

International Third-
Party Involvement in
the Transition of Rebel
Movements after
Intra-State Conflict

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The Cases of the
FMLN, RENAMO, GAM,
and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front in
Mindanao, Philippines

Master's Thesis
Linde Saar Leemhuis

Supervisor
Dr. Hans Vollaard

Second Reader
**Prof. Dr. Thomas
Schillemans**

Student Number
6289207

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Linde Saar Leemhuis

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Abbreviations

AL	Arab League
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BARMM	Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
BBL	Bangsamoro Basic Law
BDA	Bangsamoro Development Agency
BIAF	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
BNTF	Bangsamoro Normalization Trust Fund
BOL	Bangsamoro Organic Law
BTA	Bangsamoro Transition Authority
CAB	Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FMNL	Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [Aceh Free Movement]
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRP	Government of the Republic of the Philippines
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OLBARMM	The Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process
RENAMO	Resistencia Nacional Mozambiqueña
RSS	Reintegration Support Scheme
UBJP	United Bangsamoro Justice Party
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOHAC	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Mozambique
UNOMOZ	United Nations Observation in Mozambique
UNOSAL	United Nations Observation in El Salvador
US	United States of America
WHO	World Health Organizations

Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, the majority of conflicts have been ethnic and civil wars (Jung, 2003: 1). These intra-state conflicts are conflicts between or amongst two or more groups within the internationally recognized territory of a state. They include civil wars, involving the state government and at least one non-state actor, and inter-communal conflicts, involving two or more groups, none of which is the state government (Sarkees et al, 2003: 59). In general, intra-state conflicts tend to last longer than inter-state wars and are harder to solve by political effort (Jung, 2003: 1). Besides that, the effects of intra-state conflicts go far beyond state borders and may even be global (Gleditsch & Beardsley, 2004: 379, Gleditsch, 2007: 294). As such, it has been suggested that domestic political instability, in the form of civil war or guerrilla warfare, is one of the causes for international terrorism and increases the number of international terrorist attacks (Campos, 2009: 3, Campos & Gassebner, 2013: 1).

The presence of cross-border effects of intra-state conflicts is an important notion for several kind of international actors such as multilateral organizations, individual states, and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). In this thesis I will call these actors “international third parties.” Acting upon this importance, international third parties are often in one way or another involved in intra-state conflicts. Not only are they involved; external states and international organizations are argued to be the most influential in bringing conflicts to a peaceful end (Miall, 2004: 12).

In post-conflict periods following intra-state conflicts, the transformation of formerly armed non-state actors into political parties has grown to become a relatively frequent phenomenon in the last couple of decades (Söderberg Kovacs & Hatz, 2016: 991). This “transformation process” as I will call it, of rebel movements is a crucial prerequisite for peace after intra-state conflict. Instead of having to pursue an intra-state war until a bloody end, there are possibilities for rebel movements to enter negotiations leading to a peace agreement (Deonandan et al, 2007: 3). This has led to former rebel groups taking part in democratic elections and gaining influence in post-war decision-making institutions.

This transformation process of rebel movements into a political organization often happens with support of domestic and international peace makers. Their arguments for support of this process are usually the encouragement of a multi-party system and addressing some of the underlying grievances that contributed to the outbreak of the civil war (Söderberg Kovacs & Hatz, 2016: 991).

Having stated that the intra-state conflict as well as rebel-to-party transformation have become of increasing importance due to its greater presence in comparison to interstate conflict, longer duration and cross border effects, a statement by De Zeeuw (2008) is important to note. Cited in South & Joll (2016: 16), he highlights that “one of the key factors defining the success of civil war endings is the ability of former rebel movements to transform themselves into ‘normal’ political organizations.” Moreover, he notes that this is “arguably one of the hardest peacebuilding challenges.” De Zeeuw stresses the core issue here; the sustainability of peace after an intra-state conflict is for a great deal defined by the successful transformation of former rebel groups into formal political organizations but is also one of the hardest peacebuilding challenges. The transformation of the rebel group RENAMO in Mozambique illustrates the crucial role international third parties can play in this process:

With the signing of the 1992 General Peace Accord between the government of Mozambique and the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO), civil war, which started in 1977, had formally come to an end. During the civil war RENAMO had emerged as an armed organization and only developed into a political party after the war (Manning, 2004: 56). This transformation process was supported by a wide variety of international actors, aiming to contribute to RENAMO’s transformation.

The peace process was formally overseen by the United Nations Observation Mission (UNOMOZ), which carried out the formal framework for the peace process and thus RENAMO’s transformation and was responsible for the 17 million USD transformation trust fund. The process also largely depended upon flexible interventions on the part of bilateral donors, who filled in gaps left by the UNOMOZ (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 144). Influential donors such as the US, Italy, and Germany were in nearly constant contact with RENAMO’s leader, Afonso Dhlakama, in the run up to elections to allay his fears for election fraud and keep the peace process on track the donors stayed in contact with him (Manning, 2007: 260).

The example of RENAMO in Mozambique shows how international engagement can be present in the rebel-to-party transformation and might create a better chance for sustainable peace by assisting rebel movements in this transformation process.

This short introduction has stated that there is greater relevance of intra-state conflicts in the world due to their dominant presence compared to interstate conflicts, long duration and above all, effects that span national borders. For the latter reason, there is a relevance for international actors to be involved in intrastate conflicts and peace processes. It also shows that to end these conflicts and to ensure sustainable peace, the transformation of rebel movements into political parties is crucial but also one of the biggest challenges for peacebuilding. It appears that research on third party influence on rebel’s transformation processes oddly almost never has been done. The next section builds a case for research on this specific topic, identifying a void in available research at the moment, and relevance for new research focusing on different types of third parties.

Relevance

Research on third-party involvement in the transformation process of rebel movements is still fairly limited. Research has been done on other themes relating to intra-state conflict however, focusing on the involvement of international third parties. Looking into intra-state conflicts in general, it has been shown that transnational influences can affect how intrastate conflicts are fought. Many third parties often have an interest in the outcome of a war and do shape the outcome of the conflict Gleditsch & Beardsley (2004: 399). Extensive scholarly research is available on the negotiation phase of a peace process where international third parties often engage as mediator. Authors have, for example, investigated ways in which the international community can be most effective in this phase of a peace process by determining what the key issues of a successful peace process are (Gomez-Suarez & Newman, 2013).

Other than that, in many publications of Bercovitch and co-authors (1992, 2000, 2002) on mediation, international third-party mediators and their strategies for mediating a peace process are often discussed and found to be relevant in solving intra-state conflict. Peacekeeping after an intra-state conflict is influenced by international actors and they are often the ones to establish peacekeeping mission (Mullenbach, 2005: 530). In the area of peace agreement implementation, the influence of international third parties is examined as well. By looking into state capacity of countries in which a civil war is taking place, DeRouen et al (2010) conclude that the importance of third-party intervention increases when state capacity of the country in conflict is low.

In the involvement of international actors in intra-state conflicts, research shows that there is a difference in how various types of actors engage. Gleditsch & Beardsley (2004: 399, 400), conclude that different types of actors vary in how effective they are in influencing the dynamics of intra-state conflict. Furthermore, they argue that transnational influence comes from not only the most powerful or closest actors but that there is a bigger variety in influential actors. In his article on the establishment of peace keeping missions, Mullenbach (2005: 531) makes a distinction between missions by the UN, regional intergovernmental organizations, and states. As he argues, the type of actor matters in the probability of a peacekeeping mission to be established and the UN, regional IGOs and states engage in different circumstances in a peacekeeping mission (Mullenbach, 2005: 548).

Discussing a very wide variety of mediators, formal as well as informal, Bercovitch & Rubin (1992) distinguish between five types of formal mediators. Regional organizations, transnational organizations, the UN, small states and superpowers. The role these actors would play as

mediators are influenced by the type of actor. A large state with resources has the power to reward or coerce the parties, a small state does not have power resources but can effectively mediate when having good relationships with both sides, international, regional, and transnational organizations that have the legitimate voice of the global community and represent the interests of individuals across states (Bercovitch & Rubin, 1992). The type of international actors, in the role of mediators have different objectives and resources and will use various strategies in their way of mediating (Bercovitch & Rubin, 1992: 22, 25). Moreover, types of mediators are more effective in different kinds of stages of conflicts (Bercovitch & Rubin, 1992: 270).

These authors all give valuable insights on how and under what conditions third-party influence takes place and what the effects are. They highlight the importance of distinguishing various types of third parties and the way they engage in the peace process in a different manner. However, the authors do not discuss international third-party influence specifically on the transformation process of rebel movements.

In search for more theory about the rebel-to-party transformation process, it is worth taking a look into the broader scholarship of post-conflict party development. Within that scholarship, a few researchers focus on the transformation of rebel movements into political parties specifically. Studying rebel movements' transformation in civil war peace processes from 1975-2011, Söderberg Kovacs & Hatz (2016) were able to determine conditions under which rebel groups are more likely to transform into political parties through quantitative research. Others have analyzed the internal organization of rebel groups and look at organizational pressures and the importance of communication within the rebel movement to have a successful transformation (Ishiyama & Batta, 2011, Dedouet, 2012). These authors, however, do not discuss possible contributions of international actors to this transformation process.

Even though research on international third-party intervention is still quite limited, some authors have touched upon the topic. South & Joll (2016) have studied the challenges faced by armed groups, moving from insurgency to credible political actors and briefly mention how international actors influence these challenges. Following the authors, the creation of legitimacy of the rebel group and the peace process in general is an effect international third parties can have. In this process, however, donors have the tendency to provide funding through government-controlled structures, which is easier than seeking out appropriate local partners on the ground (South & Joll, 2016: 185). When analyzing the influence of international third parties is not the main goal in South & Joll

(2016), it is the aim of Curtis & De Zeeuw (2009). In a short article they state that success of a rebel-to-party transformation is indeed influenced by engagement of international third parties. They give an overview of several ways international third parties influence this process, and provide some policy advice for the actors involved.

This article however, does not make a distinction between different types of actors and reviews international third parties as a whole as it refers to the "international community" in general. Studies on other parts of peace processes have shown that it is of importance to take different types of actors and the various ways in which they interfere into account. This leaves a void in the available knowledge about differences between specific actors in the international community in their contributions to rebel movement's transformation processes and shows the need for new research.

In a case study on a rebel movement transformation process, Manning & Malbrough (2010) do make that distinction between types of actors and argue that the importance of bilateral relations in rebel-to-party transformation is often overlooked because researchers tend to focus on interference of multilateral (UN) missions. Multilateral missions and bilateral relations are of different added value in their contributions to the transformation of rebel movements and should therefore not be seen as "one." The authors stress that there is a need for a more "fine-grained investigation of the diversity of actors and micro-level approaches to multidimensional peace operations" (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 167).

This research tries exactly to do that by providing a fine-grained investigation of the types of international third parties involved in the transformation process of rebel movements after intra-state conflict. By doing that, this research adds to the existing theory on international third-party influence in rebel-to-party transformation after intra-state conflict shaped by valuable contributions of Manning, Malbrough, Soderberg Kovacs, Söderberg Kovacs, Hatz, De Zeeuw. Knowing that research on this topic is not fully developed yet and being aware that the type of actor matters in how international actors are involved in intra-state conflict is an entry point for new research. Therefore, a new point of focus is introduced: the differences in involvement of types of international third parties. In the next section, the main question of this research is introduced and explained, and the structure of the thesis is outlined.

Research Question

As argued in previous sections, there is a great theoretical and social relevance to the topic of international third-party involvement in the transformation process of rebel movements to a formal political organization after intra-state war, specifically looking into differences between actors. As a consequence, the aim of this research is to identify if there are differences in the way types of international third parties exert influence on the transformation processes of rebel movements into formal political organizations. In doing so, the goal is to add the still limited theoretical debate on third party influence in the transformation process of rebel movements and to provide useful policy insights for international third parties that want to engage that transformation process. Therefore, the following question is the central focus in this thesis: Do different types of international third parties exert different influence on the transition of rebel movements into formal political organizations?

In order to provide an accurate answer to this question two tracks have been followed. The first track consists of the examination of three cases of rebel movements that went through the transformation of a rebel movement to a normal political organization. The cases of the Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador, Resistencia Nacional Mozambiqueña (RENAMO) in Mozambique, and the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia were all cases where international involvement was present. Based on existing case studies, an analysis of secondary sources is done aiming to find first indications of how the types of international third parties exerted influence on the transformation process. The first sub question of this research is therefore: How have different types of international third parties exerted influence on the transition processes of rebel movements in El Salvador, Mozambique, and Indonesia? This analysis is followed by the second track, an in-depth case study on the transformation process of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines. For this part of the research primary resources have been used in order to check indications of the first three cases and to provide more detailed data on the different ways of exerting influence by types of international third parties. The second sub question of the research is therefore: How do different types of international third parties exert influence on the transition processes of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines?

The structure of this thesis starts with a chapter that provides the theoretical framework for the research in order to create a better understanding of what is being researched. Key concepts are discussed and expectations of different influences by different third parties are presented. Chapter 3 is an outline of how the research has been executed, what the reasons for these methods are and what this means for reliability and validity of this research. Moving to the empirical part of this thesis, Chapter 4 presents the three cases of transformation and an analysis based on secondary resources. Chapter 5 discusses the case of the MILF in the Philippines thoroughly. Based on the two empirical chapters, conclusions are drawn in Chapter 6.

How have different types of international third parties exerted influence on the transition processes of rebel movements in El Salvador, Mozambique, and Indonesia?

Do different types of international third parties exert different influence on the transition of rebel movements into formal political organizations?

How do different types of international third parties exert influence on the transition processes of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines?

Theoretical Framework

To understand international third-party involvement in transformation of rebel movements and provide an answer to the main question of this research, a theoretical framework is laid down. Looking into the main question—Do different types of international third parties exert different influence on the transition of rebel movements into normal political organizations?—some concepts are mentioned that deserve more explanation. Moreover, a theoretical assumption on how small states, big states and multilateral organizations contribute to the transition of rebel movements is needed. In 2.1. the concepts of small state, big state, and multilateral organization are clarified, 2.2 provides a deeper understanding of the concept rebel movement, and rebel movement's transformation. Having explained the most important concepts of this research, 2.3 connects those concepts and provides a framework to formulate expectations of modes of intervention by small states, big states, and multilateral organizations in the transformation process of rebel movements to formal political organizations.

Types of International Third Parties

The main question of this research refers to “types” of international third parties, implying that several international actors with particular characteristics can be put into categories. Those different types of actors are expected to engage in an intra-state conflict and peace process in a different way. The types mentioned in chapter one by other authors were UN actors, regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), states, transnational organizations, small states, superpowers, large states (Bercovitch & Rubin, 1992, Mullenbach, 2005). These types can be categorized in two ways: single states versus organizations that represent more than one state (transnational, UN, regional intergovernmental organizations) or bigger states (large states, super powers) vs small states. Using both of these distinctions, the categorization used in this thesis will be “small states,” “large states,” and “multilateral organizations.” The rest of this section further conceptualizes these types of international actors.

A discussion on large and small states operating in an international environment leads to a debate of size. The concept of the size of states has been approached in roughly two ways: through a broad conceptual framework that presents multiple variables that indicate a state’s size (Thorhallsson, 2006), and by using a relational approach to size, reviewing a state’s size always in relation to other states by which the size can be determined (Howard Grøn & Wivel, 2011). Together, these approaches give a comprehensive idea of the concept of size of states and therefore informs the concepts of small and large states used in this research. Lastly, the third type of international third-party, multilateral organization, is discussed.

Thorhallsson's Framework of Size of States

The conceptual framework that describes variables that determine the size of a state in an international context, is provided by Thorhallsson (2006). The framework originally stems from four transitional variables, describing the nineteenth century European international system where military capacity, size of economy, and concrete territorial gains were most important for the size and perceived size of states (Thorhallsson, 2006: 9). Given the overly changing international structure the four traditional variables are not sufficient anymore and are supplemented by two new measures for a state's size regarding administrative and diplomatic capacity and the political elites' ambitions and ideas.

The framework lays down six categories that describe the notion of a state's size and influence a state's international behavior. The first four variables are the traditional ones, "fixed size," "sovereignty size," "political size," and "economic size." These variables are determined by population and territory of a state, effective sovereignty on its territory, the ability to keep a state structure and presence at an international level, military and administrative capability, gross domestic product (GDP), market size and development success. Two additional variables are "perceptual size," which refers to how domestic and external actors regard the state and "preference size" regarding the ambitions and prioritization of the governing elite and their ideas about the international system (Thorhallsson, 2006: 8). The categories are also presented below.

- 1. Fixed size
- 2. Sovereignty size
- 3. Political size
- 4. Economic size
- 5. Perceptual size
- 6. Preference size

- Population size and territory
- Capacity to maintain sovereignty
- Military and administrative capacity
- GDP, market size, development success
- How state is regarded by external actors
- Ambition and prioritization of the governing elite

Variable

Indicator

Two additional factors that are of concern in the framework are "action competence," which concerns a state's ability to formulate and implement policies, domestically, and the ability to exert influence internationally, and "vulnerability," which refers to a state's domestic and international weakness and possible subjugation in a wide context (Thorhallsson, 2006: 14). Thorhallsson's framework is quite comprehensive and explains the multifacetedness of the size of states. Applying this model, one knows which factors to pay attention to in determining a state's size. If the goal is to define whether a state is small or large, another analysis is required as Thorhallsson does not say what can be defined as big or small. For that reason, the relational approach to size is discussed.

The Relational Approach to Size of States

A different approach to determine a state's size is the relational approach. Literature often refers to big or small states in relation to each other where small states are usually defined in contradiction to big states and the other way around. As such, small states are defined by Howard Grøn & Wivel (2011: 524) as "the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship, unable to change the nature of the relationship on their own." Baldacchino (2009: 26) states that small states are assumed to be the "price takers" and go with what is presented to them, and big states are the price makers determining what will happen. They do, however, have option to act on an international level. Following these definitions, small states and big states can be identified by analyzing a particular situation in which will be determined which state is the weaker part of relation and the "price taker." That state would be the small state where the one that is left is the big state. This means that the concept of small and large states differs per situation. It has been pointed out before that the concept of a small state is "highly flexible and should only be used—as for big states—as a situational or relational notion rather than something that can easily be defined in objective term" (Branner in Joenniemi 1998: 61). This approach shows how important situational factors are and a state's "bigness" depends on the other actors at play in a particular situation. The relational approach to the size of states does not give any information about which characteristics of a state would result in that player being the bigger or smaller one in that relation. Therefore, both of the approaches are used in this research.

Donor Size and Perceptual Size to Determine the Size of States

Since an agreed definition of what constitutes a small state or big state or sharp dichotomy between small and large states does not exist (Payne, 2009: 279), the framework of Thorhallsson as well as the notion of small and big states as relational and situational concepts, are useful in analyzing big and small states operating in international politics.

The relational approach to a state's size shows that relational and situational aspects influence a state's size in a particular situation. For that reason, per case that is present in this research will be determined which small and large states are. "Economic size" of Thorhallsson's framework will be used as variable to determine a state's size. In this research, this is not determined by a state's GDP or market size but by a state's available development a particular country. The amount of development money does in a great way determine what a state can do to influence a transformation process as the state can use this money to set-up projects to exert influence, contribute to trust funds, or give financial incentives to conflicting parties. In this way, the "donor size" determines the size of a state. This variable takes situational aspects into account because the size of a state will vary per peace process, based on available development money for that particular country. This also reflects the level of priority that a donor gives to a country. Which country then is small or big will be determined by comparing budget and donated money and look for the smaller or larger state in a case.

As voiced by theory on mediation and diplomacy, the amount of influence is not just determined by financial resources. The intangible resources that states have can be of great important for influence it can exert in an international context. To measure the intangible resources and size of states that cannot be expressed in money, Thorhallsson's "perceptual size" will be used to determine a state's size. To measure this perceptual size, it is assessed how certain states are mentioned on scientific articles, news items, and by players active in peace processes. the perceptual size will be measured. When certain states that are active in a peace processes are perceived as big ones, this will influence their size.

Multilateral Organizations and Multilateralism

Representing big states as well as small states, multilateral organizations can be defined as the "horizontal dimension of public spheres" (Mitzen, 2005: 402). The concept of multilateral organizations also covers regional organizations; formal institutional bodies that represent multiple states from a particular region and having these states as decision making members (Pevehouse, 2002: 611). Examples of regional organizations are the Association for South Asian Nations (ASEAN), European Union (EU), African Union (AU) and the Arab League (AL). Other than that, it covers the multilateral organizations World Bank, United Nations (UN) and the World Health Organization (WHO) that have a global interest, rather than regional organizations that are primarily focused on their own region. In order to conceptualize multilateral organizations, the notion of multilateralism will be discussed.

Multilateralism can be defined as "the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions" (Keohane, 1990: 731). Another definition by Ruggie is "an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct: that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence" (Jørgensen, 2009: 191). The reason for organizing themselves in that particular form of an international organization would be "to solve problems that require collaborative action for a solution" (Haas, 1990: 2). Following these definitions, in this thesis multilateral organizations are defined as follows: "those international organizations where national policies of more than three countries are coordinated, based on generalized principles of conduct to solve problems that require collaborative action." The term multilateral organization is thus used for regional and multilateral organizations and fall within the definition above. Besides the concepts of international third parties, the concept of rebel movements and their transformation deserves more explanation.

Rebel Movement and Transformation Processes

The term “rebel movement,” often referred to as “non-state armed groups” or “armed groups” has been defined in many ways. Policzer (2005) pledges for a minimal definition where non-state armed groups are put in contrast to a state and defines them as “challengers to the state’s monopoly of legitimate coercive force” (Policzer, 2005: 8). He states that using a more minimal definition permits the analysis of the dynamic variation of non-state armed groups. A more detailed definition is provided by Bruderlein in a policy paper for the Center of Humanitarian Dialogue. He defines armed groups as those that have a basic command structure, use violence to achieve political ends and have some independence from state control (Bruderlein, 2000: 8, 9). In line with Bruderlein’s definition but further elaborated is presented by Dedouet (2012: 98) in her study on transformation on non-state armed groups and is the following:

Actors who pursue primarily political agendas; understand the use of force to be a legitimate and pragmatic tool of resistance against clearly defined opponents; are formally organized and have hierarchical, accountable structures (and often distinct military and political organs); and exercise some degree of territorial control.

This definition captures the core goal of rebel movements: to pursue a political agenda, their mode of operation: force, the structure of the organization: hierarchical, accountable, and incorporates the fact that rebel movements often have a non-armed component and exercise some territorial control. Dedouet’s definition captures elements of rebel movements that are important in understanding a rebel movements wishes to transform into a formal political organization (their political agenda) and gives a first indication of what has to be changed in their being to make a transformation to a formal political organization. The following question is how to define this transformation to a political organization?

Klapdor uses the term “rebel-to-party transformation” to refer to the transformation process of a rebel movement to a formal political organization. He defines this as “a process of both behavioral-attitudinal and structural-organizational change from an armed rebel movement to a peaceful political party” (Koko, 2016: 522). Koko only refers to the transformation to a political party where this research will also look into possible transformations into a government organizations or other governance organizations. All these organizations will be called “formal political organization”. In his definition Klapdor refers to a transformation in twofold; the behavioral-attitudinal change and a structural-organizational change that the rebel movement will undergo in its transformation process. Zooming in on the behavioral-attitudinal change,

Koko (2016) uses the term “effective political reintegration.” He describes this as “a process that goes beyond the mere ‘formal creation’ of political parties out of the former rebel movements to embrace a focus on a wider range of spaces for active and legitimate political participation at local and national levels after violent conflict” (Koko, 2016: 522). With this definition Koko highlights that the formal creation of a political party, the structural organizational change, is not enough for real transformation into a formal political organization. This also requires a behavioral change.

The two definitions provide a first insight in what the transformation process of a rebel movement entails. It does however leave some questions unanswered. What needs to change in the organizational structure of a rebel movement? And how can rebel movements make the transition and integrate in the formal political system of its respective country? These questions can be answered by looking at key challenges and success factors of transformation of rebel movements to official political entities. The challenges can be divided in two broad categories: (1) the challenge of the internal organization of the rebel movement. As De Zeeuw notes, the organizational demands for a political party are very different from a rebel movement which makes this challenge key in the transformation process (Ishiyama & Batta, 2011: 370); (2) the external challenge of legitimacy. In order for a rebel movement to transform into a formal political entity, it need to be accepted and perceived as a movement that can be political and part of the formal political structure of a country (Södenberg-Kovacs, 2007: 994, Ishiyama & Batta, 2011: 371).

These challenges can be divided in five categories representing components of a rebel movement’s transformation processes. Faced by the internal organizational challenge a concern of a rebel movement is the *adjustments of organizational strategy*. A new medium of political exchange needs to be introduced: “ballots instead of bullets” (Deonandan et al, 2007: 8). Using this new medium, operational adjustments have to be made. Former clandestine operations are exchanged for the promotion of openness and the movement has to act conform the rules of government and electoral politics (Manning, 2004: 59). There is a shift from insurgency to dialogue with state-agents where bureaucracy and dialogues are the new way to battle (Dudouet, 2012: 101). Next to that, vertical military command structures that were of value during wartime have to be replaced by a more horizontal alternative. At the same time, rebel movements have to maintain internal cohesion to ensure post-conflict viability (Dudouet, 2012: 103).

Inherent to this new medium of political exchange is the *disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)* of ex combatants. Combatants lay down their arms towards the governments and the communities they occupy, and are integrated in civilian life (Theidon, 2007: 67). The “hard” decommissioning can be supplemented by activities for confidence building and social cohesion exercises that helps combatants prepare for the social transformation of switching their identity from combatant to civilian (Theidon, 2007: 71).

Operating as normal political organization requires a different set of skills of a rebel movement’s leadership and active members. Therefore, *leadership reform and recruiting candidates for office* is an important component of transformation as well. The leadership shifts from being military leaders to political leaders and a large number of candidates suitable for public office has to be identified and recruited (Manning, 2004: 59). While making the transition, leadership, while executing political tasks, have to ensure commitment of the rebel group to the peace process at the same time (Dudouet, 2012: 103).

An external component of a rebel movement’s transformation is the *international legitimacy*. The level of support of international actors for the rebel movement as well as support for the peace process in general, grants the rebel movement a certain amount of legitimacy (Ishiyama & Batta, 2012: 371). The international legitimacy of a rebel movement can be influenced is by international pressures, regional political and security context, and sustained international support for programs for instance political capacity building training (Koko, 2016: 523). Another external component is the *level of popular support* in the country where the rebel movement is active, which for example can be shown by citizens confirming its legitimacy through democratic processes (Ishiyama & Batta, 2012: 371). The challenges of transformation are summarized below.

International Legitimacy
Level of Popular Support

External

Adjustment of Organizational Strategies
Leadership Reform and New Candidates
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

Internal

The organizational internal challenges for rebel movements to make their transition, can be influenced by international third-parties, which will be further explained in 3.2. Also, the external challenge of gaining international legitimacy can be influenced by international third-parties as they have multiple options to grant the movement international legitimacy and therefore improve the external conditions of the transformation process. How the three types of international third parties can do this, is explained in 3.2. The level of popular support cannot be influenced by international third parties since this is determined by internal dynamics in a particular country. For that reason, the rest of this thesis will study the four components of transformation.

This first part of the theoretical framework has explained the basic concepts in this research one needs to understand the main questions and scope of this research. The three types of international third parties, rebel movements, and their transition to a formal political entity have been elucidated. Having clarified these concepts, the question arises how they are linked to each other. How do small states, multilateral entities, and big states intervene in the rebel-to-party transformation process?

Influence of Big States, Small States, and Multilateral Organizations on Transformation of Rebel Movements

The next part of this theoretical framework presents theory that will help formulate expectations for the outcome of this research. In doing so, theory about global diplomacy and international third-party mediation is used to shape the expectations. Third-party mediation is a part of peace processes where international actors often engage in and has been researched extensively. Mediators comprise a diversity of positions, varying from individual leader of states to international organization, which determines their access to resources, leverage, and powers to fulfill different mediators' roles (Bercovic & Houston, 2000: 180). Therefore, this field of theory is very well suitable to help formulate expectations for influence exerted by three types of international third parties on a rebel movement's transformation process. In assessing influence of international third parties on the transformation process of rebel movements, only diplomatic and aid interventions are being considered, leaving military interventions outside the scope of this research.

Small State Influence Through Low-Profile Missions

As noted in the theoretical framework so far, small states are usually defined in contrast to big states as the price taker, vulnerable and unable to change the asymmetrical relationship between them and big states. This does not mean that small states are left without any options to act and exert influence on an international level. A small state may present itself as a creative agency, and may have many opportunities to exert influence in an international context, regardless of its size (Cooper & Shaw, 2009: 2). Small states appear to be good in exerting influence through diplomacy when relations are bilateral, they command the moral high ground, creating sympathy from non-state actors, and when it concerns financial or economic matters (Baldacchino, 2009: 35). Following Baldacchino, in these kinds of "diplomatic adventures" a small state is likely to be effective. As this chapter aims to create expectations on how types of international third parties exert influence rather than identifying situations in which they would be successful more theory is required.

How small states can exert influence in international spheres is researched by Howard Grøn & Wivel who formulate three "smart state strategies" small states can apply. A smart state strategy is the situation in which a small state can take advantage of the transformed institutional environment by acting as a "smart state." This strategy has three components: a) goals and means are highly focused and sharply ordered in accordance with preferences—because small states do not have the resources to pursue a broad agenda, their goals must be focused and they have to signal their willingness to negotiate; b) small states have to present their ideas in the common interest of player in the particular environment

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they act in; and c) launch initiatives that seek to mediate between different great powers interest (Howard Grøn & Wivel, 2011: 529). The context where small states will be 'good' at diplomacy and the smart state strategy begins to outline how and under which conditions a small state can exert influence on the transformation process of rebel movements to a political organization.

Theory on mediation adds to this. A case study on the Sri Lankan peace process shows that when the Sri Lankan government and rebel movement had different opinions on who would be a good mediator, a small state was finally chosen to mediate the peace process. The rebel movement was seeking for international legitimacy and wanted the UN to mediate the negotiations. The government did not want too high-stake involvement and the parties converged their interests and chose Norway, which is considered to be a small state in that case study. In the case of Sri Lanka, the size of small states and their "presumed lack of clout" make them appear non-threatening and ideal to position between two parties in conflict Bercovitch & Kadayifci (2002: 32). For Norway, it was important to be on good foot with emerging big power India who called special interest in having a mediation role. Without the consent of India, or any other economic big power, Norway would not have been given the mandate to negotiate in this peace process (Höglund & Svensson, 2009: 181). Small state Norway, thus needed to make sure that its involvement did not go against any big power before it agreed to be mediator. In fulfilling the role as mediators, strategies of small states are most likely to be low-profile strategies of dialogue and communication (Bercovitch & Kadayifci, 2002: 32).

Theory of global diplomacy and small state mediator shapes the expectation of how they will influence the transformation process of a rebel movement. It paints the picture of small state using its limited resources highly focused in line with its goals and preference in that transformation process. In exerting influence the small state will make sure that it will be on good foot with big powers and might even present ideas that mediate between powers. Furthermore, a small state can be of added value because of its non-threatening character but is still able to give some international legitimacy to the rebel movement. Exerting influence on the transformation process of rebel movements are small states expected to so this through low profile missions through dialogue and communication through bilateral relations. The expectation on how small states will influence the transformation process of a rebel movement, is summarized on the next page.

Small states will influence the transformation process of rebel movements through low-profile strategies that are highly focused with the state's goals in which they make sure to be on good foot with big powers in a way that does create international legitimacy but is non-threatening.

Big states will influence the transformation process of rebel movements by using their leverage over actors in the peace process and making use of their resources to keep actors committed through an enforcing strategy.

Big States with Muscles

Big states in contrast to small states, are perceived as the price makers and the stronger part of an asymmetrical relationship, able to change the relation if it wishes to do so. Influence of a big state on a rebel movement's transformation process is therefore expected to be different influence of a small state. Mediation theory shows very clear that the 'bigness' of big states influences its mediation practices in various ways.

Offers for mediation of powerful mediators with resources to bring to the negotiation table and leverage over conflicting parties, are more likely to be accepted. These "mediators with muscles" have the leverage to push negotiators to the negotiation table and provide a political cover for actors to start a dialogue (Greig & Regan, 2008: 769). As a mediator, big states can do side payments to increase the value of a negotiated settlement or threaten with punishments. In this way, their financial resources can increase their success in mediating and likeliness to be accepted as mediator. The resources a big state has available is likely to influence its mediation strategy in another way: as actors with more resources and leverage than other actors, are more likely to apply more enforcing strategies (Kamrava (2011: 544).

Another way the bigness of a big state plays out is that the state can serve as a guarantor of a potential settlement, which further encourages the acceptance of the offer of mediation (Greig & Regan, 2008: 769). Here, the large state can use its weight to keep conflicting parties committed and willing to accept a peace agreement. This weight big states can use, does have another effect as well as has been explained by the case of the Sri Lankan peace process. The weight and resources of a big state might be perceived as threatening to actors in a peace process, which could make them a less favorable candidate to include in the peace process.

Large states are thus expected to be welcomed by states and other actors in the transformation process of rebel movements because of their resources and leverage they can use keep actors committed to the process of transformation. In their engagement, they have the possibility to use their resources to commit actors involved in the peace process but due to the large amount of resources are also likely to use a more enforcing strategy. Moreover, large state missions are expected to be more high-profile for that reason, can be perceived as more threatening and less attractive for the state actor involved. The expectation for big state influence in the transformation processes of rebel movements is summarized on the left page.

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Multilateral Organizations' Influence Using Intangible Sources

Multilateral diplomacy complements the bilateral dialogue between countries. Independent states deal bilaterally with each other and in addition to that, meet in multilateral organizations, not just because they have common interests but also because they have conflicting interests (Watson, 1984: 26). These international organizations are a diplomatic tools, created by states to meet their needs and particularly to address international problems and have a collective focus on diplomacies of its member states. This multilateral character is said to be practical because some of the organizations are highly specialized and others are focused on multiple areas and therefore are able to cover a wide variety of international problems (Leguey-Feilleux, 2017: 62, Watson, 1984: 137).

Multilateral organizations can also serve as mediator in an intra-state conflict and do this in a different manner than small and large states. Kamrava (2011) states that there are three kinds of organizations that play a role in peace and conflict: regional, international and transnational organizations. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, I will focus multilateral organizations and regional organizations and leave other international organization outside of the scope of this research. Multilateral organizations like the UN and the EU have become active participants in the process of mediation (Kamrava, 2011: 32). In case of multilateral mediation, a so called "multilateral mediation strategy" can be applied by using "multilateral power." This then, relies upon relatively intangible sources of mediation leverage to create commitment from a spectrum of partners (Hill, 2015: 447). In peace mediation, this could have the effect of solving a conflict in a context that is highly polarized. Due to the non-state character of the multilateral organization it can create commitment from a broad spectrum of (polarized) partners using its intangible mediation leverage. The expectation for the way multilateral organizations exert influence on rebel movement's transformation processes, is summarized on the next page.

Based on the theoretical framework it is expected that the type of the actor (small state, big state, multilateral organization) will matter in their involvement in the transformation process of rebel movements into a formal political party. Being aware of the other possible factors that influence the involvement (cultural and geographical proximity, historical ties), this research focuses on characteristics that are inherent to the nature of the organization. In this research is examined if the small state, large state, multilateral organization distinction is useful for identifying different kind in influences exerted by international this parties in a rebel movements transformation process. In order to do so, the research looks

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at how these types of actors try to exert influence or have exerted influence on four components in the transformation process: adjustment of organizational strategy, leadership reform and recruiting new candidates, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and international legitimacy. The expectations of the way they exert influence is summarized on the next two pages.

This chapter has provided insights in the key concepts (small state, large state, multilateral organization, rebel movement, and transformation process of rebel movements) of this thesis. Moreover, expectations about how the three type of international third parties will exert influence on this process have been formulated. In the next chapter, the execution of the research is outlined.

**Multilateral
organizations
will influence the
transformation process
of rebel movements
using their intangible
sources and ability to
create commitment
from a broad spectrum
of partners.**

Small states will influence the transformation process of rebel movements through low-profile strategies that are highly focused with the state's goals in which they make sure to be on good foot with big powers in a way that does create international legitimacy but is non-threatening.

Big states will influence the transformation process of rebel movements by using their leverage over actors in the peace process and making use of their resources to keep actors committed through an enforcing strategy.

Multilateral organizations will influence the transformation process of rebel movements using their intangible sources and ability to create commitment from a broad spectrum of partners.

Research Methods

This chapter presents the research methods used to examine the influence exerted by three types of international third-parties (small states, large states, multilateral organizations) on the transformation process of a rebel movement to a formal political organization. The use of an analysis of secondary sources on three cases of transformation processes in combination with an in-depth case study is justified. It is argued that the transformation process of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines is the ideal case to examine the research question in through an in-depth case study. The use of a case study for exploratory research is explained further after which reliability, external validity and internal validity of the research are discussed. This is followed by a detailed description of the two parts of this research: analysis of existing case studies and in-depth case study of the MILF. The chapter is concluded with some remarks on the limitations of this research.

Exploratory Research and Case Study Design

As illustrated in Chapter 1, theory specifically focused on international actors intervening in the transformation process of a rebel movement is still very limited. This research therefore aims to explore this field by looking at differences between three types of international third parties that exert influence on that transformation process. In other words, this research explores a field in which there is still little scientific knowledge about the topic of the research—international influence on the transformation process of rebel movements to a political organization—and thus can be classified as exploratory research (Stebbins, 2011: 5). This kind of research generally aims to generate new ideas and weave them together to form theory that emerges directly from data (Stebbins, 2011: 2-8). The characteristics and aim of exploratory research and the method of case study very much align. As George & Bennett (2005) argue, case studies are valuable in testing hypothesis but are especially useful for theory development. Especially in this exploratory research, a case study with ability to develop new theory and hypothesis will be of great added value. Due to the exploratory character of this research, the research also aims to discover if the distinction made between small states, large states, and multilateral organizations is useful to analyze third party influence in this transformation process and explores if the four components of a rebel movement's transformation process are a valuable distinction to study this process.

There are two strategies applied to provide the most accurate answer to the main question of this research. In the first strategy, existing case studies on rebel movement's transformation processes in Mozambique, El Salvador and Indonesia are analyzed. This provides a first indication of how the three types of international third parties try to exert influence on the transformation process. The second strategy is an in-depth case study of the transformation process of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines and international third-party involvement in this process. For this strategy the method of process-tracing (further explained in 3.3) is applied to gain more detailed data on how the types of third parties exert influence on the transformation processes of rebel movements. The whole of causal mechanisms present in influence of small states, multilateral organizations, and big states in the rebel-to-party transformation is examined. This way, possible still unknown variables can be detected and considered (George & Bennett, 2005). The two strategies complement each other as case study conclusion are stronger when they are compared to other studies (Georges & Bennett, 2005: 540). Results coming from both strategies used to formulate an answer to the main question.

By using the two strategies, the concept of triangulation—the use of more than one method or source of data in a study as validation strategy—is applied (Bryman, 2012: 392, Flick, 2004: 179). For the first strategy, research looks into existing case studies which are analyzed using secondary resources. For the second one, a single case study of the transformation process of the MILF in the Philippines, primarily primary resources are used. Within the second strategy triangulation is applied again as a broad variety of interviewees have been interviewed and documents have been used to support the interviews in terms of facts about the transformation process and international involvement. This is the strategy of “triangulation of data” which refers to the use of various data sources and can vary based on the times the data were collected, the place, or setting and from whom the data were obtained (Thurmond, 2001: 254).

Reliability, Validity, External Validity

Case studies in general are characterized by a high level of internal validity, which is concerned with the question of whether a measurement of a concept really does reflect the concept that it is supposed to be denoting (Bryman, 2012: 168, 169). This research takes contextual factors into account and looks at the concepts of this research carefully and with great detail. Since the method of process-tracing is used, alternative causal mechanisms can be detected and considered. Therefore, it can be said that the internal validity of this research is high. The focus on context and detailed study of a case, however, can be hazardous for the external validity of research. This is concerned with the question of whether the results of the study can be generalized beyond the specific context of the study. The fact that two strategies are applied that look into four case studies in total, adds to the external validity of the research as more than one context is studied. This makes the general conclusions more likely be well generalized to other contexts, as they are build on four different cases in various contexts. The reliability of this research is sufficient because secondary documents have been analyzed in consistent way and facts stated in interviews have been checked by additional documents, making those results as accurate as possible. For that reason, the results of the study will be repeatable. It has to be considered that for the case of the MILF, transformation is still ongoing which might lead to different outcomes of the same research in the future. The perceptions of interviewees might change over time when they will look at this case in retrospect.

Analysis of Existing Case Studies

In this analysis of secondary resources, case studies on the transformation of three rebel movements after peace processes in various countries are analyzed. This strategy aims to find the first indications of ways small states, big states, and multilateral organizations have influenced rebel movement's transition processes in the past. The cases analyzed are the transformation of the Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador, Resistencia Nacional Mozambiqueña (RENAMO) in Mozambique, and the Aceh Free Movement in Indonesia. The cases have been researched in case studies of Manning, De Zeeuw, Wade, Allison & Álvarez, Call, Manning & Malbrough, Ansori, Strange & Patock, Faith, Wolfram Zunzer, Schulze, Gaillard et al that have been published between 2002 and 2012.

Each of the case studies is analyzed consistently in the same manner: (1) for each identified component of the transformation process—adjustments of organizational strategy, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, leadership reform and recruiting candidates for office, international legitimacy—has been checked if it was present in the transformation process; (2) per component has been evaluated if there was any international-third party involvement of small states, large states, and multilateral organizations; and (3) possible differences in how the three types of international third parties exerted influence are identified after which and expectations formulated in the theoretical framework are tested.

Because this part of the research is based on secondary sources, and thus depends on scope and focus of research of others, it is not guaranteed that every part of the transformation process and international third-party involvement is discovered. Nor is every type of international third-party present in every transformation process. This is one of the reasons that the analysis of secondary resources is complemented by second strategy: the case study of the transformation of the MILF in the Philippines.

In-Depth Case Study

The second part of the research is the in-depth case study of the long-lasting conflict between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), also known as the Moro conflict and the following Bangsamoro peace process. Since the peace process had been very lengthy and this research focuses on the transformation process of the MILF, which started more recently the period the research investigates is from the signing of the peace agreement in 2014 until May 2019 when research was conducted. The Bangsamoro peace process is characterized by the high level of involvement of international third parties. No country in Asia is said to be more welcoming of international involvement in their internal peace processes than the Philippines (Joll & South, 2016: 178, Hutchcroft, 2016: XXII). The case of the transformation of the MILF and international involvement in this process is a so called "extreme case." The high level of foreign involvement is crucial in order to examine how types of international actors exert influence on the transformation process of rebel movement MILF to a formal political organization. In the case the MILF, all three types of actors have exerted influence on the transformation process. The transformation process of was still ongoing when the research was conducted in April and May 2019. This resulted in unique perceptions and information from key players in the transformation process as it was happening.

In aiming to investigate how the three types of international parties exert influence on the transformation process of the MILF, the method of process-tracing has been used. This matches the exploratory nature of the research as it is said to be particularly useful for obtaining an explanation for deviant cases, those that have outcomes not predicted or explained adequately by existing theories (Georges & Bennett, 2005: 524). The aim of using process-tracing in the case of MILF's transformation is to evaluate the expectations raised in the theoretical framework while being open to identify alternative processes that lead to the outcome of the research question. As process-tracing offers the possibility to identify different causal paths that lead to a similar outcome (Georges & Bennett, 2005: 523). In this way, it allows this research to do some theory testing (assessing the expectations) as well as theory development (identifying more alternative paths to the outcome of the question). In order to execute the process-tracing, the method of interviewing is used.

Interviews

The choice to conduct interviews instead of the analysis of (archival) documents was based on the specific context of the MILF transformation process in the Philippines. The transition is still ongoing and even though preparation and first steps of transition have been done, with assistance

of international third parties, there are not many things on written in public documents yet. Analyzing documents would, therefore, give an incomplete view and would be insufficient to apply the method of process-tracing. Other than that, the factual information that documents provide does not provide insights in motives for to exert influence on the transformation process of a rebel movement. Interviews are more likely to provide this research with more information on motives of actors and perceptions of professionals of the situation.

A total of twenty-two interviews were conducted in the Philippines in April and May 2019. Ten respondents are representatives of states or multilateral organizations, six were members of the MILF, and a total of six independent experts have been interviewed. Respondents were selected based on the organization they work for, work experience in relation to the Bangsamoro peace process, and knowledge of the involvement of international actors in the MILF transformation process. *Representatives of states and multilateral organizations* refers to people who work for embassies or a multilateral organization in the Philippines. They were often diplomats but also Philippine nationals working for these organizations. To be more specific, representatives of the Australian Embassy in the Philippines, the US Embassy in the Philippines, Embassy of Canada in the Philippines, Embassy of the Netherlands in the Philippines, EU Delegation to the Philippines, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and International Organization for Migration (IOM), were interviewed. From the *MILF*, members of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), and the Tarbiyyah Technical Working Group (the education committee of the MILF) were interviewed. *Independent experts* are people heavily involved in the Bangsamoro peace process and in the transition of the MILF but do not represent a state nor a multilateral organization. Most of them work for local or international NGOs active in the Philippines.

The interviews focused on the transition process of the MILF, involvement of the three types of international third parties up until that moment and plans and possible future of the MILF as governor and political party. The interviews were semi-structured so questions were not always in the same order but the following components were present in all interviews: (1) the components of the transformation process of the MILF and its challenges; (2) involvement of big states, small states, multilateral organizations in the transformation process, their mode of operation and reasons for influencing the transformation process; and (3) international involvement in the four components of transformation specifically.

The exact content of the interview differed per interviewee. For members of the MILF and independent experts, their own involvement in the process was less important and the aim was to get their views on involvement of international third-parties. It was of importance to know what their view on international influence was. For representatives of small states, big states, and multilateral organizations, their own involvement was more important, and I focused the interview on their own reasons for interfering and how. In this part of the research triangulation has been applied in two ways. Interviewing three categories of interviewees, answers of each group was checked and validated based on answered of others. Personal perspectives of interviewees were accompanied by documents to check that facts stated by interviewees. The documents used are from the following sources: official statements of the OPAPP, websites of Embassies, Filipino news sources, websites of institutions related to the Bangsamoro peace process.

Declaration of Bias and Limitations of Research

An internship of six months at the Embassy of the Netherlands in the Philippines has provided me with an insight in international involvement on the transformation processes of rebel movements that is quite unique. Connections I made during the internship helped me in arranging interviews as I could relatively easy reach potential respondents. Since I had previously met some of my respondents, the interviews were more informal. The information and background knowledge I had about the Bangsamoro peace process and the transition of the MILF because of the internship helped me in asking well informed questions. These were all great benefits but result in a bias as well.

I tried to overcome the risk of staying in a particular circle of people I knew were important by emailing people I had never met before, or people recommended by others. I was lucky to be able to attend a policy training for (future) MILF government officials in Manila where I met most of the people I have interviewed from the MILF side. This was a great opportunity to talk to MILF members, but I have only spoken with them in Manila and not in their own region. Unfortunately, I was not able to go to the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region and the fact that I only held interviews in Manila and not in the Bangsamoro region might have influenced my results. More than that, I eventually was not able to talk to the Philippine government, which is an important player in the Bangsamoro peace process and transition of the MILF. Two of the independent experts, however, were former government officials who I asked about the government side.

I was and am aware of my own color, sex, and nationality (white, female, Dutch) which most likely has influenced my interviews. During the interview I did always highlight that I did not conduct research for the Dutch foreign ministry and that my work for the embassy already had ended and I was no longer involved with them. Nevertheless, I was sometimes approached as being part of the Dutch Embassy. As the transformation process of the MILF is still ongoing, involvement of international actors is still evolving. Results and conclusion of this research, therefore, only apply to the transformation process and international involvement before June 2019.

Third-Party Influence on Transformation of the FMLN, RENAMO, and Free Aceh Movement

This chapter presents the results of the analysis of secondary sources and case studies on the transition of three rebel movements in Central America, Africa, and South-East Asia: the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), Resistencia Nacional Mozambiqueña (RENAMO), and the Free Aceh Movement. These are all cases of transformation processes of rebel movements in which small states, big states, or multilateral organizations exerted influence on. For each case, a short introduction to the conflict and transformation process is given, each component of transformation is discussed, and involvement of international third parties described. The case of transition of the FMLN in El Salvador mainly gives an insight in the involvement of multilateral organization UN, in Mozambique a wide variety of actors were active and single states and multilateral organizations worked together to ensure a successful transition of the rebel movement RENAMO, for the transition process of the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia, the multilateral organization EU played the biggest role. The chapter ends with an analysis on the different ways the three types of international third parties exerted influence on the transformation of rebel movements FMLN, RENAMO, and Free Aceh Movement and thus provide an answer to the first sub questions of this research: How have different types of international third parties exerted influence on the transition processes of rebel movements in El Salvador, Mozambique, and Indonesia?

Transformation of the FMLN in El Salvador

In October 1980, during the civil war in El Salvador, five guerrilla organizations decided to unite in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). During the heights of the war, 12,000 FMLN fighters fought against the about 56,000 strong Salvadoran army force. The war dragged on and negotiations between the FMLN and the government would only start in 1989 under pressure of the UN and US, stimulated by countries in the region (De Zeeuw, 2010: 1179). The Chapultepec Accords were signed by both parties on January 16, 1992 and put an end to the nearly 12-year civil war (De Zeeuw, 2010: 1181, Wade, 2008: 15). After the signing of the peace agreement, the FMLN had to transform to a political party and was confronted by challenges of that transformation process. Several international parties tried to exert influence on this process but mainly the UN had programs in place to support this transformation. Overall, the US had been the biggest donor in El Salvador. Through financial and military support and assisting in government reform, the US provided extensive support to the government of El Salvador (De Zeeuw, 2009: 223, 224). Its sources were, however, never used to contribute to the transformation of the FMLN but used for infrastructure projects, administrative reform or economic liberalization not for establishing new democratic institutions like the FMLN as a political party, reintegration of ex-combatants or socioeconomic reforms (De Zeeuw, 2009: 225). With regard to the transformation of the FMLN, the role of the US was not of great importance.

Components of Transformation and International Involvement

At the beginning of the transformation of the FMLN, its leaders and militants had a difficult time reconciling their past as “anti-system” with their new position as part of the system. The rebel movement had always been within society and outside the system; after the signing of the peace accords, the FMLN was out of society and had to function in the system and be part of the democratic game (Allison & Álvarez, 2012: 99). This confronted the FMLN with challenge of the *adjustment of organizational strategies* that were needed to transform into a formal political organization. International support to the FMLN was mostly regulated through a United Nations Observation Mission in El Salvador (UNOSAL) that supervised the implementation of the peace accords (Call, 2002: 559). Through that mission, the challenge of adjusting organizational strategies was influenced as one of the key clauses in the peace accord was the legitimization of the FMLN as a viable political party. The UNOSAL, for that reason, included essentials in transforming the rebel movement to a formal political party and played a key role in FMLN's transformation process (De Zeeuw, 2010: 1181).

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Transformation of the FMLN in El Salvador

The UN mission also covered the *demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR)* of the FMLN. As part of the DDR process FMLN combatants were granted ownership of a piece of land. Since the government of El Salvador did not do anything in this regard, the UN prepared a plan with technical assistance of IMF, World Bank, and Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) to grant ownership to 15,000 ex-government soldiers, 7,500 ex-guerrilla combatants, and 25,000 civilians in conflictive zones (Call, 2002: 560). FMLN needed new skills for its leadership and a variety of international organizations provided a broad range of party assistance activities. This included the training of party leaders, provision of office spaces and computers, legislative assistance, and parliamentary exchange programs (De Zeeuw, 2009: 292). In this way FMLN's *leadership reform* was influenced by the international community. This was, however, done by NGOs, political foundations, and diaspora groups, not the three types of actors that are the focus on this research.

Before the signing of the peace agreement, FMLN was granted legitimacy to become a political party by several countries. In the 1980's, the FMLN received military support and training from Cuba and Nicaragua. It gained important *international legitimacy* from Mexico and France that morally and politically supported the movement through its French-Mexican Declaration which recognized the FMLN as a "representative political force" (De Zeeuw, 2009: 224, Grabendorff, 2001: 213). After the signing of the peace agreement and the establishment of the ONUSAL, a law in El Salvador prohibiting the legal registration of any "armed" group as a political party almost led to denying the FMLN participation in the crucial elections, the UN mission ensured the participation in the political process. ONUSAL cited the FMLN's insistence that it had no plans to return to war and that no FMLN units were actively armed. The UN also argued denying the FMLN participation in the 1994 elections would place the entire peace process in grave danger. After that, the FMLN's legality was not challenged, and the peace process continued (Call, 2002: 560).

International Influence: Comprehensive Framework to Ensure Transformation

As the FMLN faced the challenges of adjusting its organizational strategies, disarming its combatants, reforming leadership, and gaining international legitimacy as a political party, the UN as multilateral organization provided a framework that covered almost all these facets of transformation. The UN was center of the operation. Funds were processed through the UN and spread out over all aspects of the peace agreement. As a multilateral organization, the UN worked together with a broad spectrum of partners: the IMF, World Bank, and Food and

Agricultural Organization. This role the UN played a role that in a certain way is expected based on theory. The UN based its mission on the principles of the organization, rather than principles of individual states, and was in that way able to organize this comprehensive strategy. Next to that, it used its intangible resources to gather more organizations to influence the transformation process. These intangible sources of leverage were also used to ensure legitimacy of the FMLN as a political party when this was in danger. The UN was able to convince many actors of FMLN's legitimacy, possibly due to its non-state nature and multilateral character. This "power" came from the intangible sources of leverage that the UN had as organization.

Mexico and France were big states in the El Salvadorian peace process. France was one of the major donors for the implementation of the peace accord and Mexico as big state in the region hosted peace talks and was also part of the "Contadora Group" that aimed to support peacemaking efforts in Central America and had offered major diplomatic support to the peace process (Allison & Álvarez, 2012: 98, Borst, 1995, United Nations, 1995: 8, 21).

The two countries together created legitimacy for the FMLN by signing a declaration in support of FMLN as a political party before the signing of the peace agreement. The US abstained from contributing to FMLN's transformation but used its "muscles" to put pressure on the El Salvadorian government and the FMLN to start with peace negotiations. In this case there are no signs that the US, as a large state used an enforcing strategy or used its resources to keep actors committed to the peace process. It did use its leverage to get the two players to get to the negotiation table. Small state influence was exerted by Cuba and Nicaragua as they were not major donors in the EL Salvador peace process nor played they a key role in another way (Borst, 1995). The two states did not exert much influence on the transformation process of the FMLN, nonetheless they were one of the first states to grant the FMLN legitimacy before the signing of the peace agreement. Their influence through military support and training was highly focused on that particular part of FMLN's transformation which is expected from small states. More cannot be said about the mission since information on their influence is quite limited.

Mozambique and the Transformation of RENAMO

In 1976 civil war in Mozambique erupted when rebel movement RENAMO started attacks against the single party Frelimo government. In 1988, the warring parties started their search for a solution for the conflict which led to peace talks hosted by Italy and observed by the US, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Germany. The negotiations led to the signing of the General Peace Accord in Rome in 1992 (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 147,148). Rebel movement RENAMO had to dismantle its armed forces, integrate some of its troops into the new, unified army, and reintegrate its authority into a unified state administration. The government needed to reform its security forces and restructure the police force after which the country's first multiparty elections were held. RENAMO participated in the elections as formal political party and thus transformed from rebel movement to political party after the civil war (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 148).

The archbishop of Beira mediator of the peace negotiations became the leading advocate for donor support to RENAMO's transformation process. International influence on RENAMO's transformation process was exerted by both the UN and bilateral donors. Similar to El Salvador, the implementation of the agreement was overseen by a UN mission. A 6,800 peace keeping force and United Nation Observation Mission in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) were established to implement the peace agreement (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 148). Next to that, individual donor support of several states complemented the observation mission. In the case of Mozambique's post conflict situation, the comprehensive framework of the UN was less effective because of its "multifaceted character." Having to oversee many aspects of the agreement, the ceasefire, elections, human rights, and more made it difficult for the UN to perform well on all of those aspects (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 166). In the transformation of RENAMO from a rebel movement into a political party, the UN mission and individual donors played a different role but both exerted influence on its transformation.

Components of Transformation and International Involvement

In order to participate in the elections in Mozambique, RENAMO had to go through a demobilization, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Mozambique (UNOHAC) was formally in charge of coordinating donor support for demobilization and reintegration of rebels (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 157). The way the body handled its task led to frustration of humanitarian agencies and international actors because of UNOHAC's slow pace and support to very costly solutions to the problems it faced (Alden, 2001: 58). At some point in the DDR process, donors

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feared that demobilized soldiers would become a source of instability on the countryside after their severance pay ran out. As a response, Norway and the Netherlands, sanctioned by the UN, proposed the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS), which extended the salary that the government had agreed to pay to demobilized soldiers from six to eighteen months (Ajello, 1999: 631). RSS emerged as a relatively inexpensive but highly effective part of the reintegration process (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 157). Following Manning & Malbrough (2010) this was the kind of action the UN mission was incapable of. Due to its multifacetedness it was too hazardous to take a risk in one area out of fear to compromise its role in others. The creation of a Technical Unit for demobilization was another successful DDR initiative. The unit looked for mechanism in which donor support would contribute to a successful process. Through this unit, the Swiss government contributed 1,5 million US Dollar for the first part of demobilization and reintegration (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 157).

Not only was there support for RENAMO's DDR process from international third parties, its legitimacy as a political party also grew because of the international involvement. RENAMO's participation in elections bolstered the party's legitimacy in the eyes of international donors and influential countries such as the US, Italy, and Germany were in nearly constant contact with RENAMO's leader, Afonso Dhlakama. In the run up to elections they tried to allay his fears for election fraud and kept the peace process on track (Manning, 2007: 260). This allowed the organization to remain politically relevant despite repeated electoral defeats (Manning, 2004: 57). When RENAMO's president Dhlakama announced his party's withdrawal from the electoral process, it was an intervention of individual donors that convinced Dhlakama to abandon his boycott of the elections (Manning, 2007: 162). The US ambassador at that time met Dhlakama alone with the message that elections would be held as scheduled with or without him, so it would be better to participate. He also assured him that any claims of electoral fraud would be seriously investigated (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 163). In this way, involvement of individual donors US, Italy, and Germany bolstered RENAMO's legitimacy, just by being in contact with him which made RENAMO internationally recognized. Another role they played was ensuring that RENAMO would remain part of the democratic process of Mozambique even when its leader had doubts and wanted to withdraw himself from the elections.

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Individual State Donors Filling up the Gaps Left by the UN

In RENAMO's transformation process, a particular dynamic was at play. Multilateral UN through its UNOMOZ mission had a framework that influenced multiple aspects of RENAMO's transformation process. The UNOMOZ implemented the peace agreement and organized donor support. What Manning & Malbrough point out in their research is that this mission decreased in its effectiveness because it had to oversee many aspects of RENAMO's transformation and was therefore less inclined to take risks in supporting areas of RENAMO's transformation process. That was where bilateral donors came in and fill those gaps. They supplemented the work of the UN and exerted influence on various aspects of RENAMO's transformation to a political party. As Manning & Malbrough (2010: 166) describe it: "The *multilateral organization* had formal authority to oversee the process of transformation, but bilateral donors had the resources, knowledge, and practical capacity to make it work." The UN laid down a framework that covers multiple facets of the transformation process wherein the UN worked closely with a variety of partners which it kept committed to the cause of implementation of the peace agreement and transformation process. The ability to keep many players committed was in line with the theoretical expectation. The fact that in Mozambique, the multifacetedness of the mission led to slow bureaucratic procedures and individual donors filled up the gaps left by UN's large mission is was not expected based on theory.

The major donors in the Mozambique peace process were the UK, US, Italy, Germany, and Portugal (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 148). The Netherlands and Norway who are not mentioned to be important donors are perceived as small states. The two *small states* exerted influence on RENAMO's transformation process by setting up one particular program in an area of which they knew immediate action was needed. In line with theory, they did not roll out a broad agenda but used their resources to fund a program to exert influence on one component of transformation. Involvement of Swiss was also specifically focused on the DDR process of RENAMO. In the case of Mozambique the US used its *big state* muscles not in terms of financial resources because the concerns of Dhlakama were not about money. It did, however, use its leverage as big state to convince Dhlakama to not withdraw from elections. As a big state, it could make that promise that possible fraud of elections would be thoroughly investigated and Dhlakama would listen to that. Other small states were unlikely to have that kind of effect. Other than using its leverage to keep the players committed to the peace process, the US did not help internal challenges of RENAMO's transformation.

Transformation of the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia

From 1976 until 2005 the Free Aceh Movement, also known as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), fought against the Republic of Indonesia. GAM had been active for years in the province of Aceh, located on the northern tip of Sumatra and had the end goal of establishing an independent state in the province of Aceh. Aceh had felt deprived of its resources for years. Its strong Muslim identity and past of an independent sultanate resulted in a strong regional identity which was challenged by the highly centralist government of Indonesia in Jakarta (Braud & Grevi, 2005: 3). When peace talks started, and a lead negotiator had to be chosen, the European Union turned out to be a legitimate candidate. The United Nations (due to negative experiences in the East Timor conflict) and the US (because of conflicting relationships with Islamic states) were excluded (Gaillard et al, 2007: 518). GAM and the Indonesia both had different preferences for a negotiator. The government preferred to have neighboring countries and GAM wanted a Western counterpart. The European Union turned out to be a legitimate candidate because of the involvement of Sweden and Finland in the conflict. This was complemented by five members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, and Malaysia). On the EU's side, it was its first European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) mission in Asia and was part of the broader policy to strengthen security and stability in the region (Braud & Grevi, 2005: 22). The conflict came to an end with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in Helsinki in 2005.

Besides a DRR element, the MOU included the establishment of special autonomy for Aceh within the Republic of Indonesia and its transformation into a political party. This became the biggest challenge for the GAM in the post-Helsinki period (Ansori, 2012: 31-35). Today, Aceh's governs 10 out of 23 districts and municipal heads are former rebels. The Aceh Party also holds 33 seats out of 69 seats in Aceh's regional parliament (Strange & Patock, 2010: 96). GAM did, however, face several challenges in that relatively successful transformation they made. A transformation process that was especially influenced by multilateral organizations EU in cooperation with the ASEAN.

Hurdles for GAM in Transformation to a Formal Political Organization

During the conflict, GAM had been lobbying for international involvement as they wanted to have *international legitimacy* of the conflict. The UN and the US were perceived by GAM as those who could put pressure on Jakarta and deliver independence (Schulze, 2004: 52). Eventually it was not GAM's lobbying practices towards the US and UN that legitimized GAM's conflict but a severe tsunami that hit Indonesia, as especially Sumatra and

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the province of Aceh the in December 2004 (Braud & Grevi, 2005: 21). The humanitarian disaster led to a high level of international presence in Sumatra and stimulated that start of peace talks between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and GAM.

After the signing of the peace agreement the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) headed by a Dutchman was established to implement to MoU. Due to its lengthy procedures the EU was not able to deploy as mission at the preferred date, but it did manage to set up a mission to cover that gap (Braud & Grevi, 2005: 22). The AMM monitored GAM's *demobilization and disarmament and reintegration (DDR)* of combatants. The mission was composed of 230 representatives of the European Union and the ASEAN (Wolfram Zunzer, 2008: 18). Besides EU participating countries, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore, and Malaysia provided monitors. This resulted is a mission of mixed nationalities and expertise where the EU laid out the planning and financial framework and some of the Asian participants used their cultural advantage and the fact that they spoke the language (Feith, 2007: 4).

Initially, the EU would only be responsible for the monitoring of the decommissioning but as GAM refused to surrender its weapons to Indonesian Forces and wanted a reliable partner, the EU through the AMM became responsible for the executing of the decommissioning process (Braud & Grevi, 2005: 28). The European Commission proposed an investment of 4 million euros to assist GAM detainees and fighters as initial effort for reintegration to provide for some peace dividend (Braud & Grevi, 2005: 30). The reintegration part turned out to be the hardest challenge of MAA's mandate. Reintegration of former GAM combatants contained many elements besides payment installments. The combination of allocating land, physical security, available healthcare, and professional training was a challenge and was even made harder because of confused division of tasks between local and central government and unreliable information on where the beneficiaries were located (Braud & Grevi, 2005: 30).

The new Law on the Governing of Aceh, that would give the region its new autonomy, would already be of force five months after the AMM started. The two Aceh-based political parties would be legitimized by the Indonesian government and includes in the formal political process. In return, GAM would let go of its quest for independence (Braud & Grevi, 2005: 27). This meant that the GAM had to transform into a governing organization very soon. What the AMM did in this regard was building confidence amongst the political parties and encourage a dialogue between actors who were involved in this process (Braud & Grevi, 2005:

27). Other than through the official monitoring mission, the European Commission provided reintegration support to former GAM combatants, technical assistance, capacity building in local governance, and police training (Faith, 2007: 2, 3; Braud & Grevi, 2005: 31). In this way, the challenges of adjustment of organizational strategies were influenced as well.

Multilateral Organization: Compromise of Two Conflicting Parties

In this case, *multilateral organization* EU was chosen by the Indonesian Government and the GAM to influence the transformation process of the GAM. Choosing the EU in combination with ASEAN countries was the way to not choose influence of a particular country. Where Aceh preferred a western country and Indonesia a country in the region, a combination of EU with help from ASEAN was the perfect compromise between the two actors in conflict who could not agree upon one particular country. This is an advantage of involvement of a multilateral organization as compared to individual states that had not been articulated in expectations made based on theory. Similar to the two UN missions in El Salvador and Mozambique, EU's mission was responsible for the whole implementation of the MOU and thus covered a wide variety of aspects of GAM's transformation process. The EU worked together with other multilateral organization, ASEAN, which helped the multilateral organization to have all the knowledge and capacity it needed to execute the MOU. Other than the ASEAN, the EU did not engage with many other actors like the UN did in El Salvador and Mozambique. This shows that the ability to partner with a wide variety of actors might not be a strategy of all multilateral organizations.

Influence of small and large states did not seem to be present based on available resources about GAM's transformation process and international involvement. The GAM had sought for attention of the US and UN to create *international legitimacy* for their struggle. These big state and multilateral organization were perceived as those most influential to get the peace process started and to create legitimacy for the GAM. Eventually, it was not the lobby attempts of the GAM that brought legitimacy to the conflict but external factors.

First Indications: International Third-Party Influence on Transformation Processes of Rebel Movements

The three cases discussed in this chapter provide first insights about the influence three types of international third parties can exert on the transformation processes of rebel movements after intra-state conflict. This section provides an answer to the first sub-question: How have different types of international third parties exerted influence on the transition processes of rebel movements in El Salvador, Mozambique, and Indonesia?

Small states exerted influence on the transformation processes of FMLN and RENAMO. In the case of Mozambique, Norway and the Netherlands exerted influence on RENAMO's transformation process. The program focused specifically on the extending of the salaries of the ex-combatants and thus had a highly specific goal directed to one particular part of RENAMO's transformation process. The project required relatively few financial resources but turned out to be highly effective. Other than that, the Netherlands and Norway set-up the program because the UN was not able to take the risk of influencing the transformation process in that way. The way small states the Netherlands and Norway exerted influence on the transformation process in line with the theoretical expectation that small states exert influence through highly focused missions. The states made sure the program was backed by the UN and in that way made sure they were on good foot with big powers active in RENAMO's transformation process. Based on available resources, it is not possible to say if the mission of the two small states was in line with their goals. What is noticeable about the influence of small states in RENAMO's is that they looked for the gaps left by the big donor. In this case, the small states contributed to the transformation process where bigger donors were unable to do so. In El Salvador, Cuba and Nicaragua exerted influence on FMLN's transformation process through military assistance and training. This exerted influence is again focused on one goal. Moreover, the states were one of the first to grant the FMLN legitimacy. It is not likely that these small states were the ones that helped the FMLN the most in gaining international legitimacy because the peace process eventually started under pressure of the US and UN.

The *big states* that contributed to the transformation processes of FMLN and RENAMO did this solely through providing legitimacy to the peace process or rebel movement. In El Salvador, the peace negotiations started under pressure of the US. In this way, the large state contributed to FMLN's legitimacy as it was recognized as a formal partner of the government. Other than that, the US did not play an important role in FMLN's transformation process even though it was the biggest donor in the peace process in general. France and Mexico also provided legitimacy to the FMLN more directly than the US by signing a declaration in which

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they stated that they recognized FMLN as a political party. In Mozambique, the US interacted more directly with rebel movement RENAMO when it convinced leader Dhlakama to not withdraw RENAMO from elections. Also in this transformation process, the US was not the most important player. Based on the three cases discussed in this chapter big states seem to use their leverage and muscles as large states to either convince conflicting parties to start peace negotiations or to convince rebel movements to participate in elections. The fact that the large states that were analyzed used their leverage to convince or pressure other actors of what they have to do is in line with the expectation raised by theory. There are, however, no indications that the states used an enforcing strategy.

Following the three cases in this chapter, *multilateral organizations* EU and UN were most influential in the transformation processes of FMLN, RENAMO and the GAM. The UN did this twice through a UN Observation Mission in which the peace agreement was implemented. Part of the peace agreement was the transformation of the (former) rebel movement into a formal political organization. In El Salvador, the UN also granted the rebel movement legitimacy after which it could participate in elections. The UN missions influenced many aspects of the transformation process which sometimes also resulted in slow bureaucratic processes or difficulties in overseeing all the aspects of the mission. The EU in its mission in Indonesia also experienced some difficulties with the EU bureaucracy but was able to establish a short-time mission before the arrival of the Aceh Monitoring Mission. Even though the EU mission was quite big, it mostly focused in the DDR of GAM. In these larger scale missions, multilateral organizations UN and EU had used the advantage of their multilateral nature to create commitment from several donors to add to the transformation process. The UN missions were mostly in line with expectations formulated in Chapter 2 and created commitment from a broad spectrum of partners, where the EU only cooperated with ASEAN. The first indications of how small states, big states, and multilateral organizations influence the transformation processes of rebel movement, are summarized on the next pages.

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Based on the first three cases, it becomes apparent that international third parties have effectively influenced the DDR process of rebel movements in their transformation and have created legitimacy for those rebel movements. Creating legitimacy for the rebel movement is something that has happened before and during a peace process and in general is done by big states. The challenges of adjustment of organizational strategies and leadership reform seem to be less influenced than the others. Due to the fact that these results are based on available information from existing case studies it is not completely sure that other actors have not influenced or there are more ways in which the discussed actors exerted influence on the transformation process. Chapter 6 offers a more in-depth case study where primary sources have been used to complement this part of the research.

Small states are likely to exert influence on the transformation process of rebel movements through smaller missions focused on a specific aspect of transformation process in which they use their limited financial resources for programs that bigger players are unable to set-up.

Big states are likely to use their leverage to convince conflicting parties to start peace negotiations, stay in the peace process, or continue transformation processes but do not exert influence on the transformation process of rebel movements in another way.

Multilateral organizations are likely to exert influence on rebel movement's transformation processes through large operations that influence multiple aspects of the transformation in which they use their ability to create commitment from many partners but are prone to slow bureaucratic procedures.

International Influence on Transformation of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines

This chapter presents the results of the case study on the transformation process of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines. After over forty years of conflict between Muslim revolutionary movements on the island of Mindanao and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), a peace agreement between the MILF and the GRP was signed in 2014. The so called Bangsamoro peace process has been characterized by a high level of international involvement from the beginning. This makes the case of MILF's transformation very suitable to investigate involvement of small states, big states, and multilateral organizations in the transformation process of a rebel movement to a formal political organization. Based on interviews, MILF's transformation process and influence of small states, big states, and multilateral organizations is discussed per components of transformation process (adjustment of organizational strategies, demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR), which is called "normalization" in the MILF transformation process, international legitimacy, and leadership reform).

The chapter starts with introducing the background and history of the conflict and long-lasting peace process in the Philippines. 5.2 introduces the transformation process of the MILF and international involvement. 5.3 zooms in on MILF's challenge of adjusting its of organizational strategies. 5.4 describes international involvement in the DDR process of the MILF. 5.5 looks closer into MILF's leadership reform and the challenge of recruiting candidates for office. 5.6 discusses international legitimacy of the Bangsamoro peace process and transformation of MILF. Per component, involvement of international third parties is discussed as well. In 5.6 an analysis of the involvement of small states, big states, and multilateral organizations in the transformation process of the MILF is given. The chapter ends with a conclusion and answers to the second sub question: How do different types of international third parties exert influence on the transition processes of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines?

Background of the Bangsamoro Conflict and Peace Process

Conflict on the most southern island of the Philippines, Mindanao, dates back to 1968, when rebellion of the Moros—Islamic ethnic groups in the Philippines—started. Two Moro liberation fronts, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), have been in a continuous struggle for historical sovereignty over what was their homeland (Monsod, 2016: 201). The MNLF was formed 1969 and the MILF, a fraction of the MNLF, separated itself from the MNLF in 1986 and continued to demand independence and an independent Moro Islamic state (Abuza, 2005: 454). The history of rebellion in Mindanao, the long-lasting peace process between the Philippine government and the MNLF, and between the Philippine government and the MILF, are now discussed. This section ends with introducing the start of the transformation process of the MILF into a formal political organization.

The Moro Conflict and Peace Process

The Jabidah Massacre in 1968 marked the beginning of rebellion in Mindanao. The incident of the killing of young Moro soldiers from the island of Sulu (southern Philippines) by members of the Philippine military is said to be the “sharpest expression of the (...) historical and systematic marginalization and minorization of the Moro’s” (Santos, 2005: 65). The event gave life to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that started its rebellion against the Philippine government until the first peace negotiations in 1975 (Muslim, 2019: 3; Monsod, 2016: 201). During the Moro conflict, 120,000 people were killed, hundred thousand Mindanao citizens became refugees, and billions of properties were destroyed (Muslim, 2019: 2).

The first peace negotiations between the MNLF and the Philippine government resulted in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement signed in Tripoli, Libya (Muslim, 2019: 3). A second peace agreement followed in 1993. This agreement established the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which offered the MNLF an autonomous region in which they could govern with relative independence from the Philippine government (Dañguilan-Vitug & Gloria, 2000: 264). MNLF chief Misuari became governor for the new autonomous region which included the provinces of Sulu, Maguindanao (without the city of Cotabato), and Lanao del Norte (Abuza, 2005: 454). The MILF rejected the agreement and continued to fight with a separatist vision of the “Muslim Homeland,” the Bangsamoro which would include a larger territory and have more autonomy (Özerdan & Podder, 2012: 523; Abuza, 2005: 454). The new autonomous region led by the MNLF was never very successful. The region was called “autonomous” but had no real capability of self-rule and was not able to gather enough revenue to sustain itself. It did not give the Moros the means they had

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hoped for to address poverty and past deprivation (Abubakar, 2004: 462). Development in the ARMM region is still lagging behind compared to the rest of the Philippines. The life expectancy is 14 years below the national average, the years of schooling is 2,5 years less, and purchasing power is below by 40 percent compared to the National Capital Region (Monsod, 2016: 200).

The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro

The MILF, that had rejected the agreement between MNLF and GRP, started peace negotiations with the Philippine government in 1997. The first breakthrough in the Bangsamoro conflict after many years was during the Benigno Aquino III Administration. President Aquino organized a historical meeting with MILF Chairman Murad in Japan on August 4, 2011, to come up with a formula for a new autonomous region that would replace the ARMM region (Muslim, 2019: 58). Negotiations resumed and the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro was signed in 2012. The agreement laid down the framework for the peace agreement, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), which was signed in 2014. Features of the new regional autonomy included in the peace agreement were: special committees and authorities that would work on the implementation of the agreement, fiscal autonomy and accountability management of the region, particular intergovernmental relations between the Philippine government and the Bangsamoro government, and normalization (decommissioning of MILF combatants, deployment of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and socio economic development for MILF members) (Muslim, 2019: 59; Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 2014). In the Framework Agreement and Comprehensive Agreement was stated that the MILF would have a leadership position in the new regional government once it was established and in return would go through a decommissioning process.

To implement the CAB and thus to establish the new Bangsamoro region and transformation of the MILF, implementing legislation, the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) had be approved by the Philippine Congress. While the law was hotly debated, a tragic incident happened in January 2015 which made the passage of the BBL impossible before adjourning of the 16th Congress of the Aquino administration. Known as the Mamasapano Incident, it was the first military encounter between the government and the MILF since the ceasefire had been declared in 2011. It resulted in the deaths of at least 64 people, most of which were members of the Special Armed Forces of the Philippines and MILF (De Jesus & De Jesus, 2016: 159). Mamasapano captured the headlines and marked a decline in the public support for the peace process (Hutchcroft, 2016: XVI).

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The continuation of the peace process and the new autonomy for the Bangsamoro region was passed on to the next president, Rodrigo Roa Duterte, who started his term in 2016.

The Bangsamoro Organic Law and Start of Transformation of the MILF

The implementing legislation which was needed to implement to peace agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF—Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (OLBARRM)—passed the Senate and the House of Representatives on July 23 and 24, 2018. The president approved the law, better known as the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) on July 27, 2018, which gave the final push for the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous region and therefore the transformation of the MILF into a formal political organization (Muslim, 2019: 65). This was the implementing legislation that failed to pass under the Aquino Administration. In order to ratify the law, citizens of the ARMM region and Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, Cotabato City, and Isabela were asked to vote in a plebiscite to establish the new Bangsamoro region or not. On January 21 and February 6, 2019, Mindanao citizens voted and ratified the BOL (Rappler, 2019a). Essential for the MILF was that with implementation of the peace agreement, an interim governing body for the new autonomous region would be established in which the MILF would take the lead. The so called the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) would govern the new autonomous region until elections for the first Bangsamoro Parliament in 2022 (Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 2012). In the 2022 elections, the MILF will participate with their political party, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party. This means that electoral success in 2022 to a great extent depends on the success of the MILF during the three years that they lead the BTA.

Transformation of the MILF: Introduction of International Involvement

Transformation of the MILF had been formally formulated in the 2012 Framework Agreement and was repeated in the Comprehensive Agreement and the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL). The MILF had been in contact with many development partners and the diplomatic corps during the peace process and held a meeting, specifically focused on the transition of the MILF, on October 11, 2018. By invitation of MILF Chairman Murad and supported by UNDP, the donor's forum was held in the City of Davao, Mindanao. Murad presented a 10-point priority program for the Bangsamoro and briefed international development partners on the current status of MILF's transformation. The donor forum was attended by development partners from eleven countries, the EU, UN, and World Bank (Minda News, 2018). In his message for the international community at the time Chairman Murad highlighted the following:

“We are revolutionaries trained in warfare and with nil experience in elections and electoral processes. (...) There are two major transitions involved and both are critical in ensuring the success of the Bangsamoro. The first is the transition of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front from a revolutionary organization into governance. The second is the transition from the ARMM to the Bangsamoro. The transition from rebellion to governance should involve careful and deliberate steps and the risks are enormous. (...) We are ever conscious of the challenges that we are about to confront. The second transition, which is from ARMM to Bangsamoro, involves a deeper understanding of the intricacies of governance and public administration (...). At the outset, let me confess that, as rebels, we are neophytes in this and we will need to learn a lot of new skills to be able to effectively manage these transitions. (...) I hope to continue this kind of engagement and to ensure that this forum continues to be a venue of productive exchanges amongst us and the donor community.”
(Message of MILF Chairman Murad at the Donors Forum, October 11, 2019, Davao) [annexed document].

As Chairman Murad articulated in his speech, the MILF faces many challenges in transforming into a formal political organization, just like FMLN, RENAMO, and the GAM in the past. The way Chairman Murad formulated it, the MILF has make a transition in two ways: it needs to transform from a revolutionary movement to governance or formal political organization and it needs to take the lead to transformation of the ARMM to the Bangsamoro as part of the BTA. Throughout the peace process, this transformation of the MILF had not really been planned. The focus of both MILF and international third parties had mostly been on the political trap:

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the passage of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 15, 2019). From the moment the law was passed and ratified, MILF's transition had to happen immediately. The challenge for the MILF of the four components of transformation and international influence on these components are discussed.

New Organizational Strategies for the MILF

“[The MILF] needs be able to struggle with the fact that they are a revolutionary group that obviously wants to change the status quo, but at the same time deal with the fact that the status quo is not going away immediately. They need to cope with that without appearing to sell out.” (Independent expert, personal communication, May 6, 2019).

In order to make a successful transformation, organizational strategies of the MILF have to change. The MILF needs to develop itself further on the track they were already on and further move from a military organization into a formal political organization (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 11, 2019). According to a BTA member, the biggest challenges are, following all government rules and regulations very strictly, learning the practice of government, managing expectations of the people, and make the government functioning as expected by the people. The BTA has to set up a new government according to the BOL and at the same time implement existing programs of the ARMM (MILF/BTA, personal communication, April 11, 2019). Because the MILF has to be the lead in an interim regional government, it faces two types of challenges for which it has to adjust its organizational strategies. First of all, the MILF has to run a regional government on a day-to-day basis which requires administrative and organizational capacities. Second of all, as the lead of an interim government, the MILF has to deliver some results to gain trust of the population in the new autonomous region.

To deal with the organizational challenges, the MILF has to be transparent about how they set-up the new government, and where their funding comes from. The BTA takes over a part of the previous ARMM administration, but still needs to set up new ministries that were not there before or redesign existing ministries because the institutions in place are not well functioning institutions yet (EU, personal communication, April 25, 2019). Many policies and projects for the first year that the BTA in set-up are already in place and just require implementation. For the next period, the BTA has to plan new policies and set-up new institutions. The MILF as organization has gained trust as being a well-structured and credible group of people. While they change organizational strategies, they have to make sure not to let go of that because and make sure their non-government being remains because many people who depend on that, will continue to do so (UNDP, personal communication, April 12, 2019).

The expectations of the population in the Bangsamoro autonomous region about what the new regional government can achieve in three years are very high. The challenge for the BTA is to “sell peace” and therefore create some peace dividend to show the population the advantages of peace.

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At the same time those expectations will need to be managed as they are too high right now (independent expert, personal communication, April 15, 2019). If the BTA (and therefore the MILF) is not able to deliver results on a short term, chances are there that new rebellion will start. Mindanao has a history of establishing a peace agreement and even implementation after which there is a part of Mindanao that still feels dissatisfied. With the passing of the BOL and establishment of the BTA, mostly MILF constituencies were satisfied. There are areas in Muslim of Mindanao that do not see a positive stake for them in the BOL yet. The benefits of peace still have to be proven in these areas in the new autonomous region (EU, personal communication, May 2, 2019). The BTA will have to deliver on short term to reduce the chances of that happening. At the same time, delivering more than the previous regional administration will be hard because they still depend on the same budget as the previous ARMM administration (EU, personal communication, May 2, 2019).

Influence Exerted by EU, the Netherlands, and Australia

International third parties EU, the Netherlands, and Australia try to exert influence on this component of transformation of the MILF. The EU Delegation in the Philippines was trying to establish a so-called Article 28 Mission to support the new BTA and thus the MILF in its transition to a formal political organization (EU, personal communication, April 25, 2019). The mission is a new way for the EU to intervene in crisis response through operational actions under Article 28 and is more flexible than other options (Council of the European Union, 2017). The Article 28 instrument is a relatively new instrument for the EU and has only been used twice in Yemen and Mali. The mission is a supportive capacity building program for which European experts from governments of member states have a mission to help the different ministries of the new Bangsamoro Transition Authority in their first steps. European civil servants would go to Cotabato and help with the everyday procedures of the BTA in the areas of expertise together with the BTA in the field of public finance, management, budget preparation, legal advice, drafting of laws, and important parliamentary procedures (EU, personal communication, April 25, 2019; Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 15, 2019). In doing so, the EU would exert influence on the organizational challenge of the MILF in governing the new BTA.

Through three fact-finding missions in 2018 and April 2019 the feasibility of the mission was assessed. During these missions, the need for the Article 28 mission became clear and local actors voiced their appreciation (EU, personal communication, May 2, 2019). The results of the mission were shared with Brussels and, ideally, the decision on the mission would

follow before closing of European institutions for summer (EU, personal communication, April 25, 2019). That mission would start in September 2019 and stay until the beginning of a larger development program of the EU. This development program, Support to Bangsamoro Transition Authority or SUBATRA, would be a large-scale program of 25 million euros that addresses the needs of capacity building of the BTA (EU, personal communication, April 23, 2019). The decision on the program will be made by the end of 2019 and after which the program would start by the beginning of 2020. Other than the relatively quick and flexible measure of the Article 28 mission, SUBATRA required a two-year perpetration. The aim of the Article 28 program is to address needs until the SUBATRA program is established in the Bangsamoro region.

In 2015, the Netherlands started the Dutch Mission to the Bangsamoro. This was a small mission of one person providing technical assistance to MILF leadership in their transformation process to a formal political organization. The mission initially started without a framework or objectives, just to see what MILF leadership needed and act upon this need. This led to advices for the MILF on how to put ideas in policy documents, how to communicate with international actors and the best strategy to negotiate with the Philippine government (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 11, 2019). The mission consisted of roughly three tracks. The first track looked into how to unite different bodies within the MILF and come up with a common strategy to prepare for normalization and decommissioning coming from the MILF. In this track, the MILF was assisted in adjusting its strategy for its internal organization with regard to normalization. The second track looked into the role of the MILF after decommissioning and transition of the BTA and worked on a possible transition to a social movement. The third track aimed to develop a socioeconomic program for the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) to stimulate self-employment and small businesses up to the level of substance in order to work on development in the future Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (independent expert, personal communication, April 3, 2019). Other than that, the mission had as an objective to make the MILF conscious of the need to connect with the international community. This added to the international legitimacy of the MILF and will be further discussed in 5.6 (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 15, 2019).

Through their Pathways for Peace Program, a 90 million Australian dollar program, the Australian government aims to improve the public-school system, for especially the early years in the Bangsamoro. This program already started in 2017 but also helps the new ministry of education and therefore the BTA, which will be the biggest ministry of the Bangsamoro

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in setting up and drafting the education code in cooperation with Minister of Education Iqbal (MILF) (Australian Embassy, personal communication, May 10, 2019).

Another program, START Peace, includes various activities that relate to transition of which one is establishing a school for peace and democracy. Under that program, Australia also supports the drafting of the Local Government Code and also assisting different ministries in drafting their 100-day plans. In this way, Australia helps the MILF to overcome the challenge of adjusting strategies by helping it draft codes it needs to run the new interim government. For all the projects Australia exerts influence with on the transformation process of the MILF, it works through major NGOs like UNDP, the World Bank, or the Asia Foundation.

Many international third parties exerted influence on MILF's transformation process through the Mindanao Trust Fund. The trust fund, managed by the World Bank, consisted of many programs amongst which some contributed to MILF's transformation process. Amongst other things, the trust fund provided financial assistance to MILF's Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) to write a development plan for the Bangsamoro region, financed livelihood programs in the six acknowledged camps of the MILF and has helped MILF's Project Management Team to provide health livelihood, and educational programs (Mindanao Trust Fund, 2019). Donors to this trust fund were the EU, Sweden, Australia, Canada, the US, and New Zealand (World Bank, 2018).

The MILF faces a complicated challenge in changing its organizational strategies as it has the lead in the interim government of the Bangsamoro region. Challenges of having to run a government on a day-to-day basis are combined with the pressure to deliver peace dividend to prove the citizens of the region the advantages of peace. At the same time, the MILF has to watch out for its own people and organizational structure. International third parties have or will exert influence on this challenge in different ways. The Netherlands provided direct assistance to MILF leadership, the EU is working on larger scale programs to assist the BTA, and Australia helps the new ministry of education of the Bangsamoro region and support drafting new codes for the new government through large NGOs. While dealing with the component of changing its organizational strategy, the MILF also needs to through the process of normalization of its combatants. This is discussed in the next section.

From Combatants to Civilian Life: Normalization of MILF Combatants

“These people have fought next to MILF leadership during the conflict and know nothing more than to hold a firearm.”
(UNDP, personal communication, April 12, 2019).

The DDR component of MILF's transition is called normalization and includes several things: decommissioning of forces and weapons of the MILF, the transformation of the over 40,000, Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) combatants and their communities, and joint peacekeeping (Independent Decommissioning Body, 2019a; Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 11, 2019). The major concern of the normalization process is to make sure that combatants and military structures are decommissioned in a way that there is no breeding ground anymore and that, in case the situation worsens, former combatants do not fall back on those military structures and start using their arms again (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 11, 2019). The decommissioning process of the MILF has already started and will evolve in four phases. The first phase, ceremonial decommissioning of 145 combatants, happened in 2015. The second phase includes verification, registration, and decommissioning of the first 30% combatants and weapons of the MILF (IDB, 2019a). That phase started when the IDB received the list of combatants from the MILF which happened on March 25, 2019, when the MILF submitted the list of the first 13,000 combatants ready for decommissioning (IDB, 2019b; independent expert, personal communication, April 3, 2019). The third and fourth phase entail decommissioning of 35% and again 35% of the combatants to complete 100% decommissioning. Next to the decommissioning of MILF combatants, the livelihood and socioeconomic part of the normalization process plays a key role in successful transformation of the MILF to a formal political organization. This refers to the “soft side” of decommissioning in which former combatants receive an allowance, livelihood package, or training to make a transformation to normal civilian life. What would happen with regard to this socioeconomic part of normalization, to ensure successful normalization of the MILF, was not clear.

Mechanisms for Third-Party Influence on MILF's Normalization

For the normalization component of MILF's transformation, international involvement of third parties occurs in two ways. The Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB), which consists of representatives of Turkey, Brunei, and Norway, is mandated to oversee the process of decommissioning of MILF weapons and forces. The IDB will execute the decommissioning process as described above. For the socioeconomic part, a trust fund was supposed to be set up. The Bangsamoro

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Normalization Trust Fund would function as a coordination mechanism for donor money and would help finance the socioeconomic part of the decommissioning process.

Following initial planning, the trust fund had to be established by August 2018. The accompanying project document would follow in September of that year. However, disputes between the World Bank and UNDP over who would be the fund manager delayed the process, and a year later, the project document was still not available (independent expert, personal communication, April 3, 2019). This slowed down the normalization process of the MILF. "There are millions of dollars edged to the BNTF which would be sufficient to sustain whatever normalization needs" (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 15, 2019). Several donors including Australia had already made clear that they wanted to donate money to the trust fund as soon as it was set up (Australian Embassy, personal communication, May 10, 2019). This potential of millions of dollars could, however, not be used since it was not clear who and how the trust fund would be implemented (independent expert, personal communication, April 15, 2019). This affected the "hard" decommissioning because that could not happen before there is more clarity about the social part of normalization, to avoid discontent amongst former combatants.

MILF's component of normalization, in which combatants transform from militaries to regular civilians, consists of the formal decommissioning and the socioeconomic part. The first part was influenced by Norway, Turkey, and Brunei through their role in the Independent Decommissioning Body. The second, socioeconomic part, will be led by either UNDP or the World Bank as soon as disputes have been resolved and the Normalization Trust Fund is functioning.

From Rebels to Rulers: Leadership Reform and New Candidates for the Bangsamoro Parliament

“You know the interesting thing. Before, when the Philippine flag or anthem was singing, we don’t stand up, we don’t recite. But now we do. (...) In my office in my back I have the flag of the Philippines, because I am the government official.” (MILF Minister Bangsamoro Transition Authority, personal communication, April 13, 2019).

The interim government body for the Bangsamoro Autonomous region, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority, is led by the MILF and most members of the authority are MILF leaders. The BTA consists of 40 MILF people, 8 MNLF people, and 24 ARMM officials (Rappler, 2019c). On February 27, 2019, Malacañang, the palace of the Philippines, released the appointment papers in which appointed members of the BTA were announced. The members were inaugurated on March 29, 2019 (Rappler, 2019b; Rappler, 2019c). An expert on the conflict stated that “from that moment on there was new parliament that already had to function and was completely unprepared” (authors translation, personal communication, April 3, 2019). The new leading role in the BTA means two things for MILF leadership: (1) the forty MILF members in the BTA have to make an immediate the transition from being a military leader to being political leader; and (2) forty MILF members that are suitable for political positions had to be found (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 11, 2019). This represents MILF’s challenge of leadership reform and recruiting new candidates for office.

Because the MILF had to recruit forty of its members to take place in the BTA, 90% of the MILF’s central committee (MILF’s leadership organ) now has a governing function. These people have a government function to worry about while still having to look out for MILF members at the same time. This gives them dual roles which can be very challenging. For example, the new Minister of Environment, Natural Resources and Energy of the BTA, is at the same time the Chief of Staff of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), and the head of the Bangsamoro United Justice Party (UBJP) (UNDP personal communication, April 12, 2019; Bangsamoro Government, 2019). The challenge that comes with these dual roles for MILF leadership is the fact that they have to prove themselves as new administration but, at the same time, hold together the core leadership of the MILF that determined success of the organization in the past. In their new role, the MILF would have to find a way to not make the same mistakes as the ARMM government made and cope with the limited resources they have as new regional government (independent expert, personal communication, May 6, 2019; Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 15, 2019).

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Finding suitable candidates is another challenge for the MILF. “They [the MILF] have a few competent people who are now in BTA positions, but other than that, they are lacking competent people to fill in government functions” (independent expert, personal communication, May 6, 2019). The MILF will thus have to find suitable candidates for office. Herein, they seem to be confronted by a generational problem in terms of human resources. The older generation of the MILF has the posts of ministers right now and lead the MILF. Then, there is a very young generation that wants to do something but is not trained yet. There is no generation in between that will be able to fill the spaces of the older generation once they are too old to do it (EU, personal communication, May 2, 2019).

International Involvement in MILF's Leadership Reform

The issue described above is influenced by several international third parties. As part of the Dutch Mission to the Bangsamoro, the Netherlands organized a policy training for future MILF technical staff. Based on a conversation with a member of the MILF's central committee in October 2018, it was decided that there was a need for MILF people to know something about policy making (independent expert, personal communication, April 3, 2019). At that time, there were clear signs that a new government would be formed within a couple of months. But within the MILF no one knew what public administration was about.

A training of two weeks in total, one in December 2018 and one in April 2019, was set up and would teach the MILF about the basics of policy making. “I do not have the illusion to deliver full-fledged policy makers in two weeks but what we can do at the most is give them a first notion of what policy is about,” the organizer of the training said (authors translation, personal communication, April 3, 2019). The risk of sending people to government functions without any experience or knowledge about policy making is that they will rush to conclusions and skip parts of the process that might seem technical and bureaucratic but are important to make good policy.

In their program Prime Bangsamoro, Australia prepared MILF leadership for transformation in cooperation with UNDP. They organized a study tour for MILF leadership to Indonesia. In Banda Aceh, MILF leadership was introduced post-conflict institution building (Australian Embassy, personal communication, May 10, 2019). MILF has taken GAM as an example for transformation because of some similarities in their peace processes and GAM's success in keeping their symbolic and philosophical roots alive after their transformation (UNDP, personal communication, April 12, 2019). By organizing the exchange between MILF and GAM, Australia and UNDP

prepared MILF senior leadership for a post conflict institution building period. The European Union organized a similar study tour to Germany and Brussels to teach MILF and MNLF about the basics of parliamentary democracy in October 2017 (EU, personal communication, May 2, 2019). The visit exposed the Bangsamoro delegation to several models of democratic governance and relations between central and federal governments. MILF and MNLF met with government leaders, members of parliament, academics, and civil society representatives of national and sub-national levels (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2017).

The US has not been active in exerting influence on MILF's transformation process. It was held back by legal reasons which made it impossible for the US to support organization that they once labeled as terrorist groups (US Embassy, personal communication, April 16, 2019). Moreover, the US wanted to wait for clarity on the future of the Bangsamoro region and the MILF before starting any projects. In April 2019, the US was looking into a three-year program in coordination with Australia that would train members of the MILF in the areas of procurement, contract setting, and more (US Embassy, personal communication, April 16, 2019).

MILF leadership, of which many are now also BTA leadership, has to make the transition from being military leader to administrator. In this transition, they are confronted with the challenge of capacity building for existing leadership but also finding suitable new candidate for future government positions. The Netherlands, Australia, and the EU have influenced this component in ways that are similar by providing a training or study tour for MILF's leadership in order to show future administrators of bureaucrats what policy making is and what post conflict institutions look like.

International Legitimacy of the MILF

As stated before, the Bangsamoro peace process was characterized by a high level of international involvement. This did not only legitimize the MILF but also the peace process as a whole. The MILF had always welcomed foreign support. "The MILF has been very smart about that (...) I think that is basically why they welcomed foreign support rather than other Filipinos helping them to give them that legitimacy to be recognized too," an independent expert said in an interview (personal communication, May 6, 2019). The high level of international involvement became very clear at the signing ceremony of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro at Malacañang palace, where the whole diplomatic corps witnessed the historical moment (independent expert, personal communication, May 6, 2019). For a long time, the MILF has been seen as a legitimate organization and important partner in the peace process, and co-chaired the Mindanao Trust Fund. Co-chairing a major trust fund meant that they were being included in major decision points and legitimized their position as a huge actor in the peace process as well (Australian Embassy, personal communication, May 10, 2019).

Another factor that might have influenced MILF's legitimacy was that the MILF and the BIAF (MILF's army) had come out of the peace process without many scandals on the ground. No major crimes against the population in Mindanao had taken place, which helps in legitimacy for the MILF from people in Mindanao but also the international community (independent expert, personal communication, April 3, 2019).

Influence of International Third Parties on Legitimacy of the MILF

In the case of the MILF, the international community did not have to pressure or convince the Philippine government of the legitimacy of the MILF. They did that on their own and had recognized the MILF as official partner of the peace process a long time ago (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 11, 2019). The international community had legitimized the peace process and the MILF mainly after the signing of the peace agreement (independent expert, personal communication, April 3, 2019). Support of international third parties was not per se directed to the MILF because the international community was always careful to include both the Philippine government and the MILF.

There was one time, the international community did specifically target the MILF and its legitimization. Right after the Mamasapano Incident (explained in 5.1), the MILF was questioned and the passage of the implementing legislation for the peace agreement was in danger. As a last run for the goal, the international community gathered together and signed a statement initiated by the Embassy of the Netherlands. The statement

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was signed by some EU member states, Canada, the US, and more, and highlighted the importance of peace in the region and therefore the passage of the law (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 15, 2019).

The MILF immediately recognized the statement and came up with their own one. The statement did not turn out to be effective because in the public the MILF was already called a terrorist group but was a clear sign that the international community supported the MILF. The Dutch Mission to the Bangsamoro had as an objective to make the MILF conscious of the need to connect with the international community (personal communication, April 15, 2019). The Embassy of the Netherlands organized a few meetings for the international community and Iqbal, the Ambassador would host at her residence (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 15, 2019). This facilitated dialogue between the international community and the MILF, and possibly added to MILF's international legitimacy.

International legitimacy had always been present in the Bangsamoro peace process. As the MILF had been recognized by the Philippine government, international pressures were not necessary to legitimize MILF as partner of the government in the peace process. The international community had legitimized the peace process continuously but not often was MILF specifically legitimized. With exemption to the international statement after the Mamasapano incident, when credibility of the MILF was seriously questioned. This did not have the effect the donor community had hoped for.

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Conclusions: Small State, Big State, and Multilateral Organization Influence on the Transformation Process of the MILF

The Bangsamoro peace process, as well as the transformation process of the MILF from rebel movement to formal political organization, has been characterized by a high level of international involvement. Many international third parties were present including small states, large states, and multilateral organizations. As the country representative of an INGO said in an interview, one explanation for this could be the nature of the conflict: "The oppressor in this intra-state conflict was the Filipino people, imperial Manila, so there was a time that the MILF would rather get help from people outside the country" (personal communication, May 6, 2019). The three types of international third parties will each be discussed and analyzed, and a reflection on the theory will be given. In doing so, the answer to the following second sub question is formulated: How do different types of international third parties exert influence on the transition processes of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines?

Small States: Direct Assistance Through a Small Mission

The Netherlands has no Official Development Assistance budget for the Philippines, nor is it mentioned as a big actor in the peace process in interviews (Rijksoverheid, n.d.; Rappler, 2018). Therefore, the Netherlands is a small state operating in the Bangsamoro peace process and transformation process of the MILF. As a small state, the Netherlands did exert influence on the transformation process of the MILF. Before establishing the Dutch Mission to the Bangsamoro, the Dutch Ambassador had good personal relations with MILF leader Mohagher Iqbal. This contact dated back to when the ambassador of the Swiss embassy ended his term. The Swiss Ambassador had strong relations with the MILF on the ground and for a while the MILF was relying on the Swiss ambassador to talk to the international community (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 15, 2019). When the Swiss Ambassador was at the end of his post he asked the Dutch Ambassador to take over his contacts, which she did.

Through that relationship with Mohagher Iqbal it became clear that there was urgency to prepare the MILF for transformation in a formal political organization. As a result, the Dutch Mission to Bangsamoro was established in 2015 (independent expert, personal communication, April 3, 2019). This small-scale mission provided direct assistance to MILF leadership in a relatively early stage of transformation in which international actors did not work together with the MILF directly yet. Implementing legislation for the peace agreement was not passed yet, and even though there were clear signs that the MILF would take a leadership position in the government of the new autonomous region, there were many hurdles to overcome to achieve the establishment of that region.

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The reason for exerting influence MILF's transformation in the form of the Dutch mission was, as the embassy said, to "contribute to projects that would have something concrete at least, and also support activities that are not supported by bigger players" (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 15, 2019). Because the Netherlands is a small country and has limited resources available, the embassy in general searched for projects that work as a catalyst, focusing on elements that are necessary to make the next step (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 11, 2019). Other ways in which the Netherlands exerted influence was through the funding of local NGOs that are active in Mindanao (Embassy of the Netherlands, personal communication, April 11, 2019).

Because of its partnership with the MILF as an embassy, the Netherlands has a quite unique position in the transformation process of the MILF. The low profile small scale mission which offered direct assistance to the MILF is in line with expectations of the theoretical framework. The mission was, as expected by theory, low profile and small. It did cover multiple aspects of the transformation process and the goals of the mission were not focused, as expected by theory. The way in which the mission was executed was very specific: direct assistance to the MILF of one person. The mission tried to create international legitimacy of the MILF as there were some meetings organized by the embassy for international donors and the MILF. The Netherlands did not take any specific measures to be on good foot with big powers in the peace process.

New insights based on the role of the Netherlands in the MILF transformation process is the ability to exert influence and provide direct assistance in an earlier stage of transformation. Due to its low-profile character, it was able to take this "riskier" strategy in exerting influence on the transformation process of the MILF directly. Also, it seems to be the case that influence of small state Netherlands is of most added value when it focuses on a project that would not have been funded by bigger donors. How small states influence the transformation process of the MILF is summarized on the next page.

Small states
exert influence on
rebel movement's
transformation
processes through small
scale missions that
provide direct support
in an early stage to the
transformation process.

Big States: Many Resources Through Large NGOs

Australia has been a supporter of peace in Mindanao for more than twenty years and, after Japan, is the second biggest donor in the peace process (Australian Embassy, personal communication, May 10, 2019). Besides its financial resources and large amount of development money available for the Philippines, Australia is perceived as a big player in the Bangsamoro peace process by many people who have been interviewed for this research. This makes Australia a big state in the transformation process of the MILF. The initial support for transition of the MILF was through Fast Track, a facility supporting the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, the organ responsible for drafting the Bangsamoro Organic Law and its passing. Fast Track was followed by many other programs that exerted influence on MILF's transformation process. In all of its programs, Australia worked with large international NGOs, usually UNDP, the World Bank, or the Asia Foundation.

Besides the many projects it funds, the Australian Embassy took the initiative for donor coordination. Due to a huge number of actors that are working on the peace process and now more in the direction of helping the new Bangsamoro government, donor coordination was needed and still missing in international involvement in the Bangsamoro (Australian Embassy, personal communication, May 10, 2019). Australia met with several donors and planned a donor-led coordination that would meet regularly. Based on these meetings, donors would be able to decide what to prioritize in order to avoid overlapping projects.

The US is still the second biggest bilateral donor of Official Development Assistance to the Philippines after Japan and is the other big state present in the MILF transformation process (Rapper, 2018). Although the US is one of the Philippine's most important donors, in the peace process and transformation process of the MILF it does not exert as much influence as would have been possible given its financial resources. The US has been involved in the peace process since the 1990s but was not dominant in the current stage of the peace process. For legal reasons, the US cannot provide aid to the MILF because it was once labeled as a terrorist organization. This makes it more difficult to engage with the MILF directly and exert influence on the transformation processes in this manner. Due to changes in its own administration, foreign policy of the US has changed and, therefore, also its role in the Philippines and Asia in general. US strategy in the Philippines will move to investments and great power competition in Asia which at the same time marks the decline of involvement in issues like peace processes (US Embassy, personal communication, April 16, 2019).

With regard to the transformation of the MILF, the US had a wait and see attitude, wanting everything to be clear before setting up new programs. Since the peace process had been a process with many insecurities, the US did not start programs. The US did contribute to the Mindanao Trust Fund and had an agriculture program in Mindanao where former combatants were taught how to farm. In April 2019, the US was looking into the possibility to establish a three-year program for transformation of the MILF in cooperation with Australia.

Australia and the US, two big states that have been analyzed in this research, have influenced the MILF transformation process in very different ways. For this reason, it is hard to draw up a general conclusion on the involvement of large states in the transformation process of the MILF. The role that theory expects big states to play in the transformation process does not seem to be accurate in this case. The US and Australia did not use their leverage to keep actors committed to the peace process, nor did they use enforcing strategies to exert influence on the transformation process of the MILF. It can be argued that Australia used its large state leverage to initiate for donor coordination. Being a large actor in the peace process, Australia was a suitable actor to initiate this. Moreover, Australia used its financial resources to finance multiple large projects through large NGOs UNDP and the Asia Foundation. These projects would then finance several components of the transition process of the MILF. How big states influence the transformation process of the MILF is summarized below.

Large states exert influence on the transformation process of rebel movements through big NGOs that set up large projects that influence multiple components of the transformation process.

110 International Influence on
Transformation of the MILF
Conclusions

**Multilateral Organizations: Influence on Multiple
Components of Transformation**

The EU has been more heavily involved in the Bangsamoro peace process since the early 2000s (EU, personal communication, May 2, 2019). For two years, the EU had been struggling with the fact that they were unable to provide aid in Mindanao since Duterte declined aid from the EU in 2017 (EU, personal communication, April 25, 2019; Fondation Euractiv, 2017). The EU is now able to provide aid in Mindanao again and aims to exert influence on the transition process in two ways: (1) the political Article 28 mission; and (2) the larger SUBATRA development program. Through these two programs, the EU aims to influence the components of adjusting organizational strategies. With the study tour it had organized, it aimed to exert influence on leadership reform.

Through its Article 28 mission, the EU does use its multilateral intangible resources to keep actors committed to the transformation process but in this case it is just EU member states. The expectation that multilateral organizations are likely to work together with a wide variety of partners does seem to be valid in this case. EU involvement had been influenced by its bureaucracy in Brussels, which required long preparation and approval of member states. With the Article 28, however, the EU had found a way to make the bureaucracy less of an obstruction to intervene in a crisis situation. The way multilateral organization EU exerted influence on the MILF's transformation process is summarized on the next page.

Multilateral
organizations exert
influence on the
transformation
process of rebel
movements through
missions that focus
on multiple aspects
of transformation
and are influenced
by slow bureaucratic
procedures.

Conclusion and Discussion

At the beginning of this thesis, it has been argued that the transformation of rebel movements to formal political organizations in the period after intra-state conflict is an important prerequisite for sustainable peace. This transformation of rebel movements into a formal political organization has become a relatively frequent phenomenon over the last couple of decades, yet a successful transformation process is one of the hardest peace building challenges. International third parties are often involved in intra-state conflicts due to their cross border effects and try to exert influence on a peaceful ending of a conflict. Based on theory on diplomacy and mediation, it is expected that the type of actor—small state, large state, and multilateral organization—matters in the way they exert influence on the transformation processes of rebel movement after intra-state conflict. This resulted in the main question of this research: Do different types of international third parties exert different influence on the transition of rebel movements into formal political organizations?

It can be concluded that three types of actors indeed exert influence on rebel movements' transformation process in a different way. Small states exert influence through small scale programs that do not require many financial resources that big states or multilateral organizations are unable not willing to fund. These small-scale programs are often "low profile" and therefore small states can take more risks and are able to execute influence in an early stage of transformation. Big states are most likely to exert influence on the transformation process of a rebel movement by granting the rebel movement legitimacy by either pressuring actors to start peace talks or by making an official statement in which it recognizes the rebel movement as important actor. When big states exert influence in another way, it is through large programs executed by INGOs. Multilateral organizations exert influence on the transformation processes of rebel movements through large programs that influence multiple aspects of the transformation process and are influenced by slow bureaucratic procedures. In exerting influence, multilateral organizations have the ability to keep a broad range of actors committed to the goals. In this chapter, conclusions are discussed and interpreted, and the implications of the results are formulated. 6.1 combines the conclusions of chapter four and five and builds the case for general conclusions of this research. 6.2 reflects on the theoretical and practical implications of the research. 6.3 provides a critical evaluation of the research and discusses possibilities for future research.

General Conclusions

The goal of this research was to identify possible differences in the way small states, big states, and multilateral organizations exert influence on the transformation processes of rebel movements into formal political organizations. In order to provide an accurate answer to this question, four cases of rebel movements' transformation processes have been investigated. Transformation processes of the first three cases had already been completed, which made it possible to assess the influence of the three types of international third parties based on secondary sources. To complement the three cases, the transformation process of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has been thoroughly researched through primary resources. The combination of results from the two strategies to answer the main question result in the general conclusions of this research.

Conclusions of International Influence on Transformation of the FMLN, RENAMO, and Aceh Free Movement

In Chapter 4, conclusions of the exerted influence of small states, big states, and multilateral organizations on three cases of transformation processes have been summarized as follows: (1) small states exert influence on the transformation process of rebel movements through smaller missions focused on a specific aspect of transformation process, using their limited financial resources for programs that bigger players are unable to establish; (2) big states use their leverage to convince conflicting parties to start peace negotiations, stay in the peace process, or continue transformation processes but do not exert influence on the transformation process of rebel movements in another way; and (3) multilateral organizations exert influence on rebel movement's transformation processes through large operations that influence multiple aspects of the transformation in which they use their ability to create commitment from many partners but are prone to slow bureaucratic procedures.

Small states Cuba and Nicaragua had influenced the transformation of the FMLN specifically through military support and training to the FMLN. Norway and the Netherlands, as well as Swiss, had exerted its influence on one aspect of the transformation process specifically. Norway and the Netherlands saw the need for a program which the UN was unable to support, and used its financial resources in a way that multilateral UN was not able to do. *Big states* US, Mexico, and France had influenced the transformation processes by creating legitimacy for the rebel movement. Mexico and France signed a declaration in support of FMLN as political party by which it granted to rebel movement legitimacy. The US put pressure on the government and rebel group in El Salvador to start peace negotiations but did not add to FMLNs transformation process in another

way even though it was the biggest donor in the country. The US had successfully convinced RENAMO's leader to not withdraw from elections by which it ensured RENAMO's transformation process to a political party using its leverage.

Multilateral organization UN influenced the transformation processes of the FMLN and RENAMO through observation missions that were concerned with the DDR process of the rebel movements and its transformation into a viable political party. Besides that, the UN created legitimacy for the FMNL through a statement by which the UN ensured FMLNs participation in elections. In the UN observation missions, the UN used its intangible sources of leverage to work together with a broad range of actors like the World Food Program, IMF, and World Bank. The larger scale of missions that focused on multiple aspects of the transformation process were prone to bureaucratic slow procedures. Similar bureaucratic issues were experienced by the EU that had trouble starting a mission as quickly as needed. The EU's mission in Indonesia was also concerned with multiple aspects of the transformation process of the GAM as it was concerned with implementation of the MOU between the government and GAM which included GAMs transformation into a political party and its DDR process. The EU also contributed to the challenge of leadership reform through trainings it offered.

Conclusions of the Transformation Process of the MILF

Based on the case of the transformation of the MILF, the following conclusions were drawn: (1) small states exert influence on rebel movement's transformation processes through small scale missions that provide direct support in an early stage to the transformation process; (2) big states exert influence on the transformation process of rebel movements through big NGOs that set up large projects that influence multiple components of the transformation process; and (3) multilateral organizations exert influence on the transformation process of rebel movements through missions that focus on multiple aspects of transformation and are influenced by slow bureaucratic procedures.

Small state the Netherlands used its limited resources for a low-profile mission which provided direct assistance in a relatively early stage of transformation. The mission focused on multiple aspects of transformation but in a very specific way. The Netherlands also aimed to help in the challenge of legitimacy of the MILF by arranging meeting between the international community and the MILF. *Big state* Australia used its many financial resources available to exert influence on multiple aspects of MILF's transformation process. Australia did this through formal structures

like the Mindanao Trust Fund and though major INGOs, UNDP and the Asia Foundation. The US, another big state present, barely exerted influence because it wanted to have a secure stable situation in order to decide upon a program.

Multilateral organization EU focuses on two aspects of MILF transformation process. By deploying an Article 28 mission, the EU aims to exert influence on the adjustment of organizational strategies of the MILF. With the development program SUBATRA, the EU would influence the capacities building in the BTA regional government. It cannot be said that EU works together with a large range of partners as was expected by theory. EU involvement had been influenced by its bureaucracy in Brussels which resulted in long preparation time and waiting for approval of member states. With the Article 28 mission, however, the EU had found a way to make the bureaucracy less of an obstruction to intervene in a crisis situation.

The Four Cases Combined

The role small states played in transformation processes of rebel movements seemed quite similar in the two parts of this research. A couple of characteristics of small state influence on transformation processes become apparent. Small states use their limited financial resources to establish missions where bigger player are unable or unwilling to do so. Their programs focus on one aspect of the transformation process and goals are highly focused. Specifically in the case of influence of the Netherlands on the MILF, transformation process was the ability to exert direct influence in an early stage of transformation due to the low-profile and more invisible character of the mission. The insights from the two parts of this research combined result in the following conclusion on small state involvement in rebel movement's transformation processes:

Small states are likely to exert influence on transformation processes of rebel movements by using their limited financial resources to establish low-profile missions that big states or multilateral organizations are unable not willing to do. Due to this low-profile character, they can take more risks and are able to exert direct influence in an early stage of transformation.

In the cases of FMLN, RENAMO, and GAM, big states used their "muscles" to exert influence by granting international legitimacy to the rebel movements through official statements or keeping actors committed to the peace process. The image of large states only using their leverage to legitimize the peace process or rebel movement is nuanced by the role of Australia in MILF's transformation process. Here, Australia used its financial resources to fund many projects that influenced many aspects of

a rebel movement's transformation. Therefore, the way large states exert influence on a transformation process was summarized differently for the case of the MILF. For the general conclusion, this nuance is incorporated. Influence exerted by big states is summarized as follows:

Big states are most likely to exert influence on the transformation process of a rebel movement by granting the rebel movement legitimacy by either pressuring actors to start peace talks or by making an official statement in which it recognizes the rebel movement as important actor. When big states exert influence in another way, it is through big programs executed by large INGOs.

The initial picture of influence of multilateral organizations on the transformation process of rebel movement, presented by the cases of FMLN, RENAMO, and GAM's transformation, is through the establishment of large missions that cover many aspects of transformation. In those missions, organizational challenges as well as DDR and international legitimacy are influenced. The case of the MILF nuances this idea as it shows that multilateral organizations do not always play a role that is as influential as in the cases of FMLN, RENAMO, and GAM. Also do multilateral actors not always work together with a broad range of partners due to their multilateral being. Yet, few things are similar in all cases: multilateral organizations exert influence through missions that focus on multiple aspects of a rebel movement's transformation process, and bureaucracy influences the way the multilateral organization was able to exert influence. The general conclusion, therefore, focuses on these two aspects but takes the UN missions in the cases of FMLN and RENAMO also into consideration. The general conclusion on influence of multilateral organization is summarized:

Multilateral organizations exert influence on the transformation processes of rebel movements through large programs that influence multiple aspects of the transformation process and are influenced by slow bureaucratic procedures. In exerting influence, multilateral organizations have the ability to keep a broad range of actors committed to the goals.

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Multilateral organizations exert influence on the transformation processes of rebel movements through large programs that influence multiple aspects of the transformation process and are influenced by slow bureaucratic procedures. In exerting influence, multilateral organizations have the ability to keep a broad range of actors committed to the goals.

Implications of Research

Since theory on influence of different types of international third parties on the transformation process does not exist, expectations for influence of small states, big states, and multilateral organizations were based on theory on international diplomacy and mediation. This research shows that, until some extent, those predictions were accurate, but international influence on the transformation process of rebel movements has its own dynamics that differ from other parts of peace processes. Small states did appear to exert influence through low profile missions but did not seem to be that concerned with being on good foot with big powers. This might be something that is typical for international influence on this part of the peace process as this did play a role in the mediation phase. Small states did not exert influence on the transformation process by creating legitimacy and the non-threatening character of small states did not seem to be an important factor. This, however, cannot be stated based on results of the research. The expectation that large states can keep actors committed to the peace processes was accurate but had to be complemented with new insights from big state's involvement in the MILF transformation process. Influence of multilateral organization is more complicated and nuanced than expected by theory. Even though the expectations were for some types quite accurate, it can be concluded that more theory focused on international influence in this part of a peace process is needed. This research was a first attempt to do as it explored the field of influence of international involvement on the transformation processes of rebel movements. By doing this, its conclusions add to both to theory of international involvement in peace processes as well as to theory about transformation processes of rebel movements to formal political organizations.

Theoretical Implications

Current scholarly on international involvement in peace processes often omits looking into the transformation processes of rebel movements as part of the peace process. At the same time, scholarly on the post-conflict transformation process of rebel movements often leaves international influence on this process outside of the scope of research. This thesis has shown that international influence on the transformation process of rebel movements is something of interest for both scholars as it reveals results about ways international involvement in peace processes occurs as well as insights on how the transformation process of rebel movements to formal political organizations evolves.

With this research it becomes clear that viewing international donors as one "international community" overlooks the individual characteristics, qualities, and strategies different kind of members of the international

community can have. Different kind of actors play various roles and are of different added value in peace processes. Moreover, the role they play is likely to be different per phase of the peace process. This seems to be the case for mediation phase and the phase of transformation of rebel movement. As theory on international involvement in peace building has vastly focused on the role of multilateral organizations (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 143), this research has also shown that bilateral actors, big states and small states, do play a key role in post conflict peacebuilding and are an important factor to take into account. Especially in the case of the MILF, where multilateral donors were not as influential as in the other three cases. Besides theoretical implications, this research also has implications for society and the knowledge on international involvement in transformation processes of rebel movements.

Social Implications

Results of this thesis suggest that every type of international third-party can play a valuable role in the transformation process of a rebel movement if it wishes to exert influence. In doing so, financial resources are not the most important factor as small missions can be highly effective. Creating legitimacy of the rebel movement does not require financial resources either but the actors have to be perceived as big and influential in order to grant a rebel movement international legitimacy successfully. It also shows that small states, big states, and multilateral organizations can successfully work together to exert influence on the transformation process, as they all have different qualities and ways in which they can best exert influence. In interviews, it was confirmed that successful transformation processes are essential in sustainable peace. All experts, diplomats, and MILF members highlighted that the MILF transformation process could be a turning point in the history of conflict in Mindanao if this would happen successfully. This shows the relevance of a successful transformation process as it could establish sustainable peace in countries with an intra-state conflict.

Discussion

In order to provide an accurate answer to the main question of this research, two strategies have been applied: an analysis of secondary sources on three case studies and a case study of the MILF transformation process based on interviews. The first strategy depended on the observations and scope of the research of others as it was based on secondary resources. To complement the first strategy, the transformation process of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has been researched through primary resources. The case has been chosen because of the presence of many international actors. On the one hand, this was an advantage because the three actors were present and influenced the transformation process. On the other hand, it made researching more difficult because it was hard to have an overview of all actors that exerted influence.

The fact that transformation of the MILF is still going on provided the research with accurate information on actors that are still in the middle of the process, but this also means that conclusions on how international third parties exerted influences on MILF's transformation process may be partial. At the time of conducting, there were many actors who just started to assess whether they wanted to support the MILF in its transformation process. The categorization of three types of international third parties used in this thesis turned out to be useful and international third parties seemed to differ in the way they exert influence along these lines. There might, however, be other factors that determine the way states exert influence that are more important than the fact that they are small states, big states, or multilateral organizations. The causal relation between the three types of states and the way they influence transformation processes could be further researched in quantitative methods.

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Master's Thesis
Linde Saar Leemhuis

Supervisor
Dr. Hans Vollaard

Second Reader
Prof. Dr. Thomas Schillemans

Student Number
6289207

Bestuurs- en Organisationswetenschap
Programma: Bestuur en Beleid
Faculteit Recht, Economie, Bestuur en Organisatie
Universiteit Utrecht

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Supervisor
Dr. Hans Vollaard

Second Reader
**Prof. Dr. Thomas
Schillemans**

Student Number
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