

A Peacekeeping Rise of China?

*The norm dynamics of United Nations Peacekeeping and the
Rise of China*

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Abstract

United Nations peacekeeping has undergone multiple changes since its creation in 1948. This thesis examines the period between 1990-2011. After the cold war, 'Western' dominance led to the prevalence of liberal norms within the United Nations peacekeeping regime. However, as the Western unipolarity is challenged by multipolarity due to growing influence of states such as China, United Nations peacekeeping norms may, too, be challenged. Therefore, this thesis examines the effect of growing role of China on the norms within United Nations peacekeeping by applying the theoretical framework on norm dynamics by Finnemore and Sikkink on the case study of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (2011). This thesis establishes that, while China can be considered a norm-maker in the context of several United Nations bodies, it is still a norm-taker in the context of United Nations peacekeeping, despite the fact that it has become the largest contributor of troop personnel of the United Nations Security Council permanent members.

Key words: norm dynamics, United Nations peacekeeping, liberal peacebuilding regime, the People's Republic of China.

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


Figure 1. International Peace Institute, UN Peacekeeping Troop Contributions by the P5.

UN peacekeeping

Military-personnel and budget contributors




Figure 2. The Economist, UN Peacekeeping: Military-personnel and budget contributors (2016).

Chapter 1. Introduction

When the United Nations celebrates its 75th birthday in 2020, over one million people will have served under its light-blue banner in over seventy separate peacekeeping missions.¹ The purpose and meaning of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has significantly evolved since the first mission was mandated in 1948. Since these mandates are primarily established in the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC), peacekeeping missions are prone to the power dynamics and influence of its fifteen member states - most notably of its five permanent members: The People's Republic of China (China), France, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA). Consequently, when changes occur within the power dynamics of these five permanent members (P5), the underlying norms that govern peacekeeping are also affected, influencing its purpose and meaning.

A good illustration is the end of the Cold War, when Western states proclaimed liberalism victorious.² As liberal scholar John Ikenberry describes, the end of the Cold War slung 'the liberal ascendancy' into a 'worldwide crescendo' as the USA-led Western unipolarity provided the setting for a wide variety of liberal policies and patterns to take hold within international organisations – so too in UN peacekeeping.³ For example, liberalism was at the core of the UN report *Agenda for Peace* (1992), which formally introduced the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding in the United Nations (UN) sphere and set the course for the next two decades of UN peacekeeping. By implementing liberal nation-building concepts, such as striving for liberal democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in war-torn societies, peace was no longer only something to be kept but also became something to be built.⁴

The turn of the century has arguably witnessed a power shift from Western unipolarity to multipolarity due to what Zakaria Fareed has named the 'rise of the Rest'.⁵ One prevalent

¹ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Data*, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>. Accessed on 10 February 2019.

² For victorious claims see, for example, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) in which most European states, together with Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union declared 'an Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity' based on the principles of human rights, democracy, rule of law and economic liberty.

³ John G. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order*. Vol. 128 (2011) 47.; While acknowledging that the term 'Western' is contested and therefore problematic because of its generalising implications, this thesis uses it in relation to the prevalence of European and Northern American countries within the international order at the end of the 21st century, following the example of many international relations scholars.

⁴ United Nations General Assembly, 'An Agenda for Peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping', *Report of the Secretary General* (1992) A/47/277.

⁵ Fareed Zakaria, 'The Rise of the Rest', in: *Debating a Post-American World: What Lies Ahead?* (London 2011) 42–51.

nation within this shift is China, whose role within UN peacekeeping only seems to grow. Since 2010, it contributes more troop personnel than any other permanent member of the UNSC (see figure 1).⁶ In fact, most Western states have decimated their costly personnel contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) since the end of the 1990s. The resulting gap was mainly filled by developing countries (see figure 2).⁷ Thus, while the top ten financial contributors to UNPKOs remain, in large, the richest countries in the world, the top ten personnel contributors are, in general, developing countries – and this divergence keeps growing. There is only one exception to this trend: China. This is remarkable given China’s emphasis on state sovereignty and non-interference which is seemingly at odds with the concepts guiding the liberal peacebuilding regime.⁸ The decline of Western hegemony and shift from unipolarity to multipolarity combined with China’s growing interest in UN peacekeeping could therefore reshape the peacekeeping regime fundamentally.

Three months ago, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael) published a report titled *A United Nations with Chinese Characteristics?*. In this report, several scholars underline the growing influence and increasing activity of China within several United Nations organs. The report aims to demonstrate how China is ‘using its growing leverage in the UN with regard to norm and standard-setting’.⁹ In answering this ‘how’, the report focuses on three topical case studies: human rights, development finance, and climate (change). It concludes that China is ‘breaking the Western monopoly of discourse on human rights’ issues’ and utilises UN agencies as a tool to ‘legitimize Chinese national objectives’.¹⁰ This report strengthens the assumption that changes in influence changes norms within UN bodies. A similar assumption can thus be made for UN peacekeeping, as peacekeeping mandates are prone to the politics of the UNSC. Even scholars who have spent significant time studying liberal peacebuilding, such as Roland Paris, argue:

⁶ International Peace Institute, *UN Peacekeeping Troop Contributions by the P5* <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/peacekeeping-data-graphs/>. Accessed on 26 March 2019.

⁷ The Economist, *Who fights and who pays for UN peacekeeping missions* (2016) <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2016/06/01/who-fights-and-who-pays-for-un-peacekeeping-missions>. Accessed on 29 January 2019.

⁸ M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s Attitude toward U.N. Peacekeeping Operations since 1989’, *Asian Survey* Vol. 36 (1996) 1102–1121, 1120.

⁹ Maaïke Okano-Heijmans e.a., ‘A United Nations with Chinese characteristics?’, *Clingendael* 30, 4.

¹⁰ Okano-Heijmans e.a., ‘A United Nations with Chinese characteristics?’, 6; *Ibidem*, 11.

'[T]he norms and understandings that underpin liberal peacebuilding will likely be challenged as rising actors, who do not necessarily share these assumptions, gain greater influence and voice in international affairs.'¹¹

Similar to the Clingendael report described above, Paris assumes that the rise of new actors on the global stage will lead to a change in global norms. Therefore, this thesis asks and answers the following question: *To what extent is China a norm-maker within the UN peacekeeping regime, based on the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan?*

Historiography

Within the field of international relations, joining the Clingendael report and Roland Paris, political scientists have attempted to explain China's growing role in international relations and organisations and its implications. A small but emerging body of literature focuses on the greater role China plays in UN peacekeeping and its reasons to do so in an attempt to explain China's behaviour. The debate around China's approach to UN peacekeeping is bound together in Marc Lanteigne and Miwa Hirono's *China's Evolving Approach to Peacekeeping*. Two main strings of thought can be distinguished within this new debate. The first is the more realist assumption that underlines how China – as all states – seeks to maximise its military influence, and participation in UN peacekeeping allows China to professionalise its troops and 'test its power projection capabilities' - making China's personnel contribution to UN peacekeeping means to an end.¹² The second string of thought comes from institutionalist sociologists such as Chin-Hao Huang which argue that China's participation in international organisations is due to 'increasing socialization and interaction with international community', encouraging the state to participate in UN activities, including peacekeeping activities.¹³

While stemming from different theoretical perspectives, both sides of the debate conclude that China is indeed a growing influence within the UN and furthermore purposely takes up an active role within UN peacekeeping. However, little research has been conducted on the effect of China's role within UN peacekeeping, especially regarding China's influence

¹¹ Roland Paris, 'The Geopolitics of Peace Operations: A Research Agenda', *International Peacekeeping* 21 (2014) 501–508, 504 <doi:10.1080/13533312.2014.946743>.

¹² Marc Lanteigne and Miwa Hirono, ed., *China's Evolving Approach to Peacekeeping* (London 2012) 15.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

on the norms that underline UN peacekeeping. Since 'norms' is a concept borrowed by the field of international relations from sociology to explain standards of appropriate behaviour within the international community (as will be elaborated in the theoretical chapter) a social constructivist approach is warranted. The scholar which has approached this topic from such a perspective, Jing Chen, examines how peacekeeping norms such as human rights have diffused into China rather than how Chinese norms have diffused into UN peacekeeping. Furthermore, the article appears to be written from a Chinese point of view and is therefore somewhat biased, concluding for example that China's active participation in UN peacekeeping is 'exactly what the US and other states in the international community would like to see', while policy briefs such as the Clingendael report demonstrate that this is not the case.¹⁴ Consequently, there is still a gap within the debate that this thesis enters into by looking at whether and to what extent the growth of China has normatively influenced UNPKO mandates using a constructivist approach.

The theory used to explain norms is the norm dynamics theory by constructivist scholars Finnemore and Sikkink, merged with the conceptual notions of norm-making and norm-taking by Lanteigne and Hirono. In short, norms are defined as a 'standard of appropriate behaviour for actors within a given identity'.¹⁵ These standards are created by norm-makers, or powerful states that hold the capability to diffuse certain norms within international relations. How these states build norms and when a normative shift can be expected is elaborated on in Chapter 2.

Methodology

This thesis uses an interdisciplinary approach. The historical science approach of examining (mostly) primary sources and placing them into context in a hermeneutic way is used to gather information. A case study analysis, derived from sociology, is applied to do in-depth research within the scope of this thesis. The theoretical framework, laid out in the following chapter, is derived from the political scientific approach of constructivism because it helps to explain the information from the primary sources and the case study and draw conclusions based on it.

¹⁴ Jing Chen, 'Explaining the Change in China's Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping: a norm change perspective', *Journal of Contemporary China* 18 (2009) 157–173, 169 <doi:10.1080/10670560802431891>.

¹⁵ Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 891.

To specify, this thesis holds a case study analysis of the mandate of UNMISS, mandated in 2011, to examine if the role of China has affected the norms ruling the UN peacekeeping regime. As stated in the introduction, mandates of peacekeeping missions are drafted in the UNSC, reflecting power dynamics within the Council, making a mandate a reliable place to examine what norms are prevalent in times of changing power dynamics. The choice for the UNMISS mandate comes from its timing: in 2010, China became the largest troop contributor of the P5. Furthermore, 2010 is the year in which domestic interest within China for UN peacekeeping arose after the death of Chinese police personnel in the UN mission in Haiti.¹⁶ As UNMISS was mandated the year after, it proves a good starting point to examine Chinese influence on UN peacekeeping norms.

The analysis of the mandate borrows from the methodological framework of case study analysis as explained by sociologists Denzin and Lincoln. A case study analysis can be seen as 'an intensive analysis of an individual unit (...) stressing development factors in relation to environment'.¹⁷ 'Intensive', because the individual unit of the case study is studied in depth, looking at details and variance, and contextualising it by linking it to 'development' in its 'environment'.¹⁸ The object of the case study in this thesis is studied in a hermeneutical way, examining concepts within the text of the UNMISS mandate, interpreting their meaning and significance, and contextualising them by first looking at the meaning of concepts in the general UN peacekeeping regime and comparing them to Chinese concepts, and subsequently linking them to possible developments in the environment of UN peacekeeping. This thesis thus practises a historical research approach to the usage of primary sources.¹⁹

This thesis holds a large theoretical component because norms in international relations are, to a large extent, abstract phenomena. Therefore, a full chapter is dedicated to theory to be able to draw conclusions from the primary sources. However, acknowledging the danger of 'theory-oriented history'²⁰ this thesis makes use of primary sources where possible and aims to use secondary literature, including the theoretical framework, only to position the sources into their historical and critical context.

¹⁶ Theo Neethling, 'China's evolving role and approach to international peacekeeping: The cases of Mali and South Sudan', *Australasian Review of African Studies* 38 (2017) 11–33 <doi:10.22160/22035184/ARAS-2017-38-2/11-33>.

¹⁷ Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln, *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research* (2011), 301.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ John Tosh, *The Pursuit of History* (2013), 36.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, 218.

The justification for the selected primary sources is as follows: the most canonical UN reform reports, according to UN Peacekeeping itself, are evaluated as they create UN peacekeeping norms first-hand. The timeframe of 1998-2011 for the Chinese government white papers has been chosen for three reasons. First, a practical consideration: the oldest (online-accessible) 'National Defense' white paper dates back to 1998. Second, the end of the 1990s is the period in which Chinese personnel contribution began to rise exponentially.²¹ Third, as a methodological consideration: a decade is a substantial timeframe to research consistencies, continuities and developments within policy. Logically, white papers published after 2011 are less relevant to this specific case study. Of course, this thesis takes into account that these government papers are highly biased, but believes this forms an advantage: the papers are used to determine what Chinese foreign policy norms consist of, and since these sources are widely accessible and translated in English, it can be assumed that the way norms are framed in these white papers is the way China would like the 'world' to perceive them.

Inevitably, this method has several shortcomings. First, it is challenging to measure how much a single country affects a multilateral project. Similarly, a single case study (UNMISS) will not be enough to prove a general rule. However, since China has such growing influence and traditionally a very different approach to multilateralism, this analysis will critically assess the assumption that shifts indeed are taking place and embeds this within a more general analysis of how norms in multilateral organisations are affected by geopolitical shifts. In other words, this thesis is a first step in measuring the effect of the rise of China and a possible shift in the global order from a norms perspective.

In short, this thesis argues that China is largely a norm-taker within the context of United Nations peacekeeping, despite being the largest troop contributor of the P5. The first chapter delves into the theoretical framework of norm dynamics, norm-makers and norm-takers, and how norms shifts can be observed in empirical data. The second chapter asks what the underlying norms of the UN peacekeeping regime are and argues that the norms governing UN peacekeeping between 1990-2011 are largely based on the liberal peacebuilding regime. The third chapter establishes through an analysis of Chinese government white papers from China's State Information Council of 2000-2011 that Chinese norms are indeed conflicting with the liberal peacebuilding regime. The fourth chapter

²¹ UN Peacekeeping, *Troop and police contributors: per country* <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>. Accessed on 12 March 2019.

analyses the extent to which both UN peacekeeping norms and Chinese norms are prevalent in the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework

To be able to understand, define and measure norms in UN peacekeeping, this thesis makes use of the theoretical framework on norm dynamics in international organisations created by prominent constructivist scholars Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink in 1998. The theoretical issue that drove them to construct this framework was that most international relations theories were better at explaining the international order in times of stability rather than change – which was unsatisfying for analyses of the post-Cold War shift from bipolarity to unipolarity.²² Consequently, their theoretical framework focuses on measuring norm changes in times of political shifts. While born out of the desire to explain norm dynamics during the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity, their theoretical framework is applied here to examine norm dynamics during the assumed shift from Western unipolarity to multipolarity. It is further supplied with the concepts of norm-maker and norm-taker, provided by Lanteigne and Hirono, to account for the power dynamics of norm creation.

Norm Dynamics in International Organisations

Drawing from the expertise of Finnemore and Sikkink, a norm is defined here as a ‘standard of appropriate behaviour for actors within a given identity’.²³ In other words, these standards of appropriate behaviour are actively built by actors (such as UN member states) that have notions about desirable or appropriate behaviour in their community or sphere – in this case, the sphere of United Nations peacekeeping. As Hirono and Lanteigne argue, a norm-advancing attitude is a classic trait of great powers, also referred to as norm-makers.²⁴ These norm-makers build norms by creating or calling attention to issues (such as UN peacekeeping) through the process of framing, or ‘naming, interpreting, and dramatizing’ norms, with the goal of the norms resonating to a larger audience and being adopted as ‘new ways of talking about and understanding issues’.²⁵ Furthermore, norm-makers, especially within international organisations, also use expertise and information in their attempt to influence or change the behaviour of other actors.²⁶

²² Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, *International Organization* 52 (1998) 887–917, 888 <doi:10.1162/002081898550789>.

²³ *Ibidem*, 891.

²⁴ Marc Lanteigne and Miwa Hirono, ed., *China’s Evolving Approach to Peacekeeping* (London 2012) 4.

²⁵ Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 897.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, 899.

These strategically framed norms emerge in a contested space as they compete with alternative norms and standards, defined by already existing and accepted norms. This process is defined as norms contestation.²⁷ Middle powers are usually recognised by their norm-taking attitude, 'going with the flow of international policy' to avoid confrontation with major powers.²⁸ When norms become so widely accepted that they achieve a 'taken-for-granted quality', they have been 'internalised'.²⁹

Norms and Geopolitics

When a set of norms are subsequently internalised, they become part of a regime. In international relations, a regime is a 'network of norms, rules and decision-making processes that act as guides for decision makers and states.'³⁰ In the case of the liberal peacebuilding regime, for example, the norms, rules and decision-making processes are rooted in the liberalism notion of what good governance and a good standard of life entails.

However, as stated before, existing and accepted norms – and thus regimes - are frequently contested. A normative shift can be expected in two cases. The first case is when existing norms become associated with failure, for example when they are associated with the losing side of war or having caused economic failure, putting them at high risk of being discredited and opening the field for alternatives.³¹ In the case of UN peacekeeping, the perceived failure of several missions in the 1990s led to reforms in the 2000s, as the next chapter will argue.³² A second case in which a norm can gain greater influence in the contested space is if the norm is diffused by a prominent or powerful state.³³ Following this line of reasoning – that powerful states can have more influence on prevalent norms – the rise of China in UN peacekeeping would seem to lead to norm contestation with Western norms as it challenges the Western hegemony on the world stage.

Ideational influence and power politics are no longer mutually exclusive within this framework, providing it with strong explanatory power to analyse normative shifts in times

²⁷ Ibidem, 897.

²⁸ Lanteigne and Miwa Hirono, *China's Evolving Approach to Peacekeeping*, 4.

²⁹ Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 904.

³⁰ Robert J. Jackson, *Global politics in the 21st century* (Cambridge 2013) 166.

³¹ Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 909.

³² Most notably the traumatic results of the UN Peacekeeping Missions in Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1995).

³³ Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 909.

of geopolitical change. Norms, too, can be driven by self-interest, as the mechanisms with which norms become influential, too, are driven by power.³⁴

Peacekeeping versus Peacebuilding

In this thesis, the concepts of peacekeeping and peacebuilding are sometimes used interchangeably, while per definition referring to two different things. Since these concepts are used in reference to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the UN definition from the Capstone Doctrine (2008) is used. Peacekeeping is a 'technique' which is designed to 'preserve the peace (...) where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers, and which 'incorporates a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – (...) to lay the foundation for sustainable peace'.³⁵ Peacebuilding, on the other hand, is a 'complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace', targeted to 'reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels'.³⁶ By definition, peacekeeping is used in an assisting role while peacebuilding is used in a 'strengthening' and arguably more intervening role. As this thesis argues, the boundaries between the two concepts have become blurred and UN peace operations since 1990 have encompassed both concepts in their mandates. The following chapter elaborates how this has come to be.

³⁴ Ibidem, 912.

³⁵ United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines* (2008) 18.

³⁶ Ibidem.

Chapter 3. Peacekeeping Norms: Internalising Liberal Peace

To gain a better understanding of the peacekeeping norms of 2011, this chapter examines the assumptions behind the liberal peacebuilding regime of the 1990s and places into political context. Subsequently, the criticisms and reforms that UN peacekeeping has undergone during the 2000s are discussed to show how these norms have evolved and to which extent these norms are a continuity of the 1990s. The demarcations of 1990-1999 and 2000-2011 have been chosen as these reflect canonical changes in peacekeeping, with 1990 the beginning of the liberal peacebuilding regime and 2000 the year of the landmark Brahimi report, triggering a decade of peacekeeping reforms. In this way, this chapter contributes to the understanding that the norms in 2011 are a continuity of the underlying peacekeeping norms established in the 1990s.

1990-1999: The Liberal Peacebuilding Regime

The 1990s marked a new era in UN peacekeeping. After the Cold War ended, UN peacekeeping departed from 'traditional' peacekeeping (pre-1990) to post-Cold War peacebuilding (since 1990). The difference stems from two separate understandings of peace, namely positive peace and negative peace. Negative peace encompasses the '*absence* of war and other forms of widescale violent human conflict', whereas positive peace expresses 'the simultaneous *presence* of many desirable states of mind and society, such as harmony, justice, equity, etc. [emphasis added]'.³⁷ Traditional UN peacekeeping is linked to safeguarding negative peace (or the absence of violence) through the monitoring of ceasefires and enforcing neutral buffer zones or borders between warring parties.³⁸ Furthermore, these missions were almost always mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, ('settling disputes through peaceful means'). Examples of traditional peacekeeping missions include UNEF (1956), UNFICYP (1964) and UNIFIL (1978). *Peacebuilding* is inherently linked to positive peace and frequently mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (authorising the use of 'necessary means', or use of force, for 'restoring peace and security').³⁹

³⁷ Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, ed., *Handbook of peace and conflict studies* (London 2009) 6.

³⁸ Michael Pugh, 'Peacekeeping and critical theory', *International Peacekeeping* 11 (2004) 39–58, 47 <doi:10.1080/1353331042000228445>; United Nations, 'Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice' (1945).

³⁹ United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, available from <http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/>. Accessed on 24 March 2019.

To illustrate: as stated in the introduction of this thesis, the launch of UN peacebuilding can be traced back to the 1992 report of UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, where he defined peacebuilding as the ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.’⁴⁰ Strengthening and solidifying peace are actions congruent to installing positive peace.⁴¹ This, in small, demonstrates the departure from traditional peacekeeping to what is commonly known as the ‘liberal peacebuilding regime’.

Roland Paris researched the underlying principles governing international peacekeeping missions in the 1990s and his data demonstrates that ‘all fourteen major peacebuilding missions launched between 1989 and 1999 shared a common strategy for consolidating peace after internal conflicts: immediate democratization and marketization.’⁴² The regime of the 1990s is based on two key principles, or sets of norms: liberal democracy and liberal marketisation, and invoked on the basis of the concept of Responsibility to Protect.⁴³ More specifically, liberalism in the ‘political realm’ involves the organisation and monitoring of democratic elections, strengthening the rule of law by training police and judiciary officials, promoting and supporting the development of civil society and political parties and the promotion of human rights and freedom of speech. Liberalism in the ‘economic realm’ includes the stimulation of free-market economies through the elimination of barriers ‘to the free flow of capital and goods within and across a country’s borders’, as well as privatisation, or the growth of private enterprises and the reduction of the state’s role in the economy.⁴⁴

Both of these principles hold assumptions which are loosely based on ideas from Western Enlightenment philosophy. For example, one underlying assumption of the liberal peacebuilding regime is the ‘liberal peace thesis’, which claims that democracies are the most peaceful form of governance because democracies are allegedly never at war with each other, coined by followers of John Locke’s idea of the social contract.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the regime implies that market democracies are less prone to intrastate violence.⁴⁶ Immanuel Kant’s

⁴⁰ UN, 1992, *Agenda for Peace*

⁴¹ Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and critical theory’, 47.

⁴² Paris, *At war’s end*, ix.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, 6.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, 5.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, 6.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, 40.

notion of perpetual peace dictates that every state should be a republic to achieve peace.⁴⁷ This demonstrates how liberal (and therefore Western) norms are firmly rooted into the liberal peacebuilding regime.

Finally, the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) plays a large role in the liberal peacebuilding regime. In short, R2P can be defined as a set of principles based on the idea that sovereignty is not a privilege, but a responsibility. It essentially obligates states primarily, and then the international community, to protect its civilian population.⁴⁸ This is highly relevant to the understanding of the UN peacekeeping change at the end of the Cold War since during the Cold War, the UN mandates underlined state sovereignty and almost only intervened by 'consent of the parties' in conflict.⁴⁹ During the past two decades, however, the concept of R2P has mandates shifted towards a more 'interventionist' approach. This is demonstrated most clearly by the fact, also described above, that UN peacekeeping operations were first mandated under Chapter VI but are now also frequently mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.⁵⁰ R2P is a norm in the sense that it becomes a 'standard of appropriate behaviour' for states and international organisations, such as the UN, to intervene in otherwise sovereign states.

The theory behind norms dynamics of Finnemore and Sikkink helps to contextualise this shift. As stated in the theoretical chapter, becoming associated with failure puts existing norms at high risk of being discredited and opening the field for alternatives.⁵¹ The end of the Cold War was often described as the end of an ideological battle between communism and liberalism. While, of course, reality was much more nuanced, the perceived victory of the liberal norms has led to the consolidation of these norms into many international governmental organisations, including the UN.⁵² So, not surprisingly, consensus within scholarly debate concludes that the implementation of the liberal peacebuilding regime is largely the result of the USA-led Western dominance during the 1990s and should therefore be viewed in this historical context.⁵³

⁴⁷ Ibidem.

⁴⁸ United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, *Responsibility to Protect*, <https://www.unric.org/en/responsibility-to-protect?layout=default>. Accessed on 12 March 2019.

⁴⁹ Jackson, *Global politics in the 21st century*, 172.

⁵⁰ Pugh, 'Peacekeeping and critical theory', 47.

⁵¹ Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 909.

⁵² Ibidem.

⁵³ Scholars within this debate hold different opinions on the degree of 'liberalism' of the peacebuilding regime but agree that the 'liberal peacebuilding regime' is linked to Western prevalence in the international order, for

2000-2011: Reforming UN peacekeeping

Just as norm dynamics changed peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War, the perceived failure of several missions in the 1990s led to reforms in the 2000s. Calls for reforms came from public opinion, policymakers and scholars alike after traumatising results in several peacekeeping operations, most notably in Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1995). These calls led to several UN peacekeeping reform reports, such as the landmark Brahimi report (2000), the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), the Capstone Doctrine (2008), and the New Horizon report (2009).⁵⁴ Their conclusions and implications for the norms governing peacekeeping are covered below.

The Brahimi report broadened UN peacekeeping. In short, it called for ‘renewed commitment on the part of Member States, increased financial support, and significant institutional change (within the UN).’⁵⁵ Section D ‘Implications for peace-building strategy’, called for ‘active engagement with local parties’, an ‘increased focus on strengthening the rule of law and improving respect for human rights’, better implementation of the ‘disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants’, and that elections ‘should be viewed as part of broader efforts to strengthen governance institutions’.⁵⁶ Thus, it appealed for more specialised and ‘realistic’ mandates, while the focus on liberal democracy and human rights remained intact. It does not, however, mention liberal economic development.

The central topic of the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of 2004 was the new ‘security consensus’:⁵⁷

‘Today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to protect its own peoples and not to harm its neighbours.’⁵⁸

better or worse. For an oversight of this debate, see: Roland Paris, ‘Saving liberal peacebuilding’, *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010) 337–365; Jan Selby, ‘The myth of liberal peace-building’, *Conflict, Security & Development* 13 (2013) 57–86 <doi:10.1080/14678802.2013.770259>; David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building* (2006).

⁵⁴ For an overview of UN peacekeeping reforms, see: United Nations Peacekeeping, *Reforming Peacekeeping*, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/reforming-peacekeeping>.

⁵⁵ United Nations General Assembly, *Brahimi Report: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (2000), (A/55/305), p.ix

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, 7-8.

⁵⁷ United Nations General Assembly, *A more secure world: our shared responsibility* (2004), (A/56/565), 16.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, 15.

This report, further focussing on transnational issues such as terrorism, poverty and HIV/AIDS, heavily endorsed the concept of R2P. In this sense, the Panel strengthened the liberal peace regime.

The Capstone Doctrine in 2008 establishes a normative framework for UNPKOs and elaborates on the 'Basic Principles' of UN peacekeeping. The normative framework consists of the UN Charter, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and UNSC resolutions on women, peace and security and children in armed conflict.⁵⁹ It reinforces the basic principles of UN peacekeeping to be consent (of the parties involved), impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate.⁶⁰ It lists the following 'Core Business' tasks of UNPKOs: security operations, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and rule of law, as well as 'political process', elections and human rights.⁶¹

The New Horizon progress report (2009, with a follow up on the first report issued in 2010) also acknowledges the growing complexity of UN peacekeeping operations as it intervenes in more complex conflicts. It recommends the agenda for a 'New Horizon' of peacekeeping, strengthening the 'unity and cohesion of all stakeholders in the direction, planning and management of UN peacekeeping', enhancing the 'credibility of UN Peacekeeping (...) to implement the task it has been assigned' and building the 'capacity of the UN'.⁶² In essence, it was an assessment of the UN secretariat that underlined the importance of broadening UN peacekeeping, emphasising flexible mandates and increased but realistic troop and financial contributions from member states to meet the demands of the increasingly complex peacekeeping operations.

Conclusively, the period of 2000-2010 was a time in which UN peacekeeping became broadened and more institutionalised. There was a recognition that UN peacekeeping became increasingly more demanding and complex as conflicts in which they intervened grew more complex. The main reforms were practical in nature to resolve the issues that arose during 1990-1999 by calling for more financial and troop contributions, creating more flexible

⁵⁹ United Nations, *Capstone Doctrine*, 15–16.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, 31.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, 23.

⁶² United Nations, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (2009) 7.

mandates, and expanding peacekeeping mandates to include resolutions passed during that time on women, security and peace and armed children in conflict. Insofar norms that govern peacekeeping were mentioned explicitly, it becomes clear that UN peacekeeping in 2000-2011 is in large a continuity of the liberal peacebuilding regime, centering human rights and democracy as principles guiding good governance, and R2P as basis to intervene within a conflict. Since these liberal norms are rarely explicitly justified, it can be concluded that these norms have become internalised within UN peacekeeping.

Scholarly Criticism of Peacekeeping Norms

To hold these UN documents in a critical light, this section distils three arguments made by academics, as the UN peacekeeping approach of 1990-2011 has been criticised across multiple disciplines and from several fields of studies. Three different arguments are most relevant to this subject. The first is a practical objection, especially vocalized by Canadian scholar Severine Autesserre, that the appliance of the liberal peacebuilding regime as a cookie-cut model to dissimilar cases of violent conflict demonstrates an ignorance to the vast differences between each case. The implementation of the liberal peacebuilding norms disregards local traditions, local social structures, local governance systems, etc., destabilising the host communities with often disastrous outcomes.⁶³

The second argument is an ethical argument against the motives behind the liberal peacebuilding regime, which can be found amongst others in David Chandler's book 'Empire in Denial'. While the liberal peacebuilding regime is often portrayed as the result of 'ethical policy making' by being focused on the needs of non-Western states, it does so through a highly Western perspective. The regime – and its use by the UN – provides Western states with more legitimacy to intervene and push their own agenda through to sovereign states that do not always agree to the UN 'intervention'.⁶⁴

The third criticism regards the postcolonial aspect of the liberal peacebuilding regime. On the one hand, the envisioned universality of liberal norms has a postcolonial implication. For example, the principles of human rights and democracy are alleged to be universal, but they have been shaped out of a primarily Western perspective on what good standards of life

⁶³ Severine Autesserre, *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention* (New York 2014).

⁶⁴ Chandler, *Empire in Denial*, 164.

and good governance entails.⁶⁵ Jan Selby takes this criticism a step further and argues from a realist point of view that the liberal peacebuilding regime is a myth because it only functions as a rhetorical concept within geopolitics. According to Selby, ‘the liberal peacebuilding discourse overstates both the liberalism of contemporary peace interventions, and the degree of global consensus thereover, and fail to capture the enduring centrality of states, strategy, and geopolitics in the making of peace.’⁶⁶ This is an important critical note to the debate because it reminds us of the power politics that are central to the liberal peacebuilding regime. However, since the regime has had serious policy implications and influenced actions within UN missions, it is safe to say that the regime itself is more than merely a ‘myth’.

To summarise, the liberal peacebuilding regime was a change in UN peacekeeping in the 1990s. It was largely based on liberal norms, due to Western unipolarity in 1990s and the perceived victory of liberal governance. These norms were challenged both by public opinion due to negative peacekeeping results as by scholars who critically assess the underlying motivations, as well as its post-colonial implications. However, this chapter has demonstrated that liberal peacebuilding norms still strongly form the basis for UN peacekeeping in 2010 – the year in which China became the largest troop contributor of the P5.

⁶⁵ Samuel Moyn, *Human rights and the uses of history* (London 2014) 134.

⁶⁶ Selby, ‘The myth of liberal peace-building’, 57.

Chapter 4. Chinese Foreign Policy: Peaceful Principles

This chapter examines thirteen years (1998-2011) of Chinese foreign policy through an analysis of Chinese State Council white papers. The white papers outline China's stance and policy perspective on a broad scope of international affairs, but the purpose of this research, focus has been put specifically on the 'China's National Defense' white papers, which have been published every two years consistently between 1998 and 2010, and China's 'Peaceful Development' white paper that outlines China's greater foreign policy narrative, published in 2011. The first section examines China's shift towards multilateralism as described by China itself. The following section dilutes the norms and principles that reappear steadily throughout these thirteen years of security policy to see which China prioritises in its foreign policies.

Chinese Foreign Policy: Shift in Focus

In 2000, China's main security focus is on domestic security ('defending the motherland') and regional security.⁶⁷ This shifts gradually during the decade as China becomes an increasingly important player on the world stage (especially economically) and demonstrates more awareness of this role. In 2002, China already lists greater involvement in international security operations, such as UN peacekeeping operations, but also conventions, conferences and summits related to anti-terrorism.⁶⁸ The white paper of 2004 describes the intensification of 'bilateral and multilateral strategic consultation and dialogues' as China picks up a more active role in international affairs and increases the number of troop exchanges and contributions to UN peacekeeping missions.⁶⁹ In 2006, China rephrases its role to be one of a global actor, stating that it plays an 'active part in maintaining global and regional peace and stability'.⁷⁰ In the 2008 white paper China explicitly recognises its key role in international

⁶⁷ Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China; 'II. National Defense Policy', in *China's National Defense in 2000* (2000), <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/2000/index.htm>. Accessed on 28 February 2019.

⁶⁸ Information Office, 'VI. International security cooperation', in *China's National Defense in 2002*, (2002) <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/index.htm>. Accessed on 28 February 2019.

⁶⁹ Information Office, 'IX. International Security Cooperation', in *China's National Defense in 2004*, (2004) <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm>. Accessed on 28 February 2019.

⁷⁰ Information Office, 'II. The National Defense Policy', in *China's National Defense in 2006* (2006), <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm>. Accessed on 28 February 2019.

affairs.⁷¹ This is combined with the emphasis that its growth is in part due to its larger involvement in international affairs:

‘China has become an important member of the international system, and the future and destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community. China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China. (...) China is playing an active and constructive role in multilateral affairs, thus notably elevating its international position and influence.’⁷²

This shows a gradual but real shift in the focus of China’s security strategy from domestic and regional to truly global as its position on the world stage rises in significance.

Also, China elaborates on its growing participation in UN peacekeeping. In several white papers, China describes its wish to ‘modernise’ and expand the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by increasing its participation in international exchanges, including the dispatchment of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations.⁷³ During 1998-2010, China gradually enlists more personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, first civilian personnel and from 2004 onwards also police and military personnel (see figure 1). Then, in the 2010 white paper, China states that ‘China has dispatched more peacekeeping personnel than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council.’⁷⁴ Also in 2010, China dedicates a section to praise its UN troops, saying that ‘tough, brave and devoted’ troops contribute to ‘world peace and security’ by repairing infrastructure, clearing mines and bombs, treating patients, etc.⁷⁵ Furthermore, China is a vocal supporter of the reforms that occur during the 2000s. In China’s words, the main focus of reforms should be to make the peacekeeping operations more ‘efficient’ (2002) and to ‘strengthen their capabilities’ (2004).⁷⁶ The white papers certainly demonstrate that China is engaged in peacekeeping. They further confirm the realist argument that China’s increasing participation in UN peacekeeping is at least in part due to the benefits it gains from sending its troops international missions. It also demonstrates a

⁷¹ Information Office, ‘Preface’, in *China’s National Defense in 2008*, (2008)

http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm. Accessed on 28 February 2019.

⁷² Ibidem.

⁷³ Information Office, ‘XI. International Security Cooperation’, in *China’s National Defense in 2006* (2006), <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm>. Accessed on 28 February 2019.

⁷⁴ Information Office, ‘IV. Deployment of the Armed Forces’, in *China’s National Defense in 2010* (2010), http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm. Accessed on 28 February 2019

⁷⁵ Ibidem.

⁷⁶ Information Office, ‘IX. International Security Cooperation’, in *China’s National Defense in 2004* (2004) <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm>. Accessed on 28 February 2019; Information Office, ‘VI. International security cooperation’, in *China’s National Defense in 2002*, (2002) <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/index.htm>. Accessed on 28 February 2019.

greater appreciation of its own UN peacekeeping contribution as the decade progresses, which could also explain in part its growing enthusiasm to UN peacekeeping. The question remains, of course, whether China's increasing role has affected the norms governing the UN peacekeeping regime.

Chinese Foreign Policy: Core Principles

The principles, or set of norms, on which the strongest and most consistent emphasis is placed within the Chinese government white papers are state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference. These principles are emphasised consistently in every single white paper from 1998 to 2011.⁷⁷ Sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference are also further highlighted in the normative frameworks that China perceives should govern international relations: the UN Charter and the (Chinese) Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.⁷⁸ This is a first difference with the UN peacekeeping regime that also includes international human rights law in its normative framework as stated in the 2008 Capstone Doctrine, which is not similarly prioritised in China's foreign policy principles. How China prioritises sovereignty is exemplified in its 2000 white paper, when it states that the UN Security Council holds the 'conferred primary responsibility' of the maintenance of world peace and security. The next sentence emphasises that the UN Charter has at its core the principle of state sovereignty.⁷⁹ This consistent emphasis shows that sovereignty is a high priority for China.

The second framework mentioned, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, is also mentioned in each white paper. These principles originate from a bilateral UN-registered agreement between China and India in 1954,⁸⁰ and from 1998 onwards appear to be guiding China's foreign policies. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are:

1. Mutual respect for each other's *territorial integrity* and *sovereignty*,
2. Mutual *non-aggression*,
3. *Non-interference* in each other's internal affairs,
4. Equality and mutual benefit, and,
5. Peaceful co-existence.' [emphasis added]⁸¹

⁷⁷ For the full list of white papers, see: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/>. Accessed on 9 March 2019.

⁷⁸ Information Office, 'II. National Defense Policy', in *China's National Defense in 2000*.

⁷⁹ Information Office, 'V. International Security Cooperation', in *China's National Defense in 2000*.

⁸⁰ 'Agreement Between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India. Signed at Peking, on 29 April 1954' in UN Treaty Series, 70. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20299/v299.pdf> Accessed on 9 March 2019.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*.

As it describes in the 1998 white paper, China's 'fundamental interests' lie in the 'establishment and maintenance of a new regional security order based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence'.⁸² As China's focus shifts towards a more global approach, the principles of sovereignty, integrity and non-aggression encompass not only standards for regional norms but also for international norms. In the 2008 white paper states: 'China persists in (...) maintaining common security with *all countries* based on the Five Principles'. [emphasis added]⁸³ In other words, China's changing focus or perceived growing importance in the international order does not change the underlying norms that govern its international (security) relations.

Another red thread through the white papers is the clear 'anti-hegemonism' norm. In the National Defense white papers of 2000 and 2006, for example, 'hegemonism' and 'power politics' as means of behaviour in the international arena are seen as great factors in 'undermining international security'.⁸⁴ China's anti-hegemonism is further elaborated on in the statement that 'certain big powers' resort to 'neo-interventionism' and 'neo-economic colonialism' by using the threat of force under the pretexts of humanitarianism and human rights, and subsequently impose political systems and ideologies on other countries.⁸⁵ It is highly remarkable that this is the only context in which China uses the term human rights in its National Defense papers – reflecting a contrast between Chinese norms and the liberal peacebuilding regime that has internalised human rights.

Also, in line with the recurring emphasis of respecting sovereignty and non-intervention, China further consistently stresses that peacekeeping operations should only be conducted with consent of the countries concerned.⁸⁶ These statements stand in sharp contrast to the R2P norms of UN peacekeeping, especially as outlined in the Panel where humanitarian issues (poverty and disease) are said to warrant collective security approaches.

⁸² Information Office, 'The Security Situation,' in *China's National Defense* (1998).

⁸³ Information Office, 'International Security Cooperation', in *China's National Defense in 2008* (2008). http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm. Accessed on 28 February 2019.

⁸⁴ Information Office, 'I. The Security Situation', in *China's National Defense in 2000*, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/2000/index.htm>. Accessed on 28 February 2019; Information Office, 'I. The Security Environment', in *China's National Defense in 2006*, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm>. Accessed on 28 February 2019.

⁸⁵ Information Office, 'II. National Defense Policy', in *China's National Defense in 2000*, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/2000/index.htm>. Accessed on 28 February 2019.

⁸⁶ Information Office, 'V. International Security Cooperation', in *China's National Defense in 2000*, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/2000/index.htm>. Accessed on 28 February 2019.

Anti-hegemonism is not only how China criticises the behaviour of ‘certain big powers’, but it is also a norm which it says to uphold for itself. All white papers, in the same or highly similar words, hold the promise that:

‘The development and powerfulness of China will constitute no threat to anyone, but will rather promote the world peace, stability and development. Never to seek hegemony is the Chinese people’s solemn pledge to the world.’⁸⁷

In this way, it claims to set itself apart from the norms governing UN peacekeeping.

Contextualising in Conclusion

The white papers above demonstrate that China prioritises a different set of norms than the norms prevalent in the UN peacekeeping regime as described in Chapter 3. First, the white papers criticise central norms of the UN peacekeeping regime, such as human rights and the use of force without consent of all parties (authorised in the case of Chapter VII mandates). Second, the white papers show that China prioritises different sets of norms, or principles, by placing constant emphasis on sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference. While these are also present in the UN peacekeeping regime, they play a more central role in China’s foreign policies. Simultaneously, China appears to have its own normative framework of ‘Peaceful Principles’.

There is also a difference discernible between the UN peacekeeping regime and the Chinese foreign policy principles regarding the ‘level’ to which they apply norms. To fall back on the definition of norms, there are two levels of spheres noticeable in which member states set standards of appropriate behaviour in the UN peacekeeping regime: on the international level, within the UNSC, determining for example when intervention is legitimate based on the concept of R2P, and on the ‘field’ level because of its focus on democracy and the concept of human rights: assumptions of standards of good governance and standard of life. This distinction becomes apparent in contrast with Chinese norms, as the white papers focus almost entirely on norms for the international level (anti-hegemony, non-interference) that reject norm-setting for the local level. It will therefore be interesting to see how norms from both sides are represented in the mandate, which the next chapter will discuss.

⁸⁷ Information Office, ‘II. National Defense Policy’, in *China’s National Defense in 2000*, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/2000/index.htm>. Accessed on 28 February 2019.

Chapter 5. Examining the Evidence: The Mandate of the United Mission in South Sudan

This chapter examines if and how China's more active role in UN peacekeeping has led to a normative shift in the UN peacekeeping regime through the case study of the UNMISS mandate. This shift will be evaluated through an examination of the UNMISS mandate to see if key concepts are present and if so, in what way. These findings are further contextualised through observations made by Hylke Dijkstra, who extensively described the negotiation and drafting process behind the mandate in his research on influence exertion by UNSC member states vis à vis the UN Secretariat and therefore provides valuable insight into the behaviour of the member states.⁸⁸ Subsequently, an analysis will be conducted to demonstrate what these concepts reveal about the role of China and what these concepts mean for the liberal norms regime of UN peacekeeping.

Resolution No. 1996 (2011)

On the 8th of July 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1996, also known as the (first) UNMISS mandate. It should be noted that the wording in UN resolutions is exceptionally subtle. For example, there is a substantial difference between clauses beginning with the word 'deciding', which are legally binding, and 'encouraging', which are not legally binding. The next section delves deeper into the context of first the preambulatory clauses, and then the operative clauses, meanwhile noting particularities and explaining their significance.

Preambulatory Clauses

The first three preambulatory clauses of Resolution 1996 emphasise the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of South Sudan. Emphasis is further placed on the fact that post-conflict peacebuilding is the 'primary responsibility of the national authorities' of South Sudan.⁸⁹ These clauses are in line with Chinese principles as

⁸⁸ Hylke Dijkstra, 'Shadow bureaucracies and the unilateral control of international secretariats: Insights from UN peacekeeping', *The Review of International Organizations* 10 (2015) 23–41 <doi:10.1007/s11558-014-9203-7>.

⁸⁹ United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1996, *Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan*, S/RES/1996 (8 July 2011), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1996>, 1-2.

discussed in the previous chapter, but are also highly common in UN documents, therefore not conclusive.

Then, several preambulatory clauses stress the need for an approach that 'strengthens coherence between political, security, development, human rights and rule of law activities' and stress the 'importance of institution-building as a critical component of peacebuilding', further recognising that peacebuilding efforts are the 'foundation for sustainable development'.⁹⁰ These clauses fall more in line with the peacebuilding regime as discussed in chapter two: human rights, rule of law and institution-building are all principles that are prioritised within the liberal peacebuilding regime and reappear in this resolution.

Several preambulatory clauses reflect the reforms of UN peacekeeping undertaken during the 2000's. One clause recognises 'the need' to show 'flexibility in making necessary adjustments to the mission priorities, where appropriate, according to progress achieved, lessons learned, or changing circumstances on the ground.'⁹¹ The importance of drawing lessons from best practices and past experiences is repeated in the preamble that recognises UN peacekeeping reform initiatives, mentioning the New Horizon Report.⁹² The last set of preambulatory clauses emphasise the need for diverse personnel, highlighting the importance of women's participation in conflict prevention and resolution, as well as drawing experts from developing countries.⁹³ The focus on flexibility, diversity and best practices represents the influence of the reforms of the 2000s and the departure from cookie-cut approach applied in the 1990s.

It is further stated that the 'situation faced by South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region' and that the Security Council, accordingly, acts under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. According to Hylke Dijkstra, the UN Secretariat proposal initially recommended a Chapter VI mandate, which would give UNMISS a supporting role to the South Sudan government.⁹⁴ However, these clauses reveal that this proposal has been amended into a full Chapter VII mandate instead, which allows for a more intervening approach. This, too, indicates a continuity of the UN peacekeeping regime as discussed in Chapter 3.

⁹⁰ Ibidem, 1-2.

⁹¹ Ibidem, 2.

⁹² Ibidem, 3.

⁹³ Ibidem, 2.

⁹⁴ Dijkstra, 'Shadow bureaucracies and the unilateral control of international secretariats', 32.

Operative Clauses

Then follow the operative clauses that outline the mandate for UNMISS. The first clause lays out the logistical details of the mission: the amount and type of personnel (7000 military personnel, 900 civilian police personnel and an ‘appropriate civilian component’) as well as the timespan (one year, with the possibility to extend).⁹⁵ The mission is tasked with the ‘strengthening [of] the Government of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically’, ‘promoting popular participation in political processes’ through the ‘holding of elections’, and fostering ‘long-term state-building’ to consolidate peace.⁹⁶ These tasks authorised within the mandate of UNMISS are largely derivative of liberal norms.

Furthermore, there is an extensive focus within the mandate on the monitoring and reporting of human rights. Clause 3b authorises the mandate for UNMISS to include the ‘monitoring, investigating, verifying, and reporting regularly on human rights (...) as well as actual and potential violations of international humanitarian and human rights law (...) and immediately reporting gross violations of human rights to the UN Security Council’.⁹⁷ Furthermore, clause eleven calls upon the ‘authorities of the Republic [to] hold accountable all perpetrators of human rights’.⁹⁸ Since this is one of the main aspects of the mandate, it can be concluded that human rights play a prominent role within this mandate, showing a clear continuity of the UN peacekeeping regime. It is notable that, in the sixth clause, the Security Council ‘demands that the Government of the Republic of South Sudan’ cooperates fully with the deployment, operations and other functions of UNMISS.⁹⁹ In contrast, in clause 11, the Security Council merely ‘encourages’ the government to implement ‘key international human rights treaties and conventions’.¹⁰⁰ In other words, cooperation with the UN is mandatory, while adopting key UN conventions on human rights is voluntary. While the second aspect would be more in line with the Chinese normative framework, the cooperation demand can simultaneously be seen as a conditionality, which is against the Chinese normative framework.

⁹⁵ United Nations, S/RES/1996, 3.

⁹⁶ *Ibidem*, 3.

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, 4.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, 6.

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, 5.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, 6.

Several other elements demonstrate the influence of liberal peacebuilding norms within this mandate. For example, the forcefulness of the mandate becomes especially clear in the fourth clause, which ‘authorizes UNMISS to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out its protection mandate’.¹⁰¹ This further underlines the idea that this mandate, which focuses heavily on human rights, falls under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In this way, the clause is seemingly in direct contrast with the Chinese normative framework that objects to the authorisation of the use of force under ‘human rights’ reasoning. At the same time, this can be described as a continuance of the UN peacekeeping regime. Furthermore, clause 18 requests the Special Representative of the Secretary General to work with ‘bilateral and multilateral partners, including the World Bank (...) on a plan for UN system support’.¹⁰² While not a norm in itself, the World Bank as international organisation is well known for its economic liberal origins.¹⁰³

Conclusively, the mandate for UNMISS is a robust mandate that takes into account the flexibility and local focus called for during the UN peacekeeping reforms, while simultaneously demanding full cooperation from the South Sudanese government. Also, the mandate is heavily focused on the concept of human rights which is an extension of the liberal peacebuilding norms. Furthermore, the UNSC rejected the proposal for the mandate to fall under Chapter VI and chose a full Chapter VII mandate instead to accomplish peace in South Sudan. Therefore, the mandate reveals that in 2011, the expected shift to Chinese norms was in fact a continuity, perhaps even reinforcement, of the liberal peacebuilding regime.

¹⁰¹ Ibidem, 5.

¹⁰² Ibidem, 7.

¹⁰³ After World War II, the World Bank (and the International Monetary Fund) were set up as part of the historic Bretton Woods system, which was known for its embedded economic liberalism, found in the often strict conditionalities for loans, although it claims to be more diverse today. See also: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/history>.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

Summary

United Nations peacekeeping has undergone multiple changes since its creation in 1948. This thesis examined the period between 1990-2011, a time in which the UN peacekeeping regime was heavily influenced by liberal norms due to a Western unipolarity and influence on international organisations, resulting in the liberal peacebuilding regime that focuses on democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Calls for reforms in the 2000s were answered with more flexible mandates but the underlying norms remained the same. Simultaneously, however, geopolitical shifts were observed with actors, such as China, taking up more prominent roles on the international stage and within the United Nations. Chinese government white papers reveal that China holds a different normative framework than the liberal peacebuilding regime, instead prioritising the principles, or sets of norms, of sovereignty, non-interference and territorial integrity. As Finnemore and Sikkink argue that norm dynamics within international organisation are prone to geopolitical power dynamics, this thesis evaluated if China has used its more prominent role to become a norm-maker, and if this has led to a normative shift within the UN peacekeeping regime. However, the case study - the examination of the UNMISS mandate (2011) - reveals that the underlying norms governing peacekeeping remain largely liberal with tellingly little influence from the normative frameworks China lays out in its foreign policy principles. Therefore, this thesis concludes based on the evidence that China is not a norm-maker but rather a norm-taker in the context of UN peacekeeping, despite becoming the largest troop contributor of the P5.

Critical Reflection and Recommendations

Placing this conclusion into the historiographical debate on China's larger role within UN peacekeeping, this conclusion strengthens the idea that China, in 2011, acted as a middle power. One explanation could be that China simply was a middle power at that time and therefore was unable to act as a norm-maker in UN peacekeeping. This would clarify why there was no large shift in the UN peacekeeping regime: according to the theory of Finnemore and Sikkink, only powerful states (norm-makers) have the capability to diffuse norms, which then are able to cause a shift in norm dynamics. Middle powers, on the contrary, act as norm-takers. Yet this explanation seems contradictory to China's large role within UN peacekeeping, as well as the enthusiasm for peacekeeping that is described in its white papers.

A more likely explanation is that China was acting as a norm-taker, or middle power, precisely because of its norms. The explicit argument found in the Chinese government white papers that hegemony and power politics cause instability, combined with the grand narrative of its own 'peaceful rise' or 'peaceful development', might explain China's refrain from acting as a great power or norm-maker. Through contributing troops, China 'modernises' its PLA whilst exemplifying its peaceful intentions. This strengthens the realist argument that China's contribution to UN peacekeeping is a means to an end. The norm dynamics of China in UN peacekeeping in 2011 thus reveals that geopolitical shifts do not necessarily have direct influence on a regime, especially when it is as internalised as the liberal peacebuilding regime.

Based on the white papers and the mandate, this explanation also seems more likely than the argument that UN peacekeeping norms have diffused into China during the 2000s, of which no direct evidence was found. At the same time, the list of sources used in this research are not exhaustive. The Chinese government white papers demonstrate foreign policy principles but do not show what happens when these policies are faced with compromise. As stated before, the mandate is the outcome, or the product, of UNSC politics. Unfortunately, no public meeting records of the UNSC on the mandate, nor explicit records of negotiations were available for this research, but inside information might cast a more conclusive light to China's behaviour within the UNSC in the context of UN peacekeeping.

Furthermore, this study is conducted through an analysis of primary and secondary sources while peacekeeping is very much 'fieldwork'. The concepts laid out in the mandate are susceptible to different interpretations in the field, and thus an examination of the mandate does not explain how these concepts are applied in the field. It is therefore also very much possible that the norm changes in UN peacekeeping are not happening necessarily within the UNSC, but rather on the ground. Therefore, a more thorough analysis on the implementation of the mandate, as well as research on the effect of an increased Chinese troop presence in the field, could both provide a sharper answer on the implications of China's growing contribution on UN peacekeeping.

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