The Power of Multiplicity:

Understanding the Pluralised Policing Landscape in Contemporary Cape Town, South Africa

MARIJE GALAMA

IRIS VAN DER KAMP

DANIQUE LAURITSEN

HANNAH POSTMA

Utrecht University

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Student: Marije Galama

Studentnumber: 5667658

Email: m.t.galama@students.uu.nl

Student: Iris van der Kamp

Studentnumber: 5679745

Email: i.kamp@students.uu.nl

Student: Danique Lauritsen

Studentnumber: 5662494

Email: d.a.lauritsen@students.uu.nl

Student: Hannah Postma

Studentnumber: 5642964

Email: h.k.postma@students.uu.nl

Supervisor: Marie-Louise Glebbeek

Email: m.glebbeek@uu.nl

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

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

[1] Made by Iris van der Kamp. Source: Google Maps. Accessed on 13-06-2019.

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

[2] Made by Iris van der Kamp. Source: Google Maps. Accessed on 13-06-2019.

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

[3] Granted by the manager of Rondebosch Community Improvement District, 13-06-2019.

Abbreviations List

ANC: African National Congress

BA: Business Association

BEE: Black Economic Empowerment

CCP: Community Crime Prevention

CBD: Central Business District

CID: City Improvement District

CPF: Community Policing Forum (sg.)

CPFs: Community Policing Forums (pl.)

DBS: Deep Blue Security

DOCS: Department Of Community Safety

EPP: Expanded Partnership Program

GSCID: Groote Schuur Community Improvement District

HBNW: Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch

IPID: Independent Police Investigative Doctorate

IY: Imizamo Yethu

LPR: License Plate Recognition

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

NPA: National Prosecution Authority

PSC: Private Security Company (sg.)

PSCs: Private Security Companies (pl.)

PSiRA: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority

RA: Resident Association

RCID: Rondebosch Community Improvement District

SAP: South African Police

SAPS: South African Police Service

WCPO: Western Cape Police Ombudsman

W.O.: Warrant Officer

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1. Introduction

Together

> Safety and security don't just happen, they are the result of collective consensus and public investment. We owe our children, the most vulnerable citizens in our society, a life free of violence and fear.[4]
>
> Nelson Mandela, World Report on Violence and Health, 2002

After a century marked by violence, Nelson Mandela (2002) aimed to encourage action for a free, peaceful, and secure society for every citizen. He emphasised that he, as a South African, knows what it is to live a life full of violence and fear. After decades of racial segregation during Apartheid, South Africa emerged from being a police state to a democratic state. With this, changes in the provision of security have also been established. This study looks at violence, fear and security in contemporary Cape Town, South Africa.

During Apartheid, the police was mainly responsible for executing the Apartheid politics. Since the end of Apartheid in 1994, the South African Police Service (SAPS) has trouble protecting the citizens of South Africa. As a consequence, marginalised groups have negative associations with the police. In order to rebuild trust between the police and citizens the Nelson Mandela administration (1994 –1999) established a new act, Act 68 (1995). This resulted in state-initiatives that aimed to integrate the community in the provision of security. However, there was still a lot of mistrust towards the state police and citizens also came up with their own initiatives to provide security. Simultaneously, non-state actors adopted the provision of security. Private policing actors became major players in a pluralising policing landscape. On top of that, other non-state actors, such as bottom-up community policing groups, also made an uprise. Now, after twenty-five years, these actors are still present in the security field and make up the pluralised policing landscape in South Africa (Diphoorn 2015a, 2015b; Pruitt 2010).

The concept of sovereignty is important in understanding how the pluralised policing landscape works and how the monopoly on violence is changing. Hansen and Stepputat (2006,

[4] "World Report on Violence and Health." https://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/introduction.pdf, Accessed on 13 January 2019.

296) elaborate on this by introducing the concept of de facto sovereignty, stating that sovereignty can be claimed by any entity that is able to use violence and generate fear. This widens the scope of actors beyond the legal powers of the state as government actors are increasingly accepting that the demand for security exceeds the capacity of the state to provide it. This has resulted in a pluralised policing landscape. In Cape Town, these policing actors are the public police, private policing actors, and community policing actors. Within community policing, we make a distinction between top-down (state-initiated) and bottom-up (self-regulated) community policing actors. In our research we discuss these four actors, and their collaboration with each other, in two different middle-class neighbourhoods in Cape Town, South Africa. As such, we answer the following main research question:

How do plural policing actors provide citizen security
in contemporary Cape Town, South Africa?

This question is subdivided and applied to four policing actors, namely: the state-initiated Community Police Forum (CPF), the South African Police Service (SAPS), private security companies, and bottom-up community policing groups. Within these different policing actors, we first look at their legitimacy and visibility. Second, we explore to whom these actors provide security. Third, we examine the collaboration between the different policing actors.

This anthropological study sheds light on different theoretical concepts such as security, sovereignty, plural policing, and twilight policing. These concepts are then applied in the context of post-colonial societies, in particular South Africa. Anthropology is of great importance in understanding local issues in a broader national and transnational context (Goldstein 2010a, 489). Furthermore, the case-study approach and cross-cultural comparative involvement, which are placed in a historical context, makes that anthropology is crucial in understanding how security works (Goldstein 2010a, 489). As Glück and Low (2017, 281) state, security is a strong force that can transform states, spaces, cities and social life in the contemporary world. This is also evident in Cape Town where security is intertwined with social processes and where safety influences daily life.

We argue that in the context of post-Apartheid Cape Town the four policing actors need each other in the provision of security in order for them to perform to their best ability. In this

study we state that the four actors contribute to the provision of citizen security through the following: police-community relationship, legal authority, resources and manpower, and intrinsic motivation. These factors are present within each actor. However, every individual actor uses and relies on one specific factor the most. We argue that CPFs mainly focus on improving the police-community relationship. The SAPS is the main legal authority as they are the only ones that can make arrests and start a prosecution. Private security companies contribute with manpower and resources. This is evident in the five to one ratio between private security officers and public police officers[5]. Bottom-up community policing groups would not exist without the intrinsic motivation of their members to contribute in the provision of their own security.

Studying four policing actors in two different neighbourhoods makes our study both complementary and comparative. This is of great value within the academic field as we create a holistic image of the pluralised policing landscape. By applying existing concepts into a broader context, we describe and explain how the four policing actors operate and collaborate. Policing actors can use this study to reflect on their own organisation and the collaboration with other actors. Furthermore, this research is socially relevant because security is a serious concern and daily struggle in contemporary South Africa. We provide different perspectives on security by taking individual stories of people involved in the four policing actors into account. These individual stories are important because they represent the human side of the organisations. An emic perspective throughout the research enables us to describe each actor from within.

Research population and location

We conducted ten weeks of fieldwork between February and half of April 2019. Our data is collected in Hout Bay and Rondebosch, two middle-class neighbourhoods in Cape Town. Hout Bay consists of three communities namely Hangberg, Imizamo Yethu (IY), and the Valley. We chose to mainly focus on the Valley, the wealthier community within Hout Bay, for the following two reasons. First, we have decided to focus on middle-class neighbourhoods and therefore we excluded Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu (IY) as these are lower class areas. In the most recent

[5] "Private security vs police officer numbers in South Africa." https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/251121/private-security-vs-police-officer-numbers-in-south-africa/, Accessed on 19-06-2019.

census[6] (2011) Hangberg and IY have not been taken into account in the census of Hout Bay. This makes that Hout Bay, meaning the Valley, and Rondebosch[7] have a comparable population in size, both neighbourhoods have a predominantly white population, and are similar in social class. Yet, we do take into account that Hout Bay has a diverse demographic structure. Second, we are aware of our own position as white western young female researchers which influenced our research. It was easier to gain access to The Valley in comparison to Hangberg and IY. On top of that, our own safety is of utter importance and this could not be guaranteed in Hangberg and IY. A difference between both neighbourhoods is that Rondebosch has three times more people in the age category of fifteen to twenty-four compared to Hout Bay. This is due to the high amount of schools in Rondebosch and the University of Cape Town.

Our research population includes both men and women from all ages. During our fieldwork we spoke to people from different ethnic and racial groups. For both CPFs, the majority of the members has a white skin colour. Nevertheless, Iris van der Kamp spoke to people from different racial groups within the CPF. Within the SAPS, Hannah Postma spoke to mainly white and coloured[8] informants. All armed response officers that Danique Lauritsen spoke to were either coloured or black men. Control room employees were often coloured. Noticeable is that managers or bosses of private security companies were white. As the majority of Rondebosch and the Valleys residents are white, Marije Galama her informants were predominantly white as well. We made use of the snowball technique to gain access to individuals within our policing actors. Especially within the SAPS and private security companies gatekeepers were present that brought us into contact with participants.

Methodology

The aim of qualitative research is to understand the nature of a phenomenon through an open and flexible approach. Different methods and techniques with their strengths and limitations create cross validations for research findings. (De Walt and De Walt 2011, 113) This is why we used

[6] "Census CT Suburb Hout Bay Profile" http://resource.capetown.gov.za/documentcentre/Documents/Maps%20and%20statistics/2011_Census_CT_Suburb_Hout_Bay_Profile.pdf, Accessed on 18-06-2019.
[7] "Census CT Suburb Rondebosch Profile" http://resource.capetown.gov.za/documentcentre/Documents/Maps%20and%20statistics/2011_Census_CT_Suburb_Rondebosch_Rosebank_Profile.pdf, Accessed on 18-06-2019.
[8] The classification of people in racial groups derives from Apartheid politics. These are Blacks, Coloureds (people of mixed race), Indians, and Whites, and are still used in South Africa today.

different qualitative research methods and techniques to answer our main research question. The triangulation of methods enables us to examine the social phenomenon of security from different angles. These different views on security create a holistic image on the pluralised policing landscape.

During our fieldwork period we used the following methods: un-, semi-, and structured interviews, participant observations, and informal conversations. In the beginning of our research we laid more emphasis on structured interviews. When we gained more rapport and knowledge about our actors we conducted more un- and semi-structured interviews. We also became more involved in participant observations. Iris van der Kamp conducted more interviews than she did participation observation, because she did not get many opportunities for participant observation. She was always present at the meetings organised by both CPFs of Hout Bay and Rondebosch, but there were no other activities she could attend. Besides interviews with most members from the Community Police Forum, Iris van der Kamp also conducted interviews with scholars from two universities in Cape Town who are engaged in research on security and policing. This benefited the research as scholars gave an academic perspective and provided context on the field of policing in Cape Town. Hannah Postma mainly collected her data through participant observations and informal conversations with police officers. To be able to include a counter perspective on the data gained from the police officers she also conducted four interviews with academic experts within the field of policing. Furthermore, she interviewed two people from oversight bodies of the SAPS. Danique Lauritsen started with structured interviews but throughout her fieldwork conducted more unstructured interviews and participant observations. This was because in the first weeks her focus laid on the Rondebosch Community Improvement District (RCID) and there she was not allowed to do participant observation only to conduct interviews. In the last weeks her focus laid on the private security company Deep Blue Security in Hout Bay and Groote Schuur Community Improvement District in Rondebosch, where she was able to participate in activities with private security officers. Marije Galama used interviewing (both structured and unstructured) as main strategy. Her main focus was on personal stories about safety and security issues and interviewing was the best method to gain this information. She used participant observation as a method when going on citizen patrols in Hout Bay, walking with residents of Rondebosch, and attending bottom-up community policing group meetings such as the annual Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch meeting.

Techniques that we used were making notes, community mapping, and keeping a diary and logbook. In the first few weeks of our research we recorded a lot of interviews with key informants. We were not yet able to filter important information and these interviews were thematically very broad. After a while we became better in making notes and filtering the most important information so we did not always need to record interviews.

Ethics

Ethics is about finding the balance between the benefits and the negative consequences of research (Boeije 2010, 43). Our aim regarding ethics is to maximise the positive outcomes for science, humanity and individuals, while minimising potential risks. To ensure this, we decided to change all the names of our informants in this thesis in order to make sure they will not be harmed. Despite our awareness about ethics, we faced some ethical dilemmas in the field.

The first ethical dilemma that was present in the field were informants' expectations regarding our research. At the beginning of every interview and meeting, we explained the purpose and aim of our study. However, informants still did not always have a good understanding of what the study entailed. Danique Lauritsen noticed that informants did not oversee the influence that a research about them could have on their life and work. Many informants did not know what research entailed and they often got the impression that we were journalists. On top of that, when we asked them what pseudonym they wanted to have, they told us that we could just use their real names. Iris van der Kamp had informants who thought they could get money from overseas in exchange for their participation in the research. Marije Galama had informants who expected feedback from her, despite the fact she told them the research is not evaluative. Especially the comparative component of the research was seen by some informants as an opportunity to learn new strategies from other organisations in Cape Town regarding the provision of citizen security.

The second ethical dilemma is that we all received some information that was said 'off the record'. The information was useful for our research, but we were not allowed to use it. The dilemma here resulted in the fact that we wanted to use the information but had to find other ways to gain the same information, so we could use it. Iris van der Kamp had informants who said something 'off the record' which another informant spoke freely about. In this case, the information is used as everyone is anonymous in this research.

The third ethical dilemma was the fact that informants wanted to have a more informal relationship then we wanted. This expressed itself in the way that informants wanted to add us to their Facebook page or they invited us to their birthday or 'braai', a typical South African barbecue. This made us feel uncomfortable as there was a lot of alcohol involved and some people made racist remarks. This made the research sometimes difficult because on the one hand we did not want to overstep our boundaries but on the other hand we needed to maintain rapport.

The fourth ethical dilemma has to do with being young females. While conducting a research in an organisation with strong masculine structures we encountered multiple sexist references. This mainly occurred within the SAPS and private policing organisations. Some male employees would make sexual comments which made us feel very uncomfortable. Consequently, this influenced our research as we not always felt comfortable and therefore in some cases we stopped participating earlier than we originally wanted.

Structure thesis

Our thesis includes seven chapters in which we answer our main research question. The first chapter is this introduction. In our second chapter we describe our theoretical framework which serves as a base for our research. First, we look at concepts as in/visibility and in/security, sovereignty, plural policing, post-colonial and divided society through an anthropological lens. The third chapter gives insights in the current context of Cape Town, South Africa. We provide a short introduction in the history and context of South Africa. We then continue with a description of how each policing actor is present in the city of Cape Town. We describe the four policing actors that have our main focus. These actors are the Community Policing Forum (CPF) as top-down community policing actor, the South African Police Service (SAPS), the Private Security Companies (PSCs), and bottom-up community policing groups.

From chapter four to seven each of us presents the empirical data that we found in the field and relate this to scientific literature. Chapter four, written by Iris van der Kamp, starts with a description of the neighbourhoods Hout Bay and Rondebosch, in which we conducted our research. This shows what both neighbourhoods look like, how the demographics are, and which security threats are present in these neighbourhoods. The second part of chapter four consists of the empirical data found on how Community Police Forums are organised, its activities and collaboration with other plural policing actors in Hout Bay and Rondebosch. The function and role

of CPFs within the pluralised policing landscape in Cape Town is mainly analysed in connection to the concepts of top-down community policing and the police-community relationship as part of the democratic policing framework (Glebbeek 2003).

Chapter five is about the state policing actor, the South African Police Service (SAPS) and is written by Hannah Postma. Within this chapter the police structure of Cape Town, the hierarchical structure within the organisation, and the policing ranks are outlined. These elements indicate the vertical organisational structure of SAPS. This is followed by a description of how both police stations deal with their security threats, the allocation of resources, and the need for collaboration with other policing actors within the pluralised policing landscape. Last, Hannah Postma discusses how SAPS' way of policing fits the democratic policing framework according to the four elements: accountability, demilitarisation, respect of the rule of law, and police-community relations (Glebbeek 2003).

Chapter six, written by Danique Lauritsen, discusses how three different private security companies (PSCs) provide security. By giving short descriptions on the daily activities of private security officers an image is created on how private security actors are contributing to security through their manpower, knowledge and resources. Furthermore, challenges that PSCs face are illustrated. Last, this chapter discusses how private security actors are collaborating with other actors and it specifically focuses on the interaction with SAPS.

Chapter seven, of the hand of Marije Galama, focuses on how citizens provide their own security and how bottom-up community policing groups provide citizen security as well. This is done by addressing the security threats and the portraying of different bottom-up community policing groups in Cape Town. Building on this, it discusses what the impact of feelings of insecurity have on daily life and how these feelings become a feature of daily life. Last, this chapter focuses on the collaboration with the other policing actors.

In our conclusion we answer our main research question by giving the most important findings of our research. We argue that within the pluralised policing landscape the different policing actors all have their own contribution to the provision of security and need each other in order to provide citizen security. Finally, we discuss the limitations of our research and we give our recommendations for further research as well as for our informants.

2. Theoretical framework

Introduction

Together

Within this theoretical framework we discuss, from an anthropological perspective, various concepts that are important when analysing plural policing. As security is important while discussing policing, we start by explaining how security is defined within the anthropological literature, and how and on what levels security can be studied. Furthermore, we elaborate on the in/visibility in/security relationship, stating that visibility can create (in)security, but invisibility can also create (in)security. We continue by explaining Agamben's (1998) notion on sovereignty, broadening it with the 'de facto sovereignty' defined by Hansen and Stepputat (2006). Meaning that sovereignty is not a fixed concept and therefore can be performed by multiple actors. This 'multiplicity of sovereignties' leads to the emerge of plural policing, which is a recently originated concept. We explain the commodification, the benefits and the problematic consequences of plural policing. The plural policing characteristics are discussed in the context of the post-colonial society. The consequences of a colonial past are often present in the division of groups based on socio-economic status, ethnicity, race, spatial- and political characteristics. Finally, we focus on the most common actors within divided societies, namely state policing actors, private policing actors, and state-initiated and self-regulated community policing actors.

Anthropology and (in)Security

Danique Lauritsen

Within the academic field security has been hard to define but it is generally related to perceived threats to the survival of the individual and the state which can be countered with the use of exceptional means (Buur, Jensen and Stepputat 2007, 12). Within the field of anthropology there has been a lack in research in which security is based at the centre of analysis. Anthropology can however be crucial in understanding local issues in a broader national and transnational context as it can explain the mutual effects they have on each other (Goldstein 2010a, 489). Moreover, Goldstein (2010a, 489) states the case-study approach and cross-cultural comparative involvement, which are placed within a historical context, make that anthropology can be of great significance within the study of security. Seven years after this statement of Goldstein (2010a) the anthropologists Glück and Low (2017, 282) propose a sociospatial framework in which they state

that security should be studied at multiple scales, namely the body, local, regional, national and global scale.

According to Glück and Low (2017) security on the scale of the body implies two things. The first builds on the work of Foucault (1975) in which the body is an instrument for governance and social control. The second implication connects safety of the body to human concerns with food, shelter, biological continuity, health and physical threat. Bodily security is then connected to the local where danger is portrayed in forms of gangs, crime, and national disasters. Local security concerns are related to city, state and transnational regulations on security. On these larger scales security is often searched for in acts of police brutality, economic depression and drug wars. States securitise the nation by managing threats. They built on secrecy and fear and operate in visible and invisible manners (Glück and Low 2017).

These tactics of in/visibilisation are used by global, national and local institutions to create security and contribute to security for a few, but also maintain insecurity for many (Jusionyte and Goldstein 2016, 4). The in/visibility and in/security relation is especially useful in understanding how the division between 'us' and 'them' is created within a society. First, visibility contributes to security through the display of cameras, gates and weapons in middle class areas to keep criminals out, while in marginalised neighbourhoods police is visible, often in a violent way, to show the presence of the state (Jusionyte and Goldstein 2016, 4). Second, invisibility contributes to security through the secrecy of combating security threats (Jusionyte and Goldstein 2016, 6) Third, invisibility can create insecurity when the state fails to inform the public about social or legal services or potential threats which creates a sense of insecurity with the public that does not know what exactly is going on. Last, visibility can cause insecurity. This depends on the people who are protected and targeted by security measures. What one audience perceives as security, another group might distinguish as intimidation or aggression (Jusionyte & Goldstein 2016).

This calls for a debate on the question of who has the authority to establish security and who decides how security must be organized. Members of the Copenhagen School of security studies have defined security as "issues staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind" (Buzan et al. 1998, 5 in Goldstein 2010, 127). This shows that a potential threat must publicly be acknowledged in order for a state agent to obtain authority to make security claims (Goldstein 2010a, 127). This definition however focuses on the state as the primary agent

for the production of security. What anthropologists should however recognize is that the state-focused, top-down approach undermines marginalized groups. In comparison, anthropologists can map the local ideas about security that might contradict to national and global ideologies (Goldstein 2010b, 499). Goldstein suggests that anthropologists should therefore look at a theoretical framework in which multiple ways of security are ensured through other actors besides the state, for example communities, groups or individuals.

Security and Sovereignty

Hannah Postma

The attacks of 9/11 in the United States are seen as a shifting point in discussion of the existence of the nation-state in western society. The secure image of the nation-state and its sovereign power began to waver. Within western societies the realisation came that the nation-state has lost its monopoly on violence, an important characteristic of state sovereignty, and therefore endangered its position as the primary agent for the production of security. Since the rise of the focus on globalisation, the concept of sovereignty has been revised within the studies of anthropology. It "understand sovereignty as the monopoly to decide not only who is included and excluded from the political community, but also what order, security and normal life consists of, and what measures should be taken to restore them when these principles are threatened including, in the last resort, the power to decide matters of life or death" (Agamben 1998; Buur 2006; Humphrey 2007 in Sieder 2011, 162).

Many anthropologists have elaborated on the concept of sovereignty after Agamben stated that the production of a biopolitical body (Foucault 1994) is the original activity of sovereign power (Agamben 1998, 6). Instead of focusing on the ruler, 'the state', or whoever makes the decision(to declare a state of exception), Agamben's understanding of sovereignty focuses on the effects of the decision, the exclusion of somebody from the political community, and the protection provided by its laws and rights (Buur, Jensen and Stepputat 2007, 15). This refers to Agamben's notion of state of exception (Humphrey 2006, 680). In addition to the discussion on sovereignty as biopower, over the human body, Hansen and Stepputat (2006, 296) introduced de facto sovereignty. This concept refers to: "the ability to kill, punish, and discipline with impunity wherever it is found and practiced, rather than sovereignty grounded in formal ideologies of rule and legality" (Hansen and Stepputat 2006, 296). They state that sovereignty should be viewed as "tentative and always emergent form of authority grounded in violence that is performed and

designed to generate loyalty, fear and legitimacy from the neighbourhood to the summit of the state" (Hansen and Stepputat 2006, 297). In other words, sovereignty can be claimed by any entity that is able to use violence and generate fear. That widens the scope of actors considerably beyond legal powers such as the state. Sovereignty and sovereign power, in line with Agamben, are often not completely related to control over a particular territory but rather to control over the body (Diphoorn 2015b; Hansen and Stepputat 2006). Anthropologists like Diphoorn (2015b) have emphasised that sovereignty should not be seen as a fixed form of power but rather as a social construct and unstable form of power. Sovereign power is repeatedly claimed and reclaimed through 'performances' of sovereignty (Diphoorn 2015b, 14). These are not single acts or deeds, but numerous practices that are part of a larger social process (Turner 1982, 91 in Diphoorn 2015b, 14). The crisis around the nation-state posed the question who owns the right to sovereign power and whether there is a monopoly to this sovereign power. Hansen and Stepputat (2006; Stepputat 2012) argue that the nation-state does not have a privileged locus on the sovereignty as sovereignties are found in multiple and layered forms around the world. When sovereign power is seen as a performance over the human body, this practice can be claimed by several actors/bodies. One of these actors are the state police and army, embodying state security providers. This leads us to state that there can be a multiplicity of sovereignties executed by multiple security providers. Within the academic debate there is a growing awareness that the security sector reform obliges to take non-state forces into account. Sometimes these forces are even more efficient and legitimate than the states' security forces or might even be the only one present. This leads to the concept of plural policing in which different actors exercise sovereign power, also known as 'multiplicity of sovereignty'.

From Multiple Sovereignties to Plural Policing

Iris van der Kamp

Sovereignty is considered as something that can be performed by bodies, as an act of power or authority over (other) human bodies, as was outlined above. A way in which sovereignty can be performed and authority can be claimed, is by policing (Diphoorn 2015a, 3). Through the existence of multiple sovereignties, policing can be done by multiple actors, who included with their partnerships can be visualised as a spider's web (Diphoorn 2013). These actors can be all sorts of groups or social units, who claim and reclaim their authority by policing (Glebbeek 2003, 40). Policing is in that sense "a field of contest among the state, private interest groups (including

economic associations), and communities over the division of authority and responsibilities for constructing and protecting secure routines of daily life" (Marenin 1996, 309 in Glebbeek 2003, 40). This field is not only contested, but also consciously expanded as government actors, including police, are accepting more and more that the demand for security exceeds the capacity of the state to provide it. This leads to a 'pluralised security landscape' that includes all security providing actors and their partnerships (Diphoorn 2015a, 3).

The pluralisation of policing can be considered a product of consumer culture which is part of globalisation (Loader 1999, 374). Eriksen (2007) argues that globalisation in the late 1980s was a worldwide process, dominated by western states. As a result, western nation-states started outsourcing services both internally as to other states. In line with this development, police institutions in these states also started outsourcing security to other, mainly private actors, as a way to gain effectiveness and efficiency. This way state police became more and more a service delivery institution, changing 'the public' to 'consumers' of security services (Loader 1999, 375-376). As a result, consumers have a certain power and at the same time a responsibility to secure themselves when they are able and/or want to. This is in line with neo-liberal thinking that strengthened the idea to transfer responsibility from governmental organisations to individual citizens (Lea and Stenson 2007, 12; Loader 1999, 374). From an individual perspective, citizens can feel motivated to act independently by consuming security and thus taking the provision of security into their own hands. The consumption of security is namely related to feelings of pleasure and autonomy. (Goold, Loader, Thumala 2010, 9/10) Besides the state and the individual, other market forces such as insurance companies also influence the security landscape by, for example, giving customers a discount when they are contracted with a private security company (Minnaar 2005, 105). Consequently, as Crawford and Lister (2006, 183) notice, security as market force "raises concerns regarding unequal access to the market and hence unequal provision of policing." Financial wealth tends to determine the presence of security, as security is found where wealth is, not where it is most needed (Crawford and Lister 2006, 183).

Security as a commodified good can symbolise a social position, creating a division between 'us' and 'them' (Loader 1999, 380; Crawford and Lister 2006, 184). Whereas some might choose to provide security on an individual level, others might feel empowered to start functioning as community policing groups. In fact, citizens are often involved with security in more than one structure which leads to a more and more fragmented as well as intertwined security landscape.

As security of person is a human right, the democratic state was always seen as responsible actor in providing and governing policing. However, the pluralisation of policing and unclear roles and functions question which actor, at least in the end, is accountable and responsible in providing security for 'ordinary' citizens. (Stenning 2009) The security field almost seems to be a reflection of society as different security providers serve other groups. For those who do not feel represented, there is space within the pluralised and sometimes ambiguous security landscape to become an actor yourself (both individually as on group level).

Policing a divided society

Marije Galama

Post-colonies are nation-states that once have been governed by, for and from somewhere else (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006, 3). Sovereign power within these post-colonies has always been fragmented and distributed among many forms of local authority (Hansen and Stepputat 2006). Because of their historical predicaments, post-colonies tend not to be organised under a single, vertically integrated sovereignty sustained by a highly centralised state. Rather, they consist of horizontally interwoven sovereign powers (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006, 25). Today, in many postcolonial democracies police agencies are likely to be characterised as being corrupt and having a weak rule of law (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). Besides, according to Comaroff and Comaroff (2006, 2) "the coincidence of democratization and criminal violence has been most visible in, and most volubly remarked, post-colonies.''

One of the most profound legacies of the colonial period in Africa has been ethnic conflict. In dividing Africa among themselves, the colonial powers did not take into account the natural boundaries of existing ethnic groups. Consequently, many ethnic groups were divided between different colonial entities. With the process of independence, these boundaries gained legitimacy as the borders of emerging democratic states (Blanton, Mason and Athow 2001). As a result, the ethnic divisions are often still present in contemporary societies and labeled as 'divided societies' (Brewer 1991; Mulcahy 2015). According to Brewer (1991, 179) a divided society is a society that has ''endemic and deep social conflict which adheres around rigid cleavages, such as religion, ethnicity, race or national origin'', and he mentions Northern Ireland, Israel and South Africa as classic examples of divided societies. Dealing with a violent past is particularly problematic in these societies as ideas about historical events are inseparably interwoven with ideas about identity, community, and nation (McGrattan 2014, 389).

It is important to mention that not all societies that have social divisions are divided societies. Factors such as race, class and gender may each have an influence on extensive divisions that withhold individuals to participate fully in a society. However, it is of a different order when within societies division is the ground on which policing operates *(*Mulcahy 2015, 266*)*. Within divided societies, the police are often symbolically associated with the nations' dominant political order and while they might still be dealing with ordinary crime on a daily basis, they often give priority to secure the state. Subordinate groups are often seen as a threat to the established order instead of part of the citizenry that needs protection. Consequently, relationships between the police and marginal groups are often tense. Hereby, dynamics of conflict often revolve around policing and the society is structured around division (Weitzer 1995). In other words, instead of being a neutral mediator, the police itself is part of the conflict (Brewer 1991, 187).

As mentioned before, sovereign power within post-colonies has always been fragmented and distributed among many forms of local authority. However, political liberation together with economic liberalisation have both increased the splintering of the monopoly over the means of legitimate force, of moral orders, and of the protection of persons and property to further extend. Post-colonial states often have significant levels of poverty and inequality, high crime, and poorly institutionalised channels of police accountability and responsiveness (Baker 2002; Dupont, Grabosky and Shearing 2003). Where the state lacks security provision, various groups choose to make use of private security services. This can be to protect their own security or for commercial/corporate interests (Mulcahy 2015). However, not all citizens can reach out to the private security industry.

Introduction on the four policing actors

In the paragraphs above we have introduced the concept of security, sovereignty and plural policing. Hereby, we included how policing is practiced in post-colonial and divided societies as this is relevant for the context of Cape Town, South Africa. In the next section we discuss the different actors that are involved in plural policing as this is the main focus within our case study. Hereby, we focus on the characteristics of the following actors: top-down community policing actors, state policing actors, private policing actors and bottom-up community policing actors.

Top-Down Community Policing Actor

Iris van der Kamp

Top-down community policing is a formal, de jure, form of policing which is initiated and controlled by the state (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2008, 427) in an attempt of the state to get closer to civil society (Marks, Shearing and Wood 2009, 437). This is done through the integration of civilians into state police practices (Saunders 1999, 135-136), therefore creating a partnership between the community and the state, focused on crime prevention and (local) problem solving (Williams 2011, 90).

In western societies the top-down community policing model emerged as result of some coherent developments. First of all, western states started with outsourcing of services in the 1980s to become more effective and efficient. Security was one of those services that changed from being a public good, free for all citizens, to a consumable good (Bayley and Shearing 2005, 718). However, a period of outsourcing security resulted in a growing distance between the state and civilians (Kempa and Johnston 2005, 185; Skogan and Hartnett 2005, 431). With the realisation that citizens are necessary for effective policing a community policing model was developed to bridge this gap. In cases where the state's lack of legitimacy hindered the effective functioning of the state police, community copolicing was initiated to rebuild trust between communities and the state police (Stone and Ward 2000, 24). Despite the differences in context, developing states often applied the western model. A post-colonial country as Uganda, once colonised by the British, received assistance from their former colonisers with the implementation of community policing in 1989. This assistance consisted of only three days of training, which was focused on crime prevention instead of the relationship between the police and the community. Some managers of the Ugandan police saw community policing therefore as a form of neo-colonisation and besides, Uganda police in general was publicly mistrusted. A violent past, a lack of resources, and a bad image of the police limited the effectiveness of community policing in Uganda. (Davis, Henderson and Merrick 2003)

This example shows that community policing needs to fit the context. Community policing as part of the state police was not only criticised in Uganda, but also in western societies. In for example Boston, Saunders (1999, 137) stated: "Community policing is forcefully critiqued as first and foremost a rhetorical strategy employed by beleaguered police departments to restore legitimacy following well-publicised instances of police abuse and/or corruption". However, community policing goes beyond rhetoric and is based on reciprocity (Glebbeek 2003). State

police aims to govern together with the community and therefore values training and education of citizens (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2008, 430). Coming back to Boston, a Police Academy was created to train and instruct civilians in order to help the police efficiently. The state police choose via training what to teach civilians and furthermore they maintain control over the performance of community policing. Civilians are trained to observe and look around in their neighbourhood for things that do not fit the environment and to communicate this to the police. The police then acts after what is being observed by civilians and hold the power to intervene. (Saunders 1999)

Besides partnership, another important element of community policing is problem-solving (Davis, Henderson and Merrick 2003; Marks, Shearing and Wood 2009; Wisler and Onwudiwe 2008). This means that the community policing actors will outline what problems exist in the community, what needs to be done to solve it and who has to be the main actor in that problem-solving process (Marks, Shearing and Wood 2009, 152). So far, we only mentioned state police and the community as actors in community policing, but there are more organisations involved. In cases such as Uganda, foreign states assisted with the implementation of community policing. In São Paulo, Brazil, also people from (local) businesses attended community policing meetings. Teachers, lawyers, shopkeepers and other businesspeople in a neighbourhood there were actively participating in community policing, as they wanted to keep the streets attractive, clean, and safe (Stone and Ward 2000). NGOs can also be local community policing actors and together with businesses seen as necessary for a successful implementation of community policing in South Africa (Davis, Henderson and Merrick 2003). Both NGOs and businesses often function as sponsors, providing training and support (Davis, Henderson and Merrick 2003; Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003; Schärf 2001).

Nevertheless, we could question if community policing will bring state police closer to the community. Scholars, as mentioned above, acknowledge that community policing that uses participation of multiple actors, mainly succeeds in wealthier areas where it is less needed (Davis, Henderson and Merrick 2003; Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003). Community policing might best work in ethnically and socioeconomically homogeneous communities (Davis, Henderson and Merrick 2003, 286). Whereas top-down community policing might sound as tailoring concept, it thus not always fits the community.

State Policing Actor

Hannah Postma

Starting this paragraph, we identify the core functions of public police. Mark, Shearing and Wood (2009, 151) select the following; "while police no longer hold the monopoly over the legitimate use of force, they remain unique in their specialized training to use ubiquitous coercion in a graduated and discretionary way. Secondly, the police remain a fundamental representative of the legal system and through their presence demonstrates that a 'regime of law exists'". The police "must balance—continuously, every day, in every decision—legitimate yet conflicting values and rights: demands for effectiveness while still protecting individual rights, the maintenance of public order without unduly restricting liberty, the need to threaten or use force without deviating into abuse, being guided by law and professional expertise simultaneously" (Marenin 2004, 108).

The role of the state is important in the way policing is executed. When talking about modern nation states, scholars often refer to Weber (1978) with his notion on the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Herein, the police is considered as the main actor that serves the state in exercising this monopoly. However, one should keep in mind that this is both a western and ideal perception on the functioning of the state and may therefore not apply entirely to post-colonial societies. Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan (2008, 5) note that: "Whereas the processes of state-formation in Europe and the western world took centuries, western state forms were 'delivered' like products to many parts of the Global South in a relatively short time span during the era of decolonization." Applying Weber's theory of the nation-state to these countries ignores their historical and cultural context.

As mentioned before in the paragraph about divided societies, societies that enter the post-colonial era may become emerging democratic societies. At time, the police within these societies need to undergo a transformation, changing from an authoritarian towards a democratic police system. In order for democratic policing to function, society "requires a civic culture that values democratic governance, social structure that support democratic practice among citizenry and political will among civilian leaders to hold officials to account" (Stone and Ward 2000, 13). By defining democratic policing, the following four elements as described by Glebbeek (2003, 45) will be used. The first element of democratic policing refers to the accountability and transparency of police forces, ending impunity and irregular police practices. Second comes the respect of the rule of law by the police, accompanied with respect for human rights, citizenship rights and fundamental freedoms and obeying the law themselves. The third point refers to the

demilitarisation of police forces, in order to eliminate repressive and violent police behaviour against civilians and rather become responsive to citizen needs, which is indispensable for effective and efficient policing. The last point is about improving police-community relations, which is important for effective and efficient policing.

Accountability of the police is a complex aspect of democratic policing. Accountability implies that "police must be accountable to law rather than to government" (Bayley 2005, 19 in Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman 2015, 26), to avoid political policing. This is a two-sided process (Chan 1999, 252-253 in Glebbeek 2003, 58). In a democratic society the police is given authority by the state on behalf of the people and must be accountable to the people they serve (Glebbeek 2003, 54). Public policing should therefore be accountable to multiple audiences through multiple mechanisms (Mawby 1999, 3 in Glebbeek 2003, 58), both internally (within the police) and externally (from outside the police) (Masuku 2005). These audiences can be, for example, communities, police commanders, and the government. An example of internal oversight mechanisms are internal departments of the police responsible for police force accountability (Glebbeek 2003, 59). External oversight mechanisms are, for example, ombudsman offices, complaint bodies like a Police Public Complaints Authority in Zambia that handles complaints made against the police, but may also include civil lawsuits, media reports of events, and community policing forums (Lumina 2006, 102-103).

Next to accountability, the state police should respect the rule of law. Meaning that the police should be accountable to "laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards".[9] The state and thus the police is obliged to obey the law and has the responsibility to respect human and citizenship rights, regardless race, sex, language or religion of its citizens (Glebbeek 2003, 45). This characteristic of democratic policing can only succeed when there is a fair and transparent government (Bica-Huiu et al. 2007, 1). Thus, the police should be open and transparent about their actions. When being inconsistent with the rule of law, the police ''cannot support democratic development and in fact may undermine development through corruption and the ability to erode the foundation of emerging societies" (Pino and Wiatrowski 2006, 69 in

[9] "The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies." https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/the-rule-of-law-and-transitional-justice-in-conflict-and-post-conflict-societies-report-of-the-secretary-general/, Accessed on 19-12-2018.

Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman 2015, 27). An example of the police not respecting the rule of law are, as stated by Comaroff and Comaroff (2006), corrupt police forces, what might challenge emerging civil societies severely. It is important to note that the police should not only abide to the rule of law in general but should also have an affirmative obligation to protect their citizens' civil rights. (Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman 2015, 27)

The third element of democratic policing is the demilitarisation of the organisation. When militarising police, the organisation implements the ideology, militarism. Police militarisation refers to a process whereby the civilian police subtracts, and organise themselves around, the tenets of militarism and the military model, such as "arming, organizing, planning, training for, threatening, and sometimes implementing violent conflict" (Kraska 2007, 503) Demilitarising a police force means eliminating authoritarian and violent police behaviour against civilians and rather become responsive to citizen needs, which is indispensable for effective and efficient policing. "The more militarised a police force, the less the chance that a civilian authority will be able to use it, at least for the purposes of upholding the rule of law and protecting individual liberties" (Costa and Medeiros 2002, 41). When turning from a military ethos, whereby it mainly revolves around gaining supremacy by using overwhelming force, to a civilian ethos, whereby it mainly consist out of protecting the security and rights of citizens, and uses as little force as necessary (Glebbeek 2003, 51), a police organisation needs a change in organisational change. Police organisational change needs both formal and informal changes. In order for police organisational change to occur, 'deep level' or cultural change needs to occur. This demands changes in the cultural knowledge of the police and (by implication) change in the most basic assumptions and beliefs held by police members. (Marks 2004, 869)

The last element that will be discussed here is police-community relations. A good partnership between the police and non-state actors, amongst others citizens, is important in order to prevent crime. One of the aspects of democratic policing enhancing prevention is good police-community relations. According to Glebbeek (2003, 54) part of the effectiveness of crime prevention depends on a public willingness to assist the police and provide the information needed. The same goes for the reactiveness of policing, such as responsiveness on crime reports by citizens and willingness to help with arrests and investigations of crime. Ideally, these relationships are based on reciprocity. However, practice often shows that these relationships are mainly one-way. (Glebbeek 2003, 54-55) Community policing is an exemplification how police tends to improve

police-community relations. Marks, Shearing and Wood (2009, 152) argue that "community policing is about bringing the state closer to civil society in co-producing security. The idea of partnership is at the centre of community policing, as is the task of problem-solving." If the police acknowledges the need for collaboration with other actors, these collaborations will fill security gaps and further the police-community relation towards a two-way relationship.

Private Policing Actor

Danique Lauritsen

To understand the proliferation of private security companies (PSCs) we should look at both the economic as the political context in which they operate (White 2011, 87). The economic context refers to the supply and demand of security which has shifted throughout the years and can be explained in three different ways.

First, the ideas of supply and demand are based upon the vacuum theory that states that when the public police is unable to fulfil her responsibilities to protect public interests, in particular citizens, a vacuum is created which is filled with private initiatives (Carrier 1999, 38). Because of the neoliberal governing mentality, in which the responsibility shifted to the individual level (Lea and Stenson 2007, 12; Loader 1999, 374), public police forces were no longer sufficiently resourced, which created a vacuum for PSCs to fill. Although it is shown that public police resources were not declining at all and were in fact growing, the demand for private security grew faster. This way the demand for security grew bigger than the supply. The rise in demands can be linked to both the increase in crime rates and the proliferation of complexity in crime patterns, making it harder for police institutions to combat these crimes. As a result, flexible market-based organisations could respond to the demand by their expertise on security and crime (White 2011, 87-88). This is in line with the criticism of Carrier (1999, 38) on the vacuum theory, who states that the vacuum theory undermines the nature of the concept of 'order'. Carrier (1999) states that the police might strive to different types of order than other actors such as businesses, suburbs or townships. Another aspect within the economic context that contributed to the demand for security is the emerge of security fetishism (White 2011, 88). The more visible security officers are, the more people are reminded of their insecurity. This is in line with what Jusionyte and Goldstein (2016) advocate through their analysis of the in/security in/visibility relation, which has been discussed above. The last economic aspect is the growth in mass private property that are used as public spaces, also called quasi-public space, for example, shopping centres and gated

communities where landlords have the right to employ private security officers when they are not satisfied with the public police.

The political context refers to the norms that are connected to the ideas on security. Although, as shown in the paragraph above, a true Weberian-style monopoly over security is impossible to fulfil, the ideas of a state monopoly on the legitimate use of force to enable order are often present in democratic societies to justify the state's activities (White 2011, 89). To counter resistance against their actions, private security organisations often recruit moonlighting or retired public police- and military officers. What is important is that PSCs create an image of 'stateness', that is to look like a state actor. Another tactic to gain this stateness of PSCs, although it is often restricted, is to wear uniforms that look almost the same as the uniforms of the police (White 2011, 99; Diphoorn 2015a, 320).

The authority that Private Security Companies (PSCs) then get, can be explained by the commodification of security, which is a result of developments in global governance (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007, 240). This means that PSCs are a result of the outsourcing of public security, but PSCs also have the increased acceptance as market actors who provide security services to third parties, for example individuals, businesses, governments and international organisations, that can be bought and sold on a free market (Abrahamsen and Williams 207, 241). This makes it hard to make a clear distinction between public policing and private security actors. Private security actors can then be best described as 'twilight institutions', that operate in the between the state and society, and between public and private (Diphoorn 2013, 23). Abrahamsen and Williams (2007, 237) criticise the two prevailing ideas about the relationship between PSCs and public actors.

First, they state that there is an inclination to believe that the rise of private security corresponds to the erosion of state sovereignty. Private security is then seen as a loss of, or threat to, state power. Even though private security actors might in fact be an indication of state weakness, this is not universally true for three reasons. First, there has been a growing emphasis on 'responsible citizenship', resulting in the outsourcing of state functions combined with the increase in non-state security solutions. Second, the rise of penal states makes that there is in fact an increased funding but not necessarily in the manning of state institutions. Third, there should be a more emphasised notion on the pluralised security landscape in which the public police is becoming more privatised and commodified while the private police is increasingly present in

public space (Diphoorn 2015a, 315). The collaboration between public and private policing actors makes that private security actors can strengthen and support the authority of the state.

The second prevailing idea about PSCs is that private security actors are often regarded as illegitimate actors that exercise illicit authority. Stating that private security actors are illicit undermines that a majority of activities are in fact legal and are often conducted together with and alongside public security actors. Private security companies often gain their legitimacy from the connection with the state forces (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007, 238). Because of this close relationship between private- and public policing actors, it cannot be said that PSCs are accountable to the market whereas state police is accountable to various levels of governance. Furthermore, PSCs are obliged to operate under the law and will receive sanctions if they do not (Baker 2002, 34). Whether a security officer is seen as public or private depends on his immediate employer, the legal power he possesses and to whom the officer is accountable.

These two prevailing ideas can best be described as what Diphoorn (2013, 24) explains as 'twilight policing', which are policing practices applied by armed response officers which come forth from a dual process of collaboration and competition between state and nonstate bodies. Twilight policing then becomes a joint performance, in which policing practices are based on the interaction between various actors.

Besides having 'Universal Rights', meaning they can undertake a citizen's arrest or use force to prevent a crime from happening, some officers might also have 'Select Rights', which are based on contractual agreements, for example the right to refuse entrance or the right to search people (Button 2003, 230). The access to these quasi-public spaces is decided by the landowner and his/her agents. This means that private security officers that enforce order can use their powers to exclude certain people such as unemployed, marginalised, and teenagers if they have reasonable grounds (Button 2003, 229-230). Because of this authority private security actors determine who is secured and who is not, and how they are secured.

This creates a relationship between private officers and clients, and private officers and suspects. The client-officer relationship should always be professional as a security guard's aim is to protect clients (Lubbe 2011, 112). In contrast, people often suspect private security officers as being involved in the crime, especially when the crime is related to the failure of the private security company. This suspicion builds on the knowledge that private security officers have low wages and are therefore more open to corruption or bribes. On top of that, private security officers

often live in lower socioeconomic neighbourhoods together with criminals, presuming that collaboration between the two could be present. (Diphoorn 2016, 167)

Bottom-Up Community Policing Actor

Marije Galama

Another often used way for citizens to provide security is taking measures into their own hands. In the literature this is described as bottom-up or community-initiated policing. Bottom-up community policing refers to ‘‘civilian forms of policing outside a partnership with the state’’ (Schärf 2001, 74). Citizen participation in contemporary societies, often portrayed as complex and divers, frequently facilitates the development of trust, empathy, and social capital (Stoker 2004: 2006 in Bullock 2014, 2). Bottom-up community policing does not necessarily translate into a change in security provision, yet it influences the way in which the state and society interact. Bottom-up community policing promotes social change and challenges political and social violence and can therefore challenge the status quo by the desire of defending fundamental rights and engagement in addressing security issues (Pearce 2007b in Colak and Pearce 2009). Nevertheless, the influence that bottom-up community policing has on safety and security issues is divergent. As noted before, community members involved in policing have been seen as providing a ‘bridge’ between service providers and the public (Stone and Ward 2000; Bullock 2014).

A well-known form of bottom-up community policing is the establishment of a neighbourhood watch (also called a crime watch or neighbourhood crime watch). A neighbourhood watch consists of a group of civilians who want to prevent crime within a neighbourhood. These civilians guard and observe for ‘suspicious’ activity and report this to the police service with the aim of helping the police in reducing crime. Another aim of establishing a neighbourhood watch is to improve the relationship between the community and the police (Bullock 2014, 125). This can be seen as a form of reciprocity in the police-community relationship, as mentioned by Glebbeek (2003).

A second form of bottom-up community policing is citizen patrolling which in some contexts overlaps with neighbourhood watches as they both clearly fit into the description of active and responsible citizens (Bullock 2014, 147). Citizen patrols and neighbourhood watches are often intertwined but it also happens that citizens organise patrols on their own. Citizen patrols often evolve spontaneously within communities, whereas the implementation of neighbourhood watches

is more structured. Additionally, neighbourhood watches persist of participants being described as 'nosy curtain twitchers' whereas citizen patrollers are physically active as they patrol their communities. Third, citizen patrols are often organised by faith groups, which is not the case for neighbourhood watches. (Bullock 2014, 125) Citizen patrols ''can function to improve quality of life, raise confidence in communities and help those in need'' (ACPO 2010, 1 in Bullock 2014, 148). They also ensure that communities feel safe and give community members the feeling of taking back ownership of their open space (ACPO 2010, 1 in Bullock 2014, 148). According to Bullock (2014, 147-157), citizen patrols are 'responsible' groups. There is however the potential for tyranny or vigilante actions by patrollers, which is another form of practicing community policing.

Vigilantism often finds its origin in social movements that become settled in an urban environment and claim to take the law into their own hands (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2008). This term has been used ''to classify a broad range of organisations that rely on violence such as death squads, para-military and defence units involved in 'establishment violence', whether these groups were sponsored by, supplementing or working against, the state'' (Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1976 in Buur and Jensen 2004, 141). Group members have a high degree of distrust in state police, which is often associated with corruption, inefficiency, and leniency. In order to survive, vigilante groups are constantly negotiating with the state (Buur and Jensen 2004, 144). Although vigilante organisations challenge the rule of law and states' monopoly on the exercise of legitimate force, these groups should be seen as a practice of everyday policing within the democratic order (Buur and Jensen 2004, 140; Wisler and Onwudiwe 2008).

Additional to these group-oriented ways of reacting to violence and crime, community members also have more individual ways of providing their own security. According to Moser and McIlwaine (2001, 39) there are four ways of coping with feelings of insecurity in everyday life: avoidance, confrontation, conciliation, and other strategies. Examples of these coping mechanisms include community members who restrict their activities after dark, change walking routes and thereby avoid high risk areas, and report violent events to authorities. Citizens that have the means can also choose to move into areas that are perceived to be safe. Citizens' feelings of insecurity are prominently featured in their fear of crime (Dammert and Malone 2006, 46). These feelings emphasize the complex link between fear of crime and the economic, political, and social position of individuals. Therefore, fear of crime cannot be isolated from other fears citizens face in their

daily lives (Dammert and Malone 2006, 46). Coping with feelings of insecurity in daily life is an ongoing process and for many citizens becomes a feature of daily life (Lysaght and Basten 2003, 4). Gated communities are a popular example of how people cope with feelings of insecurity in everyday life. Gated communities function to create safe private zones through physical inaccessibility (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2008, 431). Gated communities are previously described as quasi-public spaces (White 2011, 88). These residential areas are more than just buildings with fences and a doorman: ‘‘gated communities preclude public access to roads, sidewalks, parks, open space, playground -all resources that in earlier days would have been open and accessible to all citizens of a locality" (Blakely and Snyder, 1998, 62 in Jürgens and Gnad 2002, 338). The rationale for building and living in gated communities rests on the assumption that unregulated space is dangerous (Hook and Vrdoljak 2002). However, it is important to mention that gated communities should not be understood purely in terms of security and control of space: ‘‘it functions also as a powerful economic indicator of affluence’’ (Hook and Vroljak 2002, 10). These communities consist of a living space that accommodates the homes of prestige and security zone community and sometimes even a lifestyle zone community. To those who can afford it, private security companies provide safety and security for a fee. Those communities who cannot afford this alternative form of protection have to rely on their own initiatives (Mulcahy 2015).

3. Context of the four policing actors in Cape Town, South Africa

Introduction

Together

In 1994, Nelson Mandela was elected as the first democratic president of South Africa after a long period of racial segregation through the Apartheid regime. "Apartheid was a system of government that separated the people of South Africa based on race and controlled major functions of a person's life'' (Clark and Worger 2004 in Pruitt 2010, 117). Apartheid played a great role in the formation of social inequalities in South African society. In the context of Cape Town these social inequalities are strengthened by spatial polarisation, where suburbs, economic centers and poor overcrowded settlements exist alongside. Racist fear of the 'other' is the most important motivator for these socio-spatial divisions. (Lemanski 2004, 104) This fear builds on the racist classification of the past that were used to serve the interests of the Apartheid state. These classifications are black, white, coloured, and Indian, the first three being the most important in our research. (Durrheim, Mtose, and Brown 2011, 31)

One of the outcomes of democracy after Apartheid was that whites and capitalists could keep their wealth and property rights that were established during Apartheid. On the other hand the African National Congress (ANC) government secured it's goals of political and civil rights for all South Africans. (Whitehead 2013, 5) One of the policies that the ANC implemented is the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) which aims to increase black ownership of and control over the economy (Southall 2006, 67). However, in reality the economic system is mainly controlled by the white capitalist elite, while the political system is controlled by a black nationalist elite in contemporary South Africa (Whitehead 2013, 5). Economic prosperity also influences how different social groups secure themselves.

During the Apartheid regime, the police had a prominent role in the implementation and execution of the segregation politics on every aspect of daily life. After Apartheid, the state tried to rebuild trust with the public through Community Police Forums. However, the state police still suffers from a negative image among the public because of many integrity scandals. Consequently, citizens are looking for other ways to secure themselves, which is visible in the huge supply of private security services and the up rise of bottom-up community policing groups. In the next paragraphs we explain how these different policing actors operate and how different social groups are involved in organising security in the context of Cape Town.

Top-Down Community Policing in Cape Town

Iris van der Kamp

In South Africa top-down community policing was initiated in the aftermath of the apartheid as a way to rebuild trust between citizens and the police (Bénit-Gbaffou, Didier and Morange 2008; Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003). The South African Police Service (SAPS) formalised community policing in the form of Community Policing Forums (CPF) in their Act 68 in 1995, "as the only consultative forum designed to permit communities to make their policing concerns known to the police." As CPFs are the only recognised form of community policing by the SAPS and also, most discussed in scientific literature, we will only focus on the CPF as top-down community policing actor in Cape Town.

Act 68 of the SAPS described that at each police station a CPF had to be established (Pelser 1999, 4). Initially CPFs had to rebuild trust between citizens and the police by holding the police accountable (Schärf 2001, 75). Besides improving transparency, five other main goals were developed by the SAPS in Act 68. The first three are focused on a partnership, including the promotion, cooperation and communication, between the SAPS and the community. The fourth involves the provision of multi-level police services to the community on a local, provincial and national level. The last goal connects to what is considered as characteristic of community policing in scientific literature, that pays attention to problem-solving by the SAPS and the community.

The CPF is described as a platform where community members, NGOs, businesses, local governments, traditional authorities, and the police meet to discuss security issues. The involvement of businesses and NGOs is seen as necessary in the provision of (financial) support and training, at least for the implementation, for successful community policing in South Africa (Davis, Henderson and Merrick 2003, 296). During the implementation phase of CPFs around 1995 some NGOs have been funded by Dutch and British governments to train community members in communicating their needs to the police (Schärf 2001). This influence of former colonisers entails the western notion of community policing in South Africa (Van der Spuy 2000, 346). This might stand in the way of successful community policing as it does not always suit the specific needs of a community.

CPFs still aim to be a pivot in a network concerned with providing security and preventing crime. To work this out effectively, the province of the Western Cape has a CPF Toolkit (2003) available which provides help in the set up and run of a CPF. The local police Station

Commissioner has the responsibility by law to establish a CPF and to choose representative local community members for the forum (Davis, Henderson and Merrick 2003, 296). Besides, an Executive Committee of the forum is elected which is responsible for the everyday functioning of the CPF. The effectiveness of the forum seems to be better in Cape Town's wealthier communities as there are more resources available, according to Karreth (2018, 335). A challenge that different communities face, is the lack of training for community policing due to SAPS' weak institutional capacity. (Karreth 2018, 335) In the province of the Western Cape the Department of Community Safety (DOCS) must oversee CPFs and may assist in funding, training or resources (Brown 2016, 62).

There are multiple acts, papers, and constitutions in which the organisation of CPFs is outlined (Brown 2016). However, the concrete role and functioning of CPFs is hard to define. The CPF serves as a platform which needs to improve the relationship between the South African Police Service and citizens of a local community. How, in the sense of which activities are organised to establish a good relationship, are not specifically described. Some activities that are mentioned on local CPF websites and in recent studies, are CPFs patrolling the neighbourhood, organising meetings, and monitoring the local police (Malatji 2016; Munneke 2011). In addition, the use of social media has become part of the daily activities. Especially Facebook groups, which are freely accessible for everyone, are used to create a cohesive community by giving advice and support on security, and to provide information about meetings and crimes. (Hattingh 2015) The unclear role of CPFs is criticised by Berg, Cartwright, Lamb, and McDonald (2014, 22). They see the CPF framework as a one-size-fits-all approach which does not suit specific community needs. Therefore, they recommend a narrow mandate and suggest to rethink the role of CPFs.

State Policing in Cape Town

Hannah Postma

With the fall of Apartheid, the South African Police (SAP) underwent a transformation. The most remarkable adjustment was the name change South African Police Service (SAPS). Highlighting the fact that the police should deliver service to the public and not act as a force upon them. (Pruitt 2010, 119) As mentioned in the paragraph above the government passed a legislation, which made community policing a new goal for the SAPS. The reform aimed at creating a democratic police

organisation and bring the community closer to the police, focusing more on the civilian ethos by changing the police doctrine. However, after years of demilitarisation, the government restored certain militarised elements within the police organisation. For example, in 2010 the police minister Bheki Cele, former police commissioner, reintroduced militarised ranks, stating that this would bring back the needed discipline.[10] In May 2018 the re-appointed Bheki Cele announced to remilitarise the police especially in Cape Town. This entailed the launching of special operations to reduce the high crime rate. At present, SAPS is seen as a hierarchical and militaristic national police organisation that is directed from a national level in Pretoria. (Lamb 2018)

The SAPS is structured in provinces (9), clusters (176) and precincts (1146) and consists of almost 200.000 members today (SAPS 2018), of whom 120,475 work at station-level (Lamb 2018). The other police officers are deployed with provincials and governmental offices. When SAPS was establishment many officers left because they did not agree with the change of vision. Complementary, low recruitment was another key problem for almost a decade (Hansen 2006, 286), and it appears to still be today. Especially the Western Cape's government claims to be disadvantaged by SAPS in allocation of resources and police personnel, compared to other provinces. According to Alan Winde, president of the Western Cape ruling political party Democratic Alliance, police is understaffed by 4,500 officers[11][2], leaving the province with a police/public ratio of 1:509[12]. However, this is not due to a lack of interest: in 2018 SAPS received over half a million applications but could accommodate only 3,500.[13][4] The requirements to join SAPS are a high school degree and possession of a driver's license. These exclude many as in South Africa only half of those who begin school finish it (Wilkinson 2016 in Faull 2017, 337). Another finding of Faull (2017, 337) about the SAPS recruitment is that the majority of applicants apply out of desperation: "Those who get selected out of many who want to join, rewrite their self-narrative. There is a lack of inherent motivation for the job, but many told themselves that they

[10] "SAPS Shake-Up: How Policing is being improved in South Africa." https://oldsite.issafrica.org/uploads/2016-05-19-SAPS-Shake-Up-Presentation.pdf, Accessed on 09-05-2019.
[11] "Cele sets record straight on police resourcing in Western Cape." https://ewn.co.za/2019/04/30/cele-sets-record-straight-on-police-resourcing-in-western-cape, Accessed on 09-05-2019.
[12] "Western Cape Government declares dispute with Cele over police resources." https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/western-cape-government-declares-dispute-with-cele-over-police-resources-20190428, Accessed on 09-05-2019.
[13] "500,000 apply for SAPS learnership program which has 3500 spaces". https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1997933/500-000-apply-for-saps-learnership-programme-which-has-3-500-spaces/, Accessed on 30-04-2019.

were fortunate to be part of an organisation that offered them a life-long job, relatively good remuneration, medical insurance, skill development, and educational opportunities."

Cape Town has some of the highest crime rates in South Africa. Amongst those crimes are murder, attempted murder, robbery and common assault (Lamb 2018, 5). Most of the crime is localised in poorer areas, such as townships and the Cape Flats, with a predominantly black and coloured population. Western Cape SAPS has an unequal allocation of police resources in favour of wealthier areas, despite the fact that those areas have lower crime rates. This unequal access to security derives from Apartheid's skewed socio-spatial distribution of personal and institutional resources throughout the city (Lemanski 2004, 104) and has the effect of reinforcing established patterns of poverty, inequality and violent crimes (Lamb 2018, 23).

According to the SAPS, the department of Western Cape has measured lower crime rates over the last year, however citizens' perception of being safe has become more sceptical[14]. To continue the decrease in crime rates, SAPS wants to increase police visibility. This is done by being presence in public places and targeting deployments in high crime areas. (SAPS Western Cape 2018, 60) To increase safety in Western Cape the SAPS implemented a strategy in 2018 that requires drastic change in operationalisation. They aim at "(..) reclaiming all the 'high crime and hotspot areas' and stamp the authority of the State on these areas" (SAPS 2018, 12). These strategies mostly exist of joined operations with the Metro Police (Municipal Police). Lamb (2018, 25) argues that these operations are forms of militarised policing that does contribute to reducing 'violent crime' but simultaneously further reduced the trust between police and community. Also Makoni (2017, 49) argues that the public still mistrusts the police and is reluctant to report to or cooperate with SAPS. One of the reasons is that SAPS has been evaluated as the second most corrupt public service department in the country. An example is the case of Jack Selebi, former National Police Commissioner and former Interpol president, who was convicted for corruption in 2010. Despite allegations and convictions, still many senior SAPS members defend the SAPS and their crimes, taking their code of silence seriously. (Kutnjak Ivkovic and Sauerman 2012, 22-23) Concluding, the SAPS still suffers from a low integrity reputation, failing its corruption control mechanisms and lack of trustworthiness in the perception of the public (Kutnjak Ivkovic and Sauerman 2015, 46).

[14] "Stats SA. Statistics South Africa." http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=737&id=5=5, Accessed on 09-05-2019.

Private policing in Cape Town

Danique Lauritsen

South Africa has the largest private security sector in the world. The state first saw the Post-Apartheid private security industry as illegitimate, but in only ten years the industry has become integrated in public-private partnerships to maintain law of order. (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007, 243) As a result of government procedures favouring black or racially diverse companies, there has been a vast grow in black owned private security companies.

It is not unusual to see signs that indicate the presence of a private security company providing 'rapid armed response', in gated communities, and guards patrolling the suburbs (Lemanski 2006, 789). Within South Africa private security officers considerably outnumber police officers (Diphoorn 2015, 313). The appearance of private security officers and their gear vary depending on the threats they encounter, but it often consists of black army trousers, combat boots, batons, pepper spray, and two-way radios (Paasche, Yarwood and Sideway 2013, 1564). Most employees are men, of which a majority is non-white and lives in lower income areas as a consequence of low salaries (Diphoorn 2015, 320). PSCs employ both officers on foot and officers in vehicles, which are often armed response officers. With these vehicles, private security officers can detain and transport people in custody. Control room employees coordinate operations. (Paasche, Yarwood and Sidaway 2013, 1565).

The occupational culture of armed response officers resembles that of state police. The private security sector encourages the imitation of state police, both operationally and symbolically. Furthermore, characteristic of the armed response officers is that they initially all wanted to become police officers but were unable to do so and therefore entered the private security industry (Diphoorn 2015, 320). The resemblance between state police and PSCs in Cape Town can also be explained in three other ways. First, state police officers are recruited by private security organisations, also known as moonlighting. Second, there is an increasing exchange of information on policing techniques, patterns of crime, and crime resolving technology between police officers and private security companies. Third, private security actors are engaged in public and quasi-public places, for example in the Airport (Baker 2002, 33). The exclusive authority of state officials has therefore reduced, making that the public authorities, although an important and privileged actor, have become one of the multiple policing actors (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007, 241). PSCs are increasingly involved in the securitisation of public space resulting in a growing

target population (Berg 2010, 289) in which clients become consumers. It is now common for commercial enterprises, international organisations, and private individuals to hire PSCs, where security becomes a service (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007, 242).

Security guards do not have the same powers as the SAPS but have the right to hold a gun under license and use weapons such as guns and pepper gas for the use of self-defence, in case they suspect someone of a serious crime, or during a citizen's arrest (Baker 2002, 37). Private security companies are gaining both symbolic and real powers. PSCs intentionally operated under the criminal justice system and restricted itself to law enforcement duties. However, they are now pushing the boundaries and postponing the involvement of the police in the arrest process of suspects. On the one hand this supports their legitimacy and share in policing, but on the other hand shores up the state police. (Berg 2010)

The differences between the public character of a public police officer and the private character of a company guard can therefore be hard to characterise. This creates a grey area which is filled by quasi-public institutions, for example universities, whose security staff cannot simply be distinguished as either public or private. (Shearing and Stenning 1981, 196) An example of this is the City Improvement District (CID) which is a non-profit organisation that operates with property owners in a geographic area. These property owners pay an extra levy which is dedicated to the specific CID area to provide services, such as security, supplementary to those provided by the City of Cape Town.[15]

The private security industry in South Africa is supervised by government agency 'Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority.' They check for criminal records of future employees, inspect firms' records and approve training centres. (Baker 2002, 37)

Bottom-Up Community Policing in Cape Town

Marije Galama

South Africa's rising crime rates cause feelings of insecurity and an uprise of perceived threats. As a result, people withdraw from public spaces and take on their own measures to deal with these perceived threats (Louw 1997, 38). This resulted in the rise of bottom-up community policing initiatives. Today, bottom-up community policing is present in every neighbourhood of South

[15] "City Improvement." http://cityimprovement.co.za/wordpress/, Accessed on 07-05-2019.

Africa. Bottom-up community policing frequently facilitates the development of interpersonal trust, empathy, and social capital (Stoker 2004: 2006 in Bullock 2014, 2).

Since the early 1990s, the acceleration of crime has encouraged South Africans to take multiple measures to avoid crime and to feel more secure, of which the most common three will be discussed below.

The first measure is often evident among wealthy (predominantly, but not exclusively, white) citizens that deal with perceived threats by the physical inaccessibility of houses by constructing electrified fences, high walls, closing street access, and the rise of gated communities. These processes are not entirely new as the wish for segregation can be linked to the Apartheid era. However, the demand for gated communities significantly increased after the process of democratisation (Roberts 1996 in Jürgens and Gnad 2002, 341). According to Breetzke, Landman and Cohn (2014, 126) not just the high crime rates causes the rise of gated communities: ‘‘In the face of dramatic demographic, economic and social changes occurring in South Africa, gated communities provide a location where residents can be isolated in their territory safe from the dangers and changes that exist on the outside.’’

The second measure to deal with perceived threats are community policing initiatives that have approval of the public police. Johnson (1991 in Baker 2002, 36) refers to this as responsible citizen responses. Some initiatives are set up by resident groups, others are created by citizens forming non-profit organisations, and through the collective hiring of private security companies. (Baker 2002, 36). In Cape Town, there are many responsible citizen responses such as neighbourhood watches, community improvement districts and citizen patrol groups.[16]

The third measure is described as vigilantism. Johnson (1991 in Baker 2002, 35) refers to these groups as autonomous citizen responses as they operate without the approval of or cooperation with the state police. This is common in the poorer settlements of Cape Town which lack proper roads, pathways, and streetlights. Police are often afraid to patrol such areas. Moreover, there is still a certain level of mistrust to the police due to the legacy of Apartheid. As a result, communities have turned to alternative means of implementing the law and taken the law into their own hands: the phenomenon of vigilantism (Breetzke et al. 2014, 299). These vigilante groups are characterised by reactive and violent methods of control (Baker 2002). As a consequence of the, in their opinion, deficiency of the state, community justice provides its citizens with the protection

[16] Participant observation from Marije Galama between 12-02-2019 and 30-03-2019

they desire (Schärf 2001, 78). Vigilante groups were common under Apartheid and constructed their own specialised units that focused mostly on political activity (Pauw 1991 in Schärf 2001, 78). Since the democratic transition, vigilante groups are still present in various communities but their motives have changed. Nowadays, vigilante groups focus mainly on the high levels of crime. They centre their frustration towards the SAPS' inability to provide security, due to lack of resources and training within the SAPS (Schärf 2001, 78). Most citizens do not challenge the legitimacy of bottom-up community policing groups, even when they might criticize certain actions the groups take. The community tradition of Capetonians and their financial ability to gain access to security determines their choices in policing. (Lysaght and Basten 2003, 4)

4. Community Police Forum

Iris van der Kamp

This chapter is divided into two parts. First, the neighbourhoods of Hout Bay and Rondebosch are described to get a vivid picture of what these areas look like. Hout Bays' description is based on the division into the three areas of Imizamo Yethu, the Valley, and Hangberg. The focus in Rondebosch is on the University of Cape Town (UCT) and the Main Roads. While describing both neighbourhoods, I shed light on the security threats that are present in each neighbourhood. Second, the Community Police Forums (CPFs) as top-down community policing actors are described in the context of Hout Bay and Rondebosch. The organisation of CPFs according to different frameworks, the members, the activities, the collaboration with other policing actors, and the concrete role are explained in order to answer the question of how CPFs provide citizen security. I finish this chapter by questioning the effectiveness of CPFs, but I also highlight their value in the context of post-Apartheid Cape Town.

Hout Bay

A must-see in Cape Town is the view from Chapmans Peak, particularly at sunset. The sun goes down into the Atlantic Ocean on the left while lights of houses, lanterns, and cars go on in Hout Bay on the right. Hout Bay's banana-shaped form is clearly visible from Chapmans Peak, as this is the 'stalk of the banana' (see map 1). To get an image of Hout Bay, we went on a trip from Chapmans Peak to Hangberg. The Chapmans Peak Drive ends where a little business district with shops and restaurants on the left side of the road starts. This district is placed along one of the two main roads in Hout Bay that 'naturally' divide the neighbourhood in three smaller areas. On the right side of the road is a driveway to the secured estate of Berg-en-Dal. The estate is closed by white walls and the only visible thing is a gatehouse that cars need to pass in order to enter.

We drive towards the police station which we see on the right side of the road, when we get stuck in a traffic jam with a white car in front of us and a minivan behind. The police station is recognisable by police cars that are parked outside. Above the entrance on the wall is a police logo visible with "Hout Bay SAPS" next to it. Underneath is "South African Police" written in the languages Xhosa, English, and Afrikaans. These represent the languages spoken in Hout Bay, as Xhosa is spoken in Imizamo Yethu, English by people in the Valley, and Afrikaans in Hangberg. This visible division of Hout Bay in three areas is a result of Apartheid, when people were spatially segregated based on their race (Lemanski 2004, 102). Hangberg was in the early fifties categorised

as 'coloured area' and the middle of Hout Bay, the Valley, as 'white group area'.[17] The land which is now known as Imizamo Yethu (IY according to locals) was only made available for squatters around 1991, near the end of Apartheid.[18] This led to the establishment of informal settlements and a major influx of immigrants. These were mainly Xhosa speaking people from the Eastern Cape, but today there are also immigrants from other countries on the African continent.

At our first meeting with Nathan, who is the CPF chairperson of Hout Bay, he told us not to enter IY alone.[19] After that meeting, Nathan drove us around in the lower part of IY. On a sandy road, as there is no infrastructure, you see a lot of people, white (damaged) cars, and waste. The majority of houses are shacks built from corrugated sheets. According to the census of 2011,[20] there are approximately 15,000 people living in Imizamo Yethu. We passed small shops, such as barbershops and car garages, but also rugs on which people sell shoes. Nathan said these shoes are collected after a big fire that destroyed a part of Imizamo Yethu.[21] After one month of fieldwork, it becomes clear that these fires happen frequently. On the 26th of February 2019 a 'small' fire broke out in IY. This fire, as just one example, shows how people are affected as people are traumatised and left homeless. According to News24,[22] the cause of the fire is unknown. According to our research participants, drought, cooking on petrol, and alcohol abuse cause the fires. Alcohol, which is often bought in illicit stores called 'shebeens', leads to reckless and/or aggressive behaviour. Related to this, alcohol abuse is also considered as a cause for domestic violence.

The roundabout near the police station can drive you up to IY on the one side and to the Valley on the other side. The Valley is the richer area of Hout Bay and as a result from Apartheid still mainly 'white'. The Valley is situated between the beach and the Table Mountain. Trees along the road and green gardens make it much greener compared to IY. Villas here are fenced by walls and gates, and various private security companies (PSCs) signs are visible on the houses. Nathan says that the closer you get to the Table Mountain, the more expensive the houses get.[23] The luxury

[17] "Hangberg, Hout Bay." https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/hangberg-hout-bay, Accessed on 29-05-2019.
[18] "Imizamo Yethu, Hout Bay." https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/imizamo-yethu-hout-bay, Accessed on 29-05-2019.
[19] Informal conversation with Nathan, 05-02-2019.
[20] "Census CT Suburb Imizamo Yethu Profile." http://resource.capetown.gov.za/documentcentre/Documents/Maps%20and%20statistics/2011_Census_CT_Suburb_Imizamo_Yethu_Profile.pdf, Accessed on 21-06-2019.
[21] Informal conversation with Nathan, 05-02-2019.
[22] "Fire hits Mandela Park in Imizamo Yethu again." https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Local/Peoples-Post/fire-hits-mandela-park-in-imizamo-yethu-again-20190226, Accessed on 06-06-2019.
[23] Informal conversation with Nathan, 05-02-2019.

houses, especially in contrast with the shacks in IY, are vulnerable for crimes as housebreakings and home-invasions. Another security threat that is mentioned frequently is taxi-violence on the Main Roads that surround the Valley. As an example, at the end of our fieldwork period on the first of April in 2019 was a deadly shootout near the police station. The Times Live[24] wrote an article about the shooting by interviewing someone from SAPS, a ward councillor, and the CPF chairman. In this interview they all see cooperation as a way to address the taxi-violence problem because it hugely affects the residents of Hout Bay.

One of the consequences of taxi violence is that it hurts the economy. Tourism and the fishing industry are the main income source for residents in Hout Bay. The white sand beach, the various restaurants where you can eat freshly caught fish, the food market, and the sounds of seals that appear now and then are attractive for tourists. On the way to the food market near the harbour one comes along the only road that can bring you up in Hangberg. This is the third area of Hout Bay which is still considered as 'coloured' area. The people live in apartment buildings, brick houses, or (informal) shacks. It is geographically as well as socially a closed community. According to Fiona Anciano,[25] who is a researcher at the University of the Western Cape and has conducted research in Hout Bay in 2016, the very tight community of Hangberg where everyone knows one another results in domestic violence not getting reported to the police. The police-community relationship in Hangberg is violent due to its past. Furthermore, there are no established gangs in Hangberg anymore, but there are local middlemen embedded in crimes as drug trading, prostitution, and the poaching of fish (Anciano and Piper 2019; De Greef 2013, 78-79). The latter is mentioned frequently as security threat in Hangberg. The people in Hangberg see fishing as a source of income while the state made it a crime by law that prescribes you are only allowed to fish with a licence (De Greef 2013; Lambrechts and Goga 2016). Generations in Hangberg rely on the sea for their income and they continue with fishing as promises from governmental organisations for improved living conditions have not been delivered.[26]

The richer Valley amidst the two disadvantaged areas of IY and Hangberg creates a

[24] "Bullets Fly in Taxi Violence Killing Four People in Hout Bay." https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-04-01-bullets-fly-in-taxi-violence-killing-four-people-in-hout-bay/, Accessed on 06-06-2019.
[25] Interview with Fiona Anciano, 22-02-2019. She is a researcher at the University of the Western Cape. She is a social scientist with a broad interest in democratisation, civil society, and urban governance. Fiona Anciano just published her book 'Democracy Disconnected' with Laurence Piper about multilevel forms of governance in Hout Bay.
[26] "Here's why Hout Bay residents are protesting." https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/heres-why-houtbay-residents-are-protesting-16575333, Accessed on 12-06-2019.

situation where "first and third world are living side by side".[27] The spatial division of social, socio-economic, and racial groups in Hout Bay show why South Africa can be seen as an example of a divided society (Brewer 1991, 179). The police, and CPFs by extension, are in these societies part of the division as they are unable to serve all the different groups. Especially the Hangberg community had and still has a violent relationship with the Hout Bay police.

Rondebosch

On Schiphol Airport, before our flight to Cape Town, we decided to buy the book "Americans do not walk".[28] We did not foresee the accuracy as this book tells the story of why, especially white, Americans do not walk in the Apartheid City of St. Louis in the United States of America. Due to fear of the other, white people in Cape Town often do not walk either. In Hout Bay we were advised not to walk at all. In Rondebosch we could walk, but always together, without earplugs so we would hear everything, and with our bags visible in front us. With these tips in mind, we went community mapping Rondebosch to get a good impression of the neighbourhood. Our student identity made us less outstanding amongst the students of the University of Cape Town (UCT) who walk on the Main Road to get a burger at McDonalds while waiting for the Jammie bus. Rondebosch has a train station, but public transport is not perceived as safe by many people. Therefore, UCT has the Jammie which is their own free shuttle bus for students and staff that operates between residences, the UCT campus, and some transport facilities near the university.[29] The following vignette shows a trip with the Jammie bus up to the UCT campus to get an image of the campus in Rondebosch.

> *We wait in line with multiple students for the Jammie at the Claremont train station to go to the UCT campus. Once driving, it takes approximately twenty minutes to get to the lower campus because of traffic jam on the main road in Rondebosch. As the UCT campus is situated on the Table Mountain there are three 'levels' which are called the lower, middle, and upper campus. From the main road, we pass the lower campus to go to the middle campus. From the middle campus we walk along*

[27] Informal Conversation with Nathan, 05-02-2019.
[28] Veelen, Arjen van. 2018. *Amerikanen lopen niet.* Amsterdam: De Correspondent.
[29] "Jammie Shuttle." http://www.students.uct.ac.za/students/services/transport-parking/jammie-shuttle, Accessed on 09-06-2019.

the criminology building up towards a tunnel underneath the M3 Rhodes Drive which enables us to walk to the upper campus. The tunnel is decorated with street art and at the end are stairs that lead us through the rugby fields further up the mountain to the university library. We are impressed by the old pompous ancient Greek styled buildings. The library, with its Ionic styled columns, is placed in the middle of the campus and has an open view over the suburbs of Cape Town. Close to the library we see the anthropology building with ivy against the wall which adds more sphere.

The buildings of UCT show wealth as much as other schools and the houses in Rondebosch do. Big white houses with green lawns are remarkable in a period of drought. Most of the houses are stuccoed, have at least two floors, and gates around the property. Even the church on the corner of the street has gates. The big old trees along the roads provide shadow as well as they give a soothing feeling in the middle of the city. A clump of thorn trees on the banks of the Liesbeek river, called the Rivertrail by our research participants, are the reason that Jan van Riebeeck named this area 'Het Ronde Doornbosjen', which later evolved into Rondebosch.[30] The quietness at the river is in contrast to the sounds of 'Wynberg' screaming minivan owners and horns honking at the M4 Main Road. The M4 serves as a transit which connects the southern suburbs with the city centre of Cape Town and is, as a result, always very busy. Most of the shops and businesses are situated around this Main Road. Opposed to the Riverside Mall on the Main Road in a narrow side street is the Rondebosch police station.

The police station is visible through its sign on the Main Road. The monthly Community Police Forum meetings are held in the conference room of the police station. On the walls in the conference room are posters with the different areas in Rondebosch, various security threats, and crime statistics. The Main Road is highlighted as high-crime area. At one of the CPF meetings it became clear that for example students get robbed when they order chicken wings at Nando's. Also, people in cars get robbed when their cars are damaged by rocks on the road. The cars are a target for crime anyway. Mr. Jones, who is the responsible manager for the private security of UCT says: "Whoever stays here is

[30] "Rondebosch." https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/rondebosch, Accessed on 21-06-2019.

filthy rich, as you can see from the cars that drive around here."[31] These cars are a target for theft from/out/of vehicles. Furthermore, the big white houses are a target for burglaries and housebreakings.

The organisation of the Community Police Forum

Chapter seven of the South African Police Service (SAPS) Act 68 of 1995[32] states that each police station must have a functional Community Police Forum (CPF). Aside from this Act, the Department Of Community Safety (DOCS) of the province of the Western Cape has a uniform constitution "to regulate the establishment, functioning and management of Community Police Forums and Boards, to operate as effective Community Structurers through which the Police shall liaise with the Community".[33] Nathan gives me this fifty-two pages document during our first meeting.[34] He is a bald-headed big man with a fair skin. Nathan is elected as Hout Bays CPF chairman six months ago. He explains that the constitution is a framework and structure for Community Police Forums (CPFs) in the Western Cape province.[35]

In addition to the chairperson, the executive committee of a CPF must exist of a deputy chairperson, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer, project coordinator, and public relations officer. The only person who was elected without being asked beforehand was Fundiswa, Hout Bays' project coordinator. She is a young mother and wanted to become a CPF member because of her father who is deputy chairperson of the CPF. They are the only ones in Hout Bays' CPF from Imizamo Yethu. Fundiswa explains that her motivation comes down to the willingness to do something for her community. She has the idea of reciprocity: "If I join the CPF, I also learn things and give that to my children. I give something to the CPF, but I get something back too."[36] According to Glebbeek (2003, 54) reciprocity is ideally the basis of the police-community relationship. This idea of reciprocity applies to several CPF members in the sense that they benefit from their work at the CPF. They can voice concerns and stay informed about crime statistics and

[31] Interview with Mr. Jones, 26-02-2019.
[32] "South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995." https://www.saps.gov.za/legislation/acts/act68of1995.pdf, Accessed on 05-06-2019.
[33] "Uniform Constitution for Community Police Forums and Boards in the Western Cape." https://www.westerncape.gov.za/assets/departments/community-safety/a_-_cpf_constitution_1.pdf, Accessed on 10-06-2019.
[34] Informal conversation with Nathan, 05-02-2019.
[35] Interview with Nathan, 21-02-2019.
[36] Interview with Fundiswa, 15-02-2019.

policing operations in their area. The chairperson of the Rondebosch CPF is elected "not because I work for the University of Cape Town (UCT), but because it is the interest that we [UCT] have in reducing crime in the bigger Rondebosch area".[37] UCT is an important actor in community policing in Rondebosch. The UCT campus is a big part of Rondebosch, in and around Rondebosch live a lot of students, and it is the only open university in South Africa. The latter means that UCT has no fences and has to regulate the people that move in and out of their spaces. Through collaboration with several policing actors, UCT aims to control the people on campus. In addition, they benefit from an attractive, clean, and safe neighbourhood (Stone and Ward 2000) as this attracts international students.[38]

It is remarkable that, except for Fundiswa, all other members in both Hout Bay and Rondebosch were asked to join the CPF as the uniform constitution of CPFs[39] states that members need to be elected. Some were asked because of their professional background: "I was asked to be the treasurer of the CPF, because I got a finance background."[40] Others because of their activities in other organisations: "I have done the chair for the neighbourhood watch a few years before. I had a good relationship with all the guys here. So, they asked if I would consider."[41] Although they were often the only candidate, they were still formally elected. The CPF constitution says that members should be elected from Community-based Organisations that are registered with the Forum.[42] What is meant by Community-based Organisations is up for interpretation. In fact, all my research participants are concerned with safety and security in other organisations than the CPF. This is either work-related: "My work is safety and security"[43] or via a bottom-up community policing group: "I am also part of the neighbourhood watch."[44] In addition to these members, Davis, Henderson and Merrick (2003, 296) ascribe a big role to SAPS station commanders. This differs from what I found during fieldwork as it showed that the SAPS station commanders in both

[37] Interview with Michael, 26-02-2019.
[38] Interview with Michael, 26-02-2019.
[39] "Uniform Constitution for Community Police Forums and Boards in the Western Cape. https://www.westerncape.gov.za/assets/departments/community-safety/a_-_cpf_constitution_1.pdf, Accessed on 10-06-2019."
[40] Interview with Audrey, 18-02-2019.
[41] Interview with Nathan, 21-02-2019.
[42] Uniform Constitution for Community Police Forums and Boards in the Western Cape. https://www.westerncape.gov.za/assets/departments/community-safety/a_-_cpf_constitution_1.pdf, Accessed on 10-06-2019.
[43] Interview with Kumi, 26-02-2019.
[44] Interview with Audrey, 18-02-2019.

Hout Bay and Rondebosch are not much involved in CPF practices. Station commander Verwey was present at one meeting in Rondebosch. At the meetings of March and April there were other SAPS representatives. In Hout Bay the most important SAPS representative for CPF members is the public relations officer. The SAPS representatives are CPF members as part of their function at SAPS. The other CPF members are volunteers.

Voluntarism in combination with a legislative framework that has a lot of requirements leads to challenges for some CPFs. According to Nathan, communities like Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu (IY) in Hout Bay struggle "to set up the structures that the document [CPF constitution] requires".[45] He argues that "within a structure of a majority poverty struck community where education levels aren't necessarily high, it is difficult to manage something that is complicated like that".[46] Audrey, Hout Bays' treasurer, expresses this as: "If you are struggling in a way like in Hangberg or IY, your focus is purely on the bottom of the hierarchy of needs to put bread on the table; safety and security will be of less importance".[47] Whereas these members suggest that people in lower income areas do not join CPFs due to a lack of time and resources, scientific research (Louw and Shaw 1997, 26) shows this is due to a mistrust in the police. The police is seen as incapable to provide citizen security. CPFs suffer from that perception as they are related to the police. Multiple researchers state that CPFs function the least in lower income areas despite that they are needed there the most (David, Henderson, and Merrick 2003; Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003; Berg, Cartwright, Lamb, and McDonald 2014, 21; Malatji 2016, 33). Hangberg has, out of the three communities in Hout Bay, the most violent relationship with the police. Their violent past consists of several struggles and fights with the police. In IY there is a lot of mistrust towards the police. This situation also affects the CPF as there are no representatives from Hangberg, only two from IY, and six from the Valley. The following vignette illustrates the interaction between the members from the different communities:

> *In the conference room at the back of the police station in Hout Bay there are nine people sitting around the table for the CPF meeting of February. The two black people are sitting close to each other, furthest removed from the door, and slightly*

[45] Interview with Nathan, 21-02-2019.
[46] Interview with Nathan, 21-02-2019.
[47] Interview with Audrey, 18-02-2019.

> *distanced from the other seven white people. This "IY side" is very quiet according to the white dominant chairman. Their flabbergasted faces are a result of a comment from the SAPS captain who talked about a shooting at a Somalian Shop on the edge of IY across the police station that night. "The suspects are unknown, might be Somalian" but might be somewhere else as "every country around Somalia is the same". Laughter and rumour arises for some as a joke, for others, including the IY side, it seems to be an emotion of amazement.*[48]

The heterogeneity of Hout Bays' population makes it difficult for the CPF to serve the whole neighbourhood as each community needs another strategy. This is a challenge of policing a divided community. Top-down community policing actors namely aim attention at problem-solving on a local level (Williams 2011, 90), as described in chapter two. The Hout Bay CPF aims to set up new subforums in Hangberg and IY in order to make the CPF work there as well. Rondebosch, by contrast, is an affluent homogeneous community. Anine Kriegler,[49] scholar at the University of Cape Town, connects Rondebosch' wealth to lower crime rates, a well-functioning police station, and a well-functioning CPF too. Furthermore, the Rondebosch community does not have a violent past with the police which results in a better police-community relationship today.[50]

(In)Active

The SAPS Act 68[51] only describes the six main goals of CPFs which aim to improve the police-community relationship. The CPF constitution provides some more guidelines concerning different functions, meetings, and finances. The meetings are the only concrete mentioned activities which CPFs need to organise. In Rondebosch the CPF meets the requirement to organise a meeting once a month. In Hout Bay there was only one meeting of which we knew during our two and a half months fieldwork period. Citizens are welcome to join the monthly meetings in Rondebosch. As such, there were two or three different community members present at each meeting. Citizens participate in the sense that they ask questions or raise complaints.[52] Once a

[48] Participant observation at the Hout Bay CPF meeting of February, 25-02-2019.
[49] Interview with Anine, 14-02-2019.
[50] "Rondebosch." https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/rondebosch, Accessed on 11-06-2019.
[51] "South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995." https://www.saps.gov.za/legislation/acts/act68of1995.pdf, Accessed on 11-06-2019.
[52] Participant Observation at the Rondebosch CPF meetings of February and March, 12-02/03-2019.

resident asked what is going to happen with a wrong parked car. In another meeting a resident asked if the police has any bicycles and motors available to patrol in his area as crime is too bad. In Hout Bay citizens are only welcome to join the annual meetings. At the annual community meeting "issues of safety and security"[53] are discussed and they "can have a community coming in, write down their issues, have a chat to them so they are informed of what the CPF's function is".[54] The openness of the Rondebosch CPF might contribute to a better police-community relationship compared to Hout Bay as the openness of meetings is a sign of transparency. On the one hand, citizens can come up with problems or struggles they want to discuss so the CPF and SAPS are informed about citizens' concerns. On the other hand, citizens can get knowledge about crime statistics and the different policing actors that are active in the neighbourhood which may improve citizens' perceptions of policing actors and (the provision of) security.

Hout Bays' CPF does not invite citizens every month for the meetings but they do connect with their citizens via Facebook: "There is a Facebook group for Hout Bay. We all talk together about stuff that is happening. So people get to know what is going on."[55] On the Hout Bay Community Policing Forum Facebook page you can find posts about the SAPS crime statistics, media reports about heavy crimes such as murder, traffic operations, and updates on current happenings: "Taxis are blocking the SAPS circle, please avoid area."[56] Facebook is the platform where most people are on, according to Nathan.[57] Facebook is freely accessible for everyone (Hattingh 2015) and might therefore be used by most people from different areas. Citizens can use the Facebook group to stay informed but can also react on posts and send (personal) messages with questions, complaints, or concerns. This values for WhatsApp as well as this is used for 'general' communication. Whereas the Hout Bay CPF members know about different WhatsApp groups in the community, the Rondebosch CPF members are not informed about these. During one of the CPF meetings a guest of the Resident Association (RA) in Rondebosch said there are "many WhatsApp groups with over a hundred people in it",[58] but none of the CPF members knew about these. The Rondebosch CPF is also not active on Facebook. Kumi,[59] the vice chairperson, says

[53] Interview with Audrey, 18-02-2019.
[54] Interview with Nathan, 21-02-2019.
[55] Interview with Claire, 21-02-2019.
[56] Hout Bay Community Policing Forum Facebook. 27-03-2019 at 05:07.
[57] Interview with Nathan, 21-02-2019.
[58] Participation Observation at the Rondebosch CPF meeting of March, 12-03-2019.
[59] Interview with Kumi, 26-02-2019.

social media is a very time consuming thing and they do not have a full-time member who could do it. In Hout Bay the CPF chairperson considers "looking after our Facebook" as part of his CPF function[60]. Besides, he is concerned with "answering emails, queries, complaints, phone calls of residents with issues" and "Captain Swart will give me a call, we try to meet every morning for at least half an hour."[61] Since the Rondebosch chairperson is concerned with the provision of security in his everyday life in both the CPF and at his regular job, these are intertwined. As many CPF members are active in the provision of security for different organisations, this feeling is shared among many: "I don't know who I do it for."[62] Instead of doing something specifically for the CPF, these members are more widely concerned with securing their neighbourhood.

Some activities that are organised by the CPFs in order to improve the police-community relationship are 'Candles by Candlelight' in Rondebosch as Kumi describes "where we will sing Christmas carols with the community and the CPF arranges the food"[63] and Claire tells there is an upcoming 'Boys to Men' weekend in Hout Bay "where we will teach young boys values, how to be empowered as human beings, and how to become community leaders instead of getting sucked into the crime story".[64] Fundiswa says she is super excited about the weekend. On the one hand, she is concerned with the education of youngsters on a daily basis in order to prevent them from going into the crime scene. On the other hand, she is a young mother and wants to sign up her boys for the weekend as well. "It is a Boys to Men weekend, but the first day I am going to check out if my babies are safe!"[65] As far as my research participants told me, this weekend will be the first activity in a long time. Claire, a middle-aged woman with long grey hair who is Hout Bays' secretary for almost two years, looks forward to the weekend as: "In the two years that I have been here, not one project came off the ground."[66] She finds that a waste of time and feels totally ineffective as CPF. This feeling of unproductiveness is shared among citizens who look for a more proactive form of governance (Anciano and Piper 2019, 208). It is to say that the CPFs in Hout Bay and Rondebosch do not patrol but according to different studies there are CPFs in South Africa that actually do patrol. Fiona Anciano[67] says there are CPFs in Johannesburg that patrol the streets.

[60] Interview with Nathan, 21-02-2019.
[61] Interview with Nathan, 21-02-2019.
[62] Interview with Audrey, 18-02-2019.
[63] Interview with Kumi, 26-02-2019.
[64] Interview with Claire, 21-02-2019.
[65] Interview with Fundiswa, 15-02-2019.
[66] Interview with Claire, 21-02-2019.
[67] Interview with Fiona, 22-02-2019.

Malatji (2016) writes about patrolling CPFs in the Limpopo Province and Munneke (2011) about CPFs in the city of Durban.

The reason that these CPFs do not do that much on a day to day level is because "they are a symbolic oversight mechanism to the police".[68] Being an oversight mechanism in the extent of SAPS involves a challenge of powerlessness. "We don't have any power.. when the police don't want to do anything, I have to go up levels [provincial or national government] and that doesn't always work."[69] Every CPF member mentions that SAPS does not have enough staff and resources to provide security. This is a serious problem in the Western Cape Province[70] and also affects CPFs. Claire puts it into words as: "If we are supposed to be the person that watch up if they [SAPS] do their jobs properly, we are ineffective in that because we cannot give them more staff. So you can sit there, bitch and complain as much as you like but if they do not have enough people to do the work properly, there is nothing you can do about it."[71] In addition, CPFs have a lack of basic resources and governmental support themselves (Anciano and Piper 2019, 208). Therefore, both CPFs of Hout Bay and Rondebosch function more as a platform that serve as a place where communication between various (policing) actors takes place.

Around the table

Both CPFs of Hout Bay and Rondebosch are not involved in direct policing (Anciano and Piper 2019, 208). The CPF monthly meetings are how the role and functioning of a CPF can be best visualised. This means the forum is literally people sitting around a table in the local police station who discuss local issues about safety and security. There are always CPF members present, people from SAPS such as detectives, public relations officers, and/or the station commander, and people from state organisations as metro police, law enforcement, local councillors, and/or the Department Of Community Safety (DOCS). These representatives from governmental organisations contribute to one of the six main goals from CPFs that is focused on the provision of multi-level police services (Pelser 1999, 4). This means the CPF serves as a link between people on a local level and people on a provincial or national level. At all the CPF meetings were also

[68] Interview with Fiona, 22-02-2019.
[69] Interview with Nathan, 21-02-2019.
[70] "DA led WC govt calls for provincial police force." https://ewn.co.za/2019/01/13/da-led-wc-govt-calls-for-provincial-police-force, Accessed on 12-06-2019.
[71] Interview with Claire, 21-02-2019.

representatives from the bottom-up community policing groups that Marije Galama describes in this thesis. These were people from the Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch (HBNW) and from the Rondebosch Community Improvement District (RCID). In interviews the Private Security Companies (PSCs) that Danique Lauritsen elaborates on were also mentioned as stakeholders at CPF meetings but they were not present at meetings in Hout Bay neither in Rondebosch.

The monthly meetings are structured in a way that each actor gets a moment to inform the others about their state of affairs. This entails sharing crime statistics, concerns, and information about (upcoming) operations. As such, problems that exist in the community arise and the community policing actors can decide what needs to be done to solve it, and who should be the main actor in this problem-solving-process (Marks, Shearing and Wood 2009, 152). However, who is the responsible actor does not always become clear. When a guest at the Rondebosch CPF meeting of March said something about cars with suspicious people, no-one really responded. Eventually, the Law Enforcement officer gave the number of Traffic Services and said: "Ask them."[72]

Besides sharing information, funding and sponsorships are an important part of the collaboration between actors as well. In particular the University of Cape Town (UCT) in Rondebosch "contributes a substantial amount of money towards policing [actors in Rondebosch]".[73] It did not became clear how, how much and to which actors UCT contributes money as this is a very sensitive topic to talk about. Also the businesses in Rondebosch function as sponsor and provide support for the various policing actors. Money is for CPFs the most important resource as they do not have vehicles or manpower on the ground who actively police the neighbourhood. The CPF receives income in two ways. First, the CPF gets donations on behalf of SAPS as this is legally defined and must improve transparency. Second, the CPF can get funding from DOCS through the Expanded Partnership Program (EPP). The EPP is set up by DOCS to provide guidance and facilitate proper functioning of CPFs. Forums can earn up to 38,500,00 Rand[74] per financial year when they meet the EPP performance requirements.[75] The Rondebosch CPF uses the money mainly for activities that improve the police-community relationship but they

[72] Participant Observation at the Rondebosch CPF meeting of March, 12-03-2019.
[73] Interview with Mr. Jones, 26-02-2019.
[74] 38,500,00 Rand is 2,385,49 Euro according to OANDA Currency Converter on 20-06-2019. https://www1.oanda.com/currency/converter/
[75] Western Cape Government Community Safety. Flyer about Community Police Forum: Partners in Policing.

also use it for material things as a koi pond in the courtyard of the police station. Hout Bays' treasurer, Audrey, says they also have "funds available to do small things as to fix a broken window".[76] Claire tends to disagree on that as she says that the CPF has been "collecting the money from submitting reports every month, but they did not spend a damn thing".[77] It can be difficult to spend the money, because a donor chooses where the money must be spent on. The Rondebosch CPF struggles with this for months already as they received a donation that must be spent on street kids in Rondebosch. However, Rondebosch does not have any street kids.

This leads us to question the effectiveness of CPFs. Community Police Forums were set up to improve the police-community relationship as part of democratic policing (or becoming a democratic state in general). Matthew Skade, a UCT scholar who is mainly concerned with security in public transport and security for marginalised groups, says CPFs are only there because they must exist by law.[78] He adds, something that already has been stated above, that CPFs mainly succeed in wealthier areas while they are needed there the least. This has to do with a lack of resources in terms of money, time, and willingness. Besides, also a violent past and a bad image of the police limits the effectiveness of community policing (Davis, Henderson and Merrick 2003). Concerning the resources, CPFs are dependent on governmental organisations in order to get more resources. However, Kumi also says their CPF can use the resources better in order to be more effective.[79] This is an interesting view upon the scarcity of resources but must explicitly be placed in the context of Rondebosch, a wealthier area in Cape Town, as these areas tend to have more resources than the poorer areas (Karreth 2018, 335). This is still a result of Apartheid's skewed socio-spatial distribution of personal and institutional resources throughout the city of Cape Town (Lemanski 2004, 104).

Concluding remarks

Thus, the function of CPFs to improve the police-community relationship in the context of post-Apartheid Cape Town is still needed as the police suffers from a bad image among many citizens. Today, the CPFs in Hout Bay and Rondebosch mainly function as a consultative body which is not enough to provide citizen security. CPFs must therefore be seen as a democratic legislative

[76] Interview with Audrey, 18-02-2019.
[77] Interview with Claire, 21-02-2019.
[78] Interview with Matthew Skade, 14-02-2019.
[79] Interview with Kumi, 26-02-2019.

platform with a symbolic function within the pluralised policing landscape. While CPFs are not proactive policing actors, they do contribute by providing a place where citizens can go to and other (active policing) actors can communicate and share information.

5. South African Police Service

Hannah Postma

> *On a Wednesday afternoon, Constable Fredericks asks me about my research. After explaining it briefly, he says: "So you must be the daring one out of them [my fellow researchers]." I ask him why. While smiling derisively he says: "Police work is not for soft people, you must be tough. You must put your emotions in a box and leave them at home. When you're back home, put emotions in your body and leave all the things you have experienced on the job in the box. It's not a fun job." I ask him about the counsellors at the station. He laughs: "You can talk to them and talk about emotions and so on, if you feel like it. But it doesn't help." I ask: "So what do you do then?" Constable Fredericks: "You just live with it. Everything you have seen cannot be unseen and things you have heard cannot be unheard."*[80]

This vignette is an illustration of the first day on the job with one of my main research participants. In a nutshell, it exemplifies how research participants experience their job as a police officer. In this chapter, I describe the police organisation in Rondebosch and Hout Bay. While explaining different elements like the recruitment process, security threats and collaboration with other policing actors, I shed light on the question how the state police actor provides citizens security. I finish this chapter by elaborating on the four elements of the democratic policing framework of Glebbeek (2003) to analyse how the state police carries out its practices. While doing this I try to describe the context, the people in it and the historical past of South Africa. These are all important factors to understand how SAPS is organised and executed today.

Explaining the Police Structure

The policing structure in South Africa is divided into provinces, clusters and precincts (see chapter three). The organogram[81] (see fig.1) below visualises the organisational structure of SAPS, including the title of the officer in charge at each level.

[80] Participant Observation in Rondebosch, 12-02-2019.
[81] Made by Hannah Postma in 2019.

Organogram SAPS



Figure 1: Organisational structure SAPS.

The national department decides how many officers are appointed to each station. This is done by a population census that estimates how many police officers are needed in an area. However, these censuses are often incorrect and therefore police stations end up with less officers than they actually need.[82] Each commander is accountable to the level above. This illustrates the vertical structure of the South African Police Service (SAPS). The hierarchy of ranks is in line with the vertical structure. The complete ranking order can be found in attachment 2. Each station has three management positions: a visible police commander in charge of the police officers visibly patrolling on the street, a detective commander in charge of the investigation team, and a support head. Support officers do not wear firearms and are mostly in charge of administrational work. The three heads of department all respond to the station commander often ranked as Lieutenant

[82] Interview with Captain Swart, 21-02-2019.

Colonel (see fig.1).

As Glück and Low (2017) describe within their socio-spatial framework, state security often gets devolved to lower regional, local and urban governmental levels. In my research, I focus on the state presence at urban neighbourhood level. I conducted my research at the stations of Rondebosch and Hout Bay, two precincts belonging to the Wynberg Cluster, a local level of state security provision. I interviewed visible police officers varying in rank from Constable to Lieutenant Colonel. Along the way I had a couple of informal conversations with administrational personal. My focus was on visible police since they are out on the streets and mostly work together with other policing actors. They are therefore the most relevant for this research.

SAPS, as state security actor, makes itself highly visible through patrols and/or invisible through digital cameras. These examples illustrate what Jusionyte and Goldstein (2016) define as in/visibility of in/security. Visible police members work twelve hours per shift, four shifts per week, two of which are night shifts. Officers often work extra hours and blame this on a shortage of staff. Each shift is supposed to have six members mostly holding the rank of Constable to Sergeant, and a shift commander usually a Sergeant or Warrant Officer. I mostly dealt with lower ranking officers. The shift commanders decide the tasks for the officers of the day. They can be working outside going on patrols in vehicles or inside in the Community Service Centre (CSC) which is the reception of the police station.

Aside from cross border operations of stations, clusters also have specific police units that operate on a cluster level such as the Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) and the Public Order Police (POP). The POP unit supports stations in case of violent protests and is a first responder to crowd management situations. CPU police officers do not respond to complaints. They do foot patrols along hotspot areas (areas where there are high crime rates) and stop and searches (where police stops person or vehicles and searches them for illegal possessions). Moreover, they drive around while looking out for suspicious activities. Constable Fredericks, a 32-year-old coloured male, explains what 'something suspicious' looks like: "You learn throughout the years what to look for, it is street knowledge."[83] Whenever he stops and searches people, he speaks in 'gangster' Afrikaans, as spoken by those who are in a gang or went to prison. He uses this language as people often do not understand English nor Xhosa. Constable Fredericks knows this language because he grew up in a gangster-related area and spoke it most of his childhood. During the whole of my

[83] Participant Observation in Rondebosch between 12-02-2019 and 30-03-2019.

fieldwork he gives me negative connotations of being a police officer, yet he is always eager to work and is a highly appreciated employee. I ask him why he wanted to become a police officer. He says that he never meant to become a cop. He was into bikes (motorbikes) and did a lot of racing. However, he suffered many injuries and started to look around. He found out about the reservist program of SAPS[84] to become a police officer on a volunteer basis next to a regular job. He applied, but the interviewer convinced him to join the SAPS as a regular member, and so he did. He will be completing his tenth year within the police upcoming October. He takes his job seriously, but he does not see himself doing this much longer. "It is not a job if you want to have a family"[85], is what he often says. As I interviewed more and more police members, I started to notice a difference between those who were trained under Apartheid (in the 'olden' days) and after Apartheid. At both stations, my 'olden days' research participants tell me that they were 'born to be a cop'. They either had family who were part of the police or wanted to become a police officer straight out of high school. These officers really believe in the vision to 'protect and serve' the community. Only those who had also served in the 'olden' days explicitly told me so. They think of themselves as motivated and disciplined, and see the 'new' ones as the opposite. They do not consider them to be the same. The research participants of the 'new' generation of police officers are less explicit on the reason why they joined the police. Like Constable Fredericks they do not work in the police service for a long period of time. This makes more sense to me after Andrew Faull, a researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), told me that many police officers did indeed not have the dream to become a police officer initially. Rather, they became one along the way, as being a police officer is regarded as a stable job which provides for a stable income. In South Africa, one of the most unequal countries,[86]obtaining and having a stable job and income is not a given to everyone. Thus, becoming part of the police is seen as a safety net and not every officer has intrinsic motivation for the job itself. Faull states that "what gets interpreted as lazy and incompetent, is in fact also just waking up to the reality in South Africa."[87] The reality is that it is not guaranteed that you can become anything you want.

[84] Reservist program of SAPS is a program where a person is appointed by the National Commissioner as a member of the Reserve Police Service to render services as a volunteer in support of the Police. More info: https://www.saps.gov.za/services/reservist.php, Accessed on 18-06-2019.
[85] Participant Observation in Rondebosch between 12-02-2019 and 30-03-2019.
[86] "The world's most unequal countries." https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-world-s-most-unequal-countries.html, Accessed on 10-06-2019.
[87] Interview with Andrew Faull, 08-03-2019.

Besides the division between the 'old' and the 'new', there is also a social division (Brewer 1991). The tension this causes is also tangible within the police organisation, especially around the recruitment of SAPS members. As discussed in chapter three, after the democratic shift in 1994, SAPS needed to change. This also meant a change in recruitment. The African National Congress (ANC), the dominant political party, wanted the demographic composition of SAPS to reflect the public. To achieve this, SAPS made and still makes use of affirmative action, namely the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). This means that at every police station about eighty percent of the SAPS officers are black. This form of recruitment has been criticised by many of my (white and coloured) research participants. Racial tension is also tangible when talking about promotions. A coloured Constable remarks that other black officers in the station, who have been part of the police for a shorter time, often get a promotion before him. He feels this is unfair since he serves for a longer time and he feels like they are less qualified. "I make arrests four times more than these guys."[88] He is not the only one who is of the opinion that promotions are done unfairly. It even led to a two day strike. Striking is not allowed for police officers and could lead to serious problems, even dismissal from the job. It is noteworthy that the majority of the officers who went on strike were black while the ones who initially complained to me about the unfair promotions stayed on the job. Stating that striking only "affected the community and would not change anything anyway".[89]

Apart from racial tension, I also notice the presence of sexism within the police organisation. A high ranked officer tells me about the hardships of being white and female in a managing position within the organisation. She especially feels this with black officers, whom she refers to as 'African'. She says the perception of women within their cultures makes it harder for them to accept her authority. She often mentions: "You must be tough, as a woman in the police."[90] Here, racial tension is mixed with sexism. In my communication with research participants, I experience sexism through sexual references about other women during patrols and tinted WhatsApp messages sent towards myself.

By explaining the police organisation within both stations, I have shed light on informal culture to illustrate the context of my research. In the next part I outline the security threats both

[88] Participant Observation in Rondebosch, 21-03-2019.
[89] Participant Observation between 11-03-2019 and-27-03-2019.
[90] Interview, 13-02-2019.

stations identify. I also discuss how they come up with police strategies with the help of other policing actors to deal with these threats.

Managing the security threats per neighbourhood

Chapter four briefly elaborates on the security threats within Rondebosch and Hout Bay. Glück and Low (2017) mention that the state secures its nation by managing threats. Both stations deal with different kind of security threats. The main difference between both neighbourhoods is the nature of the crimes. Hout Bay mainly deals with contact crimes[91], whereas property-related crimes are the biggest concern in Rondebosch[92]. Since contact crimes are regarded as more severe, the SAPS in Hout Bay experience more challenges in providing citizens security. As the security threats of both neighbourhoods differ, their policing strategies differ as well. For example, Rondebosch does a quarterly, six months and nine months comparison of crime statistics. Within both stations the threats are identified by a crime intelligence officer. This officer keeps the statistics of the crimes, indicating what kind of crimes are committed, how they are committed, what is used, and when they are committed. These statistics are then shared in weekly meetings (other than the monthly Community Policing Forum meetings) where other policing actors are also present. These meetings are invisible ways of securing the areas. As elaborated upon earlier, this fits within the in/visibility of security of Jusionyte and Goldstein (2016). The weekly meetings are meant to discuss the strategies of that week and where to patrol. As mentioned in the fourth chapter, SAPS representatives also share statistics in the monthly CPF meeting. In Rondebosch only monthly statistics are shared and compared to the year prior. They do not mention their quarterly, six and nine months checks. In Hout Bay, despite having the crime statistics, the Captain does not want to elaborate on them too much during a CPF meeting.

Next to the crime statistics, the community is seen as an important tool for defining the policing strategy. Captain Swart of Hout Bay says they identify many threats by early warning of the community. This is seen as inside information that helps the police to manage certain security threats. This is yet another example of the state securitising its area in an invisible manner (Jusionyte and Goldstein 2016) as the outside world is not informed. Lieutenant Colonel Verwey of Rondebosch does not elaborate on invisible forms of securitisation but stresses the importance

[91] "Crime Stats Hout Bay.'' https://www.crimestatssa.com/precinct.php?id=1081, Accessed on 5-06-2019.
[92] "Crime Stats Rondebosch." https://www.crimestatssa.com/precinct.php?id=1057, Accessed on 5-06-2019.

of the relationship between police and community. "Interaction with the community is probably the most important thing at the end of the day."[93] Later on in this chapter I elaborate more on police-community relations. The above clearly shows that SAPS no longer works alone in policing the area. The resource problem of SAPS is one of the reasons why it is in need of other policing actors to provide citizens security.

Sharing and working together

> *It is around 5 p.m. on a Thursday. Constable Fredericks and Reservist Willliams are sitting in the police car. They have been on patrol for hours without a break. While driving around Rondebosch Williams starts talking to Fredericks about the vehicles: "I heard they gave the 'gang unit' a vehicle from the station?" Fredericks sighs: "Yeah, you know how that goes" Williams responds annoyed "Like, that is what? They [gang unit] have one car per two people?! What's that for?"*[94]

This vignette illustrates a conversation between two officers about how resources are being taken away from their police station and given to specialised units, for example the 'anti-gang unit'.[95] I have come across this scenario repeatedly throughout my time in the field. Especially in Rondebosch my research participants bring it up frequently. Whenever I ask for the reason, I often hear that Rondebosch is considered a 'quiet' station and therefore headquarters do not see the need to allocate it as many resources as other, less 'quiet' stations. As described in chapter three, SAPS aims to have more police visibility and focus on hotspot areas. Hotspot policing is a widely discussed topic within the literature on policing. Over the years, scholars have found it to be an effective strategy to reduce crime (Braga 2001; Weisburd, Braga, Groff and Wooditch 2017). Through my observations, I have seen that hotspot policing in Cape Town results in the transfer of resources and police members to high-crime areas. According to one officer in Rondebosch, this tactic is ineffective and causes an expansion of crime in their area: "When you have a hotspot area, it doesn't help to put thousand officers there and if nothing changes, adding another thousand

[93] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Verwey, 06-03-2019.
[94] Participant Observation in Rondebosch, 21-02-2019.
[95] A specialised police units that fights against gangsterism.

officers. By taking away personnel from quiet areas, the crime moves from one area into another. You do not solve the problem, just treat the symptoms."[96] Besides the lack in resources, members mention as well that they feel SAPS did not invest enough in quality of resources, especially in technology[97]. In a conversation with Reservist Williams, he mentions his dissatisfaction about the lack in digitalisation. According to him, he has not seen many visible changes since 1994. "Have you seen how they do the paperwork here? In America they have statement papers prewritten, where you only have to fill in a couple of things. We still have to write down everything by hand. It is like we still live in the nineties."[98]

This conversation reflects a feeling shared by many inside the organisation. Members notice that the newest equipment goes to specialised units, leaving the regular stations to lag behind. Most of the paperwork for dockets,[99] registration, and clocking in of personal is still done by hand. When walking around police stations you can see computers in the offices of the management and administrative personal but no computers in the Community Service Centre.

However, Andrew Faull provides me with a counter perspective. He ascribes the resource problem to be 'a narrative in an echo chamber' meaning that people repeat what they hear and start to believe in this narrative themselves. Instead of stating that the SAPS is under resourced, Faull looks beyond the stories of the officers and states that it is not only about resources but also about the social sphere within society. Faull looks at the way police institutions are perceived in modern society. "The police are being seen as the ones who should prevent crime, and yet the social generators of crimes are things the police cannot interact with. The police institution cannot control crime alone, the whole of government should do it. There are a whole sort of other things that are the blame for crime, like the thirty-six percent unemployment and the expression of masculinity in society and homes."[100] Often, police officers cannot make sense of these social problems as reasons for not being able to handle the crime. They therefore tend to blame more tangible things. As the police regards itself as understaffed and too small to secure their area, it acknowledges the need for other actors within the security sector and accepts that the security issues exceed their capacity. These collaborations lead to a pluralised policing landscape (Diphoorn 2015a).

[96] Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Verwey, 14-03-2019.
[97] Several Participant Observations during the time period between 12-02-2019 and 30-03-2019.
[98] Informal conversation with Reservist Williams, 21-02-2019.
[99] A docket is an official record book which is opened by a police official per case.
[100] Interview with Andrew Faull, 08-03-2019.

Lieutenant Colonel Verwey refers to collaboration with other policing actors as 'partnership' policing. One important actor in Rondebosch is Rondebosch Community Improvement District (RCID), which represents the community and invests in resources that benefit SAPS. An example is the License Plate Recognition (LPR) system that captures licenses plates and is used in finding suspicious vehicles. One officer tells how RCID made the availability of these cameras possible. "At the time no one knew about it [LPR cameras] we were running with the resources of the community, they [RCID] bought and installed the LPR cameras. They involved us with the placing, to block off certain areas but for years SAPS did not buy into getting involved and investing money. It was a tool that would help find suspects, it took a while, and now they bought into it."[101]

Not only in Rondebosch the community invests in resources. In Hout Bay the community has been discussing donating special camera equipment as well.[102] The private security companies and neighbourhood watch, both mainly present in the Valley, provide resources that SAPS benefits from in terms of equipment and manpower elaborated on in the next chapters. These specific actors are not present within Imizamo Yethu (IY) and Hangberg, two communities of Hout Bay that lack the financial wealth to provide these kinds of resources as described in chapter three. During my fieldwork, I heard police officers talk about their relationship with policing actors in the Valley, yet they often failed to mention their relationship with the other two communities. Whenever I asked about it, I received mixed messages. Some say they have a good relationship with the policing actors in IY claiming that they join patrols during the weekends. However, I never participated in these patrols as the police officers think it is 'too dangerous' for me. Others think the community is not open to police presence. I elaborate on this topic later on.

In both neighbourhoods, the police acknowledges and appreciates the help of other policing actors as they recognise it exceeds their capacity to securitise. These observations are in line with Loader (1999) who argues that the police do not make an issue of outsourcing security to other actors, as they see that this benefits efficiency and effectiveness. As stated in chapter three, an important factor why these resources can be made available is the financial wealth within Rondebosch and the Valley enabling both communities to afford more security provision than IY and Hangberg. This illustrates what Crawford and Lister (2006) call 'security as a market force'.

[101] Interview with Warrant Officer September, 06-03-2019.
[102] Participant Observation at the Hout Bay CPF meeting of February, 25-02-2019.

The unequal provision of policing underlines security as a commodified good which then symbolises a social position.

Another interesting phenomenon in the relationship between the police and other policing actors is that the line of authority is blurring. For example, whenever SAPS wants to look at camera images in Rondebosch, they need official permission of RCID. This makes the relationship between the community, the private sector and police an ambiguous one. That SAPS depends on the resources of other policing actors is not an exception. Rather, it is becoming the norm. Glück and Low (2017) explain that state security systems often through processes of rescaling as more policing actors take on the function of 'national' security. While the state becomes a lesser primary locus of security (Glück and Low 2017), other bodies come into play that are able to perform sovereignty. This contributes to what Diphoorn (2015b) calls the 'multiplicity of sovereignty'. However, as the police remains the main representative of the legal system, the state keeps the monopoly on legal authority. In the following part of this chapter I analyse to what extent the state police practices are done democratically. Hereby, I use to the democratic policing framework of Glebbeek (2003).

Democratic Policing Framework applied

According to Glebbeeks' (2003) democratic policing framework,[103] a democratic police institution should contain four elements: accountability, respect of rule of law, demilitarisation and a police-community relationship. Within this study, I look at to what extent the police represents these elements. I am aware of my western bias. Therefore, I have tried to analyse the practices according to the context.

The accountability of SAPS

The two best-known external mechanisms that hold police institutions accountable in Cape Town are the Independent Police Investigation Doctorate (IPID) and the Western Cape Police Ombudsman (WCPO). IPID is a national oversight body that deals only with specific cases of a criminal nature committed by police personnel. This can be rape, assault in custody, or corruption

[103] This framework is developed for Guatemala but valid for other countries that went through reform especially post-conflict.

allegations of SAPS members. Chris Zendande , an IPID employee, amplifies the reason that IPID only picks up specific cases.

> We realise that in order to have an impact, to be effective, we need to have a focus, we must prioritise. In the past, we had service delivery cases, such as failure of the police to report back to the compliant on the case progress. All the cases of domestic violence are now referred to another body. We are only dealing with those specific cases so we have an impact. Our budget is limited as well, we have to make choices. [104]

With 'impact' Mr. Zendande refers to cases against high-profile SAPS members. IPIDs' budget for funds and investigations is allocated by the Parliament. However, Mr. Zendande mentions that there are too few investigators to cover all the reported cases. Any person, either as a victim, witness, or representative can lodge a complaint with IPID. When an investigation is finished IPID gives a recommendation to the National Prosecution Authority (NPA) or to SAPS itself. These recommendations are not binding meaning that NPA or SAPS decide if they will prosecute or discipline the member. When I ask whether IPID can force NPA or SAPS to discipline, Mr. Zendande replies: "Now there is not a corner in the law which gives IPID the power to force them. But if they decline the recommendation or discipline then they must give reasons."[105] Over the years, IPID has given recommendations on at least ten high-profile cases where none of the suspects involved got disciplined. [106] This indicates that although there are external mechanisms that try to hold SAPS accountable, it solely depends on the government and the organisation itself if anyone is indeed being held accountable. Taking into account that a core element of accountability is that police must be accountable to law rather than to government (Bayley 2005, 19 in Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman 2015, 26), SAPS does not comply with the meaning of accountability.

A relatively new oversight body is the Western Cape Police Ombudsman (WCPO), established in 2015 through pressure of numerous NGOs, social movements, and the Khayelitsha

[104] Interview with Zendande, 07-03-2019.
[105] Interview with Zendande, 07-03-2019.
[106] The minutes of a meeting with the Minister of Police and IPID in May 2018. https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26410/

commission.[107] WCPO mainly deals with service delivery complaints against members of SAPS. According to Michelle Dee, deputy director of the WCPO, many people are not aware of the existence of the ombudsman. Therefore, WCPO invests heavily in marketing and publicity. WCPO cannot deal with every complaint and, where possible, refers citizens to the right bodies. Constable Fredericks says that WCPO is mostly useful for citizens to understand their rights since he knows that some of his colleagues try to 'sugar-coat' people that lodge a complaint with SAPS. By attending citizens on their rights, this 'sugar coating' is less likely to happen.

Respect of the rule of law

The second element of the democratic policing framework is upholding the rule of law. This can only be done when the government is transparent and fair (Bica-Huiu et al. 2007). Over the years, the South African government has been involved in a lot of integrity scandals, many being corruption within SAPS.[108] During my fieldwork, I not surprisingly noticed that this was a sensitive topic. Ten weeks was not enough to be able to touch upon this topic and I did not experience corruption on a first hand basis. However, I read multiple news articles regarding corruption incidents within the Hout Bay and Rondebosch police stations.[109] These observations lead me to say that corruption is present but hard to touch upon within the upper layer of the stations. It is also, as stated above, often not sanctioned by the responsible institutions.

Another aspect of the rule of law is the respect of human rights by police officers. Due to confidentiality issues, I cannot elaborate on this topic. However, I can state that there have been situations where I observed violations of human rights. Illegitimate use of violence by police officers is something that is known and condoned within the police stations. Police officers say things like "They [suspects] know who I am and that I will beat them if need to" or "These guys do not understand anything else but violence, so if I do not act right enough the police would not

[107] The Commission was mandated to investigate complaints received by the Premier relating to allegations of inefficiency of the South African Police Service (SAPS) stationed at three police stations in Khayelitsha as well as other units of SAPS operating in Khayelitsha. More info: https://www.khayelitshacommission.org.za/

[108] "South Africa's Deputy President, Accused of Corruption, Faces Uncertain Future." https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/africa/south-africa-david-mabuza.html, Accessed on 01-06-2019.

[109] "Rondebosch police station administration clerk in court for corruption." https://southafricatoday.net/south-africa-news/western-cape/rondebosch-police-station-administration-clerk-in-court-for-corruption/, Accessed on 24-05-2019, and "Hout Bay police officer nabbed after Stellenbosch robbery." https://westerncapenews.co.za/hout-bay-police-officer-nabbed-after-stellenbosch-robbery/news/1960/, Accessed on 24-04-2019.

be respected."[110] It seems that police members see the legitimate and illegitimate use of violence as the only way to claim authority. In the context of South African society, with its violent past and repressive government under Apartheid, I argue that these actions, though not democratic, can be understood as the "coincidence of democratization and criminal violence" that according to Comaroff and Comaroff (2006) often occurs in post-conflict societies.

The demilitarisation of SAPS

Another element of this framework is demilitarisation. South Africa had a repressive police force during Apartheid. In order to police democratically, Costa and Meideros (2002) state that a police organisation needs to demilitarise. Beforehand, I did not anticipate on demilitarisation to be the important element it turned out to be. Chapter three elaborated on the first signs of remilitarisation, for example the reintroduction of military titles. As discussed earlier, I notice that within the police stations still many references are made about the 'olden' days. The change that SAPS went through towards a democratic manner of policing is also noticeable within police college. This change within the police college is not interpreted as a positive shift by every police officer. A high-rank officer feels that demilitarisation mostly just takes away the discipline. This officer, amongst many, does not feel that 'new' officers have the same motivation as the officers of the 'olden' days. Warrant Officer (W.O.) Kriel, a white male, informs me how police members gain their yearly firearm competency on the shooting range. Officers are required to shoot a seventy percent accuracy with three different kinds of weapons. According to W.O. Kriel, this requirement used to be ninety percent accuracy, but since a majority failed, SAPS now lowered requirements. He blames this on the incompetence of the 'new' ones, once again stating the difference with the 'old' ones.[111]

"You [SAPS organisation] are changing our uniform, you are changing the colour of our vehicles, but you are not speaking to us [police officers] and try to change us from the inside. That is where the change must happen."[112] This quote illustrates that demilitarisation means more than solely cosmetic and top-down changes. Marks (2004) argues that in order for an organisation to

[110] Participant Observation between 12-02-2019 and 30-03-2019.
[111] Interview with Warrant Officer Kriel, 22-03-2019.
[112] Interview with Warrant Officer September, 06-03-2019.

transform, it needs formal and informal changes. Changing informal police culture is something that has yet to happen within SAPS.

The importance of police-community relationship

Another important change for democratic policing is a positive shift within the police-community relationship. The vignette below outlines an incident illustrating the tense police-community relation of Hout Bay.

> *After getting a notification from the control room concerning a house break in just outside Imizamo Yethu (IY), W.O. Kriel starts speeding, turns on the sirens and is heading towards the incident. When arriving at the spot Deep Blue security, FADT and four other SAPS members are already there. The culprits fled already, after robbing two houses. While walking around, W.O. Kriel decides to go back to the car since there is nothing he can do any more. That moment one of the residents of the houses walks up to him. The white male around his forties is completely stressed out and is smoking a cigarette intensely. As W.O. Kriel walks passed him, the man starts yelling at W.O. Kriel: "This is the third house break in in two weeks, there are around forty cases in this area that remain unsolved. And no one gets back to me about it!" W.O. Kriel responds that if the man has any complaints he should contact the station commander or the detective in charge of the case. "The insurance company called already, the detective did not even know about this case" the man yells back.*

As elaborated in chapter four, Hout Bay has three completely different communities. Anciano and Piper (2019) stress the fact that for Hout Bays' police, the relationship with members of the three communities has always been a challenge because of the nature of the different communities. The legacy of Apartheid[113] has played a role in this as the police at that time had difficult relationships with many citizens in IY and Hangberg. According to Captain Swart[114] Hout Bay Neighbourhood

[113] During apartheid, the main state body responsible for implementing apartheid was the South African Police (SAP). As the coercive arm of the state, they forced deportation of many black and coloured. This has also been the case in Hout Bay. It is therefore that the communities, especially in Hangberg but also in Imizamo Yethu to have skeptical relations with the police, despite the aim to change it.

[114] Participant Observation, 20-03-2019.

Watch (HBNW) has helped SAPS on improving the relationship with the community. This counts especially for the Valley but also for IY as HBNW has helped with the training of community leaders that started their own neighbourhood watch. Since the movement of the police station from the harbour to the edge of IY, Captain Swart has seen an uprise of reports by the residents of IY. He explains that because the police is close by, it is easier for residents to report a case.[115] Despite this improvement, residents of IY still turn to their own community leaders rather than reporting a case at SAPS.[116] The presence of police in Hangberg is little to none. Police officers claim that Hangberg is not open towards police which makes it hard for them to police there. However, a news article portrayed community members of Hangberg demanding a police station.[117] Based on these findings, SAPS is mainly present in the Valley. Since a few years, there is a neighbourhood watch in IY but police have yet to establish a well-working relationship with them.

Rondebosch, as opposed to Hout Bay, is a smaller community, with homogeneous demographics and little influx of people, making it easier to police (Davis, Henderson and Merrick 2003). Due to the affluent background of most inhabitants, they are willing to invest in community safety and interact with the police. As Glebbeek (2003) states, public willingness is important to enhance the police-community relationship. Another difference with Hout Bay is that Rondebosch has individual officers who make specific efforts towards enhancing a good police-community relationship. Lieutenant Colonel Verwey makes sure that SAPS Rondebosch has its focus on interaction with the community. Warrant Officer September has been investing in the community through multiple projects.[118] The positive attitude of both police officers and the community itself results in a constructive police-community relationship in Rondebosch.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter I portrayed how the South African Police Service (SAPS) tries to provide citizen security. I outlined their police structure, recruitment of members, identification of security threats, and the usage of resources. In addition, I elaborated on SAPS collaborations with other policing

[115] Participant Observation, 28-03-2019.
[116] Participant Observation, 04-03-2019.
[117] "Hangberg residents demand a police station." https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/hangberg-residents-demand-a-police-station-20170423, Accessed on 11-06-2019.
[118] Interview, 06-03-2019.

actors and their role within the pluralised policing landscape. By analysing SAPS police practices I illustrated how SAPS has implemented democratic change within their organisation. Despite democratic transformation, SAPS still contains certain elements that refer to the old militarised policing organisation. I conclude this chapter arguing that SAPS has lost its primary position on security provision as the state now shares this provision with other non-state policing actors. SAPS recognises that citizens security exceeds state's capacity alone. Hence, SAPS depends on other actors within the plural policing landscape for resources, manpower and information. Altogether, SAPS has established a working relationship, to a certain extent and in certain areas, with other policing actors. Consequently, the state police no longer holds a monopoly in sovereign power but is part of a multiplicity of sovereignties. Nevertheless, SAPS still fulfils a central role in policing as the only representative of the legal system within the pluralised policing landscape.

6. Private Security Companies

Danique Lauritsen

"Wynberg, Wynberg, Wynberg" is what you hear the shrill voices of the taxivan drivers screaming in the streets of Rondebosch. The streets are crowded with students, people in cars are honking to each other, and you can smell the fried chicken of the many fast food shops. If you take a better look at the cars you sometimes spot the green and white vehicles of Groote Schuur Community Improvement District (GSCID).

Just behind the Main Road, opposite of the University of Cape Town, lays the wealthier district of Rondebosch with her big houses with large gardens covered in colourful flowers. This is the Rondebosch Community Improvement District (RCID). In this area the pick-up trucks (also called 'bakkies' by Capetonians) of Fidelity ADT (FADT) are patrolling the streets and protecting the houses of the wealthy residents.

On the other side of the mountain, in the Valley of Hout Bay, the white with blue and yellow cars of Deep Blue Security (DBS) are unavoidable. The private security officers of DBS are keeping the sandy covered streets of Hout Bay safe from crime.

This chapter discusses three different private security companies (PSCs) within the context of Cape Town. This chapter is important in understanding how the pluralised policing landscape in Cape Town is organised as PSCs are major security providers and are clearly present within South Africa (Lemanski 2006, 789). Two of the private security organisations that are discussed in this chapter are based in Rondebosch, namely Rondebosch Community Improvement District (RCID) and Groote Schuur Community Improvement District (GSCID). The third private security company is Deep Blue Security (DBS) which is located in Hout Bay. I start this chapter by explaining how these companies are organised. Next, I describe the daily activities for three different job functions and the challenges that come with the provision of citizen security. I conclude by elaborating on the concept of 'twilight policing' (Diphoorn 2013) and explain how private security companies collaborate and compete with other policing actors and how PSCs are gaining power. First, a short description of the three private security companies is given.

RCID and GSCID are not private security companies themselves but are organisations that were setup by the community. These organisations then hire a private security company to provide security for that organisation in a specific area. Rondebosch Community Improvement District (RCID) is a joint resident association that collectively hire a private security company, namely FADT to provide security for them. Within the RCID area (map 3) a satellite hub, also known as control room, is based. From this satellite hub control room employees coordinate the FADT armed response officers who are patrolling the streets.

Groote Schuur Community Improvement District (GSCID) operates in the public area of Rondebosch, mainly along the Main Road. The businesses that are located around the Main Road pay a certain levy to GSCID which makes GSCID a joint business association. With this money GSCID provides services such as security and cleaning. GSCID hires Securitas, a private security company, that accommodates security officers to GSCID. When Securitas officers work for GSCID they are called 'public safety officers' as they are providing security in the public area. Note that public safety officers are still contracted with a private security company and are therefore still private security officers. This creates a blurred distinction between the characteristics of a public and private officer which Shearing and Stenning (1981, 196) call the grey area.

Deep Blue Security (DBS) is a private security company itself and operates in Hout Bay. It contracts control room employees, guards that watch the area, and armed response officers that work on alarms of private property. In the next paragraph I explain what resources PSCs have access to and what security threats they face.

Security Organisation

The organisation of employees and resources of the three companies in Rondebosch and Hout Bay correspond with what Paasche, Yarwood and Sidaway (2013) describe. They state that private security companies (PSCs) hire guards, armed response officers, and control room employees. Furthermore, officers wear company clothing consisting of army trousers, combat boots, pepper spray and radios (Paasche, Yarwood and Sidaway 2013, 1564). In the field it became clear that armed response officers also need to carry a bulletproof vest and gun. These armed response officers drive around in 'bakkies' in the colours of the company. With these bakkies they can detain suspects. Control room employees coordinate the officers on the streets. This study will

only focus on armed response officers and control room employees as those are the people that I got to speak with.

There are two differences in the gear of the three PSCs within this study. First, armed response officers of FADT need to wear a helmet, in contrast to employees of DBS and GSCID, because FADT is an international company that adheres to an international policy. Second, security officers at GSCID do not wear a gun in comparison to private security officers of FADT and DBS. This is because of three reasons. First, the University of Cape Town (UCT) is the biggest moneylender for GSCID. UCT has a strict policy on guns, namely no guns. This way GSCID is not allowed to use guns in the area as UCT has a big say in GSCIDs' policy. Second, there are state legislations concerned with the use of guns. Baker (2002, 37) explains that private security officers can hold a gun and are allowed to use it for self-defence, in case they suspect someone of a serious crime, or during an arrest. However, during this fieldwork private security officers explained that they were only to use their gun when someones' life is in real danger. If armed response officers use their gun otherwise the consequences will be major, and they can even go to jail for using their gun. Mr. Jones of GSCID explains that he does not want his officers to have guns because if the gun is illegally used, several claims will come. The third reason why GSCID officers do not have a gun is because of safety measures. Mr. Jones explains: "With a firearm you become a target. Criminals are always on the lookout for firearms. And where are they gonna get them? They approach a security officer, stab him with his knife and take his gun."[119]

The safety of officers is a very important aspect for private security companies. As explained above, a gun makes private security officers a target. However, private security officers see this is as part of the job. Braydon, a short armed response officer at DBS, explains that he does not feel safe on the job but he sees this as an advantage. "As soon as you start feeling safe, then you are no longer alert."[120]

What should however be recognised is that private security officers do not often face crime themselves. Private security officers are present to prevent crime from happening or respond to calls of crimes. Most of the time, when private security officers arrive at a scene, criminals are already gone. With that, private security officers do not think that the areas they work in are dangerous. Most private security officers, which are often non-white males, live in lower income

[119] Interview with Mr. Jones, 13-03-2019.
[120] Participant Observations with Braydon, 06-03-2019.

areas (Diphoorn, 2015, 320), for example Khayelitsha or Mitchells Plain. They joke that if I really want to research crime I should go to these areas. Mr. Smiets, a fifty-year-old coloured public safety officer at GSCID, who lives at Mitchells Plain explains: "The security threats that happen in the richer areas, in this case Rondebosch and Hout Bay, are mainly robbery and house breaking. Poor people come to these areas to steal from the rich people. In the poor regions, in my region, there is more violent crime. The crime there is often gang related and a result of revenge."[121]

A Day in the Security Industry

Below I have inserted three ethnographic descriptions that give a realistic image of the daily activities for different private security companies. First, I explain a day at work in the satellite hub of RCID/FADT. Second, I give insight into a patrol in a GSCID vehicle. Last, I describe a day patrolling with DBS.

Juan speaking

The satellite hub of RCID/FADT is a small white cabin with two windows that both have curtains in front of them. The door is always closed and the burglar bars secure the hub. In this satellite hub three different people work at different shifts, shifts A, B and C. Every shift has its own team, making that the controllers and armed response officers always work in the same team. Today Juan is working. He is a coloured, talkative man of about 25 years old. He is wearing his blue FADT uniform. The small room is equipped with seven computer screens that show footage of the overview cameras and the License Plate Recognition (LPR) system. Juan is looking at these cameras for twelve hours. His day shift starts at 7 a.m. and ends at 7 p.m. Then another controller will come in and work the night shift. The controllers work three dayshifts, three nightshifts, and then get three days off. The room is further equipped with a whiteboard hanging on the wall on which incidents are reported. There are two telephones, one mobile phone, and a base radio. This satellite hub is dedicated only to the RCID area. "I need to monitor the cameras at all time, anything can happen."[122] Juan explains: "You are not doing a lot of work basically. Sometimes a day can drag, sometimes the day is too long. And you do nothing. It gets boring."[123]

[121] Participant Observations with Mr. Smiets, 08-04-2019.
[122] Interview during Participant Observations with Juan, 27-02-2019.
[123] Interview during Participant Observations with Juan, 27-02-2019.

Throughout the day Juan is mostly involved in two things. First, he is working with the LPR cameras. If an LPR notification pops up, Juan checks in a computer system if the car registration matches the vehicle on the footage. If it does, then he sends the pictures onto multiple WhatsApp groups and confirms that the car is legit. Sometimes he also gets footage from suspicious cars. What action he then needs to take depends on the crime that the car is linked to. Suspicious cars are ranked level 1, 2, or 3. Level 1 means a stolen vehicle, level 2 means involved in drug dealing and level 3 means a suspicious vehicle. With a level 1 the controller must call SAPS to stop the vehicle and refer to a detective assigned to making a case. With a level 2 the controller must call and request SAPS to stop and search the vehicle for drugs, weapons, or to arrest for false plates or to fine for the relevant offense. For a level 3 SAPS must just be alert, but not take immediate action.

The second thing Juan does is answer phone calls. He does this very politely. When the phone rings Juan picks it up "RCID, goodday, Juan speaking. What address are you in? 34? I'll record it now ma'am."[124] Then he hangs up the phone. He says that people who call are "mostly clients with questions about suspicious guys walking in the area, guys ringing doorbells, knocking on doors, and begging. But clients will also call in to report broken streetlights."[125] Juan then makes a report of this and sends it to the person in charge of this. If necessary, he will ask an armed response officer to check it out.

The satellite hub of RCID is a good example of how invisibility contributes to security (Jusionyte and Goldstein 2010, 6). Many people do not know about the satellite hub, and if they know, they are not allowed to enter the satellite hub. The satellite hub is placed on secured grounds. If people would know about what operations take place in this hub then criminals can come and, for example, try to shut down the system so it would be easier for them to commit a crime. The secrecy and invisibility therefore contribute to security.

Suspicious behaviour

The Groote Schuur Community Improvement District (GSCID) bakkies look old and the doors are creaking. At the beginning of every shift, either at 6 a.m. or 6 p.m., Mr. Smiets goes to the police

[124] Participant Observations, 27-02-2019.
[125] Interview during Participant Observations with Juan, 27-02-2019.

station to get the crime stats of the previous day or night. Here he gets intel on what happened and where GSCID can assist during the upcoming shift. Then he does his patrols in his car around the area. The public safety officers, how the security officers at GSCID are called, are the eyes and ears on the street. They gather information and filter it through to Mr. Jones, the operational manager of GSCID/Securitas. Then Mr. Jones decides if GSCID should respond to the threat.

We drive around the neighbourhood. Mr. Smiets is looking for suspicious people and vehicles, broken streetlights, potholes, open windows or gates, and flat tires. If he sees something like this he reports it to the control room. Sometimes he waits on a hotspot for about ten minutes, just for visibility. He also looks for suspicious behaviour. He explains that a suspicious vehicle has more than one person in it. The guys in the suspicious vehicle are on their cell phones and contact the guys that will take part in the actual crime. The guys in the vehicle will look for a person that they can rob. After the crime is committed they will serve as a get-away car. What the GSCID officers do is wait at the place where the suspicious vehicle is parked until the vehicle drives away. As long as someone is watching them they will not commit a crime. This is a good example of what Jusionyte and Goldstein (2016, 40) explain as a tactic of visibility to create security. Patrolling the streets, being visible for suspects, is a tactic used by all three private security companies. Armed response officers drive around the area and guards patrol the streets. If criminals see them walking or driving around, criminals will be less likely to commit a crime as the chances of them being caught rise.

But Mr. Smiets is not only there to watch out for crime. He also works on improving the neighbourhood. One of the goals of GSCID is to reduce homelessness, drug abuse and prostitution. Homeless people are not allowed to lay or sleep on the street, they can only sit on the street. GSCID officers are there to make sure that people comply to these rules. While patrolling the street, Mr. Smiets stops. He sees two homeless couples laying on the streets underneath a viaduct. Mr. Smiets gets out of his car. Immediately the people go and sit straight up. Mr. Smiets speaks Afrikaans to them. They laugh to each other, but with respect. Mr. Smiets gets back in the car again and explains that he told the two homeless couples that they are not allowed to sleep there. “They know they can’t, but you know, as soon as we drive away, they will lie down again. But because of the rain I cannot send them away. When it is raining, they can seek shelter from the rain.”[126]

[126] Participant Observations with Mr. Smiets, 04-04-2019.

Mr. Smiets continues his patrol. While he is driving around looking for suspicious behaviour, he also visits the guards on site. The guards, mostly black young men, give him their observation book and Mr. Smiets signs their books. Then he continues his patrol again.

On patrol

When I start my patrol with DBS, I need to wear a bulletproof vest. The office employees of DBS are joking and asking if I am ready for my firearm. I laugh and answer by saying "well no thank you, I heard you become a target when you have a firearm." "Not always",[127] answers Sylvester. The others laugh.

We get in the passenger car and start patrolling. We drive in a car marked with the colours of DBS, as visibly patrolling the streets can prevent crime, as explained in the paragraph above. However, DBS also has an unmarked vehicle patrolling the streets. This vehicle, that does not look like a DBS vehicle, is used as a tactic of invisibility to create security (Jusionyte and Goldstein 2010, 6). Criminals do not know that a private security officer is driving this car which makes it easier for DBS officers to catch the criminal, might he do something illegal.

On a normal day Sylvester patrols the streets and checks up on guards to sign their observation book. While we are driving around the Valley, Sylvester hunks to many people, he waves at them, and smiles. He tells that he lives in Hout Bay and is therefore familiar with the people in the area. Today he is working on alarms. Once an alarm goes off, Sylvester gets information through the radio and he drives towards the house. The house is surrounded by a big gate and because of that, he cannot see anything of the house itself. Sylvester sighs: "I don't have access."[128] This means that he cannot go behind the gate because it needs to be opened with a key, which he does not have. He can only enter the gate when it can be opened with a code. He sulks: "It is useless to have armed response if the officers can't see your house, because the fence is so high and dense. It is just a waste of money. We can't do anything. The only way people benefit from it is because they have to pay less insurance when they are contracted with a security company."[129] He tells the control room that everything seems to be in order but that he does not have access. He drives off again.

[127] Participant Observations with Sylvester, 20-03-2019.
[128] Participant Observations with Sylvester, 20-03-2019.
[129] Participant Observations with Sylvester, 20-03-2019.

Sylvester wants to show me Hangberg, which is considered 'the red zone' by DBS. This is because a poorer coloured community lives in Hangberg. There are drugs, firearms, and alcohol abuse. Many people turn to violence. The DBS vehicles try not to come here because people might throw stones or scratch the vehicle. However, both armed response officers Braydon and Sylvester take me, during different patrols, up to Hangberg. I suspect that this is because they want to show me what Hangberg looks like. Although this area is considered a red zone, both are honking and waving at people. Braydon and Sylvester both live in Hangberg, but it is also the place where the criminals that they encounter live. I ask if they are not afraid to enter here. Braydon smiles and answers: "I am a bad person. They won't do something to me at my home, because they know that I'll do something back."[130]

Then Sylvester also takes me into Imizamo Yethu (IY). IY, the black community, is described as a no go zone by DBS, as there is a lot of hardcore violence, drug and alcohol abuse, and unemployment. When driving up the steep road into IY, Sylvester is pointing out the criminals. We drive past a group of black guys in their mid-twenties. While one of the guys is walking towards the car, Sylvester brags that he has caught this guy about seven times already. Sylvester opens his window and asks the guy how many times he has caught him. "Oeeff too many times",[131] he answers. "And what do I do with you?"[132] asks Sylvester. The guy moves his hand and his fingers click. Later Sylvester explains that the clicking of fingers means that you have beaten up someone. Sylvester smiles cheeky. The guy and Sylvester thank each other and we drive back to the Valley again. Meanwhile, Sylvester points to another guy. "See him? This guy is also wanted, we have footage of him. But he doesn't know it, so we will not arrest him now but some other time."[133] We leave IY again.

PSCs also encounter challenges during their provision of security. These challenges can serve as opportunities for criminals and can be distinguished into four things. First, weather conditions influence how armed response officers do their work. The wind triggers alarms, causing that armed response officers need to respond on a false alarm. It is also easier for criminals to access a house unheard as people think that the sounds criminals make is from the wind, instead of people entering

[130] Participant Observations with Braydon, 07-03-2019.
[131] Participant Observations and Conversation with Sylvester and Imizamo Yethu resident, 20-03-2019.
[132] Participant Observations with Sylvester, 20-03-2019.
[133] Participant Observations with Sylvester, 20-03-2019.

the house. Second, loadshedding becomes a challenge. During loadshedding the electricity in a neighbourhood is turned off for about two hours, as Eskom, the electricity company, cannot provide enough electricity. As a result, the cameras do not work. This way control room employees cannot see what is happening on the streets. Criminals know this and take their chances. The fact that there are loadshedding schedules[134] does not make this easier. Criminals know exactly when to strike. The third challenge occurs when armed response officers get stuck in traffic causing that armed response officers take longer to reach a house. Fourth, clients can be a challenge. Clients set off their alarms themselves by accident or they forget to arm the alarm. "If criminals see that your alarm is not on they will break into your house. And you can't be everywhere"[135] is what Braydon says about this. Clients also become angry sometimes if they are not happy with the services PSCs provide. In the GSCID area students are also a challenge. Mr. Smiets tells that when he sees a student walking with his/her earplugs in, he warns them to get at least one earplug out so they can hear their surroundings. However, students don't really listen to him. "Students are difficult"[136] is what Mr. Jones acknowledges. Although students get lectures on security, they do not listen to that and are therefore an easy target.

Despite the fact that clients can cause challenges, all three PSCs have the motto 'client is king'. PSCs are not only providing security services. Clients also call in to ask, for example, about broken streetlights. Most private security officers feel appreciated by the clients. At RCID/FADT officers mention that clients send them encouragement and thank them. One officer mentions: "Some of us they know our names. They go 'hé Themba, how are you?'"[137] Another officer tells: "Oohhh it is wonderful. That is why they call me powerful. Because the relationship with the clients is wooooh."[138]

At DBS the opinions are divided. Braydon feels appreciated: "People go out of our way and let us know how they feel about having us in the valley, so yeah."[139] But Sylvester thinks otherwise. He mentions: "People don't realise what security officers are doing to keep the people safe. The people think that security officers are useless but when something is actually happening

[134] "Loadshedding Schedule." http://loadshedding.eskom.co.za/, Accessed on 22-5-2019.
[135] Participant Observations with Braydon, 06-03-2019.
[136] Interview with Mr. Jones, 13-03-2019
[137] Interview with Mr. Themba, 28-02-2019
[138] Interview with Bulelani, 01-03-2019
[139] Participant Observations with Braydon, 06-03-2019

then they stop security for help."[140] However, two days later Sylvester mentions that a lot of clients know him by face. Clients greet him and they appreciate him. Sylvester does think that the white rich people respect the police more. "That is because of the uniform."[141]

Diphoorn (2016, 167) wrote that clients often suspect private security officers of being involved in crimes as clients think that private security officers might be open to corruption or bribes. However, data from this fieldwork does not confirm this. It is true that armed response officers live in the lower socioeconomic neighbourhoods, together with 'the criminals', yet, private security officers do not think that clients suspect them of any criminal behaviour. Furthermore, during my research I did not get the feeling that private security officers work together with criminals. A substantiation of this is shown on patrol with Sylvester. While driving up IY with Sylvester, and the boy came to our car, an informal relationship between a private security officer and a criminal can be seen. This is a power relationship where the private security officer knows the criminal as he has caught him multiple times. Their relationship builds on the fact that Sylvester really wants to catch the bad guy and fight crime, and not because they are friends or 'partner in crime'.

The power of collaboration

While providing security PSCs need other policing actors. In this paragraph I elaborate how PSCs collaborate with other actors. I start this paragraph with a vignette.

> *Braydon has just started his patrol when all of a sudden he accelerates the speed of the Deep Blue Security vehicle he is driving in. He takes three turns left and stops in front of a coloured man in saggy clothes. He starts talking to the man in Afrikaans. The man is suspected of robbing a house earlier that week. At first, the man does not want to get in the car but when Braydon tells him that 'he will otherwise tell his mother what he did', the suspect gets in the car. He explains that this is because the suspect knows that he would be in more trouble if his mother would know then if he would come to the police.*

[140] Participant Observations with Sylvester, 20-03-2019.
[141] Participant Observations with Sylvester, 20-03-2019.

Braydon and the suspect arrive at the police station. Braydon hands the suspect over to the police and a SAPS officer locks him in the holding cell. In the meantime, Braydon is trying to find the detective that belongs to this case. He walks through the whole police station and occasionally he greets some police officers. The detective that handles this case is not present but after a call, makes his way to the police station. When the detective arrives, he and Braydon enter the computer room. Here, the detective asks Braydon questions such as "how do you know this is him?"[142] *Braydon and the detective have a conversation in Afrikaans. The detective tells Braydon that the information that Braydon has given him, might not be enough for an arrest.*

Then Braydon and the detective walk into the holding cell. The detective and Braydon start interrogating the suspect in Afrikaans. After ten minutes Braydon leaves the cell, but the detective stays in the cell. Braydon explains that they just asked the suspect where he left the stolen goods. Braydon says that for now he cannot do anything else and it is now the task of the police to go and find the stolen goods because the private security officers do not have powers to do so. Braydon needs to give a statement at the front desk of the police station. When this is done, he leaves again. [143]

The vignette above shows that PSCs are pushing their boundaries towards the tasks of the police in the provision of security. Berg (2010) explains that on the one hand this shores up the state police but on the other hand also supports the legitimacy of PSCs. The pluralised policing landscape is then also a good illustration of what Diphoorn (2013) calls 'twilight policing'. She explains that armed response officers are involved in policing practices that are based on both collaboration as competition in relation to the state. I first explain how PSCs in Hout Bay and Rondebosch collaborate with other policing actors and then describe how these PSCs compete with the public police.

SAPS and PSCs within Hout Bay and Rondebosch supplement each other in the provision of security in multiple ways. Private security officers are not allowed to do arrests, only detain

[142] Participant Observations, SAPS officer, 07-03-2019.
[143] Participant Observations, Braydon, 07-03-2019

people. If they detain someone, then armed response officers need to take suspects to the SAPS police station. Without SAPS, PSCs cannot keep criminals off the streets. Mutually, SAPS need private security officers as SAPS does not have enough manpower herself. PSCs have more employees and there are also more than one PSC within one neighbourhood. PSCs can therefore be faster on the spot. Furthermore, PSCs are also in contact with neighbourhood watches, who are the eyes and ears on the street and who report suspicious behaviour. SAPS let PSCs be involved in the process of security provision, making that PSCs are not degrading SAPS authority, but SAPS influences how people regard SAPS' authority.

Another important argument that Diphoorn (2013) makes is that twilight policing becomes a joint performance. This is clearly evident within Groote Schuur Community Improvement District (GSCID). Mr. Jones explains:

> SAPS got the power, Law Enforcement got the power. They are peace officers. But if you leave them alone, nothing is gonna happen. Basically, the whole thing is controlled with a public member [GSCID], but at the end of the day forces of SAPS and Law Enforcement are necessary. It is a method of controlling SAPS and Law Enforcement to do certain things.[144]

What Mr. Jones is saying is that the police is understaffed and therefore has trouble providing security. GSCID has more vehicles on the road and will be faster in responding to crime. Furthermore, he elaborates that SAPS is needed to legitimise operations initiated by GSCID, which is in line with Abrahamsen and Williams (2007, 238) who state that PSCs often gain their legitimacy from their connection with state forces. Without SAPS or Law Enforcement, GSCID is not able to perform activities regarding public safety as they are not authorised to do so. About this Mr. Brook states: "If there is a complaint from a citizen about an operation, then we can say 'we work under the construction of SAPS'."[145] In this sense, it can be said that GSCID uses the public police so that GSCID itself cannot be held accountable for their actions.

Another way in which the collaboration is visible is through the exchange of information. An example is RCID/FADT, who has an advanced satellite hub with modern technology such as

[144] Interview with Mr. Jones, 13-03-2019.
[145] Interview with Mr. Jones, 13-03-2019.

overview camera's and License Plate Recognition (LPR). As also explained in chapter five, RCID/FADT supports SAPS by giving them footage. This can however only be done when a SAPS detective comes to RCID/FADT with a case number.

But PSCs are also 'competing' with the state. Berg (2010) mentions that PSC are increasingly engaging in law enforcement duties in public space and are gaining symbolic and real powers. PSCs real powers are growing because much of what private security companies do remains unchallenged (Berg 2010, 289). Symbolically, PSCs are given the authority to enforce order such as the control and management of risk, which is based on social ordering. PSCs get to manage populations by excluding and extracting them, and therefore decide who 'belongs' and who does not belong in public space. (Berg 2010, 297) In Rondebosch this is visible for GSCID and is illustrated with the vignette below.

It is a sunny day, but not too warm. Mr Smiets and Mr Stewart, two coloured men of fifty and sixty years old, are walking on the Rivertrail. The brook where the water should be running is empty. On first sight, the trail looks peaceful with her tall green trees and plants. However, when you take a second look you clearly see all the dirt on the ground. The soil is covered in plastic and cartons ranging in size. Mr. Stewart explains that on this spot a lot of homeless people built shags. Mr. Stewart and Mr. Smiets pass a group of one woman and two men, all coloured. They look unkempt, which shows through their grey sloppy outfits, unbrushed hair, and the fact that they are missing teeth.

Mr. Stewart does not trust these people and asks them what they are doing here. While talking in Afrikaans to them, he grabs a stick and starts to move it around in the earth. Now and then he picks up a small plastic sachet that is used to store drugs in. He smells the sachets and after that throws them back on the ground again. Then Mr. Stewart tells the three people "the only way you gonna safe your ass is if I get nothing." The three people are laughing nervously. After two minutes Mr. Stewart ceases his search. "Next time I will come back with a sniffle dog", he tells them. One of the guys answers by saying "thank you" repeatedly. While Mr. Stewart walks away from them, he tells them "you can fool me once, but not twice." The same guy answers again with "thank you", but also adds "I love you." "Have

a nice day", is the last thing that Mr. Stewart says to them, and he continues his walk down the path.[146]

PSCs are not only competing with SAPS because they become more visible in public space, but also because citizens regard them as important public security providers. In case of an emergency citizens are more likely to call their private security company than SAPS. The next chapter elaborates on this.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter I portrayed how private security companies (PSCs) provide security within the pluralised policing landscape. I explained that PSCs are an important actor as they have extensive access to technology, resources, and manpower. I described how control room employees coordinate armed response officers which makes the prevention and reaction to crime easier. By being both visible and invisible PSCs enhance their security provision. Furthermore, I elaborated that private security companies are increasingly becoming present within the public areas, and that they are, with the approval of SAPS, operating in the twilight zone.

[146] Participant Observations with Mr. Stewart and Mr. Smiets, 02-04-2019.

7. Bottom-up Community Policing Groups

Marije Galama

> Forget the police! That's a total waste of time. Look, if we lived in a civilized country like yours we would have had a good police service with good resources. You wouldn't have been paying a fortune for security![147]

Cape Town, a city that deals with increasing crime rates, people withdraw from public spaces and take on their own measures to deal with perceived threats (Louw 1997, 38). According to Lysaght and Basten (2003, 4) both community tradition and financial ability to gain access to security determines citizens' choices in policing in post-colonies/divided societies. Stoker (2004; 2006 in Bullock 2014, 2) pointed out that bottom-up community policing is evident in every neighbourhood of South Africa. In this chapter I elaborate on how feelings of insecurity are part of everyday life for residents of Hout Bay and Rondebosch. I support this argument by discussing the four coping strategies: avoidance, confrontation, conciliation, and other strategies (Moser and McIlwaine 2001). By giving examples of common used strategies I illustrate how the application of coping strategies can contribute to the provision of citizen security. First, I address security threats defined by citizens in order to understand why these threats cause feelings of insecurity. I continue with elaborating on the four coping strategies applied by residents of both Hout Bay and Rondebosch. Among confrontation strategies I make a distinction between confrontation strategies on individual and group level. I argue that the emergence of bottom-up community policing groups can be seen as a commonly used way of coping with feelings of insecurity. Hereby, there is a focus on how these groups operate on a daily basis and how they collaborate with other policing actors. This clarifies the role that bottom-up community policing groups play in the pluralised policing landscape of Cape Town.

Feelings of insecurity as everyday business

According to Dammert and Malone (2006, 46), citizens that have the means choose to move into areas that are perceived to be safe. This is also one of the main findings that I found among residents of Rondebosch and Hout Bay: they feel safe and secure in and around places that are, to

[147] Interview with Monique, 04-03-2019.

their ideas and standards, well secured. By well secured they mean places that have cameras, walls, fences, burglar bars and most preferably security guards. In practice these places are at home, inside a car, inside a park or shopping mall. This rests on the assumption that unregulated spaces are dangerous, as pointed out by Hook and Vroljak (2002). Katy, a twenty-year-old student from Rondebosch mentions how she feels safe at home because of the presence of a security guard: ‘‘I live in an apartment block where there is a security guard on duty all the time. So, I don't worry about that sort of safety. The security guard is always there: 24/7. In my own flat I never have to worry about safety.’’[148] In this case, unregulated spaces are places that have no protection by security providers, for example on the streets and in public transport. Citizens in both Rondebosch and Hout Bay prefer not to walk on the street. If they walk, they take all sorts of precautionary measures. Katy explains how she always thinks ahead whenever she goes somewhere: ‘‘there are a lot of precautions that I take. There are certain routes (…) like even from here to my house, which is less than a kilometre away, maybe five hundred meters, I know the roads that I take that I feel more comfortable with’’[149] Taking a walk spontaneously is never on the agenda, except for a walk in a (regulated and secured) park. As mentioned in chapter four, life in Cape Town is revolved around a certain means of transportation, may this be a car (for the wealthier people) or public transport (for the less wealthy people). Walking is perceived as an unsafe option to get from place to place because one is situated in unregulated space and not protected by something or someone. This contributes to feelings of insecurity.

(In)Visibility to feel (in)secure

Ways in which it becomes clear that feelings of insecurity are everyday business for residents of Hout Bay and Rondebosch are visible in the way houses are secured. Emily, a forty-year-old woman who lives in the Valley, tells about all the forms of barriers she has set up to make her feel safer at home: ‘‘I am very alert with putting on the alarm. We have also raised our wall. We have spikes on the fence (…) I mean, when our house is locked down I feel totally safe. All these burglar bars are cemented into walls. You need to drive a car through if you want to get in’’[150] Emily is no exception when it comes to securing a property. In both Rondebosch and the Valley almost all

[148] Interview with Katy, 26-03-2019.
[149] Interview with Katy, 26-03-2019.
[150] Interview with Emily, 06-03-2019.

houses are linked to a private security company with armed response. Besides, most houses in both neighbourhoods have burglar bars, alarm systems, and high (electric) fences to protect the property, as Emily exemplified above. Hereby, (in)visibility plays a major role in how (in)secure residents feel. Residents describe how they feel more secure when they see that a certain area is being kept safe. For instance, by the presence of cameras (see image 1), bicycle patrollers, security patrol cars and security guards. Monique, a retired woman from Rondebosch, mentions that she prefers one private security company (FADT) over another (Princeton) because they are more visible in the neighbourhood: ‘‘I see FADT patrol cars all the time. Do you ever see a Princeton patrol car? No right? (…) Therefore, they are not on top of my hit parade.’’[151] In addition, protecting a property with visible measures is perceived as important within a street, street block, or neighbourhood. Scott, who lives in the Valley, explains how ‘‘no one wants to be the weakest link in the street’’.[152] According to him, if someone in the street chooses to install electric fencing, the latest trend in the field of property security, it does not take long before neighbours follow. They believe that the weakest link in the street will be the most likely to be a target for burglars. Interesting is that there are no major differences in the way residents of the Valley and residents of Rondebosch protect their property. There are in fact more cases of property related crime in Rondebosch (962 cases in 2018[153]) in comparison to Hout Bay (628 cases in 2018[154]) but there are no significant differences when looking at the way in which people protect their properties. This can be explained by the fact that fear of crime cannot be isolated from other fears citizens face in their daily life (Dammert and Malone 2006, 46). Applied to South Africa, Breetzke, Landman and Cohn (2014, 126) point out that not just crime rates cause feelings of insecurity but also dramatic demographic, economic, and social changes that are happening in South Africa. This can explain why there are no major differences between the

Image 1: Video Surveillance sign attached to wall in Rondebosch

[151] Interview with Monique, 04-03-2019.
[152] Interview with Scott, 06-03-2019.
[153] “Crime Stats Rondebosch.” https://www.crimestatssa.com/precinct.php?id=1057, Accessed on 05-06-2019.
[154] “Crime Stats Hout Bay.” https://www.crimestatssa.com/precinct.php?id=1081, Accessed on 05-06-2019.

neighbourhood as it is a trend on a national level. It is important to note that even though property related crime is more present in Rondebosch,[155] contact crimes (murder, sexual offences, robbery etc.) are more present in Hout Bay[156] and this ofcourse also influences feelings of insecurity.

As I mentioned before, feelings of insecurity are everyday business for residents of Hout Bay and Rondebosch. This is also evident in the high level of security awareness and sensitiveness these residents have. Emily explains how these feelings have an impact on her everyday life:

> When I am parked at the supermarket, I am very aware of who is around me. I make sure when I lock my car, my car is locked. I don't leave anything in the car. I try to hide it if I have to. I don't feel comfortable leaving my laptop in the car at any stage. Even if I have to go to the petrol station I am not comfortable. (…) In the car I am very, very aware. I use my mirrors all the time. I leave enough space and I put my car in the position that if I do not feel at ease… I can get away. And I don't like it if I can't. I get very upset.[157]

This shows how significant the impact of feelings of insecurity is on someone's' day and even life. Building on this, it becomes clear that residents of Rondebosch and Hout Bay do not feel secure in their own neighbourhood and react to it in certain ways. I noticed that there is not a lot of trust in the South African Police Service (SAPS). Adriana, who is in her sixties and lives in Hout Bay since 2015, is not very positive about SAPS in terms of seeing them as an actor that should respond to security threats: ''I personally haven't tested the police in Hout Bay (…) but the fact that gangs are happy to shoot a taxi driver right in front of the police station makes me think that they are not too put off.''[158] Residents have more trust in private security companies (PSCs) to respond to security threats such as house or vehicle robberies. Residents contact bottom-up community policing groups as well to respond to (less emergent) security threats. These bottom-up community policing groups often give assistance to PSCs and sometimes operate in a grey area. I elaborate on this later.

[155] "Crime Stats Rondebosch." https://www.crimestatssa.com/precinct.php?id=1057 , Accessed on 05-06-2019.
[156] "Crime Stats Hout Bay." https://www.crimestatssa.com/precinct.php?id=1081, Accessed on 05-06-2019.
[157] Interview with Emily, 06-03-2019.
[158] Interview with Adriana, 19-03-2019.

Avoidance strategies applied by residents

According to Moser and McIlwane (2001) there are four coping strategies to deal with crime in everyday life: avoidance, confrontation, conciliation, and other strategies. For residents of Hout Bay and Rondebosch avoidance is most often applied. Examples of avoidance strategies described by Moser and McIlwane (2001, 181) are changing mobility patterns and avoiding robbery by not wearing jewelry.

Most residents of Hout Bay and Rondebosch avoid public transport. People that have no other choice than to use public transport, often do not feel safe while using it. Taxi services, busses, and especially the train are perceived as unsafe. Adriana, who lived in Johannesburg her whole life but moved to Cape Town in the mid-nineties, tells about how she travelled to work by train for twelve years but does not feel safe in the train anymore:

> People from Johannesburg, we don't use the train. Especially not in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg. So, when I moved to Cape Town I couldn't believe that I was going by train. In the early days, I am talking about 1994, it worked so well. But then eventually it got worse, worse, worse, and worse. People started with cable theft and mugging on trains. Now, it is a hopeless situation and it is really sad because there is a whole lot of people that rely on public transport. They have no option.[159]

As mentioned before, residents of both neighbourhoods protect their own property in every possible way (burglar bars, alarms, fencing, security guards etc.) and this is one of the most common applied avoidance strategies. Gated communities are also present in one of the neighbourhoods, namely in the Valley of Hout Bay. An explanation why there are gated communities in the Valley and not in Rondebosch is because the presence of the neighbouring communities Imizamo Yethu (IY) and Hangberg. For residents of the Valley these two communities are considered as unregulated space. According to Hook and Vrdoljak (2002) unregulated space can be perceived as dangerous. A consequence is that residents in the Valley choose to withdraw from this 'dangerous' environment. As White (2011, 431) points out, gated

[159] Interview with Adriana, 19-03-2019.

communities often preclude public access to among other things parks, roads, and sidewalks. Cape Town is surrounded by mountains on one side and has the sea on the other. Space is therefore a scarcity and there are few opportunities for expansion of the city. As a result, spacious gated communities are rare (White 2011, 431). However, residing in so called 'secured estates' is becoming popular in Cape Town. These estates function as small scale gated communities. Adriana lives in a secured estate in the Valley and explains how her property is secured. "The cottages are secured by the fences and the fact that the guards are on duty. Plus electric fencing and the rest of it. There are three guards on duty at any time and they patrol the houses of the estate. You definitely see that as you get older you try and put yourself behind fencing and guards. (…) It is very expensive though."[160]

Interesting here is that Adriana also mentions that age matters when it comes to the appliance of different coping strategies. This is something that I have come across more often among residents from different ages. On an individual level, younger residents are less avoidance oriented and more confrontational oriented in comparison to adults and especially elderly. For example, Monique emphasizes that younger people take more risks. "I won't drive on roads that I think are dodgy. Avoid, avoid, avoid! Young people don't feel the same way. I am sure you gathered that. They kind of think to hell with it! I live here. This is my country and I will enjoy it and do it. So, a lot of that is an age thing."[161]

Katy, a twenty-year-old student, agrees with what Monique states. This is also evident in the fact that she carries pepper spray around most days to confront a possible criminal in case of emergency:

> I have never been attacked or anything like that but it is good to have it [pepper spray] around. (…) I have never not gone somewhere because I was afraid for my safety. I never not go to Claremont because people get mugged in Claremont. But I will always know the precautions I want to take. I have friends who live in all areas in Cape Town and I will never think twice about not going there. If someone invites me over for lunch, I will go for lunch. [162]

[160] Interview with Ariana, 19-03-2019.
[161] Interview with Monique, 04-03-2019.
[162] Interview with Katy, 26-03-2019.

Another interesting finding is that the avoidance strategy as mentioned by Moser and McIlwaine (2001) can also be applied on a larger scale: residents –that have the opportunity and money to- 'avoid' the country out of safety and security reasons. The children of Monique, Jennie, Adriana and Daisy, women that are around sixty years old, all have children that live abroad. These children are now in their thirties and have made the decision to settle down in another, safer country. During a walk through Rondebosch, Jennie tells me why both of her sons made the decision to emigrate: ''I have a son in Oslo and I have one son in Germany. Life is peaceful for them in those countries. (…) They don't get the sunshine, they don't get the mountain and they don't get the sea the same way. But they do get peace.''[163] This makes again clear how much coping with feelings of insecurity becomes a feature of daily life and is an ongoing process for many citizens of Cape Town (Lysaght and Basten 2003, 4).

Confrontation strategies applied by residents

Next to avoidance strategies, confrontation strategies are also used by residents in both neighbourhoods. The interpretation of these confrontation strategies differs among residents mostly because of age, income, and personal motivation. As I mentioned before, confrontation strategies are used on both individual and group level. Fear of violent repercussions means that individual strategies involving confrontation are less common among citizens. In both neighbourhoods mainly group level confrontation strategies are applied. To support this, I first elaborate on individual confrontation strategies. Subsequently, I follow with describing group level strategies and I discuss how they contribute to the provision of citizen security.

Individual confrontation strategies

Individual confrontation strategies are strategies that involve the confrontation between a resident and an assaulter or mugger. An example of an individual confrontation strategy is the carrying of firearms or other weapons in case of robberies and assaults (Moser and McIlwaine 2004, 181). I found it interesting that Emily has taken self-defense classes to defend herself when she feels threatened. For her, this is part of her own security provision as it helps her to feel safer in public places. However, most residents I have spoken to do not make use of these kind of individual confrontation strategies. Monique is one of the many residents who is afraid that confronting a

[163] Interview with Jennie, 12-03-2019.

mugger or assaulter can bring you in more danger and thus doing the opposite of providing security. ‘‘You could actually get off worse if you try and fight them back. They pull a knife on you (…) don’t fight unless you want to be killed. Bottom line.’’[164] Younger residents take more risks when it comes to possible confrontation in a dangerous situation.

Organised citizens as confrontation strategy

Another confrontation strategy to deal with feelings of insecurity in everyday life can be seen in the founding of different sorts of bottom-up community policing groups. This way of confronting feelings of insecurity is a strategy that is often applied in Rondebosch and Hout Bay. As mentioned in chapter two, community members involved in policing can be seen as providing a bridge between service providers and the public (Stone and Ward 2000; Bullock 2014). This way citizens organise themselves to provide citizen security and therefore they are a present actor in the pluralised policing landscape. Residents of both neighbourhoods feel that the other policing actors, mainly SAPS but also private security companies (PSCs), fall short in full security provision. There is a variety of groups within bottom-up community policing groups in Cape Town. Based on literature (Bullock 2014), I expected to find one main active neighbourhood watch in both neighbourhoods. However, the situation is more complicated. In Hout Bay there are two main bottom-up community policing groups that have the approval of the community and public police, corresponding with Johnson (1991 in Baker 2002, 36) who calls these groups responsible citizen responses. However, Hout Bay consist of three communities and within IY and Hangberg there are also bottom-up community policing groups. These groups can be seen as autonomous citizen responses as they operate without the approval of, or cooperation with the state police. However, it should be mentioned that I cannot confirm this as I have not conducted in-depth research in either one of these communities. Therefore, one should keep in mind that when I write about bottom-up community policing groups in Hout Bay, I am referring to the groups that are considered responsible citizen responses that are located in the Valley. One of these two main bottom-up community policing groups in Hout Bay is the Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch (HBNW). Mick, one of the founding members of HBNW, explains the main reason for the start in 2005:

[164] Interview with Monique, 04-03-2019.

> In 2005, we had somebody murdered in Hout Bay and the community thought: enough is enough. If the SAPS aren't going to provide it we have to make our own. Let's use ourselves. Because it is just morally wrong when you see a crime committed and you can't get the people to actually take him down. And he just gets away with it again and again and again.[165]

As Mick mentions, in 2005 the community (the Valley) no longer accepted that someone could get away with murder. As the public police could not provide citizen security, they decided to take measures into their own hands and founded HBNW. In this case, taken measures into their own hands means being actively engaged with the provision of citizen security. Residents go on patrols, are observant, and report suspicious behaviour through a walkie-talkie (connected to HBNW and PSCs). In addition, they come together to discuss neighbourhood security related issues. Hereby, the provision of citizens' security by bottom-up community policing groups influences the way the state and society interact (Pearce 2007b, in Colak and Pearce 2009). Next to this local neighbourhood watch, the Community Crime Prevention (CCP) is also a very active and well known bottom-up community policing group in Hout Bay. CCP started about at the same time and with the same motivation as HBNW. However, they differ in functions. HBNW is mostly eyes and ears whereas CCP is mostly executive in nature. Community Crime Prevention is a non-profit company that was established by a group of concerned residents. In performing their tasks, they have overlap with state police and private security companies and therefore are located in a grey area. I discuss this later.

Bottom-up community policing is described as ''civilian forms of policing outside a partnership with the state'' (Schärf 2001, 74). As described in chapter two, a well-known form of bottom-up community policing group is the establishment of a neighbourhood watch. HBNW can be seen as a larger scale neighbourhood watch. However, in both Rondebosch and Hout Bay there are also smaller scale neighbourhood watches that cover one or two blocks and operate independently. This way they fulfil their task as being the eyes and ears. Through communicating via WhatsApp they warn other residents when they see suspicious behaviour or report other issues, such as open gates and broken street lights. Emily is part of a WhatsApp group in her block and describes the function as follows:

[165] Interview with Mick, 05-02-2019.

> As a street, we now got our own WhatsApp group. So, there is our little security group and we communicate on that. We started to explain to people that this is for us to be there for each other if there is a problem. Slowly, I started adding more and more people as people were interested in it, and it worked out to be great. Just to keep us all on a loop. It also worked great to get to know the street. [166]

As Emily describes, this not only helps to keep everyone involved but also improves the relationship between residents.

For Rondebosch the main bottom-up community policing group is the Rondebosch Community Improvement District (RCID). As described in chapter six, RCID is a joint resident association that collectively hire a private security company to provide security for them. The founding of RCID is similar to the start of HBNW. Daisy, RCIDs manager, explains how the community came together after a person was murdered in Rondebosch. ‘‘Seventeen years ago there was a murder in Rondebosch, which was very, very unusual. All the residents got together (…) there must have been about four hundred people. They said look, we cannot expect the police to do anything for us, we have to do something ourselves. At that meeting, they formed a committee.”[167]According to Daisy, the community could not expect the police to provide full citizen security. Residents in both neighbourhoods have little confidence in the South African Police Service (SAPS) when it comes to safe keeping of citizens. Residents believe that the SAPS is understaffed and often not able to respond to security threats. As a result, residents of the RCID area (see map 3) wanted to do their bit within the provision of citizen security. However, according to Daisy, members of RCID prefer to outsource security provision as they do not have time or motivation to actively perform tasks that are associated with the provision of citizen security:

> Crime was getting more and more sophisticated (…) and the community decided that we had to do something. In 24 hours we managed to get a neighbourhood watch going. We had two hours shifts from 6 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. The volunteers were fantastic. Then, after three weeks the sustainability started waning. Doctors that had

[166] Interview with Emily, 06-03-2019.
[167] Interview with Daisy, 19-02-2019.

> just gone of shift were willing to do it for a short time but they couldn't for a longer time. Then our committee said: 'this has worked well, why don't we just get professionals to do exactly the same?' [168]

RCID, HBNW, and CCP all have the same goal, provide security, but different resources and philosophies to achieve that goal. RCID beliefs that a partnership between the RCID committee, RCID manager, and FADT is the way to keep the area as safe as possible.[169] RCID outsources the provision of security and leaves it to the professionals whereas HBNW members support and assist the public and private police by watching out for suspicious behaviour from home and report this to SAPS or private security companies (PSCs). A small proportion of HBNW members also patrol the area, but the vast majority does not. According to Karen, a 29-year-old resident, this is because most people have other priorities: ''So, the patrols did not have a lot of success. They try every now and then, but like middle class people they don't want to go and walk with a bunch of strangers at night. And I wouldn't want to. I got other things to do at night."[170] During my fieldwork, I only interviewed one resident that regularly goes on patrols, named Scott. Scott is a forty-year-old dedicated HBNW patroller. He has been going on patrols for over ten years and tells me what motivates him. ''It is all about presence. Criminals know that there are patrols. If the patrols stop, crime will rise."[171] Scotts' statement is in line with Jusionyte and Goldstein (2016) who state that visibility can create security. Just being present as eyes and ears on the street helps with keeping the neighbourhood safe.

Other ways in which visibility creates security for bottom-up community policing groups are placing multiple HBNW-banners and signs and by driving around in cars. These cars can be recognised by the HBNW logo. RCID focuses on visibility in a different way, namely by giving residents a goodie bag filled with all sorts of RCID gadgets such as pens and magnets. Building on this, online visibility plays a role for certain bottom-up community policing groups as well. Both CCP and HBNW have a very active Facebook page. CCP has almost two thousand

[168] Interview with Daisy, 19-02-2019.
[169] "Partnership makes suburbs safer." http://www.securitysa.com/news.aspx?pklnewsid=8700, Accessed on 20-06-2019.
[170] Interview with Karen, 14-02-2019.
[171] Interview with Scott, 06-03-2019.

followers[172] and HBNW almost three thousand followers[173]. Both pages give crime related information and keep the community updated in an interactive way. However, Dave, CCPs' operational manager, explains a downside of having an active Facebook page: ''People are nervous and social media blows a lot of stuff up. Hout Bay [residents] is very vocal on social media. People want to know what has happened to their neighbours and stories spread very fast here. A lot of stuff gets blowing out of proportion.''[174]

Members of bottom-up community policing group can be seen as active citizens, in this case because they spend time on social media to discuss security and safety issues that relate to their neighbourhood. According to Mick, HBNW member, you have to be a very passionate person to be part of a bottom-up community policing group. Interesting is that most of these members are adults, mainly people above forty years old. When I visited the HBNW annual meeting on the tenth of April, more than eighty percent of the attendees were over sixty years old. Also, of all young adults I have interviewed, not one was part of a bottom-up community policing group. Katy, one of these young adults, told me how she beliefs neighbourhood watches do not match with how young people today want to be involved in citizen security provision: ''I think neighbourhood watches are a little bit ... outdated or old. It has been a while since a new system has been initiated. As a student or as a young working person you don't have time to cruise around in your street with your car and use the petrol and your own safety. I think neighbourhood watch is more for older people who own their own houses, who own their own cars, and have permanent jobs, that kind of thing.''[175]

Karen, who is twenty-nine, also noticed that she is one of the few relatively young neighbourhood watch members. She is not satisfied with the attitude and lack of interest young people have to be part of the local neighbourhood watch:

> A lot of people who live in this neighbourhood are students. They are never going to be part of a neighbourhood watch. I think that there is still a lot of misunderstanding about what a neighbourhood watch is supposed to do. That is one

[172] "CCP Hout Bay." https://www.facebook.com/ccphoutbay/, Accessed on 06-06-2019.
[173] "HBNWatch." https://www.facebook.com/HBNWatch/, Accessed on 06-06-2019.
[174] Interview with Dave, 21-02-2019.
[175] Interview with Katy, 26-03-2019.

> thing that frustrates me, that people don't see that they have a role to play. When there is a problem they are always like 'why haven't the police or why haven't the CID done anything about it?' and I am just like: what have you done about it?[176]

According to Karen, residents that wonder why the police has not done anything to provide security are residents that are not involved in bottom-up community policing. Therefore, they complicate the creation of a 'bridge' between service providers and the public, as pointed out by Stone and Ward (2000, in Bullock 2014).

Collaboration

Bottom-up community policing groups work close together with other policing actors. CCP, HBNW, and RCID all have meetings with local SAPS members where they discuss crime stats and other security and community related issues. According to both Daisy (RCID) and Dave (CCP) it is good to be involved with the Community Police Forum (CPF) as other role players such as PSCs, Law Enforcement, Metro Police, community members and other stakeholders are attending those meetings as well. The collaboration between bottom-up community policing groups and PSCs have led to some interesting findings. I have noticed that there is a grey area within the PSCs and bottom-up community policing groups. Both RCID and CCP operate in the twilight zone. They started as 'regular' voluntary bottom-up community policing groups and now have appointed professionals to assist them in the execution of the provision of security. In addition, bottom-up community policing groups also supplement the state because they assist the SAPS in their provision of citizen security. These groups also contest the state as members of these groups feel that policing actors that should provide citizens security fail to do so. Hereby, policing becomes a joint performance where policing practices are established by the interaction between various actors. This is in line with the concept of 'twilight policing' (Diphoorn 2013). According to bottom-up community policing group members, this process of outsourcing is necessary to keep the organisation running and sustainable. This has to do with accountability. CCP hires professional security guards to assist them. According to Abbie, director of CCP, this is in order to keep CCP running. ''People are tired and people are also not accountable. Life happens so you might have to put up with a small baby all night and then when it is your shift you are not going

[176] Interview with Karen, 14-02-2019.

to do it. I believe in guys getting paid to do it. Because that is how they are accountable and why they are accountable.''[177] Thus, even though voluntary efforts of residents are relevant and necessary, in general there is still a preference for the outsourcing of security as accountability enhances the democratic policing framework, pointed out by Glebbeek (2003).

Conciliation and other strategies applied by residents

Conciliation strategies are strategies that are applied when residents want to overcome the distrust or hostility towards criminals or others that contribute to feelings of insecurity. Most residents are afraid of the perpetrators of crime and would avoid conciliation strategies. In Moser and McIlwane's (2001) case of Guatemala, the predominant conciliation strategy involved religion. Enzokuhle, a student and resident of IY, is the only one I have spoken to who applied a conciliation strategy. Enzokuhle explains that older generations still have more vital resentment towards the police. This can be linked to the legacy of Apartheid (Breetzke, Landman, and Cohn 2014, 299). Younger generations focus more on hope and conciliation with police in the future. Moser and McIlwane (2001, 182) describe 'submitting' as one of the other applied strategies. This strategy is also applied among residents of both Rondebosch and Hout Bay. The rationale behind this is that it is safer to allow a thief to rob you as it reduces the chances of being harmed.

Concluding remarks

Coping with feelings of insecurity is part of daily life for residents of Hout Bay and Rondebosch. These coping strategies contribute to the provision of citizen security as they express the motivation of citizens to provide their own security. Ways of coping differ among age, race, and personal motivation. In Rondebosch and Hout Bay mainly avoidance and confrontation strategies are used on both individual and group level, the latter resulting in the origin of bottom-up community policing groups. Applying avoidance strategies results in, among other things, visible protection of houses and avoidance of dodgy areas. Confrontation strategies are expressed on both individual and group level. A popular confrontation strategy on group level is the creation of bottom-up community policing groups. Members of these groups feel responsible for their own provision of security and are encouraged through intrinsic motivation to actively police in their

[177] Interview with Abbie, 18-02-2019.

own neighbourhood. As a result, bottom-up community policing groups often are located in a grey area as they take over tasks and collaborate with PSCs and state police. Hereby, policing becomes a joint performance (Diphoorn 2013).

Conclusion and Discussion

Together

In this conclusion we look back at the previous chapters and assemble the findings of the four policing actors to answer our main research question: How do plural policing actors provide citizen security in contemporary Cape Town, South Africa? In this thesis we explain how the different policing actors, Community Police Forums (CPF), South African Police Service (SAPS), private security companies (PSCs) and bottom-up community policing groups, provide citizen security in Cape Town. By putting security at the centre of analysis and by using anthropological methods we elaborate on the pluralised policing landscape in the two Capetonian neighbourhoods Hout Bay and Rondebosch. We argue that the four policing actors have a specific contribution in the provision of citizen security. The CPF, as top-down community policing actor, aims to promote police-community relations. On top of that, CPFs are also trying to enhance the collaboration between different policing actors. The SAPS acknowledges itself as being too small to provide security on their own and depends on the collaboration with other policing actors. This is where private security companies come in, that provide security for those who can afford it. Bottom-up community policing groups are initiatives that are set up by citizens to provide citizen security without involvement but with the approval of the state. This distinguishes them from vigilante groups. (Johnson 1991 in Baker 2002, 36)

We first place the pluralised policing landscape in the context of post-Apartheid Cape Town. Post-Apartheid South Africa is still a divided society which is also visible in the policing landscape. We explain how sovereignty has splintered into different actors, creating a multiplicity of sovereignties within the pluralised policing landscape. Within this landscape the state no longer alone provides citizen security. We link this to the concept of twilight policing as introduced by Diphoorn (2013). In addition, we shed light on how policing should be done democratically according to the democratic policing framework of Glebbeek (2003). Furthermore, we demonstrate how in/visibility plays a role within the police practices of each actor. By bringing this all together, we argue that the four policing actors in this thesis are not separate entities but depend on each other and all individually contribute to the provision of citizen security.

Contemporary Cape Town as a divided society

The consequences of Apartheid are clearly visible in contemporary Cape Town. This shows in socio-spatial divisions. In Hout Bay there are three clearly defined areas in which three different

ethnic and socioeconomic groups live, namely coloured, black and white. Rondebosch reflects the socio-spatial divisions as predominantly white and wealthy people live here. These racial categories are interwoven in daily life and ideas about identity, community and the nation are connected to people's historical background (McGrattan 2014, 389). Each group has its own perception on safety and security and every group relies on various policing actors.

After Apartheid, South Africa made a transition into a democratic state which also had its influence on policing. Community Policing Forums (CPFs) were set up to bring the police closer to its citizens. The South African Police (SAP), the police force during Apartheid, was the coercive arm of the state that implemented Apartheid into society. The state police had a negative association within black and coloured communities, since mainly these communities were harmed during the Apartheid period. This caused mistrust towards the police which is still evitable today. In Hout Bay this sentiment is reflected in the black and coloured community which makes it more difficult for the CPF and SAPS to improve the police-community relationship. In comparison, Rondebosch has a more homogeneous white community making it easier to police. As SAPS expresses the feeling of being too small, the state police recognises that citizen security exceeds states' capacity alone. As a result, various groups choose to make use of other security services, for example private security companies (PSCs). PSCs are actors who provide security services that can be bought on the free market by third parties (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007, 241). This means that private security is only for those who can afford to hire a PSC. This study shows that within Rondebosch and Hout Bay it is mainly the white, rich community that are clients of private security companies. On top of that, private security officers are often coloured or black and live in lower economic areas. This shows that the divided society in Cape Town is also reflected in the way policing is organised. Additional to PSCs are bottom-up community policing groups that provide citizen security practices. Members of these groups believe that there is still a need to fill a gap in the active provision of citizen security. Bottom-up community policing groups make use of the intrinsic motivation of citizens to provide their own security. These groups try to fill this gap by going on patrols, raising security awareness within the community, and overall assisting and collaborating with other policing actors. Next to these bottom-up community policing groups, residents also provide their own security on an individual level by applying coping strategies to deal with feelings of insecurity on a daily basis.

The multiplicity of sovereignty

Policing in a divided society reconsiders the western and ideal perception on the functioning of the state, as described by Weber (1978). Within a divided society, the state police operates in a space of multiplicity of sovereignties where it no longer has the primary locus of security provision. Sovereignty has become something that can be performed by multiple bodies. Diphoorn (2015b) calls this a 'multiplicity of sovereignties' which, applied to security, leads to a pluralised policing landscape. Multiple actors, which can be all sorts of groups or social units, claim and reclaim their authority through policing (Glebbeek 2003, 40). Policing is in that sense "a field of contest among the state, private interest groups (including economic associations), and communities over the division of authority and responsibilities for constructing and protecting secure routines of daily life" (Marenin 1996, 309 in Glebbeek 2003, 40). This shows in our study as SAPS and PSCs both have the visible ability to claim authority grounded in violence by generating fear, loyalty, and legitimacy. SAPS and CPFs claim authority by law. Bottom-up community policing groups may operate in the same space of the 'multiplicity of sovereignties', but in our case study of Hout Bay and Rondebosch they claim authority to a lesser extent in the sense that they rather fulfil a supporting role. In conclusion, all actors are not static but rather act as fluid entities that collaborate as well as compete with each other. Diphoorn (2013) describes this as 'twilight policing'.

Twilight policing

Chapter two discusses, among other things, the concept of 'twilight policing' (Diphoorn 2013). Twilight policing are policing practices applied by armed response officers which rise from a dual process of collaboration and competition between state and non-state bodies. Twilight policing then becomes a joint performance, in which policing practices are based on the interaction between various actors. Diphoorn (2013, 24) focuses on armed response officers of private security companies as twilight policing actors. Moreover, we argue that not only private security companies (PSCs), but also bottom-up community policing groups are located in a grey area (Shearing and Stenning 1981, 196) and are therefore twilight policing actors.

As Diphoorn (2013) already mentioned, armed response officers are in the twilight policing zone because they compete and collaborate with the SAPS. However, in this research we do not only focus on armed response officers but we look at other job functions within PSCs, and we

argue that PSCs, as a whole, are located in the twilight zone. This research shows that private security officers supplement the state as collaboration between the SAPS and PSCs is necessary in order for them to provide citizen security. They work in a co-dependent relationship. On the one hand, PSCs need SAPS in order to cover 'the legal side' of operations, as explained in chapter six. PSCs are able to provide citizen security to a certain extent but need SAPS, as PSCs are not allowed to, for example, punish or arrest someone. On the other hand, SAPS needs PSCs as PSCs possess resources, information and techniques, for example camera footage, that SAPS does not have. On top of that, PSCs have more manpower than SAPS and therefore have a faster response time. This is why SAPS allows PSCs to work alongside them and to mimic state practices. This creates an image of 'stateness' which strengthens the state (Diphoorn 2013, 23). However, PSCs also contest the state by their ability to provide security services that SAPS cannot. PSCs then influence how citizens see the state. In case of an emergency citizens would sooner rely on PSCs than on SAPS, as described in chapter seven. This contributes to the decrease of state's authority.

Diphoorn (2013, 277) furthermore explains that the pluralised policing landscape is a spider's web consisting of multiple sovereign bodies. Building on this statement we argue that bottom-up community policing groups are also part of this spider's web, and that beside private security officers, bottom-up community policing groups are dynamically related with the state. We then state that bottom-up community policing groups also operate in the 'twilight zone'.

Bottom-up community policing groups supplement the state because they assist the SAPS and PSCs in their provision of citizen security. Bottom-up community policing groups are regarded as the eyes and ears on the street and have a preventive character. With that, bottom-up community policing groups are often voluntary and do not aim to gain customers and clients, although they seek legitimacy and cooperation from other neighbourhood residents. They operate out of an intrinsic motivation, which is a confrontation strategy as explained in chapter seven. However, bottom-up community policing groups also contest the state as members of these groups feel that policing actors that should provide citizens security fail to do so. By taking measures into their own hands, members move past the state and in this way they undermine the state's authority. Bottom-up community policing groups then become a sovereign power in the spider's web.

In conclusion, three of the four actors that are present in the pluralised policing landscape in Cape Town are policing bodies in the twilight zone. CPFs are indirectly part of the twilight zone

as they are a part of SAPS. However, as they do not compete with any policing actor and only have a collaborative element they are not a direct twilight policing actor.

The democratic policing framework

Whereas the democratic state is often seen as responsible actor in the provision and governance of policing, the pluralisation of policing questions who is, in the end, accountable and responsible (Stenning 2009). In this thesis, the democratic policing framework by Glebbeek (2003) is used in order to shed light on whether the state police acts in a democratic manner. In this next part we outline the four elements of democratic policing in the context of this study. The four elements are accountability, the rule of law, demilitarisation, and improvement of the police-community relationship.

In a democratic society the police is given authority by the state on behalf of the people and must be accountable to the people they serve (Glebbeek 2003, 54). CPFs were included in the South African Police Service Act 68 in 1995 as part of the aim to establish a democratic police system. CPFs can thus be seen as a part of the SAPS. The CPFs of both Hout Bay and Rondebosch are held accountable by the Department Of Community Safety (DOCS), which is a provincial government body. The provincial government is given authority by the citizens of the province of the Western Cape which makes CPFs within the province accountable to its citizens. At the same time, CPFs are oversight mechanisms that hold the SAPS accountable. CPFs give feedback to SAPS on the basis of complaints of citizens in order to make sure SAPS serves the community. However, CPFs cannot be qualified as internal oversight mechanisms since they are not an official department of the police which is a necessity to be able to call yourself an internal oversight mechanism (Glebbeek 2003, 59). CPFs are not an external mechanism either as they are not independent from SAPS. Furthermore, CPF and SAPS have a reciprocal relationship. This means that both actors depend on each other in the sense that CPFs take donations in the name of SAPS, but also need SAPS in order to fulfil their jobs in improving the police-community relationship.

Besides this ‘internal’ mechanism, there are two external oversight mechanisms that can hold SAPS and their members accountable. Based on our study we found that these existing oversight mechanisms are not able to hold SAPS accountable to their full extent. The Independent Police Investigation Doctorate (IPID) and the Western Cape Police Ombudsman (WCPO) do not provide binding recommendations. They report back to either the National Prosecution Authority

(NPA), who then decides whether to prosecute the specific member, or to the SAPS organisation itself, who then has the responsibility to discipline their members. However, reality shows that SAPS often do not take this responsibility and members stay undisciplined.

The second element of democratic policing is the respect of the rule of law. Everyone is subjected and accountable to laws that are applied and enforced within a country. An important condition is a fair and transparent government (Bicu-Huiu et al. 2007). South Africa's government struggles to meet this requirement as there are many integrity scandals, most of them involving corruption (Kutnjak Ivkovic and Sauerman 2015, 46). This also shows within the SAPS as executing arm of the government. As this is a sensitive topic, not many police officers spoke about it. However, as elaborated on in chapter five, we found, in newspapers, that corruption is still present within the police organisation.

The third element of democratic policing is demilitarisation. This means that a police force gets rid of the militarising characteristics within the police organisation in order to be responsive to citizens needs without executing repressive police behaviour (Glebbeek 2003, 45). In South Africa, part of the demilitarisation process was the establishment of CPFs to improve the police-community relationship as a soft approach (Schärf 2001). Demilitarisation entails a change in the informal police culture, but our study shows that this has not yet been completed within SAPS. Officers who have been trained in the 'olden' days, under a militarised police organisation, blame new officers, trained in a more democratic police organisation, on a lack of discipline and motivation. The military influence is still visible in the repressive policing methods used by some police officers.

Police-community relationship is the fourth element of democratic policing, which is necessary in order to maximise the effectiveness of crime prevention (Glebbeek 2003, 54). All our examined actors benefit from and contribute to a good police-community relationship. As the relationship between the police and citizens was disturbed through Apartheid, the post-Apartheid and emerging democratic state of South Africa initiated CPFs with the aim to improve the relationship between SAPS and its citizens. CPFs are still present as this is obliged by law and there is still need for a better police-community relationship in many communities in Cape Town today. Despite the efforts to enhance police-community relations within the SAPS, interactions with the community mostly depend on efforts made by individual officers whom are active within a police station. Today, PSCs need to have a good relationship with the community as they are

providing a service to the community. Residents of the community are thus clients of a private security company. As there is a lot of competition within the private security industry, the relationship with clients must be good or else clients can easily transit to another private security company. Private security officers often feel appreciated by the community and are therefore motivated to deliver good services. However, private security officers also acknowledge that citizens can do more regarding their own security which would make the work of PSCs easier. But, the community does not only exist out of clients of PSCs. Criminals also live in the community and private security officers often live in the same area as these criminals, showing in Hangberg. However, this does not seem to be a problem and might even be an advantage for private security officers as they know how to speak to the criminals and how to handle them.

(in)Visibility/(in)Security

Chapter two discusses the tactics of in/visibilisation to create security. Jusionyte and Goldstein (2016) argue that visibility can create both security and insecurity, but invisibility can also create security and insecurity. In our study we found that the tactic of visibility to create security is most evident within the pluralised policing landscape. SAPS and PSCs both use their visibility to prevent crimes from happening. By patrolling the streets and placing cameras in sight they show their presence. Bottom-up community policing groups such as neighbourhood watches are visible through signs in the streets stating their presence and alertness. Citizens also use the tactics of visibility by placing gates, burglar bars, fencing, and signs of private security companies securing their house around their properties. This tactic is used to keep criminals out. (Jusionyte and Goldstein 2016, 4) Building on this, stories of citizens illustrated in chapter seven acknowledge that visibility contributes to feelings of security as people indicate that they feel safer when they see vehicles patrolling the streets. CPFs try to be visible to be able to reach the community and to spread knowledge about crime and safety through social media and CPF meetings.

Invisibility is also a frequent used tactic by SAPS and PSCs. SAPS draws up crime statistics which they share in joint weekly meetings with other policing actors. In these meetings the policing actors discuss strategies that can help to provide citizen security. These meetings are an example of how invisibility can create security as the community is not allowed to attend these weekly meetings. PSCs use invisibility tactics as they need secrecy in order for them to execute their operations. This is done through the secretion of control rooms and by driving unmarked vehicles.

Between Hout Bay and Rondebosch there are also differences in how different policing actors operate in order to provide citizen security. In the next paragraph we compare the pluralised policing landscape in Hout Bay and Rondebosch.

Comparing Hout Bay and Rondebosch

There are three main differences between Hout Bay and Rondebosch. First, Rondebosch has a homogeneous community with mainly white and wealthy residents. On top of that, a lot of students live in Rondebosch. As explained earlier, Hout Bay has got three different communities that live separate from each other. We focus on the Valley as this is a mostly white and wealthy area and therefore comparable with Rondebosch. However, Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu (IY) do influence how policing actors police in the Valley. Rondebosch has about 20,000 inhabitants, where Hout Bay has about an estimated guess of 60,000 residents. Both neighbourhoods have one police station and one Community Police Forum (CPF) that serve the whole area. This fact needs to be taken into account when investigating how policing actors provide security to a certain community. On top of that, Hout Bay SAPS has only a few more staff members in comparison to Rondebosch. In addition, it is harder for the CPF to improve the police-community relationship as the community in Hout Bay is way more diverse and larger. Size and composition of community thus has an influence on how security is organised. Despite the fact that there are many people in the age category of fifteen to twenty-four in Rondebosch, there are no young CPF members. In Hout Bay, most CPF members live in the Valley. Different CPF members acknowledge that Hangberg and IY need a subforum in order to serve these communities better. Today, both CPFs thus do not equally reflect the demographics of the communities. In Rondebosch both SAPS and PSCs have no problem patrolling in the area, while in Hout Bay these actors do have difficulties with patrolling. The private security company Deep Blue Security regards Hangberg as a ‘red zone’ and Imizamo Yethu as ‘no-go zone’. Looking at bottom-up community policing groups in both neighbourhoods, it is noticeable that residents of Hout Bay are overall more active as bottom-up community policing group members. It appears that many residents within the Valley are involved with Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch (HBNW) or Community Crime Prevention (CCP) whereas residents in Rondebosch rather outsource security provision to Rondebosch Community Improvement District (RCID), and thus to PSCs.

The second important difference involves the security threats in Hout Bay and Rondebosch. Hout Bay has more contact crimes, while Rondebosch is suffering from more property crimes. Our informants say that the most common crimes in both Hout Bay and Rondebosch are theft out/of/from vehicles, robberies and house break ins. Hout Bay has more taxi violence, and multiple taxi association members were murdered in front of the police station. Hout Bay SAPS is then more concerned with reacting to crime, and therefore has less time and manpower to prevent crime. Due to lack of time there is less investment in the police-community relationship.

The third difference shows in the collaboration between different policing actors. In Hout Bay the collaboration is more visible than in Rondebosch. In Hout Bay private security officers are more involved in taking over the tasks of the police, for example by doing arrests. Neighbourhood watches are seen as the eyes and ears on the streets and are the first to see and report suspicious behaviour or crime (Bullock 2014, 125). With that, HBNW and CCP also collaborate with private security companies and SAPS. In Rondebosch different policing actors do collaborate with each other but the collaboration is more concerned with consultation and the exchange of information and is therefore less visible. SAPS relies more on the interaction with the community to prevent crime. This is done through specifically focusing on the police-community relationship. The CPF is more structured and has more (policing) actors compared to Hout Bay. RCID only focuses on her own area and does not concern itself with safety in the public area. In addition to RCID, Rondebosch also has Groote Schuur Community Improvement District (GSCID) where Hout Bay does not have a Community Improvement District. This is remarkable as many neighbourhoods in Cape Town do have a City Improvement District. A lack of a City Improvement District in Hout Bay might cause that other policing actors are more present on the streets.

Bringing it all together: the power of multiplicity within Hout Bay and Rondebosch

By creating a holistic analysis on the pluralised policing landscape in two middle-class neighbourhoods in Cape Town, we argue that all four policing actors have their own contribution within the provision of citizen security. The CPF focuses mainly on improving the police-community relationship, SAPS functions as main legal authority, private security companies

contribute through their resources and manpower, and bottom-up community policing groups build and rely on intrinsic motivation of their members.

CPFs are involved with the improvement of the police-community relationship by providing a democratic platform which brings different (policing) actors together, where local problems are outlined, and where citizens can raise complaints and concerns. CPFs do not actively police but provide a place for consultation. On top of that, they are the only actor fully concerned with the police-community relationship which is crucial for the provision of citizen security. This study shows that CPFs are still needed to improve the police-community relationship as this is not yet optimal between SAPS and different racial and age groups.

SAPS embodies the legal authority within pluralised policing landscape as they are the only representative of the legal justice system. Other actors do have legal authority, but only SAPS can enable prosecution of criminals. It is the only actor that can arrest people and is the only actor that has the mandate for criminal investigation. Other policing actors have limited legislation compared to SAPS, and without the approval of SAPS act illegitimately. Other policing actors will therefore always depend on the presence of SAPS.

Private security companies (PSCs) are contributing to security through their manpower, knowledge, and resources. Private security officers are well trained, know what actions need to be taken and are familiar with the community. Other policing actors depend on PSCs as PSCs have access to better technology. With the use of control room employees that monitor live footage of the streets, PSCs will sooner spot suspicious behaviour. On top of that, PSCs can also response to crime faster than other policing actors as they have more cars and private security officers on the streets.

Intrinsic motivation is necessary in order to provide citizen security. Intrinsic motivation is also present within the other policing actors. However, for bottom-up community policing group intrinsic motivation is the most important factor as they would not exist if group members lack motivation. SAPS and PSCs depend on bottom-up community policing groups as they function as the eyes and ears on the streets. It would make the provision of citizen security for these other policing actors harder, if bottom-up community policing groups would cease to exist. In addition to bottom-up community policing groups, efforts by individual citizens are also important. The more people are aware of and motivated to secure themselves, the better the provision of citizen security will be. Chapter seven illustrates how clients can support the PSCs, for example by not

forgetting to arm their alarm. Bottom-up community policing groups are a helping hand in creating awareness about safety within the neighbourhood.

Within our study, we conclude that the four policing actors are supplement to and interrelated with each other. The different policing actors will not be able to fully provide citizen security without one another as they all contribute to citizen security in the following ways: the police-community relationship, legal authority, resources and manpower, and intrinsic motivation. However, the provision of citizen security is impeded by broader social processes that have an impact on crime. Factors that lead to more crime and complicate the provision of citizen security are the national government that struggles with integrity scandals, socio-economic inequalities within the society, and the provision of citizens' basic needs such as water, electricity, and well-functioning public transport. Therefore, the four policing actors are the first respondents to provide citizen security but will not solve the underlying problems that cause crime.

Limitations and Recommendations

Together

The ten weeks of anthropological fieldwork in which this research is conducted has several limitations. First, this research cannot give a representative image of the pluralised policing landscape in Cape Town. We conducted fieldwork in two wealthier neighbourhoods within Cape Town. However, Cape Town is a cosmopolitan city which has many more neighbourhoods that differ from Hout Bay and Rondebosch. It would therefore also be necessary to study the policing landscape in less affluent neighbourhoods to get a good overview of the pluralised policing landscape in Cape Town.

Second, the pluralised policing landscape is more complex and expanded than described in this research. We chose four policing actors based on the presence in existing scientific literature and on the access that we had to these actors in the field. During our fieldwork period we found that there are more policing actors present in Cape Town such as the Department Of Community Safety (DOCS), the City Improvement Districts (CIDs), and Resident Associations (RA). We have mentioned these actors throughout our thesis but have not taken them into account as equally as the other actors. The gatekeepers influenced our research in two ways. First, the willingness of the gatekeepers to participate in our research made us decide to conduct fieldwork in Hout Bay and Rondebosch. Second, within these neighbourhoods our gatekeepers introduced us to specific informants which influenced our data collection. If we would have been introduced to other people,

this might have led to other data and therefore other perceptions on safety and security. Our gatekeepers decided who, and especially who not, we could speak to. As a consequence, we did not not always feel free to approach people who we actually wanted to speak to.

Third, we acknowledge that our research position, as white European females, influenced the study. This especially showed during the research within SAPS, as Hannah Postma was not introduced to certain (often black) SAPS officers, but mostly to white and coloured officers. This was mostly because of the gatekeepers as mentioned above. Also Marije Galama found that informants were not always very enthusiastic to participate in the research. Sometimes informants did not respond to emails or WhatsApp for a couple of days.

Fourth, as English is not our mother tongue and we had to get used to the accent of informants, and we understand little Afrikaans and speak no Xhosa, we experienced a language barrier. This made it harder to conduct our fieldwork as we could not follow conversations. Furthermore, during interviews informants did not always understand our questions and sometimes we did not comprehend informants' answers, making it difficult to ask follow up questions. Therefore, we could have missed data that could have been important for our research.

Keeping these limitations in mind, we draw the following recommendations for follow-up research. In order to give a holistic view on the pluralised policing landscape, other policing actors that we left out of in our research should be taken into account. On top of that, to be able to say something about policing in Cape Town, research should be conducted in a broader variety of neighbourhoods to get a better reflection of society. Cape Town differs in their sociopolitical context from the rest of the country. Therefore, we recommend conducting this kind of research in other parts and cities of South Africa.

Another important recommendation we propose is that the concept of othering should be taken into account. During our research we encountered that the influence of how the 'other' is perceived is of great importance. This shows in how informants talk about other racial and social groups. Alienating the other creates a 'fear of the other'. As we did not expect this to be of such importance, because of a lack of time, and because this is a sensitive topic, we did not add this concept into our study. By shedding light on this subject in further research, security can be better understood in the context of post-Apartheid Cape Town.

For our last recommendation we suggest to analyse all policing actors within the pluralised policing landscape according to the democratic policing framework. In this thesis, the democratic

policing framework by Glebbeek (2003) is used in order to shed light on whether the state police acts in a democratic manner. As we argue that the state no longer alone provides citizen security but rather acts within a pluralised policing landscape, we suggest that all actors present within this landscape should be analysed according to this framework.

Furthermore, we also include several recommendations for our informants. CPFs can get more input when a new and diverse group of people in the community joins the CPF, both as members as well as visitors at meetings. The Rondebosch CPF can include more students by making voluntary work at the CPF attractive through, for example, giving credits. Hout Bays' CPF would fulfil the community's needs better when there are more residents from Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu involved. Moreover, the contribution of CPFs to the pluralised policing landscape could be improved by being more active. In order to improve the police-community relationship, CPFs can organise activities for different groups within the community.

SAPS could enhance their police practices if they would actively look at the practices at other police stations. There should be more interaction between police stations so they could learn from each other. If the SAPS would make more use of the motivated individuals present within the organisation it would optimise operationalisations within the organisation. Moreover, higher ranked officers can also motivate more officers by openly praising them for executing good work.

Private security companies can become more involved in the process of security provision by joining CPF meetings. If they would come to these meetings, then they would also be updated with information about crime. On top of that, attending CPF meetings also enhances the personal contact between different policing actors.

Bottom-up community policing groups should collaborate more with groups in other areas. In that case, they can learn from each other's strengths and thereby improve their organisations. Besides, bottom-up community policing groups, mainly neighbourhood watches, should change their role within the neighbourhood to create involvement of younger generations and thereby help innovate the organisation and thus improving citizen security.

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Attachments

1. Sub questions

How does the Community Policing Forum provide security?

1. How does the CPF organise itself to provide security?

2. What does the CPF consider as security threats?

3. What are the daily activities of a CPF in order to provide security?

4. How does a CPF collaborate with other policing actors?

How does the South African Police Service provide security?

1. How does the SAPS organise itself to provide security?

2. What does the SAPS consider as security threats?

3. What are the daily activities of the SAPS in order to provide security?

4. How are SAPS officers being held accountable?

5. How is the relation between the SAPS and community?

How do private policing actors provide security?

1. How do private security actors organise themselves to provide security?

2. What do private policing actors consider as security threats?

3. What are the daily activities of private policing actors in providing security?

4. How do private policing actors collaborate with other policing actors?

5. How do private policing actors operate in quasi-public space?

How do citizens provide their own security?

1. What do citizens consider as security?

2. How do citizens organise themselves to provide security?

3. What are the coping strategies of individual citizens to deal with violence?

4. What are the daily activities of bottom-up community policing groups in order to provide security?

5. How do bottom-up community policing groups and other policing actors collaborate?

2. Rank structure SAPS