



# Unpacking a basic income scheme: Is support based on values or due to demographic characteristics?

*Insight in the public opinion towards a basic income scheme*

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Master thesis

Social Policy And Public Health

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Date: July 1, 2019

Word count: 7950

Utrecht University

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Interdisciplinary Social Science

## Abstract

**Background.** The idea of introducing a basic income scheme has been debated for decades. Studies showed that public opinion is important for the implementation of welfare state programs. This study examines whether values and demographic characteristics are determinants of support for a basic income scheme. **Research question.** What is the influence of values and demographic characteristics on the support for a basic income scheme and its characteristics? **Method.** This research is based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS), round 8 in The Netherlands (N=1681). Multiple regressions are performed to assess if the values *self-direction*, *universal protection*, *benevolence* and *security* and the demographic characteristics *gender*, *education*, *employment* and *household income* influence *support for a basic income scheme*. Because a basic income scheme is not yet an unambiguously defined and implemented welfare state program, two characters of a basic income scheme have also been included: *universal* and *unconditional*. **Results.** Individuals who value self-direction and security are likely to support a basic income scheme. However, individuals who value universal protection are not likely to support a basic income scheme. In addition, individuals with a low income and without paid work are more likely to support a basic income scheme than individuals with a high income and with paid work. Also, highly educated individuals are more likely to support a basic income scheme than individuals that enjoyed a lower education. **Conclusion.** Some values and demographic characteristics have influence on the support for a basic income scheme. Including the characteristics of a basic income scheme was more complex than expected and showed only some similarities with the support for a basic income scheme. This is the first study about the determinants of support for a basic income scheme. It lays the foundation for further research, where it is recommended to use more specified data concerning a basic income scheme.

**Key words:** basic income scheme, values, demographic characteristics, support, unconditional, universal

## Introduction

The idea of introducing a basic income scheme has been debated among philosophers and social policy analysts for decades (McKay, 2005; Bay & Pedersen, 2006). Where proponents talk about a basic income scheme as a blueprint for social justice which emphasizes freedom, efficiency and equality, opponents talk about the utopia of free money (Van Parijs, 1991; Clifford, 2017). Nowadays, the more pragmatic side of a basic income scheme is accentuated; as a solution to problems that are associated with the labour market and traditional welfare policies (Bay & Pedersen, 2006). There is unskilled work which offers little in the way of job satisfaction and social welfare systems have become extremely complex (Kay, 2017). Bay & Pedersen (2006) argue that a basic income scheme may also be the solution for rising poverty and unemployment rate.

The topic of a basic income scheme has been attracting attention in politics not only in Europe, but in the whole world. However, this idea is not implemented in any country so far (McKay, 2005). The study of De Hond (2016) showed that 51% of Dutch citizens favour the idea of introducing a basic income in the Netherlands. Although it appears that most Dutch citizens would support the idea of a basic income scheme, it is not clear why or whether people are not in favour of this scheme. Research showed that trends in public opinion have influence on the implementation of welfare state programs (Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989; Page & Shapiro, 1983). Therefore, it is interesting to study the determinants of support towards welfare state programs, specifically towards a basic income scheme.

Most studies show that support for welfare state programs often stems from self-interest or has an economical motive, meaning that people with socio-demographic disadvantages are more supportive of welfare state programs than others (Gilens, 1995; Campbell et al., 1960). According to Hasenfeld & Rafferty (1989) support for welfare state programs on the individual level is not only determined by self-interest, but also depends on ideological preferences. Blekesaune & Quadagno (2003) agree with Hasenfeld & Rafferty (1989) and showed that support is often rooted in general value systems regarding the relationship between the individual and the state.

This study builds on previous studies and explores if both values and demographic characteristics are determinants of support for a basic income scheme. This insight is valuable for the future of a basic income scheme.

## Theoretical framework

This theoretical framework describes if values and demographic characteristics are determinants of support for a basic income scheme. Firstly, the concept of a basic income scheme is defined. Secondly, values are discussed. At last, demographic characteristics are argued.

### Basic income scheme

A basic income scheme has four conditions: it is universal, there are no conditions, it is flat rate and focused on the individual (Vereniging Basisinkomen, 2019). It is a plan to replace all existing state benefits by a single payment, made unconditionally to all citizens of a country. The amount of this payment is high enough to meet everyone's basic needs (Kay, 2017). A more comprehensive definition of a universal basic income scheme which is used for this study is: *"A universal basic income scheme is an individual, unconditional allowance for everyone. For the poor or rich, for young or old, for unemployed or overworked. This allowance replaces other social security payments and is high enough to cover all basic needs (food, housing etc.)"* (Bregman, 2017).

For this study, *Support for a basic income scheme* is most important. Because a basic income scheme is not yet an unambiguously defined and implemented welfare state program and therefore support for a basic income scheme can be seen as speculative, the concept of a basic income scheme is also decomposed into characteristics. According to the Vereniging van Basisinkomen (2019), the characteristics of a basic income scheme are: universal, unconditional, individual and high enough. Given that 'high enough' is a condition that is in line with the current vision of welfare state programs and that the characteristic 'individual' corresponds with the unconditional aspect of a basic income scheme, where each individual is entitled to receive a basic income scheme, it has been decided to include the two characteristics of a basic income scheme that are most deviant from current welfare state programs: *Universal* and *Unconditional*. The characteristic universal is defined as: *Welfare state programs that are available and accessible for every citizen, regardless of age, origin, work status or marital status. A program that is based on the individual and will not look at family structures and focusses on reducing differences in income and standard of living.* Unconditional is defined as: *Welfare state programs without a mean test and any compensations.*

This study explores whether values and demographic characteristics influence the support for a basic income scheme and its characteristics universal and unconditional.

### Values

Studies showed that support for the welfare state and its programs depends on beliefs that are rooted in value systems (Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989; Bleksaune & Quadagno, 2003). When values are activated, they become infused with feeling (Schwartz, 2012). Marshall (1964) demonstrates in his study that people who support welfare state programs, believe that all citizens should have basic social rights including the right for an acceptable level of economic welfare and security, and the right to live according acceptable social standards. Schwartz (2012) defined ten basic values that are often used in combination with welfare attitudes. The ten basic values defined by Schwartz (2012) are: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence and universal. Some of these ten basic values are conflicting, but some of them are coinciding (Schwartz, 2012). Therefore, Schwartz (2012) divided the ten values into four groups: openness to change, self-transcendence, conservation and self-enhancement.

The group 'self-enhancement' consists of the values power and achievement which focuses on people's social esteem. These values are used to analyse interpersonal relations within and across cultures. Therefore, these values are not used in this study. The group 'openness to change' consists of the values self-direction, stimulation and hedonism. The values hedonism and stimulation derive from the underlying needs from the value self-direction (Schwartz, 2012). Therefore, the value *self-direction* is included in this study. Self-direction in this study is defined as the freedom to enjoy a decent life and to make your own choices and the importance to think of new ideas and be creative. According to Schwartz (2012), self-direction and universalism have a shared emphasis: the reliance of your own judgement and comfort with diversity. Self-direction satisfies individual needs with respect to others. It emphasizes the organic need as stimulation instead of adding conditions (Schwartz, 2012). Therefore, the following relations are expected:

**H1:** Individuals who value self-direction support universal policy programs

**H2:** Individuals who value self-direction support unconditional policy programs

This study suggests that people who value self-direction support both characteristics of a basic income scheme. Although there is no hard evidence to suggest that this leads to support for a basic income scheme, the following relation is expected:

**H3:** Individuals who value self-direction support a basic income scheme

The group self-transcendence consists of the values universal and benevolence. Whereas universal emphasizes the need for everyone, benevolence emphasizes the need for mainly their in-group. Therefore, it is interesting to use both values *universal* and *benevolence* for this study. The concept universal is used to define one of the characteristics of a basic income scheme as well. This definition of this characteristic universalism is different than the value universalism. Whereas the characteristic of a basic income scheme ‘universal’ is defined as a scheme that is available and accessible for every citizen, the value ‘universalism’ is defined as the protection for every citizen and the importance to care and understand others. To avoid confusion, the name of the value universalism is changed into *universal protection*.

Universal protection emphasizes equal access and opportunities. This is in line with the unconditional characteristic of a basic income scheme. Moreover, support is based on the belief that every citizen has basic social rights including the right to an acceptable level of economic welfare and security (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003). Universal protection is based on individuals and groups and makes no distinction between them (Schwartz, 2012).

Therefore, the following relations are expected:

**H4:** Individuals who value universal protection support universal policy programs

**H5:** Individuals who value universal protection support unconditional policy programs

It is expected that individuals who value universal protection support both characteristics of a basic income scheme. Although there is no hard evidence to suggest that this leads to support for a basic income scheme, the following relation is expected:

**H6:** Individuals who value universal protection support a basic income scheme

Benevolence for this study is defined as sympathy for others and the willingness to share risks and help others to contribute to the general common good. Whereas universal protection promotes the welfare of all citizens, benevolence promotes merely the welfare of people they are close to or feel related to (Schwartz, 2007). Several studies demonstrate that there is a distinction between universal protection and benevolence, but both values promote welfare for others and enforce other people (Schwartz, 2007; Schwartz, 2012). Considering that benevolence emphasizes helping their in-group, the following relation is expected:

**H7:** Individuals who value benevolence do not support universal policy programs

**H8:** Individuals who value benevolence do not support unconditional policy programs

It is expected that individuals who value benevolence, support none of the characteristics of a basic income scheme. Although there is no hard evidence to suggest that this leads to negative reactions to a basic income scheme, the following relation is expected:

**H9:** Individuals who value benevolence do not support a basic income scheme

The group conservation consists of security, conformity and tradition. Tradition and conformity are values that share the intention to subordinate the self to socially imposed expectations. Where conformity entails subordination to persons, tradition entails subordination to religious and cultural customs and ideas (Schwartz, 2007). Security emphasizes the importance to secure individuals and groups. This study focuses on values in relation to welfare state programs where religion and intergroup relations are not taken into account. Therefore, the value *security* is included. In this study, security is defined as the government's responsibility to ensure safety. Security in terms of arrangement that give certainty to life and protection of all citizens. This value maintains the status quo and emphasizes avoiding risks (Schwartz, 2012). Given that universal and unconditional are deviant terms in relation to policy programs, the following relations are expected:

**H10:** Individuals who value security do not support universal policy programs

**H11:** Individuals who value security do not support unconditional policy programs

It is expected that individuals who value security, support none of the characteristics of a basic income scheme. Although there is no hard evidence to suggest that this leads to negative reactions to a basic income scheme, the following relation is expected:

**H12:** Individuals who value security do not support a basic income scheme

### **Demographic characteristics**

According to Gilens (1995), support for welfare state programs depends on socio-demographic disadvantages. These disadvantages are a result of socio-economic insecurity (Achterberg, Raven & Van der Veen, 2013). According to this study, socio-economic insecurity can be measured by the characteristics education, employment, household income and the risk of being unemployed in the next twelve months. According to the study of Hasenfeld & Rafferty (1989), socio-economic status is determined by the demographic

characteristics income, education, gender and race. Nowadays the characteristic race is no longer used. A substitute for race can be ethnicity (Cohn, 2015), but because this characteristic has not been mentioned in previous studies, it was not included in this study. Also ‘the risk of being unemployed in the next twelve months’ is speculative and not concrete. Therefore, the demographic characteristics that may be of influence in support towards a basic income scheme that are included in this study are: gender, education, employment and household income.

According to Hasenfeld & Rafferty (1989) and Huber & Form (1973), women are economically- and socially more vulnerable than men and are therefore more likely to support universal programmes with no conditions. Women have a greater self-interest, considering they need to use welfare benefits more often than others would (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003). According to the study of Arts & Gelissen (2001), women value equality concerning welfare state programs and men emphasize merit. Therefore, the following relations are expected:

**H13:** Women show more support for universal policy programs than men

**H14:** Women show more support for unconditional policy programs than men

It is expected that women support both characteristics of a basic income scheme. Although there is no hard evidence to suggest that this leads to support for a basic income scheme, the following relation is expected:

**H15:** Women show more support for a basic income scheme than men

The study of Achterberg, Raven & Van der Veen (2013) showed that education plays a big role in defining someone’s economic insecurity. Hasenfeld & Rafferty (1989) showed that individuals with a lower education are socially and economically vulnerable and more likely to support universal and unconditional policy programs. Therefore, the following relations are expected:

**H16:** Individuals with a lower education show more support for universal policy programs than individuals with a higher education

**H17:** Individuals with a lower education show more support for unconditional policy programs than individuals with a higher education



It is expected that individuals with a lower education support the characteristics of a basic income scheme. Although there is no hard evidence to suggest that this leads to support for a basic income scheme, the following relation is expected:

**H18:** Individuals with a lower education show more support for a basic income scheme than individuals with a higher education

Blekesaune & Quadagno (2003) demonstrate that people who are unemployed or have been unemployed are more willing to share risks. According to this study, people who are unemployed think it is the responsibility of the state to make sure everybody reaches an acceptable standard of living. Therefore the following relations are expected:

**H19:** Individuals that are unemployed show more support for universal policy programs than individuals that are not unemployed

**H20:** Individuals that are unemployed show more support for unconditional policy programs than individuals that are not unemployed

It is expected individuals that are unemployed support the characteristics of a basic income scheme. Although there is no hard evidence to suggest that this leads to support for a basic income scheme, the following relation is expected:

**H21:** Individuals that are unemployed show more support for a basic income scheme than individuals that are not unemployed

Hasenfeld & Rafferty (1989) showed that household income is a key predictor to measure support for policy programs. This study showed that people with a low income are more likely to support programs that have no conditions and requirements and are more willing to share risks with others. Therefore, the following relations are expected:

**H22:** Individuals with a low income show more support for universal policy programs than individuals with a high income

**H23:** Individuals with a low income show more support for unconditional policy programs than individuals with a high income

It is expected that individuals with a low income support the characteristics of a basic income scheme. Although there is no hard evidence to suggest that this leads to support for a basic income scheme, the following relation is expected:

**H24:** Individuals with a low income show more support for a basic income scheme than individuals with a high income

Both values and demographic characteristics are independent variables in this study. To ensure clarity, the conceptual model is explained in two figures. The first figure includes values and the second figure includes demographic characteristics (Figure 1 and figure 2):




Figure 1. Conceptual model with values as independent variable




Figure 2. Conceptual model with demographic characteristics as independent variable

### Research question

The central question that will be answered in this study is: *What is the influence of values and demographic characteristics on the support for a basic income scheme and its characteristics?*

## Methods

### Research strategy

For this study, data is retrieved from the European Social Survey (ESS) – round 8, 2016. The ESS is a cross-national survey that has been deducted every two years since 2001. The survey measures attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns in more than thirty nations by carrying out face-to-face interviews (European Social Survey, n.d.). This dataset is freely accessible.

**Participants.** For this study, all participants of the Dutch dataset of the ESS are included. This is a sample size of  $n = 1681$ . The respondents are aged 15 and over (no upper

age limit) and are selected by strictly random probability methods (European Social Survey, n.d.).

### **Dependent variables**

**Support for a basic income scheme.** The support for introducing a basic income scheme in the Netherlands is measured by posing the following question in the survey: “*A basic income scheme includes all of the following: The government pays everyone a monthly income to cover essential living costs. - It replaces many other social benefits. - The purpose is to guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living. - Everyone receives the same amount regardless of whether or not they are working. - People also keep the money they earn from work or other sources. - This scheme is paid for by taxes. Overall, would you be against or in favour of having this scheme in the Netherlands?*” This question could be answered with strongly against (1) to strongly in favour (4).

**Universal.** Universal is measured by using the following items: ‘*For a fair society, differences in standard of living should be small*’, ‘*Government should reduce differences in income levels*’ and ‘*Large differences in income are acceptable for rewarding talents and efforts.*’ The questions could be answered by a 5-point Likert scale from Agree strongly (1) to Disagree strongly (5). The question ‘Large differences in income acceptable for rewarding talents and efforts’ is rescaled from 1 → 5 and 5 → 1. A subscale of universal is formed where the average of the items is taken into account. A principal component analysis was conducted on the three items with ProMax rotation. The three items are clustered around 1 factor. This factor accounts for around 64% of the variance in the questionnaire data. Furthermore, the reliability of the subscale universal is high with a Cronbach’s alpha of .72.

**Unconditional.** Unconditional is measured by using the following items: ‘*Imagine someone who is unemployed and looking for work. This person was previously working but lost their job and is now receiving unemployment benefit. What do you think should happen to this person’s unemployment benefit if... ..they turn down a job because it pays a lot less than they earned previously?*’, ‘*... they turn down a job because it needs a much lower level of education than the person has?*’ and ‘*... they refuse to regularly carry out unpaid work in the area where they live in return for unemployment benefit?*’. The questions are measured ordinally from Should lose all unemployment benefit (1) to Should keep all unemployment benefit (5). A subscale of unconditional is formed where the average of the items is taken into account. A principal component analysis was conducted on the three items with ProMax rotation. The three items are clustered around 1 factor. This factor accounts for around 66% of

the variance in the questionnaire data. Furthermore, the reliability of the subscale universal is high with a Cronbach's alpha of .74.

### **Independent variables**

Both values and demographic characteristics are included in this study as independent variables. It has been decided to use demographic characteristics as independent variables and not as a control variable to see if demographic characteristics can be interpreted as self-interest in receiving a basic income scheme, regardless of someone's values.

**Values.** In collaboration with ESS, Schwartz (2008) has made subscales of his ten basic values. Four of these subscales were meant to be included in this study. However, the reliability of these subscales are too low, varying between .3 and .6. According to Schwartz (2006), this is because he uses two items to measure each value, with exception of the three items for the value universal protection. Schwartz (2006) argues that it is equally important to select items to maximize coverage of the conceptual components of each value. Despite the low reliabilities, he argues that these scales are a good predictor for behaviour and attitudes. When looking at the selected items for each subscale, I do not agree with the fact that these items represent the values in a proper way. The poor representation in combination with the low reliability of the scales affects the quality of this study. It is attempted to create new subscales with the items which measures values. Unfortunately, creating new subscales did not lead to a higher reliability score. For that reason, it has been decided to use individual items to represent each value.

**Self-direction.** Self-direction consists of the item *'It is important to make your own decisions'*.

**Universal protection.** This value consists of the item: *'It is important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities.'*

**Benevolence.** This value consists of the item: *'It is important to help people and care for others wellbeing'*.

**Security.** This value consists of the item: *'It is important to live in a secure and safe surrounding'*.

The questions are measured ordinally from 'Very much like me (1) to Not like me at all (6).

### **Demographic characteristics.**

**Gender.** Gender is a nominal variable which can only be answered by Male (1) or Female (2).

**Highest level of education.** Highest level of education is measured nominally with 18 different levels, starting with Basisschool niet afgemaakt (1) to Doctoraat (18). For this study, these answer options are merged into two categories: low- and high education. In this study, individuals with a lower education level are seen as individuals that, according to the Central Bureau for Statistics (2018b), have enjoyed a lower or middle high education. The highest level of education of these individuals is mbo level 4. The category 'Low education' (1) consists of answer options 1 to 11. The category 'High education' (2) consists of answer options 12 to 18.

**Employment.** Employment is a nominal variable which is measured by the following question: 'Are you in paid work?'. This question could be answered with In paid work (1) or Not in paid work (2).

**Household income.** Household income describes people's household total income, after tax- and compulsory deductions, from all sources. This amount is displayed in weekly, monthly or annual income. The answer options vary from 'lower than €13.200 per year' (1) to €60.100 or more per year (10). This variable is made into a dummy variable which measures a total household income that is below average and a total household income that is above average. The average household total net income in The Netherlands is between €28.000 and €30.000 a year (Central Bureau for Statistics, 2018a). Answer options 1 to 6 are considered as below average, and answer options 7 to 10 are considered as above average.

### Data analysis

The data is analysed with IBM SPSS Statistics version 25. To estimate if the proportion of variance for support for universal policy programs, unconditional policy programs and a basic income scheme can be accounted by values and demographic characteristics, and to assess the size and direction of the variables, standard multiple regression analyses (MRA) are performed.

**Assumptions.** Prior to interpreting the results of the MRA, several assumptions were evaluated. Every variable in the regression was normally distributed. The assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity of residuals are met. The Mahalanobis distance did exceed the critical  $\chi^2$  for  $df = 4$  (at  $\alpha = .001$ ) of 18.467 when values were included in the regression model. After deleting the multivariate outliers in the data file, the Mahalanobis distance did not exceed the critical  $\chi^2$  value anymore. When including the demographic characteristics in the regression model, the Mahalanobis distance did not exceed the critical  $\chi^2$

value for any cases in the data file, indicating that multivariate outliers were not a concern. The relatively high tolerances for all predictors in the regression model indicates that multicollinearity would not interfere with our ability to interpret the outcome of the MRA.

## Results

### Descriptive

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of each variable that is used in this study. The sample size consists of 1681 respondents. It was not mandatory to answer every question in the questionnaire. For that reason, the number of respondents differs for each question. The items that belong to the scale ‘unconditional’, are presented through randomization to 1/4<sup>th</sup> of the participants. This sample size consists of 404 participants, which is acceptable and representative at a reliability level of 95% (Surveyssystem, n.d.).

The total sample size consists of 753 males (44,7%) and 929 females (55,3%). This is a good representation of the Dutch population (Central Bureau for Statistics, 2018c). From these participants, 1105 respondents (66%) have a low level of education and 570 respondents (34%) have a high level of education. The Dutch population consists of 30% high educated individuals and 70% low educated individuals (Central Bureau for Statistics, 2018b). Therefore, the sample size is a good representation of the Dutch population. There is no significant difference between participants with paid work and participants without paid work: 850 respondents (50,6%) have paid work, whereas 831 participants (49,4%) do not have paid work. According to the Central Bureau for Statistics (2019), 68,6% of Dutch citizens older than 15 years old, have paid work. This indicates that the sample size consists of a higher number of individuals without paid work than the Dutch population. Most participants have a household income below average: 972 participants (65,4%) have a household income varying from below €13,200 to €28,700 per year, while 514 participants (34,6) have a household income varying from €28,700 to more than €60,100 per year. This is a good representation of the Dutch population, in which 63,2% of the citizens have a household income below average and 36,8% of the citizens have a household income above average (Central Bureau for Statistics, 2018d).

Table 1

*Descriptive of all variables*

<b>Variables</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Min.</b>	<b>Max.</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>
<b>Gender</b> (ref. male)	1681	0	1	.55	.50
<b>Education level</b> (ref. no starters qualification)	1675	0	1	.34	.47
<b>Employment</b> (ref. in paid work)	1681	0	1	.49	.50
<b>Household income</b> (ref. below average)	1486	0	1	.34	.48
<b>Support for basic income</b>	1593	0	3	1,48	.74
<b>Universal</b>	1679	1	4,67	2,62	.50
<b>Unconditional</b>	404	1	4	2,62	.80
<b>Self-direction</b>	1671	1	6	1,90	.87
<b>Benevolence</b>	1669	1	6	2,06	.79
<b>Security</b>	1666	1	6	2,80	1.24
<b>Universal protection</b>	1672	1	6	2,05	.86

### **The relation between values and support for a universal policy program, unconditional policy program and for a basic income scheme**

In combination, the values self-direction, universal protection, benevolence and security accounted for a significant 4,4% of the variability of support for universal policy programs,  $R^2 = .044$ ,  $F(4,1376) = 15,61$ ,  $p < .001$ . The values self-direction, universal protection, benevolence and security accounted for a non-significant 1,2% of the variability of support for unconditional policy programs,  $R^2 = .012$ ,  $F(4,327) = 1.02$ ,  $p = .399$ . The values self-direction, universal protection, benevolence and security accounted for a significant 2,2% of the variability of support for a basic income scheme,  $R^2 = .022$ ,  $F(4,1309) = 7,17$ ,  $p < .001$ . Unstandardized and standardised regression coefficients, and squared semi-partial correlations are reported in Table 2.



**Self-direction.** Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals who value self-direction support universal policy programs’ (H1) showed that there is a significant relation between individuals who value self-direction and showing no support for universal policy programs, :  $b = -.04$ ,  $t(1372) = -2,13$ ,  $p = .03$ . This rejects H1, which poses that individuals who value self-direction support universal policy programs. Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals who value self-direction support unconditional policy programs’ (H2) showed that there is no relation between self-direction and support for unconditional policy programs,  $b = .06$ ,  $t(322) = 1,11$ ,  $p = .27$ . This rejects H2, which poses that individuals who value self-direction support unconditional policy programs. Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals who value self-direction support a basic income scheme’(H3) showed that there is a significant relation between self-direction and support for a basic income scheme,  $b = .06$ ,  $t(1304) = 2,27$ ,  $p = .02$ . This confirms H3, which poses that individuals who value self-direction support a basic income scheme.

**Universal protection.** Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals who value universal protection support universal policy programs’ (H4) showed that there is a significant relation between universal protection and support for universal policy programs,  $b = .10$ ,  $t(1372) = 5,25$ ,  $p < .001$ . This confirms H4, which poses that individuals who value self-direction support universal policy programs. Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals who value universal protection support unconditional policy programs’ (H5) showed that there is no relation between universal protection and support for unconditional policy programs,  $b = -.07$ ,  $t(322) = -1,19$ ,  $p = .24$ . This rejects H5, which poses that individuals who value universal protection support unconditional policy programs. Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals who value universal protection support a basic income scheme’ (H6) showed that individuals who value universal protection show no support for a basic income scheme,  $b = -.14$ ,  $t(1304) = 4,66$ ,  $p < .001$ . This rejects H6, which poses that individuals who value universal protection support a basic income scheme.

**Benevolence.** Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals who value benevolence do not support universal policy programs’ (H7) showed that there is no relation between benevolence and support for universal policy programs,  $b = .02$ ,  $t(1372) = 1,26$ ,  $p = .21$ . This rejects H7, which poses that individuals who value benevolence do not support universal policy programs. Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals who value benevolence do not support unconditional policy programs’ (H8) showed that there is no relation between benevolence and support for unconditional policy programs,  $b = .09$ ,  $t(322) = 1,43$ ,  $p = .15$ . This rejects H8, which poses that individuals who value benevolence do not support unconditional policy

programs. Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals who value benevolence do not support a basic income scheme’ (H9) showed that there is no relation between benevolence and support for a basic income scheme,  $b = .05$ ,  $t(1304) = 1,74$ ,  $p = .08$ . This rejects H9, which poses that individuals who value benevolence do not support a basic income scheme.

**Security.** Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals who value security do not support universal policy programs’ (H10) showed that there is a positive relation between security and support for universal policy programs,  $b = .06$ ,  $t(1374) = 4,06$ ,  $p < .001$ . This rejects H10, which poses that individuals who value security do not support universal policy programs. Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals who value security do not support unconditional policy programs’ (H11) showed that there is no relation between security and support for unconditional policy programs,  $b = -.02$ ,  $t(322) = -.350$ ,  $p = .73$ . This rejects H11, which poses that individuals who value security do not support unconditional policy programs. Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals who value security do not support a basic income scheme’ (H12) showed that there is a positive relation between security and support for a basic income scheme,  $b = .06$ ,  $t(1304) = 2,19$ ,  $p = .03$ . This rejects H12, which poses that individuals who value security do not support a basic income scheme.

Table 2

*Linear model of values as predictor of support for universal policy programs, unconditional policy programs and for a basic income scheme.*

Variables	Universal (N = 1376)			Unconditional (N = 327)			Support for a basic income scheme (N = 1309)		
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	$\beta$	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	$\beta$	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	$\beta$
Constant	2.27	.06		2,48	.20		1,42	.09	
Self-direction	-.04*	.02	-.06	.06	.06	.06	.06*	.03	-.14
Universal protection	.10***	.02	.15	-.07	.06	-.07	-.14***	.03	.06
Benevolence	.02	.02	.04	.09	.07	.08	.05	.03	.05
Security	.06***	.01	.11	-.02	.05	-.02	.06*	.03	.06
R <sup>2</sup>	.044***			.012			.022***		
F	15,61			1,02			7,17		

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

### **The relation between demographic characteristics and support for a universal policy program, unconditional policy program and a basic income scheme**

In combination, the characteristics gender, employment, education level and household income accounted for a significant 5,6% of the variability of support for universal welfare state programs,  $R^2 = .056$ ,  $F(4,1482) = 22,12$ ,  $p < .001$ . The characteristics gender, education level, employment and household income accounted for a significant 4,5% of the variability of support for unconditional welfare state programs,  $R^2 = .045$ ,  $F(4,356) = 4,13$ ,  $p = .003$ . The characteristics gender, employment, education level and household income accounted for a significant 1,7% of the variability of support for a basic income scheme,  $R^2 = .017$ ,  $F(4,1419) = 6,26$ ,  $p < .001$ . Unstandardized and standardised regression coefficients, and squared semi-partial correlations are reported in Table 3.

**Gender.** Results of the hypothesis ‘women show more support for universal policy programs than men’ (H13) showed that there is no relation between gender and support for universal welfare state programs,  $b = -.006$ ,  $t(1478) = -.22$ ,  $p = .82$ . This result rejects H13, which poses that women show more support for universal welfare state programs than men. Results of the hypothesis ‘women show more support for unconditional welfare state programs’ (H14) showed that there is no relation between gender and support for unconditional welfare state programs,  $b = .09$ ,  $t(352) = -1,01$ ,  $p = .31$ . This rejects H14, which poses that women show more support for unconditional welfare state programs than men. Results of the hypothesis ‘women show more support for a basic income scheme than men’ (H15) showed the there is no relation between gender and support for a basic income scheme,  $b = .04$ ,  $t(1414) = .97$ ,  $p = .33$ . This rejects H15, which poses that women show more support for a basic income scheme than men.

**Education level.** Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals with a lower education show more support for universal policy programs than individuals with a higher education’ (H16) showed that there is a significant relation between individuals with a higher education and support for universal welfare state programs,  $b = .06$ ,  $t(1478) = 2,25$ ,  $p = .02$ . This rejects H16, which poses that individuals with a lower education show more support for universal welfare state programs. Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals with a lower education show more support for unconditional welfare state programs’ (H17) showed that there is a significant relation between individuals with a higher education and support for unconditional welfare state programs,  $b = .36$ ,  $t(352) = 3,82$ ,  $p < .001$ . This rejects H17, which poses that individuals with a lower education show more support for unconditional welfare state programs. Results of the hypothesis ‘individuals with a lower education show more support

for a basic income scheme than individuals with a higher education' (H18) showed that there is a significant relation between individuals with a higher education and support for a basic income scheme,  $b = .15$ ,  $t(1414) = 3,4$ ,  $p = .001$ . This rejects H18, which poses that individuals with a lower education show more support for a basic income scheme than individuals with a higher education.

**Employment.** Results of the hypothesis 'individuals that are unemployed show more support for universal policy programs than individuals that are not unemployed' (H19) showed that there is a significant relation between employment and support for universal welfare state programs,  $b = -.09$ ,  $t(1478) = -.3,56$ ,  $p < .001$ . This confirms H19, which poses that individuals that are unemployed support a basic income scheme. Results of the hypothesis 'individuals that are unemployed show more support for unconditional policy programs than individuals that are not unemployed' (H20) demonstrate that there is no relation between employment and support for unconditional welfare state programs,  $b = .09$ ,  $t(352) = .98$ ,  $p = .33$ . This rejects H20, which poses that individuals that are unemployed show more support for unconditional welfare state programs. Results of the hypothesis 'individuals that are unemployed show more support for a basic income scheme than individuals that are not unemployed' (H21) demonstrate that there is a significant relation between employment and support for a basic income scheme,  $b = -.08$ ,  $t(1414) = -2,01$ ,  $p = .04$ . This confirms H21, which poses that individuals that are unemployed show more support for a basic income scheme than individuals that are employed.

**Household income.** Results of the hypothesis 'individuals with a low income show more support for universal policy programs than individuals with a high income' (H22) showed that there is a significant relation between individuals with a high income and support for universal welfare state programs,  $b = .17$ ,  $t(1478) = 5,90$ ,  $p < .001$ . This rejects H22, which poses that individuals with a low income show more support for universal welfare state programs than individuals with a high income. Results of the hypothesis 'individuals with a low income show more support for unconditional programs than individuals with a high income' (H23) showed that there is no relation between employment and support for unconditional welfare state programs,  $b = -.07$ ,  $t(352) = -.65$ ,  $p = .52$ . This rejects H23, which poses that individuals with a low income show more support for unconditional welfare state programs than individuals with a high income. Results of the hypothesis 'individuals with a low income show more support for a basic income scheme than individuals with a high income' (H24) showed that there is a significant relation between household income and support for a basic income scheme,  $b = -.18$ ,  $t(1414) = -4,07$ ,  $p < .001$ . This confirms H24,

which poses that individuals with a low income show more support for a basic income scheme than people with a high income.

Table 3

*Linear model of demographic characteristics as predictor of support for universal policy programs, unconditional policy programs and for a basic income scheme.*

Variables	Universal (N = 1482)			Unconditional (N = 356)			Support for a basic income scheme (N = 1419)		
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	$\beta$	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	$\beta$	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	$\beta$
Constant	2.57	.03		2,4	.09		1,51	.04	
Gender <sup>a</sup>	-.006	.03	-.006	.09	.09	.06	.04	.04	.03
Education level <sup>b</sup>	.06*	.03	.06	.36***	.10	.21	.15**	.04	.07
Employment <sup>c</sup>	-.09***	.03	-.09	.09	.09	.05	-.08*	.04	-.06
Household income <sup>d</sup>	.17***	.03	.17	-.07	.10	-.04	-.18***	.05	-.12
R <sup>2</sup>	.056***			.045*			.017***		
F	22,12			4,13			6,26		

*Note.* <sup>a</sup> 0 = male; 1 = female, <sup>b</sup> 0 = low/medium educated; 1 = high educated, <sup>c</sup> 0 = in paid work; 1 = not in paid work, <sup>d</sup> 0 = below average, 1 = above average

\*  $\rho < .05$ ; \*\*  $\rho < .01$ , \*\*\* $\rho < .001$ .

## Discussion

The main question posed in this study is: *What is the influence of values and demographic characteristics on the support for a basic income scheme and its characteristics?*

The results show that support for the characteristics of a basic income scheme are not entirely related to the support for a basic income scheme. Nevertheless, there are some values and demographic characteristics that are possible predictors for support for a basic income scheme. Regarding values as predictor, there are indications that individuals who value self-direction would support a basic income scheme. The expectation that individuals who think it is important to make their own decisions to support a basic income scheme, is in line with

these results. However, the results show that individuals who value self-direction are not likely to support universal policy programs. These results are not in line with the study of Schwartz (2012) which indicates that self-direction emphasizes the same interest as universal policy programs. A reason for these conflicting results can be found in the definitions of these programs. The definition of a basic income scheme is positively framed and emphasizes individual gains. The definition of universal policy programs is framed as equalisation concerning income. It may be possible that individuals who value self-direction may want an acceptable standard of living for all citizens, but this does not mean that everything should be equal to the point where their own situation will worsen. Although it was expected that individuals who value universal protection support universal policy programs and a basic income scheme, the results indicate an opposite effect. The results show that individuals who think it is important that people are treated equally, are in favour of universal policy programs, but are not likely to support a basic income scheme. An explanation can be that individuals who value universal protection argue that a basic income scheme does not provide full protection because it only ensures a minimal level of income protection. Another unexpected result is that individuals who value security, support universal policy programs and a basic income scheme. Previous literature showed that individuals who think it is important to live in a secure and safe environment would avoid risks and think it is important to maintain the status quo, and therefore would not support universal policy programs and a basic income scheme (Schwartz, 2012). However, these results show that there are indications that the opposite is the case. A possible explanation for these results can be that individuals who value security think protection of all citizens is more important than maintaining the status quo.

Regarding demographic characteristics as predictor, there are indications that individuals who do not have paid work, and have a household income that is below average, are more likely to support a basic income scheme than individuals with paid work and a household income above average. In addition, there are indications that individuals with a higher level of education are more supportive of a basic income scheme and basic income's characteristics universal and unconditional than, individuals with a lower level of education. An explanation may be that even though a lot of studies showed that individuals with a low education level are supportive of a basic income scheme, the study of Achterberg & Reeskens (2016) shows that a big part of this group has strong reservations. According to Achterberg & Reeskens (2016), this can be explained by their strong work ethic and critical view of welfare state institutions.

To conclude, individuals who value self-direction and security are more likely to support a basic income scheme and individuals who value universal protection are not likely to support a basic income scheme. Although it was expected that individuals with socio-economic disadvantages would support a basic income scheme, this study showed that this is not entirely the case. Individuals with a higher level of education are more likely to support a basic income scheme than individuals with a lower level of education.

This is the first study that looks at the determinants of support for a basic income scheme. The number of participants and the representativeness of the sample size is a strength in this study. Despite the fact that this study has great added value for gaining insight in the public opinion and future for a basic income scheme, there are a few limitations. Because of the fact that no earlier study has been conducted about the determinants of support for a basic income scheme, working with existing limited data was very challenging. There are two datasets that contain the subject of a basic income scheme. The first dataset is presented by Dalia Research (2016). This dataset is very brief and only measures support for a basic income scheme in combination with a few demographic characteristics. The second dataset is the European Social Survey (2016), which has been used for this study. Because of the poor representation and reliability of value scales computed by Schwartz (2012), these scales had to be adjusted. By using only one item for each value, the representation of each value can be questionable. For future research, it is recommendable to use specific data concerning a basic income scheme. Despite the fact that the dataset was limited, this study has laid the foundation for understanding the determinants of support for a basic income scheme. From here it may be interesting to explore if values and support for a basic income scheme are related to political preference. This can be of great added value for political parties in order to understand their supporters' ideologies concerning the introduction of a basic income scheme.

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## Appendix: Syntax

\* Encoding: UTF-8.

### GET

```
FILE='C:\Users\steff\OneDrive\Documenten\ESS8NL.sav'.
DATASET NAME DataSet2 WINDOW=FRONT.
```

\*Starten dataset\*

```
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
```

\*De vraag 'large differences should be rewarded' ompolen\*

```
RECODE dfincac (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) INTO Largedifferences.
VARIABLE LABELS Largedifferences 'Large differences omgepoold'.
EXECUTE.
```

\*Factoranalyse en betrouwbaarheid voor kenmerk 'universal' van een BI\*

### FACTOR

```
/VARIABLES gincdif smdfslv dfincac
/MISSING LISTWISE
/ANALYSIS gincdif smdfslv dfincac
/PRINT INITIAL CORRELATION SIG DET KMO AIC EXTRACTION ROTATION
/FORMAT SORT BLANK(.30)
/PLOT EIGEN ROTATION
/CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25)
/EXTRACTION PAF
/CRITERIA ITERATE(25)
/ROTATION PROMAX(4)
/METHOD=CORRELATION.
```

### RELIABILITY

```
/VARIABLES=smdfslv gincdif dfincac
/SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL
/MODEL=ALPHA
/STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR
/SUMMARY=TOTAL.
```

\*Factoranalyse en betrouwbaarheid voor kenmerk 'unconditional' van een BI \*

**FACTOR**

```

/VARIABLES ubpay ubedu ubunp
/MISSING LISTWISE
/ANALYSIS ubpay ubedu ubunp
/PRINT INITIAL CORRELATION SIG DET KMO AIC EXTRACTION ROTATION
/FORMAT SORT BLANK(.30)
/PLOT EIGEN ROTATION
/CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25)
/EXTRACTION PC
/CRITERIA ITERATE(25)
/ROTATION PROMAX(4)
/METHOD=CORRELATION.

```

**RELIABILITY**

```

/VARIABLES=ubpay ubedu ubunp
/SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL
/MODEL=ALPHA
/STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR
/SUMMARY=TOTAL.

```

\*Rename human values van Schwartz\*

**RENAME VARIABLES**

```

(ipcrtiv=v1)
(imprich=v2)
(ipeqopt=v3)
(ipshabt=v4)
(impsafe=v5)
(impdiff=v6)
(ipfrule=v7)
(ipudrst=v8)
(ipmodst=v9)
(ipgdtim=v10)
(impfree=v11)
(iphlpl=v12)
(ipsuces=v13)
(ipstrgv=v14)
(ipadvnt=v15)
(ipbhprp=v16)
(iprspot=v17)
(iplylfr=v18)
(impenv=v19)
(imptrad=v20)
(impfun=v21)

```

\*Samenvoegen variabelen humvan values van Schwartz\*

```

COMPUTE mrat = MEAN(v1 to v21) .
EXECUTE .
COMPUTE SEcenter = MEAN(v5, v14) - mrat .
EXECUTE .
COMPUTE COcenter = MEAN(v7, v16) - mrat .
EXECUTE .
COMPUTE TRcenter = MEAN(v9, v20) - mrat .
EXECUTE .
COMPUTE BEcenter = MEAN(v12, v18) - mrat .
EXECUTE .
COMPUTE UNcenter = MEAN(v3, v8, v19) - mrat .
EXECUTE .
COMPUTE SDcenter = MEAN(v1, v11) - mrat .
EXECUTE .
COMPUTE STcenter = MEAN(v6, v15) - mrat .
EXECUTE .
COMPUTE HEcenter = MEAN(v10, v21) - mrat .
EXECUTE .
COMPUTE ACcenter = MEAN(v4, v13) - mrat .
EXECUTE .
COMPUTE POcenter = MEAN(v2, v17) - mrat .
EXECUTE .

```

\*Compute samenvoegen eigenschappen basic income (unconditional & universal)\*

```

COMPUTE UniveralBI=MEAN(Largedifferences,gincdif,smdfslv).
EXECUTE.

```

```

COMPUTE UnconditionalBI=MEAN(ubpay,ubedu,ubunp).
EXECUTE.

```

\* Voor de vraag 'agree or against a basic income scheme' een dummy variabele aangemaakt\*

```

RECODE basinc (1=0) (2=1) (3=2) (4=3) INTO Bldummy.
EXECUTE.

```

\*Dummy variabelen maken van characteristics unconditional en universal BI\*

```

RECODE UniveralBI (1=0) (2=1) (3=2) (4=3) (5=4) INTO UniveralBldummy.
EXECUTE.

```

```

RECODE UnconditionalBI (1=0) (2=1) (3=2) (4=3) (5=4) INTO UnconditionalBldummy.
EXECUTE.

```

\*Dummies maken van demographic characteristics\*

\*Gender in male = 0 en female = 1\*

```

RECODE Genderdummy (1=0) (2=1).
EXECUTE.

```

\*Control paid work in the last 7 days: 0 = yes, 1 = no\*

**RECODE** crpdwk (1=0) (2=1).  
**EXECUTE.**

\*Betrouwbaarheid checken van de vier human values van Schwartz\*

#### RELIABILITY

```
/VARIABLES=v8 v19 v3
/SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL
/MODEL=ALPHA
/STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR
/SUMMARY=TOTAL.
```

#### RELIABILITY

```
/VARIABLES=v18 v12
/SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL
/MODEL=ALPHA
/STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR
/SUMMARY=TOTAL.
```

#### RELIABILITY

```
/VARIABLES=v14 v5
/SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL
/MODEL=ALPHA
/STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR
/SUMMARY=TOTAL.
```

#### RELIABILITY

```
/VARIABLES=v1 v11
/SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL
/MODEL=ALPHA
/STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR
/SUMMARY=TOTAL.
```

\*Dummy gemaakt van modaal inkomen (0 = onder modaal en 1 = boven modaal)\*

**RECODE** hinctnta (0 thru 6=0) (7 thru 10=1) **INTO** Modaalinkomen.  
**VARIABLE LABELS** Modaalinkomen 'Modaal inkomen'.  
**EXECUTE.**

\*Education level in 2 categorieen (0 = low en 1 = high)\*

**RECODE** edlvenl (1 thru 11=0) (12 thru 18=1) **INTO** HighestEducationNetherlands.  
**VARIABLE LABELS** HighestEducationNetherlands 'Education level Netherlands'.  
**EXECUTE.**

\*Gender in dummies\*

```
RECODE gndr (1=0) (2=1) INTO Gender1.
VARIABLE LABELS Gender1 'Gender'.
EXECUTE.
```

\*Dummy gemaakt van paid work (0 = paid work en 1 = not in paid work)\*

```
RECODE icpdwrk (1=0) (2=1) INTO PaidWork.
VARIABLE LABELS PaidWork 'Employment'.
EXECUTE.
```

\* Custom Tables Gender & BI\*\*

#### CTABLES

```
/VARIABLES VARIABLES=Bldummy Gender1 DISPLAY=LABEL
/TABLE Bldummy [C] BY Gender1 [C][COLPCT.COUNT PCT40.1]
/CATEGORIES VARIABLES=Bldummy ORDER=A KEY=VALUE EMPTY=INCLUDE
/CATEGORIES VARIABLES=Gender1 ORDER=A KEY=VALUE EMPTY=EXCLUDE TOTAL=YES POSITION=AFTER
/CRITERIA CILEVEL=95.
```

\*Gender en BI correlatie\*

#### NONPAR CORR

```
/VARIABLES=Gender1 UnconditionalBI1
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.
```

#### NONPAR CORR

```
/VARIABLES=Gender1 Bldummy
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.
```

\*Education level & BI\*

#### NONPAR CORR

```
/VARIABLES=HighestEducationNetherlands UniveralBI
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.
```

#### NONPAR CORR

```
/VARIABLES=HighestEducationNetherlands UnconditionalBI1
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.
```

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=HighestEducationNetherlands Bldummy
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

\* Custom Tables Education level & BI\*

**CTABLES**

```

/VLABELS VARIABLES=Bldummy HighestEducationNetherlands DISPLAY=LABEL
/TABLE Bldummy [C] BY HighestEducationNetherlands [C][COUNT F40.0]
/CATEGORIES VARIABLES=Bldummy HighestEducationNetherlands ORDER=A KEY=VALUE EMPTY=INCLUDE
/CRITERIA CILEVEL=95.

```

\*Employment & BI\*

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=Bldummy Paidwork
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=Paidwork UniveralBI
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=Paidwork UnconditionalBI1
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

\* Custom Tables Employment en BI\*.

**CTABLES**

```

/VLABELS VARIABLES=Bldummy Paidwork DISPLAY=LABEL
/TABLE Bldummy [C][COLPCT.COUNT PCT40.1] BY Paidwork
/CATEGORIES VARIABLES=Bldummy Paidwork ORDER=A KEY=VALUE EMPTY=INCLUDE
/CRITERIA CILEVEL=95.

```

\*Income en BI\*

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=UniveralBI Modaalinkomen
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=Modaalinkomen UnconditionalBI1
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```



**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=Modaalinkomen Bldummy
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

\* Custom Tables Modaal inkomen & BI\*

**CTABLES**

```

/VLABELS VARIABLES=Bldummy Modaalinkomen DISPLAY=LABEL
/TABLE Bldummy [C][COUNT F40.0, COLPCT.COUNT PCT40.1] BY Modaalinkomen [C]
/CATEGORIES VARIABLES=Bldummy ORDER=A KEY=VALUE EMPTY=EXCLUDE TOTAL=YES POSITION=AFTER
/CATEGORIES VARIABLES=Modaalinkomen ORDER=A KEY=VALUE EMPTY=EXCLUDE
/CRITERIA CILEVEL=95.

```

\*Correlatie met nieuwe values + BI\*

\*Self-direction\*

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=UniveralBI v11
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=v11 UnconditionalBI1
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=v11 Bldummy
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

\*Universal protection\*

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=v3 UniveralBI
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=v3 UnconditionalBI1
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=v3 Bldummy
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

\*Benevolence\*

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=v12 UniveralBI
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=v12 UnconditionalBI1
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=v12 Bldummy
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

\*Security\*

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=v5 UniveralBI
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=v5 UnconditionalBI1
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

**NONPAR CORR**

```

/VARIABLES=v5 Bldummy
/PRINT=SPEARMAN ONETAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

\*Descriptives\*

```

DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Gender1 UniveralBI v3 v5 v11 v12 Modaalinkomen HighestEducationNetherlands Paidwork
UnconditionalBI1 Bldummy
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.

```

\*Frequencies van de demographic characteristics\*

```

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Gender1
/STATISTICS=STDDEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN MEDIAN MODE SUM
/BARCHART PERCENT
/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

```

```

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=HighestEducationNetherlands
/STATISTICS=STDDEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN MEDIAN MODE SUM
/BARCHART PERCENT
/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

```

```

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=PaidWork
/STATISTICS=STDDEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN MEDIAN MODE SUM
/BARCHART PERCENT
/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

```

```

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Modaalinkomen
/STATISTICS=STDDEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN MEDIAN MODE SUM
/BARCHART PERCENT
/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

```

```

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=UniveralBI UnconditionalBI1 Bldummy
/STATISTICS=STDDEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN MEDIAN MODE SUM
/BARCHART PERCENT

```

\*Regressie human values & BI\*

```

/REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL ZPP
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT UniveralBI
/METHOD=ENTER v5 v3 v12 v11
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED)
/RESIDUALS NORMPROB(ZRESID)
/SAVE MAHAL COOK.
ORDER=ANALYSIS.

```

\*Outliers gecheckd en verwijderd - voldoet verder aan assumpties\*

\*Regressie human values\*

**REGRESSION**

```

/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT UniveralBI
/METHOD=ENTER v3 v11 v12 v5
/PARTIALPLOT ALL
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED)
/RESIDUALS DURBIN HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) NORMPROB(ZRESID)
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(2)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER ZRESID DRESID SDRESID SDBETA SDFIT COVRATIO.

```

**REGRESSION**

```

/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT UnconditionalBI1
/METHOD=ENTER v3 v11 v12 v5
/PARTIALPLOT ALL
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED)
/RESIDUALS DURBIN HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) NORMPROB(ZRESID)
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(2)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER ZRESID DRESID SDRESID SDBETA SDFIT COVRATIO.

```

**REGRESSION**

```

/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT Bldummy
/METHOD=ENTER v3 v11 v12 v5
/PARTIALPLOT ALL
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED)
/RESIDUALS DURBIN HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) NORMPROB(ZRESID)
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(2)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER ZRESID DRESID SDRESID SDBETA SDFIT COVRATIO.

```

\*Regressie demographic characteristics\*

**REGRESSION**

```

/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT UniveralBI
/METHOD=ENTER Gender1 PaidWork HighestEducationNetherlands Modaalinkomen
/PARTIALPLOT ALL
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED)
/RESIDUALS DURBIN HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) NORMPROB(ZRESID)
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(2)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER ZRESID DRESID SDRESID SDBETA SDFIT COVRATIO.

```

**REGRESSION**

```

/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT UnconditionalBI1
/METHOD=ENTER Gender1 PaidWork HighestEducationNetherlands Modaalinkomen
/PARTIALPLOT ALL
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED)
/RESIDUALS DURBIN HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) NORMPROB(ZRESID)
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(2)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER ZRESID DRESID SDRESID SDBETA SDFIT COVRATIO.

```

**REGRESSION**

```

/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT Bldummy
/METHOD=ENTER Gender1 PaidWork HighestEducationNetherlands Modaalinkomen
/PARTIALPLOT ALL
/SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED)
/RESIDUALS DURBIN HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) NORMPROB(ZRESID)
/CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(2)
/SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER ZRESID DRESID SDRESID SDBETA SDFIT COVRATIO.

```