

Governing Migration through a Process of Compromising

**A study of multilayered migration governance and
partnership between the EU and Senegal**



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¹ <https://students.uu.nl/en/practical-information/policies-and-procedures/fraud-and-plagiarism>

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ABSTRACT

This thesis discusses multilayered migration governance in the EU-Senegalese context. As this context is characterized by incompatible interests on migration control, I present the ‘process of compromising’ to study the interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government. I argue that the process of compromising shows how the Senegalese government has agency, which influences the interactions with the EU. In the thesis, I analyze three selected EU initiatives: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the Politique Nationale de Migration du Sénégal (PNMS) and the Rabat Process. These initiatives represent different forms of migration governance: funding, national policies and intergovernmental dialogues. I show that the EU presents these initiatives through the partnership approach, by emphasizing a spirit of cooperation and shared responsibility. Besides studying the presentation, in the analysis I also show how the EU and Senegalese government compromise on migration control. I argue that they do so through the process of compromising. This process is characterized by a continuous interaction through which an equilibrium is created. Through this equilibrium, both the EU and the Senegalese government can present a ‘work in progress’ on return and legal migration. By studying the process of compromising, this thesis contributes to existing literature on multilayered migration governance and partnership.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DEL	Diaspora en Ligne
DIADEM	Diaspora Développement Education Migration
DPAF	Direction de la Police de l’Air et des Frontières
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EUTF	European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
HSF	Horizons sans Frontières
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ILO	International Labor Organization
IO	International Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PNMS	Politique Nationale de Migration du Sénégal

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INTRODUCTION

Curiosity is the essence of human beings. People migrate to Europe, just because they want to see what is out there. This is not so different from people travelling to see Senegal³.

This is the message I continuously received from young Senegalese people, while doing fieldwork research in Senegal: movement is inherently linked to people. Nevertheless, there exists a global division in who can move where and how mobility is regulated. This is sharply summarized by the researcher Ruben Andersson (2014: 5) stating that:

Yet while some travelers – whether executives, “expats,” or tourists – are celebrated for their powers to shrink distances and connect territories, others are fretted about for the same reasons. The label “migrants” is usually, and paradoxically, reserved for them.

This quote reveals the highly political process through which some people on the move are presented as ‘expats’, whereas others are seen as ‘irregular’ migrants. At least, this is framed as such from a European perspective. This thesis is about migration. However, it does not focus on migrants themselves, but on the construction through which mobility is facilitated for some and restricted for others. Whereas the European Union’s (EU) role in this construction is widely discussed, this thesis adds another aspect to this discussion: the agency of the Senegalese government in negotiating migration control⁴. This perspective can tell us more about the interactions between the EU and so-called ‘third countries’ with which migration control is discussed. These third countries are countries that are ‘not a member of the European Union as well as a country or territory whose citizens do not enjoy the European Union right to free movement’ (European Commission EMN 2019). To be able to provide insights in the interactions between the EU and third countries, this thesis focuses on Senegal. During two months of qualitative fieldwork research in Dakar, I have studied how both parties compromise on migration control. Thereby, the agency of the Senegalese government influences the interactions with the EU, and whereas this actor is often presented as dominant this thesis presents a different image. To understand the interactions between the EU and the Senegalese

³ Interview 8, journalist RFM, most interviews with Senegalese people are conducted in French. Quotes are translated into English by me, more information on language can be found in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.5.

⁴ I argue that the word ‘control’ fits best in this case, as the initiatives of the EU do not aim to stop but to regulate migration. This means to prevent irregular migration and create possibilities for legal migration. Migration ‘management’ is also used regularly. Nevertheless, I prefer not to use this term as it suggests that the EU’s actions are merely about executing, rather than negotiating.

government since 2009, I present the term ‘process of compromising’. This is the process through which both parties interact on the topic of migration control. In this maneuvering, the parties cannot fully pursue their own interests. At the same time, the interactions continue to maintain the good relations between both parties. The outcome of these interactions could therefore be seen as a continuing process of compromising.

Empirical context

The empirical starting point for this study happens in 2009. In this year, the EU attempted to negotiate a Mobility Partnership with the Senegalese government. This ‘partnership’ would be based on ‘mutual offers of commitments and project initiatives covering mobility, migration and asylum issues’ (European Commission 2019j). The Mobility Partnerships of the EU are strongly focused on ‘third countries’ and based on three policy trends: first, the need for the EU to co-operate with third countries became an accepted norm, second, it was acknowledged that third countries should be compensated for this co-operation, and third, Mobility Partnerships fitted in the dominant idea that migration and development should be linked (Reslow and Vink 2015: 863). Accordingly, the focus on third countries is emphasized, however, there is barely attention for what happens if these countries decide *not* to co-operate. In 2009, the negotiations for a Mobility Partnership failed due to the rejection of the Senegalese government to co-operate (Chou and Gilbert 2012). This marks the starting point for this research, where I focus on what happens after a Mobility Partnership is not signed.

Linked to this starting point, the first part of the research started with the question: what happened after 2009? Based on the assumption that the EU’s interest to control migration did not disappear, I have studied EU initiatives in Senegal since 2009. It appeared that these initiatives were still constructed and came in different forms: funding became available, projects were set up, international summits organized and declarations signed. Studying the initiatives of the EU was one side of the research, the other side was guided by the response of the Senegalese government. This government rejected to sign a Mobility Partnership in 2009, so how did it respond to later EU initiatives? This was the puzzle with which I entered the ‘field’ in March 2019. For two months I settled in Senegal, to conduct qualitative research to collect data on the EU initiatives and the Senegalese response.

Academic debate and research question

The empirical context has generated the puzzle of the research. To study this puzzle, I constructed an academically based research question. While familiarizing with the academic debate on the EU’s migration control, the concept of ‘securitization of migration’ came up

(Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2000; Emmers 2007; Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka 2016). This is the process through which migration is securitized, which happens ‘when a securitizing actor uses rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is “normal politics”’ (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 24-25). The research question that followed was: *what are the practices of the securitization of migration by the EU, in the negotiations on migration between the EU and actors involved in Senegal, from 2009 onwards?* Although I agree that the EU securitizes migration, also in the Senegalese context, it turned out that this approach could not provide an analytical framework to understand the response of the Senegalese government. The focus in the approach is mainly on the EU, whereas my aim was to understand the interactions with the Senegalese government. While spending more time in Senegal, I discovered that these interactions were characterized by ‘incompatible interests’, mainly on return migration and legal migration. To be able to study these incompatible interests, literature on interactions (Colebatch 2009) and compromise (Barnett and Zürcher 2009) has become central in this thesis.

Above that, from the empirical research I found that the EU initiatives take on different forms. After an analysis of several initiatives, I have selected the following three cases to provide a diverse analysis: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) – as funding; the Politique Nationale de Migration du Sénégal (PNMS) – as a national migration policy; and the Rabat Process – as an intergovernmental dialogue. All three initiatives can be placed in the concept of ‘multilayered migration governance’, through which the EU governs migration. Multilayered migration governance is characterized by an experimental and process-oriented mode of governing, in which the different forms of initiatives could be placed (Kunz, Lavenex and Panizzon 2011; Lavenex and Panizzon 2013). Relating to the Mobility Partnership, I concluded that the EU governs migration through the ‘partnership approach’. In this approach, there is a strong focus on presenting initiatives as based on cooperation and shared responsibility (Lavenex and Panizzon 2013). Brought together, this has resulted in the following research question: *how is the EU’s multilayered migration governance presented and compromised between the EU and the Senegalese government, in the context of incompatible interests on migration control since 2009?* Through this question, the multilayered migration governance of the EU is studied in the Senegalese context. As this context is characterized by incompatible interests vis-à-vis migration control, the influence of these interests is also studied.

To operationalize the research question, it is divided into two sub-questions: *how is the EU’s multilayered migration governance presented in the EU-Senegalese context?* and *how is the EU’s multilayered migration governance compromised in the context of incompatible*

interests between the EU and the Senegalese government, since 2009? The first question focuses on the presentation in the governance of the EU. In relation to the multilayered migration governance, it is studied how the EU presents its initiatives through the partnership approach. By focusing on discourse, policies and interactions, the partnership approach is the analytical framework of this thesis. The second question is on the compromising on incompatible interests. This focus reveals the contribution of this thesis, as I present the term ‘process of compromising’. This is the process through which the EU and the Senegalese government compromise on the incompatible interests. In this interaction they reach an equilibrium through which they can present to their public they are doing ‘just enough’ to create opportunities for legal migration or on stimulating return migration.

Academic and societal relevance

On an academic level, this thesis provides insights on the multilayered migration governance and the partnership approach of the EU. It furthermore contributes to the discussion on the EU’s interactions with third countries. There is extensive literature on the EU’s approach to migration control (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; Lavenex 2004; Goldthau and Sitter 2015; Celata and Coletti 2016) and the EU’s approach to third countries (Lavenex and Stucky 2011; Reslow 2012; Reslow and Vink 2015). This literature is written, however, from a Eurocentric perspective: the focus is on the actions of the EU, rather than the *interactions* between the EU and third countries. Above that, there is limited literature on these interactions in the context of incompatible interests. Therefore, this thesis provides insights on interactions in such a context, by zooming in on one third country: Senegal. Through researching the compromising on incompatible interests between the EU and the Senegalese government, I have constructed the term ‘process of compromising’. This focus on the *process* of interactions links to the interpretivist approach of this thesis, and *compromise* relates to the incompatible interests of both parties. In short, the academic significance of this research lies in the elaboration of the process of compromising, in a context of incompatible interests between the EU and third countries.

On a societal level, migration is also a widely discussed topic, both in the European and Senegalese context. In the European context, it is often related to the debate on the Schengen borders and the reception of migrants, particularly since 2015. This year was marked by the so-called ‘migration crisis’, which was characterized in the media by the ‘waves’ and ‘floods’ of migrants aiming to reach the EU region (van Houtum and Lucassen 2016). As a result, the EU created stricter border regulations and return migration became an important topic of

discussion. This led to a debate in the Senegalese context, where migration is considered an integrated part of social life. As it is seen as part of daily life, migration control was barely a topic of discussion. However, since 2015 this has changed due to the stricter border regulations of the EU. It thereby became more difficult for Senegalese people to receive a visa and travel in a regular way to the EU. Moreover, this led to more Senegalese people crossing North Africa and the Mediterranean in ‘irregular’ ways, which has cost many lives⁵. This has sparked a national debate demanding the Senegalese government to create legal migration possibilities and prosperity for Senegalese youth in their own country. On a societal level this thesis contributes to the discussion on migration in both contexts, by focusing on the interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government. In these interactions, different perspectives on return migration and legal migration are central. By analyzing the discussion on these topics and the outcome as a process of compromising, this thesis provides a more nuanced approach to the discussion on migration in both the Senegalese and the EU context.

Chapter outline

In Chapter 1, I discuss the relevant literature and academic debate in which this thesis is placed. This chapter shows the theoretical framework on which the thesis builds, and presents the analytical framework through which I analyze three selected initiatives. In Chapter 2, I present the methodology of the research, by focusing on the data collection and data analysis. In this chapter, the methods are explained and the analytical framework is operationalized. In Chapter 3, I discuss the context in which interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government take place. This context is historically characterized by strong political relations, but more recently by incompatible interests on return migration and legal migration. In Chapter 4, I present the term ‘process of compromising’, through which the interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government can be understood. This chapter presents a two-folded analysis of three selected initiatives: the EUTF, PNMS and the Rabat Process. First, I show how the EU presents multilayered migration governance through the partnership approach. Secondly, I analyze the process of compromising, through which I show the influence of the incompatible interests on migration governance. Lastly, in Chapter 5 I present the most important insights of this thesis. By doing so, I answer the research question and position the findings within a larger debate.

⁵ For Senegalese reporting on the lives lost through irregular migration I have consulted: <http://diasporaenligne.net/>; <https://www.facebook.com/HorizonSansFrontieres/>; <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/pays/senegal/>.

CHAPTER 1 – MULTILAYERED MIGRATION GOVERNANCE AND PARTNERSHIP APPROACH

The analytical framework of this thesis is multilayered migration governance through the partnership approach. In this chapter, I place these concepts in a larger theoretical framework of governance and partnership. By doing so, the first part the research question can be answered: how does the EU present multilayered migration governance. The second part of the research question focuses on compromise. To study this, I present the term ‘process of compromising’, which is constructed from the research findings. Theoretically, the focus on compromise relates to a game-theoretic model focusing on ‘strategic interactions’, introduced by Michael Barnett and Christoph Zürcher (2009). Accordingly, this chapter focuses first on literature on governance and partnership in relation to migration. Thereafter, ideas on interactions and compromise are discussed, to which the core term of this thesis relates: process of compromising.

1.1 Governance

Governance is an extensively used term in academia, and numerous scholars in many different fields have written about it. I will not elaborate on the whole discussion on the concept, rather, I explain what definition is used in this thesis and link this to the external governance of the EU. To discuss ideas on governance, it is first important to distinguish between ‘government’ and ‘governance’. Gerry Stoker (1998) explains how governance was traditionally used as a synonym for government. Later, while more work was written about the term, the definition of governance changed. Richard Alan Rhodes (1996), for example, defines governance as a changed meaning of government, ‘referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed’ (652-653). In other words, governance is seen as a way of governing in which mechanisms are not only practiced by the sanctions and authority of government. More so, ‘the governance concept points to the creation of a structure or an order which cannot be externally imposed but is the result of the interaction of a multiplicity of governing’ (Kooiman & van Vliet 1993: 64). Chandler (2006) illustrates government as ‘the game itself’, whereas governance is about the ‘rules of the game’ (50). For this thesis, these definitions of governance as a ‘process of governing’ and consisting of the ‘rules of the game’ are applicable, as I will study what the process is through which the EU aims to govern, or control, migration and how the ‘rules of the game’ are constructed.

1.1.1 EU external governance

More specifically linked to this thesis is the idea of the ‘external governance’ of the EU. This term is a combination of existing debates in International Relations on comparative politics and approaches to EU external relations (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). The literature on external governance rejects the ‘projection of the unitary state actor model on to the EU’, and favors a more institutionalist view (ibid.). The external governance of the EU is often characterized by its ‘normative power’, also referred to as ‘soft power’ (Lavenex 2004; Goldthau and Sitter 2015). ‘Soft power’ occurs ‘when one country gets other countries to do what it wants’, as opposed to ‘hard power’, where a powerful country orders other countries to ‘do what it wants’ (Nye 1990: 166). The EU is often referred to as a ‘soft power’, as it lacks the capacity to exercise ‘hard power’ through military or direct financial pressure, and therefore focuses on promoting security, democracy and prosperity, mainly through economic integration (Goldthau and Sitter 2015: 944). In other words, the EU governs through regulation, rather than through direct intervention. A characteristic of the EU’s external governance through ‘soft power’, is the way in which, especially neighboring countries, are governed by ‘Europeanization’, ‘externalization’ or ‘enlargement’ policies (Lavenex 2004; Celata and Coletti 2016). Europeanization is described, for example, as ‘the transmission of Western European policy and institutional model in the European neighborhood and beyond’ (Celata and Coletti 2016: 18).

It is furthermore argued that external policies of the EU are characterized as ‘composite, plural-actor, multilevel strateg[ies], with conflicting priorities and variegated targets’ (ibid.). Hence, the external governance of the EU is not a unified strategy, it could be seen instead as a set of initiatives and interactions. This approach is guiding in my analysis, in which I study three initiatives of the EU in which migration control is central. Although these initiatives contain elements of the EU’s ‘soft power’ approach, as EU norms and policies are applied outside its territory, this mode of governance and interaction is still largely top-down. In the initiatives analyzed in Chapter 4, there is a stronger impulse from the EU to present them as ‘bottom-up’ approaches, constructed in cooperation and collaboration with non-EU ‘partners’. In other words, they are presented as a ‘partnership’, a term which I will further discuss in the following part.

1.2 Partnership

1.2.1 *Historical roots partnership*

The concept of ‘partnership’ has its origins in the sector of development cooperation, and was influenced by ideological notions of international solidarity, mainly in the 1980s and 1990s (Chandler 2006: 71, Lister 2000). Decades earlier, in the 1960s, many African states⁶ had gained independence, in the midst of the Cold War period. After years of colonization, a great deal of African countries now had to deal with another form of ‘intervention’, in which the Superpowers pushed arms and military aid, through which conflicts were fueled, particularly in southern Africa and the Horn of Africa (Harrison 2007: 190). The limited resources for development and financial aid that were available during this period, were granted on the basis of the political allegiances with the Superpowers, or the ability to pay back loans from international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Chandler 2006: 71). This other form of external ‘intervention’ was a response to the ‘failure of Africa’s post-colonial development project’, which became apparent in the early 1980s (ibid.). As a ‘new external project’ with regard to African states, structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were introduced. These programs were established by the World Bank and IMF, with the main goal to impose macroeconomic reforms upon, mainly African, states that had built up large amounts of external debt (Harrison 2007: 190). In the 1980s and 1990s, the SAPs were critiqued more and more for not acknowledging the sovereignty of these states, and even for being forms of ‘recolonization’ (Campbell and Loxley 1989; Plank 1993; Hanlon 1991, in Harrison 2007: 191). A response to this critique was that it did not take into account the agency of African states, that could have strategies to integrate and negotiate their own interests in the programs (Bayart 2000). This does not say, however, that African states were no longer dependent, because this was still the case through the neoliberal financial structures (Harrison 2007: 192).

Nevertheless, the idea of partnership slowly became more dominant in the development cooperation sector (Chandler 2006). Whereas ideological notions of international solidarity already emerged in the 1970s, partnership became dominant in US and European policy-making in the 1980s (Lister 2000: 228-229). At the core of the term is a ‘more efficient use of scarce resources, increased sustainability and improved beneficiary participation in development

⁶ By referring to ‘African states’, I run the risk of generalizing ‘Africa’ as if one comparable area, and not 54 different countries. In this overview, however, I focus on the approach of international organizations and scholars in a specific period, and therefore use their language. In my own analysis, I specifically focus on one country, Senegal, and elaborately explain the specific context of migration control in this country.

activities' (ibid.: 228). Additionally, it was believed that the 'creation of synergy' through partnership would provide results which could not be achieved without collaboration (ibid.). Despite these characteristics and the widespread use of partnership, the term still lacks a clear definition. Mainly it is referred to by related terms such as 'collaboration', 'accompaniment', 'coalition' or 'alliances' (ibid.). Despite the vagueness around the term, the following definition of partnership is regularly used in policy-making: 'a working relationship that is characterized by a shared sense of purpose, mutual respect and the willingness to negotiate' (Pugh et al. 1987, in Lister 2000: 228).

1.2.2 Power of partnerships

So far, the discussion has been on the use of partnership in the development cooperation sector. In this sector, the term is mainly used as a policy term, yet it is important to emphasize that the discussion on partnership takes place in two different fields: in the policy-world and in the academic world. In this thesis, the focus is on the use of partnership in policy-making, studied from an academic perspective. The aim is to contribute to the academic literature on partnership from a critical perspective, which Rita Abrahamsen (2004) identifies as one of the two main positions on partnership. Both positions are mostly focused on power relations in partnership, nevertheless take a different approach to partnership. The first position approaches partnership as a positive initiative which could increase recipients' leadership in the design and implementation of policies. Although there is a critical element in this perspective, namely recognizing the difficulties in achieving an equal relationship between poor and rich countries, this is mainly directed to improving partnership initiatives, rather than generally reject them.

From the second position, Abrahamsen argues, partnership is seen as little more than rhetoric, as a legitimization for the continued domination of the South by the North. From this perspective, Gordon Crawford (2003) states that partnership is a myth and a legitimization of political and economic interventions by international organizations, without the criticism of conditionality. Alan Fowler (2000) also argues that partnership is a 'mystification of power asymmetry', stating that nothing has changed in the North-South relations since the introduction of partnerships. Abrahamsen (2004) also places herself in this position arguing that power relations are present in partnerships, although not through direct domination and imposition, rather this power takes on the form of liberal power, which is exercised through promises of incorporation and inclusion. Therefore, she states, partnerships can best be studied through a framework of 'governmentality', as they 'govern through the explicit commitment to the self-government and agency of recipient states' (ibid.: 1453).

Another scholar that could be placed in the critical approach towards partnerships is David Chandler (2006), who argues that the critique of the SAPs in the 1990s has led to a transformation in the foreign policy-making of the West. Whereas earlier views were led by national and financial interests, these were now replaced by frameworks placing people, security and development in the center. Chandler calls this new approach ‘ethical foreign policy’, in which the focus is no longer on the politics of power and interest of Western states, but on a new level of engagement with non-Western states (ibid.: 71). Chandler argues that the ‘West’s interaction with the non-Western world takes the form of a denial’, where the responsibility is placed on non-Western states and Western authorities deny their influence (ibid.: 73). This is done, firstly, by framing external policy-makers as disinterested and powerless actors, secondly, by the dissolving of foreign policy in domestic policy processes, and thirdly, through the framing of the non-Western political sphere as based on ‘needs’, for which Western ‘technical’ assistance is needed (ibid.). According to Chandler, these processes are characterized by a framework of partnership, in which Western states and international institutions are illustrated as capacity-builders and facilitators, while the policy ‘transformed the appearance of the international sphere from one of power, coercion and contestation into one where it appears that non-Western states have ownership of policies which are externally imposed’ (ibid.: 77). This approach of partnership is relevant in the interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government, as the first often presents itself as a facilitator for policies or initiatives over which the Senegalese government seemingly has ownership, or at least influence, while at the same time the initiatives are largely imposed externally.

1.2.3 Partnership and migration

Literature on the relation between partnership and migration can also be placed in the critical approach towards the use of the term. Rahel Kunz (2011) explains that the term partnership has recently entered the field of migration studies, and Sandra Lavenex and Marion Panizzon (2013: 4) explain how it ‘has emerged as a panacea for the cooperative governance of international migration between countries of origin, transit and destination’. Kunz (2011) furthermore introduces the concept of ‘partnership discourse’, which is defined as ‘[discourse] that promises to address migration in a spirit of cooperation between all affected countries, based on a belief in win-win approaches to international migration, and the notion of shared responsibility for migration management’ (ibid.: 284). Above that, Kunz, Lavenex and Panizzon (2011) further argue that the ‘partnership discourse’ suggests an equality between ‘south’ and ‘north’, while in reality that is merely rhetoric to mask the asymmetry between receiving and sending

countries of migration. Above that, the discourse depoliticizes the debate on international migration regulation and reframes it into a technocratic discussion of ‘joint migration management’ (ibid.: 17-18). This links to the second position Abrahamsen identified and will also be the approach in this thesis, as the partnership discourse will be central in the analysis. In the following part, the analytical frame is presented from which three EU initiatives will be analyzed in Chapter 4.

Apart from discourse, also in practice the relation between partnership and migration shows complications. As is already shortly discussed in the Introduction chapter, in 2009 the EU attempted to negotiate a Mobility Partnership agreement with the Senegalese government. This ended in a failure, due to the resistance of this government. This idea of resistance is important in this thesis, as its influence is central to the interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government. When the EU’s external governance is discussed, this is often done from a Eurocentric perspective. Nevertheless, from this perspective the influence of the incompatible interests on migration control cannot be understood. Therefore, to be able to study what happens beyond ‘Europeanization’ and the EU’s ‘soft power’, it is crucial to build on literature which highlights the agency of so-called ‘third countries’. These are countries that the EU defines as being ‘not a member of the European Union as well as a country or territory whose citizens do not enjoy the European Union right to free movement’ (European Commission EMN 2019). To be able to show how the Senegalese government influences the migration governance of the EU, the agency of this government must be acknowledged and studied. Therefore, I build on literature in which the framing of ‘third countries’ is discussed. Lavenex and Stucky (2011: 120) argue that ‘the aim of “partnering” for the purpose of third countries’ socio-economic development gave way to one-sided interest in integrating transit and sending countries into EU migration control efforts’. This happens through the use of conditionality, which Lavenex and Stucky see as an expression of the hierarchal relationship between the EU and third countries. Another aspect of this hierarchal relationship is the rhetorical asymmetry, in which the third countries have ‘needs’ and the EU and Member States ‘offers’ (ibid.: 132). Lavenex and Stucky link this to the selection process of the EU on Mobility Partnerships.

This selection process is further discussed by Nastasja Reslow and Maarten Vink (2015), who studied why EU Member States and third countries participate in negotiations on migration policies. Whereas Lavenex and Stucky (2011) focus on the hierarchal relations between both parties, Reslow and Vink (2015) emphasize the interactions between the EU Member States and third countries. They identified two main factors that determine the

succeeding or failing of negotiations: the cost of no agreement and the autonomy of central decision-makers. In an earlier study, Reslow (2012) also compared the cases of Cape Verde and Senegal, to explain why third countries decide to participate in Mobility Partnerships with the EU. She argues that third countries are active agents in the negotiations on migration, and not passive recipients of prepared proposals. According to Reslow, cost-benefit calculations define whether third countries decide to sign or not. From this perspective, Reslow explains why Cape Verde signed an agreement with the EU, while Senegal did not: the financial and social benefits for Cape Verde outweighed the costs, whereas for Senegal these were too high. Meng-Hsuan Chou and Marie Gilbert (2012) also study the failed migration negotiations between the EU and the Senegalese government. They confirm the rational-choice approach of the cost-benefit calculations. According to Chou and Gilbert, another possible reason for the negotiation failure is the sensitivity of the emigration issue in Senegal (ibid.: 422). This shows how influential the internal context of a country is for international interactions. In this thesis, I take an interpretivist stance to study the interactions and compromising between the two parties. Nevertheless, I follow the rational-choice approach as a starting point to construct the term process of compromising. As will be shown in Paragraph 1.3.3, a rational-choice approach is useful to study the ‘strategic interactions’ between the EU and the Senegalese government on a macro level. It explains how the interests of both parties lead to a compromised outcome. This compromised outcome, however, does not take on a concrete form, such as an agreement or policy. Instead, the outcome is the continuous process of compromising. Furthermore, this process shows how the interests of both parties are fluid and can change through interactions or events. Therefore, the process of compromising can best be studied from an interpretivist stance, emphasizing its dynamic characteristic.

1.3 Analytical framework

1.3.1 Multilayered migration governance

So far, the discussion has been on the external governance of the EU and approaches to partnership. The analytical framework of this thesis is a combination of these two parts, and consists of the concepts of ‘multilayered migration governance’ and the ‘partnership approach’.

Whereas earlier in this chapter the literature on the external governance of the EU is discussed, the relation between this governance and migration is not yet examined. There is much less written about this relation, as international migration governance was long considered a sensitive topic. The interests between countries of origin, transit and destination were strongly divided, and therefore an international migration regime was absent (Lavenex &

Panizzon 2013). This does not mean, however, that governance is non-existent in international migration. As discussed before, governance should be seen as a process of governing, for which a government, or in this case ‘regime’, is not necessarily needed. Alexander Betts (2011) argues that the fragmented system of norms and institutions aiming to regulate migration, could also be seen as a form of governance. He introduces the concept of ‘global migration governance’, which is defined as a ‘bottom-up’ framework that emerges in a set of bilateral, regional and interregional institutions, as a form of ‘multi-level migration governance’ (ibid.: 3). Although the extent to which the EU’s migration governance is ‘bottom-up’ can be questioned, the focus on the ‘multi-level’ dimension is nevertheless relevant for this thesis, as the EU’s initiatives to control migration take place of several levels.

This multi-level dimension is also a core element of the concept ‘multilayered migration governance’, which is introduced by Kunz, Lavenex and Panizzon (2011). They state that ‘international migration today is regulated through a multilayered architecture of international governance’ (ibid.: 16), the ‘architecture’ consisting of the interplay between multilateral, (trans-)regional and bilateral layers. The interactions can also take place on an intermediate position between regional and bilateral layer (ibid.: 10), as is the case between the EU and the Senegalese government. Lavenex and Panizzon (2013) further define multilayered migration governance as the ‘proliferation of informal process-oriented, experimental forms of transgovernmental governance, promoted by countries of destination in their relations with countries of origin and transit’ (3). The focus on ‘process’, ‘transgovernmental governance’ and ‘multilayered architecture’ links to the earlier discussion on the EU’s external governance being characterized by its ‘composite, plural-actor, multilevel strategy[ies] with conflicting priorities and variegated targets’ (Celata and Coletti 2016: 18). This approach to the EU’s migration governance will be central in this thesis, and particularly in the analysis of the three initiatives in Chapter 4. To study these initiatives, I will focus on the use of partnership which became central in international migration governance as it ‘promises to find “win-win-win” solutions that benefit all parties, the sending and receiving countries and the migrants alike’ (Kunz et al. 2011: 2). The notion of partnership has thereby become a ‘tool’ for multilayered migration governance (ibid.: 3), which I will analyze through the ‘partnership approach’, also presented by Lavenex and Panizzon (2013). In this way, this thesis contributes to both the literature on external migration governance and partnership.

1.3.2 Partnership approach

The partnership approach could be seen as a specific tool for multilayered migration governance, in which partnership is presented at the core of interactions and the aim is to stimulate ‘an open structure of dialogue and iterated horizontal interaction’ (Lavenex and Panizzon 2013: 5). This happens through ‘experimentalist’ modes of governance, which are defined by a focus on a horizontal system of interaction between equally empowered ‘partners’ and an open and process-oriented setting (ibid.). More concretely defined, the partnership approach ‘combines a discursive component with an institutional one relating to the creation of supposedly horizontal and inclusive settings of dialogue and cooperation’ (ibid.: 3). Accordingly, it consists of a *discursive* and *institutional* element. The first is clearly defined by Lavenex and Panizzon (2013) and Kunz (2011) through the ‘partnership discourse’, as presented earlier in this chapter. Through this discourse, dialogue and cooperation are presented as tools for a ‘win-win’ solution in interactions (ibid.).

In contrast to the discursive element, the institutional element is not as clearly defined. To be able to use the partnership approach as an analytical frame, it is necessary to make the institutional element more concrete. In Lavenex and Panizzon’s definition, the institutional element is related to ‘the creation of supposedly horizontal and inclusive settings of dialogue and cooperation’ (2013: 3). This links to the earlier discussed horizontal, process-oriented governance structure in multilayered migration governance. It also relates to what Hal Colebatch (2009) calls ‘structured interaction’ in his study on policy. Policy, he argues, does not have a single meaning, rather it should be seen as a social construct. From an interpretivist perspective, he describes three different ways in which policy can be constructed: first, through vertical interactions, also called authoritative choice; second, through horizontal interactions, referred to as structured interactions; and third, through scene-setting, in which social construction and context are important (ibid.). Relating to the ‘creation of supposedly horizontal and inclusive settings of dialogue and cooperation’ (Lavenex and Panizzon 2013: 3), structured interaction fits best in the partnership approach, as policy is presented here to be constructed from ‘an interaction of a number of players inside and outside the government’ (Colebatch 2009: 28). Based on Colebatch’ notions of structured interactions, I can further define the institutional element of the partnership approach. This element consists of policies and interactions, of which the first relates to the form – the *what* – of the policy and the second to the construction – the *how* – of the policy. Accordingly, to study how the partnership approach is presented by the EU, I will focus on the partnership discourse, policies and interactions. This

analytical framework provides tools to answer the first part of the research question: *how is the EU's multilayered migration governance presented in the EU-Senegalese context?*

1.3.3 Process of compromising

The focus on interactions also links to the second part of the research question: *how is the EU's multilayered migration governance compromised in the context of incompatible interests between the EU and the Senegalese government, since 2009?* To answer this question, another approach to interactions is needed. So far, I have discussed Colebatch' (2009) interpretivist approach to interactions, in which the importance of scene-setting is emphasized. This is also important in this thesis, as the influence of the context of incompatible interests is studied. To do this, I use another approach to interactions, namely a game-theoretic model by Michael Barnett and Christoph Zürcher (2009). In contrast to Colebatch, this model takes a rational choice approach to explain the social world from a positivist stance. This thesis is written from an interpretivist stance of which the aim is to *understand* the social world, rather than *explaining* it (Demmers 2017: 17). Therefore, the main focus in this thesis is on processes and social construction. Nevertheless, Barnett and Zürcher's (2009) model is useful in analyzing on a macro level how the EU and the Senegalese government interact and compromise from their own interests. The model is based on studies on peacebuilding operations and the 'strategic interactions' of parties involved. Barnett and Zürcher describe these strategic interactions as the activities through which different parties interact with each other. The ability to achieve their goals thereby depends on the strategies of the other parties. In response, each party will strategize their interactions depending on the actions or strategies of the other, as far as these can be known. The 'logic' of the strategic interactions is described as a 'game', which can lead to four possible outcomes: cooperative peacebuilding, compromised peacebuilding, captured peacebuilding and conflictive peacebuilding. Compromised peacebuilding, Barnett and Zürcher argue, is the most likely outcome, as it comes closest to the objectives of the different parties (ibid.: 24-25). This thesis is not about peacebuilding, however, this theory is still relevant as an analytical tool to systematically study the interactions and compromising between the EU and the Senegalese government on migration control.

From the analysis in Chapter 4, I conclude that the strategic interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government indeed lead to a compromised outcome. However, this compromise is not a concrete outcome in the form of an agreement or policy. I argue instead that the outcome is a continuous process in which both parties interact on the topic of migration control. I name this continuous maneuvering the 'process of compromising'. To be able to

analyze this continuous ‘process of compromising’, Barnett and Zürcher’s model is insufficient as it suggests that the compromised outcome is a concrete, final outcome and that interests remain unchanged. Furthermore, this model is useful to analyze interactions on a macro level, whereas the working of the process of compromising can be applied on a more micro level, as is shown in Chapter 4. In other words, the model is not helpful in understanding how compromising works as a process. Hence, it will be a starting point from which the interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government can be mapped. The working of the process of compromising will be further elaborated in Chapter 4.

1.4 Governance, partnership and compromise

In this chapter, the analytical framework of this thesis is presented and discussed: multilayered migration governance and the partnership approach. These concepts derive from broader social theory on governance and partnership, particularly related to the EU’s external migration governance and the use of ideas on partnership. This analytical framework will be helpful in answering the first part of the research question, in which the development of EU initiatives is central. The second part of the question focuses on the compromise on incompatible interests, between the EU and the Senegalese government. The literature on the EU’s multilayered migration governance and the partnership approach does not provide an answer to the influence of such incompatible interests. Therefore, the model of Barnett and Zürcher has been discussed, which focuses on strategic interactions and compromise. This model is a starting point from which I present the term process of compromising.

CHAPTER 2 – METHODOLOGY

This thesis is based upon primary, qualitative data, which I collected during two months of fieldwork research in Senegal. In this part, I will elaborate on the methodology of the data collection and data analysis. I will present the ‘methodological strategy’ of the research, which Jennifer Mason (2002: 30) describes as ‘the logic by which you go about answering your research questions’. This ‘logic’ refers to both the design of the research, as well as the day-to-day decisions of the research. The methodological strategy in the data collection and analysis is a ‘coherent and consistent approach to answering [the] research questions’ (ibid.: 32). Therefore, I will first go back to the research puzzle and focus on the ontological and epistemological stance of this puzzle. Through this, I explain the approach I have used to come to answer this research question. There has been a continuous dialogue between ideas and evidence, and this research is therefore characterized by an iterative approach (Ragin and Amoroso 2011). The research should be seen as process in which data collection and analysis continuously influenced each other. What is presented in this chapter are the main directions and decisions taken in this research process.

2.1 Research puzzle and sub-questions

As presented the in the Introduction chapter, the research question is: *how is the EU’s multilayered migration governance presented and compromised between the EU and the Senegalese government, in the context of incompatible interests on migration control since 2009?* This question can be divided into two sub-questions. The first is: *how is the EU’s multilayered migration governance presented in the EU-Senegalese context?* This question thus focuses on the presentation in the governance of the EU. As explained in Chapter 1, this governance is characterized by the partnership approach. Therefore this is the analytical framework through which the initiatives in Chapter 4 will be analyzed. The second sub-question is: *how is the EU’s multilayered migration governance compromised in the context of incompatible interests between the EU and the Senegalese government, since 2009?* This question zooms in on the compromising between the EU and the Senegalese government, which I present as the ‘process of compromising’. Whereas the first question focuses on the presentation in the EU’s governance, the second question provides insights on the influence of incompatible interests. This is particularly important in the context of Senegal since 2009, as the government rejected to sign a Mobility Partnership with the EU in this year.

2.2 Ontological and epistemological stance

The ontological stance of this thesis is a focus on relational interactions. I analyze the interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government, and what this says about their (changing) relations. Epistemologically, I focus on processes, dynamics and interactions in the relation between the EU and the Senegalese government. This is the most suitable approach to gain knowledge on this relation, which is historically strong, but also characterized as dynamic and continuously changing. The most appropriate research strategy relating to these ontological and epistemological stances, is qualitative research. This form of research is most suitable to gather data on dynamics, processes and interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government. Through analyzing this data, I can say something about the relational interactions between these actors.

2.3 Qualitative data collection: sampling and methods

The data collection part of the research consisted of two phases: the first focused on orientation and the second on zooming in. In the first phase, the aim was to gather broad information on migration control in the EU-Senegalese context. This started already in the Netherlands, by gathering and analyzing large amounts of EU policy documents on migration control in the Senegalese region. In this analysis, I focused first on money flows, by following the funding and budgetary plans of the EU, and second on a broad range of topics, such as policies on development and security. This part of the research was mainly done with online information, available on the websites of the EU. From this data, it was possible to create a timeline of important policies, projects and events (see Appendix 1). Although the timeline seems clear and orderly, the web of EU policies and initiatives was not. It was a difficult process to find which policies were connected and how these could be understood in the broader EU external governance. The process of searching and selecting policies in itself provided insights in the multilayered form of EU governance. Eventually, the constructed timeline was guiding during the first three weeks in Senegal. During these weeks, I focused on arranging semi-structured interviews with the EU Delegation in Dakar, EU Member State embassies, international organizations and Senegalese government officials.

In terms of access, already in the Netherlands I e-mailed these actors to arrange meetings. To gather the contacts from these persons or organizations I used my own network, which provided me with several relevant contacts. Furthermore, many contact details of international organizations or embassies could be found on their websites. Later in the research, I gathered new contacts through the snowball effect, where the people I interviewed provided

me with new contacts (Mason 2002: 142). During semi-structured interviews, I used the constructed timeline and asked respondents which initiatives they regarded important and which less relevant. In this way, I have been able to identify three main initiatives which became central during the second phase. Before discussing this phase, it is furthermore important to emphasize that the first phase has been determining in recognizing the incompatible interests on return migration and legal migration. These were not presented as such, but a large amount of respondents referred to these topics, from both EU and Senegalese perspective. From the interviews, I discovered that these perspectives were contradictory. This led me to the idea that they could be seen as incompatible, which is further discussed in Chapter 3. The methods that were used in phase one were document analysis, semi-structured interviews and informal conversations. Document analysis was used to create a better idea of the existing policies, money flows and initiatives. Thereafter, semi-structured interviews with respondents from different perspectives provided information on the importance of the policies and topics of discussion. Lastly, informal conversations with (mainly Senegalese) persons on migration control have provided a broader context, from which I could choose the more in-depth focus in phase two.

In the second phase, I zoomed in on three initiatives: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the Politique Nationale de Migration du Sénégal (PNMS) and the Rabat Process. The sampling of these initiatives is based on the semi-structured and orientation interviews in the first phase. In these interviews, both EU and Senegalese respondents referred regularly to these initiatives. From this I concluded that these initiatives were regarded to be important for both parties. They have also been sampled this way as they represent different forms of initiatives: funding, national policy and international dialogue. As the analytical framework of this research focuses on the multilayered migration governance of the EU, it is useful to study different forms of initiatives. These could give insights first in the extent to which the governance is multilayered, and second on how this governance works in different cases.

In this phase of the research, the semi-structured interviews were more focused on collecting information on the three initiatives. Both in the questions of the interviews and in the selection of respondents, the initiatives were central. By doing this, I aimed to gather specific data on the topics of discussion in the construction of these initiatives, and how this related to the incompatible interests. This is not to say that topics of discussion were openly presented. It was a challenge to identify these topics, as many respondents would not provide clear insights on incompatibilities, or even deny their existence. This problem was partly solved by the

constructed timeline and later the selection of the three initiatives. By focusing on concrete and technical questions on the initiatives, I was able to gain information on how these were constructed. Later in the interviews, I introduced the topics of return migration and legal migration to see how these were approached. The aim of doing this was to gain insight in the relation between these topics and the initiatives, and more importantly the respondent's view on this. Accordingly, the data collection in phase two was more in-depth. Through this it was possible to sketch a broader image in the data analysis stage. The method in the second phase was mainly semi-structured interviewing, mainly with persons involved in the initiative. However, as it was difficult to reach certain persons involved, I also conducted interviews with persons that were not directly involved but still knowledgeable of the initiatives. Furthermore, these persons could provide insights in the broader context in which these initiatives were constructed. Apart from semi-structured interviews, in this phase I also gathered information from informal conversations, mainly with young Senegalese men and women. Other forms of speech were gathered during two events, at which policy-makers, politicians, civil society actors and journalists spoke. These two events were a press conference for migration journalists and an international conference for migration civil society organizations.⁷ During these events, I also used observation as a method to study the interactions between different actors, namely high officials and local civil society organizations. Lastly, document analysis remained an important method to gather more information on the chosen initiatives. This was done by continuing reading on the objectives of the initiatives and related projects.

2.4 Qualitative data analysis: coding and operationalization

Before analyzing the collected data, it was first organized through coding. To do this, I used the coding program NVivo 12. Through coding I divided the data into information on the three initiatives and on topics of discussion. Afterwards, these codes were grouped together into more specific categories and patterns were analyzed (Ragin and Amoroso 2011; Boeijs 2014). Finally, this organized data was analyzed based on the two parts of the research question: the presentation of the initiatives as forms of multilayered migration governance and the compromise on incompatible interests on migration control. To be able to provide answers to both parts, the analytical framework has been operationalized as followed.

As explained in the theory part of this thesis, the analytical framework is multilayered migration governance through the partnership approach. To be able to use this framework for

⁷ Event 1, conference DIADEM; Event 2, press conference HSF

the analysis of the three selected cases, it has to be operationalized into (more) concrete questions. First the three initiatives are introduced by general questions:

What kind of policy is this?

What is the aim of the policies?

Thereafter, the definition of the partnership approach is operationalized. The approach ‘combines a discursive component with an institutional one relating to the creation of supposedly horizontal and inclusive settings of dialogue and cooperation’ (ibid.: 3). The concept of ‘partnership discourse’, introduced earlier in this chapter, is here related to the institutional elements in which partnerships are established as an attempt to govern. Accordingly the partnership approach will be studied through discourses and policy construction through interactions. Discourses will be analyzed through the ‘partnership discourse’, which is a ‘[discourse] that promises to address migration in a spirit of cooperation between all affected countries, based on a belief in win-win approaches to international migration, and the notion of shared responsibility for migration management’ (Kunz 2011: 284). The questions to study the discourse are:

How is the spirit of cooperation discussed in the policies?

How are aspects of win-win situations illustrated in the policy?

How is the notion of shared responsibility visible in the policy?

To study how policy is socially constructed through interactions, the following questions are used:

What is the form of these policies (e.g. funds, projects, actions plans, dialogues)?

Through what interactions are the policies constructed?

What does this say about the mode of governance of the EU?

The aim of these questions on discourse, policies and interactions is to gain insight in how the partnership approach is presented by the EU. This relates to the first part of the research question, and aims to answer the first sub-question.

The second part of the research question focuses on compromise and links to the second sub-question. This is where the incompatible interests are analyzed and the notion of compromise is included. By using the game-theoretic model of Barnett and Zürcher (2009), the interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government are studied. This is done through the following questions:

What is policy preference of each actor?

What is first step/start of the EU?

What is response of the Senegalese government?

What is the bargaining process?

As discussed before, the outcome of these interactions is a compromise. Nevertheless, not in the form of a concrete agreement or policy, but as a continuous ‘process of compromising’. To analyze this process, I have constructed the following questions:

How are the incompatible interests on return migration and legal migration discussed between both parties?

How do both parties interact with each other on these topics from 2009 onwards?

How are the incompatible interests integrated in the initiative?

Brought together, the answers can provide an insight on the multilayered migration governance of the EU. The relation to this mode of governance can be studied through questions based on the definition of multilayered migration governance as an ‘architecture of international governance’ (Kunz, Lavenex and Panizzon 2011: 16) which consists of an interplay between multilateral, (trans-)regional and bilateral layers. It is further defined as a ‘proliferation of informal process-oriented, experimental forms of transgovernmental governance, promoted by countries of destination in their relations with countries of origin and transit’ (Lavenex and Panizzon 2013: 3). Questions through which the link with multilayered migration governance can be studied are:

How is the architecture of migration governance visible in these cases (e.g. multilateral, (trans-)regional, bilateral level)? Is the initiative characterized by process-oriented, experimental forms of transgovernmental governance?

2.5 Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations were taken into account during the research. To begin, informed consent has been given by all respondents. Before each interview, I shortly explained the lines of the research and how the provided information would be used. All respondents agreed with the information being used for the research, but several preferred not to be recorded. During these interviews, I made notes. Furthermore, all respondents are anonymized in this thesis. As they often had high placed positions in (governmental) organizations, I described their position as broad as possible. EU Member State embassies are therefore not referred to by country, but in

general as EU embassies. This is done to avoid the risk that these people can be recognized by tracing their positions.

Moreover, an ethical consideration has been the positionality of the researcher. My background is one of a EU female citizen. I therefore am not in the position to make claims for which Senegalese local knowledge is needed. This has led to the decision to study EU initiatives, as my background enables me to understand these initiatives in the local EU context. My position as a EU citizen also enabled me to conduct this research in the first place. Firstly, as my passport provided me (visa-free) access to Senegal. Secondly, as I received access to the EU Delegation and international organizations, which is very difficult for Senegalese people not in possession of an EU passport. This reveals the inequality in mobility, which I referred to in the Introduction: I was able to move to Senegal to conduct this research, whereas most of my respondents were not able to do the same in an EU country.

Lastly, by focusing on high-political initiatives and interactions, I have chosen not to interview migrants themselves. This decision is based on ethical considerations, as I am not trained to psychologically support these people if traumatic events are discussed.

2.6 Limitations

There were also certain limitations in this research. First of all, it was difficult to get access to Senegalese government officials. Therefore, it was not possible to select a large, varied and fully representative group of respondents. It also resulted in an imbalance in the amount of respondents with a European or Senegalese background. This problem was partly solved by shifting the focus towards EU initiatives and how these were constructed through interactions with the Senegalese government. Nevertheless, the results could provide more in-depth insights on the perspective of this government if more interviews would have been possible.

Another limitation of the research is that certain respondents did not want the interviews to be recorded. It was therefore not possible to literally transcribe these interviews. I solved this problem by making notes during the interview or record a summary of the interview shortly after it was finished. By transcribing this summary as soon as possible, I attempted to maintain the valuable information of the interview. Nevertheless, the lack of complete records and transcripts limited the data analysis phase. Important parts of interviews were left out and complete transcripts have impeded me from literally quoting.

The last limitation concerns the language barriers, which occasionally existed. Most interviews were conducted in French, which I speak and write fluently. Nevertheless, certain respondents spoke in strong dialect or regularly used words in Wolof. This is another national

language in Senegal, of which I had very limited knowledge. Therefore, miscommunications did sometimes occur or it became more difficult to spontaneously create follow-up questions. Fortunately, through the recorded interviews I could partly filter out miscommunications. Regarding the language, it must also be noted that most policy documents were published in French. Although these have thoughtfully been translated to English when needed, it is inevitable that a problem of translation has influenced the research results. This problem has partly been solved through the help of native speakers in checking translations.

CHAPTER 3 – ‘LA MOBILITÉ, C’EST LE SÉNÉGAL’

*Now while the Africa of despotism is dying – it is the agony of a pitiable princess,
just like Europe to whom she is connected through the naval.*

- Léopold Sédar Senghor, Senegal’s first president from 1960-1980 and poet (1945)

*It is a great irony of history and geography that Africa,
whose landmass is closer than any other to the mainland of Europe,
should come to occupy in the European psychological disposition the farthest point of otherness,
should indeed become Europe’s very antithesis.*

- Chinua Achebe, Nigerian novelist, poet and critic (2009: 17)

The relation between the EU and Senegal is central in this thesis. Although this relation has strong historical roots, in this thesis the emphasis is on the incompatible interests between the two parties. To understand both perspectives, this chapter provides the context of the relations, specifically on migration. First, I will shortly illustrate the historical relations between the EU and Senegal. Thereafter, I separately focus on the EU and Senegalese perspective on migration, and bring these together in a discussion on the relations between the two parties. Through this, I will show how there exist incompatible interests on return migration and legal migration. Furthermore, it is shown how these relate to deeper incompatibilities on security, migration and development.

3.1 Historical relations EU and Senegal

The relations between Senegal and Europe go back until long before the colonization by France in the 1850s (Wolf 1997; Barry 1998). Since the 15th century, ships with enslaved Africans departed from Île de Gorée, an island next to Dakar, to the Americas (Barry 1998). Through the so-called Triangle Trade, African enslaved people were shipped to the Americas, and raw and produced goods were taken back to Europe, after which the process was repeated (Wolf 1997). Through its strategic location, Île de Gorée was the center of rivalry between European powers, mainly France, Portugal, the Netherlands and Britain (Barry 1998: 47). This is an important aspect in the European and African historical relations, as this story is often told from the European perspective, in which this period was framed as the ‘golden age’ of world traveling and trade. It has, however, to a large extent shaped social life in the West African region. When the French confiscated Île de Gorée from the Dutch, their power in the West African region grew. In 1885, France colonized Senegal and ruled the country until its independence in 1960 (Gellar 1976). Although Senegal is independent for almost sixty years, the presence of France is still strong. French is one of the official languages and French multinationals are dominant in the economy. Above that, the value of the currency – the CFA franc – is determined by the

central bank in France, for which Senegal pays ‘colonial tax’ (Pigeaud and Samba Sylla 2018). This historical context is important when focusing on migration, since the discussions on migration between the EU and the Senegalese government are informed by these historically strong relations, and the changes in this relation are central to this thesis. To be able to analyze the relations and interactions on migration between the EU and Senegal, I will first separately illustrate the EU and Senegalese perspective on migration.

3.2 Migration from EU perspective

3.2.1 Externalization and Fortress Europe

To understand the EU perspective on migration, it is first important to note that the EU is not one static organization. Rather, it is a collection of the 28 Member States, which positions are determined by their internal party politics. Relating to migration, there exists a discussion on (im)migration between the Member States and the EU, which is closely related to the 2015 ‘migration crisis’. In this political environment, migration is a sensitive topic in many Member States. For example, the rise of right-wing extremism in France, Germany, Hungary, Spain, Belgium and more countries puts pressure on the EU to create stricter regulations on migration and border control. This internal discussion on migration in EU thereby determines its external migration policy, which is strongly determined by a ‘soft power’ approach.

In the ‘soft power’ approach, there is an emphasis on expanding EU ideas on security, good governance, rule of law and development (Nye 1990). Several scholars describe this process as ‘externalization’, ‘Europeanization’ or ‘extra-territorialization’ (Boswell 2003; Geddes 2003; 2008 ; Haddad 2008; Lavenex & Uçarer 2004; Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles 2016). The externalization of borders is, for example, described as a ‘process of territorial and administrative expansion of a given state’s migration and border policy to third countries’ (Casas-Cortes et. al. 2016: 231-232). This process of externalization was first focused on Eastern Europe, as part of the ‘enlargement’ process aiming to ‘foster peace and stability in regions close to the EU’s borders’ and ‘help [to] improve the quality of people’s lives through integration and cooperation across borders’ (European Commission 2019i). Later examples of EU externalization processes were the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), through which the EU ‘works with its Southern and Eastern Neighbours to foster stabilization, security and prosperity’ (EEAS 2016) and Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency [as] the operational arm of the EU in its ongoing response to the challenged at its external borders’ (Frontex 2019). Frontex was established in 2004 and gained a more important role in 2015, as it was leading in the creation of ‘Fortress Europe’. In April 2004 a ship with

eight hundred people aboard capsized near the Libyan coast (van Houtum and Lucassen 2016: 96). In combination with an influx of Syrian refugees, this sparked a debate in the EU. This led to the ‘fortification’ of the EU, often referred to as ‘Fortress Europe’ (ibid.: 101). Henk van Houtum and Leo Lucassen (2016) state that this ‘fortress’ consists of three ‘walls’: one of paper – the Schengen visa; one of iron – fences; and one of segregation – camps. These last two are mainly located at the EU territory, but slowly expand to the neighboring countries of the EU, such as Turkey or Morocco (ibid.). This links to the earlier discussed ‘externalization of borders’, as the borders are hereby placed outside the EU territory.

Relating to the ‘crisis’ mode on migration, van Houtum and Lucassen furthermore argue that this is a ‘home-made’ condition of the EU. The situation in 2015 – of Syrian refugees and other migrants fleeing to the EU – is not a situation which the continent did not deal with before (ibid.: 114). Van Houtum and Lucassen argue that the ‘crisis’ was partly created by the EU itself: by responding with the three ‘walls’ and the reinforcement of ‘Fortress Europe’ it became largely impossible to enter the territory in a regular way. This has caused migrants to take larger risks, which created inhuman situations (ibid.: 115). Although the situation in 2015 was framed as a ‘crisis’, it can thus be doubted to what extent this situation started as such or was created by the EU itself. For this thesis, it is important to know the context of the discussion since 2015, as this influenced the migration governance of the EU in Senegal.

3.2.2 Focus Sahel region

Apart from the territory close to the EU, since 2015 the focus of the EU also started to shift to the Sahel region. This became a ‘priority’ region to stop irregular migration, as a response to the lack of cooperation from North African states (Casas-Cortes et al. 2016: 240). The focus regions were thus located in the countries of departure, where the EU identified the ‘root causes’ of migration.⁸ To encourage the cooperation of countries in this region, Mobility Partnerships were established (ibid.). I have already elaborated on these forms of migration policies, as the failed negotiation for a Mobility Partnership between the EU and the Senegalese government was the starting point of this research (see Introduction). Mobility Partnerships could be seen as a perfect example of the externalization of the borders: they are characterized by strategies of ‘extraterritorialization’, through which the ‘policing of irregular migration’ no longer takes place within the EU territory or at the borders. Rather, immigration control is replaced to the territory of other states or in international waters (Ryan 2010: 3, in Casas-Cortes et al. 2016). Through Mobility Partnerships, the ideas of ‘cooperation’ and ‘partnering’ are promoted

⁸ For more information on these ‘root causes’, see Chapter 4 on the EUTF.

(Lavenex and Stucky 2011). In the absence of a Mobility Partnership with Senegal, the EU aims to implement other initiatives to regulate migration. The amount and content of these initiatives has changed since 2015, which is discussed in Chapter 4.

3.3 Migration from Senegalese perspective

3.3.1 From ‘donor darling’ to ‘emerging economy’

Since its independence in 1960, Senegal has been defined as a ‘developing’ country, and its model position transformed it into a ‘donor darling’. This means it is a country with a special status through which it attracts funding from international donors, such as IOs and NGOs (Bergamaschi 2014). In Senegal, this position of a donor darling can be derived from the emphasis on the stability of the country and its position as a model (growing) democracy (Bernardini 2018; WorldBank 2019). Although the position of the country as a ‘developing’ country has changed, the capital city Dakar is still characterized by the visible presence of IOs and international NGOs. Many of these organizations also have their regional offices for neighboring countries in Dakar, which confirms its status of a stable country. In the 1980s, a shift took place in development thinking and since then Senegal is framed as an ‘emergent economy’ (Mbaye and Golub 2002; Lagarde 2015). It is currently described as a middle income country (WorldBank 2016: 37). By which it is perceived as a good investment climate, not only for European businesses. There is also a growing interest from China and Turkey (China Org 2006; Anadolu Agency 2018). Other important trade partners are currently Lebanon, the Gulf States and the US⁹. A representative of the Senegalese government claims that the country is open for foreign investments, and that thereby the EU and its Members States are no longer considered the only economic ‘partners’ of Senegal¹⁰. He furthermore states that China, Turkey, Lebanon and the Gulf States gained ground on the Senegalese economic sector, mainly through focusing on infrastructure, natural resources and agriculture¹¹. This is not to say that these relations are ‘new’, they are merely less self-evident than the historical relations between the EU and Senegal. Later in this chapter, I will further elaborate on the effects this has on the position of the EU and its Member States in Senegal.

3.3.2 ‘La mobilité, c’est le Sénégal’

More specifically focused on migration, it is important to notice that most migration takes place in the region, towards Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea. Migration towards the EU is only a small

⁹ Interview 5, representative DPAF

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

percentage (WorldBank 2016; 2019; Ndione et al. 2019). Although it is a relatively small part of migration from Senegal, my focus is on the migration dialogues between the EU and the Senegalese government, in which the migratory routes are central. Migration is an important aspect of Senegalese social and economic life. As one of my respondents, a lawyer working for the rights of Senegalese people abroad, said: ‘la mobilité, c’est le Sénégal’ – mobility, that is Senegal¹². Not only the movement of people, but also of goods, money and knowledge are inherent to social life. This is mainly because 10.3% of the GDP of the country consists of remittances, this amount \$1.6 billion of the total \$ 16.37 billion (WorldBank 2016: 48-53; 220). The importance of remittances is also emphasized by the Senegalese lawyer stressing that every family in Senegal has one person sending money from abroad¹³.

Despite these numbers, the exact amount of remittances is hard to determine, as they are often sent through family channels (Sagna 2017). Therefore, it is also difficult to regulate these money flows and it is hardly possible to measure if this money is invested in the economic and social development of the country (ibid.: 73). These are considered to be two issues that the Senegalese government aims to control, but does not succeed in¹⁴. An example of how difficult it is to track remittances, is the story of one of my respondents. He is a young Senegalese professional and his wife lives in France for here studies. She is financially supported by her husband, who sends her money every month by giving cash money to the mother of an acquaintance in Senegal. This acquaintance lived in France, and instead of sending the money to Senegal, he gave it to my respondent’s wife. A money transaction was made, and there were no official records¹⁵. This story does not stand on itself, and therefore the ‘facts’ of the World Bank can only be seen as estimations, as hard numbers cannot be produced. The data is, however, presented as ‘facts’, which is problematic as (namely EU) policies are based upon this. So far, in discussing the Senegalese perspective on migration control, I have largely focused on the discussion in Senegalese society. This thesis focuses on the high political interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government. Nevertheless, the societal discussion in Senegal is highly influential for the actions of the Senegalese government. Particularly the discussion on legal migration determines the actions of the Senegalese government in the process of compromising with the EU.

¹² Interview 9, lawyer DEL

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Interview 8, journalist RFM; Interview 9, DEL; Interview 12, representative Ministry of Justice

¹⁵ Interview 15, journalist Tv on line 221 and DEL

3.4 EU-Senegalese relations on migration

After the failed negotiations for a Mobility Partnership in 2009, there have been no new attempts to negotiate similar kinds of agreements. An EU representative states that the Senegalese authorities are unwilling to negotiate agreements with the EU, since these deals would be with 28 countries. Rather, she says, the Senegalese government prefers to negotiate bilateral agreements with separate Member States¹⁶. This is not expressed in the same words by the Senegalese government officials I have spoken to. However, the interactions between the Senegalese government and other EU Member States suggest that this is the case, as there are several bilateral agreements on migration with for example France, Italy and Spain (FMM West Africa 2017d). The EU representative furthermore states that the EU does not have a strong position to negotiate from, which she explains as ‘we cannot say, if you don’t do this, we don’t do that’¹⁷. This is partly because the Senegalese government also has strong relations with other countries, such as the China, the US, Lebanon, Turkey and the Gulf states. A high official at the Direction de la Police de l’Air et des Frontières (DPAF) elaborates on this by stating that Senegal is ‘an open, welcoming country and that many different parties are currently present’¹⁸. This gives him, and the Senegalese government in general, more choice in deciding who to negotiate with on different topics. The EU is seen as one of the most important relations of the Senegalese government, but not the only one¹⁹. This can be related back to the critical partnership approach, as discussed in Chapter 1. In this approach, partnership is seen as a mask to cover power asymmetries between the North and the South. Through the data presented above, I state that this critical notion needs to be more nuanced. First, the power relations between the EU and the Senegalese government appear not as asymmetrical as the critical partnership approach suggests. The Senegalese government has agency in choosing who to cooperate with. Furthermore, focusing only on north-south power relations turns – in this case – eastern influences into a blind spot. Negotiating a form of partnership in this context is a complex process, in which all interests of different parties play a role.

Accordingly, the Senegalese government has a certain extent of agency in choosing who to negotiate and cooperate with. Nevertheless, this agency should not be romanticized, as there is still a financial inequality between the EU and Senegal. A Senegalese government official, for example, continuously emphasized ‘*on est pauvre*’ – we are poor²⁰. And a young journalist

¹⁶ Interview 4, representative EU Delegation Dakar

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Interview 5, representative DPAF

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Interview 5, representative DPAF; Interview 12, representative Ministry of Justice

specialized in migration issues states that ‘the problem of Senegal is poverty’²¹. This shows how the relationship between the EU and the Senegalese government is one of interdependency. On the one hand, the EU needs the cooperation of the Senegalese government to control migration. On the other hand, the Senegalese government still relies on financial support from the EU, mostly in the form of aid contributions.

It must also be noted that if the Senegalese government gains more agency through its renewed position, this does not mean that the Senegalese population also benefits from this. This relates to different levels of inequality: the Senegalese government can experience less inequality towards the EU, for Senegalese citizens this inequality is still strongly present. The inequality between EU citizens and Senegalese citizens has even grown after 2015. In this period, it became more difficult for Senegalese citizens to receive a Schengen visa, whereas EU citizens do not need a visa to enter Senegal. One Senegalese journalist also illustrates the different levels of inequality by stating that the government repeatedly uses the argument of poverty, whereas this party has the power to reduce poverty by creating employment opportunities. He furthermore doubts how ‘poor’ the government officials are, in comparison to the average Senegalese population²². Accordingly, the dynamics on the high-political level between the EU and the Senegalese government are not representative for those on the lower levels. This thesis focuses on the high-political interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government, nevertheless the context and influence of those interactions should also be taken into account. This context determines to a large extent the incompatible interests on migration control.

3.5 Consensus and incompatible interests

In the previous part, I have illustrated the relations between the EU and the Senegalese government on migration. The frictions between the two parties has already been shortly discussed, in this part I will elaborate on the incompatible interests between the EU and the Senegalese government. These incompatible interests are central to the research question and the study of their influence on migration governance is the contribution of this thesis. Officially there seems to be consensus between the EU and the Senegalese government to aim to stop irregular migration – the movement of Senegalese people towards the EU, without valid visa documents. However, there are different perspectives on how this should be achieved. From the EU perspective, a Member State representative states that the focus is on return migration,

²¹ Interview 15, journalist Tv on line 221 and DEL

²² Interview 8, journalist RFM

by sending irregular migration back to their countries of origin²³. From a Senegalese perspective, legal migration is seen as a possibility to prevent people to get involved in irregular migration. On a deeper analytical level, the incompatible interests can be identified through the security-migration-development nexus, on which I will elaborate later in this chapter.

3.5.1 Return migration

The focus of the EU in current migration policies is on return migration. Since the larger influx of migrants in 2015, there is a large emphasis on ‘sending people back’ to their country of origin (Sinatti 2015). As part of this approach, the EU aims to sign readmission agreements with ‘partner’ countries, to send migrants arriving in the Schengen area, Libya or Morocco back to their country of origin. Return migration is thereby seen as a ‘triple-win’ scenario (ibid.). First, sending states could benefit from returning resources and skills acquired abroad by migrants; second, return after temporary migration could contribute to a workforce renewal; and third, return migrants could enjoy improved conditions in the country of origin, a new status achieved through their migration experiences (ibid.). Nevertheless, return migration is a highly contested issue between government of origin and host countries, and migrants themselves (ibid.). Furthermore, different parties attribute a different meaning to ‘return’, ranging from permanent resettlement in the country of origin, to temporary return within broader mobility trajectories (ibid.). I agree that return migration is a highly contested issue, as it is one of the main topics of discussion in the EU-Senegalese context.

From the failed negotiations on a Mobility Partnership, it became clear that the Senegalese government does not want to sign an agreement with the EU on return migration, also referred to as ‘readmission agreement’ (Bernardini 2018). The EU expresses discontent on this, and demands that ‘Senegal shows further cooperation on migration by delivering on the effective readmission of illegal migrants: a 9% return ratio is in contrast with the good cooperation between Senegal and the EU’ (ibid.). Return migrants that were sent back to Senegal, often face social problems as they are seen to have ‘failed’. Also, they mostly have financial debts, as family or community members have invested in their journey, in the hope they would receive money from Europe (Sinatti 2015). An EU representative tells me that ‘this issue is very political, it is a difficult topic, the return of migrations’²⁴. She also states that the

²³ Interview 14, representative EU Member State embassy

²⁴ Interview 4, representative EU Delegation Dakar

EU would like for the Senegalese government ‘to cooperate a bit more on the return of irregular migrants’²⁵.

This on-going discussion does not mean, however, that return migration is not already integrated in migration policies. The FMM West Africa project, for example, focuses on ‘addressing the challenges of [the] reintegration of returning migrants’ (Devillard et al. 2016). It is also one of the main pillars of the PNMS, which aims for ‘better support [for] the return and reintegration of migrants’ (Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning 2018). Furthermore, one of the main pillars of the on-going migration dialogue, the Rabat Process, is ‘return, readmission and reintegration’ (Rabat Process 2019). Return migration and reintegration are also considered important topics for the International Organization for Migration (IOM). A representative of this organization explains how they focus on the problems return migrants face on the local and community level, such as debt, shame and unemployment²⁶.

3.5.2 Legal migration

Another topic of discussion is legal migration. To begin with, the term ‘legal migration’ is confusing, as it suggests that other forms of migration are illegal. Although the term ‘illegal’ migration is not used in official policy documents²⁷, there is still a large contrast between legal migration and other forms of migration. An IOM representative explains legal migration as the form of migration which happens through ‘legal routes’, with valid personal documents and visa²⁸. From the Senegalese perspective, creating opportunities for legal migration could solve the ‘problem’ of irregular migration. As return migration, legal migration is also a topic on which the 2009 negotiations for a Mobility Partnerships failed (Chou and Gilbert 2012; Reslow 2012). A young man thinking about possibly migrating to the EU told me that ‘it used to be a lot easier a few years ago to get a visa’²⁹. As a result of the stricter border policies, he says, is it almost impossible now to get a visa³⁰. This became also visible through the long lines of people waiting every day for the Schengen visa application office in Dakar (see Photo 1). Due to this difficult process, and the limited chances to obtain a visa, young, often low-skilled, people choose alternative options to reach Europe, argues a Senegalese lawyer for migrants’ rights³¹.

²⁵ Interview 4, representative EU Delegation Dakar

²⁶ Interview 10, representative IOM

²⁷ Interview 11, representatives ICMPD

²⁸ Interview 10, representative IOM

²⁹ Interview 8, journalist RFM

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Interview 9 – lawyer DEL

Furthermore he states that people who would originally stay in the EU only temporary, choose to stay longer, because the chances they can go again are diminished³². This links to the low return percentages, that the EU refers to (Bernardini 2018).



Photo 1 – People in line for the VFS Global office³³

Legal migration is thus seen from the Senegalese perspective as a possible solution to diminish irregular migration and create possibilities for young people. Also in the EU, agreements on legal migration are discussed. However, on an EU-wide level ‘this is never going to happen’ as a representative of a Member State embassy tells me³⁴. This is because the whole Schengen region, 28 Member States, should then agree to make legal migration possible. Therefore, the Member States representative assumes, the Senegalese government prefers to negotiate separately with Member States, to enlarge their possibility for bilateral agreements on legal migration³⁵. This has happened in the past with for example Spain, on seasonal labor migration (Devillard et al. 2016: 268-284). The hesitance to create possibilities for legal migration is that migrants will not return after their contract finished, which was confirmed by the experiment of seasonal labor migration in Spain, where 9% of the migrants did not return after their contract was finished (ibid.).

³² Interview 9 – lawyer DEL

³³ See bibliography for more information

³⁴ Interview 14, representative EU Member State embassy

³⁵ Interview 4, representative EU Delegation; Interview 14, representative EU Member State embassy

Legal migration is thus, as return migration, a topic of debate between the EU and the Senegalese government. It is included in the FMM West Africa project under the name of ‘labor migration’ (Devillard et al. 2016). Also in the Rabat Process, one of the pillars is on ‘labor migration and legal migration’ (Rabat Process 2019). The discussion on legal migration is furthermore confirmed by an EU representative who states that ‘there is a little gap on the level of legal migration’, as ‘the Member States are afraid to open up for legal migration’³⁶. Another point with legal migration is that Member States often claim that they have possibilities for legal migration. However, a World Bank employee working on legal migration argues that these are either exclusively available to highly educated persons or very limited in numbers³⁷. She states, for example, how in the case of Germany there was a list published for vacancies in elderly nursery. Senegalese low-skilled persons could apply for these vacancies, however, when the number of vacancies was discussed, it turned out that there were four positions available³⁸.

3.6 Incompatible interests on migration, security and development

As described above, two main incompatible interests between the EU and the Senegalese government are return migration and legal migration. These incompatible interests relate to different perspectives on larger issues, mainly related to security and development. The interconnection between migration, security and development can best be studied through the security-migration-development nexus (Truong and Gasper 2011). Adrian Smith (2016) elaborates on this by stating that security and development discourses shape migration policies, specifically those on migration control. More specifically to the EU-Senegalese context, Sandra Lavenex and Rahel Kunz (2008) explain how migration and development used to be separate areas of concern in the EU external policies, and how this has changed in the late 1990s. In this period, a paradigm shift took place whereby migration was no longer seen as a problem. Rather, it became a *tool* for development (ibid.: 441). In other words, a ‘securitarian’ policy on migration was replaced by a focus on the migration-development nexus (ibid.: 453).

Although migration, security and development can thus be seen as intertwined, the different interests between the EU and the Senegalese government can best be explained through the migration-security nexus and the migration-development nexus. Concerning the migration-security nexus, the EU prioritizes the border security of the Schengen region, by aiming to regulate migration and to stop irregular migration into this region. From the

³⁶ Interview 4, representative EU Delegation

³⁷ Interview 13, representative World Bank Senegal; Interview 14, representative EU Member State embassy

³⁸ Interview 13, representative World Bank Senegal

perspective of the Senegalese government, following the interests of Senegalese migrants, human security is an important driver for migration. Human security is the ‘security of persons’, which is ‘not merely the physical safety of individuals but their ability to secure and hold basic goods’ (Gasper 2005: 222). Migration can be related to human security, on the one hand, as a way to escape physical, food or water insecurity. On the other hand, migration can create opportunities to prevent certain insecurities, by earning money abroad to financially support family or community members at home. In both cases, migration can be seen as a ‘livelihood strategy’, which is the combination of assets of capitals that allows people to attain livelihood outcomes (Connolly-Boutin and Smit 2016: 386).

The focus on livelihood also closely relates to the migration-development nexus. From the EU perspective, development is approached as a ‘tool’ to prevent migration. Development is thereby mainly framed as economic improvement and the aim is to ‘bring development to tackle the root causes of migration’ (European Commission 2019a). A Senegalese lawyer and several civil society organizations criticize the Senegalese government for only approaching migration as a way to ‘bring’ development, mainly through remittances of the diaspora and investments in infrastructure and businesses³⁹. Although this is a different approach from the EU, development is seen this way as well in terms of *economic* development. This is characteristic for the approaches of both parties as migration and development are often seen as economic issues, rather than social ones. The lack of attention for the social aspects of migration is also a critique of Senegalese civil society organizations towards their government. They argue that the social problems that migrants face abroad, as well as when they return, are not being taken into account⁴⁰. I argue that this economic focus shows that migration is approached as a rational choice, where the costs and benefits of departure are weighted. Nevertheless, through this rational lens the social drivers for migration can often not be understood. This choice can be experienced as irrational, as people are aware of the risks but still depart. Several Senegalese journalists explain the motivations of migrants as based on hope, faith and religion. In the migrant stories they reconstruct, many migrants start their journey by saying ‘inshallah’ – if God wills, it will happen⁴¹. I suggest that the EU and the Senegalese government are not able to adequately respond to these social motivations. Their functioning of policy- and lawmaking is not built to include seemingly ‘irrational’ factors such as religion or faith. Rather, for these activities they need data, numbers and budget plans.

³⁹ Interview 9, lawyer DEL; Event 1, conference DIADEM; Event 2, press conference HSF

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Interview 8, journalist RFM; Interview 9, lawyer DEL; Interview 15, journalist Tv on line 221 and DEL

From this part, it is important to take that the same concepts – ‘migration’, ‘security’, ‘development’ – can have different meanings for the different parties involved. Not only the EU and the Senegalese government, but also the Senegalese civil society organizations and migrants have different approaches to these concepts. In the following chapter, I will zoom in on three EU initiatives. Through analyzing these, the different interests on return migration and legal migration become visible, as will the links between migration, security and development. My aim is to study how initiatives on sensitive topics, such as migration control, are constructed in the context of incompatible interests. This will also provide insights in the broader (changing) relations between the EU and the Senegalese government.

CHAPTER 4 – THREE INITIATIVES OF PARTNERSHIP AND COMPROMISE

Often there are simply no good figures available to put words [on migration] in perspective.

And in the absence of good data, semantics prevail

- Maite Vermeulen, migration correspondent at The Correspondent (2018)

After discussing the context of migration control, in this chapter I present a more in-depth analysis of three EU initiatives. These initiatives are the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the Politique Nationale de Migration du Sénégal (PNMS) and the Rabat Process. In all three initiatives, migration control takes a central role. Although there is often a regional focus, these initiatives are representative for the approach of the EU in Senegal, as this country is included as a priority country (European Commission 2019b; FMM West Africa 2017a; Rabat Process 2019). In this chapter, there will first be a macro analysis of the strategic interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government. By using Barnett and Zürcher's (2009) game-theoretic model of strategic interactions, I will be able to map the interactions between both parties. In doing so, I show how the outcome of these interactions is a compromise. This compromise, however, does not consist of a concrete outcome in the form of an agreement or policy. Therefore I present the term 'process of compromising': a continuous interaction of both parties around the topic of migration control. The working of this process of compromising will be shown through a more micro-level analysis of the three initiatives. Before doing so, the initiatives are first introduced. After that, it is shown how the partnership approach is presented through discursive and institutional elements. Lastly, the working of the process of compromising is illustrated. The analysis in this chapter is thus two-sided: first the partnership approach is studied and second the process of compromising. Together these analyses provide an answer to the research question: how is the EU's multilayered migration governance presented and compromised between the EU and the Senegalese government, in the context of incompatible interests on migration control since 2009?

4.1 Incompatible interests on a macro-level

As discussed in Chapter 1, the game-theoretic model of Barnett and Zürcher (2009) is useful in analyzing how the EU and the Senegalese government interact with each other. I argue that this happens through strategic interactions, which Barnett and Zürcher describe as the strategizing between parties to achieve their goals. In response, each party will adjust its activities depending on the actions of the other party. This strategizing most probably leads to a compromised outcome (ibid.: 24-25). Barnett and Zürcher explain that strategic interactions start with a first

step, which is often a ‘set of activities’ undertaken by external actors, in this case the EU. The other party, in this case the government of Senegal, can respond by either accepting or rejecting the activities. Although the Rabat Process has been on-going since 2006, I identify the EU’s attempt to negotiate a Mobility Partnership in 2009 as the first concrete step. This is also the empirical starting point of the research and is central in the research question. This ‘step’ of the EU was rejected by the Senegalese government, after which no further negotiations took place. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the EU’s interests to control migration disappeared. Moreover, between 2009 and 2014 several small initiatives were set up, such as the FMM West Africa project in 2013 (ICMPD 2019) and a continuation of the Rabat Process, with conferences in Dakar and Rome (Rabat Process 2019). In response, the government of Senegal showed little resistance to these relatively small and legally non-binding initiatives. Migration remained an important aspect of social and economic life in the country and it was considered an integrated part of daily life. As it was not largely difficult to migrate and irregular migration was not a large problem, migration control was not yet a national topic of discussion. I regard this as the explanation for the limited response of the Senegalese government to the EU’s initiatives. Furthermore, as Senegal is more and more framed as an ‘emerging economy’, it started to attract more attention from countries such as China, Lebanon and Turkey to invest. This changed its economic position towards the EU and Senegal became relatively less dependent. In summary, between 2009 and 2014 both parties were interested in migration control, but there were not yet strong incompatible interests on return migration and legal migration.

In 2015, however, this changed through the so-called EU ‘migration crisis’, for which the EU Member States demanded a strong response from the EU. The sense of ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’ led to a series of initiatives from the EU to control migration. First, in 2015 the Valletta Summit was organized, at which funding became available and (more) concrete action plans were constructed, among those the EUTF and the establishment of ‘migration liaison officers’ in Senegal⁴². Furthermore, in 2015 and 2016, the FMM West Africa project established more concrete pillars, such as the support for the creation of national migration policies (Noack et al. 2015; Devillard et al. 2016). Lastly, the most important response of the EU were the stricter border regulations and controls. On the one hand, this led to a stronger incentive for the EU to stimulate return migration, and on the other hand, it became more difficult for Senegalese people to apply for a Schengen visa. As a result of their discontent, more pressure was put on the Senegalese government to create opportunities for legal migration, particularly by civil

⁴² Interview 2, employee EU Member State embassy and FRONTEX; Interview 4, representative EU Delegation Dakar

society organizations⁴³. Accordingly, through these contexts and interactions, the incompatible interests between the EU and the Senegalese government became more strongly divided. Return migration and legal migration were seen as opposing objectives.

4.1.1 Process of compromising

Barnett and Zürcher (2009) explain that after the proposals of initiatives, a bargaining process takes place which most likely leads to a compromised outcome. In Chapter 3, I have shown how there exist incompatible interests between the EU and the Senegalese government, on return and legal migration. It became clear that both parties have their own perspective from which they approach the topic of migration control. Above in paragraph 4.1, I described the bargaining process which showed how the incompatible interests became sharper after 2015. This was mainly a result of the public of both parties – the EU Member States and the Senegalese population – pushing to act upon the interests. Following the model of Barnett and Zürcher, I argue that the bargaining process of both parties indeed leads to a compromised outcome. Both parties show their interests, whereas none can achieve its preferred outcome. Nevertheless, this compromise is not in the form of a concrete outcome, such as an agreement or policy. This has not been the case in 2009, with the Mobility Partnership, and also not in the years after. Accordingly, nothing concrete is institutionalized. Rather, I argue that the continuing interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government show a process of compromising.

This process-oriented focus cannot sufficiently be studied through the rational-choice model of Barnett and Zürcher (2009). Rather, the term is constructed from an interpretivist approach: I focus on the construction of an equilibrium through the process of continuous interactions between both parties. In this process, both parties interact on the topic of migration control. This can be seen as maneuvering – as walking through a labyrinth, where it should be avoided to take the wrong path or face obstacles. Both parties walk through the labyrinth trying to avoid obstacles – conflicts of interest with the other party. They also try to find a common route, through which they can maintain a good relation. In this way, the continuous maneuvering in the labyrinth is a metaphor for the process through which both parties show a ‘work in progress’: there are limited concrete outcomes – return or legal migration are not sufficiently integrated in policies or laws – but the interactions are presented as showing progress – several small initiatives such as the EUTF, PNMS and the Rabat Process are constructed and implemented. The results of these initiatives also have limited effect on

⁴³ Event 1, conference DIADEM; Event 2, press conference HSF

migration control for both parties. What the parties do gain is that they can show they do ‘just enough’ to keep their public satisfied and maintain a stable relation with the other party.

This ‘just enough’ mode is expressed by a World Bank representative, in explaining how the EU creates legal migration opportunities to satisfy the Senegalese government. However, these opportunities are of such limited amount, that there is little resistance among their own public – the EU Member States⁴⁴. On the Senegalese side, a representative of an EU Member State embassy explains how the Senegalese government cooperates on return migration. By sending ‘teams’ to the EU to ‘detect’ return migrants and take them back to Senegal. Furthermore, the representative explains how the Senegalese government claims to cooperate on providing proof of personal registration, which can confirm if a return migrant has the Senegalese identity⁴⁵. The lack of identification is a problem for the EU, as without this certainty people cannot be send back to their countries of origin. The embassy representative complains that despite the promises of the Senegalese government, this cooperation is executed in a highly inefficient and slow manner⁴⁶. I suggest that the inefficiency is also due to the limited information available for the Senegalese government. A journalist explains to me how many people in the countryside of Senegal are not registered or in the possession of personal identification documents, because they are not familiar with the procedures⁴⁷. This makes it impossible to ‘detect’ these persons. The EU also recognizes this issue, which becomes clear from one of their pillars in the FMM West Africa project. This pillar focuses on collecting reliable ‘migration-relevant data’ (FMM West Africa 2017b).

From both examples becomes clear how the parties govern migration control very inefficiently. I argue that this is the aim of the process of compromising: the inefficiency facilitates the continuing interactions. The equilibrium cannot be maintained if the interests of one party are fully integrated and the other party has to give in. This is also not the aim of the parties, as it is too important for them to maintain a strong relationship. I argue that this foremost becomes visible through the EU’s continuous attempts to create ‘partnerships’. Also on the Senegalese side it is important to maintain the relationship. Despite the growing economic independency, the EU is still an important party. The partnership discourse is not expressed as such by the Senegalese government, neither is it fully rejected. Concluding, I present the process of compromising as a strategy of both parties to present a ‘work in progress’, while

⁴⁴ Interview 13, representative World Bank Senegal; Interview 14, representative EU Member State embassy

⁴⁵ Interview 14, representative EU Member State embassy

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Interview 8, journalist RFM

taking ‘just enough’ concrete actions to keep the public satisfied. In the following part, I analyze three selected initiatives: the EUTF, the PNMS and the Rabat Process. The analysis focuses first on the EU’s presentation of the partnership approach. Second, I show how the process of compromising works in the different initiatives.

4.2 Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)

The first initiative is the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). As the name already suggests, this is a trust fund. In 2015, it is created by the EU with the aim to ‘support all aspects of stability and contribute to address the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and irregular migration, in particular by promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development and better migration management’ (European Commission 2015, in Castillejo 2016: 4). The EUTF was agreed between European and African Heads of State and Government at the 2015 Valletta Summit, as part of a broader Valletta Action Plan. The aim of this ‘action plan’ was to strengthen cooperation on migration and address the ‘current challenges but also the opportunities of migration’ (European Commission 2018a; Castillejo 2016: 3; Valletta Summit 2015). There are three African focus regions of the EUTF: the Sahel and Lake Chad region, the Horn of Africa and North Africa. For this analysis, I focus on the Sahel and Lake Chad region, of which Senegal is a part. There is a strong regional focus in the EUTF, nevertheless the programs are implemented at a national and local level. In Senegal, there are ten EUTF projects, focusing on creating economic and employment opportunities, improved governance, conflict management and migration management. The projects that receive the largest amounts of funding are focused on creating youth employment, business opportunities, return migration, sustainable reintegration and the strengthening of the civil registration system, including the creation of biometric identification documents (European Commission 2019f). This shows that these are prioritized topics for the EU.

4.2.1 Local ownership

The partnership discourse becomes visible in the descriptions of the EUTF objectives and projects, as these emphasize the ‘win-win’ opportunities, ‘spirit of cooperation’ and ‘shared responsibility’. First, the sense of ‘win-win’ opportunities is visible in the presentation of the EUTF, as it is presented by the European Commission (2019b) as a

new impetus for EU cooperation on migration by creating a platform to reinforce political engagement and dialogue with partner countries in Africa, pooling together

EU and other donors' resources, and enlarging the EU evidence base to better understand the drivers and dynamics of migration.

Above that, the cooperation and shared responsibility aspects become visible through the financing of the fund, which is illustrated as 'co-financing'. In reality, however, there are only four African countries included in this 'co-financing' model of which Senegal is one. The contributions of these countries together are not even a fraction of the total contributions of the EU and the EU Member States (European Commission 2019e). Another element of cooperation is expressed in one of the main tasks of the EU Delegations, which is to follow 'dialogues on the ground' and ensure 'local ownership of the programs identified' (European Commission 2019c). The proposals of these programs are presented as being 'jointly formulated' and the emphasis is on 'joint programming' (ibid.). The focus on 'joint' activities shows how the EU aims to construct a discourse of collaboration, collectiveness and alliance with the involved African governments. This is in line with the aim to 'strengthen coordination and collaboration' and to work with 'partner countries' (European Commission 2019a; 2019c). In summary, the EU presents the EUTF as an 'intervention' guided by 'local ownership and partnership', as it states that,

the programmes respond to the needs of partner countries' governments and local communities, with both being fully involved in the different steps of our programmes, from identification, based on dialogue with relevant authorities and other stakeholders, to implementation at local level underpinned by an in-depth understanding of local contexts (European Commission 2019d).

This focus on 'needs' relates to what Chandler (2006) described as ethical foreign policy. Thereby, the non-Western political sphere is presented as based on 'needs', for which Western 'technical' assistance is needed. Furthermore, through the partnership discourse, the EUTF appears as an international initiative where 'non-Western states have ownership of policies which are externally imposed' (ibid.: 77).

4.2.2 Funding as communicative tool

The form of the EUTF is a funding instrument, through which projects can be designed and implemented. Leonhard den Hartog (2016) argues that funds are one of the main EU instruments of policy-making since the 2015 'migration crisis'. Although the EU budget, and particularly the European Development Fund (EDF), allocate large amounts of money to development projects since long before this so-called 'crisis', the EUTF is framed as a response

to an ‘emergency’. Although this is not further defined by the EU, Den Hartog states that this ‘emergency’ focus should be seen as a compensation for the limited legal and policy tools of the EU to control migration (ibid.). Above that, he states that the funding is used as an ‘effective communicative tool’ to reassure Member States, third countries and the general public that ‘management’ and ‘implementation’ are taking place. It thus fulfils a symbolic role and is used to ‘demonstrate to the European public that leaders are taking action on migration’ (den Hartog 2016; Castillejo 2016: 6). There exists, however, a discrepancy between the political rhetoric and the actual results of the fund. In the case of Senegal, the EUTF is a relatively limited amount of money, available for small and concrete projects focused on migration. An important element of the EUTF is (economic) development, nevertheless, compared to the EDF its contribution is limited (European Commission 2018b). Despite this limited amount of financial resources, the EUTF has been referred to regularly in interviews with EU Member State embassies, the IOM and the EU Delegation⁴⁸, which supports the argument that rhetorically it is more influential than it is in practice.

The EUTF was initiated by the EU and is also presented this way, for example by stating that ‘through the EUTF for Africa, the EU provides support to the three regions facing growing and continued challenges’ (European Commission 2019d). Although the fund was ‘launched’ by European and African representatives at the 2015 Valetta Summit, it was ‘signed’ only by the European Commission (EC), 25 EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland (European Commission 2019b). African government representatives were thus part of the Valletta Summit, nevertheless their role in the construction of the fund and programs was limited. Despite this the EUTF is presented as being constructed through a ‘bottom-up’ approach (European Commission 2019c). A key role is thereby assigned to the EU Delegations and these are instructed to ‘coordinate dialogues with stakeholders in each country, such as national and local authorities and civil society organizations [...] and representatives of EU Member States’ development cooperation agencies’ (ibid.). The aim of these interactions is to gather information after which EUTF programs are ‘formulated by the EUTF for Africa teams based at the European Commission Headquarters and EU Delegations’ (ibid.). Although the construction of the EUTF programs is presented as a ‘bottom-up’ process, the role of African governments is limited. The core decisions on the direction of the fund are taken by the ‘strategic board’, which consists of the EC, representatives of the European External Action

⁴⁸ Interview 2 and 3, representative EU Member State embassy and FRONTEX; Interview 4, representative EU Delegation Dakar; Interview 10, representative IOM; Interview 14, representative EU Member State embassy

Service (EEAS), EU and non-EU donors and representatives of concerned African partner countries and regional organizations. Although EU bodies are dominant here, this board appears to include African parties as well. Nevertheless, these parties can only ‘contribute’ as observers, whereas the other parties are members (European Commission 2019b).

4.2.3 Compromise for beneficial outcomes

As illustrated above, the influence of African governments is limited in the direction and construction of the EUTF programs. By focusing on the main objectives of these programs, it can become clear what this limited influence means for the discussed topics. A main focus in the general direction of the program is on creating economic opportunities and improve migration management to reduce irregular migration. This shows a combination between development and security objectives, in which development is used to prevent people from migrating. This relates to the migration-security-development nexus (Truong and Gasper 2011; Lavenex and Kunz 2008).

Zooming in on the Sahel and Lake Chad region, there are several main policy objectives: preventing irregular migration, facilitating better return migration and building a comprehensive approach for stability, security and resilience (European Commission 2019g). This approach also links to the migration-security-development nexus, although there is a stronger ‘securitarian’ focus (Lavenex and Kunz 2008). Particularly in emphasizing security measures to ‘prevent’ migration. Furthermore, the focus on return migration is remarkable. As discussed in Chapter 3, this is one of the main incompatible interests between the EU and the Senegalese government. The earlier discussion on the process of compromising showed there is an equilibrium between the interests on return migration and legal migration. In the EUTF there is, however, no attention for legal migration. The focus is on security objectives, which could be prevented through development and ‘management’ programs. Relating to the limited influence of African governments in the construction of the fund, it could be concluded that if the EU is dominant in determining the direction return migration and security objectives are leading.

Another point to be discussed is that although the influence in the construction of the fund was limited, so was the resistance of the Senegalese government. This is my conclusion after repeatedly asking Senegalese government representatives about the fund. None of them raised crucially critical points on its existence. I argue that this limited resistance is due to the form of this initiative. As a fund, this initiative can do little harm to the Senegalese government as it is non-binding and above that relatively small. Furthermore, the development focus in the

fund is beneficiary for the Senegalese government in approaching its public. At a civil society conference, the government was repeatedly criticized for not actively work on creating employment or economic opportunities⁴⁹. It is thereby strategic for the government to make use of the communicative tools of the fund, by presenting the acceptance of the fund as a ‘work in progress’ on creating economic opportunities. Accordingly, this communicative effect is stronger than the incentive to act upon the incompatible interests on return and legal migration by actively resisting the fund.

4.3 Politique Nationale de Migration du Sénégal (PNMS)

The second initiative is the Politique Nationale de Migration du Sénégal (PNMS), which is a national migration policy. It is planned to be implemented after it passes the national assembly, in the second part of 2019 (Ndione 2019: 96-98). In this part, I therefore analyze the design of the policy and use the draft version⁵⁰, which I received from one of the parties involved (Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning 2018). The aim of the PNMS is to ‘constitute a frame of reference in terms of strategic and operational orientations to realize the vision of Senegal in the field of migration’ (ibid.: 8). Although the policy is a national policy of the Senegalese government, it is stimulated by the FMM West Africa project, which aims to ‘support the free movement of persons and migration in West Africa’ (FMM West Africa 2017a; Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning 2018). This project is funded by both the EU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional union of fifteen West African countries (ECOWAS 2019). The FMM West Africa project has a strong regional focus, whereas the PNMS is a national policy, aimed to be implemented at the national level. The relation between these regional and national levels is that one of the pillars of the FMM West Africa project is ‘elaborating and adopting national migration policies’ (FMM West Africa 2017a), of which the PNMS is the outcome in Senegal. The PNMS is divided into four ‘strategic activity areas’: migration, data management, economy and employment; migration, human rights and gender; migration, health and environment; and migration and integrated border management (Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning 2018: 9). These are fairly broad categories, divided into smaller, more concrete subcategories, which I will further discuss in the analysis of the compromising. First, I will discuss if and how the partnership discourse can be identified within the PNMS, and the broader FMM West Africa project.

⁴⁹ Event 1, conference DIADEM; Event 2, press conference HSF; Interview 9, lawyer DEL

⁵⁰ In the following interviews it was confirmed that this draft version is finished to be implemented: Interview 5, representative DPAF; Interview 12, representative Ministry of Justice; Event 1, conference DIADEM.

4.3.1 Working together makes us stronger

The ‘spirit of cooperation’, notions of ‘win-win’ situations and ‘shared responsibility’ are emphasized both in the FMM West Africa project and the PNMS. First, the FMM West Africa project emphasizes the importance of ‘policy coherence’, which is ‘consistent with other regional strategies and policies’ (FMM West Africa 2017b). This focus on coherence and a comprehensive approach is characteristic for EU policies and can thus also be recognized in this policy. For example, in the attempt to stimulate the ‘mainstreaming of migration into national development agendas’ (FMM West Africa 2017d). This idea of ‘mainstreaming’ is also an expression of the shared responsibility approach, in which migration should be a prioritized topic for parties in different sectors, such as development cooperation. Furthermore, the core principles of the FMM West Africa project are supported by one-liners, such as ‘working together makes us stronger’ relating to labor migration and ‘together we are stronger’ when emphasizing the importance of an international migration dialogue (FMM West Africa 2017b). Lastly, almost on every information sheet is mentioned that the FMM West Africa project is ‘co-funded’ by the EU and ECOWAS (FMM West Africa 2017c), which shows the urge to repeatedly emphasize that migration (control) is an issue of ‘shared responsibility’ that should be approached in a ‘spirit of cooperation’.

In the PNMS, the partnership discourse is also visible, although to a lesser extent than in the general FMM West Africa project. The notion of ‘shared responsibility’ is expressed in the illustration of migration issues as ‘challenges’ which ‘concern the State of Senegal in the foreground, but also civil society, trade unions and other actors in the private sector, with the involvement of international partners’ (Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning 2018: 8). Furthermore, shared responsibility is emphasized, through its presentation as ‘a collective responsibility of all the actors concerned by migration’ (ibid.). Above that, the notion of a ‘win-win’ situation becomes visible in the focus on ‘ensuring effective governance of migration issues *and* maximizing the benefits of migration for sustainable development’ (ibid., my emphasis). This comment partly reveals how two elements – that were illustrated in Chapter 3 as incompatible interests – are brought together in language: effective migration governance *and* the contribution of migration to development.

4.3.2 Multilayered policy construction

As described earlier, the migration policy was constructed as part of a broader objective of the FMM West Africa project, to establish migration policies in the ECOWAS region. This is supported by their claim that ‘policy is the cornerstone of effective migration management’

(FMM West Africa 2017b). The assistance of the FMM West Africa project is expressed through the ‘provision of training, policy advice and technical expertise’ (FMM West Africa 2017d), there is thus a strong focus on the technical aspects of the policy design and implementation. This is characteristic for the general FMM West Africa project, which is largely focused on action plans and operational activities to ‘support free movement of persons in West Africa’. In describing the objectives of the project, there is hardly any information on the political process through which it is established, neither is there attention for the political interactions between the project, the EU and ECOWAS. It appears as if the project is a natural product of their collaboration and merely a technical implementation of their shared visions on migration. As I have shown in Chapter 3, these visions are not as shared as they might appear, and I therefore argue that the technical approach of the project depoliticizes the context in which migration control is discussed between the actors involved.

The interactions were furthermore presented as an equal interregional cooperation between the EU and ECOWAS. On almost every policy document, information sheet and report is mentioned that the project is co-funded by these two organizations.⁵¹ Other important actors are the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) which are ‘jointly’ responsible for the implementation. These organizations are all international organizations and the implementation is focused on the national level of separate ECOWAS Member States (FMM West Africa 2017d). Instead of an interregional cooperation, there are thus interactions on the international, regional and national level, which shows the multilayered migration governance of the EU. Furthermore, in constructing a national migration policy, the Senegalese government met the wishes of international and regional organizations. In this way, it appears as if the Senegalese government developed the policy on request of the EU. This is, however, too shortsighted. The eventual form of the policy – a national migration policy – is indeed in line with the EU’s proposal. Nevertheless, this does not mean there is consensus on the construction and content of the policy. In the following part, I will elaborate on how this construction was characterized by a process of compromising.

4.3.3 Compromise through resistance

A Senegalese government official working on the PNMS and the FMM West Africa project stated that the incentive for the Senegalese government to create a national migration policy

⁵¹ For an overview of all resources provided by the FMM West Africa project see <https://fmmwestafrica.org/resources/>

only came after the initiative of the FMM West Africa project⁵². This does not mean, however, that there was no demand from the Senegalese society to create such a policy. In contrast, many civil society organizations advocated such a policy since years. In several interviews with Senegalese civil society actors, it was even expressed that a policy would not be enough. Rather, an independent agency for migration issues would be needed⁵³. The motivations for this request were the social circumstances of migrants, particularly irregular and return migrants⁵⁴. The Senegalese government did not address this request, only until the EU's initiative. I argue that this is for two reasons: first, the Senegalese government approaches migration from an economic perspective and second, the response is based on developments after the 2015 'migration crisis'.

The first reason relates to the point where migration is seen as an economic source of income in Senegalese society. As discussed in Chapter 3, remittances form an important part of the country's GDP. Therefore, it is in the interest of the Senegalese government to regulate migration in such a manner that these remittances remain and can be invested in national development. This last point could explain why the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning became responsible for the construction of the policy. A Senegalese government official working on the PNMS explained that many government officials were surprised by this appointment. He states that in most cases, certain policies would be attributed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Internal Affairs⁵⁵. This action also relates to the second reason for the government to create the policy, namely the time period. In 2018 the policy was constructed and it has still to be implemented (Ndione 2019: 96-98). The initiative from the FMM West Africa project to stimulate the establishment of national migration policies started in 2015 (Noack et al. 2015; Devillard et al. 2016). In response to the 'migration crisis', this initiative shows yet another approach of the EU to work on migration control. Nevertheless, it took a few years for the Senegalese government to establish the policy, despite requests from the EU to 'finally adopt a comprehensive action plan on migration' (Bernardini 2018: 22). This shows the agency of the Senegalese government and how it is too shortsighted to suggest that it immediately implements EU initiatives when asked for. It becomes visible here that the critical partnership approach needs more nuance. The influence of the agency of the Senegalese government should be taken more into account. I have shown in this part that the partnership

⁵² Interview 12, representative Ministry of Justice

⁵³ Event 1, DIADEM; Event 2, HSF; Interview 15, journalist Tv on line 221 and DEL

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Interview 12, representative Ministry of Justice

approach is presented by the EU and could be seen as a mask to implement political objectives on migration control. However, the response of the Senegalese government shows that this implementation did not happen without discussion or resistance.

Above that, I explain the changed position of the Senegalese government in 2018 as a response to the stricter border controls by the EU. As a result, it has become more difficult for Senegalese people to apply for a Schengen visa. This has strong effects on the country and causes a growing demand from the population to take action on legal migration. It is difficult for the Senegalese government to act upon this demand, as legal migration is an incompatible interest. Therefore, in 2018 it has ‘chosen’ the national policy option, which answered to the demands of both the EU and the Senegalese civil society organizations. In this way, the Senegalese government succeeds in maintaining the equilibrium and can show both parties that it is doing ‘just enough’. In comparison to the EUTF, I state that the process of compromising on the PNMS includes more resistance from the Senegalese government. As a result, both incompatible interests on return migration and legal migration are included in the document. This becomes visible, for example, in the first ‘strategic area’ on migration, economy and employment includes the subcategories ‘increase the potential contribution of the Senegalese diaspora to the national development effort’ and ‘better support of the return and reintegration of migrants’ (Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning 2018: 9). The first focuses on the contribution of migration to national development of Senegal, and the second on return migration. Hence, both the interests of the EU and of the Senegalese government are included.

4.4 Rabat Process: the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development

The third and last initiative is the Rabat Process, an inter-regional migration dialogue which offers ‘a framework for consultation [and] bringing together countries of origin, transit and destination of the migration routes linking Central, West and Northern Africa with Europe’ (Rabat Process 2019). It is not a signed or legally binding agreement, rather it is presented as an ‘open dialogue’ on migration between 60 European and African countries. The dialogue was established in 2006, following so-called *crise de la pirogue* – the canoe crisis – where large amounts of irregular migrants attempted to reach the Canary Islands. In response, Morocco and Spain collaborated on developing an initiative to deal with this relatively large influx of irregular migrants. Senegal and France joined the initiative, and the four countries became the ‘founding members’ (Rabat Process 2019). The initiative grew to an on-going dialogue with three-annual summits, under the name of the ‘Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development’, mainly referred to in general as the Rabat Process (ibid.). Currently, the

‘process’ is in its fifth phase and thereby one of the most long-standing intergovernmental migration dialogues (ibid.). This ‘open’ and ‘on-going’ dialogue is funded by the EU and facilitated by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).

4.4.1 Balancing the narratives

The ‘spirit of cooperation’ and the notion of ‘shared responsibility’ are at the core of this initiative, as migration control is framed as an issue demanding a cooperative approach and being a responsibility of both European and African countries. This is especially related to the discursive aspect of partnership, as the ideas on cooperation and responsibility are particularly expressed in language. Concrete outcomes, such as legally binding agreements, are not the main goal of this initiative. This focus on language is expressed by a representative of the ICMPD, the facilitator of the dialogue, stating that the main goal of the Rabat Process is to find common ground on migration control and to ‘create a common language’⁵⁶. In contrast to the other initiatives, this is not only presented by the EU or European countries. The ICMPD representative explained that Senegalese government officials have also pushed for the creation of a ‘shared language’ as a focal point of the dialogue⁵⁷.

I argue that the partnership discourse is leading in the Rabat Process, it is the core principle on which this dialogue is established. In an interview with ICMPD representatives they explain the ‘common language’ as being ‘not [in] the literal sense, more [in] the kind of metaphorical sense’. They explained the goal of the process as ‘balancing the narratives’⁵⁸. At the same time, they stated that the countries ‘obviously’ have their own definitions⁵⁹, which presents contradictions between speech and action. I argue that the Rabat Process can therefore be seen as a process to smooth out the linguistic, terminological differences on migration issues. It is way to overcome incompatible interpretations of terms such as migration and development. This is done by suggesting that there is a common understanding or consensus on these terms. Nevertheless, as I have shown in Chapter 3, the term ‘development’ can refer both to the driver *or* the prevention of migration. Also the term ‘security’ refers to different subjects. These terms are thus not as ‘commonly’ understood as is suggested. This again shows how the critical partnership approach needs to be more nuanced. Kunz, Lavenex and Panizzon (2011) state that the rhetoric in the partnership discourse is used to mask an inequality between receiving and sending countries of migration. I argue that it is not so much an inequality between the two

⁵⁶ Interview 11, representatives ICMPD

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

parties, rather they have different perceptions of similar terms. These are constructed from the respective context in which they are used. However, this does not mean that these different contexts are hierarchical and that one definition is placed above the other. Inequality between sending and receiving countries of migrants is therefore not leading in the different meanings of the terms.

4.4.2 Incoherent frameworks of dialogue

The Rabat Process is an initiative in the form of an international dialogue – a ‘framework’ in which summits are organized and countries are brought together. Dialogue has become a crucial part of the external dimension of the EU’s migration policy, and it shows the changes in the relations between the EU and African governments in the twenty-first century (van Criekinge 2013: 258). In this context of changing relations, cooperation has become a necessity, which has ‘given some African countries a renewed or increased strategic importance vis-à-vis Europe’ (ibid.). This relates to the multilayered migration governance of the EU and shows why the partnership approach has become an important tool.

Furthermore, the Rabat Process is presented as a ‘framework’: a network of relating conferences, agreements and policies. Thereby, it can be linked to the semantic network in which the ‘coherent’ and ‘comprehensive’ approach of the EU are emphasized. In practice, this means that the Rabat Process is part of a larger dialogue, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). This is an ‘intense and broad dialogue with Africa on migration and mobility at bilateral, regional and continental level’ (European Commission 2019h). In an interview with ICMPD representatives, they explain that the aim of the Rabat Process is to link its topics to this broader dialogue⁶⁰. Hence, it becomes clear that there are several dialogues taking place on different levels. The abundance of names, dates and actors can be confusing even for the persons working on them, which becomes clear during several interviews with persons involved⁶¹. Therefore, in contrast to its objectives, the ‘framework’ could be seen as an increasingly *incoherent* approach. This incoherence is argued to be characteristic for the EU’s multi-level migration governance (den Hartog 2016). In line with this point, I argue that incoherence of the Rabat Process is also characteristic for the EU’s multilayered migration governance. The focus is not on concrete outcomes, but the main aim is to continue the dialogue and interactions. I suggest that the Rabat Process fits in the EU’s strategy to continue

⁶⁰ Interview 11, representatives ICMPD

⁶¹ Interview 4, representative EU Delegation Dakar; Interview 14, representative EU Member State embassy

establishing ‘partnerships’ and dialogues. This strategy is linked to the multilayered migration governance of the EU, of which the partnership approach is a tool.

4.4.3 Compromise through agenda setting

The Rabat Process is thus presented as a dialogue to stimulate cooperation. However, as became clear in Chapter 3, the relations between the EU and the Senegalese government are characterized by incompatible interests on migration control. How does the process of compromising then work in the Rabat Process? I argue that the main method through which compromising happens is agenda setting. This is the process ‘where the competition for ideas and policies are shaped’ (Kula 2004: 70). In this process of political bargaining, the context and interests of actors involved are discussed (ibid.). In the Rabat Process, the incompatible interests between the EU and the Senegalese government are also discussed. Through analyzing the five declarations of the Rabat Process since 2006⁶², I will show the transformation of the ‘pillars’ and how legal and return migration became central topics.

In 2006, the Rabat Process was signed and the priority topics were: migration and development, legal migration and illegal migration. Five years later in 2011, the Dakar Strategy was established, focusing on (in this order): organizing legal migration, fight irregular migration and strengthen synergies between migration and development. Legal migration has become the first topic in line and ‘illegal’ migration is replaced by ‘irregular’ migration. In an interview, ICMPD representatives explain how the term ‘illegal’ has been rejected in relation to migration⁶³. In 2014, the Rome Declaration was signed, emphasizing two ‘priority topics’: the link between migration and development and the fight against irregular migration and related crimes. Legal migration has now left the agenda and irregular migration is framed as a ‘fight’ and related to other ‘crimes’. This reveals a stronger focus on security in relation to migration. In 2015, there is an interesting shift in the dialogue. As mentioned before, this years marks the EU ‘migration crisis’, which demanded a stronger response than the dialogue could provide. ICMPD representatives explain in an interview that therefore the Valletta Summit was organized. At this summit, more concrete action plans were presented, with which funding became available (Valletta Summit 2015). During the interview it was emphasized that this summit did not fit the mandate of the Rabat Process and was therefore placed in another framework⁶⁴. The Valletta Action Plan consists of five pillars: first, migration and development;

⁶² Information on all five summits and declarations is retrieved from <https://www.rabat-process.org/en/about/rabat-process/335-strategic-framework-ministerial-declarations>

⁶³ Interview 11, representatives ICMPD

⁶⁴ Ibid.

second, legal migration; third, protection and asylum; fourth, trafficking and smuggling of migrants, and border management; and fifth, return, readmission and reintegration (Valletta Summit 2015). This action plan contains more pillars than presented at the previous declarations. Furthermore, return migration is introduced on the agenda. It is presented alongside legal migration and this is thus the first time both incompatible interests are on the agenda. Although the Valletta Action Plan is placed under a different framework, its points are almost exactly taken over in the Marrakesh Declaration in 2018. The line between the two frameworks is thus more blurred than their separation would suggest. In conclusion, the topics of discussion have transformed since 2006 and the ‘crisis’ in 2015 placed both incompatible interests of return and legal migration on the agenda.

The fact that both topics are on the agenda does not mean, however, that these are equally discussed. Two representatives of the ICMPD state that priority topics change from time to time. In the current phase of the dialogue, they explain, there is a stronger focus on return and reintegration. In contrast, legal migration is not regularly discussed. The process through which certain topics become a higher priority than others is explained through the ‘demand-driven facility’. In this system, the demand of the participants determines the agenda setting. If topics are discussed more than others, this is because ‘those areas are a priority for the dialogue at the moment’⁶⁵. At the same time, the ICMPD representatives stress that for legal migration and return migration ‘you cannot imagine the [countries] are all going to have the same position’. In other words, they state that these are not topics ‘we have unanimity on’⁶⁶. On the one hand, there is thus a focus on the ‘priority of the dialogue’, and on the other hand, clashes of interest are acknowledged. This shows an ambiguity in the agenda setting of the dialogue: the aim is work demand driven and include different perspectives, but at the same time there is an attempt to avoid conflicts of interest. The ICMPD representatives state that the most important idea is ‘to move forward and to have this spirit of partnership guiding the dialogue’⁶⁷. This ‘spirit of partnership’ does not mean, however, that there is consensus on the importance of topics. Rather, the process of agenda setting and prioritization could be seen as a process of compromising.

⁶⁵ Interview 11, representatives ICMPD

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

4.5 Continued compromising

In this chapter, I have analyzed three EU initiatives, focused on migration control. Before the analysis of the initiatives, the incompatible interests between the EU and the Senegalese government were studied on a macro-level. By doing so, I showed that a compromise was created through strategic interactions. This compromise, however, did not have a concrete form. Rather, it should be seen as a process of compromising: a process through which the EU and the Senegalese government interact and maneuver around the topic of migration control. The process of compromising leads to an equilibrium in which both do ‘just enough’ to keep their public satisfied. No real steps are taken and there are no concrete outcomes in the form of agreements or policies. In other words, nothing concrete is institutionalized. Rather, the outcome is that both parties can show a ‘work in progress’ mode on migration control. In a more micro-level analysis of three initiatives, first the presentation of the partnership approach was studied and second the process of compromising. This provided insights both on the presentation of the EU’s multilayered migration governance and the compromise between the EU and the Senegalese government on their incompatible interests.

First, in all three initiatives the partnership approach was presented through a strong focus on the partnership discourse. The language in the policy documents and action plans of the initiatives was characterized by an emphasis on the ‘spirit of cooperation’, ‘notions of win-win situations’ and ‘shared responsibility’. Furthermore, despite the varying forms of the initiatives, they were mainly constructed through interactions. These were presented as horizontal interactions. First, the EUTF has the form of a fund, where the symbolic and communicative tool is more important than the actual financial means. The worth of the fund is limited, whereas the presentation and rhetoric are strong. Second, the PNMS takes the form of a national policy, which was constructed as part of the interregional FMM West Africa project. Nevertheless, the interactions through which the policy was constructed took place on the international, regional and national level. This showed how the policy is an example of multilayered migration governance of the EU. Third, the Rabat Process has the form of an intergovernmental dialogue between European and African governments. In the construction of the declarations there was a strong focus on horizontal interactions, in which all parties were stimulated to equally participate.

Second, in all three initiatives a process of compromising was visible, although to different extents and in varying forms. First, the EUTF showed a limited process of compromising, which I attributed to the form of the policy. As the EUTF is a fund, there was limited resistance from the Senegalese government. Above that, the objectives of the fund were

focused on creating economic opportunities. It was therefore beneficial for the Senegalese government to support the EUTF, to present the Senegalese population they were responding to its demand. Second, the PNMS showed more resistance from the Senegalese government in the process of compromising. The form of the initiative was a national migration policy, which has since long been a topic of discussion in the country. It was requested both by the EU and Senegalese civil society organizations. The content of the policy shows how – through compromise – the interests of both parties are included: legal *and* return migration are placed central. Lastly, the Rabat Process showed a process of compromising through agenda setting. Since the establishment in 2006, the ‘pillars’ of the declarations have transformed. Whereas before 2015 legal migration was an important topic, since the ‘migration crisis’ return migration was placed on the agenda. The process of compromising happens through a demand-driven facility, where topics can be prioritized above others. This reveals an ambiguity in the process, as the aim of the dialogue is to create a ‘spirit of partnership’ and at the same time to ‘avoid’ conflicting interests. Concluding, the process of compromising works different in the three initiatives. Nevertheless, it is present in all cases, which shows that both incompatible interests continuously play an important role. In compromising on these interests, the EU and the Senegalese government interact on the topic of migration control. At the same time, both parties can show a ‘work in progress’ to their public. Whereas in reality, there is no concrete outcome to be expected soon.

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

*When Europe is in crisis, Africa bears the stigma.
And a weakened and impoverished Africa does not work Europe either
[there is a] singular dialectic in which the need for Europe in Africa calls for and responds to
a need for Africa in Europe*

- Macky Sall, president of Senegal since 2012⁶⁸

This relation between the European and African continent has been central to this thesis. Both continents are undeniably connected, nevertheless how separate countries interact is sensitive for change. As presented in the Introduction, migration is an important topic of discussion between the two continents. This topic often relates to discussions on unequal possibilities of mobility: whereas Europeans moving to Africa are often called ‘expats’ or ‘travelers’, Africans aiming to move to Europe are seen as migrants. This illustration is regularly presented in the media and public debate. Nevertheless, in this thesis I provided another image: one of a balanced interaction between the EU and Senegalese government. One party representing (most of) the European continent, the other an African country. By focusing on the topic of migration control, I have shown how the image of inequality between both parties is not complete. It is indeed harder to travel from Senegal to the EU than the other way around. Nevertheless, the Senegalese government has agency to influence the discussion on migration control. By focusing on incompatible interests between the EU and the Senegalese government, I have presented how both parties interact through a process of compromising. This tells us how our social world is characterized by continuous interactions and incompatible interests on migration control. This thesis also contributes to academia, which is presented in the following part.

5.1 Interpretivist approach to interactions and compromise

The term process of compromising followed from the data I presented on incompatible interests on return and legal migration. These interests were leading in the interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government, and could not be understood through existing literature on multilayered migration governance and the partnership approach. Therefore I introduced a new term, which shows how the EU and the Senegalese government interact in an equilibrium. By doing so, they present a ‘work in progress’ mode to their public. In this mode they continuously interact on the topic of migration control, without concrete outcomes on either return or legal

⁶⁸ Extract of a speech at the EU-Africa Partnership conference in Strasbourg, 9 October 2013, retrieved from <https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/fr/rester-informe/actualites/le-president-senegalais-macky-sall-plaide-pour-un-partenariat-afrique-ue>

migration. Despite the limited outcomes, the parties still continue to interact. I explain this continuing interaction through the process of compromising. In this process both parties can show they do 'just enough' to satisfy their public, while at the same time maintain a stable relation with each other. Through presenting the process of compromising, I have shown how the EU and the Senegalese government interact since 2009. In this year, the Senegalese government rejected to sign a Mobility Partnership, which raised the question: what happens after such a rejection? By emphasizing the agency of the Senegalese government and the influence of incompatible interests, I have provided a nuanced and holistic account of the interactions between the EU and a third country. This thesis furthermore contributed to academia with insights on multilayered migration governance through the partnership approach. By analyzing the EUTF, PNMS and the Rabat Process, I have shown how the EU presents the partnership approach through the partnership discourse and policies constructed through interactions. Accordingly, this thesis has provided a interpretivist approach to study interactions and compromise. Whereas the rational-choice model of Barnett and Zürcher (2009) was used to map the strategic interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government, it was insufficient to study the continuing process of interactions. Therefore, a more process-oriented approach was needed, which I presented through the process of compromising. Through analyzing three selected initiatives in Chapter 4, I have shown how the process works in different forms of initiatives.

First, the EUTF as a funding faced limited resistance from the Senegalese government. As a fund, it could do little harm to the position of this party. The government could even benefit from the communicative tool of the fund by presenting to its public it was working on creating employment and economic opportunities. Second, the PNMS as national policy had more resistance than the EUTF. This resulted in both return and legal migration being integrated in the final document. Lastly, the Rabat Process as a dialogue revealed a process of compromising in the agenda setting and prioritization of certain topics over others. Both return and legal migration were discussed in the dialogue, however, to what extent differed from time to time. Since 2015, return migration has become more prominently discussed in the dialogue.

Brought together, I have answered the research question: *how is the EU's multilayered migration governance presented and compromised between the EU and the Senegalese government, in the context of incompatible interests on migration control since 2009?* The partnership approach is the tool through which the multilayered migration governance is presented. This approach could, however, only function as a presentation due to the incompatible interests on migration control. These interests were compromised through the

process of compromising. This process has evolved since 2009 and shows the continuous interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government on migration control. Through the process of compromising, both parties interact in an equilibrium by which they present a ‘work in progress’ mode to their public.

5.2 Agency of third countries

This thesis provides insights on how interactions on incompatible interests work. The term process of compromising can be used in studying other cases of incompatible interests between the EU and third countries. This links to a larger debate on the interactions between the EU and third countries (Reslow 2012; Reslow and Vink 2015; Chou and Gilbert 2012). The starting point of the research was the resistance of the Senegalese government to sign a Mobility Partnership in 2009. Certain resistance to EU initiatives is understudied. In the literature there is too much focus on the EU, and little attention for the agency of so-called ‘third countries’. This thesis contributes to literature emphasizing this agency by stating that third countries are active agents in negotiations, rather than passive recipients of funding or policies (Reslow 2012; Reslow and Vink 2015; Chou and Gilbert 2012). I have shown how the interactions between the EU and the Senegalese government played out. These insights can be used to study interactions between the EU and other third countries, particularly on sensitive topics. Migration control has been the main topic in this thesis, nevertheless security and development were also discussed. These terms were mainly related to the security-migration-development nexus. The three terms are often presented as intertwined and commonly understood. Nevertheless, as I have shown in the EU-Senegalese context these terms have different meanings for different parties. It is therefore also important to acknowledge that third countries can have different perspectives on seemingly common understood terms. The different meanings can have a large influence on the interactions between the EU and third countries, and should therefore be taken into account when studying these interactions.

5.3 Experimental and process-oriented migration governance

Furthermore, this thesis contributes to literature on the external migration governance of the EU. I have shown that this governance does no longer take the form of a ‘soft power’ approach. Therefore, the focus on ‘externalization’, ‘Europeanization’ and ‘extraterritorialization’ is not sufficient in studying this external migration governance. Instead, the partnership approach has become dominant. This approach came from the development cooperation sector and started to be influential in relation to migration. It has also become a tool for multilayered migration governance of the EU. This mode of governance is characterized by a ‘multilayered architecture

of international governance (Kunz, Lavenex and Panizzon 2011: 16) and the ‘proliferation of informal process-oriented, experimental forms of transgovernmental governance, promoted by countries of destination in their relations with countries of origin and transit (Lavenex and Panizzon 2013: 3). In the case of Senegal, this form of governance is also present. The three initiatives can be placed in the ‘multilayered’ architecture of the EU. Through their different forms, they show the ‘experimental’ approach of the EU. In this way, it appears as if different forms are tested to find out which is most effective and accepted in the Senegalese context. This ‘testing’, or experimenting, could also be seen as trying out different forms to see how they complement each other. I have shown in this thesis how the three initiatives were all presented through the partnership approach. Together they can be seen as the ‘strategy’ of the EU, where the aim is to establish ‘partnerships’ and dialogues. The focus on ‘process-oriented’ forms of transgovernmental governance has also become visible in this context. Particularly the Rabat Process was presented as a long-term process, in which relations could be strengthened through a continuous dialogue. The insights in this thesis confirm the multilayered migration governance of the EU, particularly its experimental and process-oriented characteristics. Furthermore, I have contributed to this literature that partnership can be seen as a strategy of the EU, but that this mostly works in the presentation of migration governance. Accordingly, partnership is mostly a communicative tool. In more concrete interactions, the process of compromising is dominant.

5.4 Critical partnership approach

Moreover, this thesis contributes to the critical literature on partnership. In this literature, partnership is seen as little more than rhetoric functioning as a legitimization for the continued domination of the North over the South (Crawford 2003; Fowler 2000; Abrahamsen 2004). I have shown that the partnership approach is dominant in the presentation of the EU initiatives. In practice, however, the partnership approach was used to mask the limited possibilities for cooperation with the Senegalese governance. Although the basis in the critical literature lies in the unequal power relations between the North and the South, this was not the main point in this thesis. I acknowledge that there are still elements of unequal power relations between the EU and the Senegalese government. However, the attempt of this thesis was to show a more nuanced approach to the critical partnership literature. I have contributed to this literature by showing how the Senegalese government has agency to resist the EU’s initiatives. This agency influences the interactions with the EU, and even provides the basis for an equilibrium between the two parties. This again relates to the process of compromising. If the unequal power

relations between the EU and the Senegalese government would have been central, it would be impossible to explain the equilibrium in this process. In other words, a focus on unequal power relations could not provide an explanation for why one objective was not more dominantly integrated than the other.

5.5 Crisis and emergency

Finally, this thesis provides insights in the influence that so-called ‘crises’ can have on policy priorities and interactions. During the 2015 ‘migration crisis’, the pressure of EU Member States has been strong, which influenced the actions of the EU and later those of the Senegalese government. In the analysis, I have shown how the two parties currently interact in an equilibrium, however, it is unsure for how long this will last. Although social scientists do not make predictions, it can be taken from this thesis that the ‘crisis’-mode in 2015 has had large influence on the interactions. The issue of migration control is still a sensitive topic and there are limited concrete or institutionalized outcomes. Therefore, it would not be surprising that when a new ‘crisis’ is presented, this will have large influence on future actions and interactions.

5.6 Further research

This thesis provides relevant insights in the EU’s interactions with the Senegalese government. Nevertheless, it is still based on research in one country. It would therefore be interesting to do research on the interactions between the EU and other third countries, particularly on migration control. This would be relevant in the context of successful migration agreements, to see how these differ from unsuccessful processes of compromising. It would also be relevant to study these interactions in another context of incompatible interests. In this way, the process of compromising can be studied in a different setting. Furthermore, a comparative research between Senegal and other countries that refused to sign an EU agreement would be important, as different motivations for resistance can thereby be identified. Lastly, there are several regional zones with which the EU aims to cooperate on migration control. There is little comparative research on countries in the ‘neighborhood’ and countries where the ‘root causes’ of migration are identified. This research would provide insights in the different approaches of the EU in these regions, and more importantly, in the different perspectives and responses of these countries of origin or transit.

This thesis focuses on three selected initiatives – the EUTF, the PNMS and the Rabat Process. My focus was on the design and implementation of these initiatives. Although the three initiatives are still on-going, it is important to focus on assessing and evaluating them. I have shown that the partnership approach is presented in these initiatives and how this plays out in

practice. It would be useful to study if these outcomes influence or transform the initiatives, and if the results are taken into account in the construction of future EU initiatives on this topic. Above that, this thesis only focuses on three selected initiatives. By studying more EU initiatives, a broader analysis of partnership, multilayered migration governance and the process of compromising can be provided.

Migration, governance and compromise have been central concepts in this thesis, and I have contributed to the societal and academic debate on all three. It is through these concepts that mobility is facilitated for some and restricted for others. I have attempted to grasp these dynamics in the seventy pages of this thesis. And although the social world we live in is much too complex to be ‘grasped’, we can start to understand it through academic research. This thesis has been a tiny part of that.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1 – Overview financial relations EU

General important events

2004-2013 → Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) = overarching framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy, €1 billion.

2006 → Rabat Process: brings together 55 countries of origin, transit and destination on migration along the migratory route from West and Central Africa to Europe. Covering cooperation on addressing irregular migration, legal migration, migration and development as well as international protection.

2007 (during Lisbon Treaty) → Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)

2007 (during Lisbon Treaty) → Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME)

2008 → 10th EDF: funds cooperation activities and projects which cover economic, social and humanitarian development as well as regional cooperation and integration, allocation of €22 billion

2009 → MIEUX program : strengthening migration governance capacities of governments in Africa.

2010-2013 → MIEUX projects in Senegal, on border management and irregular migration.

2015 → ‘EU migration crisis’

2015 → Valletta Summit: recognised the important role of the Rabat Process and tasked it with monitoring of the implementation of the Valletta Action Plan alongside with the Khartoum Process and the Joint EU-Africa Strategy.

2015 → 11th EDF: 2014-2020 plans, as result of renewed Cotonou agreement. €114 million of €2435 million to EUTF's (around 4.5%)

2017 → EUTF increased with 22% compared to 2016. 2017 = €3330 million, of which €2900 million from EDF. Funding of EU Member States and other donors have increased with 148.5% (€152.4 million in 2016, to €378.8 million in 2017 – mainly focused on North African region)

2016 onwards → 10 EUTF projects in Senegal, total amount €170.803.200 (of which €42.203.200 migration related).

Today → 4 EUTF projects in Senegal:

1. Project to support reduction of migration through creating jobs rural areas €10.000.000 – EUTF funded, implemented by AECID Spanish Cooperation Agency – 2016-2019.
2. Developing employment in Senegal: fair access to vocational training €19.000.000 – EUTF funded, implemented by Luxembourg Development Agency (LuxDev) – 2016-2020.
3. Infrastructures hydrauliques €27.000.000 – EDF funded – 2013-2019.
4. Developing employment in Senegal through strengthening business competitiveness €16.200.000 – EUTF funded, implemented by French Development Agency (AFD) – 2016-2019.

Africa-EU Partnership

2000 → Africa-EU Partnership, established at Cairo Africa-EU summit. ‘Africa-EU Partnership is instrument of political dialogue and cooperation overarching and complementing existing development relationship frameworks between EU and African countries’

2007 → Africa-EU Partnership is guided by Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), adopted at 2nd Africa-EU summit in Lisbon.

Updated each Africa-EU summit → JAES implemented through multiannual roadmaps and action plans

2017 → 5th Africa-EU summit: ‘Beyond donor/recipient relationship towards long-term cooperation on jointly identified interests’, based on ownership, partnership and solidarity. Four priority areas:

- Investing in people – education, science, technology and skills development
- Strengthening resilience, peace, security and governance
- Mobilising investments
- Migration and mobility

Stakeholders Africa-EU summit: EU (EEAS, DG DEVCO), AU (AU Commission, executive council) and Non-state actors (civil society – youth organisations, academic institutions, private sector)

Funding: part of general EU budget for development aid (total amount of European development aid is €20 billion, but is total of EU and Member States, unclear how much € goes through the Africa-EU Partnership)

Africa-EU Partnership and Senegal

2012 → MENA project, prevention of illegal emigration from Senegal to the EU, through job creation

2013 → Senegal finalizing National Border Management Strategy (through MIEUX project of the EU, from which the Senegalese Ministry of Interior requested technical support)

2013 → Macky Sall (president Senegal) calls for renewed Africa-EU Partnership

2016 → EU announces new support to tackle root causes of migration in Senegal – New Partnership Framework approach EU.

Under 11th EDF, value of €30 million. Senegal is priority country. Overall allocation for Senegal under 11th EDF is €347 million for 2014-2020.

Funding: short term – €500 million extra on EUTF (from EDF), makes total resources EUTF €2.38 billion). Long term – €3.35 billion from EU budget and EDF + €44 billion through investments.

September 2018 → EU & ACP group (= 79 countries) started negotiations on new Partnership Agreement (renewed Cotonou Agreement).

December 2018 → first round of negotiations concluded. From January onwards second round will take place over three month period.

Africa-EU Partnership negotiation is part of the large Cotonou negotiation process: focus on migration and migration, guided by principles of solidarity, partnership and shared responsibility (also focus on legal migration and irregular migration).

Mobility Partnerships

Consist of three funds: Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), Internal Security Fund for Police Cooperation (ISF-Police) and Internal Security Fund for Borders and Visa

(ISF-Borders/Visa) = total €5.5 million. All funds from EU Migration and Home Affairs department. 2018 → new phase, €12.5 million.