BODIES and BORDERS

Repertoires of Violence against illegalized travellers and refugees along the Croatia/European Union border

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Program trajectory: Research and thesis writing (30 ECTs)

Amount of words: 22.552

Submission on 2 August 2019

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Abstract

This thesis provides an analysis of the repertoires of violence perpetrated against illegalized travelers and refugees along the EU border between Serbia or Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The focus of the article is placed on a multi-causal approach towards analyzing violence and demonstrates how violence operates on a manifest, structural and cultural level. The in the analysis identified repertoires of violence are perpetrated by different actors, including state officials and traffickers, in different manners, including physical violence and illegal expulsions. It shows how different actors make use of similar repertoires of violence to make claims towards illegalized travelers and refugees. In this thesis it is argued that the moral panic about immigration to the EU is used as legitimization of large-scale human rights violations by member states against people on the move along the Balkan Route. Concluding that EU borders are more than territorial dividing lines, but function as in- and exclusion mechanisms and to create a normative EU identity.

Preface and acknowledgements

This thesis is written in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies and Human Rights. To remain the authenticity of the collected data, quotes coming from this data are as much as possible left in their original state. For this reason, quotes can contain grammatically incorrect sentences. Below I will express my gratitude towards the people who have helped me over the past few months.

To Prof. Dr. Ir. Georg Frerks for his role as supervisor for my fieldwork and thesis and to Prof. Dr. Jolle Demmers for the help and input she gave me with refiguring my theoretical framework.

To the Border Violence Monitoring project and No Name Kitchen, for having me as a member of their team and supporting me during my fieldworks in different manners. To the amazing colleagues I had the honor of working with for their inexhaustible energy to support people on the move. To All my respondents, friends, for talking with me and try to give me more insight in their situation, explaining me their daily struggles and making me feel welcome.

To Fabian Berends and Anita Hossain for their support as my fellow students, from shared study sessions to peer reviews. To Dr. Lennart van der Velden for the time he was willing to invest in providing me with grammatical feedback on my thesis and support in planning my writing process.

To Vivian Erdtsieck, my sister, for creating the illustration on the front page as well as the figures used in this thesis to represent both a map of the area in which I conducted my fieldwork as the data that I collected. To my mother and father, for the emotional support and making it possible for me to go to Bosnia and conduct my fieldwork there.

To O., you were there every step of the road, words cannot describe how important you have been for me.

List of abbreviations

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BVM	Border Violence Monitoring project
BVMR	Border Violence Monitoring report
ECHR	European Convention of Human Rights
EU	European Union
IOM	International Organization for Migration
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NNK	No Name Kitchen
IT/R	Irregular Travelers and/or Refugee
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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1. Introduction

> "Why is it that a European or Westerner can travel to my country freely, he needs to pay a few euro to get the visa and come to visit my country normal and I cannot do the same? Why not? What is the problem? (…) We start to collect the real value of people through their papers or through their nationality. You are welcome, just if you have a red passport" (Salah) [1].

To me the passport has always been a wonderful document that gave me the freedom to travel around the globe, go where I want to go. If I had my passport with me, I felt safe. Everything would be fine, because no matter where I go, my passport would always give me access to money, medical care, the protection of the Dutch state and a flight back home. Of course, there are exceptions to this, but to me these seemed to be extreme cases. If I get abducted, maybe my passport wouldn't protect me much, but as long as I functioned within the norm of the day, everything would be fine.

However, since my fieldwork, my vision on my passport changed. It is no longer the beautiful key that opens most gates in the world. I now view my passport as one of the most normalized and institutionalized forms of discrimination that exists. The Dutch passport is the 7th best passport a person can have for travel (see: Global Passport Index). It can take you almost anywhere. To be precise, it can take you to 167 out of 198 countries (125 visa free, 42 visa on arrival). In comparison to an Afghan passport, for example, which only takes you to 30 out of 198 countries (5 visa free, 25 visa on arrival), it is vastly more powerful. Before, the different stamps in my passport always gave me a good feeling, brought back happy memories of journeys that I have made in the past. Now they make me feel angry, because they mean that I had the freedom to go somewhere without trouble, just because I was born 'in the right place'.

Because of the discrimination that is institutionalized, and normalized, through the passport, I would argue that violence is inherent to the passport. As I will argue in my thesis, this violence isn't only in the (im)movability that the passport imparts its owner. Rather, irregular travelers[2] and refugees are more vulnerable to fall victim to different repertoires of violence, which affect their experiences during their journey. This type of discrimination, based for a big part on the

[1] Border Violence Monitoring report [BVMR]: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019.
[2] Within this thesis, the term *irregular travelers* is used instead of *migrant*, to make a clear distinction between those who travel within the legal framework of a visa, and those who travel outside this legal framework. See appendix 1 for definition of irregular traveler, migrant and refugee.

passport or nationality of the person, largely shapes the experience of the refugee while travelling.

Within this thesis I will first give a summery overview of the developments along the Balkan Route since the start of the "European migrant *crisis*" in 2015. Second, I will explain a bit more about the so-called *pushbacks*[3] or illegal expulsions, by state officials of the Republic of Croatia [Croatia] and the Republic of Slovenia [Slovenia], in which illegalized travelers and/or refugees [IT/R] get violently pushed back into Bosnia and Herzegovina [BiH] or the Republic of Serbia [Serbia]. The main focus of my data collection is based on reports about these illegal pushbacks. Chapter 2., consists of an overview of the empirical context in which I collected my data. Here I will write about the increase of migration towards the EU, the "migrant crisis" within Balkan countries as a result of the closure of EU-borders and give an (international) law perspective. In Chapter 3., I elaborate on my theoretical framework. Concepts that I used for the analysis of my data[4], *violence* and *repertoires of violence* are explained here, as well as the notion of *borders* and mechanisms of in- and exclusion that are being enabled by the creation of borders. In this chapter I will as well discuss the epistemological and ontological position of this research. Chapter 4., contains an on the ground description of the context in which I collected my data. This includes a description of the situation in the border towns Šid, Serbia and Velika Kladuša, BiH. Based on my data I will here also explain *the game*[5] and write about collaboration between IT/R. Chapter 5., holds the main analysis of the data that I collected for this research. It analyses the different repertoires of violence I identified, which are divided into five sub-categories: pushbacks by Croatian and Slovenian police, traffickers and smugglers, denying access and discrimination, risk taking and self-destructive behavior, and the passport and borders. In Chapter 6., the conclusion and discussion of my analysis will be presented, as well as the insights my empirical research has provided into academic debates on repertoire of violence and their relationship to means of in- and exclusion, passport and borders. In appendix 1, a glossary of used concepts and definitions is added.

[3] *Pushback*: see for definition appendix 1.
[4] See appendix 1 for an overview of concepts and definitions
[5] *The game*: slang used by irregular travelers and refugees, referring to an attempt to irregularly cross a border. See Chapter 4.3.

1.1. The Balkan route

Since the beginning of what in the media is often referred to as the "European migrant *crisis*", in 2015, refugee and illegalized travelers' routes into the European Union [EU] have become more and more dangerous (El-Shaarawi and Razsa 2018, 3, 12). One of these routes, the Balkan Route, is used more and more, due to forced migration from the Middle East and a shift in the central Mediterranean route (Mavrommatis 2018, 862). The framing of refugees as "terrorists" and "a threat to Europe" has led to a moral panic which gives legitimization to political leaders within the EU for the *militarization* and *securitization* of Europe's external borders (El-Shaarawi and Razsa 2018, 12; Emmers 2007, 118, 119). Following the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016, states along the Balkan Route have increasingly been trying to limit the mobility of IT/R (El-Shaarawi and Razsa 2018, 12). Borders along the route, especially borders of the EU, have become increasingly securitized and militarized (Mandic 2017, 29; Rexhepi 2018, 223). Irregular crossings over the border are treated as a serious criminal offence, and likely to end in violent encounters with border control, including the use of attacks of dogs and teargas (Mandic 2017, 36; El-Shaarawi and Razsa 2018, 4). The Balkan Route is perceived as the "vulnerability of fortress Europe" and considered to be in need of high and constant surveillance (Rexhepi 2018, 222). However, scholars of forced migration and critical border studies argue that border management policies are a cause, not a consequence of the *migrant crisis* (Freedman 2016, 21), the expansion of smuggling (Mandic 2017, 28) and human trafficking (FitzGerald 2016, 186), which empowers transnational criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers (Gibney 2006, 143; Mandic 2017, 29).

The Balkan Route is a refugee route that stretches from Turkey or Greece, through different Balkan countries, through Slovenia, Bulgaria or Austria towards Western Europe (for a summary overview of the development of the route, see El-Shaarawi and Razsa 2018, 3-5). After the EU-Turkey deal, new layers of securitization and violent enforcement have emerged along the route (El-Shaarawi and Razsa 2018, 4; Rexhepi 2018, 223). Since then the border between Hungary and Serbia has become the most militarized border of the EU (Mandic 2017, 36); IT/R traveling over the Balkan Route are forced to choose a more southern alternative and try to enter the EU by crossing the Croatian border with BiH or Serbia. Figure 1 gives a representation of movement over the Balkan Route, including an overview of borders which are highly militarized and borders on which human rights activists report illegal deportations of IT/R.

Figure 1: movement along the Balkan Route, illustration by Vivian Erdtsieck

1.2. Illegal pushbacks

Reports of international and local Non-Governmental Organizations [NGO] show that since 2016, there is an increase in human rights violations by EU-member states against people who try to cross the EU borders. One of these violations is the organization of violent pushbacks against IT/R, which, according to human rights activists and organizations, happens all over the EU border (see for an overview of reports published by activists and organizations along the Balkan Route: https://pushbackmap.org/). Human rights organizations and activists in the field argue that the expulsion of asylum-seekers (including both refugees and illegalized travelers who express the will to ask for international protection) is against international law (see also Chapter 2.3.) and that the violence used is disproportionate (Médicins Sans Frontières [MSF] 2017, 20; Border Violence Monitoring [BVM], n.d.; No Name Kitchen [NNK] 2018, 5, 13; Rigardu 2017, 2). According to a statistical study, amongst 992 IT/R that attended MSF mental health consultations in Serbia, Arsenijevic et al. (2017) find that 27% of these people

experienced violence during their journey, and in the majority of these cases (65%), state authorities were the perpetrators. According to the research, there is a high correlation between the closure of the Balkan country borders and an increase in experienced violence by IT/R (Arsenijevic, et. al. 2017, 5, 6). Besides reports of beatings, the use of teargas and attack dogs, NGOs and journalists in the field have reported (sexual) gender-based violence [SGBV/GBV] against people who tried to cross the border into the EU (NNK 2018, 11; BVM 2018; Ahmetasevic 2018).

Although scholars have done ethnographic research on the Balkan Route (Vaiou 2012; El-Shaarawi and Razsa 2018; Rexhepi 2018; Mavrommatis 2018), little academic research has been done into how IT/R traveling the Balkan route fall victim to different repertoires of violence. That IT/R are more vulnerable to violence, exploitation and abuse is well known, however, research into different types of violence against people on the move, focuses on one particular aspect of violence. Examples of this are Pittaway and Bartolomei (2001) their study on violence against refugee women, Deacon (2009) on the gendered needs and risks refugees face, FitzGerald (2016) on exploitation within human trafficking, Mandic (2017) on smuggling and violence against Syrian refugees and Arsenijevic et al. (2017) on violence perpetrated by state officials. With this research I aim to conceptualize how people on the move fall victim to multiple repertoires of violence, to better understand which mechanisms and processes play part in shaping their experiences while traveling. The main research question that I will answer within this thesis is: *What different repertoires of violence are experienced by illegalized travelers and refugees along the European Union border between Serbia or Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia?*

2. EU border control and law

In this chapter I will first write about border practices in the context of the EU, related to violence perpetrated against IT/R. Second, I will briefly give an overview of the law perspective on the matters discussed within this thesis, including EU law and human rights.

2.1. Border practices and the EU

As stated in the introduction, many scholars of forced migration and critical border studies argue that border management policies are a cause, not a consequence, of the "European migrant crisis" that emerged in 2015 (Freedman 2016, 21), the expansion of smuggling (Mandic 2017, 28; Gerard and Pickering 2013, 345) and human trafficking (FitzGerald 2016, 186), and that this empowers transnational criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers (Gibney 2006, 143; Mandic 2017, 29). Nevertheless, securitization and militarization of borders in and around Europe is on the rise (El-Shaarawi and Razsa 2018, 12; Rexhepi 2018, 2022). Gerard and Pickering argue that the securitization of Europe does not stop people from migrating but diverts them into riskier methods of traveling (2013, 355).

Recently, scholars have problematized the idea of borders for several reasons. For example, Gerard and Pickering argue, based upon their research amongst refugees in Malta, that the experience of border crossing is, in part, a gendered experience, because of threats of sexual violence on the border (2013, 345). They argue that there is a "structural contradiction between securitization of migration and refugee protection" (2013, 339), because the securitization of EU-borders is "based on the broad exclusion of undesirable migrants", or illegalized travelers, and that current border practices facilitate both structural and direct violence against refugees (2013, 353). Rexhepi (2018) even argues that racial, religious and ethnic tension is inherent within the EU-project:

> "while public debates on the Syrian refugee crisis are fraught with racist and Islamophobic language, the discursive dimensions of othering are hidden through the color-blind decision-making language of EU border bureaucracies. These understated borders are important as this is where class-based and racialized struggles over entry, exclusion, citizenship and belonging are fought over and racialized discourses narrating exclusion are generated" (Rexhepi 2018, 2219).

The tension of borders thus comes from within, rather than from without. As argued by El-Shaarawi and Razsa: "it is not the presence of refugees who create a European refugee crisis but the character of the European project itself" (2018, 22).

According to El-Shaarawi and Razsa, "violence is at the heart of the European project" because of the ongoing racialized formation of normative EU-identity and its militarized bordering practices (2018, 3). Border practices of the EU can thus be understood not only as demarcations of territory, but also as discursive "dividing lines that are simultaneously social, cultural and psychological", in need of "protection against the Other" (Brah 1996, 625; see also Chapter 3.1.2.). Focusing on the EU borders in the Balkan area, Rexhepi argues that the Balkan serves as a buffer zone between East and West. He argues that the Balkans generate a border politics that makes a division between the Self and the Other, based upon the racialization of religion (2018, 2220).

Building upon Foucault's notion of governmentality (1980, 2), FitzGerald (2016) argues that the bordering practices of the nation-states are no longer about controlling its territory, but mostly about "the regulation of its population as objects of knowledge" to strengthen a position of power (2016, 183). She argues that often overlooked, but inherent to the "socio-spatial ordering of neoliberal governmentality", is the notion of gender (FitzGerald 2016, 183). In Chapter 3.1.2. I will further elaborate on the notion of *borders* and how they function as a *mechanism* of in- and exclusion.

The organization that is mainly responsible for the security on the EU borders since 2016, is Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Briefly, Frontex is responsible for the promotion and coordination of European border management and the identification of migration patterns and cross-border criminal activities along and beyond EU external borders. Frontex coordinates and organizes operations for border intervention and assists EU member states at the external borders, including rescue of IT/R at sea and assistance in forced return of people who are not legitimized to stay within the EU.

2.2. Human rights and EU law

To understand the violation of human rights within the context of which the data for this research is collected, it is important to add a law perspective to this thesis. The most important rights that are violated, as demonstrated in Chapter 5., are the right to ask for asylum, the

principle of *non-refoulement*, the prohibition of collective expulsion and the right to irregularly cross a border, not through the official border crossing points, in order to seek asylum without penalization.

Towards the right to ask for asylum, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR] states in article 14: "everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution". In addition to this, article 6 state that "everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law", meaning every person, even when they are without documents or illegal within a countries territory, enjoys the right to seek asylum like any other person, supported by article 7: "all are equal before the law and are entitled without discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination". Adding to this, article 13 states that "everyone has the right of freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country". The deportation of people who ask for asylum without any legal procedure is thus in violation of the UDHR. The UDHR is not legally binding but a prescription of what states aim to do. However, European asylum law, which strongly correlates with human rights is legally binding.

Article 14 of the UDHR, the right to ask for asylum, is further explained within the Convention and Protocol relating to the status of refugees, which includes the *1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*, also known as the *Geneva refugee convention*, the *1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*, and *Resolution 2198 (XXI) Protocol relating to the status of refugees* (UNHCR 2010). Based on this document, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the UNHCR wrote a handbook for parliamentarians: "A guide to international refugee protection and building state asylum systems" (2017). Within this handbook, the right to seek asylum, the principle of non-refoulement, the prohibition of collective expulsion and the right to irregularly cross a border are explained.

The *right to seek asylum* holds the right to ask for international protection provided by a country to refugees in its territory. Everyone who asks for asylum has the right on a legal process in any country to see if this person is indeed under threat in his/her country of origin and can only be returned to his/her country when this is possible "in safety and dignity" (Inter-Parliamentary Union and the UNHCR 2017, 28).

The *principle of non-refoulement*, means that a person cannot be forced to return to his country when seeking international protection. As Article 33.1 of the 1951 Convention states: "no contracting state shall expel or return, "refouler", a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion". The handbook for parliamentarians, a guide to international refugee protection and building state asylum seekers, explains that the words "in any manner whatsoever" means that:

> the principle of non-refoulement applies to any conduct by the State that would place a refugee at risk of being returned, whether directly or indirectly, to his or her country of origin. This would include refusal of entry at the border as well as removal from within the territory. The principle of non-refoulement applies wherever the State exercises its authority, including beyond its borders, for example when intercepting ships on the high seas. All refugees are entitled to protection from refoulement – including those who have not been formally recognized as such. This means that asylum seekers whose status has not yet been determined by the authorities are protected from forced return (Inter-Parliamentary Union and the UNHCR 2017, 20).

This means that a country is not allowed to return a person to his/her country of origin without a fair process to ask for asylum, and includes that countries are not allowed to reject people who ask for asylum at their frontiers/borders. All countries are obligated to admit asylum-seekers and refugees to its territories, without discrimination based on race, religion or country of origin (Inter-Parliamentary Union and the UNCHR 2017, 28).

Furthermore, the handbook states that "it is not a crime to cross a border without authorization to seek asylum" (Inter-Parliamentary Union and the UNHCR 2017, 94). Article 31 of the 1951 Convention states that "refugees coming directly from a country where their life or freedom is threatened shall not be punished because of their illegal entry or presence, as long as they are coming directly from that country, present themselves without delay to the authorities, and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence". The handbook states that "coming directly" includes asylum-seekers/refugees that arrived directly from their country of origin, but also from another country where "safety and security" cannot be assured, and from transit countries where the person was for a short period of time without having applied for or received asylum (Inter-Parliamentary Union and the UNHCR 2017, 94). This means that Article 31 thus applies to any person who has transited other countries during their journey, or who were unable to find protection in countries to which they previously fled.

All EU member states are signatories of the UDHR. Besides this, all member states of the EU have signed the European Convention of Human Rights [ECHR], a declaration that is bonding for all member states. Protocol no. 4; Article 4 of the ECHR states that "collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited" (Council of Europe 1950, 38). In the more recently published Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [CFREU], Article 18 states:

> "the right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community" (Article 18, CFREU).

Article 19, protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition: *collective expulsions* are prohibited. No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a state where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, this includes expulsion to countries where one is not able to find asylum or risks being expulsed to a state where they would be subjected to the above named human rights violations (European Union 2012, 399). *Collective expulsion* is defined as:

> "any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group" (European Court of Human Rights 2018).

As shown in the collected data, (see Chapter 5.), the pushbacks against irregular travelers and refugees are often perpetrated by police officials, sharply contradicting the main task of state police, as law enforcing entity.

Within the context of the EU, there exists a common asylum system: Regulation NO 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, also known as the Dublin agreement. This agreement establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an application for international protection in one of the member states by a third-country national or a stateless person. This agreement states that irregular travelers and refugees have to ask for asylum within the first country they enter in the EU (European Union 2013). However, this puts a lot of pressure on countries near the external borders of Europe, such as Greece and Italy. It is the shared responsibility of all member states

to ensure that their common principles are respected, also on the external borders of the EU and to hold other member states accountable for this.

Nation-states, including member-states of the EU, have the right to control and protect their borders. Yet, it is illegal to completely close their borders for people who come to ask for international protection or asylum. However, irregular travelers and refugees are often placed in an extralegal position, as state officials deny their presence within the state territory or their appeal for asylum at the frontiers.

3. Theory and methodology

Within this chapter, I will first elaborate on the conceptual framework that is used within this study, including its ontological and epistemological position. Second, I will discuss the methodology used to collect the data for this study.

3.1. Conceptual framework

This section is dedicated to the explanation of the conceptual framework on which the analysis in this thesis is based. First, I will elaborate on the meaning of *violence,* and the concept of *repertoires of violence,* as my main analytical framework to help me conceptualize and understand the experiences of my respondents. In appendix 2 an overview is given of the indicators of *violence* and *repertoires of violence* as discussed within this chapter. After that, I will elaborate on the notion of *borders* and *space*, as this is crucial to understand the tension in the areas in which I conducted my field research: a part of the Serbia – Croatia border and a part of the BiH? – Croatia border, both of which simultaneously make up a part of the EU border. I decided to go here to conduct my field research as this are known transit areas on the Balkan Route which lead into the EU. I will argue how borders are social, cultural and psychological and how the creation of borders relates to mechanisms of in- and exclusion based on possession of a specific passport. Lastly, I will place my analytical framework within a broader ontological and epistemological academic debate.

3.1.1 Violence and repertoires

Violence can be defined as: "an act of physical hurt deemed legitimate by the performer and illegitimate by (some) witnesses" (Riches 1989, 8 in Demmers 2017, 59). However, structuralist thinkers such as Galtung, argued that defining *violence* as "an act of physical hurt" is too narrow (Galtung 1996). To overcome this, Galtung wrote a typology of three levels of violence: *manifest violence, structural violence* and *cultural violence.*

The definition of *structural violence,* as given by Galtung, gives a wider perspective on how violence can be acted out towards individuals and/or groups. *Structural violence* is defined as: "avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally life, lowering the real levels of

needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible" (Galtung 1996, 197). Structural violence thus includes denial of access to medical care, clean drinking water and a safe place to live. When talking about *violence* as an act of physical hurt, we can refer to *manifest violence*: "violence as visible, instrumental and expressive action. Generally defined as an act of physical hurt" (Demmers 2017, 59). When it comes to how *violence* is embedded in a deeper level of society, Galtung referred to *cultural violence*, defined as: "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logics, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence" (Galtung 1996, 196). *Cultural violence* thus includes for example the normalization of discrimination against specific groups, by means of art, but also the legitimizing discourses towards acts of structural or manifest violence that are used within certain ideologies. *Manifest*, *structural* and *cultural violence*, can be used to study how violent processes or mechanisms operate. To understand this, below I will explain the concept of *repertoires of violence* as an alternative to studying violence from a functionalist perspective.

In 1978, the concept of repertoires was introduced to the study of *contention* by Tilly (Dobratz and Waldner 2012, 50). Tilly defined a *repertoire of contention* for a particular group as "the whole set of meanings it has for making claims of different kinds on different individuals and groups" (Tilly 1986, 4). When similar groups use similar repertoires, a general repertoire that is available for contention comes into existence (Tilly 1986, 4). An example of this is are the protest marches social movements use to influence political decisions.

In 1995, Tarrow, applied the concept of *systemic cycles of protest* to explain how different but specific strategies become part of a repertoire of contention (Tarrow 1995, 91-92). He explains repertoires of contention according to Tilly as:

> "(the) repertoire is therefore not only what people do when they make a claim; it is what they know how to do and what society has come to expect them to choose to do from within a culturally sanctioned and empirically limited set of options (Tilly 1978, 151). It follows from this definition that the repertoire of contention changes very slowly, constrained by overarching configurations of economics and state building and by the slow pace of cultural change" (Tarrow 1995, 91).

Later on, in 2007, Tilly and Tarrow defined *repertoires of contention* as: "arrays of contentious performances that are currently known and available within some set of political actors" (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 11). They explained that "repertoires are the source of tactical performances

that combine in protest campaigns" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 21). A recognizable performance by a social movement or political actor/group can thus be understood as a repertoire.

Based on the work of Tilly and Tarrow, Ahram defined *repertoires of contention* as "a set of practices groups and individuals routinely engage in as they make claims against one another" (Ahram 2015, 4). She added to the definition of repertoires of contention a definition of *repertoires of violence*: "a subset of these wider repertoires of contention which features various kinds of *violence specialists*, men (typically) who control the means of inflicting damage on persons and objects" (Ahram 2015, 4). On *violence specialists* she explains "the army and police are violence specialists, as are guerillas and rebels. Besides these are a wide array of what Vadim Volkov calls violent entrepreneurs, who use coercion for private or apolitical purposes, including armed guards, tribal warriors, private security forces, thugs, kidnappers, bandits, and enforcers" (Ahram 2015, 4).

To summarize, repertoires are sets of practices people use to make contentious claims. But where do these repertoires come from? Tilly and Tarrow explain that "repertoires draw on identities, social ties and organizational forms that constitute every social life. From those identities, social ties, and organizational forms emerge both the collective claims that people make and the means they have for making claims" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 21). They explain that repertoires emerge over time, as people learn what kind of interactions, or sets of practices to make contentious claims, are able to make a political difference. People learn repertoires by watching the interactions of others, but also by learning what meanings of those interactions are (locally) shared. Tilly and Tarrow explain that "repertoires are the source of tactical performances that combine in protest campaigns" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 21).

However, this is not to say that repertoires are crystalized in the first format they take on. Repertoires can change over time and in space. Tilly and Tarrow point out two major kinds of processes in repertoire change: "the effects of periods of rapid political change" and "the outcome of incrementally changing structural factors" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 19). Tilly and Tarrow write that:

> "during major cycles of contention, the ordinary preference for familiar claim-making routines dissolves in spurts of innovation. (…) periods of rapid political change produce sequences of innovation in repertoires, and successive innovations largely account for the ebb and flow of movement activity (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 19). They argue that "these periods sometimes produce lasting change but are more

> easily routinized and repressed as authorities regain control of contention" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 19).

On the second process, "incremental changes in repertoires" they write that these are "more decisive in the long run. The major causes of incremental change sort into three categories: connections between claim making and everyday social organization, cumulative creation of a signaling system by contention itself, operation of the regime as such" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 20).

To be able to understand the dynamics of periods of contentious politics, it is necessary to cross the formal boundaries between institutional and non-institutional politics (Tarrow and Tilly 2009, 439). *Processes*, or dynamic social movement trajectories, do not occur in a political vacuum (Tarrow and Tilly, 448). Therefore, it is of importance to understand the context in which changes in repertoires, and the processes that come with this, appear.

Beissinger argues that in cases of sustained violence, *repertoires of violence* become institutionalized, through the "intervention and involvement of state structures" (1998, 414). Below I will further elaborate on the notion of *borders*, and why this can be understood as both a *repertoire* and an institutionalized form of violence.

3.1.2 Borders as mechanism of in- and exclusion

In 1996, Brah defined the concept of *borders* as follows: "Arbitrary dividing lines that are simultaneously social, cultural and psychological; territories to be patrolled against those whom they construct as outsiders, aliens, the Others; forms of demarcation where the very act of prohibition inscribes transgression; zones where fear of the Other is the fear of the self, places where claims to ownership – claims to 'mine', 'yours' and 'theirs' – are staked out, contested, defended, and fought for" (Brah 1996, 625). In her work on the production of the nation-state, Yuval-Davis (1997) argues that discourses of gender, race, sexuality and the *nation-state* are intertwined and mutually constituted. The definition Brah gave to *borders* is much broader then the classic understanding of borders as "demarcation lines between territories". Borders are not just there; they are actively produced and constitute social and cultural meaning as well as mechanisms of in- and exclusion. They are, in line with what Yuval-Davis argued, co-constructed in the intersection of normative notions of *gender*, *ethnicity*, *religion* and the *nation-state*. This broad definition of *borders* is helpful within this thesis to understand how

social relations are shaped and affected by the construction of borders, as well as how borders intersect and co-create social identity. As Ron (2000) argues: "territorial boundaries continue to produce substantial inequalities even in an era of globalization. Although territorial boundaries are socially-constructed lines in the sand, they have dramatic, real-world consequences" (Ron 2000, 609).

The notion of *space*, and *borders* as part of space, is of importance for my research, because of the specific experience of border-crossing by IT/R. Drawing on the work of Yuval-Davis (1993), and, more recently, scholars of feminist geography (Mollet and Faria, 2018; Hopkins 2018; Rodó-de-Zárate and Baylina 2018), I argue that the meaning of space is mainly defined by social relations. Borders, for instance the external borders of the EU, are actively created by mechanisms of in- and exclusion and should thus be analyzed within a multi-causal approach that includes an intersectional understanding. It requires a multi-causal approach that incorporates both structuralist and constructivist analysis. In this way it helps to understand the mechanisms of in- and exclusion, based on social identity and possession of specific passports, as well as experiences that are shaped or affected by this.

In his work on the modern state, Max Weber emphasized the importance of territoriality, and thus borders, as it monopolizes the legitimate use of violence by state authorities (Ron 2000, 615). When analyzing different repertoires of violence, perpetrated by state authorities, it is of importance to take into account the spatial dimension in which this takes place. As for example "the right to control and protect borders" is often used as an argument by state authorities to increase control and dismiss or legitimize violations of human rights, such as the right to ask for asylum (see for example SRF 2019).

As argued above, borders are thus more than territorial demarcation lines. They also involve practices of social, cultural and psychological *boundary drawing*. But what basic practices are involved in the creation of *borders* and *border control*? Mitchel describes this as frontier-creation, which involves continuous barbed-wire fences, passports, immigration laws, inspectors and currency controls (in Ron 2000, 617). These developments are relatively new, they emerged over the last century. However, they are now vital parts of manufacturing *stateness*. The territorial boundaries have become key parts of *statecrafting,* which states use on a daily basis to "promote and reinforce" national identity (Ron 2000, 617, 618).

The existence and creation of borders can thus be understood as part of *a mechanism of in- and exclusion, or in other words* a process of *boundary activation*. Tilly and Tarrow defined the

process of *boundary activation* as "(a process of) creation of new boundaries or the crystallization of an existing one between challenging groups and their targets. (…) by defining citizens as members of a particular racial or ethnic group, the census acts as an agent of boundary activation" (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 34).

To explain how this mechanism of in- and exclusion is related to the concept of borders, I draw of the discipline of geography, and more specifically feminist geography, which builds upon a multidisciplinary background and feminist critique/theory, to situate the study of geography within the intersection of different power structures, as for example social identity (Rodó-de-Zárate and Baylina 2018, 548). Insights from feminist geography could be helpful in understanding why the experience of IT/R when crossing borders is situated within this mechanism of in- and exclusion.

According to Mollet and Faria, *intersectionality* is, in itself, a spatial concept (Mollet and Faria 2018, 576). As Rodó-de-Zárate (2014) argues: "the spatio-temporal context of intersectionality is not only where and when intersectionality occurs but also contributes to the configuration of intersectional dynamics itself" (Rodó-de-Zárate and Baylina 2018, 549). Meaning that the specific spatial context influences relevant categories of analysis as well as the meaning of these social categories and different power relations.

The axis of space and place in intersectional dynamics can be understood in different ways. Drawing from the work of Gramsci, feminist geographers have argued that the notion of gender is spatially and culturally constructed within different levels of spatial scales (Vaiou 2018, 579). That is, gender is constituted within the intersection of, for example, the private and public sphere. As Rodó-de-Zárate and Baylina argue: place is not only a variable of intersectional relations, but it also configures these relations (2018, 549). As being based within intersectional feminist research, the notion of *gender* is just one of multiple axes and can be replaced with any part of *social identity*, as for example religion, ethnicity or race. Multiple layers of inequality, privilege and suppression, are thus spatially constituted. In addition to the different levels of scales, Vaiou argues that *space* also constituted intersectional relations as an axe that can best be translated as positionality and location (2018, 580). Yuval-Davis' work on *the politics of belonging* (2011), as well as Rich's work on *the politics of location* (1986), show that position/location matters. The intersectional approach can add to this that space/place and other axes of social identity are mutually constitutive.

In regard to the intersection of space and social identity, Vaiou argues that "particular spaces are produced and stabilized through the performing of (intersectional) identity by dominant groups as they exercise power in and through particular spaces" (Vaiou 2018, 580). Linking this to the securitization of the EU we can see, as Rexhepi (2018, 2220) argues, that the border practices of the EU are not only practices to control territory, but also generate and co-constitute a "normative European identity", against which the Other is created to enhance mechanisms of in- and exclusion and strengthen privilege and oppression of particular groups who are seen as "(not) belonging to Europe".

3.1.3 Ontology and epistemology

Coming from a political process tradition in social movement studies, the academic tradition is built on a structuralist ontology, despite the label of processes. Scholars of social movement studies, tended to see movements as a direct outcome of structural constants and variations (Tarrow and Tilly 2009, 445). However, Tilly and Tarrow added to the study of social movement *strategic interactio*n, *consciousness* and *historically accumulated culture*, moving their study of social movements into a multi-causal approach towards social movements (see also: Demmers 2017, 91-94). Towards *repertoires of violence,* Ahram explains that the concept can be understood as an alternative to functionalist approaches to studying violence (Ahram 2015, 4). She argues that instead of complex calculations of risks and rewards, the concept of repertoires of violence emphasizes that actors are managing different kinds of violence specialists, as collective violence requires coordination, practice and repetition (Ahram 2015, 4, 5). Once an actor is able to do this, the set of practices can be used in different contexts and circumstances and become a repertoire. Ahram argues that operating in a relatively familiar and standardized way further solidifies repertoires of violence, making the performance of contentious politics more and more easy (Ahram 2015, 4, 5). In a case study by James Ron (1997), he argues that different actors, as state security forces, global auditors, and targeted populations, are involved in complex processes of negotiations towards repertoires of (state) violence (Ron 1997, 298). Repertoires of violence are thus best understood from a mutli-causal perspective, as they evolve from both structural constants and variations, as well as from relational interactions between different actors and (identity) groups and meaning making by involved actors (discourse).

3.2. Methodology

To gather data for my research I traveled to the border areas between Serbia and Croatia and between BiH and Croatia. Both areas also form part of the border of the EU. In Serbia I traveled to Šid, and in BiH I traveled to Velika Kladuša and Bihać (see also Chapter 4., Figure 2). These three villages are all known as points along the Balkan Route where IT/R are stuck on the EU border.

In order to reach my respondents, I collaborated with different organizations. In Šid I worked together with volunteers of No Name Kitchen [NNK] (https://www.nonamekitchen.org/en/), an organization that provides humanitarian aid to IT/R. I decided to work with this NGO because it is an NGO that is based on solidarity with and equality to the people that they offer support. In Velika Kladuša all organizations that were working there before as humanitarian aid NGOs (NNK and SOS Kladuša, @SOSTeamKladuša) were forced by the police to stop their activities. However, I was able to make use of their network that was still laying there. By collaborating with humanitarian aid organizations, it was easy for me to get in contact with my respondents and to observe the daily life of my respondents. Next to this, I have been working with the Border Violence Monitoring project [BVM] (https://www.borderviolence.eu/), by collecting reports for them about the illegal pushbacks from Slovenia into Croatia, and from Croatia into BiH or Serbia. In total I collected 12 of these reports, which I, combined with other sources, use as data for my research.

To summarize the different people that I talked with; all my interviewees, from who I gathered most of the data for my research, were in Serbia or in BiH as IT/R, traveling the Balkan Route. Besides this, I have informally talked with local Bosnian citizens who have been observing the situation in Velika Kladuša for a longer period of time and who try to help the IT/R who are there. In addition to this, I have engaged with activists and activist networks from Zagreb, Croatia, and from Ljubljana, Slovenia, and with international volunteers, working in Šid and Belgrade, Serbia, and in Velika Kladuša, Bihać and Sarajevo, BiH, trying to provide humanitarian aid to people on the move. All people that have informed me and that I talked with, I met through snowball effect and the network of the organizations I have worked with.

For this research I used various data collection methods. I held two in-depth interviews with IT/R and collected 12 border violence reports with IT/R on voice-record. Besides this I used (participant) observation and kept up a field diary about the situation on the ground in Šid and

Velika Kladuša. The field diary that I wrote consists of summaries of the work I was doing, as food distribution, working in the free shop and the (coordination of) collecting violence reports, and observations that I made during this work. It includes conversations I had with people, both volunteers, locals and IT/R, and events that were happening in and around the towns where I was located. For this last item, it was of great help that I had different informants who would keep me up to date on what was happening in the towns. This was mainly done through social media messenger applications, as for example Facebook messenger. The information they sent me consisted of both written texts, as well as photos and videos.

Next to the data I gathered during my fieldwork, I use reports from both local and international NGOs on violence against IT/R along the Balkan Route and from the illegal pushbacks by Slovenia and Croatia. By triangulating different sources of data, I have tried to increase the validity and reliability of my research and broaden the representativeness within my research.

During my fieldwork I stumbled upon different difficulties in carrying out my research. The biggest challenge that I had to overcome, was that when arriving in Šid, Serbia, I figured out that the theoretical framework I proposed and the research question that I was hoping to answer were not at all feasible.

Initially my research question was: *For refugees traveling the Balkan route, how does gender shape and affect experiences of interacting with border control when trying to enter the European Union, at Šid, Serbia, on the Croatian border in March and April 2019?* However, the language barrier was much bigger than I initially expected it to be, which made talking about abstract subjects such as *the notion of gender identity* very hard. Besides this, I concluded that the cultural barrier between the people on the move in the border area and myself was very big, which made it also with people with whom I could communicate more easily, very hard to talk about issues concerning gender, masculinity and vulnerability. Although a lot of the people I met were eager to help me, talking about issues such as how gender identity affected their experiences of border crossing didn't seem urgent enough, both to them and me, within the tense situation near the EU-border. Together this made me decide to change both my main question and my analytical framework.

During my fieldwork, I found difficulties to work on rewriting and refiguring my analytical framework, as there seemed to be always a crisis situation that asked for immediate attention, where computer work stayed as it was. This made me decide to keep on collecting border

violence reports, fieldnotes and interviews, but for the time no longer search for a new analytical framework. This changed my research from a more deductive to a more inductive approach.

One of the difficulties I still experienced was making appointments with people to sit down and talk about the situation and what was happening. As everyone was always about to "go on game", scheduling an appointment in a couple of days turned out to be senseless. Whenever running into someone who wanted to make a report or give an interview, the best thing was to immediately do so. However, this was sometimes difficult for different reasons. Often this was the moment that they would be exhausted from a game/pushback, my schedule was very full due to different activities within food distribution, the free shop and other appointments, or there was nobody there at that moment to help with translation. After conducting my fieldwork, I changed my analytical framework to *repertoires of violence*. This new analytical framework allowed me to conceptualize the experiences of my respondents within a multi-causal framework.

The analysis of the data I performed by inserting all my data, including fieldnotes, interview and border violence report transcripts and reports from (local) NGOs, into NVivo to help me code all the data that I collected. Within NVivo, I created different nodes to structure my data, and recoded these several times, to see which patterns I could detect. Based on this, I identified five main areas in which IT/R fall victim to different repertoires of violence (see Chapter 4. and 5.).

4. On the ground description of situation

After the closure of the Hungary – Serbia border in 2016 (Mandic 2017, 36), the Balkan Route shifted south towards the Serbia – Croatia border. The data that I collected for my research, has been collected in the border town Šid, Serbia and in the border towns Velika Kladuša and Bihać, BiH. In this chapter I will discuss the situation on the ground in Šid and in Velika Kladuša, as well as *the game* (irregular border crossing) and cooperation between IT/R that I met during my fieldwork. Figure 2 gives a representation of the area in which I conducted my field research, including pushback points that were frequently mentioned by respondents.



Figure 2: overview of pushbacks points in collected data, illustration by Vivian Erdtsieck

4.1. Šid, Serbia

Šid is a small town in Serbia, close to the border with Croatia. Close to the town and in the town, there are three official refugee camps. However, many IT/R prefer, or are forced, to live outside of the camps. To conduct my field research, I have been working with an organization that was active in Šid to provide humanitarian aid: NNK. Volunteers working with the organization would provide drinking water, food, showers, hygienic products, clothes and tents/sleeping bags as much as possible to IT/R who were living outside of the official camps. Besides this, in cooperation with MSF, there was basic medical care for these people. The site that is used by the organization for distribution is an abandoned factory, close to the town of Šid.

Picture 1: entrence of the squad in Šid, photo published by NNK on Facebook

As distribution would happen on a daily basis inside the factory, a group of 80-100 people from Afghanistan had settled there and occupied the building as a squat. Different areas of the building would serve different functions, as kitchen, living room, room for prayer and rooms where people would set up their tents to sleep. Among the group were unaccompanied minors between 13 and 17 years old. People coming from other countries were often not allowed to enter the squat or were threatened by a few of the people living there, when entering the squat.

Picture 2: water tank provided by NNK in Šid, NNK on Facebook

Living conditions inside and outside of the camp are overall very low. Outside the camp there was limited access to drinking water. People from both inside and outside the camp would state that they don't have enough food, and that hygienic conditions are very low. One of the problems that came with this, was the constant outbreak of scabies. Based on conversations with people living around the town and on observations, people living there had to deal with violence from three different angles: intragroup violence, for example by traffickers, intergroup violence between social identity groups, and violence coming from external actors, such as police, border control and locals.

During the time that I was in Šid, multiple fights happened between traffickers and refugees, as well as between different groups of IT/R. The level of direct violence used was high, including two people that got stabbed multiple times as a result of an ongoing argument between two groups both living in the squat. Besides this, more indirect forms of violence would occur. For example, not everyone who was living in the squat was allowed to come to the food distribution. People who would hold power within the squat would systematically get more food, where other would get nothing. One of the tents was set into fire as a revenge action, and personal belongings would get stolen or destroyed.

Outside of the squat, illegalized travelers/refugees were often not allowed to go to the city center, that is, police would stop them and tell them to get outside of the city or bring them to the camp or outside of the city. People were denied access into stores, barbershops, bars and bakeries.

Once in a while, the police would also come to the squat and harass people living there. A few weeks before I came to Šid, the squat was evicted by the police. All people living in the squat and the volunteers working there were arrested and held in custody for several hours. The electricity network, tents, sleeping bags and other personal belongings of the IT/R were destroyed by the police, some set into fire, and other stuff taken away to an unknown garbage distribution center.

From time to time, people from the official refugee camp would come to the squat to convince people living there to come to the camp. The people who would go to the camp were often back within a few days, with stories about the inhumane conditions within the camp. Apart from lamenting the conditions, they would also tell that it was not safe for them to stay inside the camp because of the other ethnic groups living within the camp, according to them mostly people from Iran. They would tell that there was a lot of fighting happening between people from Iran and people from other origins, and that they were discriminated against with food distribution and places to sleep. In three informal conversations with people from Iran, who were living within the camp, I understood that conditions in the camp were “fine”.

4.2. Velika Kladuša, BiH

Velika Kladuša is a small town in BiH, near to the Croatian border. In February 2019, the small NGOs that were helping people living outside of the official refugee camps were ordered to stop their activities by the police. All international volunteers who were working there before were told to leave BiH. However, the network they built was still laying there and there were a few people still active in providing humanitarian aid to IT/R. One of the biggest differences with Šid, Serbia, was that here there was more contact between the international volunteers and locals who were helping out people on the move. Because the two NGOs that were working there before were ordered to stop working, all internationals were only allowed to be there as tourists. No kind of organizational structure could be visible, as the local police and the International Organization for Migration [IOM] were trying to regulate the movement of IT/R as much as possible.

Near to Velika Kladuša there is a refugee camp, which is run by IOM and houses around 700 people. Exact numbers of people living outside of the camp are unknown, but the team I worked

in estimated that there were about 300-400 people living in tents and old houses in and around the village.

In Velika Kladuša different structures or support systems were active. There were lots of local individuals who would help how they could. For example, some squats would be provided with drinking water by neighbors. When IT/R started to come to Velika Kladuša, in 2015, one of the restaurant owners decided to open his restaurant for people on the move to come to have a meal for free. During the time that I was conducting my field research in Velika Kladuša, people were trying to provide people on the move outside the camp as much as possible with basic hygienic products and food. One of the Bosnian people I worked with re-opened a free shop that had been running there before to provide people on the move with clothes.

Living conditions differed a lot between different squats. Some squats were better equipped than others, for example because they had running water. People living in the squats would sometimes make use of showers build from plastic bottles. Some squats had a place to cook, for example on fire, where in others, people would make use of small gas bottles and primus stoves. In some squats there was (old) furniture, and sometimes couches or mattresses, where in others, people would sleep on cartons and blankets.

Picture 3: a squat in Velika Kladuša, photo by Diego Herrera

Video footage from inside the official camp near to Velika Kladuša, showed me that conditions there were not much better. People slept in overcrowded rooms and bathrooms look dirty. From stories of the people I met, I understood that they didn't feel safe within the camp. In particular at night there were a lot of fights, personal belongings got stolen and people felt threatened. Although there should be medical care inside of the camp, people would come to the free shop to ask for basic medical care. From people who arrived new in Velika Kladuša, we would understand that the camp was at full capacity, and that they were told that there was no room for them. On a daily basis, people left the camp to "go on game" and people I met would jump over the fences at night to sleep inside the camp. According to them beds were available in the camp. However, the camp remained "full".

In the town, attitude towards IT/R differed a lot. Some shops and cafés would welcome people on the move, where others didn't allow them to come inside or would follow them around through the shop. One of the café's that was open for IT/R when I arrived in Velika Kladuša, closed for them during the time I was there due to regular fights between IT/R within the café. Others would only allow a few people in, who they've known for a longer period of time. As an owner of one of the bars explained to me in an informal conversation:

> "I lose all my costumers when I allow them to come in, I know it's not good, but what can I do? They only have one cup of coffee during a whole day, things get stolen, and other people who do pay, stay away" (anonymous)[6].

In Velika Kladuša, and in Šid and Bihać, access to medical care was very limited. People who had an identity card from the camp were supposed to get medical care inside the camp, however, as mentioned above, they would come to the free shop for basic medical questions, as for example to change bandage. People who did not have such a card from the camp, told us that they did not receive any medical help in the camp when they would ask for this. However, at the hospital in Velika Kladuša, they were told that they needed to go to the camp to receive medical help. Only in cases of immediate emergency or cases that could not be treated by doctors in the camp they could come to the hospital.

[6] Informal conversation: fieldnotes on 8 March 2019.

4.3. The Game and cooperation between IT/R

The people, IT/R, that I talked with to conduct my field research, had been close to the EU-border between 2 weeks and 11 months. Some of them had been traveling for up to three years before arriving here, others a few months. Mostly depending on their point of departure, varying from arriving to Greece by crossing the Mediterranean Sea, traveling over Turkey to get to Europe, or being able to get a visa to Serbia and starting from there.

Crossing the border was often referred to by IT/R as *game*, or to indicate that they were going to try to cross the border: "game tonight" or "going (to) game". Most of my respondents previously had irregularly crossed (closed) borders before but crossing the Croatian border into the EU seemed especially hard. As one of my respondents explained about the differences between the BiH – Croatia border and other borders:

> "I crossed the borders [before], it's not easy (…) [police] catch you, bring you back, maybe they hit you one time, with hand, with feet. It's normal, (…) for us it's normal, because you cross the border. But with this rage, and this hate, I feel they hate. They have so much [anger] inside" (anonymous)[7].

How many times someone tried to cross the Serbia or BiH border with Croatia, trying to reach the EU, was depending on each individual case. In my conversations with IT/R, three things came forward as most prominent causes of being able to "go on game": traffickers, personal wellbeing and cooperation with others. If they were paying someone to smuggle them into the EU it depended highly on their relationship with the trafficker how often they would be allowed to try to cross the border. Their physical wellbeing at that moment was important for them being able to make it through, especially after a heavy pushback it would take them longer to recover physically to be able to try again or when they went on a game that lasted for up till 15 days, it would take them longer to recover from that. Finding someone to cooperate with to try to cross the border, was depending on personal relationships, trust in one another and ability to collect resources and make a "game plan". Some of my respondents tried crossing the border up to three times a week, others sometimes needed to wait for a month or even longer because of the physical abuse they faced during a pushback and the time they needed to recover from that.

[7] Interview: 02, recorded on 22 March 2019.

To plan a game, people tried to find a group of people to go on game with. In my findings, group sizes varied from 2 – 15 people, but according to reports by BVM, groups take sizes of sometimes up to 25 or even 60 people. The groups who arrived in Velika Kladuša after a pushback, would vary between 1 – 40 people, however, this was not necessarily the same group as they started a game with. How the game was planned varied, most common was to plan a "walking game" within an offline maps application or to pick a point to walk through, and there being picked up by a "taxi" or truck, trying to take public transport from there, or hide inside/on a truck or train.

One of my respondents explained me that they need permission of the trafficker they paid to go on a game. From there, they need to walk for several hours, varying between 3 and 7, after which the trafficker cuts open a truck and lets them hide inside. However, they also explained that the trucks go through a scanner when crossing the border, because of which they often get caught by police officers or border control. He explained to me:

> "The problem is the scanner. When they catch you in Serbia, they send you to the prison. There they ask you for 90 or 120 euro, if you don't give it you need to stay in the prison for 15 days. (…) If you are a minor, if you are older, they catch you and bring you to prison" (Anonymous)[8].

However, according to this respondent, Serbian police was much less violent with them than the Croatian (border) police.

When being pushed back, illegally deported, to BiH or Serbia, IT/R were often returned immediately, especially when they would still be near to the border, but sometimes taken to a police station. When being pushed back from Slovenia to Croatia, IT/R were usually taken to a police station, where they needed to sign a document, indicating in Slovenian that they needed to pay 400-500 euro as a fine for illegally crossing the border, after which they were handed over to Croatian police. Typically, Croatian police would after this deport them to BiH.

People I talked with would make different use of each other's experiences and support each other in different manners. To prepare a *game*, people would try to find a group that was physically strong enough to survive during up to 15 days in the forest, people with useful (material) resources, such as power banks and phones, and with a good plan to enter the EU. As one of my respondents explained to me: "every time we have a good idea, a new idea"[9].

[8] Interview: 01, recorded on 14 March 2019; translated by author.
[9] Interview: 02, recorded on 22 April 2019

However, the few women that I talked with who were traveling by their own, expressed that they felt like nobody wanted to take them, because they were perceived as physically less strong than the (young) man. Besides preparing a route, some of my respondents also talked in advance what they would do when caught by police:

> "[the Croatian police found us] and we were very relaxed, telling him we won't [do anything crazy]. We want to show him that we were not going to do crazy or run away or anything. We spoke Arabic, [before going on this game] when we were with our friends. And we made the agreement that if the police catch us, we have to be very peaceful with them and it is that what we did" (Salah)[10].

Living on the EU border, meant for many IT/R that *the game* was the most prominent conversation topic. One of my respondents expressed that when Croatian (border) police asks him to show the road from where they crossed the border, he would never show them the road they really took, trying to keep this route open for other people on the move. Talking with IT/R after a pushback, they often started to analyze themselves what went wrong during the game, or where they made a fault which led them to being caught. For example: leaving a jacket behind, sleeping too close to the road or making a fire to protect them from cold. One of my respondents explained that he likes to hear stories from others, to learn from and to adjust his strategy on their experiences. Someone else told me that the group he was traveling with and himself afterwards talked about what happened during the game, and how they cope with the discriminative behavior of Croatian (border) police officers:

> "honestly it was, sorry [for this], but we were thinking that those people; they are fucking stupid people. How they, they treat us, and the migrants in general. It is not nice, and we start to, we start actually to critique them and to laugh about how they think" (anonymous)[11].

In the next chapter I will discuss the data that I conducted during my time in Serbia and BiH. By using quotes from the interviews and reports that I collected I will represent the collected data. Based on my theoretical framework and the proposed indicators (see Chapter 3 and appendix 2), I will explain why the collected data can be understood as parts of *repertoires of violence* and on what level the violent behavior against IT/R operates.

[10] BVMR: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019.
[11] Ibidem [ibid.].

5. Repertoires of violence

Within the data, I identified five main areas in which illegalized travelers and/or refugees [IT/R] fall victim to different repertoires of violence. Most of the data that I collected is about the pushbacks by Croatian and Slovenian (border) police, by which IT/R are being illegally expelled into Serbian or Bosnian territory. Hence, this will be the repertoire of violence which I will elaborate about most. However, within my data I identified more repertoires of violence against people on the move, that is: violent repertoires used by traffickers, the denying of access to basic human needs and discrimination, the huge risks people take to be able to cross the EU-border and a repertoire of self-destructive behavior, and finally the *passport* and the *border* as universal concepts which are inherently violent towards people, especially when they want to but are unable to move.

In practice, there is a lot of overlap between these five categories. For example, violence perpetrated by traffickers is interrelated to the violent securitization of Europe, as well as to discrimination in access to an asylum procedure and the pushbacks of IT/R have a strong relation to the possession of a certain passport. However, to be able to analyze, conceptualize and explain my data, I categorized all of my data into one of these five above named categories.

That the violence acts perpetrated towards illegalized travelers/refugees are indeed *repertoires of violence,* can be gleaned from the sentence my informants and respondents often repeated: "No problem, it's normal" or "*nema problema*" (Bosnian/Serbian for "no problem")[12]. This phrase captures the perceived normalcy of the violence perpetrated against them, whether this was about violence perpetrated by police or other actors, not having any food for the day or being denied access to public services as for example hospitals. It indicates that the violence and human rights violations are indeed part of a repertoire of violence against IT/R. The indicators of the concept of *violence* and *repertoires of violence* will be mentioned within this chapter. For an overview see Chapter 3.1.1. or appendix 2. In appendix 4, an overview of the collected reports and interviews is given.

[12] See Fieldnotes on 9 and 20 March 2019.

5.1. Pushbacks by Croatia and Slovenia

As explained in Chapter 2.3., the deportation of IT/R is against international law. Although deportations can happen within a legal framework, everyone should have the chance to claim asylum in any country. The EU, and member states of the EU, all have the right to monitor their borders. However, this does not mean that they have the right to deport anyone who finds themselves within their territories without lawful stay to neighboring countries. The instances of the illegal expulsion of IT/R is referred to as *pushback(s)*.

Over the past few years, several human rights activists and organizations have been reporting on these illegal pushbacks by Croatian and Slovenian authorities (see amongst others: Are you Syrious; NNK, BVM). One of these organizations, BVM, regulates a database in which over 500 reports of illegal pushbacks of IT/R are collected.

Picture 4: still from a video of an alleged pushback, photo published by BVM, December 2018

For a long time, state officials have been denying the illegal deportations of IT/R from Croatia into Slovenia. However, on 9 July 2019 the Swiss news website SRF published an interview with the Croatian President, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, in which she admitted that this is happening (SRF 2019). Nevertheless, she still denied the violations of human rights and that excessive force is used by police against IT/R during these pushbacks (SRF 2019; Tondo 2018; Walker 2019). After this, the ombudsperson of Croatia, Lora Vidović, made public a letter

written by Croatian (border) police officers who remain anonymous. In this letter they state that they are using excessive force, are told to break/steal personal belongings of IT/R and are threatened to do so by loss of their jobs (Vidović Ombudsman.hr 2019; see appendix 3).

During my fieldwork, I observed daily how groups of people would come back to both Šid and Velika Kladuša, after they went *on game*. They were exhausted: dehydrated, hungry, and feeling devastated, telling stories about how Croatian or Slovenian police found them and brought them back to BiH. Within their stories, I identified different repertoires of violence. The illegal deportation in itself can be seen as a repertoire of violence, combined with a repertoire of violence in denying asylum requests, direct physical violence, indirect physical violence, breaking and stealing of personal belongings and psychological violence. Below I will explain these different repertoires of violence that IT/R experienced during a pushback.

In general, their stories of a pushback were about similar experiences. Although the level of violence differed from case to case, all the people I talked with experienced violence during one or multiple games/pushbacks perpetrated by Croatian and/or Slovenian (border) police. When I asked whether police would act violently towards them every time or just sometimes, responses to this were that sometimes the police did not act violently towards them, explained as: "simple treatment, (they) broke (our) phones and let you go, (they) put you on the border and (say that you need to) go (to) Velika (Kladuša), or Bihać"[13]. This mainly indicates the level of violence my respondents normalize. This treatment by police officials still includes violence, in the form of breaking personal belongings and violations of human rights by illegally deporting people. Next to this, it also indicates a *repertoire*: the actor that performs the repertoire seems to make use of routinized act and has control over means to inflict damage on persons or object, based on social identity, EU-citizen and non-citizen, and the organization form of police forces.

In general, a pushback would be described as starting when the IT/R were found by police officials. After which they would either get beaten up or told to sit down, and sometimes threatened using weapons the police were carrying. After that, police officials would ask the IT/R whether they are carrying any weapons, identity papers, phones, power banks and money. In all cases I discussed with my respondents, police did perform a body search. After this, police officials would ask for information about nationality and what they were doing in

[13] Interview: 02, recorded on 11 March 2019.

Croatia/Slovenia. One of my respondents, who had been pushed back an estimated 14 times, explained to me about the procedure:

> "(…) they don't want too much communication with you, so sometimes they communicate with you and sometimes… [they don't]. They ask, 'who speak English', but they don't [speak English]. They don't ask much questions, or you want something or you need something, no. (…) The first question is cellphones, after, "where are you from?", after that they search all your body, all your clothes, all your backpack, and after that they put you in the van and bring you back (…), to the border" (anonymous)[14].

Next, the IT/R were told to wait for, or get into, a police car, which brought them to a police station or to the border with BiH. After expulsion, IT/R are given back (some of) their phones and power banks, but with broken screens and charge points. Most stories that I heard included violent behavior by police officers on the border, for example beating with batons (see also Chapter 5.1.2.). After this, IT/R had to walk 15 – 35 kilometers back to Šid, Bihać or Velika Kladuša. One of my respondents explained how a pushback goes on average:

> "You know, it's the protocol! (…) when they put you in the place to go back (the border), so they have this, this things [baton], they beat and tell you go Velika, and they give him the bag with phones, broken; and power [banks], broke; take yours, [they hit] two times, and you go, fast" (anonymous)[15].

About the pushbacks, my respondents expressed different thoughts and feelings. One of the major issues experienced by them was the amount of surveillance along the border, making them feel powerless and desperate:

> "They can see us from maybe two or three kilometers. They have all the military stuff, we don't have nothing. (...) after all they catch us you know, (...) I don't know what is the problem, with them, with us" (anonymous)[16].

Statements such as "it's the protocol" as well as the frequency of similar stories told to me by people on the move, indicate that the pattern of violence is highly routinized, and therefor thus falls within the concept of *repertoires of violence*. The surveillance along the border, and the

[14] Interview: 02, recorded on 3 March 2019
[15] BVMR: 01, recorded on 20 March 2019.
[16] BVMR: 06, recorded on 1 April 2019.

use of high-tech methodology, by Didier Bigo explained as a "ritual against fear" (2006, 52), can also be understood as a *repertoire of violence*, as the cultural violence that is perpetrated with the moral panic around migration flows, legitimizes both structural and manifest violence against people on the move.

5.1.1. Asylum request

When found by police in Croatia or Slovenia, IT/R would often express that they wanted to ask for asylum in the country. In general, this request was turned down by police officers, who do not have the authority to decide over this matter, with different responses:

> "They [Croatian police] say no and start laughing, like always" (anonymous)[17].

> "He [Croatian police officer of special police] told me that I have to say that [the asylum request] to the police, but the police they didn't speak with us, they didn't spoke with us, nothing" (anonymous)[18].

> "He [Slovenian police officer] say me, "why you don't make asylum in Bosnia?" I say, I need asylum here. (…) and I ask him, I ask him: will you give us to Croatia police, he says "probably""(anonymous)[19].

The outright denial of a request for asylum by a police officer, who legally has no right to do so, constitutes a repertoire of violence, as it denies the refugees' human right to do so. Often with the explanation that it is not the police's work or responsibility:

> "I say to the [Croatian] special police "why you don't give me asylum", and he say, "that is not my work, (it is) big boss work"" (anonymous)[20].

> "We ask for asylum, but they [the Croatian police] say we don't know what is going to happen to you, but they know, they are police men, they know" (anonymous)[21].

[17] BVMR: 01, recorded on 20 March 2019.
[18] BVMR: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019.
[19] BVMR: 03, recorded on 26 March 2019.
[20] BVMR: 10, recorded on 24 April 2019.
[21] Interview: 02, recorded on 22 March 2019.

Some of the people I talked with were even convinced that in Croatia there is "no asylum system". Even though they knew that almost all countries are obligated to ensure the right to ask for asylum to all human beings, that the Dublin-agreement binds the EU member states to this commitment, and that Croatia is a member state of the EU.

In some cases, IT/R were brought to a police station. Although law prescribes that a person in custody has the right to an interpreter or translator in his native language, often these were not available, or were not of any help for them:

> "There (was) translator [Arabic]. I don't know where [he] is from, maybe Iraqi or Sudan, [it was an] old man. He translates for police station but [it] is not help for anything. Translation [translator] not tell anything (…). I told him I want asyl [asylum] here, (…) he told me "just listen, no talk", he won't have [let] me talk" (anonymous)[22].

Within the police stations in Slovenia, IT/R were sometimes told to sign a document, that stated that they needed to pay a fine for up to 400-500 euro for illegally crossing a border. No translation of the document was offered to the IT/R. People that I talked with expressed that they felt threatened into signing the document. One of the people that I met told me that the police officer who told him to sign the document threatened to use a taser on them if they didn't sign the document:

> "No explain, just give me this document, I don't know what is this document. Just give me this document, force for signature, but I don't know what. I am ask you, he didn't told me anything. Because I want to tell you, I want to translate for what I am sign, because I don't know what I am signing, he [Slovenian police officer] told me is no translate" (anonymous)[23].

Sometimes, the document was taken back by police officers after the person had signed the document, for others the document was given to Croatian police, and some people would bring the document back to BiH.

[22] BVMR: 08, recorded on 12 April 2019.
[23] Ibid.

> "He give, is five papers with information and with the penalty, 500 euro, for cross border. (…) He give us [the document] and he, if we leave from police station, he say give me this paper" (anonymous)[24].

> "They give paperwork, but it's not for asyl [asylum], or something, it's just (…) you need to give them 500 euro because you crossed the border illegal. So, they tell you to sign, sign, sign, maybe it's 4 or 5 paper. So, this paper they give to other police, Croatian police, this police take this picture and throw it to the garbage" (anonymous)[25].

Within a legal framework, the document is very useful to make complaints about the treatment of IT/R by Slovenian police officers, as it holds information about involved police officers, police stations, and stating that the person is going to be deported, without any legal process plus got a fine for irregular border crossing.

The above-mentioned reactions to asylum requests, indicate that the denying of access to the asylum procedure, an EU law and Human Rights violation, is part of a *repertoire of violence*. It indicates a relational interaction between different actors (or social identity groups), a routinized act and an act used to make a claim towards someone else. It is violent, in the sense that it is a violation of human rights, and therefor can be understood both as *manifest violence*, as an expressive action, and as *cultural violence*, as it is legitimized through the larger anti-migration discourse/politics.

5.1.2. Direct physical violence

About the pushbacks, many IT/R would testify that the police used physical violence towards them. People who would come back from a pushback often had visible injuries on their bodies, which they would testify were inflicted by Croatian and/or Slovenian police officers. A report by MSF states that the injuries on IT/R their bodies, were patterns of beatings with batons and that it is very likely that these were inflicted by military and/or police officials (Arsenijevic, et. al. 2017; MSF 2017; 20). About what happens when the Croatian police finds them during a game, one of my respondents told me:

> "They come to us, tell us "don't run away, we catch you until Germany", and when they catch us, they start boxing. They learn how

[24] BVMR: 03, recorded on 26 March 2019.
[25] Interview: 02, recorded on 22 March 2019.

> to do boxing on us, we are like sandbags [boxing balls] to them. (…) And that is the problem, we can't do anything, just see, watch how they beat us. When they are with less people, it's not a problem, they put us in the car and take us out with two or three, and they beat, wait for the others [to come out of the van], and beat them too" (anonymous)[26].

Police officers, often dressed in black or dark blue uniforms, sometimes wear a *balaclava* to cover their faces. All of my respondents mentioned police officers using batons, sticks, hands and feet to beat/kick them or fellow IT/R, using pepper spray on them or letting them trip over on the ground on purpose:

> "They beat you. Where she (the baton) go, it's no problem. In your head, in your eye, in your [balls]" (anonymous)[27].

> "They beat him in his face, but it is not a big thing you know [nothing got broken]. Just they beat normal" (anonymous)[28].

Some of my respondents would tell me that they tried to have thick jackets or bags to protect their backs, as they identified the back as the place most likely to be hit with a baton by the police. Four of them expressed that they had been "lucky", as they didn't get any bones broken during a pushback, where friends of theirs experienced much worse than they did. One of my respondents, while showing me a bruise of about 20 centimeters long over his arm, told me:

> "You know, maybe I'm lucky, because they don't break a bone or something. You know, I'm lucky. There is some people, they broke their hand, his leg, his face. They just give me this with the matraque [baton]" (anonymous)[29].

> "We were lucky that they did not hit us [that bad] but we can see on the way that they hit a lot of people" (anonymous)[30].

In the interviews that I held, it became clear that at the deportation point, police officers use systematic strategies to physically abuse people. My findings overlap with previous findings by NNK (NNK Monthly Reports) on "illegal pushback methods". Figure 3, 4, and 5 give an abstract representation of the systematic strategies that are used by police officials when

[26] Interview: 01, recorded on 14 March 2019; translated by author.
[27] Ibid.
[28] BVMR: 02, recorded on 21 March 2019.
[29] Interview: 02, recorded on 22 March 2019.
[30] BVMR: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019.

illegally expelling people into BiH. The illegal expulsions that people reported to me, mostly happened during the night.



Figure 3: pushback method A., illustration by Vivian Erdtsieck



Figure 4: puschback method B., illustration by Vivian Erdtsieck

In figure 3 and 4, it is showed how police officers line up in two rows. The IT/R is forced to walk through the two lines of police officers and expelled over the border between Croatia and BiH. In figure 4, police officers are holding flashlights, making it difficult for the person moving towards the border to see what is happening. In both cases, police officers were hitting the IT/R with batons.

Figure 6 shows a visual representation in which the IT/R is expelled in a different manner. One of my respondents explained this to me:

> "They beat you and they hide. It's like a game. There is the border, on the finish. (…) When you jump here, you see the flashlight, so you run to the other side. The other side, there is a police man with no flashlights, so when you come [bom, bom, bom, makes sound of hitting]. Like a trick, you run from the flashlight you see, other people with no flashlight, they hide until you come. You come and the same thing [hitting]" (anonymous)[31].



Figure 5: pushback method C., illustration by Vivian Erdtsieck

[31] Interview: 02, recorded on 22 March 2019.

References that respondents made, as "just they beat normal", indicate that the manifest violence perpetrated against them is seen as a routinized and normalized act. This indicates that the violence is part of a repertoire. The *illegal pushback methods*, as illustrated in Figure 3, 4 and 5, give the impression that this is not random police violence, but rather that it is organized. The acts can thus be understood as routinized acts of manifest violence that are used to making a claim, based on social identity, social ties and organization forms. Therefore, this is a *repertoire of violence*. Some of my respondents expressed about this that it's not the police officers who are the problem, but that they are following "orders". This corresponds with the few testimonies of Croatian (border) police officers (see: Matejćić 2019; BBC 2019; TRT 2019; Vidović Ombudsman.hr 2019; see appendix 3).

On a question about how they deal with this kind of violence perpetrated against them, I would get different responses. Most of the people I talked with told me it wouldn't stop them from trying to reach the EU. However, when asking how friends of them reacted to this kind of violence, they explained to me that some people "go crazy" or "break" because of this:

> "Every person, every action have a reaction. So, when you do something, there is a reaction after that. Some people they have this rage and this hate, and it is growing inside" (anonymous)[32].

> "The first time, when we walk back to Kladuša, I cried the whole time. But I can't, you know, because they [other IT/R] make fun of me" (anonymous)[33].

Besides falling victim to direct physical violence themselves, many testify that they see or hear that others are got beaten up by police officials. Sometimes violence is perpetrated randomly, for example directly by the first encounter between police and IT/R, sometimes the violence is perpetrated to get information or as a "punishment" for asking questions:

> "So, they, this Afghanistan [people], no one say it is their phone, because the phone have the point of the road. So, no one say it is my phone. All, 17 or 18 people, no one [says something]. So, they beat him. They [we] hear just the noise of the screaming of others. So, they

[32] Interview: 02, recorded on 22 March 2019.
[33] Informal conversation, fieldnotes on 21 March 2019.

> beat them and bring them back to the gym, to the big prison [garage behind police station in Korenica, Croatia]" (anonymous)[34].

> "Yesterday, there come some guys here [into Velika Kladuša], with nothing, the stuff, the clothes, the money, everything [gone]. I think that is because they tried to run away from the [police], so when they catch them they really hit them a lot" (anonymous)[35].

> "Me, my friend [his] telephone [is] good [expensive], after deport [I asked the police officer] "give me telephone please", [but he] pepper spray [to me], [he did] not give me telephone" (anonymous)[36]

Most of the respondents I talked with, explained to me that for them the dehumanizing and disrespectful behavior they face is far worse than the physical violence perpetrated against them (see also Chapter 5.1.5. and 5.4.).

5.1.3. Indirect physical violence

Besides the direct physical violence, IT/R experienced indirect physical violence used against them. One of my respondents explained to me:

> "Sometimes, they let us walk, to say, to use violence with walking. They are behind us with the car and tell us to walk, to make us tired, to break us. So, we can't go further. They take our food and try to exhaust us" (anonymous)[37].

More IT/R told me that they needed to walk great distances without any resources, because of the position on the border from which they were deported by Croatian police:

> "[the Croatian police says] "Velika, 5 kilometers". But it's not 5, it's 20 or maybe 30 kilometers" (anonymous)[38].

> "they put us 16 kilometers from here. (…) So, we walk with 30 kilometers (to cross the border) and then we walk the 16 kilometers

[34] BVMR: 05, recorded on 1 April 2019.
[35] BVMR: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019.
[36] BVMR: 09, recorded on 23 April 2019.
[37] Interview: 01, recorded on 14 March 2019; translated by author.
[38] Interview: 02, recorded on 22 March 2019; translated by author.

> from here. We arrive at night, arrive here almost at three or something, much late. And we were so tired" (anonymous)[39].

> "70 kilometers deport. Me coming in house, help me, one bread [makes 'please' gesture with hands], no bread. (…) After deport; money no, mobile no, food no. (near) Mostar deport, after me going city, all people see food, all people see car, no help, police, they speak police help me, police Bosnia no help" (anonymous)[40].

Many migrants/refugees testified that they were denied access to food, water and a toilet when held for a longer period of time:

> "One day we are in police station, (…) [during night] very, very cold, nothing, no blanket. (…) There is two doors, is closed. After one hour, I "open the door, open the door", not come police, after very pushy, police come. I say I need water and I need to toilet. After he open the door. But I say we are hungry, but they give not food" (anonymous)[41].

> "[in] the car, the police car, the big one. The van, they [we] stay in the van [for] 18 or 19 hours. Like animals. No food, no water, no toilet, no nothing, with 10 people" (anonymous)[42].

During transport by police officials, people I talked with experienced that the driver was driving very wildly, which made them feel unwell:

> "[I] sit in car, not see [anything]. At deport, and the car, all people there is [nauseous], and after, two [people vomit]" (anonymous)[43].

Besides this, people I talked with would mention forced exposure to low temperatures and cold water, which can be exhausting and painful for the body, and with extreme weather even be life threatening. Some respondents said they were forced to undress in low temperatures, others describe that they were forced to go into (cold) water (see *Figure 6: pushback method D.)*:

> "We come, one by one, we go from the car. And the police is like "go, go, go, motherfuckers, go", *poem*, in this water, all wet. All water, very cold, very cold, (…) all night. O God, this place. (…) problem" (anonymous, describing how six police officers kicked him and the

[39] BVMR: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019
[40] BVMR: 09, recorded on 23 April 2019.
[41] BVMR: 10, recorded on 24 April 2019.
[42] BVMR: 01, recorded on 20 March 2019.
[43] BVMR: 09, recorded on 23 April 2019.

group he was traveling with into a river, *see figure 6: pushback method D.*, based on a drawing during the interview)[44].



Figure 6: pushback method D., illustration by Vivian Erdtsieck

Overall, IT/R that I interviewed argued that police officials did not care about their wellbeing or their (physical) safety. As the quote below indicates, the composition of the group of IT/R made no difference in this regard:

> "But Croatia, [they] treat you like animal. With family, with kids, they don't care about nobody. (…) The last night [game], it was with a woman from Syria and his daughter, 14 years, and 2 little [children]. They put us in the jungle, in the middle of the night, and they don't care about the family. They don't care about the women, they don't care about the children, they don't care about the daughter. (translated from Arabic:) I would never be able to live with myself if I would do something like that. (…) They put us on the border around one or two in the night, (…) and they tell us you must walk from here for 5 or 6 kilometers, but you know, it is 35-kilometer walking, 7 kilometers with feet, after you can take a bus. But you must sleep in the wood, it is

[44] BVMR: 11, recorded on 26 April 2019.

> night, until the morning, until the bus come. That is, really like animals you know. (…) it's not a human" (anonymous)[45].

The indirect physical violence perpetrated against my respondents, can be understood as an act of manifest violence. The violence perpetrated is not directly visible, but does include an act of physical hurt, that is both instrumental, as it makes people scared, and expressive, as it gives a message that one is not welcome. That multiple people I talked with experienced this kind of treatment, indicates that there is a routinized act, in which one actor has control over means to inflict damage on persons/objects. Therefore, this can be understood as a *repertoire of violence*.

5.1.4. Stealing and breaking of personal belongings

In general, IT/R returning to Šid or Velika Kladuša after a game/pushback, would have broken screens and broken charge points on their phones and power banks. Respondents explained to me:

> "He took me to the border, but there, we have some best friend, he broke the phone first [with a baton], and after he give me the phone and he told me "go to Bosnia, back"" (anonymous)[46].

> "these police, they take phone, money, power bank. Ali-baba [slang for stealing], sleeping bag, backpack" (anonymous)[47].

When talking about pushbacks by Croatian and/or Slovenian police officials, they also testified that their money, phones and power banks would get stolen and/or broken and their other personal belongings, as for example shoes, backpacks and sleeping bags, would get stolen or set on fire:

> "They ask us for everything, money, if we had. We told them we don't have, only one friend of us told them he had 20 euros. Because, we were hiding our money in our underwear, because we heard that they took also the money sometimes, so we said we don't have money. (…) Then when we arrive at the border, they give us the small plastic bag where there is the power banks and the telephone, but they were taking

[45] BVMR: 04, recorded on 30 March 2019.
[46] Ibid.
[47] BVMR: 09, recorded on 23 April 2019.

> one of our power bank. It was the big one of 20.000, this one they took it from us, they stole us, they took" (anonymous)[48].

> [when deported to Bosnia] "They give all the phone, coming down in the water [river], (…) we go, and police throw bag [into the water], "here take your phone", (…) you find your phone in the water. (…) The money, we not see money. (…) they take from me 50 [euro] and another 20, another 10 euro and one 150 euro, they all took over 200 euro" (anonymous)[49].

Sometimes, IT/R would leave a backpack or phone on the border after a deportation, for example if they dropped it trying to run away from the police and were too scared to go back. Photos from video footage on deportation points, shows a large collection of (broken) phones, screens, backpacks, jackets and more (see TRT 2019; BBC 2019).

Picture 5: phones after a game, photo by Adis Imamovic Pixi, Velika Kladuša (NNK 2018)

One of my respondents explained to me:

> "Now it is better I walk without a phone. (…) Every time you can buy a new phone, again. (…) No power bank, no phone. I already bought 5- or 6-times new clothes, now I have these clothes and that is all I have. Because police, and people here who have the power, when they

[48] BVMR: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019.
[49] BVMR: 11, recorded on 26 April 2019.

> see you have nice clothes, good clothes, who have the power take them. What they like with clothes or phones, (…) they take it. (…) Here, we get a sleeping bag, for in the nights, they give to us, but when we take the sleeping bag, or the tents [on a game], the Serbian [Croatian] police come, and they burn everything. (…) we have a backpack, Red Bull, monster, energy stuff, they take for themselves, phones also, power banks also, what they like they take for themselves. For themselves, and the other things they set on fire" (anonymous)[50].

Also, IT/R told me that police officers would make abuse of their necessity for basic human needs, such as food, for their own benefits inside the police station:

> "He (police officer) ask me "do you want some food or anything?" He told me, you can give me money. I give him 10 euro, but no come back, no anything. He take me 10 euro (laughs) but don't give me any food, no. No food, no money (laughs)" (anonymous)[51].

Besides power banks, phones and money, multiple people also told me that the Croatian police destroyed or took their documentation:

> "When I open the bag [that I got from the Croatian police], I see my passport. When I open it, the first page with my picture and surname and name, they take it [rip it off]" (anonymous)[52].

> "The first time when they [Croatian police] search them, they took everything. They take his passport, Moroccan passport. [They take] any paper, id-card, any paper has your identity, your picture, name, surname, you can't take it back. (…) Driver's license, from Spain and Morocco. Is this legal? (…) They don't give it back, never" (anonymous)[53].

In a letter written by a police officer, which was recently made public by the ombudsperson of Croatia, it is stated that police officers are told to take or break personal belongings such as phones, power banks and money, to leave no trace of the IT/R ever having been in Croatian territory (Vidović Ombudsman.hr 2019; see appendix 3).

Although the breaking and stealing of personal belongings is no direct act of physical hurt, it does fall within the definition of manifest violence, as it is a visible, instrumental and expressive

[50] Interview: 01, recorded on 14 March 2019; translated by author.
[51] BVMR: 08, recorded on 12 April 2019.
[52] Interview: 02, recorded on 22 March 2019.
[53] BVMR: 01, recorded on 20 March 2019.

action, that inflicts damage on an object. That this happened to almost everyone coming back to Šid or BiH, also shows that it is a routinized act in which an actor inflicts damage on an object, which fits within the culturally sanctioned and empirically limited set of options to make a claim towards another identity group, This makes that the breaking and stealing of personal belongings can be understood as a *repertoire of violence*.

5.1.5. Psychological violence

Apart from the direct and indirect physical violence, people I talked with experienced emotional distress or psychological violence. An example of this is the use of balaclavas. The person wearing the balaclava is no longer recognizable and interaction through facial expression is impossible. This dehumanizes the person and makes him/her more threatening.

Multiple people expressed that they felt like they were under constant surveillance. Especially with the high-tech equipment that they thought Croatian and Slovenian border control used, such as infrared cameras and movement detectors. Besides this, they expressed to felt threatened by (border) police officials:

> "[they were] with seven police men, all with the gun, a big gun" (anonymous)[54].

> "One friend of me, told me 'they are going to hit us'. I told him: put your jacket [over your back], like you cannot feel bad more. (…) I think that he was very, very scared. Also me, I just control my scare to not shock my friend" (anonymous)[55].

The behavior of (border) police officers, was often described as threatening and disrespectful:

> "Nobody speaks with us from the part of the police. (…) The first thing that we saw after he open the car, that was one old man, police man (…). But with the one stick in his hand, the black one, and he was all of the time doing with his hand, smashing, smashing [the] other hand [with the baton]. I am sure that he was meant something, it was not something by accident, but like he wanted to tell us "I am in the power,

[54] BVMR: 03, recorded on 26 March 2019.
[55] BVMR: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019.

> I can do everything". They [the police] were "okay, hajde, hajde [Croatian for 'go'], quickly"" (anonymous)[56].

> "In Kladuša going game, in night going in route, going in jungle [forest], and then "bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang" [makes sound of fire shot in the air]. (…) me, "bang", [I say] "Stop! Stop! Stop!'" (anonymous, describing police firing shots in the air when they find them)[57].

> "the second police [second police car to arrive] is very, very big racist. The first police [which arrived], they speak normal, normal question, but the other police; big racist. (Impersonating shouting police officer) "Motherfuckers, what are you doing here, stand up, take your jacket, take your shoes". (…) O my God, we are no terrorist. (…) Not nice this [police officers], (impersonating shouting police officer) "Fuck off motherfuckers, what are you doing in my fucking country, go back to your country, why you come here?", nothing is good, I go to Slovenia, I am not going to stay in your country" (anonymous)[58].

Multiple people told me that police officials would take pictures of them and that they felt humiliated by them because of this. One person said he was worried about coming across the same police officer again, because after taking his picture the police officer told him to "never let his face see there again"[59]. Besides this, they expressed that their privacy was violated, as police officers would search through their phones, for locations in maps applications, but also through Facebook messenger, WhatsApp and images on the phone.

One of my respondents told me that in the police station, a female police officer came to him to perform a body search on him. He expressed to the present police officers that this made him feel uncomfortable and asked if it was possible to have a male officer do the body search. He told me that the police officers started laughing at him and that the woman performed the body search on him anyway.

Previous reports on pushbacks, from NNK and of BVM, show that such gender inappropriate behavior towards women is also common. Women are forced to take off their hijab, undress, under the pretext of a body search. Reports from NNK also show that women feel that they

[56] BVMR: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019.
[57] BVMR: 09, recorded on 23 April 2019.
[58] BVMR: 11, recorded on 26 April 2019.
[59] BVMR: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019.

were inappropriately touched by male police officers when performing a body search[60] (NNK Monthly Reports). One of the people I met, who was traveling with his wife and two young kids, told me that in the police station in Zagreb, police officials had told his wife to take off her hijab. When she refused, they tried to take off her hijab by force.

The behavior by police officials that was perceived as threatening, humiliating and dehumanizing by my respondents, can be understood as a repertoire of violence. The behavior is both manifest violent, as it is an instrumental and expressive action that enforces damage, and cultural violence, as language is used in a manner that is discriminative, dehumanizing and humiliating, with this legitimizing direct and structural violence against IT/R.

5.1.6. Remarks on pushbacks

The data presented above indicate that the illegal pushbacks against IT/R are holding different repertoires of violence perpetrated by police officials. A few of the people I spoke with told me that sometimes they would meet a nice police officer:

> "there was one police man, he was nice, he talk nice with me, all different questions. (…) he say me: "excuse me for that", I say "I know, this is your job"" (anonymous)[61].

> "we wait with them, later the man [police officer] (…) he was little, little polite with us, we could have kind of discussion, familiar discussion. He was very good person. And we asked him for asylum, but he said it was not his business, he said we had to ask for that to the police. We ask him if they are going to hit us (…). I think he was loving our reaction because that we didn't run away, we didn't call him, we were very polite, my friend was, they were very intelligent, like even the cigarette they ask can we smoke a cigarette, and they said yes. Like kind of, you know we already tried to make luck with them [police officer]. (…) they [police officer] told me, what are you doing in your job? I told him I am a teacher. And he said that his wife also, she is a teacher, and he becomes kind of familiar in discussion" (anonymous)[62].

> "[the police officer said] sit down, sit down, stay (…), you want to drink, cigarettes, sit down and no problem. Then in the police station,

[60] The inappropriate touching by police officials would be more appropriate to include within Chapter 5.1.2. However, as this is not data that I collected myself, or have personal testimonies on, I decided to leave it out of this analysis.
[61] BVMR: 03, recorded on 26 March 2019.
[62] BVMR: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019.

> and he take to doctor, and another say you go to the camp in Croatia, he is good. (…) After two minutes maybe come other police [not so good]" (anonymous)[63].

Or that they didn't blame individual police officers for their behavior:

> "[about police officials] you need to understand him, why he does these things. So maybe he has something in childhood, something you know, so I never see this man do this thing and just judge him. Yes, you are bad, maybe he is a good man, but in a bad situation" (anonymous)[64].

However, these few exceptions, in these examples, human rights are still violated. Repertoires of violence, including the illegal deportations, the direct and indirect physical violence, stealing and breaking personal belongings and psychological violence, indicate a structural pattern of violence towards IT/R who are trying to reach the EU by crossing the Serbia or BiH border with Croatia, into Slovenia, towards a safer place within the EU. The above-named repertoires are consistent with findings in reports of NGOs who have been working in the field for the past 3-4 years (see for an overview of these reports: https://pushbackmap.org/).

The human rights that are violated during these pushbacks are that police officials, who are not the ones to determine if someone has will have a refugee status in the future, prohibit individuals from applying for asylum, which is a general infringement of the Geneva convention and a violation of international (EU) law. The collective expulsion of groups, as during the pushbacks, denies individuals the right to a fair process concerning their request for international protection. The principle of non-refoulement is not respected, and sometimes a penalty is given for irregular border crossing, even though this is not allowed under international law if the person wants to ask for asylum.

Besides this, the excessive violence used against irregular travelers and refugees, consisting out of indirect and direct physical violence, the stealing and breaking of personal belongings and psychological violence, is in no way legitimized. As often no reports are made of the pushbacks and state officials have for a long time denied that the irregular travelers and refugees were on their territory or borders, the people that I talked with are placed in an extralegal position: they often fall outside legal frameworks, as it is hard for them to prove that they were within the territory and asked for international protection.

[63] BVMR: 11, recorded on 26 April 2019.
[64] Interview: 02, recorded on 22 March 2019.

5.2. Human trafficking and traffickers

In informal conversations, multiple people have told me about their relationship with human traffickers, and the amount of money they paid them to be brought into the EU. Amounts differed between 600 euro from BiH into Croatia, until 6000 euro from Serbia to Western Europe in which success was "guaranteed". Most amounts were between 2000 and 2500 euro from Serbia/BiH to Slovenia or Italy. However, not everyone would always "go on game" with a trafficker, they would also try to go on their own. Besides this, people would buy travel documents, which costs about 700 to 1200 euro, depending on the quality of the document[65].

People who were with a trafficker expressed to me that they couldn't go without the trafficker because they were threatened by them of because of different power relations. It would often happen that traffickers would "give permission to go on game" to a selected group of about 30-40 people. At multiple, seemingly random points, people would get sent back by the traffickers. Besides this, it would often happen that a taxi didn't show up or that a game was cancelled at the last minute[66]:

> "I give all my money now to one person, for to put me out of here. I give him 600 euro. My family, they have sent him this money, [but now] he don't take the phone. Yesterday (…) he must come to Glina [Croatia], but he doesn't come" (anonymous)[67].

> "(about the success rate of traveling with a trafficker) 70 percent you go; 30% police catch you. And this (trafficker that the respondent payed 2500 in cash), I think maybe he go, maybe nothing" (anonymous)[68].

Some of the people I talked with had made a money transfer, that could only be picked up by the trafficker after they successfully crossed a border, others had paid in cash and sometimes never heard of the trafficker again. At some point, when I was working in Velika Kladuša, we heard multiple stories from people who paid around 1500 euro per person to a local Bosnian

[65] Fieldnotes: 6, 8, 10-12, 16 and 25 March 2019 and 2 April 2019; BVMR: 11, recorded on 26 April 2019; Interview: 01, recorded on 14 March 2019.
[66] Fieldnotes: 6, 8, 10-12, 16 and 25 March 2019 and 2 April 2019; Interview: 01, recorded on 14 March 2019.
[67] BVMR: 04, recorded on 30 March 2019.
[68] BVMR: 11, recorded on 26 April 2019.

citizen, after which this person had disappeared. However, the IT/R were unable to go to the police or any other organization to declare what had happened to them[69].

Besides the dependency relation upon traffickers, some of my respondents expressed that they had violent encounters with traffickers, or that traffickers would behave violently towards them or others. During my fieldwork, a few of my informants had pointed out to me certain people as part of the trafficking-network. Some of these people I saw acting violently towards others without a clear or direct cause. Four of the people that I met had to stay in the hospital for multiple days as a result of stab wounds and beatings by someone who was, according to them, part of the traffickers' network[70]:

> "It is hard to live here. There are a few people who have the power, that are the smugglers, and you don't see it, but they are afraid of nothing. They beat, take money and belongings in the squat. (…) They are in a group and we are not good here with them. Being a refugee, you want to run away from danger, but when you come here, it is more dangerous than in your own country. The people here [traffickers], they hit you, with a knife (anonymous)[71].

Next to the direct violence, in Šid, entrance to the squat was denied to people who were not from Afghanistan. Therefore, people from other origins were unable to make use of the humanitarian aid provided by No Name Kitchen: two meals a day, clothes, and other non-food items.

In the violence perpetrated by traffickers, we can see *manifest*, *structural* and *cultural violence.* The *manifest violence* is perpetrated in the form of physical violence, as beating and stabbing, the stealing of personal belongings and blackmailing. The limited access for specific social identity groups to a squat where humanitarian aid is provided can be seen as structural violence, as it lowers the level of need satisfaction for some social groups, below what is possible. Besides this, the discriminative discourse against people from other social groups, based on religion, ideology and language, can be seen as *cultural violence*, used to legitimize the *manifest* and *structural violence*. All the forms of violence perpetrated by traffickers can be understood as a *repertoire of violence*, as it is a routinized act used to make claims against others, based on social identity, social ties and organizational forms (networks). The perpetrating actor has

[69] Fieldnotes: 22 April 2019
[70] Fieldnotes: 10 and 13 March 2019 and 2 April 2019.
[71] Interview: 01, recorded on 14 March 2019; translated by author.

control over means to inflict damage on persons/objects, which is used to make meaning (discourse).

5.3. Denying access and discrimination

During my fieldwork, I observed different forms of discrimination against IT/R. For example: one evening I was walking back from the squat with two colleagues and three people from Afghanistan. We stopped at an evening shop to buy something to drink. When we wanted to walk away an older woman started talking to us in Serbian, while pointing at the fridge with drinks from the shop. We didn't understand what she said, but one of the guys I was walking with thought she wanted to have a drink. He walked to the fridge to get a coke, paid for it and gave the coke to her. However, she started shouting at us, until the owner of the shop came out to see what was happening. The owner, who spoke English, calmed her down and afterward explained to us that she was accusing us of stealing from the store. This discrimination would manifest in various places: people were refused in restaurants, bars and shops, but also to enter hospitals and make use of public transport[72].

In Velika Kladuša, people who would hang around in the park would be told to "go camp", and not be allowed to be in the streets without reason. Often, there was a police raid in one of the squats. From people who came from Bihać we heard stories about police using random violence during the nights against IT/R who were outside of the official refugee camp. However, the official camps would refuse new people into the camp as they were "at maximum capacity"[73]:

> "it is the same with [Bosnian] police. They say to you "go to the camp", and the camp say, "you can't sleep here". What you do?" (anonymous)[74].

Only in cases of emergency would the hospital accept IT/R. When someone needed to go to the hospital, one of the people I was working with would go with them, to ensure they would be treated by a doctor. One of the people I met broke his leg during a game, however the ambulance staff refused to drop him off in the city center or near the hospital, which was close to the place where he lived. Instead they brought him to the official camp, a 50-minute walk from the

[72] Fieldnotes: 10, 11, 20 March 2019 and 20 April 2019.
[73] Ibid.
[74] BVMR: 04, recorded on 30 March 2019.

hospital, and they told him he could walk back if he didn't want to stay in the camp. However, the camp refused to let him in because of their "full"[75].

In public transport from Sarajevo to Bihać or Velika Kladuša, police would enter the bus and ask people they thought might be an IT/R for their travel documents. Everyone without a valid identity card would be ordered to leave the bus. There was no refund given for the bus ticket, and people would be "left in the middle of nowhere"[76]. When I was traveling from Sarajevo to Velika Kladuša by bus, police entered the bus about 65 kilometers from Velika Kladuša. Two people of color and myself were the only three people in the full bus to be asked for identity papers. The two others who got asked for identity papers didn't have any with them and were ordered to leave the bus. I ran into them a couple of days later in Velika Kladuša, and they told me that they had walked all the way to Velika Kladuša without being able to prepare themselves by taking food or water[77]. Taxis generally refused to drive people, even when shown the money beforehand, and even to families with young kids who were unable to walk great distances, for example from the official camp to the city center[78].

Most shops, bars and restaurants would refuse IT/R to come inside. There were a few who did allow my respondents to come inside. However, some of them were closing due to regular fights between people within the bars. In stores, IT/R were sometimes told to leave their bags at the entrance or were followed around by staff throughout the shop:

> "It is not so good now [in BiH], because you don't can to stay in any café. He [hotel owner] put you out from hotel, you saw it today. He [IT/R] give 100 euro for hotel and after he [hotel owner] say go out from here" (anonymous)[79].

Discrimination of people from a specific social identity group, in this case IT/R, can be seen as *cultural violence*. The denial of access to medical care, clean drinking water and food, can be understood as *structural violence*, as it lowers the levels of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible, and as a *repertoire of violence* perpetrated by state officials who are responsible for the general care of all people in their territory, as well as those who refuse entrance of people on the move to safer countries.

[75] Fieldnotes: 6 April 2019.
[76] Fieldnotes 20 April 2019; BVMR: 09, 23 April 2019.
[77] Fieldnotes: 20 April 2019.
[78] Fieldnotes: 25 March 2019.
[79] BVMR: 04, recorded on 30 March 2019.

Picture 6: refugees in the squat in Šid, photo published by NNK on Facebook

The relation between local Bosnian/Serbian citizens and IT/R differed a lot from person to person. In Velika Kladuša, there were a lot of people actively involved in supporting people on the move. As mentioned in Chapter 4.2., a lot of the people I talked with noted that they had received support in different forms from the citizens of the village:

> "Bosnian people, they don't have too much money, but you know, they are good, but now they are little stressed form the situation" (anonymous)[80].

However, clashes between IT/R and Bosnians would occur as well as between IT/R and international volunteers and between the local citizens and international volunteers. This relational aspect is unfortunately beyond the scope of this research, however, my informal conversations made it clear that in the perception of some, international volunteers did more harm than good, violating the *do no harm principle* of humanitarian aid work.

As a local Bosnian citizen, who is highly involved in the support of people on the move in Velika Kladuša, expressed on his Facebook:

[80] BVMR: 04, recorded on 30 March 2019.

> "Several times people, (western) 'volunteers' asked me how I can cope with their smell. This humans (not 'volunteers'), are sisters and brothers. My question is: how the fook [fuck] can you cope with yours, stank? And yours sorry ass life?" (Adis Imamovic Pixi)[81].

5.4. Risk taking and self-destructive behavior

When "going on game", IT/R take high risks to enter the EU. Because it is unknown exactly how many people "go on game" every year, and people disappear in different systems, exact figures on deaths during the game are unknown. However, the death of a friend during a game came up during several interviews/reports. In the database of the BVM, several reports can be found in which it is stated that someone died.

People go out into the woods in dangerously low temperatures and during heavy rainfall. Often, they don't have much choice in which road to take, and the roads they take are dangerous for several reasons. As my respondents explained to me:

> "There is a [minefield warning] sign there, a lot, but you don't have another way" (anonymous)[82].

> "There is a river with big water, we want to go Monday, but there is a big water on Monday, after we cross on Tuesday" (anonymous)[83].

> "I was the first crossing the river, but all something [it was] crazy cold. It was my first time to think to come back [to my country]. And I was going to come back [to the others], but my friend start to call "no, continue, continue". I was really become crazy with the cold. I finish and they couldn't even put my feet inside of my shoes. I keep taking my shoes with my hand and then run. And I don't feel what happened down, because it is so cold. So fucking cold" (anonymous)[84].

One of my respondents told me about how his 19-year-old friend, Mehdi, drowned in a river during the last game they went on. Shortly after, the Slovenian police caught the group. The respondent made a request to IOM to send him back to his country of origin. Now, almost 5 months later, he is still waiting for IOM to comply his request:

[81] Facebook page of Adis Imamovic Pixi, 9 July 2019.
[82] BVMR: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019.
[83] BVMR: 10, recorded on 24 April 2019.
[84] BVMR: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019.

> "I'm tired of this Europe, I back to my country is better for me. My friend died to arrive in Europe. Can I meet you after tomorrow, excuse me, my friend is dead on a river in Slovenia, [I] am under shock. I need cry, cry, cry, cry and sleep, maybe I forget that" (anonymous)[85].

> "He died in a river (…) I say him, don't go in this way, go with me in other side, and he go. [the river was] very strong. He has two sides, in this side, the water is very strong, other side is good, where I cross" (…) "The [Slovenian] police, he didn't make anything [when I told them that my friend is dead], they didn't do anything with that" (anonymous)[86].

Unfortunately, this was not the only case of someone who had died during a game. During my fieldwork, two people got electrocuted trying to jump onto a train and multiple videos of people who had frozen to death in the Croatian/Slovenian woods were circulating on Facebook. It can be hard for remaining family members to find the body of the person who died during a game:

> "My friend last week, he was 10 days [in game], death. In Slovenia, in border Slovenia-Croatia this water, he is death now. (…) but they, his family, don't know what happened. In [name of country] contact, embassy Croatia and Slovenia, but not find it" (anonymous)[87].

Apart from the high risks people take to arrive in Europe, I observed self-destructive behavior amongst IT/R. People were abusing (prescription) drugs and had scars of previous self-inflicted wounds, mostly caused by razor blades (referred to as the Gillette-problem by respondents), especially amongst unaccompanied minors between 14-17 years of age that I met[88]. One of my respondents explained the drug abuse of others in the following way:

> "The situation is not good, (…) they feel rage. This things they stay inside him. (…) Every time he have nightmare, after he can't sleep at night, because of this [pushbacks]. (…) it follows you, all your life. After this road you need a medical [psychotherapist]" (anonymous)[89].

One of the people that I met was often under influence of prescribed *downers* in the evenings. He explained to me that he was doing all right before, but that it got hard on him in BiH:

[85] Facebook messenger, 24 March 2019.
[86] BVMR: 03, recorded on 26 March 2019.
[87] BVMR: 11, recorded on 26 April 2019.
[88] Fieldnotes: 8, 12 and 13 March 2019 and 25 April 2019.
[89] Interview: 02, recorded on 22 March 2019.

> "Croatia, it is where your dream [is] broken. It's too much, it's really broke. It's like you, like it is finished [meaning death in slang]. (…) I'm just so tired you know" (anonymous)[90].

During my fieldwork, multiple people expressed to me how tired they were of the situation and that they felt like they were no longer able to continue like this[91]:

> "If I don't cross the border this month, I will kill myself. It has been too long that I didn't take care of my family. I don't deserve this life anymore" (anonymous)[92].

Being away from family or not being able to do anything for them, and the inhumane treatment by Slovenian and Croatian officials seemed to be the hardest for the people that I met. Some of the people I talked with even seemed to have internalized an image of themselves as less worth than others. When I would meet new people, often they would start to introduce themselves with an explanation of how they are not stealing from other people, not acting violently and not having kind of terrorist motive:

> "I hate them [Croatian officials], it's not good. It's not legal, when you do this things [violence perpetrated by police] to other people. I say to myself, I can't do this things to other people, to take something and just, just… for fun. They do this for funny things, after this, when you go, they take a bottle of drink or wine or something, so they start laughing, you know. It's funny. For them it's funny" (anonymous)[93].

> "Police Croatia and Slovenia (shaking his head), they look at me, all person see animal" (anonymous)[94].

The high risks that people are forced to take in order to reach a safer place can be understood as a *repertoire of violence*. The securitization of the EU makes irregular border crossing more and more dangerous. As Gerard and Pickering argue: the closing of borders doesn't stop people on the move but makes the routes they have to take more dangerous (2013, 355). It is violent on both a *manifest*, *structural* and *cultural* level, as it inflicts physical hurt, lowers the level of needs satisfaction below what is possible and is based upon anti-migration discourse. The self-

[90] BVMR: 04, recorded on 30 March 2019.
[91] Fieldnotes: 14, 22 and 30 March 2019 and 2 April 2019.
[92] Notes on paper relating to interview: 01; 14 March 2019.
[93] Interview: 02, recorded on 22 March 2019.
[94] BVMR; 09, recorded on 23 April 2019.

destructive behavior of some, can be understood as a *repertoire of manifest violence* against the self. It is a visible, instrumental and expressive action that inflicts physical pain/damage and can be seen as a *repertoire*, because it is a routinized act within a culturally sanctioned and limited set of options, in which the actor takes control over means to inflict damage on him/herself. This behavior is often copied, or learned, from others by observation and can be used to express oneself or make socially meaningful claims.

5.5. The passport and the border

As demonstrated in Chapter 5.1., the passport and the *border* both made a lot of difference in the daily life of my respondents. When I mentioned that a colleague drove to Croatia to pick up someone, one of my informants responded "you make it sound so easy, just going to Croatia, like that"[95], highlighting the discriminative nature of both the passport and the *border*.

Another respondent expressed to me his inability to understand how the concept of borders is made so important in modern days:

> "Borders, it's just here [pointing to head]. There is no border, it's a planet with no border. Borders it's just, we make the borders. But God, when he create the planet, he don't create border, just the planet. Just, we create the border, with the first war, the second war, so we create this problem. So the human, the human it's the first problem on this earth. (…) There is no border to me, why this border, to keep what? To keep other people [from] to enter to you country, what do you have in your country and we don't have?" (anonymous)[96].

Discrimination based on the kind of passport they possess came back in multiple interviews/reports. Respondents would express how their passport would hold them back from going where they wanted to go and articulate feelings of anger and despair relating to their passport[97]:

> "This fucking passport. (…) My friend say to me "don't broke it", but I want to burn it. It's my identity, I want to burn it. I want to burn my… it's not my fucking identity. I don't care about no country, no religion. I am Muslim, but I am [a] good one. I just want to live with good

[95] Fieldnotes: 30 March 2019.
[96] Interview: 02, recorded on 14 March 2019.
[97] BVMR: 04, recorded on 30 March 2019; BVMR: 07, recorded on 3 April 2019; Interview: 02, recorded on 22 March 2019.

> people, I don't care. (…) What can I say? (…) Just say to me, where I have to go to live in peace, and there I go. How I can go there. Please, I can't go anywhere with this [passport] (anonymous)[98].

> "[during a pushback, the police officer said to us] "now you know, you are illegal". I said to him, we are illegal all over this world, we hear this, even if you go in Italy or Swiss, they say the same thing" (anonymous)[99].

Picture 7: refugees looking at the border from Velika Kladuša, photo by Diego Herrera

During pushbacks, sometimes fingerprints and headshots were taken, and people would express their fear of getting caught in Croatia or Slovenia, which would endanger their possibilities to ask for asylum in other EU member states where relatives of them were living, because of the Dublin-agreement and the Eurodac system. This emphasizes the increased relationship between the body and the passport. As described in an article by Didier Bigo (2006), the relation between the body and the passport is more intensified with new technologies of control. Giving an impression of "technological neutrality", were in reality, the detection mechanism of "irregular behavior" is heavily based upon western cultural norms.

[98] Ibid.
[99] BVMR: 04, 30 March 2019.

Both the passport and the border can be understood as *cultural violence*, and in the case of my respondents, also legitimized *manifest* and *structural violence* perpetrated against them. They can be seen as a repertoire as they are based on social identity, social ties and organization forms, routinized by all nation-states, used to make meaning about the territory of a nation-state and used to make claims on that territory, on norms of belonging and not belonging, creating an in- and outgroup.

6. Conclusion and Discussion

For my analytical framework, I choose to use the concept of *repertoires of violence*, as this enables me to conceptualize the experiences of my respondents beyond functionalist approach towards violence, within a multi-causal framework towards studying mechanisms. The concept of *repertoires of violence* incorporates both structural constants and variables, as well as relational interaction between different actors or social identity groups, and the process of meaning making by these actors (see Chapter 3.1.3.). A *repertoire of violence* is a subset of acts that are routinized by a group in order to make claims. A repertoire is what "we know how to do" within a culturally sanctioned and empirically limited set of options. Repertoires draw upon (social) identities, social ties and organizational forms and can be learned from watching others (see Chapter 3.1.1.). Below I will first answer the main question of this research, and second discuss the results of this research and the interpretation of these results.

6.1. Conclusion

The main question that I will answer in this conclusion is: What different repertoires of violence are experienced by illegalized travelers and refugees along the European Union border between Serbia or Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia?

Within the data as presented in Chapter 5., we can see that IT/R along the EU border between Serbia or BiH and Croatia experience different repertoires of violence, on different levels of violence, perpetrated by different actors (see appendix 5 for a schematic representation of the data as presented in Chapter 5.). Chapter 5., shows how IT/R fall victim to *repertoires of manifest violence*, *repertoires of structural violence* and *repertoires of cultural violence*.

Towards *repertoires of manifest violence*, it is shown that respondents are forced to deal with violence perpetrated by official authorities, such as Croatian and Slovenian (border) police, but also to manifest violence within the own social identity group (intragroup), as for example by traffickers, and between social identity groups (intergroup), through for example the discrimination they face by other social identity groups. We can see that *manifest violence* occurs in different forms which all are visible, instrumental and expressive actions. This includes the breaking and stealing of personal belongings, acts of physical hurt or damage, humiliation, and violations of human rights.

On *repertoires of structural violence*, we can see that violence is perpetrated by the same set of actors: respondents fall victim to structural violence intergroup, intragroup and by state officials. The *structural violence* perpetrated against IT/R includes the limited access to clean drinking water, food and medical care, which lowers the needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible.

In-depth analysis of *repertoires of cultural violence* fall largely outside the scope of this research. However, the act of border control and bordering in itself can be understood as a repertoire of cultural violence. As explained in Chapter 3.1.2., borders are more than just territorial demarcation lines. They represent social, cultural and psychological difference between what is the Self and what is the Other. The practice of bordering involves acts of boundary drawing between the in- and outgroup. Statecrafting, as a manner to promote and reinforce national identity, also happens on the EU level. As El-Shaarawi and Razsa argue: "violence is at the heart of the European project" (2018, 3; see Chapter 2.1.); as the militarized border practices of the EU stimulate a racialized formation of normative EU-identity. This can be understood as a repertoire of cultural violence, as it stimulates a discriminative and anti-migration discourse, within the cultural and symbolic sphere of our communities. The EU-project as an ideology in itself, created by religion, language and shared history, is used to justify and legitimize acts of direct and structural violence against those who are constructed as "not belonging to Europe" or the Other. These *repertoires of cultural violence* are used to legitimize and justify both *manifest* and *structural violence*, perpetrated towards IT/R.

What is noteworthy within the different *repertoires of violence* that IT/R fall victim to, is that all perpetrating actors make use of the same kind of violent tactics. On a cultural level, they create or reinforce a discriminative discourse towards a certain social identity group, which is used to legitimize structural and manifest violence towards this group, existing out of the same kind of behavior including visible, instrumental and expressive action to inflict damage. To illustrate this: state officials, building upon an anti-immigration discourse, dehumanize the Other and use manifest violence against those who irregularly enter their territory, including breaking and stealing of belongings and beating, further dehumanizing the Other, to the point that they are even denied basic human rights. Traffickers, building upon already existing tense relations between different social identity groups in the Middle Eastern and (North-)African social identity groups, dehumanize the Other in order to legitimize the structural and manifest violence they perpetrate against these groups. For example, the denying access to humanitarian aid, stealing and breaking of personal belongings and acts of physical hurt as beating. The

repertoires of violence, although perpetrated by different actors, are thus relatively similar to each other. However, legally they differ a lot from each other, as social identity groups, in contrast to police forces, don't have law enforcement as their main task, nor did they swear in to protect the rights of all human beings.

6.2. Discussion

To me, the first question following the analyzes of what *repertoires of violence* are experienced by IT/R, is where do these repertoires come from? Is the violence perpetrated somehow scripted, do the specific pusback methods as shown in figure 3, 4, 5 and 6 build upon a longer history? How did they come to be what they are now? Typical for repertoires of violence is that they are learned by watching others. Because they are passed across time and space, repertoires can evolve or change. However, lasting changes are slow in their evolvement.

To be able to understand where these repertoires are coming from, it is necessary to understand how the repertoires evolve over time. This will give more insight to the context in which this violence is happening. Research of Hendriks and Hults (2016) shows that within police forces, there are cultural repertoires on policing. But from what larger repertoires is the violence perpetrated against IT/R coming from? Are these repertoires coming from the Croatian war history relating to the collapse of the former Republic of Yugoslavia, did the Muslim Other of Croatia, the Muslim Bosnian citizens, change into the Muslim Other of further countries? Or are these repertoires coming from the EU level, in which the "fear of the Other" has become a racialized notion of religion to who the EU-identity is in need of protection?

Another aspect in understanding where these repertoires are coming from is to gain knowledge about the official orders on the illegal expulsions of IT/R and the manner in which they are performed. Are there given specific orders to police officials for this procedure? Or is this part of what Zwaan (2003) calls *silent understandings*, in which elite actors give implicit messages, indicating general direction, in which possibilities are opening up and legitimization and means are provided in a broader sense?

The lack of outrage in media and Western pressure groups, about an EU member state violating human rights to a large extent, is a possible indicator that the violence used at the borders is already seen as legitimized and has been justified through the moral panic that is spread out about the "European migrant crisis" and the anti-migration discourse that is since then been the

political mood. Although for a majority of the EU citizens the violence amongst the Balkan Route is maybe less known then the violence perpetrated by the EU towards IT/R on the Mediterranean Route, large-scale public outrage or demonstrations stay out. The moral panic on the “European migrant crisis” is apparently high enough to legitimize the securitization of the EU by all means, including large scale violations of human rights.

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Appendix 1: concepts and definitions

Agency	The capacity of individuals or groups to embark on processes of autonomous self-realization. The approach is one that considers agency as 'located in a dialectic relationship with social structures' and 'embedded in social relations' (Lister 1997, 37; in Goddard 2000, 27)
Asylum seeker	Someone who is seeking international protection. In some countries it is a legal term referring to a person who has applied for refugee status and has not yet received a final decision on his or her claim. Not every asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee. However, an asylum-seeker should not be sent back to his or her country of origin until the asylum claim has been examined in a fair procedure (Inter-Parliamentary Union and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2017, 17).
Borders	Arbitrary dividing lines that are simultaneously social, cultural and psychic; territories to be patrolled against those whom they construct as outsiders, aliens, the Others; forms of demarcation where the very act of prohibition inscribes transgression; zones where fear of the Other is the fear of the self, places where claims to ownership – claims to 'mine', 'yours' and 'theirs' – are staked out, contested, defended, and fought for (Brah 1996, 625). Borders are mechanisms patterning state activities and generating notions of appropriate behavior through tacit norms and explicit rules. Borders also serve as tools of statecraft, helping elites implant notions of state legitimacy in the minds of relevant audiences, including officials of other states, international organizations and important domestic audiences. Especially crucial in this respect are groups who still have not accepted the state's borders as 'natural' and might therefore be inclined to challenge the state's boundaries. Borders can help states define some areas as 'internal' and 'pacified' regions that unequivocally belong to 'us', while defining other areas as 'external' and 'dangerous' lands belonging to outsiders (Ron 2000, 610).

Border control	"Border control means measures adopted by a country to regulate and monitor its borders. It depicts a country's physical demonstration of territorial sovereignty. It regulates the entry and exit of people, animals and goods across a country's border. It aims at fighting terrorism and detecting the movement of criminals across the borders. In addition, it also regulates both legal and illegal immigration, collects excide taxes, prevents smuggling of illegal and hazardous material such as weapons, drugs, or endangered species, and prevents the spread of human or animal diseases (USLegal 2016).
Boundary activation	A process of creation of a new boundary or the crystallization of an existing one between challenging groups and their targets. (…) by defining citizens as members of a particular racial or ethnic group, the census acts as an agent of boundary activation (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 34).
Collective expulsion	Any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group (European Court of Human Rights [ECHR] 2018).
Contention	Making claims that bear on someone else's interests (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 4).
Contentious performances	Relatively familiar standardized ways in which one set of political actors makes collective claims on some other set of political actors (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 11).
Contentious politics	Episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants (Tarrow and Tilly 2009, 438).
Contentious repertoires	Arrays of contentious performances that are currently known and available within some set of political actors (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 11).
Cultural violence	Those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logics, mathematics) – that can be used

	to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence (Galtung, 1996: 196).
Deterritorialisation	Distinctive feature of what they call 'minor literature' – that is, literature with its primary characteristics defined in opposition to canonical writing. Minor literature, they contend, is marked by the deterritorialisation of language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation (Deleuze and Guartari 1986 [1975], 13). The concept of deterritorialisation is understood as describing the displacement and dislocation of identities, persons and meanings, with the moment of alienation and exile located in language and literature. It refers to the effects of a rupture between signifier and signified, so that 'all forms come undone, as do all the significations, signifiers and signified to the benefit of an unformed matter of deterritorialised flux, of nonsignifying sings' (Brah, 1996, 627, 628).
Disadvantage	Socially derived inequalities in material well-being, political access or cultural status by comparison with other social groups, this includes economic, political or cultural discrimination (Gurr 2007, 139).
Discourses	Representations of how things are and have been, as well as imaginaries – representations of how things might or could or should be (Fairclough 2003, 207). Social relations represented in texts where the language contained within these texts is used to construct meaning and representation. The focus of discourse analytic research is on regularities in the construction and function of linguistic resources. (…) The underlying assumption of discourse analysis is that social texts do not merely reflect or mirror objects, events and categories pre-existing in the social and natural world. Rather, they actively construct a version of those things. They do not describe things, they do things. And being active they have social and political implications (Jabri 1996, 94-95).
Ethnic identity	What made an ethnic identity "ethnic," therefore, was to be sought in the social processes of maintaining boundaries that the people themselves recognized as ethnic (Baumann 1999, 59).
Identity	Answer to the question 'who or what am I?' (Demmers, 2017: 21).

Illegalized traveler	Those asylum seekers, refugees and other migrants who have fallen outside of the narrow legal migration categories recognized by states (Gerard and Pickering 2013, 339).
Intersectionality	The interaction between gender, race, and other categories (axes) of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power (Crenshaw 1989). Intersectionality was intended to address the fact that the experiences and struggles of women of color fell between the cracks of both feminist and anti-racist discourse. Crenshaw argues that theorists need to take both gender and race on board and show how they interact to shape the multiple dimensions of Black women's experiences (Davis 2008, 68).
Irregular migration	The phenomenon of people crossing borders outside accepted legal pathways (Gerard and Pickering 2013, 339).
Manifest violence	Violence as visible, instrumental and expressive action. Generally defined as an 'act of physical hurt' (Demmers, 2017, 59).
Mechanisms	A delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 29).
Migrant	Someone who chooses to move, not because of a direct threat to life or freedom, but in order to find work, for education, family reunion, or other personal reasons. Unlike refugees, migrants do not have a fear of persecution or serious harm in their home countries. Migrants continue to enjoy the protection of their own governments even when abroad and can return home (Inter-Parliamentary Union and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2017, 17).
National identity	Self-perception based on history, mythology, tradition, language and culture (Jabri 1996, 134).
Process	Regular combinations and sequences of mechanisms that produce similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those elements (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 29).
Pushback	When people are expelled shortly after entering the territory of a country, without the possibility to start administrative procedures to stay, to access the mechanisms of international protection, to explain their personal circumstances or to object their treatment. Pushbacks

	are expulsions, direct deportations or readmissions, or other forms of immediate involuntary return across one or several territorial borders. Depending on the regulatory framework in place, these forms of forced displacement can be legalized under national law, semi-formalized or informal practices. They continue to put in danger those who attempt to cross borders. Deportations conducted under the Dublin Regulation exceed the scope of [a pushback], because they are carried out after the procedure of international protection has been administratively initiated (pushbackmap.org 2019).
Refugee	Any person who, as a result of- and owing to a well-founded fear of being prosecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself to the protection of that country; or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (1951 UN Refugee convention, in Valji, de la Hunt and Moffett 2003, 63).
Repertoires of contention	A set of practices groups and individuals routinely engage in as they make claims against one another (Ahram 2015, 4).
Repertoires of violence	A subset of these wider repertoires of contention and features various kinds of violence specialists, men (typically) who control the means of inflicting damage on persons and objects (Ahram 2015, 4).
Securitization	The move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 23). A concern can be securitized – framed as a security issue and moved from the politicized to the securitized end of the spectrum – through an act of securitization (Emmers 2007, 111).
Social identity	(…) those aspects of the self-concept which derive from the individuals' knowledge of his/her membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership (Tajfel 1981, 255 in Demmers 2017, 22). Answer

	to the question "who am I", based on group membership (Demmers 2017, 22). *(discursive approach)* A product of all that which is located in the realm of society, as context of communication, power relations, contestations, and dominant discursive and institutional practices (Jabri 1996, 134).
Space	Occurs as the effect produced by the operations that orient it, situate it, temporalize it, and make it function in a polyvalent unity of conflictual programs or contractual proximities (Certeau 1985, 117 in Peyrefitte and Sanders-McDonagh 2018, 326).
Statecrafting	The multi-layered effort through which social actors construct, disseminate, naturalize, and reproduce notions of 'the state' – any state – in the discourse and consciousness of relevant audiences. A key statecrafting mechanism is territorial marking, since spatial boundedness is an essential component of state0centric discourse (Ron 2000, 617).
Structural violence	Avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally life, lowering the real levels of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible (Galtung, 1996: 197).
Structures	Rules and resources recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems (Giddens 1979, 64 in Demmers 2017, 66). Rules that are articulated in social interaction and tell people how to 'do' social life, and the resources on which people can call to achieve their objectives (Wallace and Wolf 1999, 181 in Demmers 2017).
Violence	An act of physical hurt deemed legitimate by the performer and illegitimate by (some) witnesses (Riches 1989, 8 in Demmers 2017, 59). See also: manifest violence, structural violence and cultural violence.
Violence specialists	The army and police are violence specialists, as are guerillas and rebels. Besides these are a wide array of what Vadim Volkov calls violent entrepreneurs, who use coercion for private or apolitical purposes, including armed guards, tribal warriors, private security forces, thugs, kidnappers, bandits, and enforcers (Ahram 2015, 4).

Appendix 2: indicators of *violence* and *repertoires of violence*

Repertoires	- Acts that are used to make claims - Acts that are used to make meaning - Culturally sanctioned - Acts that are routinized - Learned from others - Based upon social identity, social ties and organization forms - Actor has control over means to inflict damage on persons/objects - Relational interaction between different social identity groups - Culturally sanction - Within empirically limited set of options
Manifest violence	- Visible action that inflicts damage - Instrumental action that inflicts damage - Expressive action that inflicts damage - Act of physical hurt
Structural violence	- Basic human needs satisfaction - Potential of levels of needs satisfaction - Difference between needs satisfaction and potential

Cultural violence	- Used to legitimize direct and structural violence
	- Discrimination based on
	  o Religious motivation
	  o Ideological motivation
	  o Language differences
	  o Art
	  o Empirical and formal science

Appendix 3: letter by a Croatian police officer to the ombudsperson of Croatia



Poštovana gospodjo,

obračam vam se za pomoč jer vidimo da jedini vodite brigu o zakonitom postupanju prema izbjeglicana i jadnim ljudima prema kojima svakodnev no postupamo na nehumani i loš način.
Djelatnik sam PGP [redacted] i radim na zaštiti državne granice već duže vrijeme. nas nekoliko više nemamo ni volje ni snage gledati što se radi sab timljudima.
Svakodnevno ih vračamo u BiH bez papira bez procesuiranja bez obzira o kome se radilo, žene djeca , prema svima isto.
Nema azila to ne postoji samo i ako u iznimnim situacijama, kada je nešto medijski popračeno.

Zapovijed načelnika [redacted] i rukovoditelja i uprave da sve vračamo bez papira , nema traga , uzeti novce , mobitele razbiti baciti u [redacted] ili si uzeti i izbjeglice na sili vratiti u Bosnu.
To je istina kako postupamo sa njima , policajci na ispomoči iz drugh PU su posebno okrutni u postupanju , jer su ljuti što su tu, a tu su kratko pa rade što žele bez kontrole , liče mim na janjičare tuku , otimaju. Ovo je žalosno ali istinito i to sve uz blagoslov rukovoditelja iz policijske postaje i uprave.
Posebno nas par policajaca žalosti što na sve to nas potiču i to zapovijedaju rukovoditelji koji bi trebali raditi zakonito i to suzbijati i ne dozvoliti takovo ponašanje policajaca.
Na dnevnoj bazi ih vračamo 20 .- 50 . Kada ih dovoze iz drugih PU ljudi su iscrpljeni ponekad i pretučeni i onda ih još mi vozimo tijekom noći i prebacujemo na silu u Bosnu.

Svega tu ima pa neki policajci posežu i za oružjem , to je sramno za ovu policiju, tako ju ja nisam zamišljao kad sam išao u školu.
Ja sam ih osobno tijekom noći vratio preko 1000 , nastojim biti što humaniji , ali imam [redacted] , ako odbijem to raditi dobiti ću otkaz, a od čega ću prehraniti obitel.
Nas nekolicina koji dijelimo isti stav vas molimo da spriječite ovakvo ponašanje i postupanje policije.
Sve ono što dolazi do vas , natpisi u medijima su točni i vrlo blagi u odnosu što se radi u ovoj postaji.
Takodjer jako je žalosno da se rukovoditelji u postaji, a naročito policijskoj upravi kada spomenu vaše ime iskazuju to na vrlo ružan i neprimjeren način jer vi to ničim niste zaslužili, to ne dolikuje visoko obrazovanim ljudima ta vas časte takovim epitetima i psovkema.
Vi samo radite pošteno i časno vaš posao u skladu sa zakonskim propisima i pravilima i tako bi trebalo biti i u policiji , ali nažalos daleko smood toga .
još jednom vas molimo da osobnim angažmanom spriječite ove ružne poja ve koje mogu dovesti do tragičnih posljedica, a to nitko ne želi.

Vjerujemo u vas i vaše poštenje i zakoniti rad.

Nezadovolji policajci PGP
[redacted]

REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA
URED PUČKOG PRAVOBRANITELJA

primljeno: 20.03.2019.		
	Br. osn.: članak/ ustroj. jedinica / službenik	
PP 19-11-6/6/19-37-1		
	Br. priloga	Br. listova

“Dear Ms.,

We are asking for your help because we see that you are the only one taking care of the illegal practices towards refugees and distressed people, who we treat in a bad and inhumane way every day. I am a worker of the police station _ and I have been working on protection of the national border for a longer while. A few of us are screaming, we have no more will nor power to look at what is being done to these humans. Every day we return them to Bosnia, without papers, without processing, no matter whether they are women, children, we treat everyone the same. There is no asylum, that doesn't exist, only and if in extraordinary situations, with media attention. Orders of the chief, the executive, and the administration is to return everyone without papers, no traces, take money, break mobile phones throw into ___, or take for ourselves, and forcefully return refugees to Bosnia.

This is the truth about how we treat them, the police that come as extra resource units from the other police stations are especially cruel, because they are angry for being here, and they stay here shortly so they do what they want to without control, they remind me of the Janissaries, beating and stealing. This is sad, but true, and with the blessings of the executives from the police station and administration. We few policemen are especially saddened by the fact that we are encouraged and ordered to do this by the executives who should be working legally, against these kind of practices and not allowing such behavior in the police. Every day we return 20-50. When they are driven to here from the other police stations, people are exhausted, sometimes beaten up, and then it's us who drive them during the night and forcefully pushback to Bosnia.

All sorts of stuff happen here, some police draw weapons, this is shameful for this police, and not what I imagined when I went to school. I personally returned around 1000 people during the night, I try to be as humane as possible, but I have _, if I refuse to do this I will lose my job, and how will I feed my family. The group of us who share these views are asking you to stop this behavior and practices in the police. All that is coming from you, media writings are correct, and very mild compared to what happens in this police station.

Also it is very sad that the station executives, and especially in the police administration mention your name in a very rude and inappropriate way, because you do not deserve this, it is not suitable for highly educated people to receive such insults and names. You are only doing your job in a honorable and decent way, according to legal rules and regulations, and this is how police should work too, but unfortunately, we are far from that.

We ask you again to personally engage in stopping these bad practices that could lead to tragic consequences, and nobody wants that.

We believe in you, your fairness and legal work,

Disaffected police officers of police station”

Translation by native speaking friend (anonymous).

Appendix 4: overview of recorded data

In-depth interviews

Number	*Date*	*Persons present during the interview*
01	14 March 2019	Three people from Afghanistan, author
02	22 March 2019	One person from Morocco, author

Border Violence Monitoring Reports

Number	*Date*	*Persons present during the interview*
01	20 March 2019	Two people from Morocco, author
02	21 March 2019	Two people from Morocco, author
03	26 March 2019	One person from Algeria, author
04	30 March 2019	Three people from Tunisia, author
05	1 April 2019	Two people from Morocco, author
06	1 April 2019	Two people from Morocco, author
07	3 April 2019	One person from Morocco, one person from Sudan, one person from Tunisia, two people from Algeria, author
08	12 April 2019	One person from Morocco, one person from Slovenia, author
09	23 April 2019	Four/Six people from Iran, one person from Portugal, author
10	24 April 2019	One person from Pakistan, author
11	26 April 2019	One person from Algeria, author
12	27 April 2019	Four people from Pakistan, one person from Portugal, author

Appendix 5: schematic representation of data as presented in chapter 5

	Manifest violence Violence as visible, instrumental and expressive action. Generally defined as an 'act of physical hurt' (Demmers, 2017, 59).	**Structural violence** Avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally life, lowering the real levels of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible (Galtung, 1996: 197).	**Cultural violence** Those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logics, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence (Galtung, 1996: 196).
Intragroup violence	**Repertoire of manifest violence by traffickers**: - Physical violence (beating, stabbing) - Stealing of personal belongings (no game after paying for a game) - Limited possibilities to go to someone else because of threats. We see visible, instrumental and expressive violence. **Repertoire of manifest violence towards the self**:	*Not much to say here*	**Repertoires of cultural violence**: internalizing racism, discriminative discourse in aspects of the symbolic sphere, by ideology, language and art mostly. Behavior and political opinions of others.

	- Risk taking in games (drowning, cold, minefields) - Self-destructive behavior (drugs abuse and self-inflicted wounds)		
Intergroup violence	**Repertoires of manifest violence between groups**: visible, instrumental and expressive action. For example, revenge actions between groups, fighting and stealing. **Manifest violence by international volunteers in humanitarian aid work**: do no harm principle.	**Structural violence, lowering the level of need satisfaction below what is possible:** Limited access to a squat of humanitarian aid, because of belonging to a certain social identity group.	Discrimination between groups: cultural violence. Discrimination by traffickers: based on ethnic group/language towards other group/the outgroup, legitimizes more structural and manifest violence towards each other. **Cultural violence** by **international volunteers,** superior attitude, dehumanizing others
State official violence	**Repertoires of manifest violence by Croatian and Slovenian (border) police officials**: - Direct physical violence (beating, use of pepper spray, letting people trip over) - Indirect physical violence (exhausting people, exposure to cold water, purposely	**State officials** who don't take care of basic needs (where they are obligated to) - Minors traveling on their own and not receiving any protection. - Bad living conditions in the official camps (overfull, limited food, safety, medical care).	**Cultural violence** to deny people in stores and shops → repertoires of cultural violence that legitimizes more structural and manifest violence Dehumanizing the other: - Bordering practices of the EU as boundary activation, to not only control EU territory but also

	making nauseous in cars) - Degrading behavior, for example stripping nude, name calling - Breaking and stealing of personal belongings. These are all acts of visible, instrumental and expressive violence Systematic procedures which are used to expel people are a repertoire (routinized act), see figures 3, 4, 5, and 6. (but where is this repertoire coming from?) Manifest violence is referred to by respondents as 'the protocol' (BVMR 01), 'simple treatment' (interview 02) and 'it's normal' (fieldnotes 9 and 10 march) These are all references to a pattern, or a repertoire Claim making: a repertoire is a set of acts that are routinized and used for making claims: but what is the claim that is being	**Structural violence (purposely denying access) by police officers:** - leaving people in the middle of nowhere in the woods without any resources, denying their ask for help even though you are able to provide - Denying of access to drinking water or food or toilet while in detention (when perpetrated by someone on purpose both manifest and structural) **Human rights protection:** - Basic principle of the EU, for EU citizens… - Violations of human right by Croatian and Slovenian officials (collective expulsion, denying access to asylum procedure, violating non-refoulement principle, giving	create normative EU identity. - Humiliated feeling, dehumanizing behavior (talking disrespectful, not talking, taking photos, no privacy, need to strip, gender-based violence etc.), also a form of cultural violence that legitimizes structural and manifest violence? - Cultural violence; not giving someone a translator, feeling of constant surveillance, Verbal violence that draws boundaries between migrants and police (motherfuckers, go back to your own country) **The passport:** as both structural and cultural violence? Mechanisms of in- and exclusion, discrimination based on identity papers. Normalized within the international community… legitimizes

	made? → Received message by migrants is that they are not welcome in Croatia.	fines for irregular border crossing) **Discrimination on structural level**: - no access to hospitals, health care - limited access to public transport (**apartheid system)** - no access to police services, falling outside the legal framework… Plus: how can you go to the police that someone stole your money that you gave to them for trafficking you? - limited access to drinking water and food… - denying access somewhere, not being allowed to be in the streets… - long term health consequences, even though this can be prevented!!	and justifies structural and manifest violence. **Cultural violence by state Dublin agreement:** people are scared for this because they want to be with their families. PLUS sending people back to countries such as Greece, Croatia, Bulgaria, is sometimes violating their human rights and structural violence as here people will not have good living conditions, and we knowingly send them there…