THE SELF AS INSTRUMENT

An Understanding of the Scientific Self in Artistic Research



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Drawing on the front page: Dear Hunter, *S.M.m.m.R.I (Sea Monster map making Research Instrument)*. From: Lectoraat AOK, "Symposium."

PART ZERO (INTRODUCTION)

> There is no such thing as an objective map. Maps are always political statements or narrative. Cartography infiltrates meaning into space and in doing so invents geopolitical truths that legitimize political action and trigger political reaction.
>
> – Nijmegen Centre for Border Research (NCBR)[1]

We tend to use a map as an objective representation of a certain part of the world. When we see the borders of nations and regions, the cities' names, the green nature areas and the vast sea on a map, we trust that the way in which these borders, cities and areas are depicted is correct: the place they take in the map, corresponds with the place they take in the world the map represents. We trust the representation is factual; that a map is a direct model of the world on a smaller scale. The relations, we assume, between these borders, cities and landscapes are measured with reliable equipment and, with equally reliable tools, translated into an image. Perhaps we would go as far as to say we trust that the people involved in the map making had no significant influence on the process, which makes the map free from personal interpretation and, thus, a correct depiction. When we say that maps are an objective representation of the world, we mean that the representation is free from subjective influences, *and therefore* reliable.

According to the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research (NCBR), however, this is an incomplete understanding of maps. NCBR is a centre, affiliated with the Radboud University, for interdisciplinary research on borders and bordering.[2] They state that maps engage in a process of meaning-making. "The mapmaker inscribes meaning into geographical phenomena through representations of territory. Simultaneously, the map reader derives and adds meaning through an interpretation that is guided by a cultural background greatly influenced by the nation state and the symbolism it promotes."[3] That is why they state that there does not exists such a thing as an objective map.

[1] These words are borrowed by Dear Hunter to express why they work with map making in anthropological research. Dear Hunter, "About Dear Hunter."
[2] NCBR, "On the history of NCBR."
[3] Dear Hunter, "About Dear Hunter."

This is only one example of many that proves that there is more to science than the cliché image of an objective, impersonal practice. Although this is widely acknowledged, subjectivity in science still challenges the process of knowledge making. Recently, the upcoming field of artistic research has posed such a challenge. As a research practice executed with artistic means, it might sound like a clumsy contraction between two opposing terms: science and art. Without attempting to evaluate whether artistic research really counts as science, this thesis will analyse how this subjective practice works as a way of creating knowledge about reality. To discuss the role of the subject in the research practice, I will form an understanding of the scientific self of the artistic research.

First, let us consider an example of artistic research to get on the same page about an understanding of it. Let us look at the example of architectural bureau Dear Hunter, that will also be the central example in this thesis. "We're a spatial-anthropological research practice and produce alternative maps and atlases through qualitative fieldwork," Dear Hunter describes itself.[4] Dear Hunter – formed by Marlies Vermeulen and Remy Kroese – perform research in the sense that they use methods to investigate in a reliable way how people live their daily lives in a particular city or area. At the same time, they are artists in the sense that they conduct research *with* their art practice: artistic research is both the method and a way of reflecting on the working process. In other words, the result is not necessarily an artwork: the artful way of working is serving research.

Dear Hunter's working method is that, usually commissioned by an institution or a city, they live on site in a sea container for three months, six days per week. From there, they observe and participate in the lives lived in that place, in order to understand the ways of the locals. Not coincidentally Dear Hunter refers to themselves as hunters: from their container, that they call their *hunting hut*, they hunt for information. They observe how locals go about the place, they live the place themselves, and they question their 'neighbours'. Continuously, they draw to document and reflect on their findings. This practice of drawing makes them sensitive towards the descriptions of locals and towards Dear Hunter's own impressions. At the same time, since the drawings function as both a personal and research journal, the researchers ensure themselves of a reflective attitude to stay on the research track they have set out. These drawings eventually turn into alternative maps and atlases. As such, over the years, they have developed their own empirical anthropological method to get to know the city in its daily use.[5] They are able to interpret how a place is experienced – what is nice about an area, what the problems are in terms of safety and practical use, what would improve the general atmosphere, etc. They collect qualitative experience, the implicit information, instead of numbers about an area.

[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.; Spronck, "Drawing Instruments," Een instituut voor kalibratie.

To make the information they have gathered approachable for their clients, they bring their research together in an overview like a map or an atlas. Their maps, however, differ from the nowadays standard maps. Dear Hunter got the inspiration for their maps from NCBR's understanding of maps, that I have previously discussed, and from old maps. In old maps sea monsters and other details used to be drawn as part of the visualisation of a place, with as much detail as the lands itself. The monsters had a symbolic value: they told something about the curiosities, religions or habits of a place.[6] These monsters and suchlike in old maps add an extra dimension: they give a sense of a place that goes beyond plain border description. This extra dimension Dear Hunter brings back into maps and atlases. From their sea container they hunt for the sea monsters of their time; they visualise what the specific uses of a city are, or the problems that occur in that use.[7]

In short, they conduct anthropological research, combined with their art practice of drawing, thus expressing implicit knowledge – artistic research that Vermeulen calls *cartopology* by.[8] Dear Hunter analyses the undocumented: where the locals prefer to meet up for coffee or where they usually like to get their groceries – the daily behaviour of the habitants, in qualitative terms. Although the preferences that are underlying the locals' habitat are implicit, they very much determine how a city functions. Thus, Dear Hunter appears to be of great value to cities, since they are commissioned continuously.

This example, that I will discuss extensively further on, is exemplary for the kind of artistic research I would like to discuss: artistic research as a form of research executed by artists with their art practice. So, with artistic research I do not refer to cases in which artists and scientists work together on an issue.[9] Neither cases in which artists are incorporating or reflecting on science in their artworks[10], nor design, nor the reflection of artists or the research they might do for an artwork, nor art as a means to present or promote science[11], nor scientific research inspired by art[12] are included in my discussion. I am interested in manifestations of research where the art practice is used as a method.

The example of Dear Hunter exemplifies specifically a form of artistic research in line with the 'Maastricht way', which is a way of doing artistic research that I will make central to this thesis. In Maastricht they imagine artistic research as an exercise in experimental anthropology of the contemporary time. The art practice is used as reflection. By way of this reflection, the researcher should be able to discipline their self into a well-functioning instrument – an instrument that can

[6] Spronck, "Drawing Instruments," Een instituut voor kalibratie.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Vermeulen et. al., "Tuning In."
[9] As discussed in: Zijlmans et. al., *CO-OPs*; and various other works by both Zijlmans and Zwijnenberg.
[10] As discussed in: Miller, *Colliding Worlds*.
[11] Kolman, "Hoe kunst en wetenschap elkaar kunnen versterken," Ervaarbaar.
[12] Ibid, Kantoor van de toekomst.

detect the implicit, like Dear Hunter uses drawing in order to experience an environment the way the locals experience it. However, this conception of artistic research is not a general one. To put it more strongly: there is no general conception of artistic research. It is a practice where research and academia, and art come together – so far, there is agreement. But the understanding of artistic research very much depends on how the relationship is imagined between the art practice and the research practice.

This variety in conception of artistic research is also the reason for why I strongly focus on only one example. To gain consistent insights for my question, it is helpful to analyse one expression, namely Dear Hunter, of artistic research solely.[13] Still, Dear Hunter can be seen as exemplary to the Maastricht way, simply because both Dear Hunter and Maastricht themselves present Dear Hunter as such. Dear Hunter teaches at the university of applied sciences in Maastricht, they do research in the circle of that school, and they discuss the Maastricht way of doing artistic research on conferences in context of Dear Hunter's practice.[14]

Just as the conception of artistic research has a pluralistic character, the terms *research*, *academia* and *science* in general can be understood in various ways. To clarify my terminology: I use the words *research* and *science* somewhat interchangeable in this thesis. With *science*, I mean both the natural sciences, the humanities and the social sciences. I do this to avoid ending up in the discussion whether, the humanities, for example, are really science. Academics have sometimes tried to explain humanities in terms of objective, hard sciences, but in doing so they have neglected the fact that the image of natural sciences as hard, objective science, too, has been problematised.[15] When I use the word *science*, I refer to any practice that has found a place within academia. Although within academia the discussions on how to practice science never stop, recurrent in all sciences is the critical attitude that is required from a researcher, who also should be part of a professional community executing a (however changing) normative practice. In short, every form of academic research is science. Then again, not every form of reliable research is being performed within academia – take a laboratory that focusses on a practical application, for instance. My use of the term *research* is, thus, a bit slippery: with it, I refer to research that is performed according to a framework that has a form of normativity to it – although perhaps not exactly strict rules. Research, in order to become reliable, should have room for reflection and criticism from a professional, specialist community.

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[13] Besides, the focus on one example is conform the tendency in the History and Philosophy of Science to discuss science in an embodied way: because the practice of science is subjected to the specific circumstances of the scientists, writers in the History and Philosophy of Science tend to focus their general insights on science around one specific example (as argued for in Shapin, *Never Pure*, or Müller, "Geschichte machen").

[14] Spronck, "Drawing Instruments," Een instituut voor kalibratie; Vermeulen et. al., "Tuning In."

[15] For example: Rens Bod, *A New History*. Further on in this introduction, I will go into examples of people that have problematised this traditional depiction of natural sciences.

Diversity in definitions and conceptions

Worldwide, artists and theorists have argued that artistic research should resist the academic system and a definition altogether, to avoid the focus on accountability based on written results as the only means to contribute to knowledge production.[16] Having high expectations of fine art, they argue artistic research should be thought of as escaping language: the knowing that results from artistic research should be articulated by *art*, which should be distinguished from the writing about that art (whether poetry is allowed in artistic research, however, they do not comment on).[17] The ways of knowing that are central to artistic research, therefore, cannot and should not be made explicit.[18] The urge to justify the methods according to scientific standards will lead to a rigid approach that stands opposed to the presupposed openness that artistic research should have inherited from the art practice.[19] In short, this perspective has a one-sided view on both science and art: science as rigid and structured, and art as a free and ineffable practice. Artistic research, in this instance, is imagined first and foremost as art; only an art form that investigates.

Others, however, are prepared to discuss definitions and methodologies of artistic research, in order to contemplate where the fruitfulness of artistic research lies. Nevertheless, even within the Netherlands there is quite a diversity in the conception of artistic research. For example, while at Groningen University a conference was held in November 2017, discussing 'Artistic research in the North', in March 2018 MERIAN (Maastricht Experimental Research In and through the Arts Network – an environment for PhD candidates in artistic research) presented the 'Maastricht-style of doing artistic research'.[20] On the one end of the country in Groningen, Tim Ingold warned against the combination of art and ethnography, that would lead to both bad art and bad ethnography.[21] Ruth Benschop, on the other end in Maastricht, developed a vision of artistic research in fact much inspired by ethnography – a view I will discuss extensively in this thesis.

An awkward relationship

Although artistic research is institutionalised by universities and universities of applied sciences in the form of PhD's, masters and courses, its place in academia is not self-evident. Many discussions on artistic research are about this: about how to define artistic research in terms that give it an academic ground. Two main figures in the field of artistic research in the Netherlands

[16] Lysen, "A north-south divide."
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Wilson, *SHARE*, II-III.
[20] Lysen, "A north-south divide"; Benschop, "Introduction."
[21] Lysen, "A north-south divide"; Ingold, keynote. Ingold argues that anthropology is and should be different to ethnography, and similarly art should be different from ethnography. Anthropology and art, however, share many similarities.

have discussed the tension between artistic research and academia, and both give slightly different solutions. They lead the PhDArts in Leiden, a PhD position for artists at Leiden University, established in 2008.[22] Janneke Wesseling, Professor in the Practice and Theory of Research in the Visual Arts, is one of the founders of PhDArts and the current director. Her colleague Henk Borgdorff is professor at the same chair and the academic director.

Wesseling presents a clear definition and position for artistic research, without denying the somewhat problematic relation between artistic research and academia. For her, artistic research is the "critical and theoretically positioned reflection" performed by the artists themselves on their "practice in the world, in art works and in the written text".[23] This reflection by the artist is in line with humanities research, according to Wesseling: research on cultural or human-made objects or phenomena.[24] The difference between conventional research in the humanities and artistic research, however, is that in the case of artistic research the researcher is at the same time the maker. According to Wesseling, it is advantageous for research that the maker and the researcher of an object coincide. When the research is performed by the maker, the making and thinking happen simultaneously, she states.[25] The interpretation of the artwork, thus, gains reliability, while the work simultaneously benefits from the insights resulting from the research. That makes artistic research different from, for example, the interpretation by art historians of an existing and finished work of art. The art historian's interpretation is, in comparison, less decisive. Besides, the resulting artworks are, as a product of reflective research, carefully contextualised and therefore in itself a value to art history. As such, Wesseling argues that artistic research has a significance to the field of humanities.

Clearly, the importance of positioning artistic research in academia when defining it – to describe it in a way that fits the existing academic structure – is something Wesseling is aware of. She notices that the discussions on the problematic relation between artistic research and academia revolve around the legitimisation of research in art according to an academic framework. Borgdorff, too, explains the difficult relationship in terms of legitimisation; however, it leads him to a different solution. Instead of trying to explain artistic research by reference to existing research structures, for instance as a form of research in the humanities as Wesseling does, he argues that artistic research, characterised by plurality and vagueness, fits perfectly into contemporary academia. The apparent tension between academia and artistic research arrives, according to him, from a conventional understanding of academia; he observes, however, that academia has changed. He points out developments in academia like the increasing interest in

[22] Wesseling, *Of Sponge*, 7.
[23] Ibid., 9-10.
[24] Ibid., 10.
[25] Wesseling, *See it Again*, 2.

tacit, or practical, knowledge.[26] This proves for Borgdorff a growing tendency to conceptualise *research* in broader terms.[27] Science, nowadays, has a plurality of research methods and epistemological grounds, Borgdorff writes; for him this means academia would make a fertile ground for something like artistic research to flourish.[28] Moreover, artistic research would be a contribution to academic research. Art is thought, Borgdorff states – he means art in general, not only conceptual art.[29] It is thinking of a special kind, a thinking that is not the same as theory. Borgdorff writes: "art is thought, not theory. It actually seeks to postpone 'theory', to reroute judgments, opinions and conclusions, and even to delay or suspend them indefinitely."[30] The unfinished material thinking that art is, is creating room for the unthought and unexpected by resisting theory. "Not knowing," as Borgdorff calls it, results in an ongoing questioning and openness that, although new to academia, would look at things differently, resulting in valuable contributions.[31] That there is nonetheless resistance from academia – while he pointed out that, looking at the contemporary developments in academia, there should not be – leads him to asking not what *artistic research* is, but what *academia* is.[32]

That last question posed by Borgdorff is important. The discussion on the definition of artistic research seems to revolve around validating it in academic terms. Naturally, we then must ask: what is academic research? Many discussions, however, focus solely on the definition of artistic research, not reflecting on different conceptions of science and academia. A caricaturisation of science and academia is the consequence: science is imaged as a hard, cold, distant practice, a rigid, rule-based body that is drawing out objective facts from nature. Without regard to the notions of science that nuance this cold image. Take Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin's publication *Leviathan and the Air-Pump*, in which they, among other things, address how facts are man-made in the sense that the representation and reception of research results are very decisive for the outcome.[33] Or, for that matter, Shapin's *Never Pure: Historical Studies of Science as if it was produced by People with Bodies situated in Time, Space, Culture, and Society, and struggling for Credibility and Authority* – the full title alone suggests that there is no such thing as pure science, but that science is a practice in which researchers find opportunities for or limits to their research that ultimately shapes the results.[34] Also Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison discussed the role of subjectivity in science to a great extent with their book *Objectivity* – a publication that

[26] Borgdorff, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, 68.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid., 69.
[29] Ibid., 71.
[30] Ibid., 71.
[31] Ibid., 61.
[32] Ibid., 72-73.
[33] Schaffer et. al., *Leviathan and the Air-Pump.*
[34] Shapin, *Never Pure*.

will have a grand role in this thesis.[35] These examples are only a tiny section of the literature in the history and philosophy of science that addresses forms of subjectivity in scientific research. Especially in contemporary writings on science, it seems to be a trend to discover these aspects with the goal to nuance the cliché image of science as a hard, cold and objective practice.

However, as earlier stated, I will not attempt to evaluate artistic research as a science, or as an art for that matter. There is already plenty discussion on that subject, and I think it would help these discussions to know what artistic research *is* rather than what it could or should be. Understanding the academic nature or academic elements of artistic research is the first step in evaluating whether artistic research conforms to the norms one holds within academia. Therefore, for now, I take for granted that artistic research is in fact a scientific or academic research form, and in this thesis, I will go into the intrinsic workings of this research. In order to understand the subjective elements in artistic research, I will focus on the scientific self of the artistic researcher – in other words, I will investigate how this highly subjective research works *as* subjective research.

Objectivity *by Daston and Galison*

The reason for my focus on *Objectivity* by Daston and Galison is, that it makes for a good starting point to discuss the subjective elements in artistic research. *Objectivity* is an exemplary publication for this contemporary tendency to discuss a nuanced perspective on science. It discusses the concept of *subjectivity* and its history, as well as the influence (or the lack of it) of the researcher on the research process; all in contrast with the notion of *objectivity*. Besides, as Daston and Galison investigate atlas images for their discussion, it fits nicely with the atlas-making practice of Dear Hunter.

To explain what I understand with terms like *subjectivity*, *the scientific subject* and so on, I will now discuss Daston and Galison's *Objectivity* extensively. In their account of the history of objectivity, they write about the tension between objectivity and subjectivity in science, and distinguish multiple scientific selves as well as multiple epistemic virtues throughout history that determine science making. Instead of arguing for *the* scientific self, they refer to a couple of different ones – similarly, I will follow in their footsteps, and instead of deciding whether the artistic researcher's self is scientific, I will try to understand *what* the scientific self of the artistic researcher is.

As said, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison wrote a history of the concept of *objectivity*. With their book *Objectivity* they show how the history of epistemology is *not* the same as the history of objectivity. Instead, *objectivity* refers to an epistemic virtue. "Epistemic virtues are

[35] Daston et. al., *Objectivity*.

distinct as ideals and […] as historically specific ways of investigating and picturing nature," Daston and Galison write.[36] It determines which instrument one should use, how to interpret data and how to train scientists. Different epistemic virtues can exist next to each other. Besides *mechanical objectivity* (a form of *scientific objectivity*), they distinguish *truth-to-nature* and *trained judgment* as epistemic virtues. Although there is a chronological order of when these epistemic virtues became prominent (as follows: truth-to-nature, mechanical objectivity, then trained judgment), rather than eliminating their predecessor, they accumulate.

Epistemic virtues underlie the practices of science, the scientific selves and ways of observation. Virtues like exercising an unprejudiced, unthinking and blind-sighted practice, for example, accounts for scientific objectivity.[37] To tell the history of how and why objectivity came into existence, Daston and Galison surround this account with that of other virtues like truth, certainty, precision, replicability, etc. resulting in other epistemic virtues with their own historical trajectory and scientific practice with corresponding methods and scientific selves.[38] I will discuss some of the book's themes and points made, in order to ensure myself of a framework and vocabulary. Besides that, I will eventually show how the scientific practice of artistic research is an addition to Daston and Galison's account. As they acknowledge themselves: the epistemic virtues they mention are just some of many that they did not discuss since this book was centred around *objectivity*.[39] This thesis is an attempt to formulate yet another conception of the scientific self – supported by another epistemic virtue – that is known to the history of science. In this context, I will also discuss the historical example of self-experimenters, to show that my conception of the scientific self is not only applicable to the practice of artistic research, but can be recognised throughout the history of science.

As the history of epistemology is not necessarily the history of objectivity, similarly the history of epistemology is not necessarily a battle against subjectivity, Daston and Galison state.[40] It is the scientific practice formed by the virtue of objectivity that fears subjectivity, but even in that practice there is no getting rid of it altogether.[41] "Subjectivity is the pre-condition for knowledge: the self who knows," according to Daston and Galison.[42] Subjectivity is not a quality of the self; it is not a weakness of the self that must be corrected or controlled; it *is* the self.[43] Scientific objectivity did not seek to erase subjectivity or the self; instead, it sought to cultivate certain

[36] Daston et. al., *Objectivity*, 28.
[37] Ibid., 16.
[38] Ibid., 33.
[39] Ibid., 371.
[40] Ibid., 372.
[41] Ibid., 374.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid. This must be read in the context of the epistemic virtue of objectivity, in which an opposition exists between subjectivity and objectivity, both understood in post-Kantian terms (something Daston and Galison discuss in chapter four *The Scientific Self* of the same book).

aspects of the self.[44] Evidently, the scientific self plays a central role in Daston and Galison's book. The way the self was used or not used in research is key to discussing the different epistemological virtues. Thus, I will proceed with discussing characteristics of the self shortly to ensure myself of an example when discussing the scientific self in artistic research and self-experimentation.

"Quests for truth and quests for objectivity do not produce the same kind of science or the same kind of scientist," Daston and Galison write.[45] One chapter they devote to the scientific self: the person behind the research. "What is subjectivity?", is the question of this chapter.[46] Observation, so they find, is an essential part of the science practice and the part that is tied in with the scientist's self.[47] Therefore, amongst other things, they focus on how scientists in the past trained or restrained themselves while observing.[48] The scientist's journal proves to be to Daston and Galison a useful object to investigate this. It was common for these journals to have personal notes and scientific insights next to each other. 18th century scientists used the daily journal as an instrument for self-examination and self-consolidation for "an intact self".[49] It supposed to be an unbroken transcript that organised memory of daily life in all facets, and the self, in its turn, was the conscious memory itself.[50] Thus, the daily diary shaped this memory into a personal identity, or a scientific insight.

In the same way, the observation journal, the description of empirical research and results, guarded the coherence of the scientific object.[51] Undivided attention of the scientist was key: the representations of the object of inquiry were only unified when the scientist's impressions were fused together.[52] However, a too meticulously observed written account was, in fact, a danger to knowledge. Accounts that consisted of details upon details appeared difficult to read; in order to get through it the reader also had to consider the idiosyncratic individual of the scientist as part of the research account, which made it difficult to interpret the results.[53] Therefore, *selective attention*, guided by reason, was required.[54]

Selective attention was an active way of observing. However, 19th century psychologists dismissed these 18th century's considerations as inadequate. The 19th century psychologists pointed out that their predecessors were only interested in spontaneous or natural attention, the kind of attention that overcomes one without extra effort. This was nothing like the kind of

[44] Ibid., 381.
[45] Ibid., 232.
[46] Ibid., 198.
[47] Ibid., 234.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid., 235.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid., 236.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid., 240.
[54] Ibid.

attention that scientific observation required.[55] Pursuing science was hard work: it demanded voluntary and unnatural attention that was the result of civilisation.[56] An active self was needed, training and shaping itself into a good observer.

Around 1860, however, observers were ascribed a passive self. This was the result of the contrast between observers and experimenters: "[O]bservers took nature as they found it, experimenters pushed nature to its limits in the laboratory."[57] Experimenters were considered to be active whereas observers were passive – even though experimenters were observers, too.[58] That distinction proved difficult for experimenters: they needed to be both active *and*, as observers of their experiment, passive. "The experimenter forces nature to unveil herself, attacking her and posing questions in all directions; but he must never answer for her nor listen incompletely to her answers by taking from the experiment only the part that favors or confirms the hypothesis… One could distinguish and separate the experimenter into he who plans and institutes the experiment from he who executes it and registers the results," wrote 19th century physiologist Claude Bernard.[59] This is where, once again, the journal came in.

In order to keep the active and passive elements of experimental research in balance, a scientist should keep an immediate scientific journal. With a strong emphasis on *immediate*: writing everything down at the end of the day would already be too late.[60] The lab notebook was now more than an instrument for the memory; "it was a place where hypotheses could be spun, experiments devised and described, and sharp distinctions between these activities made."[61] The scientific self was "actively willing its own passivity."[62] The scientist's self was trained and kept in check by describing the passive element of observation and the active element of experimentation.

Thus, Daston and Galison give an account of how the scientific self relates to the scientific practice of observation and experimentation by looking at journals of scientists. As mentioned before, the virtues of the scientific practice very much shape the role of scientific self. Now, I will discuss some characteristics of various scientific selves and their role according to the epistemic virtues discussed by Daston and Galison.

For mechanical objectivity the scientific self could be described, stereotypically, as follows.[63] The scientist should work on suppressing their will. They should work around their self as much as possible by using mechanical instruments to observe, like a photo camera, and keep

[55] Ibid., 241-242.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid., 242.
[58] Ibid., 242-243.
[59] Ibid., 243.
[60] Ibid., 243-245.
[61] Ibid., 245.
[62] Ibid., 246.
[63] Daston and Galison admit they discuss only stereotypical scientific selves, precisely because that is a depiction of how scientists of a certain time were seen. Ibid.: 232-233.

themselves out of the mechanical process by following procedures. A mechanical image is the result, a depiction of singular, particular objects, where the scientific self is taken out as much as possible. The scientist's self is, thus, willing to actively restrain themselves.[64]

For truth-to-nature, the scientist should be a sage knowing and deciding on how to depict nature truthfully. The drawn image is not what is actually seen – the particular object – but a reasoned image showing a *type*: an ideal or average image of the phenomenon with a universal quality. Hence, the scientific self is actively exercising will and reasons to depict nature truthfully instead of objectively, relying on their long experience and on memory, both written and natural. As such, they eliminate purely personal influences upon the image.[65]

For trained judgment the scientist is a trained expert who interprets images. Relying on unconscious processes that cannot be introspected, and again on long experience, they seek for depicted patterns, in pictures, for example. Alternatively to using types for that, they interpret depicted objects on the basis of family resemblance. Again, the scientist is actively relying on their self to find truth instead of objectivity, diminishing the personal influence with training.[66]

Truth-to-nature, trained judgment and mechanical objectivity all deal with threats to knowledge.[67] Dangers, like, drowning in details, as we have seen, but also leaving out a fact to support a theory or being constrained by mechanical procedures.[68] However, the dangers of one epistemological virtue are still preferred over dangers of another: truth-to-nature, for example, still exists next to other options because the danger of being overwhelmed by particulars is yet considered worse.[69]

An approach to understand the scientific self

At the end of this thesis, I will compare these epistemic virtues with those of artistic research. To get there, I will conceptualise the scientific self for Dear Hunter, for the Maastricht Way of doing artistic research, and for the practice of self-experimentation, in a way similar to how Daston and Galison evaluated scientific selves. Just like they did, I will analyse what kind of attention the researchers are practicing – is it of the cultivated kind, and what do they do to cultivate it and to

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[64] A useful summarising scheme of the scientific self's characteristics per epistemological virtue can be found in the closing chapter of the book: Ibid., 371. Daston and Galison deal with mechanical objectivity extensively in chapter 3.
[65] A useful summarising scheme of the scientific self's characteristics per epistemological virtue can be found in the closing chapter of the book: Ibid., 371. Daston and Galison deal with truth-to-nature extensively in chapter 2.
[66] A useful summarising scheme of the scientific self's characteristics per epistemological virtue can be found in the closing chapter of the book: Ibid., 371. Daston and Galison deal with trained judgment extensively in chapter 6.
[67] Ibid., 376-377.
[68] Ibid., 377.
[69] Ibid.

keep track of it? Moreover, I will distinguish passive and active elements of their self and in their research. How do they keep these elements active or passive, and why? Are they observers, or experimenters, or both? Finally, ways of reflection, training and restraining will return in my analysis. How do they balance the active and the passive elements; how do they guard the coherence of both the research object and their subject?

First, I will discuss Maastricht's notion of artistic research in more detail by diving into the ideas of Ruth Benschop, lector at Maastricht. With the help of the theory of Daston and Galison I will attempt to make a first conceptualisation of the artistic researcher's self. Second, in order to understand Benschop's ideas more thoroughly and to ensure an analogy with the artistic research practice and that of self-experimenters, I will discuss the radical empirical epistemology of William James. After that, I will discuss one example of self-experimentation, that will provide me with various important points to reflect upon in its relation to the example of artistic research I will discuss after. The example of Dear Hunter I will analyse in the last two parts, with the knowledge previously acquired from the other discussed material. In the conclusion, I will reflect on my understanding of the scientific self of the artistic researcher and of the self-experimenter, how it relates to the selves as discussed by Daston and Galison, and what questions yet remain.

PART ONE (THE MAASTRICHT WAY)

The research lectorate *Autonomie en Openbaarheid in de Kunsten* (*Arts, Autonomy, and the Public Sphere*, AOK) revolves around two questions: how does art become relevant for society, and what does it mean when we say that artists make knowledge? These themes of engagement and artistic research can be found throughout their projects and publications.[70] AOK is a centre that takes part in the arts tracks of the Faculty of Arts of Zuyd Hogeschool in Maastricht.[71] Lectorates at Dutch 'hogescholen' (universities of applied sciences) are circles of teachers and researchers, led by the lector, that conduct practice oriented research on a specific topic. The research should be valuable for both educational purposes, for the professional practice, and for a general body of knowledge.[72] The aim of AOK's research is to train artists to be engaged and able to contribute to knowledge making.[73] Thus, AOK wants to achieve this by improving and developing educational curricula, and by contributing to teacher professionalisation and a vivid interaction with society.[74]

I will, naturally, mostly focus on discussing AOK's theme of artistic research – although later in the thesis I will shortly come back to the theme of engagement. Artistic research for AOK should be "a form of experimental ethnography in which the systematic sensibility for the world is central".[75] This vision of artistic research is explained and argued for by lector Ruth Benschop, whose inaugural lecture I will now discuss extensively.[76] In this lecture, she formulates what "artistic research the Maastricht way" means.[77]

Artistic research as experimental anthropology

In November 2015 the new lector of the AOK, Ruth Benschop, gives her inaugural speech. According to her, the lectorate has a strong focus on the practice of research and the creation of

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[70] Zuyd Hogeschool, "Autonomie en Openbaarheid in de Kunsten," Engagement en Artistiek Onderzoek.
[71] Besides this lectorate, also *Technology Driven Art* is part of Zuyd, focusing on the influence of technological developments on artistic processes.
[72] Zuyd Hogeschool, "Lectoraten."
[73] Zuyd Hogeschool, "Autonomie en Openbaarheid in de Kunsten," Praktijkonderzoek in en voor de Kunsten.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Lectoraat AOK, "Over Onderzoek bij het Lectoraat," Artistiek Onderzoek: een oefening in vervreemding.
[76] The inaugural lecture of Ruth Benschop will be the central literature, for the information on the lectorate website is always and only referring to this piece. The ideas expressed in Benschop's speech are conform the artistic research that the 'Maastricht way' is nurturing.
[77] Lectoraat AOK, "Upcoming Kenniskring."

knowledge, instead of on the results of research.[78] This influences her speech on two levels: firstly, her focus, when she discusses artistic research, is on its practice – she wants to concentrate on what is *actually* happening when doing artistic research – a focus she also expects of the research emerging from this lectorate. Secondly, her speech itself shows a process of thinking. She investigates examples she picked from anthropology and art, on the basis of which she tests and forms her ideas on artistic research. Eventually, she arrives at a notion of artistic research as an exercise in experimental anthropology of the contemporary time.[79] I will now follow the steps she took to get to that notion.

Benschop's first step is to elaborate on her conception of knowledge, and how that leads to a different method of observation. She emphasises that knowledge is always local and intimate instead of something general and distant. The idea of knowledge as intimacy she draws from anthropologist Hugh Raffles (1958). Raffles criticises the opposition between subjective, local, bodily knowledge of the practical kind – a 'knowing how to' – and objective, scientific knowledge of a universal nature. He (and others with him) argues that scientific knowledge, too, is produced locally – only, it is made in such a way that it can travel to other local places.[80] In fact, Raffles states, every form of knowledge is ultimately local; some just more than others:

> I want this intimacy to be understood broadly, as a realm of the affective. […] Because of the practices through which they are produced, all knowledges are also intimate, though, […] not equally so. Moreover, […] all intimacies are necessarily relational.[81]

Knowledge is an affective, "embodied, intensive way of *relating*", Benschop writes, following Raffles.[82] Whilst objectivity is the ideal of science, in reality the scientific practice is not objective. Consequently, we need to consider non-objective or subjective forms of knowledge.[83] Accordingly, Raffles does away with the dichotomy between local, intimate, subjective knowledge and universal, objective scientific knowledge. We must instead imagine gradations of more or less intimate knowledge.[84] This leads to more interesting questions, according to Benschop, that are very much in line with her attempt to focus on the creation of knowledge. Instead of asking to justify the research results of artistic research as objective scientific knowledge, the question is:

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[78] Benschop, *De Eland*, 9.
[79] She mostly uses the term *anthropology*, but it seems for her to be interchangeable with *ethnography*, as she uses both these terms to discuss the same. This is different from, for example, how Tim Ingold uses these words: he argues that the two are very different and is only prepared to compare anthropology with artistic research (Ingold, keynote). Nonetheless, since I discuss the Maastricht Way of doing artistic research, I, too, will use the terms *anthropology* and *ethnography* interchangeable.
[80] Benschop, *De Eland*, 19-20.
[81] Benschop, *De Eland*, 20, quoting Raffles.
[82] Ibid., 21. "[K]ennis als een belichaamde, intensieve manier van *zich verhouden*."
[83] Ibid., 17.
[84] Ibid., 21.

what kind of intimate relations (in other words: knowledge) can we recognise in the practice of artistic research?[85]

The notion of knowledge as intimate relations asks for a particular understanding of *observation*. When one considers knowledge as a relation between the researching self and the object of research, observing that relation becomes also observing oneself: the self is, after all, an essential part of that relation. Thus, observation of people, culture and society is also self-observation, according to the anthropologists Benschop cites. Correspondingly, she sees self-observation as a method of artistic research. To argue for this, she dives into the ideas of sociologist and ethnographer Stefan Hirschauer (1960). Interested in the research practice of ethnographers, he argues that ethnographers focus on what happens in silence. Take an interview, a popular instrument in the social sciences: the ethnographer is not so much interested in the answers people give and in the language they use, as the interviewer is; according to Hirschauer, the ethnographer focusses their attention on the silences that might fall between the interviewer and the interviewee – the "wordless, inarticulate, "illiterate" process" of the everyday practice.[86] The "silence of the social", as Hirschauer calls it, refers to the implicit relations amongst beings and things.[87] Observing this silence demands also self-observation, in the sense that the ethnographer makes something speak that essentially resists verbalisation: the ethnographer can only detect the implicit by paying attention to what the ethnographer themselves experiences, with any of their senses.[88] Their relation towards the implicit, towards the silence, gives away the implicit – after all, the intimate relation is knowledge. Hence, the ethnographer, when consulting their own experience, can regard themselves as a tool for their research.

According to Hirschauer, for the ethnographer to function as a proper research instrument, a particular sort of attention needs to be created. One needs to be very aware of all the things they sense, detect and experience. In order to create and discipline such an attention, to make the ethnographer into a well-functioning instrument, the ethnographer needs to write.[89] Hirschauer refers to the notes made during participatory fieldwork. By writing continuously, the ethnographer is, firstly, made sensitive to search for words to describe the silence. Secondly, the practice of writing disciplines them into keeping their attention on the implicit, and to not go astray. Thus, continuous writing is a technique of cultivating the ethnographer's attention into an attitude that makes it possible for the object of research to make an impression.[90] Only disciplined

[85] Ibid.
[86] Hirschauer, "Puttings Things into Words," 415.
[87] Benschop, *De Eland*, 25.
[88] Ibid., 26-27.
[89] Ibid., 27.
[90] Ibid., 29.

by writing can the ethnographer function as a proper research instrument, that, practicing self-observation, describes the silence of the social, the implicit aspects of reality.

As such, Hirschauer describes a method for ethnographic research that depends on subjectivity. The researcher needs to create and use a sensitivity for pursuing their research that is necessarily subjective – it in fact benefits from its subjective nature. By paying attention to their experience, by observing their selves, the researcher has access to the implicit: it is the way to notice what cannot be said out loud. With the method of writing, the researcher can cultivate their attention, and thus, make their research trustworthy. However, writing as a way of disciplining the researcher into a well-functioning instrument has its issues. How can this writing be disciplining the self, if it is creative (even more so since it is describing the wordless)? To that, Hirschauer answers that the constructive and creative characteristics of writing are not a problem, as long as the process of writing is one of *describing*.[91] Benschop discusses how Hirschauer points out the opportunities of *describing* instead of its limits. I will discuss how Hirschauer envisioned this by turning to his text. This brief digression makes is possible to evaluate Benschop's argumentation later.

With *describing*, Hirschauer explicitly does not mean *documentation*, but "a theory-oriented practice of writing".[92] Comparing describing to recording, he admits that describing is far more constructive of nature. However, he argues that this weakness in the reliability of description becomes rather relative in the context of ethnography.[93] Most other media used in ethnography, like recordings, are also processed and presented. Furthermore, he states that any science based on experience has one way or another of translating empirical data. At least, ethnographers, by participating, are much more subjected to the control of the people they research, which should make that translation closer to the 'original'. Ethnographers give all the opportunity for the phenomenon of research to "inscribe" itself into the researcher; thus, their interpretation is much more strongly bound to the phenomenon than that of researchers who can simply distance themselves from the documents they analyse in order to place it within the researcher's own disciplinary context.[94] Lastly, Hirschauer emphasises that an ethnographer has a greater need for control over the readers' interpretation than other descriptive sciences have. Usually, ethnography discusses phenomena that are not new to the reader, but that they have already experienced – first-hand or through other channels. When ethnographers limit themselves to "eloquent reports of other people's exotic lives and talk becomes gossipy as soon as

[91] Ibid., 30.
[92] Hirschauer, "Puttings Things into Words," 415.
[93] Ibid., 437.
[94] Ibid.

those people start to publicly articulate their self-reflexive knowledge themselves".[95] He concludes:

> If every description is an addition, omission, accentuation, and presentation, and if all these things are considered "distortion" according to the truth criteria of the recording, then it has to be said that many ethnographies suffer from a *lack of distortion*.[96]

Therefore, in Hirschauer's opinion, the context in which ethnography works demands constructive description. More importantly, there is a need for this kind of descriptions: an ethnographer must, after a symbiosis with the object, also de-contextualise it in order to create a meta-perspective *on* the object.[97] Thus, they create "a vision of the field that differs starkly from the way members see it".[98] The researcher's writing will be judged on the basis of their analytical achievements, Hirschauer assures.[99] In the light of Hirschauer's elaboration on the possibilities of describing, we should understand Benschop's vision as such: by means of describing, the artistic researcher disciplines themselves in being as sensitive as possible, to capture the research object as truly as possible.

Up till now, Benschop follows and adapts ideas from anthropology and ethnography. Raffles' notion of knowledge as intimate relations and Hirschauer's ethnographic method that turns the researcher into an instrument, disciplined by descriptive writing, are applicable to artistic research, according to Benschop. It is exactly how she imagines the artistic researcher at work: a self-observing anthropologist, researching the implicit, disciplining their necessarily subjective attitude with writing. So far, she describes the artistic research practice no different from anthropology. Moreover, at this stage, the artistic researcher can only depend on writing as a creative method. To distinguish artistic research from anthropology, and to allow the artistic researcher a broader spectre of creative methods, Benschop extends the ideas of Raffles and Hirschauer.

Firstly, she discusses anthropologist Tim Ingold (1948). With his theory, Benschop argues that other media, besides writing, can work disciplining, too. For Ingold, *to make* means *to participate*: making art about the world in which the artist lives makes it possible for the artist to actively follow that world.[100] The artist thinks through making; they are not thinking *about* their work, but thinking *by* working.[101] Consequently, the artist falls together with their work and

[95] Ibid., 438.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid., 438-439.
[98] Ibid., 439.
[99] Ibid., 439.
[100] Benschop, *De Eland*, 36; 40.
[101] Ibid., 39.

material. They are the research instrument for investigating the world they live in. Yet, they only function that way when they actively surrender to the world they want to know.[102] Similarly to Hirschauer's ethnographer, Ingold's artist investigates and thinks about the world by conducting self-observation: through making, they reflect on their participation in the world under investigation. Preparing themselves (and their art, as the artist coincides with their practice) to function as a research instrument requires a sensitivity and surrender from the researcher that is cultivated and disciplined by *making* – referring to writing as well as any other medium. Thus, following Ingold, Benschop sees any form of making as a way of disciplining the artistic researcher's self into a well-functioning instrument.

Secondly, for the final aspect of Benschop's understanding of artistic research, she adds an experimental level to the practice of observation as described by Hirschauer. She mentions *breaching experiments*, a notion from ethnomethodologist Harold Garfinkel, that artist Pilvi Takala utilises: she got herself an internship at a big company but instead of participating she does absolutely nothing. Secretly she filmed the confused and outraged reactions. Thus, the implicit norms of the work floor are revealed, by intervention instead of participation.[103] Moreover, Benschop refers to a finger eating dinner, organised both by artists that are experts on and novices to finger eating; an experiment that investigates the scope of tasting. Here, instead of going along with or intervening in the world, the world is staged.[104] The artistic researcher has more of an active role, in the eyes of Benschop, than Hirschauer's ethnographer: where Hirschauer talks about observing phenomena, Benschop thinks that the artistic researcher should be allowed to put up experiments by staging and intervention in order to investigate phenomena.

In short, Benschop moves away from Hirschauer's ethnographer by equipping the artistic researcher with some extras. Besides writing, the artistic researcher can use any medium, as long as it is their art practice with which they fall together, to cultivate and discipline themselves, and to describe their object of research. Moreover, the artistic researcher does not have to stick with observation alone; they can take the role of the experimenter, too. Following Hirschauer's image of the ethnographer, the artistic researcher themselves functions as the research instrument: similarly, the artistic researcher performs self-observation and reflection in order to investigate the implicit. Their creative practice, with which they fall together, makes the artistic researcher into a well-functioning research instrument by both making them sensitive and disciplining them; thus, it allows them to observe and self-observe, and to set up experiments.

[102] Ibid., 40.
[103] Ibid., 51; 55.
[104] Ibid., 67.

'Anthropology+': instrumentalising the self

In Benschop speech, Daston and Galison's themes of attention, observation and experimentation, and reflective and disciplining methods are returning. Evidently, the artistic researcher's self as imagined by Benschop is very active, be it in a precise manner. They are active in the sense that they need to use their ability to experience subjectively in order to detect the implicit. Moreover, Benschop calls for an experimental method instead of a solely observational one. Although the experimental nature of artistic research does not exclude observational aspects, the observational practice in this case is characterised by a supplementing self-observation. This observation of subjective experience detects the implicit. In order to do it correctly, the artistic researcher needs to discipline themselves with their art practice: by means of their art, an attention is cultivated. *Disciplining* both means to make the self sensitive to impressions and to keep its attention in check by reflection. The research requires a voluntary or unnatural attentive attitude, as the 19th century psychologists would say. At the same time, the artistic researcher needs to surrender to the world they are investigating; they need to make themselves sensitive to get impressed by it. These active and passive elements of the research tool that is the artistic researcher's self, the artistic researcher should keep in check with help of their art practice – like the researchers discussed by Daston and Galison made use of their scientific journal.

According to Benschop, the self falls together with the artistic practice. Thus, referring to Daston and Galison's distinction between the scientific self and the artistic self, here we encounter nothing of the sort.[105] It is in line with Benschop's wish to leave the dichotomy between distant, objective scientific knowledge and intimate, subjective knowledge. Consequently, about the artistic researcher's self, too, should be asked the more interesting question. Not whether it is a scientific self or an artistic self, or to what degrees they are mixed; but *what kind* of experimenting self is this?

In describing her notion of artistic research, Benschop stays very close to an understanding of anthropology and ethnography. "What will happen if we hold on to Hirschauer's thought [of ethnography], but we start to push and pull the methods of research and documentation somewhat?" she asks after introducing how the artistic researcher is different from the anthropologist.[106] Also in her definition she refers to the close relation: artistic research as an exercise in experimental anthropology. Basically, artistic research to her is 'anthropology+'. The difference between the two is that artistic researchers have a wider range in disciplining media and can set up experiments instead of only observing reality as it is.

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[105] Daston et. al., *Objectivity*, 199.
[106] Benschop, *De Eland*, 32. "Wat gebeurt er als we Hirschauers gedachte vasthouden, maar een beetje gaan duwen en trekken aan de onderzoeks- en documentatiemiddelen?"

However, I would like to emphasise that the variety in documenting and disciplining methods is not much of a differentiation from anthropology. As Hirschauer showed, writing as disciplining method and way of documenting research is necessarily constructive. The constructive nature is not a threat to the reliability of the results, rather it makes for opportunities: it ensures a maximal impact of the research phenomenon onto the researcher and their writing. Benschop adds to the methods of writing all other creative practices, by referring to Ingold's notion of making as thinking. However, since Hirschauer relies so much on the constructive nature of writing, in theory the fact that he talks about writing is subordinate. If writing should first and foremost be a creative and constructive practice in order to fulfil its job, then that job it could be done by any media, as long as it has a constructive ability. Therefore, Benschop discussion of Ingold's ideas is, in that sense, not making the methodological difference between artistic research and anthropology.

The modification in methodology to move artistic research away from anthropology, is exclusively in the experimental character ascribed to artistic research. The freedom that the artistic researcher has to set up experiments by means of their art practice, like in the example of the finger food diner, removes artistic research from anthropology. To conclude, the self of the artistic researcher is, together with their art practice, a research instrument. With their art, they create the setting of the research (the experiment), the methods of documenting, and they discipline themselves into a well-working research instrument that registers the phenomena of research.

To discuss Benschop's ideas more thoroughly, I will explain them in context of the philosophy of William James, that will prove to be quite fittingly. The discussion of his philosophy will also support my statement that artistic research and self-experimentation are rather similar from an epistemological perspective.

PART TWO (SELF-EXPERIMENTATION IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE)

Artistic researchers are not the first to use their selves as a research tool, and to depend on subjectivity to learn about the world. Other approaches in the history of science have meant to be doing quite the same. Self-experimenters have worked, epistemologically, very similarly: they depended on subjective knowledge, or self-knowledge, as a source for knowing reality. Romantic self-experimenters, investigating the senses, have gathered self-knowledge and looked for ways to make this knowledge publicly available; and 19th century psychologists discussed the epistemological and methodological merits of introspection. In this part, the epistemological level of these practices will be central. After a short historical account of the development of self-experimentation, I will jump to the 19th century and discuss the philosophy of William James. Many of the notions that Benschop addresses are also present in his philosophy. Benschop's idea of knowledge as intimacy and her focus on knowledge creation are explained and argued for by William James. With his philosophy he emphasises the need, too, to understand knowledge in such a way. Besides, he offers a solution for the struggles with the duality of subject and object. These struggles characterised the debates around self-experimentation, whilst also being at the base of today's question whether artistic research can be academic research. Putting Benschop's ideas in this context will help to understand even better these notions on which she builds the workings of artistic research. James adds more weight to these notions than Benschop does. Then, I will jump back to the Romantic self-experimenters and focus on the case of experimenter Johann Wilhelm Ritter, to show how he worked and what kind of problems he ran into when validating self-knowledge. This will become important when, later in this thesis, I will discuss the artistic research case of Dear Hunter.

From ethical to epistemological reasons

Katrin Solhdju did research on the practice of self-experimentation. Because she investigates the epistemological status of self-experimentation, I will follow her analysis and use it to describe the implications for artistic research. Solhdju remarks that most historical cases of self-experimentation are usually seen as painful adventures undertaken by heroic or romantic scientists, questioning the neutralising distance allegedly required for objectivity. The focus

mostly lies on the heroic character of these scientists instead of the epistemological level of self-experimentation. However, Solhdju argues that this practice is worth looking at from precisely this epistemological angle: self-experiments provide a profound challenge against the subject-object distinction that became increasingly important at the time. Self-experimenters minimised the difference between object and subject, or aimed at ways to let nature speak for itself, unmediated.[107]

Doing experiments with oneself for the sake of knowledge is a continuous phenomenon in Western science and natural philosophy, but before the Romantic era the reasons for it were practical and ethical.[108] Medicines, for example, needed to be tested first on animals, and then on the scientist themselves before they were used to treat patients. Not only was the scientist (usually) willing and immediately at hand; it was simply the right thing to do as a scientist to accept the risks as their burden.[109] A true scientist should be willing to make that sacrifice in the name of knowledge – which contributed to the heroisation of self-experimenters.[110]

In the Romantic era, next to these practical and ethical reasons, also epistemological reasons persuaded experimenters to perform self-experiments. The Romantic idea of the unity of nature resulted in the assumption that the human body could serve as a structural model for the unity of all domains and levels within nature – a unifying principle underlying everything meant one could look for it in one's own body.[111] The subjective experience was more important than the reproducibility of the experiment. Where in the testing of medicines the subjective experience of the experimenter was not important – the test results would not have been threatened when tested on any other random human being – the individual, immanent experience of the Romantic experimenter was of epistemological value. The subject, trained and calibrated, *was the experiment*, in the sense that the subject was seen as an immanent lived experience that referred beyond the individual experience directly to the experience of the cosmos.[112] I will look more closely into the Romantic self-experimenter later on, when discussing Johann Wilhelm Ritter.

In the 19th century, two different developments are present. There is a strong trend amongst scientists to remove the subject as much as possible from research. The development of mechanical apparatuses, and of mechanical objectivity, made it possible to set up experiments in which the mechanics took over the observation from the subject. At the same time, an interest in processes in organisms, instead of static objects, came up. Experiments with the self, for example in psychology, were popular.

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[107] Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 7-8.
[108] Ibid., 8.
[109] Ibid., 9-10.
[110] Ibid., 10.
[111] Ibid., 11-12.
[112] Ibid., 12.

Studying the human mind as a new science

Psychology, since the 1870's an academic discipline, often applied a method of self-experimentation: introspection, the observation of one's own mind.[113] Psychology in general holds a paradoxical stance with respect to the 'hard sciences': as a study of the human mind, there is per definition no strict separation between subject and object – a discussion in itself.[114] When it comes to introspection, within experimental psychology different opinions existed on how to relate to it. Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), director of the Leipzig institute for psychology, made a distinction between self-perception (how the self appears to itself, not how it really is) and self-observation, and he rejected the latter.[115] According to him, introspection as a self-observational practice aiming at insights in mental events *as they really are*, would immediately alter or destroy the state of the process observed.[116] He argued for the controlled conditions that he applied in his psychological laboratories. The experimenter should focus on 'lower' processes and restrict to judgments about size, intensity and duration of physical stimuli. Thus, Wundt limited to use of introspection to areas like *sensation* and *reaction time*.[117]

William James (1842-1910), philosopher and one of the first American experimental psychologists, described this restricted method, however, as one "that taxes patience to the utmost and could hardly have arisen in a country whose natives could be bored".[118] Besides psychologist, James was a philosopher with thoughts on both physiology, psychology and philosophy.[119] He developed a radical empiricist philosophy in which he understood reality as a pluralistic universe, made up of an infinite variety of experiential centres and their relations to one another.[120] Solhdju discusses how the practice of self-experimentation can be understood in terms of James' radical empiricism and how his philosophy challenges rationalist epistemology.[121] In discussing her ideas here, I can provide the Maastricht way of understanding artistic research with context. It will show Benschop's need to refer to knowledge as intimacy and her focus on the creation of knowledge. Looking at artistic research through the eyes of William James, it becomes clear why the discussion on the validation of artistic research does not benefit from a starting point in a strong subject-object distinction – besides it leading to caricaturising science as hard and objective, opposing the subjective nature of artistic research, as mentioned earlier. It does not make sense, as I will show, to discuss artistic research within these terms. Since William James

[113] Ibid., 13.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Danziger, *Introspection*, 702-703; Kusch, *Recluse, Interlocutor, Interrogator*, 421.
[116] Kusch, *Recluse, Interlocutor, Interrogator*, 424.
[117] Danziger, *Introspection*, 703; Kusch, *Recluse, Interlocutor, Interrogator*, 424.
[118] Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 196, footnote 131.
[119] Goodman, "William James".
[120] Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 196.
[121] Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*.

does away with this dichotomy, his theory will help to understand what kind of self and subjectivity underlie self-experimentation and artistic research.

William James' radical empiricism

James departs from the assumption of a pluralistic universe. With this, he means that the universe exists of heterogeneous realities. Because the image we have formed of a reality, based on our knowledge about or experience of them, does not shape these realities, we are confronted with indefinite modes of existence and their relations.[122] Everything – things, thoughts, feelings – is potentially connected, and they are real as long as they are experienced one way or another. Reality, therefore, is a multiplicity of modes of experience.[123]

"Experience means experience of something foreign supposed to impress us", James states.[124] It is an effect of something exterior on something interior, that leaves traces. However, experience is not only receptive: we should understand it as a *reaction* towards something noticed and thus appropriated.[125] In other words, it changes something, and this is not one-sided: both the interior self and the exterior reality undergo this change simultaneously when an impression takes place.[126] There is no strict separation between inner and outer – experience should be understood as a mutual process *between* things that establishes a relation between them.[127] Therefore, James thinks of experience as a process of the changing of relations.[128]

Thus, experience is a creative act: it creates and changes relationships, ultimately creating reality. The pluralistic universe is made of heterogeneous material and immaterial things and their relations; it is the sum of changes, or experiences.[129]

> To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, *the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system*.[130]

So, James' radical empiricism becomes radical because, firstly, nothing but experience counts for constructing reality and therefore it levels experience with things and thoughts. Radical

[122] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 39; Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 198.
[123] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 40; Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 198.
[124] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 40, quoting James.
[125] Ibid., 40-41.
[126] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 41; Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 197-198. Consequently, having experiences is not limited to humans alone (Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 40).
[127] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 41; Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 197.
[128] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 41.
[129] Ibid., 41; Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 198.
[130] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 41, quoting James.

empiricism grants relations as interior to things and persons. Secondly, as already described, there is no strict separation between inner and outer: it does away with the dualist distinction between subject and object, between mental and material world.[131] Consequently, radical empiricism focusses on processes rather than oppositions.[132]

In radical empiricism, gaining knowledge means something different from what it means in rationalist epistemology. James stood for an investigation of processes and practices of knowing, rather than for a theory of knowledge with a focus on results and facts.[133] Radical empiricism is about *getting to know* something in sense of *noscere*, *kennen*, *connaître*, instead of *knowledge about* something in the sense of *scire*, *wissen*, *savoir*.[134] "Knowing as in transit or on its way," as James puts it, rather than "knowing as verified and completed".[135] Such a point of completeness is unreachable in James' pluralistic universe, because the process of getting to know has an effect on the whole network; a newly made connection shifts the relations between things already there.[136] This phenomenon is a common experience between interior and exterior, similar to a human relationship: a mutual exchange resulting in a type of knowledge that is reciprocal and in transit.[137] *Knowledge-of-acquaintance*, as James describes it, is a tracing of the process.[138]

To engage with reality, for James, is to consider our immediate and concrete experience with things – our relations with them, that is. To emphasize the need of explaining knowing as such, he uses his term *pure experience*. With this, he does not mean to refer to something sacred or clear; rather, it is primal and chaotic.[139] It is the most fundamental material of the universe, more so than thoughts, bodies and material objects.[140] Although it can only be experienced in a strict sense by "new-born babes, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or blows", pure experience is every lived experience "considered from an immanent point of view".[141] Whether pure experience makes up either a person or an object, does not depend on a difference in 'pure experiences', but on the relations in which pure experience enters.[142] Pure experience itself is beyond dualities, beyond mind or matter, beyond the dichotomy between subject and object.[143]

> [T]here is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call this stuff 'pure' experience, the knowing can easily be explained

[131] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 41.
[132] Ibid.; Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 199-200.
[133] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 42.
[134] Ibid.; Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 199.
[135] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 42, quoting James.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid.; Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 199-200.
[138] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 42; Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 199.
[139] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 43-44.
[140] Goodman, "William James," Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912).
[141] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 43-44, quoting James.
[142] Goodman, "William James," Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912).
[143] Ibid. ; Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 201; Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 43.

> as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is part of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known.[144]

So, every lived experience, every relation, is *also* pure experience. Pure experience is the most original, most primal material of which reality consists. It does not depend on a self or consciousness, a priori categories that function to generate knowledge *about* the experience. Pure experience is "a simple *that*", where *knowledge about something* is a *what*, as opposed to *knowing in transit*.[145] James notion of pure experience makes *knowing in transit* necessary, instead of *knowledge about* something.

Artistic research through James' framework

When it comes to knowing; rather than secure a distinction between object and subject, James looks for spaces to establish new relations by enabling zones of indistinction. "[K]nowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter," James wrote.[146] So, for the process of getting to know, portions of pure experience should be integrated into one's experience of reality. This is what it means to know reality. Although it is impossible for a sane adult to experience pure experience in the strict sense, in order to know reality, they need a sensitivity for pure experience. So, here, sensitivity is not only key to self-knowledge and self-relations; more importantly it is an instrument for getting to know reality *in general*. *Getting to know*, thus, demands a willingness to enter an insecure space, outside other relations, where new and unexpected relations can form.[147]

Solhdju convincingly argues that the theory of William James is the way to understand the practice of self-experimenters. Into his radical empiricism, the method of self-experimentation neatly fits; even more so, it is *the* way to get to know reality. Exactly in line with James' philosophy, she notes how experience for self-experimenters is the key to gain knowledge. Experience for them is "the vehicle or medium connecting knower with known," in the words of James.[148] The self-experimenter *relates* to their research phenomenon in order to experience the phenomenon.[149] She remarks how self-experimenters have strategies to become sensitive, in order to find zones of indistinction between them and their research object.[150] They make changes

[144] Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 43, quoting James.
[145] Ibid., 44, quoting James.
[146] Ibid., 43, quoting James.
[147] Ibid., 44.
[148] Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*, 197; 200; Solhdju, "Self-Experience," 42, quoting James.
[149] Solhdju, *Selbexperimente*.
[150] Ibid., 196.

to their own body or take intoxicants – they create situations or spaces, by setting up self-experiments, through which new relations can be established and knowledge-of-acquaintance can come to flourish.[151] It is the only way beyond dualities; it is the only way to know reality.

As said, self-experimentation and artistic research have an epistemological ground in common. Both use the self as research instrument for epistemological reasons: subjective experience of and a relating to the phenomenon of research is in both cases essential for knowing reality. Furthermore, in both research approaches the researcher uses ways to make themselves sensitive to impressions, and thinks of ways to train and restrain themselves. Artistic research, as experimental anthropology by means of art practice, *is* self-experimentation. As Solhdju discusses William James' ideas to understand self-experimentation, James' philosophy equally illuminates the central ideas used by Benschop to explain artistic research.

Placing Benschop's conceptualisation of artistic research into the context of radical empiricism, explains in more detail why she needs to focus, in understanding artistic research, on the creation of knowledge and knowledge understood as intimacy. In his theory, James makes *experience* the key to getting to know reality: since reality is nothing more than everything that is experienced, experiencing is the only way to approach that reality. Experience is the changing of relations, and reality is an everchanging network of relations. Getting to know, therefore, is experiencing: it is relating. Just as Benschop, in line with Raffles, argued for; knowing is relating, is experiencing that relation by both observation and self-observation. In this case, knowledge should be understood as intimacy, she concludes. And James adds: knowing as relating is the *only* way of getting to know reality; not only in the context of implicit knowledge, but in general.

Benschop needs to get rid of a strict separation between object and subject to explain her notion of knowledge as intimacy. James, too, does away with any form of dualism: in his system, there is no opposition between inner and outer, between subject and object, between mental and material. Since experiencing means the changing of relations, which means the changing of the network that reality is, *it means changing reality*. Therefore, a point of completeness (like results) is unreachable. Getting to know, knowledge-of-acquaintance, will in its process of knowing *at the same time* change reality – which makes knowledge in the form of facts and results impossible. By getting rid of the dualism, James emphasises the need for his notion of knowledge-as-acquaintance: knowing as a process. Similarly, when considering artistic research through the theory of James, Benschop's focus on the *creation* of knowledge, instead of its results, gets a stronger emphasis.

Moreover, besides making the assumptions at the basis of Benschop's discussion more urgent, James' philosophy emphasises why a discussion based on a strong subject-object

[151] Ibid., 195-196.

distinction is not feasible for evaluating and understanding artistic research. James' whole philosophy is supported by his effort to take dualism out of the equation. There is no distinction between object and subject in self-experimentation, and not in artistic research. If one would caricaturise science as hard, cold and factual, striving towards objectivity and in doing so diminishing every form of subjectivity, then there is, indeed, no place for artistic research. Benschop, Daston and Galison, and others have already established that this image of science is unnuanced. James, on top of that, by suggesting there is no duality at all, does away with the opposition between objectivity and subjectivity in science altogether. Benschop, already, wanted to get rid of the duality in order to ask what *kind* of intimate knowledge artistic research is, instead of attempting to pour subjective research in objective terms. James' framework is more radical: knowledge is no longer more, or less, subjective; there is simply only knowledge as relation. In line with James, instrumentalising the self is not debatable – there is not much else to do. If we want to understand artistic research, and the artistic researcher's self, in its own terms, we need to think alongside radical empiricism instead of traditional rational epistemology.

Romantic experiments with Ritter

In order to take a more concrete look at the self in radical empiricism, I will discuss a case of Romantic self-experimentation and one of contemporary artistic research. The case of the self-experimenter will shed light onto the practice of the artistic research and, thus, help to conceptualise the self. Besides, as we understand self-experimentation in the context of the history of science, it will make the step easier to understand artistic research, too, in these terms.

As already mentioned, the self became an issue within science in the Romantic era. Romantic experimenter Johann Wilhelm Ritter (1776-1810) instrumentalised the self and used it as a model for nature, whilst also struggling to share these individual experiences with the public. I will determine how Ritter dealt with these issues by following Stuart Walker Strickland, who analyses why self-knowledge became a subject of discussion for Romantic scientists.

In line with Romantic thought, Ritter departed from the idea that there is an analogy between self-knowledge and knowledge about nature, that there is an unifying principle underlying all phenomenon of reality.[152] In his research on galvanism, he systematically applied a voltaic column to all his sense organs. The battery produced tones in his ears, colours in his eyes, sensation of hot and cold in his fingertip, and made him sneeze.[153] Comparing these effects, he aimed to show that there is a common basis of all sensations – that colours are actually "mute tones", and tones "speaking colours".[154] His results proved to him that all human functions and

[152] Strickland, "The Ideology of Self-Knowledge," 456-457.
[153] Ibid., 457.
[154] Ibid., 458.

senses have a common ground, and thus made the body an unified whole.[155] Moreover, Strickland argues, by investigating phenomena residing within himself, Ritter gained the knowledge about his own body that made it into a calibrated instrument.[156] On top of that, proving that his body is an unified whole persuaded him to consider the body a reliable tool for further research.[157]

From then on, he distanced himself from his body and regarded it as a now carefully prepared laboratory instrument with which he could perform more experiments. He went on searching for the boundaries of the battery's effect, and therefore struggling with pain and long-lasting consequences for his sense organs.[158] Ritter alienated himself from his body for it to become a passive registering device, regarding the self-knowledge acquired in this process as knowledge about a microcosm that reflects nature.[159] The body and the self were separated, Strickland states.

However, Ritter later included his self again in his practice. Since he was now going to extreme lengths for his research, finding no limit to the battery's effect, he figured that the only boundary lay in the experimenter's capacity for or willingness to endure pain.[160] This meant, for his experiments, that it was rather unlikely somebody would perform them again – he reached far beyond limits anyone else had dared to cross. Instead of making this a weakness of his research – it also meant that nobody could test his results – he presented himself as a superior source of knowledge.[161] He distinguished himself from his rivals by gaining access to phenomena not yet observed, at the same time proving his personal dedication and character as a scientist.[162] His body again represented his self, Strickland concludes, possessing tacit knowledge gained by continuous practice.[163]

A place for self-knowledge in the public sphere

Throughout his research, Ritter kept in his writing explicitly addressing the problem of how to bring his experiences across. He sought ways to make his personal knowledge part of a communally shared body of knowledge.[164] For instance, he trusted the aesthetic sensibility of his public: his readers would have to see the truth by recognising the harmony of the whole, even when they had not experienced the experiment's results themselves.[165] The subjective character

[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Ibid., 458-459.
[159] Ibid., 460.
[160] Ibid., 459.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid., 460.
[164] Ibid.
[165] Ibid., 461.

of experiences was essentially woven into the whole that, aspiring harmony, "would assure their truth", Strickland writes.[166]

Also the format in which Ritter presented his findings played a huge role in his attempt to share his self-knowledge. Although as a rule public lectures could work persuasively, the problem with them was that the results of self-experiments were not that visible: the public could not see the development Ritter's body had gone through in order to become a reliable instrument, thus validating his research. The lectures would create "the illusion of completeness", Strickland states, "it shut out the historical nature of its subject".[167] In lectures, the essential historical nature of the self-experiments remained private.[168] As an alternative, Ritter turned to writings in which he did not distinguish the historical representation of experiments from the life-history of the experimenter. Self-experimentation became a form of autobiography. Thus, the research was accessible and truly transparent: he transferred his research from the private sphere into the public sphere.[169]

Yet, many remained pessimistic about the value self-experimentation, precisely on grounds of its lack of public or objective nature. For example, doctor and historian of medicine August Friedrich Hecker emphasised the importance of knowledge that would last, unlike this kind of "speculation that remains eternally bound to the individuality of the spectator".[170] Moreover, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel pointed out how undemocratic self-knowledge was: self-experiments had forsaken the interest of the people.[171] In general, too, it was thought science should transcend the political conflict of the Napoleonic Wars and dismantle the tension between French and German researchers that was the result of their long dispute over Lavoisier's chemistry.[172]

In short, Strickland concludes that both self-experimenters like Ritter and the critics of self-experimentation – although coming from different standpoints – agreed that self-knowledge, with its particular and individual setting, threatened in one way or another a cumulative body of knowledge that reflects the interests of a larger community.[173] Ritter tried to overcome that by showing his public the reasons for why his body was a reliable tool. He went through phases of calibration to make his body a well-working instrument. Therefore, the historical development of his subject is key to the reliability of his research results. The subjectivity on which he relied for his research was not a weakness, as long as his results were presented in context of his personal

166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid., 462.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid., 463.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.

process. Although opponents of self-experimentation said that the results would remain individual and undemocratic, Ritter made sure his personal knowledge translated well into general insights.

Hence, Ritter instrumentalised his self for his experimental research, and made his research reliable by calibrating himself into a well-working tool through the research practice and by including this development into his written results. He did so, to overcome the private character of self-experimentation. In the next part, I will show how Ritter's instrumentalisation of the self relates to the method of the artistic research of Dear Hunter.

PART THREE (THE CASE OF DEAR HUNTER)

The artistic researchers of Dear Hunter perform ethnographic research, with the help of their artistic practice of drawing, in order to map implicit knowledge. To zoom in on Dear Hunter's practice, I will now discuss one of their projects in detail. I will keep it in theme: I am going to focus on the work they did for the city of Maastricht. *Dear Maastricht*, the hunt they did in 2015 for *Gemeente Maastricht*, *Provincie Limburg* and project organisation *Avenue2 Maastricht*, is part of their international project *Dear Euregio*.[174] In this project, covering two years, they visited eight cities in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium in the Meuse-Rhine region; changing their location every three months.[175] For every stay, they visualised and processed information about all daily working, living and traveling experiences. Besides that, they sometimes worked on a local assignment, as was the case with Maastricht. For *Dear Maastricht* they were asked to focus on the interaction between three neighbourhoods and the highway that crosses them. I will explain Dear Hunter's assignment in detail.

The A2 highway used to separate neighbourhoods in Maastricht. The project organisation *A2 Maastricht* was set up to develop plans for a connected city; they aimed at improving the traffic flow on the A2 and the accessibility of Maastricht, as well as improving the quality of life and road safety.[176] To connect the separated neighbourhoods, the *Groene Loper* (Green Carpet) was designed: a green area on top of the A2 highway tunnel between the neighbourhoods. Future real estate development will be oriented towards this area.[177] Therefore, the city and its organisations needed to know what role the Green Carpet would have for the surrounding neighbourhoods, and whether this new role interfered with public places that possibly already exist within those neighbourhoods. They wanted to know what happens in those places at that moment. They wondered whether the existing public places would be able to enrich the Green Carpet area, or whether they would be emptied by the coming of a new centre. Or perhaps these neighbourhoods missed a centre altogether, opening up new possibilities for the Green Carpet.[178] With these questions, they sent Dear Hunter on their hunt. Dear Hunter stayed in the area of three neighbourhoods along the Green Carpet (Wyckerpoort, Wittevrouwenveld and Scharn, see fig. 1),

[174] Dear Hunter, *Dear Maastricht*, 6; Dear Hunter. "A2 Neighbourhoods Maastricht".
[175] Dear Hunter, *Dear Maastricht*, 6; overview: Dear Hunter, "Past Hunts."
[176] Dear Hunter. "A2 Neighbourhoods Maastricht"; Dear Hunter, *Dear Maastricht*, 12.
[177] Dear Hunter. "A2 Neighbourhoods Maastricht".
[178] Ibid.; Dear Hunter, *Dear Maastricht*, 12.

observing and identifying the significance and implications of the coming of the Green Carpet for these neighbourhoods, while sharing insights that could enrich its development.[179]

The book that is the registration of their time in Maastricht should be seen as an inspirational atlas that combines representation with qualitative evaluation of the area. "Just like having travelled the world as a child, in your room, only lighted by the globe you slowly turned with your hands while your eyes flew over the countries you had no idea of how they look like."[180] One should go for a stroll with this atlas as guide, they state.[181] After they explained in the atlas the working method and process, like I did above, they show the maps in different periods of time. Next to it, they wrote a short analysis that gives the maps a 'reading direction'. The atlas itself is not the result of their research: "in fact, the process only just starts with the map".[182] This atlas starts the dialogue between the different stakeholders; the debate in which the qualities and needs of the surrounding can be identified and discussed.

Fig. 1. The three neighbourhoods in green, in the east of the city. Wyckerpoort is on the left of the highway; Wittevrouwenveld in the top right; and Scharn bottom right, below the Scharnerweg (left white). (Dear Hunter, Dear Maastricht*, 13).*

The first stage

After installing their sea containers on October 5th, hunters Vermeulen and Kroese started the first month of sensing and infiltrating, as they put it themselves, the three neighbourhoods in order to understand and experience them as the locals do.[183] One of them stayed inside during that month, to be able to draw solely based on descriptions.[184] The other visited only the spots

[179] Dear Hunter. "A2 Neighbourhoods Maastricht"; Dear Hunter, *Dear Maastricht*, 12.
[180] Dear Hunter, *Dear Maastricht*, 6.
[181] Ibid., 83.
[182] Ibid., 9.
[183] Ibid., 14.
[184] Ibid.

that were explicitly described by locals. Limiting themselves to those parts that are described, makes the experience more intense, they state.[185] These descriptions they received from their 'neighbours': local people living there, and institutions, politicians and entrepreneurs that Dear Hunter invited.[186] Dear Hunter bluntly asked these people questions like 'how is it?' – asking them to describe what the special places are, why these are special, and what these places look like.[187] From these descriptions the hunters start drawing, and those drawings slowly turn into maps over the next months.[188]

Since they stationed their container in the neighbourhood of Wittevrouwenveld, the first conversations they had were about this area, and more surprisingly about some parts of Wyckerpoort. This led them to believe that the highway does not function as a border, neither physically nor socially.[189] Save for some clichés, they were never referred to the third neighbourhood of Scharn – the empty spots on the map shows this perfectly (see fig. 2). After some time, they decided to cross the 'border' of the Scharnerweg: in Scharn it was the same story yet the other way around: apart from clichés, Wittevrouwenveld and Wyckerpoort were hardly mentioned. They concluded that the boundaries exist quite strongly yet mentally.[190] Besides, these mental boundaries do not coincide with where the city imagined them: instead of three neighbourhoods separated by the highway, the three neighbourhoods consist of many different identities Dear Hunter referred to as *islands*. Often these islands have a lot in common, despite their mental or physical borders.[191] Therefore, they decided they were going to approach this area differently. First, they would map these different islands and their identities, then they would determine their relationship with each other and the Green Carpet.

So, in this first stage, the hunters keep themselves as blank as possible, while at the same time participating to some degree in the area under investigation. They participate in the sense that they live there and attempt to infiltrate the neighbourhoods. Although this is a rather active attitude, Dear Hunter also makes sure they keep themselves passive at this stage. They do not interfere with or manipulate the phenomenon of investigation, as an experimenter would. They are as an anthropological observant: they function as a data-gathering device, solely documenting the experiences of the locals. As such they document a subjective view; however, a collective subjective view and not a personal one. The practice of drawing is, firstly, a way of documenting all the incoming information. Secondly, it is a way of reflection on their research: by drawing exclusively on the basis of the description of others, it is a way to guide and restrict their attention.

185 Ibid.
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid., 10.
189 Ibid., 19.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.



Fig. 2. The map after the first month (Dear Hunter, Dear Maastricht*, 20-21).*

Drawing as a way of processing information is a method of restricting personal influences and cultivating attention.

In this way, their drawing practice is different from traditional map-making of nowadays: the kind of drawing that Dear Hunter utilises, goes beyond documenting and presenting an area. Drawing, for Dear Hunter, is a way of thinking. Although they work towards a map, the drawing in this stage should be understood as a performative method for focusing on the research process. To refer to Benschop: drawing is making; it is artistic in its constructive and creative nature. Dear Hunter uses their practice of drawing not only to observe their environment, like a traditional mapmaker would do, but also for self-observation.

The second stage

After this month of describing, the second step is to collect identities, different values and qualities based on the drawings and writings of Dear Hunter's own perception and of the descriptions of the locals. They mean all the characteristics of an area in the broadest sense: what impression do the different buildings give, what social or public places are there, which streets are dangerous, etc.; everything that contributes to the formation of the different identities in the neighbourhoods. They compare where possible and analyse the things that are most mentioned by the

respondents.[192] It becomes clear what is important in the neighbourhoods, regardless of the reason for it. The drawn maps show this: very detailed, hand-drawn streets or squares that are visited a lot, and blind spots or ruler-drawn streets for places Dear Hunter has rarely or never gone to (see fig. 3 and 4).[193] "Patterns arise from the drawing," they state, "the drawing starts to tell a story and becomes a map". [194] Only it is a map from a different perspective: that from outsiders who both have been informed and at the same time have been able to discover by themselves.[195]

For this second stage, they redefined the boundaries. They divided the area in smaller squares to get a grip on the islands (see fig. 3). Dear Hunter investigated where these islands begin and end, where the differences between them come from, and whether that has anything to do with architectural differences.[196] Take the island of the Ribbelschool and old Hickoryplein for instance (see fig. 4). In the atlas, next to the detailed map, they describe how the school (where once a church was standing) fulfils the social function and adds life to the square. Other than that, the Old Hickoryplein has changed a lot: still beautiful, the housing that used to be for the wealthy turned, by corporations, to social housing for people "that don't seem to care a lot about their surroundings".[197] The shops once there have disappeared. They compare it with the square Vrijthof, approximately the same size, and conclude that the Old Hickoryplein could do with more



Fig. 3. The map after the second stage (Dear Hunter, Dear Maastricht*, 24-25).*

[192] Ibid., 14.
[193] Ibid., 10.
[194] Ibid.
[195] Ibid.
[196] Ibid., 23.
[197] Ibid., 35.



Fig. 4. The island of Ribbelschool and Old Hickoryplein (Dear Hunter, Dear Maastricht*, 34-35).*

attention. According to Dear Hunter, the scars that are left by big housing corporation, owning large parts of the area, seem to be a theme throughout these islands. The corporations demolished many high-quality housing and replaced it with less characteristic buildings (with the *MOSA-huisjes* as exception).[198] They control how these neighbourhoods are arranged by their maintenance or the lack of it, and by allocating specific houses to specific families.[199] Therefore, they conclude that these housing corporations have a way bigger impact on the neighbourhoods than the highway or the increase in traffic.[200]

In contrast to the first phase, Dear Hunter takes up a more active role in the second. They participate more actively by visiting places and experiencing them themselves. Still, their experience is guided by that of the locals, by sticking to the information Dear Hunter collected in the first phase. In the second phase, by experiencing the area themselves, the hunters have instrumentalised themselves and the knowledge they have gained earlier. In that sense, they have calibrated their selves and cultivated their attention with the knowledge previously acquired. To make sure that their self keeps working as a well-functioning instrument, the drawing practice, again, diminishes personal influences and allows Dear Hunter to look through the eyes of the locals. Besides this way of reflecting on and restraining their selves, the practice of drawing is instrumentalised, too: the drawings becomes a map and, therefore, start to tell a story.

[198] Ibid., 33.
[199] Ibid., 23.
[200] Ibid.

The third stage

Dear Hunter distilled the story that emerges from the maps in the third and last stage, in which they "extract insights".[201] The insights in this case regarded the discrepancy between Dear Hunter's perception of the neighbourhoods and how they are treated by the city. As already mentioned, instead of three clearly distinguished neighbourhoods with each their own identity, they saw lots of different characters inside these neighbourhoods.[202] This conclusion gives indeed opportunity for the Green Carpet: it should be developed according to the needs, values and qualities of the surroundings – the many different identities of *Maastricht-Oost* (East).[203] Thus, in this phase, the map becomes a neutral tool: it represents the insights Dear Hunter shares.[204] The parties involved can use it as a reference point in discussions to point out present values and future chances.[205]

After describing the individual islands in the previous phase, Dear Hunter turns back to the initial assignment: the relation of these islands with each other and with the Green Carpet.[206] They divided the area in ten section, straight lanes perpendicular on the highway, to find similarities and complementaries between the islands across the Green Carpet. For each lane they explained how the different identities across the highway relate to each other (see fig. 5). Where



Fig. 5. The map in the third stage (Dear Hunter, Dear Maastricht*, 60-61).*

[201] Ibid., 9.
[202] Ibid., 14.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Ibid., 10.
[205] Ibid.
[206] Ibid., 59.

the drawings in phase two were still leading the descriptions – by way of drawing they discovered the islands and their forms – the drawings in this phase are points of reference. The analysis that accompanies the maps explains the connection between the different islands and the Green Carpet; some additional thick lines in the maps illustrate the text. For some of the sections, they gave an advice. As is the case for the previous example of Old Hickoryplein: the hunters see it as a potential heart of Wyckerpoort-noord, "as a 'hipster' place" for young, urban and creative singles and families, where hip initiative can flourish (see fig. 6).[207] Only with some important chances, it would function as a necessary addition to the Green Carpet, "because, to be honest, who will come from the city centre in order to visit the Green Carpet, or Parklaan, just to be beside a street with tiny trees, without any other attraction than cars and a couple of cyclists passing by?"[208] They conclude: "both the Old Hickoryplein and the Burgemeestersplein need to be taken into account. The former garage building is a present that can't be overlooked. If done properly, this east-west connection could become an example for the Green Carpet."[209]



Fig. 6. The analysis of the relation between the islands of the Old Hickoryplein and the Burgemeestersplein (Dear Hunter, Dear Maastricht*, 78-79).*

To conclude, in this last stage, Dear Hunter has distanced themselves from the object and the research material in order to draw conclusions on the basis of theoretical principles. They have integrated their findings into a broader conceptual framework – they make, for example, use of their knowledge as architects. As previously stated, the maps form a reference point in their discussion and conclusions; they no longer function as a research instrument or reflection for the self as instrument.

In this part, I have determined some aspects of the self for Dear Hunter. In the next part, I will look more closely into which virtues underlie the aspects of the self as discussed above. Furthermore, in the next part I will strongly focus on the

[207] Ibid., 78.
[208] Ibid.
[209] Ibid., 79.

aspect of calibration in Dear Hunter's practice, and how we should understand the role of the art practice in this.

PART FOUR (A CALIBRATED INSTRUMENT)

Now that I have extensively discussed the research practice of Dear Hunter, I can return to the main focus of this thesis: how should we understand the self and the virtues underlying it? We have seen that the self should be understood as an instrument, and that the researcher calibrates this instrument with their artistic practice. In this part, I will discuss the aspect of calibration in more detail. After this, I can determine the virtues supporting artistic research as a research practice. To do so, let us first recapitulate the previously discussed ideas in context of the case of Dear Hunter.

The example of *Dear Maastricht* is very much in line with the Maastricht way of doing artistic research, as formulated by Benschop. *Dear Maastricht* is an anthropological project, in which the researchers themselves function as the research instrument. This instrument is calibrated by their artistic practice. The artistic practice functions as a reflection on the self and on the process of the investigation. Through drawing, Dear Hunter is able to both observe their new environment, and to perform self-observation, in order to keep their self sensitive and restrained. Thus, with this working method, they can detect the implicit: the qualitative workings of the daily lives in an area.

The striking difference with Benschop's ideas is that, instead of setting up an experiment, Dear Hunter takes an observing role: from their container they watch how society happens in this area, as it also happens when they are not stationed there. This is, however, not to say that Dear Hunter takes a passive stance towards their research object – they call themselves 'hunters' for good reason. They actively hunt for the experiences of the locals and visit those places to grasp that experience. Not only are they sensing the area, they also infiltrate it; quite literally by planting their container in the neighbourhood. There is a participating aspect, although it is very cautious. Dear Hunter does not go about the neighbourhood guided by their own experience; they are very careful to follow the experience of the locals. Steered by these descriptions, they have cultivated their attention. As such, they are capable of identifying the areas and add to the locals' descriptions aspects they have noticed themselves. It is their art practice that keeps them on track: the drawings keep telling them what is important and what is not. It is standing between the personal influence of the self and the subjective yet collective experience of the neighbours.

Although *Dear Maastricht* does not have the form of an experiment per se, Dear Hunter's working methods makes an example that would fit in James' radical empiricism. Through an

intimate relation with their phenomenon of research, they are able to get to know it. Their drawing practice disciplines the sensitivity needed to experience the phenomenon truly. Dear Hunter makes the distance between their experience and the locals' experience as small as possible, as a way to gain knowledge of the implicit – knowledge-of-acquaintance, that is. Only through their art practice are they able to instrumentalise their subjective experience.

The problems Ritter encountered with regard to bringing the subjective research results into public spheres are not in the same way present in the case of Dear Hunter. The reason for this is mostly that their research, although dependent on their subjective experience, is in service of the public need. By being engaged with society – one of the other pillars of Benschop's lectorate – this kind of artistic research proves useful and enables Dear Hunter to contribute to a larger body of knowledge. They do not describe a personal experience that cannot be recognised by other people – as was the case for Ritter – they map the experience of a community. The locals could, if the research went well, recognise themselves in the insights of Dear Hunter. Dear Hunter aims at uncovering implicit knowledge that is their experience as well that of others; Ritter was after embodied knowledge that, although applicable for everyone, was practically impossible to share. He had to rely on his authority, status and the Romantic sensitivities of his public. Both of Dear Hunter's and Ritter's ways of making their method reliable is, however, similar. They are transparent about how they have worked and how the different stages insured a calibrating development of the self into a trustworthy instrument.

The Institute of Calibration

Dear Hunter is able to instrumentalise their selves, their ability to experience subjectively, thanks to their calibrating artistic practice. The precise, concrete workings of Dear Hunter's method, however, might remain vague – even to Dear Hunter themselves. In order to learn more about their own method, they gave a course for AOK in which they, together with the students, analysed their practice by, again, drawing.[210] In this context, Dear Hunter established the Institute of Calibration (IoC).[211] The central question of IoC is: how is it possible to calibrate your artistic practice in the same way a scientist calibrates, uses and maintains their instrument?[212] To find answers, they continuously drew instruments, together with their students, that should function as a metaphor for Dear Hunter's practice. This kind of drawing is similar to scientific drawing: drawing of anatomy for biology students, for example, is a way of learning to look at the relations of things.[213] Thus, the drawings of imagined instruments are instruments themselves – they are

[210] Spronck, "Drawing Instruments,"
[211] Spronck, "Drawing Instruments," Instituut voor kalibratie.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid., Tekenen als methode.

not sketches for an end result, but the drawing itself is a performative method that makes a process possible.[214]

In figure 7, we see the first drawing Vermeulen made to envision the research practice of Dear Hunter. She refers to the instrument, that embodies Dear Hunter's practice, as the *Sea Monster map making Research Instrument* (S.M.m.m.R.I.).[215] We see a Blackbox, something comes in and maps come out. It remains unclear what happens within, although there must be happening something: some clumsy buttons on top have an unknown effect on the input. In figure 8, we see a depiction of the S.M.m.m.R.I. after a long period of drawing. The Blackbox changed into a glass dome, revealing complex systems inside. Antennae on the right pick up input that the instrument leads through several channels which are all in a way connected to each other. At the left side of the instrument, thin needles draw out the map, being well adjusted by multiple calibrating buttons and devices. The needles, as well as almost any other element of the instrument, are in their turn connected to feedback loops leading back into the instrument. All is connected, all is circulating. In the end, what these drawings are showing, is not the most interesting element for my discussion. What is, is how Dear Hunter uses drawing as reflection and calibration.



Fig. 7. The first prototype of the S.M.m.m.R.I. by Marlies Vermeulen (Spronck, "Drawing Instruments, "Tekenen als methode voor reflectie).



Fig. 8. The last depiction of the S.M.m.m.R.I. by Marlies Vermeulen (Spronck, "Drawing Instruments," Op jacht naar precisie: van 'blackbox' naar glazen stolp).

So, in this AOK-course, they attempted to calibrate their drawing practice they used in, for example, *Dear Maastricht*, by using the practice of drawing. Beyond the course, the calibrating of their practice proceeds. Throughout their research projects like *Dear Euregio*, they

[214] Ibid.
[215] Spronck, "Drawing Instruments," tekenen als methode voor reflectie.

keep reflection on their practice. "The experience gained through this project will be embedded in the next projects within Dear Euregio," they write in the atlas of *Dear Maastricht*.[216] Similarly, they continue in the same passage, the experiences gained through the projects yet to come, will be shared for Maastricht to benefit from in retrospect.[217] They circle around: the closest they can get to a reliable method is a continuous reflection on it by the same method. The constant calibration, and transparency about the workings of that calibration, makes their research consistent.

Using art for standardisation

To conclude, the artistic practice makes it possible for the researchers of Dear Hunter to instrumentalise themselves, their practice, and to perform their research. In other words, the calibration is precisely what the artistic practice can contribute to the research process. This is somewhat surprising. In this instance, the artistic practice is not a way to gain a looser research practice, a method towards non-standardisation, but precisely the other way around: the artistic practice is a way to gain more precision. Consequently, this account goes against the vision of some theorists – the vision that the conclusion of an art practice would result in freedom within research (and defining artistic research would defy that purpose). The inclusion of the art practice is, in fact, to gain more precision in subjective research.

Now, it becomes clear what virtues underlie the artistic practice. In order to make the self as an instrument work well, the researcher's self needs to be both active and actively discipline themselves. Experience is the key to getting to know reality. However, to experience properly, to relate as closely to the phenomenon of research as possible, the subjective experience of the researcher should be calibrated by their art practice. This calibration is an ongoing process, as the process of getting to know is, too. The continuous reflection makes the method as reliable as possible. Then, when presenting one's research, it is important for the researcher to show analytical skills and transparency with respect to describing their method, ways of calibration and their results. Besides, their research practice's engagement with society, too, makes it easier to transport the subjective experience of the researcher into public spheres. Thus, these virtues together underlie the self as a reliable and useful research instrument.

[216] Dear Hunter, *Dear Maastricht*, 6.
[217] Dear Hunter, *Dear Maastricht*, 6.

PART FIVE (CONCLUSION)

To sum up, if we want to be able to evaluate artistic research, we should first of all have a good understanding of it in its own terms. In this thesis I have contributed to this understanding by conceptualising the self. In doing so, I decided on the context in which the self of the artistic research can be discussed to its fullest. Firstly, we must acknowledge that subjectivity in research is not uncommon or even problematic. Daston and Galison, amongst others, have shown this. How Daston and Galison have dealt with different scientific selves throughout history has provided me with terms and a framework to think about the scientific self. They discussed the selves emerging from different epistemological virtues in terms of how (and if) they cultivate their attention; what the active and passive elements are of the researching self, for both observers and experimenters; and how researchers reflect on themselves to balance these active and passive elements. Accordingly, I have paid attention to these themes in discussing the self of artistic research.

Secondly, in understanding artistic research in its own terms, the radical empiricism of William James proves very useful. The premises that Benschop uses to come to her understanding of artistic research are founded more strongly in the context of James' philosophy. For James, reality consists of relations and is nothing more than the experience of these relations. Therefore, the only way for getting to know reality is by experiencing. Self-experimentation is, thus, a perfect approach to gain knowledge: it is a way to directly experience phenomena of nature. Self-experimenters have ways to make themselves sensitive towards the phenomenon of research, to make as little distinction as possible between them and the phenomenon. In doing so, they relate to the phenomenon, they experience it: they get to know it. To argue for this epistemology, James needs to move away from the distinction between object and subject and presents a radical empiricism without dualities.

James' ideas help to further support Benschop's need to focus on knowledge creation and knowledge as relations. According to James' framework, knowing as relating is the only way for getting to know reality in general – not only when it concerns implicit knowledge, as in anthropology. Thinking in dualities is completely unfunctional within James' philosophy, which supports Benschop suggestion to focus on knowledge creation instead of knowledge in the form of results: when experiencing (i.e. getting to know) means a change of relations (i.e. a change of reality), then a point of completeness is unreachable. A fixed result, therefore, is an unrealistic expectation. Moreover, Benschop states that all knowledge is to a degree local, intimate and

subjective; some forms just more than others. Without any object-subject distinction, there is no more or less intimate knowledge; there is only knowledge as intimacy, as relation. James' radical empiricism is not only a way to explain the instrumentalising of the self; it makes the instrumentalising of the self inevitable.

Benschop's notion of artistic research as an exercise in experimental anthropology of the contemporary time, leads her to the idea of the artist as research instrument. In other words, the artistic researcher, together with their art practice, form the research instrument with which they register and analyse an experiment. While observing their phenomenon of research they must perform self-observation at the same time to detect the implicit. In such a way, they instrumentalise their subjective experience to learn about the research phenomenon. Their art practice should cultivate their attention and offer them reflection; in other words, it should discipline their self into a well-working instrument.

To look at how this idea works in practice, I have discussed two cases. One artistic research case, and one self-experimentation case from the Romantic era to illustrate the challenges that face the instrumentalised self and how one could overcome those challenges. Self-experimenter Ritter calibrated himself into a reliable instrument by his research practice: by experimenting, he developed a reliable tool over time. His writing, with which he hoped to transfer his private knowledge into the public sphere, is besides a documentation of his findings an account of the historical development of his self. Thus, by showing the development through which his self went, he made his findings convincing. The fact that he was the only one prepared to go to such great lengths for his experiments – making it impossible for anyone to test his results – was not a weakness. The exclusivity of his experiments made him an authority: it made his results more reliable yet. Hence, the dependence on his self *improved* the reliability of his results, rather than weakening it.

Dear Hunter's practice shows many similarities with the case of Ritter. As true artistic researchers in line with the Maastricht way they instrumentalised their self, their ability to experience subjectively. By going through different stages in their project, they calibrated themselves, and their art practice, into well-working instruments to analyse the locals' experience. Besides, throughout their whole practice, throughout different projects, they keep calibrating their practice – just as Ritter did. Their art practice in turn, in line with the Maastricht way of doing artistic research, works disciplining for their self. Because of the constructive nature of the art practice, it cultivates their attention (it makes them sensitive to the research phenomenon) and it functions as a way of reflection to keep the self in check (to emphasise the experiences of locals and not record solely personal experiences). Finally, their art practice is a method of documentation of the research process.

Also similar to Ritter, Dear Hunter shows their calibration and working process in their atlas. Not only do they explain how they executed their method, they also show how the different stages of calibration and the collecting of information changed their approach. However, different from Ritter, Dear Hunter has less trouble bringing their subjective experience into the public sphere. Their self-knowledge is not solely personal to begin with: they aim at conforming their own experience to the collective experience of the locals. Their insights should represent the collective experience; their method has only made the implicit explicit. For this to come across convincingly, the transparency about their calibration becomes even more important – all the more reason for them to describe their project step by step.

In short; just as the exclusivity of his results were not a weakness for Ritter, the constructive and subjective nature of Dear Hunter's art practice does not weaken their reliability. It is not a problem that their knowledge is founded on purely subjective experience; they make it into a richness. Just as Hirschauer describes how we should regard the constructive nature of writing: it brings possibilities for a practice that depends on experience. The reliability then, Hirschauer states, can be evaluated on the basis of the analytical capacities of the writer: how they argue for the insights gained by their practice. That is exactly what both Ritter and Dear Hunter aim to do in their end products: the transparency about their disciplining methods and the inclusion of the development that their self underwent, contribute to the analytical level that Hirschauer refers to.

The instrumentalised self as virtue

In the beginning of this thesis I stated that the scientific self as an instrument might be emerging from another epistemic virtue than the ones Daston and Galison discuss. By discussing self-experimenters, I pointed out that the self as instrument is not only emerging from artistic research: using subjective experience to gain knowledge is a theme throughout the history of science. Now that I have discussed how this self should be understood, I can compare it to the epistemic virtues discussed by Daston and Galison.

Evidently, the self as instrument has nothing to do with the self connected to mechanical objectivity. The suppressing, restraining self of objectivity, that uses mechanical instruments to interfere as less as possible in the research, is quite the opposite of the self as instrument. The self of truth-to-nature has some similarities with the self as instrument: in the first mentioned, the scientist also interferes with the research by exercising will and reason in order to depict nature truthfully. To be reliable, they trust on their long experience in the work field and their memory. The self of trained judgment also interferes, in the sense that they, as a trained expert, interpret the images, basing that interpretation on unconscious processes. However, the interference by

both the self of truth-to-nature and trained judgment is not to the degree of the interference by the self as instrument.

Firstly, both the self of truth-to-nature and of trained judgment are interfering on a somewhat rational level – even if the process of the trained judgment is based on unconscious processes. The subject interferes with the research on basis of things they have learned by experience or training (that eventually form the unconscious processes), but there is yet a distinction between the object of research and the researching subject. The self does not fall together with the research, it only performs reflection on it: one might say they instrumentalise their knowledge. However, the distinction between them and the research object makes them further removed than a self that *is* the research instrument.

The epistemic virtue that underlies the self as instrument should not be understood in rational epistemology, but, as previously stated, in radical empiricism. The distinction between object and subject falls away. The self as instrument is an experiencing self that relates, in a non-hierarchal relation, to the phenomenon of research. Thus, they are directly imprinted by it. Experiencing, here, is the way to know reality, which is a never-ending process. The art practice, which is the other side of the coin that is the research instrument, disciplines the self in becoming sensitive to experience – sensitive for *real* experience; *pure* experience, in James' terminology. The art practice depicts the experience; thus, it documents the research and is a technique for the self to reflect on themselves and their workings as research instrument. The reliability of the researcher's insights depends on the analytical level of their research presentation: whether they show transparently how they disciplined and calibrated themselves, and thus, how they have argued for their insights.

These virtues of analytical capacity, calibration and disciplining of the self, knowing as relating, experience as key to knowing, etc., characterise the epistemic virtue underlying the instrumentalised self. In a sense, virtues function normatively: they describe how a research practice should work. Indeed: it is unfunctional to attempt to grasp artistic research in a framework provided by hard, cold science; and the form of methods of artistic research possess still a lot of freedom. Still – besides providing us with a better understanding of artistic research – these underlying virtues are a way to evaluate artistic research. Precisely this is expected from a research form that is part of academia.

Thus, this research form, that at first sight seems purely subjective and therefore opposing standardisation, can, at the same time, contribute perfectly well to standardisation. Instrumentalising the self is, in the case of the discussed examples, instrumentalising the subjective experience. However, through the calibration, it builds an instrument: it is a subjective research practice that actually grants standardisation.

The artistic in artistic research

As said, the artistic researcher needs their artistic practice in order to calibrate their selves. Thus, the artistic practice has a key role in artistic research – it makes it into a precise, somewhat standardised and reliable method. Nevertheless, the confusion around the relation between artistic research and anthropology remains; at least in the case of Dear Hunter. I have determined that the disciplining, and calibrating, aspect of the artistic practice is not different from the constructive method of describing an anthropologist uses. The main difference in methodology between artistic research and anthropology is that artistic researcher is equipped with the freedom to set up experiments with their art practice in which they can test phenomena. In Dear Hunter's case, however, the researchers do not seem to set up an experiment; they merely observe what is already happening.

One could argue that Dear Hunter's experiment is to place their container in an area. *What if we were living there, how would we live?* is the experiment, then. The placing of the container is, as such, part of their art practice. Instead of observing life by participating in it like an anthropologist, they go native. In order to do so, they calibrate themselves into experiencing what locals experience. An anthropologist would observe and self-observe the implicit by participating *as someone different*. Dear Hunter wants to be as little different as possible. Nonetheless, this nuance is too small: an anthropologist, too, can go native and it would not problematise their insights, as long as they reflect on themselves and argue clearly for them.

I should conclude that Dear Hunter, as artistic research practice, is methodologically not different from the anthropological practice. I have explained that their drawing practice is artistic, and different from traditional map-making, because of the performative character of the first – a method through which the researchers think and reflect. The method of describing that anthropologists use, however, is as performative. This lack of difference between artistic research and anthropology does not have to pose a problem for the reliability or functionality of Dear Hunter's research. Nor should we have to start wondering whether Dear Hunter's research is artistic research at all. Without the experimental element, too, their example falls within the Maastricht way of doing artistic research, for Benschop understands artistic research as an *exercise* in experimental anthropology. Artistic researchers should *exercise* anthropology, with their art, and have the freedom to do so by way of experiments. However, it does make one wonder why artistic research should be necessarily institutionalised differently from anthropology. What is the differentiating element that gives artistic research, as a field, a value of its own?

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