

Master thesis

European Integration in Energy Policy – A Hot Issue in Parliament?

A Case Study of Politicization of EU Energy Policy in
the German Bundestag 2014-2019

Daan van Dijk
6536778

Dr. Paschalis Pechlivanis

Utrecht University
January 15, 2020.

Key words: *EU Energy Policy; European Integration; Energy Union;
Politicization; Bundestag; Germany*

Word count (excl. abstract, notes and references): 14,912

Abstract

From 2014 onwards, European integration in energy policy has been given new impetus with the Energy Union initiative, which further integrates EU policy domains aimed at the security-of-supply of energy, energy sustainability and an internal market for energy. This study approaches the political dimension of EU energy policy by analysing whether recent EU decision-making in energy policy from February 2014 to May 2019 has been politicized in the setting of the national parliament of Germany. The concept of politicization depicts the degree to which decision-making is discussed collectively and publicly and involves *issue salience* and *polarization of opinions*. Given the high interest of Germany in EU energy policy, European integration in energy policy is expected to matter for the Bundestag to discuss upon publicly and collectively.

On the basis of minutes of the plenary and other parliamentary correspondence of the Bundestag archives, this study reconstructs the Bundestag debate on EU energy policy and sets out the politicization strategies of the German political parties that were involved in the debate. Based upon the analysis, this study concludes that European integration in energy policy from 2014 to 2019 has not been politicized in the context of the Bundestag. Although the general commitment to the Energy Union and related EU decision-making in energy policy have been debated collectively and publicly in the Bundestag over several occasions, politicization of European integration in energy policy has been limited as the debate has only incidentally proven to be a salient issue, and did not involve a polarization of opinions.

This study links itself with those scholars that argue that public and collective debate can contribute to the democratic responsiveness of EU decision-making. In conclusion, this study observes that even though EU national parliaments have a role in EU decision-making, and as such might contribute to the democratic responsiveness of EU decision-making, this does not imply that national parliaments will act correspondingly. In that respect, the theoretical framework of this study helps to understand why European integration is not politicized when political parties have no incentives to do so.

List of abbreviations

ACER	Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
AfD	Alternative für Deutschland
CDU/CSU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands / Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EU	European Union
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei
NECP	National Energy and Climate Plan
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Table of contents

Abstract	1
List of abbreviations	2
Table of contents.....	3
Introduction.....	4
Chapter 1: Historical background of EU energy policy and recent integration under the Energy Union initiative.....	8
1.1 Historical development of EU energy policy	8
1.2 The Energy Union and related EU decision-making 2014-2019.....	12
1.3 The Energy Union – a case of <i>sectoral integration</i>	16
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework and methodology.....	18
2.1 Definition and dimensions of politicization of European integration	18
2.2 Object of politicization	19
2.3 The causes of politicization of European integration.....	20
2.4 Settings and actors of politicization of European integration.....	21
2.5 Framework for political strategic interaction of political parties.....	23
2.6 Methodology for research and selection of sources.....	25
Chapter 3: Politicization of European integration in energy policy in the German Bundestag 2014 to 2019.....	27
3.1 Germany’s energy policy and policy towards European integration	27
3.2 Formal instruments of the Bundestag.....	28
3.3 Political landscape of the Bundestag 2014-2019	29
3.4. Reconstruction of the debate on European integration in energy policy.....	30
3.5 Party strategies of politicization.....	33
3.6 Reflection on issue salience, polarization of opinions and causes of politicization.....	37
Conclusion	38
Bibliography.....	40

Introduction

Energy – defined as “the power to do work that produces light, heat, or motion, or the fuel or electricity used for power”¹ – has been at the heart of the European peace project from its beginning, as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) regulated the production of coal. However, up until recently, energy policy in its wider sense was still one of the less integrated policy fields in the European Union (EU). Primarily, this has had much to do with the vital interests of energy to the economic and national security of EU Member States. Consequently, EU Member States have been generally reluctant to delegate competences over issues of energy to the supranational regime of the EU.

However, from 2014 onwards, new impetus has been given to European integration in energy policy with the creation of the Energy Union. The Energy Union initiative assembles energy policy domains aimed at the full realization of an internal market for energy, the decarbonization of the economy and stimulation of sustainable energy, and the security of supply of energy, notably in overcoming energy dependence from ‘unreliable’ partners such as Russia. Coinciding with geopolitical tensions with Russia in 2014 and renewed international commitments to tackle climate change following the Paris Climate Conference in 2015, the Energy Union initiative seems to satisfy emerging demands of EU Member States and EU institutions for further integration in the field of energy.

Interestingly, Eurobarometer results have indicated that EU citizens are by large in favour of a common energy policy among EU Member States.² This would imply that further European integration in the field of energy is not only something intended by EU elite policy makers from EU institutions and national governments, but is in fact something that might be supported by the larger public of EU citizens as well. This leads one to wonder whether and how the attitudes of the larger EU citizenry might matter for the advancement of European integration in the field of energy. What is more, according to a broad consensus among scholars of European Integration, the European project has shifted from being a matter of an “insulated elite” of national governments and firms lobbying over economic interests to a matter of “mass politics.”³ This development has frequently been labelled by the concept of politicization.⁴ Essentially, the concept of politicization of European integration depicts the degree to

¹ Cambridge Dictionary online, s.v. “energy,” accessed September 19, 2019, <https://dictionary-cambridge-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/dictionary/english/energy>.

² On a European level, this claim is supported by the results of the Eurobarometer surveys. Responding positively or negatively to the statement “A common energy policy among EU Member States”, from 2014 to 2018, just over 70 percent of overall EU respondents reacted positively, supporting a common EU energy policy, with on average 20 percent of all respondents reacting negatively. See: European Commission, “Public Opinion,” European Commission (website), accessed September 15, 2019, <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/lineChart/themeKy/29/groupKy/182/savFile/646>

³ Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining,” *British Journal of Political Science* 39, no.1 (2009): 13.

⁴ In fact, it is widely accepted among scholars of European integration to argue that European integration in general has become politicized. See e.g. Hanspeter Kriesi, “The Politicization of European Integration,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 54, no. Annual Review (2016): 33-34; Tanja A. Börzel, and Thomas Risse, “From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 25, no. 1 (2018): 93-94; Pieter de Wilde, Anna Leupold, and Henning Schmidtke, “Introduction: the differentiated politicization of European governance,” *West European Politics* 39, no. 1 (2016): 3-22.

which European Union decisions are being debated collectively and publicly.⁵ According to a consensus among most scholars studying politicization of European integration, it is characterized by *issue salience*, *polarization of opinions* and *expansion of actors involved*.⁶ One of the empirical approaches to analyse politicization is to focus on the debate of EU affairs in the national parliament.⁷ In fact, all EU Member State national parliaments have a role in EU decision-making, not only by discussing EU affairs but notably by controlling and instructing the national government, which engages in EU decision-making through the European Council and the Council of the European Union (the Council).

The central question of this study is whether European integration in energy policy from 2014 to 2019 is politicized in the German Bundestag.

The goal of the present study is not to prove that European integration in energy policy is impacted by mass politics, leading to what some scholars have argued a 'constraining dissensus' in EU decision-making.⁸ Rather, this research will link itself to those scholars that have argued that politicization, that is, collective and public discussion of decision-making, contributes to the democratic responsiveness of EU decision-making.⁹ In this respect, EU decision-making has traditionally been labelled 'policy *without* politics', as European integration historically evolved largely outside of the political arena and left national politicians and citizens with little to say in most decision-making. Then, politicization might contribute to EU decision-making becoming 'policy *with* politics'.¹⁰ Or, said differently, the goal of this study is to look for politicization of energy policy, as it *should* be debated collectively and publicly.¹¹ In this respect, the focus of this study will be to analyse whether politicization has occurred and under what conditions it emerged, rather than to evaluate the democratic responsiveness of decision-making or discuss the consequences of politicization, which lie outside the scope of this study.¹²

⁵ Christian Rauh, Bart Joachim Bes, and Martijn Schoonvelde, "Undermining, defusing or defending European integration? Assessing public communication of European executives in times of EU politicization," *European Journal of Political Research*, early view (2019): 3; Christian Rauh, "EU politicization and policy initiatives of the European Commission: the case of consumer policy," *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 3 (2019): 346; Vivian A. Schmidt, "Politicization in the EU: between national politics and EU political dynamics," *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 7 (2019): 1018.

⁶ Kriesi, "The Politicization of European Integration," 33; Rauh, Bes, and Schoonvelde, "Undermining, defusing or defending European integration?" 3; Edgar Grande, and Swen Hutter, "Beyond authority transfer: explaining politicization of Europe," *West European Politics* 39, no. 1 (2016): 25; Swen Hutter, and Edgar Grande, "Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena: A Comparative Analysis of Five West European Countries, 1970-2010," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52, no. 5 (2014): 1003; Pieter de Wilde, and Michael Zürn, "Can the Politicization of European Integration be Reversed?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50, no. S1 (2012): 137-153; Rauh, "EU politicization," 346; De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, "Introduction," 4.

⁷ Schmidt, "Politicization in the EU," 1023-1024.

⁸ Hooghe and Marks, "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration," 1-23.

⁹ Paul Statham, and Hans-Jörg Trenz, "How European Union Politicization can Emerge through Contestation: The Constitution Case," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51, no. 5 (2013): 969; Rauh, "EU politicization," 344-365; Michael Zürn, "Politicization compared: at national, European, and global levels," *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 7 (2019): 984; Pieter de Wilde, and Christopher Lord, "Assessing actually-existing trajectories of EU politicization," *West European Politics* 39, no. 1 (2016): 145-163; Christian Rauh, "Communicating supranational governance? The salience of EU affairs in the German Bundestag, 1991-2013," *European Union Politics* 16, no. 1 (2015): 116-138; Pieter de Wilde, and Michael Zürn, "Can the Politicization of European Integration be Reversed?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50, no. S1 (2012): 139.

¹⁰ Schmidt, "Politicization in the EU," 1019.

¹¹ Zürn, "Politicization compared," 984.

¹² Up to today, scholarly contributions primarily focus on the long-term consequences of politicization to European integration, divided between those who argue that politicization has a 'constraining effect' and those who argue that politicization can have a supporting effect on European integration. For discussion of the long-term consequences of politicization, see e.g. Hooghe and Marks, "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration," 21; De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, "Introduction," 6; Rauh, Bes, and Schoonvelde, "Undermining, defusing or defending European integration?" 2-3; Philippe C. Schmitter, "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration," *International Organization* 23, no. 1 (1969): 161-166.

Politicization is analysed in the setting of the national parliament, as most scholars have argued that public debate on issues of European integration principally takes place within national contexts rather than in a European context.¹³ In this regard, national parliaments are considered the appropriate democratic institution to link supranational governance to the wider public, as within most political systems, national parliaments are regarded the highest democratic institution.¹⁴ Reasonably, if the larger EU citizenry would have an opinion on whether or not to engage in European integration in energy policy, this opinion should at least matter to their national representatives, that is, the national parliament.

Then, Germany is taken as a case study for several reasons. Due to a lack of domestic natural resources, Germany is known for a high dependence on energy imports.¹⁵ Furthermore, given Germany's central location in Europe and given that Europe's supply of energy is reliant on an integrated electricity grid and network of gas pipelines throughout Europe, Germany's supply of energy is dependent upon proper coordination with other European states.¹⁶ What is more, Germany is known for its *Energiewende*, its national transformation from a primarily coal-fuelled industrial economy to an economy fuelled by renewable energies.¹⁷ Given its ambitious sustainable energy policy, Germany has a high interest in shaping European policies as much as possible resembling its own energy regime, in order to avoid costs of adjusting its national policy, and to enjoy relative advantages over other Member States within the internal energy market.¹⁸ Finally, Germany is known as a leading Member State in the European Union, being one of its founding Member States and having an important say in current day-to-day EU politics. Therefore, German national politicians are considered to deem Germany's ability to influence EU decision-making to be stronger relative to other Member States. Given such characteristics, the Bundestag is expected to be a positive case in politicization, that is, given the high interest of Germany in EU energy policy, European integration in energy policy is expected to matter for its national parliament to debate upon collectively and publicly.

A time frame from February 2014 to May 2019 is selected. In February 2014, the Russian annexation of Crimea and meddling in Ukraine stirred new concerns over the European security-of-supply of energy, given the significant reliance of European countries on energy imports from Russia. It sparked debate among European state leaders about the need for closer cooperation in the EU in the field of energy policy, wherefore the Energy Union was proposed. In May 2019, negotiations on the 'Clean Energy Package' were finalized, through which the EU had adopted new legislation on all dimensions of the Energy Union.

¹³ Kriesi, "The Politicization of European Integration," 32; De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, "Introduction," 2; Grande and Hutter, "Beyond authority transfer," 29; Hutter and Grande, "Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena," 1004; Rauh, "Communicating supranational governance?" 116.

¹⁴ Rauh, "Communicating supranational governance?" 116; De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, "Introduction," 7-8.

¹⁵ Anna Milena Jurca, "The *Energiewende*: Germany's Transition to an Economy Fueled by Renewables," *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review* 27, no. 1 (2014): 144-145.

¹⁶ John S. Duffield, and Kirsten Westphal, "Germany and EU Energy Policy: Conflicted Champion of Integration?" in *Toward a Common European Union Energy Policy*, eds. Vicki L. Birchfield and John S. Duffield, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 169; Kacper Szulecki, Severin Fischer, Anne There Gullberg, and Oliver Sartor, "Shaping the 'Energy Union': between national positions and governance innovation in EU energy and climate policy," *Climate Policy* 16, no. 5 (2016): 554.

¹⁷ Milena Jurca, "The *Energiewende*," 142-143.

¹⁸ Robert H. Cox, and Mariam Dekanozishvili, "German Efforts to Shape European Renewable Energy Policy," in *Energy Policy Making in the EU*, eds. Jale Tosun, Sophie Biesenbender and, Kai Schulze, (London: Springer, 2015): 182.

This research project offers a new approach to analyse EU energy policy, as it tackles the political dimension of energy policy by applying the concept of politicization to analyse decision-making. Up until today, a vast body of literature has been dedicated to analyse European integration in energy policy, including the latest Energy Union initiative. This includes literature focusing on the role of competing preferences of national governments, notably as evidenced in the Council, and literature focusing on the role of the Commission as 'policy entrepreneur'.¹⁹ Alternative to literature that focuses on top-level decision-making processes in energy policy, others have focused on the process of agenda-shaping, the role of external global developments, or reviewed the efficiency and effectivity of the proposed governance mechanism of the Energy Union.²⁰ Finally, some have given an outline of EU public opinion toward climate policy and energy sustainability using the Eurobarometer.²¹ However, no studies have focused on the role of national parliaments in discussing EU energy policy by applying the concept of politicization, to which this project fills a gap in research.

Analysing the central question requires several issues to be tackled. First, what is the history of European integration in energy policy? In addition, what is the Energy Union, how does it integrate energy policy in the EU and what decision-making related to the Energy Union has come about up until 2019? Second, what is the concept of politicization and how can the concept serve to analyse the emergence of debate on European integration in the national parliament? Finally, what is the role of the German national parliament in discussing EU decision-making and has European integration in energy policy been politicized in the Bundestag from 2014 to 2019?

Therefore, the first section of this study will provide an historical background on the development of EU energy policy from the start of the ECSC to the latest Energy Union initiative. It will discuss the Energy Union and the related series of EU decision-making that has been concluded between 2014 and 2019, and discuss how recent EU energy policy can be understood as *sectoral integration*. The second section provides a theoretical framework and discusses how politicization of European integration in a specific policy-area can be analysed by looking at debate among political parties in the national parliament. The third section provides an empirical case study on politicization of EU energy policy in the Bundestag. This includes a reconstruction of the Bundestag debate and a discussion of the politicization strategies of the German political parties that were involved in the debate. To that effect,

¹⁹ Ole Gunnar Austvik, "The Energy Union and security-of-gas supply," *Energy Policy* 96 (2016): 371-382; Szulecki, et al., "Shaping the 'Energy Union'," 548-567; Samuel R. Schubert, Johannes Pollak and Maren Kreutler. *Energy Policy of the European Union*, (London: Palgrave, 2016): 85-126; Tomas Maltby, "European Union energy policy integration: A case of European Commission policy entrepreneurship and increasing supranationalism," *Energy Policy* 55 (2013): 435-455; Matús Misík, "On the way towards the Energy Union: Position of Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia towards external energy security integration," *Energy* 111, no. 1 (2016): 68-81; Philipp Thaler, "The European Commission and the European Council: Coordinated Agenda setting in European energy policy," *Journal of European Integration* 38, no. 5 (2016): 571-585.

²⁰ Jale Tosun, Sophie Biesenbender, and Kai Schulze, *Energy Policy Making in the EU* (London: Springer, 2015); Rose Maria Fernandez, "Conflicting energy policy priorities in EU energy governance," *Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences* 8 (2018): 239-248; Marc Ringel, and Michèle Knodt, "The governance of the European Energy Union: Efficiency, effectiveness and acceptance of the Winter Package 2016," *Energy Policy* 112 (2018): 209-220.

²¹ Camilla Adelle, and Sirini Withana, "Public Perceptions of Climate Change and Energy Issues in the EU and the United States," in *The New Climate Policies of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Policy*, eds. Sebastian Oberthür, Marc Pallemmaerts, and Claire Roche Kelly (Brussels: Brussels University Press, 2010), 309-336; Oscar Fitch-Roy, and Jenny Fairbrass, *Negotiating the EU's 2030 Climate and Energy Framework: Agendas, Ideas and European Interest Groups*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018): 89-91.

this study consults minutes of plenary debates and other parliamentary correspondence from the Bundestag archives from February 2014 to May 2019.

Finally, this study will conclude that European integration in energy policy from 2014 to 2019 has not been politicized in the context of the Bundestag. Although the general commitment to the Energy Union and related EU decision-making have been debated collectively and publicly in the Bundestag over several occasions, politicization of European integration in energy policy has been limited as the debate has only incidentally proven to be a salient issue, and did not involve a polarization of opinions.

Chapter 1: Historical background of EU energy policy and recent integration under the Energy Union initiative

In this section, a historical context of European integration in energy policy will be provided by discussing how integration of EU energy policies has developed from the start of the ECSC up to 2014, when the Energy Union was introduced, which announced the most recent phase in European integration in energy policy. Subsequently, this section discusses the latest developments in EU energy policy which are related to the Energy Union initiative. It provides a brief history on the emergence of the Energy Union initiative and presents a series of decision-making that is related to the Energy Union and has been concluded between early 2014 and mid-2019. Together with the March 2015 general commitment of EU Member States to creation of the Energy Union, this series of decision-making will serve as the object for analysing politicization in the German Bundestag, wherefore the next section will present a theoretical framework. In addition, this section establishes how the general commitment to the Energy Union and the series of decision-making can be understood as a matter of European integration, as they signify *sectoral integration*.

1.1 Historical development of EU energy policy

From the beginning, energy was at the heart of the integration project of European nation-states, with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC created a common market for coal and steel in order to neutralize competition for these natural resources among the Member States of the ECSC. The ECSC had existed from 1952 until its absorption into the EU in 2002, and its establishing Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and then West-Germany. Historically, it can be considered a peace project for preventing a run over resources among nation-states that could lead to new conflicts after World War II, so to “make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible.”²² However, what is more, the ECSC turned out to be a model for further European integration and was the first international organization run by the principle of supranationalism, as the ECSC High Authority – the forerunner of the European Commission – enjoyed competences in decision-making independent and superior to the authority of nation-states.

²² European Commission, “The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950,” European Commission (website), accessed September 31, 2019, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en.

Although the ESCS constituted a model for further integration for the European Economic Community, the further integration of energy resources other than coal, such as oil and gas, remained an omission from the European economic integration schemes in the subsequent decades.²³ Markets in energy resources such as gas and electricity were essentially national markets dominated by national companies and regulated by national policies. Moreover, apart from integration of energy in the internal market, energy policy aspects such as infrastructure planning, production schemes and decisions over energy consumption were all kept at the national discretion. To quote one scholar of European integration in energy policy, “nothing really significant happened” in European energy policy until 2005.²⁴ In general, the omission to stimulate an internal market in energy, and, more generally, the reluctance of Member States to pool competences over energy policy, can be related to the vital interests of energy to the national economy and national security of Member States.²⁵

However, from the signing of the Single European Act in 1987 onwards, which was aimed at the full realization of a European single market, some impetus was given to the development of a common European energy policy. The so-called First Energy Package was aimed at the introduction of energy to the European internal market. In 1996, the *Directive concerning common rules for an internal market in electricity* was adopted, followed by the 1998 *Directive on common rules for an internal market in natural gas*. Both Directives were aimed at gradually introducing competition in the markets for electricity and natural gas, principally by introducing unbundling requirements to the vertically integrated companies that dominated the energy markets of Member States.²⁶ Shortcomings in the implementation of the First Energy Package led to the presentation of the Second Energy Package in 2003.²⁷ The 2003 Directives revised those of the First Energy Package and were aimed at the further liberalization of the markets in electricity and natural gas.²⁸

In addition to initiatives in energy policy on the basis of establishing the internal market, a new basis for European energy policy was created with the institutionalization of environmental policy in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on the European Union.²⁹ Accordingly, energy was no longer exclusively

²³ Thaler, “The European Commission and the European Council,” 573.

²⁴ Jean-Arnold Vinois, “The Road to Energy Union,” in *Energy Union: Europe’s New Liberal Mercantilism*, eds. Svein S. Andersen, Andreas Goldthau, and Nick Sitter (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 28.

²⁵ Tosun, Biesenbender, and Schulze, *Energy Policy Making in the EU*, 4; Szulecki, et al., “Shaping the ‘Energy Union’,” 549; Andreas Pointvogl, “Perceptions, realities, concession – What is driving the integration of European energy policies?” *Energy Policy* 37, no. 12 (2009): 5704.

²⁶ European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity,” *Official Journal of the European Communities* L27 (1997): 20-29; European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 June 1998 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas,” *Official Journal of the European Communities* L204 (1998): 1-12; Austvik, “The Energy Union and security-of-gas supply,” 376; Tosun, Biesenbender, and Schulze, *Energy Policy Making in the EU*, 4.

²⁷ Pointvogl, “Perceptions, realities, concession,” 5709.

²⁸ Pointvogl, “Perceptions, realities, concession,” 5709; European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC,” *Official Journal of the European Union* L176 (2003): 57-78; European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC,” *Official Journal of the European Union* L176 (2003): 37-56.

²⁹ Tosun, Biesenbender, and Schulze, *Energy Policy Making in the EU*, 4-5; Thaler, “The European Commission and the European Council,” 574.

dominated by concerns over the internal market, but could also be discussed in light of environmental concerns.

Hampton Court as a turning point in energy integration

In spite of the efforts of the First and Second Energy Packages, some scholars of European integration indicate the informal European Council at Hampton Court in 2005 as the turning point in European integration in energy policy.³⁰ In fact, it was the first occasion under which the EU Heads of State or Government deliberated on shared commitments in the sphere of energy policy in general. Under the presidency of the United Kingdom, the EU Heads of State or Government agreed to work on a common energy policy within the European Union.³¹ Roughly, the 2005 Hampton Court can be considered as resulting in four subsequent developments in the EU energy policy.

First of all, upon the request of the 2005 Hampton Court European Council, the European Commission issued a Green Paper on a strategy for energy policy in 2006. Called “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy”, perhaps the most important effect of the Green Paper was the establishment of the three pillars of EU energy policy.³² These pillars include ensuring the security-of-supply of energy, ensuring competitiveness and affordability of energy, and the promotion of sustainable energy, notably with the aim of combating climate change.³³ Importantly, the three pillars were formally adopted as the principle dimensions of future EU energy policy at the March 2007 European Council.³⁴

Second, the March 2007 European Council meeting signified the first time the EU Heads of State or Government agreed upon an EU binding target to deliver results in the promotion of sustainable energy.³⁵ A 20% share of renewable energies in overall EU energy consumption by 2020 was adopted as a EU binding target, to which differentiated national targets were derived. Eventually, the targets were formally established by the *2009 Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources*, which also included a governance requirement to deliver national renewable energy action plans, which would set out Member State plans to achieve the target in renewables.³⁶

Third, the Third Energy Package was proposed in 2007, aimed at the consolidation of the internal market for energy. The package included two directives on the internal market for electricity and gas and three regulations, which all entered into force in 2009. In short, the Third Energy Package included three important elements. First of all, it led to the further unbundling of energy companies, requiring that gas and electricity transmission networks are unbundled from energy selling companies. Accordingly, the energy transmission networks are either owned or run by independent operators,

³⁰ Vinois, “The Road to Energy Union,” 28; Thaler, “The European Commission and the European Council,” 577.

³¹ Vinois, “The Road to Energy Union,” 28.

³² *Ibid.*, 28-29.

³³ Commission of the European Communities, *Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy* (Brussels: 2006).

³⁴ Vinois, “The Road to Energy Union,” 29; Thaler, “The European Commission and the European Council,” 577.

³⁵ Vinois, “The Road to Energy Union,” 29; Council of the European Union, *Presidency Conclusions – Brussels European Council 8/9 March 2007* (Brussels: 2007).

³⁶ European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewables and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC,” *Official Journal of the European Union L140* (2009): 16-62.

depended upon the preferred structure adopted by an individual Member State.³⁷ Second, the package involved the installation of independent national energy regulators. Finally, the package involved the establishment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). The ACER was created as an agency operating independent from the Commission and national governments and was granted regulative competence in matters related to cross-border issues of national energy regulators.³⁸

Last but not least, the 2005 Hampton Court informal agreement on a common energy policy paved the way towards formal integration of energy policy in EU treaty-law by the conclusion of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty altering the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Hence, Article 194 TFEU indicates energy policy as a shared competence of the EU and Member States under the ordinary legislative decision-making procedure.³⁹ On the basis of Article 194(1) TFEU, EU energy policy is aimed to “ensure the functioning of the energy market,” “ensure security of energy supply,” “promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy,” and “promote the interconnection of energy networks.”⁴⁰

Although formally establishing EU energy policy, Article 194 TFEU also formally entrenches profound limitations to European integration in energy policy.⁴¹ Article 194(2) TFEU excludes to the discretion of Member States the competence over the exploitation of a country’s energy resources, the composition of the national energy mix, and the general structure of a country’s energy supply other than “the development of new and renewable forms of energy under Article 194(1)(c) TFEU.”⁴² It means that, although the EU can set targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency, it can in principle not enforce energy policies such as a nuclear or coal phase-out, as such would interfere with Member State’s discretion in these decisions.

Overall, the developments in European integration in energy policy following the 2005 Hampton Court European Council were promising for those in favour of further integration in energy policy. However, from 2009 onwards, European integration in energy policy did face constraints. Without seeking to give a full account of all setbacks, this primarily had much to do with the financial crisis from 2008 onwards. Overall, EU decision-making was increasingly focused on financial, economic and monetary crisis-management, through which less resources could be spend on energy policies.⁴³ In addition, financial support schemes for renewable energy in some countries became unbearable, through which national targets for renewables became unrealistic.⁴⁴

³⁷ European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC,” *Official Journal of the European Union L211* (2009): 55-93; European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC,” *Official Journal of the European Union L211* (2009): 94-136.

³⁸ Vinois, “The Road to Energy Union,” 30-34; European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators,” *Official Journal of the European Union L211* (2009): 1-14.

³⁹ Tosun, Biesenbender, and Schulze, *Energy Policy Making in the EU*, 5.

⁴⁰ European Union, “Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Part Three: Union Policies and Internal Actions – Title XXI: Energy – Article 194,” *Official Journal of the European Union 115* (2008): 134.

⁴¹ Vinois, “The Road to Energy Union,” 38-39; Thaler, “The European Commission and the European Council,” 575.

⁴² European Union, “Article 194 TFEU.”

⁴³ Thaler, “The European Commission and the European Council,” 578.

⁴⁴ Vinois, “The Road to Energy Union,” 39.

1.2 The Energy Union and related EU decision-making 2014-2019

The emergence of the Energy Union initiative can be placed in the context of global recovery from the financial crisis, but there are more factors that can explain the renewed interest in energy matters in the EU. Without claiming to deliver a full account, three factors will be outlined here.

The annexation of Crimea by Russia in February 2014 and subsequent Russian meddling in the separatist unrest in Eastern Ukraine significantly worsened the relations between the EU and Russia. It considerably reawakened concerns over the security-of-supply of gas among EU countries that are heavily depended on Russian gas imports, notably Germany and Eastern European states.⁴⁵ To that effect, new policy proposals that effectively addressed the strengthening of the energy system from supply disruptions from Russia were welcomed. While the idea of an Energy Union had been name-dropped earlier by former EU Commission President Van Rompuy,⁴⁶ it was within this context of concerns that then Poland's prime minister Donald Tusk employed the concept of the 'Energy Union' in April 2014. Under the concept of an EU 'Energy Union', Tusk proposed new measures to strengthen the EU's security-of-supply of gas. His prime idea was that in order to face the dominance of Russia as a supplier of gas to European states, the EU should pool negotiation competence over gas contracts vis-à-vis third parties, to be executed by a single EU body.⁴⁷

Apart from the security-of-supply concerns, the emergence of the idea of an Energy Union can be related to the European Council negotiations on a 2030 Framework for climate and energy policies (2030 Framework). These negotiations broadly took place from mid-2013 until October 2014. The 2030 Framework is aimed at setting EU targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions and promoting energy efficiency and energy renewables.⁴⁸ The Tusk proposal for the security-of-supply of energy can be seen as a reaction to the negotiations on the 2030 Framework as he sought to balance the environmental approach of the EU's energy agenda.⁴⁹ Mutatis mutandis, eventually, the Energy Union initiative proved to be the perfect occasion for the design of an effective governance mechanism for the later implementation of the same 2030 Framework.

Finally, the emergence of the Energy Union can be explained as a matter of political convenience. Over the summer of 2014, Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker, the then lead conservative candidate for the EU Commission Presidency, started to cooperate on the plan for an Energy Union.⁵⁰ Accordingly, while Tusk could link his proposal for the Energy Union to supranational decision-making, for Juncker, the concept of the Energy Union served as an ambitious and attractive priority for his political programme as future EU Commission President-elect.⁵¹ Eventually, as Tusk became the new President of the European Council and Juncker became Commission President, the political survival of the 'Energy Union' became a certainty. It was included in the 2015 Commission Work

⁴⁵ Vinois, "The Road to Energy Union," 42.

⁴⁶ Thaler, "The European Commission and the European Council," 578.

⁴⁷ Austvik, "The Energy Union and security-of-gas supply," 372; Donald Tusk, "A United Europe can end Russia's Energy Stranglehold," *Financial Times*, April 21, 2014, <https://www.ft.com/content/91508464-c661-11e3-ba0e-00144feabdc0>.

⁴⁸ European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030* (Brussels: 2014).

⁴⁹ Szulecki, et al., "Shaping the 'Energy Union'," 552.

⁵⁰ Thaler, "The European Commission and the European Council," 579.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 579.

Plan and in February 2015, the Juncker Commission published “A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy”. In the new framework, the Energy Union evolved as representing something far more substantial than the original Tusk proposal:

“The goal of a resilient Energy Union with an ambitious climate policy at its core is to give EU consumers - households and businesses - secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy. Achieving this goal will require a fundamental transformation of Europe’s energy system.”⁵²

From the Energy Union proposal of the Commission, two observations stand out. In the first place, the Commission did not prioritize concerns over Tusk’s security-of-supply agenda of the implementation of the 2030 Framework, as the Energy Union intended to include all traditional pillars of EU energy policy, including the internal market, energy sustainability and security-of-supply.⁵³ Accordingly, the Commission sought to employ the Energy Union initiative to stimulate European integration in all dimensions of energy policy, simultaneously and cross-dimensional. Second, given its vision for a ‘fundamental transformation’ of Europe’s energy system, the Energy Union framework pretended to have profound effect on the energy systems of member states, going beyond the wording of energy policy in Article 194(1) TFEU.

After the final Commission proposal for the Energy Union at the end of February 2015, public deliberation among Member States’ governments on the Energy Union remained limited. The Member States generally seemed to support the concept, with the exception of Hungary that rejected the Energy Union by stating that it would “hinder its national sovereignty”.⁵⁴ In early March 2015, discussions in the Council of EU Ministers of Energy primarily concentrated on the issue of nuclear energy, as some Member States considered nuclear energy as an option to reach targets in climate policy, to which Germany largely opposed.⁵⁵ In addition, an issue of deliberation concerned whether the Commissions should still be granted an advisory role in national gas company negotiations of contracts with third partners, which was already a significant downgrade of the original Tusk proposal to pool negotiation competence.⁵⁶

At the late March 2015 European Council, the EU Heads of State or Government agreed on a general commitment to “building an Energy Union with a forward-looking climate policy on the basis of

⁵² European Commission, *Energy Union Package. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank: A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy* (Brussels: 2015).

⁵³ European Commission, *Energy Union Package* (Brussels: 2015).

⁵⁴ Dave Keating, “Orbán criticises Commission’s plan for energy union,” *Politico*, February 23, 2015, <https://www.politico.eu/article/orban-criticises-commissions-plans-for-energy-union/>.

⁵⁵ Dave Keating, “Energy ministers clash over nuclear power,” *Politico*, March 3, 2015, <https://www.politico.eu/article/energy-ministers-clash-over-nuclear-power/>; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, “Press Release: Minister Gabriel: European Energy Union is a great opportunity,” BMWi website, accessed November 23, 2019, <https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2015/20150305-gabriel-europaeische-energieunion-als-grosse-chance.html>.

⁵⁶ Dave Keating, “Energy ministers clash over nuclear power,” *Politico*, March 3, 2015, <https://www.politico.eu/article/energy-ministers-clash-over-nuclear-power/>.

the Commission's framework strategy".⁵⁷ The agreement did not include provisions on nuclear energy or the pooling of competences in gas contracts with external parties.⁵⁸ Significantly, the endorsement launched a process to implement the Energy Union by EU legislation, to which this study will turn next. In general, between early 2014 to May 2019, three sets of decision-making have been concluded that relate to the Energy Union initiative. Together with the March 2015 general commitment of the European Council to the creation of the Energy Union, this series of decision-making will serve as the object for analysing politicization in the national parliament of Germany, wherefore the next section will present a theoretical framework.

2030 Framework for climate and energy targets

First of all, although the 2030 Framework for climate and energy (2030 Framework) had already been proposed by the Commission in 2013, and intergovernmental agreement in the European Council was reached in October 2014, the 2030 Framework agreement is a prominent part of the Energy Union strategy. The 2030 Framework sets out EU wide targets for climate and energy policy up to 2030. In early 2015, the implementation of the 2030 Framework targets and objectives were quickly involved in the Energy Union strategy, corresponding to the Energy Union objective of the "decarbonization of the economy".⁵⁹

First of all, under the 2030 Framework, the EU commits itself to a binding target of at least 27% renewable energy of total energy consumption to be reached in 2030.⁶⁰ The target was raised to be at least 32% renewables in total energy consumption at a later stage. Second, the European Council agreed on an *indicative* EU target of at least 27% improvement in energy efficiency in 2030.⁶¹ Similarly, this target was increased to be at least 32,5% improvement in energy efficiency in 2030. In addition, the EU commits itself to reach at least 40 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU compared to 1990.⁶² The greenhouse gas reduction target is closely related to targets in energy policy, given that a large share of the total of greenhouse gas emissions stems from the use of energy.

The commitment to 40 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions primarily served as European initiation ahead of the UN Convention on Climate Change in December 2015, known as the Paris Agreement. However, the targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency needed to be translated in EU legislation. In that respect, both targets became part of the Clean Energy Package that transposed the objectives of the Energy Union into EU legislation, which will be discussed below.

Regulation on the security-of-supply of gas

In February 2016, the Commission proposed a new Regulation in the realm of the security-of-supply of gas, as it had announced in its Energy Union communication. The *Regulation concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply* serves as a revision of a previous Regulation on security-of-supply from 2010. It was first discussed in the Energy Council in June 2016 and political

⁵⁷ European Council, *European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) – Conclusions* (Brussels: 2015).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ European Commission, *Energy Union Package* (Brussels: 2015).

⁶⁰ European Council, *European Council (23 and 24 October 2014) – Conclusions* (Brussels: 2014).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

agreement between the European Parliament, Council and Commission was reached in April 2017, after which the Regulation entered into force in November 2017.⁶³

The Regulation introduces a new 'solidarity principle', according to which EU Member States are obliged to help neighbouring Member States with providing gas to households in an event of extreme shortage of gas. Furthermore, the Regulation requires Member States to cooperate in regional groups. Within the regional groups, Member States work together on the assessment of potential disruption of gas supplies. Subsequently, the regional groups must establish joint actions plans in order to mitigate the consequences of gas disruptions.⁶⁴

Clean Energy Package

Third, in November 2016, the Commission presented the Clean Energy Package, including four regulations and four directives that concern energy policy measures aimed primarily, but not exclusively, at the internal market for electricity and the promotion of sustainable energy. The Clean Energy Package has been discussed in the Council of Energy Ministers several times, including the December 2016 Council, the February 2017 Council, the June 2017 Council and the December 2017, covering the period in which period the Council negotiated the Package with the European Parliament and the Commission. Final political agreement was reached at the end of 2018 or in May 2019 for some legislative acts, and all legislation entered into force by June 2019 at the latest.

First of all, the *Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union* requires all Member States to draft a ten-year National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), setting out the national plans to reach targets in all dimensions of the Energy Union for 2021 to 2030, including a long-term planning up to 2050. The Regulation requires Member States to submit biannual progress reports that will be subordinate to monitoring and feedback by the Commission.⁶⁵

Three directives are aimed at energy efficiency and renewable energy. The amending *Directive on energy efficiency* establishes a *binding* target of at least 32,5% improvement in energy efficiency in the EU by 2030, to be converted in national targets through national legislation.⁶⁶ The recast *Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources* establishes a binding target of at least 32% use of energy from renewable sources in the EU's total energy consumption, to be converted in national targets through national legislation.⁶⁷ The *Directive on the energy performance in buildings* is

⁶³ European Commission, "Securing Europe's gas supply: new Regulation comes into force," European Commission website, accessed December 22, 2019, https://ec-europa-eu.proxy.library.uu.nl/info/news/securing-europes-gas-supply-new-regulation-comes-force-2017-oct-27_en.

⁶⁴ European Parliament and Council of the European Union, "Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010," *Official Journal of the European Union L280* (2017): 1-36.

⁶⁵ European Parliament and Council of the European Union, "Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, [...]," *Official Journal of the European Union L328*, (2018): 1-77.

⁶⁶ European Parliament and Council of the European Union, "Directive (EU) 2018/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency," *Official Journal of the European Union L328* (2018): 210-230.

⁶⁷ European Parliament and Council of the European Union, "Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use from renewable sources (recast)," *Official Journal of the European Union L328* (2018): 82-209.

aimed at specific measures for the building sector to tackle challenges in improving sustainable energy performance in buildings.⁶⁸

Furthermore, the *Regulation on the internal market for electricity* and the *Directive on common rules of the internal market for electricity* reform the electricity market. In the words of the Commission, the reform must lead to make the electricity market “more flexible, more market-oriented and better placed to integrate a greater share of renewables.”⁶⁹ First of all, the Regulation introduces a limit on national capacity mechanisms (subsidies) for powerplants with high carbon emissions.⁷⁰ The Directive enables providers of electricity to set their own prices for electricity, and liberalizes the electricity market to citizens who want to sell self-generated electricity or join energy communities.⁷¹ In addition, the Regulation establishes Regional Cooperation Centres, that will regulate regional coordination of European transmission system operators.⁷²

The *Regulation on Risk-Preparedness in the electricity sector* introduces an obligation to Member State to prepare plans to deal with potential electricity crises.⁷³

Finally, a revision of the *Regulation establishing an EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators* (ACER) strengthens the role of the ACER in the electricity market. On top of its existing competences, the ACER is granted competence over the newly installed Regional Coordination Centres, and decision-making in the ACER is modified from absolute majority to simple majority voting among national energy regulators.⁷⁴

1.3 The Energy Union – a case of *sectoral integration*

Finally, as this research will discuss politicization of European integration, it is vital to shortly discuss how the Energy Union and the series of decision-making related to the Energy Union can be understood as a matter of European integration.

⁶⁸ European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Directive (EU) 2018/844 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy performance of buildings and Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency,” *Official Journal of the European Union L156* (2018): 75-91.

⁶⁹ European Commission, “Clean Energy for all Europeans package,” European Commission website, accessed December 22, 2019, <https://ec-europa-eu.proxy.library.uu.nl/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/clean-energy-all-europeans#content-heading-0>.

⁷⁰ European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (recast),” *Official Journal of the European Union L158* (2019): 54-124.

⁷¹ European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (recast),” *Official Journal of the European Union L158* (2019): 125-199.

⁷² European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (recast),” *Official Journal of the European Union L158* (2019): 54-124.

⁷³ European Commission, “Electricity market design,” European Commission website, accessed December 15, 2019, <https://ec-europa-eu.proxy.library.uu.nl/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/market-legislation/electricity-market-design#content-heading-1>; European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC,” *Official Journal of the European Union L158* (2019): 1-21.

⁷⁴ European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EU) 2019/942 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (recast),” *Official Journal of the European Union L158* (2019): 22-53.

Following Webber's definitions of integration, one can distinguish between *horizontal*, *vertical* and *sectoral integration*.⁷⁵ *Horizontal integration* refers to "the expansion [...] of the number of member states,"⁷⁶ which refers to new countries acceding to the EU, which does not apply to this study. *Vertical integration* is "the expansion [...] of the formal (i.e. treaty-based) competences and effective authority of the EU's supranational organs vis-à-vis the EU's intergovernmental organs and/or those of the member states."⁷⁷ In that respect, *vertical integration* in EU energy policy was brought about by the formal establishment of energy policy in Article 194 TFEU, following the 2009 Lisbon Treaty.

Sectoral integration is "the expansion [...] of the range of issue-areas in which the EU exercises policy-making competences and, within specific issue-areas, an expansion [...] of the scope of existing common policies."⁷⁸ This study argues that the general commitment to the Energy Union and the series of decision-making related to the Energy Union can be understood as *sectoral integration*, as these encompass an expansion of the scope of EU energy policy. Most importantly, *sectoral integration* has been established by the conclusion of new EU legislation in energy policy. First of all, the 2017 Regulation on the security-of-supply of gas entailed an expansion of the scope of EU energy policy by obliging Member States to cooperate in regional groups for the prevention and mitigation of shocks in the supply of gas, and by the introduction of the 'solidarity principle'. Second, the Clean Energy Package comprised multiple instances of *sectoral integration*. This includes the expansion of the scope of the NECP's, the binding character of the targets on energy efficiency, the harmonization and liberalization of rules in the electricity market including the restriction on capacity mechanisms, the creation of the Regional Coordination Centres, the obligations to Member States under the Regulation on Risk-Preparedness in electricity, and the strengthened competences of the ACER, notably as decision-making is transformed to simple majority. In addition, the general intergovernmental agreement on the Energy Union entailed an expansion of EU energy beyond the wording of Art. 194(1) TFEU to include an "energy and climate-related technology and innovation strategy".⁷⁹

Conclusion

To conclude, the general commitment to the Energy Union and the series of decision-making related to the Energy Union established from 2014 to 2019 represent a matter of *sectoral integration* in the field of EU energy policy. In that respect, the European integration in energy policy presents a political choice of EU national governments to commit themselves to an increasingly integrated energy policy. Therefore, it is relevant to analyse whether this political choice has been debated collectively and publicly, in an EU national parliament, to which the German Bundestag will provide a case study. The next section will first provide a theoretical framework and discuss how the concept of politicization can serve for analysing the debate in the Bundestag.

⁷⁵ Douglas Webber, "Trends in European political (dis)integration. An analysis of postfunctionalist and other explanations," *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 8 (2019): 1135.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ European Council, *European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) – Conclusions* (Brussels: 2015).

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework and methodology

This section provides the theoretical framework and discusses how politicization of European integration in energy policy can be analysed by looking at the debate in the national parliament. Employing the concept of politicization in this study requires a compact account of its theoretical understanding. Therefore, this section discusses, first of all, the definition of politicization and the dimensions that are generally associated with politicization. In addition, it touches upon the objects of politicization, as this study focuses on specific policy of European integration. Next, it discusses the causes that are related to politicization of European integration.

Subsequently, this section sets out the empirical variation in settings and actors to politicization. In that respect, debate in the setting of the national parliament primarily involves political parties. Therefore, this section provides a framework for understanding politicization from the political strategic interaction of political parties. Finally, this section lays down a methodology to the empirical analysis of this study, including a justification of the selection of sources from the Bundestag archives.

2.1 Definition and dimensions of politicization of European integration

In most general terms, the concept of politicization of European integration is the degree to which the European Union, its functioning and its decision-making is being debated collectively and publicly.⁸⁰ Therefore, the first objective of the analysis of this study is to reconstruct whether European integration in energy policy has been subject to collective and public debate. In addition, apart from a general definition of politicization, most scholars of politicization describe the concept in terms of its dimensions. According to a general consensus, politicization is characterized by *issue salience*, *polarization of opinions* and *expansion of actors involved*.⁸¹

First of all, *issue salience* is the degree of visibility of issues of European integration, or the importance that is being attributed to the issue by the participants of the debate.⁸² Issue salience implies that politicization of European integration is a relative issue as well. Given that time and attention of both politicians and the electorate are scarce, European integration in energy policy is only one issue that has to compete with other political issues, in order to be a priority on the agenda of day-to-day politics.⁸³ Second, *polarization of opinions* is focused on the degree to which opinions regarding an issue differ, or the level of intensity of conflict on the issue.⁸⁴ EU energy policy can be a vital issue to politicians and citizens, but as long as there are no different views on the issue, debating the issue will be less pertinent. Finally, the third aspect focuses on the *expansion of actors involved* in the collective debate beyond the traditional decision-makers, to include other societal actors as well. However, as debate in the national

⁸⁰ Rauh, Bes, and Schoonvelde, "Undermining, defusing or defending European integration?" 3; Rauh, "EU politicization," 346; Schmidt, "Politicization in the EU," 1018.

⁸¹ Kriesi, "The Politicization of European Integration," 33; Rauh, Bes, and Schoonvelde, "Undermining, defusing or defending European integration?" 3; Grande and Hutter, "Beyond authority transfer," 25; Hutter and Grande, "Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena," 1003; De Wilde, and Michael Zürn, "Politicization be Reversed?" 137-155; Rauh, "EU politicization," 346; De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, "Introduction," 4.

⁸² Grande and Hutter, "Beyond authority transfer," 25; De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, "Introduction," 6.

⁸³ Christoffer Green-Pedersen, "A Giant Fast Asleep? Party Incentives and the Politicisation of European Integration," *Political Studies* 60, no. 1 (2012): 117.

⁸⁴ Grande and Hutter, "Beyond authority transfer," 26.

parliament usually involves a constant number of political parties, this study focuses on the dimensions of issue salience and polarization of opinions. Accordingly, this study analyses whether the debate in the Bundestag on EU energy policy was a salient issue in the Bundestag and involved a polarization of opinions among political parties.

2.2 Object of politicization

With regard to the object of politicization, in general, scholars distinguish between politicization of the *polity* of European integration and politicization of the *policy* of European integration.⁸⁵ On the one hand, politicization of the *polity* of European integration implies that the European Union as a whole or European integration as a process in general is object of debate.⁸⁶ In that respect, politicization can concern issues such as a country's membership to the EU, the legitimacy of the EU institutions, the governance of the EU or the European integration process, as decision-making competences are transferred to the supranational level. Accordingly, politicization of the *polity* of the European Union involves the salience of discussing the legitimacy of the European Union in general, and the polarization of attitudes towards the European Union.⁸⁷

On the other hand, politicization can have *policy* of European integration as its object. Accordingly, politicization refers to collective debate on specific EU policies or EU decision-making in certain policy-issues.⁸⁸ For example, some scholars have recently indicated how, during both the European debt crisis and the European migrant crisis, particular EU policies were highly politicized in European-wide and domestic national contexts.⁸⁹

This study considers *policy* of European integration as the object of politicization, as it analyses the Bundestag debate on EU energy policy, more specifically the general commitment to the Energy Union and the series of decision-making related to the Energy Union established between February 2014 to May 2019. However, this study takes into account that politicization of a specific policy-area of European integration cannot completely be isolated from the politicization aimed at the *polity* of European integration. In fact, attitudes regarding issues of European decision-making can be subject to preferences regarding the European Union in general. For example, Eurosceptic political parties can be opposed to EU decision-making in energy policy, because in principle they prefer less decisions to be made on the EU supranational level. Vice versa, political parties could be in favour of European integration in energy policy, even if national solutions would be effective as well.

⁸⁵ De Wilde, and Michael Zürn, "Politicization be Reversed?" 140; Schmidt, "Politicization in the EU," 1018; Daniela Braun, Swen Hutter, and Alena Kersch, "What type of Europe? The salience of polity and policy issues in European Parliament elections," *European Union Politics* 17, no. 4 (2016): 571-572.

⁸⁶ In fact, most scholars employing the concept of politicization of European integration have focused on analysing the politicization of the polity of European integration in general. See e.g. Kriesi, "The Politicization of European Integration," 32-47; De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, "Introduction," 3-22; De Wilde, and Michael Zürn, "Politicization be Reversed?" 137-155; Schmidt, "Politicization in the EU," 1018-1036.

⁸⁷ See e.g. Kriesi, "The Politicization of European Integration," 32-47; De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, "Introduction," 3-22; De Wilde, and Michael Zürn, "Politicization be Reversed?" 137-155; Schmidt, "Politicization in the EU," 1018-1036.

⁸⁸ Pieter de Wilde, "No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration," *Journal of European Integration* 33, no. 5 (2011): 561.

⁸⁹ Börzel and Risse, "From the euro to the Schengen crises," 86-87; Frank Schimmelfennig, "European integration (theory) in times of crisis. A comparison of the euro and Schengen crises," *Journal of European Public Policy* 25, no. 7 (2018): 969-989.

2.3 The causes of politicization of European integration

Apart from its object, scholars of politicization of European integration have different approaches regarding the causes of politicization. In general, the debate is divided by those who argue along the *authority transfer* argument and those who focus on the political strategic interaction of political actors for explaining politicization.

On the one hand, according to the *authority transfer* argument, politicization is driven by the process of European integration itself, that is, the transfer of competences from the national level to the supranational level.⁹⁰ Those scholars stressing the *authority transfer* argument assume that political actors and citizens care about who has authority in political decision-making and they assume that citizens and political actors will voice their opinion whenever such authority is not exercised satisfactorily.⁹¹ Subsequently, the transfer of competences under European integration is expected to “generate controversiality”,⁹² which generally relates to existing concerns over the legitimacy of supranational institutions in EU decision-making.⁹³ Accordingly, a transfer of authority is expected to provoke discussion, i.e. politicization. For example, politicization is logically expected to emerge in relation to intergovernmental treaty negotiations establishing a transfer of authority, such as the 1992 Maastricht Treaty or the 2007 Lisbon Treaty.⁹⁴

On the other hand, many scholars have focused on the political strategic interaction of political actors to explain politicization.⁹⁵ Within the national conflict structure in EU Member States, this interaction evolves primarily among political parties that naturally compete to one another in order to increase their relative position. Subsequently, politicization is an option to political strategies of political parties in order to raise the salience of issues on which the political party thinks it might have an electoral advantage. Most prominently, scholars have pointed to the strategies of radical populist right-wing and Eurosceptic political parties in politicization of European integration. These political parties have framed issues of European integration in light of a *cultural-identitarian conflict*, and the framing strategies led to the successful mobilization of Eurosceptic attitudes among domestic electorates in which European integration was framed as a threat to the national identity and national sovereignty.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ The terms ‘authority transfer’ and ‘integration’ will be used interchangeably in this study. Importantly, this study understands *vertical integration* and *sectoral integration* as matters of authority transfer. De Wilde, and Michael Zürn, “Politicization be Reversed?” 137-155, Grande and Hutter, “Beyond authority transfer,” 23-43; Hutter and Grande, “Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena,” 1005; Michael Zürn, “Opening up Europe: next steps in politicization research,” *West European Politics* 39, no. 1 (2016): 164-182.

⁹¹ De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, “Introduction,” 10-11.

⁹² De Wilde, and Michael Zürn, “Politicization be Reversed?” 141.

⁹³ *Ibid*, 138.

⁹⁴ Hutter and Grande, “Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena,” 1006.

⁹⁵ Here, these approaches are labeled ‘political strategic interaction among political actors’. Scholars of politicization have used diverging labels to categorize these factors to politicization, which, in short, involve the strategies of political actors, and how actors interact in domestic conflict structures. See e.g. Hooghe and Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration,” 1-23; Kriesi, “The Politicization of European Integration,” 32-47; Grande and Hutter, “Beyond authority transfer,” 23-43; De Wilde, and Michael Zürn, “Politicization be Reversed?” 137-155; Hutter and Grande, “Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena,” 1002-1018; Green-Pedersen, “A Giant Fast Asleep?” 115-130; Rauh, Bes, and Schoonvelde, “Undermining, defusing or defending European integration?” 1-27.

⁹⁶ See, e.g. Grande and Hutter, “Beyond authority transfer,” 29; Hooghe and Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration,” 21; Hanspeter Kriesi, “The Politicization of European Integration,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 54, no. Annual Review (2016): 32-47.

Significantly, the two approaches to the causes of politicization are not mutually exclusive.⁹⁷ Rather, as will be assumed in this study, the *authority transfer* is perceived a root cause to politicization, while for politicization to emerge in practice it is reliant upon the trigger of factors that relate to the political strategic interaction among political parties.⁹⁸

However, still, these approaches are limited to the extent that politicization is highly context-specific.⁹⁹ Hence, the emergence of politicization and variation in politicization can as well be related to, inter alia, the specifics of the policy issue, the timing of the debate, the circumstances of the national political system, or external events such as crises that might trigger politicization.¹⁰⁰

Therefore, when analysing politicization of EU energy policy in the German national parliament, three observations stand out. First of all, in general, politicization of EU energy policy might relate to a *transfer of authority*. In this respect, *vertical integration* of EU energy policy has been established under article 194 TFEU following the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, *sectoral integration* has occurred under the general intergovernmental commitment to the Energy Union and the series of decision-making related to the Energy Union concluded between February 2014 and May 2019. Second, politicization of EU energy policy will be dependent upon the trigger of the political strategic interaction among political parties, to which a larger framework will be discussed below. In addition, politicization of EU energy policy might be context-specific and relate to German energy policy, Germany's national political structure or other external events. Therefore, these factors will as well be considered in a context to the analysis of this study.

2.4 Settings and actors of politicization of European integration

Next, scholars of politicization of European integration widely diverge in empirical focus regarding the setting of politicization and the actors that can be involved in politicization.¹⁰¹ In this respect, a recent publication of Schmidt (2019) has indicated how politicization of European integration in general can manifest itself 'at the top', 'at the bottom' and 'from the bottom up' of European integration.¹⁰²

First of all, 'at the top' signifies politicization of European integration at the European institutional level, among different EU institutions as well as within EU institutions.¹⁰³ While issues of EU decision-making logically are salient issues to EU institutions, politicization 'at the top' indicates how discussions on the way to go forward with EU policies evolve in public debate as well. Actors that can be involved in politicization 'at the top' include EU institutions such as the Council, the Commission, and the European

⁹⁷ De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, "Introduction," 11; Grande and Hutter, "Beyond authority transfer," 24; Rauh, "Communicating supranational governance?" 123.

⁹⁸ De Wilde, and Michael Zürn, "Politicization be Reversed?" 138-139.

⁹⁹ De Wilde, "No Polity for Old Politics?" 563; De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, "Introduction," 12; Zürn, "Opening up Europe," 177.

¹⁰⁰ Grande and Hutter, "Beyond authority transfer," 28; Hanspeter Kriesi, "The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns," *European Union Politics* 8, no. 1 (2007): 83-108; De Wilde, and Michael Zürn, "Politicization be Reversed?" 138-139.

¹⁰¹ Importantly, scholars have indicated how politicization is a flexible concept that is open to ample empirical variation. See e.g. Grande and Hutter, "Beyond authority transfer," 25; De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, "Introduction," 4.

¹⁰² Schmidt, "Politicization in the EU," 1018-1036.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 1020.

Parliament, as well as individual Commissioners, Members of the European Parliament or leaders of national governments.

Second, 'at the bottom' signifies politicization at the domestic level, among citizens, and within national public spheres, electorates and citizen organizations.¹⁰⁴ In this respect, politicization can manifest itself through public attitudes regarding European integration being voiced in mass media, through public opinion polls, through street protests or through publications of societal groups or political organizations.¹⁰⁵ Accordingly, actors 'at the bottom' include citizens, social movements or protest movements, interest organizations and political parties.

Finally, 'from the bottom up' signifies politicization of European integration from the national level to the European supranational level, the setting at which national politics interacts with EU decision-making.¹⁰⁶ In general, this involves the national parliament discussing EU affairs. In this respect, all EU national parliaments have legal access to EU documents. Most importantly, this involves the national parliament scrutinizing the role of the national government in EU decision-making as the national government participates in the Council and the European Council.¹⁰⁷ In that regard, national parliaments generally have the powers to control and instruct their national government in EU affairs as governments are generally reliant on a supporting governing majority in the parliament. Besides, most national parliaments can issue bills or motions to demand certain policies or actions from their national government in respect of EU affairs. Accordingly, actors that are involved in 'from the bottom up' politicization include members of the national parliament, government officials, and, most importantly, the political parties to which these members of the government and the national parliament belong.¹⁰⁸

The focus of this study will be to analyse politicization of EU energy policy in the German national parliament, corresponding to a 'from the bottom up' setting to European integration. Political parties are considered the principal actors involved in the debate, as all members of the national parliament generally belong to a political party, which guides the position of its party members on EU energy policy. Then, given that this study assumes that for politicization to emerge it is dependent upon a trigger from the political strategic interaction of political actors, a framework for understanding politicization from the political strategic interaction of political parties is needed, to which this section will turn next.

¹⁰⁴ Schmidt, "Politicization in the EU," 1018-1019.

¹⁰⁵ Schmidt, "Politicization in the EU," 1018-1019; De Wilde, "No Polity for Old Politics?" 569.

¹⁰⁶ In the categorization of Schmidt, 'from the bottom up' politicization also involves Members of the European Parliament, as these are principally elected through national elections, and, accordingly, will seek to interact with the national electorate when dealing with issues of EU decision-making in order to seek re-election. However, given the sometimes distant relationship between Members of the European Parliament, correlating with the lack of genuine European media and a genuine European electorate, here, the European Parliament is considered part of 'at the top' politicization. See Schmidt, "Politicization in the EU," 1023-1024.

¹⁰⁷ Schmidt, "Politicization in the EU," 1018-1019; De Wilde, "No Polity for Old Politics?" 569; Katrin Auel, "Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs," *European Law Journal* 13, no. 4 (2007): 487-504.

¹⁰⁸ National governments operate both in the Council and European Council and in the national parliament for discussing EU decision-making and defending its policy regarding EU affairs. Essentially, the behavior of national governments in politicization is more complex, as governments face interaction from multiple levels. For means of lucidity of this study, the role of and interaction with the German Federal Government in the Bundestag is limited to the necessary for reconstructing the debate.

2.5 Framework for political strategic interaction of political parties

The framework for understanding politicization from the political strategic interaction of political parties consists of five expectations on the strategies and positions of political parties towards EU energy policy. These expectations are drawn from scholars of politicization focusing on the role of political parties, and help to understand the politicization strategies towards EU energy policy of the political parties of the Bundestag.

Political parties are expected to pursue strategies for politicization

First of all, political parties are expected to engage in a strategy for politicization of EU energy policy. This could be an active strategy of politicization, a passive strategy, or a strategy aimed at depoliticization. For example, parties can pursue strategies in which they seek to bring EU energy policy higher on the Bundestag agenda to make the issue more salient or they might deliberately take an opposing view relative to other political parties. Conversely, political parties can seek to actively depoliticize in order to downplay the salience of EU energy policy, such as by resorting to technocratic language about EU energy policy or by avoiding to discuss the issue in the national parliament. In addition, political parties can have passive strategies, by not pro-actively engaging in debate or actively negating the issue.

Political parties frame the issue of EU energy policy

Next, political parties are expected to engage in framing the issue of EU energy policy. In general, political parties have considerable leeway in framing issues of European integration.¹⁰⁹ Even more in the case of European integration in energy policy, which is generally unknown to most citizens and complex to understand. Accordingly, parties will seek to strategically frame decision-making in EU energy policy in order to shift the logic of conflict in a way that best profits the party position on the issue.¹¹⁰ For example, EU energy policy could be framed by political parties in light of security concerns over the supply of energy, concerns over the affordability of energy to ordinary citizens, or the issue can be linked to climate policy and the urge to promote sustainable energy. In addition, EU energy policy can be labelled 'necessary' or 'obsolete', and be connotated with more positive or more negative associations.

Political parties are driven by the policy-seeking and electoral incentive

Furthermore, the strategies of political parties are expected to be driven by both the policy-seeking and the electoral incentive.¹¹¹ On the one hand, political parties are policy-seeking and therefore seek to find effective solutions for societal problems. In that respect, most political parties have a political program and election manifestos that set out the party's vision for the country, including what political plans are best for societal problems. On the basis of the policy-seeking incentive, political parties can consider that societal problems related to energy policy such as energy shortage, climate change or

¹⁰⁹ Hutter and Grande, "Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena," 1006; Grande and Hutter, "Beyond authority transfer," 29; Green-Pedersen, "A Giant Fast Asleep?" 120; Rauh, "Communicating supranational governance?" 121.

¹¹⁰ Grande and Hutter, "Beyond authority transfer," 29;

¹¹¹ Rauh, Bes, and Schoonvelde, "Undermining, defusing or defending European integration?" 6.

higher energy prices are best to be dealt with through European energy policies, or a party can argue that national level solutions are most effective and more desirable.

On the other hand, political parties are driven by the electoral incentive. Following the electoral incentive, political parties intend to increase their power, notably through better results in elections. This implies that political parties will strategically calculate whether it is electorally advantageous to politicize EU energy policy by relating its attitude on the matter with the larger electorate and relative to other political parties.¹¹² Whenever a party has the electorate on its side and might have a better position relative to other political parties that have a competing position on the matter, it will have a higher incentive to politicize EU energy policy.

The electoral incentive and policy-seeking incentive can be complementary, but can be conflicting as well. For example, a political party can be generally opposed to European integration, which resonates well with popular Euroscepticism among the electorate, even though the party deems a common EU solution to energy policy to be most effective. Alternatively, parties could also seek to find effective European solutions without bringing these decisions in public, so to effectively protect EU decision-making from politicization.¹¹³ However, political parties can as well seek to actively promote their support for EU energy policy, if the party sees electoral advantage in doing that.¹¹⁴ Finally, how these incentives impact the strategies of political parties can be different depending upon the specific context of the debate.

Strategies are specific to the type of party

In addition, the way in which the policy-seeking and electoral incentive play out in politicization strategies can be specific to the type of political party. In that respect, two distinctions will be set out here. In the first place, one can distinguish between governing majority parties and opposition parties. Governing majority parties have a lower incentive to politicize EU energy policy as long as the government is involved in intergovernmental negotiations on the issue, in order not to disturb the government's negotiation position. Moreover, these parties have a low incentive to actively control and criticize the government position in public and collective debate, as that might weaken the credibility of the government.¹¹⁵ On the contrary, opposition parties have a higher incentive to actively control and criticize the national government, as these parties seek to weaken the government and the parties supporting it in order to increase their own electoral position.¹¹⁶

Second, one can distinguish between mainstream parties and niche political parties. Mainstream parties are traditional parties in parliament, that are either part of the governing majority or have a high chance of becoming part of the governing majority in the next government. For mainstream parties, it is vital to relate its position to the largest potential majority of the electorate. As mainstream

¹¹² Green-Pedersen, "A Giant Fast Asleep?" 119-120'; Hooghe and Marks, "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration," 19.

¹¹³ Frank Schimmelfennig, "European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism," *Journal of European Integration* 36, no. 3 (2014): 334; Matt Wood, and Matthew Flinders, "Rethinking depoliticization: beyond the governmental," *Policy & Politics* 42, no. 2 (2014): 161-164.

¹¹⁴ Rauh, "Communicating supranational governance?" 119.

¹¹⁵ Auel, "Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments," 491-492.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

parties seek to increase their voter potential to reach government, they will seek to attract the median voter of the electorate, that might have a nuanced position regarding EU energy policy.¹¹⁷ Niche parties are smaller parties, parties with extreme or populist positions or single-issue parties, that have a lower chance of becoming part of a governing majority.¹¹⁸ For niche parties, the incentive for politicization is stronger whenever an issue aligns with their political agenda, regardless of the preference of the majority of the electorate. Moreover, niche parties are less inclined to take more moderate positions in order to fit within governing majorities.¹¹⁹

Politicization strategies of political parties are limited

Finally, the strategies of political actors for politicization can be limited in multiple respects. This framework sets out two limitations. Foremost, politicization strategies are limited by the external events that might trigger politicization. For example, European-wide discussions on the Eurozone were triggered by the financial crisis and the discussions on EU migrant policy were triggered by the major influx of migrants to Europe in 2015. In such cases, political parties have no option but to take a position and engage in debate. Second, strategies of politicization are limited in effectiveness by the strategies of other political parties that are more dominant. For example, whenever one party successfully issues EU energy policy on the agenda of the Bundestag, other political parties may be obliged to participate in debating the issue.

2.6 Methodology for research and selection of sources

Finally, this section will set out a method for analysing whether European integration in energy policy between 2014 and 2019 has been politicized in the context of the national parliament of Germany, the Bundestag. Again, this study takes the general commitment to the Energy Union and the series of EU decision-making in energy policy that has been concluded from 2014 to 2019 as the object of politicization (short: EU energy policy). Following the theoretical framework that has been set out in this section, the method for analysing politicization consists of four stages.

Given that politicization can be highly context-specific, the first stage of analysis provides the context of the debate on EU energy policy in the Bundestag. This includes a discussion of Germany's energy policy, notably towards European integration, the Bundestag formal instruments to debate EU decision-making, and the political landscape of the Bundestag from February 2014 to May 2019.

The second stage involves the reconstruction of the debate on EU energy policy in the Bundestag. Accordingly, the second stage deals with the general definition of politicization, that is, the degree to which EU energy policy is being discussed collectively and publicly. In this respect, *collective and public debate* includes plenary debates and other Bundestag correspondence through which Bundestag parties set out their position, such as motions, committee documents and interpellations. The reconstruction involves discussing when EU energy policy was being issued in the Bundestag and on what occasion it was being issued. This stage involves a consultation of the minutes of the plenary

¹¹⁷ Green-Pedersen, "A Giant Fast Asleep?" 120.

¹¹⁸ See note 89.

¹¹⁹ Green-Pedersen, "A Giant Fast Asleep?" 120.

and other parliamentary documents from the Bundestag archives, for which a justification for the selection of sources follows below.

The third stage is to analyse the strategies for politicization of the political parties that were involved in the debate in the Bundestag. Given that the debate largely overlaps with the eighteenth parliamentary session of the Bundestag, this study will focus on the four political parties that have been represented in both the eighteenth and the nineteenth session.¹²⁰ This includes the social democratic *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD), the left-wing populist party *Die Linke*, the green party *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* (The Greens), and the Christian democratic political alliance of the *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* and the *Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern* (CDU/CSU). Following the framework of politicization by political parties set out above, this stage involves discussing the politicization strategy and position of the political party towards EU energy policy, and whether the politicization strategy and position correspond with the official party position and the expectations derived from the type of party. This stage involves consulting the minutes of the plenary and other parliamentary documents from the Bundestag archives, and consulting the 2013 and 2017 election manifestos of the political parties.¹²¹

The fourth stage will reflect upon the *issue salience* and *polarization of opinions* in the Bundestag debate on EU energy policy. The salience of EU energy policy in the Bundestag is assessed on the basis of the recurrence of debate on EU energy policy, the politicization strategies of the political parties and the relative priority that is given to the issue in the election manifestos of political parties. The polarization of opinions in the debate will be assessed on the basis of the reconstruction of the debate and the positions of the political parties. In addition, the fourth stage will discuss whether the emergence of the Bundestag debate can be related to the causes of politicization that have been put forward in this section.

Selection of sources from the Bundestag archives

Primarily, this analysis relies on the consultation of plenary debates and other parliamentary documents depicting the parliamentary debate from the archives of the Bundestag. From the archives of the Bundestag, documents have been convened by searching under the term “energieunion”, over the selected time frame of February 2014 to May 2019. Additionally, in order to better see whether the specific decision-making related to the Energy Union has been discussed by the Bundestag, documents have been searched under “paket saubere energie”, “2030 rahmen energiepolitik” and “verordnung gewährleistung sicheren energie”, applying the same time frame from February 2014 to May 2019.

Subsequently, from the results of these search efforts, documents have been scrutinized on whether these plenary debates and documents entailed political statements that directly address European integration of energy policy, the general commitment to the Energy Union, or one of the

¹²⁰ In addition, the engagement of the FDP and Alternative für Deutschland in debating European integration in energy policy during the nineteenth session of the Bundestag up until May 2019 remained limited. Therefore, the engagement of these parties in the debate is considered insufficient to analyse in this study.

¹²¹ The 2013 and 2017 Bundestag elections manifesto are selected, as these largely guide the party program for the Bundestag for the consecutive parliamentary session (2013-2017 and 2017 onwards).

specific issues of decision-making related to the Energy Union.¹²² From this selection has resulted a total of sixty-two statements covering thirteen plenary parliamentary debates, and parliamentary correspondence covering three committee recommendations, two motions, nine minor interpellations and one written question. This selection will be the primary base for analysis.

Chapter 3: Politicization of European integration in energy policy in the German Bundestag 2014 to 2019

In this section, politicization of European integration in energy policy in the German Bundestag from 2014 to 2019 will be analysed. As set out in the methodology, this section first provides a context to the debate of EU energy policy in the Bundestag. Then, this section provides a reconstruction of the Bundestag debate on EU energy policy. Next, this section provides an analysis of the party strategies. Finally, this section concludes by relating the debate to the dimensions of issue salience and polarization of opinions and to the causes that are related to the emergence of politicization.

3.1 Germany's energy policy and policy towards European integration

In recent decades, Germany's energy policy is internationally famous for its strong focus on the energy transition (*Energiewende*), the national transformation towards an economy fuelled by renewable energies.¹²³ In general, Germany's *Energiewende* policy can be related to several characteristics of Germany's energy context. First of all, Germany has a high dependence on energy imports for the functioning of its economy, which is politically undesirable.¹²⁴ Additionally, Germany has suspended its coal production and announced a complete phase out of its nuclear plants by 2036, and must increasingly rely on alternative energy sources.¹²⁵ Finally, the *Energiewende* can be explained by a strong German environmental movement and growing concerns over climate change.¹²⁶

In its policy orientation towards European integration in energy policy, Germany has proven to be an ambivalent factor. On the one hand, from the 2005 Hampton Court launch of European-wide discussions on EU energy policy onwards, the German Federal Government is believed to have taken an active role in shaping the common European energy policy. Notably, in the first half of 2007, the Federal Government listed both the completion of the internal market for electricity and gas and the promotion of energy efficiency and energy renewables as key priorities of its Council Presidency.¹²⁷ The

¹²² As this study explicitly focuses on politicization of the Energy Union initiative and EU decision-making related to the Energy Union, some parliamentary documents and debates that touched upon EU energy policy had to be left out of the selection. This includes debates in the Bundestag on EU climate policy, on the EU emissions trading system, on the Nord Stream II project, on EU external energy policy, and discussions on a European nuclear energy phase-out.

¹²³ Szulecki, et al., "Shaping the 'Energy Union'," 554.

¹²⁴ Energy imports of total energy consumption reached 60 percent in 2000, Szulecki, et al., "Shaping the 'Energy Union'," 554.

¹²⁵ Milena Jurca, "The *Energiewende*," 148-149.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 146-147.

¹²⁷ Bundesregierung, "Europe – succeeding together" *Presidency Programme 1 January to 30 June 2007* (Berlin: 2006).

active role of the German Presidency contributed to the adoption of binding national targets in renewables in 2007, formally established in the 2009 Renewables Directive.¹²⁸

However, on the other hand, the German Federal Government was opposed to the inclusion of an energy chapter in the unratified 2004 European Constitution, and Germany is still a firm defender of the Member States' discretion in policy decisions regarding the national energy mix.¹²⁹ Importantly, the strategy of the Federal Government is characterized as aimed at establishing European policies that closely align with Germany's domestic energy policy outlook.¹³⁰ In addition, in the domain of the internal market for energy, Germany has proven reluctant towards the liberalization of its energy market, notably in regard of implementing the unbundling requirements to the vertically integrated German energy companies.¹³¹

Finally, when the Energy Union initiative was introduced in 2014, the German Federal Government was no outspoken supporter of the Energy Union straight away.¹³² In an official reaction in February 2015, the Federal Government underlined the central role of the internal energy market and the need to establish a reliable governance framework for the 2030 Framework, only to formally support the Energy Union initiative a month later.¹³³

3.2 Formal instruments of the Bundestag

In order to discuss EU decision-making and control and instruct the Federal Government in EU decision-making, the Bundestag has several formal instruments to rely on. First of all, according to German law, if the EU Commission proposes new legislation, the Federal Government is obliged to grant the Bundestag the opportunity to formally state its position.¹³⁴ In case the Bundestag issues a formal position, the Federal Government is obliged to take the Bundestag position as a basis for its negotiations in the European Council or the Council.¹³⁵ Subsequently, the Federal Government must continuously report to the Bundestag on the consideration it has committed to the Bundestag position during negotiations.¹³⁶

Furthermore, the Bundestag has ample opportunities to control and instruct the Federal Government in EU affairs on the basis of its ordinary rights and instruments under the Basic Law of the Federal Republic and Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag. These rights include, inter alia, issuing motions that instruct the government, and issuing major and minor interpellations and written questions

¹²⁸ Cox and Dekanozishvili, "German Efforts," in *Energy Policy Making in the EU*, eds. Tosun, Biesenbender and Schulze, 174-176; Duffield and Westphal, "Germany and EU Energy Policy," 178.

¹²⁹ Duffield and Westphal, "Germany and EU Energy Policy," 178.

¹³⁰ Szulecki, et al., "Shaping the 'Energy Union'," 554.

¹³¹ Duffield and Westphal, "Germany and EU Energy Policy," 181; Milena Jurca, "The *Energiewende*," 152-154.

¹³² Szulecki, et al., "Shaping the 'Energy Union'," 554.

¹³³ Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, "Press Release: State Secretary Baake on the European Commission Communication on the Energy Union," BMWi website, accessed November 23, 2019, <https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2015/20150225-staatssekretaer-baake-mitteilung-europaeischen-kommission-energieunion.html>.

¹³⁴ Article 23(3) of the Basic Law, see Deutscher Bundestag, *Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berlin: 2019); Section 1(1) of the Act on Cooperation, see Deutscher Bundestag, *Act on Cooperation between the Federal Government and the German Bundestag in Matters concerning the European Union* (Berlin: 2013): 1-7.

¹³⁵ Section 8(2) of the Act on Cooperation, see Deutscher Bundestag, *Act on Cooperation between the Federal Government and the German Bundestag in Matters concerning the European Union* (Berlin: 2013): 1-7.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

to question the government. In addition, any EU document, government statement or topical event relating to EU affairs can be issued for debate in a plenary session of the Bundestag.¹³⁷

Finally, the Bundestag is involved directly in the EU legislative procedure under Protocol 2 of the Treaty on the European Union on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.¹³⁸ Under this protocol, regarding those policy areas the European Union and Member States share legislative competence, a national parliament can issue a reasoned opinion in case it deems a EU legislative proposal incompliant with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.¹³⁹ However, this instrument requires one third of all EU national parliaments to issue a reasoned opinion for the Commission to be obliged to revise the draft legislative act.¹⁴⁰

3.3 Political landscape of the Bundestag 2014-2019

As regards the political landscape of the Bundestag from February 2014 to May 2019, the selected timeframe of this study is covered by the eighteenth (2013-2017) and the nineteenth (2017-) session of the Bundestag. Following the 2013 Bundestag elections, four political parties were represented in the eighteenth session of the Bundestag that had 632 seats in total. This includes the CDU/CSU alliance (311), the SPD (193), Die Linke (64) and the Greens (63). It was the first time in German history that the liberal party, the FDP, failed to win seats in the Bundestag as it failed to meet the 5% vote threshold. Losing its former coalition party FDP, the CDU/CSU alliance formed a 'Grand Coalition' with the SPD and the third Merkel cabinet was installed in December 2013, supported by a broad majority in the Bundestag.

After the 2017 elections, a total of 709 seats of the Bundestag were divided among six political factions. This includes the CDU/CSU alliance (246), the SPD (153), Die Linke (69) and the Greens (67). In addition, a new right-wing populist party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), managed to enter the Bundestag with 94 seats and the liberal FDP re-entered with 80 seats. The standing coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD remained in office and formed a fourth Merkel cabinet, which was installed after a long formation process, in March 2018.

As set out earlier, the analysis will focus on the strategies of the political parties that have been represented in both the eighteenth and nineteenth session of the Bundestag. Both the CDU/CSU and the SPD are considered governing majority and mainstream parties. The Greens are considered an opposition party and can be categorized both a mainstream and a niche party. On the one hand, it is a mainstream party as it has formed coalition governments with the SPD from 1998 to 2005. On the other hand, it can be regarded a niche party as its party identity is rooted in a strong focus on issues of sustainability and green policy. Besides, in numbers of seats, the Greens have always been relatively

¹³⁷ Rules 75 and 75 of the Rules of Procedure. See Deutscher Bundestag, *Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag and Rules of Procedure of the Mediation Committee* (Berlin: 2014).

¹³⁸ In short, the principle of subsidiarity serves to rule out legislative action by the EU when issues can be dealt with effectively by Member States themselves, and requires that the EU only exercises its powers when Member States are unable to achieve objectives through national policies. European Union, "2. Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality," *Official Journal of the European Union C130* (2004): 207-209.

¹³⁹ Article 6, European Union, "2. Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality," *Official Journal of the European Union C130* (2004): 207-209.

¹⁴⁰ Article 7(2), European Union, "2. Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality," *Official Journal of the European Union C130* (2004): 207-209.

small. Lastly, Die Linke is considered an opposition party. Based upon its character as a left-wing populist party, Die Linke is considered a niche party.

In addition, it is noted that the governing majority parties are guided by the coalition agreement. The coalition agreement stipulates the priorities of the Federal Government, for which it can largely rely upon the support of the governing majority parties throughout the cabinet term. The 2013 coalition agreement, governing the third Merkel cabinet, contained some broad agreements with respect to European integration in energy policy. The coalition agreement stipulated a commitment to “ambitious goals” for the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework, a commitment to integrate energy renewables in an EU internal market for electricity, the need for investments in grid interconnections and cross-border high voltage lines and the need to deal with the energy transition “in an European context”.¹⁴¹

The 2018 coalition agreement governing the fourth Merkel cabinet scarcely deals with European integration in energy policy. The coalition agreement solely contains a broad commitment “to embed the energy transition at the European level”, which is framed as “an opportunity to reduce costs and use synergies”.¹⁴²

3.4. Reconstruction of the debate on European integration in energy policy

The first stage of this analysis reconstructs the Bundestag debate and discusses when EU energy policy has been debated or issued in the Bundestag, and on what occasion it was being debated or issued. For clarity, the reconstruction of the debate is divided between plenary debates and debate through other parliamentary correspondence.

Plenary debates

Overall, from February 2014 to May 2019, thirteen plenary debates were issued in the Bundestag in which EU energy policy was an issue. In two plenary debates, EU energy policy was the main issue, which are discussed more elaborately below. In the other plenary debates, EU energy policy was a side issue to the debate.

First of all, a plenary debate was held in March 2014 on the occasion of a motion issued by the Greens, called “To anchor the energy transition in Europe”. In light of the discussions of the 2030 Framework, though still in advance of the Tusk proposal on the Energy Union, the faction of the Greens pleaded for the German energy transition policy to be implemented at the European level, including ambitious binding targets in renewables and energy efficiency.¹⁴³ In short, during the plenary debate, representatives of the CDU/CSU and the SPD argued to be in favour of European integration in energy policy, though against the motion of the Greens.¹⁴⁴ In that respect, the CDU/CSU criticized the motion for “not being in the European spirit” and the SPD criticized the motion for being “not conducive”, as the

¹⁴¹ Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, und Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, *Deutschlands Zukunft Gestalten. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD* (Berlin: 2013), 40, 43 and 115.

¹⁴² Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, und Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, *Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD* (Berlin: 2018), 71.

¹⁴³ Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/777: Antrag: Die Energiewende europäisch verankern* (Berlin: 2014): 1-4.

¹⁴⁴ Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenografischer Bericht: 20. Sitzung* (Berlin: 2014): 1542-1545; 1547-1548; 1561.

motion sought to enforce a German transition model to the EU, inappropriate to harmonize the essentially different energy systems of the EU Member States.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, the CDU/CSU and SPD put forward their preferences on the way to move forward with EU energy policy, which will be discussed in the next stage of analysis.¹⁴⁶ Lastly, Die Linke argued positive towards the Greens' motion, and confirmed the need for ambitious EU targets in renewables and energy efficiency.¹⁴⁷ Several days after the plenary debate, the Economic and Energy Committee of the Bundestag issued a committee decision to reject the motion of the Greens with the majority votes of the CDU/CSU and SPD against the votes of the Greens and Die Linke, corresponding to the positions that had been set out in the plenary debate.¹⁴⁸

In addition, of the thirteen plenary debates, six debates were issued on the occasion of the Federal Chancellor attending a European Council meeting.¹⁴⁹ Most importantly, this included a plenary debate prior to the European Council of March 2015, in which the Energy Union was the main topic of the agenda, and from which eventually resulted the general commitment of the EU Heads of State to create the Energy Union. During this debate, Chancellor Merkel first addressed a government declaration to the Bundestag, including her vision for an Energy Union, after which multiple Members of the Bundestag from all four political parties had contributions to the debate. In summary, all political parties generally supported the idea of an Energy Union, except for Die Linke that did not explicitly state its position on the Energy Union proposal.¹⁵⁰ More specifically, the Greens argued that the given EU proposals were yet not ambitious enough, while the factions of the CDU/CSU and the SPD supported the government declaration and underlined why they think European integration in energy policy is needed, and put forward their preferences on what the Energy Union should comprise.¹⁵¹

Next, two of the plenary debates have been issued on the occasion of the presentation of the Annual Working Program by the EU Commission, in February 2015 and January 2018. In these debates, the Energy Union was only one of multiple issues discussed.¹⁵² In addition, in four plenary debates, the Energy Union and related decision-making was incidentally discussed, and it was only a side issue to the debate.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁵ Bundestag, 20. Sitzung (2014): 1547-1548.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 1541-1563.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 1555-1556.

¹⁴⁸ Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/875: *Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht der Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Energie zu dem Antrag 18/777* (Berlin: 2014): 1-4.

¹⁴⁹ Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenografischer Bericht: 38. Sitzung* (Berlin: 2014): 3258-3290; Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenografischer Bericht: 76. Sitzung* (Berlin: 2014): 7195-7219; Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenografischer Bericht: 94. Sitzung* (Berlin: 2015): 8881-8905; Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenografischer Bericht: 145. Sitzung* (Berlin: 2015): 14279-14298; Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenografischer Bericht: 221. Sitzung* (Berlin: 2017): 22064-22094; Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenografischer Bericht: 89. Sitzung* (Berlin: 2019): 10479-10505.

¹⁵⁰ Bundestag, 94. Sitzung (2015): 8881-8905.

¹⁵¹ Bundestag, 94. Sitzung (2015): 8897-8899, 8904-8905.

¹⁵² Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenografischer Bericht: 85. Sitzung* (Berlin: 2015): 8051-8068; Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenografischer Bericht: 7. Sitzung* (Berlin: 2018): 539-553.

¹⁵³ Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenografischer Bericht: 146. Sitzung* (Berlin: 2015): 14395-14408; Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenografischer Bericht: 179. Sitzung* (Berlin: 2016): 17593-17613; Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenografischer Bericht: 225. Sitzung* (Berlin: 2017): 22538-22553; Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenografischer Bericht: 231. Sitzung* (Berlin: 2017): 23307-23314.

Other parliamentary correspondence

Apart from plenary debates, political factions have used other parliamentary instruments to discuss EU energy policy or control and instruct the Federal Government in EU decision-making in energy policy. Most significantly, this includes a March 2017 decision by the Economic and Energy Committee of the Bundestag to issue a reasoned opinion on the principle of subsidiarity on the proposed revised *Regulation establishing ACER* and the *Regulation on the internal market for electricity*.¹⁵⁴ According to the committee decision, the main objections to the Regulations for them to be incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity concern the creation of Regional Operation Centres and the increased competences of ACER.¹⁵⁵ The reasoned opinion was adopted with the majority votes of the CDU/CSU and the SPD. The factions of Die Linke and the Greens abstained from voting, for which the reasons were not clearly stated.¹⁵⁶

Furthermore, two motions on EU energy policy were issued by the faction of the Greens. The first motion concerned the February 2014 motion to ‘anchor’ the energy transition at the European level, as discussed above. The second motion of the Greens called “*European Energy Union – independence through efficiency, energy saving and the promotion of energy renewables*” was issued in May 2014. With the May 2014 motion, the faction of the Greens reacted to the Tusk proposal for an Energy Union focused on the security-of-supply of gas. Specifically, the motion was aimed at requiring the Federal Government to plead for ambitious targets in energy efficiency and renewable energies in EU context. According to the view of the Greens, these targets would be the single right approach to overcome energy dependence in Europe.¹⁵⁷

Both motions were eventually rejected through decisions of the Economic and Energy Committee of the Bundestag. The committee decision on the first motion was issued shortly after the motion was issued, in March 2014.¹⁵⁸ The committee decision on the second motion was only issued in February 2015. The motion was rejected with the majority votes of the CDU/CSU and the SPD against the votes of the Greens, with the Die Linke faction abstaining from voting.¹⁵⁹ Most principally, the CDU/CSU rejected the Greens’ motion because it was too narrowly focused on energy renewables for overcoming energy dependency, while the rejection of the SPD was not explained explicitly.¹⁶⁰

Finally, nine minor interpellations and one written question were issued to the Federal Government in relation to the 2030 Framework, the Energy Union and legislation from the Clean Energy Package. All were issued by the faction of the Greens. These include questions on the position of the

¹⁵⁴ In total, the Commission received eleven reasoned opinions on the Regulation for the internal market for electricity and three reasoned opinions on the Regulation for ACER. These quantities were insufficient to require the Commission to revise the Regulations, although the Commission did formally react to reasoned opinions of the national parliaments. See European Commission, *Report from the Commission: Annual Report 2017 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality* (Brussels 2018).

¹⁵⁵ Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/11777: Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht der Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Energie: [...]* (Berlin: 2017): 3-4.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁵⁷ Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/1461: Antrag: Europäische Energieunion – Unabhängigkeit durch Effizienz, Einsparung und erneuerbare Energien schaffen* (Berlin: 2014): 1-4.

¹⁵⁸ Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/875: Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht der Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Energie zu dem Antrag 18/777* (Berlin: 2014): 1-4.

¹⁵⁹ Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/3936: Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht der Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Energie zu dem Antrag 18/1461* (Berlin: 2015): 4.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

Federal Government on the pending negotiations on the 2030 Framework (February 2014), on the Tusk proposal to pool negotiation power in gas contracts (May 2014), on the effectiveness of the agreed 2030 Framework (November 2014), on the ambition for an Energy Union of the newly installed Juncker Commission (January 2015), on increasing the 2030 Framework targets following the 2015 Paris Agreement (February 2016), on the legislative proposals under the Clean Energy Package (March 2017), on the progress of Council negotiations on the Clean Energy Package (March 2018), and on requiring a Bundestag consultation of the German NECP (September 2018).¹⁶¹

3.5 Party strategies of politicization

The second stage involves discussing the politicization strategies of the four political parties that were involved in the Bundestag debate on EU energy policy. Subsequently, it will relate the strategies and party positions to the official party position and to the expectations derived from the type of party.

The strategy of the CDU/CSU

Based upon its activity and plenary contributions in the Bundestag, the CDU/CSU had a passive strategy of politicization of EU energy policy. The CDU/CSU alliance did not actively engage in publicly controlling or instructing the Federal Government on the matter by issuing formal positions, motions or minor interpellations. Also, the strategy of the CDU/CSU was to defend the policy of the Federal Government. For example, it stated explicitly that it did not support a motion of the Greens on the European energy transition as it trusted the Federal Government in its negotiations for the 2030 Framework.¹⁶² Only in the event of the Commission presentation of the Clean Energy Package, the CDU/CSU supported the March 2017 reasoned opinion on the principle of subsidiarity.

However, in case EU energy policy was issued for plenary debate, the CDU/CSU did engage in putting forward its preferences regarding EU energy policy, including framing the issue. In general, the CDU/CSU has argued in favour of European integration in energy policy, preferably including all dimensions of energy policy.¹⁶³ It argued explicitly in favour of, inter alia, an EU uniform price zone for electricity, harmonization of the support system for renewables and more grid interconnections.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, the CDU/CSU framed the Energy Union as of “vital importance” to overcome energy

¹⁶¹ Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/638: Kleine Anfrage: Position der Bundesregierung zu den Vorschlägen der Europäischen Kommission zu den europäischen Klima- und Energiezielen 2030* (Berlin: 2014): 2-3; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/1434: Schriftliche Fragen* (Berlin: 2014), 9; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/3167: Kleine Anfrage: Position der Bundesregierung zu den Verhandlungen und Ergebnissen für eine neue EU-Energie- und Klimastrategie* (Berlin: 2014): 1-5; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/3817: Kleine Anfrage: Position der Bundesregierung zu den Plänen über eine Energieunion und zur Mitteilung der Europäischen Kommission „Eine Investitionsoffensive für Europa“* (Berlin: 2015): 1-4; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/4255: Kleine Anfrage: Konkrete Schritte zur Umsetzung des Nationalen Aktionsplans Energieeffizienz* (Berlin: 2015): 1-6; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/7718: Kleine Anfrage: Europäische Klima- und Energiepolitik nach dem VN-Klimaabkommen von Paris* (Berlin: 2016): 1-3; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/11804: Kleine Anfrage: Position der Bundesregierung zu den Vorschlägen der Europäischen Kommission über den europäischen Strommarkt* (Berlin: 2017): 1-3; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/11807: Kleine Anfrage: Haltung der Bundesregierung zum geplanten Governance-System der Energieunion* (Berlin: 2017): 1-3; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 19/1292: Kleine Anfrage: Stand der Dinge des EU-Pakets „Saubere Energie für alle Europäer“* (Berlin: 2018): 1-2; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 19/4179: Kleine Anfrage: Integrierter Nationaler Energie- und Klimaplan* (Berlin: 2018): 1-2.

¹⁶² Bundestag, 20. Sitzung (2014): 1542-1545.

¹⁶³ Bundestag, 20. Sitzung (2014): 1542-1545, 1559-1561; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/3936: Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht der Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Energie zu dem Antrag 18/1461* (Berlin: 2015): 4.

¹⁶⁴ Bundestag, 20. Sitzung (2014): 1542-1545, 1549; Bundestag, 94. Sitzung (2015): 8904-8905.

dependency, combat climate change and ensure affordable energy, and framed European energy policy as not only an environmental issue, but also about economic issues and “strategic components”.¹⁶⁵ The position of the CDU/CSU only partly corresponds with the official position it had set out on European integration in the 2013 Bundestag elections manifesto, as in its manifesto, it focused solely on strengthening the European internal market for securing the supply of energy.¹⁶⁶ On the other hand, the position of the CDU/CSU set out in plenary debates does correspond with its 2013 coalition agreement with the SPD, although both parties did not agree on the harmonization of support systems for renewables.¹⁶⁷

The CDU/CSU strategy can be related to its relative position in the Bundestag as a governing majority party. Accordingly, although it supported European integration in the Energy Union, it has no high incentive to publicly control or instruct the Federal Government in the Bundestag. This observation is underlined by the CDU/CSU support for the reasoned opinion on the principle of subsidiarity, as it did take the chance to criticize EU legislation when it could do so directly, by not disturbing the Federal Government.

The strategy of the SPD

Based upon its activity and plenary contributions in the Bundestag, the SPD had a passive strategy of politicization. The SPD did not engage in controlling or instructing the Federal Government on the matter of EU energy policy by issuing formal positions, motions or minor interpellations. Only in the event of the Commission presentation of the Clean Energy Package, the SPD supported the March 2017 reasoned opinion on the principle of subsidiarity.

However, when EU energy policy was discussed in plenary debate, the SPD did engage in putting forward its preferences regarding EU energy policy, including framing the issue. In large, the SPD argued in favour of European integration and it argued that the future of the European supply of energy lies with energy renewables and energy efficiency.¹⁶⁸ Also, it argued in favour of strengthening the EU internal market, notably through reducing overcapacity, more interconnections and more cooperation in research and development.¹⁶⁹ However, it argued against the harmonization of national support schemes for renewables.¹⁷⁰ The SPD framed EU energy policy as essentially a “social issue”, and therefore argued for policy to be focused at ensuring affordable energy for households.¹⁷¹ Finally, the SPD framed European cooperation in energy policy as in the interest of German industry.¹⁷² It cannot be established whether the SPD position in the Bundestag corresponds with the official party position,

¹⁶⁵ Bundestag, 20. Sitzung (2014): 1542-1545, 1559-1561; Bundestag, 94. Sitzung (2015): 8904-8905; Bundestag, 146. Sitzung (2015): 14409; Bundestag, 221. Sitzung (2017): 22085; Bundestag, 225. Sitzung (2017): 22548; Bundestag, 89. Sitzung (2019): 10489.

¹⁶⁶ Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands und Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, *Gemeinsam erfolgreich für Deutschland: Regierungsprogramm 2013-2017* (Berlin: 2013), 30; the 2017 CDU/CSU Program for Government did not concern EU energy policy; see Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands und Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, *Für ein Deutschland, in dem wir gut und gerne leben: Regierungsprogramm 2017-2021* (Berlin: 2017).

¹⁶⁷ Bundestag, 20. Sitzung (2014): 1542-1545, 1558-1559.

¹⁶⁸ Bundestag, 20. Sitzung (2014): 1558-1559; Bundestag, 85. Sitzung (2015): 8062-8063; Bundestag, 94. Sitzung (2015): 8897-8898.

¹⁶⁹ Bundestag, 20. Sitzung (2014): 1558-1559; Bundestag, 94. Sitzung (2015): 8897-8898.

¹⁷⁰ Bundestag, 20. Sitzung (2014): 1558-1559.

¹⁷¹ Bundestag, 85. Sitzung (2015): 8062-8063; Bundestag, 20. Sitzung (2014): 1558-1559.

¹⁷² Bundestag, 94. Sitzung (2015): 8897-8898.

as EU energy policy has not been covered in the SPD party manifestos.¹⁷³ However, the SPD position does correspond with the 2013 coalition agreement with the CDU/CSU, although both parties did not agree on the harmonization of support systems for renewables.

In sum, the SPD strategy can be related to its relative position in the Bundestag, as it has a low incentive to actively control and construct the Federal Government as a governing majority party. As for the CDU/CSU, this observation is underlined by the SPD support for the reasoned opinion on the principle of subsidiarity, as it did take the chance to criticize EU legislation when it could do so directly, by not disturbing the Federal Government. In addition, the passive and nuanced position of the SPD suggests the low electoral incentive for the SPD to actively discuss the issue or actively defend the government policy.

The strategy of Die Linke

Based upon its activity and plenary contributions in the Bundestag, it is argued here that Die Linke had a passive strategy of politicization of EU energy policy. Die Linke did not engage in actively controlling or instructing the Federal Government by issuing motions or minor interpellations. What is more, when EU energy policy was issued in plenary debate, the engagement of Die Linke was limited relative to the engagement of the other political parties.

However, still, in general, Die Linke argued in favour of ambitious EU targets for renewables and energy efficiency.¹⁷⁴ It argued that European energy policy must be understood as climate change policy, and that it should include nuclear phase-out and the reduction of fossil fuels.¹⁷⁵ In addition, it framed the Energy Union initiative as detrimental for potentially increasing the dependence on “expensive and ecologically devastating” US energy imports.¹⁷⁶ It framed the Energy Union as well as increasing the power of large energy corporations, and criticized the Commission proposals for not addressing the problem of energy poverty.¹⁷⁷ The passive strategy of Die Linke corresponds with its official party position, as it scarcely covered EU energy policy in its election manifestos. However, the 2017 Die Linke Bundestag elections manifesto included a commitment to create an alternative “European Community for the Promotion of Renewable Energies and Energy Saving”.¹⁷⁸

The passive politicization strategy of Die Linke in politicization does not correspond with its relative position as opposition party. However, its framing of the Energy Union might relate to its position as a niche party, as niche parties take more outspoken positions. The politicization strategy of Die Linke suggests that the left-wing populist party encountered low incentives to engage in publicly debating the issue of EU energy policy, and suggests that the issue of European integration of energy policy does not align with the political agenda of Die Linke.

¹⁷³ Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, *Das Wir Entscheidet: Das Regierungsprogramm 2013-2017* (Berlin: 2013); Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, *Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit: Unser Regierungsprogramm für Deutschland* (Berlin: 2017).

¹⁷⁴ Bundestag, 20. Sitzung (2014): 1555-1556.

¹⁷⁵ Bundestag, 20. Sitzung (2014): 1545, 1555-1556.

¹⁷⁶ Bundestag, 94. Sitzung (2015): 8886.

¹⁷⁷ Bundestag, 94. Sitzung (2015): 8886; Bundestag, 7. Sitzung (2018): 545.

¹⁷⁸ Die Linke, *100% Sozial: Die Linke: Wahlprogramm zur Bundestagswahl 2013* (Berlin: 2013); Die Linke, *Die Zukunft, für die wir kämpfen: Sozial: Gerecht: Für alle: Wahlprogramm zur Bundestagswahl 2017* (Berlin: 2017), 107.

The strategy of the Greens

Finally, based upon its activity and plenary contributions in the Bundestag, it is argued that the faction of the Greens had an active strategy of politicization of EU energy policy. It has continually engaged in controlling and instructing the Federal Government on EU energy policy by issuing two motions, nine minor interpellations, a written question, and debating in plenary. Moreover, it continually criticized the Commission proposals for falling short for achieving its goals in sustainably energy policy and continually questioned the role of the Federal Government in negotiating European energy policy.¹⁷⁹

In general, the position of the Greens on European integration in energy policy was aimed at the dimension of sustainable energy. Inter alia, it pleaded for the European implementation of the German energy transition policy, ambitious EU targets in renewables and energy efficiency, and in favour of the Energy Union to become a “Climate Union” instead.¹⁸⁰ In general, it framed European integration of energy policy as necessary in order to combat climate change. Similarly, it framed the issue of security of supply of energy and overcoming energy dependence to be understood as essentially a matter of promoting the use of sustainable energy.¹⁸¹

The position of the Greens corresponds with the official party position presented in its election manifestos, which set out a similar focus on renewable energy and energy efficiency for EU energy policy, and a call for creating a “Climate Union”.¹⁸² The active politicization strategy of the Greens corresponds with its position as an opposition party, as it enjoys a higher incentive to publicly control and instruct the Federal Government. In addition, the strong focus of the Greens on sustainable energy importantly aligns with the party’s identity as a green party focused on issues of sustainability. This corresponds with its position as a niche party. Consequently, the Greens’ faction has framed EU energy policy in a way that best profits the party position and has continuously attempted to frame the Bundestag debate on EU energy policy by issuing motions and minor interpellations that focus on the domain of energy sustainability. This observation implies the high policy-seeking and electoral incentives for the faction of the Greens to politicize European integration in energy policy.

¹⁷⁹ Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/3167: Kleine Anfrage: Position der Bundesregierung zu den Verhandlungen und Ergebnissen für eine neue EU-Energie- und Klimastrategie* (Berlin: 2014): 1-5; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/3817: Kleine Anfrage: Position der Bundesregierung zu den Plänen über eine Energieunion und zur Mitteilung der Europäischen Kommission „Eine Investitionsinitiative für Europa“* (Berlin: 2015): 1-4; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/11807: Kleine Anfrage: Haltung der Bundesregierung zum geplanten Governance-System der Energieunion* (Berlin: 2017): 1-3; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 19/1292: Kleine Anfrage: Stand der Dinge des EU-Pakets „Saubere Energie für alle Europäer“* (Berlin: 2018): 1-2; Bundestag, *85. Sitzung* (2015): 8063-8063; Bundestag, *145. Sitzung* (2015): 14295-14296.

¹⁸⁰ Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/777: Antrag: Die Energiewende europäisch verankern* (Berlin: 2014): 1-4; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/1461: Antrag: Europäische Energieunion – Unabhängigkeit durch Effizienz, Einsparung und erneuerbare Energien schaffen* (Berlin: 2014): 1-4; Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/4255: Kleine Anfrage: Konkrete Schritte zur Umsetzung des Nationalen Aktionsplans Energieeffizienz* (Berlin: 2015): 1-6; Bundestag, *85. Sitzung* (2015): 8063-8063; Bundestag, *94. Sitzung* (2015): 8892-8893.

¹⁸¹ Deutscher Bundestag, *Drucksache 18/1461: Antrag: Europäische Energieunion – Unabhängigkeit durch Effizienz, Einsparung und erneuerbare Energien schaffen* (Berlin: 2014): 1-4.

¹⁸² Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Zeit für den Grünen Wandel: Teilhaben: Zukunfts Schaffen: Bundestagswahlprogramm 2013* (Berlin: 2013), 41; 290; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Zukunft wird aus Mut Gemacht: Bundestagswahlprogramm 2017* (Berlin: 2017), 51-52.

3.6 Reflection on issue salience, polarization of opinions and causes of politicization

In conclusion, this section will reflect on the issue salience and polarization of the debate, and on the causes that can explain the emergence of the debate. First of all, with regard to issue salience, it is argued here that the issue of European has only incidentally proven to be a salient issue to the Bundestag to discuss collectively and publicly. From February 2014 to May 2019, EU energy policy has only elaborately been discussed in two plenary debates. Second, the factions of the CDU/CSU, the SPD and Die Linke had passive politicization strategies towards EU energy policy, indicating the low incentives for these political parties to discuss the issue, and confirming the low overall salience of the EU energy policy debate in the Bundestag. Furthermore, no formal position on EU legislations has been issued to the Federal Government. In addition, apart from the March 2017 reasoned opinion on the principle of subsidiarity, all motions and minor interpellations that were issued in relation to EU energy policy reflect the solitary agenda of the faction of the Greens, to which EU energy policy actually was a salient issue. Third, the low issue salience corresponds with the limited coverage of the issue of EU energy policy in the 2013 and 2017 election manifestos of the political parties, as discussed earlier.

As regards polarization of opinions, this study argues that the debate on European integration did not involve a polarization of opinions. In general, all political parties involved in the debate generally supported European integration in energy policy. However, the parties did differ in preferences regarding the composition of the Energy Union and in framing the matter. Nevertheless, although the parties did disagree on the Greens' motions and the March 2017 reasoned opinion, this rather reflected the political divide between the opposition parties and the governing majority parties, rather than principal disagreement on the expediency of European integration in energy policy among the political parties of the Bundestag.

As regards the causes of politicization, it is argued here that the Bundestag debate can be related to both an *authority transfer* and the political strategic interaction of political parties. This confirms the complementary character of both causes of politicization. On the one hand, in those occasions EU energy policy was discussed collectively and publicly, a *transfer of authority* was involved. First of all, during both the March 2014 and March 2015 plenary debates, the integration in energy policy was being discussed, and the CDU/CSU, the SPD and the Greens have argued explicitly in favour of more European integration in energy policy. Second, the Regulation on ACER and the Regulation on the internal electricity market prompted the CDU/CSU and SPD to issue the March 2017 reasoned opinion on the incompatibility with the principle of subsidiarity of the *sectoral integration* involved under these Regulations.

On the other hand, the low overall recurrence of collective and public debate of EU energy policy can be explained from the political strategic interaction of political parties. The passive politicization strategies of the CDU/CSU, the SPD and Die Linke imply the low incentives to these parties to issue EU energy policy for debate. Furthermore, *sectoral integration* was involved with the legislative proposals of the Regulation on security-of-supply on gas, the Regulation on Risk-Preparedness and the Governance Regulation on the Energy Union. Nonetheless, none of these legislative proposals provoked the political parties to collectively and publicly control or instruct the Federal Government throughout the negotiation process on any of these legislative matters, apart from the solitary efforts of

the Greens. Most importantly, this confirms that even though the Energy Union reflected a *transfer of authority*, this does not by definition result in public and collective debate in the national parliament.

Conclusion

This study concludes that European integration in energy policy from 2014 to 2019 has not been politicized in the context of the Bundestag. Although the general commitment to the Energy Union and related EU decision-making have been debated collectively and publicly in the Bundestag over several occasions, politicization of European integration in energy policy has been limited as the debate has only incidentally proven to be a salient issue, and did not involve a polarization of opinions. While this study expected the issue of European integration in energy policy to matter for the members of the Bundestag, such expectation has not been mirrored in EU energy policy being a hot issue in the Bundestag. Several observations stand out in relation to the outcome.

First of all, the given study of the Bundestag debate and the politicization strategies of the German political parties might prove to be a snapshot in time of the Bundestag debate of EU energy policy. Needless to say, politicization has been indicated as highly context-specific and therefore, the saliency of the debate on European integration in energy policy might intensify under different conditions. Perhaps, the recent entry of *Alternative für Deutschland* in the Bundestag provides an interesting development for future analysis of the Bundestag debate on EU energy policy, as the political party is known for a critical stance towards European integration, the German *Energiewende* and the promotion of energy renewables.¹⁸³

Next, even though EU decision-making can entail profound commitments to European integration, such political choice does not by definition increase the saliency for national parliamentarians to discuss EU policy in public. What is more, even though EU national parliaments have a role in EU decision-making, and as such might contribute to the democratic responsiveness of EU decision-making, this does not imply that national parliaments will act correspondingly. In this respect, the framework for understanding politicization in the national parliament has proven useful to understand why European integration might not be discussed publicly and collectively when political parties face no incentives to do so. However, the framework presented in this study is limited. Most importantly, the salience to discuss EU energy policy is impacted by factors external to the framework presented here, including, inter alia, external energy crises, global or domestic developments in energy, the role of the media, and developments in EU institutions or among the larger citizenry.

What is more, discussing politicization in the national parliament provides only one approach to discuss whether and how the attitudes of the larger EU citizenry might matter for the advancement of European integration in the field of energy. Therefore, aside from case studies

¹⁸³ Alternative für Deutschland, *Manifesto for Germany: The Political Programme of the Alternative for Germany* (Berlin: 2016): 15-16, 78-80.

in different Member States, the efforts of this study can benefit from enhanced research that includes multiple levels of analysis. Future research may include the perceptions of EU citizens on energy policy, the role of the media in facilitating or constraining public debate on EU energy policy, and the role of EU institutions and national governments to respond to the demands of the larger EU citizenry in EU decision-making in energy policy. Finally, future research can contribute by suggesting alternative models to address the democratic responsiveness of EU decision-making of EU energy policy more comprehensively.

Bibliography

Adelle, Camilla, and Sirini Withana. "Public Perceptions of Climate Change and Energy Issues in the EU and the United States." In *The New Climate Policies of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Policy*, edited by Sebastian Oberthür, Marc Pallemmaerts, and Claire Roche Kelly. Brussels: Brussels University Press, 2010.

Alternative für Deutschland. *Manifesto for Germany: The Political Programme of the Alternative for Germany*. Berlin: 2016.

Auel, Katrin. "Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs." *European Law Journal* 13, no. 4 (2007): 487-504. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00380.x>.

Austvik, Ole Gunnar. "The Energy Union and security-of-gas supply." *Energy Policy* 96 (2016): 371-382. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.06.013>

Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. "From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics." *Journal of European Public Policy* 25, no. 1 (2018): 83-108. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1310281>

Braun, Daniela, Swen Hutter, and Alena Kerscher. "What type of Europe? The salience of polity and policy issues in European Parliament elections." *European Union Politics* 17, no. 4 (2016): 570-592. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116516660387>.

Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie. "Press Release: Minister Gabriel: European Energy Union is a great opportunity." Accessed November 23, 2019. <https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2015/20150305-gabriel-europaeische-energieunion-als-grosse-chance.html>.

Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie. "Press Release: State Secretary Baake on the European Commission Communication on the Energy Union." Accessed November 23, 2019. <https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2015/20150225-staatssekretaer-baake-mitteilung-europaeischen-kommission-energieunion.html>.

Bundesregierung. "*Europe – succeeding together*" *Presidency Programme 1 January to 30 June 2007*. Berlin: 2006.

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. *Zeit für den Grünen Wandel: Teilhaben: Einmischen: Zukunft Schaffen: Bundestagwahlprogramm 2013*. Berlin: 2013.

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. *Zukunft wird aus Mut Gemacht: Bundestagwahlprogramm 2017*. Berlin: 2017.

Cambridge Dictionary online. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org>.

Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands und Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern. *Gemeinsam erfolgreich für Deutschland: Regierungsprogramm 2013-2017*. Berlin: 2013.

Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands und Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern. *Für ein Deutschland, in dem wir gut und gerne leben: Regierungsprogramm 2017-2021*. Berlin: 2017.

Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, und Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. *Deutschlands Zukunft Gestalten. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD*. Berlin: 2013.

Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, und Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. *Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD*. Berlin: 2018.

Commission of the European Communities. *Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*. Brussels: 2006.

Council of the European Union. *Presidency Conclusions – Brussels European Council 8/9 March 2007*. Brussels: 2007.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Act on Cooperation between the Federal Government and the German Bundestag in Matters concerning the European Union*. Berlin: 2013.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany*. Berlin: 2019.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag and Rules of Procedure of the Mediation Committee*. Berlin: 2014.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 18/638: Kleine Anfrage: Position der Bundesregierung zu den Vorschlägen der Europäischen Kommission zu den europäischen Klima- und Energiezielen 2030*. Berlin: 2014.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 18/777: Antrag: Die Energiewende europäisch verankern*. Berlin: 2014.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 18/875: Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht der Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Energie zu dem Antrag 18/777*. Berlin: 2014.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 18/1434: Schriftliche Fragen*. Berlin: 2014.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 18/1461: Antrag: Europäische Energieunion – Unabhängigkeit durch Effizienz, Einsparung und erneuerbare Energien schaffen*. Berlin: 2014.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 18/3167: Kleine Anfrage: Position der Bundesregierung zu den Verhandlungen und Ergebnissen für eine neue EU-Energie- und Klimastrategie*. Berlin: 2014.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 18/3817: Kleine Anfrage: Position der Bundesregierung zu den Plänen über eine Energieunion und zur Mitteilung der Europäischen Kommission „Eine Investitionsoffensive für Europa“*. Berlin: 2014.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 18/3936: Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht der Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Energie zu dem Antrag 18/1461*. Berlin: 2015.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 18/4255: Kleine Anfrage: Konkrete Schritte zur Umsetzung des Nationalen Aktionsplans Energieeffizienz*. Berlin: 2015.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 18/7718: Kleine Anfrage: Europäische Klima- und Energiepolitik nach dem VN-Klimaabkommen von Paris*. Berlin: 2016.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 18/11777: Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht der Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Energie: [...]*. Berlin: 2017.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 18/11804: Kleine Anfrage: Position der Bundesregierung zu den Vorschlägen der Europäischen Kommission über den europäischen Strommarkt*. Berlin: 2017.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 18/11807: Kleine Anfrage: Haltung der Bundesregierung zum geplanten Governance-System der Energieunion*. Berlin: 2017.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 19/1292: Kleine Anfrage: Stand der Dinge des EU-Pakets „Saubere Energie für alle Europäer“*. Berlin: 2018.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache 19/4179: Kleine Anfrage: Integrierter Nationaler Energie- und Klimaplan*. Berlin: 2018.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Stenografischer Bericht: 20. Sitzung*. Berlin: 2014.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Stenografischer Bericht: 38. Sitzung*. Berlin: 2014.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Stenografischer Bericht: 76. Sitzung*. Berlin: 2014.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Stenografischer Bericht: 85. Sitzung*. Berlin: 2015.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Stenografischer Bericht: 94. Sitzung*. Berlin: 2015.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Stenografischer Bericht: 145. Sitzung*. Berlin: 2015.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Stenografischer Bericht: 146. Sitzung*. Berlin: 2015.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Stenografischer Bericht: 179. Sitzung*. Berlin: 2016.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Stenografischer Bericht: 221. Sitzung*. Berlin: 2017.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Stenografischer Bericht: 225. Sitzung*. Berlin: 2017.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Stenografischer Bericht: 231. Sitzung*. Berlin: 2017.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Stenografischer Bericht: 7. Sitzung*. Berlin: 2018.

Deutscher Bundestag. *Stenografischer Bericht: 89. Sitzung*. Berlin: 2019.

De Wilde, Pieter. "No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration." *Journal of European Integration* 33, no. 5 (2011): 559-575. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2010.546849>.

De Wilde, Pieter, and Michael Zürn. "Can the Politicization of European Integration be Reversed?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50, no. S1 (2012): 137-153. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02232.x>.

De Wilde, Pieter, Anna Leupold, and Henning Schmidtke. "Introduction: the differentiated politicization of European governance." *West European Politics* 39, no. 1 (2016): 3-22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1081505>

De Wilde, Pieter, and Christopher Lord. "Assessing actually-existing trajectories of EU politicization." *West European Politics* 39, no. 1 (2016): 145-163. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1081508>

Die Linke. *100% Sozial: Die Linke: Wahlprogramm zur Bundestagswahl 2013*. Berlin: 2013.

Die Linke. *Die Zukunft, für die wir kämpfen: Sozial: Gerecht: Für alle: Wahlprogramm zur Bundestagswahl 2017*. Berlin: 2017.

Duffield, John S., and Kirsten Westphal. "Germany and EU Energy Policy: Conflicted Champion of Integration?" In *Toward a Common European Union Energy Policy*, edited by Vicki

L. Birchfield and John S. Duffield. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230119819_9.

European Commission. *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030*.

Brussels: 2014.

European Commission. *Energy Union Package. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank: A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy*. Brussels: 2015.

European Commission. *Report from the Commission: Annual Report 2017 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality*. Brussels 2018.

European Commission. "Clean Energy for all Europeans Package," Accessed December 22, 2019. <https://ec-europa-eu.proxy.library.uu.nl/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/clean-energy-all-europeans#content-heading-0>.

European Commission. "Electricity market design," Accessed December 15, 2019. <https://ec-europa-eu.proxy.library.uu.nl/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/market-legislation/electricity-market-design#content-heading-1>.

European Commission. "Public Opinion." Accessed September 15, 2019. <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/lineChart/themeKy/29/groupKy/182/savFile/646>.

European Commission. "Securing Europe's gas supply: new Regulation comes into force." Accessed December 22, 2019. https://ec-europa-eu.proxy.library.uu.nl/info/news/securing-europes-gas-supply-new-regulation-comes-force-2017-oct-27_en.

European Commission. "The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950." Accessed October 25, 2019. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en

European Council. *European Council (23 and 24 October 2014) – Conclusions*. Brussels: 2014.

European Council. *European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) – Conclusions*. Brussels: 2015.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. "Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity." *Official Journal of the European Communities* L27 (1997): 20-29.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. "Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 June 1998 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas." *Official Journal of the European Communities* L204 (1998): 1-12.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. "Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the

internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC.” *Official Journal of the European Union L176* (2003): 37-56.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. “Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC.” *Official Journal of the European Union L176* (2003): 57-78.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. “Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewables and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC.” *Official Journal of the European Union L140* (2009): 20-29.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. “Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC.” *Official Journal of the European Union L211* (2009): 55-93.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. “Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC.” *Official Journal of the European Union L211* (2009): 94-136.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. “Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators.” *Official Journal of the European Union L211* (2009): 1-14.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. “Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010.” *Official Journal of the European Union L280* (2017): 1-36.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. “Directive (EU) 2018/844 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy performance of buildings and Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency.” *Official Journal of the European Union L156* (2018): 75-91.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. “Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, [...]” *Official Journal of the European Union L328*, (2018): 1-77.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. “Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use from renewable sources (recast).” *Official Journal of the European Union L328* (2018): 82-209.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. “Directive (EU) 2018/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency.” *Official Journal of the European Union L328* (2018): 210-230.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. "Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC." *Official Journal of the European Union L158* (2019): 1-21.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. "Regulation (EU) 2019/942 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (recast)." *Official Journal of the European Union L158* (2019): 22-53.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. "Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (recast)." *Official Journal of the European Union L158* (2019): 54-124.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. "Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (recast)." *Official Journal of the European Union L158* (2019): 125-199.

European Union. "Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Part Three: Union Policies and Internal Actions – Title XXI: Energy – Article 194." *Official Journal of the European Union 115* (2008): 134.

European Union. "2. Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality." *Official Journal of the European Union C130* (2004): 207-209.

Fernandez, Rose Maria. "Conflicting energy policy priorities in EU energy governance." *Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 8* (2018): 239-248.

<https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-018-0499-0>

Fitch-Roy, Oscar and Jenny Fairbrass. *Negotiating the EU's 2030 Climate and Energy Framework: Agendas, Ideas and European Interest Groups*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90948-6>.

Grande, Edgar and Swen Hutter. "Beyond authority transfer: explaining politicization of Europe." *West European Politics 39*, no. 1 (2016): 23-43.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1081504>

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer. "A Giant Fast Asleep? Party Incentives and the Politicisation of European Integration." *Political Studies 60*, no. 1 (2012): 115-130.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00895.x>.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining." *British Journal of Political Science 39*, no. 1 (2009): 1-23. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27568377>.

Hutter, Swen, and Edgar Grande. "Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena: A Comparative Analysis of Five West European Countries, 1970-2010." *Journal of Common Market Studies 52*, no. 5 (2014): 1002-1018. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12133>

Keating, Dave. "Orbán criticises Commission's plan for energy union." *Politico, February 23, 2015*. <https://www.politico.eu/article/orban-criticises-commissions-plans-for-energy-union/>.

- Keating, Dave. "Energy ministers clash over nuclear power." *Politico*, March 3, 2015. <https://www.politico.eu/article/energy-ministers-clash-over-nuclear-power/>.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter. "The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns." *European Union Politics* 8, no. 1 (2007): 83-108. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116507073288>.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter. "The Politicization of European Integration." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 54 (2016): 32-47. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12406>.
- Maltby, Thomas. "European Union energy policy integration: A case of European Commission policy entrepreneurship and increasing supranationalism." *Energy Policy* 55 (2013): 435-455. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.12.031>.
- Milena Jurca, Anna. "The *Energiewende*: Germany's Transition to an Economy Fueled by Renewables." *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review* 27, no. 1 (2014): 141-178. <https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/gintenlr27&i=145>
- Misík, Matúš. "On the way towards the Energy Union: Position of Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia towards external energy security integration." *Energy* 111, no. 1 (2016): 68-81. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2016.05.056>.
- Pointvoogl, Andreas. "Perceptions, realities, concession – What is driving the integration of European energy policies?" *Energy Policy* 37, no. 12 (2009): 5704-5716. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.08.035>.
- Rauh, Christian. "Communicating supranational governance? The salience of EU affairs in the German Bundestag, 1991-2013." *European Union Politics* 16, no. 1 (2015): 116-138. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116514551806>
- Rauh, Christian. "EU politicization and policy initiatives of the European Commission: the case of consumer policy." *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 3 (2019): 344-365. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1453528>.
- Rauh, Christian, Bart Joachim Bes, and Martijn Schoonvelde. "Undermining, defusing or defending European integration? Assessing public communication of European executives in times of EU politicization." *European Journal of Political Research*, early view (2019): 1-27. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12350>.
- Ringel, Marc, and Michèle Knodt. "The governance of the European Energy Union: Efficiency, effectiveness and acceptance of the Winter Package 2016." *Energy Policy* 112 (2018): 209-220. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.09.047>
- Schimmelfennig, Frank. "European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism." *Journal of European Integration* 36, no. 3 (2014): 321-337. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.886399>.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank. "European integration (theory) in times of crisis. A comparison of the euro and Schengen crises." *Journal of European Public Policy* 25, no. 7 (2018): 969-989. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1421252>.
- Schmidt, Vivian A. "Politicization in the EU: between national politics and EU political dynamics." *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 7 (2019): 1018-1036. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1619189>.

Schmitter, Philippe C. "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration." *International Organization* 23, no. 1 (1969): 161-166.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2705772>.

Schubert, Samuel R., Johannes Pollak and Maren Kreutler. *Energy Policy of the European Union*. London: Palgrave, 2016

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. *Das Wir Entscheidet: Das Regierungsprogramm 2013-2017*. Berlin: 2013.

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. *Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit: Unser Regierungsprogramm für Deutschland*. Berlin: 2017.

Statham, Paul, and Hans-Jörg Trenz. "How European Union Politicization can Emerge through Contestation: The Constitution Case." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51, no. 5 (2013): 965-980. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12032>.

Szulecki, Kacper, Severin Fischer, Anne There Gullberg, and Oliver Sartor. "Shaping the 'Energy Union': between national positions and governance innovation in EU energy and climate policy." *Climate Policy* 16, no. 5 (2016): 548-567.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2015.1135100>.

Thaler, Philipp. "The European Commission and the European Council: Coordinated Agenda setting in European energy policy." *Journal of European Integration* 38, no. 5 (2016): 571-585. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2016.1178252>

Tosun, Jale, Sophie Biesenbender, and Kai Schulze. *Energy Policy Making in the EU*. London: Springer, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-6645-0>.

Tusk, Donald. "A United Europe can end Russia's Energy Stranglehold." *Financial Times*, April 21, 2014. <https://www.ft.com/content/91508464-c661-11e3-ba0e-00144feabdc0>.

Vinois, Jean-Arnold. "The Road to Energy Union." In *Energy Union: Europe's New Liberal Mercantilism*, edited by Svein S. Andersen, Andreas Goldthau, and Nick Sitter. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59104-3_3.

Webber, Douglas. "Trends in European political (dis)integration. An analysis of postfunctionalist and other explanations." *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 8 (2019): 1134-1152. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1576760>

Wood, Matt, and Matthew Flinders. "Rethinking depoliticization: beyond the governmental." *Policy & Politics* 42, no. 2 (2014): 151-170.
<https://doi.org/10.1332/030557312X655909>.

Zürn, Michael. "Opening up Europe: next steps in politicization research." *West European Politics* 39, no. 1 (2016): 164-182. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1081513>

Zürn, Michael. "Politicization compared: at national, European, and global levels." *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 7 (2019): 977-995.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1619188>