

Fear Appeals: a Right-Wing Monopoly?
The Use of Fear Appeals in Reducing Conflict

Tamara te Winkel (4128532)

Utrecht University

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Supervisor: Bart de Vos

Second assessor: Anouk van der Weiden

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Abstract

The extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992) explains that fear appeals consist of two subsequent steps, where first threat is established and then efficacy is addressed. Another line of research shows that problems presented in the near future are perceived as more important (relevant) than problems in the distant future (Lewis & Oyserman, 2015). This study combined these lines of research to investigate if fear appeals can be used to reduce conflict, using the refugee crisis as a context. It was expected that more negative conflict intentions would be expressed when the threat was high compared to when the threat was of moderate strength. Furthermore, when a threat was high and relevant (i.e., in the near future), it would lead to most negative conflict intentions, but only when self-efficacy and / or response efficacy were low. Finally, it was expected that when both self-efficacy and response efficacy were high, a high relevant threat would lead to the strongest intentions to reduce conflict. These hypotheses were tested by a 2x2 design (high threat vs. moderate threat and in near future vs. in far future), using a fictitious article as the manipulation. Following, positive conflict intentions and negative conflict intentions were measured. Although efficacy did not show to have any effect on the results, it was shown that a relevant threat leads to less negative conflict intentions, which suggests that fear appeals can indeed be used to reduce conflict. The research of using fear appeals to reduce conflict is new and these results show that further research is necessary.

Keywords: fear appeals; time framing; conflict intentions; integrated threat theory; self-efficacy; response-efficacy; extended parallel process model

The use of fear appeals in reducing conflict

"The Netherlands needs to become ours again", if we may believe Geert Wilders, leader of the right-wing party Party for Freedom (in Dutch: PVV) (Election Programme PVV, 2017).

According to a recent video the PVV published on YouTube, Islam is, among other things, violence, terror, hatred of women, totalitarian, injustice, and deadly (PVVpers, 2018).

Furthermore, Wilders stated that the Quran is the Islamic version of Mein Kampf (Wilders, 2007).

This suggests that we should fear Islam. The threat of Islam is getting bigger as there has been a rise of asylum requests in the past few years (Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst, n.d.), due to the refugee crisis. Them, the refugees and their Islam, are coming to our country. This us/them distinction leaves room for conflict, and fueling the fear of Islam can therefore fuel the conflict between the Dutch and the refugees. The PVV states that, to help stop the threat of Islam, the Netherlands should close their borders to new refugees (Election Programme PVV, 2017). So, fear of Islam is the motivator for changing the behavior of the Dutch from welcoming refugees into rejecting them.

This way of motivating people is explained by fear appeals: persuasive messages that draw attention to the negative consequences that follow a particular course of action, and how negative consequences can be avoided with an alternate course of action (Witte, 1992). Indeed, the PVV uses fear appeals in a negative fashion: excluding people. Although fear appeals can be used in a negative way, fear appeals in themselves are not negative per se. For example, teachers use them by highlighting the negative consequences of educational failure, and by this, they encourage students to engage in actions that are likely to result in success (Putwain, 2009; Putwain & Roberts, 2012). Another example is the focus on promoting healthy behavior, like, for example, practicing safe sex and self-examination for breast- and testicular cancer (Ruiter, Abraham, & Kok, 2001; Ruiter, Kessels, Peters, & Kok, 2014). Besides this, it is communicated that CO₂ emissions by driving a car strengthens the greenhouse effect, and the solution is traveling by public transport (MilieuCentraal, 2018).

These examples show that fear appeals can be powerful motivators that can promote

positive behavior as well. In a social context, fear appeals are often used to escalate a conflict. Therefore, in order to de-escalate the conflict between the refugees (them) and natives (us), and to contrast the use of fear appeals to escalate the conflict, this study sets out to examine if the powerful fear appeals can be used to reduce conflict as well.

Groups in conflict

Belonging to a group, being part of an 'us', is an important source to shape one's own identity, as stated by the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Consequently, because one wants to feel good about one-self, this group will be perceived as better than other groups (i.e., outgroups, or 'them'). Moreover, social categorization of people into 'us' and 'them' stimulates perceiving or achieving a sense of positive group distinctiveness.

This also implies that there can be conflicts between groups. A conflict between 'us' and 'them' can be partly explained by the symbolic racism theory (McConahay & Hough, 1976; Kinder & Sears, 1981). This theory includes threats that arise from a conflict in values, norms and beliefs between groups. In their paper, Kinder and Sears (1981) use White Americans and Black Americans as an example. Whites feel resistance to change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings that Blacks violate traditional American values, like individualism and self-reliance, work ethic, obedience, and discipline. These perceived conflicting values, in turn, lead to negative attitudes.

Another explanation of how conflict arises is given by the realistic group conflict theory (RGCT; Campbell, 1965). The RGCT states that conflict arises from competition over limited resources, which means that potential success of one group threatens the well-being of the other group, resulting in negative outgroup attitudes (Sherif & Sherif, 1965). This competition can be real or perceived, and can hold material (e.g., money or land) or symbolic (e.g., status or esteem) resources (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998; Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). Esses, Dovidio, Jackson and Armstrong (2001) used the RGCT to explain bias towards immigrant groups. They found that the perception that immigrant gains leads to resident group losses, for example, by 'stealing' jobs, resulted in negative attitudes toward immigration and immigrants.

Whereas these theories were first seen as mutually exclusive, the integrated threat theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 1996; 2000) aimed to combine these theories into one, more complete, theory. ITT addresses four distinct threats: symbolic threat, realistic threat, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes. Within ITT, symbolic threat is similar to the threats described by symbolic racism theory, whereas realistic threat is similar to the threats described by RGCT. Furthermore, intergroup anxiety holds feelings of awkwardness and uneasiness in the presence of outgroup members because of uncertainty about how to behave towards them, which makes interactions with outgroups seem threatening (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Finally, negative stereotypes generate threat by creating negative expectations concerning the behavior of outgroup members (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006).

These threats, in turn, lead to emotional reactions. Those emotions are likely to have a negative valence, and include contempt and disgust (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), vulnerability (MacLeod & Hagan, 1992) and fear, anxiety, anger, and resentment (Renfro, Duran, Stephan, & Clason, 2006; Davis & Stephan, 2011).

Fear appeals

Negatively valenced emotions can have serious consequences. Anger, for example, can lead to aggression (Berkowitz, 1993), and hatred can lead to the rejection of a person or a group in a generalized and totalistic fashion (Ben-Ze'ev, 1992). Fear was already linked to flight behavior by Cannon (1929), but Spanovic, Lickel, Denson and Petrovic (2010) also found that fear, just as anger, can lead to aggression in intergroup conflict.

Behaviors as a consequence of fear can be divided in two broad categories, namely avoidance behaviors and protective behaviors (Warr, 1994). Avoidance behaviors are those actions “taken to decrease exposure to crime by removing oneself from or increasing the distance from situations in which the risk of criminal victimization is believed to be high” (DuBow, McCabe, & Kaplan, 1979, p. 31). Reducing risk through avoidance behavior is not always possible. Where avoidance is not an option, people may engage in protective behaviors. Protective behaviors can be seen as strategies designed to reduce the risk of situations getting worse.

Fear can be expressed to induce these behaviors on purpose. The usage of fear to motivate people to change their behavior is described by fear appeals: persuasive messages that draw attention to the negative consequences that follow a particular course of action, and how negative consequences can be avoided with an alternate course of action (Witte, 1992). Among others, fear appeals are used to promote studying hard (Putwain, 2009; Putwain & Roberts, 2012), showing healthy behavior (e.g. Ruiter, Abraham, & Kok, 2001; Ruiter, Kessels, Peters, & Kok, 2014) and using public transport instead of cars (MilieuCentraal, 2018).

Fear appeals consist of two steps, namely perceived threat and perceived efficacy (Rogers, 1975, 1983). According to the extended parallel process model (EPPM; Witte, 1992), the first step is the perceived threat. Witte (1992) states that perceived threat comprises two dimensions: perceived susceptibility to the threat and perceived severity of the threat. When both of these dimensions are high, in other words, when the threat is relevant, the second step will follow. If this is not the case, it is a low perceived threat, and this will lead to ignoring the threat. The second step, the perceived efficacy, comprises perceived self-efficacy (the perceived ability to act; Rogers, 1975) and perceived response efficacy (the perceived effectiveness of the solution; Rogers, 1975).

Relevance. A threat needs to be relevant in order for the target to pursue to the second step. Relevance of the threat thus appears to be important for the threat to have any impact on the target's behavior. One important instrument of relevance is how far away in time the outcome is. That is to say, the further away the problem, the less relevant it is. Subsequently, behavior in the present can have serious consequences for people's future-self, as people fail to engage in preventive health behaviors (Sirois, 2004), fail to invest enough time studying for school (Oyserman, 2015) and fail to save enough money for retirement (Munnell, Webb, & Golub-Sass, 2007).

Although there are multiple reasons in play why people do not act in the way it is best for them in the future, Lewis and Oyserman (2015) focused on the psychological explanation. They showed that when people think about how many days they have to save money, they

will save more than when they think how many months or years they have. They explain this finding by stating that it is not the importance of the problem that causes the behavior, it is the way in which the future is presented that leads to take action. When a problem is described as near rather than far away in time, there is more relevance to act on it.

Self-efficacy and response-efficacy. When the threat is indeed seen as relevant, step two of the EPPM (Witte, 1992) will follow. The second step regards the perceived efficacy, and it is divided in response-efficacy (perceived effectiveness of the recommended response; Rogers, 1975) and self-efficacy (perceived ability to perform the recommended response; Rogers, 1975). There are two different outcomes. When one or both of the perceived self-efficacy or perceived response efficacy is low, people will focus on losing the fear instead of losing the danger, which will lead to defensive avoidance or reactance. Therefore, fear control responses, that focus on losing the fear, are often seen as maladaptive responses (Witte, 1996). Witte (1992) describes defensive avoidance as “a motivated resistance to the message, such as denial or minimization of the threat”, based on the work of Hovland, Janis, and Kelly (1953). As Witte (1996) states, individuals may avoid a message by being inattentive to the communication (for example, by skipping through a magazine on HIV/AIDS to avoid having to think about it), or suppress any thoughts about the threat over the long term. Changing the subject of conversation to a less disturbing one can also be seen as defensive avoidance behavior (Janis & Feshbach, 1953).

Another example of losing fear instead of losing danger is reactance. In her paper, Witte (1992) cites Brehm (1966, p. 94) to explain reactance: it occurs when perceived freedom is reduced and an individual believes “that the communicator is trying to make him [or her] change”. The given example of reactance is a person smoking even more after confronted with the fear appeal, to show they cannot manipulate him.

The outcome that is desired by the use of fear appeals is controlling the danger, and this will only be achieved when both dimensions in both steps are high. So, for example, one has to perceive lung cancer as a severe threat for himself (perceived severity and susceptibility), believe quitting smoking will prevent lung cancer (perceived response-

efficacy) and believe he is able to quit smoking (perceived self-efficacy), in order to actually quit smoking.

The present study

Based on the EPPM (Witte, 1992) and its components, and combining this with time framing effects, this leads to the expectation that when a problem is in the future, it is considered less relevant and thus will be ignored sooner. Furthermore, when a person does not believe he can do it or does not believe the given solution will work, he will turn to defensive avoidance or reactance. In conflict situations, ignoring the conflict, defensive avoidance and reactance can all be seen as negative conflict intentions. This study will build on this regarding the refugee crisis.

The refugee crisis holds the high amount of people fleeing from their home, starting in 2012 and peaking in 2014 (UNHCR, 2016). People are trying to get into Europe, in an unorganized manner, and are arriving on islands that are not able to provide shelter to that number of refugees. European countries were not prepared for such a rise (NRC, 2015).

The crisis fuels a conflict in Europe. Fear of the Islamic refugees leads people to harass Muslims. One example of the harassment of Muslims comes from the action committee Identitarian Opposition, where two men put up a banner on an Islamic school: "He who sows Islam, reaps Sharia" (De Volkskrant, 2017). On the website of this committee, they state: "we resist the decline of our culture, norms and values" (idverzet.org, 2018).

Therefore, means must be found on how to de-escalate the conflict. To my knowledge, no study focused on using fear appeals as a means to reduce a conflict. As fear appeals have shown to be useful in escalating a conflict, it may be possible that the powerful fear appeals can be used to reduce a conflict as well.

To investigate this, I conducted an online experiment where participants read a fictitious article about the refugee crisis in the Netherlands in which the amount of threat and time relevance were manipulated, and where self-efficacy and conflict intentions were measured. In this study, self-efficacy means that one believes one is able to actually improve the situation of the refugees. Also, as a behavioral measure, I asked if the participant wanted

information about how to help. The threat I used was a realistic threat, which means that the gains of the other group would lead to a loss of their own group (based on the ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 1996; 2000).

First, I expect more negative conflict intentions when the threat is high compared to when the threat is of moderate strength. Furthermore, I expect that when a threat is high and relevant (i.e., it is in the near future), it will lead to mostly negative conflict intentions, but only when self-efficacy and / or response efficacy are low. Finally, I expect that when both self-efficacy and response efficacy are high, a high relevant threat will lead to the least negative conflict intentions.

Method

Participants and design

Dutch speaking adults between the ages of 18 to 74 participated in the study ($N = 371$). There were 230 completed surveys. After excluding participants ($n = 16$) based on reaction time (under 200 seconds and over 2,700 seconds), the final sample consisted of 214 participants. The sample was diverse in age with an average of 33.50 ($SD = 15.40$), gender (72.4% female, 27.6% male), education (14.5% low, 41.6% middle, 43.9% high) and voting behavior (1.4% extreme left, 41.1% left, 37.4% middle, 19.6% right, 0.5% extreme right). The experiment was executed online, using Qualtrics, through a convenience sample (see Appendix A for information on how I obtained the participants). This study consisted of four conditions in a 2 (threat: moderate vs. high) x 2 (time: near future vs. distant future) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions using a double-blind procedure, resulting in cells ranging from 46 to 59.

Procedure

After accepting the informed consent, the participants were instructed to carefully read an article about the refugee crisis and its effect on the Dutch economy, as they would be required to answer a series of questions about it. This article was manipulated based on time and threat. After reading one of the four fictitious articles (the four conditions), participants were asked to respond to several questions and statements regarding the text. After the

questionnaire, they were asked questions about their demographic variables. Following, they were asked if they understood the aim of the research, if they answered the questions honestly and if they thought the manipulation text was reliable. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

The respondents were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions (near moderate, near threat, distant moderate and distant threat). Threat was manipulated by the accentuation of horrible consequences. For example, in the moderate conditions, participants read “this will result in a shortage on the housing market”, and in the threat condition this was accompanied by “fatal for young people”.

Temporal relevance was manipulated by telling participants that the consequences of refugee crisis would either immediately (near condition) or in the more distant future (distant condition) start. The complete manipulation texts can be found in Appendix B.

Questionnaire

In the questionnaires following the manipulation, participants were asked to respond to several questions and statements regarding the text. These blocks consisted of, respectively, the emotions the moment after reading the article, their conflict intentions (based on Horney in 1945 and the adaptation of de Vos, van Zomeren, Gordijn, & Postmes, 2013), their idea of the relevance of the refugee crisis, their self-efficacy (based on the GSE-6 of Romppel, Herrmann-Lingen, Wachter, Edelmann, Dungen, Pieske, & Grandethe, 2013), a manipulation check for time and threat and, as a behavioral measure, whether they want to receive information about what they can do to help after the study.

Conflict intentions. To measure conflict intentions, the Horney (1945) and de Vos and colleagues (2013) scales were used and altered. The items were scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*). Move away intentions were measured with 4 items ($\alpha = .85$), for instance "To what extent would you as a Dutchman ignore refugees." Move against intentions were measured with 4 items ($\alpha = .84$), for instance "To what extent would you as a Dutchman want to fight refugees to abreact your frustration". Do nothing intentions were measured with 4 items ($\alpha = .62$), for instance “To what extent would you as a

Dutchman want to ignore refugees". Since these questionnaires had strongly matching patterns, they were combined, which lead to the negative conflict intentions scale consisting of 12 items ($\alpha = .87$). Positive conflict intentions, the move toward tendencies, were measured with 4 items ($\alpha = .81$), for instance "To what extent would you as a Dutchman want to make amends".

Relevance. Relevance of the threat was measured with 5 items ($\alpha = .81$), scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*). One example of questions is "I think the refugee crisis is a relevant subject."

Self-efficacy. Self-efficacy in light of the ability to do something about the crisis was measured using 6 items ($\alpha = .78$), scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*). It was based on the GSE-6 of Romppel et al. (2013). One example of the GSE-6 is "If someone opposes me, I can find means and ways to get what I want".

Fear. Fear as a construct was measured combining 4 items ($\alpha = .83$), scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*). The questions used, are: "I fear for the consequences of the refugee crisis", "I am afraid of the consequences of the refugee crisis", "To what extent are you afraid of the consequences of the refugee crisis" and the measure of the emotion "fear"¹.

After the questionnaires, there were 2 manipulation checks, scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*). To check temporal relevance, the question was: "To what extent does the refugee crisis cause problems to the near of distant future?"². To check perceived threat, the question was: "To what extent do you experience threat?".

Lastly, there was a behavioral measure, namely "Do you want to receive more information on how to personally contribute to the improvement of the integration of refugees?" with answer possibilities *Yes* and *No*.

In the third part of the study, participants were asked about their demographic variables. They had to state their sex, age, highest level of education and political preferences. All questions, questionnaires and scales can be found in Appendix C.

Analyses to be conducted

To test the previous mentioned hypotheses, a 2x2 ANCOVA will be conducted to test the main effects of time framing and amount of threat on the two conflict intentions (positive and negative). Furthermore, a simple main effects analysis will be conducted to further investigate interaction effects.

Covariates. Since people have an opinion about the refugee crisis beforehand, or experience with it, I wanted to control for specific covariates to eliminate these variables as possible explanations for the findings. The possible explanations I anticipated, are the effect of the refugee crisis on the participants' living situation, amount of contact with refugees (based on the intergroup contact hypothesis by Allport, 1954, as cited in Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005), perceived amount of negative and positive effects of the refugee crisis, and the relevance of the refugee crisis. Preliminary analysis showed that all these variables significantly affected negative and positive conflict intentions, $F_s > 5.88, p < .016$. The only exception was amount of contact, which only affected negative conflict intentions. As a consequence, I decided to include all variables as covariates. As all subsequent results are controlled for these covariates, means are reported as estimated marginal means (M) with standard errors (SE).

Results

Analysis

Manipulation check. One manipulation check was executed. A 2x2 ANCOVA on the manipulation check for threat illustrated no significant main effect of communicated threat on experienced threat, $F(1, 205) = 0.282, p = .596, \eta_p^2 = 0.001$. Participants did not experience significantly more threat in the threat conditions ($M = 1.56, SE = 0.07$) than in the moderate conditions ($M = 1.61, SE = 0.07$). Due to faulty coding of the manipulation check question, I could not check whether the manipulation of time was a success². Consequently, I concluded that both manipulations were not sufficient.

Fear. Subsequently, I investigated if there was a difference in experienced fear between the conditions. Using a 2x2 ANCOVA, it was found that there was no significant

main effect of threat on fear, $F(1, 205) = 0.78, p = .378, \eta_p^2 = 0.004$, nor of time on fear, $F(1, 205) = 0.64, p = .425, \eta_p^2 = 0.003$. Also, no interaction effect was found, $F(1, 205) = 0.10, p = .756, \eta_p^2 < 0.001$. See Table 2 for the means and standard errors per condition.

Correlations. To check possible relations between the variables, I conducted several Pearson Correlation analyses. This resulted in multiple significant correlations, except between negative conflict intentions and self-efficacy, and between self-efficacy and fear, see Table 1 for all correlations between variables.

Table 1.

Correlations between dependent variables.

Variables	1	2	3	4
1. Negative conflict intentions	—			
2. Positive conflict intentions	-.53**	—		
3. Self-efficacy	-.01	.22**	—	
4. Fear	.35**	-.17*	-.03	—

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 2.

Estimated Marginal Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) of dependent and independent variables per condition, controlled for covariates.

Variables	Moderate				Threat			
	Near		Distant		Near		Distant	
	M	SE	M	SE	M	SE	M	SE
Positive conflict intentions	3.35	0.09	3.42	0.08	3.45	0.09	3.53	0.09
Negative conflict intentions	1.65	0.06	1.57	0.06	1.48	0.06	1.75	0.07
Fear	2.59	0.10	2.64	0.10	2.65	0.10	2.77	0.11
Self-efficacy	3.50	0.08	3.55	0.08	3.42	0.08	3.55	0.09

Note: All variables were measured on a 5-point Likert scale.

Positive conflict intentions.

Main effects. A 2x2 ANCOVA of threat and time on positive conflict intentions revealed a non-significant effect of threat, $F(1, 205) = 1.45, p = .230, \eta_p^2 = 0.007$. Participants did not show more positive conflict intentions in the threat condition ($M = 3.49, SE = 0.06$) than in the moderate condition ($M = 3.39, SE = 0.06$), see Table 2 for the means and standard errors per condition and Figure 1 for a graphic presentation.

The test also revealed a non-significant effect of time, $F(1, 205) = 0.76, p = .385, \eta_p^2 = 0.004$. Participants did not show more positive conflict intentions in the near condition ($M = 3.40, SE = 0.06$) than in the distant condition ($M = 3.48, SE = 0.06$), see Table 2 for the means and standard errors per condition and Figure 1 for a graphic presentation.

To test my hypothesis with regard to self-efficacy, I created a median split to divide participants in a high and low self-efficacy group. The resulting analysis did however show no significant difference between the two groups. Self-efficacy did not significantly impact the main dependent variables, see Table 2 for the means and standard errors per condition. As a result, in the rest of the results I analyzed the group as a whole whereby self-efficacy was left out.

Interaction effect. Moreover, no interaction effect was found between threat and time on positive conflict intentions, $F(1, 205) < 0.01, p = 0.949, \eta_p^2 < 0.001$, see Figure 1 for a graphic presentation. This is inconsistent with the expectation.

Negative conflict intentions.

Main effects. A 2x2 ANCOVA of threat and time on negative conflict intentions revealed a non-significant effect of threat, $F(1, 205) < 0.01, p = .959, \eta_p^2 < 0.001$. Participants did not show more negative conflict intentions in the threat condition ($M = 1.62, SE = 0.05$) than in the moderate condition ($M = 1.61, SE = 0.04$), see Table 2 for the means and standard errors per condition and Figure 2 for a graphic presentation. This is inconsistent with the expectation.

The test also revealed a non-significant effect of time, $F(1, 205) = 2.06, p = .153, \eta_p^2 = 0.010$. Participants did not show more negative conflict intentions in the near condition ($M = 1.57, SE = 0.05$) than in the distant condition ($M = 1.66, SE = 0.05$), see Table 2 for the means and standard errors per condition and Figure 2 for a graphic presentation.

Interaction effect. However, an interaction effect between threat and time on negative conflict intentions was found, $F(1, 205) = 6.98, p = .009, \eta_p^2 = 0.033$, see Figure 2 for a graphic presentation. This illustrates that if there is a low threat, the near condition leads to more negative conflict intentions, while if there is a high threat, the distant condition leads to more negative conflict intentions. So, high threat leads to less negative conflict intentions in the near condition. This is in line with the expectation.

Logistic regression. I conducted a binary logistic regression analysis to check if respondents wanted to receive more information on how to help (i.e., the behavioral measure). Contrary to my prediction, the test indicated that there was no significant association between time, threat, their interaction and wanting more information, $\chi^2(3) = 1.07, p = .784$.

Effects of threat and time on positive conflict intentions:




Figure 1.
Note: Estimated marginal means, controlled for covariates.

Effects of threat and time on negative conflict intentions:




Figure 2.
Note: Estimated marginal means, controlled for covariates.

Discussion

Building on prior research that showed how fear appeals can be used successfully, the present study aimed to investigate if fear appeals can be used to reduce conflict, using the refugee crisis as a context. I argued, based on the EPPM (Witte, 1992) and time framing literature, that a high threat would result in more negative conflict intentions compared to a moderate threat. Furthermore, I expected that when a threat is high and relevant (i.e., in the near future), it would lead to the most negative conflict intentions, but only when self-efficacy and / or response efficacy were low. Finally, I expected that when both self-efficacy and response efficacy were high, a high relevant threat would lead to the strongest intentions to reduce conflict. Results showed partial support for my hypotheses.

Theoretical and practical implications

Results did not support the expectation that if the threat was in the near future (i.e., is relevant), it would lead to more positive conflict intentions, but only if both self-efficacy and response-efficacy were high. Time, threat and their interaction did not affect positive conflict intentions. A possible explanation could be the manipulations. The checks showed the manipulations to be insufficient.

Another possible explanation could be the level of efficacy. Participants did not differ significantly in efficacy level. This resulted in the fact that they could not be divided in a high efficacy group and a low efficacy group. Therefore, as there was no comparison between a high group and a low group, it could be expected that my hypothesis could not be confirmed.

The impossibility of the distinction between a high and a low efficacy group results in the expectation that they would have been put together in one group if the sample would have been bigger. As the sample scored above average ($M = 3.50$, $SD = 0.62$) on self-efficacy, it can be expected that this sample would be part of the high-efficacy group. Assuming that the whole group is high in efficacy, this has implications for one of the hypotheses. I found no confirmation of my expectation that a high threat would result in more negative conflict intentions compared to a moderate threat. However, I expected that when a threat is high and relevant (i.e., in the near future), it would lead to most negative conflict intentions, but only

when self-efficacy and / or response efficacy were low. In line with expectations based on the high level of self-efficacy, I found that near threat led to less negative conflict intentions. So, people were focused on controlling the danger, which is the desired outcome of the EPPM (Witte, 1992). Summarizing, the participants were high in efficacy, which meant that they believed that they could control the high relevant threat. This made the fear appeal, with the goal reducing a conflict, successful.

In conclusion, this outcome gently suggests that fear appeals can indeed be used successfully to not only promote positive behavior in health communication and school performance, but also to promote positive behavior in a social context, namely to reduce conflict.

Not only does the result suggest that a near threat can indeed lead to reduction of a conflict, the finding also shows an escalation of the conflict in the far threat condition. Following the EPPM, a far threat would be ignored because it is not relevant. In conflict situations, ignoring the threat escalates a conflict. Although, in contrast with my prediction, no main effect of threat was found, there is an explanation of the finding that a far threat leads to more negative conflict behavior.

Trope and Liberman (2010) argue with their construal level theory (CLT) that events that are spatially remote, like the past and the future, are beyond our perception, and therefore have to be construed: predicted, contemplated, remembered or imagined. While the CLT explains four dimensions of psychological distance, being temporal, spatial, social and hypotheticality, I will now focus on only the temporal dimension, as I used this one in my research. As cited in Stephan, Liberman and Trope (2011), the CLT states that “events that are more distant will be represented at a more abstract, higher level of construal, because higher-level construals capture those features of objects that remain relatively invariant with increasing distance, and thus enable prediction across distance”. So, a greater temporal distance increases reliance on schematic representations (Stephan et al., 2011).

Not only distant events are described more schematic. Schematic representations are often used to describe outgroups as well (Park & Judd, 1990; Park & Rothbart, 1982). Also,

outgroups are perceived as more homogeneous, compared to ingroups, and are described in more abstract terms (Werkman, Wigboldus, & Semin, 1999).

These lines of research combined suggest that, because the outgroup will be seen as more stereotypical, and negative stereotypes results in threat (as shown by the ITT, Stephan & Stephan, 1996; 2000), contact in the distant future is perceived as more threatening compared to contact in the near future. So, if a threat is presented in the distant future, the reliance on stereotypes will be heightened, which, in turn, will lead to more negative conflict intentions. This is indeed what was found and can therefore slightly support the CLT.

Practical implications. As my study partly supports both the EPPM and the CLT, the results suggest that fear appeals can be used for both conflict escalation and conflict reduction. More specifically, fear appeals can be used to reduce conflict by framing it to be a near threat, while framing it to a distant threat would lead to an escalation of the conflict. Not only is this useful for a construction of a fear appeal, it is also useful for weakening a fear appeal of the opposite party.

Limitations and future research

Although the results paint an interesting picture, there is reason to be cautious about generalization of these findings.

First, in this study, there was a fundamental problem with the sample. My first concern after seeing the demographics of the first respondents was the fact that my convenience sample stayed in academic circles. I did everything in my power to distribute the questionnaires among people of multiple layers of the society, but in the end there was still an overrepresentation of high-educated left-voters. The following limitations show the necessity of a distribution in more different social classes.

The first problem that comes with this overrepresentation is the focus of the respondents. A big part of the sample were left-wing voters. Left parties in general focus more on including people than excluding people. As the fear appeal is a means for people to change their behavior, instead of confirming their behavior, the participants being left-wing oriented could be the reason why no effect on positive conflict intentions was found.

This homogenous sample also showed their answers to be very similar. Firstly, their homogeneity was shown in the patterns of the results. More specifically, the significant relation between the interaction of time and threat on negative conflict intentions was determined by the lowest estimated mean score of 1.48, with a standard error of 0.06 and the highest estimated mean score of 1.75, with a standard error of 0.07. The deviation was very little, and this could mean that the effects have shown to be weaker than they really are.

Furthermore, there was no difference between the respondents concerning their self-efficacy, so no high- and low self-efficacy group could be conducted. This resulted in the choice to use the complete sample for every analysis. As the level of self-efficacy is a key element in the EPPM (Witte, 1992), this sample made it impossible to test the EPPM in the right way.

Also, response-efficacy has been implied by stating that there are solutions, but participants had to opt for receiving this information. In other words, people could not state whether they believed that the solution that was given would be effective. This means that response-efficacy could not be measured in a way that it should be, based on the EPPM. Consequently, I was unable to test whether the effects depended on the presence of both forms of efficacy. This could either mean that the results are an underestimation of the actual effect, or that efficacy is less important than thought in advance. In further research, solutions should be provided over the conditions to check for response-efficacy. If this is done properly, combined with a more heterogeneous sample, my expectation that a threat in the near future (i.e., is relevant), would lead to more positive conflict intentions, but only if both self-efficacy and response-efficacy are high, could still be met.

Not only was there no way of checking whether people believed the solution would work to check response-efficacy, it could also be possible that just the implication that there solutions already had an effect. It could be possible that this resulted in people becoming already high in efficacy, and subsequently this would lead to less of a deviation in answers. It could be possible that people would be more inclined to respond positively on the threat.

Furthermore, while the time manipulation could not be checked, the threat

manipulation showed to be unsuccessful: the threat conditions did not lead to more perceived threat than the moderate conditions. Interestingly enough, an interaction effect was found ($F(1, 205) = 4.10, p = .044, \eta_p^2 = 0.020$), which suggests that the least threat was experienced in the near threat condition. Where there was the least threat, people showed significantly less negative conflict behavior. So, it may be possible that a lower threat leads to more intentions to reduce conflict. This can be an alternative explanation of the finding that the near threat condition led to the least negative conflict intentions, which is unfavorable in the use of fear appeals in reducing conflict. In further research, the threat conditions need to accentuate the horrible consequences even more, so a distinction can be made more properly and the effects of threat on conflict intentions can be unraveled.

Moreover, the threat in this study was based on realistic threat, and I chose to communicate this by text only. The ITT (Stephan & Stephan, 1996; 2000) states that a realistic threat comes from competition over limited resources, which means that potential success of one group threatens the well-being of the other group, resulting in negative outgroup attitude. Arguments based on realistic threats are indeed used in the media, but often combined with symbolic threat, which is a threat that arises from a conflict in values, norms and beliefs between groups. For example, in October 2015, Wilders combined letters he received from Dutch natives, and wrote a speech about it. He talked about “refugees wanting to get things for free”, as well as “young girls being harassed by refugees”. He concludes with “we do not accept that our safety, our freedom, our culture, our money, and our future are put on the line by our prime-minister.” His speech shows that he combines realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety and stereotypes. Summarizing, he uses four entries to generate threat, where I used one. Furthermore, he used speech, whereby he could use non-verbal cues, while I only used written words.

This leaves a lot of opportunities for further research. For example, one could study the use of a combination of the four threats proposed by the ITT: realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes (Stephan & Stephan, 1996; 2000). It could be fruitful to provide all of the four threats alone, a combined threat and a moderate condition

to see which way of presenting a threat is most useful in this situation. Based on my theoretical framework and my findings, I expect that the combination will be most effective, but only when people are high in self-efficacy and response-efficacy. If this is not the case, a high threat like that will backfire, and lead people turn to defensive avoidance or reactance (i.e., negative conflict intentions). Another study could focus on the difference between the communication of a fear appeal visually and verbally. I expect that the use of non-verbal cues will strengthen the effect of the fear appeal.

Finally, it would be interesting to study the effect of another relevance cue than temporal on increasing positive conflict intentions. A research question could be, for example, “Does spatial distance affect conflict intentions different than temporal distance?” Just like the theory that a personal story increases more donations than statistics (Berman, Barasch, Levine, & Small, 2018), I theorize that seeing a refugee rather than hearing about it increases helpful behavior. Therefore, I expect spatial distance to have a bigger influence on relevance than temporal distance, and therefore will lead to more positive conflict behavior. For a research based on spatial distance, it is important to take into account the feelings of intergroup anxiety when in the presence of the outgroup (as shown by the ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 1996; 2000), as this could lead to fear as well.

Conclusion

The present study aimed to examine if fear appeals can be used to reduce conflict. Although it did not succeed in providing tools on how to use fear appeals to increase positive conflict intentions, it does open a door for using fear appeals to reduce conflict. Further research of fear appeals in conflict situations is necessary to provide answers on how to use fear appeals to increase positive conflict intentions. Hopefully, this will show even more that right-wing parties do not have a monopoly on fear appeals.

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Footnotes

1. A mistake has been made in the questionnaire design regarding the manipulation check of time, whereby the answer possibilities should have been dichotomous. Instead, a Likert scale was used, which made it impossible to check for manipulation success.
2. Immediately after the manipulation text, participants had to indicate their feeling at that moment regarding 16 emotions, with answer possibilities ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*). Fear was one of the emotions.

Appendix

A. Recruitment text shared on social media.

1. Formal (LinkedIn and Facebook groups)

RESPONDENTEN VOOR MASTERSCRIPTIE (18+)

Beste allemaal,

Ik doe voor mijn studie onderzoek naar het effect van de vluchtelingencrisis op de Nederlandse economie. Hiervoor zoek ik respondenten. Het gaat om een vragenlijst die u gewoon op uw laptop/tablet/mobiel kunt invullen en die zo'n 10 minuten van uw tijd in beslag zal nemen. U zult mij hiermee enorm helpen en mijn dank is daarom groot!

Iedereen mag meedoen (graag zelfs!) dus delen wordt gewaardeerd!

https://uusocsci.au1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bl6JII1vsmPv0vH

Shared on:

Geen AZC, grenzen dicht

Nederland mijn Vaderland

Nederland is mijn land

Ik stem op Geert Wilders en de PVV

Respondenten gezocht

Psychologie UU 2016-2017

Psychologie RuG Jaar 2 2014-2015

Psychologie jaar 3 rug

Psychologie RUG 2014-2015

2. Informal (Personal Facebook and family and friends)

Respondenten voor masterscriptie (18+)

Hoi allemaal,

ik ben bezig met het schrijven van een scriptie voor mijn master. Ik doe onderzoek naar het effect van de vluchtelingencrisis op de Nederlandse economie en ik zoek hiervoor respondenten. Het gaat om een vragenlijst (die je ook gewoon op je mobiel kunt invullen) van ongeveer een kwartiertje. Alvast heel erg bedankt!

Delen wordt gewaardeerd!

https://uusocsci.au1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bl6JIJ1vsmPv0vH

B. Conditions

Condition 1.

Vluchtelingencrisis: gevolgen op korte termijn

Iedereen heeft het gehoord: er is op dit moment een vluchtelingencrisis, want er zijn nog nooit zoveel mensen tegelijk op de vlucht geweest. Tussen 2015-2017 werden ruim 100,000 asielverzoeken ingediend in Nederland. Voor al deze mensen moeten er dingen geregeld worden, zoals bijvoorbeeld huisvesting, verzekeringen en inkomen. Als we ze niet helpen, zullen we daar snel de consequenties van ondervinden. Onderzoek laat zien dat wanneer vluchtelingen niet goed integreren dit negatieve effecten heeft. Zo zal de economie stagneren en de criminaliteit toenemen. Op korte termijn betekent dit onder andere een stijging van de werkloosheid, een daling van de koopkracht, een tekort op de huizenmarkt, een toename van onrust in grote steden en een verhoogde aanvraag van het aantal bijstandsuitkeringen. Ook zeggen ziektekostenverzekeringen een stijging van de premie ter waarde van 2% door te willen voeren, en woningcorporaties zeggen dat de huurprijzen met 3% zullen stijgen. Door in te grijpen kunnen deze negatieve gevolgen op korte termijn worden tegen gegaan of zelfs worden omgezet in positieve gevolgen.

Condition 2.

De vreselijke consequenties van de vluchtelingencrisis, nu ingrijpen noodzakelijk

Iedereen heeft het gehoord: er is op dit moment een vluchtelingencrisis, want er zijn nog nooit

zoveel mensen tegelijk op de vlucht geweest. Tussen 2015-2017 werden ruim 100,000 asiel verzoeken ingediend in Nederland alleen. Voor al deze mensen moeten er dingen geregeld worden, zoals bijvoorbeeld huisvesting, verzekeringen en inkomen. Onderzoek laat zien dat wanneer vluchtelingen niet goed integreren dit negatieve effect heeft. Zo zal de economie stagneren en de criminaliteit toenemen. Op korte termijn betekent dit onder andere een stijging van de werkloosheid, een daling van de koopkracht, een tekort op de huizenmarkt, een toename van onrust in grote steden en een verhoogde aanvraag van het aantal bijstandsuitkeringen. Dit raakt ons allemaal flink in de portemonnee.

Ziektekostenverzekeraars zeggen nu al een forse stijging van de premie ter waarde van 2% te zullen moeten doorvoeren als dit zo door gaat, en huurprijzen zullen met 3% zelfs nog sterker stijgen. Dit is funest voor de jonge bevolkingsgroepen. Ditzelfde onderzoek laat ook zien dat bij een goede integratie juist het omgekeerde plaatsvindt: een stijging van de koopkracht en minder werkloosheid. Op dit moment merken we in Nederland al de negatieve gevolgen, want de koopkracht is verminderd en de werkloosheid is verhoogd. Het is daarom erg belangrijk om vluchtelingen **nu** te helpen goed te laten integreren, als we niet direct wéér in een economische crisis willen belanden.

Condition 3.

Vluchtelingencrisis: gevolgen op lange termijn

Iedereen heeft het gehoord: er is op dit moment een vluchtelingencrisis, want er zijn nog nooit zoveel mensen tegelijk op de vlucht geweest. Tussen 2015-2017 werden ruim 100,000 asiel verzoeken ingediend in Nederland. Voor al deze mensen moeten er dingen geregeld worden, zoals bijvoorbeeld huisvesting, verzekeringen en inkomen. Als we ze niet helpen, zullen we in de toekomst de consequenties daarvan ondervinden. Onderzoek laat zien dat wanneer vluchtelingen niet goed integreren dit negatieve effecten heeft. Zo zal de economie stagneren en de criminaliteit toenemen. Op lange termijn betekent dit onder andere een stijging van de werkloosheid, een daling van de koopkracht, een tekort op de huizenmarkt, een toename van onrust in grote steden en een verhoogde aanvraag van het aantal bijstandsuitkeringen. Ook

zeggen ziektekostenverzekeringen over een paar jaar een stijging van de premie ter waarde van 2% door te moeten voeren, en woningcorporaties zeggen dat de huurprijzen met 3% zullen stijgen. Door in te grijpen kunnen deze negatieve gevolgen op de lange termijn worden tegen gegaan of zelfs worden omgezet in positieve gevolgen.

Condition 4.

De vreselijke consequenties van de vluchtelingencrisis, een probleem voor de toekomst

Iedereen heeft het gehoord: er is op dit moment een vluchtelingencrisis, want er zijn nog nooit zoveel mensen tegelijk op de vlucht geweest. Tussen 2015-2017 werden ruim 100,000 asielverzoeken ingediend in Nederland alleen. Voor al deze mensen moeten er dingen geregeld worden, zoals bijvoorbeeld huisvesting, verzekeringen en inkomen. Onderzoek laat zien dat wanneer vluchtelingen niet goed integreren dit negatieve effecten heeft. Zo zal de economie stagneren en de criminaliteit toenemen. Op lange termijn betekent dit onder andere een stijging van de werkloosheid, een daling van de koopkracht, een tekort op de huizenmarkt, een toename van onrust in grote steden en een verhoogde aanvraag van het aantal bijstandsuitkeringen. Dit raakt ons allemaal flink in de portemonnee.

Ziektekostenverzekeraars zeggen over een paar jaar een forse stijging van de premie ter waarde van 2% te zullen moeten doorvoeren als dit zo door gaat, en huurprijzen zullen met 3% zelfs nog sterker stijgen. Dit is funest voor de jonge bevolkingsgroepen. Ditzelfde onderzoek laat ook zien dat bij een goede integratie juist het omgekeerde plaatsvindt: een stijging van de koopkracht en minder werkloosheid op de lange termijn. Het is daarom erg belangrijk om vluchtelingen gaandeweg beter te laten integreren, als we over een aantal jaar niet wéér in een economische crisis willen belanden.

C. Questions and questionnaires

Emotion questions

-Afkeer

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Angst

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Bezorgdheid

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Boosheid

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Hulpeloosheid

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Kwetsbaarheid

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Minachting

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Nervositeit

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Ongerustheid

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Paniek

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Schaamte

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Superioriteit

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Verdriet

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Wanhoop

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Woede

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Wraakzucht

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

Negative conflict intentions scale

-In hoeverre zou u als Nederlander ruzie willen maken met vluchtelingen om uw frustratie af te reageren?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-In hoeverre zou u als Nederlander vluchtelingen uw zienswijze willen inpeperen om uw frustratie af te reageren?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-In hoeverre zou u als Nederlander de confrontatie met vluchtelingen willen opzoeken om uw frustratie af te reageren?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-In hoeverre zou u als Nederlander vluchtelingen terug willen pakken om uw frustratie af te reageren?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-In hoeverre zou u als Nederlander vluchtelingen willen uitsluiten van uw eigen sociale netwerk?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-In hoeverre zou u als Nederlander vluchtelingen willen negeren?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-In hoeverre zou u als Nederlander vluchtelingen willen ontwijken?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-In hoeverre zou u als Nederlander situaties waarbij vluchtelingen aanwezig zijn uit de weg gaan?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

Positive conflict intentions scale

-In hoeverre zou u als Nederlander met een vluchteling rond de tafel willen gaan zitten om over het probleem te praten?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-In hoeverre zou u als Nederlander samen met vluchtelingen de situatie aan willen pakken?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-In hoeverre zou u als Nederlander een oplossing willen zoeken voor het probleem waar zowel autochtonen als vluchtelingen tevreden mee zouden zijn?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-In hoeverre zou u als Nederlander het goed willen maken met vluchtelingen?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

Relevance scale

-Ik vind de vluchtelingencrisis een belangrijk onderwerp

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Ik vind dat er nú iets gedaan moet worden aan de vluchtelingencrisis

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

- Ik voel me betrokken bij de vluchtelingencrisis

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Persoonlijk doet de vluchtelingencrisis voor mij ertoe

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Ik vind de vluchtelingencrisis relevant

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

Self-efficacy scale

-Als iemand me dwarsboomt, dan kan ik wel een manier en middelen vinden om te krijgen wat ik wil.

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

- Het is makkelijk voor mij om mij vast te houden aan mijn doelen en mijn doelen te bereiken

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Dankzij mijn vindingrijkheid weet ik hoe ik hoe ik met onvoorziene situaties moet omgaan

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Ik ben er van overtuigd dat ik efficiënt om zou kunnen gaan met onverwachte gebeurtenissen

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Ik kan kalm blijven als ik tegen iets moeilijks aanloop, omdat ik kan vertrouwen op mijn vaardigheden om het uit te staan

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Wat er ook gebeurt, ik kan het meestal aan

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

Fear scale

-In hoeverre ervaart u angst

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Ik ben bang voor de gevolgen van de vluchtelingencrisis

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Ik vrees voor de gevolgen van de vluchtelingencrisis

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

-Ik ben bang voor de gevolgen van de vluchtelingencrisis

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

Control questions

-In welke mate ervaart u dreiging?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (geen) to 5 (erg veel)

-In hoeverre levert de genoemde vluchtelingencrisis problemen op voor de nabije of verre toekomst?

5-point Likert scale, 1 (geen) to 5 (erg veel)

-Ik begrijp het doel van het onderzoek

(“Nee”, “Ja, ik denk dat het gaat over -open-”)

-Ik heb mijn antwoorden naar waarheid ingevuld

(“Nee”, “Ja”)

-Ik vond het artikel geloofwaardig

5-point Likert scale, 1 (helemaal niet) to 5 (heel erg)

Behavioral measure

-Zou u na afloop meer informatie willen ontvangen over hoe u zelf persoonlijk bij kunt dragen aan een verbetering van de integratie van vluchtelingen?

(“Ja”, “Nee”)

Demographic questions

-Geslacht

(“Man”, “Vrouw”, “Anders, namelijk -open-”)

-Leeftijd (in jaren)

(open)

-Mijn hoogst genoten opleiding is

(“Basisschool”, “VMBO”, “Havo”, “VWO”, “MBO”, “HBO”, “WO bachelor”, “WO master”, “PhD”, “Anders, namelijk -open-”)

-Mijn politieke voorkeur is te omschrijven als

(“Uiterst links”, “Links”, “Midden”, “Rechts”, “Uiterst rechts”)