

# The U.S. and Park Chung Hee's Yushin Regime:

An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy towards South Korea, 1972-1979



Burr, "Stopping Korea from Going Nuclear, Part I."

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# Preface

I humbly present my master's thesis, written during the last semester of the Utrecht University master's program International Relations in Historical Perspective. This is the result of nearly eight months of work, and I am excited to have completed it to my satisfaction. I would like to thank everyone who assisted me along the way, but especially Dr. Steffen Rimner, my supervisor, who supported my writing process from its earliest stages and provided detailed feedback that guided my writing. Throughout the process, I have learned much about the research process, academic writing, and of course, the United States-South Korean relationship during the 1960s and 1970s, and hopefully have channeled this knowledge well into the following thesis.

# Abstract

After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, and the subsequent deployment of U.S. troops in support of the South Koreans, the relationship between the South Koreans and the United States had been tightly forged. The introduction of Park Chung Hee into the relationship complicated the situation for the United States, and specifically for the American presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, who were in office during Park's Yushin regime, where Park had complete control and an indefinite term in office. Although the United States still had operational control of the military in South Korea, they were unable to get Park to dissolve the Yushin regime and have him return to democracy. Park's undemocratic and human rights violating actions during the Yushin period strained the already tense relationship between the United States and South Korea, and therefore it was interesting to determine how Nixon, Ford, and Carter navigated this relationship during their presidencies. The resulting research question is as follows: *How do the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations compare in their approaches to the US-South Korean relationship during the 1972-1979 Yushin (유신) period of Park Chung Hee's presidency?*

In order to answer the research question, this thesis first looks at the time period leading up to the Yushin regime, and how the United States-South Korea relationship evolved from Park's participation in the military coup that landed him in power until Park's declaration of the Yushin regime in late 1972. Using the literature coding software NVivo, Nixon, Ford, and Carter's primary documents from the Foreign Relations series of the U.S. Office of the Historian were coded and analyzed to provide conclusions regarding their approach to the U.S.-South Korea relationship. Following a comparison, it was identified that for all three American presidents, the security interest the Americans had in the Korean peninsula was more essential than a democratic South Korea, although each president had a different overall strategy towards South Korea. While Nixon, and to an extent Ford, was content ignoring Park, Carter was much more human rights focused and therefore was more discontent with his actions; this is among the factors identified as differences in their approaches. The thesis also looks into the impact Park's usage of modernization theory, especially in justifying his authoritarian actions, had on the U.S.'s ability to dissolve the Yushin regime.

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## Introduction & Method

*I believe that the Republic of Korea and the United States have a common interest in deterring hostilities and blocking the North Korean scheme to bring Communist rule to the South. My efforts to establish peace are based on close cooperation with the United States.*

~Park Chung Hee<sup>1</sup>

South Korean President Park Chung Hee (박정희/Bak Jeong-hui<sup>2</sup>), after his assassination in 1979, left behind a controversial legacy. On the one hand, he brought economic prosperity by rapidly modernizing the southern half of the Korean peninsula during his twenty years in power. On the other hand, he repeatedly violated some of the most basic principles of democracy—freedom of the press, checks and balances, and due process. He justified many of his actions on protecting South Koreans from aggression of the North Koreans and the destabilizing effects of any communist sympathizers within South Korea. While South Korea was officially recognized as a democracy, his terms as head of the South Korean government could probably be best called a developmental dictatorship.

Park rose to power a mere seven years after the end of the Korean War, by participating in a military coup that began his reign. On May 16<sup>th</sup>, 1961, the military coup, co-led by Park Chung Hee and his nephew-in-law Kim Jong Pil (김종필/Gim Jong-Pil), took over power from the democratically-elected interim government, which had been in place since the April 19<sup>th</sup> Student Revolution a year earlier. He was democratically elected two years later, and would remain president until his death at the hands of the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Gim Jae Gyu (김재규), in 1979. During his presidency, the fine line he walked between president and dictator, already blurry, became more and more blurred. In October 1972, it disappeared nearly completely. Officially, Park claimed that the threat from North Korea, at that time, had risen to intolerable levels, and therefore he needed to declare a national emergency to allow him access to the tools to combat this threat. However, no intelligence possessed by either South Korea or the United States indicated this was actually

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<sup>1</sup> Park Chung Hee in a conversation with President Ford, shortly after Ford's election, and as part of Ford's first official state visit as president. N/A, "Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, November 22, 1974, 3 Pm."

<sup>2</sup> For a note on the romanization style used in this paper, please view Appendix 1.

the case.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, Park instituted what would become known as the Yushin (유신) regime in which he had total control; amongst other emergency powers, he could bypass the National Assembly.<sup>4</sup>

This is not to say that Park had free reign. The United States was still heavily involved in South Korean military operations after their participation in the Korean War, and government actions were expected to get U.S. approval before they were executed. For the U.S., embroiled in the Cold War, South Korea was strategically incredibly important, not only for military reasons—South Korea being positioned between North Korea, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union—but also as a poster child for capitalism and the U.S. cause; South Korea's success would provide motivation for and proof of the necessity and positive impact of the Cold War. The United States, therefore, provided heavily for South Korea, transferring high levels of economic aid and military support.

As a result, Park was limited in his ability to disobey the United States' wishes by two aspects: his dependence on U.S. aid and his dependence on U.S.-provided security. Park was surrounded in the north and west by North Korea and the People's Republic of China, and Japan, the only non-communist country in the region, had been the colonizer of the Korean peninsula (at the time of the coup in 1961) only fifteen years earlier and relations between the two were still tense. South Korea's only strong ally was the United States. As the years under Park's rule went on, the Koreans (and especially Park Chung Hee) learned which cards to play to have the U.S. bend to their will, if only partially. This frustrated and challenged the American presidents in office during his terms, who really struggled with limiting Park Chung Hee without admitting to the world that South Korea's democracy was on shaky ground. Five successive U.S. presidents were unable to convince Park to run South Korea democratically. Especially Nixon, Ford and Carter, in office during Park's Yushin regime, could or would not limit his powers and convince Park to restore power to the National Assembly, freedom of speech and the press, and to limit his terms in office. Despite possessing both operational control of the South Korean military and significant sway in their government processes, the American administrations were unable to dissolve the Yushin

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<sup>3</sup> "If ROK has evidence we do not possess we would appreciate learning of same. We have no knowledge of any immediate plans or preparations by North Korea for any unusual military operations except exercises. Accordingly, if ROK persists in present efforts, we will have no choice other than to make clear publicly we do not share ROKG estimate. Obviously, we far prefer to avoid public quarrel with ROK over this issue, but ROK must understand that stakes involved are too high to be subordinated to internal political maneuvering"-Department of State to the US Embassy in South Korea after Park claimed one reason for increasing his powers was the looming North Korean threat. Dorr, "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea."

<sup>4</sup> Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.



regime. Consequently, it is of interest to investigate how the three U.S. presidents each approached interactions with Park Chung Hee and his Yushin regime, with the following research question:

**How do the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations compare in their approaches to the US-South Korean relationship during the 1972-1979 Yushin (유신) period of Park Chung Hee's presidency?**

Park Chung Hee, the American relationship with South Korea, and American foreign policy have all been studied before, sometimes even in combination with each other.<sup>5</sup> Yet this thesis departs from these studies by comparing three presidents' approaches to discover why overall the U.S. policy during the Yushin regime did not manage to convince Park Chung Hee to dissolve the regime, and what elements in each of the administrations specifically failed.

***Methodology***

In order to answer the research question, this thesis will proceed as follows. Firstly, background will be provided on Park and his rise to power. Information on the coup will be provided mostly by a set of interviews conducted with Kim Jong Pil in 2015. As one of the key conspirators, his account will look at the motivations for the coup and help answer the first sub-question: *How did Park Chung Hee and the United States' relationship begin?*

Next, the years of the military junta and Park's presidency will be explored. The years of the military junta demonstrate Park's initial experience of power without limits and his reluctance to transfer power to a democratic government. It also looks at the first U.S. attempts to control Park's actions, mainly through controlling the distribution of food aid. In addition, it demonstrates how Park won his first election, despite American disapproval of him running. The next chapter looks into Park as president. It discusses several major events that occurred during the years 1963-1969, including Korean participation in the Vietnam War, opening of relations with Japan, and a spike in aggression from North Korea. These will later

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<sup>5</sup> Major works include *The Park Chung Hee Era* Kim, Kim, and Vogel., *Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961-1979* Kim and Sorensen, *Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961-1979: Development, Political Thought, Democracy, and Cultural Influence.*, *Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee* Kim, *Korea's Development Under Park Chung Hee.*, and various papers including "From Pupil to Model: South Korea and American Developmental Policy during the Early Park Chung Hee Era" Brazinsky, "From Pupil to Model: South Korea and American Development Policy during the Early Park Chung Hee Era.", "Change in US Policy towards South Korea in the Early 1960s" Park, "Change in U.S. Policy Toward South Korea in the Early 1960s.", and "A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas" Lee, *A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas.*

become Park's justifications for his actions during the Yushin period, and therefore provide important context. The chapter also deals with the approximately three years between the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine on July 25<sup>th</sup>, 1969 and Park's declaration of the Yushin Regime on November 21<sup>st</sup>, 1972. The last factors contributing to Park's grab for power occur—an amended Korean constitution allowing him to run for president a third time, the Nixon Doctrine and the resulting anxiety of U.S. abandonment, and Nixon's opening to China. The chapter will provide the answer to sub-question two: *How did events in the relationship between the United States and Park Chung Hee-led South Korea before 1972 lead to the Yushin regime?*

While the previously described chapters have mostly been substantiated with secondary documents (with the exception of the Kim Jong Pil interviews), the following chapter will rely on primary documents from the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. U.S. foreign policy documents will be analyzed in order to answer the research question. Using the literature coding software NVivo, volumes of the Foreign Policy series from the US Office of Historian's online archive were analyzed. Using the archive's search function, volumes that referenced South Korea were collected, of which only the Nixon, Ford and Carter volumes were downloaded. The volumes were thereafter narrowed down again based on whether they would provide information on American interactions or intentions with regard to the Park presidency. In this sense, the volume concerning Nixon's policies with Chile (with minimal mention of South Korea) was excluded, while volumes containing U.S. interactions with Japan (a major US and South Korean ally, and also a source of South Korean insecurity) were not. For Carter, more volumes were used to triangulate his policy towards South Korea. In the chapter itself, each U.S. president's policy towards the U.S.-South Korean relationship will be explicated and justified. This will answer the third sub-question: *What were the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations' reactions to the Park Chung Hee administration's problematic actions after 1972?*

After analyzing each President separately, a chapter will be dedicated to a comparison of the three administrations. Common and differentiating factors will be highlighted and discussed. While each administration used unique approaches and dealt with unique challenges that made their interactions with Park difficult, some factors could be expected to be similar across Presidents. For example, during the 1950s and 1960s, American foreign policy was heavily influenced by the ideas of Walt Rostow and his development theory, more commonly known as modernization theory. This influence is explored in books like *Mandarins of the*

*Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* by Nils Gilman.<sup>6</sup> However, as Michael Kim points out in his article<sup>7</sup>, the effect the Americans' belief in modernization theory indirectly had on other countries is much less explored. Kim argues that in South Korea, around the time of Park's ascension to power in the early 1960s and throughout his presidency, the ideas of Rostow took off. It replaced the earlier ideas of Korean intellectuals that Korean culture was the reason South Korea hadn't advanced and therefore South Korea needed to adopt Western culture in order to catch up. However, the adopted ideas of Rostow led Koreans to stop attributing their economic difficulties to culture, and more to the lack of a necessary state-centered economic growth.<sup>8</sup> For Park, as he discusses in his book *The Country, the Revolution, and I*, the coup was necessary to clear out the culture of corruption (a remnant of the old ideology) and to allow for a few years of concentrated, state-driven economic growth without the constraints of a bureaucracy-heavy democracy.<sup>9</sup> This belief is reflected in later actions of Park as well, like his justification for a third term as president.<sup>10</sup> Hence, this thesis will argue that Park Chung Hee's use of modernization theory to guide and justify his actions is an overarching or connecting factor explaining why Nixon, Ford, and Carter were unable or unwilling to get Park Chung Hee to dissolve his Yushin regime, as represented in the fourth and final sub-question: *Did Park Chung Hee's use of modernization theory to guide and justify his actions impair President Nixon, Ford, and Carter from convincing Park to dissolve his Yushin regime?*

This thesis will continue with a discussion of the answers to the research question and sub-questions laid out in the previous paragraphs, followed by the discussion and conclusion to this thesis.

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<sup>6</sup> Gilman discusses several aspects of modernization theory's influence on the American policy, including its origins, the further development of the theory in the MIT Center for International Studies, and modernization theory's eventual collapse in influence on US foreign policy. Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*.

<sup>7</sup> Kim, "The Discursive Foundations of the South Korean Developmental State: Sasanggye and the Reception of Modernization Theory."

<sup>8</sup> Kim.

<sup>9</sup> Park, *The Country, the Revolution and I*.

<sup>10</sup> Han, "Political Parties and Political Development in South Korea."

# From Democracy to Junta

## The May 16<sup>th</sup> Revolution and Military Junta (1960-1963)

### ***Syngman Rhee and the April 19<sup>th</sup> Student Revolution***

Park Chung Hee was not the first undemocratic leader South Korea had had in its young history of independence. Syngman Rhee's (이승만/ I Seungman) regime would provide the reasoning for the May 16<sup>th</sup> revolution that brought Park into power. Marshall Green, the charge d'affaires of the American embassy in Seoul during the last months of the Syngman Rhee regime, gave an interview to Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1988, describing the internal situation of the Rhee regime during the last weeks of Rhee's regime.<sup>11</sup> Rhee had been appointed by the United States in 1945, shortly after the liberation of the Korean peninsula from the Japanese. He was also the U.S.-backed candidate in the 1950 presidential election. However, his regime practiced both corruption and political repression. When it became clear that Rhee would not win the next election, he manipulated the results in order to guarantee his win. Rhee 'won' 74 percent of the vote, and therefore assuming the presidency once again, with Chang Myeon (장면/Jang Myeon) as his vice-president.<sup>12</sup>

On April 19<sup>th</sup>, 1960, students at Korea University in Seoul protested police violence on their campus. The police forcefully ended the protests; this violent suppression of the protestors led to further protests occurring later that day at the Blue House, the South Korean presidential house. Here, police fired into the crowd, resulting in between 100-200 deaths, and more than a thousand wounded. Every time a student died, the protesters paraded their body to fire up the crowd. Despite the gruesome scene, the next day, Rhee refused to listen to the protestors or take any further action. The protests continued, and on April 22<sup>nd</sup>, Chang Myeon resigned.<sup>13</sup>

On the 25<sup>th</sup> of April, 200 professors, followed by students of all ages, from elementary to university age, marched. The next day, they geared up to do the same, while at the Blue House, tanks were moved in and took position. Due to the good relationship between Rhee

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<sup>11</sup> For more information on Marshall Green, and his witness of among others, the fall of the Rhee regime, the Park Chung Hee coup, and the Great Leap Forward as consul general in Hong Kong, see Curran, "Marshall Green: America's Mr Asia."

<sup>12</sup> "The Fall of South Korean Strongman Syngman Rhee - April 26, 1960 - Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training."

<sup>13</sup> "The Fall of South Korean Strongman Syngman Rhee - April 26, 1960 - Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training."

and the U.S. ambassador to Korea, McConaughey, the Americans were able to convince Rhee to resign, effectively ending the protests, and helped Rhee flee to Hawaii, where he lived until his death.<sup>14</sup> After the student revolution, an interim government was established with Chang Myeon as the Prime Minister, and Yo Bosun (윤보선), as president.

Dissatisfaction with this interim government resulted in the May 16<sup>th</sup> revolution and Park Chung Hee's presidency.<sup>15</sup>

### ***Revolution Planning and Execution***

In order to understand the origins of Park's presidency and certain events that would underlie his justifications for later actions, and to offer an introduction to several major players within the relationship between the United States and South Korea, it is useful to take a short look at the May 16<sup>th</sup> coup that placed Park at the head of the fledgling South Korean government. Information regarding the coup is well documented through a set of interviews with Kim Jong Pil, who served as the founder and head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and later would serve as prime minister for Park from 1971 until 1975. Kim would also later help South Korean Presidents Kim Yeong Sam (김영삼/Gim Yeong Sam) and Kim Dae Jung (김대중/Gim Dae Jung) win their bids for presidency, and would serve as Prime Minister under Kim Dae Jung.<sup>16</sup> Another account of the organization of the military coup is documented in the book *the Park Chung Hee Era*, however the sources for much of the account are weak, and as Malzac argues in his 2016 thesis "Mythbusting Park Chung Hee", does not always make sense in the face of some of the primary evidence. On the other hand, as a key organizer of the coup, the information Kim Jong Pil discusses fits better with Park Chung Hee's plan to wait and see what the Chang Myeon government would accomplish, and is therefore a more reliable source of evidence, despite the years between the actual events and the interviews that have provided this information.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> "The Fall of South Korean Strongman Syngman Rhee - April 26, 1960 - Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training."

<sup>15</sup> Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.

<sup>16</sup> Kim, In the tumult of post-war Korea, one man was always there. The Kim Jong Pil interviews are part of a series called Kim Jong Pil Remembers. The newspaper who conducted the interviews did not number the entire series correctly, therefore the name of the article will always follow the citation.

<sup>17</sup> For a more extensive analysis and argumentation of the Kim Jong Pil interviews versus the May 16th Revolution extract, see "Mythbusting Park Chung Hee" Malzac, *Mythbusting Park Chung Hee: A Reexamination of Park and His Coup*. who dedicates a chapter to this subject.

According to Kim Jong Pil, revolution planning officially began on February 19<sup>th</sup>, 1961.<sup>18</sup> Song Yo-chan's (송요찬) 'Operation Pigeon', which allowed Rhee to secure ninety percent of the military vote for the Rhee government,<sup>19</sup> caused Park to consider a revolution. Additionally, the continued corruption of the new interim regime caused Kim Jong Pil, along with five other officers, to distribute petitions calling for the resignation of the military officials involved in the election rigging. All six were arrested for 'conspiracy to rebel against the state' for circulating the aforementioned petitions.<sup>20</sup> During Kim Jong Pil's detainment, he was offered the option either to step down from his position in the military, or have Park, his wife's uncle, persecuted as a communist. Park had been accused in the past of communist connections, his linkages with a left leaning student political party had gotten him arrested and made him a candidate for the death penalty. Park's connections allowed his sentence to be reduced to ten years suspended, and he even was eventually reinstated into the military when he showed up to help the South Korean army fight against the North Koreans at the beginning of the Korean War. However, another accusation would certainly ruin Park. Kim Jong Pil resigned, and recalled that after his release from prison, he went to tell Park to put the plan for revolution in motion.<sup>21</sup>

Park, on April 7<sup>th</sup>, 1961, officially announced himself as the leader of the revolution in a room of twenty nine other people, including Kim Jong Pil. It is assumed that around this time both the American Central Intelligence Agency and the Republic of Korea government had some knowledge of the planned coup.<sup>22</sup> The first date set for the coup was April 19<sup>th</sup>, 1961, exactly one year after the April 19<sup>th</sup> student revolution. While also symbolic for the events that had taken place a year before that removed Rhee Syngman as an authoritarian leader, there were also expectations that protests would take place, in regard to the lack of change that had resulted from the interim government. However, the day passed without incident, and the coup was postponed. The next proposed date was May 12<sup>th</sup>, but an overeager Colonel Lee Jong Tae (이종태/I Jong Tae) accidentally shared the details of the coup on a bus; however besides Colonel Lee's arrest, no other action was taken, but out of necessity the coup was postponed once more.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Kim, Planning a "revolution" in only 90 days.

<sup>19</sup> Kim, Election fixing provoked "revolution."

<sup>20</sup> Kim. Election fixing provoked 'revolution'.

<sup>21</sup> Kim, Planning a "revolution" in only 90 days.

<sup>22</sup> Dulles, "Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Kennedy."

<sup>23</sup> Kim, Complacent top brass allowed coup to proceed.

On May 14<sup>th</sup>, Kim Jong Rak (김종락/Gim Jong Rak), Kim Jong Pil's brother, hosted the final meeting at his house. Lieutenant Colonel Bak Won Bin (박원빈), who had led coup planning, finalized the last few details; at midnight, he would give a deployment order to the 6th military district command in the style of an emergency drill. They would enter the city and successively take over Seoul's 6th military district compound, the Korean Broadcasting Station Headquarters, and finally the Army headquarters. They would have been horribly outnumbered if there had been any opposition against them, as there were about 3600 troops committed to the operation, and a combination of 600,000 Korean and 56,000 American troops who could counter their coup. However, according to Kim Jong Pil, all were willing to give up their lives for the coup.<sup>24</sup> Despite several setbacks and the coup participants being largely outnumbered, dedication to the cause did not waver; this demonstrates a commitment to fixing the ills they saw within the government, no matter the cost. For Park and other members of the coup, this would rematerialize in other forms later, specifically, in excessive purges of suspected communists and corrupted officials, as well as altering the constitution to maintain Park's place at the head of the South Korean government, even if it irritated their closest and most necessary ally--the United States.

As the 14<sup>th</sup> drew to a close, Kim Jong Pil finished the declaration he wrote to explain to the country the reasoning behind the coup. Especially because Park was to be the leader of the coup, Kim had drafted as the number one priority anti-communism, to dispel any fears that Park, despite being cleared of the communist charge, had suddenly become an agent of communism. Park gave approval for the declaration, but asked Kim to add that once the country had been stabilized, he would relinquish control back to the civilian government. Kim obliged.<sup>25</sup> On May 15<sup>th</sup>, at 8 p.m., the coup organizers got word that the plans had been leaked once again, this time by the 30th Reserve Division, who had been infighting over leadership. During this power struggle, they leaked the plans to Commander Lee Sang Guk (이상국/I Sang Guk), who reported it to Jang Doyeong (장도영), the Army Chief of Staff. Jang Doyeong ordered the arrests of those involved, and Park and Kim Jong Pil, as they departed from Kim's brother's house at 11:30 p.m. to head towards Seoul, noted that they were being followed.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Kim. Complacent top brass allowed coup to proceed.

<sup>25</sup> Kim, The promise that Park didn't keep.

<sup>26</sup> Kim, The night the coup began and Park got shot at.

At this point, however, the agreement amongst planners had been to proceed no matter what. Therefore, Kim Jong Pil headed to the printing press, owned by Lee Hak Su (이학수/I Hak Su), who allowed him to use it free of charge to print the declaration. Around 2 a.m., the forty military trucks that were to head to Changgyeong Palace in the Jongno district, made their way past American checkpoints. Just as they had hoped, they were waved by, as the Americans assumed it was simply a drill. Lieutenant Sin Yun Chang (신윤창) even noted that one of the American soldiers wished them good luck, according to Kim Jong Pil.<sup>27</sup>

At 3 a.m., the trucks made their way to the front of the palace. At the same time, Park, along with the Marine's 1st Brigade, which consisted of 1500 marines, went to cross the Han River Bridge. They were stopped by fifty military police dispatched by Jang Doyeong. There were shots fired by both sides, but Park and his men outnumbered the counterforce and were able to cross the bridge by 4:15 a.m.<sup>28</sup> Shortly after, he met Kim Jong Pil at the printing press and reviewed the declaration one last time. With the green light, Kim headed to the Korean Broadcasting Station (KBS) headquarters and asked anchor Bak Jong Se (박종세) to read the declaration on air.<sup>29</sup> Pledges in the declaration included anti-communism, adherence to the United Nations Charter, eliminating corruption, improving the standard of living, improving military effectiveness, and, as Park had requested, the promise to eventually return to civilian rule.<sup>30</sup>

Yet, the revolution was not over. At 10:30 a.m., President Yun refused to declare martial law, although when the U.S. Forces Korea Commander Carter Magruder offered to counter the coup with his own forces, he refused this option as well to prevent bloodshed.<sup>31</sup> At 4:30 p.m., Jang Doyeong finally accepted his (unwillingly assigned) role as commander of the coup, and instituted martial law, which included the following:

- Nightly curfew at 10 p.m.
- Full censorship
- Restricted use of air/seaports
- Travel ban for South Koreans trying to travel out of South Korea

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<sup>27</sup> Kim. The night the coup began and Park got shot at.

<sup>28</sup> Kim. "The night the coup began and Park got shot at"

<sup>29</sup> Kim, Coup pivots on a tense standoff at military HQ. "Coup pivots on a tense standoff at military HQ"

<sup>30</sup> Malzac, *Mythbusting Park Chung Hee: A Reexamination of Park and His Coup*.

<sup>31</sup> Kim, Coup pivots on a tense standoff at military HQ. "Coup pivots on a tense standoff at military HQ"



- Ban on public meetings
- Freezing of banks
- Dissolution of the National Assembly and local councils
- The arrest of Cabinet Ministers and Vice Ministers<sup>32</sup>

On May 21<sup>st</sup>, the military government, also known as the junta, was officially instituted, led by Jang Doyeong.<sup>33</sup> While the United States was wary of the new government, they would attempt to build relations with Park while encouraging a return to democracy as quickly as possible.

## Park's Junta Meets the American Administration

### ***Tackling Corruption and Communism***

With the junta now in place, Park could begin executing his policies. As the top priority of the junta was anti-communism, much of its activity in the first two years was anti-communism oriented. Between the 22<sup>nd</sup> and the 28<sup>th</sup> of May, 1961, the Supreme Council of National Reconstruction (from here on out, the SCNR) conducted a series of arrests on communist and corruption charges. They arrested over 4200 alleged racketeers and 2100 suspected communist sympathizers.<sup>34</sup> Most prominently, on the 28<sup>th</sup> of May, the SCNR arrested fifty-one businessmen, men who would later become chaebols, heads of massive corporations that held sway over the Park Chung Hee government. These men were charged with illicit profiteering, and the SCNR demanded they donate their property to the government. The Park Chung Hee regime would later support their businesses and allow them to grow into the strong chaebol conglomerates that still exist today.<sup>35</sup>

Thirteen of these men, after their release on the 30<sup>th</sup> of June, 1961, helped Park form the Promotional Committee for Economic Reconstruction (PCER, later, and more commonly, known as the Federation of Korean Industries), led by Yi Byeong Cheol (이병철), the owner of Samsung. Formed on July 17<sup>th</sup>, their first action was to build factories in six sectors: cement, synthetic fibers, electricity, fertilizer, iron, and oil refining. Only oil would be entirely government controlled. The other sectors would be divided amongst the PCER, the fines related to their arrests were supposed to be paid back in shares of these factories by the end of 1961. These shares were never handed over, but it had little impact on the amount of

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<sup>32</sup> Bowles, "Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Geneva."

<sup>33</sup> Kim, Military coup sees a successful end. "Military coup sees successful end"

<sup>34</sup> Kim, *Korea's Development Under Park Chung Hee*.

<sup>35</sup> Kim.

influence the Park regime would have on their businesses. Those who didn't comply were given 'lessons', a form of thought training instituted by Minister Chong Naehyuk (정내혁) in May.<sup>36</sup>

On the 9<sup>th</sup> of June, 1961, U.S. Charge d'Affaires Marshall Green, who had also been present in South Korea during the last few months of the Rhee regime, and had been part of the group encouraging Rhee to resign, met with Park Chung Hee to reassure Park that the Americans had trust in his anti-communist stance. The Americans were hoping to prevent purges and other repressive measures against those Park considered anti-communist. Despite this reassurance, Park performed wide spread purges of those he considered communist sympathizers anyways; ironically, these purges actually raised suspicions that the May 16<sup>th</sup> coup had been sponsored by communists. For example, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), which had been established under Decree Number 619, on June 10<sup>th</sup>, 1961, with Kim Jong Pil at its head, performed purges of government officials. Besides those who had been arrested in the initial May purge, the KCIA investigated 41,712 additional cases of civil service members and government-run businesses, resulting in the charging of some 1863 civil servants. In July, 6900 civil servants would be dismissed, mostly for the evasion of military service, some for keeping mistresses.<sup>37</sup> Most notably in July, Jang Doyeong and a variety of his supporters were purged on the 3<sup>rd</sup>.<sup>38</sup> This was possible due to a June 6<sup>th</sup> SCNR declaration giving it had supreme power over the constitution should it conflict with Extraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction. With Jang purged, Park, within two months of the coup, was now officially the head of the military junta.<sup>39</sup>

On the 24<sup>th</sup> of June, the new U.S. Ambassador, Samuel D. Berger arrived, and shortly after met with Park. Berger promised public support of the military government if Park brought an end to the purges. Park did so, as well as releasing 1293 individuals, and commuting others' sentences.<sup>40</sup> The United States held its end of the deal. On July 27<sup>th</sup>, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk acknowledged and provided public support for the military junta, while carefully mentioning an anticipated return to civilian rule. Park was also invited for a two day working visit with President Kennedy starting November 14<sup>th</sup>. For Park, this visit provided ultimate legitimacy in South Korea; not only did the US government recognize the junta, it also invited its leader to speak with the president. The SCNR even modeled its government

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<sup>36</sup> Kim.

<sup>37</sup> Kim.

<sup>38</sup> Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.

<sup>39</sup> Kim, *Korea's Development Under Park Chung Hee*.

<sup>40</sup> Kim.

administration on the U.S. military and U.S. planning programs.<sup>41</sup> For the United States, this was a begrudging acceptance of the new situation, as it was possible to work with this new government and shape their policy; for the South Korean government, the new U.S.-South Korean relationship brought legitimacy and a secure alliance.

With Park in charge, he started implementing the goals he had outlined in *The Country, the Revolution, and I*.<sup>42</sup> Park, through recruitment of professors and technocrats, created two groups of elites within his junta. The first were the technocrats, who recognized the difference between their businesses and their political power. The second group included former generals, corporate managers and professional administrators, who demonstrated remarkable efficiency, focus, and motivation for achieving the goals set out for the country. However, both groups suffered from a short-cut mentality, and Park and his supporters often practiced nepotism, and favored the regions they originated from.<sup>43</sup>

Park generally practiced guided capitalism, which asked for heavy state intervention in the economy, specifically in industrial enterprises. He commissioned three economists to design a five-year plan that would double the gross national product, and increase the national income by 7.1 percent. The plan placed emphasis on heavy industries and exports. It would also impose administrative controls over business groups. A preliminary draft was announced on July 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1961 under the name May 1961 plan, but was later formally announced as the (first) Five Year Plan in January of 1962. It was criticized by Koreans for not focusing on the current issues plaguing the country, and being too rigorously planned to work.<sup>44</sup> The United States State Department called Park's First Five Year Plan at the time a mere shopping list of items and was unimpressed with the effort. In addition, in June 1962, Park's banking and currency reform<sup>45</sup>, already unsuccessful, infuriated the Americans; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Edward Rice warned the South Korean Ambassador Chong Ilgwon (정일권/Jeong Il Gwon) that should more actions be taken without the knowledge of the Americans, the U.S. would reevaluate the assistance they were providing

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<sup>41</sup> Kim.

<sup>42</sup> *The Country, the Revolution and I*.

<sup>43</sup> Kim, *Korea's Development Under Park Chung Hee*.

<sup>44</sup> Kim.

<sup>45</sup> Park attempted to collect funds for government operations through financial regulations. In June 1962, he instituted three major reforms: on the 9th, he nationalized five major banks, on the 15th, he passed the Stock Exchange Act, which forced South Koreans to buy stocks with funds that Park had frozen earlier, and on the 16th, he switched the Korean currency from the hwan (환) to the won (원) at a rate of 10 hwan to 1 won. The currency reform intended to collect cash that Koreans theoretically had stored away from banks, however it failed because the government vastly overestimated the percentage of Koreans that had cash that was not in a bank. None of the measures resulted in significant increases to government funds. Kim, Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.

the South Koreans. Similar techniques (namely a combination of diplomatic pressure and changing U.S. aid regulations) were used by US policy advisors to pressure Park to return to civilian rule.<sup>46</sup>

The relationship between the two countries during this time, and especially between Park and Berger, can be best described as 'quid pro quo'. The United States partially lifted sanctions they had imposed to force Park to hold elections, Park partially announced elections. Park arrested Hwang Tae Seong (황태성), the North Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, on spying charges, and handed him over to the Americans in exchange for food under the PL 480 program. Park would later approve Hwang's execution to disprove and eliminate any links to Park's communist past.<sup>47</sup> However, the U.S.'s role was not always constructive, mostly due to a series of changes that occurred before Park and the junta. The United States, and especially Kennedy, wanted to guide South Korea to self-sufficiency and lower the number of forces in South Korea. The United States therefore transferred aid discretion to the U.S. Ambassador, made aid linked to economic reform and planning, and started following a policy based on the Dillon Letter<sup>48</sup> towards a self-sustaining growth for South Korea. After Park's enactment of the emergency financial reforms in June 1962, a last change in policy direction was made; instead of encouraging the Park regime to follow the Rostovian model of development<sup>49</sup>, Berger withheld fifteen million in aid to pressure Park to pursue stabilization instead. Ironically for the United States, this policy changing pushing towards self-sufficiency likely allowed for Park's rise to power (as the flood of aid Park received for holding elections caused an increase in Park's popularity), and gave Park leverage over the United States by claiming to complete actions in the name of self-sufficiency.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Kim, *Korea's Development Under Park Chung Hee*.

<sup>47</sup> Park's older brother, who had been executed on charges of being a communist, had been close friends with Hwang Tae Seong, which caused suspicion that Park had remaining ties to Hwang. Kim.

<sup>48</sup> The Dillon Letter was penned in October 1960 by Secretary of Treasury (and former Under Secretary of State) Clarence Dillon and indicated countries receiving American aid should demonstrate plans to develop their economy towards the goal of self-sustaining growth, which would eventually allow for a reduction in the U.S. aid burden. Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.

<sup>49</sup> The Rostovian model of development consists of a step by step graduation from a traditional society to a society that experiences high mass consumption. For more information on this particular model of development see Tsiang, "A Model of Economic Growth in Rostovian Stages."

<sup>50</sup> Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.

### ***The American Influence on the Election of 1963***

In order to indicate to the United States that they were indeed on the path to self-sufficiency, Park sent Kim Jong Pil to conclude a secret agreement with Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira to begin the normalization process between the two countries on November 12<sup>th</sup>, 1962. This was an incredibly risky political move considering the end of Japanese colonial control of the Korean peninsula had only been seventeen years prior. At the same time, he had Kim, who was also the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, set up the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), which would support Park when he ran for president. Park announced on December 26<sup>th</sup> the new constitution, and the next day, the months for the elections: April 1963 for the National Assembly, May 1963 for the presidential elections, and August 1963 for the transfer of power. However, this progress towards democratic elections would come to a halt only a week later.<sup>51</sup>

In January 1963, Kim Jong Pil's diplomatic activities with Japan, the existence of the Democratic Republican Party, as well as the funding activities undertaken for the DRP came to light. The Korean public was outraged, especially the development of a secret political party indicated to the Korean people that Park might not actually step down. Within the junta itself, two factions began to form which prevented Park from presenting a united front to the Korean people, but that wasn't the only issue.<sup>52</sup>

Kim Jong Pil wasn't favored by the Americans either. They had long been concerned about how much power Kim had, and how his presence in the administration aggravated already existing South Korean factions. They were also worried about his fervent nationalism, and during Kim's visit to the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1961, he failed to reassure or impress the Americans. After the DRP-related activities of Kim were revealed in January, the U.S. suspended delivery of development loans to South Korea.<sup>53</sup> South Korea had just been hit by a severe drought and then by flooding, and Park desperately needed to keep aid money flowing in order to appease the opposition.<sup>54</sup> Park, therefore, was beginning to feel intense pressure with regard to Kim Jong Pil's position within his administration. The

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<sup>51</sup> Kim, *Korea's Development Under Park Chung Hee*.

<sup>52</sup> The first was the mainstream faction and consisted of Park, Kim Jong Pil, members of the 8th Korean Military Academy graduating class, and natives of the Gyeongsang (경상도) and Chungcheong (충청도) provinces, where Park and Kim were born. The second, named the Hamgyeong (함경도) faction, was against the secret activities of Kim Jong Pil and consisted of the 5th KMA graduating class, older Hamgyong generals, and some civilian politicians who were banned due to the political purification law. They were often oppositional to Park. Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.

<sup>53</sup> Kim, Kim, and Vogel.

<sup>54</sup> Kim, *Korea's Development Under Park Chung Hee*.

final straw was when, on the 17<sup>th</sup> of February, Defense Minister Pak Pyong Gwon along with the Chiefs of Staff of all military branches, demanded Kim Jong Pil's resignation. Park relented, and made Kim a roving ambassador. Eight days later, Kim retired from the military and the KCIA to run the DRP full time. Park announced on the 18<sup>th</sup> of February that he wouldn't run for president if the civilian opposition met nine conditions before the junta retired, including not retaliating against any of the junta members. The Americans were especially pleased to hear this, as it meant Park would more seriously consider judgment passed by the United States, especially when related to democratic processes, and that the U.S. methods of influence, especially related to aid control were still effective.<sup>55</sup>

Yet, in March, the path to democracy took a second sharp turn. The KCIA claimed to have uncovered a plot to overthrow the Park-led junta, with leadership originating within the Hangyong (함경도), or anti-mainstream, faction. This allowed the KCIA to weed out the last of the Hangyong faction members within Park's junta. Shortly after, Park notified Ambassador Berger that he was planning on holding a referendum to extend military rule, which was followed by public demonstrations by the military to extend the junta's rule. Park did not listen to Berger to wait until the U.S. could prepare their position before announcing the referendum, and Berger, already upset, urged Park to abandon the idea. When Berger was informed that the referendum was scheduled for the next day, he threatened withholding economic aid, especially food aid. If Park were to publicly announce the referendum date, the U.S. would make a statement regarding the reevaluation of the U.S.-South Korean relationship, as their initial assessment had been based on the assumption of return to civilian rule with democratic elections. This strong, negative response by the United States caused Park to delay the referendum in early April, and in late August 1963, Park announces his retirement from the military to run for president, despite earlier claims, with the presidential election set for October 15<sup>th</sup>.<sup>56</sup>

While the Americans met with candidates Yun Boseon and eventually supported Ho Chang for president, Park ran an effective divide and conquer strategy in his race. He referred to his opponents as flunkeys, or U.S. dependent, and that a Korean-style democracy was a nationalistic democracy with a Korea and economy first approach. The opposition had too many candidates and could not provide a united front, therefore on October 15<sup>th</sup>, 1963, Park won the election by a margin of 1.4%, or approximately 150,000 votes. In November, the National Assembly elections gave the DRP 110 out of 175 seats. The elections, especially

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<sup>55</sup> Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.

<sup>56</sup> Kim, Kim, and Vogel; Kim, *Korea's Development Under Park Chung Hee*.

due to how close the results were, were deemed fair and just by both the United States and the United Nations. Park was now the leader of a democracy, and the period of the military junta had come to a close.<sup>57</sup>

The period between the military coup and Park's first successful election was characterized by American actions either strongly condemning or quietly supporting Park and his junta. While, as previously mentioned, there was often a requirement of a reciprocal action in order to get Park to change his path, overall, the United States, giving such significant aid amounts to South Korea, was able to mold the new government to its wishes. Especially official, democratic, legitimate elections pleased the Americans, as it indicated that the democracy they had fought to install would return. They, therefore, would enter the relationship with the Park presidency on an optimistic note.

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<sup>57</sup> Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.

# Park as President and the Influence of the Nixon Doctrine

## South Korea Arrives on the World Stage

In the six years between Park's first term and the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine (and Park's alteration of the Korean constitution) on July 25<sup>th</sup>, 1969, South Korea would rise to the international stage in economic and diplomatic performance. From 1962-1966, the economy maintained an impressive 8.2 percent growth rate, rising to 12 percent during the years 1967-1973 due to funds coming in from South Korea's participation in the Vietnam War. Relations were normalized with Japan, allowing for a diversification of aid sources. South Korea also made multiple attempts at creating regional organizations, first with the Manila Summit Conference with their participating allies in the Vietnam War, and later with the Asia and Pacific Council. During this time period, Park was re-elected for the second time, and on the other side of the ocean, Presidents Johnson and Nixon would take office. It was therefore a period of rapid change, not only for South Korea, but also for the US-South Korean relationship.<sup>58</sup>

### ***South Korea's Turn to Their Neighbor***

During the time of Syngman Rhee, South Korea would not have considered an agreement of any sort with Japan; the time of colonization by Japan was just behind them, having ended in 1945 with the Japanese surrender, and as the original colonization by Japan had resulted from the opening of relations between the two countries, the South Koreans were downright fearful of any contact between Japan and South Korea. By the time Park Chung Hee had come into power in 1961, attitudes had already shifted significantly. This shift was largely due to a shift in U.S. attitudes, especially towards the amount of aid it was providing South Korea. In 1961, the US provided approximately 265.8 million dollars in aid, yet it dropped to 194.3 million in 1965. In 1964, the US slashed military aid to South Korea by 100 million. For the U.S., normalized South Korea-Japan relations had other benefits as well, including an improved security position in east Asia and an elevated chance of South Korean self-sufficiency (and therefore a reduction in U.S. aid costs). As previously mentioned, an early attempt was made at normalized relations when Kim Jong Pil visited with Japanese

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<sup>58</sup> Park, "Korea's Return to Asia: An Analysis of New Moves in South Korean Diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s."



Foreign Minister Ohira. The meeting produced the Kim-Ohira memorandum, in which South Korea demanded 600 million in reparations from Japan. Public outcry in South Korea, and the subsequent dismissal of Kim Jong Pil, resulted in a wary Park of pursuing any further attempts at normalized relations.<sup>59</sup>

Park's wariness was amplified by what was viewed by the South Koreans as suspicious pressure by the United States. The South Koreans became worried that this was a signal that the United States was considering pulling away from its commitments in South Korea, so much so that even those who opposed Park normally joined him in suspicion of the U.S.'s actions. In response to these concerns, the United States sent Marshall Green, trusted by the Koreans, to reassure both Park and the opposition leaders about their intentions to remain in South Korea. In addition, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited both Seoul and Tokyo to encourage reconciliations; he emphasized the United States would not play a mediating role, rather, they would provide advice where necessary. Eventually, the Korean Business Association also voiced its support towards normalization, which would allow for Korean business interests to be pursued in Japan. While public opinion wasn't entirely in favor of normalization yet, Park seized the beginnings of a shift and returned to negotiations with a higher demand of reparations—800 million over ten years, consisting of 300 million in grants, 200 million in government loans, and 300 million in private commercial loans.<sup>60</sup> He declared that it was in the national interest to “manage Japanese economic infiltration to the benefit of South Korea”<sup>61</sup>.

There was, however, a fundamental disagreement between South Korea and Japan. South Korea believed Japan should apologize for the atrocities committed when Korea was a colony of Japan; Japan disagreed, they did not feel they had done anything wrong, and besides, South Korea wouldn't have had the infrastructure in place it did, had the Japanese not colonized them. It likely would have dissolved the negotiations, had Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburo not, while initialing a draft of the normalization treaty in February 1965, commented that “I...really regret that an unfortunate period existed in the long history of the two nations, and deeply reflect on such a past”<sup>62</sup>. This apparently soothed the South Koreans enough that on June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1965 the Normalization of Relations Treaty between South Korea and Japan was concluded, consisting of five parts: the Treaty on Basic Relations, the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims

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<sup>59</sup> Park.

<sup>60</sup> Park.

<sup>61</sup> Park, 96.

<sup>62</sup> Park, 70.

and Economic Cooperations, the Agreement on Fisheries, the Agreement on the Legal Status and Treatment of the Nationals of the Republic of Korea, and the Agreement on Art Object and Cultural Cooperation. Japan was also asked to not conclude any official relations with North Korea, and recognize South Korea as the only legitimate Korea. For the Americans, who had planned and pushed for the treaty, lending legitimacy and advice when necessary, were pleased with the normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea. It helped them economically by lessening their aid burden to South Korea, and it also helped with maintaining South Korean security with less U.S. effort. With Japan contributing to South Korean security, the U.S. could place a heavier focus on events unfolding in Vietnam, where they would be assisted by the South Koreans.<sup>63</sup>

### ***South Korea's Second Front in the Fight Against Communism***

The South Korean military was first requested to participate in the Vietnam War in September of 1964 by the South Vietnamese government, but participation was heavily nudged by the United States, as they needed international participation to justify their own involvement. William Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs had visited South Korea in order to discuss their possible involvement in July 1964. South Korea was unwilling to send troops at that point, so instead, they sent a Mobile Army Hospital Unit of 130 men and a ten man taekwondo instruction team to train soldiers in hand to hand combat. In December, it became obvious to the United States that they would need South Korean troops, and thus President Johnson sent a letter to Park detailing this necessity. Johnson also outlined what the United States would contribute in return for a South Korean troop deployment; the U.S. would cover the cost of deployed troops, including their allowances, and the maintenance of their equipment, as well as reimbursing the 1966 portion of MAP (Military Assistance Program), which had reduced military aid to South Korea by 100 million. The United States would not withdraw forces without alerting South Korea, and during the deployment, it would help South Korea modernize its forces.<sup>64</sup>

Despite these promises, an official deployment was met with hesitation. Emphasis was therefore placed by Park on the first deployment's peaceful mission, and that it would strengthen the U.S.-ROK security relationship.<sup>65</sup> Additionally considered was the unique opportunity South Korea would have to lead the Asian fight against communism, as part of the South Korean ideal of a common destiny shared by free Asian nations, increase

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<sup>63</sup> Park, "Korea's Return to Asia: An Analysis of New Moves in South Korean Diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s."

<sup>64</sup> Park.

<sup>65</sup> Park.

international prestige, and of course the opportunity to start “paying back the international debt which South Korea accrued during its struggle against communism in the Korean War”<sup>66</sup>. In January 1965, South Korea sent army engineers and a transportation service unit, which totaled about 2000 soldiers, to Vietnam.<sup>67</sup>

Four months later, in May 1965, Park and Johnson met in Washington D.C. to discuss a possible combat deployment of South Korean troops. In return for this deployment, the United States would provide additional economic aid, totaling about 150 million dollars in the form of development loans and technical assistance under the Food for Peace Program. A month later, in June, South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen sent an official request for South Korean combat troops. The National Assembly was very reluctant to agree to the deployment of South Korean combat troops; they were especially worried that this deployment would compromise their own national security, and that North Korea would take advantage of their weakened state to infiltrate. The United States then heavily implied that without South Korean troops, the U.S. would have to use troops originally stationed at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea to assist in their fight. Panicked, the decision to send combat troops passed the South Korean National Assembly in August, and two divisions of South Korean troops were shipped to Vietnam: a South Korean Marine Corps Division, the Blue Dragon, consisting of the best of South Korea’s troops and numbering 5000 men, and an Army Division, Fierce Tiger, which numbered 15,000 men. While these troops wouldn’t officially be deployed until October, on the 13<sup>th</sup> of August, President Johnson wrote a thank you letter to Park and South Korea for their assistance in the fight against communism. When Johnson visited South Korea in late 1966, it was the only country where he wasn’t met with anti-war protests, and where he was hailed as a great American leader.<sup>68</sup>

In January and February of 1966, U.S. Vice President Humphrey visited South Korea twice in order to request increased troop presence in Vietnam, and this was coupled with a formal request from South Vietnam in February. If South Koreans were worried about the first three troop requests, they were especially concerned about this one. With this requested deployment, ten percent of all Korean troops would be in Vietnam, an incredible security risk for the South Koreans. They were also worried about the continued U.S. commitment in South Korea if so many troops were needed in Vietnam.<sup>69</sup> Humphrey reassured the Koreans

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<sup>66</sup> Park, 102.

<sup>67</sup> Park, “Korea’s Return to Asia: An Analysis of New Moves in South Korean Diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s.”

<sup>68</sup> Park.

<sup>69</sup> Park.

with “as long as there is one American soldier on the line of the border, the demarcation line, the whole and entire power of the United States of America is committed to the security and defense of Korea”<sup>70</sup>.

Although there was concern about national security, the national pride from participation had created increased confidence in the South Korean people to demand better conditions for their troops. The opposition in Park’s government, once focused on blocking deployments, now oriented themselves to getting South Korean troops back as soon as possible, as well as better pay and conditions. The South Koreans claimed that Japan was earning ten times them in terms of U.S. procurements despite not sending any troops. Especially Cha Jicheol (차지철), an influential figure in the South Korean National Assembly defense committee, wanted higher levels of economic and military aid in return for their troops. However, the opposition was worn down from opposing South Korean and Japanese reconciliation, and did not want to alienate the United States, and therefore backed off from some of the more extreme aid demands. Nevertheless, in March of 1966, what would be known in South Korea as the Brown Memorandum<sup>71</sup> was delivered to South Korea, promising that the United States would shoulder most of the expenses for South Korea’s participation in Vietnam, in addition to an USAID loan of 150 million. The National Assembly passed a resolution sending an additional army regimen to Vietnam at the end of March, resulting in a total of 47,872 South Koreans fighting in Vietnam.<sup>72</sup>

The South Koreans would continue to fight in Vietnam until the Paris Truce Agreement in 1973. They had initially participated as a way to lead the Asian fight against communism and as a way to pay back the United States and the international community for their assistance in their fight against communism. Yet, in the end, there were more benefits than simply repayment of this debt. They already began noticing other benefits of participating in the Vietnam War as early as 1966, as their fighting resulted in increased national pride, increased international prestige, and more international aid and foreign receipts. With the setup of the South Korea Vietnam Businessmen Association in 1966, South Koreans were participating not only in the front lines, but also in the various civilian projects that were commissioned in Vietnam. South Koreans, civilian and military, sent about eighty percent of

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<sup>70</sup> Park, 113.

<sup>71</sup> The Brown Memorandum, named after the U.S. Ambassador Brown, who penned it, offered South Korea a variety of benefits for their participation in Vietnam, including both military financing and modernization guarantees and economic aid for the South Korean economy. Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.

<sup>72</sup> Park, “Korea’s Return to Asia: An Analysis of New Moves in South Korean Diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s.”

their earnings into South Korean banks, increasing the liquid capital available for South Korean development projects as part of Park's second Five Year Plan. They also learned that the United States needed South Korean troops, both to supplement fighting and to justify the Vietnam War by demonstrating multiple nations' interest in fighting communism in Vietnam. This allowed them to demand better conditions and pay for their soldiers, as well as increased aid for South Korea during the entirety of the Vietnam War. For the Americans, expanding contacts between the South Koreans and South Vietnamese was very positive. As previously mentioned, from the American perspective, increased positive relations between South Korea and South Vietnam aided in the international legitimacy of the Vietnam War. It also contributed to peace and infrastructure building efforts in Vietnam, as well as to the growth of the South Korean economy, which went from an average of 8.5 percent from 1962-1965, to an average of 12 percent during their participation in the Vietnam War. While the increasing demands for funds irritated the Americans, it was easier to justify the spending of additional funds than to send more American troops. The Americans were also pleased with South Korea's increasing international recognition, as the regionalism South Korea would foster with it, fit into their shift in Asian policy from intense U.S. assistance, to Asian self-sufficiency.<sup>73</sup>

### ***South Korea Embraces Regionalism***

South Korea also used the increased international recognition from their participation in the Vietnam War to try to expand its contacts outside of the United States and Japan. Worry about the extent of U.S. commitment in South Korea, and a decreasing faith in the United Nations and its idea of universalism, caused South Korea to look to Asia for further security arrangements. Starting in 1964, South Korea began forming the Asia and Pacific Council, an organization intended to boost Asian regional cooperation. While President Park had thought of the council as a way to form a regional security arrangement, he recognized that many of the countries he considered would be wary of such an arrangement. He therefore had his ambassador, in a tour of the countries to ask about their interests, declare the purpose to be "common concerns in the political, economic, social, and cultural fields"<sup>74</sup>. The organization was to be founded on equality of representation and power, and Park hoped the collective spirit fostered by the council would allow for a security arrangement in the future. The Council met from 1966 until 1972, when differing views about the future of Asia and the growing recognition of the People's Republic of China over Taiwan caused the council to dissolve. Participating countries included South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,

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<sup>73</sup> Park.

<sup>74</sup> Park, 147.

Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, South Vietnam, and as an observer state, Laos. The United States was appreciative of South Korean attempts to foster regional spirit, and in Johnson's address in 1966, he discussed his new Asian policy and his (and the United States') encouragement of regional cooperation amongst the non-communist Asian nations<sup>75</sup>

Another attempt by South Korea to foster a regionalist spirit was the Manila Summit Conference in October of 1968. Again, South Korea eventually wanted to create a sort of security arrangement, but the official purpose was for allies of South Vietnam to meet and condemn the communist aggression in Vietnam. Seven countries sent their leaders: the United States, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and South Vietnam. Termed 'the Manila Spirit', it brought renewed fighting spirit temporarily to the war-weary allies. Unfortunately, the Manila Spirit quickly faded with the looming withdrawal of the United States that would occur in the early 1970s, but the international recognition South Korea received for its part in organizing the summit did not.<sup>76</sup>

### ***North Korea Attacks***

As the Americans and South Koreans were occupied fighting in Vietnam, another front required their attention. The period between 1963 and 1969 marked a notable increase in North Korean aggressions, especially from 1967-1969. In 1965 and 1966, there were eighty-eight and eighty acts of North Korean aggression respectively. In 1967, that number jumped to 784, and peaked in 1968 at 985 acts of aggression. North Korea was likely taking advantage of a perceived weakness in South Korean defenses, however the economic prosperity South Korea was experiencing and the clear memory of life under communism prevented them from gaining the support needed to incite a guerilla war to fight for reunification under the North Korean government. However, this does not mean that South Korea was unaffected by the acts of aggression, and four instances in particular worried the South Koreans about the state of their defenses.<sup>77</sup>

The first took place in January of 1968. A group of heavily armed North Koreans attempted to attack the Blue House (the official residence of the South Korean president), slipped past the American unit at the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone), and were stopped a mere two miles away, at the cost of the life of one South Korean police chief. The thirty-one agents were arrested, and all were executed, with the exception of one agent, who revealed that the

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<sup>75</sup> Park, "Korea's Return to Asia: An Analysis of New Moves in South Korean Diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s."

<sup>76</sup> Park.

<sup>77</sup> Park.

North Koreans were training fifty thousand more agents to conduct similar activities. Two days later, North Koreans apprehended and took hostage the crew of the USS Pueblo, who were only released a year later, through a secret deal concluded between the United States and North Korea. These two events shook South Korean belief in the impenetrability of US defenses.<sup>78</sup>

In April of 1969, North Koreans shot down an unarmed American reconnaissance plane, and shortly thereafter, sent two hundred North Korean agents over sea, to infiltrate the south of South Korea. The agents landed successfully, but were quickly turned over to the police by the local population when they attempted to encourage communist activity and incite dissent towards the South Korean government. If the aggression in January 1968 worried the South Koreans about the strength of their defenses, the aggression in April 1969 reassured the population that North Korea could not easily incite a guerilla war for communism, and that the population of South Korea was vehemently anti-communist. Overall though, the acts of aggression North Korea committed during this time period increased President Park's, and the South Korean population's, fear of North Korea and decreased their blind trust in the American defense of the DMZ and the American ability to protect them from communist attacks and infiltration.<sup>79</sup>

### ***Park's 1967 election***

In the National Assembly elections of 1967, the Democratic Republican Party won 129 out of 175 seats. This is attributed mostly due to their ability to obtain the rural vote; Park and the DRP were able to obtain most of the rural votes as they were able to mobilize government offices and the police force in support of their campaign. As the incumbents, they had a more well-established network of party offices, and were able to better fund their candidates. By one estimate, each DRP National Assembly candidate was able to spend about 30 million won, or a hundred thousand dollars, on their campaign<sup>80</sup>, while other political parties were only able to spend about a tenth of that amount per candidate. This made the New Democratic Party a permanent minority in the National Assembly.<sup>81</sup>

This also wasn't the only issue the NDP was facing. Besides funding and networking struggles, they had serious factionalist strife within the party. In order to attempt to beat

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<sup>78</sup> Park.

<sup>79</sup> Park.

<sup>80</sup> The DRP was able to fund these campaigns through mandatory 'donations' from businessmen, who had been supported by the Park administration. Han, "Political Parties and Political Development in South Korea."

<sup>81</sup> Han.

Park, they unified the New Korea Party and the People's Party under the NDP, but there were disagreements on fundamental issues. In addition, to the public, the NDP was having trouble providing a united front.<sup>82</sup> The only thing the NDP seemed to agree on was opposing everything Park and the DRP introduced. This caused a public image of continuing nay-saying; moreover, none of their candidates were young, new, or modern, many were career politicians with no contacts in the rural community. For example, they continued to have Yun Boseon as their presidential candidate, despite his failure at beating Park in the previous election. Yet, the DRP was also struggling with factionalism. Over the years, the party had separated administrative power and party power, allowing for more people to have prestigious positions. However, for Kim Jong Pil as head of the party, it was creating difficulties in accessing funding. For those in the National Assembly, it was creating difficulties in passing legislation. In addition, those running the party wanted Kim Jong Pil to run for president, while those in the administration were against the idea, and wanted Park to continue as president. While Park won the 1967 elections easily, it was not the end of the problems for the DRP. In May of 1968, Kim Jong Pil resigned from his position. A year later, in April 1969, five leading DRP members in National Assembly were fired for convincing other DRP assemblymen to vote against the firing of the Minister of Education. These five were loyal to Kim Jong Pil, and very against the idea of a potential third Park term as president.<sup>83</sup>

Around the same time, President Nixon recently assumed office in the United States, and Park began to feel that the United States might not be as interested in giving aid to South Korea. On July 8<sup>th</sup>, 1969, he wrote that he was open to the idea of a third term, if that was what the Korean people wanted. It would require a two thirds majority to rewrite the constitution. Shortly after, on July 25<sup>th</sup>, the same day that Nixon announced the Nixon Doctrine and the subsequent change in US aid policy, Park announced he would run for a third term as president, altering the Korean Constitution.<sup>84</sup>

### Nixon Doctrine's Influence on the U.S.-ROK Relationship

The time period after the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine influenced US-South Korean relations in significant ways. Firstly, on the American side, they started actively trying to limit Park and his power, as well as withdrawing military forces from South Korea, without directly offending Park. Critically, they attempted to block his third term in office and did not retaliate

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<sup>82</sup> Han.

<sup>83</sup> Han.

<sup>84</sup> Han.



when North Korea attacked Korean or American forces. This generated issues of trust between South Korea and the United States. It especially indicated to Park that the United States could not be trusted in the task of defending South Korea, and as a result, he retreated within himself and took more extreme measures to ensure his power. Park looked to Japan for help with security, and when it was clear that Japan could not replace the U.S.'s security presence, declared a national emergency in 1971 to deal with the perceived increasing security threat. This escalated into the eventual formation of the Yushin Doctrine, which granted Park total power and an unlimited term as president, which generated worries regarding democracy and human rights in South Korea for the United States.

### ***War-weary Americans and war-fearing South Koreans***

War-weary U.S. voters had had enough of their citizens fighting others' wars, even if framed as part of the global anti-communism struggle. For Americans, the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in Guam<sup>85</sup>, and its subsequent implementation in the following months, was a relief. Newly elected President Nixon understood the country was no longer willing to continuously fight; the Vietnam War and its burgeoning costs both in terms of finances and human lives had taken its toll. The American public no longer understood spending billions on the various front lines scattered across the world. With the Nixon Doctrine, the United States was able to justify its step back from Asia in light of giving security sovereignty to these nations.<sup>86</sup>

While Nixon had tried to reassure his Asian allies that this did not mean U.S. abandonment or retreat from their security commitments, Park Chung Hee was not convinced. Especially when, a few months later, the United States began to initiate legislation to withdraw troops from South Korea, Park understood what the Nixon Doctrine would truly mean for South Korea. Doubts after lack of U.S. retaliation in response to North Korean acts of aggression had already arisen before Nixon's announcement of a new policy towards Asia, and for Park, the initiation of the withdrawal of American troops was a clear signal that the United States was no longer intending to provide for South Korean security or protect South Korean interests.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> The Nixon Doctrine was a series of informal remarks delivered by President Nixon on July 25th, 1969, at a press conference in Guam (and is therefore also known as the Guam Doctrine). A full text can be found in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Nixon, "Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen." however most essential to this thesis include the implications of greater Asian responsibility for Asia, especially in regards to American military and economic commitments.

<sup>86</sup> Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.

<sup>87</sup> Choi, "The Foreign Policy of Park Chunghee: 1968- 1979."

While the future for South Korean citizens was potentially less secure, in some ways for Park, the beginnings of an American retreat worked out well. After his announcement that he would run for a third term, Nixon invited Kim Dae Jung, currently running as a presidential candidate, to Washington D.C., as he was considered a cooperative candidate, especially with his liberal and flexible foreign policy, in particular towards North Korea. This made Park incredibly nervous and agitated, and indicated to him that the Americans were still determined to have significant sway over South Korean politics. When his victory over Kim Dae Jung in the election was only by 0.95 million votes, Park planned to implement a government where he had total power, which he called the Yushin (유신, literally translates to rejuvenation/reformation) regime. Yet, he wouldn't have the electoral support for another constitutional revision similar to the one in 1971, so he had to find a justifiable cause to implement such a regime. With the Americans removing troops from South Korea<sup>88</sup> (and to a certain extent the U.S.'s Vietnamization program<sup>89</sup>), Park could more effectively use the fear of North Korea to justify his planned authoritarian regime, as well as worry less about possible U.S. reactions, as it would be difficult for the Americans to argue both that there would be less U.S. intervention in Asian nations and that Park should listen to the United States. It, for example, helped Park experience minimum resistance from the United States when he declared a national emergency in December 1971<sup>90</sup>, simultaneously passing the Special Law for National Security, which allowed him to declare national emergencies, order economic measures, prohibit outdoor demonstrations, restrict the freedoms of speech and press, and block worker's collective actions. In this way, the United States inadvertently helped pave a path for Park and his authoritarian Yushin regime.<sup>91</sup>

The Nixon presidency also inadvertently helped set Park up for his Yushin regime through the phasing out of the Bretton Woods system in 1971. Many countries, including South Korea, were unprepared for the United States to abandon the gold standard for the dollar and scrambled to develop floating exchange rates and other protectionist policies for their

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<sup>88</sup> Choi.

<sup>89</sup> The U.S.'s Vietnamization program was a program in which the United States slowly started transferring the responsibility of defending South Vietnam to the Vietnamese, so that the United States would be able to pull out of the Vietnam War. "Vietnamization."

<sup>90</sup> Park had, during the election of 1971, taken actions that both disadvantaged the opposition and eliminated dissent within his own party. However, the opposition had a larger minority in 1971 than in 1969, making constitutional revision impossible. With increasing student protests against economic inequality and repressive measures, Park first ordered the military suppression of the protests, followed by Seoul being placed under garrison, and finally declared a national emergency in order to supposedly better handle the economic crisis and security crisis. The state of emergency included restriction on protesting and the press, placed national security first, and called on the public to take actions that benefit national security. Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.

<sup>91</sup> Choi, "The Foreign Policy of Park Chunghee: 1968- 1979."

economies in the aftermath. South Korea was especially hard hit by the American import tax, seeing as forty percent of South Korean exports went to the United States. It sent South Korea into a “vicious circle of inflation, current account deficit and economic recession”<sup>92</sup>. While GDP continued to grow, the percentage of GDP growth dropped dramatically, from twelve percent in 1969 to 7.6 percent in 1970. When combined with the effects of the Nixon Doctrine, investors and creditors began leaving South Korea en masse.<sup>93</sup>

The economic recession was also bankrupting chaebols, who were the core of Park’s supporters, and by 1971, the head of the Federation of Korean Industries requested the assistance of Park to help the failing chaebols. In August 1972, Park, using one of the emergency powers he had granted himself the previous year, enacted the Emergency Decree on Economic Stability and Growth. It replaced high interest, short term bank loans with long term, low interest loans through the issuance of bonds. A public fund was established to help finance the industrial rationalization program, and there was a massive issuance of policy loans. The measures were criticized for just making the chaebols richer without helping the average Korean, however it quickly stabilized the failing chaebols and in turn, the South Korean economy. Not only did this create a favorable image of Park among South Korean voters, it also put the chaebols back into Park’s debt, who planned to cash it in in the form of favorable support for the Yushin regime and commitment to Park’s pursuit of heavy and chemical industries.<sup>94</sup>

In its essence, South Korea’s fears were based on the lessening of US commitment to not only South Korea, but also the rest of the world. Park therefore did make attempts to stall American withdrawal and tried to replace the security relationship with the United States with one with Japan instead. He stalled an American army division withdrawal from South Korea by making high demands of compensation, that only the U.S. Vice-President or President could authorize. Park claimed this was necessary to modernize South Korean troops to the extent that they could feasibly replace withdrawing American troops. When Nixon relented and gave him the aid money he demanded, Park switched strategies. He threw himself into bettering relations with North Korea hoping it would convince Nixon that he was trying and make Nixon more favorable to his relations with South Korea. While unsuccessful in convincing the United States to stay, it did give Park enough popularity for both North Korea and South Korea’s respective planned regime consolidations. Since his U.S. retainment efforts were failing, he focused efforts on building stronger relations with Japan, but quickly

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<sup>92</sup> Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*, 248.

<sup>93</sup> Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.

<sup>94</sup> Kim, Kim, and Vogel.

realized that even though the improved relationship would bring certain benefits to South Korea, the fact that Japan was not permitted to maintain a military made them an unrealistic replacement for the withdrawn U.S. troops.<sup>95</sup>

Around this time, Nixon and National Security Advisor Kissinger were working on relaxing relations with the People's Republic of China. The PRC and the Soviet Union's relationship was strained and the United States wanted to take advantage and open its relations with the PRC. For South Korea, the announcement on July 15<sup>th</sup>, 1971 that Nixon would fly to the People's Republic of China the following year, as well as the hints they had received over the previous years concerning friendlier US-PRC relations, was devastating. The People's Republic of China had sided with North Korea during the Korean War, and it was a huge blow to South Korean trust that the United States would establish relations with this country. It would remain a source of insecurity for South Korea throughout the rest of Park's regime, and the United States would spend time reassuring South Korea of its commitment first to South Korea, and assuring that any topics discussed would be summarized and sent to South Korea for review.<sup>96</sup>

All of the above factors combined (and Park's wish for an unlimited term in office) led to Park adopting the Yushin constitution on October 27<sup>th</sup>, 1972. The new constitution dissolved the National Assembly, replacing it with the Extraordinary State Council. Hereafter, there would no longer be direct elections; instead the president would be appointed by the National Conference for Reunification. The National Conference for Reunification would also establish a plan for the reunification of the Koreas, as well as eventually confirm Park-appointed members of the new National Assembly. Park had everything in place now for lifetime rule. Interesting here is his public justification: Despite the ongoing communications with North Korea and apparent progress, Park insisted the only way to handle negotiations with Kim Il Sung was to have a consolidated government that could easily outmaneuver Kim Il Sung and prevent communist infiltration.<sup>97</sup> Nixon's reaction was a message of disappointment, and nothing else. No actions were taken against South Korea for a variety of reasons, most prominently, Nixon preferred a stable secure South Korea over a destabilized, democratic South Korea, and as he had outlined in the Nixon Doctrine, it was not the responsibility of the United States to intervene in Asia. In addition, during the transition, it coincided with the days prior and on the presidential election day for the United States for Nixon, and Kissinger was busy negotiating peace with North Vietnam as part of

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<sup>95</sup> Choi (2012)

<sup>96</sup> Choi (2012)

<sup>97</sup> Choi (2012)

the Paris Peace Talks. The United States, therefore, was distracted and uninterested in Park's new authoritarian regime.<sup>98</sup>

In sum, during the first years of Nixon's presidency, and most especially the years between the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in Guam and Park's declaration of the Yushin, United States actions were countered with South Korean reactions that would eventually cumulate in Park's Yushin Regime. It also confirmed many South Korean fears of U.S. abandonment, a fear that would plague the U.S.-South Korean relationship throughout the Park regime. While certain authors<sup>99</sup> have classified Park's reactions as overreactions, this thesis disagrees. Park certainly used the situation to his advantage to ensure the implementation of his idealized Yushin regime, but to classify every one and the entirety of his reaction towards developments in the U.S.-South Korean relationship as an overreaction would be unnecessarily dismissive. It ignores the permeability of this fear and betrayal in future interactions between Park and the United States, and in the fact that Park used these developments as justification for his actions. Especially regarding relations with North Korea, Park correctly believed that this message would resonate with the South Korean public, further lending credibility to the fear of abandonment and feelings of betrayal not only in Park, but in the South Korean population. In this chapter, the U.S.-ROK relationship is built with Park as president, but as the United States changes the way it approaches developing countries, South Korean insecurity develops. While the relationship with the junta was *quid pro quo*, in the years with Park as president, it could be better described by the United States trying to soothe and sway South Korea to its benefit, while the insecurity felt by U.S. actions in South Korea fester. This will set the tone for the future interactions between the two countries, described in the following chapter, under Park's Yushin period.

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<sup>98</sup> Kim et al. (2011)

<sup>99</sup> Kim et al (2011) and Choi (2012)

## Three American Presidents' Approach to Yushin Regime

### Nixon

Between Park's declaration of the Yushin regime in October 1972 and Nixon's resignation in August of 1974, Nixon attempted half-heartedly to have Park return to democratic rule. Nixon's ultimate goal was to keep South Korea stable and secure enough that he did not have to worry about Korea along with China, the ending of the Vietnam War, and back home, the Watergate scandal. In South Korea though, doubts were burgeoning regarding U.S. support and ability to defend the South Korean border with the North. Park read the signs coming from the United States after the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine as a threat to South Korean security, and would, throughout the rest of Nixon's presidency, become more and more authoritarian. Nixon tried to keep them satisfied and reassured about the U.S. presence, and hoped it would contribute to Park lessening his grip on the presidency. Eventually, Park's authoritarian ways (including the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung, discussed later) would impact the U.S. Congress' willingness to contribute to their aid or security, and American officials in South Korea tried to get Park to back down. However, with the Watergate scandal picking up steam, eventually focus drifted, once again, away from monitoring Park.

With Nixon focused on re-election at the beginning of Park's Yushin regime, the American reaction towards the government reorganization in South Korea was muted. Interesting is that it appears Park, aware of the American election, timed his reorganization, with Kim Jong Pil stating the Americans should not be worried, their actions would not stop Nixon from winning with an overwhelming majority.<sup>100</sup> While the U.S.'s South Korean country team expressed shock and disappointment to South Korean representatives when informed of the shift, they acknowledged there would be little use in attempting to convince Park to back down. Secretary of State William Rogers informed Habib, the American ambassador, to meet with Park and communicate that "while we will seek to avoid public comment on the wisdom of Park's actions, we will be unable to avoid dissociating ourselves from these actions or from commenting on proclamation statement re: President Nixon actions".<sup>101</sup> They took much greater issue with the fact that the United States was implicated as a reason for South Korean insecurity and therefore a catalyst for this action, and the country team warned South Korea that aid and military presence might not be as easily secured in the

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<sup>100</sup> Habib, "Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State." 160

<sup>101</sup> Rogers, "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea." 161

future with South Korea no longer being a representative government.<sup>102</sup> For example, in Document 161 in the Nixon Volume on Korea, Secretary Green calls Ambassador Kim to inform him:

We...in particular cannot understand the attack on U.S. policy in Asia contained in the proposed presidential proclamation...it called into question the wisdom and morality of U.S. policy and suggested that U.S. actions would adversely affect ROK security... ROK [Republic of Korea] rationale for declaring martial law was erroneous and that its attack on U.S. policy would create dismay in U.S., Asia and elsewhere. It would be interpreted as an attack on U.S. policy by an old and trusted friend...ROK action could only embarrass all those countries who had worked to postpone debate [on the Korea question in the UN] on very grounds that inscription would create internal problems for ROKG.<sup>103</sup>

However, the United States was in the beginning of the end of the Vietnam War. The international and national public opinion regarding the Vietnam War was increasingly negative, and the United States was asked to justify its continued presence in the region. With South Korean troops in Vietnam, credibility was offered in the international field through the reasoning that the United States was not the only country concerned about the spread of communism in Vietnam. As 1972 bled into 1973, the Koreans were getting anxious to pull their troops out of Vietnam, just as the United States was desperate for them to stay. For the Koreans, they needed those troops to defend their own border, especially with American troops being withdrawn of the Korean peninsula. In addition, they were worried that the Americans would pull out of Vietnam without informing the Koreans, and that they'd be left alone in Vietnam, as remarked in a memorandum to National Security Advisor Kissinger, "Phil [Habib] said that our failure to talk to Park about Vietnam has been the most serious shortcoming with our relations with Korea. He feels that we are going to sell Thieu out and that he will be left holding the bag on troops in Vietnam"<sup>104</sup>. Therefore, the Koreans began making plans to withdraw troops. Panicked, the Americans tried to convince them to stay, which also drew their attention away from convincing Park to return to democracy. Nixon felt committed to the South Koreans, and tried to reward their efforts with aid; Ambassador Habib remarks "that President Nixon felt the completion of the Modernization Program was a personal commitment to the ROKG for the close support and assistance the USG received

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<sup>102</sup> Rogers. 161

<sup>103</sup> Rogers. 161

<sup>104</sup> Haig, "Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)." 156 Brackets are author's own

from Korea in supplying ROK troops to assist our efforts in South Vietnam and for their immediate unquestioned response for F5As under the ENHANCE PLUS agreement.”<sup>105</sup> Despite Nixon’s commitment to repaying the Koreans for their efforts, the Koreans would withdraw all of their troops in March of 1973, two years before the last Americans left Vietnam.

In addition, Nixon, in the process of opening up the People's Republic of China and U.S. relations, also had to reassure the South Koreans of his intentions there. The Americans tried to both keep the South Koreans informed and unconcerned about the developing relationship between their ally whose military might they depended on and their enemy with a military who had overwhelmed their capabilities in the recent past. The consolation came in the forms of aid (especially modernization aid for the South Korean military) and diplomatic reassurance. For example, in Document 241 of the Nixon and Ford Volume on East and Southeast Asia, the Americans reassured the South Koreans “We will do nothing that will harm South Korean vital interests, and will consult with the ROK to the maximum extent possible.”<sup>106</sup> In addition, the United States took action by convincing other nations to postpone opening up relations with North Korea (as countries like Australia and the United Kingdom began considering relations), and worked to postpone the United Nations vote on how to address what was known as the Korea problem: should both Koreas be admitted to the United Nations? Would that be equivalent to sacrificing the ideal of reunification? What would be the conditions of both countries being admitted? Both Koreas at this point had not given up on the idea of reunifying, although both had very different ideas about what style of government that would entail. In this sense, the Nixon administration tried to keep interactions positive and focused on South Korean concerns and worries in order to convince Park that one day, this form of authoritarian control would no longer be necessary.

On August, 8<sup>th</sup>, 1973, Kim Dae Jung (leader of the opposition before the Yushin regime) was kidnapped from his hotel while in exile in Japan. The kidnapping was carried out by the KCIA, and the original plan appeared to call for his murder.<sup>107</sup> Outrage from both Japan and

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<sup>105</sup> Enhance Plus was the agreement to transfer airplanes and other military supplies to the Vietnamese military (and other allied fighters) to assist in their defense. Information regarding Enhance Plus from Hartsook and Slade, *Air War Vietnam Plans and Operations 1969 - 1975.*, Habib’s remarks from Document 254 can be found in Jordan, “Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 28, 1974, 2:05–3:05 P.m.”

<sup>106</sup>This statement was part of a memorandum discussing President Nixon’s policy to South Korea. Kissinger, “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Washington, July 18, 1973.” 241

<sup>107</sup> Kim would later recount that a weight had been attached to his feet and he had been led onto a boat, presumably to be drowned. The Japanese Coast Guard was in pursuit of the boat at this point, and threw a flash grenade at the boat to halt the activities. The KCIA would later admit to this kidnapping. Breen, “Abduction of Opposition Leader Kim Dae-Jung in 1973.”



the United States caused Park to reconsider, and instead Kim Dae Jung was found, alive, in his South Korean home a few days later. The Americans, as noted in a Secretary of State staff meeting in January of 1974<sup>108</sup>, believe that without their intervention, Kim would not have survived the attempt on his life. Increasingly, U.S. Congress was becoming irritated with the Park regime's blatant disregard for democracy and human rights, and were demanding improvements in the situation if they were to continue funding the development of the South Korean military. Both the United States State Department and the Department of Defense advocated for reductions of aid, as well as establishing a termination date for the aid; Nixon ignored both departments and decided on continued aid, although he authorized no additional aid.<sup>109</sup>

Towards the end of Nixon's presidency however, with the focus on Watergate and its implications, the policy returned to, as long as South Korea is stable and secure, let them be. Trust in the United States dwindled even further after Watergate, and South Korea was very focused on becoming self-sufficient in their defense and economy. The United States needed South Korea to secure them against the threats from the East, and therefore it was better to have them secure and welcoming of the U.S. military presence, than to be a democracy. Habib commented following an accusation by Kissinger that he was interested in changing the South Korean government, "No, no, no! I don't know what makes you think that I want to change the government. I don't want to change the government. I think our interests are served by a continuation of the existing institutions".<sup>110</sup> Kissinger remarks similarly, "I don't think it is worth our investment to democratize Korea or Turkey — where we've recently, also, given political advice — and so forth".<sup>111</sup> As the Watergate scandal developed, documents regarding South Korea become less frequent,<sup>112</sup> and more often reference just letting them be, as long as they are stable. In essence, this was the core of

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<sup>108</sup> "For example, I think Kim Tae Jung [Gim Dae Jung] was not killed partly because of the reaction of the United States and the reaction of Japan. I think Kim Tae Jung was released partly because of it. I think that was wise. I think Christian ministers have not been persecuted because of the reaction of the United States. You get to a point where the United States has to be true to something." Pickering, "Minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, Washington, January 25, 1974."

<sup>109</sup> N/A, "Minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, Washington, January 6, 1975, 8 A.m." 261 and Kissinger, "National Security Decision Memorandum 282, Washington, January 9, 1975." 262

<sup>110</sup> Pickering, "Minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, Washington, January 25, 1974." 249

<sup>111</sup> Pickering. 249

<sup>112</sup> During the last five months of Nixon's presidency (April-August 1974), there were 3 Korea related documents (as listed in the Korea related section of the Nixon and Ford Volume on East and Southeast Asia Coleman, Goldman, and Nickles, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976.") compared to at the beginning of the Yushin Regime (October 1972-February 1973), where there were 19 Korea related documents (contained both in the Nixon Volume on Korea Lawler and Mahan, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976.", and the Nixon and Ford Volume on East and Southeast Asia Coleman, Goldman, and Nickles, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976.").

Nixon's policy towards South Korea in the final two years of his presidency: as long as our interests are served, it does not particularly matter what sort of government exists on the southern half of the Korean peninsula. Unfortunately for his successor, the cumulative distrust that had been growing during the Nixon administration would make them more difficult to deal with and a less secure security partner.

## Ford

President Ford faced the difficult task of trying to restore trust not only between Park and the United States, but the United States and South Korea. The South Koreans were feeling increasingly abandoned by the United States, and contrary to the U.S.'s wishes, were looking elsewhere for support. Therefore, Ford tried to placate Park with kind words, while simultaneously, U.S. Congress was becoming increasingly irked with the authoritarian regime. They demanded actions that would punish Park, while Ford was trying to talk Park down from riskier actions, especially after the North Korean Tree Incident.

Ford knew that the situation with South Korea wasn't favorable after Nixon once again damaged South Korean trust in the United States with the Watergate scandal. Therefore, from the beginning, Ford was very praiseworthy of Park, especially of his leadership ability. He tried to earn Park's respect, "I wish to establish a personal relationship with the leader of a great country whom I have greatly admired and with the people of this country whom I have respected and admired over the years."<sup>113</sup> and renew faith that the United States could fulfill its promises, "It is our intention to have sufficient strength to negotiate from strength, not weakness."<sup>114</sup> While the American documents don't reveal if these efforts worked, at least based on South Korean actions, they didn't entirely reassure the South Koreans. South Korea began looking at other sources for their weapons, especially France, and U.S. officials were conflicted about how they should feel about it. Kissinger felt it signalled growing Korean independence, and as the United States had proven to be an unreliable partner, a smart choice: "But why is it in our interest to be the sole supplier of Korean arms? — all the more so, as we are demonstrably totally unreliable...I don't see that it's against our interest that Korea has some other source of arms...They also need the assurance of not being totally dependent on us. And I can only applaud anything that comes to this conclusion".<sup>115</sup> Ambassador Habib disagreed, believing that South Korea should not be spending American aid money on other countries' weapons: "Well, if I were a Congressman and I discovered

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<sup>113</sup> N/A, "Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, November 22, 1974, 3 Pm." 258

<sup>114</sup> N/A. 258

<sup>115</sup> N/A, "Minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, Washington, January 6, 1975, 8 A.m." 261

that I appropriated 145 million dollars to a country which spent another hundred million dollars for weaponry from another country, I don't think I'd appropriate 145 million dollars".<sup>116</sup>

Of greater concern was the fact that Park was showing indications of wanting nuclear weapons. The United States rushed in to halt this line of thinking, pushing South Korea towards signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which they would in April 1975. In a memo, the State Department urged the following actions: "inhibit ROK access to sensitive technology and equipment both through unilateral U.S. action and through the development of common supplier nation policies, [and] press the ROK to ratify the NPT. (The ROK has told us recently that it intends to proceed to ratify the NPT in the near future.)"<sup>117</sup> In addition, Park was increasingly violating human rights and democratic principles, especially when the last of the American troops were airlifted from Vietnam. Congress was working on blocking funding to South Korea, and the American press was escalating its criticism. Ford, seeing this as only a way to aggravate Park further, tried to pacify Congress and ensure funding and troop presence in South Korea. In one document from the embassy in South Korea, the officials state "In present crisis and with heightened threat from the North, domestic discipline and control must be given highest priority. ROKG has utilized present crisis as further rationale for adopting what comes naturally — tighter authoritarian regime intolerant of opposition." followed by the reasoning for this panic, "US fails to understand need for internal discipline and in fact encourages opposition. There is gnawing suspicion that views of American press and Congressional critics may well be shared by administration and that support in US for opposition may be aimed at undermining position of President Park, personally."<sup>118</sup> In response to threatened aid reductions, the administration tried to frame aid differently, "The Congress should be generally sympathetic to an effort to make the ROK self-sufficient and we should do our best to obtain Congressional support. Congress will, however, probably relate future aid commitments to the U.S. force presence in Korea. We should attempt to insure that Congressional perceptions of our presence are tied to increases in South Korean capabilities rather than U.S. security assistance levels per se."<sup>119</sup>

Ford's reasoning behind pacifying Park can be linked to North Korea's increasingly threatening activity. In the beginning of Ford's term, from mid-1974 to early-1975, relations

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<sup>116</sup> N/A. 261

<sup>117</sup> Smyser and Elliott, "Memorandum From Richard Smyser and David Elliott of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, February 28, 1975." 264 Parentheses are not author's own, brackets are.

<sup>118</sup> Sneider, "Telegram 2685 From the Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, April 18, 1975, 0933Z." 267

<sup>119</sup> Jordan, "Study Prepared by the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, Washington, Undated." 274

with North Korea were thawing, and it seemed that both South and North Korea had accepted their two state existence. Starting at the end of Nixon's presidency and through Ford's, South Korea began advocating for a two state solution. However, with Ford's presidency came more frequent threats from North Korea; in one memo, dated May 28th, 1975, North Korea claims that soldiers fired warning shots towards the North Koreans, and that North Korea was considering this event a war provocation.<sup>120</sup> Tensions were escalating quickly.

On August 18th, 1976, North Korean soldiers beat two American soldiers to death at the Demilitarized Zone. Two Americans, and a group of 15 UN soldiers, went to trim a tree at Panmunjom (판문점), the peace village located in the DMZ. While the North Koreans had not permitted the tree to be cut down, when the group was asked about what they were doing, the North Korean soldiers had given approval to the trimming. However, after fifteen minutes, the North Korean soldiers demanded a halt to the trimming, and when the American/UN group refused, they called for reinforcements and began beating the group with their own axes they had brought for the trimming. Since all of the American/UN soldiers were not permitted to fight back, there was very little they could do except defend themselves with their hands, which resulted in the two deaths. Many incidents of taunting and aggression by the North Koreans had been reported along the DMZ before this day.<sup>121</sup> The incident was dubbed the North Korean Tree Incident, and it brought back American attention to the Korean peninsula and the reasoning behind American troop presence. Kissinger ordered a variety of actions: DEFCON Level<sup>122</sup> was raised to Level 3 (1 is the highest, 5 is the lowest level, 4 was standard at the time), two fighter squadrons were deployed, US forces were moved closer to the DMZ and moved to Midway Islands, and guard posts in Panmunjom Peace Village that were technically 'on the other side' were removed. The tree that was being trimmed was cut down.<sup>123</sup> While the Americans took

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<sup>120</sup> The memo said "North Korea accused South Korea May 25 of firing a .57 millimeter recoilless rifle at a North Korean guard post in the Demilitarized Zone. The North Koreans called the alleged act "a grave military provocation." The official Korean Central News Agency accused South Korea of trying to increase tension in Korea and start another war. The North Korean statement warned that if the U.S. and South Korea "persisted in such provocations the sentries of the Korean people's army will take a strong retaliatory measure and make the provocateurs pay properly for this." The United States, on May 6th, had performed a reconnaissance flight over a North Korean merchant ship, which North Korea found a provoking incident. Barnes, "Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, May 28, 1976."

<sup>121</sup> Miller, "At Korean Summit in DMZ, 'deranged' Ax Murders Still Cast a Shadow."

<sup>122</sup> DEFense readiness CONdition, the scale used by the United States to indicate threat level and proximity to war. Hyland, "Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Hyland) to President Ford, Washington, September 5, 1976." 288

<sup>123</sup> Hyland. 288

strong actions against the North Koreans, Park felt it wasn't enough, and criticized American resolve. Habib visited Park to tell him these comments were unacceptable and would likely cause the situation to deteriorate further.<sup>124</sup> North Korea would express regret about the incident, and guaranteed the future safety of American/UN soldiers.<sup>125</sup>

Lastly, while due to the North Korean Tree Incident, U.S. troop presence in South Korea was being deemed more necessary, a scandal erupted that affected Congress' willingness to fund and support South Korea. Nicknamed 'Koreagate', it was revealed that the South Korean government had indirectly been bribing Congress members to vote in their favor. The business was conducted through Bak Dong-seon (박동선), but revealed by Gim Seong Geun (김성근), who defected from the KCIA.<sup>126</sup> While it wouldn't fully be worked out until well into Carter's term in office, it further damaged the fragile trust between the U.S. Congress and the Park administration. It also sent the Koreans into a panic; they were worried that if Carter, with his strong human rights agenda, was elected, it would have an impact on both military presence and aid from the United States to South Korea.<sup>127</sup>

Overall, Ford found himself constantly pushed back and forth in the U.S.-South Korean relationship throughout his term. While he was trying to repair Park's trust in the United States in order to convince Park to feel secure in American protection and aid, and therefore reduce his stronghold on the South Korean government and people, he was simultaneously trying to prevent Congress from cutting South Korean aid and military presence in South Korea due to human rights issues. He also had to admonish Park for several of his actions. His actions resembled a scale; the North Korean Tree Incident happened, which temporarily tilted the scales in Park's favor, but it was immediately rebalanced with Koreagate. If Nixon

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<sup>124</sup> Kissinger, "Telegram 213541 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of Korea, August 27, 1976, 2010Z." 287

<sup>125</sup> Hyland, "Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Hyland) to President Ford, Washington, September 5, 1976." 288

<sup>126</sup> Bak Dong-seon received cash from an American funded rice exporting company, and used that money to bribe Congresspeople to vote in favor of Korean funding legislation. It was suspected that the KCIA informed Bak of who to bribe and to what end. A full investigation was launched, but due to a variety of factors, very few of the involved Congresspeople were punished. For more information, read the Washington Post's article by Babcock, "Koreagate: Bringing Forth a Mouse, But an Honest One."

<sup>127</sup> "What underlies Korean concern about impact of recent developments is fear that it will impact adversely on prospects of reaching understanding on US-Korean relations with President-Elect Carter. Even before these developments, Koreans were very anxious about policies toward Korea that might be adopted by new administration. Discussion of troop withdrawal and human rights issue during campaign had already led to strong element of uncertainty regarding [sic] term credibility of American commitment to Korea, which Vietnam collapse had previously called into question. Uncertainty is now that much greater." Sneider, "Telegram 9567 From Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, December 3, 1976, 0835Z." 290

was ignoring the human rights violations in favor of stability, and Carter would focus heavily on human rights, Ford represents the conflict between these two approaches well; working simultaneously to soothe Park and Congress to get the best possible result.

## Carter

While the specific Carter volume on Korea from Foreign Relations series by the U.S. Office of the Historian hasn't been published yet<sup>128</sup>, other volumes allow for valuable insight into how Carter interacted with the South Koreans, specifically in his Foundations of Foreign Policy and Human Rights volumes. Herein, the focus of Carter on South Korea, or rather lack of focus, becomes clear. Carter, throughout his term in office, was heavily pushing for human rights violations to be punished. This push tended to be heavily focused on Latin America and Africa, and paid much less attention to happenings in Asia, with the exception of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. In addition, any actions taken against South Korea were moderated by security concerns, and therefore there was limited progress on human rights issues in South Korea.<sup>129</sup>

There were several key issues wherein South Korea was a major consideration, and security concerns altered the strong response Carter wished to give. All of the issues were tinted by repeated human rights abuses committed by the Park regime, and undemocratic behaviors demonstrated through the lack of term limits on Park, and restrictions on the freedom of the press and protest.<sup>130</sup> Park, in the last years of his regime, heavily cracked down on dissidents, conducting many arrests. One incident, whose victims were termed the Myongdong (Myeongdong/명동) defendants by the State Department, consisted of a mix of Catholic priests and dissidents totalling 13 people, who were all arrested in the Myongdong Church on March 1<sup>st</sup>, were released after pressure from the American government on December 31<sup>st</sup>.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> As of June 2019, Carter's Korea/Japan volume is set for publishing in 2020, and is currently under declassification review.

<sup>129</sup> For example, "the administration would not reduce aid to South Korea "despite the fact that we have great concern about the human rights situation in that country," noting that security concerns remained paramount." Hormats, "Memorandum of Conversation." 23

<sup>130</sup> Kim, Kim, and Vogel, *The Park Chung Hee Era*.

<sup>131</sup> Dodson, "Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance." 73

Frequently, not only in South Korea, but around the world<sup>132</sup>, Carter would use prisoner releases and other corrections of human rights issues as bargaining chips for American aid and other support, and would retract support for loans from international institutions if there were human rights violations taking place (however, this would only be done if the retraction of U.S. support would not jeopardize the loan being given).<sup>133</sup> Yet, when discussing aid that would be going around the world, Secretary of State Vance said that this aid would be constrained by human rights records, except of course, in cases like South Korea, where security concerns overrode the need for these sanctions.<sup>134</sup> The Carter administration also tried to classify countries that were human rights violators in various categories, with the highest (negative) score being a 'gross and consistent violator of human rights'. No country was given that classification, although Chile was considered internally as a country falling under that classification. This largely was because classifying a country as such could have a serious negative impact on relations with that country, and they were worried the situation could spiral further. Unfortunately, this made the classification system not very effective, especially in deciding which countries would have aid limited as a result of their human rights abuses, of which South Korea was a frequent consideration. One thing that was effective was the Carter Administration requesting of certain governments, South Korea included, that their aid be specifically distributed to the needy.<sup>135</sup> While initially the State Department worried that it would upset Park, the South Koreans agreed to the provision.<sup>136</sup>

South Korea was also an exception due to the security concerns in the area. Carter, besides human rights, was additionally focused on nuclear non-proliferation. As indicated previously,

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<sup>132</sup> Frequently, these sort of negotiations would occur with Latin American and African states. For more information on these negotiations, see Carter's Human Rights Volume, Ahlberg, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980."

<sup>133</sup> "However in practice the Administration has flouted this requirement by making sure that a particular loan has enough votes to pass, even while the U.S. delegate formally votes against." Tuchman, "Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)." 4

<sup>134</sup> "Vance noted, however, that assistance to strategically important countries like South Korea would not be cut." Brzezinski, "Memorandum of Conversation." 260

<sup>135</sup> "There are 29 recipients of PL-480 Title I shipments. So far as we are aware, none has ever been determined to be a "gross and consistent violator of human rights". Thus we are not legally required to withhold shipments to the intended recipients (evidently Chile has been judged a "gross and consistent violator", but none of the shipments are planned for Chile anyway). The Christopher Committee has decided that 14 of the 29 recipients have engaged in questionable human rights practices, and the Committee has decided that our PL-480 contracts with these countries be amended to provide for additional reporting on human rights matters. Our Ambassadors to these countries have been instructed to seek host government concurrence in such amendments." Armacost, "Memorandum From Michael Armacost of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)." 290

<sup>136</sup> " On December 17, The Washington Post reported that the Department had reached agreement in principle regarding P.L.-480 Title I shipments with South Korea, Guinea, Zaire, Bangladesh, and Indonesia." Armacost. 290

South Korea was beginning to show interest in developing nuclear weapons, as a form of replacement for the weakening/lessening American security. With the American withdrawal from Vietnam very much still present in South Korean memory, nuclear power would ensure its security if the United States could not. The Carter administration was strongly against the spreading of nuclear power and worked to barr South Korea's access to nuclear technologies, although there were occasions where the administration wondered if nuclear power would balance power in East Asia and contribute to a more stable region in the long term.<sup>137</sup>

One last major issue between the United States and South Korea was mainly regarding the U.S. importing from South Korea. The Americans were worried about the items they were importing from other countries, as part of bilateral trade agreements meant to stimulate development in exporting nations, were negatively impacting American businesses. The Americans wanted to put in place import restrictions on certain items, specifically color TVs and rubber soled shoes, both of which South Korea sold. Restrictions would provide relief to American suppliers, but would cause price increases for these items, as South Korean minimum wage was much lower than American minimum wage, allowing for the items to be produced at a lower price. There were several other disadvantages to this, the U.S. could be accused of protectionism, which would disadvantage its negotiating position in future treaties, and the countries impacted most were important raw material trading partners for the United States.<sup>138</sup>

In the end, import restrictions were placed on these items to provide relief to American suppliers. However, it brought up another point; in the beginning of the U.S.-South Korean bilateral partnership, South Korea was at the beginning of its development and therefore the partnership allowed the United States to influence their economic policy in a way that was beneficial to them, and allowed them to successfully put pressure to change government actions they did not approve of.<sup>139</sup> That was no longer the case, as the South Korean economy was doing well. As phrased in Document 282 in Carter's Foreign Economic Policy

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<sup>137</sup> Regarding the South Korean reasoning for nuclear weapons "Loss of faith in the credibility or utility of great power security commitments (e.g., Pakistan, Taiwan, South Korea)." Mention of a balance of power in the case of a nuclear weapon in South Korea: "On the contrary, there is some prospect that the introduction of nuclear weapons into some current areas of tension and conflict (e.g., the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula) could, over time, contribute to regional stability and reduce interstate violence by creating local "balances of terror."" N/A, "Intelligence Report." 327

<sup>138</sup> Yeutter, "Paper Prepared in the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations"; Hormats, "Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)." 4,10

<sup>139</sup> Owen, "Memorandum From the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter." 282



volume, “The opportunities for exerting policy leverage through US bilateral assistance programs thus hinge on an increase in its scale and a close linkage between that aid and the policies of the international lending agencies. US willingness to exert bilateral pressure for economic reform and the recipient country’s ability to yield to such pressure are now sharply constrained.”<sup>140</sup>

Despite it being one of the main violators of human rights at the time, they were mentioned very infrequently in the Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Carter volume, and sometimes even omitted from discussion regarding East Asian policy. Carter was even warned that he did not have a strong or coherent policy towards South Korea. As stated in Document 76, “I have received recently a letter from a colleague who summarized for me some criticisms of our Asian policy, which are shared by a number of Asian specialists. In summary form, his key points are these:...The Korean troop withdrawal has been unsettling; the timing was precipitate...Our human rights policy has been poorly implemented, particularly its emphasis on punitive measures against the violators rather than providing incentives to those with improving records.”<sup>141</sup> When South Korea was considered, and especially the violations of human rights addressed, it was often moderated by the need for security on the peninsula. The reality was that Carter was more focused on USSR support for countries where human rights were being violated (especially in Latin America and Africa), as well as limiting nuclear weapons worldwide. In addition, official diplomatic relations with China were being established, which also prevented a focused policy on Park. Finally, around the time of Park’s assassination, the Iran hostage crisis began, making it difficult for a focused response to be developed towards the new situation in South Korea.<sup>142</sup>

To summarize, Carter’s policy towards South Korea, despite being much more focused on human rights than his two predecessors, ran into the same issues, demonstrating the strategic importance of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, which prevented even a human rights oriented President from putting in focused effort in dissolving the Yushin regime. The security of the Korean peninsula, in the end, was too important to afford affecting real change. Small bits of progress were made, especially concerning prisoner releases and South Korea being effectively deterred from pursuing nuclear technology. However, Carter, heavily focused on other countries, could or did not develop a coherent policy towards Park

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<sup>140</sup> Owen. 282

<sup>141</sup> Brzezinski, “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter.” 76

<sup>142</sup> For documents concerning USSR, Latin America, and Africa’s human rights infringements, please read Carter’s volume on Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Ahlberg, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980.” Documentation on official relations with the People’s Republic of China can be found in Carter, “Address by President Carter to the Nation.” 104

that caused him to genuinely alter the way he was running South Korea, despite consistent human rights violations. In the end, the only people who would stop Park were the Koreans themselves, as the Korea Central Intelligence Agency's director, Gim Jae Gyu, would assassinate him in the KCIA's compound on October 26<sup>th</sup>, 1979.<sup>143</sup> Hereby Park's presidency, and the Yushin regime, came to an end.

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<sup>143</sup> For more information regarding Park Chung Hee's assassination, including the dinner leading up to the event, please read Korea Times' article regarding the event: Breen, "Assassination of President Park Chung-Hee in 1979."

# The American Approaches Compared

## Park and the United States

Across Nixon, Ford, and Carter's administrations there exists both a common thread and several differences. This stems from events external to the administration that the presidents had little to no control over as well as internal focuses and adjustments that bonded or divided administrations. The binding factors will point to why, despite 3 different approaches with differing external factors, the United States was unable to dismantle Park's Yushin regime and return South Korea to democracy. The dividing factors demonstrate what other variables impeded the administrations' approach to U.S.-South Korean relations. Finally, one last non-administration factor will be analyzed, Park himself. As mentioned previously, with his actions being influenced by the American modernization theory, it is worth looking at whether this could have prevented efforts to redemocratize South Korea.

### ***Presidential Comparison***

In terms of strategy towards South Korea, there were two extremes: Nixon with an 'accept and ignore' strategy and Carter with a 'reject and ignore' strategy. Ford fell somewhere in between, attempting both based on conflicting calls from his administration and Congress. However, all three presidents were very effective at ignoring Park, mostly because of the intense security value placed on South Korea. The U.S. would often excuse Park's actions in favor of its own interests on the peninsula. There was also a sense of damage control that spanned the three administrations, whether controlling the effect of U.S. actions on Park, or Park's actions on U.S. Congress. In a sense, the three administrations tried to alter the new situation in South Korea to their interests, but no actions further than that.

Despite overall strategy carrying many similarities, there were external factors that differed and may have influenced where on the spectrum from accept to ignore each president fell. One example is the main Asian threat at that time. For Nixon, it was very clearly Vietnam, with him focused on ending the war without admitting defeat. For Ford, it was likely a similar concern with Vietnam, but with the escalation following the North Korean Tree Incident, North Korea was added as a main focus. For Carter, it was the USSR, who had been causing severe tension build up with its growing stockpile of nuclear arms. Therefore, because of South Korean participation in the Vietnam War, Carter was the only president not fighting (militarily or diplomatically) an enemy *with* the South Koreans as an ally. This would obviously influence an administration ability to accept or reject Park Chung Hee's actions.

Another factor was if the administration was more concerned about the lack of democracy in South Korea or the human rights violations committed by Park. With Nixon's and most of Ford's administrations, the concern was lack of democracy, and with Kissinger, an intense realist, as Secretary of State, this lack of democracy was not much of an issue at all. For Carter though, the issue was much more the human rights violations the Park regime was committing, such as mass arresting of protestors. With Carter's Secretary of State Vance also taking a strong stance against human rights violations worldwide, their policy was to reject Park Chung Hee and his actions. Ford, towards the end of his administration, and especially after Koreagate, was seeing this opinion begin to take hold in Congress.

While part of the binding 'ignore' part of the U.S. administrations' strategy was certainly due to strategic security concerns, there were also distracting elements in each regime that contributed to the ignore strategy. During the Nixon administration, Vietnam was a subject of popular and presidential concern. Additionally, Watergate not only reduced trust in the American government worldwide, but due to the President's intense involvement, also distracted from a clear and influential policy towards Park. In Ford's administration, the legacy of both Vietnam and Watergate continued, but also the 1973 oil crisis caused especially the State Department's focus to be necessary elsewhere. Finally, in Carter's case, his broad focus on human rights caused the State Department to focus on many necessary regime changes at once. In addition, negotiations with the USSR and responding to other human rights violations did not assist Carter in developing an effective South Korean policy.

Finally, each President dealt with a couple major, South Korea related incidents. The kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung during the Nixon Administration indicated to the United States that the Park regime wouldn't be just undemocratic, but also strongly persecute those who dared to oppose, going as far to attempt to murder them. It also indicated to Park at which point the Americans would actually step up and express outrage to an action. Making himself lifelong president hadn't caused much outrage, but kidnapping and attempting to murder opposition candidates favored by the United States certainly did, although besides the demand of the safe return of Kim Dae Jung, not much else occurred. Ford faced quite a few incidents that drew American (Congressional) attention. There was the North Korean Tree Incident. This temporarily brought favorable attention to the South Koreans, as for the Americans, losing two of their own made it intensely personal, however this favor did not last long.

The next two incidents took place partially in the Ford Administration, and partially in Carter's, but both brought negative American attention to South Korea. Koreagate rattled Congress and removed any goodwill left in Congress towards South Korea and made them

highly suspicious towards any Congressmembers supporting any increases of military aid to South Korea. On the other hand, South Korea being interested in nuclear power sent the State Department into a panic. It also caused controversy, because while the general policy was nuclear non-proliferation, it would be advantageous in a security sense to have nuclear arms on the Korean peninsula (although that would, of course, lead to other issues, especially with the USSR). Finally, Park Chung Hee's assassination required an obvious foreign policy shift. While none is (yet) clear from available foreign policy documents, the Carter administration needed to adjust American actions to counter the fallout from Park's assassination and the subsequent South Korean administration's policies. These events that took place demonstrate each administrations' policy; while as the administrations moved towards Carter, they were less likely to accept the actions taking place, infrequently did it result in strong disproving actions by the United States.

### ***The Influence of Modernization Theory***

There is one last binding factor in all three administrations--Park Chung Hee himself. Park had had very little political experience when he became president of South Korea and was therefore heavily influenced by current political and economic ideology, which at the time in South Korea was modernization theory--a neat package of the economic and political theory shipped over from the U.S., where it was currently losing favor (the U.S. switched from using Rostovian economics to heavier self-sufficiency promotion towards South Korea early on, during Park's junta). The version of modernization theory that commanded influence in South Korea is generally attributed to Walt Rostow, an American economist. His ideas were absorbed in post-World War II American policy towards developing countries, and lasted to the mid-1960s. Modernization theory dictated that a country must go through certain phases from its conception as mainly agrarian society to an industrial nation such as the United States.<sup>144</sup> During this process, democracy would become increasingly likely, and economic prosperity would grow. The United States' policy was then to support these countries in order to result both in democracy and increased economic opportunity. However, as Park's junta was just beginning, the theory was losing favor, replaced increasingly by self-sufficiency ideals, supported by the United States in a more distant role. This general foreign policy transition can be considered completed with Nixon's Nixon Doctrine in 1969, which encompassed the ideas gaining favor in the United States--that countries should rely more

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<sup>144</sup> The five stages are: Traditional Society; Preconditions for Take-Off; Take-Off; Drive to Maturity; and Age of High Mass Consumption. Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*.

on countries close to them for aid and support, and no longer on the United States, who had problems at home to focus on.

However, even though the United States was beginning to let these ideas fade from its foreign policy doctrine, in South Korea, they were just picking up steam. As discussed briefly in the methodology section of this thesis, they were replacing previous ideas of cultural unsuitability as a reason for the lack of South Korea's economic success, especially when compared to North Korea's economic success at the time. This transition is investigated and demonstrated in Kim's 2007 paper, where he looks at an academic journal

(사상계/Sasanggye) active in South Korea from 1953-1970, when it was shut down by Park.

Here the academic articles demonstrate a transition from the idea that South Korea's culture was unsuitable for success, to the idea that South Korea simply would need to grow from the mainly agrarian society it was in 1953, into an industrial powerhouse similar to the United States.<sup>145</sup>

As *Mandarins of the Future*<sup>146</sup> explains, there are three main 'methods' that can drive a country through these stages. There is the technocosmopolitan strand, which argues that this drive must be built on existing traditions, followed by the revolutionary strand, which argues that in order to launch itself into the next stages, a country must have a radical break from tradition. Finally, there is the authoritarian strand, which also demands a radical departure from tradition, but in the form of a centralized and all powerful state that can drive the economy of the country into success. Park favored this last strand, and mentioned it indirectly in his book detailing his plans for the nation, by saying the nation needed the junta to drive it in the right direction for a few years until the country was economically sound enough to handle democracy.<sup>147</sup>

He would continue to use this justification, especially in relation to reducing reliance on the U.S., and it was on several occasions remarked by the Americans, as seen in the selection of quotes in the table below:

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<sup>145</sup> Kim, "The Discursive Foundations of the South Korean Developmental State: Sasanggye and the Reception of Modernization Theory."

<sup>146</sup> Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*.

<sup>147</sup> Park, *The Country, the Revolution and I*.

YEAR	DOCUMENT	QUOTE
1972	Habib, "Airgram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State."	"Park is also convinced that in a changing international environment, and in dealing with North Korea, his country's national interest demands his strong, unchallenged leadership."
1972	Kissinger, "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon."	"Park has probably also convinced himself that he needs greater control at home in order to cope with unforeseen contingencies that will be produced by the new, more fluid international context in which South Korea is now operating."
1974	N/A, "Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, November 22, 1974, 3 Pm."	"The best way is self-reliance through a more vigorous effort so that Korea can live without reliance on the U.S. in the future. But we will remain, as in the past, true allies and trustworthy partners."
1975	Abramowitz, "Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 30, 1975, 1145."	"The Secretary replied that it is necessary to maintain a high rate of economic growth in South Korea. He was impressed with the Korean standard of living, adding they are indeed in the takeoff period.  Mr. Miyazawa agreed that the ROK had taken off. Despite the oil crisis he was sure that economic growth would again pick up."

Park did not only give the Americans this impression, he gave his constituents this impression, especially in his justifications for extension of rule, whether by presidential election or constitutional revision. Even among the academics discussed in Kim's paper, they seemed to agree with the general premise of Park's strong rule, even though they often argued against certain actions that were particularly authoritarian (and this dissent eventually resulted in them being shut down in 1970, as Park was planning for his Yushin regime). When actions brought economic prosperity or relief, Park's popularity rose, and around elections, it helped his results (as seen in his initial election especially). It seemed that as long as the economy did well, the authoritarian rule was more tolerated; modernization theory told the South Koreans it wasn't their culture at fault for their lack of economic success, and seeing the positive results gave Park more freedom to continue despite his

undemocratic and human rights endangering actions. However, as the South Korean economy became more prosperous and economic security was greater, as well as when the economy took a downturn, Park's popularity also suffered. In his last official election, Park was notably less popular than he anticipated, and won only by a slight margin. The economy during the Yushin regime was notably less strong than during previous years, and due to this in combination with less tolerance for Park's undemocratic actions, resulted in increased dissidence, and eventually to his death at the hands of a South Korean.

How did this influence the U.S.-South Korean relationship? It affected the United States' ability to limit Park during his Yushin regime. In the beginning, the United States, and the South Koreans, were enamored with Park's ability to increase South Korea's economic capabilities, making them less dependent on the United States. By the time the United States was becoming discontent with Park's progressively more undemocratic actions, he had already brought quite a bit of prosperity to South Korea. While the United States did attempt to support the opposition during elections, they were unsuccessful as Park was able to run a compelling campaign advertising his economic successes. With the belief that South Korea would be able to join the international stage by tolerating a few years of a centralized, all powerful government validated by the success of South Korea, it was difficult to convince the South Korean people that a different option might be better. This coupled with an ever present threat from North Korea, it made sense to tolerate Park, who promised increased security and increased prosperity. By the time the Yushin regime was brought into existence, much of the opposition had been disheartened or arrested. It would have been very difficult for the United States to support the opposition in the Yushin regime's environment, and therefore could only try to moderate Park, and were ultimately unsuccessful in getting him to dissolve the Yushin regime themselves.

### ***Discussion***

Following this extensive analysis, it is worth going back to the research questions laid out earlier, and reviewing their answers as provided for by this thesis. Starting with the first sub-question, *how did Park Chung Hee and the United States' relationship begin*, the groundwork for the relationship between the two under the future Yushin regime was laid. The fall of Syngman Rhee, and the subsequent military coup after the corruption of the interim regime meant that the relationship began shakily, both sides desperate for stability in the South Korean peninsula, and in the relationship between the United States and South Korea. Park appeared to be open to American influence, especially if handled on a quid pro quo basis, which pleased them and made them optimistic about future handlings with the leader. While they encountered some resistance regarding the transition to democracy, the



eventual success and fair elections that were held made the Americans approach the new South Korean president with an acceptance of the undemocratic way in which he had originally seized power, and a selective ignorance to his fledgling undemocratic tendencies.

With this first test of the American influence on Park and his regime, the Americans pass, but barely. There are limits to what they are able to do, as well as costs involved; the Koreans now demand things in return for their cooperation, in contrast to the general ease in which Americans got their way with both Syngman Rhee and the interim government. The recognition of these limits ensure that they take rapid action when Park hints at not returning to democracy, cutting off aid immediately. However, when Park relents and the aid returns, it has the unintended effect of boosting support for Park, who is seen as having brought the much needed food aid to South Korea. It is the first example perhaps, of a well-meaning, Park-limiting, American action that unintentionally backfires and creates a new wave of support for Park and his actions.

This leads into the second sub-question: *how did events in the relationship between the United States and Park Chung Hee-led South Korea before 1972 lead to the Yushin regime?* This includes various events that triggered Park's activation of the Yushin regime. Most prominently, this includes the Vietnam War. While not the only war South Korea was engaged in, it brought positive international attention to the nation, who sent the second largest number of troops to support the South Vietnamese. It also put the Americans in debt to Park and the South Koreans. Park became louder in voicing his demands regarding the modernization of his military, as well as demanding better conditions for the soldiers who were fighting in Vietnam. Park also became more interested in contact with other nations besides the United States, reaching out to Japan and other non-communist Asian nations as a way to expand both economic and security arrangements. While partially due to the Vietnam War, these actions can additionally be attributed to Park feeling less secure in his position vis-a-vis North Korea. With the Americans concentrated on Vietnam and withdrawing from South Korea, as well as not responding (in the South Korean view) adequately to the increasing attacks from North Korea, Park withdrew from his U.S. focused policy and attempted to replace them with relationships with other nations. Unfortunately for Park, they were unsuccessful, and for a short while he attempted to better relations with the United States by completing favorable actions, such as improving contacts with North Korea, in order to try to guarantee the security of South Korea.

However, the Americans weren't interested. American opinion was turning increasingly against involvement in foreign nations, and this was evident in the recently-elected Nixon's July 25<sup>th</sup>, 1969 speech which would later become the Nixon Doctrine, in which the

Americans would more frequently leave Asian problems to Asia, and become less involved in Asian affairs in general. While Nixon tried to reassure South Korea of American commitment to South Korean security, they were unconvinced, and were even more skeptical when the Americans began to withdraw troops later in the year. This fear of being abandoned if North Korea were to attack was heightened when the U.S.-PRC began to develop in 1971; this fear would eventually be used to justify Park's Yushin regime. In summary, the answer to the second question is that on both sides of the American-South Korean relationship, actions were taken that required either reassurance or compensation; the Americans with Vietnam and the Nixon Doctrine, and Park with his increasingly undemocratic regime type, as examples.

The next sub-question looks at primary evidence from the Foreign Relations series of the U.S. Office of the Historian. The question, *What were the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations' reactions to the Park Chung Hee administration's problematic actions after 1972?*, was answered both individually by American president and in comparison with each other. Nixon's section explored Nixon's policy of a secure South Korea required less attention than a democratic South Korea, and therefore the previous was preferable, as Nixon's administration faced a variety of distractions both nationally and internationally. Ford's administration struggled between Nixon's policy, which involved placating Park, or one that seriously took on the democracy and human rights issues plaguing the Park regime, which would placate Congress. Doing both, as demonstrated in Ford's regime, wasn't possible. For Carter, a more focused human rights approach was chosen, which despite Carter's good intentions with this focus, was often dismissed in the case of South Korea in favor of American security interests, especially with increasing level of communication between the Soviet Union and the United States.

A comparison between these three approaches was explored earlier in this chapter, with various factors being identified as both points of comparison and difference. These factors include general strategy towards the U.S.-South Korean relationship, the main Asian threat at the time, the main concern regarding the Park regime, and the main distracting factor from addressing the Park regime. While many factors differed during each of the American presidencies, it often led to the same result—Park would not have to change his undemocratic, human rights violating ways as long as it ensured security for the United States in the East Asian region. This chapter also took a look at the last question, *Did Park Chung Hee's use of modernization theory to guide and justify his actions impair President Nixon, Ford, and Carter from convincing Park to dissolve his Yushin regime?*. Here the influencing factor of modernization theory demonstrated the value South Korea placed on economic growth, and their willingness to therefore sacrifice democracy for it. While its

influence on the United States was fading, its remaining influence, coupled with the positive attention the U.S. was receiving for the South Korea economic success, allowed Park enough leeway that it was difficult for the U.S. to stage any successful opposition when Park's practices became unacceptable.

With the answers to the sub-questions shortly summarized, the main research question remains, namely, *How do the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations compare in their approaches to the US-South Korean relationship during the 1972-1979 Yushin (유신) period of Park Chung Hee's presidency?* Through the analysis of U.S. foreign policy documents in this thesis, insight was gained into Nixon, Ford and Carter's aims and issues with the U.S.-South Korean relationship, and how their approach compared to one another. The answer to this question in sum is this: although there certainly were significant differences in the way Nixon, Ford, and Carter dealt with the U.S.-South Korean relationship during Park's Yushin regime, the outcome was the same. In the end, it was both the invaluable contribution South Korea offered to the United States' national security, and Park's use of modernization theory as a justifier for his actions, that prevented three U.S. presidents from ending the Yushin regime. These factors limited feasible options for stopping Park, not only for the three U.S. presidents trying to end Park's Yushin regime, but also for the American presidents before them, despite varying interests and conditions of the Asian region under each American president.

### ***Limitations and Future Research***

Despite efforts to produce the most reliable analysis possible, this thesis encountered certain limitations. As previously discussed, this includes the not yet published Jimmy Carter, Korea volume of the U.S. Foreign Relations series, which, when published, may offer added insight to his relationship with South Korea. However, efforts undertaken to gather information regarding Carter's relationship with South Korea from the available U.S. Foreign relations volumes will hopefully compensate for the unpublished volume. In addition, due to inability to speak the Korean language fluently, this study was unable to access Korean government documents or Korean sources that might have been able to more completely tell the story of the relationship between the United States and South Korea during the Yushin period, and throughout the entirety of the Park presidency.

These limitations also provide avenues for future research. When the Carter Korea volume is published in the U.S. Foreign Relations series, it could provide valuable new insights into Carter's approach, especially in the final few months before Park's assassination. The same can be said for researchers with the ability to access Korean sources. Other future research

avenues stem from the implications of this research. Research could look at the U.S. relationship with the Park presidency in comparison to the U.S. relationship with other South Korean dictators, namely Syngman Rhee and Park's successor, Chun Doo Hwan (전두환/Jeon Duhwan). In addition, more research into the United States' post World War II use of modernization theory, especially on the impact on countries they exercised this theory on, including South Korea, is necessary. An additional interesting avenue of research that stems from this thesis is the impact the Park presidency had on present day South Korea, and the present day U.S.-South Korean relationship. Finally, another possible avenue for further research is how Park and his military junta impacted how the United States handled military juntas, and developmental dictatorships, in the future.

### ***Conclusion***

Park Chung Hee posed an interesting challenge for the United States during their attempt to stave off communism during the Cold War. While South Korea was absolutely necessary for the security of the United States during the Cold War, the United States was struggling to find support at home to continue to fund a regime that both abused democratic and human rights. This push and pull of interests forced all five American presidents who were in office at the time of Park to choose a course of action, and were often occupied placating both Park and the United States Congress. In particular, the actions of Nixon, Ford, and Carter were of interest, and this thesis extrapolated from documents released by the U.S. Office of Historian how they balanced these interests. For all three presidents, the security interests would outweigh any form of serious action against Park and his regime, however this did not mean no action took place. While not being able to get Park to dissolve the Yushin regime, they did manage to make Park's ability to complete actions more difficult.

In the end, the three American presidents were quite similar in their approaches to Park Chung Hee's Yushin period, and perhaps that is why they were unable to dissolve it. The Korean peninsula was a large security interest for the United States, and for South Korea, it was essential that North Korea remained at bay; this coupled with Park's economic success justifying his authoritarian rule through modernization theory stifled American attempts to control Park in the long run. As Park said in the quote in the introduction, the United States and South Korea share a common interest, and in the end, this common interest prevented the United States from limiting Park Chung Hee's controversial legacy.

# Appendices

## *A Note on Romanizations*

This thesis uses the Revised Romanization system to transliterate the Korean Hangul into Latin letters. The first use of a name or place that has been Romanized will immediately be followed by the name in Hangul, to allow for alternate romanization systems to be used if so desired. Exceptions to this rule will exist in this thesis; certain names, such as Park Chung Hee, or Syngman Rhee have been Romanized in this way across most texts, even though these do not necessarily make use of existing romanization systems. These popularized spellings will also be used in this text. In addition, for Korean names, there are certain acceptable alternatives, such as ㅇ] transliterating to either Lee or Yi, instead of I. In order to ensure clarity, however, the first use of these names will be followed by the Hangul, as well as the Revised Romanization of their name. The author hopes in this way to make explicit who is being spoken of.

Additionally, the Korean language places the family name first. This practice will be adopted by this thesis for Korean names only, all others will follow the English language's convention of placing the family name last.

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