Politics of Multiculturalism in an Age of Intolerance

Identity Construction and Political Engagement of Religious Students in Yogyakarta, Indonesia

A mural in the centre of Yogyakarta. It was part of a project set up by KPU, the General Election Commission. It reads "Pancasila is an achievement, not just a narrative" (Photo: Puck Remeeus)

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26-06-19

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Wordcount: 21.872

Acknowledgements

In our research, we have much to thank to the time and efforts of students of Gadjah Mada University. Without their help, this research would not have been possible. Not only were they keen to answer our questions, they also helped us in finding new informants, often in their circle of friends or classmates. We would especially like to express our gratitude to Yudianto, Nousha and Khadija. Nousha and Khadija have done a wonderful job translating interviews, conversations, and Khadija specifically, the final summary of this thesis for us. Yudianto has been a crucial informant in the pre-fieldwork phase of our research as he gladly shared his religious and organisational contacts with us that led to many interesting meetings and conversations. We also want to thank Dr. Noorhaidi Hasan who found time for us in his incredibly busy schedule to answer our more theoretical questions. The same is true for Dr. Zainal Abidin Bagir who helped us get more insights into national-political dynamics during the first stage of our research. Finally, to our advisor Kees, we would like to say our thanks for reassuring us during the hectic yet exciting period that was fieldwork and the writing process thereafter. We are grateful for all his feedback, involvement and genuine interest in our thesis (and all our thesis-related ramblings).

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Maps

Figure 1: Indonesia[1]

[1] Travel Encyclopaedia, accessed June 18, 2019, https://wiki--travel.com/map-of-indonesia-and-philippines.html

Figure 2: Yogyakarta, Java[2]



[2] Mapz, accessed June 17, 2019, https://www.mapz.com/en/about

Figure 3: Gadjah Mada University Campus[3]

[3] Universitas Gadjah Mada, accessed June 18, 2019, https://www.ugm.ac.id/id/info/132-peta-kampus-ugm

Glossary

Cebong	Cebong translates to 'tadpoles' and is primarily used on social media to refer to Jokowi supporters.
Golput	Golput is an abbreviation of *golongan putih* (white group). This term was first used during the Reformasi and refers to the activist movement of not voting.
Hijra	Hijrah means 'to travel' or 'moving' in Arabic. The Hijrah trends motivates Muslims to lead a more religious way of life but the use of the term is not restricted to the Islamic context only.
Ikhwanul Muslimeen	The Muslim Brotherhood. It is a Sunni Islamic movement that developed in Egypt but has spread far beyond it. Its influence in Indonesia is mainly found in its affiliation with Islamic party PKS.
Islam Nusantara	Islam Nusantara means 'Islam of the Archipelago'. It is a Sunni Islamic ideology followed by NU and is a mixture of Islamic and, in Yogyakarta, Javanese traditions. Under NU, it is characterised as moderate, tolerant and anti-radical.
Kampret	Kampret translates to 'shuck' which is a bat like animal and is primarily used on social media to refer to Prabowo supporters.
Khilafah	It is the Arabic word for 'caliphate'. Khilafah or the Khilafah ideology is often referred to as the wish or goal to make Indonesia an Islamic state with Islamic laws, norms and values.

Luber Jurdil This Indonesian term refers to the principle of keeping your political preference or voting decision private.

Marhaenism Socialism as developed by Indonesia's first president Sukarno. Under student organisation GMNI, its goal is to fight against oppression of all kinds.

Nadhlatul Ulama Also abbreviated to NU. 'It means Revival of the 'Ulama', an Islamic 'scholar'. It is an influential Indonesian Sunni Islamic movement which promotes moderatism, tolerance, anti-radicalism and Pancasilaist diversity. Its student organisation is KMNU and its unofficial political student organisation is PMII.

Pancasila The word Pancasila is derived from two Old Javanese words: *panca* (five) and *sila* (principles) and thus refers to the five principles, the first acknowledging five official religions. Pancasila is Indonesia's national ideology and philosophy.

Semangka The Indonesian term is used to refer to people who are 'different from the inside as they are from the outside'. Specifically related to religious and political affiliations. Semangka literally translates to watermelon which too is different from the inside as from the outside.

Syumuliyatul Islam Syumuliyatul Islam has been described as the 'all-encompassingness of Islam'. This goal or guideline entails that Islam should be implemented in life as much as possible, for instance in law, medicine, economy, social relations, et cetera.

Tarbiyah Tarbiyah is an Indonesian Islamic movement affiliated with the Ikhwanul Muslimeen and the Islamic party PKS. It follows the directive of Syumuliyatul Islam. Da'wah, proselytising, is an important aspect of Tarbiyah.

Ulama An Islamic scholar, known for their knowledge and experience. Influential Ulama organisations in Indonesia are NU, the Nadhlatul Ulama, an Islamic movement and MUI, the Indonesian Ulama Council, a national advisory council

Vihara Buddhist house of worship.

Abbreviations

BEM UGM	*Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa Universitas Gadjah Mada* (Student Executive Board of Gadjah Mada University)
BEM KM	*Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa Keluarga Mahasiswa* (Student Organisation of the Student Executive Board)
BNPT	*Badan Nasional Penanggulan Terorisme* (National Agency for Combating Terrorism)
Fisipol	*Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik* (Faculty of Social and Political Sciences)
GMNI	*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Student Movement)
HMI	*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (Muslim Students' Association)
HMI Dipo	*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Dipo* (Muslim Students' Association Dipo (after Diponegoro, Jakarta))
HMI MPO	*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi* (Muslim Students' Association Organisational Salvation Assembly)
HTI	*Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*

KAMMI	*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia* (United Front of Indonesian Muslim University Students)
KMB	*Keluarga Mahasiswa Buddhis* (Buddhist Student Organisation)
KMHD	*Keluarga Mahasiswa Hindu Dharma* (Hindu Dharma Student Organisation)
KMNU	*Keluarga Mahasiswa Nahdlatul Ulama* (Nahdlatul Ulama Student Organisation)
Maskam	Masjid Kampus (the campus mosque)
MPM	*Majelis Permusyawaratan Mahasiswa* (Consultative Student Assembly)
MUI	*Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (Indonesian Ulama Council)
NU	*Nahdlatul Ulama* (Ulama Revival)
PDI-P	*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
PKB	*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (National Awakening Party)

PKS	*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperous Justice Party)
PMII	*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia* (Movement of Indonesian Muslim Students)
PPP	*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development Party)
UGM	*Universitas Gadjah Mada* Gadjah Mada University)

Introduction

In the 1990's, after years of authoritarianism and political repression during Suharto's New Order, Indonesian students, activists and intellectuals jointly started a democratisation movement, the *Reformasi*, which culminated in Suharto's resignation in 1998 (Braithwaite et al. 2010; McGregor 2009). The *Reformasi* gave way to free elections in 1999 and since then national elections have been held every five years in Indonesia - the most recent one on April 17th, 2019. This year, in highly conflictive elections characterised by corruption allegations, hoaxes and disillusionment, citizens could vote for both presidential and legislative candidates of several different parties.[4] Notably, three of the ten parties already in parliament, PPP (United Development Party), PKB (National Awakening Party) and PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), are explicitly Islam-based and all parties mainly try to appease the Islamic majority to secure their seats (Shah 2017). Platzdasch (2009) calls such bias towards the Muslim majority in multi-religious Indonesia the 'pro-Islamic ideological middle ground', which is also evident in the presidential election of April 2019 itself: candidates Prabowo Subianto of the Gerindra party and incumbent president Joko Widodo (also known as Jokowi) from PDI-P (Democratic Party of Struggle) used Islam-inspired rhetoric and strategies to appeal to Muslim voters. They both did so by using Islamic greetings when giving a speech, Prabowo's last campaign rally consisted of a mass prayer and a recital of the Qur'an and Jokowi chose Ma'ruf, NU[5] (Nadhlatul Ulama[6]) scholar and chairman of the MUI[7] (Indonesian Ulama Council), as his vice-presidential candidate.[8] Yet, political researchers have found that religion actually played little to no role in past Indonesian elections (Liddle & Mujani 2007).

The pro-Islamic middle ground is further problematised by the understanding of Indonesia as a religiously pluralistic country. Officially, Indonesia does not have a state religion, yet some

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[4] Marguerite Afra Sapiie and Kharishar Kahfi. 2019. "Facebook, Twitter try to safeguard Indonesian elections." *The Jakarta Post* website, February 1. Accessed on June 23, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/02/01/facebook-twitter-try-to-safeguard-indonesian-elections.html, and Nurul Fitri Ramadhani. 2019. "PPP to suspend chairman Romahurmuziy." *The Jakarta Post* website, March 16. Accessed on June 23, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/03/16/ppp-to-suspend-chairman-romahurmuziy.html

[5] An Indonesian Sunni Islamic movement which promotes moderatism, tolerance, anti-radicalism and Pancasila-ist diversity.

[6] An Islamic scholar.

[7] In Indonesia, the Ulama's have a national council called MUI which advises Indonesian Muslims on contemporary issues. In a way, it acts as an intermediary between the Indonesian state and its Islamic citizens.

[8] Nurul Fitri Ramadhani. 2019. "Religious fervor marks Prabowo's largest open rally." *The Jakarta Post* website, April 8. Accessed on June 21, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/04/08/islamic-mass-prayer-religious-fervor-marks-prabowo-s-largest-open-rally.html

researchers would call the archipelago neither secular nor unsecular (Seo 2010; Shah 2017). The origin of this ambiguity can be found in the country's five institutional principles known as Pancasila. The first principle of Pancasila is that Indonesians have to commit to the belief of one Supreme God in order to facilitate the archipelago's religious pluralism (Künkler 2018; Shah 2017). Five religions are formally acknowledged under this principle: Islam, Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism), Hinduism[9], Confucianism and Buddhism[10] (Abdi et al. 2014). The pro-Islamic middle ground and the simultaneous acknowledgement of religious pluralism in Indonesia under Pancasila thus point to a complex religion-oriented situation in Indonesia's national political environment. Especially students of various religious backgrounds, who, as they became increasingly disunited and the idea of a cohesive Indonesian student movement became a myth after Indonesia's democratic transition progressed (Weiss & Aspinall 2012), now have to navigate their various loyalties, political preferences and identificatory markers to decide on what basis they will politically engage, or decide not to. If religion playes only a small role, at least in voting behaviour as found by Liddle and Mujani (2007), how does this reflect Muslim students' engagement in political-Islamic student organisations, evident in Indonesia today (Lussier and Fish 2012)? And are non-Muslim students discouraged by the pro-Islamic middle ground, or are there other identificatory markers important to their decision to politically engage?

To answer these questions, this research focuses on the identity construction of religious students at Gadjah Mada University (UGM), Yogyakarta in relation to their motivations to politically engage or not, either in national or campus politics and in the April 2019 presidential elections. This focus is finalised in the following research question:

How do religious students at UGM, Yogyakarta, construct their identity and how does this influence their political engagement in the context of the 2019 presidential elections?

To answer the research question, Tessa analyses at the identity construction and political engagement of self-identified Muslim students while Puck does so with religious minority students, making for a comparative analysis of both populations. We will look at how these students judge and experience the current political-religious climate of Indonesia. The second aspect of this thesis addresses how UGM students construct and perceive their identity. These two aspects come together as we look at the relationality of students' identities; how they position

[9] While Hinduism is generally thought to be a polytheistic religion, Hinduists actually believe in the existence of one supreme being that all other gods are a manifestation of.
[10] Buddhism joined after efforts to fit Pancasila's monotheistic prescriptions (Brown 1987).

themselves in relation to others and wider society on the basis of their - due to the influence of the national political(-religious) climate - *politicised* identity, pointing at a incongruence between how the students see themselves and are seen by others. In turn, the interplay between the politicised religious identity and personal identity construction are related to students' decision whether to politically engage or not, differentiated on the basis of the more public campus politics and the more private affair of voting.

By looking at the ways in which religious students construct and prioritise certain identities over others, not only will be made clear how they navigate the current national political environment, but also how this environment in turn, influences their identity construction. Researching this interaction is important as identity politics, multiculturalism and the concurrent polarisation between various identity-based groups in political and social environments are very relevant topics today. An exploration of Indonesia with regard to identity politics and multiculturalism provides additional knowledge as research outside of the 'west' has mostly been focused on postcolonial Caribbean contexts which stress migration and transnational diversity (see Gilroy 1993; Guadeloupe 2009). Postcolonial Indonesia, however, does not see itself as a society of immigrants, yet is one of the few countries that bases its nationalism on its diversity ("*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*", "Unity in Diversity," being the national motto). What's more, the subject of Islam and politics remain socially relevant because religious politics in Indonesia are not considered progressive by everyone. Some even speak of Islamic radicalisation, referring to Indonesia as 'Indostan' in order to compare it to the violent Islamic dynamics in Pakistan.[11] Our research can shed light on this subject of political Islam, especially on the views of the new religious generation, perhaps leading to new and depolarising insights.

Methodology

Our research is ethnographic in nature, based on extensive fieldwork in Yogyakarta and UGM which took place between February 21st and April 19th 2019. During this time, we made use of both qualitative and quantitative methods to interpret, describe and explain the lived experiences of politics and identity of the students studied, taking into account constructivist and intersectional approaches. These students were between the ages of 18 and 25, while the ex-students and experts

[11] Maas, M. 2019. "Indonesië heeft een islam-probleem, maar hoe groot is dat?" Volkskrant website, January 2. Accessed January 14, 2019. https://www.volkskrant.nl/columns-opinie/indonesie-heeft-een-islam-probleem-maarhoe-groot-is-dat~b4bc03fa/

interviewed were in many cases older. The students came from a diverse range of faculties, but most came from Fisipol (faculty of social and political sciences), which housed the more politically active students. It is necessary to note that these students represent only a small faction at UGM, of which most students are said to not actively participate in (campus) politics. The students that do engage are in many cases affiliated with student organisations, which will be discussed in chapter 2.

Because religious identification and political preferences have the potential to be sensitive topics we made sure that our informants were aware they knew they could stop participating in the research at any minute and were not obliged to answer any questions. We also assured their participation was anonymous, using pseudonyms in our fieldnotes and administration as well as this thesis. At the same time, we would often find a photo or video of us with an informant on various social media sites. This led to a complex ethical issue wherein informants did not reciprocate our attention to privacy and simultaneously breached their own anonymity as such social media posts make it easier to discern who participated in our research. While this was something we did not anticipate but turned out to be common to discussions or meetings, we decided to explain the situation before hand and mention if we were not comfortable with our pictures being taken.

Throughout the course of this research we used a range of different methods to gather our data, some methods like interviewing, informal conversations and content analysis became more prominent than other methods like hanging out, participant observation and the survey. The beginning of our fieldwork mainly consisted of informal conversations in which we decided to cooperate throughout the research because these conversations were often relevant for us both. Interviews on the other hand, we did do individually, divided by research population. Participant observation and hanging out, in particular at political events, was less evident in this research, firstly because their occurrence was rare and secondly because of safety reasons as violence and tensions surrounding the elections and demonstrations in Yogyakarta were not uncommon. We did go to political debates on campus or religious gatherings in which students participated. But as ethno-religious minority students, compared to the majority, turned out to gather less in religious contexts (or campus politics for that matter) applying this method was particularly hard in the research on minorities which led interviewing to be the dominant method.

Apart from the aforementioned methods, we applied content analysis to stay up to date on national political-religious tendencies. This provided us with the ability to compare the topics that were covered by the media and the topics our informants addressed, which led us to critically analyse the overall religious-political environment. Besides that, we also did a survey about

perceived religiosity and political preference. Although we do not want to feign a certain amount of representativity for *all* students, the survey results still gave us an idea about general tendencies of students' religious and political behaviour. This issue of representativity is true for the overall representativity of the thesis: we did our best to present our findings as truthful as possible, but do not claim these apply to all students, in Indonesia or Yogyakarta. We also acknowledge that our biases as agnostic researchers limited our understanding of personal religiosity and could affect these findings as we, in some cases, write about students' experiences and interpretations from a religious perspective. We did continue to reflect on these biases and followed the words of our participants as possible.

The first chapter, our theoretical framework, will discuss theories on nationalism, cultural citizenship, voting behaviour and political student engagement. Second is the contextual framework in which the concepts discussed in chapter one will be linked to national religious-political dynamics, the students of UGM and the construction of their (ethno-)religious identity. The following chapter will focus on the perceptions of students on these national religious-political dynamics and it will be argued that recent developments have led to an age of intolerance, linked to polarised relations between different Islamic ideologies. The fourth chapter focusses on Muslim students in relation to this polarisation, and illustrates how they construct their religious identity in relation to their engagement in the highly conflictive campus politics. The fifth chapter has the same approach but argues how the identity construction of ethno-religious minorities had led to political disengagement. The sixth and last chapter, however, illuminates how and why, in voting, *all* students engage. The thesis will be concluded with an answer to our research question, shedding light on the dynamics of identity construction Indonesia in relation to a complex negotiation and reification of essentialising and politicising structures, followed by suggestions for further research.

Chapter 1

Theoretical Framework: identity and political engagement in discourses of multiculturalism and citizenship

Introduction: on the construction of political identities *Tessa*

In this chapter, we explore in what way identity interacts with the political sphere and how, from this, political identities develop. As Huddy (2001, 137) argues, "each of us has many potential identities derived from diverse group memberships, but relatively few of these identities develop or become politically consequential." For that reason, Huddy says, citizens are inclined to discard membership of a politically low-status group. Still, it is important to keep in mind the intersectional perspective as developed by Crenshaw (1989), because people's social world and positions are constructed by multiple intersecting identifications (Bolles 2016), and so the political identity likely is too. Additionally, while political values may generally be based on the acquired identity, the identity one assigns to themselves, it might be ascribed identity that is of political consequence: as Crenshaw (1989) notes, political institutions have often looked at the identity that they thought to matter politically, treating other identities as mutually exclusive. Along these lines, it can be argued that in case of being part of a low-status group qua political importance citizens will prioritise other (intersecting) identities that political actors *do* appeal to.

We will first discuss the role of identity, assigned an acquired, in politics through the lens of theories on nationalism. These theories prioritise the identificatory markers of ethnicity, culture and religion, of which the meaning and use is largely dependent on nation-state's classificatory discourses on belonging and citizenship. Then, we will expound on how political engagement is influenced by such discourses and a multitude of other mediating factors, which have created majority and minority dynamics in the facilitation and motivations to politically engage. Finally, we will specifically go into students, how they develop their political engagement, also through social media practices, and what forms this engagement generally takes.

In the theoretical debate on nationalism, there is a conceptual debate which deals with the question of nationalism's nature. Whereas Ernest Gellner (1983), for instance, thinks of nationalism primarily as a political principle that states political and national borders should be consistent with each other, Benedict Anderson (1991) concentrates on the sentimental and communal dimension of 'nation-ness' (the sense of belonging to a nation). And while Smith (2000, 13) defines nationalism as an ideology, he agrees with Anderson that understanding nationalism as inherently political misses "the fundamental emotional level of mass appeal that gives nationalism its wide resonance."

Theorists do agree that there needs to be a national identity that unites people within the same nation-state and determines whether someone is considered part of one nation or another.[12] In this sense, national identities are always, as Eriksen (2010, 134) says "constituted in relation to each other". Eriksen continues that such boundary-making between one's own nation and that of the (stigmatised) Other is essential in nationalism, which is exemplified by how many nationalist myths characterise the rise of a nation as a fight, either against an external Other or an enemy within. Gellner (1983) and Smith (2000) equate national identity to ethnic identity, yet Eriksen (2010) rightly points out many nation-states are in fact poly-ethnic, making the idea of such *ethno*nationalism at the very least questionable. He therefore concludes that some form of supra-ethnic symbolism is required to create national unity. This can be a nationalism built on symbols such as shared history and language (that is inclusive in the sense that anyone can learn it) like Anderson (1991) describes, which Smith (2000) calls 'civic' nationalism. Thus, this civic format of nationalism does not stress the importance of a specific identity.

Multicultural nationalism, or simply multiculturalism, is another nationalist ideology/sentiment that challenges ethnonationalism, that *does* look at identity in that it focuses on the nation's poly-ethnicism. Eriksen (2010) explains that multiculturalism thinks about how ethnic/cultural diversity can be accommodated within the nation-state while at the same time reconciling this accommodation with intercultural solidarity. Stuart Hall (2000) further emphasises that multiculturalist strategies and processes do not act out of a single doctrine and are always incomplete. Vertovec and Wessendorf (2009), too, note that a singular explanation of

[12] As, in contemporary times, people are politically and socially conceptualised as to belong to a nation, or at the very least to a nation-state as its citizens. The nation-state, here, can be seen as an entity that either existed prior to or exists as a result of nationalism and the idea of a nation. This is another dimension of the conceptual contestation of nationalism, which we will not get into here because it is not central in our research question.

multiculturalism would not explain its many domains, but do define it in relation to cultural and religious difference.

Multiculturalism is therefore different from ethnonationalism because it promotes the incorporation of ethnic/cultural diversity instead of the maintenance of ethnic particularism. But to understand the way in which the identity-centred nationalisms, especially multiculturalism, facilitate the political role of the ethnic/cultural identities they focus on, it is first necessary to expound on the lingering ambiguity on the meanings of ethnicity, but also culture and religion: until now, these identificatory markers have been used quite variably and even interchangeably by different theorists to explain the focal points of their nationalisms.

Political consequentiality of identificatory markers: a matter of dominant discourses

For analytical purposes,[13] we use theories on ethnicity as the basis for the remainder of our theoretical exploration on political identities. Ethnicity is often used as an umbrella term for cultural and religious identities: to Hall (2000, 223) ethnicity "generates a discourse where difference is grounded in cultural and religious features." Eriksen (2010) and O'Leary (2014) add that ethnic groups are often understood as comprising of a community with shared culture and as a religious group respectively. Baumann (1999) relates this interchangeability of concepts to what he calls 'the riddle of multiculturalism' which must be solved by rethinking what is meant by nationality, ethnicity, religion.[14] Several scholars have made an attempt at this already, thinking of *identifications* as relational and hybrid instead of primordial and unchanging (Hall 1994; Glissant 2000; Guadeloupe 2009; Eriksen 2010). Yet looking at the emic perspective of citizens and the nation-state, ethnicity (in its broadest sense) can still refer "to aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive" (Eriksen 2010, p. 5) and therefore act as a classificatory concept.

An issue that arises out of the classificatory use of identity is that the resulting dependency on dominant classifications in the relational, political sphere can force citizens to take on an identity they would not like to see highlighted (Baumann 1999). Eriksen (2010) explicitly connect this issue multiculturalism because, as he says:

[13] This choice is made for two reasons. One consideration is that we found that some theorists use the cultural identity marker (and sometimes even national identity) in the same way that ethnic marker is used by others. Also later in our fieldwork, we found that culture and ethnicity were used quite interchangeably. It is thus, to a certain extent, a matter of preference. Second, for ethnonationalism, ethnicity has been the most important identificatory marker used and for further comparison it is useful to employ the same analytical concepts.

[14] Baumann, contrary to our approach, takes culture as his base concept of analysis

> “The policies and discourses surrounding [equity and society] presuppose that society is divided into mutually exclusive, ascriptive groups […] This, ultimately, is the dilemma of multiculturalism, and it is interesting to note that the term is increasingly being replaced with the looser, less reifying ‘diversity’ in public discourse” (2010, 185).

Still, similarly to Crenshaw (1989) on identity, Baumann (1999) notes it is the state’s power to determine what constitutes difference – what constitutes diversity – in its multicultural policies, and there might be discrepancies with the views of its citizens: as Baumann (1996) explains in his earlier work, there are two types of discourses about ethnicity. One is the dominant discourse of the media and public sector that equates ethnicity to an essentialist group identity. The other is the demotic discourse of citizens themselves, and even though they use reifying classifications too, they recognise the relationality and individuality of their ethnic identifications. The contestation of these discourses, and especially the debate on which one is dominant, continues in the discussion of cultural citizenship, a status which to some makes it possible for ethnic identities to become politically consequential on their own terms.

Cultural citizenship, politics of recognition and minorities in politics *Puck*

According to Miller (2007, 231) cultural citizenship “concerns the maintenance and development of cultural lineage via education, custom, language and religion and the positive acknowledgement of difference and by the mainstream”. However, in the discussion on how it is constructed and in relation to which concepts it should be used, the opinions vary. Ong (1996), for instance, uses cultural citizenship to refer to the cultural practices and beliefs produced out of negotiating often-contested relations with the state. The state’s hegemonic role in this is that it establishes the criteria of belonging within a national population and territory. Cultural citizenship, then, is both about ‘self-making’ – what an individual or community believe themselves to be – and ‘being made’ by the state – what kind of citizen the state wants or tries to construct of a person or community (Ong 1996). However, according to Rosaldo (1994) cultural citizenship refers to the right to be different with respect to the norms of the dominant national community in the sense of participating in the nation-state’s democratic processes. In other words, it is a process by which immigrant and minority rights are claimed and expanded. Yet, according to Ong (1996), Rosaldo’s definition gives the false impression that cultural citizenship can be unilaterally constructed and that immigrants or minority groups can escape cultural inscription of state power and other forms of

regulations. She argues that Rosaldo's concept of cultural citizenship indicates subscription to a liberal principle of universal equality. According to Shafir (1998, 10), liberalism assumes that people merge into citizenship fully formed "as sovereign individuals with individual preferences", i.e. - as people with full agency.

Another important concept in thinking about (cultural) citizenship is equality, because as Kymlicka (1995) argues, integration and adaptation of minorities to the majority culture can also be described as 'the right to equality'. But, according to Eriksen (2010, 175):

> "faced with a de facto situation of ethnic and cultural pluralism, the state may be accused of injustice both if it promotes equality and if it supports the retention of difference. If the state stresses equal rights and duties, minority members may feel that their cultural distinctiveness is not being respected; that their boundaries and identities are threatened. If, on the other hand, the dominant group emphasises cultural differences and turns difference into a positive thing, minority members may end up feeling that they are being actively discriminated against"

According to Charles Taylor (1992), such politics of equal recognition have been essential to democratic culture because the underlying premise of dignity of human beings or citizens, is that everyone shares in it. But, with the politics of equal dignity, to be a citizen should be universally the same for everyone. Instead, to speak of cultural citizenship (in line with Rosaldo's perspective) is to speak of politics of difference: to recognise the unique identity of an individual and their distinctiveness (Taylor, 1992). But although Taylor argues all citizens are positioned in equal recognition, facilitation of political engagement as the ultimate form of democratic participation is not that unambiguous. Instead, it often has to do with minority-majority differentiation.

Ethnic minorities experience relative disadvantage compared to members of a dominant social group based on their identifications (Healey et. Al 2018). Both minority and majority groups exist within the borders of the state which often classifies and discriminates against minorities based on their ethnicity. O'Toole and Gale (2013) mention that it is the failure of political parties and the state to engage ethnic minority voters on the issues that concern them which discourages minorities to politically engage. In accordance with the politics of recognition, on the one hand, the state needs to secure the right to equal treatment and on the other hand the right to respect one's minority identity (Vetrovec, 2014). It is in this minority identity where another reason for a disbalance in political engagement lies .

Following institutionalist theory, Freedman (2002, 33) argues that "certain political systems and organisations make [political] participation easier." Freedman (2002) and Fung (2007) take into account the varying degrees in which states motivate minority and majority groups to engage in politics and reason that, specifically in electoral politics, parties or candidates have no need to target all people. Therefore they seek out the majority groups and mobilise those to vote or rally which means the majority would have an institutional advantage over the minority. As a result, Freedman (2002) argues, this disadvantage is the reason why people with a minority identity are not as motivated to engage in political activities. And, following Lussier and Fish (2012), even if minority groups experience extreme grievances, their engagement in protests and opposition parties will still depend on their belief that they can make a difference, which is not always the case. It is therefore no surprise that low political engagement, especially among young people and ethnic minority groups, reveals minorities' disillusionment with political and representative institutions. Continued under-representation in political institutions contributes to lower levels of political engagement among (ethnic) minorities (O'Toole & Gale, 2013) - a problem, however, that could partly by solved through voting.

Voter motivations in national elections: values and rational voting *Tessa*

Because motivations to politically engage are based on values and symbols that arise from identity, politicians attempt to tap into these to win elections (McLeod 1999). McLeod (1991) argues that politicians actors might appeal to potential voters by engaging in activities (rituals, as he calls them) and rhetoric that these voters value, his example being religious rituals and rhetoric. But as there are multiple (intersecting) values and identities to appeal to, and because not all matter politically, opinions on which factors play the biggest role are divided.

Huddy (2001) notes that group prototypes might also have an influence on motivation. As Huddy says, group prototypes are "the types of people who typically exemplify group membership" (and give it meaning, Huddy 2001, 144). Party leaders are, for instance, such prototypes. If the prototype of a specific political group or movement does not appeal to people, it is unlikely that they would want to affiliate or identify themselves with it. Important factors of presidential and vice presidential candidates are regional backgrounds, political leadership qualities and professional backgrounds (Mujani et al. 2018). Max Weber (1968) also points at the importance of political actors, not as group prototypes, but as charismatic leaders. In modern democracies, a charismatic leader "is most spectacular, [the one who] promises the most, or who

employs the most effective propaganda measures in the competition of leadership (Weber 1968, 65)." He gains electoral legitimacy and recognition by virtue of the sense of personal trust that his followers – and voters – have in him, providing that he keeps satisfying them (Weber 1968).

However, all voters prefer election outcomes that benefit themselves (Mujani et al. 2018) or their social group with whom they share identity (Feddersen 2004). Newman and Sheth (1985) indeed found that policies and group values are the most determinative factors of voting behaviour. This consideration can be called rational voting behaviour. Rational choice models argue that voting and political knowledge are anchored in group interests and can be understood as an investment in desirable outcomes (Abrams et al. 2010). An example of such a pragmatic motivation is economy. Voters who perceive an economic improvement tend to vote for the incumbent president while voters who perceive economic deterioration tend to vote for the opposition (Mujani et. Al 2018, 166). In any case, reasons to vote, or reasons to politically engage in general, are shaped largely before and during, studentship.

Political student engagement *Puck*

Literature on political student engagement has mostly concerned itself with the U.S., leaving a gap that can be filled by studies in other parts of the world. In their research on youth in the U.S Glasford (2008) Kiesa (et al. 2007) and Asad (et. al 2006) primarily focus on political participation and the future and legitimacy of democracy. The basis of such engagement lies in participation in (group) activities facilitated by, for example, schools or neighbourhoods, in which they learn about and practice citizenship. Such involvement is associated with participation in public organisations in adulthood and therefore has great impact for the youth involved (McIntosh & Youniss 2010; Pruitt 2017). By participating in local organisations and institutions youth develop social theories that match the goals, practices and values formulated by these organisations (Flanagan 2003). Because such values are of great importance in judging behaviour and organising political views, these activities can be seen as a predicting variable to later participatory politics (Jennings 1991). A similar influential environment that stimulates political engagement is that of the university (Oliver & Marwell 1988).

The size of the aforementioned group activities (Pruitt 2007; McIntosh & Youniss 2010) is important to its political potential as like-minded people must find one another if they are to form a critical mass. Group activities are particularly evident among students since universities are places that bring large numbers of similarly motivated people together (Oliver & Marwell

1988). These actions of group formation are politicising and create a political environment on campus (Crossley 2008). Because collective living, learning arrangements, shared activities and campus groups - among which political groups that are actively seeking to recruit others - are all part of daily campus life (Crossley 2008), the campus environment ensures recipiency to political engagement. Besides, students are relatively free of the familial and full-time employment ties that tend to limit political and/or activist opportunities. “They are structurally freed up for activism” (Crossley 2008, 32) and therefore more susceptible to recruitment and mobilisation. Other influential factors, like their parents’ engagement (Kiesa et. Al 2007) but most of all political knowledge (Asad et. al 2006) are also influential. Nevertheless, there still is an increasing disengagement in the political system. The problem is not the lack of information but an overload of news and opinion that students do not trust (Kiesa et. al 2007). Because the current generation of students and young adults are heavily engaged in internet and social media (Pruitt 2017) they are flooded by suchlike news and opinions, but although they do not trust the media (and the political system), they do try to engage with it (Kiesa et. al 2007).

Students and the use of social and mass media *Puck*

Modern media have a large mediating role in citizen’s motivation to engage in politics (Pickard 2017) and are shown to be particularly useful for collective political action among young people (Pruitt 2017). They provide an accessible way to engage in politics and allows youth to ‘have a say’; expressing social and political concerns and sharing their views (Pruitt 2017). While Loader, Vromen and Xenos (2014) found that participation in online activities appears to lay a foundation for engagement in participatory politics, Skoric and Poor (2013) suggests that this is not directly related to any political participation. Besides that, type of information also affects political engagement and mobilisation (Skoric & Poor 2013), users of social media also have to consider the truthfulness of such information.

Pickard (2017, 119) points out the frequency and threat of spreading misinformation and refers to the fact that hoaxes and fake news have now led to a major challenge for the users of this medium in terms of information validation (Seto 2017). Fake news and hoaxes are defined by Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) as articles that are intentionally and verifiably false and that could mislead readers. Especially media outlets with no third party fact-checking or editorial judgement are suitable for these articles (Allcott & Gentzkow 2017). The spreading of fake news has been deployed as political strategy as it's spreaders seek to advance or disadvantage a certain candidate and because it is hard to distinguish real from fake news these articles can be decisive and therefore

harmful in deciding political support. Gurak (1999) acknowledges this but also admits that it can simultaneously add to the mobilisation and civic participation of citizens.

Following above theories, political identities and political engagement are thus created out of an interplay between on the one hand the dominant discourses and facilitation of engagement that thinks about belonging and citizenship in terms of minority and majority ethnic identities - identificatory markers with shifting national, cultural or religious connotations. On the other hand, there are the motivations of the citizens themselves, students specifically, that are mediated by facilitatory, ideological, rational and social-media based factors. In the next chapter, we will see what this interplay means for the students in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

The road to UGM, framed by the flags of political parties of the April 17th elections (Photo: Tessa Glas).

Chapter 2

Contextual national politics and the students of Gadjah Mada University

The dominant national narrative of the contestation of diversity *Both*

In the introduction, Pancasila has been presented as Indonesia's five institutional principles, but it has a broader role as a symbol of Indonesia's nationalism. As Leifner (2000, 104) points out, Indonesia's nationalism is not rooted in a dominant ethnicity, but was, in its formative years, "defined with reference to external foes (the Dutch) and their domestic sympathisers" against which all ethnic groups in Indonesia should unite. Now, it is recognised as a political ideology and can best be understood as a multicultural nationalism that emphasises Indonesia's ethnic and religious diversity in which Pancasila (for religious diversity), but also the national motto "*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*" (for ethnic diversity), are its most important supra-ethnic symbols. This Pancasilaist multiculturalism has thus turned its focus on Indonesia itself, and Leifner (2002) notes it now misses the external Other by which it would otherwise be defined.

Apart from the pro-Islamic strategies discussed in the introduction, Pancasila and the rhetoric of supporting diversity remain widespread in Indonesian politics, as is seen in the 2019 presidential elections: in a debate, candidate Prabowo Subianto reacted defensively when he was accused of not supporting Pancasila and supporting pro-caliphate groups.[15] Indeed, in recent years, the *Khilafah* ideology (which can be understood as the wish for Indonesia to be an Islamic State) has been an upcoming subject in politics, even wider Indonesian society. It is explicitly placed in opposition to Pancasila: instead of supporting religious diversity, Khilafah would want Indonesia to be entirely Islamic. This is exemplified by the ban on Khilafah-supporting HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), an Islamic organisation part of a broader transnational movement, in 2017 by president Joko Widodo on the grounds that its goal of creating an Islamic state contradicted the values of Pancasila, namely diversity and pluralism.[16] Dr. Noorhaidi Hasan, expert on public Islam in

[15] News Desk. 2019. "My mother was a Christian: Prabowo denies supporting caliphate" *The Jakarta Post* website, April 30. Last accessed May 12, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/03/30/my-mother-was-a-christian-prabowo-denies-supporting-caliphate.html

[16] Safrin La Batu. 2017. "Jokowi signs regulation banning Hizbut Tahrir." *The Jakarta Post* website, July 11. Last accessed May 12, 2019.

Indonesia, argues this use of Pancasila is the strategy of Jokowi's administration to guide its citizens away from both Islamisation (Khilafah) and secularised globalisation.[17] This narrative of Pancasila vs. Khilafah now has become dominant in the explanation of how diversity, defined in religious terms, is contested in national politics.

But Pancasila itself is also not without controversy: the realities of its implementation have been less inclusive and harmonious as "what counts as 'recognized religions' proved to be elusive and highly political" (Abdi et al. 2014, 56). In the introduction, we already spoke of a complexity in the simultaneous existence of Pancasila's multiculturalism and the pro-Islamic middle ground, in which Islam, above all other religions, gains the institutional support and thus the majority advantage Freedman (2002) describes. But Pancasila's controversiality goes beyond national elections as religious minorities took on an increasingly vulnerable position in Indonesian society and politics. This is illustrated by the circulating of rumours on social media around the 2014 elections that Jokowi was secretly a Christian/Chinese communist as an attempt to discredit him (Hamid 2018). Hadiz (2017, 268) explains that:

> "This is a characterisation well-suited to stoking antipathy towards him, given that Islamic political identity in Indonesia has been shaped both by the experience of coping with perceived ethnic Chinese economic dominance and by participation in a struggle against 'godless' communism".

Another example and illustration of this unilateral focus in politics is the conviction of Jakarta's ethnic Chinese non-Muslim governor Basuki 'Ahok' Tjahaja Purnama. In early 2017, Ahok made comments that were considered blasphemous towards Islam which resulted in the largest mass demonstration in decades, known as the 212 movement, with thousands of Muslim protesters demanding his prosecution (Hamid 2018, Mietzner et al. 2018). Some simply characterise this event as Islamic mobilisation (Mietzner et. al 2018), others call it the 'conservative turn' (Hamid 2018, Hadiz 2017), yet all agree that these events continuously affect everyday life and electoral politics. Hamid (2018) explains that the conservative turn strengthened a sense of in-group religious identity which manifested by emphasising difference, leading to the normalisation of Othering and intolerance. However, such exclusion is not only targeted at non-Muslims but also towards Islamic minorities (Hamid 2018). The ban on HTI is also regarded as a reaction to the Ahok case as the organisation played a significant role in the demonstrations that led to Ahok's

[17] Noorhaidi Hasan, informal conversation, 04-04-19.

imprisonment (Hadiz 2017). Although its ban disrupted the organisations recruitment operations (Mietzner et. Al 2018), mosques kept being used to convey messages about the importance of voting for a Muslim candidate, even in supposed neutral areas like university campuses (Hamid 2018).

Localities: the (ethno-)religious identity on the campus of UGM *Both*

Just like HTI, many students movements in Indonesia can be dated and placed at the beginning of the New Order movement (1965-1966) in university towns like Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Bandung (Weiss & Aspinall 2012). Nowadays, many Indonesian students belong to intra- and extra-campus associations that also operate at national level and have competitive elections for leadership positions (Lussier & Fish 2012). On motivation for joining such organisations, Nilan (2004, 190) explains that "subgroups within the age cohort are falling back on stock of meanings, (ideological) values and modes of conduct established by the larger, even global groupings to which they belong." So, as universities are subject to national political-religious dynamics and trends they too see political-religious topics becoming an increasingly important topic in their organisations and campus elections.

At UGM, such elections revolve around BEM KM (Student Assembly), the student representative body, which is divided into BEM UGM (Student Executive Board) and MPM (Consultative Student Assembly). BEM KM is the designated organisation for student advocacy and the development of campus policies, which can pertain to issues like budgeting and student demonstrations. Demonstrations are most often organised by BEM UGM, and under 2018-2019 student president Fatin, the latest one was organised to call for justice for Novel Baswedan, a government official who was attacked with acid in 2019.[18] The BEM elections are key for extra-campus organisations as the president of BEM UGM has executive power over on-campus regulations and off-campus demonstrations and therefore influence over how UGM is represented. What's more, BEM UGM is by some perceived to have the ability to affect governmental policy through their demonstrations (even though the extent of this ability is highly contested).[19] MPM is also strategically important because it gained mediating power in 2018: now, it can rule that

[18]Fatin, interview, 09-04-19.
[19] Huda, interview, 09-03-19; Johan and Nousha, interview, 21-03-19; Fatin, interview, 22-03-19.

BEM UGM must discuss policy implementation with all faculty heads, making implementation less easy for BEM UGM than before.[20]

Especially the dominant national narrative of Pancasila vs. Khilafah and contestations on religious diversity explained above reflect on the lives and political engagement of students at UGM. In this, the narrative functions as the dominant discourse that Baumann (1996) discerned in relation to ethnicity: these students are affected by this narrative because it defines and categorises them into essentialist and mutually exclusive religious identities as either actors (debating about diversity, Muslims) or subjects (seen to constitute diversity, non-Muslims). This essentialist categorisation is strengthened by the mandatory aspects of Pancasila as it is in the first place illegal for Indonesians to register as a-religious or as adherents to a religion other than the five described by Pancasila (Künkler, 2018) and in the second place because official religious identification is automatically inherited through parents. Students' religious identification is thus obligated and made (politically) meaningful by the state. According to Raffi and Edo, former students at UGM, this obligation creates '*Semangka's,* or watermelons; people that feign religiosity, but are really non-believers.[21] As Indah, also a former student, explains, just like watermelons, these people are a different 'colour' from the inside, personal religiosity or lack thereof, than the outside, to the public and on their ID card.[22] Minority and majority students both experience similar negotiations of identity, be it religious, ethnic or political. For Muslim majority students this construction primarily takes place in an environment of political engagement on campus which revolves around the BEM elections. For minority students, however, the construction and intersection of identities rather ensures political disengagement.

The Muslim majority *Tessa*

Similar to the ratios on the national level, Muslim students form the majority on the UGM campus. To them, the dominant national narrative is especially important, as it is from the 'sides' discerned from this narrative that they identify themselves and other Muslim students as 'pro-Pancasila' or 'pro-Khilafah'[23]. The students do so on the basis of their affiliations with larger religious groupings and ideologies that simultaneously determine which extra-campus organisation they join (Nilan 2004) – the most important facilities of their political engagement. These extra-campus

[20] Budiono, group interview, 06-04-19; Fatin, interview, 08-04-19.

[21] Raffi and Edo, Informal conversation, 10-02-2019

[22] Indah, Informal conversation, 07-02-2019

[23] Here, and in other denominations of *sides, pro-Pancasila* and *pro-Khilafah*, I use single quotation marks to signify that the use of sides belongs to a narrative, a representation of lived reality, rather than to reality itself. It is necessary to denote it as such as these representations are rather contested, which will be shown in later chapters.

organisations are often part of a larger national student movement of the same name which are active on many of Indonesia's university campuses. On the 'pro-Pancasila side' are the Muslim students of PMII (Movement of Indonesian Muslim Students), KMNU (Nahdlatul Ulama Student Organisation) and GMNI (Indonesian National Student Movement).[24] According to Freddy, engineering student and leader of PMII Sleman, his organisation follows NU's *Islam Nusantara* (Islam of the Archipelago).[25] This is a mixture of Islamic belief and Javanese practices, thus an intersection of distinctly religious and ethnic traditions which distinguishes it from less acculturated Islamic ideologies.[26] Community organisation KMNU also follows Islam Nusantara (in this PMII's non-political counterpart) and while they mostly focus on nationalism, some Muslim members of GMNI do too according to GMNI Fisipol faculty leader Budiono. Additionally, GMNI actively teaches their members about Marhaenism[27] (Sukarno-ist socialism) and Indonesian diversity.[28]

Characterised on the other 'side' are the students of KAMMI (United Front of Indonesian Muslim University Students) and on-campus missionary institution Jema'ah Shalahuddin. According to Dina, member of KAMMI, her organisation follows the movement of *Tarbiyah* which developed from Ikhwanul Muslimeen[29] and strives for *Syumuliyatul Islam*: an all-encompassing Islam which is integrated into culture, politics, economy, – i.e. all aspects of life.[30] Some members of Jema'ah Shalahuddin, which is responsible for Islamic activities at Maskam (the campus mosque) and Muslim student representation at UGM, are also said to support it.[31] Lastly, HMI (Muslim Students' Association) is characterised as ideologically "in-between" GMNI's nationalistic and KAMMI's Islamic focus[32]: HMI Dipo is known to be on the pro-Pancasila GMNI side, while HMI MPO (the Organisational Salvation Assembly) often aligns with KAMMI[33].

[24] Of which GMNI is the only one not explicitly based on Islam.
[25] A district of Yogyakarta. The PMII faction in UGM is part of this faction of PMII.
[26] Freddy, interview, 22-03-19.
[27] Marhaenism is the Indonesian socialist alternative to Marxism developed by Sukarno, Indonesia's first president. It is named after a farmer named Marhaen who Sukarno allegedly met while campaigning in the countryside. To GMNI, it emphasises a fight against oppression of all kinds (Budiono, interview, 06-04-19).
[28] Small talk at KMNU basecamp, 14-02-19; Budiono, interview, 01-04-19.
[29] 'Muslim Brotherhood'. It is a Sunni organisation founded in Egypt by Islamic scholar Hassan Al-Banna.
[30] Dina, interview, 02-04-19.
[31] Freddy, interview, 01-03-19.
[32] Budiono, interview 06-04-19; Johan and Nousha, interview, 21-03-19.
[33] This sum-up is by no means representative of the Islamic-ideological diversity on campus, or even the diversity within the organisations. There are many different ideologies and sub-ideologies which deserve further research, but for practical reasons I will stick with the largest ideological trends of each student organisation.

All organisations, separately or jointly, organise and engage in debates, be it about Islam and feminism or the presidential debates[34]. Trainings, albeit for developing soft- or leadership skills, are also politically oriented as their aim is to help students in their future, in many cases in regional or national politics like the alumni before them, and to teach them about political and/or Islamic ideologies.[35] It is important to keep in mind however that Islamic ideologies do not only belong to the organisations themselves, but are also key in the students' personal religious identity. This identity is at the very least *present*, and oftentimes even dominant in the construction and understanding of intersecting identifications[36] and is the core of Muslim students' daily practices (i.e. which are purely Islamic or mixed with Javanese traditions), education (i.e. Ikhwanul Muslimeen- or NU-oriented schools) and understanding of the world (i.e. as seen through the teachings of Islam Nusantara, Tarbiyah and other Islamic ideologies or movements). In this sense, one is not just a Muslim, but a Muslim with a particular interpretation of Islam related to prominent Islamic ideologies and organisations, and as shown above each of these ideologies and organisations are assigned a 'side' in the dominant national narrative.

The Muslim students distinguish themselves and others based on these 'sides' in a variety of ways. Students from the 'pro-Pancasila side' are often defined as less Islam-oriented, especially because a lot tend to practice Islam more 'loosely' (i.e. by smoking and drinking). 'Pro-Khilafah' students follow Islamic teachings more closely and "control each other", as Fatin, also a KAMMI member, says, by asking if they have committed their prayers or read the Qur'an.[37] Dress is also an important indication of 'sides' for students as Khadija, English major and member of KMNU, for instance said that the 'pro-Khilafah' groups were quite distinguishable from members of KMNU and PMII because the women "wear big scarves" and the men "wear skirts above the ankle."[38] Nousha, member of Jema'ah Shalahuddin, too, characterised the more strict Muslims as "people wearing chadors."[39] More importantly, the students distinguish themselves through contestations in campus elections, in which political extra-campus organisations on both 'sides' oppose each other to win the campus presidency, now held by KAMMI. They do so through their associated student parties (see appendix A) as it is prohibited by the government for extra-campus

[34] HMI discussion, participant observation, 20-03-19; YouthTalk debate, participant observation, 09-04-19.
[35] Khadija, informal conversation, 16-02-19; Freddy, interview, 01-03-19; Murad, interview, 11-03-19; Johan and Nousha, interview, 21-03-19.
[36] For instance the ethnically Javanese identity, which intersects with the Muslim identity to become a traditionalist Islamic identity. The intersection between Islam and gender is also notable because it determines how Muslim students should conduct themselves based on whether they are a man or a woman.
[37] Fatin, interview, 22-03-19, p. 14; Budiono, interview, 02-04-19; Dina, interview, 02-04-19.
[38] Khadija, informal conversation, 16-02-19, p.8.
[39] Nousha, informal conversation, 06-03-19l.

organisations to participate directly. KAMMI, ever since the Reformasi, has been dominant in BEM UGM - quite contradictory to the role of 'pro-Khilafah' groups in national politics. Nousha speculates this is because KAMMI does not openly support Khilafah, but does base its campaign strategies on broader Islamic practices and values, something which can mobilise many Muslim students to vote.[40] Yet, KAMMI *is* opposed by the other Muslim student organisations, apparent in a conflictive politics further discussed in chapter 4.

Ethno-religious minorities *Puck*

Minorities in Indonesia are labelled as such because of their ethno-religious identity. This means that everyone who *is not* Muslim is automatically a minority. Many students therefore have an ambiguous relation with the principle that categorises them that way. Vidhi for example, a philosophy student who 'cannot and will not label his religiosity' but is a Muslim in his ID card, explained to me he thinks 'we should be secular' as religion is what makes people divided as it leads them to think their way is the best way and away from focussing on basic needs.[41] But, his opinion is not a popular one and many minority students have found their way with the 'rules' of Pancasila. For example for Buddhists students who see Buddha as a teacher instead of a God.[42] Or as Buddhist monk Santacitto explained; "If really the God exists, he created us and he is very good to me because I am happy with my way of life. But if God does not exist that is also okay, no problem."[43] Still, Ning and Dewi, former leaders of KMHD (Hindu Dharma Student Organisation) consider themselves religious people of which meditating, discussing religion with friends, religious knowledge, attending a house of worship and joining a religious student organisation are manifestations. But, unlike Ning and Dewi, many other religious minority students say their religion is not important to them or influential in their lives.

What does matter for minorities is ethnicity, in the first place because it is something you cannot 'hide' and in the second place because of certain sentiments that are attached to this identity (see Hadiz, 2017).[44] Yulia, a Chinese Buddhist student and member of KMB (Buddhist Student Organisation), explains:

> "The Chinese identity is one identity that I cannot separate with because when it is religious views you can choose not to follow it or keep it to yourself but with the way

[40] Johan and Nousha, interview, 21-03-19.
[41] Vidhi, Interview, 21-02-2019.
[42] Ning, informal conversation, 11-02-2019; Dewi, interview, 28-02-2019.
[43] Santacitto, interview, 09-04-2019.
[44] Ning, interview, 18-02-2019; "We Chinese have the small eyes, that is our unique physical trait [laughs]"

I look, people already have thoughts about Chinese people which is affecting the way they interact with me and I too have thoughts about what other people think about me being Chinese…"[45]

Many Chinese students that I have interviewed still experiences these sentiments in their daily lives. Seyoung, head of KMB for example, expressed that "When I meet someone new, from another ethnicity or religion, especially Muslims, I sometimes get a fear of introducing myself. I am afraid what he or she will think of me, will he or she dislike me because I am Chinese?"[46] Yulia too explained that in Yogyakarta, she feels really different as 'a Chinese' and sometimes feels that people do not want to be around her.[47] This reflects the relation between Chinese Indonesians and Muslim Indonesians, the latter whose political identity is shaped to contest perceived ethnic Chinese economic dominance and 'godless' communism" (Hadiz 2017). So although ethnicity and religion are understood as independent concepts, this division is only limited to certain ethnicities and religious beliefs. Although these struggles culminated many years ago in the genocide of 1965-1966 some sentiments remained.

Their lack of political engagement can be seen as, following Crenshaw (1989), the result of an intersection of identities. But although campus politics are thus, one can argue maybe 'logically', dominated by Muslim students, GMNI, which was described as supportive of a less religious, more nationalist ideology, is the only political extra-campus organisation that has minorities as its members. This is however limited to Christian students. Other minority students, like Hindus and Buddhists, too, are involved in student organisations but with a less political character. Most Buddhist students are part of Keluarga Mahasiswa Buddhis (KMB) and most Hindu students are involved with Keluarga Mahasiswa Hindu Dharma (KMHD). These religious student organisations are described as communities, even families, and have, apart from practicing their (minority) religion, experiencing a sense of like-mindedness and belonging as its purpose. Apart from these organisations, some minorities are involved in boards or councils related to their faculties but almost never in organisations with a clear political purpose.[48]

[45] Yulia, interview, 13-03-2019.
[46] Seyoung, interview, 01-03-2019
[47] Yulia, interview, 13-03-2019
[48] For further reference of these students organisations, see appendix A.

Chapter 3

Student perceptions of the religious-political dynamics of Indonesia

Puck

Recurring themes in political-religious trends in national politics are increased importance of religion, both on personal and political level, and consequently increased intolerance. Ever since these developments took place in national politics both majority and minority students are subject to these changes, but perceptions on what it means for them, personally and politically, vary. In this chapter we will primarily look at the experiences of students but we will also take the perceptions of lecturers on these dynamics into account. First, we will look at how the increased religiosity has affected personal relations and religious outings. We will do so by describing the contestation regarding the multicultural nationalism of Pancasila in what will be argued is an era of intolerance. Second, we will expound on the dominant national narrative and describe how the primarily Muslim students characterise the Pancasila vs. Khilafah debate, something that influences their perception of self and other Muslims.

Negotiating religion in politics: Pancasila in the age of intolerance *Puck*

Chapter 2 illustrates how the conviction of ethnically Chinese and Christian Jakarta governor Ahok led to an increased focus on religion and ethnicity in daily life and in politics. But, although these events have been described as Islamic mobilisation (Mietzner et. Al 2018) and the 'conservative turn' (Hamid 2018, Hadiz 2017) the views on what it really meant for the perception of ethnicity and religion for students in Indonesia vary. Dr. Noorhaidi Hasan characterises the Ahok conviction and its aftermath as a *revival* of a religious focus instead of an increase.[49] According to him, Jokowi thought he could ignore religion in his presidency but found it was something that could not be ignored following the Ahok case. Contrary to Dr. Hasan, many students do refer to the *hijrah* movement.[50] Although this movement is often used to describe

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[49] Dr. Noorhaidi Hasan, informal conversation, 04-04-2019, p. 3.

[50] Hijrah means 'to travel' or 'moving'. The hijrah trends motivates Muslims to lead a more religious way of life but the use of the term is not restricted to the Islamic context only.

increased religiosity on a personal level it also reflects on more public matters. For example on campus, Nuning, a psychology lecturer at UGM observed that more students started wearing hijabs and niqabs.[51] Albeit a signifier of increased religiosity, according to Nuning their hijab did not always correspond to the rest of their outfit.[52] Although these students might not be 'really' religious, religion has proven to be an effective tool in mobilising Indonesian citizens. In the BEM UGM election, Nousha and Johan, a Christian student and member of GMNI, describe how one of the candidates acted as Imam on Instagram to show that he is a 'real Muslim'.[53] This increase of religiosity is not only about display, but also affects personal relations. Indah, a former anthropology student explained that;

> "They [Hijrah] go with their community and only engage in exclusive groups. A lot of my friends don't talk to me and my other friends anymore because they engage in religious groups only".

Indah's remark underscores Hamid's (2018) argument about how the conviction of Ahok strengthened a sense of in-group identity which is manifested by emphasising difference and leads to the normalisation of intolerance.[54] Yulia illustrates that such intolerance is not only targeted at religious but also at ethnic and sexual minorities. She expressed that LGBT did not used to be a 'thing' but that nowadays, and with the elections going on, a supportive remark by Jokowi towards that community was even used to attack him.[55] I therefore argue that rather than having increased in terms of piety, religion has been predominantly used to normalise intolerance towards different kinds of minorities which also reflects in the current elections.

Indonesian candidates focus on the Islamic majority only, doing so by channelling and displaying Islamic values in their campaigns. This strategy works because as Raffi explains:

> "Indonesians are majoritarian, Prabowo accused Jokowi of being Christian or a communist. And since parties and candidates do not give a lot of information about their

[51] Nuning, informal conversation, 26-09-2019, p. 2.

[52] The hijab/niqab wearing students wore tight clothes or see through things under their veil.

[53] Johan and Nousha, interview, 21-03-19.

[54] Indah, interview 1, 14-02-2019, p. 5.

[55] Yulia, interview 2, 22-03-2019, p. 4.

programmes, the election became driven by such religious issues. In the end, this is probably why Jokowi chose Ma'ruf as his running mate."[56]

Minority and majority students, as well as lecturers, have identified Jokowi's choice for Islamic scholar Ma'ruf as a strategy to appeal to Muslim voters (McLeod 1991). Additionally, Indah thinks that the choice for Ma'ruf is rather motivated by the additional support of the Islamic PPP.[57] Not all have been equally supportive towards Jokowi's choice and Dr. Zainal Abidin Bagir, director of cross-cultural studies at UGM even called it 'a bad choice'.[58] According to Bagir, Jokowi overestimates the influence of religion based on the before mentioned accusations towards his ethnic and religious identification. Prabowo's Islamic rally, discussed in the introduction, also got critique from former president Yudhoyono, who is part of Prabowo's coalition, as he labelled it 'not reflecting an inclusive national campaign'[59]. Many religious and ethnic minority students agree with this statement and Johan and Ning, a Chinese Buddhist student even feel 'the majority want to push down the minority'. These displays and the use of Islamic values in politics only have led to an increasingly sensitive position for ethno-religious minorities in politics and as Yulia expresses 'there is a lot of risk for the minorities'.[60] This disbalance in religious representation has been attributed by majority and minority students alike to the fact that minorities simply make up a small percentage of Indonesian society. But despite their small amount, Pancasila should be there to guarantee their religious diversity.

The state ideology of Pancasila has been described to symbolise, 'humanity' and 'justice'.[61] Dr. Noorhaidi Hasan, described Pancasila as a middle way, a navigating force on the national level, explained it would be logical for ethno-religious minorities to unite under a nationalist ideology since in Indonesia it is based on the idea of ethnic and religious diversity – i.e. Pancasila. This theory is illustrated by Boaz, a Christian student and former president of BEM:

"If I want to participate in public organisation in campus or maybe in the government, I must have ideology and because I live in a multicultural country I think that to be

[56] Raffi, informal conversation, 11-02-2019, p2. Post-graduate anthropology student, teacher at an Pesantren and member of the organisation Gusdurian which was founded in name of former president Gus Dur.
[57] Indah, interview 1, 14-02-2019, p. 17.
[58] Dr. Z. A. Bagir, informal conversation, 20-02-2019, p2
[59] Nurul Fitri Ramadhani. 2019. "Religious fervor marks Prabowo's largest open rally." *The Jakarta Post* website, April 8. Accessed on June 24, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/04/08/islamic-mass-prayer-religious-fervor-marks-prabowo-s-largest-open-rally.html
[60] Ning, interview, 27-02-2019, p. 8; Yulia, interview, 22-03-2019, p. 3; Johan, interview, 01-04-2019, p. 14.
[61] Freddy, interview, 22-02-19, pp. 4-5.

> nationalist is one of the best choices. Rather than you follow Christianity or another religion. National ideology is more proper for Indonesia, for me too, to join."[62]

But while Boaz, and some other Christians, see nationalism as their designated ideology I found that, contrary to dr. Hasan's argument, other ethno-religious minorities do not feel encouraged or facilitated to unite politically. So while the narrative of national politics is about Pancasila, ethno-religious minorities are not actively involved. They are positioned by political actors in comparison to the majority but, as illustrated by the Ahok case, do not get a voice.

Narratives of nationalism: characterisations of Pancasila and Khilafah *Tessa*

As indicated by the students, it is ethno-religious diversity symbolised through Pancasila that is central in their understanding of the Indonesian nation. Still, what Leifner (2000) misses is the external Other by which this contemporary Indonesian nationalism defines and expresses itself. As indicated in Chapter 2, however, there is a perceived contender to Pancasilaist nationalism which the dominant narrative in national politics regards as an explicit enemy to Indonesian diversity: the Khilafah ideology. This Khilafah ideology greatly overlaps with the *Hijrah* movement, as can be deduced from their shared involvement in the Ahok case and signification of intolerance. This Pancasila vs. Khilafah narrative is primarily given meaning by Muslims.[63] I argue that it is through their interpretations and characterisations of this narrative that we can understand Khilafah as the post-colonial Other: considered inherently un-Indonesian not only in its intolerant values, but also in its perceived origination.

The 'pro-Pancasila' and 'pro-Khilafah' sides discussed in chapter 2 are not always denominated as such, or simply as tolerant or intolerant, by students themselves. They are also characterised in terms of dichotomous Islamic categorisations which are primarily ascriptions from the 'side' of those who consider themselves – and more importantly *are generally considered* – 'pro-Pancasila'. The first time I came across such categorisations was in a conversation with Freddy. As explained in chapter 2, PMII follows NU's Islam Nusantara and Freddy brought up that he sees this Islam as moderate: not liberal and not conservative. He continued with an example:

[62] Boaz, interview, 07-04-2019, p. 6.

[63] Which is reflective of the non-participative role of ethno-religious minorities in national politics.

"NU says Pancasila is final, Indonesia is final. We must not have an Islamic country. The conservatives say we have to have an Islamic country. And we don't have.. the Qur'an talks about Khilafah.. the Qur'an and the Hadith talk about Khilafah. The NU interpreted this, and Khilafah is not about [our] country."[64]

Here, Freddy relates Islamic moderatism to Pancasila, regarding it as a 'middle way' like dr. Hasan explained, between an undefined liberalism and a pro-Khilafah conservatism. Conservatism has often been used by students to denominate intolerant pro-Khilafah actors, and the increase of intolerance they describe could therefore indeed be called the "conservative turn" Hamid (2018) and Hadiz (2017) discerned.

Besides conservatism, Islamic radicalism or extremism are also used to denominate pro-Khilafah actors, especially groups whom the students consider explicitly anti-democratic. Budiono, leader of GMNI Fisipol, pointed out that PKS and Ikhwanul Muslimeen, both seen as pro-Khilafah actors in the dominant national narrative, differ from HTI (deemed radical by the Jokowi administration) because they want to implement Khilafah through democratic politics and HTI did not.[65] Fatin, president of BEM, agreed, adding that HTI is radical in its anti-Pancasila views.[66] At the same time, he, Nousha, key informant because of her shifting 'sides', and Murad, leader of KAMMI UGM, condemn the current government's "monopolised" use of Pancasila to criticise or label anyone that does not fully agree with it in its eyes as radical. That is, the Islamic opposition of PKS, the affiliated Ikhwanul Muslimeen and, following a rapport of the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT),[67] also KAMMI and Jema'ah Shalahuddin.[68] Nevertheless, some students do continue to use radicalism/extremism and conservatism interchangeably. Johan stated somewhat matter-of-factly that he uses the word conservative to signify 'extreme' Muslims because Khilafah developed a long time ago and they wanted to implement it now. For this reason, he said, some people call these Muslims "camels". Nousha, his conversation partner, laughed at this and explained: "because Islam, you know? Islam. Desert. Camels."[69]

Particularly striking is that this form of name-calling imagines these 'extreme' Muslims as originating from outside of Indonesia, not only historically as Johan suggested, but also

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[64] Freddy, interview, 22-02-19, p. 4.
[65] Budiono, group interview, 06-04-19, p. 6.
[66] Fatin, interview, 22-03-19, p. 13.
[67] The National Agency of Combating Radicalism
[68] Nousha, informal conversation, 06-03-19. Murad, interview, 11-03-19; Fatin, interview, 22-03-19, p. 12.
[69] Johan and Nousha, interview, 21-03-19, p. 18.

geographically.[70] This characterisation is key to understanding why the Khilafah ideology can be seen as the external Other that Leifner (2000) thought missing. Throughout our fieldwork, students have informed us that these pro-Khilafah actors, 'conservative' or 'radical', understood Islamic teachings textually as opposed to contextually.[71] They are said to take these teachings literally and do not aim to put them in the temporal and geographical context before implementation. Freddy says NU, however, *does* want to understand the Indonesian context before implementing these teachings, and Budiono explains[72]:

> "If we try to purely implement Khilafah that existed in the past, in the Middle-East, what would happen in Indonesia then? Because we believe there is still our own culture in Indonesia, our characteristics. And there is not simply one religion that exists in Indonesia.. ..[Islam] needs to be contextualised because it could create oppression of the dominant group towards the minority group."[73]

In both cases, Khilafah is characterised as a "Arabic" and "Middle-Eastern" ideology and it is thought that it cannot be implemented in Indonesia without, as Nousha says, "losing the concept of 'nation' and the idea of Pancasila": its textuality ostensibly favours Islam and would therefore undermine Indonesian ethno-religious diversity, especially non-Muslim minorities.[74] If ethno-religious diversity is seen by students as distinctively Indonesian, these interpretations of Khilafah therefore imply that the ideology is un-Indonesian without further contextualisation. This un-Indonesian-ness – as opposed to Indonesian nation-ness (Anderson 1991) – is further emphasised in its opposition to Islam Nusantara which, which as explained in chapter 2, *is* an accultured, or contextualised, form because it mixed Javanese culture and Islamic belief.[75] In this sense, Muslim students' characterisation of Khilafah as textual ties into the dominant national(ist) narrative that Khilafah contests Indonesian intra- and extra-Islamic diversity as it implies the ideology is inherently un-Indonesian and, consequently, unnationalistic. In this, we can see a new nationalist myth (Eriksen 2010) unfolding as Khilafah becomes the Other by which the Pancasilaist Indonesian nation can define itself, its ideology an outside enemy to diversity and its actors an enemy within.

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[70] As, to our knowledge based on some brief research, camels are not native to Indonesia.

[71] Freddy, interview, 22-02-19; Ahmed, Huda and Suzanna, informal conversation, 03-03-19; Budiono, group interview, 06-04-19.

[72] Freddy, interview, 22-02-19. Also note that in his comment, he said that Khilafah was not about "our country."

[73] Budiono, group interview, 06-04-19, pp. 8-9.

[74] Nousha, informal conversation, 06-03-19.

[75] Discussion at PMII, informal conversation, 12-02-19; Freddy, interview, 22-03-19; Raffi, informal conversation, 04-03-19; Huda , interview, 29-03-19; Johan and Nousha, interview. 21-03-19. Budiono, interview, 01-04-19, p. 9.

All in all, students' experiences in and interpretations of the national political environment are intimately linked to the dominant national narrative that Jokowi's administration brought about. On the national level, students identify trends of increasing religiosity and intolerance towards religious minority groups. This reflects on Pancasila, a nationalism inclusive of religious diversity, which as we have shown is explained by (primarily) Muslim students to be threatened by un-nationalistic pro-Khilafah groups. Still, the dominant national narrative must be understood for what it is: a *narrative* that represents, by no means perfectly but by all means rhetorically, the *perceived* reality of national politics. We say rhetorically because, according to dr. Hasan, presenting certain actors (HTI as an easy scapegoat) as anti-Pancasila and thus radical to the public was a way for Jokowi's administration to create a common ideological enemy without directly attacking this Islam-centred opposition of PKS.[76]

This nuance is important to keep in mind because, even though all students see the same narrative unfolding on the national level, that does not mean some do not contest its dichotomous and essentialising character in their own lived experiences. Especially Muslim students who have been placed on the 'pro-Khilafah side', like we have seen from Fatin, Murad and Nousha's reactions, resist the characterisations 'pro-Pancasila' students have assigned to them that have become dominant in the narratives on the distinctions between Muslims. In the next chapter, I elaborate on how the negotiation of the dominant narrative between Muslim students unfolds in the realm of campus politics – their primary means of political engagement and contestation - in which it is the 'pro-Khilafah groups' that are dominant.

[76] Dr. Noorhaidi Hasan, informal conversation, 04-04-19.

Chapter 4

Tessa

"Academic life is political life": Muslim students' negotiation of identity and political engagement

> "We as a KAMMI also think that we're nationalist. Yeah, of course, because we don't have an agenda to destroy our country. We just want to participate in democracy, contribute to this country in our way, and respect the other ways. Yeah, this our way, this is your way and why should we think that we're not nationalist if we have the definition of nationalism? […] Because we think that the nationality or being nationalist does not mean you cannot be religious. We implement the first point of Pancasila. It talks about religiosity, so we ask: how can we be nationalist without being religious? Because our Pancasila, its first point talks about God."
>
> Fatin, president of BEM UGM[77]

In an half-empty Dunkin' Donuts on the busy Kaliurang street, Fatin and I were discussing the intricacies of campus politics of Gadjah Mada University while trying not to be drowned out by the noise of early-morning Yogyakartan traffic. I asked Fatin about the characterisation of KAMMI in relation to GMNI, which was described to me as distinctively nationalist.[78] What about KAMMI, the political-Islamic student organisation considered to be GMNI's main rival[79] – does Fatin not consider his organisation nationalist too? Fatin's answer above reveals that he sees KAMMI's nationalism as an Islamic sort that takes into account Pancasila, the main symbol of Indonesian nationalism. This points to a seemingly paradoxical situation: in chapter 2, it is pointed out that KAMMI is considered 'pro-Khilafah' and in chapter 3, it was shown that within the dominant national narrative of Pancasila vs. Khilafah, this characterisation is attributed to Islamic groups that are deemed anti-diversity and therefore unnationalistic. How can this nationalistic identification of KAMMI come into being, then?

In this chapter, I will dig deeper into the dynamics of campus politics of which the motivations to engage in it are shaped by intersections of student, national and ideological

[77] Fatin, interview, 08-04-19, p. 9.
[78] Wherein nationalism refers to Indonesia's contemporary Pancasilaist nationalism described in chapter 2, and students' interpretations of it described in chapter 3. Also see Appendix A.
[79] Murad and Nousha, interview, 11-03-19; Fatin, interview, 22-03-19; Dina, interview, 09-04-19.

(Islamic) identities. As I will show, the dominant narrative of there being ‘sides’ in the Muslim population, which largely overlap with ideological identities, have real consequences in how these students practice campus politics and experience campus life, affecting the *performance* of their religiosity. At the same time, the ‘sides’ and their characterisations might not reflect students’ perception of self. In the last part, I will therefore focus on KAMMI specifically, discussing how they negotiate their pro-Khilafah characterisations, thereby make nationalist discourses their own.

Political identity construction

One way the political identity of Muslim students is constructed pertains to the question *why* they should concern themselves with politics. Oliver & Marwell (1988) emphasise the influence of the university context as it brings large groups of similarly motivated youth together, but what I emphasise here is rather Gadjah Mada University’s motivational role in students’ political engagement. As described in the introduction, students have historically had an important role in Indonesia’s democratisation process, and UGM reinforces this political function of students by teaching its freshmen that they are 1. a moral force, 2. agents of change, 3. an iron stock, and 4. necessary for social control of the government.[80] Freddy and Dina explain these four roles add to the understanding that students have the *duty* to contribute to the Indonesian nation and think about how they do this through political activities and organisations.[81] Fatin adds that this perceived responsibility is shared by him, other students and the broader public:

> “Students feel that they have the responsibility to create or produce something for the public. Like, you have to be social entrepreneur even when you’re still young so you can start being a useful person. So students, and the public, feel that students or young people have a responsibility to change the country through their agenda, through their programmes or through their creations.”[82]

Being a student enhances the youthful ability ‘to be useful’ and ‘change the country’ because it provides additional resources, knowledge and the freedom to speak out on societal issues without

[80] Dina, interview, 02-09-19.
[81] Freddy, interview, 01-03-19; Dina, interview, 09-04-19.
[82] Fatin, interview, 14-03-19, p. 13.

risking unemployment.[83] By teaching students these four roles, UGM thus invokes and strengthens a sense of political consequentiality (Huddy 2001) to their identity as students. Relating this to their ability and wish to contribute to the nation, the political identity is one that is constructed out of the *intersection* (Crenshaw 1989) between the student identity and the national identity.

The second way Muslim students construct their political identity relates to the (political) student organisations they are a part of and concerns the question of *how* the students should contribute to their country. As described in chapter 2 (also see Appendix A), these organisations – and thereby students' religious identities – have their own distinct ideologies aligned with the 'sides' of the dominant national narrative: in line with 'pro-Pancasila' are PMII, KMNU, GMNI and HMI Dipo, whereas KAMMI, HMI MPO and Jema'ah Shalahuddin mainly follow the Islamic *Tarbiyah* ideology, put on the 'pro-Khilafah' side. In this sense, Huda, a non-affiliated philosophy student, explains that Muslim identities can be considered 'fragmented'.[84] Khadija, member of KMNU, showed a similar sentiment as she does not really experience a sense of belonging in her broader Muslim identity, on campus and beyond. She explains:

> "Because, well, in Islam there are a lot of sects. Sections, yeah there are a lot of sections, a lot of Islamic schools. And well, I.. basically don't really talk much about religion if I know that maybe the person is not NU or different from me and I see that they are a little bit exclusive. Ah, they're not really openminded."[85]

This perceived exclusiveness is the exact reason why Islamic ideologies are also relevant in the construction of political identities, because it is following this issue that Muslim identities not only 'fragmentise' but also contest each other in campus politics. This contestation, again, has to do with the dominant national narrative of Pancasila vs. Khilafah which imagines these ideological Muslim identities not only as mutually exclusive, but as we have seen in chapter 3, also in terms of conflict between tolerance and intolerance; moderatism and conservatism; pro- and anti-diversity. The only difference on campus is that students' interpretations of the narrative directly pertain to their lived experiences, and on both 'sides' Muslim students have their own contesting ideas on how these experiences could be interpreted.[86]

[83] Freddy and Gunadi, interview, 09-02-19; Fatin, 14-03-19; Dina, interview, 02-04-19
[84] Ahmed, Huda and Suzanna, informal conversation, 03-03-19; Huda, interview, 09-03-19.
[85] Khadija, interview, 27-02-19, p. 9.
[86] It must be noted that these experiences are not a matter of truth or falsehood. Rather, we must see these through the lens of a theorem that it often used in anthropological theory, namely that "if people define situations as real, they are real in its consequences" (Thomas & Thomas 1928, pp. 571-572).

Reification of the dominant narrative

> In the traditional Javanese Joglo, everything was wooden, except for the tiled beige floor. On the wall hung two portraits, with in-between a *Garuda*, the national symbol of Indonesia. Khadija explained to me that the portraits were two of the nine men who first brought Islam to Indonesia. In the 7th century, she believed. We, Khadija, other members of KMNU, PMII and HMI Dipo, and I, sat on the carpets that were laid out on the floor. We were listening to an UGM lecturer, Zaki Arrobi, who began the discussion of the evening with a speech on NU, Muhammadiyah[87], and their silent majority status when it comes to extremism on campus. Everyone was tired and distracted as they had already sung from the *Mawlid*, the text on Muhammad's birth, for one and a half hour beforehand. Besides, it had gotten late. And yet the discussion afterwards got passionate and long as the Muslim students discussed their experiences on campus: that of exclusion and intolerance by the influential Tarbiyah-affiliated groups of KAMMI and Jema'ah Shalahuddin. According to Taufik, a member of HMI who spoke clearly and determined, it was time to come forward at the mosque, and in BEM UGM for that matter, in order to not be controlled by these other organisations. The other students wholeheartedly agreed. [88]

In the discussion, Taufik pointed out two scenario's in which tensions arise in campus politics: one concerns the campus mosque, or Maskam, the other scenario involves BEM UGM. While KMNU, PMII and Jema'ah Shalahuddin refrain from participating in the BEM elections, GMNI, HMI and KAMMI are still fighting for the BEM presidency and MPM representative majority every year. As 'pro-Khilafah' KAMMI has the presidency, the 'pro-Pancasila' GMNI and HMI Dipo act as a unified opposition because they think KAMMI "is not good for this campus."[89] This judgement is based on the policies and programmes KAMMI develop when dominant in BEM UGM. In the words of the GMNI members that chimed in during my interview with Budiono:

> Gilang When KAMMI comes to power, they will make a lot of weird programmes.

[87] Another organisation associated with the pro-Pancasila side. While there are students that follow Muhammadiyah at UGM, I did not get to speak to them, and neither is their organisation of IMM very active in campus politics.
[88] This speech was initially in Bahasa Indonesia and was translated to English with help of Khadija (informal conversation, 16-02-19). Taufik later explained his answer to me (informal conversation, 23-02-19).
[89] Freddy, interview, 01-03-19.

Ardi	Because KAMMI is.. is yet again highly aligning with PKS, sometimes.. the BEM itself sometimes is utilised as a tool for them to move..
Wafi	PKS agenda.
Ardi	..and it is important, also, I think, to have this kind of check and balance. Because, also in the past, [MPM] is not really that strong in comparison to BEM. So that's why the regulation is kind of basic. But it could prevent them from being more of a loose cannon.[90]

This association with PKS, on the national level on the 'pro-Khilafah side', implies an 'intolerant' and 'conservative' agenda, something the 'pro-Pancasila' organisations oppose. Huda gave the concrete example that BEM UGM made a declaration on countering 'LGBT' behaviour.[91] Therefore, the opposition has already put measures into place to counter KAMMI's policy development: it was their majority in MPM that recently developed the policy that constrained BEM UGM's executive power.[92] In other cases, they attend evaluative inter-organisational debates with KAMMI, often said to result in aggressivity and shouting matches.[93]

In addition to BEM UGM, Maskam is regarded as a 'strategic place' to spread ones ideology too, in which the 'pro-Khilafah side' is now is said to have the upper hand because of its dominance in Jema'ah Shalahuddin. While Maskam in itself is not a place for political engagement, its function is *politicised* by the contestation enacted through it: in the eyes of 'pro-Pancasila students', Jema'ah Shalahuddin invited 'pro-Khilafah' speakers and rejected Islam Nusantara events such as the Mawlid celebration.[94] Freddy thought it was because they did not think the Mawlid was an Islamic tradition, relating the rejection to the textual and contextual tensions he described.[95] Nousha, as a member of Jema'ah Shalahuddin, responded to this accusation by explaining that the alumni in charge of the Maskam activities were just trying to stay neutral, because if they choose to let the celebrations happen, it might spark a lot of reactions from those who indeed oppose contextualised Islam. She did admit to me that doing nothing, in this case, was also "taking a side."[96]

While the power of 'pro-Khilafah' organisations on campus is being challenged politically, at the very least through MPM, the contestation of the two 'sides' also leaves a mark on how

[90] Budiono, group interview, 06-04-19, p. 12.
[91] Huda, interview, 09-03-19.
[92] Budiono, group interview, 06-04-19
[93] Johan and Nousha, interview, 21-03-19; Fatin, interview, 08-04-19.
[94] Taufik, informal conversation, 23-02-19; Khadija, informal conversation, 16-02-19. Freddy, interview, 22-02-19.
[95] Freddy, interview, 22-02-19.
[96] Nousha, informal conversation, 06-03-19.

Muslim students interact with each other socially: experiences of exclusion and stigmatisation changed the manner in which and the extent to which *both* sides conveyed their (political) ideological identity to each other.[97] A lot of students adjusted this identificatory *performance* to avoid conflict. Khadija, for instance, elected to not perform or talk about her NU-identity because she feared that she might ruin the friendship with her *Wahhabi*[98] friend if she accidentally said anything that might be offensive to her.[99] After an interview, Freddy also noted that he kept quiet about politics because there are lot of 'conservative' Muslims in his engineering faculty.[100]

On the other 'side', too, Muslim students adjusted their performance to avoid conflict, although this non-performance is less specifically about the ideological identity, and more about the Muslim identity in general. Nousha, for instance, showed more lenience in her performance of Da'wah[101] with her friends who were indifferent to religion, jokingly reminding them of their religion so that she would not push them away.[102] And as the 'pro-Pancasila' opposition regards KAMMI-dominated BEM UGM as exclusive to non-Muslims, Fatin chose to show less of his Muslim identity by avoiding reading the Qur'an in the secretariat:

> "I just like.. I don't want to make a problem. Because, like, if I can do it in the *Musholla*[103], I think it's better than in the secretary. I won't make a policy that says "don't read the Qur'an here", but I think it's better if I read it [in the *Musholla*] because it's near, so why don't we read there? […] I just want to minimise the problem, because actually, it's not a problem, but I have to explain when someone sees it. "Oh, this is the secretary!" I don't want to explain it, but prevent it."[104]

This is not the only instance in which Fatin felt the pressure of non-performance of his (more strict and public) religiosity. He "feels like a minority," being stigmatised for his identity by other Muslims. Indeed, there have been instances in which Muslim participants, specifically those on the 'pro-Pancasila side' of the narrative, noted that religion should be something that one should keep private.[105] This ties into how the public performance of religiosity, especially in the form of

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[97] Khadija, interview, 27-02-19; Freddy, small talk, 01-03-19; Huda, interview, 09-03-19; Johan and Nousha, interview, 21-03-19

[98] Wahhabi refers to the Salafi ideology, which is also connected to the Khilafah ideology.

[99] Khadija, interview, 27-02-19.

[100] Freddy, small talk, 01-03-19.

[101] The Islamic-Arabic word for proselytising.

[102] Nousha, small talk, 02-04-19.

[103] A prayer area.

[104] Fatin, interview, 08-04-19.

[105] Nurul and Indah 21-02-19; Budiono, interview, 01-04-19.

dress, is often associated with the 'pro-Khilafah side' (as discussed in chapter 2), and thus conservatism, radicalism and, again, un-Indonesianness.[106] So, Fatin shakes hands with women, even though it is not recommended by the MUI, and refrains from wearing his pants rolled up or wearing a Muslim cap or shirt. And this not only goes for him: women, he said, are also afraid to wear "big hijabs."[107]

Dina explicitly criticises this 'conservative' denomination used to characterise her 'modest' appearance, however.[108] But even though she considers it an oversimplification, Dina uses the word 'conservative' herself too. After I asked her about it, she explained:

> "I would say it's a way of explaining because it's ... what other people think. I would characterise myself as someone who is quite open. Even if I have certain boundaries. […] Me as a Muslim who holds religious values very closely, so far, it hasn't stopped me from interacting with people who have different values. Very different values, actually. Based on these values, we don't really like the LGBT[109], like the existence, but that doesn't stop me from having a friend, a very close friend, who is also Bi. It's more like how I conduct my days. It's more like the perspective, how I see me in terms of perspective and how that affects my mannerisms towards other people."[110]

Dina's answer exemplifies the complex relationship in which Muslim students handle their ascribed identities. She acknowledges that the 'conservative' ascription is used by others to explain her behaviour and ideology, but simultaneously criticises the supposed exclusivity that is assumed because of her 'conservative' appearance. To be sure, all students I talked to thought of themselves as tolerant, and to them individually, it *is* true – also for those who are ascribed the 'pro-Khilafah' and consequently intolerant and unnationalistic identities. And even though they adjust their performances, these students *do* negotiate these ascriptions: either through active resistance, like Jema'ah Shalahuddin did through counter-research as a response to their characterisation as radical by the BNPT rapport,[111] but also in the way they make sense of their political ideological identity, as KAMMI does through their own demotic discourse.

[106] Raffi, informal conversation, 06-02-19; Khadija, informal conversation, 16-02-19; Nousha, informal conversation, 06-03-19.
[107] Fatin, interview, 14-03-19. By big hijabs, he later said, he meant niqabs or jilbabs.
[108] Dina wears a long hijab and a long dress under it, as opposed to a 'less modest' one that just covers her neck.
[109] Recall that in Chapter 2, it was described that the perceived intolerance towards minorities also included minorities in terms of sexuality.
[110] Dina, interview, 02-04-19, pp. 5-6.
[111] Nousha, informal conversation, 06-03-19.

"Doing things the Islamic way": KAMMI's demotic discourse

When Murad, leader of KAMMI UGM, was telling me about KAMMI's goal to make Indonesian society more Islamic, Nousha, who was translating for him, chimed in: "so, not constitutionally-based Islamic, but society-based Islamic. They are not trying to change Pancasila and be called radicals."[112] Here, Nousha interprets anti-Pancasilaist sentiments as radicalism, as is the common interpretation within the dominant national narrative, but she rejects the notion that it could be ascribed to KAMMI and their goals. As clarified by Murad, the organisation's primary goal is namely to implement Islamic values in Indonesian society without causing frictions between them and non-Muslims.[113] It only later dawned on me when I compared his explanation of KAMMI's goals to that of other members, that this entailed what Fatin meant with KAMMI's religious nationalism.

Earlier, in the same Dunkin' Donuts, Fatin and I discussed how he thought, in line with his ideas described in chapter 3, KAMMI *and* Khilafah itself are not necessarily 'anti-Pancasila'. Rather, Khilafah is an ideology about having a country with Islamic values which are not only good for Muslims, but for all of the public and should therefore be implemented through regulations. Inspired by the student responsibility to contribute to the nation, he tries to do this himself in BEM UGM by breaking down his "Islamic perception" to "rational argumentation" so that he can show Islamic values are beneficial to the public.[114] Dina, too, explains Islam brings benefits and KAMMI is the "bridge to bring those benefits" by trying to implement Islam – on campus through BEM policies.[115] Likewise, she regards Islamic values as beneficial to *all* of the nation, and thinks it is desired to have a societal and governmental system based on Islamic views, following the goals of the Khilafah ideology. At the same time, she understands that a lot of people, on- and off-campus, will not accept such a system. So she explains that the implementation of values is also a goal worth contributing towards:

> "At the very least we could have certain values of Islam that we could implement in life. Things like that, I think, are focus in comparison to in your face kind of values. So HTI really drives, really wants to establish a nation that's based on Khilafah, whereas Tarbiyah is more like *Syumuliyatul Islam*. If it doesn't get to that point [of Khilafah], at the very

[112] Murad and Nousha, interview, 11-03-19, p. 7.
[113] Murad and Nousha, interview, 11-03-19.
[114] Fatin, interview, 22-03-19.
[115] Dina, interview, 09-04-19.

least we need to implement certain values in terms of the social aspect, the political aspect – we need to base it on Islamic views."[116]

In KAMMI members' understanding, they do not work against Pancasila: they do not want to have an Islamic country or ban non-Islamic practices per se, certainly not through undemocratic means, but they do want to work towards an Indonesian nation that follows Islamic values. If nationalism, in the Indonesian context, can be understood as a multiculturalism emphasising ethnic and religious diversity, being nationalist is thus about taking into account this diversity, and this is essentially what the 'pro-Khilafah' students of KAMMI aim to do. Being called 'anti-Pancasila' or radical (in anti-democratic terms), to them, is therefore an accusation and overestimation of their moralistic – not constitutional – goals for the Indonesian nation. And while Khilafah, Tarbiyah, and therefore KAMMI might be Othered as un-Indonesian, in KAMMI's eyes, these goals are nationalistic in nature. In this sense, they thus reject the reifying dominant narrative – or discourse (Baumann 1996) – of the Pancasila vs. Khilafah on the mutually exclusiveness of 'Khilafah' and national(ist) identities through their own *demotic* discourses by showing the hybridisation of those two identities through their own interpretation of nationalism. This is a religious nationalism which may not be understood in terms of a political ideology, like Gellner (1983) suggests, but rather, like Anderson (1991) argues, in terms of sentimentality: It is a nationalism that is based on feeling of wanting to "make my religion proud and to make my country proud,"[117] which in turn stimulates the pursuit of the betterment of the Indonesian society by, as Murad formulates it "doing things the Islamic way."[118]

In Muslim students' nationally oriented but campus-based political engagement, there is thus a tension in the identification processes of Muslim students, especially of those ascribed to the predominantly negatively perceived 'pro-Khilafah side', between self-making and being made (Ong 1996). But while this shows the dominant national narrative is not only being reified, but also negotiated, this tension has not been exposed in campus politics, these students' main form of political engagement, itself. Rather, negotiation happens at most on the organisational level, whereas campus politics remain heated, polarised and characterised by a fear and unwillingness to talk about differences. It also remains a paradoxical situation wherein 'pro-Khilafah' is experienced to be stigmatised by 'pro-Pancasila' yet at the same time is dominant in representative

[116] Dina, interview, 09-04-19, p. 16.
[117] Fatin, interview, 14-03-19, p. 9.
[118] Murad and Nousha, interview, 11-03-19, p. 8.

facilities on campus, which to a certain degree suggests some form of majoritarian support. As such, the UGM campus is riddled with political and identificatory complexities one of our first informant, Yudianto, implicitly warned us about: in Indonesia, at the very the UGM campus, "academic life is political life."[119] That is, it is so for Muslim students.

While the campus politics of Muslim students are focused on a contestation with regards to religious diversity, non-Muslim minorities do not seem involved in this debate, which *does* pertain to their lived experiences on intolerance, exclusion and stigmatisation. In the next chapter, Puck will therefore go into these lived experiences, discussing their perspectives on community formation and political engagement, so that the experiences of both student populations can come together in an examination of a political activity they both engage in and takes on other forms than the conflictive campus politics – voting – which will be discussed in chapter 6.

[119] Yudianto, informal conversation, 02-02-19.

Chapter 5

Ethno-religious minority communities and political engagement in the age of intolerance

> "Religion and ethnics affect me a lot in daily life and my future because I live in this kind of country that is still thinking about those things" [120]
>
> – Amri, Hindu student

As became apparent in Chapter 3, Pancasila and religion, and consequentially intolerance, became especially evident and important in politics since Ahok. But, it also turned out that on the personal level religion takes in a more paradoxical position in terms of importance. While the students that I have interviewed are minorities by the sake of their (ethno-) religious identification their perception of what their religiosity means to them vary. Looking back on the opening quote but also to chapter 3, religion is important to these students because it is *made* important since they are categorised in terms of religious identification. Of course, there are some students who do consider themselves religious but a more common sound is that it is ethnic identification what really matters. This variety in identifications accumulates in two ways, first, ethno-religious minorities all are part of a religious student organisation. For Hindu students this organisation is KMHD, for Buddhist students KMB. Second, all regularly visit a house of worship. But although these sites are religious in character I found that the motivation to join them is rather communal.

In this chapter I will explain how the religious and ethnic identification of minority students is perceived and constructed in community forming. I will argue that, in accordance with Chapter 2, ethnic values are what matters in the forming and sense making of communities, formalised in student organisations like KMB and KMHD. These communities, also defined as families, are of particular importance in, as argued in Chapter 3, what is an age of intolerance. But while the dominant political narrative is *about* minorities but they are not involved in this debate. Because this also reflects on social relations, and on a more local level in terms of disengagement in campus politics, I will mainly focus on their positioning on the broader scale of Yogyakarta.

[120] Amri, Interview, 14-03-2019

Following Crenshaw (1989) their political engagement or lack thereof can therefore be seen as the outcome of an intersection of religious, ethnic and political identity or position in society.

Ethno-religious communities: negotiating the importance of religion

> After the prayer, the attendees at Vihara Karangdjati, young and old, male and female, mingled. While chatting, someone handed out tea and other attendees started to prepare a table with food. With a cup of tea in their hand, they gradually moved to the table and started to queue up for a steaming noodle soup with pork and fish-balls. After receiving their soup they returned to the floor in groups of 4 to 8 and while eating their meal, had lively conversations with each other. A group of young people wearing blue jackets with Kamadhis Mahasiswa Buddhis on the back was particularly noisy. The group consisted of both men and women whom were all around the age of 20. The students showed each other pictures on a smart phone which was followed by shouts and laughter. During the course of the evening, everybody mingled and knew each other by name, they laughed together and ate together. When people gradually started to go home, the students stayed last.[121]

It is in religious student organisations or during prayer evenings like these where Buddhist but also Hindu students socialise and feel a sense of community based on shared values. Buddhist students find their religious community in the organisation of KMB and Hindu students do so in KMHD. Amri, who is a member of KMHD, replied on my question whether shared religion leads to a feeling of connectedness by saying; “absolutely, because we are living in a world with people with different thoughts and it makes us feel better if we go with them who have the same thought as us”.[122] So it is not their perceived religiosity but rather their desire for unification that motivates these students to engage in such religious activities. Salmi, a Hindu girl from Bali and member of KMHD, adds to that by explaining that as a minority in a new city, Yogyakarta, she didn’t have anyone that understood her but her family.[123] Because the religious community has the same faith and perceptions as her, they became her family.[124] So although group identity is of particular

[121] Based on fieldnotes, 27-02-2019
[122] Amri, interview, 14-03-2019
[123] Salmi, interview, 24-03-2019
[124] This adds to Phinney’s (2000) argument that group identity is of particular importance among members of minority groups within a multicultural society.

importance for minorities, these religious communities are more than just a group, they function as their family away from home.[125] But as religion is not perceived by many as an important identification, other identificatory aspects like ethnicity, or rather the acculturation of religious and ethnic values play a more decisive role in community forming.

Eriksen (2002) explains that a community, often understood as ethnic group, can be based on shared language, religion or origin. It is therefore no surprise that it is not just religious values that lead to this sense of belonging. Salmi said:

> "Things that make us go together is that we are doing the same prayers and eat pork [lowers voice], just because we are the same we feel like we are family. The same in the way we are praying, sharing, talking, especially in Bali. The KMHD member that come from Bali speak the Balinese language and it feels like if you can speak Balinese language it is like 'oh my God I am home'".[126]

So apart from religious values, ethnic values like, common past, eating habits and language, make for a sense of inclusivity and belonging and can work as a tool for unification. But although Hindu student Tika confirmed she experiences more connection with people who share the same kinds of habits and characteristics, she too experienced how ethnicity can be a tool for exclusivity.[127] She was born and raised in West-Borneo with a Balinese Hindu father and a Christian Borneo mother. Because her mother converted to Hinduism when she married her father, Tika got a Balinese name and was taught the Hindu traditions. But as there were no Hindu temples in her surrounding her religious education was set in a more Christian environment. When she moved to Yogyakarta to continue her education she joined the Hindu community at her university but would soon find out that she was unable to participate in the ceremonies as they were done in Balinese. Language is thus, as Anderson (1983) describes, an important signifier of belonging to an ethnic group but can also work reversed and lead to a feeling of exclusion. Moreover, this example illustrates how the acculturation of religious and ethnic values have led to the use of 'Hindu' and 'Balinese' as interchangeable characteristics. This is not only true for Hindu and Balinese people but also for Buddhists students.

Although Buddhist student Ning explains that 'religion and ethnicity is not the same' and many Buddhist and Hindu students acknowledge that to be Hindu doesn't necessarily mean you

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[125] Dewi, interview, 28-02-2019: "Yes it is my family! Because we come here, almost 99% of us have family in other parts in Indonesia so we have nobody here. We call it Kamadhis, we are kamadhis and we feel like it is my family". Kamadhis means family in Bahasa Indonesia.

[126] Salmi, interview, 24-03-2019

[127] Tika, interview, 05-03-2019

are Balinese or to be Buddhist doesn't mean you are Chinese, these concepts have become so closely tied that in practice it is often almost impossible to really separate them from each other. [128]/[129] For example, most Chinese people are either Buddhist, Konghucu (Confucianist) or Christian and the majority of Buddhist at KMB come from Sumatra as that is where most Chinese people in Indonesia are from. The same applies to KMHD where the majority of members are from Bali.

The positioning of ethno-religious minority students in a multi-ethnic city

Because Yogyakarta has been generally described as a tolerant city, its citizens and the students of UGM have to deal with this diversity and are faced with cultural exchanges on a daily basis. But although I found that minority and majority students do live among each other, as this is inevitable, they do not live *with* each other. Religion is a topic that is perceived as something that is better left undiscussed as it can lead to what is understood as unnecessary discussions. The following anecdote is an example of such an what is called 'awkward situation';

> "I was in a situation where there was some music playing randomly of a playlist. Symphony from Clean Bandit was on and the video is about two guys that have a relationship, they have a different sexuality than us, they are gay. I was totally fine, listening to it and doing my work when suddenly he [Muslim friend] was like 'I liked this song until I knew that the video is about two guys that are having a relationship'. I was shocked that he was talking like that. So I said to him 'I think it doesn't matter if those people are gay, lesbian or straight, they only have different culture, if you don't like it that is okay but there is nothing wrong with it'. He suddenly shut up at that moment and I was awkward too but that was it…it was suddenly awkward"[130]

To avoid such conflicts, minority-majority relations are based on more trivial things like going to the mall or the movies where religious based differences can be easily avoided. Because as Dewi, former head of KMB, explains 'we can't ask them to go eat pork with us but in this way we can

[128] Amri, interview, 14-03-2019; "All the people are connected because they are Hindu, it is not because they are Balinese or Javanese or something or any kinds of ethnics. If you are Hindu so you are connected by that kind of community".
[129] Ning, interview, 18-02-2019
[130] Amri, interview, 14-03-2019

also have fun'.[131] Just like Dewi, many religious minorities do not describe any difficulties in interacting with people from other religions or ethnicities but rather an incompatibility of values. This reflects on campus too, where according to Amri, religion remains undiscussed. "If we want to talk about it, we talk about it with the people that have the same religion as us".[132] Ethno-religious minority students thus discuss certain topics with their 'own people', which reflects in, but is also maintained by the formation of somewhat exclusive religious student organisations or communities like KMB and KMHD. This idea of 'own people' attributes to exclusive character of these student organisations, or families. So tolerance in Yogyakarta takes the shape of acceptance, instead of understanding of ethno-religious values. Still, it is the co-existence of different ideas, and the perception that these ideas can be discussed that what according to Ning, makes Yogyakarta tolerant. 133 He said that "as a Buddhist I don't feel small".[134]

But while Ning and Seyoung, current head of KMB, see Yogyakarta as a tolerant city, many would argue otherwise. 135 Since the age of intolerance, which became evident in Chapter 3, intolerance became normalised in Indonesian politics and consequentially society. This too reflects on the city of Yogyakarta and experiences of cultural exchanges by minority students. Tika, for example told me she sometimes get scared as she feels that since two years 'the situation is getting hotter' by which she refers to rumours of the 212 movement being present in Yogyakarta.[136] Many with her agree that Yogyakarta has become more intolerant and even Ning agrees that recently some lines have been crossed. When I asked what crossing a line means to him he told me a story about how a Buddhist woman was thrown in jail because she complained about the noise of the Adhan.[137] Apart from this particular story there are many other cases of intolerance and majority preferences. Underlying these cases and the normalisation of intolerance is a sense of in-group identity which was strengthened by the conservative turn (Hamid 2018). But although many minority students indicate that they can be friends with majority students as long as religious topics are being avoided they also feel that intolerance is something problematic that

131 Dewi, interview, 28-02-2019
132 Amri, interview, 21-03-2019
133 Acceptance is in fact inherently to the definition of tolerance, opposed to understanding.
134 Ning, informal conversation, 11-02-2019
135 But, his perception of Yogyakarta as a tolerant place, which is shared by Seyoung, might have to do with the fact that they are both from Medan, a city in Sumatra which is characterised as particularly intolerant towards ethno-religious minorities. Seyoung, interview, 03-02-2019
136 Tika, interview, 05-03-2019
137 Apriadi Gunawan. 2019. "BREAKING: Buddhist woman imprisoned for complaining about mosque's speaker." *The Jakarta Post* website, August 21. Accessed on June 6, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/08/21/breaking-buddhist-woman-imprisoned-for-complaining-about-mosques-speaker.html.

should be solved. According to the students I spoke with, his solution lies, paradoxically, in cultural exchanges.

> "If they have encountered and experienced people with other religions, than they will have tolerance but if they live very comfortable in a situation where everybody is from the same religion and it is the majority religion than she or he might not have tolerance"[138]

This is in line with Oliver and Marwell (1988) who explain that values and goals are adapted by being in a certain environment which therefore has great influence.[139] Most of the students I met feel they *have* to be tolerant because as Salmi explains 'the Muslims sometimes have a strong standing about their religion and faith and because we are the minority and have a less amount, we have to understand this'.[140] Some blame a homogenous Muslim environment for intolerance, others say it is about its followers or a lack of religious understanding.[141] Keeping these elements, a heterogenous religious environment and religious understanding, in mind, a place of particular tolerance should be the university. This has been supported by Tika who found that people who went to university are more understanding about other preferences opposed to people who didn't whom according to her 'really strictly belief in their religion'.[142]

Anticipation of risk in political engagement

Joining an organisation or community is an important manifestation of student identity.[143] For example because as Buddhist student Yulia explains 'organisation skills are something you can't learn in the classroom or as we have seen before, for a sense of community.[144] But while many Muslim students, opposed to minority students, unite in an organisation because of a politicised (religious) ideology as seen in Chapter 4, Hindu and Buddhist students rather stay away from campus politics or strong religious beliefs as these have proven to be sensitive topics. Instead, they unite for a sense of family and community in organisations like KMB and KMHD.

[138] Tika, interview, 05-03-2019
[139] On a more critical note, according to the latter quote, and many other observations, it seems that although intolerance is being blamed on a religious homogenous environment this only applies to the religious majority i.e. Muslims. Because almost all Hindu students come from Bali where Hinduism is the majority religion, many Chinese Buddhists went to Chinese high schools and even now, many minorities tend to cluster in religious communities.
[140] Salmi, interview, 24-03-2019
[141] Seyoung, interview, 01-03-2019
[142] Tika, interview, 05-03-2019
[143] Ning, interview, 18-02-2019
[144] Yulia, interview, 13-03-2019

Of minorities in Indonesia, only Christians engage and join in political students organisations. They do so, as was shortly described in Chapter 3 under the ideology of nationalism which is being propagated by GMNI, an extra-campus student organisation. Gotong Royong is the on-campus organisation related to GMNI. Not only does this organisation have a Christian leader, Johan, they also put forward last Christian BEM president, Boaz. According to Boaz, his presidency was experienced as a welcome alternation and led to many new diverse members of BEM: ethnically, religiously and in terms of class.[145] This proves there is no lack of willingness to engage in campus politics from a religious minority perspective. What did keep students from engaging can be described as fear or a calculation of the risks.[146]

Many (minority) students feel that as a student, you have to be political or ideological because after graduating, they feel you will only be able to think about work .[147] But, although many students feel that people with a university degree are more ideological they do not consider themselves engaged in politics.[148] This has to do with the little (experienced) facilitation for minorities to be involved in politics, but also with their high standards of what it means to be politically engaged.[149] For Ning, being engaged in politics means being open to 'the public' about your political beliefs.[150] Indah adds to that by saying;

> "Politics in Indonesia it is not only a personal matter, the term politic is…it involves the life of many people. In Indonesia we depend on politics to survive. There are a lot of critical issues that need to be addressed that involves the life of many people. So I think to be engaged in politics you have to try to make certain impacts for other people".[151]

Even Johan, who meets the terms of political engagement as formulated by McIntosh and Youniss (2010) by spreading his ideology as the leader of Gotong Royong still doesn't see himself as someone engaged in politics.[152] Like in the last quote, their actions have to have impact, are often related to a(n) (established) political party or organisation and involves

[145] Previous to Boaz, BEM was ruled by a member of what is described as a conservative Muslim organisation named KAMMI.
[146] Boaz described that people felt safer to join BEM when he was president opposed to it was ruled by BEM. Boaz, interview, 07-04-2019
[147] Seyoung, interview 02-03-2019. Ning, interview, 18-02. Gunadi, interview, 09-02-2019
[148] Tika, interview, 05-03-2019, Gunadi, interview 21-02-2019
[149] According to Flanagan (2003) by participating in local organisations and institutions youth will develop social theories that match the goals, practices and values formulated by these organisations. Minorities are not legally prohibited to join certain organisation but do not feel safe enough to do so.
[150] Ning, interview, 27-02-2019
[151] Indah, interview, 20-02-2019
[152] Johan, interview, 09-04-2019

taking a personal risk by taking a political stance or taking part in demonstrations.[153] In this last characteristic of political engagement lies an important reason for ethno-religious minority students to *not* engage in politics or to consider themselves engaged. Demonstrating or protesting, which is often done by BEM UGM (chapter 2) is seen as one of the most characteristic manifestation of political engagement.

Demonstrating is public, collaborative, conflictive, voluntary, often has (direct) impact and involves taking a risk.[154] In the eyes of students this tool for political participation has obtained an increasingly negative reputation. Gunadi, who can be considered a semangka Muslim, sees demonstrating as a waste of energy. Amri feels it will lead to antipathy as you are bothering people by occupying the road and Seyoung notes that demonstrations often don't represent the 'real' issue.[155] But as we are talking about ethno-religious minorities here, political engagement but demonstrating specifically means an additional dimension of risk. Seyoung, for instance, is afraid that people won't bother helping him if he gets hurt because he is Chinese.[156] But as the Muslim majority is dominant in both national and campus politics, not only risk but under-representation also contributes to their lack of engagement.

While continued under-representation in political institutions contributes to lower levels of political engagement among (ethnic) minorities (O'Toole & Gale, 2013), a recurring sentiment is that this is 'logical' because they only make up a small percentage.[157] However, as minorities experience grievances under the age of intolerance (Chapter 3), according to Lussier and Fish (2012) they *should* (theoretically) engage. However crucial to this is the idea their engagement can make a change which, given political scepticism, might not be evident. Tika's boyfriend who unexpectedly joined our interview explained that;

> "I think it is about the system because the people don't have the base to gain the power they need. The young people who actively want to change the political stance, it is hard for them to be politicians because the system is corrupt. That I think that is the major problem"[158]

[153] Indah, interview, 14-02-2019, Salmi, interview, 12-04-2019
[154] Conflictive because you are protesting *against* something.
[155] Seyoung, interview, 06-03-2019. Amri, interview, 21-03-2019. Gunadi, interview, 21-02-2019
[156] Seyoung, interview, 06-03-2019
[157] Yulia, interview, 13-03-2019
[158] Tika, interview, 05-03-2019

The experience of being led by a corrupt system, or as declared by Amri by people who only want to better themselves or their own community, is for many students a reason to distrust (national) politics. Besides that, risk too is recurring as a reason to stay away from politics because as Yulia explains "most Buddhist people are like… they better not deal with politics because getting into politics means getting into trouble eventually. If you can stay away from it better stay away".[159] So although Asad (et. Al 2006) argues that political knowledge leads to political engagement, I found that in the case of the minority students that I have met, the opposite is true. Instead, political knowledge is discouraging students as it intertwined with cases of corruption and intolerant outings. And while these issues are perceived as problems, a common sentiment is, especially in the improvement of minority rights, that now is not the time to solve these things as the religious political climate is not supportive of such change.

So, although ethno-religious minorities are characterised in terms of religion, ethno-religious values, are what matters in the lives of minority students. They are important because it is in these shared values where they find a sense of belonging manifested in the communities that are KMHD and KMB. These communities or families are of great meaning to these students as this is an environment wherein they can discuss 'sensitive' topics like religion. This is a topic they feel can't be discussed with the majority as they experience incompatibility of ethno-religious values, enhanced by the age of intolerance. I therefore argue that these two populations live side by side and among each other but not *with* each other. This dynamic also reflects on political engagement; ethno-religious minorities socialise in their own community and do not engage in (campus) politics. This lack of political engagement has to do with the high standard of what it means to be politically engaged but also with an aspect of this definition; a dimension of risk. This risk is particularly high for minorities and is therefore avoided. But although they do not engage in campus politics, they do practice their citizenship in a more individual context which is voting.

[159] Yulia, interview, 13-03-2019

Chapter 6

Of ‘*Cebongs’* and ‘*Kamprets’*: sameness and difference in voting behaviour

Tessa

When I asked Freddy if he engaged in politics, he told me that he does do political activities in PMII, but he is hesitant to engage in practical politics.[160] He explained that practical politics, that of parties, legislatives, governors and presidents, in Indonesia are ‘corrupt’: dominated by the rich; purely for self-benefit. He shares this view with many other students, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Muslims concern themselves almost exclusively with campus politics, and the ones that engage outside of campus confines do so outside of the ‘practical’ political realm which are ridden with issues that students so vehemently oppose. Be it increase of intolerance – a trend identified within the dominant national narrative of the contestation of diversity – or the monopoly the Jokowi administration has on this narrative. In this last chapter, we aim to find out how this dominant national narrative relates to the only form of political engagement on the national level that most students *do* plan to engage in: voting in the 2019 presidential elections.

First, we will discuss the strategy of track records that students use to come to a voting decision, showing that the information they get out of these strategies can have discouraging effects. Then, we will examine how students still find reasons to vote out of a sense of duty that come from a variety of standpoints and ideological considerations, to finally argue that these motivations, mediated by a fear of polarisation and hoaxes, testify to a continued tension between students in the realm of national politics, avoided through individualistic approaches.

Same strategies, same sentiments: on track records and ‘going Golput’ *Tessa*

On the use of Islamic rhetoric and rituals by presidential candidates Jokowi and Prabowo, professor Zainal Abidin Bagir rather pessimistically had to say that “religion doesn’t sell except when you have nothing else to sell.”[161] Looking at the students, his statement seems to bear

[160] Freddy, interview, 01-03-19.
[161] Zainal Abidin Bagir, shared fieldnotes, 20-02-19.

scrutiny, because they find that candidates are extremely unclear on what they 'sell'; their goals, plans and values. Especially Indah has been very outspoken in this, saying that:

> "Indonesian political campaigns are very normative and I think most people will find it very boring because every year they will give the same approach. We have been through this, flags and pictures of candidates, we have been doing this forever after the reformation. It never changed and only a small hand full of politicians who is transparent and give goals."[162]

Khadija and Freddy similarly critiqued that, because Jokowi and Prabowo only ever spoke about what people wanted to hear, their programmes for Indonesia remain unknown.[163] Most students therefore resort to the same strategy of searching for the candidates' track records. These records are assembled bits of information on the political achievements, alliances, promises, work and (socioeconomic) background of the candidates. This information is not just 'given': students have to keep track of those themselves through mass and social media, even though students might take suchlike information with a grain of salt, as will be discussed below. Even so, the information does give students the ability to look beyond popular rhetoric and campaign strategies, and instead look at the candidates themselves.

In the eyes of the students, Jokowi and Prabowo are rather group prototypes (Huddy 2001) than charismatic leaders (Weber 1968), because their appeal lies not in the sense of personal trust or satisfaction that they evoke per se, but rather in what benefits their backgrounds embody. What seems influential are the personal benefits one could get from the candidates' victory. As one respondent in our election survey said: "I will vote for someone who thinks about me."[164] This relates to what is called rational voting, and as Mujani et al. (2018) discerned, this largely has to do with economic motivations, Freddy thinks that Jokowi is a good candidate because he achieved a lot in terms of economics. Dina likes Sandiaga Uno as Prabowo's vice-presidential candidate because he, as a businessman, could bring economic stability.[165] But while voting, in this sense, can indeed be understood as an investment in desirable but mostly pragmatic outcomes instead of ideological values (Abrams et. Al 2010), less and less Indonesians experience personal and direct benefits from voting (Liddle & Mujani 2007). And from this, another trend, named *Golput*, arose.

[162] Indah, interview, 14-02-19, p. 13.
[163] Khadija, interview, 21-02-19; Freddy, interview, 01-03-19.
[164] Respondent 27, online survey.
[165]Freddy, interview, 01-03-19; Dina, interview, 09-04-19.

Golput

Puck

Golput was a symbol of protest during the New Order regime and is an abbreviation of *golongan putih* (white group), meaning to refrain from voting. People who ‘go Golput’ are considered activists and are disappointed with Jokowi’s track records, either because of his choice for Ma’ruf or not following up on his promises to address human- and minority rights.[166] Many of the students agree with these sentiments, saying that Jokowi is generally seen as a good person, but that he did not keep his promises and that he is a puppet of PDI-P and its party leader Megawati Sukarnoputri.[167] Voters and people who ‘go’ Golput alike are also sceptic towards Prabowo’s track records because of his military background and role in the human rights violations during the New Order. He is said to spread hoaxes and not care about minorities, even though he positions himself as a Pancasilaist nationalist.[168] Golput see evil in both candidates’ track records and do not want to choose the lesser evil, thinking their vote cannot make a difference.[169] For Yudianto, going Golput does not mean he is not engaging in politics: for him it is about criticising the country and learning more about politics.[170]

As it is assumed that the more educated the more likely a person is to vote rationally (Mujani et. Al 2018) it seems logical that the trend of going Golput would be particularly evident among university students. But while many students are disillusioned by track records and hoaxes and thus agree with Golput sentiments, we found that *not* voting is often not seen as an option. Most of the students are eager to vote, mainly because they see it as their duty as an Indonesian citizen or, as Amri expresses it: ‘politics is also about you, it is something you can’t avoid’.[171] This sense of duty is experienced by both Muslim students and non-Muslim students alike, albeit interpreted differently, and this is where the ideological oppositions of the “sides” from the dominant national narrative realign with the motivations behind (electoral) political engagement.

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[166] Zainal Abidin Bagir, informal conversation, 20-02-2019; see also Endy Bayuni. 2019. “Which candidate? How about ‘none of the above’?” *The Jakarta Post* website, February 4. Last accessed June 5, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/02/04/which-candidate-how-about-none-of-the-above.html

[167] Nuning, informal conversation, 26-02-19; Freddy, interview, 01-03-19; Fatin, interview, 22-02-19; Budiono, group interview, 06-04-19; Dina, interview, 09-02-19.

[168] Indah, informal conversation, 07-02-19; Yudianto, interview, 22-02-19; Freddy, interview, 01-03-19; Budiono, group interview, 06-04-19; Johan, interview, 09-04-19.

[169] Indah, informal conversation, 07-02-2019

[170] This supports my argument from Chapter 5 that political knowledge in Indonesia has an opposite effect, instead of encouraging engagement (Asad et. al 2006) it leads to disengagement.

[171] Amri, interview, 21-03-2019

Other (ideological) motivations: different senses of duty

Muslim students *Tessa*

For Muslim students, non-pragmatic reasons to vote have to do with ideas on 'citizenship' and 'duty' and the different interpretations of how to 'contribute to your country' that were shown to be prevalent among Muslim students in Chapter 4. In other words, it is based on the nationalistic reasoning that voting for a specific candidate will benefit *all* people of Indonesia (as opposed to just the people with whom the students share an identity (Feddersen 2004)) For this, the students primarily look at the track records – specifically the affiliations – of the parties behind the presidential candidates which as Budiono said, will hold significant power in the government when either of them will be elected.[172] Dina's motivation to vote for Prabowo, for example, was inspired by the idea that Islam could bring stability and goodness to Indonesia, which was something that the supporting Islamic party of PKS could do after Prabowo got elected.[173] This idea is not surprising: PKS is affiliated with Ikhwanul Muslimeen and thus follows the value of *Syumuliyatul Islam* – the Islamic value by which members of KAMMI construct their nationalist political identity. What's more, Dina contrasted this use of Islam with that of Jokowi, which she found quite shallow. She specifically had to say about the candidacy of Ulama Ma'ruf Amin:

> "It is kind of a pity, for religion to be used in that way, because religion in a sense.. should not only be viewed or used in a political way. It should manifest in all parts of life. […] I think what's being misused or is missing in that sense is that holistic view of Islam. That Islam is not.. used for just its identity. It should be used for its.. what it could bring as a whole, for what it could contribute towards the nation. Like, what good does Islam if its only used for popularity."[174]

On the other "side", like in campus politics, Muslim students formulated their motivations to engage in terms of opposing their ideological counterparts and defending Indonesian diversity rather than having their ideology becoming the dominant one. PKS was thus the exact reason that these students planned to vote for Jokowi, because they associate the ideological affiliations of this party with intolerant pro-Khilafah sentiments.[175] Furthermore, with regard to the un-

[172] Budiono, group interview, 06-04-19.
[173] Dina, interview, 09-04-19.
[174] Dina, interview, 02-04-19.
[175] In relation to GMNI, even though Jokowi's party PDI-P is characterised as a nationalist party associated with Marhaenism and Pancasila, its politics are considered to be corrupt and revolving around patron-client relations,

Indonesianness of PKS-associated ideologies, Freddy's motivation to vote for Jokowi accentuates how it is thought that these ideologies would turn Indonesia in a nation resembling those of the Greater Middle East:

> "Maybe, I vote for Jokowi because the conservative side is on Prabowo's side. […] I don't want my country to be like Pakistan or.. you know, ISIS. I don't want my country to become like Syria or another country that has a conservative, strong conservative side."[176]

In this way , the opposition between Muslim students is also reified through their engagement in electoral politics and preferences for either Jokowi or Prabowo and PKS (and interestingly, never Gerindra, Prabowo's party).

Minority students *Puck*

But other than in campus politics, minority students now also take part in the debate, however silently, and the majority of them will vote for Jokowi. For them, it is rather about voting *against* one ideology instead of voting for the other. Yulia said:

> "I still consider the choice to not vote but if I think about the two candidates, they don't really match my expectations. I think those two are not good enough but I realise that if I am that idealistic…I cannot be that idealistic in this world so I will still vote"[177]

Later in our conversation Yulia explained that by saying she cannot be that idealistic, she meant not voting could mean Prabowo could be president which is something she wants to avoid at all costs. Interestingly, the ideology minority students oppose is not necessarily that of Khilafah, but Prabowo's perceived authoritarianism coming from his military background. They are afraid that Indonesia will become more authoritarian and that 'Prabowo will become a dictator'.[178] To avoid this, or even a repeat of the New Order, it is of particular importance, experienced as duty even, that they practice their rights as Indonesian citizens and go out to vote.[179] So compared to what has been found in chapter 4, similar to the majority, voting is experienced as a duty in terms of citizenship but with another incentive. In this way, voting behaviour still to a certain extent reifies the "sides" that were discerned in Chapter 3, with the addition of minority students who now *do*

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which is more important to GMNI members than their ideological similarities (Budiono, group interview, 06-04-19).

[176] Freddy, interview, 01-03-19, p. 12.

[177] Yulia, interview, 22-03-2019.

[178] Johan, interview, 09-04-2019.

[179] Ning, interview, 27-02-2019.

oppose the perceived pro-Khilafah side, albeit for different reasons, in their electoral engagement. This opposition, however, does have consequences for the attitude regarding electoral preferences, as even though both populations perform similar behaviour in this area of political engagement they remain rather secretive about their choices.

Manoeuvring political preferences: stigmas and hoaxes *Puck*

After I took a sip of my ice-coffee and put on my jacket because I got cold, Ning and I resumed our conversation about the presidential elections. Although the café was almost empty, Ning lowered his voice when he named his preference for the elections, Jokowi, out loud. Later in our conversation, after having whispered the incumbents name a number of times, he mentioned Jokowi had a lot of enemies because he promised the support minorities in the 2014 elections.[180]

During fieldwork we encountered such reserved behaviour surrounding the indication of electoral preferences many times. Seyoung for example, referred to Prabowo as 'the second candidate' or 'dua' instead of calling him by name.[181] And, even in our survey, which could be filled in anonymously, over one third of the respondents did not name their preference. This secrecy originates from, among other things, a principle named Luber Jurdil. This means that voting preference is something you have to keep a secret as political opinion is supposed to be an individual choice.[182] But although these students appear to follow this rule, stigma might contribute even heavier to the private character of political preference and voting. In the 2019 elections, there is a stigma surrounding certain voting decisions which has been accentuated since one of the candidates, Prabowo, has been characterised rather negatively. Because of this stigma, discussing political preference might 'lead to enemies' which is something most people want to avoid.[183] This is especially true for minorities because as Seyoung explains, who was taught by his family to be secretive about his choice:

[180] Ning, Informal conversation, 11-02-2019
[181] Seyoung, interview, 06-03-2019
[182] Salmi, interview, 12-04-2019, Khadija, interview, 27-02-19; "*politics is a don't ask don't tell subject*"
[183] Angga and Freddy, informal conversation, 03-02-2019; Ning, interview, 18-02-2019; "I think it is some kind of fear because when I and my friend is for Prabowo, and I am pro Jokowi it might interfere with our relationship"

> "If you speak it is just like you make unnecessary conflict. Like when I choose for the first or the second and then we argue, I think it is not important. It just makes unnecessary conflict".[184]

But also Dina, who does discusses it with her family, explains she does not discuss political preference with her friends as 'they might get scared'.[185] According to Fatin, polarisation in the 2019 elections has contributed to the fact that such outings might lead to conflict: "everything in the election is about *satu* or *dua,*[186] if you are criticising satu you are dua and vice versa."[187] *Cebong* and *Kampret* are also terms used to denominate Jokowi and Prabowo supporters respectively. Whereas 'Cebong' refers to the tadpoles Jokowi keeps in his presidential garden, 'Kampret' has a dual definition, meaning both 'small bat' or 'shucks'[188]. The terms are used mockingly and, according to Budiono, its use attests to the political fanaticism of either following.[189] Therefore, students rather keep whom they will vote to themselves as, according to Angga and Freddy, it seems like the supporters are at war with each other.[190] But instead of discussing these topics with each other they take to social media in which groups can create a secure environment for themselves and fight with those who do not share their perspective.[191]

Modern media have a large mediating role in citizen's motivation to engage in politics as they set discursive parameters around, for example, political debates during elections (Pickard 2017). But although social media is an important tool for getting up to date about political news or track records it can also lead to misinformation, or hoaxes, and thus have its downside. Because while it can add to image building and formulate messages to appeal to voters (Mujani et al. 2018) social media can also be used to discredit candidates as we have seen in Chapter 3.[192] According to the Jakarta Post, this even led to an electability drop for Jokowi in West Java.[193] But while Jokowi and Prabowo are *both* victim of hoaxes, at least according to themselves, Prabowo is often

[184] Seyoung, interview, 06-03-2019
[185] Dina, interview, 09-04-19.
[186] Satu is used to refer to Jokowi and dua to refer to Prabowo.
[187] Fatin, interview, 22-03-19, p. 9-10
[188] Johan and Nousha, interview, 21-03-19.
[189] Budiono, interview, 06-04-19.
[190] Angga and Freddy, informal conversation, 03-02-2019.
[191] Nuning, Informal conversation, 26-02-2019.
[192] Jokowi was accused of being Chinese and a Communist.
[193] News Desk. 2019. "Jokowi blames fake news for electability drop in West Java." *The Jakarta Post* website, March 2. Last accessed June 5, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/03/02/jokowi-blames-fake-news-for-electability-drop-in-west-java.html

accused by students of spreading them.[194] Although, according to most students, lower educated people are particularly sensitive for hoaxes, they too are careful in what to believe and what not to. Gunadi for example, explained that he rather keeps his information to himself as he is afraid it might be based on misinformation and Ning decides to stay away from social media and hoaxes leading up to the elections[195].

The mural reads "stop hoax; filter before sharing; be smart in choosing; control our fingers." The yellow posters refer to Golput, the election day of April 17th 2019 and money politics (photo: Puck Remeeus)

Tessa

Campus politics are full of tensions and so too, as we have seen in this last chapter, the electoral politics *all* students engage in. These tensions arise out of track records that point at relevant information to determine whom to vote for, or to decide not to vote at all. Most students *do* vote, however, and we have seen that Muslim students' contesting political identities, which are inspired by (Islamic) ideologies and are prominent in campus politics, are also relevant here, this time in

[194] Khadija, interview, 27-02-19. Also, News Desk. 2019. "Jokowi endorses 'Dilan', Prabowo says he's 'Batak of Java' in rollercoaster debate." *The Jakarta Post* website, March 31. Last accessed June 5, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/03/31/jokowi-endorses-dilan-prabowo-says-hes-batak-of-java-in-rollercoaster-debate.html
[195] Ning, Informal conversation, 11-02-2019; Gunadi, interview, 21-02-2019

their duty to vote. Whereas Prabowo is favoured because of his alliance with PKS by some, others vote for Jokowi *exactly* because of their opposition to this 'pro-Khilafah' party. Minority students, who in campus politics mostly refrained from participating, add a new dimension to this contestation as they said to vote out of a duty to their fellow minorities and to prevent Indonesia from falling back to authoritarianism.

Thus, the similarities and differences between Muslim and non-Muslim students point at two issues: one is that while minority students *are* faced with the contestation of diversity, in which Prabowo is also a perceived actor, the Pancasila vs. Khilafah narrative is still mainly reserved for Muslim students. This suggests that while both groups engage in electoral politics, their realms of understanding and engagement are still separate. Secondly and related to this, it seems that minorities specifically are more comfortable with this *individual* act of voting than with the organisational acts within campus politics which would perceivably entail a confrontation with individual risk and antipathy. This is especially notable in the way they, but also Muslim students, engage with electoral politics, namely through secrecy and media avoidance to keep away from the elections' polarised climate and stigmatising hoaxes.

Conclusion

It is just over two months after Indonesian general elections that we write this conclusion to our bachelor thesis, and in the meanwhile it has been announced that incumbent president Joko Widodo has won the popular vote with a secure 55.5 percent.[196] This result has not been accepted by everyone, and on the same day, losing candidate Prabowo Subianto promised to seek legal avenues to challenge the election outcome based on suspicions of polling irregularities and campaign violations committed by the Jokowi camp.[197] Protests led by Prabowo supporters soon followed and quickly turned into deadly riots that ultimately killed nine people. These post-election riots are now characterised by Indonesian media as the epitome of political polarisation which had been building up these past few years.[198]

Throughout the thesis, we have seen that polarisation around religion is an important aspect in how religious students perceive the national political climate in Indonesia. They link it to an increase of intolerance towards ethno-religious (and sexual) minorities and connect it to the simultaneous increase of specifically Islamic religiosity in an already 'pro-Islamic middle ground'. As a result, these trends affect how they perceive others, themselves, and their possibilities to politically engage. The denomination of these trends have roots in the multicultural framework of Pancasila: embedded in Pancasila is the dilemma of multiculturalism that Eriksen (2010) discerned, namely that its multiculturalism *has* to categorise Indonesian diversity in some form, doing so on the basis of religious identities. This led to the division of supposedly distinct religions into mutually exclusive and ascriptive group identities. Also within the Muslim majority identity, there are multiple ideological identities recognised that are associated with distinctive Islamic organisations.

[196] Ghina Ghaliya. 2019. "KPU names Jokowi winner of election." *The Jakarta Post* website, May 21. Last accessed on June 18, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/05/21/kpu-names-jokowi-winner-of-election.html

[197] Nurul Fitri Ramadhani. 2019. "Prabowo to challenge election results at Constitutional Court." The Jakarta Post website, May 21. Last accessed on June 18, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/05/21/prabowo-to-challenge-election-results-at-constitutional-court.html

[198] Suherdjoko, Hasani, Makur and Dipa. 2019. "Flag ceremony, calls for national unity mark Pancasila Day." *The Jakarta Post* website, June 2. Last accessed on June 18, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/06/02/flag-ceremony-calls-for-national-unity-mark-pancasila-day.html

The polarising implications of these ascriptions especially comes forward in how these ascriptions are fitted into the dominant national narrative of Pancasila vs. Khilafah which holds Indonesia's inherent religious diversity is threatened by 'pro-Khilafah' actors. Polarisation, following the narrative, takes place between the 'tolerant' and 'contextually oriented' 'pro-Pancasila' and the 'intolerant' and 'textually oriented' 'pro-Khilafah' actors. Muslim students' religious identities, too, are ascribed to these 'sides', creating mutually exclusive ideological identities and affiliated extra-campus organisations. Even though the goal of Pancasila's multiculturalism is to create a shared sense of nation-ness (Eriksen 2010) among Indonesia's different religious groups, the ascriptive character of the identities has led to the opposite - even giving way for 'pro-Pancasila' Muslim students to identify 'pro-Khilafah' groups as unnationalistic. In this sense, the dominant national narrative acts as an essentialising dominant discourse (Baumann 1996) on religious identity.

Theories on cultural citizenship point out that such ascriptive and essentialising dynamics of 'being made' (Ong 1996) are challenged by dynamics of 'self-making' (Rosaldo 1994). These debates are related to the positioning of minority groups toward a majority environment. The diverse character of Indonesia is maintained and derived from the existence of religious minorities, but the categorisation of citizen identities is done by the state through Pancasilaist multiculturalism, in line with Ong's (1996) definition of cultural citizenship. Yet, both minorities and majority students take in ambiguous positions within this debate, negotiating the dominant discourse on their politicised religious identities. Baumann (1996) calls these processes demotic discourses; students' own way of explaining their identity. But while the students do reject essentialist ascriptions in some ways, their negotiation cannot be entirely disconnected from the dominant discourses as there are also aspects of these identificatory classifications they do reify and internalise. The ascriptions described above are namely in many cases also self-ascriptions, especially in relation to 'opposing' identities. The nuances of negotiation, therefore, often lie in students' personal or group/organisational identification, while reification mostly takes place in relation to others.

For Muslim students, reification and negotiation of the dominant discourse is strongly related to their political engagement, and the connection between the two processes is very intricate as the Pancasila vs. Khilafah narrative is persistent in the oppositions between extra-campus organisations that compete for strategic leadership positions in the campus mosque and BEM UGM. This polarisation between the 'sides' on campus has led Muslim students on both 'sides' to adjust the *performances* of these identities, avoiding stigmatisation by refraining from enacting their ideological Muslim identities. Yet, paradoxically, it is in Muslim students'

ideological identities' interaction with the national and student identity that the polarising narrative of Pancasila vs. Khilafah is also contested. These identities together create a sense of duty to 'contribute to the country' In their duty, 'pro-Khilafah' students of KAMMI characterise their ideology, not as an unnationalistic threat to Pancasila, as one of many multiculturalist doctrines (Hall 2000), but as an alternative doctrine which through its goal of implementing Islamic values can contribute to Indonesia while still keeping Indonesian ethno-religious diversity intact.

Minorities, as it is for the sake of their assigned religious identity that they do *not* belong with the national or dominant population, use criteria for belonging that are more ethno-religious in character as the ethnic identity is in many cases more prominent in their self-identification than their religious one. Yet, they do form communities based on their religious background because it is in religiously-oriented organisations they can find others with which they experience a sense of belonging. While their identificatory background lead to community forming, ethno-religious minorities refrain from engaging in campus politics because of this identity. This means there is a differentiation in political engagement based on construction and positioning of identities. So while Pancasila has been at the forefront of the 2019 elections, especially as there is the Khilafah ideology to contest it, ethno-religious minorities are not actively involved or feel they are free to speak up. They are positioned as the subject to this polarisation which has led them to alter their performances of identity. Facilitation of political engagement alone, for them, proved to be insufficient because while all citizens enjoy equal facilitations, ethno-religious minorities are reluctant to engage in a majority environment.

So while Pancasilaist multiculturalism, for the Muslim majority, leads to polarisation and conflict in their political engagement on the basis of their ideological differences, ethno-religious minorities do not feel they have the right to openly express this difference. They rather refrain from national or campus politics, although Pancasila should acknowledge the right to be different. This is in contrast to the understanding of Pancasila which is inherently about diversity and can even be seen as a tool for equal recognition; an institutionalised concept by which citizens are categorised but also acknowledges the right to be different. According to Taylor (1992) such politics of recognition have been essential to democratic culture because the underlying premises of dignity of human beings is that everyone shares in it.

Yet, in voting in the presidential election all students practice their political agency on their own terms, but their motivations, based on citizenship and ideas of duty, are still defined in different ways. Some Muslim students vote for ideological values, which is for instance exemplified by the support of PKS for Prabowo. For other students, however, this support is a reason to vote for a less authoritarian and Islam-focussed side which is embodied by Jokowi.

Minority students especially see it as their duty to their fellow minorities to vote *against* Prabowo. They act on this sense of duty because contrary to being engaged in national or campus politics, voting provides a way to individually, critically and anonymously contribute to their country. So, although many students would say they vote because it is their duty as an Indonesian citizen, they, as students of the Gadjah Mada University, do so critically. In deciding whom to vote for they do not vote blindly for or against a certain ideology or candidate but make use of track-records about the candidates' background. As voting is something minorities do engage in, a form of political engagement that is thus facilitated for all Indonesians, it seems that a top down facilitation of particularised cultural citizenship on its own is not enough to motivate ethno-religious minorities to engage in other kinds of political engagement. In addition, when looking at the Golput trend (abstention voting), certain facilitation might not even be enough to motivate citizens to engage at all.[199]

In conclusion, how religious students construct their identity in relation to political engagement is not only a matter of their own agency: there are also (national) structuring forces at play that determine which identity of these students become politically consequential (Huddy 2001). In Indonesia, it is the classifying discourses on multiculturalism and citizenship that in this regard point to a complexity in the facilitation of diversity, shaped by an interplay of Pancasila and the actual trends of increased intolerance in the national political sphere. In the context of this interplay, religious diversity is on the one hand prioritised in politics but on the other hand also perceived to be stigmatised. As a result, Pancasila indeed (along the lines of the front page mural) remains a narrative rather than an achievement, and the construction of students' religious identity as a political identity is thus less unambiguous than Pancasila's explanation of religious diversity suggests.

For Muslim students, this not so much leads to disengagement but rather to a highly conflictive form of political engagement as oppositions are categorised on the basis of various ideological Muslim identities, politicised and dichotomised in the narrative that puts the 'tolerant' Pancasila on the opposite side of an 'intolerant' Khilafah. While some Muslim students do negotiate their 'intolerant' ascriptions, this dichotomisation remains influential in their relations with others. Minority students, on the other hand, rather refrain from national or campus politics but unite in more social communities in which they too are depending on religious ascriptions, while *ethno*-religious values are dominant in their individual identification. Here, the (in)famous

[199] People who go Golput out of activist considerations would argue instead that going Golput *is* a way of participating in politics.

structure vs. agency debate thus manifests in a tug of war between a reification and negotiation of religious ascriptions, and navigating this complexity of identity construction has led to a differentiated degree and manner of political engagement among majority and minority students. In voting in the presidential election, however, all students can practice their political agency on their own terms as they had the agency to individually, critically and anonymously help change their country, in their perception, for the better.

Recommendations

This research has focussed on the political engagement of Indonesian students, a topic discussed by more theorists for its conflictive and Islamic character. Yet, in our theoretical orientation we have found that broader research on student political engagement has mostly been focused on European and North-American contexts. While this research can be, of course, a basis for further research in 'non-western' contexts, the lack of research on other contexts have led for us - and we imagine for many other researchers - to an ethnocentric view of what political student engagement entails. It is thus necessary to expand research on this subject to non-European and non-North-American countries, ideally in the form of comparative research to understand what these movements share and what they differ in.

Our research, too, has been limited in representativity as our fieldwork took place within a timespan of three months at one specific university campus in Indonesia. The findings discussed in this thesis can thus not be unproblematically generalised to the entire Indonesian context, or beyond the archipelago for that matter. It has also been limited in what could be added to the discussion of political dynamics, such as the influence of gangs in Yogyakartan politics. We have not been able to include these gangs in our research, but they would provide a good starting point for further research on the intricacies of politics in Indonesia, especially because they were also described to deal with the political-religious polarisation the students identified. Another point of departure is the presidential election. We have described the aftermath of this election briefly at the beginning of this conclusion, but further research would help to enlighten how the trends of increased religiosity, intolerance and the Pancasila vs. Khilafah debate developed in Indonesia after months of great political-religious tension and polarisation.

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Appendix

Appendix A: characterisations of intra- and extra-campus organisations

The extra- and intra-campus organisations, both political and community-based, are characterised in different ways. Below are the dominant characterisations of the organisations from the students we spoke to, those that are political and Islamic in nature also related to the "sides" that are introduced in chapter 3. These characterisations does not necessarily reflect all of the students' opinions on the organisations, but do show the major trends. For the political organisations that participate in the BEM elections, their student parties are also indicated in the table below.

Islamic organisations

Student organisation	**Dominant characterisation**
HMI <u>Parties</u> Kampus Buro (Engineering) Partai Boulevard (Fisipol) Partai Sayang Mama (Law) Future Leaders Party	Muslim Students' Association. HMI is an Islamic organisation which can be divided into two sub-organisations, HMI Dipo and HMI MPO. HMI Dipo is commonly referred to as being on the GMNI side in terms of loose Islamic practice and political ideals (but not necessarily ideology). It is deemed on the pro-Pancasila side. HMI MPO is placed on the pro-Khilafah side with its closer connection to KAMMI and stricter Islamic practice. As HMI can be divided into two, it is commonly characterised as "in-between" the political oppositions of KAMMI and GMNI. Together with GMNI, it dominates the MPM council of UGM.
Jema'ah Shalahuddin	The Campus Missionary Institution. Jema'ah Shalahuddin is a broader internal campus organisation that acts as a representative of all Muslim students. It concerns itself with Islamic activities on campus, under which the Ramadhan and activities at the campus mosque, Maskam. It is not active

	in campus politics. Because of its more 'conservative' membership, it is put on the pro-Khilafah side.
KAMMI Parties Partai Bunderan	United Front of Indonesian Muslim University Students. KAMMI explicitly follows the Tarbiyah movement that is associated with Ikhwanul Muslimeen and PKS. It values *Syumuliyatul Islam* that says Islam should encompass all things in life, including economics and politics. It is therefore associated with the pro-Khilafah side, and its explicit focus on Islam in its politics makes it the opposition of GMNI. KAMMI is currently dominant in BEM UGM, with a member, Fatin, as its president.
KMNU	Nahdlatul Ulama Student Organisation. As the name suggests, community-based organisation KMNU associates with NU and its 'traditional' Islamic ideology of *Islam Nusantara* which is a mixture of Islamic and Javanese traditions. In this, its practices are different from standard Islamic belief and that of Tarbiyah. As NU values Pancasila, KMNU does too and therefore puts itself on the pro-Pancasila side of campus politics.
PMII	Movement of Indonesian Muslim Students. PMII is often regarded as KMNU's political counterpart, as it once too belonged to NU, and its membership overlaps with this organisation. PMII does still follow traditional Islam and is therefore pro-Pancasila. In recent years, it has not participated in BEM elections, but does participate in political activities.

Other organisations

Student organisation	Dominant characterisation
GMNI Parties Partai Gotong Royong	The Indonesian National Student Movement. GMNI is a political extra-campus student organisation characterised as nationalistic in focus as it is based on Marhaenist ideology and values Pancasilaist diversity. It is not Islamic in origin, but the majority of its members are Muslim, although many are non- or loosely practicing. It is the main opponent of KAMMI in campus politics because it thinks Islam should not be dominant in (campus) policies. In term of the "sides", it can be placed on the pro-Pancasila side. Together with HMI, it dominates the MPM council of UGM.
KMB	Religious student organisation at UGM. This Buddhist organisation is religious in character but offers more than just religious practices. It can be described as a social club in which mainly Chinese Buddhist unite but is open for other ethnicities too. Because they do not have a place to unite at the campus they do so at Vihara Karangdjati, a Buddhist temple. Because its members come from all over Indonesia, it serves as a community or family away from home. They are not involved in campus politics in any way.
KMHD	Religious student organisation at UGM. This Hindu organisation is religious in character but offers more than just religious practices. It can be described as a social club in which mainly Balinese Hindu's unite but is open for other ethnicities too. This organisation or community serves as a family away from home. They are not involved in campus politics in any way.

Appendix B: Rinkasan (summary)

Penelitian ini mengungkapkan pengaruh narasi dominan nasional terhadap kontestasi keragaman etnoreligius. Narasi ini menyebutkan bahwa nasionalisme Pancasila dan nilai-nilai toleransi, kemanusiaan, dan keadilan terancam oleh ideologi khilafah yang ingin membuat Indonesia menjadi kekhalifahan Islam. Namun demikian, bahkan tanpa kontestasi seperti ini pun, minoritas etnoreligius sudah menempati posisi terpinggirkan dalam kancah perpolitikan Indonesia, terkepung oleh kalangan menengah pro-Islam yang menguntungkan pandangan serta populasi Muslim dan ditandai dengan problematisasi bahkan stigmatisasi identitas minoritas ketika dikaitkan dengan pemimpin politik. Mahasiswa Muslim dan mahasiswa minoritas etnoreligius mengatakan bahwa mereka melihat adanya intoleransi yang meningkat terhadap minoritas etno-religius (dan minoritas seksual); sebuah trend yang mereka kaitkan dengan meningkatnya kereligiusan Islam pada khususnya yang terjadi secara terus-menerus. Mahasiswa Muslim pada umumnya memahami kereligiusan Islam intoleran ini dalam kaitannya terhadap narasi dominan yang membenturkan Pancasila dan khilafah, yaitu kontestasi keragaman melalui dua pihak dikotomi yang ada dalam populasi Muslim. Jika pihak pro-Pancasila dianggap sebagai pihak pro-keragaman, toleran, moderat, dan berorientasi pada konteks, maka pihak pro-khilafah dianggap sebagai pihak intoleran, konservatif Islam, radikal, dan berorientasi pada teks dalam hal interpretasi kitab suci dan nilai-nilai yang menyokong Muslim. Lebih lanjut, dalam karakterisasi ini, ideologi pro-khilafah dipandang sebagai sesuatu yang tidak nasionalis tepatnya karena ideologi tersebut terlihat tidak mementingkan dasar ontologis Indonesia tentang keragaman etnoreligius.

Karakterisasi ini juga muncul dalam konteks benturan perpolitikan kampus di Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) seperti yang dijelaskan dalam bab 4. Dalam politik ini, beberapa organisasi ekstra kampus berkompetisi untuk memperoleh posisi kepemimpinan strategis dalam masjid kampus dan BEM UGM (Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa) dan di sinilah ideologi, khususnya ideologi Muslim seperti Islam Nusantara dan Tarbiyah, menentukan apakah sebuah organisasi atau mahasiswa yang berafiliasi di dalamnya termasuk ke dalam satu pihak atau pihak lainnya. Dalam artian, kontestasi dalam politik kampus pada umumnya bersifat ideologis sehingga dapat diidentifikasi secara alamiah. Hal ini merupakan akibat dari pengaruh kuat dari bagaimana mahasiswa Muslim mempraktikkan identitas keagamaannya di kampus: di kedua pihak, ada rasa takut untuk mengamalkan ajaran agama tertentu yang mungkin bisa menimbulkan kontroversi, baik itu ajaran ideologi tertentu maupun ajaran Islam pada umumnya. Di satu sisi, narasi dominan

nasional, khususnya karakterisasi dikotominya, tidak hanya direifikasi tetapi juga dinegosiasi. Khususnya dari pihak pro-khilafah, ada perlawanan terhadap anggapan yang datang dari narasi Pancasila vs Khilafah yang menyatakan dirinya sebagai interpretasi KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia) dalam hal keterlibatan politiknya. Interpretasi ini tidak hanya mementingkan ideologi identitas Muslim yaitu Tarbiyah, tetapi juga persimpangan antara mahasiswa dan identitas nasional yang memberikan seluruh mahasiswa rasa tanggung jawab untuk berkontribusi untuk bangsa Indonesia. Di mata KAMMI, implementasi nilai-nilai Islam di Indonesia hanyalah seperti itu—berkontribusi untuk bangsa, termasuk kepada kelompok non-Muslim. Dalam kacamata tujuan yang terinspirasi Islam namun berorientasi nasional inilah KAMMI menganggap dirinya sebagai nasionalis; bukan radikal, anti-Pancasila, maupun tidak nasionalis seperti narasi yang ditularkan para pendukung Jokowi atau lawan KAMMI di kampus.

Jika minoritas etnoreligius ditentukan oleh negara dalam hal agama, nilai-nilai etnis pada kenyatannya lebih terbentuk dalam komunitas. Komunitas inilah, yang berdasar pada nilai-nilai etnoreligius, yang dianggap sebagai keluarga. Nilai-nilai etnis dan agama sangat berakulturasi. Namun demikian, penggabungan nilai-nilai ini ada batasannya. Sebagai contoh karena 'sebagai seorang keturunan Tiongkok, kamu beragama Buddha atau Kristen, tapi kamu bukan Muslim'. Komunitas ini merupakan bagian dari kepentingan tertentu bagi mahasiswa minoritas karena mereka dihadapkan pada lingkungan multi etnis dan agama yaitu Yogyakarta, maka interaksi dan hubungan dengan minoritas tidak dapat dihindari. Namun demikian, meskipun mereka hidup berdampingan, mereka tidak hidup bersama karena topik sensitif seperti nilai-nilai agama atau etnis sangat dihindari. Yogyakarta telah lama dianggap sebagai kota yang toleran, akan tetapi sentimen intoleransi terus meningkat. Menurut mahasiswa, intoleransi ini ada kaitannya dengan lingkungan homogen agama dan etnis.

Di kampus UGM, menjadi bagian dari organisasi mahasiswa merupakan bagian penting dalam identifikasi mahasiswa.[200] Jika bagi mahasiswa Muslim keanggotaan tersebut sering memiliki karakter politis atau ideologis, bagi mahasiswa minoritas hal tersebut bertujuan untuk memperoleh rasa memiliki terhadap komunitas tertentu. Hanya mahasiswa Kristen yang terlibat dalam politik yang menunjukkan bahwa tidak ada kurangnya kesediaan untuk terlibat, tetapi lebih ke ada hal lain yang menghalangi mereka. Banyak mahasiswa minoritas yang kemudian menganggap diri mereka tidak terlibat secara politik karena standar mereka yang tinggi tentang definisi terlibat, tetapi juga karena ada rasa takut dan perhitungan risiko jika mereka terlibat. Namun demikian, meskipun politik di Indonesia secara umum terlihat buruk dan rusak, baik

[200] UGM merefleksikan karakter (in)toleransi dan keragaman di Yogyakarta

mahasiswa mayoritas maupun minoritas merasa penting untuk terlibat dalam politik ini dengan cara menyalurkan hak pilih.

Banyak mahasiswa memanfaatkan track record karena seringkali program yang ditawarkan kandidat atau ideologi yang ditawarkan secara umum tidak diketahui. Dalam track record ini, mereka pada dasarnya lebih melihat kandidatnya dibandingkan identitas partainya. Di sinilah, Prabowo seringkali dideskripsikan dalam istilah negatif sedangkan Jokowi dilihat sebagai 'sosok yang baik'. Karena program mereka tidak diketahui, beberapa mahasiswa cenderung memilih secara rasional, sering kali berdasarkan pertimbangan nilai-nilai ekonomi. Namun demikian, nilai-nilai seperti kewarganegaraan dan tanggung jawab juga terlihat. Sebagai contoh dalam nilai-nilai keagamaan, yang dicontohkan melalui dukungan PKS terhadap Prabowo. Bagi yang lain, khususnya minoritas, hal ini menjadi alasan untuk memilih pihak yang lebih tidak otoriter yang dimiliki oleh Jokowi. Banyak mahasiswa minoritas melihatnya sebagai kewajiban mereka kepada sesama minoritas untuk tidak memilih Prabowo. Namun demikian, mereka merasa kecewa dengan lembaga pemilihan atau mengalami skeptisme politik yang disebarkan melalui berita bohong. Akan tetapi, karena aturan institusional dan stigma terhadap preferensi politik tertentu, kerahasiaan menyelimuti keputusan memilih. Preferensi yang berbeda bisa menyebabkan konflik yang disebabkan oleh polarisasi politik yang terlihat.

Kesimpulannya, mahasiswa minoritas dan mayoritas merupakan subyek dari konteks politik agama yang sama, yaitu Pancasila, Khilafah, dan narasi intoleransi, tetapi membangun dan menegosiasikan identitas mereka sejalan dengan keterlibatan politik dalam cara yang berbeda. Dalam kedua populasi, konstruksi dan negosiasi ini dipengaruhi oleh narasi dominan nasional yang menghasilkan ide dominan tentang apa yang mereka bisa atau tidak bisa lakukan tanpa distigmatisasi atas kepercayaan atau latar belakang agama dan/atau etnis. Di satu sisi, semua mahasiswa menggunakan hak pilihnya, dan begitu juga lembaga pemilihan, sebagai sarana untuk mengekspresikan keyakinan dan nilai-nilai yang berorientasi pada etnoreligius tanpa takut akan stigmatisasi semacam itu. Dalam hal ini ada hubungan resiprokal antara struktur politik nasional dan lembaga mahasiswa yang sejalan antara mahasiswa dengan narasi politik nasional hegemoni Indonesia, tetapi secara terus-menerus berusaha untuk mengubah negara mereka, dalam persepsi mereka, menjadi lebih baik.