

# Statelessness, do you want to protect me?

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Explanations for the support of government  
policies to protect stateless people

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28th of June, 2019  
Wageningen

Statelessness, do you want to protect me? Explanations for the support of government policies to protect stateless people

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## Summary

In this thesis, policy preferences are measured regarding policies to protect stateless people in the Netherlands. The research questions were: “What explains support for statelessness protection in the Netherlands?” and “Do people support it more when it is presented as a human rights issue?” Four possible explanations for the support for statelessness protection are examined, each of these have a corresponding hypothesis.

The first hypothesis is: “Respondents who think more positively about immigration will be more likely to support government policy to protect the rights of stateless people.” Because the issue of statelessness is closely linked to immigration, for example because a portion of the stateless people in the Netherlands are immigrants (as shown in the theoretical framework), it can be expected that people’s opinions of these topics are linked.

The second hypotheses is: “When people have greater employment security they will be more likely to support government policy to protect the rights of stateless people.” The theory behind this is a broad range of literature about the influence of economic factors on immigration attitudes. And because the first hypotheses is that immigration attitudes and policy preferences for statelessness policies are linked to each other, the hypotheses is aimed at the policy preferences directly.

The third hypotheses is: “When people are worried less about crime they will be more likely to support government policy to protect the rights of stateless people.” Just as the prior hypotheses this hypothesis is aimed at the policy preferences of statelessness policies directly and that worry about crime has a influence on this is based on an article about the influence of worry about crime on immigration attitudes (Fitzgerald, Curtis, & Corliss, 2012).

The fourth hypotheses is: “Respondents exposed to the human rights frame will be more likely to support government policy to protect the rights of stateless people.” This hypothesis is linked to the second research question about presenting the issue as a human rights issue. This approach was taken into account, because framing effects are often studied and framing has much impact in many scientific studies.

To measure the policy preferences, a survey experiment was set out online to Dutch speaking people. No database of potential respondents was used, the respondents were mainly from the social network of the researcher. After some questions in the survey, a set of information was offered to the respondents. This was a randomly assigned set of information out of five sets. These sets were not equally shown. The last question was the question about the policy preferences regarding statelessness policies.

The results of the survey experiment are that only one hypotheses is supported, hypothesis one. This means that a relation is present between more positive attitudes towards immigration and support for government policy to protect the rights of stateless people.

Further, no significant relationships were present in the regression models. However, some suggestive evidence is present following the correlation matrixes. Following the significant relationships in these matrixes, it is expected that hypotheses three can be supported in future research. Also, another new relationship becomes apparent. How much people worry about crime and if they perceive their job as secure is positively correlated and that correlation is significant in the matrix where the 'N' is higher.

Another interesting result was that many people answered 'I don't know' on the question that asked to their policy preferences for policies to protect stateless people. Apparently the information offered was not enough to let them answer the question. It is interesting for future research to find out how people create policy preferences.

The answer to "What explains support for statelessness protection in the Netherlands?" is that although according to the theory four possible explanations could be found, for only one explanation is evidence. This supported explanation is that the immigration attitudes of the respondents have influence on their policy preferences regarding policies to protect stateless people. If somebody is more positive about immigration, it is likely that this person is also more positive about policies to protect stateless people. The second research question: "Do people support it more when it is presented as a human rights issue?" can be answered with a no. In the results no evidence was present to state that presenting the issue in a human rights frame would increase the support for policies to protect stateless people. Even though in scientific literature enough indications were present.

## **Foreword**

Before you lies the thesis report “Statelessness, do you want to protect me? Explanations for the support of government policies to protect stateless people” written as a graduation research of the master ‘Bestuur en beleid’ of Utrecht University in the Netherlands.

Before 2019, I had a list with possible topics for my thesis, of which statelessness was one. For another course, I chose to write an assignment about statelessness and it became clear to me that I wanted to write my thesis about it. Early on the topic was clear, only the angle from which I was going to approach statelessness was still to be determined. In the end, it developed into a research about policy preferences and the data was collected by a survey experiment.

Coming to this final version of this thesis cost me a lot of work and was difficult, but I would like to thank my supervisor Mallory for her feedback and support during these months. Further, I want to thank Harmen for his feedback on the proposal, survey and sets of information.

I also want to thank my boyfriend, family, friends and all other people who supported me through the process, gave me helpful ideas and feedback and/or helped me with my questions. And lastly, of course, all respondents of the survey and the people who even shared the survey with others.

Daphne Meijer,

Wageningen, 24<sup>th</sup> of June, 2019

## 1. Introduction

This thesis is about the policy preferences of individuals about policies for stateless people. Policy preferences are an important topic to study, because it is important to know what the opinion of the public is and policy preferences are important for the democratic system. Acting in the way the public wants is a form of legitimacy that is important for a democratic government. This can be seen in the following quote: "Democracy means a form of government in which, in contradistinction to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule" (Held, 1996, p. 1). Though Held (1996, pp. 1–2) shows that this phrase, that the people rule, is ambiguous. Who are the people and what does the ruling entail?

Still, it is clear by this quote that what the public thinks is important for a democracy, because they rule. The way the rule by the people is shaped can be different.

Statelessness is an interesting topic to apply the policy preferences on, because it is quite unknown (as explained in the problem statement) and is also a pressing issue. The Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, a convention aimed at ensuring that stateless persons will have access to 'a minimum set of human rights', is dating from 1954 (UNHCR, n.d.-g). In this Convention, stateless people are defined as followed: "For the purpose of this Convention, the term "stateless person" means a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law" (UNHCR, 1954). This is the legal definition of statelessness. Then in 1961, a second convention on the topic of stateless became apparent. This one was focused on preventing statelessness and to reduce it (UNHCR, n.d.-g). It is called Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (United Nations, 1961). Now, there are still millions of people stateless (UNHCR, n.d.-b) and it has many consequences in people's lives. It can be harder for people to work, travel, get medical assistance etc. (UNHCR, n.d.-b, 2010). Therefore, measuring policy preferences about this particular topic enhances the relevance.

An experimental survey is set out to see what has influence on the policy preferences regarding statelessness. The research questions are: "What explains support for statelessness protection in the Netherlands?" and "Do people support it more when it is presented as a human rights issue?" The goal of the thesis is therefore to find the factors that explain the support for statelessness protection in the Netherlands. To measure the policy preferences of the individuals a survey was set out. Not only a question about their policy preference of statelessness policies was asked, but also for example their opinion about immigration, their economic circumstances and their voting behaviour. The respondents were Dutch speaking people and only answers of respondents with the age of 18 and older were used. The survey was distributed online using different forms of social media, including WhatsApp, and email.

To measure the second research question, different sets of information were included in the survey. Some of the respondents received in their set of information a value frame about human rights which focused on the value of equality. All respondents were given neutral information about statelessness, because the topic is quite unknown. To rule out that the effect of the frame is not about the content, but because of the quantity of the information, additional neutral information for some groups was used to balance it out.

## **Relevance**

In the beginning of this introduction some considerations of the relevance of this project are already discussed. Some more points of relevance will be discussed below, followed with a short outline of the thesis.

To get back on the relevance of measuring policy preferences for the democratic system, in the Netherlands a parliamentary democracy is at place, elected representatives are present on different levels (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-c). It is expected that elected politicians respond to the public preferences, because the threat is present that the representatives will be punished electorally, as Hobolt & Klemmensen summarized from literature (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005, p. 380). But to act according to the will of the public, the public preferences should be known. As Gilens states (2005, p. 778), citizens being able to influence the policies is core to the democracy and in what extent this happens is an important factor when the quality of democratic governance is evaluated. Seeing if the opinion of the public is recognisable in the doings of a government can be captured in the term policy responsiveness, because that is what Hobolt and Klemmensen (2005, pp. 380, 388) tested in their model. In this model they used data on the policy preferences of the public and the government policy priorities in opening speeches of governments.

Further, to get back on the legitimacy of a government, this concept is also linked to the opinion of the public, for example in substantive legitimacy. Substantive legitimacy is simply said about the content of the policies and this content should match the ideas of the stakeholders and the public. The general sentiments in the society should fit the policies (Wallner, 2008, p. 424). The other form of legitimacy Wallner (2008) defined was procedural legitimacy, therefore it is one way of defining legitimacy. Another 'form' of legitimacy is democratic legitimacy. This form can be linked to the popular will, though Knight and Johnson have critique on this and state that constructing democratic legitimacy as popular will is misguided (Knight & Johnson, 1994, p. 283).

Still it is clear that throughout the political science, public opinion is deemed as important. For example, 'salience' is used for pinpointing which issues the voters think are important/what the importance of issues is for voters (Wlezien, 2005). It was often measured in scientific research,



as summarized in Wlezien (2005, p. 556).

Because of these many points of relevance, it is reasonable to focus on policy preferences. It will contribute to the scientific literature to find out which factors influence the policy preferences about statelessness policies and to see what these policy preferences are, because there is not much literature on statelessness.

Further, measuring policy preferences with the addition of using framing will lead to knowledge about framing effects on policy preferences. This is important, because knowledge about this possible effect can lead to a change in policy when an influential party can get the issue on the agenda using a frame. In this context, a human rights frame could have the consequence that people will be positive about more protective policies for stateless people. Change in policy is very welcome, because stateless people are not enjoying all their rights in the Netherlands (this will be explained in the problem statement).

What is interesting about this particular research is that the topic of the research is often unknown by people, they won't have many opinions about it already. As Chong and Druckman (2007) stated; people who know more about a subject will have a higher chance to have an already existent frame of reference and will be less vulnerable to other frames offered (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 121). Because statelessness is a quite unknown topic (as shown in the problem statement), a framing effect could be easier achieved than when a topic is better known. Thus, creating more knowledge about human rights frames and to what extent people react to human rights frames can contribute to the scientific debate about human rights and the persuasive powers of value frames, what gives even more relevance to this research approach. Lastly, about statelessness isn't much literature and therefore attaining knowledge about the opinions of regular citizens towards statelessness is a contribution to the literature about statelessness as a whole.

The next chapter is the problem statement. Here, more information about statelessness will be laid out as well as information about statelessness as a human rights problem and information about the unfamiliarity of the concept of statelessness. The following chapter is the theoretical framework in which the theory behind the four hypotheses will be discussed and the hypotheses will be introduced. In the methodology, the way the data collection was shaped will be presented, as well as some related issues such as the ethicality. Then in the next chapter, the results of the survey experiment will be shown. Also will be examined following the results of the analyses if the hypotheses are supported. Then the discussion, conclusion and recommendations are the following chapters. The thesis concludes with the bibliography and appendixes.

## 2. Problem statement

For measuring policy preferences, the problem of statelessness is an interesting topic to use. Statelessness can be the cause of many problems in a person's life. Let's take Anastasia as an example. She was stateless for 29 years, encountered many difficulties during her life because of her statelessness (UNHCR, n.d.-a). In a plane that flew from Russia to Uzbekistan she was born. During that time both countries belonged to the Soviet Union. When she was 14, she went to live in France. She couldn't continue her studies after her graduation exam due to being stateless, but she did training courses. When she gave birth to her daughter, the doctors didn't want to give her baby back to her, because she couldn't prove who she was. Luckily, her spouse could get the baby as he had a citizenship. Also her daughter and her second child became stateless, because of the statelessness of their mother. In 2008, she was officially recognised as stateless, but the official letter came by registered post. When she wanted to pick it up, it was denied, because she couldn't prove her identity. She asked for help to employees of the city hall who knew her personally in order to get the letter. In 2009, she was finally able to marry. Before that time, it was not allowed. In the end, Anastasia and her children received the French nationality in 2014 and the time of being stateless was finally over (UNHCR, n.d.-a).

The story of Anastasia shows the hardships a person can go through because of statelessness. As also stated in the human rights frame of the survey, it is possible that stateless people will have a harder time or are not able to travel, get a job, get medical help or open a bank account and more (UNHCR, n.d.-e, n.d.-b, 2010, p. 14, 2011, p. 12). As seen in the story of Anastasia, she was first not allowed to marry. This is also a possible consequence of statelessness (UNHCR, n.d.-e, n.d.-b, 2010).

There are multiple causes for statelessness. Among others they are: discriminatory laws of a country regarding passing on nationality and the emergence of new countries or change in borders and nationality laws that have gaps in them (UNHCR, n.d.-b). The Soviet Union is an example of a country that fell apart which led to many stateless people (Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, 2013, p. 37; Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, 2017, pp. 58, 73; Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2016, pp. 8-9; UNHCR, n.d.-c, p. 15). Also arbitrary deprivation is a cause of statelessness (Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, 2013, p. 27; *Handreiking Staatloosheid*, 2016 "2. Oorzaken van Staatloosheid"; PILP, n.d.-b).

By the 1961 Convention, an international framework was set up with the aim of safeguarding the people's right of a nationality. Important is that children should get the nationality of the country they are born in if no other country is granting them a nationality (UNHCR, n.d.-g). Further, it is interesting to note that there are also provisions placed to deprive a person his or

her nationality (UNHCR, n.d.-g).

Pushing back statelessness is important because millions of people are stateless. The total number of stateless people are estimated as 10 million people or more and one third or more than one third are children (Amnesty International, n.d.-a; Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2016, p. 13; PILP, n.d.-b; UNHCR, n.d.-c, p. 4, n.d.-e, n.d.-b, n.d.-f, n.d.-h, 2017b).

### **Statelessness in the Netherlands**

More than 4000 people are acknowledged as stateless by the Dutch government and there are 80.000 people who are registered as nationality unknown, including the people registered as stateless (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b). According to the Dutch government, most of these people listed as 'nationality unknown' have nationalities, but these people can't prove it (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b). The burden of proof to be acknowledged as stateless is severe according to a report of the UNHCR, while being acknowledged as stateless gives people more rights (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b; UNHCR, 2011, p. 1). People are registered with the label 'nationality unknown' if they can't prove they are stateless (UNHCR, 2011, pp. 1, 30, 34, 58). Also, there is no procedure to determine statelessness (UNHCR, n.d.-f). By having the status of 'nationality unknown', instead of 'stateless', the rights of the 1954 Convention are not applicable on these people (G.-R de Groot, as cited in UNHCR, 2011, p. 38; UNHCR, 2011, p. 1). It is estimated that 10.000 people are stateless in the Netherlands (UNHCR, 2017b).

The UNCHR advises the Netherlands to establish a procedure to determine if a person is stateless (UNHCR, 2011). By this procedure, it will be easier to ensure that stateless people will enjoy the rights set out in the 1954 Convention and it is needed to fulfil the duties as prescribed by this Convention (G.-R de Groot, as cited in UNHCR, 2011, p. 55; UNHCR "Stateless Determination Procedures and the Status of Stateless Persons", as cited in UNHCR, 2011, p. 59; UNHCR, 2011, pp. 1-3, 18, 55, 58-61). The site of the government states that they are working on a new legislative proposal to let statelessness be determined by a court (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b). Also in a report of the Ministry of Security and Justice (2016, p. 4) was the recommendation mentioned of the UNHCR to have a procedure to determine statelessness. And in this same report of the ministry was mentioned that a report of the Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken (2013) had this same advise and an additional recommendation of the Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken was stated (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2016, p. 4). In the report of the ministry the Netherlands was not named in the list of countries who has such a procedure, but in the conclusion is written about the procedure like it is already existent (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2016, pp. 20, 153-154). Still is mentioned in 2019 on the site of the government that they are working on the procedure (Government of the

Netherlands, n.d.-b).

There are more examples of the Netherlands not fully following up the Conventions of 1954 and 1961. The 1961 Convention speaks of 'habitual residence' as a possible prerequisite to grant a child the nationality of the country of birth when otherwise the child would be stateless, this refers to a "stable and factual residence" (UNHCR, n.d.-d, p. 9) and not to a situation in which there is 'lawful residence', which is defined, though in slightly other words, in a law of the Netherlands (UNHCR, 2011, pp. 47–48, 60).

The UNHCR recommends the Netherlands to give children born on Dutch soil Dutch citizenship if they would be stateless without it. The condition is that their parents must have durable or permanent residence in the Netherlands. This would fit the inclusive approach of Article 1 of the 1961 Convention (UNHCR, 2011, pp. 3, 50, 65). Further, even when people are stateless, they only have the right to get a residence permit when they can fulfil the conditions (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b). About stateless people who live here illegally is written by the government: "If no country is prepared to repatriate them, they may be eligible for a special permit, a 'no-fault residence permit'" (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b). Though the conditions for this 'no-fault residence permit' are very strict (UNHCR, 2011, pp. 4–5). Even when people were acknowledged as stateless by a governmental body, people had trouble with enjoying their rights (UNHCR, 2011, pp. 2, 60).

Bianchini (2017) made clear in her scientific article that all the EU-countries she revised are violating the commitments they accepted by ratifying the 1954 Convention (Bianchini, 2017, pp. 43, 83). One of them was the Netherlands (Bianchini, 2017).

Though the Netherlands is not violating the treaties in every way. An example of the Netherlands complying with the 1961 Convention is that the Dutch nationality won't be taken away from somebody if that would make the person stateless. The exception that is made is permissible according to the same Convention (UNHCR, 2011, pp. 53, 60).

But still, it is clear a lot of improvements can be made to protect this vulnerable group and to make sure that less people are stateless.

### **Statelessness as a Human Rights Problem**

Statelessness is a human rights problem. On the site of the OHCHR, The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, which is an UN entity, is stated that it is a human right to have a nationality (OHCHR, n.d.-a, n.d.-c). "It implies the right of each individual to acquire, change and retain a nationality" (OHCHR, n.d.-a). It is also stated in the 15<sup>th</sup> article of the Declaration of Human Rights. In the following article, number 16, is stated that men and women have the right to get married and that it shouldn't be hindered by among others nationality (although people

should be full of age) (*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, n.d.). This is interesting, because as stated in the problem statement, being stateless can have the consequence of not being able to marry. Conventions about statelessness also show that this problem is seen as important.

In scientific literature has been attention for statelessness as a human rights problem. Foster and Lambert (2016) wrote about statelessness as a human rights issue and used the ideas of Goodwin-Gill. They conclude that although more countries participate in the Conventions about statelessness by the leadership of the UNCHR, that this doesn't have to mean that the reality is improving. There is still a few domestic procedures to determine statelessness and nationality laws that violate the principle of no discrimination. But there is more attention for the issue and the time has come for statelessness as a human rights problem (Foster & Lambert, 2016, pp. 583–584).

The human rights have different underlying values. When looked at the Declaration of Human Rights itself, in the preamble is written: "Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, (...)" (*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, n.d.). Article 1 is the following: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood" (*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, n.d.). Additionally, most sentences of the Declaration state rights or freedoms which are for 'everyone', or 'no one' should not have this right. This seems to refer to the value of equality, because everyone has the same rights and the rights are equal and inalienable. Further, on the website of the OHCHR is stated about the human rights: "The principle of universality of human rights is the cornerstone of international human rights law" (OHCHR, n.d.-b). Additionally is written: "Non-discrimination is a cross-cutting principle in international human rights law" (OHCHR, n.d.-b). Interdependency, interrelatedness and indivisibility are also traits connected to the human rights. (OHCHR, n.d.-b). Also these sentences seem to refer to equal rights for everyone in the end, so shortly: equality.

### **The unfamiliarity with statelessness**

Although thousands are stateless in the Netherlands and being stateless gives them many hardships, the general public in the Netherlands doesn't know much about statelessness and generally there is not much attention for the topic. That there is not much attention for the topic can be seen by doing a basic search on the words 'staatloos' (stateless in Dutch) and 'stateeloos' (another spelling of the word stateless) on different sites of Dutch national newspapers. The outcomes are shown in Table 1.

**Table 1.**

*Amounts of articles of searches on 'staatloos' and 'stateloos', 15<sup>th</sup> of May 2019.*

	<b>Staatloos</b>	<b>Stateloos</b>
<b>Trouw<sup>1</sup></b>	30	94
<b>De Telegraaf<sup>2</sup></b>	9	33
<b>de Volkskrant<sup>3</sup></b>	35	63
<b>AD<sup>4</sup></b>	7	37
<b>NRC<sup>5</sup></b>	36	111

The amounts of hits were diverse, though all were quite low. This can be seen when doing a search on other words. In the following table the hits on other words will be shown:

**Table 2.**

*Amount of articles of different searches, 15<sup>th</sup> of May 2019.*

	<b>Immigratie (immigration)</b>	<b>Koopkracht (purchasing power)</b>	<b>Paspoort (passport)</b>	<b>Joegoslavië (Yugoslavia)</b>
<b>NRC</b>	3897	1787	3957	1153
<b>AD</b>	5626	917	3772	746

Of course, these minimal analyses about how much attention is given to statelessness will not show all articles that will be about statelessness or stateless people. For example 'staatloosheid' (statelessness) could also generate other hits, but this is to give a general idea.

<sup>1</sup> The website of Trouw seemed to only show 1000 hits, of the word 'koopkracht' the oldest hit was from 2012. The oldest hit of 'stateloos' was of an article from 2000 and the one after that from 2004. (17-06-2019)

<sup>2</sup> The site of De Telegraaf shows at maximum 50 hits. The oldest hit of 'koopkracht' was from 2019. The oldest hit of 'stateloos' was from 2012. The one after that was from 2013. (17-06-2019)

<sup>3</sup> De Volkskrant, just as Trouw, seemed to only show 1000 hits. The oldest hit of 'koopkracht' was from 2013. The oldest hit of 'stateloos' was of an article from 1995 and the one after that from 2006. (17-06-2019)

<sup>4</sup> AD shows a total amount of hits that can be bigger than the hits that are visible, namely only 20 pages with 10 hits can be seen. The oldest two hits of 'koopkracht' were from 2017. The oldest hit of 'stateloos' was an article from 2007 and the one after that from 2012. (17-06-2019)

<sup>5</sup> NRC seems to show articles from February 25<sup>st</sup> 2010 on. The oldest hits of 'koopkracht' were from 2010, as well as the two oldest hits of 'stateloos'. (17-06-2019)

### **3. Theoretical framework**

In this chapter four possible explanations for the support of policies to protect stateless people are proposed. These will be tested later on. These are the attitudes of people about immigration, their economic insecurity, their worry about crime and the influence of a human rights frame. After the discussion of these factors, also shortly some other possible factors will be discussed that won't be part of the further research.

#### **3.1 Policy perceptions about immigration**

Policy perceptions of people are often measured in scientific literature and put into a context of a policy area. Because statelessness isn't a topic on which much literature is existent, basing the theoretical framework on literature about policy preferences regarding statelessness is not possible. It is possible to link it to immigration though.

Stateless people in the Netherlands have an immigration background, because simply said when parents are Dutch, the child will be too. When the child is born after 31 December 1984, the child will automatically receive the Dutch citizenship by birth when a parent is Dutch, though sometimes acknowledgement is needed (IND, n.d.-a). It is also possible that a child receives Dutch citizenship when the child and one or both parents had their main residency in the Netherlands. Also, when that parent was born one or both of their parents should have had their main residency in the Netherlands too (IND, n.d.-a). Further, people can go through procedures to become Dutch (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-a). Thus, many people will have Dutch citizenship when they live here for a long time and comply to the prerequisites.

In statistics can be seen that most of the time stateless people and people with an unknown nationality have an immigration background. Many people with an unknown nationality are born outside of the Netherlands or have a father who is born outside of the Netherlands (CBS, as cited in UNHCR, 2011, p. 32). People with an unknown nationality who are born in the Netherlands and have no residence permit, have relatively often a father born in Somalia (CBS, as cited in UNHCR, 2011, p. 33). From the people with an unknown nationality who have a residence permit, only two percent has Dutch descent (CBS, as cited in UNHCR, 2011, pp. 31–32). From the registered stateless people, 71% of the people are born in the Netherlands, the fathers of these people are relatively often from Indonesia (CBS, as cited in Van Dalen & Henkens, 2005, pp. 24–25). Thus migration is closely linked to statelessness in the Netherlands.

Further, being recognized as stateless by the Dutch government could have the consequence for a person of being able to become Dutch sooner than when somebody should do the regular naturalisation procedure (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b, n.d.-a; IND, n.d.-c, n.d.-b). Statelessness is thus also closely knit to immigration, because recognized stateless people can more easily become Dutch. Thus, in the end, many reasons are at place why people can link

immigration and statelessness together in their head and why it is useful to look into literature about policy preferences about immigration.

That is also why the following hypothesis is created to test if immigration attitudes are an useful explanatory fact for the support for policies to protect stateless people.

H1: Respondents who think more positively about immigration will be more likely to support government policy to protect the rights of stateless people.

### **3.2 Economic factors**

The reason why people oppose or support immigration is disputed in scientific literature as summarized by Hainmueller & Hiscox (2010, p. 61). And in what extent economical factors matter when it comes to the policy preferences regarding immigration is also not clear, as will be seen below. Still, it is an important factor to consider and it will be a contribution to the literature on the influence of economic factors on policy preferences to include it in this research. Economic insecurity is the concept that is used in this research.

First, economic self-interest and economic insecurity can be seen as synonyms, depending on the conceptualisation. In Burns and Gimpel (2000) the terms economic self-interest and economic insecurity seem to be used for one another. In their model, they used the personal financial situation of people, as well national conditions, though they have the hypothesis that their personal situations are more important (Burns & Gimpel, 2000, p. 205). Concluded is that self-interest isn't that big of a factor in explaining attitudes on immigration when the stereotypical thinking is taken into account (Burns & Gimpel, 2000, pp. 222–223).

If economic insecurity is seen as economic self-interest targeted at the labour market competition model, because that is related to people's income, no unambiguous evidence was found in literature to support that full model, as summarized by Naumann, Stoetzer & Pietrantuono (Naumann, Stoetzer, & Pietrantuono, 2018, p. 1011). In the study of Naumann et al. (2018), the labour market model, that natives prefer immigrants who don't have the same level of skills as them, was (mostly) not supported. Their findings fitted the fiscal burden argument, rich natives had a bigger preference for highly skilled migrants over low-skilled migrants than low-income natives had.

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) looked at the labour market competition model and the fiscal burden model and doesn't seem to think that economic self-interest is a good explanatory as theorized by these two models (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010, p. 79). However, they seem to gathered evidence for another argument, namely that poor natives are more negative about low-



skilled immigrants in states where the fiscal exposure is high than in the states where it is low (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010, p. 79). Thus even when these two traditional arguments may not be accurate, still the economic insecurity can play a role.

Hainmuller and Hiscox (2007) already argued earlier that (cultural) values and beliefs are more important to explain the attitudes towards immigrants than worries about the personal economic circumstances. Further, according to Hainmuller and Hiscox high-skilled American people are not acting to their economic self-interest, because they are more positive towards immigrants regardless of where they come from and what their skills would likely be (Gerber, Huber, Biggers, & Hendry, 2017, p. 155; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007, p. 436). Gerber et al. (2017) disputes that they are not acting in their economic self-interest and is arguing that not all economic pathways that could be of an influence are taken into account (Gerber et al., 2017, p. 155). Gerber et al. broadened the scope of the economical factors used and therefore they argue that economic self-interest is more important for the policy preferences about immigration policy than previous work established and cultural factors are less important than stated. They conducted a broad research by including other factors than only the labour market (Gerber et al., 2017).

That economic insecurity is an important factor to consider when researching anti-immigration sentiments can be backed-up as well with the argument made by Storm (2018). She knit economic insecurity, immigration attitudes and religion together and she concluded the following: "Secondly, the association between religious identity and anti-immigration [sic] attitudes is exacerbated in times of economic uncertainty and threat" (Storm, 2018, p. 616).

Because there are many different types of factors related to economical interests found to have impact or no impact on the preferences for high-skilled or low-skilled immigrants, it will contribute to the body of literature to include an economical explanatory factor for the opinion about statelessness policies, because these policies are related to immigration as a whole. There is chosen for using employment insecurity focusing on the personal circumstances, because of different reasons. First, it are easy questions for people to answer and the concept is measured with a small number of questions. Second, it fits the idea of economic self-interest, because when people are more insecure about their jobs or about the amount of taxes they will have to pay, immigrations can be seen as a threat for them.

Because it is proposed that immigration attitudes and support for statelessness protection policies are closely linked, the effect of economic insecurity will be measured directly on the topic of statelessness with the following hypotheses:

H2: When people have greater employment security they will be more likely to support government policy to protect the rights of stateless people.

### **3.3 Crime**

These articles draw much attention to the economy, but that is not the only factor that determines ideas about immigration. Fitzgerald, Curtis and Corliss (2012) argue that anxiety about crime is intensifying anxiety over immigration, based on data from Germany. This is not only applicable on Germany, but also on the rest of Western Europe. This fear of crime is an even more strong predictor of immigration views than concerns about the economy (Fitzgerald et al., 2012). To see if this argument is also apparent in the attitudes of Dutch people towards statelessness policies, which are related to immigration, the following hypothesis is based on this idea:

H3: When people are worried less about crime they will be more likely to support government policy to protect the rights of stateless people.

### **3.4 Human Rights Frame**

The fourth way through which support for policies to protect stateless people could be influenced is the way the issue is framed. Because statelessness is a human rights issue, it is interesting to see if framing the issue with a value frame based on the value of equality, will change people's policy preferences. First, an elaboration on the concept of framing is present, then the focus will be on value frames and the issue of the familiarity with the topic will be discussed.

In short, framing is defined as the following: "Framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue" (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). The idea behind framing theory is that something can be perceived in different ways and something can be explained in different ways regarding the consequences it has for different considerations or values (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). Frames can cause shifts of preference by the different formulations of choice problems, seemingly small or insignificant changes of these formulations can cause significant shifts (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, pp. 453, 457), as Tversky and Kahneman (1981) showed in their article about decision frames and the psychology of choice. Further, there is a more specified definition of framing which also includes a formula in Chong & Druckman (2007). This definition comes down to the following: "An attitude toward an object, in this view, is the weighted sum of a series of evaluative beliefs about that object" (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 105). Though in practice people don't have clear ideas about all topics and therefore don't have such detailed

opinions, it can be called attitudes in those cases. People can give some considerations, but don't have elaborate ideas that you can put for example in a summary score. The consequence of this is that the outcome of the survey shows imperfectly the feelings of a person based on some beliefs they had when filling out the survey (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 105).

Goffman (1974) is often used in the study of social movements as a base for the concept of framing (Benford & Snow, 2000, pp. 611, 614). "For Goffman, frames denoted "schemata of interpretation" that enable individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" occurrences within their life space and the world at large (p. 21)" (Goffman, 1974, p. 21, as cited by Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614).

Further, the word 'frame' can be used for different meanings. It can refer to the linkages in the minds of people or frames in communicating texts (Kinder and Sanders, 1996, p. 164, as cited by Brewer, 2003). Such a theory is also seen in Chong & Druckman (2007). They state the following difference: a "frame of thought" of an individual is made by a dimension or a set of dimensions that influence somebody's thoughts/opinions. These dimensions are aspects the person considers, for example free speech (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 105). To get people thinking about subjects in a certain way a "frame of communication" can be used (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 106).

Requirements for framing effects are that consideration of which the frames are based, should be understood by the person the frame is targeted to (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 110). Also, the consideration cannot be offered to a person too long ago, the person should have access to it in its memory (Chong & Druckman, 2007, pp. 110–111).

How well received a policy will be among the general public is dependent on the language/what the description of the policy is (Kinder & Sanders, 1990, pp. 73–74). It is/can be complicated to evaluate public opinion about a policy, because it can be framed differently to give it another political meaning (Kinder & Sanders, 1990, p. 74). Frames structure the mind which is helpful to give meaning to everything that happens in political history (Kinder & Sanders, 1990, p. 74). Additionally, it is present in political discourse and tries to create interpretations about something which are favourable (Kinder & Sanders, 1990, p. 74). A decision-maker adopts a frame and that frame is partly controlled by the way the problem is formulated and partly by the personal characteristics of the person (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453). Kinder and Sanders (1990) showed that by presenting different frames to people, they will think differently about a affirmative action, the topic the article used to examine the frames. The public understanding of a policy and therefore the public opinion seems to be changeable by framing (Kinder & Sanders,

1990, p. 90). Therefore, it is interesting to see what the effect of a human rights frame will be on the policy preferences.

Framing can be done in different ways, one of them is a value frame. A clear example of the consequences of value frames is the article of Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997) that is already more than 20 years old. It showed by using frames based on the values freedom of speech and maintaining public order that people who got information through these different frames, had different levels of tolerance for the Klu Klux Klan. People who got the frame focused on free speech were more tolerant than people who got the frame focused on public order. This research clearly shows the effect different values can make as a base for a frame.

That a value can have impact on the thoughts of the respondents is also seen in Brewer and Gross (2005). Important for the study was if counter frames affect the change in thoughts. It was proven that framing with the use of the value 'equality' had an impact on the thoughts of the respondents and more specific on the content and quantity of their answers. Though no significant main effect was found in the close-ended questions. This shows the possible importance of value frames on peoples thoughts and therefore on possible policy preferences.

As summarized by Barker, literature suggests that core values are more important for political judgements than cost-benefit calculations (Barker, 2005, p. 377). Core values named that Americans see as important are individualism, humanitarianism and (versions of) egalitarianism. He did an experiment and used frames based on the values individualism and egalitarianism. The sample he used were registered Republican voters and he looked at the relationship between people who got information framed with individualism as value and the support for McCain, a Republican candidate. The result was that value frames can create support from like minded people, this is at when people are more educated (Barker, 2005). Therefore, it will be interesting to ask about the political preferences to see if people react differently to the human rights frame according to their political preference.

There is also a relationship between the public debate, political knowledge and framing. Brewer (2003) wrote an article about the public opinion framing about gay rights in America. The effect of political knowledge is examined with two values, egalitarianism and traditional morality, which have effect on the policy opinion and also framing of the media is examined. Brewer (2003) states that scholars examining public opinion often think that people use frames to make connections between values and issues and they borrow these frames from public debates (Brewer, 2003, p. 175). Also, if elites that are in competition with each other, are going to

actively oppose each other, they often will use competing frames in a public debate (Kinder and Sanders, as cited in Brewer, 2003, p. 176; Jacoby, 2000). Because issues are understood with values, widely shared values can be used in these frames and these frames will influence people's thoughts about an issue (Brewer, 2003, p. 176). The result of the research "(...) suggest that the extent to which political knowledge moderates a value's effect on opinion can depend on whether public debate provides an undisputed frame or competing frames for that value" (Brewer, 2003, p. 173).

Because value frames can have a clear impact on the thoughts of people as seen above as well as that it depends on the language how well received a policy is (Kinder & Sanders, 1990, pp. 73–74), framing is an important factor to consider in evaluating policy preferences. The topic of statelessness lends itself well for examining framing effects on policy preferences. Because, people who know more about a subject, will have more chance to have a already existent frame of reference and will be less vulnerable to other frames offered (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 121). Therefore, offering information about statelessness and then measuring the policy preferences is quite interesting, because people don't know much about it.

Further, Gilens (2001) argues that people who are more knowledgeable about politics and people who are in sophisticated parts of the society, can be considerably influenced by plain facts. But this is not only true for this group, facts about politics can also affect the judgements of politics by people belonging to other groups (Gilens, 2001, pp. 379, 391–392). Information and having knowledge are therefore important factors for framing effects. Measuring if people already know more about something can be a smart move.

Since people have little knowledge about statelessness, likely they haven't encountered several frames about the issue. Therefore it isn't necessary to show respondents counter frames in order to see if a frame had effect.

In the end it is clear that framing can be a powerful tool to alter opinions, thus policy preferences. With the following hypothesis it will be tested in this context:

H4: Respondents exposed to the human rights frame will be more likely to support government policy to protect the rights of stateless people.

### **3.5 Other variables**

Van Dalen and Henkens (2005) did research on a broader set of reasons people have for their opinions about the number of foreigners. This research was conducted in the Netherlands. They

concluded that not only the political economy of immigration is important for the policy preferences about immigration, but also population size preferences and social interaction with immigrants. The latter is interesting to elaborate on further, because a surprising finding emerged. Where is expected that the people would think that too much foreigners are in the country, in places with a lot of immigrants, big cities, this link is not found. It appeared that people living in localities where the density of the population is low, had a more anti-immigration sentiments. This opposes many studies based on data of the US, though that can be explained by the context of the geography of the US compared to European cities (Van Dalen & Henkens, 2005, pp. 81–82).

Seen in this research is that not only economical worries or worries about crime are relevant for people's opinions about immigration, a lot of factors should be taken into consideration when measuring policy preferences about statelessness. By capturing peoples overall opinion about immigration the factors that influence immigration are taken into consideration when comparing the opinion about immigration and the policy preferences of statelessness policies.

## **4. Methodology**

In this chapter the design of the empirical research will be set out. Afterwards, the sample and the measurements of the variables will be shown and the way the analysis was done will be explained. Lastly, the validity and the ethicality will be discussed.

### **4.1 Design**

To being able to test all the hypotheses, a survey experiment is needed. By using a survey, it is possible to ask many people a couple of simple questions. When respondents are asked about their economic insecurity, worry about crime and immigration attitudes, it is possible to compare these answers to the dependent question, what their policy preference regarding policies to protect stateless people is. The last hypothesis is a bit harder to measure. It is needed to provide a human rights frame to a part of the respondents to compare respondents who did and didn't received the information on how they scored on the dependent question. Therefore the survey is a survey experiment. An experiment can give insight in a causal relationship, though a weakness is that the results can be harder to generalise (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002, p. 18). The specific measurements of all the variables will be explained later in this chapter.

The survey experiment consisted of five different versions of a set of information that were given to five groups of respondents, see Table 3. This survey experiment was created using the program 'Qualtrics'. Because people probably have no or almost no knowledge about statelessness, basic information is offered to the respondents. All respondents will receive basic information and four groups will receive additional information, of which three groups will receive information in a human rights frame. Then the framing effect will be measured. The dependent variable is aimed at the policy preferences about statelessness policies.

The choice to use five groups is made to be able to measure the effect of the human rights frame and filter out the effect of having more or less information and of information in a particular order. Version four and five are together shown to approximately 25% of the respondents, just as version one, two and three are. The precise distribution can be looked up in the results. This distribution is chosen, because the main effect that is interesting for this study, is the difference between having no information about human rights and having the information. The last two versions are only there as a control. To make sure a bigger part of the respondents will see the most relevant versions, there is chosen to first randomise between four groups and not five.

**Table 3.**

*Set up of the experimental groups*

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5
Neutral facts	Neutral facts	Neutral facts	Neutral facts	Neutral facts
	Neutral facts	Human rights facts	Neutral facts	Human rights facts
			Human rights facts	Neutral facts

Randomisation is the equal and independent chance to be assigned to a certain group in the experiment (Kumar, 2014, pp. 142–143). However, the five different groups were not planned to be assigned equally. The exact plan for the randomisation between groups four and five didn't work out. It was planned that approximately 12,5% would be in 4 and approximately 12,5% in 5. This did not happen, the exact assignment will be shown in the results.

The information offered is present in Appendix 1. During the composition of the neutral information there was tried to add information that would not evoke too strong associations with other subjects tied to immigration. Though information about statelessness is never fully neutral and therefore people can react differently to it than expected.

This survey is a self-completion questionnaire as defined by Bryman (2012), it means that respondents fill in the survey by themselves without an interviewer (Bryman, 2012, pp. 232, 233). This has multiple advantages and disadvantages, of which a disadvantage is that an interviewer can't interfere to help people with answering or to get more or other response and it is not known who answers the questionnaire (Bryman, 2012, pp. 233–234). A risk is that people will influence each other by giving information to the other or their personal opinions. It is not possible to see if this is happening, though questions are asked in the survey to see if people already know more about the research and about statelessness. Also the response rate can be low (Bryman, 2012, p. 235). And people can get tired if a survey is too long, this is called 'respondent fatigue' (Bryman, 2012, p. 235).



## 4.2 Sample

The sample used in the analyses consists of Dutch-speaking people (the survey was in Dutch) who are at minimum 18 years old. The survey was set out using an anonymous link on Facebook, LinkedIn, WhatsApp and email in the researcher's network. Further, a snowball sampling was created by asking people to send it forward to others. Asking people from the social network of the researcher fits the description of convenience sampling of Bryman (2012, p. 201). The sample created by convenience sampling is not that good for generalization, though frequently used (Bryman, 2012, pp. 201–202). Snowball sampling is chosen as method when there is no sampling frame to take the sample from and making one is too difficult (Bryman, 2012, p. 203). For this research, there was no access to a big database of potential respondents, therefore the snowball method was used. Using snowball sampling also doesn't lead to representative samples (Bryman, 2012, p. 203). However, this is not a big problem, because of the randomisation between the groups in the experiment. Still, it does have influence on the external validity (Bryman, 2012, p. 203). The sample will not be representative for the Dutch population, but conclusions can still be drawn, because of the random assignment to different groups.

## 4.3 Measurements of the variables

The 9-point scale for the independent variables (displayed below) and the dependent variable was chosen to have some variance in the answers and to have a middle category people can choose when they want to indicate that they are satisfied with the situation right now. The question didn't only consist of these nine categories, but also two extra options were included, these are 'I don't know' and 'Prefer not to answer'.<sup>6</sup> These options are used to give people the freedom to opt out of a question or to indicate that they don't know what to answer. Therefore, people don't have to quit the whole survey, because they are forced to answer the question if they don't want to and the voluntarily stays high. Also, a lot of other questions included options to indicate that the respondent didn't know the answer or didn't want to answer the question. Not all respondents saw all questions, according to the answers they gave. The full survey with the directions about skipped questions can be seen in Appendix 2.

### The dependent variable

Central to the research are the policy preferences of the public towards statelessness policies. The dependent variable only existed of one question. When translated to English, the question is as follows:<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> 'Weet ik niet' and 'Beantwoord ik liever niet' are these options as included in Dutch.

<sup>7</sup> Format is changed in both the English and Dutch version. The Dutch version is the following:

Om de rechten van staatlozen in Nederland te beschermen, zou de Nederlandse overheid:

1 = veel minder moeten doen

*To protect the rights of stateless people in the Netherlands, should the Dutch government:*

*1 = do a lot less*

*5 = do the same as now*

*9 = do a lot more*

*Indicate this on a scale of 1 to 9.*

An inspiration for the phrasing was the dependent variable of Hawley (2011). The original question comes from the 2004 NAES (Hawley, 2011, pp. 408–409). The topic of this question was restricting immigration and it asks if the government should do more about, do less etc. (Hawley, 2011, p. 409). However, this question as inspiration and the questions used in the survey differ greatly. To make sure it is clear what is meant with the policies about statelessness the ‘positive connotation’ of protect the rights of stateless people is added. Then, it is clear what way the policies would be aimed.

### ***Independent variables***

#### **Economic insecurity**

To test the hypotheses about the influence of economic insecurity on the policy preferences, two variables are used which together explain employment insecurity in Carr & Chung (2014). These two variables are taken from the ESS 2010, which is amongst others available in Dutch and English (European Social Survey, n.d., 2010; Ipsos MORI, 2010). The questions are changed to fit the context of the survey of this thesis better. One variable is measured as:

To what extent is the following statements about your current job true? Indicate this on a scale from 1 to 9. ‘My job is secure’ 1 = not at all true, 9 = very true.<sup>8</sup> The options: ‘I don’t know’ and ‘Prefer not to answer’ were also included.<sup>9</sup> These options were also included in the other independent variables.

The second variable is measured as: How difficult or easy would it be for you to get a similar or better job with another employer if you had to leave your current job? Indicate this on a scale from 1 to 9. 1 = extremely difficult, 9 = extremely easy.<sup>10</sup>

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5 = hetzelfde moeten doen als nu

9 = veel meer moeten doen

Geef dit aan op een schaal van 1 tot 9.

<sup>8</sup> Format is changed in both the English as Dutch version. ESS 2010 (2010b) used for translation. Question: In hoeverre is de volgende uitspraak over uw huidige baan waar? Geef dit aan op een schaal van 1 tot 9. ‘Mijn baan is zeker’

1 = helemaal niet waar

9 = heel erg waar

<sup>9</sup> ‘Weet ik niet’ and ‘Beantwoord ik liever niet’ are these options as included in Dutch.

<sup>10</sup> Format is changed in both the English as Dutch version. ESS 2010 (2010b) used for translation. Hoe moeilijk of makkelijk zou het zijn voor u om een gelijkwaardige of betere baan te krijgen bij een andere werkgever als u uw

## **Worry about crime**

The influence of the worry about crime on immigration attitudes was examined by Fitzgerald, Curtis, & Corliss (2012). The measurement of worry about crime in this survey is inspired on the measurement of the variable mentioned in this article, changes are made to fit the context of this survey better. Fitzgerald et al. (2012, p. 484) used data from the GSOEP survey.

In the survey of this thesis the question was used as follows: Which reaction to the following statement fits you best? Indicate this on a scale from 1 to 9. 'I am worried about crime in the Netherlands.'

1 = I am not concerned, 9 = I am very concerned.<sup>11</sup> Here the two other options; 'I don't know' and 'Prefer not to answer' are also used.

## **Immigration**

Multiple questions were used as inspiration for the question about immigration attitudes, but the most important one was the question used in Scheve and Slaughter (2001). This question was asked in the NES surveys in 1992, 1994 and 1996 as reported by Scheve and Slaughter (2001). The question was changed to fit this particular survey and was as follows: Do you think the number of new immigrations who are permitted to come to the Netherlands to live here should be increased, should stay the same as now or should be decreased? Indicate this on a scale from 1 to 9. 1 = decreased greatly, 5 = stay the same, 9 = increased greatly.<sup>12</sup>

By phrasing the question this way people have the option to choose that they are okay with the influx of immigrants that are permitted to live here as it is now or they can see they want it decreased or increased.

## **Control variables**

The control variables used are mostly quite standard control variables. A lot of the control variables are inspired or based on the European Social Survey (ESS). Basing the questions on

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huidige baan zou moeten verlaten? Geef dit aan op een schaal van 1 tot 9.

1 = uiterst moeilijk

9 = uiterst makkelijk

<sup>11</sup> Format is changed in both the English as Dutch version. In the English version as seen in the article concerned was used in the answering categories, in Dutch the word for 'worry' was the same in the question as well as in the answers (Fitzgerald et al., 2012, pp. 484, 485). Question: Welke reactie tegenover de volgende stelling past het beste bij u? Geef dit aan op een schaal van 1 tot 9. 'Ik maak mij zorgen over criminaliteit in Nederland.'

1 = ik maak mij geen zorgen

9 = ik maak mij zeer veel zorgen

<sup>12</sup> Format is changed in both the English as Dutch version. Vindt u dat de hoeveelheid nieuwe immigranten die naar Nederland mag komen om hier te leven moet worden vergroot, hetzelfde moet blijven als nu of moet worden verkleind? Geef dit aan op een schaal van 1 tot 9.

1 = sterk worden verkleind

5 = hetzelfde blijven

9 = sterk worden vergroot

other survey questions used in scientific research or other important surveys is useful for the replication of research and the questions are already well thought through. The Dutch version of the survey can be found in Appendix 2.

Gender had four different answering categories to make sure everyone is included and can opt out of the question. People's sex was asked and the categories were: 'Man', 'Woman', 'Different', 'Prefer not to answer'.

People could fill in their age themselves, though people could only fill in two characters to make sure only the age in whole years would be put in.

For level of education, a lot of answering categories were made. Also was added that people could choose for a similar level of education if they got a diploma in the older education system. Additionally, people were asked to choose the highest achieved level, with the note that it means that a diploma is earned on this level. An important inspiration was the classification of CBS Statline, due to the time of writing the site is updated May 14th (Statline, 2019). The classification on the site was still the same, but for the survey of this thesis, more answering categories are made.

Province of residence was asked and there was specified that people should live there most days of the week. The twelve provinces were ordered on alphabetical order (Brabant was mentioned without the prefix 'Noord'). Just like the former question also the options of other, 'I don't know' and 'Prefer not to answer' were used. This variable can be used to see how the survey is distributed, it was not used in the analyses.

Inspired on the ESS 2016/2017 (European Social Survey, 2016a) the survey asked if the respondent has the Dutch nationality, if the respondent is born in the Netherlands and if both parents of the respondents are born in the Netherlands. All three times the answering categories were: 'Yes', 'No', 'I don't know' and 'Prefer not to answer'. This is particularly interesting, because it is a research about stateless people and as argued for hypothesis two, about immigration. If people have an immigration background, they could have another opinion. If people are Dutch is not included in the analysis, because the amount of people that was not Dutch was very small.

Inspired on the ESS 2010 (European Social Survey, 2010) was asked about the religion of the respondents. First, a question if the person sees itself as belonging to a religion or religious movement was asked and if they answered 'Yes' they were sent to a corresponding question, namely which religion or religious movement this was.

Voting behaviour was also based on the ESS, though on the one of 2016/2017 (European Social Survey, 2016a). The question was if people voted during the elections for the Dutch parliament in March 2016. If they answered that they did, there was asked on which party. The original

question was about an earlier election of the parliament.

Income was not asked directly, because people can experience that as a too personal. The question in the survey asked respondents to choose the description that fitted their idea about the income of their household best. The answers were ranging from “living comfortably on present income” (European Social Survey, 2016b, p. 68) to “very difficult to make ends meet on present income”<sup>13</sup> (European Social Survey, 2016a, p. 63). This question was based on the ESS survey of 2016/2017 (European Social Survey, 2016a).

To control if people answer differently on the dependent question when they know more about this particular research project, a question was included to find this out. Respondents could choose between three answering categories and ‘I don’t know’.

The same thing was done after the set of information was shown with the question if people already knew more about statelessness than the information they received in the survey. They could choose between ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘I don’t know’. If they answered that they did, they could choose out of different options to indicate how they knew more.

Before the questions about employment security (earlier in the survey), people were asked if they had a job. This question had multiple answering categories. Only if people had a job, the questions about employment security were shown. It didn’t matter if it was a full-time, part-time or secondary job. Whether or not people had a job was not included in the analysis. It was included to make sure people don’t get confused if they don’t have a job and encounter the questions about employment insecurity.

#### **4.4 Analysis**

The analysis is done using IBM SPSS Statistics 24. Multiple tables are showed in this thesis, but the main results are based on three models, all linear regressions. This statistical method is used when the dependent variable is a continuous variable and the independent variables are also continuous variables (Field, 2013, pp. 296–298, 916). All three models have as dependent variable the variable which measures the policy preferences to protect the stateless people, measured on the scale from 1 to 9. One model is a linear regression in which the independent variables are the question if people perceive their job as secure, one if they worry about crime, one with their attitude towards immigrants and lastly the exposure to the human rights frame.<sup>14</sup>

There is chosen to only include one measurement of employment insecurity, because the two

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<sup>13</sup> Translated from the Dutch: “Heel erg moeilijk rondkomen met het huidige inkomen” (European Social Survey, 2016a, p. 63).

<sup>14</sup> The variable with the exposure to the human rights frame is a dummy with the value 1 when people ticked the box that they read the information of the frames that included all the information or when people ticked the box that they read the information of the frame with the human rights frame and the neutral information every group received.

variables were closely correlated. Further, if both variables were put in, the N would be 93, instead of 98 as well as only the other variable was put in.

The other model, also a linear regression, consisted of these same variables, a variable for age<sup>15</sup> and multiple dummies<sup>16</sup> for the following control variables: gender,<sup>17</sup> higher educated,<sup>18</sup> born in the Netherlands,<sup>19</sup> both parents born in the Netherlands,<sup>20</sup> if the respondent is religious,<sup>21</sup> if the respondent voted,<sup>22</sup> income,<sup>23</sup> knowledge about the research project,<sup>24</sup> knowledge about statelessness.<sup>25</sup>

The third model included all these above mentioned variables, though the dummy for exposure to human rights frame is replaced with four other dummies. These four are the exposure of four of the five sets of information.<sup>26</sup>

The raw data file of June 4th<sup>27</sup> consisted of 220 respondents. Two respondents were deleted from the data file, because they were not the minimal age as specified in the informed consent form. The respondents that only filled in that they agreed with the informed consent form, but

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<sup>15</sup> This variable is made into a numeric variable.

<sup>16</sup> The dummies are created by recoding the original variable into a different variable and assign the value of the dummy 1 if the old value is the topic of the dummy and 0 if the old value is not the topic.

<sup>17</sup> A dummy was created with the value of 1 when the person was a male and 0 if the person was female. Nobody filled in 'Other' or 'Prefer not to answer'.

<sup>18</sup> A dummy was created with the value of 1 when a person has a bachelor or master (both HBO and university level) or is a doctor. When people chose 'other' or 'I don't know' it is not seen as a missing, they are included in the dummy as a zero. Nobody chose 'Prefer not to answer'.

<sup>19</sup> A dummy was created with the value of 1 when a person is born in the Netherlands. Nobody chose a 'Prefer not to answer' or 'I don't know'.

<sup>20</sup> A dummy was created with the value of 1 when both parents of a respondent are born in the Netherlands. Nobody chose a 'Prefer not to answer' or 'I don't know'.

<sup>21</sup> A dummy was created with the value of 1 when respondents saw themselves as religious. I don't know was not a missing and included as a 0 of the dummy variable. Nobody chose 'Prefer not to answer'.

<sup>22</sup> A dummy was included with the value of one when a person voted. If people didn't vote or didn't had the right to vote they were both assigned as a zero. Nobody chose 'Prefer not to answer' or 'I don't know'.

<sup>23</sup> A dummy was included with the value of one for all people with a comfortable household income. Of the four substantive options the two best options were mostly chosen. The second option sounds less positive of the income, therefore is chosen to only include the people who are probably best off. 'I don't know' was not seen as a missing and included as a 0. Nobody chose 'Prefer not to answer'.

<sup>24</sup> In the analyses the dummy for 'little' knowledge' was included. 'I don't know' was included as a zero, as well as the respondents that reported to have no knowledge of the research project. The option of having 'much knowledge' was not chosen and therefore not included. No other answering options were available.

<sup>25</sup> The people who stated to have more knowledge about statelessness than the information they received where made into a dummy. The persons who answered 'I don't know' where included in the 0 as well as the respondents that reported to not have more knowledge about statelessness than the information offered. No other answering options were available.

<sup>26</sup> The dummies had a value of 1 when a particular set of information was showed to the respondent and a 0 when that particular set of information was not offered. The dummies included in the model were the ones for the set of information with all the neutral information, the one with basic information and the human rights frame, the one with all the information and the human rights frame before the additional neutral information, and the one with all the information and the additional neutral information before the human rights frame.

<sup>27</sup> On June 6<sup>th</sup> another respondent entered a response, though only the informed consent form was responded to. Thus it wouldn't be used.

didn't fill in the other questions, were deleted too. Furthermore, the respondents that didn't consent with the form were also deleted. Together, these two last groups were ten respondents. Further, two respondents were deleted, because they didn't tick the box of having read a certain information set, though they did fill in the dependent question. Thus, in total 14 respondents are deleted from the data set, leaving 206 respondents. 191 respondents filled in the last question, the dependent question, thus 15 respondents stopped beforehand. The regression analyses had a N of 98 respondents. To come to 98 respondents in model two, the model with the control variables, the respondents who answered 'I don't know' were included in the dummy variables as a zero or a different answer was made into a zero.<sup>28</sup> More than one value could be included as 0 in the dummy variables.<sup>29</sup>

#### 4.5 Validity

Campbell and Stanley (1963) introduced the term internal validity and showed threats to this internal validity (Campbell and Stanley, as cited in Robson, 2011, p. 88). "If a study can plausibly demonstrate this causal relationship between treatment and outcome, it is referred to as having *internal validity*" (Campbell and Stanley, as cited in Robson, 2011, p. 88).

Twelve threats to this internal validity are included in the book of Robson (2011), these are based on Cook and Campbell (1979) (Cook and Campbell, 1979, pp. 51-55, as cited in Robson, 2011, pp. 88-89). Some of these threats will be discussed below based on the information offered in Robson (2011).

- A testing effect can occur, because before the intervention multiple other issues were asked about, such as immigration. This could have an effect on the dependent question.

On a side note, the questions asked before the intervention could also influence the answers given on other questions before the intervention. When making the survey, it is tried to make a logical order in the questions and there was thought about the way the questions could influence each other.

- Mortality was a threat that occurred, because respondents stopped with the survey before the survey ended. Respondents even noticed that they were in agreement with the informed consent form and then didn't answer a question.

- The maturation effect here could be that over the time the survey was open, respondents learned more about statelessness which had an influence on their opinion about stateless. The effect would be between different respondents, because it was not the intention that somebody

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<sup>28</sup> The dummies where the 'I don't know' option was included in the zero were: higher education, religious, knowledge research project, knowledge statelessness and comfortable income (here the option was: 'I don't know/not applicable' or in Dutch: 'Weet ik niet/niet van toepassing').

<sup>29</sup> For example voting included in the zero the respondents that didn't vote as well as the respondents that didn't have the right to vote at the time of the election.

filled it in twice. The chance that maturation occurred is small, because there is not much news coverage of the topic of statelessness.

- A selection effect didn't take place, because by the use of Qualtrics for the survey which randomized the groups. However, the whole sample was not a random sample.
- There is an ambiguity about causal direction, because this survey is not sufficient to prove causal relationships. Only when the framing effect would occur significantly this could prove a causal relationship.
- It is possible that diffusion of treatments took place, because respondents could have shared some of the information they received in the survey with other respondents who didn't fill the survey in yet or was not at the end of the survey yet, or the latter respondents for example looked at the survey somebody else was making. Therefore, it is possible that they knew information that they didn't receive themselves. However, there was asked to respondents if they knew more information about statelessness than they received during the survey. Therefore, this effect is taken into account. Also, in the follow up question respondents saw when they answered they knew more than the offered information options were given about how the respondent knew more. One of the options was that they knew more, because of the researcher. Thus, if people knew more information, because of contact with the researcher, this could also be taken into account.
- Further, if respondents had prior knowledge about the research project was asked to make sure that if such a factor had a lot of influence, it could be taken into account. This is not directly linkable to one of the threats, maybe to a sense of compensatory rivalry, though even if people knew that different sets of information were apparent, it would be unlikely that they would try to rival. Especially if a respondent doesn't know how much information of the available information it got. Still, maybe respondents who are familiar with framing effects could be suspecting that this was also apparent in this study and therefore answered differently, but the chances are low that even if they suspected it, they would answer differently.

Some other comments can be useful to consider for the internal validity as well:

- Effects could have occurred, because people are tested. The one that is most important is the likelihood that people will fill in answers that they feel are socially desirable. By the informed consent form this is hopefully solved, as the answers of individual respondents will not be shared with others. The option 'Prefer not to answer' was also not used often. Further, sometimes people don't read well enough to give proper answers to the questions. They don't read all text that is offered to them in the survey or they don't read the questions well. That this is the case could be seen by the respondents who even though they were not 18, still entered the survey.



- The term construct validity refers to if the survey measures what it is supposed to measure (Robson, 2011, p. 87). In this project was tried to use survey questions that are already used in other articles and/or surveys and thought through by researchers. This way the survey questions will probably have a higher validity and the answers can be more easily compared to results of other research.

- 191 filled in the last question of the 206 respondents who were left in the sample (this excludes people who filled in the last question, but are deleted). Because the last questions weren't required to fill in (see Appendix 2), it is possible that a respondent made it to the ending screen without filling in the last question. Qualtrics didn't show a progress of '100' for somebody who didn't fill in the last question.

The attrition effect is  $(15/206) \times 100 = 7,28$  (rounded). Still, two respondents were deleted from the sample, because they filled in the last question, but didn't tick a box at the sets of information. If these are included in the attrition effect, the effect is as follows:  $(15/208) \times 100 = 7,21$  (rounded). For more information about the deleted respondents, see the information above under 'Analysis'.

External validity can be referred to as generalizability too (Robson, 2011, p. 91). External validity is also subject to threats, these are specified in Robson (2011) based on LeCompte and Goetz (1982) (LeCompte and Goetz, as cited in Robson, 2011, p. 91). The four threats in Robson (2011) specified will be discussed below for this particular study.

- A big selection threat is present here, because the sample is not a random sample and not representative for the Dutch population (as shown in the results). Therefore the results are only applicable to the group studied.

- The results are not very dependent on setting. It was a survey that the respondents could fill in on their phone, laptop or other device and they could choose themselves when or where they wanted to do it. Further, the independent questions were just questions about how people perceive their job, their worry about crime and what their opinion about the number of immigrations is. This is not that dependent on this specific survey, though the order in which questions were asked could have make a difference in the outcomes. The framing effect is very dependent on the specific setting of the study, because their reaction to the specific set of information was important.

- The history isn't that important for the generalizability. The respondents were not chosen out of a specific database through which they could have a common history that is very different than for other people. Further, statelessness is a quite unknown topic, so not much history is present. It could be though that if statelessness will be in the media a lot, people will gain different opinions about the topic, then the generalizability for this research will be lower.

- The constructs studied are not very specific to the sample. Though a large group didn't have a job (showed in the results), but they were excluded from the regression. The constructs used were mainly based on other articles to make sure the questions used were appropriate. The question for the dependent variable was more improvised than the questions for the independent variables.

In the end the results are not appropriate to generalize, mainly because of the specific sample used.

#### **4.6 Ethicality**

Because this survey included an experiment and looks at framing effects it is important to think about the ethicality of the choices made. To ensure people don't feel misguided afterwards, a small amount of information was offered to them about the research. In Appendix 2, the whole survey including the ending page for the people who hit the consent button will be included. Furthermore, I ensured that people were able to learn more about the subject by offering websites about the topic at the end of the survey. Especially since people are given different amounts of information and framing was used, they will have the possibility to read more about the subject.

Lastly, it was obligated by law to ask informed consent, which I did. In the informed consent form, the supervisor of the thesis is mentioned, so that people can contact her.

## 5. Results

As stated in the methodology, the total N of the dataset was 220 respondents. After deleting respondents that were too young and respondents that didn't fill in a question after the approval or denial of the informed consent form, 206 respondents were left. The sample became existent using snowball sampling and convenience sampling. Therefore, it is useful to look into the descriptive of the sample. As it is particularly interesting to know the descriptive of the respondents who are included in the models that test the hypotheses. Of these 98 respondents some background information will be shown. The descriptive of the independent variable will be shown afterwards and information on the missings. Correlation matrixes will be shown and the three regression models.

### 5.1 Control variables

First, the descriptive for age will be shown and afterwards more information about the sample will be laid out.

**Table 4**

*Descriptives for age*

<b>Descriptives</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. deviation</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<b>Age</b>	30,3673	12,48371	18	62

Descriptive statistics, N=98

The sample has a mean age of 30 years old and a big majority of the respondents is women, namely 74,5%. When looking at the higher educated people, 33,7% has a bachelor degree (hbo and university) and 8,2% a master degree (hbo and university) or is doctor. This is a bit higher than the Dutch average; in the age range from 15 to 75 in 2018, 11,4% has a master degree or is doctor and 19,5% has a bachelor degree (CBS, as cited in Rijksoverheid, n.d.-a). 74,5% of the respondents live most of the time in Gelderland. That means that the sample is not distributed well throughout the whole of the Netherlands.

Only one respondent included in the regression doesn't have the Dutch nationality, 95,9% of the sample was born in the Netherlands and 93,9% of the respondents has two parents who are also born in the Netherlands.

The sample consisted out of very big percentage of religious respondents, 66,3% of the respondents see themselves as religious. Out of these religious people, most of them, 78,5%, are protestant. The other 21,5% stated that they belong to another Christian movement. However chances are high that these people are also protestant.

That the sample consists of a lot of religious people is also seen in the voting behaviour. To start,

80,6% of the respondents voted, another 10,2% didn't and 9,2% didn't have the right to vote. From the 76 people who noticed the party on which they voted for, 40,8% stated that they voted ChristenUnie and 13,2% SGP. All these values are excluding the people who didn't know for which party they voted or didn't want to state it. It is clear that the sample consists of a lot more ChristenUnie and SGP voters than the Dutch figures of 2017 (3,4% and 2,1%) (Kiesraad, n.d., p. 10). This reflects the high number for people who see themselves as religious too.

Two other parties on which respondents relatively often voted for were GroenLinks with 19,7% and D66 with 11,8%. In the Dutch figures, the percentage of voters for GroenLinks was 9,1% (Kiesraad, n.d., p. 10), way less than the sample. The figures for D66 are more similar to each other, because the percentage in reality was 12,2% (Kiesraad, n.d., p. 10). The percentage voters on VVD and PVV are almost negligible in the sample (totalled 3,9%), even though it are the two biggest parties of that election with 21,3% and 13,1% (Kiesraad, n.d., p. 10). Therefore, the political spectrum was very different in the sample than in reality.

On average the respondent in the sample are well off as 39,8% has a comfortable income and 39,8% is able to make the ends meet, for 12,2% it is difficult making the ends meet and for one person it is very difficult. 7,1% doesn't know or doesn't see it as applicable.

Nobody answered that they had a lot of knowledge about this particular research project. Though 40,8% of the valid responses answered that they had some knowledge. The majority didn't have knowledge about this research project and 4,1% didn't know if they had knowledge about it.

21,4% of the respondents knew more about statelessness than the information that was offered to them. Most of these respondents gained this knowledge by the news. This is a substantive group of people, but still not even a quarter of the sample and only a small set of information was offered. 77,6% didn't know more than the information offered and one person didn't know if he/she knew more.

## **5.2 Exposure to the frames**

23,5% of the 98 respondents saw the set of information with only the basic neutral information, 23,5% saw all the neutral information. 26,5% saw the basic neutral information and the human rights frame. 20,4% saw the basic information, then the human rights information and then the neutral information. 6,1% saw all the information with additional neutral information first and afterwards the human rights information. The sets of information with all the information were not equally divided as was the goal. This was also the case for the percentages of all the respondents of the sample, thus not only the respondents in the regression, though with other percentages.

### 5.3 Descriptives for the independent variables

The following descriptive table shows the average responses on the independent questions and dependent question.

**Table 5.**

*Descriptives for independent variables*

<b>Descriptives</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. deviation</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<b>Job is secure</b>	6,34	2,647	1	9
<b>Worry about crime</b>	5,05	1,896	1	9
<b>Immigration attitude</b>	5,29	1,905	1	9
<b>Statelessness policies</b>	6,63	1,549	3	9

Descriptive statistics, N=98.

The whole scale is ranging from one to nine, therefore the average is five. All variables have a mean that is higher than the average. Not every variable is positively stated. When a respondent scores high on worry about crime, this person is more worried, this is therefore a negative statement. Worry about crime has a mean very closely to the average of the answering possibilities. There is also quite some variance in the answers. Also the other variables have quite some variance, especially 'Job is secure', with a standard deviation of 2,647. This variable has a quite high mean, as well as statelessness policies. They have a mean both above the six. It is interesting to note that nobody chose the answers '1' and '2'. People are less positive on average about immigration then more policies for protection for stateless people.

Some remarks are interesting here about the missings of the independent variables used in the regression analyses. The question about how secure somebody perceives it's job is only asked to people who have a job. Thus, all people who answered prior in another question that they didn't have a job were excluded; that were 59 people. Three people answered: 'Other'. This made the sample size for the regression considerably smaller. These 62 respondents are together 28,6% of all responses (all responses is also including 3,4% who stopped with the survey, the system missing of this question).

Another question a lot of respondents didn't answer was the dependent question about people's policy preference. Many people chose for the option: 'I don't know'. Of all respondents that answered some questions (even respondents that stopped early are included, this is 7,3% of the respondents) 20,4% of the 206 respondents answered 'I don't know'.

Another independent variable that generated quite some missings is the question about the immigration attitude of people. Of the 206 respondents; 8,7% answered 'I don't know', 0,5%

preferred not to answer and 5,3% already stopped. Apparently these last two questions were harder for people to answer, the questions about crime and about job security didn't generated that many missings.

#### 5.4 The correlation matrixes

In the following correlation matrixes the independent variables are set out.

Table 6 shows the correlations based on only the respondents who are present in the regression analysis, every comparison is therefore based on 98 respondents. Table 7 shows the correlation of a much bigger population. Here the N is different for the different comparisons. When more respondents are entered, another correlation becomes significant. Looking at the significant correlations; one correlation gets a smaller p-value when more respondents are entered.

**Table 6.**

*Correlation matrix, only respondents in the regression*

<b>Correlation matrix</b>	<b>Job is secure</b>	<b>Worry about crime</b>	<b>Immigration attitude</b>	<b>Statelessness policies</b>	<b>Human rights frame</b>
<b>Job is secure</b>	1	0,185; 0,067	-0,119; 0,241	-0,037; 0,715	-0,043; 0,676
<b>Worry about crime</b>	0,185; 0,067	1	-0,418; 0,000*	-0,264; 0,009*	-,040; 0,699
<b>Immigration attitude</b>	-0,119; 0,241	-0,418; 0,000*	1	0,581; 0,000*	0,055; 0,587
<b>Statelessness policies</b>	-0,037; 0,715	-0,264; 0,009*	0,581; 0,000*	1	0,041; 0,687
<b>Human rights frame</b>	-0,043; 0,676	-0,040; 0,699	0,055; 0,587	0,041; 0,687	1

Bivariate correlation matrix. Noted are the Pearson-correlation and significance 2-tailed. \* =  $p < 0,05$ . N=98.

In the matrix above, the significant correlations are worry about crime compared to immigration attitude, worry about crime compared to statelessness policies, as well as statelessness policies compared to immigration attitude. That statelessness policies compared to immigration attitude is significant could also explain why worry about crime would be significant with both. These outcomings match hypotheses one and three. Hypotheses two and four are not seen in this matrix. Though this isn't the appropriate model to test the hypotheses with, it suggests that hypotheses three could be supported in a regression model. Also for hypotheses one, it suggests that this hypothesis could be supported.

**Table 7.***Correlation matrix, all respondents*

<b>Correlation matrix</b>	<b>Job is secure</b>	<b>Worry about crime</b>	<b>Immigration attitude</b>	<b>Statelessness policies</b>	<b>Human rights frame</b>
<b>Job is secure</b>	1 N=133	0,173; 0,046* N=133	-0,125; 0,171 N=122	0,022; 0,828 N=102	-0,006; 0,945 N=133
<b>Worry about crime</b>	0,173; 0,046* N=133	1 N=201	-0,373; 0,000* N=175	-0,187; 0,023* N=148	-,107; 0,130 N=201
<b>Immigration attitude</b>	-0,125; 0,171 N=122	-0,373; 0,000* N=175	1 N=176	0,583; 0,000* N=141	0,057; 0,452 N=176
<b>Statelessness policies</b>	0,022; 0,828 N=102	-0,187; 0,023* N=148	0,583; 0,000* N=141	1 N=149	-0,015; 0,854 N=149
<b>Human rights frame</b>	-0,006; 0,945 N=133	-0,107; 0,130 N=201	0,057; 0,452 N=176	-0,015; 0,854 N=149	1 N=206

Bivariate correlation matrix. Noted are the Pearson-correlation and significance 2-tailed. \* =  $p < 0,05$ .

The last matrix also entails worry about crime compared with job is secure as significant correlation. This correlation doesn't have a clear relation with the hypotheses. This suggestion for this result can be used in further research.

### 5.5 The regression models

In table 3, the outcomes of the regression models are shown.

Hypotheses one (respondents who think more positively about immigration will be more likely to support government policy to protect the rights of stateless people) is supported by both models. Immigration attitudes and statelessness policy preferences are correlated with each other and the standardized coefficient is positive. In the model with the control variables can be seen that this coefficient is 0,528.

The economic security, here measured as having the idea that your job is secure, is also not significant. Therefore hypothesis two (when people have greater employment security they will be more likely to support government policy to protect the rights of stateless people) is also not supported. Interesting is that in model 1 the standardized coefficient is positively correlated, while in model 2 it is negatively correlated. The control variables therefore have a clear effect on the model.

Worry about crime is not that big of an influence as was expected by the hypotheses, because hypotheses three (when people are worried less about crime they will be more likely to support government policy to protect the rights of stateless people) is not supported. Though the relationship between worry about crime and the policy preferences are negative, as expected, it is not a significant effect.

Hypotheses four (respondents exposed to the human rights frame will be more likely to support

government policy to protect the rights of stateless people) is clearly not supported. Even though a very small positive relationship is seen between exposure to a human rights frame and supporting policies to protect stateless people, it is far from being significant.

**Table 8.**

*The regression models*

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>
<b>Job is secure</b>	0,037; 0,050 0,667	-0,011; 0,052 0,901
<b>Worry about crime</b>	-0,031; 0,077 0,739	-0,139; 0,086 0,193
<b>Immigration attitude</b>	0,572; 0,076 0,000*	0,528; 0,087 0,000*
<b>Human rights frame</b>	0,010; 0,261 0,908	0,016; 0,282 0,865
<b>Age</b>		0,148; 0,013 0,157
<b>Male</b>		-0,158; 0,324 0,090
<b>Born in the Netherlands</b>		0,007; 0,750 0,938
<b>Both parents born in NL</b>		-0,011; 0,612 0,909
<b>Higher education</b>		-0,076; 0,311 0,447
<b>Comfortable income</b>		0,033; 0,302 0,735
<b>Voted</b>		0,093; 0,362 0,318
<b>Religious</b>		0,072; 0,331 0,482
<b>Knowledge research project</b>		-0,056; 0,277 0,529
<b>Knowledge statelessness</b>		-0,070; 0,342 0,444

Noted are the Beta coefficient, standard error and significance.

\* =  $p < 0,05$

N=98, linear regression model, dependent variable = support for statelessness protection policies

In the following table, the values of the dummies of sets of information are included based on the variables entered in model 2. Instead of only entering a dummy for all the respondents who received the human rights frame, the dummies for the different sets of information are included and only the dummy for the respondents who only got the basic neutral information is left out. Only the values of these sets of information are shown in the following table:



**Table 9.***Some values of model 3*

<b>Set of information</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
<b>Human rights information</b>	0,023; 0,409 0,843
<b>All information, neutral information first (N very small)</b>	0,134; 0,751 0,255
<b>All information, human rights information first</b>	0,015; 0,432 0,898
<b>All neutral information</b>	0,049; 0,420 0,671

This table shows the differences between the sets of information. There can be seen that giving people more information than just the basic neutral information will have the effect of more positive respondents. Although these effects are not significant. Further, no suggestion is found that there would be a clear relation between showing human rights information or not and there also doesn't seem to be an effect that receiving more and more information will lead to more positive attitudes towards protection policies for stateless people.

## 6. Discussion

A striking result of this thesis is that a lot of people didn't know what to answer on the dependent question. Apparently, these respondents didn't have the feeling they knew enough to form an opinion or they didn't have an opinion because of other reasons. I also got signals that respondents found it hard to answer this question, because no information about the current status of the policies in the Netherlands was offered. No information about it was given, because it would be quite complicated to give this information neutrally while also giving people a full picture. Writing facts that are neutral and don't steer into a direction was an overall difficulty, because a lot is unknown about the group of stateless people and often a fact could already lead to specific thoughts that would steer people into a direction. For example, mentioning countries in the Middle East as countries stateless people are from, can lead to all kinds of opinions on immigration or the Islam, what could mess with the policy preferences on policies for stateless people.

If a research about policy preferences with the topic of statelessness would be done again, it would be wise to reconsider which information would be offered to respondents and if this would leave them with a feeling of being informed enough to form an opinion about the questions they are asked. As this research shows, it is not possible to just assume people will form an opinion.

The N of the regression analyses was small. Already in linear regression model 1 and 2, the difference could be seen in the significant comparisons between the matrixes with different N. With a bigger sample, an extra comparison becomes significant. Therefore, it could be true that more hypotheses are supported when the sample size is bigger. One way of achieving this, is reconsidering the measurement of economic insecurity. When a measurement will be chosen that every respondent could fill in regardless of if they are having a job, a smaller loss of respondents would occur. Further, when another way of measuring the policy preference is used, without 'losing' a lot of respondents because they chose 'I don't know', the sample size could have been much bigger. Of course, also the simple solution, finding more respondents, will enlarge the sample size and a sample with another composition could lead to more respondents included in the regression.

The fact that sample size and control variables matter is also seen that in some versions of the regression model the value for 'male' was almost significant. In the final version of the model, the significance level of 'male' is almost significant: 0,090.

It is known that respondents don't always read the information in surveys well. In this survey, proof was given for this, because even though it was stated in the informed consent form that

respondents should be 18 years old to participate, still two people entered the survey and stated that they were 17. I also suspect that there may be some respondents that filled in a wrong education level they received a diploma from. It is easy to not read it well and just fill in the education level you are busy with now. Also some other questions can be filled in with another idea than the question was aimed for, because people didn't read well or understood the question differently than it was meant. Another example is that 66 respondents (of the whole group of respondents, not only the ones in the regression) filled in that they had some knowledge about this particular research project, though I have doubts about if that is true.

The results are not appropriate to generalize. The population is not a random sample of the population and is also not representative for the whole Dutch population, as it can be seen in the description of the sample. Furthermore, because it was a sample distributed online through a personal network, it was not a random sample and people could choose to fill it in themselves. The respondents are most likely people who for example like to fill in surveys and/or who do this more often, people who want to help the researcher by filling in the survey, etc. People who are not interested or don't see the importance of filling in surveys will not do it. Respondents also couldn't easily ask help in this set-up, what could have led to more people choosing 'I don't know' or even quitting. Further, some people quit after already filling in some questions, it could be that they thought it was too long or they didn't want to share so much personal information.

Because the survey is distributed online, respondents can make mistakes, tell others too much information, share the link however they like etc. without the researcher having a lot of influence on it. Such events occurred on the way, some interventions were applied.

A small mistake was also apparent in the survey, as I called a province 'Brabant' and not 'Noord-Brabant', though it would be unlikely that somebody was confused by it.

It was hard making a good set of answering categories for the question about the educational level, because it shouldn't be too long, but also not that short that people don't know what to answer or feel hurt by the way the answering categories are constructed. This has to do with the Dutch education system that changed over time and the many levels the system consists of.

What is interesting regarding the relevance of this research, is that much more can be learned about how policy preferences work, because a large percentage of the sample didn't know what their opinion was about the policies for stateless people. Also, at the immigration question, a relatively big percentage of people chose; 'I don't know'. This question was also more related to policy preferences. That people don't always know what their policy preference is can be used to rethink how democracies should distribute information. Further, no framing effect was found,

what implies that it doesn't have such a strong effect as would be expected by the theory. Whether it still doesn't have an effect in a study with a bigger sample is unknown. Future research about this particular framing effect can be used to see if it would help politicians and/or others who want to change the policy opinions to use a human rights frame. However, the effect in the regression tables doesn't suggest that it would be a big effect; it was far from significant and the values of the different frames didn't show a clear pattern.

The survey also generated more information about the policy preference about statelessness policies. The respondents that were included in the regression were on average quite positive about more policies to protect stateless people in the Netherlands and the lowest possible answers: '1' and '2' were not even given.

A nice detail was that everybody (also the respondents who are not in the regression are included in this statement) knew if they voted for the elections two years ago. This shows a sense of importance. Not everybody knew on which party they voted for, but the percentage of people who didn't know this anymore was very small.

## 7. Conclusion

One hypothesis is supported by the results of the survey experiment. The other three hypotheses are not supported, though some suggestive evidence is found by the significant correlations in the correlation matrixes. The hypothesis that is supported is that respondents who think more positively about immigration will be more likely to support government policy to protect the rights of stateless people. The beta coefficient for this effect, when a linear regression model is run with the control variables included, is 0,528. This is quite high comparing to the other coefficients in the regression table. The standard error is only 0,087 and the significance level is 0,000. The relationship between this independent variable and the dependent variable was also already seen in the correlation matrix. It is interesting that this relationship is supported by the regression models, because there is known more about immigration attitudes than about people's opinions about statelessness policies and therefore it could create a lot more information on the topic of statelessness.

The other hypotheses are not supported. Also the beta coefficients of these variables are lower. The way the relationships are shaped, whether it is a negative or a positive relationship, match the hypotheses, except for hypotheses two in the second model. This relationship is negative; the beta coefficient is -0,011. This is not logical, because that means that when people are more secure about their job, their policy preference for policies to protect stateless people is less positive. Additionally, in the theoretical framework was laid out that in scientific literature a positive relationship is seen between being well of economically and immigration attitude and immigration attitude and the policy preferences on statelessness are related, a positive relationship was expected between economic security and the policy preferences for these policy preferences. The negative relationship found is not significant at all and also in the correlation matrixes no suggestive evidence was found for this hypothesis, thus according to these results the hypotheses is not supported.

Suggestive evidence was found in the correlation matrix for hypotheses three, because a significant correlation between worry about crime and policy preferences of statelessness policies is seen. Also, a significant correlation was apparent for worry about crime and immigration attitudes. This is explainable since immigration attitude and these policy preferences are related. However, no evidence was found for hypotheses three in the regression models. It could be that in further research this relationship will be supported, just as the relationship between worry about crime and immigration attitude is supported by Fitzgerald et al. (2012).

Hypothesis four, that a framing effect will occur by using a human rights frame, is also not supported and also no suggestive evidence was found for it. Although it is expected by the large body of literature on framing effects and value frames, in this case, no effect was found. It is also

not clear if giving more information will lead to more positive opinions about protective policies for stateless people.

Thus, the answer for “What explains support for statelessness protection in the Netherlands?” is answered with that only immigration attitudes explains support for statelessness protection. And “Do people support it more when it is presented as a human rights issue?” is answered with a no, because no evidence was found.

What is interesting is the fact that suggestive evidence was found on a relation between job security and worry about crime. Is that this relationship was positively correlated, what means that more security about a job means that people worry more about crime, so it can be interesting for future research if such a relationship exists and if it does, why it exists.

Further, a lot of people didn’t know what their opinion was about policies to protect stateless people. This raises some questions. First, what does this say about the validity of policy preferences as a method, if a lot of people struggle with forming an opinion if they are not very familiar with the topic? Second, which information or other things do people need to form an opinion about a certain topic that has to do with policy preferences? Third, what are the consequences of this particularity for information distribution by the government or the media? Fourth, does this information have consequences for the doings and the legitimacy of a democratic government? In a way a representative democracy can gain legitimacy by this information, because it can be seen as a way in which the public doesn’t have to form policy preferences about a topic, and representatives they trust, on which they voted, have the job to form the policies. It would therefore be interesting to do more research on how, why and when people form policy preferences.

## 8. Recommendations

A clear recommendation done by the UNHCR in 2011 through an extensive report is that the Netherlands should have a procedure to determine statelessness. This procedure will make it easier to ensure that stateless persons will enjoy the rights set out in the 1954 Convention and this procedure is needed to fulfil the duties as prescribed by this Convention (G.-R de Groot, as cited in UNHCR, 2011, p. 55; UNHCR “Stateless Determination Procedures and the Status of Stateless Persons”, as cited in UNHCR, 2011, p. 59; UNHCR, 2011, pp. 1-3, 18, 55, 58-61). The government states that they are working on such a procedure (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b). Still it should be a priority to protect the rights of this vulnerable group of people, as it is even a human right to have a nationality (*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, n.d., “Article 15”) and therefore to not be stateless. Also, the acknowledgement of statelessness leads to advantages in the process to gain the Dutch citizenship (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-a; IND, n.d.-c; Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2016, p. 153; Rijksoverheid, n.d.-b).

Another way of reducing statelessness by the Netherlands is by granting children born on Dutch territory, who would be stateless if they won’t get the Dutch nationality; the Dutch nationality with the prerequisite is permanent residence of the parents.<sup>30</sup> This is recommended in the same report of the UNHCR of 2011 (UNHCR, 2011, pp. 3, 50, 65). Also, in 2019, attention was asked for stateless children in Europe. The UNHCR and UNICEF were the organisation behind it. One of the proposed measures is that bills should be made which make sure that children will get a nationality if they are being seen as stateless in the country they are born in (UNHCR, 2019). Although it is not a solution for all stateless people, it will still stop the cycle in generations and give the child the chances in life it has the right to. In the end, protecting stateless people can best be done by getting a nationality.

Further, that a lot of respondents didn’t know what to answer when there was asked about their preference on statelessness policies and the amount of immigrants, shows that not everybody knows what their opinion is in these matters. When a government is considering asking people’s opinions about policies, for example with a referendum, they should also consider well how they make sure that the public is able to make an informed opinion.

Lastly, knowledge about statelessness is lacking and a lot of people didn’t know what their opinion was on the statelessness policies. I think it would be good if the media, the UNHCR, PILP (an organisation who strategically sues for human rights, also statelessness is a theme they worked on (PILP, n.d.-a, n.d.-b)) and/or other organisations will gain more attention for this

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<sup>30</sup> In Dutch the term is: ‘duurzaam verblijf’.

topic, what could lead to more pressure for the rights of this group. Further, the government should provide more information on this topic and on the progress they make with creating a procedure to determine statelessness. Not a lot of recent information is available on the topic. Also politicians should make sure this topic is discussed more often in the parliament. They should put pressure on the creation of the procedure.



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## **Appendix 1**

### **The basic neutral information**

#### **Dutch:**

Informatie over staatloosheid

- Staatlozen worden niet erkend als een staatsburger van een land, ze hebben geen paspoort en geen nationaliteit.
- Het exacte aantal staatloze mensen in Nederland is onbekend. De site van de Rijksoverheid vermeldt dat ruim 4000 mensen geregistreerd zijn als staatloos in de Basisregistratie Personen.
- Twee van de mogelijke oorzaken van staatloosheid zijn het uiteenvallen van een staat en de willekeurige ontzegging van de nationaliteit.

#### **English:**

Information about statelessness

- Stateless persons are not recognized as citizens of a country, they have no passport and no nationality.
- The exact number of stateless people in the Netherlands is unknown. The site of the government states that more than 4000 people are registered as stateless in the Personal Records Database.
- Two of the possible causes of statelessness are the breakup of a state and the arbitrary deprivation of the nationality.

#### **Sources:**

- Staatlozen worden niet erkend als een staatsburger van een land, ze hebben geen paspoort en geen nationaliteit (Amnesty International, n.d.-a; Rijksoverheid, n.d.-b; UNHCR, n.d.-e, n.d.-b, 2017a).
- Het exacte aantal staatloze mensen in Nederland is onbekend (Amnesty International, n.d.-a; Rijksoverheid, n.d.-b; UNHCR, 2017b, 2018). De site van de Rijksoverheid vermeldt dat ruim 4000 mensen geregistreerd zijn als staatloos in de Basisregistratie Personen (Rijksoverheid, n.d.-b).
- Twee van de mogelijke oorzaken van staatloosheid zijn het uiteenvallen van een staat en de willekeurige ontzegging van de nationaliteit (Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, 2013, p. 27; *Handreiking Staatloosheid*, 2016, “2. Oorzaken van Staatloosheid”; PILP, n.d.-b; UNHCR, n.d.-b, 2018).

## **Additional neutral information**

### **Dutch:**

- De Sovjet-Unie is een voorbeeld van een staat die uiteenviel met als gevolg veel staatlozen.
- Er wordt geschat dat er wereldwijd ongeveer 10 miljoen of meer mensen staatloos zijn en dat ongeveer een derde of meer dan een derde hiervan kind is.

### **English:**

- The Soviet Union is an example of a state that fell apart<sup>31</sup>, resulting in many stateless persons.
- It is estimated that worldwide around 10 million or more people are stateless and that approximately one third or more than one third of them are children.

### **Sources:**

- De Sovjet-Unie is een voorbeeld van een staat die uiteenviel met als gevolg veel staatlozen (Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, 2013, p. 37; Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, 2017, p. 58,73; Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2016, pp. 8-9; UNHCR, n.d.-c, p. 15).
- Er wordt geschat dat er wereldwijd ongeveer 10 miljoen of meer mensen staatloos zijn en dat ongeveer een derde of meer dan een derde hiervan kind is (Amnesty International, n.d.-a; Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2016, p. 13; PILP, n.d.-b; UNHCR, n.d.-c, p. 4, n.d.-e, n.d.-b, n.d.-f, n.d.-h, 2017b).

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<sup>31</sup> In the Dutch version for 'fell apart' and 'break up' the same word was used.

## **Human rights information**

### **Dutch:**

- Een nationaliteit hebben is een mensenrecht en dit recht staat in de Universele Verklaring van de Rechten van de Mens. Ieder mens heeft recht op een nationaliteit. Nederland heeft als lid van de Verenigde Naties zich aan deze verklaring verbonden.

- Concrete gevolgen van staatloosheid zijn dat het voor staatloze mensen lastig of niet mogelijk kan zijn om te reizen, werk te krijgen, medische hulp te ontvangen, een bankrekening te openen etc.

### **English:**

- Having a nationality is a human right and this right is stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Every person has the right to a nationality. The Netherlands has as a member of the United Nations committed itself to this declaration.

- The concrete consequences of statelessness are that it may be difficult or impossible for stateless people to travel, get work, receive medical help, open a bank account etc.

### **Sources:**

- Een nationaliteit hebben is een mensenrecht en dit recht staat in de Universele Verklaring van de Rechten van de Mens. Ieder mens heeft recht op een nationaliteit. Nederland heeft als lid van de Verenigde Naties zich aan deze verklaring verbonden (Amnesty International, n.d.-c, n.d.-b; College voor de Rechten van de Mens, n.d.; United Nations, n.d.).

- Concrete gevolgen van staatloosheid zijn dat het voor staatloze mensen lastig of niet mogelijk kan zijn om te reizen, werk te krijgen, medische hulp te ontvangen, een bankrekening te openen etc. (UNHCR, n.d.-e, n.d.-b, 2010, p. 14)



**Table 10**

*The set-up of the sets of information (same as Table 3)*

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5
Neutral facts	Neutral facts	Neutral facts	Neutral facts	Neutral facts
	Neutral facts	Human rights facts	Neutral facts	Human rights facts
			Human rights facts	Neutral facts

## Appendix 2

Below are all questions of the survey shown. The original as the respondents received it was in another format. Also not all the information about the structures of how the survey was made are shown. This is a basic presentation of the information in the survey.

Sometimes questions were not shown to people due to earlier answers. Here all questions are shown, directions about which questions are shown to whom when not all respondents receive it, are added to understand the flow of the survey. These added directions are in grey and have a '\*' before and after the direction. When not all the respondents will be sent to the next question and a direction about this if shown, then that point will also be like a page-ending. The next question they will see, will be on another page. Some other point for page-endings have been added too, these are called 'pagina-einde'.

This is the survey when people accepted the informed consent form. If they didn't accept the informed consent form, they were automatically sent to a short 'end'-screen.

When a question was shown to a respondent, they were almost all required to fill in. The question about a person's age was not required, as well as the last three questions (if people knew more information than the set of information showed, how they know this and the dependent question). Further, it was not required to tick the box under the shown set of information (except for one set of information) to indicate the respondent read it.

## Survey:

Toestemming voor medewerking aan dit onderzoek

Dit is een masterscriptie-onderzoek van een student van de Universiteit Utrecht naar de invloed van informatie op de voorkeur van mensen over beleid rondom staatloosheid. Deelname kost ongeveer 5 tot 10 minuten.

Uw deelname is vrijwillig en u behoudt het recht om op elk moment te stoppen met de vragenlijst, zonder dat u daarvoor een reden hoeft op te geven. De data die is verzameld tot het punt dat u besloot te stoppen met de vragenlijst kan wel worden gebruikt in het onderzoek.

Doe alleen mee met het onderzoek als u 18 jaar of ouder bent.

De onderzoeksresultaten worden gebruikt in de masterscriptie die gaat over beleidsvoorkeuren en worden alleen geanonimiseerd opgenomen. Ook kunnen de onderzoeksresultaten mogelijk in andere publicaties geanonimiseerd worden gebruikt. Er wordt op een vertrouwelijke manier met uw gegevens omgegaan en gepubliceerde resultaten zijn nooit te herleiden tot individuen. Er worden alleen geaggregeerde, samengevatte statistieken gepubliceerd.

Als u meer informatie over het onderzoek wilt, nu of in de toekomst, dan kunt u zich wenden tot de scriptiebegeleider Dr. Mallory E. Compton, verbonden aan het departement Bestuurs- en Organisatiewetenschap van de Universiteit Utrecht.

Door te klikken op 'Ik ga hiermee akkoord' geeft u aan dat u voldoende bent geïnformeerd over het doel van het onderzoek en de manier waarop wordt omgegaan met uw gegevens. Als u niet akkoord gaat, wordt u doorverwezen naar het einde van de vragenlijst.

☐ Ik ga hiermee akkoord

☐ Ik ga hier niet mee akkoord

\* This is the end of the page. If people chose: 'Ik ga hier niet mee akkoord' (I do not agree with this), they will be sent to the end of the survey, though another message will be shown than the people who finished the survey.

Shown will be:

"Bedankt voor uw tijd om aan deze enquête deel te nemen.

Uw antwoord is geregistreerd." \*

Wat is uw geslacht?

- ☐ Man
- ☐ Vrouw
- ☐ Anders
- ☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

Wat is uw leeftijd?

\_\_\_\_\_

Wat is uw hoogst behaalde opleidingsniveau? Dit houdt in dat u een diploma heeft behaald op dit niveau. Als u een diploma heeft behaald in een ouder onderwijsstelsel dan het huidige stelsel, dan mag u kiezen voor een gelijkwaardig opleidingsniveau.

- ☐ Basisonderwijs
- ☐ Praktijkonderwijs
- ☐ Vmbo basis (basisberoepsgerichte leerweg)
- ☐ Vmbo kader (kaderberoepsgerichte leerweg)
- ☐ Vmbo GL of vmbo TL (gemengde leerweg of theoretische leerweg)
- ☐ Havo
- ☐ Vwo
- ☐ Mbo 1
- ☐ Mbo 2
- ☐ Mbo 3
- ☐ Mbo 4
- ☐ Hbo-bachelor of wo-bachelor
- ☐ Hbo-master, wo-master of doctor

- ☐ Anders
- ☐ Weet ik niet
- ☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

In welke provincie woont u de meeste dagen van de week?

- ☐ Brabant
- ☐ Drenthe
- ☐ Flevoland
- ☐ Friesland
- ☐ Gelderland
- ☐ Groningen
- ☐ Limburg
- ☐ Noord-Holland
- ☐ Overijssel
- ☐ Utrecht
- ☐ Zeeland
- ☐ Zuid-Holland
- ☐ Anders
- ☐ Weet ik niet
- ☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

Pagina-einde

---

Heeft u de Nederlandse nationaliteit?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nee
- ☐ Weet ik niet
- ☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

Bent u geboren in Nederland?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nee
- ☐ Weet ik niet
- ☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

Zijn uw beide ouders geboren in Nederland?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nee
- ☐ Weet ik niet
- ☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

---

Pagina-einde

---

Beschouwt u zichzelf als behorende tot een religie of religieuze stroming?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nee
- ☐ Weet ik niet
- ☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

\*All respondents who chose 'Ja' (Yes) will be send to the next question. The other respondents are send to: "Heeft u tijdens de laatste Tweede Kamer verkiezingen in maart 2017 gestemd?" \*

Welke religie of religieuze stroming is dat?

- ☐ Rooms Katholiek
- ☐ Protestants
- ☐ Andere christelijke stroming
- ☐ Jodendom
- ☐ Islam
- ☐ Hindoeïsme
- ☐ Boeddhisme
- ☐ Anders
- ☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

---

Pagina-einde

Heeft u tijdens de laatste Tweede Kamer verkiezingen in maart 2017 gestemd?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nee
- ☐ Niet stemgerechtigd tijdens de verkiezingen in maart 2017
- ☐ Weet ik niet
- ☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

\* When a respondent chose 'Ja' (Yes), it will see the next question. The other respondents will skip the next question and will see: "Welke reactie tegenover de volgende stelling past het beste bij u?", the question after the next question.\*



Op welke partij heeft u bij de laatste Tweede Kamer verkiezingen in maart 2017 gestemd?

- ☐ VVD
- ☐ PVV
- ☐ CDA
- ☐ D66
- ☐ Groenlinks
- ☐ SP
- ☐ PvdA
- ☐ ChristenUnie
- ☐ PvdD
- ☐ 50Plus
- ☐ SGP
- ☐ DENK
- ☐ Forum voor Democratie
- ☐ Anders
- ☐ Weet ik niet
- ☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

---

Pagina-einde

Welke reactie tegenover de volgende stelling past het beste bij u?  
Geef dit aan op een schaal van 1 tot 9.

'Ik maak mij zorgen over criminaliteit in Nederland.'

1 = ik maak mij geen zorgen

9 = ik maak mij zeer veel zorgen

☐ 1

☐ 2

☐ 3

☐ 4

☐ 5

☐ 6

☐ 7

☐ 8

☐ 9

☐ Weet ik niet

☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

---

Pagina-einde

Welke van de volgende omschrijvingen komt het dichtst in de buurt van uw beeld van het huidige inkomen van uw huishouden?

- ☐ Comfortabel leven met het huidige inkomen
- ☐ Het lukt om rond te komen met het huidige inkomen
- ☐ Moeilijk rondkomen met het huidige inkomen
- ☐ Heel erg moeilijk rondkomen met het huidige inkomen
- ☐ Weet ik niet/niet van toepassing
- ☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

Heeft u een betaalde baan? Als u een eigen onderneming heeft, wordt dit hier ook gezien als een baan.

- ☐ Ja, ik heb een voltijdbaan
- ☐ Ja, ik heb een deeltijdbaan
- ☐ Ja, ik heb een bijbaan naast mijn studie of opleiding
- ☐ Nee, ik heb geen baan
- ☐ Nee, ik volg een studie of opleiding en heb geen baan
- ☐ Anders
- ☐ Weet ik niet
- ☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

\* All respondents who chose the options starting with the word: 'Ja' (Yes) will be sent to the next question and the other respondents will be sent to question: "Vindt u dat de hoeveelheid nieuwe immigranten die naar Nederland mag komen om hier te leven moet worden vergroot, hetzelfde moet blijven als nu of moet worden verkleind?", so not the question after the next question.\*

In hoeverre is de volgende uitspraak over uw huidige baan waar?  
Geef dit aan op een schaal van 1 tot 9.

'Mijn baan is zeker'

1 = helemaal niet waar

9 = heel erg waar

- ☐ 1
- ☐ 2
- ☐ 3
- ☐ 4
- ☐ 5
- ☐ 6
- ☐ 7
- ☐ 8
- ☐ 9
- ☐ Weet ik niet
- ☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

Hoe moeilijk of makkelijk zou het zijn voor u om een gelijkwaardige of betere baan te krijgen bij een andere werkgever als u uw huidige baan zou moeten verlaten?  
Geef dit aan op een schaal van 1 tot 9.

1 = uiterst moeilijk

9 = uiterst makkelijk

☐ 1

☐ 2

☐ 3

☐ 4

☐ 5

☐ 6

☐ 7

☐ 8

☐ 9

☐ Weet ik niet

☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

-----  
Pagina-einde

Vindt u dat de hoeveelheid nieuwe immigranten die naar Nederland mag komen om hier te leven moet worden vergroot, hetzelfde moet blijven als nu of moet worden verkleind?

Geef dit aan op een schaal van 1 tot 9.

1 = sterk worden verkleind

5 = hetzelfde blijven

9 = sterk worden vergroot

☐ 1

☐ 2

☐ 3

☐ 4

☐ 5

☐ 6

☐ 7

☐ 8

☐ 9

☐ Weet ik niet

☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

---

Pagina-einde

Hoeveel weet u al over **dit specifieke onderzoek** naar staatloosheid?

- ☐ Veel
- ☐ Weinig
- ☐ Niets
- ☐ Weet ik niet

---

Pagina-einde

Op de volgende pagina zal een tekst verschijnen met informatie over staatloosheid.  
Lees deze informatie aandachtig door.

\* This text is shown before a respondent will receive the set of information. The sets of information are randomized (the five sets are not equally shown to respondents, more information about that in the methodology). The first set of information is shown as an example of how it was incorporated in the survey, especially since a box to be ticked is present. The other frames can be seen in the former appendix. \*

## Informatie over staatloosheid

- Staatlozen worden niet erkend als een staatsburger van een land, ze hebben geen paspoort en geen nationaliteit.

- Het exacte aantal staatloze mensen in Nederland is onbekend. De site van de Rijksoverheid vermeldt dat ruim 4000 mensen geregistreerd zijn als staatloos in de Basisregistratie Personen.

- Twee van de mogelijke oorzaken van staatloosheid zijn het uiteenvallen van een staat en de willekeurige ontzegging van de nationaliteit.

☐ Ik heb de tekst gelezen

\* The next question was on another page. \*

Wist u al meer over staatloosheid dan de informatie die u net heeft kunnen lezen?

☐ Ja

☐ Nee

☐ Weet ik niet

\* Respondents who answered 'Ja' (Yes), will be send to the next question. As can be seen, these answering options have squares instead of circles. This means that multiple options can be chosen. The other respondents will be send to: "Om de rechten van staatlozen in Nederland te beschermen, zou de Nederlandse overheid:". \*

Via welke kanalen bent u meer te weten gekomen over staatloosheid?

☐ Nieuws (kranten, het journaal etc.)

☐ Persoonlijke verhalen

☐ Zelf informatie erover opgezocht

☐ Via werk of vrijwilligerswerk

☐ Ik hoorde meer informatie over dit onderzoek

☐ Anders



☐ Weet ik niet

---

Pagina-einde

Om de rechten van staatlozen in Nederland te beschermen, zou de Nederlandse overheid:

1 = veel minder moeten doen

5 = hetzelfde moeten doen als nu

9 = veel meer moeten doen

Geef dit aan op een schaal van 1 tot 9.

☐ 1

☐ 2

☐ 3

☐ 4

☐ 5

☐ 6

☐ 7

☐ 8

☐ 9

☐ Weet ik niet

☐ Beantwoord ik liever niet

\* This was the last question. The end of the survey when people finished the whole survey will be shown now. \*

Bedankt voor het invullen van de vragenlijst!

Er zijn in dit onderzoek vier versies van de tekst met feiten over staatloosheid gebruikt.

Als u meer over staatloosheid wilt lezen, kunt u op de volgende sites kijken:

<https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/nederlandse-nationaliteit/staatloosheid>

<https://www.unhcr.org/nl/wie-we-zijn/wie-we-helpen/staatlozen/>  
<https://www.unhcr.org/nl/wie-we-zijn/wie-we-helpen/staatlozen/staatloosheid-in-nederland/>

U kunt dit scherm nu sluiten.