'The Roots of Evil': Polarization and Othering in the Netherlands

How the securitization of Dutch counterterrorism and migration policies has contributed to processes of radicalization in the context of the refugee crisis

Master thesis – International Relations in Historical Perspective

Supervisor – Prof. Dr. Bob de Graaff

Date – June 2018

Word count – 16.904 words

Utrecht University

Table of Contents

Summary

In 2015, the large-scale influx of refugees to Europe became known as 'the refugee crisis', a term adopted by media, politicians, scholars and the public alike. Over a million people arrived in 2015 alone, mainly as a result of the Syrian civil war and the rise of Islamic State (IS). Through a critical qualitative analysis of Dutch counterterrorism and migration policies, this paper argues that a link between migration and terrorism exists.

Using the framework of securitization theory, the relationship between these two phenomena can be localized in a process characterized by polarization. Marked by different perspectives on immigration, the Netherlands has witnessed growing tensions between its Muslim minorities on the one hand and its 'regular' Dutch population on the other hand. Since the turn of the millennium, (Muslim) migrants have increasingly been constructed as 'Others' because these new, unknown people were considered to pose a threat to Dutch society, economy, culture, religion and security. Consequently, the Dutch government adopted an approach that dealt with this problem from a security perspective. A similar, securitizing approach was adopted in the domain of counterterrorism.

However, the government overlooked the fact that at the root of both problems was the 'othering' of migrants and, by extension, of Muslim minorities in the Netherlands who considered themselves to belong to the same collective identity (e.g. Moroccan Dutch people identify with asylum seekers from North Africa or refugees with an Islamic background). Its securitizing policies not only maintained this image of Muslims as 'the other', but only reinforced the perceived threats between these two distanced collectives. Thus, when it did not address this fundamental issue, polarization increased and reached its peak when the Netherlands was confronted with the refugee crisis of 2015.

Afterwards, polarization turned into radicalization. Dutch people acted on the threat they had 'foreseen', as did Muslim minorities. In essence, then, the Dutch government created counterproductive policies that, instead of protecting the Dutch from a potential threat by focusing on its security character, only reinforced it. The securitization of migration and counterterrorism policies linked the issue of migration directly to radicalization processes and terrorism.

Introduction

When the amount of uprisings in the context of the 2011 'Arab Spring' created a democratic fervor unknown to the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region, many commentators saw a bright future for countries like Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Libya and eventually also Syria. However, when the dust had settled, many of these countries turned out to be in a state of civil war and unrest, or autocratic leaders had once again established their control.[1] Parallel to this popular resistance movement advocating the rule of law and democratic values, the world saw the rise of Islamic State (IS) and the expansion of radical jihadist terrorism.

Since Al-Qaeda conducted the 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, this form of terrorism has shifted its gaze to Europe. Starting with the bombings in Madrid (2004), London (2005) and Istanbul (2003 and 2008), Europe has seen a steady increase in the amount of attacks and the number of fatalities. Since IS declared its caliphate in June 2014, it conducted more than 140 terrorist attacks in 29 countries other than Iraq and Syria.[2] Especially in Europe, terrorist attacks increased manifold.[3] The Institute for the Study of War concluded in 2017 that 'ISIS's attack campaign in Europe is expanding despite ISIS's losses of terrain and senior leadership in the Middle East and North Africa.'[4] Importantly, IS has been very capable of recruiting people from Western countries, both shown in the amount of foreign fighters that left to fight in Syria and Iraq,[5] and in the number of home-grown terrorists that conducted terrorist attacks in their own country.[6] When IS lost its territory to the US-led coalition in 2017, the issue of returning foreign fighters became a hotly debated issue in Western countries. Although the fighters had lost their cause in Syria, the appeal that IS had had on them, could still incentivize them to execute terrorist attacks on Western soil.[7]

---

[1] 'The Arab spring, five years on' (11 January 2016), https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/01/daily-chart-8 (22 January 2018).

[2] Tim Lister, Ray Sanchez, Mark Bixler, Sean O'Key, Michael Hogenmiller and Mohammed Tawfeeq, 'ISIS goes global: 143 attacks in 29 countries have killed 2,043', *CNN* (12 February, 2018), https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/index.html (22 January 2018).

[3] Max Roser, Mohamed Nagdy and Hannah Ritchie, 'Terrorism' (January 2018), https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism (22 January 2018).

[4] Jennifer Cafarella and Jason Zhou, 'ISIS's Expanding Campaign in Europe', *Institute for the Study of War* (18 September 2017). See appendix 1 for a full overview of attacks inspired and conducted by ISIS, compiled by the Institute for the Study of War.

[5] See, for example: Güneş Murat Tezcür, Clayton Besaw, 'Jihadist waves: Syria, the Islamic State, and the changing nature of foreign fighters', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* (21 November 2017), 1-17, based on: Ryan Browne, 'Top intelligence official: ISIS to attempt U.S. attacks this year', *CNN* (9 February 2016), https://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/09/politics/james-clapper-isis-syrian-refugees/ (22 January 2018).

[6] Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone, Eva Entenmann, *Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West* (Milan 2017).

[7] Cafarella and Zhou, 'ISIS's Expanding Campaign in Europe'.

The deterioration of the region's security, the rise of IS, civil war and a coalition fighting in Syria and Iraq, contributed to an unprecedented amount of refugees, especially from Syria. In total, the UNHCR estimates that almost a quarter of the 60 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide have fled the MENA region; the number of Syrian refugees is estimated at 5.5 million, which amounts to a quarter of all refugees.[8] A significant percentage of these refugees fled to neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, and at the end of 2016 the number of refugees amounted to 5,199,900, with 2,869,400 residing in Syria's neighbour Turkey, which seemed to function as the refugees' main gate to Europe.[9] Eventually, this large-scale influx of refugees to Europe became known as 'the refugee crisis', a term adopted in 2015 by media, politicians, scholars and the public alike. Over a million people arrived in Europe in 2015 alone,[10] mainly as a result of the Syrian civil war and the rise of IS.

This paper aims to look at the way the Dutch government has dealt with these two major events – the rise of IS and the emergence of the large-scale refugee influx – and how this has been influenced by, and still influences, perspectives of Dutch citizens. In doing so, it tries to answer the question whether there is a relationship between terrorism and migration using securitization theory. In the following chapter, the historical developments and current position of this theory will be elaborated on. Securitization is essentially a constructivist theory that argues that issues can be socially constructed as a threat. It is more or less

> 'the process through which nonpoliticized (issues are not talked about) or politicized (issues are publicly debated) issues are elevated to security issues that need to be dealt with with urgency'.[11]

Before getting into the main argument of this paper, it is important to mention that this paper makes no difference with regards to migrants, refugees and asylum seekers: it seeks to establish a relationship between the *phenomenon* of migration, that is the movement of a person or a group of persons across international boundaries, and terrorism. However, it does make a distinction based on the identity of these people; this paper will specifically look at

---

[8] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'Global Trends: Forced Displacement 2016' (21 June 2017).
[9] Ibid., 14.
[10] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'Operational Portal: Refugee Situations' (22 January 2018), http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean (22 January 2018).
[11] Rens van Munster, 'Securitization', *Oxford Bibliographies* (26 June 2012), http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0091.xml (22 January 2018).

Muslim migrants. It will be argued that the social construction of threat is highest regarding this type of migrants, because of the rise of Islamic-inspired terrorism and therefore this focus is capable of showing the link between terrorism and migration most profoundly.

This paper will show why and how Dutch society has been securitized in the realm of migration. Here, Sniderman and Hagendoorn make the argument along which this paper is built: 'focusing a spotlight on differences in collective identities undercuts support for both diversity and tolerance.'[12] By examining Dutch counterterrorism and migration policies and showing that they have become increasingly strict, this paper argues that those policies have contributed to the polarization of Dutch society. This polarization can be localized in the Dutch adoption of multiculturalism and then suddenly abandoning the idea after wide-spread criticism by people like Pim Fortuyn.[13] This has resulted in the fact that, as Sniderman and Hagendoorn also clarify, the Dutch Muslim population has increasingly found itself at odds with the 'regular' Dutch citizen, which in turn has consequences for policy. But, this is not a one-sided process:

> 'Multiculturalism encouraged an ambiguity of commitment. On the one side, political and intellectual elites ruled out a declaration of identification with the larger society as inappropriate. On the other side, Muslim leaders have acted as though identification with the larger society was unnecessary. Both could have made different choices; if either had, there well may not have been a pervasive suspicion about the loyalty of the Muslim community as a whole before the overt demonstration of disloyalty of a few.'[14]

Although Sniderman and Hagendoorn do not use the term polarization, the process they discover to be at work here does certainly amount to it. Polarization is used a lot in the political arena today, also (maybe even mostly) in relation to radicalization, terrorism and migration.[15] However, in academic works surrounding terrorism and migration, polarization is an underexposed phenomenon. Moreover, in chapter 2 and 3 it will be shown that policies in

---

[12] Paul M. Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn, *When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands* (2007) 138.
[13] Ibid., 19.
[14] Ibid., 11.
[15] To see if this was true, LexisNexis was used to find out media coverage about polarization in Dutch news. In the six main newspapers of the Netherlands, the combination of the terms 'polarization' and 'radicalization' got 29 hits. When scrolling through the results, many headlines name minorities in relation to polarization and sometimes they also show a specific link to terrorism. See, for example: Fidan Ekiz, 'Een vuist vanuit het "radicale midden"', *De Volkskrant* (1 October 2016).

the fields of counterterrorism and migration have not adopted significant attention to polarization.

This paper argues that polarization is essential to the process of radicalization and thus directly relates to terrorism. Moreover, it argues that both the majority and minority are affected by polarization in the sense that they radicalize and finally may perform violent, terrorist activities. In short, the majority will first use securitizing rhetoric and policies to protect itself from the perceived threat but in doing so it can run the risk of not addressing the actual problem, namely the differences between them and the other; if this never happens, certain members of the majority will radicalize in their opinions of the other and will act (violently) on them. The minority will use other, sometimes criminal, violent or terrorist, measures because they feel they are unable to use the 'normal' instruments of politics and society, since they feel that they are depicted as an unwelcome threat. In both senses, it is about perception, making it essentially 'all between the ears.'

Polarization is about opinions and prejudice,[16] and is essentially the same as a process called 'othering' by representatives of a majority, which on the one hand marginalizes minority groups and on the other hand creates antagonisms between the two. In general, polarization is considered to be the splitting of society along certain – especially ethnic and religious – lines.[17] Othering results in a two-sided increased threat perception: the one thinks the other is a threat, while the other thinks the same. Recognizing that the minority has no political influence, it has to find other measures to secure themselves and their interests. The majority does have political influence and organizes society according to their perception that the minority poses a threat. The theory of securitization that is used in this paper argues that this threat perception exists in society but it has to be legitimized through a certain action or 'speech act'; how this theory has looked into this will be explained in the next chapter. By looking at the way the majority in Dutch society – the 'regular' Dutch people – has created policies aimed to combat radicalization, terrorism and migration, this paper will look for the 'moment of securitization'. Or, in other words, it aims to find the moment that has exacerbated tensions between this majority and the minority in Dutch society – Dutch Muslims – in such a way that the latter might become incentivized to use measures outside the normal political domain (e.g. terrorism) and that the former has formed policies that put the

---

[16] Sniderman and Hagendoorn, *When Ways of Life Collide*.
[17] Bob de Graaff, 'Polarisatie en radicalisering', in: Hans Moors, Lenke Balogh, Jaap van Donselaar and Bob de Graaff, *Polarisatie en radicalisering in Nederland. Een verkenning van de stand van zaken in 2009* (Tilburg 2009), 29-61: 32.

minority outside this realm. Essentially, then, the threat perception is legitimized in the eyes of the 'regular' Dutch people, while in fact only reinforcing already existing tensions. Thus, securitization has a negative influence on actual security and links migration and terrorism.

Tensions surrounding security issues do not only exist among the Dutch. In recent years, citizens of EU countries have signalled their fear of terrorism and migration; they have increasingly indicated that what they fear most, what they perceive as the most threatening issues, are terrorism and migratory movement. In 2016, this amounted to almost half of EU citizens stating that immigration is their biggest fear and 39% saying terrorism is what worries them most.[18] Moreover, a large majority of EU citizens strongly demands that the EU acts tougher on immigration by strengthening external borders; similar numbers can be seen with regards to terrorism and EU measures on that front.[19] This leads us to the following hypothesis:

> *The emergence of Islamic State and their targeting of multiple European cities has increased the threat perception among western audiences to an extent unknown since the early years after 9/11. The securitizing moment, or the moment in which this threat perception became legitimized through political actions, is the refugee crisis. The large-scale influx of (Muslim) refugees from Syria and Iraq was surrounded by extensive political and societal debate and extensive measures were, and are, made to deal with it, which run the risk of becoming counter-productive, i.e. fuel radicalization processes.*

This paper does not aim to test the validity of securitization as a theory, but merely borrows its insights to understand how the threat perception among Dutch audiences has affected real policies made in the context of the rise of IS and the emergence of the refugee crisis. The policy instruments the Netherlands uses towards migration and (counter)terrorism will be central to this paper, with securitization theory providing the tools to analyse and compare the two policy areas on both historical experiences and present-day policy.

---

[18] Maxim Schuman, 'Immigration and terrorism are Europeans' biggest fears' (3 August 2016), https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/immigration-and-terrorism-are-europeans-biggest-fears/ (2 June 2018).

[19] Jacques Nancy, 'Europeans in 2016: Perceptions and expectations, fight against terrorism and radicalisation', *Special Eurobarometer of the European Parliament* (June 2016), 19-20. Found on: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/20160623PVL00111/Europeans-in-2016-Perceptions-and-expectations-fight-against-terrorism-and-radicalisation (2 June 2018).

First, the way the Netherlands has historically combatted terrorism both externally and internally will be discussed; here, this paper will first look at the incredibly complex nature of terrorism and the consequences this has for counterterrorism measures. Subsequently, the country's history of migration will be succinctly described and followed by a description of the internal and external measures the Duch government has taken to securitize migration, to strengthen its asylum and migration procedures.

Methodologically, this means that the analysis conducted throughout this paper will consist of a positioning within the debate surrounding the relationship between migration and terrorism, a relationship that – according to the hypothesis of this paper – lies within the process of threat-formation through polarization/othering. Using the case study of the Netherlands and its Muslim minorities, this paper will examine the policy areas mentioned above to find out where the relationship between terrorism and migration can be localized. A case study by definition requires academics to also use primary sources, but that is not to say that this will be an empirical research into the specifics of Dutch migratory issues. However, some examples will be needed– especially from the policy realm – that show where specific measures come from, how they are formulated and what language they use to identify the problem and its solution. Again, for clarity's sake as well as for the purpose of succinctness, only a few important examples will be used as a sample for the bigger picture. Concretely, this means that the used sources will mainly consist of secondary sources, complemented by: first, policy documents that describe the position and approach of the Dutch government to (counter)terrorism, migration and asylum; second, excerpts of media coverage surrounding the migration-terrorism relationship; and third, public opinion inquiries into the opinion of the Dutch and people regarding migration and terrorism.

Every chapter will motivate why the sources used were chosen and why they are relevant to the position of the Dutch government. Since this paper will largely be based on threat perception as explained by securitization theory, chapter 1 will provide the necessary theoretical framework to elucidate the paper's basis for analysis. Also, it will establish the relationship between the processes of 'othering' and 'securitizing'. Moreover, it will give an overview of scholarly work surrounding the migration-terrorism relationship as well as a short historical summary of securitization in the migration domain, on an EU-wide scale.

Having established the groundworks, it is useful to provide some historical and scholarly insights into the case study that is used throughout this paper. Therefore, chapter 2 will give an overview of Dutch counterterrorism policies and how perspectives on, as well as

solutions to the problem have changed throughout Dutch history. Acknowledging the incredibly complex nature of terrorism, and thus of counterterrorism, the idea of 'terrorism as a wicked problem' will be covered, showing all intertwined and related concepts that influence the way a country deals with terrorism.

Chapter 3 will do the exact same thing with regards to migration policies in the Netherlands. Moreover, it will also deal with the question of the EU-Turkey Deal and the Dutch position regarding it. Here, it is shown that migration policies throughout the last centuries have had historically differing goals: from enabling people to leave the Netherlands after inviting them there as cheap labourers, to accepting them in the country because they would not leave, to reducing the possibility of family reunification, to eliminating the possibility of regular migration altogether by solely focusing on international agreements that oblige the Netherlands to accept refugees.

Chapter 4 will analyse the way that migrants and/or refugees are intrinsically considered to be 'the Other', meaning that they do not belong to the society of 'the Self'. This process, it will be argued, is the stage preceding securitization, since a society takes security measures to protect itself against the other, constituting a shift from 'othering' to 'securitizing'. These security measures, however, will intensify polarization and thus exacerbate existing tensions. Thus, by targeting minorities through securitizing moves, the policies aimed at eliminating security threats only increase them. In this process, which takes the shape of a self-fulfilling prophecy, I argue, lies the link between terrorism and migration.

Chapter 1 – Securitization and the migration-terrorism nexus

Throughout this chapter, the aim is to establish the important theoretical notions surrounding the hypothesis, in order to ground it in theory and in the broader scholarly debate. As a result of this, the understanding of the Dutch case will be more elaborate and a contribution to a larger debate on how polarization and threat perception contribute to radicalization and terrorism can be made. First, we have to understand how, why and when migration becomes a security issue. Second, we have to gain insight in the process of threat-formation: what constitutes a threat, when and why? Third, policy changes in the migration domain have to be understood within a framework of security as the relationship between migration and security is less obvious than is the case with terrorism. These three things essentially pertain to the three main explanations securitization theory thrives to find. It aims 'to explain the politics through which (1) the security character of public problems is established, (2) the social commitments resulting from the collective acceptance that a phenomenon is a threat are fixed and (3) the possibility of a particular policy is created.'[20] The main argument this paper makes, shown in the hypothesis and elaborated upon in chapter 4, is that polarization has been the main determinant for threat perception between Dutch Muslims and 'regular' Dutch people. Securitization theory is a theoretical framework that is capable of showing how this perception becomes reality and how it subsequently influences policy. Therefore, the following will shortly introduce securitization as a theory. Since this paper is interested in the relationship between terrorism and migration, the second part of the chapter will look at how this connection has been characterized by different authors. Derived from this scholarly exploration, the concept of 'othering' and its relationship to migration and terrorism will be elaborated upon in the final part of this chapter.

Securitization as a theoretical framework

Securitization theory can clarify how and why it is the case that threat perception contributes the development of certain policies. It explains why a perception of threat among certain people is a direct incentive for the government to start adopting tougher policies. It is usually understood to have been developed by the 'Copenhagen School' as a reaction to a debate existing between different strands of International Relations scholars.[21] Securitization as

---

[20] Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard and Jan Ruzicka, "'Securitization' revisited: theory and cases", *International Relations* 30 (2016) 4, 494-531: 494.

[21] For a list of some authoritative works that are generally considered to fall within the 'Copenhagen School' of securitization theory, see: Rens van Munster, 'Securitization', *Oxford Bibliographies* (26 June 2012),

developed by this school argues that security should be seen as a so-called 'speech act', meaning that security is neither objective nor subjective but socially constructed through speech utterances.[22] Whereas neo-utilitarian theories have argued that 'insecurity derives from the objectively threatening complexion of certain issues', securitization theory argues that "the 'security-ness' of an entity does not depend on objective features, but rather stems from the interactions between a securitizing actor and its audience."[23]

In other words, neo-utilitarian theories treat security as being inherent to certain issues (objectivist), whereas securitization theory argues that threats can be socially constructed. This is different from a subjectivist approach, which argues that it only matters if a certain issue is *perceived* to be a threat. In the Copenhagen School's understanding of securitization, there is both a subjective (e.g. the issue has to be perceived as being a threat) and an intersubjective (e.g. a 'negotiated […] enterprise between the securitizing actor and the relevant audience') dimension, thereby making the threat real (objective).[24]

As opposed to securitization theory of the Copenhagen School, current literature analyses this by looking at both political discourse and policy practice.[25] This means that speech acts are only one part of the equation, namely the discursive one. Policy practice, in this case, 'refers to the activities of those parts of the administration involved in the elaboration and implementation of collectively binding decisions on questions of immigration and internal security.'[26] This shows, then, that securitization is essentially a political question. It does require public support, because 'the agreement of [the audience] is necessary to confer an intersubjective status to the threat',[27] but again this is political as politics is 'primarily occupied with securing public legitimacy'.[28] However, of course, this does not necessarily mean that we can talk of a top-down process; it is simply true that politics is a necessary component of securitization discourse and practice.

According to recent literature on securitization, in order to study the influence of practices on securitization, one must use 'an analytics of government', meaning that one must study regimes of practices, or 'the ways in which we are governed', aiming 'to identify how

---

http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0091.xml (9 January 2018).

[22] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO 1998).

[23] Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' revisited", 496.

[24] Ibid., 500.

[25] Christina Boswell, 'Migration Control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the Absence of Securitization', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45 (2007) 3, 589-610: 591 & 592.

[26] Ibid, 592.

[27] Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' revisited", 495.

[28] Boswell, 'Migration Control in Europe after 9/11', 592.

that regime came into being, the multiple sources of the elements that constitute it, and how it was transformed into institutional practice (Dean, 1999: 21).'[29] There are, according to Balzacq et al. four main characteristics to this analytics of government: first, the ways in which we perceive or see certain issues; second, the ways in which we think about and question these issues; third, the ways we act on and intervene in these issues, as defined by expertise and know-how while relying upon definite technologies; fourth, the way we form subjects, selves, persons, actors or agents.[30] In short, an analytics of government 'is also necessary to study the power relations as they shape distinctive ways of thinking, acting and the subject formation that precedes, accompanies and follows processes of securitization.'[31]

Combining these regimes of practices with the so-called speech act is essential because both comprise an essential feature of what transforms a particular issue into a threat, and subsequently securitizes it. To illustrate, we can quickly think about the issue at hand, namely migration, where not only *saying* that terrorists might be travelling amongst refugees (i.e. a speech act), but also for example the French government's annunciation and implementation of the state of emergency following the November 2015 Paris attacks, have resulted in targeting migrant-populated areas more specifically.[32]

Connecting terrorism to migration: exploring the academic debate

This section aims to find how the relationship between migration and terrorism has been characterized. Based on the premises of securitization theory, this paper positions itself in the broader academic debate surrounding the migration-terrorism nexus. The first finding of this literature review is that there seems to be disagreement as to the relationship between the two. On the one hand, certain authors argue that 'there is remarkably little evidence of attempts to securitize migration in Europe through explicitly linking irregular migrants and new entrants to terrorism.',[33] while others state that migrants and terrorism are seen as 'Doppelgänger', meaning that '[t]he migrant is a potential terrorist hiding among the crowd of migrants, and the terrorist is a potential migrant ready to move into Europe'.[34]

---

[29] Eliot Che, 'Analytics of Government, Theories of State: Governmentality and the Foucauldian Challenge to International Political Economy' (2007), 1-13: 2.
[30] Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' revisited", 497.
[31] Ibid., 502.
[32] Jennifer Fredette, 'The French State of Emergency', *Current History* 116 (March 2017) 788, 101-106.
[33] Christina Boswell, 'Migration Control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the Absence of Securitization', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45 (2007) 3, 589-610: 590.
[34] Thomas Nail, 'A Tale of Two Crises: Migration and Terrorism after the Paris Attacks', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 16 (2016) 1, 158-167: 158.

This last position is illustrated clearly by authors Gabriella Lazaridis and Khursheed Wadia, who state that scholarly debate on the securitization of migration in the EU has a clear focus on the post-9/11 period when discussing the migration-terrorism nexus. This is unsurprising because, as opposed to the pre-9/11 and especially Cold War period, non-state actors (NRA's) – in this case, terrorist organizations are the most illustrative example – are considered to pose new and increased threats. As a result, western governments as targets of many of these NRA's argued in favour of the idea that security should also be about non-military threats. One of those, and maybe even the most prominent, is the migration problem. It is argued by many governments in the post-9/11 world that migration is threatening the cross-border security of states. Despite advocating mobility in order to facilitate the global economy, western governments have simultaneously tried to restrict this mobility by securitising it out of fear of these NRA's, i.e. out of fear of terrorism.[35]

Interestingly, we can already observe the process of securitizing migration before 9/11. Huysmans argues that from the 1980s onwards, a trend can be observed where migration in Europe is thought to be problematic with regards to domestic integration and public order; referring to Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*: 'the conservative discourse which identifies multiculturalism as a cause of societal disintegration'.[36] Public order, on the other hand, corresponds with the emergence of phenomena like the Single European Act (SEA), the single market, Schengen and the Dublin Convention, after which reasoning amounted to:

> 'if we diminish internal border controls then we must harmonize and strengthen the control at the external borders of the European Community to guarantee a sufficient level of control of who and what can legitimately enter the space of free movement'.[37]

This paper, however, focuses on the period after 2011 when IS and the people it inspired had risen to the top of Western security agendas. So far, as shown above, developments in the securitization of the EU's borders have been characterized by a *pre-9/11* and a *post-9/11* moment. Despite this, the position that Lazaridis and Wadia take, is in line with the position of this paper. The restriction of mobility that these authors talk about has,

---

[35] Gabriella Lazaridis and Khursheed Wadia, 'Introduction', 1-18, in: Gabriella Lazaridis, Khursheed Wadia (eds.), *The Securitisation of Migration in the EU: Debates Since 9/11* (Palgrave Macmillan 2015).
[36] Jef Huysmans, 'The European Union and the Securitization of Migration', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38 (2000) 5, 751-777: 757.
[37] Ibid., 758-759).

according to the hypothesis of this paper, largely been motivated by the construction of the migrant as 'the Other', the latter part of an us/them divide, which is 'represented as barbaric and diabolical.'[38] This process of 'othering' is often directed against foreigners but can also be directed against domestic populations. Katherine Brown argues that Muslims in Britain have been put outside a newly created 'British identity', which has enabled the government to externalize terrorism even in domestic settings – 'othering'.[39] To illustrate, she points to 'the higher percentage of Asians who are stopped and searched by police, increased surveillance, disruption activities in Muslim neighbourhoods, and the impact of new citizenship laws', securitizing mechanisms that result in the marginalization of Muslim populations in the name of counterterrorism.[40]

This is in line with what Bob de Graaff has written on the relationship between migration and terrorism: radicalization of migrants often does not happen in their country of origin but in the country they migrated to. In Europe or North America, they live a marginalized, semi-illegal life with countless minor incidents of criminal activity that nobody from the justice department follows up on. After they have radicalized and are planning or have conducted a terrorist attack, there seems to be an instant call for more surveillance, border controls and other security measures (i.e. securitization). However, De Graaff argues, these securitizing, marginalizing measures are often the exact reason these people disappear from the authorities' radar. They facilitate the migrant's vanishing into illegality, creating a vacuum for authorities that they cannot reach while simultaneously increasing the risk of attacks.[41]

'Othering' and terrorism

Theoretically, 'othering' has been analysed by various authors, having its origins in post-colonial theory. In general, the theory of othering pertains to identity formation and 'assumes that subordinate people are offered, and at the same time relegated to, subject positions as others in discourse.'[42] It is therefore about the construction of inferiority that resides outside

---

[38] Jolle Demmers, *Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction* (Routledge 2016) 123.
[39] Katherine E. Brown, 'Contesting the Securitization of British Muslims', *interventions* 12 (19 Jul 2010) 2, 171-182: 176. See also: Dan Bulley, '"Foreign" terror? London bombings, resistance and failing the state', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 10 (2008) 3, 379-94.
[40] Ibid., 181.
[41] Bob de Graaff, 'Losers op en onder de radar. Parallelle levens: de Millennium Bomber en Anis Amri', *De Groene Amsterdammer* (4 January 2017).
[42] Sune Qvotrup Jensen, 'Othering, identity formation and agency', *Qualitative Studies* 2 (2011) 2, 63-78: 65.

of 'who "we" are and what distinguishes "us" from 'the others'.'[43] As a discursive phenomenon, othering is essential to understanding why we speak of specific subjects in a certain way, especially with regards to the concept of audience that is central in the theory of securitization. Therefore, othering is defined here as:

> 'discursive processes by which powerful groups, who may or may not make up a numerical majority, define subordinate groups into existence in a reductionist way which ascribe problematic and/or inferior characteristics to these subordinate groups. Such discursive processes affirm the legitimacy and superiority of the powerful and condition identity formation among the subordinate'.[44]

It is important to stress how we will use the concept of othering in this paper. In order to methodologically delineate, we will use the framework set out by Grove and Zwi.[45] These authors have focused on the question of how migrants are constructed as the 'other' and are socially excluded as a result of this process. They have identified four mechanisms through which (forced) migrants are socially constructed as the other: the language of threat, queue jumping and the uninvited guest, charity and choice, and overload. Although they will not be analysed specifically, this is an illustration of the processes that are at work when the construction of others takes place. Therefore, they are made visible in chapter 4 through various examples. First, the language of threat uses metaphors of war, contagion and natural disaster to frame migrants' movements in order to justify extensive control measures that '[shift] the focus from protection *of* the refugee, to protection *from* the refugee (Sathanapally, 2004).'[46] Essentially then, this mechanism directly pertains to securitization of migration: it pictures them as a threat that needs to be contained, through securitizing moves. Second, migrants are being framed as 'jumping the queue' and as being a burden on 'us' by making demands on 'our' society. Third, and related to the second, host societies are often framed as charitable and migrants as being a drain on these societies through the use of words like 'burden sharing'. Finally, as has been clear throughout recent years as well, there is often a

---

[43] Saskia Bonjour and Betty de Hart, 'A proper wife, a proper marriage: Constructions of 'us' and 'them' in Dutch family migration policy', *European Journal of Women's Studies* 20 (February 2013) 1, 61-76: 61.
[44] Jensen, 'Othering, identity formation and agency', 65.
[45] N.J. Grove and A.B. Zwi, 'Our health and theirs: Forced migration, othering, and public health', *Social Science and Medicine* 62 (2006) 8, 1931–1942.
[46] Ibid., 1934.

widespread public perception in host societies that there is an overload in the numbers of migrants.[47]

All these mechanisms are interesting to look at in relation to the securitization of migration and how this relates to terrorism. This paper observes them to be at work along the lines of Bob de Graaff's argumentation; the portrayal of migrants as 'the other' – as a marginalized individual – contributes to a heightened threat perception and threat management.[48] This process results almost instantly in a call for extra, extensive control measures to protect 'us' from 'them'; in the cases discussed throughout this paper, 'they' could potentially be terrorists and thus 'we' have to be protected. Consequently, the people in power (i.e. the government) securitize society, legitimated by the public perception of threat (i.e. audience assent). How the Netherlands has done so historically in the realms of (counter)terrorism and migration will be the topic of the next two chapters.

---

[47] Grove and Zwi,'Our health and theirs', 1936.
[48] Bob de Graaff, 'Losers op en onder de radar'.

Chapter 2 – The Dutch response to the 'wicked problem' of terrorism

This chapter aims to show how counterterrorism policies have expanded, changed and become more stringent since the first time the Netherlands had become familiar with the incidence of terrorism – when Moluccans occupied the Indonesian embassy in Wassenaar and killed a guard on 31 March 1970.[49] The chapter shows that the Netherlands still maintain an approach that focuses on deradicalization while also expanding securitizing measures rapidly. This so-called 'comprehensive approach' has often been dubbed a 'soft approach', where both repressive and preventive measures are presented as equally important. However, as Bob de Graaff argues in his contribution on Dutch counterterrorism policies:

'through this approach, the authorities cast their nets widely over society leading one to wonder whether such an approach is justifiably called softer than a more focused approach that would target only a minor portion of the population.'[50]

The next paragraphs will not look into the effectiveness of Dutch policies, because 'it has been […] difficult […] to score major and lasting successes in the fight against terrorism'.[51] Determining whether or not the Dutch have booked any success in their adoption of the comprehensive approach is impossible because terrorism is a so-called 'wicked problem'. A discussion of what this means and why this is the case will constitute the first section of this chapter. The second part will briefly discuss the first incidence of terrorism and the development of counterterrorism in the Netherlands. Finally, the 2011-2015 and 2016-2020 integrated counterterrorism strategies (CT-strategies) as developed by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) will be analysed. In doing so, it will be argued that a process of securitization has occurred in the domain of counterterrorism: the focus on radicalization adopted by the Netherlands is a securitizing policy, because it overlooks the process of polarization that precedes it. It is at the this earlier point that the government should intervene to indeed uphold a soft approach to counterterrorism.

---

[49] Paul Abels, ''Je wilt niet geloven dat zoiets in Nederland kan!' Het Nederlandse contraterrorismebeleeid sinds 1973', in: Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Beatrice de Graaf (eds.), *Terroristen en hun bestrijders: vroeger en* nu (Amsterdam 2007), 121-129: 121.

[50] Bob de Graaff, 'Why Continue Counterterrorism Policies if They Are Hurting?', in: Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni and Amna Guellali (eds.), *Jihad: Challenges to International and Domestic Law* (The Hague 2010), 265–73: 268.

[51] Ibid., 270.

Terrorism as a 'wicked problem'

Since 2004, the year of its establishment, the NCTV coordinates all Dutch counterterrorism efforts by developing strategical plans and facilitating cooperation between the many actors in the field. Between 2011 and today, the NCTV's CT-strategies have identified three main goals of counterterrorism: diminish the risk of attacks, decrease fear for attacks in Dutch society and limit potential damage after attacks.[52] This has a direct link to the definition of terrorism all counterterrorism partners officially use:

> *'Terrorisme is het uit ideologische motieven dreigen met, voorbereiden van of plegen van ernstig op mensen gericht geweld, dan wel daden gericht op het aanrichten van maatschappijontwrichtende zaakschade, met als doel maatschappelijke veranderingen te bewerkstelligen, de bevolking ernstige vrees aan te jagen of politieke besluitvorming te beïnvloeden.'[53]*

Essentially, this definition tries to encompass all possible expressions of terrorism. However, in doing so it remains extremely vague because it does not name any specifics. Unsurprising as this may be, given the historical and even present-day differences of interpretation regarding the definition of terrorism, it has some real consequences for CT-strategies. As such, terrorism as a concept is incredibly difficult to grasp, while efforts to combat it suffer from this reality.

Without resorting to a page-long description of academic and political definitions of terrorism, it suffices to say that in a big study conducted by Leiden University scholar Albert Jongman, 109 definitions of the phenomenon were found and not one characteristic in these definitions was mentioned in all of them.[54] The consequence for counterterrorism is that, depending on one's perspective and expertise of the problem, the solution is defined very differently. It can be considered a form of warfare (i.e. the 'war on terror'), a criminological issue, a problem of state security and a threat to the democratic order, a societal affair, or a

---

[52] Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV), *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015* (April 2011), 17.

[53] Ibid., 20. See for further elaboration: Kamerstukken I 2010/11, 30 164, nr. J, blz. 3-4. Translation of my own: Terrorism is the ideologically motivated threatening with, preparing of or committing of serious violence aimed at persons, or actions aimed at inflicting damage to property in such a way that it disrupts society, with the purpose of bringing about societal change, frightening the population or influence political decision.

[54] Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (Routledge 2017).

problem of safety and/or security.[55] Obviously, this has its consequences for combatting the phenomenon. When the problem is considered a form of warfare, extraordinary measures are easier to legitimize but they will infringe upon civil and human rights. Another example is when it is defined as a judicial problem. If a prosecutor is trying to put a terrorist behind bars, he will try to get the highest possible punishment. If it works and the individual will be sent to prison, he might become even more radicalized in there or instigate others to radicalize and commit terrorist attacks. A good example of how these dilemmas turn out in reality is the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, where many innocent Iraqis were locked up, tortured and treated inhumanely when the US invaded in 2003. These individuals often radicalized and sometimes turned into terrorists after having suffered the torture and inhumane conditions laid upon them by the US.[56] Moreover, many people who simply saw the videos of what happened in Abu Ghraib became radicalized quickly,[57] and some eventually even conducted terrorist attacks.[58] Therefore, as the CT-strategy of the Netherlands recognizes, counterterrorism policies can actually have a counterproductive effect:

> *'[er] moet worden gekeken naar de vraag of de overheid door de manier waarop zij optreedt in haar strijd tegen terrorisme en de zichtbaarheid waarmee zij dit doet, de terroristische dreiging en de voedingsbodem voor terrorisme niet onbedoeld vergroot.'[59]*

Another problem is that the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies is simply unmeasurable. Many questions surrounding terrorism remain unanswered, both by academics and politics. Considering the fact that not every radicalized person turns into a terrorist, it is unclear how radicalization relates to terrorism. Is it simply the stage before, are there multiple degrees of radicalization (e.g. someone who travels to fight in Syria has experienced a different radicalization process and considers other issues to be important than someone who

---

[55] Bob de Graaff, 'Ze hebben het op ons gemunt, maar wie zijn het nu weer? De telkens wisselende fenomenen van terrorisme, radicalisering, extremisme en fanatisme' in: De Waele, Moors, Garssen, Noppe (eds.), *Aanpak van gewelddadige radicalisering*, Cahiers Politiestudies 42 (2017) 1, 23-39: 24 & 25.
[56] *Paul Bremer - Lessen uit Irak*, VPRO Tegenlicht (16 mei 2007), https://www.vpro.nl/jeugd/speel~POMS_VPRO_158130~paul-bremer-lessen-uit-irak~.html
[57] Thomas Hegghammer, 'Saudis in Iraq: Patterns of Radicalization and Recruitment', *Cultures &* Conflits (12 June 2008), https://journals.openedition.org/conflits/10042
[58] Ibid.
[59] NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015,* 74. Translation of my own: 'Attention must be paid to the question whether the government may unintentionally increase the terrorist threat and the breeding grounds for terrorism by acting in the way it does in its fight against terrorism and the visibility by which it does so.'

conducts a terrorist attack on his home country's soil)[60], is radicalization different from extremism? Illustrating the problem with vaguely defined concepts is the definition of radicalization the NCTV uses; it changed the original process-oriented definition, [61] in favour of a more individually-oriented one. This definition seems to suggest a linear pathway towards a 'growing willingness' to use undemocratic or violent means. However, academics agree that radicalization is a process that is characterized by multicausality; it has no single way of developing, nor is there just one cause for it.[62] Finally, there is also the concept of extremism: *'het fenomeen waarbij personen of groepen bij het streven naar hun idealen bewust over de grenzen van de wet gaan.'[63]* To use the words of Bob de Graaff once more, there really exists 'a hodgepodge of definitions',[64] of which neither academics nor policy makers know exactly how the described issues influence one another.

Perhaps the most important unanswerable question is: 'What is the profile of a terrorist?' Can we even say something about this considering the amount of historical examples of left-wing terrorism, right-wing terrorism, anti-colonial terrorism, jihadist terrorism, separatist terrorism? If effectiveness needs to be measured, one needs a consistent repetition of the same conditions. In the case of terrorism and counterterrorism, this is undeniably impossible because of the reasons mentioned above and many more. Consider for example the fact that terrorists can learn quickly and adapt to measures adopted by states. These bureaucracies by nature operate less effectively and fluently than the loosely organized terrorist organizations do.[65] Since 9/11, airports have greatly increased their security and no planes have been used to conduct a terrorist attack ever since. However, the recent European terrorist attacks have shown that terrorists adapted very easily and that they shifted their

---

[60] De Graaff, 'Ze hebben het op ons gemunt, maar wie zijn het nu weer?', 29-31.
[61] Definition is obtained from: Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD), *Van Dawa tot Jihad. De diverse dreigingen van de radicale islam tegen de democratische rechtsorde* (2004), 15. Dutch quote: '*Radicalisering is de groeiende bereidheid tot het nastreven en/of ondersteunen van diep ingrijpende veranderingen in de samenleving die op gespannen voet staan met de democratische rechtsorde en/of waarbij ondemocratische middelen worden ingezet.*' My translation: 'Radicalization is the growing willingness to strive for or support deeply disruptive changes in society which are at odds with the democratic rule of law and/or with the use of undemocratic means.'
[62] Bob de Graaff, 'Polarisatie en radicalisering', 55
[63] NCTV, 'Extremisme', https://www.nctv.nl/organisatie/ct/terrorismebestrijding/extremisme/extremisme.aspx (14 May 2018). My translation: 'the phenomenon whereby persons or groups consciously violate the law to pursue their ideals.'
[64] Bob de Graaff, 'Ze hebben het op ons gemunt, maar wie zijn het nu weer?', 25.
[65] Ibid., 31.

tactics to targeting public areas, using trucks for example (Nice 2016, Berlin 2016, London 2017, Barcelona 2017), which requires much less expertise and access to materials.[66]

All in all, terrorism is a 'wicked problem', a problem that is unstructured, that 'cut[s] across hierarchy and authority structures within and between organizations and across policy domains, political and administrative jurisdictions, and political "group" interests',[67] and that is relentless. In other words, it is almost impossible to create a working solution for terrorism because of its case-specific character: every actor, action and counteraction in the field of terrorism influences another and thus a universal solution is non-existent.

Developing a counterterrorism policy in the Netherlands after 1970

Until 1973, the Netherlands did not have any official counterterrorism policies. The catalyst for creating one was the incidence of Moluccan terrorism during the 1970's. The policy derived by the dominantly social democratic Den Uyl-cabinet and continued by the Christian-democratic/liberal Van Agt-cabinet had four main purposes: avoid escalation, negotiate as long as possible, use representatives of the Moluccan community to de-escalate and only use the label 'terrorism' when acts resulted in fatalities and societal damage. If this was not the case, the Dutch secret service BVD (*Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst*) used the word 'politically violent activism'.[68]

Compared to other countries with similar experiences, such as Germany, the Netherlands maintained a vision where societal tensions had to be regulated and solved but not fought. In other words, the Dutch used a very equanimous attitude towards (terrorist) protest movements. But, as a result of this approach, the Dutch had much less experience with tracking down and arresting terrorists; there was not enough experience with determined, relentless terrorists within the Dutch security system.[69] Hesitance to expand the capabilities available to counterterrorism actors was, to a large extent, motivated by prime minister Den Uyl's reluctance towards the issue.[70] Interestingly, as we will see, the amount of political will and/or societal salience of the issue is often a driving factor in determining what

---

[66] Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 'DHS-FBI Warning: Terrorist Use of Vehicle Ramming Tactics' (13 December 2010), https://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-dhs-fbi-warning-terrorist-use-of-vehicle-ramming-tactics/ (21 May 2018).
[67] Edward P. Weber and Anne M. Khademian, 'Wicked Problems, Knowledge Challenges, and Collaborative Capacity Builders in Network Settings', *Public Administration Review* 68 (April 2008) 2, 334-349: 336.
[68] De Graaf, *Terroristen en hun bestrijders*, 111.
[69] Ibid. 112.
[70] Ibid. 113.

counterterrorism measures make it to the agenda.[71] As historian Beatrice De Graaf notes in her contribution on the relationship between terrorism and the state's reaction to it, the Netherlands has propagated a 'deradicalizing' approach to counterterrorism. Moreover, she argues that it is crucial to understand the effect of dialogue with (potential) terrorists. Counterterrorism policies have to recognize, analyse and disrupt terrorists' identification with 'the cause'.[72] However, she also recognizes that it is difficult to create policy that actively uses these contentions;[73] when in 2003 the AIVD wrote that negative publicity surrounding Islam could contribute to radicalization of Muslims, widespread allegations were made that the AIVD was limiting the freedom of expression.[74]

Counterterrorism policies in the Netherlands: 2011-present

The Netherlands have come a long way since it developed its first CT-strategies during the Moluccan actions. However, its vision of non-violent solutions has sustained itself until today. This shows in the CT-strategies of 2011-2015 and 2016-2020, the documents that will form the basis of this part of the chapter. Using these documents, the most important current policies will be discussed. Having seen that terrorism is by no means an easy problem to deal with, it is worth looking into the Dutch efforts to see how the authorities have tried to solve the wicked problem terrorism poses. These efforts will be regarded from a national, strategical perspective to prevent digressing into technicalities. The CT-strategy of 2011-2015 is the foundation of all counterterrorism policies in the Netherlands and will therefore be used most for this chapter. The strategy of 2016-2020 is less elaborate and basically summarizes the main parts of the earlier one while adopting some recommendations from a 2015 report that evaluated the 2011-2015 strategy. If referenced on itself, the 2016-2020 has changed the approach towards that specific issue. Throughout the following section, the main strategic objectives – gather, prevent, prepare, defend and prosecute[75] – will be summarized and illustrated by a tactical implementation. Since prevention is almost completely outsourced to the local level and this paper aims to look at national policy, tactical plans are not discussed in this context.

---

[71] Counterterrorism Evaluation 2011-2015.
[72] Beatrice de Graaf, 'Wanneer stoppen terroristen? Het historisch referentiekader als aanknopingspunt voor (contra-)terrorisme', in: Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Beatrice de Graaf (eds.), *Terroristen en hun bestrijders: vroeger en* nu (Amsterdam 2007), 121-129: 118 & 119.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, *Jaarverslag 2003*, 35.
[75] NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015*, 52-103.

In general then, the NCTV's goals are pursued through cooperation on the national scale and implementation on the local scale.[76] The playing field of counterterrorism actors is large, but can essentially be limited to two categories. The national actors are all joined together in the 'Joint Terrorism Committee' (*Gezamenlijk Comité Terrorismebestrijding*).[77] On the local level, municipalities and local organizations are the most important players.[78]

Firstly, gathering national and international intelligence contributes to creating a clear image of the threat and increases the possibility to respond effectively to signs of radicalization and terrorism.[79] This task finds expression in the quarterly *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland* (DTN), which is published by the NCTV but based on a so-called 'all source threat assessment' including police surveillance, intelligence from the AIVD and MIVD, the Tax Revenue service and many others. After having structured all this information, the NCTV draws a picture of the current situation in the Netherlands and assesses the threat posed using a code on a scale of 1 to 5.[80] Currently, the threat level is at 4, which means that the chances of an attack happening are realistic given national and international circumstances, but that there is no concrete evidence of one being prepared.[81] A major criticism of this system, aside from methodological questions, is the fact that this way of 'grading' a threat is highly political. Imagine that the threat level is raised, even from a 2 to a 3, this means that the country is warned and therefore has to be vigilant. But doesn't this increase the fear among society, something terrorists strive for in and of themselves? Moreover, imagine that the threat level is lowered, this suggests that we can 'relax' somewhat but it does not guarantee complete safety: a terrorist attack can just as well occur on the lowest level as on the highest. Thus, whatever measures states takes or whatever indications they may give as to the level of threat, they 'can *never* guarantee safety.'[82]

---

[76] Mirko Noordegraaf, Scott Douglas, Aline Bos and Wouter Klem, *Gericht, gedragen en geborgd interventievermogen? Evaluatie van de nationale contraterrorisme-strategie 2011-2015* (8 april 2016).
[77] Parties to this Joint committee are: the General Intelligence & Security Service (AIVD), the Military Intelligence Service (MIVD), the Ministry of General Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice and Security, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), the military police (KMar), the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), the public prosecutor's office (OM) and the police. Obtained from: Noordegraaf, Douglas, Bos and Klem Evaluatie, *Gericht, gedragen en geborgd interventievermogen?*, 26.
[78] Ibid.
[79] NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015*, 9.
[80] Edwin Bakker and Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 'Barometer van de dreiging. Tien jaar Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 2005-2015', *Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid* (2015).
[81] Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 47* (Maart 2018).
[82] Lord Toby Harris, 'London and anti-terrorism in Europe', *European View* 16 (2017), 261–269: 264 (original emphasis).

Preparing for an attack is another pillar of the national CT-strategy. Primary concerns in this field are communication, cooperation and information exchange between the local, national and international level. As such, the NCTV stresses that: societal changes resulting from the terrorist and extremist threat must be monitored; crisis scenarios must be developed to ensure all parties are prepared for realistic situations; players must think in advance about key decisions, solutions and authority relationships between them; the network between the essential partners should be strengthened as much as possible; local, national and international partners should be training and practicing often; de-escalating, nuanced, objective and non-polarizing crisis communication has to be developed to control societal unrest and increase resilience.[83] Eventually, preparing is also about ensuring that in the moments following an attack, all emergency services work optimally in protecting people, preventing second-tier attacks and taking care of the victims.[84]

Despite all this preparation, however, being unable to ensure safety is one of the biggest challenges for the imperative pillar of Dutch CT-strategies over the last decades; total prevention is impossible. However, the comprehensive approach is characterized by a focus on prevention on the one hand and repression on the other hand. Since a risk-free environment is impossible to create,[85] the NCTV has identified the heightening of resilience as one of the partners' main components of prevention. The second part is 'limiting demand' and the third constitutes 'investing in deradicalization'. These three have to counter 'terrorism as an act' as well as 'terrorism as a phenomenon'. The former refers to committing a terrorist attack, the latter to violent extremism and radicalization as breeding grounds for terrorism.[86]

First, prevention is about increasing resilience of those groups that are (or may be) vulnerable to jihadist recruitment and propaganda.[87] Resilience 'is the capacity of a social system […] to proactively adapt to and recover from disturbances that are perceived within the system to fall outside the range of normal and expected disturbances.'[88] In the context of

---

[83] NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2016-2020*, 18.

[84] Ibid., 18-19.

[85] See, for example: Bob de Graaff, 'Why continue counterterrorism policies if they are hurting?', 19-20.; Liesbeth Mann, Bertjan Doosje, Elly A. Konijn, Lars Nickolson, Urs Moore en Nel Ruigrok, 'Indicatoren en manifestaties van weerbaarheid van de Nederlandse bevolking tegen extremistische boodschappen. Een theoretische en methodologische verkenning', *Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum* (2015).; Elisaveta P. Petkova, Stephanie Martinez, Jeffrey Schlegelmilch & Irwin Redlener, 'Schools and Terrorism: Global Trends, Impacts, and Lessons for Resilience', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40 (2017) 8, 701–711.

[86] See appendix 1 for the NCTV's model for terrorism as an act and a phenomenon, obtained from: Noordegraaf, Douglas, Bos and Klem Evaluatie, *Gericht, gedragen en geborgd interventievermogen?*, 8.

[87] NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015*, 71.

[88] Louise K. Comfort, Arjen Boin, Chris C. Demchak, 'The Rise of Resilience', in: Louise K. Comfort, Arjen Boin, Chris C. Demchak, *Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events* (2010) 1-12: 9.

Dutch counterterrorism, the strategy of enhancing resilience has two components. On the one hand, the resilience of the Dutch Muslim population, especially youths, to the jihadist narrative needs to be strengthened. By strengthening the resilience of these youths, it is expected that the attraction to jihadism will be limited and thus supply and demand will abate.[89] On the other hand, 'societal resilience' is of paramount importance. Recognizing the fact that frightening a population is one of the main goals of terrorists, societal resilience refers to the extent to which citizens are able to lift up their heads and continue their daily lives after an attack. In other words, the population must resist giving in to the fear that terrorists try to instil upon them, while simultaneously recognizing the impact it has on them and on society as a whole.[90] These two poles of resilience are strongly intertwined in the Dutch context, as for example shown by the many times Muslims have specifically been called upon to condemn terrorist attacks,[91] while at the same time appeals to the population as a whole is addressed to not let them be governed by fear: '*Wij laten ons niet regeren door angst. Wij laten ons onze vrijheid niet afpakken.*'[92]

Second, 'limiting demand' is about undermining the supply of the jihadist narrative by using a so-called 'counter-narrative' – a case-specific, individually targeted story that offers another perspective to those that might be or have been influenced by the jihadist narrative.[93] Moreover, it is about depleting the breeding ground for terrorism.[94] The government has to engage with and recognize the feelings of abasement and neglect among the target group. Here, the assumption is that those who do not participate with 'regular' society are more vulnerable to radicalization, which relates to the integration debate: as long as the Dutch government is able to integrate people in the everyday political and societal processes, they

---

[89] Edwin Bakker et al (eds.), *Terrorisme. Studies over terrorisme en terrorismebestrijding* (Deventer 2017) 347.
[90] Edwin Bakker and Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, *Terrorisme* (Amsterdam 2016) 127-129.
[91] In the Dutch context, see for example: Berend Sommer: "Koopmans: 'Moslims moeten in opstand komen tegen fundamentalisme'", *Elsevier Weekblad* (5 September 2017), https://www.elsevierweekblad.nl/nederland/achtergrond/2017/09/ruud-koopmans-door-religieuze-taboes-lukt-integratie-moslims-nauwelijks-537833/; Bas Soetenhorst, 'Moeten alle moslims zich nu uitspreken?', *Het Parool* (13 January 2015), https://www.parool.nl/amsterdam/moeten-alle-moslims-zich-nu-uitspreken~a3828918/; Youssef Azghari, 'Moslims, besef: je uitspreken tegen IS is niet genoeg', *NRC* (2 October 20140, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/10/02/moslims-besef-je-uitspreken-tegen-is-is-niet-gen-1424530-a912465; Geart van der Pol, 'Turkse-Nederlanders zoeken het gesprek op straat in 18 steden', *De Volkskrant* (29 April 2017), https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/turkse-nederlanders-zoeken-het-gesprek-op-straat-in-18-steden~be233a69/.
[92] My translation: 'We will not let ourselves be governed by fear. We will not allow our freedom to be taken from us.' Redactie Algemeen Dagblad, 'Rutte vastberaden: Handen af van onze vrijheid', *Algemeen Dagblad* (8 January 2015), https://www.ad.nl/buitenland/rutte-vastberaden-handen-af-van-onze-vrijheid~af6f16f1/.
[93] NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015*, 71-72; NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2016-2020*, 13.
[94] Ibid., 72-75; Ibid., 14.

will be less vulnerable to, in this case, jihadist thought.[95] However, it must be noted that several academics have shown that there is no evidence for certain *root causes* of terrorism such as humiliation, neglect, poverty, or failed integration.[96] Finally, the NCTV proposes to engage in deradicalization processes as much as possible.[97]

Although both the CT-strategies of 2011-2015 and 2016-2020 keep stressing the preventive capabilities of every objective, this paper considers defending and prosecuting to be repressive measures, following the reasoning adopted by the CT-evaluation 2011-2015 and in fact even by the CT-strategy itself: *'Voor degenen die de stap naar geweldpleging reeds gezet hebben of op het punt staan dit te doen, zijn andersoortige ingrepen vereist van meer repressieve aard.'*[98]

First, defending is about protecting targets of a terrorist attack, both in the public and private sector. Two concrete examples that guide this strategic objective are the *Alerteringssysteem Terrorismebestrijding (ATb)* and the *stelsel Bewaken en Beveiligen (B&B)*. The former ensures that the entirety of Dutch companies and vital sectors are being alerted when the threat of terrorism increases, based on information from the police and the intelligence and security services. Moreover, the ATb has developed guidelines to take the most effective measures in the face of a significant threat. Its overarching goal is to consistently structure the communication between government and business in such a way that there is security awareness in the public sector.[99] In 2017, this system has been changed in favour of a more local approach, because the NCTV has recognized the fact that threats often have a distinctly local character rather than a national one; the new system enables actors in the public sector to handle this more efficiently.[100] The goal of the B&B system is to protect persons, objects and services from (terrorist) attacks. Depending on the nature of the threat, one of the following actors is deployed as protection: the police, the public prosecutor, municipalities, intelligence and security services, ministries, the NTCV or a combination hereof.[101]

---

[95] Bakker et al, *Terrorisme*, 346.
[96] Bob de Graaff, 'Ze hebben het op ons gemunt, maar wie zijn het nu weer?', 31.
[97] NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015*, 75. NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2016-2020*, 14.
[98] Noordegraaf, Douglas, Bos and Klem, *Gericht, gedragen en geborgd interventievermogen?*, 83. My translation: 'For those that have already committed violent acts or that are about to do so, other interventions of a more repressive nature are required.'
[99] NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015*, 84-85
[100] NCTV, 'Alerteringssysteem Terrorismebestrijding' (2 August 2017), https://www.nctv.nl/organisatie/ct/atb/index.aspx (17 May 2018).
[101] 'Circulaire bewaking en beveiliging personen, objecten en diensten', *Staatscourant* (15 January 2013).

In the context of this paper, an especially relevant implementation of the objective to defend is external border control, assigned to the *Mobiel Toezicht Veiligheid (MTV)* and executed by the military police around the Dutch-Belgian and Dutch-German borders. The goal of this form of defence is detecting and stopping illegal immigration as well as other forms of criminality – including terrorism. The rationale behind this is that, according to the NCTV, the Netherlands is an important transit country within Europe and is therefore a tempting gateway for cross-border terrorist activities.[102] In the strategic framework for 2016-2020, more focus is being put on 'forward defence': the Netherlands is supposed to engage more in missions abroad to defend itself from international terrorism. Moreover, the B&B has increasingly recognized the threat of 'lone wolves'[103] and focuses more on their individual paths to terrorism than before so as to protect possible targets from them.[104]

The final objective of the NCTV's CT-strategy is prosecution. Prosecuting terrorists is judicially founded in the *Wet terroristische misdrijven* of 2004, which was expanded in 2007 to the *Wet voor verruiming opsporing terrorisme*. In 2017 a new law was enacted that was supposed to expand the preventive character of Dutch criminal law regarding terrorism: the goal of the *Tijdelijke wet bestuurlijke maatregelen terrorismebestrijding* is to be able to impose measures to individuals connected to (supporting) terrorism. Moreover, with this law it has now become a criminal offense to travel to a so-called 'terrorist battleground' (e.g. Syria).[105]

Dutch counterterrorism policies securitized

The CT-strategies focus mostly on the preventive approach, making it seem that it must be the most elaborate and structured part, but this is not quite the case. The 2015 evaluation of the 2011-2015 CT-strategy concluded five things: first, the comprehensive approach unintentionally ensures that the repressive approach receives more attention because it resorts more effect on the short term; second, partners drift away from each other when attention and salience are low, which eventually results in the preventive approach receiving less attention because the more socially-focused players participate less; third, the capacity of national partners fluctuates and – related to the second conclusion – when attention and salience are low, the first budget cuts will be made in the socially-focused players; fourth, the second and

---

[102] NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015*, 88-89.
[103] PGE's, or *potentieel gewelddadige eenlingen* in Dutch; NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2016-2020*, 14.
[104] NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2016-2020*, 16.
[105] *Kamerstukken II* 2015/16, 34359, 3 (MvT).

third conclusion both apply to local partners as well; finally, the role of the NCTV is valued but its role is often up for discussion because its partners notice that the delicate balancing between practice and policy remains a difficult task for the NCTV – however, this role as a mediator between politics and practice must be maintained. The first four conclusions show that there is a clear focus on repressive, securitizing measures when strategies are actually implemented.[106]

Moreover, having established the important role polarization plays in fuelling radicalization processes, by intentionally choosing to focus on radicalization in the CT-strategies, it overlooks the preceding stage of polarization. Once policy focuses on targeting radicalized groups and individuals, it inevitably becomes more repressive and aimed towards security. Radicalized persons have, as shown in the definition earlier, already adopted views that go beyond dialogue. The NCTV and its partners propose a counter narrative, but as Bob de Graaff argues, this type of communication is equally radical in its perceptions. In essence, then, this is a securitization of counterterrorism policy because it focuses on threats that exist and have become set in people's minds. Instead, De Graaff argues for the adoption of a 'different story' that acknowledges the downtrodden, suggests another 'heroism' than becoming a jihadi and where nuance replaces polarized differences.[107] I argue that, because polarization/othering is the stage preceding radicalization, this should be the moment in which intervention takes place. By focusing solely on the *security threat* radicalization poses, the government enters into securitization. By countering the process of polarization, governments counter the process of radicalization as well. Consequently, they would not adopt a securitizing policy which will only run the risk of exacerbating the threat they aim to counter. The following chapter shows that this securitization process also applies to Dutch migration policies, which have become tougher and effectively have securitized the migration domain.

---

[106] Noordegraaf, Douglas, Bos and Klem *Gericht, gedragen en geborgd interventievermogen?*, 11-12.
[107] Bob de Graaff, 'Ze hebben het op ons gemunt, maar wie zijn het nu weer?', 33.

Chapter 3 – Migrants as 'Others': migration policies in the Netherlands

When discussing migration in the context of present-day debates, it is about people moving from one state to another. More importantly, it is often about the reasons people have for moving from one place to another: is someone leaving his or her country of origin to gain material means, to flee persecution or war, to join family who left earlier? All of this is reflected in the definition provided by the United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM). According to this official but not universally recognized nor adopted definition, migration is:

> 'The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.'[108]

Illustrating the complexities of this phenomenon is the fact that this definition includes both refugees and migrants, although the UN itself acknowledges that there is no official legal definition for migrant.[109] Obviously, this leaves room for politically motivated definitions of migrants and/or refugees.

Accordingly, it is important to look at migration policy at the national level. Because of the lack of internationally binding agreements on issues surrounding migration, national policies mostly determine the outcome of how states deal with these matters. Obviously, this is not the case regarding anything that is agreed upon in ratified international human rights frameworks like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, or the Geneva Convention of 1951.[110]

The following will show that there have been two important shifts in the Dutch context that have contributed to 'the politicisation of integration and immigration issues [which has]

---

[108] International Organization for Migration, 'Glossary on Migration', *International Migration Law* 23 (Geneva 2011).
[109] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 'Definitions' (2018) https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/definitions (13 May 2018).
[110] UNHCR, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees* (2011), http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10 (13 May 2018).

opened up the public and political debate.'[111]. First, whereas emphasis used to be put mostly on multiculturalism, currently the Netherlands (and many other western countries) have adopted an assimilationist approach.[112] Second, the discussion surrounding immigration and integration has shifted from 'conflict avoidance to the politicisation and polarisation of immigration and integration issues.'[113] It will be argued that the EU-Turkey Deal,[114] the new Modern Migration Policy Act (MMPA)[115] and the National Visa Act (NVA)[116] that entered into force on, respectively, 20 March 2016, 6 March 2013 and 1 June 2013, are designed to keep out a threat to Dutch security and can thus be characterized as securitizing policies. They do so through two mechanisms: the control of external borders[117] and the guarding of internal boundaries.[118]

The first paragraph of this chapter will map the historical developments in Dutch migration and the perspectives of the public and government regarding it. The second section deals with how the Dutch government deals with asylum seekers and refugees and will elaborate on the effects of the EU-Turkey Deal. The third will do the same for migrants who are not considered refugees and how this is regulated by the MMPA and NVA. Finally, it will be argued why Dutch migration policies can be considered to have adopted a securitizing approach.

Dutch migration history: 1945-present

After World War II, the destructed societies of European countries had to be rebuilt. During the first years of reconstruction, generally considered the years 1940-1965, the Netherlands'

---

[111] María Bruquetas-Callejo, Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, Rinus Penninx and Peter Scholten, 'Policymaking related to immigration and
integration. The Dutch Case.', *IMISCOE Working Paper: Country Report* 15 (2007) 5.
[112] Leo Lucassen and Jan Lucassen, 'The Strange Death of Dutch Tolerance: The Timing and Nature of the Pessimist Turn in the Dutch Migration Debate', *The Journal of Modern History* 87 (March 2015) 1, 72– 101.; Halleh Ghorashi, 'Negotiating belonging beyond rootedness: unsettling the sedentary bias in the Dutch culturalist discourse', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40 (2017) 14, 2426–2443.; Masja van Meeteren, *Irregular Migrants in Belgium and the Netherlands. Aspirations and incorporation* (Amsterdam 2014).; Wilma Vollebergh, Justus Veenman and Louk Hagendoorn, *Integrating Immigrants in the Netherlands: Cultural Versus Socio-Economic Integration* (2017).
[113] Bruquetas-Callejo, Garcés-Mascareñas, Penninx and Scholten, 'Policymaking related to immigration and Integration.', 3.
[114] European Council, 'EU-Turkey statement' (18 March 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ (9 May 2018).
[115] Ministry of Justice and Security, 'Wet modern migratiebeleid' (21 September 2013), available at: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0027930/2013-09-21.
[116] Ministry of Justice and Security, 'Wijzigingswet Vreemdelingenwet 2000 (nationale visa)' (1 June 2013), available at: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0031667/2013-06-01.
[117] Van Meeteren, *Irregular Migrants in Belgium and the Netherlands*, 63-65.
[118] Ibid., 66-72.

infrastructure and economy had to be built up from nothing. However, this resulted in labour market shortages. So, during the 1960s immigration increased significantly when people from former colonies and newly 'invited' guest workers were recruited from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Yugoslavia, and Tunisia.[119] Especially Turkish, Moroccan and Spanish people came to the Netherlands as guest workers; due to poor living circumstances in the first two groups' countries of origin, they rarely returned. On the contrary, they brought their families to the Netherlands as well. This process of family reunification peaked around 1980. Already before this process took hold, the Dutch government started to create more restrictive immigration policies. In the 1970s an economic downturn decreased the labour shortages among the Dutch population, meaning that guest workers were no longer required. In fact, they were considered unwanted guests since they could now possibly take over jobs that Dutch citizens could do.[120]

In the early 1980s, the Netherlands realized that these guest workers would stay permanently – an unforeseen outcome of the 1960s' and early 1970s' welcoming stance towards immigrants – which created the need for immigrants' integration into Dutch society. But, because this immigration was still seen as historically unique, further immigration and integration was to be prevented. As a result, the 1980s and 1990s saw a more restrictive policy than the decades before.[121] Then, with the turn of the century, the debate on immigration and integration opened up to public and political debate after having been characterized by a technocratic, managerialist approach.[122]

In this new millennium, the rise of right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn, who was killed by an animal rights' activist in 2002; the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the London train bombings of 2005, the Madrid bombings of 2004; and the killing of Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh by Islamist radicals after he made a film criticizing Islam, were some key events in changing the discourse on migration.[123] For a long time, the Netherlands have been known for its flexible, liberal immigration and integration policies but events around the turn of the century 'led generally to a stricter immigration regime in both countries; more specifically, in the

---

[119] Evelyn Ersanilli, 'Country Profile: The Netherlands', *Focus Migration* 11 (November 2014), 2.
[120] Masja van Meeteren, *Irregular Migrants in Belgium and the Netherlands* (2014).
[121] Bruquetas-Callejo, Garcés-Mascareñas, Penninx and Scholten, 'Policymaking related to immigration and Integration', 4.
[122] Ibid., 20-23.
[123] Lucassen and Lucassen, 'The Strange Death of Dutch Tolerance', 72.

Netherlands, these events led to the restriction of low-skilled labour migration and family reunification against a background of growing debate on the limits of multiculturalism'.[124]

Interestingly, it is also at this point that policy-making on migration changed significantly. Currently, as will be shown in the next section, the Netherlands only accepts refugees into the country, because it is obliged to do so under international agreements. Other migrants are, in general, depicted as economic refugees which have no accepted reason to come to the Netherlands and should be sent back as soon as possible.[125] This has been illustrated most profoundly by the way the Netherlands positions itself towards the EU-Turkey deal. In short, the history of migration policy in the Netherlands can be summarized as follows: from enabling to accepting, reducing and finally eliminating the possibility of migrants entering the Netherlands.[126]

Asylum seekers and refugees

Generally, countries have two measures to protect themselves from the potential threat refugees pose: they can control external borders and guard internal boundaries. The following will argue that the Dutch government has adopted an approach that secures both its external and internal boundaries from any migrant that is not a refugee.

An asylum seeker is anyone who is looking for protection in another country by filing a request for asylum. A refugee is an asylum seeker who has been permitted residence in another country to protect him or her against prosecution on religious, political, sexual or ethnic/social grounds – according to the Geneva Convention.[127] In the Dutch context, the Immigration and Nationalization Service (IND) is in charge of determining whether or not a certain asylum seeker is actually requesting asylum for the right reasons. In this decision, however, the IND is bound to European legislation as upheld by the European Court of Human Rights as well as by the Dutch national courts. The IND's main task is to establish whether the asylum seeker in question is not posing a danger to Dutch public order or the rule

---

[124] Khursheed Wadia, 'Regimes of Insecurity: Women and Immigration Detention in France and Britain', in: Gabriella Lazaridis, Khursheed Wadia (eds.), *The Securitisation of Migration in the EU: Debates Since 9/11* (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 91-118: 92.
[125] Government of the Netherlands, *Vertrouwen in de toekomst. Regeerakkoord 2017-2021* (10 October 2017), 54. See also for example: Arjan Noorlander, 'Timmermans: meer dan helft vluchtelingen heeft economisch motief', *NOS Buitenland* (25 January 2016), https://nos.nl/artikel/2082786-timmermans-meer-dan-helft-vluchtelingen-heeft-economisch-motief.html (14 May 2018).
[126] Note here that a distinction must be made between migrants and asylum seekers. The Dutch government has a duty to look at the validity of asylum requests under international and EU agreements and laws. See for example the Geneva Convention of 1951 mentioned earlier.
[127] VluchtelingenWerk Nederland, 'Wanneer ben je een vluchteling?', https://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/wanneer-ben-je-vluchteling (14 May 2018).

of law. In other words, the IND has to determine – alongside other actors such as intelligence services, the police and municipalities – whether an asylum seeker poses a threat to the Netherlands and thus engages with all forms of guarding internal boundaries.[128]

However, because of the huge flows of refugees after 2015, the Dutch government and its EU counterparts decided that something needed to be done to reduce the influx of people to the European Union. Looking at security challenges posed by the migration issue, Christian Ehler and Lea von Martius argue that

> '[a]t least since October 2013, the unprecedented influx of migrants and refugees has triggered growing concerns in the EU with irregular migration, which has increasingly come to be viewed as a security or strategic risk […] In part by virtue of its association with migrant smuggling and other forms of cross-border crime'.[129]

Consequently, the EU needed to do something to protect itself from this security risk. The EU-Turkey Deal came into effect on 20 March 2016 and became the form of external border control central to the EU's migration policy. It is also the form of migration policy the Netherlands now favours. The deal is a multilateral treaty to regulate and control the large amounts of refugees trying to cross the EU's borders into its states. It does so by sending back to Turkey every refugee coming to Greece that does not apply for asylum or when his application is rejected. For every Syrian refugee crossing the Greek-Turkish border under the deal, one Syrian already settled in Turkey is allocated to an EU member state.[130] Currently, the Netherlands has relocated about 3000 refugees under the deal, meaning that the Dutch government has accepted this number from Greece, Italy and Turkey.[131] Turkey agreed to this to further EU integration talks and because the EU promised €3bn (later stepping this up to €6bn in total) in financial aid.[132]

In the Dutch coalition agreement, the government argues that the future approach to refugees coming to Europe and the Netherlands, is going to be centred around closing similar

---

[128] Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (IND), 'Hoe neemt de IND een beslissing in een asielaanvraag?', https://ind.nl/over-ind/Paginas/Hoe-toetst-de-IND-een-asielaanvraag.aspx (14 May 2015).

[129] Christian Ehler and Lea von Martius, *Long March for Europe: Migrant Smuggling in the Mediterranean as a Challenge for Internal and External Security Strategies of the EU* (2016) xv.

[130] European Council, 'EU-Turkey statement' (18 March 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ (9 May 2018).

[131] Ministry of Justice and Security, *Rapportage Vreemdelingenketen Periode januari-december 2017* (April 2018) 24.

[132] European Council, 'EU-Turkey statement' (18 March 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ (9 May 2018).

deals with third party countries to diminish the influx of refugees.[133] As such, new and more extensive security enforcement mechanisms have to be created to prevent the disruption of social order within the Netherlands and Europe. The 2017 coalition agreement itself acknowledges the fact that large migration flows have the capability of doing this. Moreover, the coalition agreement explicitly states that these migration deals function as a very important way to track down, prosecute and punish terrorists and war criminals.[134]

Obviously, besides this deal and possible future ones, the Netherlands have their own national policies to ensure no criminal, radical or terrorist elements get into the country. Upon arrival, asylum seekers are being housed, identified, registered and screened. The organization responsible for housing, the *Centraal orgaan Opvang Asielzoekers* (COA) is the first organization asylum seekers get in touch with when arriving in the Netherlands. Identifying and registering who the individual asylum seekers are, is the next step in the asylum procedure. The National Police takes care of this process, unless the individual arrives on Schiphol Airport when the Military Police (*Koninklijke Marechaussee*) takes over. First, the asylum seekers (and their luggage) have to be searched. Second, their identity is established using identity documents, devices such as phones and cameras, and a short interview.[135] Next, every person over the age of six is obliged to have their fingerprints taken and registered with EURODAC. EURODAC allows EU countries to compare fingerprints in a single database, which eases the process of allocation as established in the Dublin Accord. This EU Accord stipulates that asylum seekers who have requested asylum in another country cannot request it somewhere else in the EU and are thus sent back to the first country. Also, if there is reason to assume that the asylum seeker has any criminal intent, an additional security screening is executed.[136] When all identification and screening procedures have been completed, the IND determines whether or not the asylum seeker has legitimate and legal reasons to seek asylum. In general, it takes eight days for the IND to assess whether the asylum seeker has the right to obtain a residence permit. After the amount of requests increased significantly in 2015, this period extended, which resulted in the IND eventually getting behind on over 30.000 cases,

---

[133] Government of the Netherlands, *Vertrouwen in de toekomst.*, 50.
[134] Government of the Netherlands, *Vertrouwen in de toekomst*, 51.
[135] Struik, Sickler, Moerenhout and Huijskes, 'Identificatie en registratie van asielzoekers in Nederland. Toekomstscenario's voor de Nationale Politie', in: De Waele, Moors, Garssen, Noppe (eds.), *Aanpak van gewelddadige radicalisering*, Cahiers Politiestudies 42 (2017) 1, 133-150: 136.
[136] Anneliese Baldaccini, 'Counter-Terrorism and the EU Strategy for Border Security: Framing Suspects with Biometric Documents and Databases', *European Journal of Migration and Law* 10 (2008) 1, 31–49.

causing a delay of multiple months.[137] If the asylum seeker is entitled to stay, he/she is officially a refugee and allowed to stay for five years. If not, he/she has to leave the Netherlands to return to his/her country of origin. In the latter case, many rejected asylum seekers extend their stay in the Netherlands, thus becoming illegal migrants.[138]

The migrant as an economic refugee

Now that we have seen how the Netherlands have approached the issue of asylum, the way it addresses other forms of migration must be discussed. This will show to what extent the Netherlands have securitized the migration domain because, as will be argued, every person that is not considered a refugee will be considered an 'Other' and will literally be placed outside of 'Us' by refusing him/her access to the country.

First, the laws that guide the process surrounding 'regular' migrants (anyone who does not seek asylum or is rejected for receiving it) are the MMPA and the NVA complemented by the basic law of the Aliens Act. The MMPA ensures that the application process for admission into the Netherlands is streamlined: the provisional residence permit (*Machtiging tot Voorlopig Verblijf*) is combined with the long-term residence permit. Together with this, the new act makes it obligatory for most migrants to have a sponsor in the Netherlands: someone who guarantees the correct provision of information to the government and to keep records of the migrant. This act is, in the words of former State Secretary of Security and Justice Fred Teeven, a policy that is 'inviting to migrants for whom there is an economic need and that [is] restricting to others.'[139] Corroborating this is the fact that enforcement is strengthened by introducing fines for sponsors.[140]

The NVA contains the criteria based on which an individual can obtain a visa for staying in the Netherlands longer dan 3 months (short periods of residence are regulated by European Union law). The decision period of whether such visas should be issued has been shortened to 90 days instead of six months; the visa is legally valid for three months instead of six; in case of an individual having been fraudulent in the past, the visa or residence permit can be denied; if an individual has ever stayed somewhere illegally he/she can be denied

---

[137] Struik, Sickler, Moerenhout and Huijskes, 'Identificatie en registratie van asielzoekers in Nederland',140-141.

[138] Ibid., 136-137.

[139] Wendy Zeldin, 'Netherlands: Major Overhaul of Immigration Policies in 2013', *The Law Library of Congress* (April 2013), 5.

[140] Ibid.

his/her visa or residence permit (this is not the case for family reunification).[141] Both the MMPA and the NVA have a retroactive effect on people who came to the Netherlands stretching back to 1 July 2010.[142]

Finally, it is important to discuss what happens to people that came to the Netherlands to request asylum but did not receive it. The majority of this group returns to their country of origin.[143] Those who do not are, by means of the Dublin Accord, unable to request asylum in another EU country and thus they stay in the Netherlands, where they will be 'illegals' from that moment on.[144] The main guideline for the leaving procedure is that asylum seekers have to find their own way to return. Once their request is denied, they have four weeks to do so. After this period has passed by, they are no longer viable for staying in asylum centres and will not receive housing anymore. Often, those who have been denied their request do receive (financial) aid from NGO's and international organizations such as the IOM. If processed asylum seekers do not leave themselves, they can be evicted by the military police or the *Vreemdelingenpolitie* (AVIM). This whole process is directed by the *Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek* (DT&V).[145] A major hick-up in this process is that the country of origin has to cooperate with the eviction procedure and has to show that they accept the returnee. Another major problem is the fact that many of these people do not own any identity papers, without which they cannot be evicted.[146]

Securitization of migration

The EU-Turkey Deal, the MMPA and the NVA have contributed to the securitization of migration in the Netherlands. The Netherlands is both controlling external borders and guarding internal boundaries by firmly establishing who is welcome in the Netherlands on what terms and who is not. In the words of the coalition agreement:*'Wie mag blijven, moet snel meedoen. […] Wie niet mag blijven, moet snel vertrekken.'*[147] As explained, these

---

[141] Ministry of Justice and Security, 'Wijzigingswet Vreemdelingenwet 2000 (nationale visa)' (1 June 2013), available at: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0031667/2013-06-01; (14 May 2018).

[142] Zeldin, 'Netherlands: Major Overhaul of Immigration Policies in 2013', 3.

[143] Heinrich Winter et al, '*Onderdak en opvang door Rijk en gemeenten van vertrekplichtige vreemdelingen en de invloed daarvan op terugkeer* (Groningen 2018), 8.

[144] Struik, Sickler, Moerenhout and Huijskes, 'Identificatie en registratie van asielzoekers in Nederland', 136.

[145] Heinrich Winter et al, '*Onderdak en opvang door Rijk en gemeenten van vertrekplichtige vreemdelingen en de invloed daarvan op terugkeer*, 1.

[146] VluchtelingenWerk Nederland, 'Terugkeer van uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers', https://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/procedures-wetten-beleid/terugkeer (14 May 2018).

[147] Government of the Netherlands, *Vertrouwen in de toekomst*, 50. My translation: 'Those allowed to stay, must soon participate. […] Those who are not allowed to stay, must soon leave.'

measures have been taken in an increasingly politicised context, which has resulted in migration becoming a nation-wide topic of debate. More specifically, the refugee crisis has become a hotly debated topic in political as well as public circles. Being a fairly recent phenomenon, not much has been said about the way the refugee crisis has affected the national discourse on migration. However, the work of Halleh Ghorashi provides some ideas as to how to understand the way the Dutch see refugees and migrants these days: 'cultural framing of difference has become dominant in the discourse on migration in Europe.'[148]

This particular form of framing has indeed contributed to the reach and depth of the anti-immigrant position, and is now also affecting the Dutch position towards refugees from Syria and Iraq. Almost 80% of Dutch citizens thinks that refugees should be hosted by the Netherlands if they are in need of refuge, but 22% thinks that they might pose a threat to security and 27% thinks they are endangering Dutch norms and values.[149] Moreover, a small majority of people thinks refugees should not be allowed to maintain their own culture,[150] but they should assimilate into Dutch culture and society through several integration mechanisms such as civic integration courses, language lessons and the adoption of the Dutch 'national identity'.[151]

This suggests a process of othering when talking about refugees and migration in general, which contributes, as will be shown in the final chapter, to polarization. Polarization, as argued by many academics and policy makers alike, is a fertile ground for radicalization which, in turn, can produce terrorists. Polarization is essentially a different name for the process of 'othering': it splits a society along certain lines where one part is 'we' and another is 'them'. I argue that, given the way the discussed migration policies are set up, the focus – like the counterterrorism policies – is on securing this domain. They secure it both externally and internally and clearly focus on the four mechanisms Grove and Zwi identified as contributing to the construction of the migrant as an 'Other'. The language of threat is visible in the coalition accord when it states that there is a real possibility of terrorists travelling alongside migrants. The 'queue jumping and uninvited guest'-frame can be observed in the way 'regular' migrants are addressed: only if they contribute to Dutch economy they are welcome, if they cannot and still try they tend to be seen as taking advantage of it. This

---

[148] Ghorashi, 'Negotiating belonging beyond rootedness', 2426-2427.
[149] Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS), 'Meerderheid bevolking voor opvang vluchtelingen' (27 March 2018), https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2018/13/meerderheid-bevolking-voor-opvang-vluchtelingen (14 May 2018).
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ghorashi, 'Negotiating belonging beyond rootedness', 2429.

directly relates to the 'charity and choice'-frame, which is shown in EU-Turkey Deal that specifically deals with 'burden-sharing' through the relocation scheme. Finally, all the policies have obtained the 'overload'-frame: the coalition agreement acknowledges that the rise of migration can come across as unregulated and too much,[152] which is one of the reasons the government has adopted these tough policies.

Now, at first glance this does not seem to be a huge problem: these migrants and refugees *are* outsiders, right? They come from completely different countries and have no connection to the Netherlands at all. However, as shown in the historical overview at the beginning of this chapter, there are a lot of people who migrated to the Netherlands in the period 1960-1980. Consequently, these people are now minorities who make up only a small percentage of the population. In the following, final chapter it will be argued that tensions between these groups and the 'regular' Dutch people have exacerbated to a point where it results in the radicalization of perspectives and actions towards each other. The construction of the migrant as 'the Other' has contributed to feelings of neglect and inferiority among, especially Muslim, minorities in the Netherlands. On the other hand, in the face of terrorist attacks and the refugee crisis, the Dutch have adopted increasingly negative attitudes towards 'their' minorities. In other words, polarization has contributed to radicalization of both Muslims and non-Muslims (minorities and 'regular' Dutch). The next chapter will map how this process has occurred in the Dutch context.

---

[152] Government of the Netherlands, *Vertrouwen in de toekomst*, 1.

Chapter 4 – How securitization turns polarization into radicalization

In the previous chapters, it has been argued that migration and counterterrorism policies in the Netherlands have, over the years, become securitized. Both Dutch counterterrorism policy and Dutch migration policy have adopted an approach in which security threats are central in policy-making. Counterterrorism strategies as well as the complementary tactical implementations have focused on preventing radicalization instead of polarization. In the migration area, the Dutch government has focused its policies on securing external boundaries and internal boundaries. Consequently, migrants have been an are constructed as the 'other', which contributes to a feeling of neglect and inferiority among Dutch, especially Muslim, minorities. This happened according to the three steps of securitization theory: first, policy-makers establishing that certain public problems are a security issue, that they are threats; the public becoming aware of this threat, accepting it as a reality and acting upon that perception; the creation of particular policies is created.[153] In this chapter, it will be analysed how the second step has manifested itself in the Dutch case.

The following will show that the relationship between the Dutch and Muslim minorities in the Netherlands is characterized by polarization.[154] Polarization has led to a distance between the two groups in both reality and perspective. On one hand, there is a *de facto* state of apartheid characterized by school segregation, neighbourhood segregation, marriages in the own group, and other real distances.[155] On the other hand, both Dutch people and Muslims came to see each other as a threat because assumptions towards each other had become characterized by the change of attitude towards immigration described in the previous chapter. When IS started its campaign of terrorist attacks in Europe, the threat perception of the Dutch towards Muslim minorities increased but, it will be argued, the real 'securitizing moment' has been the refugee crisis. At that point, Dutch people started to radicalize in their opinions towards Muslims, which in turn intensified the feelings of neglect and inferiority among Muslims leading them to radicalize as well. Although the Netherlands has not yet witnessed a real terrorist attack, it has seen a significant amount of foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq.

---

[153] See: Balzacq, "Securitization' revisited", 494.

[154] Note here that, obviously, it is recognized here that these minorities are Dutch as well. 'Dutch' from here on out refers to the vague notion of 'the normal Dutch guy', another way to emphasize the otherness of minorities – somehow they are not 'normal Dutch guys' despite being born in the Netherlands and sometimes even having two parents who have been born there.

[155] De Graaff, 'Polarisatie en radicalisering', 53.

To make the argument as put forward here, this chapter will first see how polarization has been a reality since the late 1990's until 2013. This will allow for making a distinction between the process before the refugee crisis and after. Secondly, the negative attitudes of Muslims towards the Netherlands and the Dutch as well as the way the Dutch think about Muslims will be central. Using public opinion inquiries, discrimination reports and scientific reports on the issue, it can be observed that a significantly more negative attitude has become a reality after the refugee crisis. Thirdly, this process will be connected to the policies surrounding counterterrorism and migration. Fourthly, by showing the actions of the Dutch towards the settling of asylum seeker centres (*asielzoekerscentra* or azc's in Dutch), it will be argued that they have become radicalized in their opinions towards Muslims. To conclude, the case will be made that the large-scale influx of (Muslim) refugees from Syria and Iraq was surrounded by extensive political and societal debate and extensive measures were, and are, made to deal with it, which run the risk of becoming counter-productive, i.e. fuel radicalization processes.

Polarization in the Netherlands: 1999-2013

Before we venture into the details of polarization in the Netherlands, it is useful to first establish what polarization really is. Also, it will be shortly repeated how it relates to terrorism and migration. The definition of polarization used in this chapter is the process where:*'de verscherping van tegenstellingen tussen groepen in de samenleving […] kan resulteren in spanningen tussen deze groepen en de toename van de segregatie langs etnische en religieuze lijnen.'*[156] Polarization has a direct relation to terrorism in that it is the stage preceding radicalization, which in turn is the stage preceding terrorism. Sticking to the definition of terrorism used earlier, terrorism as an ideologically motivated phenomenon makes no sense when it is directed against the same, homogeneous group. It will always be aimed at the 'other', the group held responsible by the terrorist (group) for wrongdoings in society. Therefore, for terrorists to conduct their acts, they must perceive other groups to be at extreme odds with them and their views, i.e. they must see them as a significant threat. Obviously, the extent to which this link is causal will, due to the complex nature of terrorism, never be completely sure; we can always wonder who the 'same' group is, a problematic issue when we for instance consider the fact that the Sunni-Salafi group IS targets Sunnis as much

---

[156] *Actieplan Polarisatie en Radicalisering 2007-2011* 2006-2007, 29754, nr. 103. My translation: 'contradictions between groups in society are exacerbated which may result in tensions between these groups and increase of segregation along ethnic and religious lines.'

as it targets Shi'ites and other populations.[157] Polarization also links directly to migration, because minorities in society, who have a migratory background, are perceived to be different groups based on their identity. Tensions between them (e.g. Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese) and the 'regular' citizen (e.g. the Dutch) are heightened and exacerbated by a focus on the differences between them; the cultural framing of difference as described by Halleh Gorashi. Differences in religion, norms and values, identity, customs and traditions are perceived as central in understanding 'the Other' – as well as more structural differences such as income, place of residence and education.[158] Here, again, we see that there are both real distances and 'distances of the mind'.

Also, it is important to stress that there is no strict divide between social groups in the Netherlands. When talking about polarization 'Esteban and Ray conclude that polarization is greatest when society is divided into two similarly sized groups, each internally homogeneous but significantly different from the others on all possible attributes.'[159] Despite the fact that the Netherlands is often characterized as a highly polarized society, especially in comparison to its EU counterparts,[160] this is not to say that there are two groups radically and completely opposed and different to each other. There is always internal disagreement within such groups as to the nature of the relationship with the other.[161]

However, the perception that one is a threat and an 'Other' can even 'mobilize support for exclusionary reactions to immigrants in the electorate as a whole, not just in the segment already concerned about threats to cultural or national identity.'[162] Using a large-scale quantitative analysis on media coverage of migrants conducted by Jelmer Brouwer, Maartje van der Woude and Joanne van der Leun in the *European Journal of Criminology* in 2017, we can see that when no securitizing moment has come to the fore, such extreme reactions will not yet take hold. The authors looked at all Dutch newspaper items on unauthorized migrants between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 2013, trying to find whether media attention on this group of migrants increased and became more negative when a bill to criminalize unauthorized stay in the Netherlands was introduced in October 2010. They found that during

---

[157] Charles R. Lister, *Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency* (London 2015) 119.

[158] Mark Bovens, Paul Dekker and Will Tiemeijer (eds.), *Gescheiden werelden? Een verkenning van sociaal-culturele tegenstellingen in Nederland* (Den Haag 2014) 60.

[159] Philip Keefer and Stephen Knack, 'Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links Between Inequality and Growth', *Public Choice* 111 (2002) 127-154: 133.

[160] Moors, Balogh, Van Donselaar and De Graaff, *Polarisatie en radicalisering in Nederland*, 9-11.

[161] See especially: Bovens, Dekker and Tiemeijer, *Gescheiden werelden,* on the way the Dutch differ in their opinions on several topics, including their relationship to Muslims.

[162] Sniderman and Hagendoorn, *When Ways of Life Collide*, 7.

this month media attention was the lowest and least negative. In the three years that followed, reporting rose 'due to the political and public controversy over the proposal.'[163] As such, they argue that 'political debates and developments are the main cause of intense media attention on unauthorized migrants.'[164] Nevertheless, during these years it can also be observed that the main collocates of unauthorized migrants were 'illegals' and 'criminals', used by multiple Dutch newspapers, resulting in 'repressive and punitive policies with an intense focus on control.'[165]. However, in 2014 the bill was rejected after suffering backlash from both the political and public debate.[166] These findings support this paper's hypothesis in two ways: first, negative attention for 'others' leads to securitizing measures; second, if the public is not fully convinced of the idea that the 'other' poses a threat, securitizing measures will not be sustainable.

The consequences of the 2015 refugee crisis

The previous paragraph established that the Netherlands has been polarized for a long time and that it is hard for polarization to really turn into radicalization without a catalyst. Thus, it is worth looking into the immediate aftermath of the refugee crisis. From the hypothesis, it can easily be deducted that it is likely for negative attitudes towards other groups (i.e. polarization) to have risen after the refugee crisis. The perception of threat, which had existed in people's mind since the end of the 1990s now became a visible reality. Whereas before terrorist attacks had targeted nearby countries, which undeniably increased the threat perception of the Dutch towards Muslims, the refugee crisis brought people from the IS region directly to the Netherlands. This section will use discrimination reports and public opinion inquiries among Muslims and Dutch people to show that, indeed, negative attitudes towards 'the other' increased after 2015 and will build up to the role of policy in this.

First, it must be noted that the issue of discrimination against Muslims already has a problematic character. In reality, it might be possible that Muslims are exaggerating the number and severity of discriminatory remarks and actions directed towards them, while it is equally possible that a certain tiredness to report such incidents can be instilled in those to whom discrimination is aimed. There is no certainty about which of the two is correct, because in both cases it is exactly the fact the Muslims are *aware* of discrimination that they

---

[163] Ibid., 107.
[164] Sniderman and Hagendoorn, *When Ways of Life Collide*, 108.
[165] Ibid., 113.
[166] Ibid., 112.

act in one or the other way: if they perceive discrimination, they can either choose to report every incident by reasoning that it *must* be discrimination or they can simply accept it as a fact of life and never report it. It makes sense to argue that both these perspectives are represented in discrimination reports. Because essentially polarization and radicalizations are 'products of the mind', it is hard to establish the objective impact of them on each other; no obvious causal relationship can be established, but building upon our hypothesis and securitization theory, there are clear correlations in the components of the pattern observed in the introduction of this chapter.

Now, looking at multiple reports on Muslim discrimination, the idea that the refugee crisis was a catalyst for exacerbating tension and increasing mutual negative attitudes is confirmed by the numbers. Although the reasons mentioned before make it impossible to be entirely sure of the validity of these statistics, that is not the point here. The reports clearly observe a significant rise in discriminatory incidents from 2015 onwards.[167] The joint anti-discrimination facilities for example, reported 254 incidents of Muslim discrimination in 2016 compared to 240 in 2015. The 2015 number is an increase of 45% compared to 2014.[168] This development shows two things, neither of which rules out the other one's validity: first, the (inter)national developments in 2015 regarding refugees and terrorism have affected Muslims negatively – they experience more discrimination by non-Muslims; second, Muslims have shown more initiative in reporting because they perceived tension between them and the 'other' heighten. Both are confirmed by the SCP, which observed a pattern among their respondents: trust in government and police is low, they perceive society to be negative and sometimes hostile towards them, they feel excluded, less accepted and experience discrimination.[169] The SCP also concludes that a certain group of Muslims, which it calls 'selective Muslims', lacks trust in society and welfare. They are not the most religious, but they are closer to Dutch society and are therefore more often confronted with negative experiences. Strict Muslims are more likely to live in their own 'bubble' and thus experience less negativity from outside.[170] Thus, in this regard, we can confirm that the findings of the 2009 report on polarization in the Netherlands still hold true in 2018: the so-called

---

[167] Ron van Wonderen and Maaike van Kapel, *Oorzaken en triggerfactoren moslimdiscriminatie in Nederland* (June 2017) 15-20.
[168] Ibid., 16.
[169] Bovens, Dekker and Tiemeijer, *Gescheiden werelden,* 12.
[170] Ibid.

'integration paradox' where those who are integrated and educated, are most aware (or made aware) of their 'otherness' persists to this day.[171]

A third conclusion that can be drawn from this rise in discriminatory incidents, is that the perception of non-Muslims regarding Muslims has focused more on the threat they pose to Dutch society and Dutch culture or Dutch identity. A Dutch think tank called the *Verwey-Jonker Instituut* found that since 2015 more people started thinking negatively about Muslims than those that did positively.[172] Respondents name 'terrorist attacks' as the most important reason for this, closely followed by 'media depiction of Muslims', 'bad experiences with Muslims' and 'the influx of Islamic refugees'.[173] The report identifies the media, personal contact and experiences, friends' and relatives' ideas and experiences, lessons at school and statements by politicians as the most important ways to form an opinion of Muslims.[174] Of these five ways, the most negative image of Muslims comes from politicians, while the most positive one is derived from personal contact and experiences with Muslims.[175] However, people obviously know politicians' statements through media so these categories can in fact be coupled. Therefore, the following section of this chapter will analyse media excerpts to establish how the Dutch have been radicalized with regards to their perceptions towards Muslims.

When threat perception escalates: radicalization among the Dutch

Here, it will be argued that negative attention for Muslim minorities (i.e. polarization) turned into radicalization among Dutch people after the refugee crisis of 2015. It is not to say that they radicalized into terrorists but it is certainly true that their negative opinions, resulting from years of polarization, turned into (violent) action directed at asylum seekers, refugees, migrants and minorities in general.[176] Before getting into recent examples of how the media has portrayed migrants and refugees, there is a trend in media reporting that needs to be pointed out. In the context of the refugee crisis, it has been observed that incidents surrounding refugees and asylum seekers (centres) are the most important catalyst for reporting. Dutch newspaper *Trouw* found that in the one-year period 2015-2016 reporting on

---

[171] De Graaff, 'Polarisatie en radicalisering', 30.
[172] The report did its research among youngsters but referenced it with a group of adults and found no significant differences.
[173] Van Wonderen and Van Kapel, *Oorzaken en triggerfactoren moslimdiscriminatie in Nederland*, 74.
[174] Ibid., 82.
[175] Ibid.
[176] The Verwey-Jonker Institute shows that every minority in the Netherlands is regarded in a more negative light than 'regular' Dutch people. See appendix 2.

undocumented migrants in every one of the five major Dutch newspapers rose almost seven-fold; peaks in newspaper items occurred when incidents happened, especially negative ones.[177] Note that there is no normative argument being made here; media studies have shown that every major (and most minor) media outlets report on that which attracts the most viewers, the maximum news value, and '[c]onflict is routinely considered to have maximum "news value"'.[178]

However, it must be recognized that it is possible that a reporting bias exists with regards to these issues; the number of items does not necessarily cover the severity of the incidents nor the relative quantity of incidents (i.e. 'over reporting').[179] Nevertheless, having already established that people are influenced by the media regarding their perspectives on minorities in general and Muslims specifically, the following will give some examples of the radicalization motivated by an inflated threat perception. This section will give some examples of this process by citing newspaper items from the last three years.

Incidents at *asielzoekerscentra*, or azc's (asylum seeker centres) are the most prominent examples of how Dutch people have radicalized their stance towards newcomers. Acknowledging the fact that there have been a lot of incidents involving asylum seekers that were staying in azc's,[180] it seems that there has been a shift in people's minds. Whereas the tougher bill on undocumented migrants of October 2014 could not get a resounding 'yes' from the public nor from politics, nowadays even legally staying asylum seekers and refugees are targeted both in speech and action. Even more, the following article from the regional Dutch newspaper *Brabants Dagblad* shows that simply the announcement that an azc will be settled somewhere, can stir up extreme protests:

> *'De aangekondigde komst van een asielzoekerscentrum in Heesch lokt daags na de bekendmaking steeds extremere reacties uit. Woensdag werd aan het eind van de dag een dode big opgehangen bij het akkerland waar het azc zou moeten komen. Ernaast een spandoek en protestbord: 'Heesch = tegen azc' en 'Het volk zegt nee tegen azc'.*[181]

---

[177] Kristel van Teeffelen, 'Hoe in de vluchtelingencrisis de balans zoekraakt in de media', *Trouw* (22 January 2016), https://www.trouw.nl/home/hoe-in-de-vluchtelingencrisis-de-balans-zoekraakt-in-de-media~a950376c/
[178] M. Griffin, 'Media images of war', *Media, War & Conflict* 3 (2010) 1, 7-41, aldaar 8-9.
[179] See for example: Roy Greenslade, 'Study shows how media in peaceful countries 'over report' violence' (29 October 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2010/oct/29/war-reporting-al-jazeera (9 June 2018).
[180] See the (half-)yearly reports of the COA for exact numbers: Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers, 'Incidentenregistratie', https://www.coa.nl/nl/asielopvang/wonen-op-een-asielzoekerscentrum/regels-en-maatregelen/incidentenregistratie (10 June 2018).
[181] Peter van Erp, 'Protest tegen azc Heesch neemt extreme vormen aan; dode big opgehangen aan boom', *Brabants Dagblad* (13 January 2018), https://www.bd.nl/bernheze/protest-tegen-azc-heesch-neemt-extreme-

This may seem like an extreme example, but there are multiple incidents where similar events took place.

On 16 December 2015, riots broke out in the municipality hall of Geldermalsen, where dozens of protesters were screaming and chanting, also throwing fireworks, rocks and cans at the police. Outside was a crowd of over a thousand people that protested the arrival of an azc. Eventually, the meeting that was taking place in the city council had to be cancelled.[182] In February, three of these protesters were sentenced to 60 and 240 hours of community service.[183] Another famous example is the protest in Oranje, a small village in Drenthe, where on 6 October 2015 protests took place after the city council had announced that the number of asylum seekers in the village would be doubled. As a result, the Minister for Migration Klaas Dijkhoff's car was stopped and damaged by angry citizens. Those citizens also stopped busses with arriving asylum seekers from entering Oranje. In the end, the national government decided to concede.[184]

Giving more examples will go beyond the scope of this paper, but it suffices to say that many more of these incidents occurred; so much so, that an investigation of the Ministry of Justice and Security commissioned an investigation to see if the main concern of the protesters – asylum seekers are criminals and thus threaten the safety and security of citizens – had any merit. The commissioned investigation showed that while there is a higher percentage of criminality among asylum seekers this has no consequences for the safety and security of the environment he resides in.[185]

---

vormen-aan-dode-big-opgehangen-aan-boom~ae558003/ (10 June 2018). My translation: 'The announced arrival of an asylum seeker centre in Heesch has provoked increasingly extreme reactions only days after the announcement. The corps of a piglet was hung next to the farmland designated for the settlement of the centre. Next to the piglet a banner and protest sign: 'Heesch = opposed to azc' and 'The people says no to azc'.

[182] 'Raadszaal Geldermalsen ontruimd wegens protest tegen komst azc', *NOS Binnenland* (16 December 2015), https://nos.nl/artikel/2075643-raadszaal-geldermalsen-ontruimd-wegens-protest-tegen-komst-azc.html (10 june 2018).

[183] Henk van Gelder, 'Relschoppers azc-rellen Geldermalsen krijgen werkstraffen', *De Gelderlander* (27 February 2018), https://www.gelderlander.nl/rivierenland/relschoppers-azc-rellen-geldermalsen-krijgen-werkstraffen~a2bb77b0/ (10 June 2018).

[184] 'De azc-inloopavonden, waar ging het mis?', *NOS Binnenland* (19 January 2016), https://nos.nl/artikel/2081450-de-azc-inloopavonden-waar-ging-het-mis.html (10 June 2018).

[185] W. Achbari and A.S. Leerkes, *Van perceptie naar feit. Asielzoekers en buurtcriminaliteit* (February 2018), 54/55.

A vicious cycle: The radicalization of Muslims

Although the Ministry of Justice and Security could not find any consequences for the security and safety of people living close to azc's, the polarization, radicalization of the Dutch and the securitizing measures of the government have had such consequences. In fact, by not targeting polarization but instead targeting radicalization to prevent terrorist attacks, the Dutch government contributes to creating exactly that. The polarization of Dutch society and the subsequent radicalization of Dutch citizens in terms of their stance towards Muslim minorities has resulted in Muslims perceiving differences between themselves and other Dutch citizens more profoundly. A report by the SCP in 2015 already identified this. They feel, for example, that there is more attention for Western victims of terrorism than there is for people of their 'own group', e.g. Palestinians or people dying from attacks in Baghdad, Damascus and Raqqa. Also, they think negative perspectives by politicians and the public concerning Muslims are more easily accepted than opinions of Muslims that reason the other way around. In general, there is a feeling among Muslims that the framing of national and international events and developments is unjustified and this contributes to a sense of moral irritation among Muslims. Combined with experiences of discrimination, rejection and stigmatising, questions concerning identity have become very important (who am I? To what group do I belong? Am I a Dutch citizen? How do I fit in this world?).[186]

The SCP argues that these processes are strongly related to the radicalization of Muslims. Those who experience all of these social-cultural problems are more likely to radicalize and are thus more likely to perform terrorist attacks.[187] Empirical evidence supports this: the AIVD has reported that the number of foreign fighters in Syria has increased more in the period shortly after the refugee crisis emerged (January 2015-January 2016) than ever before.[188] The NCTV reports that, as of March 2018, 300 of these are still active in Syria/Iraq and about 160 of these have jihadist intentions.[189]

All of this is in line with the findings of this paper: questions pertaining to the status of minorities – whether they are migrants, refugees, asylum seekers or people that have been born in the Netherlands – have contributed to polarization. There has been a sharp contrast

---

[186] Willem Huijnk Jaco Dagevos Mérove Gijsberts and Iris Andriessen, *Werelden van verschil. Over de sociaal-culturele afstand en positie van migrantengroepen in Nederland* (Den Haag 2015) 18.
[187] Ibid.
[188] AIVD, 'Terugkeerders in beeld' (15 February 2017),
https://www.aivd.nl/publicaties/publicaties/2017/02/15/aivd-publicatie-terugkeerders-in-beeld
(11 June 2018).
[189] Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 47* (Maart 2018).

between 'the regular Dutch person' and 'the Muslim' where the latter is depicted as being 'the Other'. By using frames of threat, burden and overload the former has been able to marginalize the latter. This marginalization only reinforced the distance between the two groups, thus creating an even more unknown 'other' and thus a higher perception of threat. Through the use of securitizing policies in the fields of counterterrorism and migration, the government has given terrorists and other conflict entrepreneurs the possibility to use a so-called 'frame of injustice' which is the easiest and most effective way to obtain new terrorist recruits.[190]

The problem with this, however, is that there is a vicious cycle at work. Once Muslims become radicalized, the Dutch see it as a confirmation of their threat perception. It is therefore impossible to locate 'who did it first'. Fact is that radicalization of the one leads to radicalization of the other because the fundamental differences between them – both real and perceived – are not addressed by any policies.

---

[190] David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd, 'Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review* 12 (2007) 2, 119-136.

Conclusion

An analysis of the Dutch case has shown that a relationship between migration and terrorism exists. Analysing the policy domains of migration and counterterrorism, it can be observed that the Dutch government has securitized both these domains around the turn of the millennium. It adopted an approach where the security character of these public problems was established and overlooked other, social-cultural characteristics. The most important one, this paper has argued, is polarization or 'othering', where a collective acceptance that another group or individual is a threat arises. Having said that, this paper has built up to the following process, in which the relationship between migration and terrorism can be localized.

Migration has led to the creation of 'Others' because these new, unknown people were considered to pose a threat to Dutch society, economy, culture, religion and security. To prevent this, the government started adopting securitizing policies in the field of migration – the 'Others' had to be kept out; 'We' had to be protected from 'Them'. When terrorism became a priority on the agenda of Western governments, the Dutch government also securitized this policy domain – they did everything they could to prevent radicalization as a security issue, but overlooked the fact that the creation of 'others' (polarization) hugely contributed to it. Thus, when it did not address this fundamental issue, threat perceptions and polarization increased, until they reached their peak when the Netherlands was confronted with the refugee crisis of 2015. After this, polarization turned into radicalization among Dutch people: the threat they had 'foreseen' for so long had now become a reality – 'they' were invading, attacking, targeting, et cetera 'us'. Therefore they had to act (often violently) against the other – the Muslim migrant. However, this also showed the Muslim migrant (whether born here or just arrived) that the threat they had seen coming also became a reality – their feelings of neglect, inferiority and hostility towards them had now turned into actual action against them. Thus, the incentive for radicalization among Muslims could – and can – be created and the possibility of terrorist acts in fact grew – and grows.

Now, as was already noted throughout this paper, due to the complex nature of terrorism and the fact that polarization and radicalization are complicated social-cultural processes, 'processes of the mind', there is no causal connection in any step of this process. The major pitfall of this paper is that it has tried to establish a general relationship between two phenomena that are very complicated and case-specific, based on one case study. Moreover, although the Netherlands is often considered to be one of the most polarized societies in Europe, it has not experienced any terrorist attacks since the murder of Theo van

Gogh in 2004. Countries that are arguably less polarized nevertheless have more experience with terrorism. It can therefore be argued that polarization is not a necessary and maybe not even a sufficient condition for radicalization and terrorism. Recognizing this problem, it has been handled here by firmly grounding the process in a global issue. By connecting it to the refugee crisis, a situation with which all the EU countries experience similar problems, the tensions in the Netherlands gain more salience when compared to processes in other countries. Moreover, the theory of securitization has been used to explain that there is a mechanism – threat perception – that can in fact be observed in real life and that is clearly influencing the way people think about others.

Obviously, the major question that remains is how governments should deal with issues of migration and terrorism. It has been shown that focusing on the security character of these problems is counterproductive, because this approach produces security risks itself. Instead, it has been argued, policies should focus on countering polarization in order to also prevent radicalization and terrorism. By tackling this problem, no (or at least less) mutual threat perceptions arise and thus the chances of radical thought emerging are limited. However, how should governments do this? Even more so, *can* they?

First, securitization has been used throughout this paper as a heuristic theory. In other words, it has been used as a methodological framework to establish a relationship between two incredibly complex phenomena. However, when looking at practical, policy-oriented solutions for these issues, it is possible to add an element to the theory that was not addressed here. Governments, and politics in general, establishing an issue's security character will – according to securitization theory – always result in the creation of particular policies as soon as the issue is perceived as a threat; this has been shown in the preceding chapters. However, we can assume, the perception of threat will sustain itself once it has taken its hold exactly *because* these particular policies are created. It can be logically derived from securitization theory that once the first step has been realized (i.e. an issue is established to be a security issue), the last two steps will repeat themselves seemingly indefinitely. Securitization is all about threat perception, which is incredibly hard to eradicate. Consequently, securitization seems to have the effect of a vicious cycle, where the need for security will result in securitizing measures that create more need for security, which in turn will provide the incentive to create more securitizing measures. In other words, 'desecuritizing' is close to impossible due to the fact that securitization is similar to a closed loop.

Second, it must be acknowledged that migration has also been dealt with from a non-security perspective. Consider, for example, the German case: Angela Merkel adopted a very open and lenient approach towards the refugee crisis (*'wir schaffen das'*) but her position has long been under attack from the public. The result of this approach, however, can also be securitization. In the first chapter it has been stated that securitization is never a top-down process; indeed, it can work bottom-up equally well or even better. The German population has been calling for the securitization of migration since a few years and has shown its determination in the last election – Merkel lost enormously. Consequently, securitization allows for understanding how policy can change easily from a lenient towards a harsh approach. In essence, then, when the public or politics engage in a call for security it has to be answered at some point. This pertains to the intersubjective characteristic of securitization: once the audience has assented – acting on its own threat perceptions or on those invoked by the government – it will ask for securitizing measures and this will create the inevitable, Catch-22-like situation in which these policies must be created, no matter the results. So, it is incredibly hard to suggest an approach that doesn't securitize an issue, especially when the specific issues are as complex as migration (or terrorism). Historically, it has been shown that it is possible (e.g. the approach the Dutch government maintained during the 1970s regarding Moluccan terrorism) to adopt depoliticizing policies. However, looking at the contemporary situation where the issues of migration and terrorism have become prioritized on both the public and political agenda, it is difficult to create such an approach. Interestingly, this idea of bottom-up politicization is opposite to the idea of Sniderman and Hagendoorn, who argue that this is mainly a top-down process: one where public sentiments can only find expression once the issue has been politicized by political and intellectual elites. The German example does show that this is possible, making it a potentially interested line of research regarding securitization, politicization and the migration-terrorism nexus.

Both the impossibility of 'desecuritization' and the issue of public assent that results in a focus on security policies are viable topics of future research. Essentially, they allow for new perspectives on the theory of securitization as well as on complex issues like migration and terrorism. When observed from a policy-oriented perspective, they might even result in practical solutions as to how governments *can* in fact deal with these issues from a non-security perspective.

Something else that was not addressed in this paper, but that is incredibly relevant for understanding the relationship between migration and terrorism is how the international war

on terror has influenced perspectives of minorities in European countries such as the Netherlands. One could imagine that the idea of 'forward defence' introduced in the CT-Strategy 2016-2020 and similar policies in other countries contribute to radicalization as much or even more than national political and social issues do. Despite this paper's contribution and many that will follow, terrorism will remain a 'wicked problem' to which many solutions raise equally as many new questions. However, I have argued, an approach that would de-emphasize the security character of the problem would prove more beneficial than one that emphasizes it.

Appendices
Appendix 1

The ISIS Attack Campaign in Europe
January 2014-September 14, 2017

Overview of attacks inspired and conducted by ISIS from January 2014-September 2017.

Obtained from: Jennifer Cafarella and Jason Zhou, 'ISIS's Expanding Campaign in Europe', *Institute for the Study of War* (18 September 2017).

Appendix 2



Terrorisme als fenomeen en als daad

The NCTV's model for terrorism as an act and a phenomenon.

Obtained from: Mirko Noordegraaf, Scott Douglas, Aline Bos and Wouter Klem, *Gericht, gedragen en geborgd interventievermogen? Evaluatie van de nationale contraterrorisme-strategie 2011-2015* (8 april 2016).

Appendix 3

*Figuur 4.9 Hoe denk je over verschillende bevolkingsgroepen in Nederland? * Sekse (weergegeven zijn de gemiddelde scores per groep op een schaal van 0 (zeer negatief) tot 10 (zeer positief)*[58]

Answers of respondents on questions about their opinions on different groups in the Netherlands. The average scores are shown, from a scale of 0 (very negative) to 10 (very positive).

Obtained from: Ron van Wonderen and Maaike van Kapel, *Oorzaken en triggerfactoren moslimdiscriminatie in Nederland* (June 2017).

Bibliography

'Circulaire bewaking en beveiliging personen, objecten en diensten', *Staatscourant* (15 January 2013).

'De azc-inloopavonden, waar ging het mis?', *NOS Binnenland* (19 January 2016), https://nos.nl/artikel/2081450-de-azc-inloopavonden-waar-ging-het-mis.html (10 June 2018).

'Raadszaal Geldermalsen ontruimd wegens protest tegen komst azc', *NOS Binnenland* (16 December 2015), https://nos.nl/artikel/2075643-raadszaal-geldermalsen-ontruimd-wegens-protest-tegen-komst-azc.html (10 june 2018).

'The Arab spring, five years on' (11 January 2016), https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/01/daily-chart-8 (22 January 2018).

Abels, Paul, "'Je wilt niet geloven dat zoiets in Nederland kan!' Het Nederlandse contraterrorismebeleeid sinds 1973", in: Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Beatrice de Graaf (eds.), *Terroristen en hun bestrijders: vroeger en nu* (Amsterdam 2007), 121-129.

Achbari, W. and A.S. Leerkes, *Van perceptie naar feit. Asielzoekers en buurtcriminaliteit* (February 2018).

Actieplan Polarisatie en Radicalisering 2007-2011 Tweede Kamer 2006-2007, 29754, nr. 103.

AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, *Van Dawa tot Jihad. De diverse dreigingen van de radicale islam tegen de democratische rechtsorde* (2004).

AIVD, 'Terugkeerders in beeld' (15 February 2017), https://www.aivd.nl/publicaties/publicaties/2017/02/15/aivd-publicatie-terugkeerders-in-beeld (11 June 2018).

AIVD, *Jaarverslag 2003*.

Azghari, Youssef, 'Moslims, besef: je uitspreken tegen IS is niet genoeg', *NRC* (2 October 20140, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/10/02/moslims-besef-je-uitspreken-tegen-is-is-niet-gen-1424530-a912465.

Bakker, Edwin, and Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, *Barometer van de dreiging. Tien jaar Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 2005-2015* (2015).

Bakker, Edwin, and Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, *Terrorisme* (Amsterdam 2016).

Bakker, Edwin, et al (eds.), *Terrorisme. Studies over terrorisme en terrorismebestrijding* (Deventer 2017).

Baldaccini, Anneliese, 'Counter-Terrorism and the EU Strategy for Border Security: Framing Suspects with Biometric Documents and Databases', *European Journal of Migration and Law* 10 (2008) 1, 31–49.

Balzacq, Thierry, Sarah Léonard and Jan Ruzicka, "'Securitization' revisited: theory and cases", *International Relations* 30 (2016) 4, 494-531.

Bonjour, Saskia and Betty de Hart, 'A proper wife, a proper marriage: Constructions of 'us' and 'them' in Dutch family migration policy', *European Journal of Women's Studies* 20 (February 2013) 1, 61-76.

Boswell, Christina, 'Migration Control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the Absence of Securitization', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45 (2007) 3, 589-610.

Bovens, Mark, Paul Dekker and Will Tiemeijer (eds.), *Gescheiden werelden? Een verkenning van sociaal-culturele tegenstellingen in Nederland* (Den Haag 2014).

Brown, Katherine E., 'Contesting the Securitization of British Muslims', *interventions* 12 (19 Jul 2010) 2, 171-182.

Browne, Ryan, 'Top intelligence official: ISIS to attempt U.S. attacks this year', *CNN* (9 February 2016), https://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/09/politics/james-clapper-isis-syrian-refugees/ (22 January 2018).

Bruquetas-Callejo, María, Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, Rinus Penninx and Peter Scholten, 'Policymaking related to immigration and integration. The Dutch Case.', *IMISCOE Working Paper: Country Report* 15 (2007).

Bulley, Dan, '"Foreign" terror? London bombings, resistance and failing the state', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 10 (2008) 3, 379-94.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO 1998).

Cafarella, Jennifer, and Jason Zhou, 'ISIS's Expanding Campaign in Europe', *Institute for the Study of War* (18 September 2017).

Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS), 'Meerderheid bevolking voor opvang vluchtelingen' (27 March 2018), https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2018/13/meerderheid-bevolking-voor-opvang-vluchtelingen (14 May 2018).

Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers, 'Incidentenregistratie', https://www.coa.nl/nl/asielopvang/wonen-op-een-asielzoekerscentrum/regels-en-maatregelen/incidentenregistratie (10 June 2018).

Che, Eliot, 'Analytics of Government, Theories of State: Governmentality and the Foucauldian Challenge to International Political Economy' (2007), 1-13.

Comfort, Louise K., Arjen Boin, Chris C. Demchak, 'The Rise of Resilience', in: Louise K. Comfort, Arjen Boin, Chris C. Demchak, *Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events* (2010) 1-12.

De Graaf, Beatrice, 'Wanneer stoppen terroristen? Het historisch referentiekader als aanknopingspunt voor (contra-)terrorisme', in: Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Beatrice de Graaf (eds.), *Terroristen en hun bestrijders: vroeger en nu* (Amsterdam 2007), 121-129.

De Graaff, Bob, 'Losers op en onder de radar. Parallelle levens: de Millennium Bomber en Anis Amri', *De Groene Amsterdammer* (4 January 2017).

De Graaff, Bob, 'Polarisatie en radicalisering', in: Hans Moors, Lenke Balogh, Jaap van Donselaar and Bob de Graaff, *Polarisatie en radicalisering in Nederland. Een verkenning van de stand van zaken in 2009* (Tilburg 2009), 29-61.

De Graaff, Bob, 'Why Continue Counterterrorism Policies if They Are Hurting?', in: Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni and Amna Guellali (eds.), *Jihad: Challenges to International and Domestic Law* (The Hague 2010), 265–73.

De Graaff, Bob, 'Ze hebben het op ons gemunt, maar wie zijn het nu weer? De telkens wisselende fenomenen van terrorisme, radicalisering, extremisme en fanatisme' in: De Waele, Moors, Garssen, Noppe (eds.), *Aanpak van gewelddadige radicalisering*, Cahiers Politiestudies 42 (2017) 1, 23-39.

Demmers, Jolle, *Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction* (Routledge 2016).

Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 'DHS-FBI Warning: Terrorist Use of Vehicle Ramming Tactics' (13 December 2010), https://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-dhs-fbi-warning-terrorist-use-of-vehicle-ramming-tactics/ (21 May 2018).

Ehler, Christian, and Lea von Martius, *Long March for Europe: Migrant Smuggling in the Mediterranean as a Challenge for Internal and External Security Strategies of the EU* (2016).

Ekiz, Fidan, 'Een vuist vanuit het "radicale midden"', *De Volkskrant* (1 October 2016).

Ersanilli, Evelyn, 'Country Profile: The Netherlands', *Focus Migration* 11 (November 2014).

European Council, 'EU-Turkey statement' (18 March 2016),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-
statement/ (9 May 2018).

Fredette, Jennifer, 'The French State of Emergency', *Current History* 116 (March 2017) 788,
101-106.

Ghorashi, Halleh, 'Negotiating belonging beyond rootedness: unsettling the sedentary bias in
the Dutch culturalist discourse', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40 (2017) 14, 2426–2443.

Government of the Netherlands, *Vertrouwen in de toekomst. Regeerakkoord 2017-2021* (10
October 2017).

Greenslade, Roy, "Study shows how media in peaceful countries 'over report' violence" (29
October 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2010/oct/29/war-
reporting-al-jazeera (9 June 2018).

Griffin, Michael, 'Media images of war', *Media, War & Conflict* 3 (2010) 1, 7-41.

Grove, N.J. and A.B. Zwi, 'Our health and theirs: Forced migration, othering, and public
health', *Social Science and Medicine* 62 (2006) 8, 1931–1942.

Harris, Toby, 'London and anti-terrorism in Europe', *European View* 16 (2017), 261–269.

Hegghammer, Thomas, 'Saudis in Iraq: Patterns of Radicalization and Recruitment', *Cultures
& Conflits* (12 June 2008), https://journals.openedition.org/conflits/10042 (13 March
2018).

Huijnk, Willem, Jaco Dagevos, Mérove Gijsberts and Iris Andriessen, *Werelden van verschil.
Over de sociaal-culturele afstand en positie van migrantengroepen in Nederland* (Den
Haag 2015).

Huysmans, Jef, 'The European Union and the Securitization of Migration', *Journal of
Common Market Studies* 38 (2000) 5, 751-777.

Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (IND), 'Hoe neemt de IND een beslissing in een
asielaanvraag?', https://ind.nl/over-ind/Paginas/Hoe-toetst-de-IND-een-
asielaanvraag.aspx (14 May 2015).

International Organization for Migration, 'Glossary on Migration', *International Migration
Law* 23 (Geneva 2011).

Jensen, Sune Qvotrup, 'Othering, identity formation and agency', *Qualitative Studies* 2
(2011) 2, 63-78.

Kamerstukken I 2010/11, 30 164, nr. J.

Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 34359, 3 (MvT).

Keefer, Philip, and Stephen Knack, 'Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links Between Inequality and Growth', *Public Choice* 111 (2002) 127-154.

Lazaridis, Gabriella, and Khursheed Wadia, 'Introduction', 1-18, in: Gabriella Lazaridis, Khursheed Wadia (eds.), *The Securitisation of Migration in the EU: Debates Since 9/11* (Palgrave Macmillan 2015).

Lister, Charles R., *Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency* (London 2015).

Lister, Tim, Ray Sanchez, Mark Bixler, Sean O'Key, Michael Hogenmiller and Mohammed Tawfeeq, 'ISIS goes global: 143 attacks in 29 countries have killed 2,043', *CNN* (12 February, 2018), https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/index.html (22 January 2018).

Lucassen, Leo, and Jan Lucassen, 'The Strange Death of Dutch Tolerance: The Timing and Nature of the Pessimist Turn in the Dutch Migration Debate', *The Journal of Modern History* 87 (March 2015) 1, 72– 101.

Mann, Liesbeth, Bertjan Doosje, Elly A. Konijn, Lars Nickolson, Urs Moore en Nel Ruigrok, *Indicatoren en manifestaties van weerbaarheid van de Nederlandse bevolking tegen extremistische boodschappen. Een theoretische en methodologische verkenning* (2015).

Ministry of Justice and Security, 'Wet modern migratiebeleid' (21 September 2013), available at: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0027930/2013-09-21 (9 May 2018).

Ministry of Justice and Security, 'Wijzigingswet Vreemdelingenwet 2000 (nationale visa)' (1 June 2013), available at: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0031667/2013-06-01 (9 May 2018).

Ministry of Justice and Security, *Rapportage Vreemdelingenketen. Periode januari-december 2017* (April 2018).

Murat Tezcür, Güneş, Clayton Besaw, 'Jihadist waves: Syria, the Islamic State, and the changing nature of foreign fighters', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* (21 November 2017).

Nail, Thomas, 'A Tale of Two Crises: Migration and Terrorism after the Paris Attacks', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 16 (2016) 1, 158-167.

Nancy, 'Jacques, Europeans in 2016: Perceptions and expectations, fight against terrorism and radicalisation', *Special Eurobarometer of the European Parliament* (June 2016), available at:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/20160623PVL00111/Europeans-in-2016-Perceptions-and-expectations-fight-against-terrorism-and-radicalisation (2 June 2018).

Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV), *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015* (April 2011).

NCTV, 'Alerteringssysteem Terrorismebestrijding' (2 August 2017), https://www.nctv.nl/organisatie/ct/atb/index.aspx (17 May 2018).

NCTV, 'Extremisme', https://www.nctv.nl/organisatie/ct/terrorismebestrijding/extremisme/extremisme.aspx (17 May 2018).

NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 47* (Maart 2018).

NCTV, *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2016-2020* (11 July 2016).

Noordegraaf, Mirko, Scott Douglas, Aline Bos and Wouter Klem, *Gericht, gedragen en geborgd interventievermogen? Evaluatie van de nationale contraterrorisme-strategie 2011-2015* (8 april 2016).

Noorlander, Arjan, 'Timmermans: meer dan helft vluchtelingen heeft economisch motief', *NOS Buitenland* (25 January 2016), https://nos.nl/artikel/2082786-timmermans-meer-dan-helft-vluchtelingen-heeft-economisch-motief.html (14 May 2018).

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'Operational Portal: Refugee Situations' (22 January 2018), http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean (22 January 2018).

Paul Bremer - Lessen uit Irak, VPRO Tegenlicht (16 mei 2007), https://www.vpro.nl/jeugd/speel~POMS_VPRO_158130~paul-bremer-lessen-uit-irak~.html (9 January 2018).

Petkova, Elisaveta P., Stephanie Martinez, Jeffrey Schlegelmilch & Irwin Redlener, 'Schools and Terrorism: Global Trends, Impacts, and Lessons for Resilience', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40 (2017) 8, 701–711.

Redactie Algemeen Dagblad, 'Rutte vastberaden: Handen af van onze vrijheid', *Algemeen Dagblad* (8 January 2015), https://www.ad.nl/buitenland/rutte-vastberaden-handen-af-van-onze-vrijheid~af6f16f1/ (21 May 2018).

Roser, Max, Mohamed Nagdy and Hannah Ritchie, 'Terrorism' (January 2018), https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism (22 January 2018).

Schmid, Alex P. and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (Routledge 2017).

Schuman, Maxim, 'Immigration and terrorism are Europeans' biggest fears' (3 August 2016), https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/immigration-and-terrorism-are-europeans-biggest-fears/ (2 June 2018).

Sniderman, Paul M. and Louk Hagendoorn, *When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands* (2007).

Snow, David A., and Scott C. Byrd, 'Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review* 12 (2007) 2, 119-136.

Soetenhorst, Bas, 'Moeten alle moslims zich nu uitspreken?', *Het Parool* (13 January 2015), https://www.parool.nl/amsterdam/moeten-alle-moslims-zich-nu-uitspreken~a3828918/ (14 May 2018).

Sommer, Berend, "Koopmans: 'Moslims moeten in opstand komen tegen fundamentalisme'", *Elsevier Weekblad* (5 September 2017), https://www.elsevierweekblad.nl/nederland/achtergrond/2017/09/ruud-koopmans-door-religieuze-taboes-lukt-integratie-moslims-nauwelijks-537833/ (14 May 2018).

Struik, Mieke, Femke Sickler, Laura Moerenhout and Pieter Jan Huijskes, 'Identificatie en registratie van asielzoekers in Nederland. Toekomstscenario's voor de Nationale Politie', in: De Waele, Moors, Garssen, Noppe (eds.), *Aanpak van gewelddadige radicalisering*, Cahiers Politiestudies 42 (2017) 1, 133-150.

UNHCR, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees* (2011), http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10 (13 May 2018).

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 'Definitions' (2018) https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/definitions (13 May 2018).

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Global Trends: Forced Displacement 2016* (21 June 2017).

Van der Pol, Geart, 'Turkse-Nederlanders zoeken het gesprek op straat in 18 steden', *De Volkskrant* (29 April 2017), https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/turkse-nederlanders-zoeken-het-gesprek-op-straat-in-18-steden~be233a69/ (14 May 2018).

Van Erp, Peter, 'Protest tegen azc Heesch neemt extreme vormen aan; dode big opgehangen aan boom', *Brabants Dagblad* (13 January 2018), https://www.bd.nl/bernheze/protest-tegen-azc-heesch-neemt-extreme-vormen-aan-dode-big-opgehangen-aan-boom~ae558003/ (10 June 2018).

Van Gelder, Henk, 'Relschoppers azc-rellen Geldermalsen krijgen werkstraffen', *De Gelderlander* (27 February 2018), https://www.gelderlander.nl/rivierenland/relschoppers-azc-rellen-geldermalsen-krijgen-werkstraffen~a2bb77b0/ (10 June 2018).

Van Meeteren, Masja, *Irregular Migrants in Belgium and the Netherlands. Aspirations and incorporation* (Amsterdam 2014).

Van Munster, Rens, 'Securitization', *Oxford Bibliographies* (26 June 2012), http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0091.xml (22 January 2018).

Van Teeffelen, Kristel, 'Hoe in de vluchtelingencrisis de balans zoekraakt in de media', *Trouw* (22 January 2016), https://www.trouw.nl/home/hoe-in-de-vluchtelingencrisis-de-balans-zoekraakt-in-de-media~a950376c/ (14 May 2018).

Van Wonderen, Ron, and Maaike van Kapel, *Oorzaken en triggerfactoren moslimdiscriminatie in Nederland* (June 2017).

Vidino, Lorenzo, Francesco Marone, Eva Entenmann, *Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West* (Milan 2017).

VluchtelingenWerk Nederland, 'Terugkeer van uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers', https://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/procedures-wetten-beleid/terugkeer (14 May 2018).

VluchtelingenWerk Nederland, 'Wanneer ben je een vluchteling?', https://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/wanneer-ben-je-vluchteling (14 May 2018).

Vollebergh, Wilma, Justus Veenman and Louk Hagendoorn, *Integrating Immigrants in the Netherlands: Cultural Versus Socio-Economic Integration* (2017).

Wadia, Khursheed, 'Regimes of Insecurity: Women and Immigration Detention in France and Britain', in: Gabriella Lazaridis, Khursheed Wadia (eds.), *The Securitisation of Migration in the EU: Debates Since 9/11* (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 91-118.

Weber, Edward P., and Anne M. Khademian, 'Wicked Problems, Knowledge Challenges, and Collaborative Capacity Builders in Network Settings', *Public Administration Review* 68 (April 2008) 2, 334-349.

Winter, Heinrich, et al, *Onderdak en opvang door Rijk en gemeenten van vertrekplichtige vreemdelingen en de invloed daarvan op terugkeer* (Groningen 2018).

Zeldin, Wendy, 'Netherlands: Major Overhaul of Immigration Policies in 2013', *The Law Library of Congress* (April 2013).