning-Making: Reading the Newspaper*, 2010, 146.

The fourth change combines the media logic with mediatisation. Political logic focussed on the effect of political decisions is replaced by a self-mediatisation of politics, where political actors are aware of the necessity to act attractive instead of focussing at rational content.[126] The citizen is expected to fall under the negativity bias describing the idea, that negative thoughts, emotions, interactions or events have an increased effect compared to neutral or positive things.[127] The impact on politics is that political actors tap into negative associations to gather support and media coverage. A cycle is created where controversial behaviour, alike that of UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, leads to increased coverage and increased coverage leads to political actors that are compelled to deliver.[128] The fifth change is the development of hybrid media, a combination of old and new media, which requires its own section that will follow the subsequent paragraphs summarizing Social Media as a catalyst of political communication.

3.1.1. Social Media as a Catalyst

Political communication is an essential and existential aspect of politics, as political phenomena become phenomena by being communicated to an audience.[129] The invention of the printing press in the 15th Century lead to the possibility of mass communication. The traditional media such as newspapers but later also broadcasters on TV and radio are considered to be the linking tool between people and political entities. The concepts of framing, referring to the use of context, and priming, the repeated coverage of certain news, explain how the media relates to and influences politics.[130] Social Media determines an increased access of the people to information, be it through accidental exposure or active search.[131] The enhanced speed and global possibilities of connection lead to issue publics, groups connected through a common issue, networks and connective action.[132] On the other hand, Social Medias self-expressive echo chambers and irrational flaming abilities lead to more polarized and fragmented societies, with an increase of alternative views and parties at the outer rims of the political spectrum, that utilize Facebook, Twitter & Co to spread and share their views in disproportionate numbers.[133] These actors can bypass media filters and enter into direct contact with supporters. Alternative narratives ranging from fake news to scientific facts can be spread online. Regardless of these seemingly new forms of information provision, experts see social media not as an entirely new media system or the transformation of the old one, but instead as a catalyst, increasing the possibilities of old structures and processes, using new tools. It is therefore not the change of a paradigm but the adjustment of an old paradigm to a new technological and societal environment. This thought can be further elaborated using the theory of hybrid media.

[126] Kriesi et al., *Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization*.
[127] Paul Rozin and Edward B. Royzman, 'Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion', *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 5, no. 4 (2001): 296–320.
[128] Kriesi et al., *Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization*.
[129] Dietram A. Scheufele and David Tewksbury, 'Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models', *Journal of Communication* 57, no. 1 (2007): 9–20.
[130] Scheufele and Tewksbury.
[131] Bakshy E, Messing S, and Adamic LA, 'Political Science. Exposure to Ideologically Diverse News and Opinion on Facebook.'
[132] Clay Shirky, 'The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change', *Foreign Affairs*, 2011, 28–41.
[133] Coleman, Freelon, and Edward Elgar Publishing, *Handbook of Digital Politics*.

3.1.2 Hybrid Media as a Tool

In his 2013 book *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power,* Andrew Chadwick resolves the complexity of the modern media system, by stripping the issue to its essentials.[134] The media intends to create, tap or steer information flows according to their own individual goals and it tries to modify, enable or disable the agency of their competition. This essential purpose has not changed, but instead the tools to fulfil the purpose changed from an old logic based on transmission and reception to a new logic based on circulation, recirculation, and negotiation. The Hybrid Media System exercises its power by using both old and new tools towards a maximization of efficiency. It takes the old media logic, viewing the broadcaster or newspaper as transmitter and the consumer as receiver of information, and adds the new logic seeing the broadcaster or newspaper as the creator and seller, circulating and recirculating content and as the entity negotiating with new modern technological information sources like WikiLeaks.[135]

[134] Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System*.
[135] Chadwick.

4. Chapter IV: The Role of Identity in Political Processes

4.1 European Identity: Social Identity Theory

To understand identity and how it influences attitudes over Europe we can look at social identity theory. This includes groups like the European community as a whole, as well as subgroups that can be either national or transnational and issue-specific. A community can be considered a group of people. Groups are perceived as a united entity sharing a close bond.[136] While there are different kinds of groups, just as there are different kinds of communities on the local, regional, national and transnational level, they all share that they are based on a notion of identity, a sense of membership, common traits and interests. The membership to the group fulfils the individuals need for affiliation and power and the social need of belonging, inclusion, control and affection. It also allows self-categorization. Nationality, race, origin, gender and sexuality are some of the various factors, that determine identity. As identity moves into the context of the political sphere, it is mainly associated with group affiliation. The individual sense of self, that is identity, automatically leads to a social context, described by social identity. Social identity is based on the individual's perspective of its own position within the social group linked with the emotional connection to the group-membership.[137] This social identity is a precondition for politicised identities, determined by a shared understanding of the groups social hierarchy. Thus, identity is able to create the feeling of belonging and togetherness and has the ability to support the building and strengthening of a community, for example the European community but also Eurosceptic groups. In general, people favour their own group over others which can under certain circumstances lead to conflict or hostility towards other groups or individuals not belonging to the own group.[138] Applied to the effect of public opinion in Europe three relevant and common observations can be made:

1. Identity is more important to the public than it is to elites or interest groups
2. Identity is subjective and therefore has to be politically constructed to affect political decisions
3. The more exclusively a person identifies with a group the lower is the persons support for jurisdiction that includes people outside the group

[136] Martha L. Cottam, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, 2nd ed., 1 online resource (xi, 404 pages) vols (New York ; Psychology, 2010), http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=481003.
[137] Cristian Tileagă, 'Introduction: Political Psychology as an Interpretative Field', in *Political Psychology: Critical Perspectives* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
[138] Marilynn B. Brewer, 'The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate?', *Journal of Social Issues* 55, no. 3 (1999): 429–444.

4.1.1 The Perpetual Other

Historically European Identity shaped in antithesis to the outgroup. In this case the Islamic world. Syrian refugees are not only the largest group of migrants to the European Union, they are also predominantly Muslim. Before discussing European Identity today, it is important to add this historical perspective to our understanding of what it means to be European. As a sideshow of the actual discussion of politicization this perspective highlights the complexity of identity and social integration. To understand the role of Islam to European Identity view it in a historical context spanning back 1300 years. In 754, Isodorus Pacensis (Isodore of Beja) first used the word *Europenses* in his "Mozarab Chronicles".[139] Later this term transformed into *European*, to distinguish the population of Europe not only geographically but also culturally and ethnically from the Islamic (*Saracen*) world. This laid the foundation for a common Christian European Identity with the Muslim as the other. Despite having good relations to Muslim leaders and a lack of Christian fanatism, this thinking was increasingly attributed to Charlemagne in the same period who unified Europe. The "Chansons de Geste" from the 10th and 11th century, for example, that glorified Charlemagnes deeds, were very culturally influential and projected a negative view of Muslims and their practices and beliefs.[140] Today these songs could be described as the oldest preserved form of fake news. The unification and consolidation of a European Identity was therefore specifically based on religious grounds, increasing the influence of the Pope and leading to several crusades.[141] This development further created a common collective identity uniting Europeans in their fight against the defamed heathen. Later the reasonable enlightened Europe was opposed to the irrational religious Islam. While many developments and inventions in medicine, culture and industry can be linked back to the Islamic world, the focus was usually set on what is different.[142] Victorian prudence, puritanism and restraint in the arts for example was considered the antithesis to Oriental hedonism. Harem subculture became a subject of Western fascination, repeatedly used in European art as a depiction of the indecent other.[143] Recurrent themes in art were slavery and slave markets as a way to show the low degree of oriental civilization and the depiction of the Islamic world as luxurious and cruel. Also, academically, Islam was historically opposed to Europe, increasing the European Identity. The sheer idea of Orientalism as a field or style of thought that is based on the ontological and epistemological distinction between Orient and Occident, between East and West is an indication that Islam is a dimension of Europe's political identity.[144]

[139] Carmen Cardelle De Hartmann, 'The Textual Transmission of the Mozarabic Chronicle of 754', *Early Medieval Europe* 8, no. 1 (1999): 13–29.
[140] Sarah Kay, *The Chansons de Geste in the Age of Romance: Political Fictions* (Oxford University Press, 2011).
[141] Paul Rich, 'European Identity and the Myth of Islam: A Reassessment', *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 3 (1999): 435–451.
[142] Herman Beck, Islam and the Making of Europe, Lecture, 2018.
[143] Joan DelPlato and Julie Codell, *Orientalism, Eroticism and Modern Visuality in Global Cultures* (Taylor and Francis, 2017).
[144] Edward W. Said, 'Orientalism Reconsidered', *Race & Class* 27, no. 2 (1985): 1–15.

Ever since the overthrow of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the rise of Ayatolla Khomeni in 1979 in Iran, some Islamic fundamentalist, who had been seen as allies against the Soviet Union, are considered a threat to existing regimes and the West in general.[145] The most prominent groups of Islamic fundamentalists today is the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).[146] Terrorists such as ISIS are often reduced on their religious affiliation. A generalization of this kind is unfavourable to Muslims in general but especially to vulnerable Muslim groups such as refugees.[147] The flow of refugees from Syria provides the opportunity for ISIS to send fighters to Europe to commit terrorist attacks. Not only did the organization threaten this trojan horse strategy, it has also been frequently used by (populist) political speakers and media platforms as an argument to advocate for stronger anti-immigration laws and closer monitoring of refugees admitted, at times exceeding the limits of basic human rights.[148] While there has not been a single case of ISIS fighters disguising as refugees and committing attacks in Europe it is a widely spread fear among Europeans.

4.2 Identity in Multi-Level Governance

In Chapter I the Post-Functionalist idea of multi-level governance was introduced. The following paragraphs will take a closer look at the aspect of identity, prominent in this approach. This provides a foundation for discussion on the influence of identity and politicization on European integration in the subsequent chapter. The sovereignty of nation states is gradually merging with the sovereignty of subnational and supranational actors. The adding value of a multi-level governance understanding is an conceptualization of European policy that is not necessarily functional. It also proposes the active focus on non-state actors in the research on European integration. Especially the public sphere is highlighted with politicization becoming a force to be reckoned with. A major differentiating argument between this approach and that of the traditional neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism is the claim that identity can be an alternative factor in preferences over the jurisdictional architecture, meaning that identity can be causally important to the extent that "an issue has (a) opaque [unclear] economic implications and (b) transparent communal implications that are (c) debated in public forums by (d) mass organizations rather than specialized interest groups."[149]

4.3 Identity on National-Level Governance

Focussing on national-level governance and a monopoly as described by Liberal Intergovernmentalism, a basic hypothesis can be singled out: salient and concrete policy demands encourage substantive policy change, whereas diffuse or symbolic identity-based demands from voters encourage superficial, rhetorical and formalistic changes. Populist nationalistic motivations are non-issue specific and the related popular behaviour is chaotic and inconsistent. Where PF views identity as a decisive factor, Moravcsik accepts the importance of psychological and ideological factors as an addition to an issue specific understanding of national preferences that can provide a more comprehensive account of integration.[150] To him however, identity as a motivation is weak as it is not based on clear rational arguments. Public behaviour, preference and policy reactions will be weak, inconsistent and ineffective and not functionally determined.

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[145] Elliot Hen-Tov and Nathan Gonzalez, 'The Militarization of Post-Khomeini Iran: Praetorianism 2.0', *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (2011): 45–59.

[146] Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, 'Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria', *The Council on Foreign Relations. June* 12 (2014).

[147] Christian Von Sikorski, Jörg Matthes, and Desirée Schmuck, 'The Islamic State in the News: Journalistic Differentiation of Islamist Terrorism from Islam, Terror News Proximity, and Islamophobic Attitudes', *Communication Research*, 2018, 0093650218803276.

[148] Muhanad Seloom, 'ISIS and the Refugee Crisis in Europe – Migration Research Institute', accessed 21 February 2020, https://www.migraciokutato.hu/en/2015/11/21/isis-and-the-refugee-crisis-in-europe/.

[149] Hooghe and Marks, 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration'.

[150] Moravcsik, 'Preferences, Power and Institutions in 21 st -Century Europe'.

5. Chapter V: European Union Public Preferences

5.1 Eurobarometer 1999 -2019

The Eurobarometer public opinion surveys have been conducted since 1973. It should be kept in mind that 1999 the EU had 15 member states with gradual enlargement over the years. To get an indication of the policy preferences the following paragraphs will provide an empirical secondary analysis of the biannual surveys. 40 survey reports have been included in this study.[151] A focus will be set on questions regarding policy priority comparing migration to other issues. The questions slightly changed over the years which will be considered in the analysis.

In 2003 the Eurobarometer first included a question directly asking which problems countries face according to the EU citizens. Survey takers could choose two topics. Unemployment ranked highest with 41% followed by Crime with 29%. Immigration was only selected by 13% and is 7th. The following years show a similar line of questioning and results peaking in 2006 with 21% on 4th position. Unemployment and Crime still being in the lead until 2008 when Economic situation and rising prices and inflation move up in light of the global financial crisis. At this point only 4%-9% choose immigration as a top problem faced. In 2010 Eurobarometer extends the survey, asking specifically which problems individuals, the own nation and the European Union face. The individual issue with migration remains below 10% throughout and can be ignored. On the national level 8% of European citizens see immigration as a main problem in 2012. Slowly rising in each subsequent year, the peak is reached in 2015 with 36% falling back on 17% by 2019. On the European level numbers start differing from the national level in 2013 with 16%. In 2015 this number climbs to 38% and later in the year to 58%, slowly falling back to 34% by 2019. Figure 1 shows the rise of *immigration* as an answer to what the most important issue is that the EU faced between 2010 and 2019. Figure 2 adds a comparison with other issues named in the period 2014 to 2019.

[151] For the purpose of space only a summary of the findings and a digital overview will be included here. The full reports, Standard Eurobarometer Reports 51 – 91 can be provided by the author upon request or be found digitally at https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/General/index



Figure 1



Figure 2

5.2 European Parliament Elections 2009, 2014 and 2019

Eurobarometer published special reports on European Parliament elections.[152] The special Eurobarometer 320 Post-election survey of the European Parliament Election 2009 shows that the economic crisis of 2008 had a major impact on the election results. 41% of the voters determined economic reasons and unemployment the main reasons to vote. All other issues were named by around 16% to 22%.[153]

The 2014 European Elections Desk Research presents data on electoral issues for voters. 45% of voters name the topic of unemployment as a reason to vote in the EP election. 41% are concerned with Economic growth and 23% with issues of immigration.[154] One interesting development is the cooperation of Eurosceptic parties in the elections in 2019. The most extreme example being Italy where the far-right Lega Nord and the partially far-left Five Star Movement not only worked together on European level but also briefly entered into coalition to govern the country.

According to the 2019 Post-Electoral Survey the European Parliament Elections had the highest turnout in 20 years with over 50% compared to close to 40% in 2014. This time the main reason to vote was economy and growth with 44% followed by climate change and environmental protection with 37%. Human Rights and democracy (37%) and the Future of the EU (36%) all surpassed immigration (34%) as a reason to vote.[155] While the election in 2009 was driven by economic factors and benefited conservative liberal parties, populist right-wing parties could gain ground in 2014 with anti-establishment and anti-immigration politics. In 2019 climate related politics gained ground being a policy priority in many central European countries.

[152] EU European Parliament, '2014 Post-Election Survey - European Elections 2014 - Analytical Overview' (Directorate-General for Communication, n.d.), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2014/post/post_2014_survey_analitical_overview_en.pdf.

[153] EU European Parliament, 'Post-Electoral Survey 2009' (Directorate-General for Communication, 2009), https://europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2009/post-electoral-survey/report/en-report-post-electoral-survey-200911.pdf.

[154] EU European Parliament, '2014 European Elections Desk Research' (Directorate-General for Communication, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2015/postee2014/rapport_comportement_electoral_ee2014_en.pdf.

[155] European Parliament, 'The 2019 Post-Electoral Survey - Have European Elections Entered a New Dimension?' (Directorate-General for Communication, 2019), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2019/post-election-survey-2019-complete-results/report/en-post-election-survey-2019-report.pdf.

6. Chapter VI: Politicization - A Theoretical Blindspot

De Wilde highlights five fundamental characteristics of European Integration that are important to keep in mind when discussing the influence of politicized migration on processes of regional integration. Firstly, the topic of European Integration generates fundamental controversy not only among citizens but also in media debates and party politics.[156] Secondly, constitutional issues, questions of jurisdiction as well as specific policy questions, like the right to free movement within the Schengen area, are debatable. Thirdly, nature and degree of these debates vary over time, space and the frameworks or environments in which they manifest.[157] Fourthly, referenda can function as a catalyst, but generally follow deeper causes of controversy.[158] Lastly, such catalysts drive the (re)negotiation of terms of European Integration with possibly profound consequences for the political structure and legitimacy of the European Union.[159]

6.1 The Role of the Public in European Integration

The influence of the public (opinion) on European policy and governance is a remarkably under researched aspect of European Integration scholarship and there is no theoretical account on how and when the public influences policy.[160] While a correlation is not necessarily causal, certain trends can be determined with the media following public demand and influencing political priority building.

Migration is the perfect example of an issue that has opaque economic implications. In 2015 the German economy expressed excitement about skilled workers entering as refugees to fill a void on the labour market. When Merkel uttered her famous “Wir schaffen das!” it came at a time of great uncertainty on what the actual economic impact would be. There were seemingly transparent communal implications with numbers of refugees increasing in several parts of Europe, overflowing centres and camps as well as obvious representation on the street and extensive coverage in the media. The migration crisis is massively debated in public forums and while specialized interest groups are involved this is merely the tip of the iceberg.[161] Most of the debating happens online and in mass organizations and political parties. The following paragraphs will discuss the role of the public sphere in European Integration in general along specific foci including the role of Identity, the Internet, fact and perception in public opinion creation, Euroscepticism and Populism.

[156] De Wilde, ‘No Polity for Old Politics?’; Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen, *European Integration and Political Conflict* (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
[157] de Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, ‘Introduction’.
[158] De Wilde and Zürn, ‘Can the Politicization of European Integration Be Reversed?’
[159] de Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, ‘Introduction’.
[160] Hooghe and Marks, ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration’.
[161] De Wilde and Zürn, ‘Can the Politicization of European Integration Be Reversed?’

The influence of the public on European Integration can be passive or active. Passively, decision makers, especially state executives react to public sentiment, "anticipating the effect of their decisions on domestic publics."[162] It can be described as a preventive action. We can look here at the reaction of the European Union to the Refugee crisis. The large majority of refugees originated in the middle east, but media representation and public perception did not necessarily make this distinction between political and economic refugee and migrants from North Africa or other parts. The first political reaction was a meeting with the African Union. But the public can also mobilize actively on the grounds of rational motivation, emotional motivation or both. This can create pressure that can influence either national or supranational preferences and decisions. The public power can be direct through protest or polling or it can make use of democratic powers and change the political frame of conversation by using regional and national elections as a mouthpiece. Economic agents can be affected by the public. Continuous extreme popular sentiment can affect financial markets and investments or draw in foreign countries and international organization that possibly add to the pressure on national and supranational decisionmakers.[163] We have seen this more recently with the Green movement that affected the 2019 European Parliament election. The direct decision-making power of the public can be neglected at this point. While referenda happen occasionally and have led most prominently to Brexit, they are usually initiated by the government to reaffirm public support for already made decisions and are a tool grand effect with little institutional impact. The European Parliament also lacks jurisdiction to count as a legal representation of the public, but similar to polls, indicates a general political position of European citizens.

[162] Hooghe and Marks, 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration'.
[163] Hooghe and Marks.

6.1.1 Identity

Before discussing Identity as a factor for preference building as seen by Post-Functionalist scholars, we should look at European Identity in particular. European Identity is interesting for two reasons when looking at its relation to migration. On one hand European Identity was traditionally build on Christian value and belief, arguably using Islam as the antithesis as described before. Logically being European has an inherent determent of being Christian or adhering to Christian values. Migration questions this perception of the European. On the other hand, European Identity is a goal of European integration opposing the idea of national identity, broadening this ingroup and blurring its borders. It is about creating something new as opposed to clinging to the old, creating a dilemma of conceptualisation. Identity is arguably a subjective concept and the idea on what is considered European can differ largely. The research on European Identity is a field in itself that would exceed the bounds of this paper, but it should suffice to understand that European Identity is a vague, subjective and abstract concept.

Looking at polls and European Parliament voter turnout or the fact that the most googled terms after Brexit were related to what the European Union is, one can assume that the average European citizen has limited knowledge, time and interest to assess their interest in regional integration and rely on shortcuts.[164] These shortcuts can be information from the media, political parties, non-governmental organization or the internet. They could also be inherent and ideological, based on the individual's position on the political spectrum following general understandings of this positions. According to Hooghe and Marks identities have been quite stable while jurisdictions have changed rapidly.[165] Their argument on identity as a preference building factor therefore does not stand on vast changes in individual identities. Instead they argue that the public perceives European integration as deeper and more extensive, reducing the borders between a growing number of countries. This led to increasing migration between European countries even before the crisis and to growing economic competition. At the same time, mostly new political parties have constructed connections "between national identity, cultural and economic insecurity and issues such as EU enlargement."[166] These constructions are specifically relevant shortcuts as they fill a void in individuals that have no prior understanding of these issues. As European Integration only recently came into the public focus, there is plenty of space for such political parties to construct, using methods discussed earlier as tools of the media such as framing, the creation of context and connections in this case to already salient political issues, priming, the increasing of the importance of an issue, and cueing, the creation of bias through for example a shortcut.

[164] European Parliament, 'The 2019 Post-Electoral Survey - Have European Elections Entered a New Dimension?'
[165] Hooghe and Marks, 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration'.
[166] Hooghe and Marks.

The European Parliament Election polls show that the push of right-wing parties in 2014 was successful as they managed to increase the salience of immigration pre-election and interestingly pre-crisis. The Post-Functionalist arguments for identity as a preference building factor would explain the success of right-wing parties in 2014. But this does not constitute a theoretical gap in the traditional theories on European Integration. Moravcsik, sceptic about the influence of identity, explained that it only creates weak political changes and policies. Claiming that migration is more of an ideological and political issue rather than a material, the findings of this paper support this view in light of the lack of EU migration policies since 2015. The turkey deal and the fund for Africa merely outsourced the issue to address public preferences without sacrificing national government preferences. Crisis in combination with public pressure can induce major changes in preference building on a national and supranational level, affect national and regional elections and even act as a tipping point for countries with an instable relation to the European Union such as the United Kingdom as we have seen with Brexit. This is however an exception.

6.1.2 The Internet

The internet has connecting and disconnecting features. It can connect people in protest crossing national borders. It can support a common European Identity. It can also connect Eurosceptic groups and increase or support national identities. It can disconnect a group from reality, creating a bubble of perception masked as fact. It can be educating, as most information can be found online, but also disinformation is spread online and with an overflow of information individual users can be overwhelmed. Ultimately, the internet is a tool that increases or decreases voices. It can have positive and negative features. It cannot be seen as a political entity that influences decision makers, but it can be used to politicize. In terms of sovereignty, the internet neutralizes certain authority of whoever is considered the deciding agent in traditional theories. By information being able to instantly reach everyone with access to the internet it is harder to decide without taking public perception into account. But an interesting thought is also that the Internet creates new ways to take sovereignty and wield it. If we take Russia as an example we could argue, that by using cyber warfare to influence the elections and identities of other countries, Russia absorbs aspects of sovereignty by deciding which way voters sway. It creates completely new relationships across borders. There is a possibility that the internet as a tool is ineffective or that it does as much positive as it does negative. National governments could learn to use the internet themselves. With immigration and climate change being the most prominent issues for voters and an increase in young voters in 2019 it should be tested if social media are used over proportionately by the right wing and green parties. This would give the new media an even more prominent role in politicization processes. At this point there has not been enough research with the internet and Social Media being a fairly new phenomenon with a strong political influence. It is not possible to determine this influence in a small-scale research project.

6.1.3 Fact and Perception

Liberal Intergovernmentalists defend the argument that fact-based issues can lead to substantive policy change as they can be rationalized.[167] Perception-based issues can only lead to symbolic change which is unsustainable and easily reversed. The public sphere is an unorganized entity that has partial ability to influence governments, institutions and domestic politics with consequences for European politics and integration. If this influence is fuelled by perception it constantly needs to be refuelled. Where facts stand for themselves, perceptions need to be actively maintained. It is highly unlikely that a sustainable position of political power can be built on perception in a democratic system. This LI view is however already developed and has accepted that the understanding of the 20th century is not the same understanding of the 21st century. It does not even completely disregard the multi-level governance approach but could see it as an interesting concept to national governments that allows them to transfer responsibility and governance to multi-level actors in areas that are less or not relevant to their political position. A functional motivation is retained.

There is plenty of support for the post-functionalist understanding of multi-level governance. Consensus between 28 countries is hard. European Integration means compromise, and this is much more complicated in the 21st century with 16 additional member states compared to the early 1990s and therefore common solutions of 28 national executives, a growing number of influencing groups, a strengthening of minority influence on politics through the internet and a globalized public. In addition, a realistic picture of the European Union is largely bureaucratized and to avoid stand-still the European Commission did get an increasing level of influence. European Integration is far larger than the working together between national governments. Especially with the increasing cross-border communication ability that is provided by the internet, European Integration spread to new levels on the social, economic and political level. It is not merely about governance but also about identity, ideology and responsibility that spreads over multiple levels.

The European Union is much more an economic community than a political or identity-based community. We divided integration in the beginning into economic integration, political integration and social integration. The slow but steady development of political integration that was analysed using primary resources on European migration policy suggests, that political migration is fairly rigid and not easy to be influenced by public preferences. Economic integration is based on economic models and global markets and is equally immune to public preferences. It is mostly social integration that can be influenced by the public. Questions of European Identity and cultural exchange are secondary to the European Integration process in the first place. As long as this is the case, substantive decisions on European Integration will be motivated by economic and materialistic rather than identity and ideological reasons. Brexit will only be a success if Britain remains integrated in the European market and to a certain extent maintains political ties to the European Union.

[167] Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*.

6.1.4 Euroscepticism and Populism

Euroscepticism as the discourse that opposes European integration is important to include in the discussion as well. De Wilde and Trenz relate it to the unsettled and principally contested character of the European Union.[168] This scepticism therefore correlates with uncertainty in the institutional structure, its purpose and rationale and its trajectory. The authors see a clear link to mass media. This link is particularly important, as Euroscepticism is at least partially explained as the result of a negativity bias of political news and social media campaigns and less by actual political party campaigns. Euroscepticism could therefore be seen as a consequence of the changing media landscape and politicized migration in Europe, that highlights the increasing uncertainty of the capabilities of the European Union in tackling the crisis indirectly explains a contesting discourse on European Integration.

In the Syrian case we could see how protest during the Arab spring was pushed by new media providing the individual with an access to the world. In most European countries Euroscepticism and Populism are minority movements consisting of small groups with equally extended loud voices, especially on the European stage. But Euroscepticism is not necessarily based on perception. Regional Integration benefits the majority and it started as an economic community. The world market is based on certain economic foundations and integration fits into this system. But not everyone benefits from the system. While younger generations make increasing use of globalization and its benefits, many older generations have only limited access and interest in related developments, be it travelling, the use of the Internet or internationalized communication and exchange.

On a country level, European Integration provides stronger bargaining weight in the international market and increases the possibilities of individual governments to advance its economy and other areas. This is one of the reasons that even Eurosceptic governments such as the Italian coalition of the Movemento Cinque Stelle and Lega Nord or the Hungarian Fidesz party avoid reducing integration on the large scale and limit their scepticism and action to matters of migration.[169] Here a clear trend is visible that is also represented in the respective national public sphere. Countries that act as prominent host countries for refugees and migrants are interested in closer Integration, in order to share the responsibility and reduce the relative amount of migrant inflow. Countries that receive only a limited number of refugees and migrants oppose further integration in this area as they want to avoid increased responsibility.[170]

What is questionable is if any actor is interested in complete integration. The idea of creating a European federal state is no longer a political option. Neither European governments nor institutions are realistically interested to create such a responsibility. Even Pro European parties do not necessarily push for increasing integration in every aspect. Euroscepticism is a broad concept. What is new is highlighted by Post-Functionalism as the constraining dissensus.[171] Recent years have strongly developed a certain kind of Euroscepticism, one that does not come naturally but is constructed and based on populism and national identity sentiments.

[168] Pieter de Wilde and Hans-Jörg Trenz, 'Denouncing European Integration: Euroscepticism as Polity Contestation', *European Journal of Social Theory* 15, no. 4 (November 2012): 537–54, https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431011432968.

[169] Moravcsik, 'Preferences, Power and Institutions in 21 st -Century Europe'.

[170] This argument that Moravscik makes reflects also in the public opinion survey data used for this paper. Populations with less refugees determine it a higher priority

[171] Hooghe and Marks, 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration'.

Populism merely continues the logic of the Islam as the perpetual other creating its own European Identity. What supports this argument, is that populist national parties and voters pool resources. Using the cross-border communication methods provided by the internet and the confines of the European Union, coalitions of right-wing parties are representors in the Parliament and populist Eurosceptic governments support each other. Interestingly, this can be understood as an entirely new arm of European Integration. Ideological Integration. Nationalistic parties are by definition ingroup and outgroup developers, but in this case European Integration is so far reaching and such an influential system that it creates a new ingroup. Another way to argue is that populist parties construct their ideology and their political basis not being bound by facts or reality, this allows to be opportunistic, like Lega Norde and the Five Star Movement in Italy. It allows to take any support that is offered to gain influence and power, be it through Putin in Russia, who actively supports European right-wing parties, Trump in the US, or other countries in the European Union. This latter argument is also supported by the observation, that populist parties that come to power quickly lose their Eurosceptic drive and focus on anti-migration as described before.

6.2 European Migration Policy and Crisis

Looking at migration policy in Europe over the course of the past three decades, we can see a gradual development of a foundation for increased cooperation, harmonization and conceptualization of EU migration policies. In light of the general intention to increase European integration there is a more positive view on migration visible. Three of the four pillars of GAMM are promoting legal migration as a benefit to all parties involved. Merely illegal immigration is opposed. The crisis shows an obvious change. The second pillar on illegal migration is highly prioritised ever since. With the European Agenda on Migration, the first pillar of GAMM on improving legal migration moved to the last position while hard solutions like border control, security and combatting migration are emphasised. The post-crisis system also sees a clear focus shift from migration within Europe to prevention in external countries. Both the turkey deal and Emergency Trust Fund for Africa outsource the issue of migrants to third countries. This shows to be a political solution, that is based on the fact that national governments try to reduce own responsibility, to a humanitarian issue.

The survey data of the public opinion in Europe indicates a trend. While different topics have a sustainable place in European policy considerations, peaks and lows in public interest can be seen. Regularly, global crisis affects salience of issues. In 2001 the 9/11 attacks pushed security and terrorism up. In 2008, the economic crisis highlighted topics like inflation and economic growth. 2015 the migrant crisis focussed public perception on immigration and the climate activism of 2018 pushed for climate change combat as a policy priority. At the same time, European Integration is a rigid process that is constantly revised and updated. Sometimes this process takes years. In the meantime, short-term crisis solutions such as the Turkey deal address salient political issues. If they are based on ideological rather than factual motivations it is likely that the issue is solved or another issue replaced it in salience, before the processes for actual substantive policy change are finalized.

6.3 Politicization: Downfall or Turning Point for the European Idea

Migration is an integral part of Europe. But migration today has a different meaning than it had 50 or just 25 years ago, when we take into account that the European Union grew from 12 to 28 member states of which 26 are in the Schengen Area. Most people in Europe can easily leave their country for another European country to work or study and through globalization and European Integration Europeans did grow closer together in many aspects of life. Taking an even closer look, migration again became an entirely different meaning in 2015 with the European Refugee crisis and increasing political but also economic migration to Europe. Since then migration is and remains one of the leading topics in politics, the media and in public debate. The Syrian Case is an important point of departure in looking at the relation between migration and European Integration because it exemplifies this changing narrative on migration, connects it to politicization even if the process has started before and it is closely related with European Integration. It also provides a unique starting point to discuss European Integration theory as a currently unresolved issue that does not only polarizes political parties and European people but also scholars of regional integration. The Syrian case is paramount to the European migrant crisis and this crisis is or should be at the centre of the academic debate on the threat of politicization to regional integration in Europe. It represents most aspects of the possibly largest trial ever to the European Idea. If the crisis is really this central to Europe remains to be seen. The coin is tossed and can land on either side. If it is the start of the end and the downfall of the European Union or if Europe will come out stronger on the other end is also not clear, but what we can say is that the crisis taps into the core of major variables, including politicization, the role of the media, rising populism, Brexit, European Identity and questions of sovereignty, to only name few. The most prominent debaters of how the coin will land are the scholars representing liberal intergovernmentalism, currently the most established theory on European Integration and post functionalism, a possibly worthy contender. To understand the expected influence of politicization in Europe it is necessary to discuss the differences and commonalities between these two lines of thought that were introduced in the previous chapters.

6.3.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism vs Post functionalism

First and foremost, the debate between LI and PF evolves around the question if functionalism still applies as an explanation of European Integration. If Hooghe and Marks are right, and their theory remains to be proven by substantial changes in European Integration policy, future decisions will not be made entirely based on functional merit but increasingly defined by ideological factors. For now, Moravcsiks hypothesis, that only functional preference lead to substantial policy change, is corroborated. Even if functionalism has reached a limit it remains to be discussed which areas are affected. European Integration is wide reaching and even if future policies on migration and climate change, another topic gaining in salience in recent years, can no longer be explained on functionality, most other decisions and therefore the largest part of regional integration in Europe might still be explained best by a functionalist theory.

The multi-level governance approach opposes the state-centric governance preference of LI in which governments remain the primary actors with authority and jurisdiction. The PF argument that the number of actors influencing European policy increased and that alternative decisionmakers were established wins the argument, being supported by an entire field of research in institutionalism. The role of supranational institutions and especially the European Commission questions states and governments monopoly position in European decision making. Moravcsik himself speaks of re-election as the absolute priority of democratic governments and this could be an indication that even LI is in some form aware of the possible power of the public.[172] While he does not see the public as an organized body that would count as an entity wielding authority, Hooghe and Marks describe a recent development of political opposition parties organizing communities with the support of the internet and new media. Bennett and Segerberg described the diminished role of organization to further the interest of a group.[173] The influence of the individual seen in the Arab spring protests exemplifies this new individualized logic that does not require a collective identity frame or organizational support. Instead of collective action and organization the enhanced speed of online communication and the global possibilities lead to issue publics, networks and connective action. This replaces organization and could possibly question Moravcsiks understanding of the role of politicization. PF understands politicization, that developed further in recent years as a major influence on European policy decisions. They describe an increased interest by the public, rising Euroscepticism and an authority of the public to affect European Integration, turning the mode of decision making from an elite driven permissive consensus politics to a public driven constraining dissensus politics. This ultimately leads to decreasing integration as identity is a decisive factor and identity politics are driven by nationalist sentiments rather than pan-European.

Moravcsik does not agree with this power of politicization. He admits that LI does not yet cover politicization in its current form but he hypotheses that the influence of the public is possible but rather irrelevant when it is based on identity as Euroscepticism often is. Substantive policy changes on a European level will, according to him, not be based on ideological grounds. Looking at the political integration of the European Union and the case of migration policy in the 21st Century, this paper supports this claim. Despite large shifts in public perception and voter behaviour that can be found in the Eurobarometer survey data, immigration, a largely ideological topic did not lead to essential changes. Quite the opposite can be found. Due to the emotional situation of a crisis policy decisions seemed to have been postponed to quieter times. A public perception of what is necessary, that is based on their feeling of identity rather than on empirical facts will not push decision makers to substantive policy. Instead these authorities will mislead the public and create symbolic changes like the turkey deal, that are easily reversed or follow different agendas, while continuing to decide on relevant changes based on other preferences. Moravcsik denies the decisive role of identity and also introduces some relevant limitations. The public has a limited range of topics that it deems relevant enough to influence decision makers. Migration is a unique example, becoming salient over the years and leading to political change in Europe. But Moravcsik also points towards certain empirical observations.

[172] Moravcsik, 'The European Constitutional Compromise and the Neofunctionalist Legacy'.
[173] Bennett and Segerberg, 'The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics: Information, Communication & Society: Vol 15, No 5'.

Euroscepticism seems to end with migration most of the times. The Italian coalition of the right-wing Lega Nord and the Eurosceptic Five Star Movement pushed for strong anti-migration politics while dropping their interest in other areas in the moment of their election. The Hungarian Fidesz party and its leader President Victor Orban pushed extreme unilateral anti-migration policies, resorting to create physical borders. However, outside of migration, Hungary and other 'Eurosceptic' governments push for further integration where it serves them. Eastern European countries benefit exceptionally from European agricultural subsidies and projects and here there is no opposition to increasing supranational governance. The perception of migration today is that of crisis. Even if the number of immigrants decreased since 2015, the media covers migration and its consequences regularly be it the humanitarian crisis of drowning refugees in the Mediterranean, their living conditions in the camps around them or the situation in host countries that try to integrate, manage or return them. The public debate on immigration is kept alive throughout society. This crisis situation warrants crisis measures. In accordance with Moravcsiks analysis of decision making it would be logical that crisis measures do not create substantive long-term policy change but provide short-term solutions to regain a status quo. Substantive policy could then ensure a crisis prevention in the future.

The internet is described above not as a political actor but as a tool available to a wide range of political actors. Five major partially interrelated changes were introduced, the technological change leads to a decentralization of information. Post-Functionalism uses the same logic to describe the decentralization of decision making in European Integration. Decentralization furthers the democratization of politics with the liberalisation and diversification of regimes on one hand and mobilization possibilities in the public. Mediatization is one possible method of pressure to decision makers. The second change is demographic. If technology has the effect described above, demographic change becomes important, as the younger generations are used to using and understanding the modern tools of information and communication, at least in comparison with older generations. A third change in the media that can be broadened in its logical approach is the changing roles of the media as simple content providers and consumers as passive information receivers. Through social media individuals actively produce information creating larger input of both information and disinformation. Media start competing with a wider range of actors simplifying the approach and often resorting to spectacularization.

This also seems to be true for political parties and other actors. Especially populist parties repeatedly place themselves in the centre of public attention using this new form of media and politics that cares more about presentation than content describing the fourth change. Here the negativity bias shows, hypothesising that negative news and information have a greater impact on individuals and therefore represent more significance than positive news. The negative narratives of populist parties sell better than the positive narratives of established parties reflecting on their own work in the past. Lastly the Hybrid Media describe how media circulate and recirculate content to develop feelings and narratives. This can also be seen in politics where irrelevant issues are repeated until they become salient or are related to salient issues. Euroscepticism is often created by focussing on the relation between immigration and the European Union. Political parties circulate certain information and recirculate them after a while to keep the constructed perception of the issue alive. The concepts of flaming, priming and cueing provide an understanding how the internet works as a politicization tool as they explain how productive discussion is irritated and emotion and ideology enter rational, fact-oriented debates.

7. Chapter VII: Conclusion

The question to what extent the phenomenon of politicization of the European Refugee Crisis questions the common theoretical understand of European Integration quickly boils down to a showdown between Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Post Functionalism. On one hand the advanced functional traditional theory that most convincingly transferred into the 21st Century and on the other hand a novel approach that questions functionalism as a theoretical basis and views politicization and identity as increasingly important variables, that are not covered by any other established theory. Andrew Moravcsik delivers convincing arguments that can be supported by empirical findings of this paper. The findings determine that migration is a complex issue that provides enough salience to shape public preferences. The role of the internet and new media as tools to transfer this preference into pressure was described. However, a real influence of public opinion on European policy and therefore on European Integration cannot be found. A much larger scale research project could possibly come to a different conclusion. There is a trend of both identity and politicization changing their roles in European politics, but policy decisions can still be explained along functional theoretical concepts. Voters can be irrational, but our democratic system on national level and rigid procedures on European level ensure that irrationality is limited and reversable. Decisions are based on compromise and a veto system is in place on the European level. On the national level governments work towards re-election which is hard to justify if important decisions were irrational and European policy is an increasingly salient topic among voters. The European Union also comprises rigid bureaucratic barrier. If we look for example at the British exit from the European Union, the process does not allow a rash decision to lead to substantive change. It is ensured that the United Kingdom goes through a process of deliberation and even then, measures that uphold a certain integration are preferred over a hard Brexit that cuts all ties for a start.

European Integration is wide-reaching. The past 30 years the European Union welcomed 16 new countries that integrated smooth and fast. This integration happened on several levels, economic, social, educational, agricultural, environmental, to only name some. Of all these examples, only few are contested and only one can be considered a salient issue for a mass public at this stage: Migration. The discussions on economic and political migrants and the public perception are a large part of the crisis. Rationally, with appropriate measures in place Europe would not have an economic or cultural problem with migration. The issue is a lack of responsibility sharing and solution-oriented thinking. Countries that take many refugees for example push for increasing integration but not primarily to solve a humanitarian crisis, but rather to reduce its own share of responsibility. Countries with little or no refugees oppose further integration as it allows them to unilaterally close their borders to immigrants. But opposing migration is not the same as opposing integration. In fact, Euroscepticism is largely based on an unwillingness to share responsibilities in the refugee crisis. Eurosceptic parties and interest groups connect across borders making use of an integrated Europe. Leading populist and Eurosceptic parties keep largely away from European questions outside of migration. Many actions are symbolic and as Moravcsik would describe them as examples of organized hypocrisy, where politicians say one thing to calm the public while acting differently.

Looking at the survey data between 1999 and 2019 a trend can be seen. While different topics have a sustainable place in European policy considerations, peaks and lows in public interest can be seen. Regularly, global crisis affects salience of issues. The Syrian case provides a snapshot of the situation in Europe today. It highlights migration as a major policy priority and a salient issue to the mass public. It provides a perfect example for politicization in Europe and European Integration. Originating from war and humanitarian crisis, migration and the refugee crisis in Europe is a political discussion. Decisions by regional, national and supranational decision makers are under close scrutiny of the public and other interest groups. Proposed solutions tap into this pressure and are not necessarily functional. When Germany opened its borders to Syrian refugees and ignored European legal agreements, it did not have a functional strategy in mind. Traditional theories do not cover politicization sufficiently which is why they are obsolete as such. Liberal Intergovernmentalism however is not a typical traditional theory. It can be described as the evolved advanced version that is still developing in areas that only gain relevance now. Politicization does not affect a large enough amount of European Integration to justify an entire paradigm shift and while theories are no longer entirely valid, they do have their merit and should have the chance to adapt. What can be said is that there is enough support to include identity and the public into research on European Integration. Post-functionalism also manages to question the validity of functionalism to explain European Integration from here on out. Liberal Intergovernmentalism has the chance to corroborate Moravcsiks hypothesis that decisions based on identity and driven by politicization cannot bring about substantive change to European Integration. In conclusion, it can be said that politicization does question essential aspects of traditional theories such as the state-centric governance approach favoured by Intergovernmentalism or the functionalist foundation inherent to all theories on European Integration of the 20th Century. Further research should conceptualize the Post-functionalist approach within a Liberal Intergovernmentalist framework to widen reach of the most promising theory and provide a convincing empirical strategy to account for politicization, identity and non-functional decisions.

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