# **Cultural Integration of**

# **Immigrant Youth in the Netherlands**

The effect of religiosity on salience of ethnic identity and on progressive ideas on abortion, homosexuality and gender roles

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#### Abstract

This paper will explore the effect of religiosity among immigrant youth in the Netherlands on other parts of their cultural integration. Using the Accommodation hypothesis, combined with Assimilation theory, the secularity of the Dutch context is established. Next, building on earlier research findings, expectations on the relationship between religion and progressive attitudes towards abortion, homosexuality and gender roles are formulated. Using the Dutch data from the first wave of the CILS4EU database, linear regression analyses have been performed to test this relationship. Both religious behavior and religious salience were found to have a significant negative effect on progressive ideas towards abortion, homosexuality and gender norms; both religious determinants showed a significant, positive effect on salience of ethnic identity.

#### **Keywords**

Cultural integration, religious behavior, religious salience, abortion, homosexuality, gender roles, salience of ethnic identity

#### Introduction

The past decades have sparked a renewed interest in immigrant integration in Europe. Since the 1950's, immigrant flow has greatly increased and lately, terms such as 'migration crisis' or 'refugee crisis' have become the norm in both politics, as well as mass media, covering the subject matter (Berry, Garcia-Blanco & Moore 2016). In light of the increased ethnic and religious diversity in Europe, integration in relation to different aspects of society has become the subject of numerous previous researches (Entzinger & Biezeveld 2003; van Tubergen 2007).

Among these studies, some have shed light on the relation between integration and religiosity. Saroglou and Mathijsen explored how religiousness of European Muslim immigrants in Belgium relates to their attachment to one or both cultures (that is, the dominant culture of the country of origin, or the receiving country), and found that high religiousness could predict said attachment, implying a negative effect on integration (Saroglou & Mathijsen 2007). Similarly, Fleischmann and Phalet (doing a comparative analysis among second generation Turkish immigrants across four European capitals: Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels and Stockholm) found evidence for a negative effect of religion on integration, in more secularized countries (Fleischmann and Phalet 2011).

Not all research agrees on this subject, however. In their 2011 research on Mosque attendance in relation to integration into the political system in America, Dana, Barreto and Oskooii found quite the opposite: mosque attendance and involvement leads to more political participation and integration (Dana et al. 2011). In their article on religion and immigrant occupation attainment (comparing different integration contexts) Connor and Koenig (2013) argue that the effect of religion on integration is context-dependent. They found that in areas that they consider as more religious (the USA), immigrant religion functions more as a bridge to integration, while in more secular areas (Europe), religion should be seen more like an integrational barrier. Foner and Alba, also researching the topic of immigrant religion in the U.S. and Western Europe, (2008) agree on this. They argue that integration can be explained by religion, once three factors are considered: the religious backgrounds of immigrants in Western Europe and the United States; the religiosity of the native population; and historically rooted relations and arrangements between the state and religious groups (Connor and Koenig 2013; Foner and Alba 2008).

The adolescence period is viewed by many as one of the most important periods in one's life, when it comes to identity formation. Here, continuity in identity and coherence of life story grows (Swanson et al. 1998; Meeus 2011). Because of this, the process of cultural integration, and the connection with religiosity could possibly be subject to interesting developments during this specific time period. So, to gain more knowledge on religion and integration, and to explore whether religion functions as a bridge or a barrier for immigrant adolescents in the Dutch, secular context (more on this later), this paper will try to answer the following research question:

How does the religiosity of immigrant youth in the Netherlands affect other parts of their cultural integration?

Integration as a construct is quite complicated, and is determined by many different things. To clarify and differentiate, integration is often divided into two dimensions; Structural- (labour market position, income, etc.), and Cultural integration (Identification with the Nation, cultural ideas and traditions, language proficiency, religion etc.) (Entzinger & Biezeveld 2003). In their 2003 book on integrating immigrants in the Netherlands, Vollebergh, Veenman and Hagedoorn compared different researches on integration, to come up with a general idea on which dimension is more relevant in certain situations. They argue that cultural integration is often more useful, because cultural changes are often necessary to function as a foundation for structural changes. For example, in order to be able to achieve more academically (structural integration), language proficiency (cultural integration) often is key (Vollebergh et al. 2003). Following this idea, this paper will look at the relation between religiosity and cultural integration.

One might wonder, however, how religiosity can have an effect on cultural integration, since it in itself could be considered part of cultural integration. While this is true, different aspects of (cultural) integration tend to overlap and influence each other quite extensively. In their research on Muslim integration into western culture (comparing origin and destination contexts), Norris and Inglehart found that religiosity remains a subject wherein western origin and destination of Muslim immigrants differs greatly; in the integration process, religion is the origin characteristic that is held (Norris Inglehart onto most and In this study, the concept of cultural integration will be regarded to as 'the extent to which somebody of foreign descent 'gives up' their own culture and traditions, in order to adopt (parts of the) culture and traditions of the receiving country' (Gordon 1964). Important to note here, an aspect of integration that could be considered part of cultural integration is language

proficiency. Considering the fact that the sample for this research consists of immigrant youth in the Netherlands (mostly second generation), averaging at 14 years old, the relationship between religiosity and language proficiency will not be tested. Because most participants have been brought up in the Netherlands, language is not likely to be an issue for them.

This paper will use data, collected in the 'Children of Immigrant Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries' (CILS4EU) (Kalter et al., 2016). Different questions will be used as indicators for both cultural integration and religiosity and the relation between the two will be tested. The results will be interpreted to provide insight in this relationship, specifically for immigrant youth in the Netherlands.

#### Theory and Hypotheses

#### Integration in a secular context

As described in the introduction of this paper, some scholars bring up the fact that the effect of immigrant religiosity is context-dependent (Connor and Koenig 2013; Foner and Alba 2008). This implies that to be able to predict the relationship between religiosity and other parts of cultural integration, (religious) context has to be considered.

In 1982, De Vaus added his 'Accomodation Hypothesis' to Durkheim's 'Social Integration Theory' (De Vaus 1982; Durkheim 1951). Durkheim argued that individual beliefs and practices are influenced by 'social settings or –groups'. The more an individual integrates in social settings or groups (in this case those that are considered the majority, or dominant group), the more this individual will adjust its beliefs and practices to conform to the norms of this group, and vice versa. In his article on the impact of geographical mobility on adolescent orientation, De Vaus added his 'Accomodation hypothesis'. Here, he argued that when exploring immigrant integration, the secularization of the host country should be taken into account. Combining this with ideas of 'Assimilation Theory' scholars, who argue that over time, immigrants will start to adopt new beliefs and practices, and abandon previous habits and traditions in order to be accepted within the receiving society (Lieberson 1973; Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba 2005), it is important to know just how secular the context of this paper – the Netherlands – is. Previous research has concluded that secularization in Europe, as well as in the Netherlands, has increased. In their 2011 research on 'religious change' Voas and Doebler concluded that there is significant evidence that Europe can be regarded as highly secular (Voas and Doebler 2011). Adding to this, research by Knippenberg even shows that the levels of secularization in the Netherlands are relatively high when compared to other European countries (Knippenberg 1998).

#### Gender roles, abortion and homosexuality

As described in the introduction, the concept of cultural integration in this paper revolves around 'the extent to which somebody of foreign descent 'gives up' (part of) their own culture and traditions, in order to adopt (parts of the) culture and traditions of the receiving country' (Gordon 1964). Previous research has concluded that on the subject of gender roles, abortion and homosexuality, cultures from different parts of the world and of different religious contexts, tend to have their differences (Phalet et al. 2000). Attitudes towards these subjects can thus be regarded as 'cultural information'. Considering these attitudes as cultural information, differences in said attitudes between natives and immigrants could function as an indicator of integration.

In their research on the relationship between religion and attitudes towards same sex marriage, Olson et al. found that a stronger religious affinity had a negative relation with attitudes towards same-sex marriages (Olson et al. 2006). Adding to this, Schulte and Battle tested whether ethnic differences or religious attendance plays a bigger role in predicting attitudes towards homosexuals, and found that religiosity is consistently linked with negative attitudes, while the relationship with ethnicity often is found not to be significant (Schulte and Battle 2004).

Next to homosexuality, ideas about abortion have proven to be closely linked with religiosity too. In their 1985 research, Harris & Mills studied whether religious values affect attitudes towards abortion using data from the United States, collected between 1974 and 1982. They found that, while religious values and values of freedom of choice could cause internal conflict, religious values have a strong, negative effect on attitudes towards abortion. Furthermore, Ellison et al., conducted a survey among U.S. Hispanic subgroups and found that religious factors are highly important predictors of preferences regarding abortion policies (Harris and Mills 1985; Ellison et al. 2005).

Regarding the relation between religiosity and gender roles, previous research suggests that more traditional attitudes can be explained by religiosity. In her research on religious differences in immigrants' gender role attitudes (comparing first- and second-generation immigrants from different origin countries), Röder found that higher levels of religiosity predicted more conservative attitudes on gender roles, especially for Muslims (Röder 2014). Similarly, in her research on the impact of religion on gender-role attitudes among women in predominantly female and predominantly male college majors in the USA, Morgan provided evidence that suggests that religiosity was the most important variable to consistently predict

gender-role attitudes (being more religious implied in both college majors more conservative attitudes towards gender roles) (Morgan 1987).

Considering previous research done on the relation between religion and gender roles and progressive attitudes towards abortion and homosexuality, the following hypothesis is derived:

Hypothesis 1: The more religious immigrant youth in the Netherlands are, the less progressive their attitudes towards abortion, homosexuality and gender roles will be.

#### Religiosity and ethnic identification

As mentioned before, cultural integration in this paper is generally regarded as the process of 'abandoning' (part of) one's 'cultural information', to be able to adopt (parts of) the cultural information of the host country. Another aspect of cultural information is ethnic identification, assuming that this is not completely compatible with national identification. In order to identify more with the national identity of the receiving country, one will sacrifice (part of) their ethnic identification. Considering this, and the fact that identification with the nation also can be seen as cultural identification, a person with high amounts of ethnic identification can be regarded as less culturally integrated than someone with a low level of ethnic identification. Thus, in an effort to explore the relation between religion and cultural integration of immigrant youth, it is interesting to look at the relation between religiosity and ethnic identity (considering ethnic identity as indicator for cultural integration).

In 2010, Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts studied generational differences in ethnic and religious attachment and their interrelation among Muslim minorities in the Netherlands. Their research has provided evidence for a positive effect of religious attachment on ethnic identification. The authors argue that this effect will become stronger over time, since they found generational decline in both religious and ethnic attachment (Once ethnic identity and religious identity become less salient, religiosity becomes a stronger predictor of ethnic identity) (Maliepaard et al 2010). Adding to this, Verkuyten et al. studied the relation between religious group identification and national identity among Moroccan-Dutch Muslim adolescents and their parents. They too, found a religiosity to have a positive effect on ethnic identification (Verkuyten et al. 2012). Considering previous research on the relation between ethnic identity and religiosity, the following hypothesis is derived:

Hypothesis 2: The more religious immigrant youth in the Netherlands is, the more they identify with their ethnic identity.

#### Methods

This research will use data from the 'Children of Immigrant Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries' (CILS4EU) (Kalter et al. 2016). In this study, a longitudinal survey research has been conducted to explore the integration of children of immigrants in four European countries (Germany, The United Kingdom, Sweden and The Netherlands) (CILS4EU, 2016). The 'CILS4EU' research focuses on the dimensions of integration as mentioned before: structural- (sometimes called socio-economic-) and cultural integration. This paper utilizes data from the first wave in The Netherlands (collected in 2010-2011) and will zoom in on the cultural dimension of integration. The research population of this first wave consists of native and immigrant students, attending high school, third grade, averagely 14 years old. The population sample consists of 4363 participants, 49.1% male and 50.8% female. The total response rate for the Netherlands in the first wave was 78.9%.

The CILS4EU survey has used a 'three-stage stratified sample design'. The first stage started by dividing each country into four strata and selecting schools randomly from within those strata. After the application of this method, however, the amount of participating schools was 34.9%. To compensate for schools that did not want to participate, a 'replacement strategy' was used. Schools that were drafted from the strata were linked to other schools that also fit the target group, providing for a 'backup' if the drafted school did not want to participate. By using this replacement strategy, approximately 92% of Dutch schools participated in the research.

The second stage selected two classes at random, within each selected school. Of these classes, 94.5% of the students participated in the study.

In the third and final stage, the participating students had to answer self-report questionnaires, tests and sociometric nominations (students had to report on the social relations within their own class; best friends, most popular classmates, classmates that they would not want to sit by, etc.)

#### Sample

This study will explore the relation between integration of immigrant youth in the Netherlands and their religiosity. Therefore, the dataset has been filtered to only contain respondents that are immigrants, living in the Netherlands. The complete dataset consisted of 4363 respondents, and the (filtered) sample counts 637 respondents in total.

### Independent variables

In this research, the independent variable is religiosity of immigrant youth in the Netherlands. Since 'religiosity', is not a directly measurable construct, this paper will divide religiosity into 'religious behavior' and 'religious salience'. To measure religious salience (how much an individual values religions), this question was used: "How important is religion to you?". The respondents could choose: 1) Very important, 2) Fairly important, 3) Not very important, 4) Not at all important. Religious behavior in this paper can be split up into two parts: 'visiting religious meeting places', and 'prayer'. To measure 'visiting religious meeting places', the following question was asked: "How often do you visit a religious meeting place (e.g. a church, a mosque, a synagogue or a temple)?". The respondent could then pick one of the following answers: 1) Never, 2) Occasionally (but less than once a month), 3) At least once a month, 4) At least once a week, 5) Every day. To measure 'prayer' the following question was asked: "How often do you pray?". Here, the answer categories where: 1) Never, 2) Occasionally (but less than once a month), 3) At least once a month, 4) At least once a week, 5) One to four times a day 6) Five times a day or more. To be able to combine 'prayer' and 'visiting religious meeting places' into one general variable 'religious behavior', it is necessary to test whether the two variables measure the same thing. To test this, Cronbach's Alpha was used. The measured alpha for these two variables was .662 (>.5), which means that the two variables (approximately) measure the same thing.

#### Dependent variables

In this research, the dependent variables are 'progressive attitudes towards homosexuality'; 'progressive attitudes towards abortion'; 'progressive attitudes towards gender roles'; and 'salience of ethnic identity'. Measuring progressiveness of immigrants attitudes towards homosexuality and abortion, the following questions were asked: "Do you think the following are "always OK", "often OK", "sometimes OK" or "never OK" – Abortion and "Do you think the following are "always OK", "often OK", "sometimes OK" or "never OK" -*Homosexuality*. Respondents had to choose one of the following answers for each question: 1) Always OK, 2) Often OK, 3) Sometimes OK, 4) Never OK. The progressiveness of immigrant attitudes towards gender roles was measured by the following questions: "In a family, who should do the following?"- Take care of the children; "In a family, who should do the following?"- Cook; and "In a family, who should do the following?"- Earn money; "In a family, who should do the following?" – Clean. The answer categories for all four questions were 1) Mostly the man, 2) Mostly the woman, 3) About the same. To test whether all four questions about gender roles measure the same, Cronbach's Alpha was performed. The alpha for these four variables was .586 (>.5), meaning that the variables are assumed to measure the same thing, and can thus be combined into one, general variable. This general variable considers answering "Mostly the woman" as conservative, and answering "Mostly the man" and "About the same" as progressive, following earlier research using the CILS4EU data (Kretschmer 2018). To measure salience of ethnic identity, the following question was asked: "How strongly do you feel that you belong to this group? (if you feel you belong to more than one of these groups, please tell us about the one you feel you belong to most strongly.). The answer categories here were: 1) Very strongly, 2) Fairly strongly, 3) Not very strongly, 4) Not at all strongly.

#### Control variable

To test the validity of the relation between immigrant youth's cultural integration and religiosity, this paper will use 'language proficiency' as a control variable. In their 2003 book on integrating immigrants in the Netherlands, Vollebergh, Veenman and Hagedoorn argue that language proficiency often is a necessary precondition for immigrants to integrate into society. Because of this, language proficiency could function as an alternative explanation for the relation between integration of immigrant youth in the Netherlands and their religiosity (Vollebergh et al 2003). In the CILS4EU survey, four questions were asked, regarding language proficiency: "How well do you think you can speak [survey country language]?"; "How well do you think you can understand [survey country language]?"; "How well do you think you can write [survey country language]?". For all four questions, respondents could choose between one of the five following answers: 1) Not at all, 2) Not well, 3) Well, 4) Very well, 5) Excellently. To be able to combine these variables into one 'language proficiency' variable, Cronbach's Alpha test was performed, once more. The measured alpha for these two variables was .905 (>.5), which means that the two variables (approximately) measure the same thing.

# <u>Descriptives</u>

**Table 1.** Descriptive statistics  $(N_{total} = 637)$ 

Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard	Missing
				deviation	percentage
Independent					
variables					
Religious	.00	5.00	2.07	1.62	1.25%
behaviour					
Religious salience	.00	3.00	2.29	.88	2.00%
Dependent					
variables					
Progressive	.00	3.00	.49	.79	11.50%
attitudes towards					
abortion					
Dua anaasiasa	00	3.00	1.01	1.20	9.30%
Progressive attitudes towards	00	3.00	1.01	1.20	9.30%
homosexuality					
Progressive	.00	1.00	.64	.28	0.83%
attitudes towards					
gender roles					
-					
Salience of ethnic	00	3.00	2.45	.66	74.90%
identity					
Control variable					
Language	1.00	5.00	4.16	.74	.28%
proficiency					

Looking at the independent variables, the means of 'religious behavior' and 'religious salience', show some interesting differences. Religious behavior has a mean of 2.07 on a scale from .00 (no visit of religious meeting places and never praying) to 5.00 (praying five or more times a day, and/or visiting religious meeting places every day). This mean suggests an intermediate amount of religious behavior for the sample population. Religious salience, however, has a relatively high mean; 2.29 on a scale from .00 (not important at all) to 3.00 (very important) suggesting that this sample population values their religion quite much.

The first independent variable, attitudes towards progressive ideas on abortion, has a mean of .49, on a scale from .00 (abortion is never OK) to 3.00 (abortion is always OK). A mean this low suggests that the sample population has relatively negative attitudes towards abortion. The mean for the second independent variable, attitudes towards progressive ideas on homosexuality, is a bit higher; 1.01 on a scale from .00 (homosexuality is never OK) to 3.00 (homosexuality is always OK). The sample's attitudes towards progressive ideas on homosexuality are somewhat more positive than those regarding progressive attitudes on abortion, but are still relatively negative. The third variable, progressive attitudes towards gender roles, has a slightly above average mean; .64, on a scale from .00 (conservative attitudes) to 1.00 (progressive attitudes). The respondents' attitudes towards gender roles are neither completely conservative, nor completely progressive.

The control variable, language proficiency, has a minimum score of .00 (the respondent can't read, understand, write and speak the language at all) and a maximum score of 5.00 (the respondent is an excellent reader, writer, speaker and is able to understand the language perfectly). The mean here is 4.16. The fact that the mean is this high, suggests that the respondents feel that they have relatively high amounts of language proficiency.

It is important to also mention the missing percentages displayed in the table above, since some of them are quite notable. To start off with ethnic salience, the amount of missing data here is this high, because the question was only applicable to people who identify with an ethnic identity. Progressive ideas towards homosexuality and abortion also report relatively many missing data. This can be explained by the fact that the questions regarding these topics gave respondents the option to answer "I don't know". People who chose this answer are considered as 'missing'.

#### **Results**

To test the effect religiosity has on other parts of cultural integration, a regression analysis will be performed. Before this can be done, however, it has to be made sure that the four (main) regression assumptions are met.

The first assumption says that the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable should be linear. If there is no linearity to be found in this relationship, the results of the regression analysis will underestimate the actual relationship, according to Osborne and Walters (2002). All relationships have been tested on linearity, and only the relation between religious behavior and ethnic salience (P < .01); religious salience and progressive ideas towards homosexuality (P < .05); and religious salience and salience of ethnic identity (P < .01) have shown significant linearity. The other relationships, religious behavior and progressive attitudes towards homosexuality (P = .469); religious behavior and progressive attitudes towards abortion (P = .099); religious salience and progressive ideas on abortion (P = .662); religious salience and progressive ideas on significant linearity. Analyzing these relationships, the non-linearity should be taken into consideration.

The second assumption requires all variables to be multivariate normal. To test normality, a p-p plot and a histogram have been made. The variables 'religious behavior' and 'progressive ideas on homosexuality' both are slightly positively skewed, but only deviate so little from a normal distribution, that it can be ignored. Religious salience and ethnic salience are a bit more skewed (both positively), and progressive ideas on abortion and homosexuality are a somewhat more negatively skewed. Although more skewed than religious behavior and progressive ideas on homosexuality, here too, the skewedness remains rather low and should not affect the interpretation of the results much. Progressive ideas on gender roles seems to be normally distributed. Analyzing the p-p plots, the residuals of all variables seem to be more or less normally distributed. Some plots show small deviations, but none of them are drastic enough to deny normality.

The third assumption to be met, is that of homoscedasticity. According to Osborne and Walters, the regression analysis can have weak results once there is evidence for heteroscedasticity (Osborne and Walters 2002). That is, if the variance of error varies between different values of the independent variables. To test this assumption, Levene's test for equality of variances has been performed for religious salience, and religious behavior (because the variables are

categorical, whether they are homoscedastic or not, cannot be derived from a scatterplot). For religious salience, Levene's test has shown significant results for progressive ideas on abortion; progressive ideas on homosexuality; and salience of ethnic identity, meaning that these variables cannot be considered homoscedastic. Progressive attitudes towards gender roles don't report any significant results on Levene's test for equality of variances, implying that this variable is homoscedastic. When Levene's test is performed for religious behavior, similar results are found. Significant results are found for progressive ideas on abortion; progressive ideas on homosexuality; and salience of ethnic identity. Again, progressive attitudes towards gender roles don't report any significant results.

The final regression assumption is about multicollinearity. Once an independent variable has shown multicollinearity, statistical interpretation of the results decreases in strength (Graham 2003). To test whether there are signs of multicollinearity to be found in both independent variables, as well as the control variable (since this variable could be considered a predictor of the dependent variables), three VIF-tests have been conducted. Religious behavior, religious salience and language proficiency all have a VIF-score below 10. This suggests that there is no multicollinearity, and the assumption has been met.

The effect of religious behavior on progressive attitudes towards abortion, homosexuality and gender roles

First, the effect of religious behavior on progressive attitudes towards abortion, homosexuality and gender roles will be analyzed.

**Table 2.** Religious behavior effect on progressive ideas on Abortion ( $N_{total} = 637$ )

	В	SE	
Religious behavior	149***	.176	
Language proficiency	002	.040	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	.094		

<sup>\*</sup>p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001

**Table 3.** Religious behavior effect on progressive ideas on Homosexuality ( $N_{total} = 632$ )

	В	SE	
Religious behavior	294***	.027	
Language proficiency	.251***	.058	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	.186		

<sup>\*</sup>p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001

**Table 4.** Religious behavior effect on progressive ideas on Gender roles ( $N_{total} = 632$ )

	В	SE	
Religious behavior	019**	.007	
Language proficiency	.042**	.015	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	.025		
$*_{n} < 0.5 **_{n} < 0.1 ***_{n} < 0.0$	1		

<sup>\*</sup>p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001

Table two and three show a significant, negative effect of religious behavior on progressive ideas towards abortion (B=-.149; p<.001/2), homosexuality (B=-.294; p<.001/2). This means that once immigrant youth in the Netherlands show more religious behavior, they will have less progressive ideas on abortion and homosexuality. In table four, it is shown that religious behavior also has a significant negative effect on progressive ideas on gender roles (B=-.019; p<.01/2). This effect, however, is slightly less significant than those of tables two and three. All three analyses have been controlled for language proficiency. While language proficiency itself has a significant effect on progressive attitudes towards homosexuality and gender roles, controlling for this variable does not have an influence on the measured effects. Religious behavior explains a significant proportion of the variance of progressive ideas towards abortion ( $R^2=.094$ ; F(2, 634)=32.741; p<.001), homosexuality ( $R^2=.186$ ; F(2, 634)=72.215; p<.001) and gender roles ( $R^2=.025$ ; F(2, 634)=7.965; p<.001).

The effect of religious salience on progressive attitudes towards abortion, homosexuality and gender roles

**Table 5.** Religious salience effect on progressive ideas on Abortion ( $N_{total} = 632$ )

	В	SE	
Religious salience	367***	.032	
Language proficiency	020	.039	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	.168		

<sup>\*</sup>p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001

**Table 6.** Religious salience effect on progressive ideas on Homosexuality ( $N_{total} = 632$ )

	В	SE	
Religious salience	539***	.049	
Language proficiency	.230***	.059	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	.184		

<sup>\*</sup>*p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01, \*\*\**p*<.001

**Table 7.** Religious salience effect on progressive ideas on Gender roles ( $N_{total} = 632$ )

	В	SE	
Religious salience	045***	.013	
Language proficiency	.040**	.015	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	.032		

<sup>\*</sup>*p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01, \*\*\**p*<.001

In tables five to seven, the results of the tested relationship between religious salience and progressive ideas on abortion, homosexuality and gender roles are shown. Religious salience has a highly significant negative effect on progressive ideas on abortion (B=-.367; p<.001/2), homosexuality (B=-.539; p<.001/2) and gender roles (B=-.045; p<.001/2). This implies that the more salient the religion of immigrant youth in the Netherlands becomes, the more

conservative their ideas towards abortion, homosexuality and gender norms will be. Next to this, a significant proportion of the variance of progressive attitudes on abortion ( $R^2$ =.168; F(2, 634)=64.220; p<.001), homosexuality ( $R^2$ =.184; F(2, 634)=71.680; p<.001) and gender roles ( $R^2$ =.032; F(2, 634)=10.633; p<.001) is explained by religious salience. Like with religious behavior, the effect of religious salience on these progressive ideas is not influenced by the addition of the 'language proficiency' control variable.

In conclusion, the performed regression analyses have provided evidence that supports the first hypothesis "The more religious immigrant youth in the Netherlands are, the less progressive their attitudes towards abortion, homosexuality and gender roles will be".

#### The effect of religious behavior on salience of ethnic identity

**Table 8.** Religious behavior effect on salience of ethnic identity ( $N_{total} = 632$ )

	В	SE
Religious behavior	.121***	.015
Language proficiency	059	.034
$\mathbb{R}^2$	.092	

<sup>\*</sup>*p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01, \*\*\**p*<.001

Looking at the table above, regression analysis shows a significant, positive effect of religious behavior on salience of ethnic identity (B=.121; p<.001/2). The more religious behavior immigrant youth in the Netherlands show, the more they will value their ethnic identity. Controlling for language proficiency did not affect this relationship, nor its significance. Regarding the variance of salience of ethnic identity, a significant proportion can be explained by religious behavior ( $R^2=.092$ ; F(2, 634)=32.181; p<.001).

#### The effect of religious salience on salience of ethnic identity

**Table 9.** Religious salience effect on salience of ethnic identity  $(N_{total} = 632)$ 

	В	SE	
Religious salience	.303***	.027	
Language proficiency	044	.033	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	.166		

<sup>\*</sup>p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001

Table nine - about the effect of religious salience on the salience of ethnic identity - shows that here too, a significant positive effect (of the first on the latter) has been found (B=.303; p<.001/2). This means that the more immigrant youth in the Netherlands values their religion, the more salient their ethnic identity becomes. Religious salience explains a significant proportion of the variance of salience of ethnic identity ( $R^2=.166$ ; F(2, 634)=64.197; p<.001). The positive effect of religious salience is on salience of ethnic identity remains highly significant after controlling for language proficiency. The results of the analysis of the effects of religious behavior and –salience on ethnic identity provide evidence that supports the second hypothesis "The more religious immigrant youth in the Netherlands is, the more they identify with their ethnic identity".

#### **Conclusion and Discussion**

In an age of ever-growing ethnic diversity, immigrant integration has become the subject to widespread debate and media attention. In an effort to explore immigrant integration in the Netherlands, and to shed light on whether religion functions as a bridge to integration or rather as a barrier in this specific (secular) context, this paper has tried to answer the following research question:

How does the religiosity of immigrant youth in the Netherlands affect other parts of their cultural integration?

This paper has especially looked at data collected among immigrant youth in the Netherlands (CILS4EU) (Kalter et al. 2016), because this could provide useful insights about the effect of religiosity on other parts of cultural integration in people's most formative years: adolescence (Swanson et al. 1998; Meeus 2001). Linear regression analyses have been performed to analyze the effects between two determinants of religiosity (religious behavior and religious salience) and four determinants of cultural integration (progressive ideas towards abortion, homosexuality and gender roles, as well as salience of ethnic identity).

The results have shown significant negative relationships between religious behavior and progressive ideas towards abortion, homosexuality and gender roles, as well as between religious salience and progressive ideas towards these subjects. While religious salience turned out to have somewhat of a stronger negative relationship with these subjects, both effects combined provide clear evidence for a negative relationship between religion and other parts of cultural integration. These findings support the formulated hypothesis "The more religious immigrant youth in the Netherlands are, the less progressive their attitudes towards abortion, homosexuality and gender roles will be". Immigrant youth in the sample used in this paper does in fact show less progressive attitudes, once they are more religious (either in their behavior or in their religious salience).

Regarding ethnic identity, the performed analyses have shown a significant positive effect of both religious salience and religious behavior on the salience of ethnic identity among immigrant youth in the Netherlands. Here too, evidence is found to support the formulated hypothesis "The more religious immigrant youth in the Netherlands is, the more they identify with their ethnic identity". Returning to the theory, the fact that immigrant adolescents in the

Netherlands tend to value their ethnic identity more when they are more religious, implies that they are less culturally integrated.

The question that remains is; what does not rejecting the afore-mentioned hypotheses imply for immigrant integration in the Netherlands? In the Dutch, secular context, immigrant youth seem to have a harder time integrating (culturally) if they are more religious. Their religiosity, whether this means visiting religious meeting places and prayer frequency or how much they value their own religion, seems to function mostly as a barrier to integration. This is in line with earlier research (Saroglou and Mathijsen 2007; Fleischmann et al 2011), but contradicts with findings by other scholars (Dana et al. 2011). As argued by Connor and Koening (2013) and Foner and Alba (2008), the effect of religiosity on other parts of cultural integration could be context-dependent. The findings of this paper also support this claim; in a highly secular context - the Netherlands - (Voas and Doebler 2011; Knippenberg 1998) religiosity functions as a barrier rather than a bridge.

There are also some limitations to this research. First, the measure of progressive ideas on gender roles could be considered somewhat dubious. Following previous research, the idea that the woman should do most of the work is considered as conservative, and the idea that the man should do most or that they should do equally much, is considered as progressive. One could argue, however, that thinking that the man hast to do most work, is not very progressive either.

The second limitation lies in the sample selection used for this paper. Since this research was focused on the cultural integration of immigrant youth in the Netherlands, other respondents that were not considered immigrant youth, were filtered out of the data. Within this group of immigrant respondents, no distinctions were made. It could be interesting for future research to make distinctions between different groups of immigrants (dividing them, based on religion or on country of origin, or both), so that internal differences could be compared.

Third, the fact that this research is done within the Dutch, highly secular context, can be considered as a limiting aspect of this study. While the findings are relevant to secular, European contexts, there cannot be generalized to other, more religious contexts. A final point of discussion could be about the four regression assumptions that were discussed in this paper. Not all relationships are linear, to begin with. Next to this, there are some (small) deviances from normality to be found within the variables. These things should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.

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
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# Apendix

# **Regression Assumption 1: Scatterplots**


Religious behavior → Progressive ideas towards abortion

#### Graph




Religious behavior → Salience of ethnic identity

### Graph




Religious behavior → Progressive ideas towards gender roles

Graph




Religious behavior → Progressive ideas towards homosexuality

Graph




# Religious salience → Progressive ideas towards abortion

#### Graph




# Religious salience → salience of ethnic identity

#### Graph




Religious salience → Progressive ideas towards gender roles

### Graph



Religious salience → Progressive ideas towards homosexuality


#### Graph




# Regression Assumption 2: histograms and p-p plots

Abortion:

### Graph




### abortion




# Salience of ethnic identity

### Graph




### ethsal




Progressive attitudes towards gender roles


### Graph




### gender role



# Progressive attitudes towards homosexuality




#### homonorm




### Religious behavior

### Graph




### religious behavior



# Religious salience

### Graph



### relsal

