
WHO CONTROLS THESE LANDS? MOBILIZING SOCIAL JUSTICE CLAIMS OVER LAND IN TANZANIA'S THIRD SECTOR



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Asante sana

ABSTRACT

'Land grabbing' has become one of the most iconic concerns within contemporary development circles brought about by the unscrupulous acquisitions of agricultural land by foreign investors. Recent attention within the land grab debate has gone out to the structural power imbalances underlying these this process and the land control regimes which facilitate them. This has shifted the focus from agricultural acquisitions alone to broader process of dispossession. Against the backdrop of structural critique this research has aimed to gain insight into the ability of domestic organizations to mobilize influence over land control in Tanzania, focusing on their concrete strategies and the discursive frames adopted to legitimize them. The research findings reveal a variety of civil society actors engaged in the facilitation and contestation of land control processes. Furthermore, the research reveals a number of conflicting frames, each laying claim to Tanzania's land based resources and each enjoying varying degrees of influence over the practice of land control.

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ACRONYMS

- AGRA A Green Revolution for Africa
- AU African Union
- CBNRM Community Based Resource Management
- CCM Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution)
- CFS Committee on World Food Security
- CHADEMA Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Party for Democracy and Progress)
- CSO Civil Society Organization
- CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
- DO Development Organization
- EU European Union
- FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
- G8 Group of Eight
- G20 Group of Twenty
- GCA Game Controlled Area
- IFI International Finance Institution
- INGO International Non-Governmental Organization
- MSF Multi-stakeholder Forum
- NAFCO National Agricultural and Food Corporation
- NARCO National Ranching Company
- NGO Non-Governmental Organization
- **OBC** Ortello Business Company
- PSLO Private Sector Lobby Organization
- REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
- **RBO** Rights Based Organization
- SAGCOT Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor
- SMO Social Movement Organization

- TALA Tanzania Land Alliance
- TANU Tanganyika African National Union
- TFL Tanganyika Federation of Labor
- USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
- WMA Wildlife Management Area

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The land grand debate is perhaps the most iconic of current debates within both development circles and the broader public discourse. The unscrupulous acquisitions of agricultural land in developing countries by foreign actors triggered concerns and outrage due to their negative impacts on former land users. The initial debate was however characterized by a prevalence of preconceived notions on the one hand, and a lack of structural grounding on the other. Recently however there has been a 'political turn' in the land grabs debate towards structural critique. This shift to holistic analysis has revealed the many shapes and sizes of land grabbing outside of those for agriculture alone. The introduction of the term 'land control' has served to highlight this broader process of dispossession and the institutional facilitation underlying it. Seen from this perspective dispossession is not an anomaly, but a fundamental characteristic of the projects of neo-liberal globalization. Within the shift towards structural critique, the mobilization of counter powers has increasingly been identified as the 'solution' to the problem of dispossession, as opposed to the technical policy fixes recommended within the initial debate. Social movements and civil society it has been argued, are both vital for countering the power balances relating to concrete land control practice and for developing counter narratives to the logic underlying these distributive regimes.

Despite this however, social movements and civil society organizations have not been subjected to any empirical research within this context. By adopting a social movement framework this research aimed to counter this knowledge gap and to provide insights with a practical applicability, which is most often absent in structural critiques. The adopted frameworks consists of resource mobilization, political opportunity and frame theory, each representing the actor, structural and constructivist paradigms. In doing so previously mutually exclusive theories have been brought together as dimensions of social movements. The dimensions are hypothesized as relating to one and other as follows: CSO's adopt interpretive frames which give discursive meaning to a particular grievance. The degree in which these frame align with the interests of potential supporters determines the degree of resources which can be mobilized to engage in (collective) strategies. These strategies are influenced by the political opportunity structures within which they occur in. These processes ultimately make up the degree of agency and influence CSO's and movements can mobilize over land control practice. As a result, each dimension makes up a component which determines the ability of social movements to mobilize power.

The research was conducted in Tanzania, a country whose experience with small-holder dispossession is more of a historical constant then a recent phenomenon. Decades of authoritarian

rule has also served to suppress political dissent. This has lead to a particularly antagonistic relationship towards critical CSO's which is still very much prevalent at the present day. Tanzania serves as a prime example of a country whose struggles over land have not been restricted to agricultural land grabbing. Protected areas for conservation which cover 40% of the country, have proven to be a significant cause of conflict, with pastoralist minorities being particularly hard hit. An exploitative extractive industry, water scarcity and rising tension between pastoralist and agriculturalists are additional factors associated with land control in Tanzania. A defining feature of all these manifestation of land control is the active involvement and facilitation by the Tanzanian state. This puts those CSO's which are critical of land control practices at odds with government interests.

The objective of the research was to identify the various CSO's involved in influencing land control, their strategies, the discursive logic deployed by them, and the influence of political structures on their agency. The research was explorative in that most respondents were identified through snowballing. The primary respondent category was CSO spokespeople. Several university staff members and government affiliates also participated in the research. The research aimed to put the experience of CSO's at the forefront and was therefore qualitative, with the primary mode of data-collection being semi-structured interviews. The data-collection covered a period of 14 weeks and was undertaken in the regional capitals Arusha, Morogoro, Dar Es Salaam and Moshi.

The research findings point to a number of CSO categories spanning small-scale producer representatives, conservation organizations, multi-stakeholder forums and private sector lobby organizations which are extensively involved in influencing land control. Small-scale producer representative have been engaged in three broad categories of strategies aimed at advancing social justice concerns of small-holders. The first is public education strategies covering media campaigning, dissemination of research findings and grass-roots awareness raising. The latter type was generally recognized as being the most effective, due to its ability to empower communities to proactively deal with land control changes. The second category relates to mitigating or reversing negative outcomes after their occurrence. This was generally recognized as the most susceptible to failure due to its dependence on the unaccountable and corruption-prone legal system. As a result, despite being routinely associated with dispossession and injustice, land control changes have proven all but impossible to reverse. The third category of strategies related to lobbying and advocacy. Despite these CSO being actively involved in such strategies, the level of access to the government is determined by the whim of individual office holders and therefore a great deal of arbitrariness. All in all, the efforts of small-scale producers have not been reflected in significant structural changes.

Standing in contrast to the difficulty experienced in shaping the structures of land control, are the conservation and private sector lobby organizations. The interests of both organizations have been manifested in the two most significant trends of land control and dispossession in Tanzania; Conservation and agricultural modernization. The level of access and *actual influence* enjoyed by these CSO's is unparalleled by small-scale producers organizations, due to governments interests in the massive short terms revenues associated with these processes.

The research findings show that the agency of CSO's is strongly determined by the political opportunities granted to them. These opportunities are granted disproportionately to conservation organizations and private sector lobby organizations, with the government being generally closed and hostile towards small-scale producer organizations advocating against small-holder dispossession. This has been further compounded by the rise of political competition, which has seen sitting leaders become increasingly erratic towards actors who may hurt their prospects of staying in power. The findings also reveal a great deal of fragmentation among small-scale producers organizations, with a low degree of strategic coordination and information sharing among them. Additionally, their dependence on donor funding has rendered them susceptible to external fluctuations. The current squeeze on Western funding, the rise of economically motivated donors such as China and India, together with increasing basket funding, is a cause for concern for CSO's critical of the government. These insecurities not only serve to hamper the strategic capability of individual CSO's, but also the potential for greater coordination among them due to the secrecy and competition resulting from funding scarcities.

In terms of the discursive meaning motivating CSO strategies, the research revealed the following distinct frames. *The small-scale farmer frame*, which prioritizes small-holder farmers control over land arguing that it is vital to Tanzania's agricultural development. *The pastoralist frame*, which is concerned with the right of existence of pastoralists and resisting the encroachment of conservation areas. *The conservation frame*, which is concerned with increasing the protected area's in Tanzania, while identifying unsustainable livelihood practices (such as pastoralism) and large-scale agriculture as a major risk to bio-diversity. *The modernization frame*, which is concerned with social justice and identify exploitative power balances as the major cause of small-holder dispossession. The conservation and modernization frame on the other hand are devoid of power critique and place the 'problem' of land in the realm of small-holder livelihood practices (either due to unsustainability or low production). Thus the latter two frames essentially serve to advance small-holder dispossession in favor of new

resource 'management' arrangements and corporate agriculture, together with the elite capture of land based resources implicit in these changes.

As a result there is a significant degree of antagonism between the pastoralist and small-scale farmer frame on the one hand and the conservation and modernization frame on the other. The latter two frames have however demonstrated the most power in determining the trajectory of land control. By placing the 'problem' of land control with small-holders and not exploitative elites, they target the powerless while reaffirming the powerful. Additionally, both the green economy and corporate agriculture have the ability to generate massive revenues for those elites in the position to enjoy them. The pastoralist and small-scale farmer frame however, with their lack of revenue generating ability and problematization of elite arrangements, have struggled to influence land control. In terms of their ability to mobilize there is one other weakness in the social justice frames. According to frame theory the strength and clarity of a narrative is of vital important for mobilization. The pastoralist frame and small-scale farmer frame however are lacking such a clear counter narrative to the powerful narratives such as climate change, tragedy of the commons and food security underlying conservation and modernization. This is due to the specialist and case based focus of most proponents of the small-scale farmer and pastoralists frame, which rarely sees them going further then reactive strategies and fragmented projects. As such there is a strong need for the articulation and communication of a progressive and alternative vision to counter the dominant frames.

The research findings identify a number of levels which could serve to enhance mobilization against small-holder dispossession. First of all there is a need for greater coordination unity among like minded organizations. The current political closure also suggests the need for a strategic reassertion towards extra-institutional mobilization at the grass roots level. This can serve to create new channels of power not accessible through the state institutions. Finally, there is a need for small-scale producer representative to articulate a clear vision for the future as an alternative to the current trajectories of land control. This does not only relate to the domestic level, but is also of relevance to international debate seeking to replace the trends of the green economy and the green revolution with constructive alternatives prioritizing small-holder land control.

1:INTRODUCTION

The concepts of 'land grabbing' and 'the global land rush' have risen to become one of the central concerns in global development, resonating far beyond professional circles and into the broader public discourse. These concepts and respective debates came about as the result of the convergence of the global food, fuel and financial crises, which sparked an investment trend into agricultural lands in developing countries by (a variety of) foreign actors. Intensive monitoring by researchers and International NGO's (INGO's) soon lead to widespread concerns about the unscrupulous nature of these acquisitions and the negative impacts they were having on former land users. As noted by Borras & Franco, these concepts build on 'familiar, iconic images from the past of (Northern) companies and governments enclosing commons (mainly land and water), dispossessing peasants and indigenous peoples, and ruining the environment (in the South)' (Borras & Franco, 2012, p.34). Since its inception into the development lexicon land grabbing has generally been approached from 3 angles. The first is the outright and somewhat populist dismissal of large-scale agriculture by influential INGO's such as Oxfam (2012). The second is the win-win discourse advocated by neo-liberal institutions such as the world bank. This approach defines land grabs as an anomaly within the otherwise liberating process of commodification, thus arguing for the maximization of 'potentials' and the mitigation of 'risks' (World Bank, 2010). Occupying a middle ground between these two politically laden approaches are a variety of development researchers, which through their case based research have observed both negative outcomes and development potentials of such acquisitions (see for example: Schoneveld et al, 2011).

More recently however the land grab debate has been characterized by a 'political turn' towards more holistic approaches. These approaches have placed land grabbing within the context of broader structural processes, with the adoption of the concepts 'primitive accumulation' and 'accumulation by dispossession' signifying a renaissance of neo-marxist analysis. Such publications have drawn attention to a variety of 'grabs' brought forth by these processes, such as water grabs and green grabs. As argued by Peluso & Lund (2011) all these grabs are underpinned by land control regimes which legitimize and institutionally facilitate the accumulation of land based wealth by those in positions of power. As argued by theorists of the political turn, exploitative land control regimes are not an anomaly or a deviation from the rule, but a fundamental characteristic of the trajectory of neo-liberal globalization. Within the context of this development, power balances have been recognized as a defining feature of how control grabs manifest themselves. With this context the 'solution' to land grabbing has shifted from the technical policy fixes characteristic of the initial debate, to the mobilization of counter powers. While civil society organizations (CSO's) and social movements in target countries have been theorized as having the ability to mobilize such counter power, they have not been the subject of any empirical research. As argued by Borras et al (2011) there is a glaring knowledge gap in relation to the strategic and discursive resistance of land grabbing in target countries. In fact, throughout the entire land grab debate, the agency of domestic organizations has not received any serious attention at all. While the initial debate essentially rendered all things 'local' as little more than passive recipients of 'impacts', the political turn risks romanticizing the resistance of domestic movements without providing any empirical underpinning.

The neglect of such domestic agency is peculiar, and somewhat reflective of the trend-sensitivity in development circles. For not too long ago, the concept of civil society occupied centre stage in much development debates due to the perceived ability of the 'thirds realm' to advance collective interests and democratic values. This begs the questions of how organizations vested with such a task have responded to the exploitation associated with the many manifestations of land control. On the other hand, on the other side of the social science pond, social movements have routinely been the subject of analysis. Such research has demonstrating the ability of social movements to advance the interest of rural land users, most notably in the context of Latin American peasant movements. This again begs the question of why no empirical research has been conducted on domestic social movements within the context of the global land rush, which has broadly been recognized as unprecedented in scale.

It is against the background of the political turn in the land grab debate that this research set out to help fill the knowledge gap in relation to the strategic and discursive involvement of domestic organizations in Tanzania. While this research assumes the tenets of the political turn, that is to say that unequal power balances enable exploitative land control regimes, it was not conducted using the political ecology and/or political economy frameworks most commonly associated with this approach. The primary reason for this is that such frameworks, despite their sophistication, are notoriously lacking in real world application. As a result, they tend to offer a lot in terms of eloquent deconstructions of the status quo, but little in terms practice oriented recommendations. Social movements theory on the other hand has enjoyed a long tradition of identifying the factors which set successful movements apart from unsuccessful ones. As a result social movement theory is inherently more practice oriented, providing a promising theoretical source for advancing social justice *in practice*. In addition to filling the knowledge gap on domestic agency therefore, this research will attempt to offer insights into how this might be further strengthened.

Two distinct dimensions relating to land control can be identified as levels which social movements could (theoretically) contribute to. The first relates to countering power balances through concrete strategies, such monitoring land control changes, empower communities and enforcing accountability (Borras & Franco, 2010a; Borras & Franco, 2010b; Li, 2011; Borras et al, 2013). The second relates to countering power balances within the dominant discourses of land control by developing and communicating counter narratives and alternatives for the broader debate (Muradiana et al, 2012; Mehta et al, 2012; McKeon, 2013). The research was therefore aimed at eliciting the current and potential contributions of social movements to the two levels of concrete strategies and discourse.

The thesis consists of the following consecutive parts:

• The regional context

This parts consists of two components. The component first tracing the historical roots of civil society and lands control trends from colonial times to the present day. This will highlight the extent in which historical and political trajectories have shaped the current state of civil society and land control. The second component consists of an overview of the various manifestations of land control, serving to highlight the extent in which Tanzania has seen its fair share of land and resource related conflicts.

• Theoretical background

This part also consists of two components beginning with an in-depth literature review of the land grab debate which will address its various developments and the subsequent knowledge gap relating to the involvement of domestic actors. The second component will present the theoretical framework in which three broad dimensions of social movements will be identified.

Methodology

This part will present the research question and methodology as well as situating the research within the tradition of explorative qualitative research.

• Strategies, resources and struggles over land control

This part consists of the empirical findings relating to the various categories of CSO's involved in land control, together with their strategies and relative strengths and weaknesses in terms

of real influence. The part will end with a critical reflection of these findings . These findings reveal a variety of CSO's and strategies involved in land control

• Framing land control claims within civil society

This part consists of a analysis of the major frames discursively adopted by CSO's engaged in land control. The findings suggest the presence of several frames with different logics, with the most powerful frames having negative implications for the social justice of small-scale producers.

• Discussion/conclusion

This part consists of a final discussion of the research findings in which a number of insights are offered which might serve to advance the interests of small-scale producers within the context of land control.

2: THEORETICAL CONTEXT

2.1 EXPANDING THE LAND GRAB DEBATE

The concept of 'Land grabbing' has become one of the most iconic themes within contemporary development, resonating far beyond development circles alone and into mainstream media and public discourse of donor countries. Since its gradual inception into development theory and practice in the latter half of the 2000's, the debate around land grabbing has evolved considerably. This evolution has not only seen a maturation of the critique of land grabbing *as a phenomenon*, but also of land grabbing as an analytically useful category. In the following section we will review a number of major developments within the land grab debate. We will begin by addressing the narrative on which the contemporary land grab debate was founded which has shaped much of the debates focus. From there on we will address a number of critical additions to the land grab debate which we will refer to as the 'political turn'.

The founding narrative

The story of land grabbing appeared in development circles and mainstream media in the latter half of the 2000's. Within this narrative the 'birth' of the global land rush was attributed to the convergence of the global food, energy, environmental and financial crises (Borras et al, 2011; Borras & Franco, 2010b; The International Land Coalition, 2011; Rosset, 2009; Rosset 2011; McCarthy et al, 2012; Land Action Research Network, 2011). These crises had in turn lead to an unprecedented surge of foreign direct investment (FDI) into agricultural lands in developing countries. This surge was undertaken by a variety of state and private actors from mid to high income countries, spurred on by national interest and/or the potential for financial gains. Within this context a defining role was played by various multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank and the FAO, who actively facilitated FDI into developing land markets based on the assumption of its benefits to poverty alleviation (Shepard, 2010; International Land Coalition, 2011; TNI, 2012; World Bank, 2010; FAO, 2012; IFC 2012). The land grab narrative would never have surfaced had it not been for the increasing concerns related to the outcomes of the surge in FDI. For as close monitoring by academics and NGO's revealed, these large scale land acquisitions were frequently occurring to the detriment of former land users (German et al, 2011; Mabikke, 2011; Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008; Nyari 2012; Salomão & Nhantumbo, 2009; Schoneveld et al, 2011; Vermeulen & Cotula 2010; The Oakland Institute, 2012; Kusiluka, 2011; Massay, 2012). The following core assumptions can be distilled from this narrative:

- The global land rush is a new phenomenon caused by a multitude of crises
- The global land rush involves large scale acquisitions for agriculture

• The global land rush emanates from the global realm and impacts on the local level

The initial debate

The initial land grab debate consisted of contributions which, despite their varying valuations of the global land rush, generally accepted the assumptions underlying the above narrative. We will demonstrate this by distinguishing three general approaches which dominated the initial debate.

The first approach is that of populist 'anti-landgrabbing' perspective, generally associated with the campaigns of INGO's, often targeting broader audiences. This approach fits what Borras & Franco have called the use of land grabbing as a 'catch-all phrase', which 'builds on familiar, iconic images from the past of (Northern) companies and governments enclosing commons (mainly land and water), dispossessing peasants and indigenous peoples, and ruining the environment (in the South) (Borras & Franco, 2012, p.34). Overall this approach is characterized by extreme simplicity, generally suggesting land grabbing to be a unified and coherent global phenomenon. A strict binary is upheld in terms of winners and losers, with global actors (investors, International finance institutions, etc.) being identified as the aggressors and 'local communities' as the victims (see for example: Oxfam, 2012). Consequentially the responsibility for land grabbing by this approach has been sought in the international realm.

The second approach is essentially the counterweight to the first, and consists of the contributions made by multilateral donor agencies. Seen from this perspective FDI into agriculture is defined as the prerequisite to poverty alleviation. The global land rush (albeit a term rarely deployed by these organizations) is therefore viewed in terms of potential. This is not to say that the mounting evidence of the adverse impacts of large-scale land acquisitions has not been recognized by these institutions. For example, a well known 2010 report by the World Bank reveled that 'many investments (...) instead of generating sustainable benefits contributed to asset loss and left people worse off than they would have been without the investments' (World Bank, 2010, p.71). This did not lead to an ideological reassertion however, illustrated by a 2012 World Band press release stating that 'Now, more than ever, the world needs to increase investment in agriculture (...) Both smallholder and large-scale agriculture are necessary to boost productivity and produce enough food to feed the world's poor' (World Bank, 2012). Instead, the mounting accusations of land grabbing have been internalized by these international institutions in the form of international standards and guidelines intended to secure 'win-win' outcomes. This 'flurry of global rule making projects' (Margulis et al, 2013, p.4) has lead to a hodgepodge of initiatives by a variety of platforms such as the FAO, CFS,

World Bank, G8, G20, EU and AU, none of which are binding and all of which are intended to support FDI o agriculture (ibid.).

Finally, sitting at a sensible academic distance from the politically charged first and second approaches, is the third approach occupied by empirical researchers. The majority of research on which the land grab debate has been based has been in the form of geographically fixed case studies into the outcomes of acquisitions for former land users (see for example: Schoneveld et al, 2011; Sulle & Nelson 2009; Kusiluka eta al, 2011). Based on the impacts on their 'livelihoods', these studies have revealed that large-scale land acquisitions routinely occur to the detriment of former land users. A characteristic tendency of this approach has been to occupy a middle ground, pointing both to negative outcomes and the potentially positive impacts of investments towards (a generally undefined concept of) 'rural development' (see for example Schoneveld et al, 2011). While 'outcomes' have generally determined the valuations of large-scale land acquisitions by these researcher, their case studies have also shown sever deficiencies in terms accountability and transparency during negotiations processes. The case based and outcome focus of these researches have lead the majority of such research to lacking in structural critique.

When reviewing the founding narrative of land grabbing in light of these three approaches it apparent that these perspective have taken the narrative as an uncritical starting point. As a consequence, the various contributions have therefore been concerned with arguing the *desirability* of the global land rush, as opposed to the *correctness* of its underlying assumptions. A number of recent publications have questioned the manner in which land grabbing has been framed. Within this context Deiniger has criticized the dominance of preconceived notions within the debate, while Alden Wiley (2012) has drawn attention to the fact that the majority of research has been descriptive and ahistorical, thus divorcing land grabs from broader structural processes. In the following sections we will address these persistent assumptions in light of some critical additions to the land grab debate.

The agricultural assumption

Agriculture has become a central concern in relation to the various global crises. Food production is obviously a central concern of the global food crises and food security agenda, while bio-fuels are central to concerns relating to the global energy and environmental crises. The increasing demand for agricultural land, together with the global financial crises, gave way to the 'rediscovery of agriculture' by investors (World Bank, 2010, p.1). Consequentially the land grab debate has been dominated by concerns relating to agricultural acquisitions (Zoomers, 2010). Without questioning the significance of agricultural land ownership changes, a number of publications have started to draw attention to new 'grabs' which fall outside the reach of this narrow focus. The concept of 'greengrabbing' has focused concerns towards the increasing process of land alienation in reference to environmental concerns (Fairhead et al 2012; Corson & MacDonald, 2012; Benjaminsen et al, 2012; TNI, 2012, Tienhaara, 2012; Kabiri, 2011; Noe, 2013; Nelson et al, 2012). Although the notion of 'green grabbing' is a relatively new concept, it's ideological basis is rooted in critiques of conservation and the commoditization of nature, critiques which predated or run parallel to the land grab debate (See for example: Neuman, 1998; Escobar 1996; Holmes, 2007; Brockington 2008). Green grabbing as a concept, therefore essentially signifies the reintroduction of this established line of critique, placing a strong emphasis on post-strucutralist notions of power/knowledge dynamics and discourse. This is exemplified by Corson & McDonald's (2012) argument that representation and narratives play a crucial role in legitimizing green grabs, while Fairhead et al (2012) draw attention to the relationships between the science and policy worlds which 'establishes these commodities and the operation of markets' behind the green economy (p.241).

That land is not the only subject of 'grabs' has been illustrated by growing scholarly attention to the impacts of large-scale agriculture on water stocks. Agricultural inherently requires an abundance of water, large-scale agriculture is therefore logically dependent on large-scale water stocks. Many of the developing countries where the global land rush has manifested itself however are struggling with water scarcities. Consequentially large-scale agriculture has been shown to further exacerbate the pressure on this finite resource, leading to concerns 'water grabbing' and 'blue grabbing' (Rulli et al, 2012; Mehta et al, 2012; Woodhouse, 2012; Benajaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Duvail et al, 2012; Hertzog, 2012; Bues & Theesfeld, 2012). The question of water introduces a dimension which supersedes the tendency to evaluate large-scale land acquisitions solely in terms of impacts on the acquired land. As argued by Mehta et al 'the fluid nature of water and its fluctuating variability across time and space, and multiple scales (upstream, downstream, across the watershed or basin) have tremendous impacts on water allocation, reallocation, distribution and quality both now and in the future' (2012, p. 194). The water dimension should therefore serve to unsettle even the most optimistic advocate of technicist 'management' solutions to land grabbing. For the degree of institutional capacity required to manage and monitor the distribution of such a fluid resource through time and space is obviously multiple times greater than that required to 'manage' such a geographically fixed resource as land. This begs the question of how institutions, which have repeatedly demonstrated an inability to manage the just distribution of land, can be expected to 'manage' the additional complexity inherent to the water dimension.

Expanding the concept of 'grabs' even further are those authors which have questioned the relevance of focusing on land at all, arguing that it is not the ownership of land which constitutes the end goal of acquisitions, but the control over land based wealth. In this vein McCarthy et al have introduce the concept of 'virtual land grabs' which they define as 'situations where, behind a facade of land acquisition for a stated purpose, there lies an agenda to appropriate subsidies, obtain bank loans using land permits as collateral, or speculate on future increases in land values' (2012, p.523). Virtual land grabs point to the fact that researchers should demonstrate caution when labeling acquisitions as 'failed' based on unmet contractual agreements, for this takes for granted the assumption that investors had such an initial intention at all. The concept of virtual land grabs, as well as green grabbing, can additionally be placed within broader context of 'land control'. This concept has been introduced by Peluso & Lund describing 'practices that fix or consolidate forms of access, claiming, and exclusion for some time. Enclosure, territorialization, and legalization processes, as well as force and violence (or the threat of them)' (2011, p.668). This concept highlights various means which are used to secure control over land based wealth and that these means are often formally, legally and institutionally supported (Alden Wily, 2012; Hall 2011; Li, 2011). Land control therefore does not presuppose the physical displacement of people from the land, but can also entail their adverse incorporation into vertically controlled corporate regimes, such as those found in contract farming schemes (Da Vià, 2011). On this Hall has argued that it is not just land, minerals and water which is being grabbed but also 'the cheap labour with which to exploit these' (2011, p.207).

These critical additions to the land grab debate show that land grabbing is by no means restricted to agricultural land and that the grabs themselves are not restricted to land either. All grabs essentially entail 'control' grabs (TNI, 2012). With this, we move onto the second assumption of the founding narrative.

The crises-driver assumption

The tendency within the dominant land grab debate to view the global land rush as being driven by the convergent global crises is a problematic one. This essentially assumes that land grabbing is a phenomenon which came about largely due to contingent factors. While the *increase in demand* for land can indeed be attributed to these crises, the institutional basis which constructed and facilitated this demand cannot (Margulis et al, 2013; Shepard, 2010; Stephens, 2011). The tendency to view the global crises as the starting point has lead to a debate which has largely been divorced from this broader historical and political context (Alden Wily, 2012).

An increasing amount of publications have opted for a broader contextual analysis placing the global land rush firmly within the institutional project of neo-liberal globalization (Margulis et al, 2013; Zoomers, 2010; Alden Wily, 2012; Stephens, 2011; McCarthy et al, 2012; Adnan, 2013; TNI, 2012). Seen from this perspective the global land rush should not be analyzed in terms of a radical shift, but in terms of continuation and intensification of this project. With private capital accumulation as their central concern, the institutions of neo-liberalism have not only facilitated the trade in existing commodities, but also the *construction* of new commodities and markets. Land markets, property rights and the various 'green' commodities all constitute such recent commodity constructs (Adnan, 2013; Fairhead et al, 2012; Corson & McDonald, 2012). It is this continued process of expanding commodification which has prompted the reintroduction of the Marxist notion of 'primitive accumulation' (Adnan, 2013; Corson & McDonald, 2012; Martiniello, 2012) and the use Harvey's concept of 'accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey, 2003; Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Adnan, 2013; Martiniello, 2012) as a holistic lens to analyze the broader process of capitalist accumulation of which land grabbing is a manifestation. Seen from this perspective, the true driver of land grabbing is the project of neo-liberal globalization together with its institutional components. This shift in focus essentially entails reframing land grabbing from a cause to a symptom of deeper structural drivers. 'Zooming out' to this structural level also reveals that land ownership changes are by no means the only symptom. The privatization of rights to nature (Corson & McDonald, 2012), the decline of the commons (Alden Wily, 2008) and corporately controlled agro-food chains (Da Vià, 2011) are just some of the dimensions of social and agrarian change brought forth by these drivers.

Carrying on from this perspective there is an obvious irony in the fact that those institutions currently most influential in formulating policy intended to prevent land grabs, are the same institutions which paved the way for land grabs to occur at their current scale (Margulis et al, 2013). It is hardly surprising therefore that these institutional components of neo-liberal globalization have left their ideological foundations untouched in search for solutions to this problem. Currently therefore, international financial and development institutions 'prioritize procedural safeguards to curb the excesses of 'grabbing' in the forms of a 'code of conduct' or 'principles to guide responsible agro-investment' (...) rather than questioning the paradigm of development that promotes such deals, and the directions of agrarian change that they precipitate (Hall, 2011, p.207). Within this context a range of technical administrative measures have been suggested with which land markets are to be 'managed', thus mitigating 'risks' while capitalizing on 'opportunities' (World Bank, 2010). This tendency towards technical fixes has been criticized by a number of authors for its neglect of local power dynamics (Hall, 2011; Borras & Franco, 2010a; Borras & Franco, 2010b; Borras & Franco,

2012; Li, 2011). Within this context Borras & Franco have argued that 'dominant groups and classes in society can easily influence technicist, top-down, administrative processes due to the extensive reach of their influence inside and outside the state bureaucracy' (2010a, p.23). Consequentially, what has been offered as a solution in the form of administrative mechanisms, may in fact prove to be a mechanism for formalized land grabbing by elites (see also: Deiniger, 2011). Here again there is an inescapable irony in the fact that the very institutions which facilitate elite capture are being put forward as the solutions to land grabbing. As argued again by Borras & Franco 'foreign direct investment through large-scale land acquisitions is still seen as the answer despite the "risks"; in fact, on this view, it is *because* of the risks that some kind of management mechanism is needed'. (2010b, p.512). Thus, instead of revealing the inherently contradictory nature of neo-liberal globalization, land grabbing has essentially served to further legitimize its steady institutional expansion. The ahistorical and descriptive tendency of the dominant land grab debate has, wittingly or unwittingly, served to depoliticize these deeply political processes.

The global driver-local impact assumption

The question of local power dynamics raises an issue which has been all but absent in the dominant land grab debate; The role of domestic actors. The majority of solutions and responsibility for land grabbing by FDI advocates and 'anti-land grabbing' CSO's alike, have been sought in the international realm (Borras & Franco, 2012). While the global land rush is indeed an obvious example of global-local dynamics, it would be mistaken to assume that this entails little more than a 'local' submission to will of 'the global'. For example standing between the global and the local, at least conceptually, is the oft overlooked realm of national governments. Far from being institutionally irrelevant, national governments constitute the only actors which 'have the absolute authority to carry out these key legal-administrative steps to facilitate land deals' (Borass et al, 2013, p.163). Consequentially national governments play a decisive role in facilitating land deals and capturing land based wealth (Borass et al, 2013; Hall, 2011; Nelson et al, 2012; Alden Wiley, 2012). The tendency of seeking solutions and responsibility solely in the realm of international non state actors, as many INGO's advocacy campaigns have done, has essentially served to exempt these national governments of their responsibility.

Aside from deeming the role of domestic governments as nonexistent or irrelevant, there has been a persistent tendency in the land grab debate of attributing a shared victimhood to the 'local' (see for example: Oxfam, 2012). Leading from this is the implicit assumption that 'local communities' are inherently against large-scale land acquisitions. This is a problematic assumption which is not

grounded in empiric realities. As argued by Borras & Franco, the 'local' 'include elite local chiefs, corrupt petty officials, local bosses, local bullies, moneylenders, landlords and rich farmers, who have competing class interests that are different from, and typically opposed to, the interests of small farmers or landless labourers' (2012; p.47). In fact, a case study review by Deiniger of large-scale land acquisitions in various continents lead to the observation that, 'virtually everywhere local investors, rather than foreign ones, were dominant players' (2011, p.225). The work of Hall (2011) on Southern Africa (2011), of McCarthy et al (2012) on Indonesia, Nelson et al (2012) on Tanzania and Adnan (2013) on Bangladesh have further identified local elites as key actors engaging in and facilitating land grabs. The consequences of associating 'local communities' with victimhood, and simply as passive recipients of 'impacts' and 'outcomes', reaches further then assuming a fictional unity of interests. Discursively it essentially serves to rob people of their agency, neglecting their ability to influence land grabs. As the previously mentioned authors have observed however, local level actors play a key role in influencing land deals. In addition to local actors engaging in land grabbing, a number of publications have shown land deals to be severely hampered by local resistance (Neville & Dauvergne, 2012; McCarthy 2012; Nelson et al, 2012; Adnan, 2013; Mehta et al, 2012).

The fact that the 'global land rush' is both facilitated and resisted at the international, national and local level sits uncomfortably with the tendency within the dominant land grab debate to view it as a 'single, coherent process that explains all manner of political-economic programs across a wide variety of settings' (McCarthy et al, 2012). For while the critical addition mentioned above identify neo-liberal globalization as the true driver, this is by no means to say that it's concrete manifestations are by any means uniform. As McCarthy et al's (2012) comparative case study of rice, oil palm, jatropha and carbon trading in Indonesia revealed, the various forms of land control each imply a different set of actors, institutional arrangements, biophysical requirements and outcomes, making it difficult to distinguish a singular overarching process. As argued by Hall therefore 'The term 'land grabbing' – while mobilising – patently fails to capture the range of actual experiences. It is not so much that the term lumps together 'apples and oranges'; it is more like 'apples and combine harvesters'' (2011, p.207).

Political solutions for political problems

The critical additions the land grab debate discussed above constitute something of a political turn within this debate. While the initial debate was devoid of any structural critique, the political turn has signified an emergence of critical holistic analyses of the phenomenon of land grabbing. Within this context post-structuralist methods, (Neo) Marxism and political ecology are becoming increasingly popular. In terms of real policy and decision making power however, it is essentially business as usual in the realm of the global governance powerhouses (Margulis et al, 2013). The free flow of global capital still has top priority, which has resulted in a number of flaccid attempts at reigning back land grabbing without harming this primary concern. The patchwork of initiatives undertaken by these international institutions have generally sought the solution in the realm of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and domestic governance, both of which are severely deficient. As argued by Li (2011) 'is against the prevailing capital-logic to expect private investors to take the lead in designing and managing schemes that reduce their profits' and thus that 'poverty reduction cannot be left to corporations' (2011, p. 288-9). In relation to the governance solution Stephens has argued that institutions such as the World Bank are fully aware of the institutional under-capacity in target countries, and that they are therefore 'disingenuous in their assumptions that host states will be able to implement the necessary changes to safeguard themselves against land grabbing' (2011, p.18). In addition to this, as was addressed previously, it is national governments themselves which have often been engaged in 'laying the welcome mat ' for FDI into their lands (Alden Wiley, 2012, p.769). It is therefore either naive or intentionally deceptive to leave the prevention of land grabbing to the discretion of the primary beneficiaries of land deals.

Perhaps the most salient shortcoming of this approach is the assumption that there is an unproblematic relationship between top down policies and concrete practices. As argued by a number of authors however, it is power dynamics which 'define winners and losers' (Fairhead et al, 2012, p.250; see also: Li, 2011; Bues & Theesfeld, 2012; Borras & Franco, 2012; Borras & Franco, 2010a; Hall, 2011; McCarthy et al, 2012). Translating pro-poor policies into pro-poor *processes and outcomes*, implies dedicated allies of the poor in positions of power (Borras & Franco, 2010a). As we have mentioned earlier however, local power dynamics often tend to serve the interests of elites to the detriment of the powerless. Therefore even if investors and governments were to formally adopt policy measures intended to prevent land grabbing, these initiatives would still stand or fall based on the interests of local power holders.

Within the context of the political turn, land grabbing has therefore been defined as a problem of power balances, and a political problem logically requires a political solution. It is within this context that the concepts of social movement has surfaced as a means of creating a counter balance in favor of the interests of the powerless (Borass et al, 2011; Borras & Franco, 2010a; Borras et al, 2013; Mckeon, 2013; Li, 2011; Mehta et al, 2012). Within this context a variety of possible contributions

have been theorized which domestic social movements could make, spanning from the local to the international level. At the local and national level social movements have been mentioned as agents with the ability to inform and mobilize the poor while acting as a watchdog over land deals and policy processes (Borras & Franco, 2010a; Borras & Franco, 2010b; Li, 2011; Borras et al, 2013). Adnan (2013) and Martiniello (2012) on the other hand have argued that social movements have the ability to resist processes of primitive accumulation. Other publications have addressed the (potential) ability of domestic social movements to inform international policy spaces by linking with broader transnational social movements (Margulis et al, 2013; Mckeon, 2013; Borras et al, 2013) and creating counter narratives (Muradiana et al, 2012; Mehta et al, 2012).

Despite the optimism towards the contributions of social movements however, a closer look at the publications advancing this argument show that there is still much empirical and theoretical work to be done. Empirically, social movements in target countries have yet to be analyzed within the context of land grabbing. As argued by Borras et al (2011) there is a significant knowledge gap relating to such processes of organized resistance in target countries, both in concrete and discursive terms. Consequentially, previously mentioned writings on social movements are generally based on their *assumed* potential and rarely on their empirically demonstrated potential. The lack of empirical grounding is further illustrated by the generally uncritical adoption of the concept of 'social movement', suggesting a readily observable phenomenon 'out there'. A review of the vast body of social movement literature however reveals that this is a problematic assumption. The tendency to view social movements as actors in their own right is not reflective of the contingent, conflicting and often contradictory nature of organized social mobilization (Gillan, 2008). In reality therefore, social movement analysis is still an uncharted territory within the context of the global land rush.

Moving forward

The additions to the land grab debate have signified a reemergence of critical theories which have challenged the current paradigm governing global development. Instead of depoliticizing these structures and seeking the solution *within* neo-liberal globalization, it is the project of neo-liberal globalization itself which is increasingly being viewed as the root cause. This is not a new observation, and has been the general tenet of various critical development theories. An oft heard argument regarding such critical theories however is their tendency towards generalizations and abstraction which inhibits their ability to be translated to practice oriented recommendations. The local essentialism of post-development theory and the abstract deconstructions of post-structuralism and political ecology (Walker, 2006; Nederveen Pieterse, 2009; Rapley, 2007) are examples of such

theories which have been brushed aside based on this argument. Indeed it is hard to argue against the fact that critical theories have, thus far, rarely been strategically operationalized. Despite this however, the 'practice argument' is incomplete due to the fact that the practice of development is generally governed by those same institutions whose legitimacy is questioned by these theories. It should therefore come as no surprise that these institutions have not made any serious attempts to translate critical theory to practice.

Social movements however, are inherently practice oriented. Their ability to counter adverse power relations and articulate the voice 'from below' (Bebbington et al, 2010) demonstrates their ability to embody the ideals of critical theories. This insight, together with the increasing attention for social movements within the land grab debate, signals the need to further explore the concept social movements within the context of land control.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

What is a social movement?

Throughout history social movements have demonstrated the ability to dramatically change society and social relations. According to Christiansen, scholars have therefore spent 'a great deal of time trying to understand where they come from, who participates in them, how they succeed, and how they fail' (2009, p.1). While the body of literature on social movements is indeed extremely vast, Christiansen's observation implicitly points to a significant gap in much of this literature. For by focusing on the origins, participation, and relative success or failure of social movements, the majority of scholars have not attempted to define what a social movement actually is, thus implicitly taking this as a conceptually unproblematic starting point. As argued by Gillian however, 'when a researcher defines a social movement as an object of study they necessarily reify what is, in fact, a set of events and processes that may have competing interpretations' (2008, p.3). While the actions, claims and impacts of social movements actors are observable to some extent, it is important to recognize that social movements are in fact social constructs. We should therefore refrain from assigning this concept an unwarranted ontological weight by assuming an independent, objective existence. Any empirical social movement analysis is therefore inherently tentative. The following references to social movements throughout this thesis should therefore be read while taking this into mind.

While recognizing this inherently problematic nature of social movements, Bebbington et al provide the following useful definition:

'A process of mobilisation that is sustained across time and space, rather than as a specific organisation. Thus, while formal organisations can be part of social movements, movements are more than formalised actors and also include the more nebulous, uncoordinated, and cyclical forms of collective action, popular protest and networks that serve to link organised and dispersed actors in processes of social mobilisation. (...) social movements are 'politically and/or socially directed collectives' of usually several networks and organizations aiming to change elements of the political, economic and social system'. (Bebbington et al, 2010, p.1306)

In another publication Bebbington (2010) sets this definition apart from 'short term campaigns or a week of street protests, arguing that 'when protests and campaigns are linked to a series of other activities, sustained over time and across different geographical locations, and all ultimately oriented toward making a similar set of arguments, then the phenomenon differs from a mere mobilization and specific campaign and reflects something that might be referred to as a "social movement' (p.1). Mobilization in itself does not constitute a social movements. What sets social movements apart from spontaneous short-lived mobilizations is therefore a degree of sustained and coordination intent among the actors engaged in it. It is due to this that social movements research has often taken the formal counterparts, generally referred to as Social Movements Organizations (SMO's), as the units of study (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Jenkins, 1983).

In addition to differing from short lived campaigns, social movements aim of realizing change differ from similar attempts which are limited to existing institutional channels. As argued by Haunss, social movements 'always signify, to a certain degree, a breaching of the limits of the existing representative arrangements. Social movements develop when other channels of influence are not available, or are, at least, not promising' (2007, p.161). Seen from this perspective a political party and its followers, operating within the confines of the existing political system, does not constitute a social movement. Social movements therefore always imply a challenge to the legitimacy of existing political arrangements (Hauns, 2007). This is not to say that social movements operate solely outside the existing political system. For aside from having a horizontal dimension, consisting of like minded activists, successful social movements generally have a vertical dimension consisting of 'strategic alliances with politically and economically powerful actors, often at the national and international levels' (Campbell et al, 2010, p.967)

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A final definitional issue which needs be addressed in respect to the tendency of viewing social movements as 'things' is the fact the that this suggests a greater deal of internal coherence then is often the case. Social movements rarely consist solely of coalitions of like-minded and mutually cooperative actors, and are often fractured and subject to a significant degree of internal competition (Gillan, 2008; Bebbington et al, 2010; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Jenkins 1983; Caldeira, 2008). Additionally, due to the temporal nature and often unpredictable evolution of social movements, participant actors generally do not 'sign on' unconditionally for an indefinite period of time. As argued by Snow et al, 'Decisions to participate over time are thus subject to frequent reassessment and renegotiation' (Snow et al, 1986, p.466-7).

Amidst these temporal, dynamic and conflicting characteristics it is the shared social/political grievance, and corresponding desire for change, which binds the parts together under the common conceptual banner 'social movement' (Gillan, 2008).

Social movements and civil society

Social movement theory and development theory represent two relatively independent disciplines, both with their own conceptual vocabularies. Integrating both approaches can therefore lead to confusing conceptual parallels. For instance, in relation to land grabbing, Margulis et al have spoken of the mobilization of 'global civil society and transnational social movements' (2013; p.2), McKeon has argued of 'rural social movements and civil society organizations' exploiting the current political opportunity (2013, p. 106), while Borras et al observe an increasingly complex terrain 'for social movements and civil society campaigners' (2013, p.175). For the purpose of this research it is important to clarify the relationship between social movements and the 'third realm' of civil society, for there is a greater degree of overlap between both concepts then mentioning them as two distinct categories would suggest. Bringing social movement analysis into development theory therefore requires a degree of 'conceptual housekeeping' in order to achieve a coherent vocabulary.

In social movements literature, the organizational components of movements are referred to as SMO's (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). As observed by Haunss (2007) these are often the same organizations that are referred to as NGO's in civil society literature. This overlap is further complicated by the concept of civil society organizations (CSO's). As a concept, civil society has been the subject of much academic debate and its use has ranged from normative to descriptive (Orvis, 2001). In the most neutral terms, civil society is defined as an 'arena conceptually distinct from the state, market and individual households, in which people come together in formal and informal groups to promote their shared interests, either alone or through interactions with others, with the

state, the market and with individuals' (Riddel, 2007, p.302). This definition implies that social movements operate *within* the realm of civil society. Therefore we can logically assume that SMO's are CSO's, and that the formal counterparts of social movements are also CSO's.

Dimensions of a social movement

According to Christiansen (2009), for each successful social movement there have been as least as many which have not succeeded in their aims. The vast majority of social movement literature has therefore aimed at analyzing which features determine a social movements relative success or failure. Keeping fully in the tradition of social sciences, this has given way to a great degree of debate, critique and refutations within the field of social movement research. A review of the key approaches in social movement theory reveals that these debates are essentially debates about scientific paradigms. Consequentially the majority of contributions have consisted of debating the relationship between structuralist, constructivist and actor oriented perspectives of social movements, while generally arguing the validity of one approach over the other (See for structure/construct debate: Polletta & Kai Ho, 2006; Polletta, 1999; Joachim, 2003; Gamson & Meyer, 1996; For actor/structure debate: Rootes, 1999; Meyer, 2004; Tarrow, 1996; For actor/construct debate: Jenkins, 1983; Caldeira, 2008; For structure/actors/construct debate: Snow et al, 1986; Benford, 1997). In reaction to this tendency within social movement literature Fuchs has argued that 'searching for singular laws of the emergence of movements is an expression of one dimensional, linear, and deterministic thinking', a mode of thinking which does not reflect the complexity of social change (2006, p.101). In keeping with this line of argument the following framework will adopt theories from these three paradigms as complementary *dimensions* of social movements. Resource mobilization and agency theory will represent the actor dimension, political opportunity the structuralist dimension and frame theory will be used for the constructivist dimension. The incorporation of these theories into a singular framework will serve the purpose of drawing up deductive categories with which to identify, explain and predict social movements. It is important to note that each approach signifies a body of theory, contributed to by numerous theorists, as opposed to a single theory of a single scholar. Due to the fact that each theory and concept incorporated into this framework has, at some time, lead to considerable discussion and/or criticism among academic peers, each will be presented within the context of these discussions. By doing so we wish to convey our awareness of the criticisms of each theory's shortcomings, while simultaneously highlighting their strengths and relevance.

Agency theory & resource mobilization

The concept of agency originally derived from the ongoing sociological debate on the nature and relationship between actor and structure. The initial articulation of agency theory incorporated insights from both structuralist and actor perspectives. In doing so social life is defined as both positioned within broader structures of power, and as reflexive and capable of informed action (Long & van der Ploeg, 1994). This is a dialectical process in which both actor and structure are constituted in relation to one and other. From an agency perspective social life is seen as consisting of a constant process of strategic reassertion within imperfect information flows and broader networks. It is relational as well as it is processual. The ability to realize agency is therefore not determined by certain unchanging cognitive abilities or technical capacities, but by a social forms ability to act strategically within a changing environment. In relation to the practice oriented field of development studies, this somewhat abstract definition of agency has been translated as following; An actor's ability 'to make informed choices in the face of external agendas and powerful actors, and the capacity to act on those choices' (Vorley et al, 2012, p.5). A further concretization is offered by Blokland & Gouët (2008) who's writing on farmers organizations define agency as being determined an organizations level of vertical and horicatonal integration; Vertical in terms of it's internal top to bottom information flows, and horizontal in terms of their positioning and within broader networks.

Agency theory is most relevant for the analysis of individual actors and less to movements as a whole. It's emphasis on strategy, networks and information does however have strong similarities with resource mobilization theory, which is specifically focused on understanding social movements in their entirety. According to this theory, the success of social movements is dependent primarily on the capability of their formally organized counterparts (SMO's), to strategically mobilize resources (McArthy & Zald, 1977). This focus has also become known as the 'entrepreneurial model' of social movements (Jenkins, 1983, p.531). It is not surprising therefore that resource mobilization see's agency as 'the key factor in the development and proliferation of collective action" (McArthy & Wolfson, 1996, p.1071). The term 'resource' is further subdivided into material resources; Such as financial capital and manpower, and non-material resources such as legitimacy and personnel connection etc. (Fuchs, 1996). One of the theory's most significant contributions has been the observation that social movements mobilize resources from institutions which predate social movement and are often not explicitly aligned with their goals. Direct beneficiaries of social movements cause are therefore not the only source of a movements resources. Media, universities, government, corporations and social institutions are examples of such resource sources which SMO's pull from (Jenkins, 1983). According to resource mobilization theory, competition over resources is

fierce, not only between movements and countermovement's (those who mobilize in opposition to another movements aims) but also between SMO's belonging to the same movement.

According to McCarthy & Wolfson (1996) there are three general SMO strategies:

- Bringing certain social conditions to wide audiences through public education
- Direct services to 'the victims of the social conditions movement leaders and adherents define as unacceptable' (p.1070)
- Structural change aimed at laws regimes and/or authorities.

Both agency theory as well as resource mobilization theory has come under considerable criticism however. Although agency theory was originally articulated as a synthesis between actor and structure theories, the concept has since been criticized for its emphasis on strategy and the underlying assumption of rational and planned action (Kaag et al, 2004, p.67). Indeed little of the original concept's emphasis on imperfect information and continutal change seems to have translated to the practice oriented definitions mentioned above. In fact, the previously mentioned sociological debate about the relationship between actor and structure, has since then been rearticulated as a debate between agency and structure by various commentators (Benford, 1997; Meyer & Minkhoff 2004; Meyer, 2004). Instead of offering a middle ground between actor and structure, it would seem that the concept of agency has been placed firmly within the actor camp. This argument is even more relevant in relation to resource mobilization theory, which states explicitly that movement participation is based on a rational calculation of costs and benefits in relations to a movements goals (McArthy & Zald, 1997). The key shortcoming of resource mobilization and agency is the assumption that a movements success is dependent solely on the aptitude of individual organizations. This completely neglects the fact that actors enact their strategies within broader (political) structures, and that these structures determine to a large extent 'the rules of the game' within which they operate and organize (Meyer, 2004). Another deficit is that these theories they fail to address why movements occur and what motivates their actions. Grievances motivating participation are assumed as unproblematic and structurally given. This neglects the extent in which grievances and motivation are in fact socially constructed and thus subject to a variety of interpretations.

The shortcomings of agency and resource mobilization point to the need to incorporate insights from theories which compensate these deficiencies, but not to discard them completely. As argued by

Benford 'we should keep in mind that these things we call "social movements" and their organizational manifestations are comprised of interacting, co-acting, and reacting human beings (...) Social movements do not engage in protest, violence, frame contests, and the like; human beings do these things' (Benford, 1997, p.418). Although not the only determinant, agency and resources are still a defining feature of an movements success.

Political opportunity theory

As previously mentioned, social movements occur within, and are conditioned by, broader political structures. Returning to Tanzania's post-dependence era provides a prime example of how political structures can enable or restrict social movements. Political opportunity theory, also known as political process theory (Meyer, 2004), is focused specifically at this level. Rootes describes the principle of political opportunity theory as follows, 'political actors make history, but they do not do so in circumstances of their own making. Instead, they encounter constraints and are presented with opportunities configured by the institutional arrangements and the prevailing patterns political power which are the inescapable contexts of political action' (Rootes, 1999, p.75).

Social movements are therefore not only dependent on internal capacities, but on external structures. Based on a synthesis of political opportunity literature McAdams identified the following four broad levels of political opportunity (1996, p. 27)

- 'The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system'
- 'The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity'
- 'The presence or absence of elite allies'
- 'The states capacity and propensity for repression'

Looking at these four levels we can see political opportunity relates both to political institutions as it does to power relations. In doing so political opportunity incorporates both fixed and dynamic conceptions of structure, signifying an integration of insights from the structuralist leaning of political science (with its focus on institutions) and the post-structuralist leaning of sociology (with its focus on dynamic power relations) (Rootes, 1999). This broad coverage see's political opportunities influencing all facets of a social movements, from mobilization, the type of claims advanced, the type of alliances which are cultivated, the type of strategies employed, and the influence of a movement on politics and policy (Meyer, 2004).

As argued by Tarrow (1996) social mobilization has a demonstration effect which can serve to inspire or deter potential followers. Consequentially vanguard and pioneer movements not only react to political opportunities, but in doing so demonstrate the possibilities of collective action to others, thus creating new political opportunities. Tarrow identified the following four ways in which collective action and influence political opportunities (1996, p.58-60):

- Expanding a groups own opportunities: A groups actions can influence its own political opportunities
- *Expanding opportunities for others*: This can be both positive and negative; Groups can demonstrate possibilities to allied groups
- *Creating opportunity for others*: Groups can also unwittingly create opportunities for countermovement if they offend others. If they make extreme policy demands, they can also be outmaneuvered by groups posing the same claim but in a more acceptable form.
- Making opportunities for elites: The opportunities created by groups can also be seized by
 political elites who "seize the opportunity created by challengers to proclaim themselves as
 tribunes of the people" (Tarrow, 1996, p.60)

Tarrows conception of political opportunity is essentially a dialectical conception of structure and actor. It is very much reminiscent of the original conception of agency theory described earlier, in which both structure and actor are seen as being mutually constituted (Long & van der Ploeg, 1994).

Another aspect which political opportunity research has uncovered is the apparently contradictory relationship between opportunities for extra-institutional mobilization and opportunities for institutional change. According to Meyer (2004) movements are more likely to succeed at mobilizing extra-institutional support when government policies are particularly hostile and when routes to institutional policy influence seem foreclosed, which are 'precisely those times when they (movements) are unlikely to get what they want in terms of policy' (Meyer, 2004, p.137). With this insight Meyer forward the need to distinguish between activistic/extra-institutional movements and those aimed and reformist policy change. It also provides a challenge to the notion advanced by resource mobilization theory that participation is the result of a calculated prospect of change

(Meyer, 2004), for extra-institutional mobilization generally occurs when existing prospects for change are low.

Although political opportunity theory provides a much needed structural component to the social movement framework, the approach has not been without its criticisms. These criticisms can be broadly grouped into two categories. The first category of criticism relates to the theories analytical ambitions. According to Gamson and Meyer (1996) political opportunity threatens to become an all-encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that form the context of collective action. Used to explain to much, it may ultimately explain nothing at all' (Gamson & Meyer, 1996, p.275). According to Rootes (1999) this analytical overstretching has resulted from the incorporation of both political and sociological conceptions of structure.

The second category of criticism is of particular relevance for this framework due to it pointing to a dimension which is also lacking in agency and resource mobilization theory, namely that of interpretation. This is due to political opportunity being presumed as *objective* and structurally given (Polletta, 1999; Benford 1997; Gamson & Meyer, 1996). On this Gamson & Meyer (1996) write 'An opportunity unrecognized is no opportunity at all. There is a component of political opportunity involving the perception of possible change that is above all else, a social construct.' (p.283). Snow et al, elaborate this point poignantly with the statement 'concern with interpretive issues in the everyday world is grounded in the readily documentable observation that both individual and corporate actors often misunderstand or experience consider-able doubt and confusion about what it is that is going on and why.' (Snow et al, 1986, p.466). Thus we see that the perception of opportunities is an interpretive act, and not simply the registration of an objective given. This criticisms lead us to the final of the social movements framework.

Frame theory

According to constructivists, power struggles are not only characterized by struggles over material resources, but also by struggles over meaning and the power to '(re-)define and (de-) legitimize' competing interpretations (Joachim, 2003, p.269). Such discursive struggles are characteristic of the political turn within the land grab debate, whereby not it is not only the distributive arrangements of land control which are questioned, but the underlying logic which legitimizes them (Borras et al, 2013, Muradiana et al, 2012; Mehta et al, 2012, Fairhead et al, 2012; Da Vià, 2011). It is this constructivist dimension which motivates mobilization and structures interpretation that is the primary focus of frame theory. Frame theory, or frame analysis, was first articulated in relation to

social movements in the mid 1980's during the rise of social constructivist theories and criticisms of 'structural determinism and crass utilitarianism' (Benford, 1997, p.409-10). It currently signifies one of the central concepts of social movements (Ferree & Merrill, 2000). The central notion of frame analysis is that the grievances which drive social movements are interpretive acts, and that they vary across individuals and organizations (Snow et al, 1986). Due to the interpretive process behind mobilization, the manifestation of social movements can never be derived solely from structural characteristics. The interpretive dimension also draws attention to a deficiency in agency theory's approach to information. For by viewing information as a neutral resource, the act of *interpreting* information is completely overlooked.

The concept of 'frames' refers to the interpretive angle from which grievances are approached. They provide 'collective patterns of interpretation with which certain definitions of problems, causal attributions, demands, justifications and value-orientations are brought together in a more or less consistent framework for the purpose of explaining facts, substantiating criticism and legitimating claims' (Gillan, 2008, p.4). Frames can be broken down into three general components. *Diagnostic frames,* which describes the social condition in need of changes, *prognostic frame* which offers proposed solutions, and *motivational frames* which consist of vocabulary motivating action and a 'call to arms' vocabulary which motivates action Benford & Snow (2000). The fact that frames consist of these clearly demarcated categories means they provide an analytically useful tool for ordering and comparing discourses.

From the perspective of frame theory mobilization occurs when the frame of movements come into alignments with the frames of actors in the 'sentiments pool' which is made up of potential followers . Snow et al (1986) developed an elaborate framework of the following frame alignment processes:

- Frame bridging: Frame bridging involves the linking of two similar but structurally unconnected interpretive frames. An example is that of an organization reaching out to a 'unmobilized sentiment pool' within a community, thus connecting the two. Mass media are vital tools for bridging.
- *Frame extension:* A movement can also increase followers and participants by strategically expanding its framework to include concerns of potential constituents and adherent pools which were previously not part of the movements framework.

- *Frame transformation:* In some cases movement frames are not congruent to and sometimes even opposing conventional frames. In this case movements can seek to plant new meanings and remove erroneous ones through the transformation of these conventional frames.
- *Frame amplification:* Involves clarifying and invigorating aspects of the interpretive frames of others which are lay dormant, have receded in priority or have been repressed. Frame amplification can be further subdivided into the amplification of values and beliefs. Value amplification consists of the amplification of values deemed necessary for a movements goals, but which have fallen into disuse. Belief amplification can be based on the following 5 beliefs:
 - Beliefs about a problem or grievance
 - o Beliefs about the cause of a problem and the who or what is to blame
 - o Beliefs about antagonists
 - o Beliefs about the need for, and probability of, change
 - Beliefs about the necessity of "standing up".


This process of framing is influenced by both social and strategic processes (Ferree & Merrill, 2000). This is due to the fact that framing is never conducted in a vacuum, but within a 'multi-organizational field' consisting of protagonists, antagonists and third parties within which frames are strategically modified, adopting and countered (Polletta & Kai Ho, 2006; Joachim, 2003). Frames are therefore both passive and active with existing frames constitute the structures on which new frames are strategically aligned (Caldeira 2008). According to Snow et al (1986), strategic framing is a complex and precarious. Frame extension for example, may win new constituents but may also alienate older followers and lead to a movements aims becoming less salient. Extensive frame bridging can also lead to potential followers becoming desensitized to a frame, particularly when competing movements deploy similar frame concepts in order to win over the same sentiment pool. Another vital contribution of frame theory to the study of social movements is their dynamic and temporal nature. Snow et al (1986) point to the fact that social movement actors rarely sign up on unconditionally to movements. As movements evolve so to do the stakes of their followers, 'decisions to participate over time are thus subject to frequent reassessment and renegotiation.' (Snow et al, 1986, p.466-7). These aspects form another criticism towards structuralist approaches, which tend to portray movements as coherent units, with the participation of their actors being static and timeless .(Snow, et al, 1986)

Finally, as argued by Gillan (2008) social movements are characterized by a significant level of internal ideational diversity. As a result broad based social movements may in fact consist of several

different specific yet normatively similar movements. The subject of inter movement networking has been researched by Carroll & Ratner (1996) who used the concept of 'master frames' to identify broader frames which underlie multiple movements, binding them together under a common normative orientation.

2.3 CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Figure 1.1: Integrated dimensions of social mobilization in respect to land contro



The process of mobilization

The conceptual model illustrates the process of mobilization based on an integration of the various social movement theories. At the top of the model is the individual CSO which adopts a particular frame (whether implicitly or explicitly). The frame also serves to interpret the political opportunity structures. The extent in which this frame is aligned with interests of potential supporters in the sentiment pool then determines the extent of resources which can be mobilized around the frame. These resources determine the nature and scope of strategies which can be engaged in, in accordance with the normative orientation of the collective frame. These strategies then occur within the formal (institutions) and informal (power balances) political opportunity structures, which again determine the extent in which these strategies translate into agency, and thus influence over land control. Social movements are by nature dynamic and temporal, each component of the mobilization process is therefore subjected to constant reassertion and change.

3: REGIONAL CONTEXT

3.1 HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES

Umajaa and Neo-liberalism

Conflicts over land control induced dispossession is no recent phenomenon in Tanzania. In order to more fully understand the context of this East African nation it is important to take into account it's historical background.

After gaining independence in 1961, Tanzanian politics embarked on a trajectory of socialist reform headed by president Julius Nyerere. This phase was officially ushered in by the Arusha declaration in 1967. The declaration was funded on the notion of Umajaa (familyhood) and self-reliance and placed agriculture at the center of the countries development. With the declaration the state was mandated to intervene in the economy and to mobilize the countries resources as a means to advance social and economic justice (HAKIARDHI, 2011). The declaration saw the enactment of two agricultural programs which would fundamentally change Tanzanian land governance and ownership (HAKIARDHI, 2011). The first program was that of Umajaa villagization which was aimed at maximizing agricultural production through collective farming. Villagization eventually lead to the relocation, both forced and voluntary, of up to five million citizens to village collectives (Nelson et al, 2012). The second program saw the introduction of nationalized agriculture projects which eventually lead to the establishment of two parastatal organizations to deal with crop production (NAFCO) and livestock (NARCO). These processes saw massive tracts of agricultural and grazing land come under central control.

Despite the government's efforts however, the Tanzanian economy went into a freefall during the 1970's and early 1980's (Nelson et al, 2012). This eventually lead to the collapse of the parastatals and the abandonment of villagization. This turn of events has been to attributed to a number of factors relating to villagization, the parastatals and Umajaa politics in general. In respect to villigization, it's failure has been attributed to a lack of understanding under the peasantry of its policies. As a result they were not able to properly implement it. Villagization was also met with considerable opposition from certain private farm owners who saw little prospect in relinquishing their property. The demise of the parastatals on the other hand has largely been attributed to corruption. Many of the executives who were assigned to run them were found to have drained resources for personal gain. In addition, these factors all came together in an era which was marked by a global shift to neo-liberal policies. With an imploded economy and failed villagization and

parastatals, Umajaa socialism was eventually abandoned. This marked a retreat of state interference with the economy and the adoption of neo-liberal policies (HAKIARDHI, 2011).

The neo-liberal shift, formalized in the 1991 Zanzibar resolution, saw a shift to government promotion of private accumulation and foreign investment. This ideological reassertion also saw the removal of legal constraints for private enterprising by public officials. These factors instigated a free-for all amongst investors and certain public officials, leading to investor and elite capture of former parastatal lands (Nelson et al, 2012). The scramble for land eventually lead to the enactment of a number of policy reforms as a result of outcry's from civil society organizations. Most notable was the formulation of the village land act of 1999, which decentralized the governance of village lands to village councils and granted equal legal recognition to customary land rights. To this day the village land act is seen as one of the most progressive land reforms (Nelson et al, 2012). Despite being heralded as a progressive document however, the practice of land governance is rarely in accordance with it. The history of forced relocation coupled with institutional under-capacity has lead to widespread confusion over community borders, land rights and administrative mandates (Neville & Dauvergne, 2012). Running somewhat parallel to these processes of dispossession was the steady expansion of protected area's which continued since the introduction of the first national parks under colonialism colonial rule (Brockington et al, 2008).

Social movements and civil society

The social and economic deterioration associated with colonial rule saw to the emergence of nationalist movements, trade unions and cooperatives in Tanzania from the late 1940's on (Haapanen, 2007). These organizations provided a springboard for mass protest and public action which, despite counter measures by the colonial powers, was not to be contained. At the time of independence in 1961 as much as 42% of the Tanzania working force was a member of the umbrella organization Tanganyika Federation of Labor (TFL) (Lange et al, 2000). The success of Nyerere and his TANU party in 1961 would not have been possible without the cooperation and backing of this vibrant and highly organized civil society (Lange et al, 2000). After independence however conflicts between TANU and TFL soon eschewed leading to the latter being banned followed by the establishment of a government controlled union (Lange et al, 2000). This marked the start of a period of state oppression and control of civil society which culminated in the election of 1965 in which Tanzania became a single party state. As a result, it became virtually impossible for civil society organizations to organize independently from the government (Haapanen, 2007). Ironically therefore, the TANU had banned the very social movement that had put them in power.

State control of civil society continued until the mid 1980's when neo-liberal reforms were adopted, leaving openings for CSO's where the state had retreated. Throughout the late 1980's and 1990's the influence of civil society grew, primarily in the field of service provision. The relative absence of domestic CSO's meant that it was a realm initially dominated by INGO's. During the 1990's however, Tanzania saw an explosive growth of domestic CSO's (Mercer, 2003; Green, 2012). Despite the drastic increase of domestic CSO's, the majority of them was severely under-capacitated, with many existing only paper. A number of recent writings have concluded that this is currently still a persistent feature of domestic CSO's in Tanzania, and that civil society is highly disorganized and lacking in policy influence (Egli & Zurcher, 2007; Mercer, 2003).

The Tanzanian governments historic distrust of CSO is still evident today. Most noticeably in the NGO act of 2005, which stated that NGO's are to be strictly non-partisan or risk being banned. The term 'partisan' is defined as 'Not seeking political power or campaigning for any political party' (UCT, 2005, p. 2; see UCT, 2002 for full act). Consequentially there is significant room for interpretation as to what constitutes partisan activities. Due to the inherent political nature of the majority of CSO dealings, the act has essentially given the government the tools to neutralize any non-aligned CSO's. While the government has increasingly engaged with service delivery organizations, advocacy and rights based CSO's are still generally regarded with suspicion (Egli & Zurcher, 2007). In addition to the suppression of civil society, Tanzania's history with authoritarian rule has been observed to have created a 'culture of silence' among the citizenry, posing a hindrance to the possibility of political dissent (Lange et al, 2000; Egli & Zurcher, 2007). Another factor which is particularly relevant to the influence of CSO's is the sectors association with self enrichment, which has impacted negatively on the sectors legitimacy (Policy Forum, 2012; Lange et al, 2000; Egli & Zurcher, 2007).

Despite these observations however, some more recent commentators have signaled what appears to be a shift towards increased civil society influence and a more open political dialogue (Nelson et al, 2012). Of particular relevance is the fact that the traditionally uncontented rule of the CCM party by the opposition CHADEMA. This seen an increasingly open contention of political authority and public scrutiny of government leaders. Within this political discourse, land grabbing has become one of the main political issues. According to Nelson et al the past five years have seen 'a vastly more open public discourse around the use of resources, corruption, and policy decisions; much stronger challenges from civil society, media, and opposition politicians to state policy decisions and choices; and greater public access to key policy processes' (Nelson et al, 2012, p.9)

Kilimo Kwanza and the current agrarian trajectory

'Kilimo Kwanza' is the current vision underlying Tanzania's agrarian trajectory. In general terms the programme is aimed at inducing a new green revolution in Tanzania through modernization and commercialization of the sector. According to its formulators this change is to come about by means of a holistic strategy consisting of interactions between government, the private sector and civil society. In reference to the failures of past agriculture reforms, the programme cites a number of key factors based on lessons learnt from the past. Those are 1) private accumulation, 2) bottom up implementation, 3) sectoral linkages and 4) private funding (HAKIARDHI, 2011). The programme has however come under increasing criticism regarding the position of smallholder producers who's position in Kilimo Kwanza is all but clear. It is also unclear how the current tenure insecurity of smallscale producers will be protected under increased pressure of investment. What is clear however is the central role which has been assigned to FDI and large-scale agriculture. As a result one of the primary aims of Kilimo Kwanza is to make land accessible to (foreign) capital. It is due to this that increasing concerns have been voiced about the type of development envisaged by Kilimo Kwanza, which has been argued to favor large-scale enterprises, elite accumulation and foreign capital (HAKIARDHI, 2011; Maghimbi et al, 2011; Makwarimba & Ngowi, 2012). In fact one the 'release' of labor from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors is one of the medium to long term goals of the current trajectory (Makwarimba & Ngowi, 2012, p.13). Small-holder dispossession is therefore inherent in Kilimo Kwanza's aim. Despite its bottom up aspirations Kilimo Kwanza has been argued to be all but that. This is exemplified by the fact that it was formulated by the Tanzanian National Business Council (TNBC), a private sector advisory body chaired by the president. As such, not smallscale producer representatives were consulted during its formulation or involved in its revision (HAKIARDHI, 2011). Tanzania's current trajectory therefore highlights the extent in which the historical process of state facilitated dispossession is still present to this day.

3.2 LAND AND RESOURCE CONFLICTS IN TANZANIA

Conservation

40% of Tanzania's land mass is covered under some form of environmental protection (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012), making it the largest protected area, both relatively and absolutely, of all African countries (Brockington et al, 2008). The restricted access to land and resources associated with conservation has a long history of leading to conflicts in Tanzania, with the first conservation induced evictions dating from the colonial era. Many of the areas now under environmental protection, particularly in the North, were inhabited by semi-nomadic pastoralist. As such, 'conservation areas have led to more land being taken from pastoralists than all the other factors put together' (Maghimbi et al, 2011, p.56). In fact, more than one third of protected area's in Tanzania originally belonged to pastoralists (Oxfam, 2008). As a result, conservation initiatives have been identified as the primary agent of land grabbing in several regions of Tanzania.

Environmental protection in Tanzania covers a vast array of institutional constructs each entailing varying degrees of restriction and distribution of administrative powers. Up until the eighties conservation was shaped by the 'fortress discourse' entailing fully restricted national parks. After this period there was in increasing shift towards more inclusive forms of conservation under the win-win discourse of Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) initiatives (Benjaminsen, Bryceson, 2012). One such CBNRM initiative is the Wildlife Management Area (WMA), an initiative which promised communities 'local people full mandate of managing and benefiting from their conservation efforts' (MNRT, 1998, p.31) by engaging in contracts with tourism companies. Despite this discursive shift to community control, fortress style national parks have been steadily increasing (Brockington et al, 2008). In addition, recent policy changes have signaled a significant recentralization of administrative power over WMA's which were formerly held at the village level (Benjaminsen, Bryceson, 2012;). This has served to confirm suspicions that the community based approach simply serves as a tool for 'signing communities on to conservation projects primarily as a means to protect the integrity of the national park system' (Goldman 2003, p.838). WMA's have therefore increasingly been viewed as a subtle means of expropriating village control over land based resources. Additionally, by not involving physical displacement, WMA's constitute a considerably more 'soft' and insidious means of securing land based resources then the blatant evictions most commonly associated with land grabbing. The massive revenues associated with tourism mean that conservation in Tanzania is rarely an altruistic endeavor. As argued by Benjaminsen & Bryceson, rent seeking officials and politicians, fund seeking conservation NGO's and profit seeking tourist companies are the three major categories of actors 'which accumulate capital on the back of these processes of dispossession in the wildlife sector' (2012, p.344).

Without a doubt the most emblematic case of conservation induced land conflicts is the long running struggle in Loliondo division in Northern Tanzania. The conflict between pastoralist communities on the one hand and the government and the Ortello Business Company on the other illustrates how the state machinery has been used to secure elite control over land based resources. Many pastoralist in Loliondo have a long experience with land conflicts. The revision of the national parks ordinance in 1960 made human settlement in parks illegal, as a result pastoralists were evicted from the Serengeti national park, of which many settled in the Loliondo division. During the economic liberalization of the 1980's the area saw increasing pressure on land from agricultural expansion and outsiders. As a means to protect their land claims the pastoralist villages pushed the government for village land use plans and registration. According to the Tanzanian Natural Resource Forum (TNRF), by 1990 9 villages in Loliondo had statutory land rights for their communal lands (TNRF, 2011).

Since the colonial era the Loliondo division had also been a part of the Loliondo Game Controlled Area (GCA) which also covered the neighboring Sale division. Up until 2009 GCA's only regulated the utilization of wildlife and had no bearing on human activities or settlement. As such the overlap between centrally administered GCA's and locally administered village land was not uncommon. in 1992 however the central government allocated the entire Loliondo GCA as a hunting block to the Ortello Business Company (OBC), a private company representing a senior official in the army of the United Arab Emirates. Despite leading to tensions between villages, the government and OBC, these were kept down due to the fact that OBC only utilized the hunting block a few weeks per year (Nelson et al, 2013).

In 2009 the relatively dormant tensions erupted when the 20.000 pastoralists were violently evicted by the government Field Force Unit in which 50.000 cattle was displaced and 200 homesteads were burnt. The eviction occurred in an area defined by the village land use plans as communal dry season grazing area, which was coincidentally the area where OBC conducted most of its hunting activities. The basis of the eviction was that the hunting block of a foreign investor had been subjected to resource degradation due to overgrazing. At the time the region was experiencing one of the harshest droughts in recent history. As argued by the TNRF, while such resource degradation is a common characteristic of droughts, there is no scientific evidence that exists suggests that pastoralism has lead to long term resource degradation in Loliondo (TNRF, 2011). The fact that the evictions were carried out in a time of drought, displacing livestock from water and feed, severely compounded the droughts negative impacts on pastoralist livelihoods. As a consequence the events of 2009 have further compounded pastoralist resentment towards the central government.

The latest chapter in the Loliondo saga was issued in on the basis of the new Wildlife Conservation Act which became effective in 2010 (Benjaminsen, Bryceson, 2012). The act introduced a number of far reaching measures, such as the introduction of new protected areas wildlife corridors and buffer zones, and the restriction of grazing in GCA's to individuals with written permission from the Director of Wildlife of the central government. Additionally section 16-50f the act specified that 'no land falling under the village land is included in the game controlled areas'. (URT, 2009, p.23). As a result, pastoralists in Loliondo were again threatened with land loss. Not only did the new grazing restriction essentially prohibit grazing within their village lands as formalized in the land use plans of 1990, there was great concern that village control would be lost altogether due to section 16-5 of the act. The most resistance however occurred due to government plans enact a 1,500 square kilometer wildlife corridor, a move deemed in the interest of OBC and entailing the eviction of 40,000 pastoralists. (The Guardian, 2013). The uproar which arose around the pending evictions triggered a coordinated human rights campaign both at the domestic and international level. This eventually culminated in an unprecedented victory for pastoralist land claims as the plans were officially abandonded in October of 2013.

The Loliondo saga is but one of numerous struggles small-scale producers, particularly pastoralists, have been engaged in to retain control over their land in the face of conservation. It also illustrates how administrative machinery of the state has been repeatedly deployed to secure exclusive access over massive tracts of land to accommodate private interests, all under the guise of conservation. As argued by Nelson et al, the historical experience of the Loliondo pastoralists with threats to their land had lead to a 'context where local communities were well aware of their land rights and means to defend those, including through mass mobilization' (2012, p.15). Two international Avaaz petitions counting a total of well over 3 million signees are a testament to their ability to mobilize support (Avaaz, 2012; Avaaz, 2013).

Aside from this particularly mediagenic case of indigenous people vs. foreign hunters however, the steady expansion of conservation area is in itself evidence of small-scale producer land rights losing to new land control regimes (Brockington et al, 2008). Dispossession resulting from conservation for non-consumptive tourism has proven particularly more difficult to rally global support against then conservation for hunting. The introduction of REDD projects, which are currently in their pilot phase,

have raised additional concerns for a pending wave of elite capture under the guise of conservation (Beymer-Farris & Basset, 2012; Odgaard & Maganga, 2009)




Figure 2.1: Protected area coverage in Tanzania (Forest reserves not included)

Major Lake / Ocean Country Boundary

Source: Brockington et al, 2008

Agriculture


As of 2012 Tanzania ranked among the highest globally in terms FDI led agricultural acquisitions (Anseeuw et al, 2012). Within this context Tanzania was one of the countries which attracted the most interest in jatropha plantations for bio-fuel production (Segerstedt & Bobert, 2013). The jatropha investment surge occurred roughly between 2005 and 2008. By 2009 an estimated 4 million hectares had been requested from the government, with around 640,000 hectares being formally allocated (Neslon et al, 2012). The jatropha boom in Tanzania was something of a perfect storm consisting of a short-lived investment hype, a lack of guiding policies and a FDI hungry government pressing down on under-capacitated institutions (Romijn & Caniëls, 2010; Habib-Mintz, 2010, Neslon et al, 2012). Consequentially, the boom was short lived with its subsequent bust following some years later. As a result the majority of operations have been downscaled or suspended, not to mention the many acquisitions which were left undeveloped altogether. As argued by Nelson et al, 'it is fair to say that the bloom is off the rose at this point in time; the demand for land for jatropha, notably, has essentially evaporated' (2012, p.12). The consequences of the jatropha boom on local livelihoods has been devastating in a number of regions, particularly Tanzania's coastal region. Despite jatropha having being marketed as a crop with the ability to grow on 'marginal lands' (Romijn & Caniëls, 2010) the majority of acquisitions occurred on fertile land, often falling under village control. The subsequent bust of the sector has left many small-scale producers landless, without them seeing any of the promised development outcomes as a means to compensate their losses.

Since then jatropha has dropped off the radar of both investors and the government. In fact the rejection of large-scale jatropha constituted one of the few shared views among the respondents which participated in this research. Since the jatropha bust however a new phenomenon has arisen which has divided stakeholders involved in land issues known as SAGCOT (the Southern Growth Corridor of Tanzania). The SAGCOT programme is set to cover one third of Tanzania's land and is essentially the operationalization of the Kilimo Kwanza vision. The programme is said to be implemented under the moniker of Public Private Partnerships (PPP). Within SAGCOT large-scale agriculture has been assigned a central role as a means to upscale production and lift farmers out of subsistence through 'partnerships' (SAGCOT, 2011). Leading stakeholders in SAGCOT are the World Bank, FAO, USAID and AGRA along with corporate heavy weights such as Monsanto and Syngenta. Despite near-utopian claims 'to deliver rapid and sustainable agricultural growth, with major benefits for food security, poverty reduction and reduced vulnerability to climate change' (SAGCOT, 2011, preface) SAGCOT appears to lack any concrete measures for doing so. And while outgrowing schemes are mentioned as a *possibility*, the terms and degree of small-scale farmer involvement are

left entirely up to the whim investors. Additionally no measures are in place to secure that the commodities produced will benefit local food markets as opposed to simply being siphoned off through international value chains. In fact the entire notion of PPP is a difficult one to uphold, for if it is indeed a partnership it is by no means one on equal footing. The fundamental dependence on FDI for SAGCOT's realization appears to have rendered the government as little more than an accommodator of investor interests. One outcome of this dependence has been the tax competition and subsequent 'race to the bottom' which East African countries have been engaged in to attract investors (Policy Forum, 2012b). As such SAGCOT appears to be no more than government facilitated neo-liberalism dressed up in contemporary PPP rhetoric.

The story of the jatropha bust has often been expressed as the result of inadequate crop knowledge. However it would be mistaken to 'explain-away' Tanzania's boom and bust experience by referring to crop technicalities alone. As argued by Habib-Mintz, the jatropha crises was a crises of the agricultural sector as a whole, whose failure is 'strongly associated with weak property rights, a misaligned decentralized governance system, and a weak infrastructural system that contributes to unplanned agro-industrialization with disastrous results for the poor' (2010, p.3986). Since the jatropha bust however, aside from a few minor infrastructural developments, the structural landscape is arguably no different now than it was then. In fact the majority of respondents stated that the many small-scale producers within the SAGCOT region are completely unaware of the programmes implications and how they should engage with investors. And yet at the same time the central government is going all-out to flood the region with FDI and calling for a dramatic restructuring of land control and agriculture production.

Figure 3.1: The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor



Source: SAGCOT, 2011

Extractive industries

Tanzania is among the top five countries in terms of minerals and fossil fuels (LHRC, 2012). The country posses (among others) abundant reserves of gold, copper, natural gas, coal, diamonds and gemstones such as Tanzanite. In addition to those reserves discovered, much of Tanzania's mineral and fossil fuel stocks are estimated as yet to be discovered. The extractive industries have been notorious for bringing the 'resource curse' to developing countries and Tanzania appears to be no exception. The countries experience with these industries has been one characterized by pollution, corruption, heath hazards, tax evasion, dispossession and exploitation of local labor (LHRC, 2012). As argued by LHRC's 2012 human rights report the mining sector is 'the most vulnerable sector to be hit by grand international corruption practices.' (LHRC, 2012, p.243). In some subsectors, particularly Tanzanite mining in the Arusha region, mining companies have routinely come into conflict with local land users and artisanal miners. The extractive industries is currently stimulated by the Tanzanian government and enjoys a variety of tax incentives. Just as in the case of agricultural investment, this has lead to concerns over a race to the bottom resulting from competition between East African countries (Policy forum, 2012b). Figures from 2008 highlight a particularly perverse outcomes of tax

arrangements in the mining sector with 65% of tax revenues being attributed to tax paid by mine workers themselves (LHRC, 2012). In contrast to agriculture development however, development of the extractive industries is generally met with significantly more skepticism among development actors. As explained by one respondent as follows:

"Land is at the core of development in Tanzania, not only for agriculture, but beneath the land there is a big treasure of minerals and so forth, this area has not been spoken of so much in the past because no explorations were done, but now it has come to our knowledge that a big part of Tanzania has one type or several types of minerals, even gas, therefore not only civil society, but the government as a whole should be very careful in the process of allocating land to the so called investors, because most of them we are told, are not coming for growing rice, they are coming for what is beneath the rice fields therefore this is also causing big problems in our country, investors are pouring in, not for improving the production of maize, but because there is something else, like uranium, like diamonds, gold, and other stones, which are found in the agricultural land in Tanzania" (Interview DO1, 2013)

The extractive industry not only has a long history of contributing far too little to Tanzania's development, the nature of the industry also entails rendering land unusable for agricultural production once the reserves have been depleted, leaving 'dead land' in its wake.

A case example of the hostility towards the extractive industries have been the recent developments leading from the discovery of natural gas reserves in Mtwara near the coastal border of Mozambique. The central government's decision to build a pipeline some 500 km long in order to refine the gas in the capital of Dar Es Salaam has been met with heavy protest in Mtwara. The predominantly Muslim coastal region has experienced some of the highest incidences of poverty due to being historically neglected by development budget allocation. By not choosing to build a refinery on location or to rehabilitate the cities port, this long standing resentment towards the government has resurfaced with residents fearing they will not enjoy any of the benefits associated with the gas's exploitation (Ahearne, 2013). As a result tensions surrounding this question have repeatedly lead to riots and loss of life between residents and security forces in 2013.

Water

Livelihood security of small-scale producers is fundamentally dependent on their access to water. Water is also a vital resource for sustaining bio-diversity, wildlife and agricultural development. Competition over water is therefore fierce, and increasingly becoming a source of conflicts (Mbonile, 2006/7; Ngailo, 2011). Irrigation for agriculture is recognized as the largest freshwater user throughout Africa (Machibya & Mdemu, 2005). Research conducted by Rulli et al (2012) into the water use for irrigation in countries targeted for large-scale land acquisitions found Tanzania to have the highest per unit usage. As the research argued, this can be attributed to Tanzania's dry climate together with widespread large-scale cultivation of water-demanding crops. In addition to having the highest per unit use, Tanzania was also found to have the highest per unit wastage, with nearly twice as much irrigation water being used then what is required for optimal crop production. These findings lead Rulli et al (2012) to conclude that Tanzania has among the highest incidences of 'blue-grabbing' worldwide. The increase in large-scale farms in Tanzania has therefore increased pressure on the availability of water (Machibya & Mdemu, 2005)

The case of the Ihefu-Usanga wetlands is particularly controversial example of a recent water induced conflict. The Ihefu-Usangu wetlands lie in the Mbeya region and feed into The Great Ruaha River, one of the country's largest rivers, which again feeds into both the Ruaha national park and two major hydro electric dams. The wetlands were gazetted as a conservation area in 1998 which lead to the establishment of the Usangu Game Reserve. This opened up processes for eviction of pastoralists who had resided there since the early 1970's, which again lead to a case being presented to the high court in order to contest the evictions (PINGO's forum & HAKIARDHI, 2007). 8 years later in 2006, with the pastoralist representatives still awaiting a court ruling, a massive eviction was undertaken to evict the pastoralists from the Ihefu-Usanga wetlands. Besides the familiar allegations of resource degradation, the eviction was motivated by an additional and particularly far-fetched accusation towards the pastoralists. During 2006 dropping water levels in the Great Ruaha River had lead to a drastic decline in water flows to the two hydropower dams. This lead to severe power rations throughout the country, affecting nearly all sectors of the economy. According to government officials it was pastoralist livestock numbers which were responsible for the dropping water levels and the subsequent power cuts (Ngailo, 2011; Ngailo, 2013; PINGO's Forum & HAKIARDHI, 2007). Soon after the eviction the Ruaha National Park was expanded to cover the Usangu Game Reserve, Sub sequentially making Ruaha become Africa's largest national park.

As many observers have noted, rice crop irrigation systems are by far the greatest water users in the region (Machibya & Mdemu, 2005; Wildlife Conservation Society, 2006; PINGO's Forum & HAKIARDHI, 2007; Benjaminsen et al, 2009). Since the 1960's the region has witnessed several such medium and large-scale donor driven irrigation schemes, none of which have been deemed successful. A number of publications have criticized these irrigation projects for massive water

wastage and for having an efficiency far below traditional irrigation schemes (Machibya & Mdemu, 2005; Wildlife Conservation Society, 2006; PINGO's Forum & HAKIARDHI, 2007). It was hardly surprising therefore that the hydroelectric dams continued to experienced power cuts after the evictions, even after heavy rain falls (Ngailo, 2011). The true motive of the national parks expansion as argued by a number of pastoralist rights groups however, is the fact that the park lies within the SAGCOT region. Enclosing these water stocks under conservation regimes has therefore been seen by some as a means of securing water sources exclusively for SAGCOT enterprises.

The evictions the Ihefu-Usangu wetlands were no exception to the many other evictions carried in Tanzania's recent history. They too were shrouded in accusations of human rights abuses, theft of livestock, lack of compensation and all round livelihoods insecurity as pastoralists dispersed throughout neighboring regions (Ngailo, 2013; PINGO's Forum & HAKIARDHI, 2007). As argued by Ngailo 'In many respects, the case of the evicted livestock keepers in Mbarali District also echoes the experiences of thousands of other communities displaced by efforts to protect some areas in many parts of Tanzania' (2013, p.90). The ease with which pastoralists were blamed for the power shortages of 2006 highlights an additional dynamic which has been playing out in Tanzania as a result of the pressures on land; the increasing tensions between small-holder land users.

pastoralist/farmer conflicts

A particularly insidious side-effect of the increasing pressure on Tanzanian land has been the increasing conflicts between pastoralists and small-scale sedentary farmers. The impacts of climate change and population growth on the availability of land have further been compounded by the expansion of conservation areas and large-scale agriculture. As a result, pastoralists in particular have witnessed massive land losses in recent history (Maghimbi et al, 2011; Mtengeti, n.d.; Oxfam, 2008; Benjaminsen et al, 2009). Without pastoralists being assigned new lands however, these processes of dispossession have resulted in pastoralist populations becoming increasingly dispersed throughout Tanzania in the search for grazing lands and water sources. This in turn has lead to pastoralists steadily encroaching into areas occupied by small-scale farmers which has again lead to various (violent) conflicts between the two groups in several regions (HAKIARDHI,2009a; Makoye, 2012). Just as pastoralist evictions are no new phenomenon, neither are these conflicts. The most bloody thus far was the notorious 'Kilosa killings' in 2000, which costs 38 lives in a village in the region of Morogoro (Benjaminsen et al, 2009).

There is a decidedly political component to these conflicts. As argued by HAKIARDHI 'most land use conflicts in Tanzania are caused and escalated by decisions and acts of the state through its various agencies' (2009a, p.1). Historically, and to the present day, pastoralists have generally been viewed as backwards by government leaders, while pastoralism as a system has been viewed as an inefficient and environmentally degrading use of land (Maghimbi et al, 2011; Mtengeti, n.d.; Oxfam, 2008). This is exemplified by president Kikwete's statement that the country should do away with such 'archaic ways of livestock farming' (Benjaminsen et al, 2009). This attitude has further been formalized by Strategic Plan for the Implementation of Land Laws (SPILL) which has defined nomadic pastoralism as disruptive, calling for a shift towards a sedentary ranching (HAKIKAZI Catalyst, 2006). The disregard for pastoralism is further evident by concepts of 'idle' and 'misused' land as used by the central government to attract investors. These concept cover all arable land which has not been tilled or built on. Consequentially grazing land has inherently been deemed idle and available, even though "that land is 100% production land for pastoralists" as one respondent argued (Interview RBO1, 2013). Government discontent for pastoralism is further expressed by the complete lack of support to the pastoralist industry in terms of sectoral development projects or subsidies.

The extent in which the marginalization of pastoralists is a political issue is evident due to the lack of economic rationale. In fact, since South Sudan's succession, Tanzania's livestock industry is believed to be one of the largest in Africa and second only to Ethiopia. 99% of the industry which is owned by pastoralists with a meager 1% in hands of sedentary ranches (Oxfam, 2008). The size of the industry lead it to contribute to 6.1% of GDP, with an estimated 4 million Tanzanians deriving their livelihoods form the pastoralist economy (Oxfam, 2008). As noted by one respondent, the ability of the sector to contribute such figures despite its neglect makes it particularly unique arguing "It is a self sufficient industry, it doesn't receive a single cent of subsidy, that doesn't exist anywhere else in the world, not in the U.S. and not in Brazil" (Interview DO6, 2013). In addition the notion that pastoralism poses a threat to the environment is hard uphold, particularly due to sedentary ranch management being presented as a more sustainable alternative. As argued by Oxfam 'Major investment in farming or ranching on fragile pastoral lands would lead to precisely the sort of environmental degradation of which pastoralist communities in Tanzania are wrongly accused' (2008, p. 18). On the state of pastoralism in Tanzania Maghibi et al have argued that 'Inbuilt societal stereotypes and negative perceptions of pastoralists have often been the basis of policies, (...) attitudes that have found their way into mainstream policies often go unchallenged, even when they are contradicted by scientific proof' (2011, p.57). Far from act as a mediator between small-scale farmers and pastoralists therefore, government leaders have in fact actively contributed to the escalation of conflicts by

supporting the expropriation of pastoralists lands and reinforcing negative stereotypes. This somewhat puzzlingly when viewed form an economic stand point for it essentially entails the neglect of one of Tanzania's prime sectors (Oxfam, 2008), particularly when compared to agriculture. As one respondent explained:

"Agriculture has been motivated as the primary economic development policy since independence, but if you look at the production system and compare the value of pastoralists and agriculture, they are not the same, a farmer will have one acre, and look what someone is producing, it is very poor and it's just like, for family use and not for business, but the pastoralists, they are making a lot of money, it's a huge economy within Tanzania, even though the pastoralist population may be small compared to farmers" (Interview MSF1, 2013)

Land control in Tanzania

The land and resource conflicts in Tanzania highlight the fact that the concerns over land grabbing, such as alienation and livelihood insecurity, are by no means restricted to agriculture alone. Large-scale agriculture, while indeed having wreaked havoc in many localities, is but one manifestation of land control regimes which serves to extract land based wealth in favor of actors *other then* former land users. These manifestations also serve to highlight the extent in which the Tanzanian state has served as an agent of these land control changes. In fact the general consensus under small-scale representatives during this research was that the state was the major perpetrator of land and resource grabs. Tellingly one respondent stated the following when asked what his future expectations were : "Frankly speaking, the community land is going to be taken by the government through various strategies, through WMA's and through the Tanzanian Investment Centre" (Interview RBO7, 2013) (the latter institution being the central governments one stop shop for investment).

The violent evictions of pastoralists, unmet jatropha promises, riots over gas and conflicts between small-scale farmers and pastoralists additionally serve to highlight the severity of social disruption caused by these changes in land control. There has been a general tendency within the land grab debate to view affected people simply as neutral bearers of livelihood variables. Assuming 'local people' are purely motivated by the rational pursuit of livelihood strategies however risks overlooking the more deep seated social and psychological impacts which can result from dispossession. It is these simmering tensions which were mentioned on numerous occasions by respondents as potentially destabilizing to Tanzania's future, with one respondent describing them tellingly as "a bomb that can explode at any time" (interview RBO2, 2013).

4: METHODOLOGY

4.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

Overall objective

The overall objective of this research is to gain insight into the involvement and influence of domestic organizations in Tanzania in relation to land control, together with insights into how CSO's and social movements might serve to enhance social justice issues within this context. The analysis is not limited to those CSO's advancing social justice, but also covers the involvement of CSO's which might be deemed as posing a hindrance to social justice. This involves identifying and categorizing the various actors, strategies, limitations, narratives and potentials within the context of civil society and land control.

Academic objective

The agency of domestic organizations constitutes a neglected territory within the land grab debate. This research will contribute to filling this knowledge gap relating to the actors involved, the strategies deployed and the discourses motivating their actions. Furthermore by bringing social movement analysis to the critical additions within the land grab debate, the research aims to inspire academic innovation, disciplinary cross-pollination and a bridging of structural critique towards practice oriented solutions.

Practical objective

The research aims to identify a number of aspects within the practices of CSO's which may serve to inform their strategies so as to enhance the power of actors advancing social justice concerns within the practice of land control.

4.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Central research question

To what extent have social movements been involved in influencing land control changes in Tanzania and how can such movements strengthen the voice of small-scale producers within this context?

As of yet no publications have attempted to chart the presence and involvement of social movements in relation to land control changes in Tanzania. The first component of the central research question is therefore aimed at charting the extent in which social movements have organized around this issues and what the nature of this involvement has been, both in terms of strategies and framing of grievances. Based on this analysis of the current situation, the second

component of the central research question will attempt to gain insights as to the potential for social movements to advance the interests of small-scale producers within the context of future land control changes in Tanzania.

Research sub questions

1. Which types of CSO's are currently involved, directly or indirectly, in activities relating to land control and which strategies have these organizations engaged in.

The formal organizations counterparts of social movements are CSO's (see theoretical framework). The first sub question therefore serves to identify which types of CSO's have been involved in influencing land control and which strategies they have deployed to do so.

2. To what extent are their shared and/or competing frames among these CSO's regarding land control?

While the first sub question focuses on the strategies of CSO's, the second question serves to identify the different frames adopted by these organizations. The discursive dimension is an intrinsic component of social mobilization which ties individual actors together under a common cause by means of a shared interpretation of a particular grievance.

3. What are the characteristics of the current political opportunity structure for these CSO's?

This question is aimed at determining the influence of the government and state institutions on the ability of CSO's to influence land control

4. How might social movement serve to advance the interests of small-scale producers within the context of future land control changes?

Based on an integrated analysis of the findings from the first two sub questions and social movement theories, the final research question will serve to offer insights as to how social movements might increase their future influence, thus increasing the influence of small-scale producer interests.

4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

While the land grab debate has demonstrated an increasing sophistication in terms of analyzing land control within broader structural processes, they have yet to offer the practice oriented recommendations. As a result they risk suffering the same fate of many critical approaches which, despite their eloquence, have often not managed to come further than deconstruction and critique. Despite this research being grounded in the assumptions of critical political theories, it will not be

conducted using the political economy or political ecology frameworks commonly associated with such analysis. Instead it will be conducted using a social movement framework. The reason for doing so is that there is a vast body of social movement theories which have yet to be used within the context of land control. More importantly however, is the fact that these theories have attempted to analyze and predict which factors which set successful social movement apart from those which are unsuccessful in their aims. As a result, social movement theory is decidedly more practice oriented then critical political theories. In doing so we hope to contribute to bridging the divide between critical theories and practice, and contribute to advancing social justice concerns within the context of land control.

In addition this objective the research is explicitly aimed at bringing the experience of domestic actors to the forefront, so as to sensitize the land grab debate to the experiences of those actors engaged *on the ground*. In doing so the research can be placed within the interpretive paradigm. The assumption underlying this paradigm is that social experience and human behavior is structured by interpretative processes and not an objective or rational relationship with the world 'out there'. Understanding this interpretive dimension implies qualitative methods which allow for respondent input to be central, as opposed to eternally attributed variables. This is not to say the research was entirely inductive however. By virtue of adopting a particular framework the input from respondents was obviously structured to a degree by these theoretical assumptions. The use of these assumptions was however more guiding then restrictive.

As a result the research was inherently explorative both in its innovative aims and qualitative approach. The involvement of domestic CSO's in relation to land control, the presence of social movements, and the experiences of such domestic actors all constitute domains which have not been previously researched. Aside from drawing up a number of tentative CSO categories before hand, the majority of respondent organizations were identified and approached based on in-field snowballing. In keeping with the tradition of explorative research the relationship between data collection and analysis was cyclical. This entailed a frequent alternation between the collection and (tentative) analysis of data, with each alternation serving to further refine and guide the subsequent processes of collection and analysis. This cyclical process was repeated throughout the entire in-field segment of the research.

4.4 RESEARCH PROCESS

The in-field research process was conducted over a period of 14 weeks in 2013 with data-collection being conducted in the regional capitals Arusha, Morogoro, Dar Es Salaam and Moshi. In general terms this in-field part of the research consisted of the following components.

- Orientation phase (+/- 4 weeks): This component consisted primarily of the identification of respondents and respondents categories. This was conducted through snow-balling with key respondents and desk study. In addition various media sources were consulted to get a more general 'feel' of land related issues in the public and political discourse.
- 2. Planning phase (+/- 2 weeks): This phase consisted primarily of contacting and planning interviews with the respondent organizations identified in the orientation phase.
- 3. Data collection (+/- 8 weeks): This phase consisted primarily of the data collection in accordance with the schedule which had been drawn up in the planning phase

The activities of each component were however not restricted to the primary activities alone, but included the activities of other phases in a secondary fashion.

4.5 RESEARCH RESPONDENTS

The primary respondent category was CSO spokespersons. During the orientation phase the following CSO categories were identified as stakeholders in land control:

- Pastoralist/hunter gatherer
- Small-scale farmer
- Gender
- Land/environmental
- Development
- Conservation
- Private sector
- Multi-stakeholder forum

Respondents were chosen based on these categories and was restricted to those organization with a regional and/or national coverage. In addition to these CSO respondents several staff members of Sokoine University for Agriculture and the University of Dar Es Salaam were interviewed. Finally, due to their significant influence in the policy and practice of land control in Tanzania, interviews were held with respondents from the Tanzanian Investment Centre of the central government and the

Tanzanian National Business Centre, an advisory body of the central government. See Annex 2 for a complete list of respondent organizations.

4.6 RESEARCH METHODS

By virtue of its exploratory nature and interpretive grounding, qualitative research methods were most suited to the researches data requirements. These encompassed the following general methods.

Semi structured in-depth interviews

The primary mode of data-collection was semi-structured in-depth interviews. This entailed that interviews were conducted along the lines of pre-determined topics, while allowing a substantial amount of room during interviews for respondents to contribute additional input. The topics consisted of an operationalization of the three major theories adopted in the theoretical frame work and covered the categories resource/strategies, frames and political opportunity (See Annex 3). A total of 45 respondents, representing 36 various organizations and institutes were interviewed along these lines. Aside from 3 interviews conducted by phone or skype, the interviews were all conducted in person with an average duration of 1-1 ½ hours per interview. Aside from 3 respondents which were unwilling to have their interviews recorded, all the face-to-face interviews were taken during the interview.

Secondary data-sources

CSO publications and media sources were used as secondary data-sources. CSO publication were collected throughout the in-field part of the research and used to add further depth to the data-collected through interviews. Media sources were also consulted throughout the research process as a means to contextualize the issue of land control within the broader public discourse.

Informal interviews

Throughout the entire research informal interviews were conducted with a variety of people ranging from farmers and street vendors to development professional and public servants. Such 'interviews' took the form of casual conversations which touched on the research subject. Although notes were taken after these conversation, they were not structured or analyzed in the manner which the semi-structured interviews were. As a result they served as a means to contextualize the research and occasionally to provide new insights which were then incorporated into subsequent semi-structured interviews.

4.7 DATA ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION

Extensive notes were taken along with relevant citations from the audio recordings. The data was then reviewed together with the notes taken from unrecorded interviews in light of the theoretical categories and research questions. Repeated review of these findings also lead to the establishment of major categories or 'codes' which served to further structure the findings. This process was informed in a secondary manner by CSO publications and notes taken from media sources and informal interviews. This process of ordering findings, based on a revision of predetermined categories and questions in light of emergent categories, influenced the final documentation as presented in this thesis in the following manner

- The CSO categories as presented in the findings differ from those categories used to select respondents (see previous 'respondent categories' section) in that they are based on the mandate of CSO's as opposed to their focus. This resulted in these 8 categories being narrowed down to the four general mandate categories consisting of small-scale producer representatives, conservation, private sector lobby and multi-stakeholder forums.
- Although a significant part of each interview was dedicated to sub question three regarding the political opportunity structure, it became evident during the data-analysis phase that this dimension was intertwined with question of resource mobilization and CSO frames. As a result the findings relating to political opportunity have not been presented as an individual chapter but are integrated into the resource mobilization and frame sections in this thesis.

Finally, the interviews were conducted based on the premise of anonymity. The interviews used for in-text citations have therefore codified and are referenced based only on the respondent category and interview date. See Annex 1 for a registration of the codes used throughout this thesis. For a complete list of respondent organizations see Annex 2

4.8 LIMITATIONS

A research of this kind is not without its limitations which should be taken into account. firstly, the research is explorative and innovative in its aims and should therefore be read as an attempt at serving a foundation for further research and theory building. The findings and conclusions are therefore inherently tentative and intended to instigate further refinement of the subject matter, not authoritative or irrefutable 'truth' claims. Secondly a number of factors should be taken into account regarding limitations relating specifically to the data. The CSO's incorporated into this research were generally identified as being the most well established in their respective fields, however the scale of the research inevitably meant leaving out the many 'lesser' CSO's from this research. Additionally,

there is a distinct regional component underlying the data due the fact that these major CSO's are located in just a few of Tanzania's many regions. As a result the research findings cannot be generalized to the level of Tanzanian civil society as a whole. Hunter gatherers for instance, make up a distinct population group represented by CSO's which were left out of the research due to the limitations associated with such a relatively short research. A final and particularly significant factor relating to the data collection has to do with the sensitivity of the subject matter, particularly in Tanzania's current political context. While the majority of respondents appeared remarkably open and outspoken, they often hinted at the degree in which political orientation and personal interests influence the position of their CSO colleagues. Determining to which extent these undercurrents colored the research findings was simply not possible given the scope of this research.

Despite these limitations however we believe that the research findings as presented throughout this thesis are of particular relevance to understanding the continuous power play behind land control, while additionally serving to explore new avenues for the enhancement of social justice within the context.

5: STRATEGIES, RESOURCES AND STRUGGLES OVER LAND CONTROL

The following chapter will present the research findings relating to the various CSO's involved in influencing land control arrangements, their strategies and relative influence. The chapter will begin with a presentation and discussion of these aspects based on the categories of CSO's involved in land control. The second part of the chapter will discuss these findings within the context of broader trends within civil society. The primary weight of this section will be granted to those organizations mandated to represent the interests of small-scale producers.

5.1 CSO CATEGORIES AND STRATEGIES

Small-producer representative organizations

Rights Based Organizations (RBO's) and Development Organizations (DO's) represent two broad categories of organizations whose mandate consists of representing the interests of small-scale producers. RBO's are organizations whose primary concern relates to enhancing justice and equality. They are generally organized around specific population groups or specific issues. Examples of these organizations are PINGO's, TAPHGO, CORDS and UCR-T (pastoralist and/or hunter gatherers), WLAC (Women's rights), HAKIARDHI (land rights), LHRC (human rights), LEAT (environmental rights) and HAKIKAZI Catalyst (social justice). All of these RBO's deal with issues of justice and equality in relation land and resources. RBO's generally exhibit a high degree of academic and legal professionalism with in-house staff capable of conducting independent research and litigation. DO's are organizations which deal with issues relating to the long term socio-economic improvement of small-scale producer livelihoods. MVIWATA, PELUM and the smaller CSO Farmers Pride are examples of domestic DO's which have been engaged in strategies relating to land. The country offices of the INGO's TRIAS, SNV and Oxfam have also been engaged in such strategies, albeit by taking on more of a background role through financing projects and facilitating networks and forums. While being recognized as a primary component, land rights and tenure security are generally dealt with by DO's (particularly INGO's) within the broader projects aimed at small-scale producer entrepreneurship.

Public education strategies

The RBO's and DO's which participated in this research all mentioned a lack of awareness of rights at the grass-roots level as on of the major barriers towards realizing social justice and development. All RBO's and several DO respondents mentioned being involved in grass-roots awareness raising campaigns. These public education strategies consist of a variety of trainings, workshops and (printed) information disseminations to the village level. In addition to a lack of awareness under civilians, there is also a widespread lack of awareness under local level authorities, resulting in governance practices which are not in line with (land) policies. As one respondents recounted:

"We conducted research on the land issue it was ten years after the enactment of the land act, to see how effective it is, we went to more than 10 regions and we tried to go to the district level and even the village level, you find that in every village and ward authorities don't know anything about the land act, so we asked them, how do you respond to the land disputes now that you are the one that has been given the task to deal with land disputes? and they say that they use their personal wisdom and that the people have elected them because of their wisdom" (Interview RB03, 2013)

A number of RBO's have therefore also been involved in institutional capacity development strategies, essentially consisting of awareness raising trainings for local authorities. Land issues within awareness of raising and capacity building strategies are generally dealt with in the broader context of governance, transparency, and accountability. This is illustrative of the fact that all RBO and DO respondents viewed land and resource rights as just one component of social justice enhancement. The various awareness raising strategies were generally viewed as the most promising and sustainable strategies due to their proactive nature and ability to prevent and mitigate future land rights abuses and conflicts. Such strategies often entail enacting local networks by training a number of village members who then spread awareness among their peers and act as guardians and watchdogs. The fact that RBO and DO headquarters are located in urban centers however, together with the sheer size of Tanzania, means that these strategies pose massive resource strains. Distance, infrastructure and seasonality are just some of the factors which pose very real material restrictions on the ability to conducts grass-roots awareness raising. At their current capacity RBO's and DO's are by no means capable of meeting the current need for such strategies.

Aside from raising awareness, a number of RBO's have also been involved in initiating and overseeing rights formalization processes conducted by the local and central government through village registration, village land use planning and issuing customary right of occupancy. This costly and time consuming process has been identified as key to mitigating conflicts between various land users (such as pastoralists and farmers), which have been increasing due to rising pressure on land and widespread confusion over land use categories. Consequentially pastoralist RBO's have been most prolific in this field due to the steady encroachment of agriculture into grazing lands. According to the ministry of lands and human settlements however, only a meager 2% of Tanzanian land has been surveyed (Policy Forum, 2012a).

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The localities in which these strategies are implemented fall under the jurisdiction of various local levels of officialdom, this inherently implies that RBO and DO's interact with these authorities. The attitudes of local authorities towards these organizations varies greatly, from cooperation to hostility. The respondent stated two general reasons for local leaders to be hostile. The first related to the rise of the political opposition, which critical CSO's have increasingly been accused of being associated with by the ruling party, an issue we will return to later. At the basis of the hostility however is most often the fact that public education strategies have the potential to disrupt local power balances, thus altering the status quo which local leaders have routinely been shown to exploit. This has lead to incidences of village participants of awareness raising projects being threatened by local leaders, but it has also lead to local leaders being overthrown. According to one respondent

"When we go there (villages) to train people on their land rights and their environmental rights, the government leaders think that we are the source of conflict, there is no harmonious relationship between the government and NGO's, unless you are doing things that are in their benefit and in the government interest" (Interviews RBO2, 2013)

In addition to these education strategies aimed at specific localities, RBO's and DO's have increasingly adopted media channels as a means to educate the broader public. While state media is perceived as thoroughly partisan to the ruling party, private media newspapers are generally viewed as relatively independent by the various RBO and DO respondents. The lack of financial resource among private newspapers has rendered journalists largely dependent on external funding in order to report stories. As a result journalists they are regularly commissioned to conduct investigations in return for financial and logistical support by RBO's and DO's. The notorious Loliondo case provides an example of a local case which dominated national headlines due to such media campaigns. This case also serves as a reminder that the power of the media can swing both ways. A number of respondents mentioning private sector actors funding media reports aimed at implicating specific RBO's as instigating hostility and conflict against the government. Aside from newspapers radio broadcasts are also frequently adopted as public education strategies with various RBO's and DO's, such as MVIWATA and WLAC having their own weekly broadcasts. In addition to providing a means to inform the broader public, media channels are also viewed as a means to pressure the government, as one RBO respondent stated in relation to his organizations advocacy reports: "if someone has decided to bury it in his desk then the officer or the minster will ultimately find it in the newspaper" (Interview RBO4, 2013).

Finally, in addition to public education aimed at localities or the broader public, a number of RBO's and DO's have become increasingly proficient at conducting and disseminating academic research, either independently or in partnership with institutes such as the University of Dar Es Salaam. HAKIARDHI in particular has become an authority in this field with a variety of publications (HAKIARDHI, 2009b; HAKIARDHI, 2010; HAKIARDHI, 2011). The yearly human rights reports of LHRC (see for example: LHRC, 2012), LEAT's research into land acquisitions for agribusiness (LEAT, 2011), PELUM funded research into land acquisitions in Morogoro region (Chachage, 2010), joint research between PINGO's Forum and HAKIARDHI into pastoralist evictions (PINGO's & HAKIARDHI, 2007) are examples of high quality independent research intended to inform broader (scholarly) debates.

Service to the those affected

This category of strategies is inherently reactive and deals with strategies aimed at reversing or mitigating negative outcomes associated with land use changes after they have occurred. The primary activity within this category is that of legal advice or litigation. Due to their rights focus RBO's are more suited for these strategies then DO's. Despite their expertise however, there was a general consensus under RBO respondents that the potential for failure of these strategies is significant for a number of reasons. Since the enactment of the land law in 1999 land tribunals have been enacted to relieve the judicial system of increasing land cases. While the primary judicial system has a clear hierarchy of accountability, the land tribunals suffer from structural accountability gaps. The ward land tribunal for instance, despite being at a lower level, is not accountable to the district land tribunal. In the words of one RBO respondent:

"You'll find that the people from the ward don't work well at all, their decisions are very poor, when you go to the district to make a follow up on those issues and he writes a letter to the people of the ward or the village, those people will say that they are not reporting to him, so he can't make a complaint" (Interview RB03, 2013).

The cost of filing land cases is also disproportionately high, as of 2012 fling a case at the district tribunal costs 150,000 TZS (approximately 93 USD), as opposed to 5000 TZS (approximately 3 USD) for filing other non-land cases through the primary court at the same level. Plaintiffs are also required to reimburse the costs associated with tribunal staff inspections of the land in question. With an average GDP per capita income under 500 USD a year, this essentially makes these land tribunals inaccessible to the majority of Tanzanians. In addition to these structural deficiencies, the court system is generally viewed as extremely susceptible to corruption and infiltration from powerful adversaries. According to a 2010-2011 governance review by Policy Forum, Tanzania's

leading CSO policy platform, 'Judges and magistrates distort the rule of law by receiving bribes in order to deliver favorable verdicts, while court clerks 'lose' files in order to slow down court proceedings, political interference, bribery and cronyism are often factors in judicial outcomes' (Policy Forum, 2012a, p.60). As a result court cases have been known to drag on for tens of years, with little guarantee of outcomes being in favor of plaintiffs.

"As the saying puts it; justice delayed is justice denied, if you are supposed to use your land for farming and the decision takes ten years to reach the conclusions then certainly you're livelihood means are being denied, that's why because of the frustration and because of lack of proper solutions, there are always conflicts" (Interview D02, 2013)

The state of land tribunals in Tanzania essentially means that RBO's support provide the only means for small-holders to bring land cases to court and that their resource intensive efforts are also often to no avail. The demand for legal assistance therefore far outweighs the pool of staff and financial resources among RBO's. Consequentially the court system provides little in terms of a means to correct land grabs, which those grabbing land are all too aware of. As argued by one RBO respondent "There is a culture of impunity, people are breaking the law and nobody is taking them to court" (Interview RBO8, 2013)

Land acquisitions by foreign investors were mentioned by the respondents as being all but impossible to reverse. Foreign land acquisitions entail leases of up to 99 years of land in the 'general land' category, which falls under the central administration. Therefore acquisitions of village land require a re-categorization from village to general land. This administrative shift to the central government is independent from the responsibilities of the investor however. Consequentially, failing to develop the land as agreed upon only provides ground for individual contract to be revoked, not for a re-categorization back to village land. As such, land is permanently lost from village control regardless of the outcomes of these acquisitions, an issue which villagers are often not made aware of during negotiations. Only with a presidential decree can land be re-categorized from general back to village. However none of the respondents were aware of any cases of such acquisitions, of which there are numerous examples, being re-categorized from general back to village land. As argued by German et al, this re-categorization processes is 'setting the stage for marked and systematic recentralization of land administration and management' (2011, p.29) In addition, as research by LEAT has observed, development commitments of investors to communities are in many cases only expressed orally and not formalized in contractual agreements (LEAT, 2011). As such investors cannot be held legally accountable when expectation are not met. In such cases even the porous legal system provides no ground for contesting the outcomes of acquisitions.

RBO and DO respondents were generally more optimistic about their ability to influence land deals during the negotiation process, which are essentially strategies aimed at those potentially affected by land acquisitions. The recent Loliondo victory, in which a plan to evict thousands of pastoralists to make way for a wildlife corridor was dropped by the central government, stands as a testimony of what a coordinated CSO efforts can achieve if mobilization occurs before a change in land control has been formalized (The Guardian, 2013). The majority of large-scale land acquisitions have however occurred under the radar of CSO's. This is due in no small part to the powerful interests exploiting the lack of awareness at the local level. Seen from this perspective a lack of transparency should not be viewed simply in terms of an absence (of formal transparency mechanisms for instance) but also in terms of a *presence* of adverse interests. Those with access to information, who could potentially call for CSO assistance during negotiations, are often those who are themselves actively upholding secrecy regimes. As such, RBO's and DO's are generally only called upon by villagers once the concrete impacts of land acquisitions are felt, which is long after contracts have been signed, making cumbersome and unpromising reactive strategies the only option left. As argued by a professor of Sokoine University of Agriculture: "Only when lands markets encroach on village land does the necessity become evident to become aware of land rights, by then however it is often too late" (Interview Uni1, 2013).

A final type of service provided to those affected by large-scale land acquisitions is mediation between pastoralists and small-holder farmers during conflicts over land. MVIWATA which has a grassroots membership base covering both population groups has been involved in such strategies. While the respondents mentioned a number of such successes, the general sense is that these are outweighed by the steady increase of conflicts between both groups.

Lobbying and advocacy for structural change

All RBO and DO respondents mentioned conducting some form of lobbying and advocacy which generally consists of submitting policy recommendations in print or in person to policy makers. There are a number of formal channels for CSO's to interact with the central government on land issues, such as the annual policy dialogue and the standing parliamentary committee for land, environment and natural resources. Despite these formal platforms however, the majority of access to the government is based on informal lobbying between CSO's and individuals in office or parliament. This type of access is susceptible to a great degree of arbitrariness, with the personality of the individual

in question generally being viewed by respondents as the decisive factor. Describing such lobbying strategies an RBO respondent explained "we can look at who we are closely related to, maybe that person is not in the particular ministry, but can still have influence to that ministry, we can talk to that person, and influence him, once he has agreed he can influence the people in the responsible ministry" (Interview RBO8, 2013). The general lack of formal platforms however essentially means that the whim of government leaders determines the extent of their interactions with CSO's. As one RBO respondent recalled:

"The government had issued some securers and regulations with regard to land administration and management and we reviewed them, we wrote our comments and we invited them to share our comments and also to seek their opinions as to why they came up with such unreasonable and unjustifiable regulations, but they did not show up, we really wanted to have justification as to why they came up with these regulations because they were highly unreasonable" (Interview RBO4, 2013)

As a result CSO's experience a great variation in access from various administrative levels throughout Tanzania. While CSO's may be met with cooperation from officials in a certain administrative levels, they can be met with hostility in another.

RBO respondent generally mentioned having more difficulty accessing government leaders then DO's, this confirms Egli & Zurchers (2007) findings that the Tanzanian government is considerably more cooperative to CSO's engaged in service delivery then critical human rights organizations. This may point to an added advantage of addressing land rights within the context of broader development concerns, as opposed to the specialist case based emphasis of many RBO strategies.

While much of the lobbying and advocacy conducted by RBO's and DO's has been uncoordinated, the establishment of the Tanzanian Land Alliance (TALA) in 2010 has signified a step towards consolidating national level lobby and advocacy efforts of a number of leading CSO's dealing with land. The TALA is a coalition of seven RBO's and DO's (HAKIARDI, WLAC, U-CRT, PINGO's Forum, LHRC, LEAT and MVIWATA) which is aimed at advancing the land rights of all categories of small-scale producers (pastoralists, hunter gatherers, artisanal miners, farmers, women). A characteristic of the TALA which was explicitly addressed by all TALA member respondents, is the degree dedication and incorruptibility of it members. In order to ensure that this is maintained, the membership base has been kept deliberately small so as not to muddy the waters with questionable interests. On this one member respondent stated:

"We see that things are working and moving forward with TALA, those people are very serious, I can say that the TALA network is very serious, and the land issue now is a very serious thing, we even discussed to see if we can expand the number of members, but you know, we have to be very cautious, not all NGO's are genuine, we have seen foreign companies and foreign countries try to use NGO's to frustrate things, we have received a number of requests from different organizations who want to join TALA, but we have to really scrutinize them and be sure of what their real intention is to join TALA (...) If we see for example that you have received a certain fund which may influence your decision on issues we will not invite you, we are really very serious on that" (Interview RB03, 2013)

Consolidating the efforts of TALA members under a unified cause has much potential for advancing the interests of small-scale producers and limiting resource waste through project duplication. Currently however, the majority of this potential appears to yet be realized. At the time of the research TALA had not yet been independently registered as an NGO and was therefore dependent on resources from its members, which are by no means in abundance. On the other hand, no non-TALA member respondents which participated in this research were not aware of the TALA's existence, suggesting there is still much work to be done if it is to be recognized as the authority on small-scale producer land rights.

Despite the general sense among respondents that the strength of civil society has been increasing throughout the years, this appears not to have translated into tangible outcomes when the scrutinizing Tanzania's policies and development programmes dealing with land. The fact that the Tanzanian government is in the process of rolling out the unprecedented and highly contested agricultural modernization programme SAGCOT illustrates this lack of felt influence of its CSO critics. As argued by one land rights expert at the University of Dar Es Salaam, the land rights work of RBO's and DO's "remains in documents" (Interview Uni2, 2013). This observation was echoed by a number of RBO respondent with one stating that "we are striving to build the country on the one hand, but we are failing when we look at what is being implemented based on what we are doing" (Interviews RBO2, 2013).

The institutional review, set to culminate in a new constitution in 2014, has come as something as an exception to this general lack of institutional influence. During the review process citizens and civil society have been asked to submit recommendations for the new constitution. This has given rise to an network of activists and CSO's known as the Katiba initiative which has set to collect recommendations from rural communities who risk being cut off from the review process. Somewhat unique for a country so often associated with corruption is the fact that RBO and DO respondents

were generally satisfied with the transparency and accountability regarding the review committee and their actions. Shifting the radical title over land from the president to the village, distinguishing between grazing and cultivating land, and guaranteeing an independent appointment of judges are some of the key recommendations which have been submitted by RBO's and DO's to the review committee.

There is however an obvious limitation to lobbying and advocacy for structural change, for even in the few cases when CSO's are able to influence policy, the real problem as argued by many respondents lies in the implementation. In the words of one DO respondent:

"You know the problem of our country, not only Tanzania, you can say the whole of Africa, the problem is not only policy, the problem is implementing the policy, we have a lot of policies, good policies, but they are only documents and with the implementation, nothing is there, so even if the new constitution will address the issue of rights, the implication of that section will be marginal" (Interview DO5)

Tanzania, with its relatively progressive land policies, is a case example of how local power dynamics and access to information, not policies, govern ownership and access to land based resources. As argued by the respondents, it is mobilization through public education strategies which see progressive policies translate from paper to practice.

Multi-stakeholder forum's

Multi-stakeholder forums (MSF's) are generally national level apex organizations which bring together various stakeholders within (but not limited to) civil society around a common issue. Examples of such forums which touch on land related issues are the Agricultural Non State Actors Forum (ANSAF), Policy Forum, and the Tanzanian Natural Resource Forum (TNRF). The diversity of interests among members means these forums do not constitute movement actors as such, but should be viewed as providing a platform where actors of various movements come together. The activities MSF's can be ordered along the following three categories:

- Services to members, such as capacity building, access to information and access to other members.
- Coordinating activities, such as organizing workshops and research workgroups which are aimed at leading to collective policy recommendations
- Lobbying and advocacy based on collective interests of members.

The majority of RBO's and DO's which participated in this research were also members of one or more MSF. In addition to domestic CSO's, INGO's are also among the members of these forums. The size of their membership base together with the presence of donor NGO's have allowed MSF's to be prolific and critical in their fields, while being less susceptible to political intimidation as individual RBO's and DO's are. More than is the case with many RBO's and some DO's however is their emphasis on constructive engagement with the government, explicitly aiming for reforms from the inside out. As is the case with RBO's and DO's, it is unclear as to what extent the policy recommendations have translated to concrete outcomes in practice. A brief look at the objectives of the previously mentioned MSF's paint a sobering picture. While ANSAF is aimed at pro-poor agricultural development, Tanzania's flagship agricultural development programme would appear to be anything but pro-poor, as argued by one RBO respondent "I am quite sure it will kill the smallscale farmer" (Interview RBO4, 2013). Policy Forum's mission of enhancing poverty reduction equity and democratization, is overshadowed by their own findings that 'violations of human rights have never gone down, but rather they have kept increasing and evolving into new dynamics' (Policy Forum, 2012a, p.60). Finally the increasing conflicts surrounding mining and conservation show little evidence of TNRF's impacts on enhancing governance and accountability in the natural resource sector.

While these broad issues can obviously not be attributed to the relative success or failure of individual MSF activities, they do show that the growth of civil society should not be taken uncritically as signaling a growth of civil societies *influence*. They also highlight the inherent limitations of top down policy reforms, which MSF's target their activities at, and their ability to single handedly enhance social justice *in practice*. Not only do such policies require a willingness from leaders to be accepted, they also require a chain of dedicated authorities throughout the various administrative levels to oversee their successful implementation. It is at this latter level where the majority of critique has been targeted, in words of one MSF respondent "I think it's high time the government went past developing policies and assured that these policies are implemented" (Interview MSF2, 2013). Currently however, there is a significant accountability-disconnect between the central and local government institutions, as one RBO respondent noted: "If the ministers were responsive then they could assure that the local leaders work according to the laws and follow the procedures, but the local leaders don't care because they know that nobody will hold them to account" (Interview RBO8, 2013)

One of the most significant MSF's in relation to land is the Tanzanian Bio-Energy Forum (TABEF) which was initiated by the RBO HAKIARDHI in order to secure a more socially just and equitable biofuel sector. Consequentially it is the only formal CSO in Tanzania which was established as a direct response to the global land rush (not including the TALA which was not formally registered at the time of research). TABEF has hosted interactions between CSO'S, government officials, academics and perhaps most importantly, the private sector. This latter aspect is particularly unique due to the general lack interaction between CSO's representing small-scale producers and investors. According a TABEF respondent, investors are generally hostile towards CSO's due to fears of being demonized. Those investors which partook in TABEF however had come to see, albeit after some initial hesitance, that cooperation and transparency was also in their best interests. While the subsequent bust of the jatropha boom saw interest in bio-energy decrease substantially, the TABEF does provide an example of a politically neutral initiative (thus potentially more feasible for donor funding) which may serve to enhance transparency and social justice around land deals in the future.

Conservation organizations

Conservation organizations are those whose primary concern is environmental protection (wildlife, forestry, wetlands etc.) and therefore constitute a unique category of CSO's who's strategies are aimed directly at influencing land control. The leading conservation organizations in Tanzania are the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) which is predominantly active in Northern regions together with the Frankfurt Zoological society (FSZ). The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) which is predominantly active in the Eastern regions, and the smaller George Adamson Wildlife Preservation Trust (GAWPT) and Jane Goodall Insitute (JDI). While conservation has traditionally been associated with 'fortress style' national parks, which are still steadily expanding, there has been an increase in CBNRM schemes in which conservation is addressed in tandem with community development. The above mentioned organizations have played a defining role in these various manifestations of conservation in Tanzania. The strategies of conservation organizations can be subdivided into the following two categories

Implementation activities

The leading conservation organizations take up a key position in implementing Tanzania's conservation initiatives, these activities range from land surveying, carbon monitoring and building infrastructure to general financial support. The extent in which conservation organizations are integrated into the implementation of government initiatives is particularly evident in relation to the Wildlife policy which stipulate that 'the role of the local and international NGOs is to support the

government financially and technically at all levels, in the conservation and management of wildlife resources' (MNRT, 1998, P.34). In respect to WMA's in Northern Tanzania, the AWF has played a defining role both in raising community support for their establishment and land surveying which determines the various terms of access and resource use. The trend towards integrating development objectives into conservation has seen conservation organizations increasingly involved in activities traditionally associated with DO's, from 'securing local livelihoods' to 'capacity building with local institutions' (AWF, 2012, p.16).

Lobbying and advocacy

A sample of just a few of Tanzania's numerous conservation constructs reveals the decisive role played by individual organizations. From the AWF's role in the Tanzanian Land Conservation Trust (Kabiri, 2011), the WWF's role in REDD+ piloting in the Rufiji river basin (Beymer-Farris & Bassett, 2012)to the GAWPT's role in Mkomazi national park (Brockington, 2002), Tanzania's protected area's would be a shadow of what they are now were it not for lobbying and financial support of these organizations. The extent of conservation initiatives in Tanzania and the sectors fundamental dependence on conservation organizations is a testament to these organizations ability to influence both policy and practice. Not surprisingly, the respondents of this category reported productive relationships with the central government. Tellingly, when asked about the frequent complaint raised by CSO's regarding the closed nature of the central government, the country director of a leading conservation organization stated:

"It is civil society themselves who make it to be understood like that, I have respect, I can access any government office without fear (...) Most of the NGO's come out and tell the government they are doing things wrong, so you already creative a negative thing, the government has an NGO policy, it is respected, it is only us as civil society that are abusing that, that now we can tell the government that they are stupid, no, there are ways of talking to the government and there are ways of talking to civil society, you should not be just poking at things and just correcting things, as if you are the opposition when it comes to politics" (CON1, 2013)

There can be little doubt that the relationship between conservation organizations and the government is related to the revenues raised by conservation initiatives. This is not to say however that the interests of the government and these CSO's are inherently in line. For it is government lead agricultural expansion which has been defined as one of the primary threats to bio-diversity. As such organizations such as the AWF and WWF have been involved in campaigning against large-scale bio-

fuel development. This points to a thematic overlap between conservation and small-scale producer representative organizations, illustrated by joint advocacy campaigns between the WWF and HAKIARDHI, Tanzania's leading RBO concerned with land rights. Ironically, both organization conduct opposing strategies in relation to other themes, such as conservation vs. indigenous land rights. SAGCOT has also raised concerns among conservation organizations. The good standing of conservation organizations with the government has however allowed them to identify "go zones" (Interview CON1, 2013) in cooperation with the SAGCOT secretariat for potential WMA's and national park expansion within the SAGCOT area. This points a degree of equilibrium between the conservation and SAGCOT agenda, despite their seemingly contradictory interests.

Private sector lobby organizations (PSLO's)

PSLO's constitute a category of organizations with significant influence over the policy and practice related to large-scale land acquisitions, particularly those related to agriculture. The leading PSLO's are the Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT) and the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) which are both national level umbrella organizations. These organizations are aimed creating an institutional and policy environment which conducive to commercial enterprises in Tanzania. As is the case with MSLF's, their strategies can be divided into the following categories:

- Services to members, such as capacity building, access to information and access to other members.
- Coordinating activities, such as organizing workshops and research workgroups which are aimed at leading to collective policy recommendations
- Lobbying and advocacy based on collective interests of members.

The ACT and TPSF are both members of the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC). The TNBC is an private sector consultation body which has the Tanzanian president as its chairperson. It has 40 members, half of which are private sector representatives and half of which are business related ministers. By striving for the collective aim of private sector enhancement the TNBC can essentially be viewed as a PSLO in itself, but one which sits in a conceptual grey area between government and civil society. As argued by a respondent of the TNBC, the presidential chair allows for "much quicker access" (Interview PSLO1, 2013) to the government then lobbying through parliament. This formal and direct link to the highest level of government decision making is unparalleled by RBO's and DO's. The TNBC and its members have played a defining role in Tanzania's current trajectory of agricultural development. The Kilimo Kwanza vision for instance, was entirely a product of the TNBC and was accepted without parliamentary or civil society review. TNBC members, particularly the ACT, have also played a crucial role in SAGCOT advocacy. In addition to being a TNBC member, the ACT is also a member of the MSF ANSAF, of which various CSO's critical of SAGCOT are also members. This raises obvious questions about power balances within MSF's and to the extent interests can diverge before becoming irreconcilable.

The emphasis on private sector lead growth sets these PSLO's at odds with RBO's and many DO's. According to one DO respondent they have "a completely opposite mind" and that they "are using the countries resources to advance the business interests that are shared between the rulers and themselves" (Interview D02, 2013). This was echoed by another DO respondents comments in reference to a particular PSLO saying it was "a buddy of the government" and that "it is an NGO, but has been founded by government retired officers with investors" (Interview D03, 2013).

5.2 SMALL-SCALE PRODUCER REPRESENTATIVES AND THE CURRENT STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Internal civil society relationships and donor funding

Research conducted by Lange et al in 2000 found Tanzanian civil society to be highly disorganized. The research findings show that a variety of networks and platforms have been established since then, coinciding with Haapenens conclusions in 2007 that Tanzanian civil society has increasingly sought 'has sought stronger unification and cooperation' (2007, p.6). TABEF (bio-energy), TAPHGO (pastoralists and hunter gatherers), Agrihub (farmer entrepreneurship), ANSAF (pro-poor agricultural development), Policy Forum (policies for social equity), the TALA (small-scale producer land rights) and TNRF (natural resource management) all constitute post-2000 initiatives dealing with land and resources (among other issues) and with (but not restricted to) RBO and DO membership. Although this increase in cooperation was recognized by the majority of respondents, Tanzanian civil society is still a 'ruthlessly competitive' sector' (Green, 2012, p.325). The ability of domestic CSO's to conduct their strategies is fundamentally dependent on donor funding. This has created a climate of secrecy and competition among many organizations, which see's the struggles of individual CSO's to remain operational hampering the collective cause. These effects can prevail within networks as well (Policy Forum, 2012a). On the other hand a number of respondents mentioned CSO's claiming "flagship identities" (Interview MSF2, 2013) which another respondent described as organizations "putting up a face that something has been done by them, although it has been done by the network" (Interview DO1, 2013). This tendency was reinforced during the research process on multiple occasions, with respondents from two or more organizations each referencing the same project as if it was theirs alone.

Aside from joint lobbying strategies, which most networks are aimed at, there appears to be significant room for coordinating grass-roots awareness raising strategies. While all the RBO and most of the domestic DO respondents mentioned conducting such activities, very few mentioned coordinating these activities with like minded organizations. This suggests that there is a great degree of duplication, which is wasteful not only in terms of resource *expenditure* but also in terms of potential resource *gains*, such as knowledge development and inter-organizational learning. Such duplication is not only restricted to strategies, but also occurs among entire CSO's. One salient example of such duplication is that of PINGO's and TAPHGO. Both organizations are CSO networks located in Arusha and are concerned with pastoralist and hunter gatherer rights. During the research process a number of respondents hinted at hostility between both organizations.

Relationships between domestic NGO's and INGO's has also been a source of friction within Tanzanian civil society. While this by means characterizes all interactions between these two categories, with exposure and resources of INGO's being fundamental to (inter) national advocacy campaigns, a number of respondents reported a tendency of being undercut by INGO's. As one MSF respondent stated "There are INGO's that feel they have enough capacity, they have money they have exposure they have good connections, they perceive local NGO's as not having capacity, but at the same time the local NGO's feel that INGO's are blocking them from getting funds and support" (Interview MSF2, 2013)

Aside from competing over resources a number of respondents mentioned a trend of INGO's towards establishing local organizations which not only leads to competition over resources but also to the duplication of activities which would otherwise be conducted by domestic CSO's.

There can be no doubt that the dependence on donor funding, and thus on the unpredictable political climates of donor countries, has lead to a degree of neurosis within civil society which is counterproductive to the greater cause. Current donor trends point towards a further squeeze on financial support to CSO's engaged in social justice strategies. A number of RBO respondents voiced concerns for the future with EU donors downscaling aid and increasingly engaging in basket funding, explained by an RBO respondent as followed:

"(Basket funding) is killing for these land rights and advocacy organizations, those dealing with the soft political angle they will enjoy it, those dealing on the kilimo kwanza they will enjoy it, but for those who are dealing with the land rights issues specifically, on the rough angle, they will not get money, if the economy in Europe gets smart, NGO's dealing with land will survive, if the economy gets worse, we will perish, because there is no way we can depend on basket funds, for us no way, even at this moment I am receiving nothing from the basket fund, because of the nature of the work that we are doing, unless the district commissioner will say that this is a good NGO, while I am saying that what he is doing is not good for the community" (Interview RBO5, 2013)

Basket funds are not the only means by which CSO's are disciplined through funding however, for donor dependence also implies a degree of donor influence over projects recipient CSO's engage in. On this the one respondent explained the following:

"You won't see that they influence you directly, at the beginning they will ask you to write a proposal, you'll request the money and they'll fund you, but after 2 or 3 or 5 years they will say no, now we have a thematic area, and the fund will be for this and this and this, so they will move you to where they want, so that's the way they do it, at the beginning they will say we are going to fund you just write your proposal (...) They'll see that you are very frustrated and that you don't have money and you want to work, automatically you will start working on the other issues, it happens". (Interview RB03, 2013)

The process of requiring the approval of donors, who are themselves influenced by the comings and goings of political trends, serves to undermine the expertise of domestic CSO's and the long term sustainability of projects. Being able engage in grass-roots awareness training for instance is not simply a matter of securing funds, but of convincing donors of the need for such strategies over others. Additionally, a number of RBO respondents voiced concerns about the fact that India and China are increasingly providing the Tanzanian government with an alternative funding source to traditional 'Western' aid, one which is not concerned with social justice issues. This will most likely lead to a significant decrease in incentives for government to interact with (critical) civil society actors. These research findings point to a very fundamental influence of financial resources on advancing social justice. Decreasing funding to critical CSO's and increasing government funding therefore constitute a double threat to land rights activists in Tanzania, potentially increasing both civil society neurosis on the one hand and government indifference and hostility on the other.

Government-civil society relationships.

The Tanzanian government has traditionally been unresponsive and authoritarian towards (critical) CSO's (Egli & Zurcher, 2007). The NGO act of 2002 provides a particularly salient and formal example of this tendency. Within the current context of political competition accusation of opposition partisanship has often been leveled at RBO's by ruling party leaders in the cases were RBO campaigns

had similarities with that of the opposition. In one recent case, an opposition MP had used an RBO land rights document in parliament which had been obtained independently through the RBO's website. As a result the director of the RBO in question was called before a parliamentary commission to explain the organization's ties with the opposition. Although this did not lead to the disbandment of the RBO, it does illustrate the extent in which the NGO act serves as a disciplining mechanism which has been looming over the heads of many critical CSO's. Consequentially all respondents, particularly those of RBO and DO's, were very emphatic in distancing themselves from any political parties. As one DO respondent stated "we don't attach our self with any political party, we know it is very very dangerous to engage in relationships with political parties." (Interview D03, 2013)

The increasing political competition appears to have triggered contradictory trends. On the one hand various respondent mentioned it opening up political space due to (potential) leaders recognizing CSO's as constituents which need to be appeased. On the other hand a number of respondents mentioned increasingly oppressive behavior from the ruling party authorities to any actors posing a threat to their future office. This has been further illustrated by Minister of information recently invoking the controversial 1973 newspaper act to suspend two of Tanzania's leading private newspapers Mwananchi (14 days suspension) and Mtanzania (90 day suspension), which according to Reporters Without Border was a 'totally illegitimate' suspension (Reporters Without Borders, 2013a). The newspaper act assigns the Minster of Information the power to act as 'chief editor' of any newspaper and to ban any publication deemed by the minister as not in the public interest, without intervention of the court system (LHRC, 2013). A year beforehand in 2012 the private newspaper MwanaHalisi was banned indefinitely. According to human rights activists the ban was motivated for their investigative reports into the involvement of a state intelligence officer in the kidnapping and torture of an outspoken activist (LHRC, 2013). Consequentially Tanzania's steady annual increase on the World Press Freedom Index dropped dramatically by 36 marks from 34 to 70 between 2012 and 2013 (Reporters Without Borders, 2013b). Aside from formal disciplining instruments, a number of RBO respondents reported an increase in intimidation and violence towards social justice activists. As one RBO respondent explained:

"We are seeing how the government is becoming violent, how the state is becoming cruel to the initiatives of civil society, if you have heard recently there is one activist who is really being hunted by the government and he has sought asylum, I don't know where but he doesn't want to be found, but also there was a doctor in Tanzania, who was captured and tortured and beaten severely, something

similar occurred to someone from the media who is actually still being medically treated in South Africa, so these are the things we are seeing, that the state machinery is becoming cruel to the voices that are trying to critique the government, so we deal with these things by being balanced, without being too vocal as of recent, because you will end up hurting yourself, because we are seeing the signs that things might become really bad" (Interview RBO4, 2013).

While these acts of violence have not been formally linked to political interests, there is a general sense that they were politically motivated. As argued by a number of respondents however, such political interests should not be seen as those defined by political parties, but should be seen as relating to the interests of individuals in office. As such the hostility towards critical CSO's has its roots not in a clash of ideologies, but in an unwillingness of elites to part with their positions of power. With the next elections set for 2015, together with the their very real potential to reconfigure Tanzania's political landscape, it is highly likely government-civil society relationships will become increasingly erratic as authorities struggle to stay in power.

The question of government-civil society relations points to deeper issues of democracy and governance, in which a number of criticism towards Tanzanian civil society are also warranted. For just as positions of office provide power to those in them, so to do positions in civil society organizations. Additionally, just as the government has been accused of being un-transparent and unaccountable, so too have many CSO's. This has contributed to a generally negative perception towards civil society by both the government and Tanzanaian citizens. As argued by Policy Forum's governance report, CSO's have often been associated with waste and misuse of funds, leading many government officials to view them as self-serving organizations (Policy Forum, 2012a). A number of researches conducted by Tanzania's Foundation For Civil Society (FCS) found similar suspicions towards CSO from much of the general public (TANGO, 2010). A particularly salient characteristic of the majority of organizations incorporated into this research is the general lack of grass-roots membership. Despite RBO's and DO's being formally mandated to represent small-scale producers, ironically this mandate has not originated from those they claim to represent. While professional CSO's play a vital role in providing expertise within social movements, this problematic link to the grassroots essentially provides authorities with a legitimate basis to question the accountability and representation of these CSO's. Ironically these are the same arguments often leveled at the government by CSO's themselves.

A notable exception to this rule is MVIWATA, the national network of small-holder farmers and pastoralist with local, regional and national offices with a total membership base of around 100.000. At a strategic level, this makes MVIWATA significantly harder to discredit along the lines of the criticisms leveled at many other CSO's. That MVIWATA differs in this respect was further illustrated by the general high standing the organization has among the various respondents. As a result MVIWATA's strength lies particularly in its legitimacy, a key non-material resource seen form a resource mobilization perspective (Fuchs, 2006). MVIWATA as a DO however, is concerned with a variety of development related issues, of which land and resource rights is one of many. This is why MVIWATA's membership of TALA is of vital importance. For it brings legitimacy to the alliance in return for collective action regarding land rights, thus mitigating an organizational overstretch associated with the organizations broad range of activities.

The government and public view of civil society caution against uncritically accepting CSO's as the representatives of small-scale producers and the need to strengthen links between organizations and the grass-roots. This link is vital for these organizations legitimacy, both in real and strategic terms. On the one hand, it ensures that campaigns are truly representative of those on whose behalf they claim to speak. On the other hand it provides a strategic defense against being dismissed along the lines of those arguments leveled at many CSO's.

Civil society and resource mobilization: Concluding remarks

The research findings reinforce the fact that power balances at the grass-roots level determine how land control is manifested. Skewed power balances lead not only to a lack of awareness of rights, but also to a lack of means to enforce them. Small-scale producer organizations have a vital role to play in raising awareness and acting as a watchdog. A central tenet of resource mobilization theory is movements actors dependence on existing institutions as a means to mobilize resources. While increased coordination within civil society appears to suggest an increased ability to mobilize resource among civil society actors, small-scale producer organizations still face great difficulty in accessing key institutions outside of civil society. Access to local and central government is susceptible to a great deal of arbitrariness, and will most likely become increasingly unpredictable as elections approach. The ability to reverse exploitative land deals is all but impossible due to a dysfunctional court system, while media channels are increasingly being restricted by 'the very real dangers of getting too close to sensitive information' (Policy Forum, 2012a). Additionally, the ability of RBO's and DO's to mobilize resources through donors is becoming increasingly uncertain, which may potentially strengthen competitive and counter-productive incentives. While it should be noted

that a degree of competition among like minded organizations is a fundamental tenet of resource mobilization theory, these are obviously trends which are counterproductive for the greater cause. In contrast to the difficulty experienced by small-scale producer representatives stand conservation organizations and PSLO's. The fact that conservation and agricultural modernization represent the two most significant trends in land control in Tanzania stands as a testament of their influence and alignment with powerful interest. The revenues associated with both trends show that these organizations are not only adept at mobilizing resources to advance their interests, but also at generating (financial) resources from their initiatives. It should appear as little coincidence that the government is more cooperative to those organizations demonstrating an ability to generate massive short terms revenues, as opposed to those concerned with less profitable ventures associated with social justice.

While civil society has indeed been growing as a realm independent of the state, the growth of civil society as a *factor of influence* over the state appears less evident, at least in relation to small-scale producer land issues. Mistaking the latter development for the former essentially serves to portray the Tanzanian government in a more democratic light then is actually warranted. The reality of small-scale producer representatives with the central government questions the extent in which strategies aimed at formal interactions constitute a viable and efficient means of resources expenditure. Without suggesting CSO's abandon lobbying and advocacy campaigns entirely, these findings do however suggest the need to upscale efforts at building links between CSO's and the grassroots. As we have argued, it is here were the power balances lie that determine the day-to-day reality of land control. Such CSO-grass roots interactions can serve to both empower and unify the grass roots while informing the campaigns of organizations. The TALA, with its current emphasis on national level advocacy, serves as a potential organizational blueprint for such a consolidated effort at grass roots mobilization.

6: FRAMING LAND CONTROL CLAIMS WITHIN CIVIL SOCIETY

As has been argued by critical additions to the land grabs debate, discourse plays a fundamental role in legitimizing particular land control arrangements. These arrangements are inherently normative in that they imply specific distributive arrangements over others. As argued by Corson & MacDonald 'representation and narrative become critical means of securing this space as they legitimate certain claims not only to material resources but also to the authority that enables accumulation by certain claimants' (2012, p.269). In the following section frame theory will be adopted to make a ordering of the discursive 'logics' which inform the various CSO strategies. As argued by frame theory, the strength of a frame is determined by its coherence and ability to align with the interests of potential followers (Polletta & Kai Ho, 2006). Advancing social justice within the context of land control therefore requires more than material resources alone, but also a strong frame with which to mobilize support and legitimize particular distributive arrangements while delegitimize competing claims.

The frames will be presented along the lines of the three dimensions of collective action framing as defined by Benford & Snow (2000): *Diagnostic framing*, which describes the social condition defined as in need of change, *prognostic framing* which offers solutions to the social condition, and *motivational framing* which deals with the construction of a 'call to arms' vocabulary motivating action. The frames should not be read as closed dogma's, but as sources of meaning which organizations draw upon. As such it is not uncommon for certain organizations to draw meaning from multiple frames, an issue which will be addressed later.

6.1 THE FOUR FRAMES

1) The pastoralist frame

The pastoralist frame is concerned with the interests of (semi) nomadic pastoralists in Tanzania. It is a frame which is generally deployed most explicitly by RBO's dealing (among others) with pastoralist rights and some DO's. In general terms the pastoralist frame is a social justice frame due to its 'fundamental aim of protecting and advancing the land access and property interests' of small-scale producers (Borras & Franco, 2010a, p.510)

Diagnostic frame

Pastoralists livelihoods are seen as increasingly under threat due to expanding agriculture and conservation into their lands. The central government together with the conservation movements are defined as the agents of these threats. Both are accused of upholding a stereotype of pastoralists

which portrays them as backwards, and their livelihood practices as unsustainable and economically unviable. This is seen as a guise used to legitimize claims to resource rich pastoralist lands for conservation and as a means to appease the small-scale farming majority through agricultural expansion. The minority status of pastoralists is fundamental to their position according to the pastoralist frame, as argued by one RBO respondents:

"In the case of Tanzania, the issue of human rights is left wanting in this country, of course you may be hearing that it is a democratic country and so forth and so forth, but in reality minorities are suffering, really suffering, there are moments which have seen the government destroying its own people". (Interview RBO6, 2013)

The central government is therefore believed to be overtly antagonistic to pastoralist concerns, due to pastoralists not representing a politically significant constituency. In addition to their minority status, the traditionally decentralized and dispersed nature of pastoralist communities has made it particularly difficult for them to organize a unified counter-power. As a result of these conditions pastoralists have systematically been subjected to evictions which have routinely been associated with human rights violations and lack of compensation. The evictions surrounding large-scale land acquisitions are believed to be directly linked to increasing conflicts between pastoralists and small-scale farmers in regions such as Morogoro. These conflicts are seen as increasing and potentially destabilizing to Tanzania's development.

Conservation initiatives in Tanzania are generally seen as based on an imported Western 'Yellowstone' model, which assumes an incompatible relationship between humans and nature. This assumption is however not reflective of the traditionally peaceful coexistence between pastoralists and wildlife and low impact of pastoralism on dry-land ecosystems. In addition to these fortress style parks, WMA's have been increasingly been regarded as a covert means of appropriating community control of land and resources.

Both conservation and agricultural expansion are seen as driven by, and legitimized in reference to, global concerns relating to environmental degradation and food security. As argued by one RBO respondent : "Throughout the world governments look for soft targets, first and foremost they have to have a global appeal, that whatever they are doing, even if it is hurting people, it has good global reasons". (Interview RBO1, 2013)

Prognostic frame

The solutions to the plight of pastoralists is seen as lying primarily at the village level, and secondarily at the level of government. Communities are seen as in need of awareness raising and mobilization strategies as a means to deal with future encroachment onto their lands. As argued by one respondent: "Making a strong community that will be able to have a proper documentation of the issues and who are more organized, this is the only thing that will help them in the future" (Interview RBO5, 2013). At an institutional level village land use planning, which demarcates land categories according to its use, is seen as a vital means to preventing the increasing conflicts between small-scale farmers and pastoralists.

Due to the strong belief that pastoralist marginalization is driven largely by a negative stereotype, the government (at all levels) is seen as in need of education, particularly in relation to the contribution pastoralists make to the Tanzanian economy. The question of community organization and pastoralist stereotypes are linked, as one RBO respondent explained

"People do not understand properly how pastoralists, as a system, work, and they do not understand the dynamics of using the dry land ecosystem, coupled with that again, pastoralists are disorganized and do not explain properly on their rationale for their mode of production, so you will find a person, a senior official, who does not understand the system properly, but then you find again a pastoralist you cannot explain eloquently on the rationale of their mode of living, so that is a double jeopardy." (Interview RBO6, 2013)

Motivational frame

The pastoralist frame is built on a vocabulary of indigenous rights and resistance. Pastoralists claims to land are grounded in a narrative which defines them as the original land users of areas now under conservation and agriculture. The nomadic character of pastoralism is seen as an expression of a harmonious relationship with the eco-system, due to pastoralists adapting to migratory patterns of wildlife and seasonal resource changes. Respondents frequently referred to pastoralists as the traditional conservers of bio-diversity. As argued by one respondent "you (referring to a person in authority) forget that the people have been there with the wildlife before you came there as an official" (Interview RBO6, 2013).

There is a strong sense of victimhood and injustice within the pastoralist frame. The term 'land grabs' is frequently used to describe agricultural and conservation expansion. Aside from the physical displacement associated with evictions, there is a strong sense that pastoralist marginalization represents a clash of ideologies between communal and private ownership. As such the communal

character of pastoralism, through shared ownership and management of land and herds, is seen as under threat by the dominant trend towards individual land titling which benefits sedentary farmers. As a whole the pastoralist frame is characterized by a general pessimism towards the future of pastoralism in Tanzania.

2) The small-scale farmer frame

The small-scale farmer frame is concerned with the interests of small-scale sedentary farmers in Tanzania. It is adopted by RBO's dealing with small-scale farmers and DO's. As is the case with the pastoralist frame it can be viewed as a social justice frame in that it prioritizes small-holder control over land.

Diagnostic frame

The recent wave of large-scale agricultural land acquisitions are seen as not having delivered on their promised benefits to small-scale farmers and development in general. The current course of agricultural development in Tanzania seem as one which serves the interests of elites and big investors, not small-scale farmers. This is believed as largely resulting from the top down tendencies of the central government which is unresponsive towards small-scale farmers and their representatives. As argued by one RBO respondent: "All these initiatives of the government, be it ASDP, be it Kilimo Kwanza, be it SAGCOT, be it AGRA all of them are devoid of the voices of small scale producers, they are top down, farmers are being told what is good for them, they are not being asked" (Interview RBO4, 2013). As a result of not being informed by those actors most directly experienced with small-scale farming, agricultural policies and programmes have been unrealistic in their aims.

Aside from formal policies and programmes, institutional under-capacity and corruption are also seen as a major cause of land grabs. This is due largely to a lack of awareness of rights and means to enforce them at the village level. This has seen officials at various levels abusing their power to facilitate land deals either for private accumulation or as middlemen for investors. Local elites play a pivotal role in land grabs, as argued by one DO respondent:

"Even the conflicts which are between foreign investors and the communities, these investors, first and foremost, when they come, they have the referees, who are the referees? They are our leaders, the counselor in the ward level, the district commissioners, the district executive officers, directors, land officers in the district level, some of the MP's, some of the ministers are involved and some of the leaders in the apex, so those are the ones who are facilitating this problem" (Interview D04, 2013) There is a general sense that there is land available for investment in the 'general land' category. The majority of deals have however occurred on village land which has had a direct impact on the availability of land for villagers.

Prognostic frame

As with the pastoralist frame, the solution for advancing small-scale farmer interests is seen as lying at the village and government level. Awareness raising at the community level is seen as the key to enhancing the accountability and transparency of officials dealing with land, particularly at the local government level. Certificates of customary rights of occupancy (which require village registration and land use planning) are generally seen as an important safety mechanism against external pressures on land. Land use planning is also seen as an important means to prevent future conflicts between pastoralists and farmers.

CSO's are seen as needing to exert pressure on the government to incorporate input from smallsscale farmer representatives. This is required if agricultural development programmes are to be realistic and investment is to serve the interests of small-scale farmers. Although past investments have rarely benefitted small-scale farmers, there is a general sense that investment can be beneficial to small-scale farmer livelihoods, as long as small-holders are guaranteed a place within agricultural development and maintain control over their land. As argued by one DO respondents:

"Smallholder farmers should be part of the producing force, either by being involved as out-growers, so that they can also improve the small lands they have, they should not be bought out and forced to leave their lands for investors, that instead of outright sale of their land they should be contracted so that that land is used for some time and that the farmers benefit out of that" (Interview DO1, 2013)

Motivational frame

The small-scale farmer frame is built on a vocabulary of democratic entitlement and contribution to Tanzanian development. Respondents often referenced the fact that small-scale farmers make up the majority of citizens of Tanzania, the extent in which small-scale farmer interests are served is essentially a reflection of the state of Tanzanian democracy. The governments current emphasis on corporate capital is therefore a signal of a democratic deficit in Tanzania. A statement frequently made by respondents was that small-scale farmers 'feed the nation', seen in contrast to export oriented large-scale farmers. Consequentially the small-scale farmer frame also derives its legitimacy from the vital role small-scale farmers play in Tanzania's food security and 'the greater good'. As with the pastoralist frame the term 'land grabs' is frequently used to describe large-scale land acquisitions in Tanzania.

3) The conservation frame

The conservation frame deals with advancing environmental protection in Tanzania, such as national parks, forest reserves and CBNRM initiatives. It is deployed by the leading conservation CSO's such as the AWF, WWF, the Frankfurt Zoological society, the George Adamson Wildlife Preservation Trust and Jane Goodall Institute. The conservation frame is a strong proponent of the green economy and the notion of win-win solutions for economic development and environmental protection (Fairhead et al, 2012)

Diagnostic frame

Environmental degradation is seen as driving climate change and as posing fundamental threats to bio-diversity and ultimately the global population. Large-scale agriculture is seen as a major source of deforestation and water use. As argued by one respondent "the great Ruaha river is no longer great due to large-scale agriculture" (Interview CON1, 2013). A number of livelihood practices are also seen as posing a threat to bio-diversity. Among those practices are pastoralism, which is believed to lead to soil degradation and competition over fodder between cattle and wildlife, slash and burn agriculture and charcoal harvesting. These livelihood practices are associated with poverty and a lack of knowledge of environmental consequences at the local level. This is further exacerbated by population growth and expansion of human settlements (Jane Goodall Institute, 2013).

Prognostic frame

The perceived link between poverty and resource degradation is seen as requiring 'capacity building' of local communities through education and livelihood diversification strategies. Villages in areas of rich biodiversity are in need of land use plans, which distinguishing between land for humans (grazing, settlement, cultivation etc.) and wildlife, together with intuitions with the capacity to enforce them. The revenues associated with the various conservation initiatives, from national parks to CBNRM to REDD projects, are seen as providing a win-win situation between development and environmental protection. As argued by the president of the AWF: 'Africa can use its wildlife and biological resources as a comparative advantage, finding ways to both conserve its unique natural heritage while also building increasingly successful economies' (AWF, 2012, p.2). Lobbying of the government is required to reduce agricultural expansion. Small-scale farming is viewed as more viable then large-scale agriculture.

motivational frame

The conservation frame derives its legitimacy in reference to environmental protection and poverty alleviation. Resource 'management' through various forms of conservation is seen as bringing the

otherwise mutually exclusive interests of humans and the environment together. Terms such as 'human-wildlife conflicts' are used to describe the negative impact of humans on bio-diversity, reinforcing the notion of natural incompatibility. There is a strong sense of urgency within the conservation frame due to the global nature of environmental changes and a sense that environmental protection needs to be up-scaled if degradation and climate change is to be mitigated.

4) The modernization frame

The modernization frame deals with private sector lead agricultural commercialization and modernization. Therefore it embodies the ideals of the new green revolutions as forwarded by international donors and coalitions such as the World Bank and AGRA. This frame is generally adopted by PSLO's and to a large extent by the Tanzanian government itself.

Diagnostic frame


Tanzania's agricultural sector is seen as severely underperforming due to underinvestment by the government and private sector. Poverty and food insecurity is seen as the result of this lack of capital in the agricultural sector. The prevalence of non-mechanized subsistence farming and a lack of small-scale farmer entrepreneurship is seen as a sign of underdevelopment of the agricultural sector. Tanzania is seen as having huge potential due to belief that the majority of arable land is underutilized. Weak institutions and weak tenure insecurity have further inhibited small-scale farmers from investing in their land and from making land accessible to FDI. The livestock sector is also seen as underperforming due to the high mortality and low yields of nomadic pastoralist cattle.

Prognostic frame

Large-scale agriculture is seen as playing a key role within the development of the agricultural sector by bringing knowledge, infrastructure, markets and high yields. Small-scale farmers can enjoy these advantages through outgrower schemes which can 'lift' them out of subsistence farming and into farming as a business. Making the agricultural sector accessible for FDI and creating an attractive investment environment is therefore the primary concern of the modernization frame. Land surveying, private titles, deregulation and tax exemptions are a number of the measures deemed necessary to attract the required FDI. The livestock sector is seen as in need of a transition to sedentary ranch management as a means to enhance its productivity.

Motivational framing

The modernization frame is grounded in modernist vocabulary of linear progression through enhanced productivity of the agricultural sector. Poverty is defined as a characteristic of the current stage of development and as the logical result of underproduction, while underproduction is defined as the logical result of underinvestment. Words such as 'kick starting' growth through investment, 'unleashing' the agricultural potential, 'speeding up' development, thus 'lifting' farmers out of poverty (see for example: SAGCOT, 2012) evoke a sense of mechanical inevitability regarding agricultural development and the redeeming power of private capital. The modernization frame therefore derives its legitimacy primarily in reference to 'the greater good' by reducing poverty, food insecurity and development through agrarian transition.





The Frame model

The frame model provides a graphic representation of the four frames as a source of normative orientation for those making up the sentiment pool (they have therefore not been depicted in terms

of their relative 'size'). In addition it shows the broader origins of their legitimacy claims. Framing involves a constant process of reassertion (which is either done implicitly or explicitly) in which the claims of other frames are affirmed or contested (Snow et al, 1986). The model is therefore not intended to suggest a static state.

6.2 THE STRUGGLE OVER MEANING

A number of recent publications have drawn attention to defining role of narratives in legitimizing particular regimes of land and resource control (Da Vià, 2011; Corson & MacDonald, 2012; Mehta et al, 2012; Brockington et al, 2008; Margulis et al, 2013; Borras et al, 2013; Borras & Franco, 2012; Borras & Franco, 2010a; Fairhead et al, 2012). This points to a very clear relationship between the non-material realm of socially constructed meaning and the material realm of resource control and distribution. The four frames each represent such discursive logics which lay claim to Tanzania's land based resources. In addition to legitimizing the claims of certain actors, the frames also serve to de-legitimize the claims of others. As the previous findings relating to resource mobilization illustrated, land control in Tanzania is most reflective of the interests of conservation organizations and PSLO's. Consequentially the conservation and modernization frame have been more successful in influencing the policy and practice of land control then their small-scale farmer and pastoralist counterparts. The green economy and green revolution advanced by these two frames have routinely been criticized as drivers of dispossession and elite accumulation within the recent political turn of the land grab debate (Fairhead et al, 2012; Corson & MacDonald, 2012; Borras & Franco, 2012; Da Vià, 2011; McMichael, 2012). A key characteristic of both the conservation and modernization frame is their politically neutral vocabulary which is devoid of any references to power balances. Both frames derive their primacy from impersonal global forces, such as climate change and food security, while defining the 'poverty' of current land users as the major obstacles to dealing with these threats. Consequentially the 'solution' to these problems becomes a question of changing the current land use practices, through new technologies, FDI, and 'management' arrangements, or by replacing former land users altogether by actors and arrangements deemed more sustainable and/or efficient. The pastoralist and small-scale farmer frames on the other hand are inherently political and define the 'problem' of land as emanating primarily from unjust power balances.

The green economy and the green revolution are both lucrative in terms of their ability to generate massive revenues to those in the position to capture them. This fact together with their indifference towards power balances, serves to enrich economic and political elites while reaffirming their privileged positions. The success of conservation and modernization actors therefore lies in their

ability to work through existing power relations. It is hardly surprising that the pastoralist and smallscale farmer frame have encountered much greater difficulty in accessing power, for it is the practices of many of those in power which are defined by these frames as a major source of land problems. Seen from the perspective of frame theory therefore, both modernization and conservation frames have been successful in aligning their frames with the interests of political and economic elites. Both approaches essentially legitimize the capture of village land by new land control arrangements consisting of central government, investors and CSO stakeholders. What's more, they do so in accordance with their own conception of the greater good. This underlines Bryant's observation about resource capture and the fact that 'Political and economic elites have invariably sought to justify specific, usually highly unequal, patterns of human use of the environment in terms of `the greater social good' (1998, p.87). Far from being an anomaly therefore, loss of small holder land control is in fact a fundamental characteristic of both the conservation and modernization frames.

So what does frame theory have to offer in terms of strengthening the power of small-scale producers within the context of land control? In order to answer this question we will need to analyze the relative strengths and weaknesses of both pastoralist and small-scale farmer frames

Framing small-scale producers struggles over land

As argued by frame theorists, individual frames are often related by drawing their normative assumptions from an overarching master frame (Haunss, 2007; Polletta & Kai Ho, 2006; Carroll & Ratner, 1996). By prioritizing power balances and rights, both pastoralist and small-scale farmer frames can be placed within a social justice master frame. During the research process it was not uncommon for respondents to mention the shared struggle of pastoralists and small-scale farmers as small-scale producers both being subjected to social injustice. Both groups however differ fundamentally in a number of respects which has significantly influenced their frames and strategies.

The historical experience of pastoralists with the Tanzanian government has been one characterized by marginalization. Their experience with eviction and dispossession is one which can be traced back to Umajaa era livestock ranches and colonial era national parks. With the majority of Tanzanian's being sedentary agriculturalists, the minority position of pastoralists has frequently been exploited to gain political support. As argued by one respondent: "If I (the politician) need a vote, and the majority are agriculturalists, I will tell them that I will expand the agriculturalists land towards the grazing land" (Interview RBO5, 2013). Negative imageries of pastoralists, as backwards and unsustainable, have routinely been adopted to legitimize the capture of their lands. This experience

has lead to a frame which identifies the government as an aggressor and malignant threat to pastoralists and their way of life. As such the relationship with the government is framed quite clearly in terms of suspicion, distrust and antagonism.

The historical experience of small-scale farmers however is quite different. By virtue of their majority position, leaders have been required to reference the interests of small-scale farmers, albeit in a purely rhetorical manner, as a means to gather political support. The modernization frame has therefore had to pander to the interest of small-scale farmers by advocating for partnerships between them and investors as a means to advance their corporate agenda. That this is little more than empty rhetoric is evident by the complete lack of means to secure small-scale land control within the modernization agenda. The positive imagery of small-scale farmers as adopted by government leaders and modernization advocates is therefore the opposite of how pastoralists are portrayed. As a result the sense of security within the small-scale farmer frame is stronger than that of the pastoralist frame. Seen from the small-scale farmer frame the problem of Tanzanian land governance is therefore more of a question of top-down unresponsiveness, dysfunctional institutions and associated elite capture. The problem of land governance as defined by the pastoralist frame however is one of systematic and intentional repression and displacement by the government.

As a consequences, the relationship with the government is a lot less clear within the small-scale producer frame then the pastoralist frame. While a number of respondents dealing with small-scale farmer issues emphasized proactive engagement as development partners of the government, others strongly questioned the possibility of such constructive engagement. This division is most clearly illustrated by the different interpretations regarding SAGCOT. On the one hand, many CSO's have been extremely critical of SAGCOT, with one respondent stating tellingly "we are going towards neocolonialism, after five to ten years we will find ourselves working as servants on our own land in our own country." (Interview D05, 2013). On the other hand, some CSO respondents viewed the programme as a means to uplift small-scale farmers livelihoods. When seen in terms of framing strategies, these SAGCOT optimists display a number of characteristics of the modernization frame, and thus represents a degree of alignment between the small-scale farmer and modernization frame. This combined frame underlines the technical and de-political assumptions of the modernization frame, but in a manner which prioritizes the position of small-scale farmers as 'entrepreneurs' as opposed to deregulated foreign capital. In contrast to this MVIWATA, as the national network of small-scale farmers and pastoralists, has formally rejected SAGCOT and the notion of constructively engaging in the programme. Just as SAGCOT has divided CSO's, so too has MVIWATA's positions, in the words of one respondent "how can you tackle you enemy without interacting?" (Interview MSF2, 2013), which represents the annoyance of the SAGCOT optimists towards MVIWATA's position. On the other hand a number of other small-scale producer representatives, particularly of RBO's, were understanding towards MVIWATA'a position. In the words of one such respondent: "When the government invites them, it is not because they really want their opinion, but it is for them to rubber stamp, they just want to have it on the record that they have involved these people, while they have all the plans already done and written" (Interview RBO4, 2013). This skepticism is supported by previous research by Mercer (2003) into government-civil society interactions in Tanzania, whereby he observed a similar phenomenon of CSO involvement being used in 'partnership performances' as a means to legitimize policies.

As a consequences of these divergent opinion, the small-scale farmer frame is less coherent then the pastoralist frame. The governments flirtation with small-scale farmer interests has created disagreement among small-scale farmer representatives as to the extent in which these represent real political opportunities. This supports Gamson & Meyers (1996) argument that political opportunities are not objectively observable but are themselves the result of interpretive acts, and thus subjected to framing processes. Those prioritizing formal engagement appear much more hesitant to upset government relations, displaying a degree of alignment with the modernization frame, while those skeptical of government intentions adopt a language of resistance and social mobilization. Despite the general recognition that the needs of farmers and pastoralists differ in concrete terms, these more activistic proponents of the small-scale farmer frame were also more inclined to mention the common interests of farmers and pastoralists. This implied recognizing the need to protect the pastoralist system. Those aligning with the modernization frame however, appeared more inclined to question the viability of pastoralist system, with ranch management being seen as more desirable.

The recondition of mutual interests and right to land was generally echoed by the proponents of the pastoralist frame, which often argued that cooperation between both population groups is the only way to deal with exploitative power balances and the escalating conflicts over land use. This, together with the pastoralist sympathists of the small-scale farmer frame, can be seen as an attempt at aligning both frames along the lines of a common social justice frame. The TALA, with its explicit aim of enhancing social justice for *all* categories of small-scale producers represents a significant attempt at formalizing this frame alignment strategy.

There is an additional factor which may help explain the relative e strength of the conservation and modernization frame which is generally absent in social justice frames. Aside from their ability to

serve existing power configurations, these frames contain an imagery of 'a better future' which speaks to the majority of Tanzanians struggling to meet there livelihood needs. As argued by Li (2011) the linear development trajectory promised by the modernization narrative speaks to the rural poor who are generally eager to escape the uncertainty of subsistence farming. The CBNRM discourse adopted by conservation organizations contains a similar promise of employment and wage increases for communities engaging in WMA's. Social justice frames however, with their language of resistance, not only agitate existing power balances but do so without promising better material circumstances. While enforcing rights may serve to protect against dispossession, they do little for those not directly threatened by land loss. The benefits of *proactively* challenging the political status quo by demanding accountability is therefore unclear. The risk of questioning powerful interests at the community level is however clear, and it is likely to inhibit small-scale farmers from mobilizing against leaders until their livelihoods are directly under threat. A general characteristic of those CSO's adopting the pastoralist and small-scale farmer frames is their specialist focus. While DO's generally address land issues within projects oriented towards service delivery, and RBO's generally focus on case based rights violations and policy recommendations, there is still much room for a coordinated effort at formulating a broader vision of the future of Tanzanian development and the position of small-scale producers there in. MVIWATA, as the national level network of small-scale farmers and pastoralists, with a nationwide grassroots membership base, would appear to be the CSO most legitimately suited to formulate such a vision. A coordinated effort by TALA could also serve to produce such an alternative. Currently however no such coherent counter narrative has been articulated. This was implicitly confirmed by the majority of respondents who were not able to explain MVIWATA's vision of development, outside of the fact that they represent small-scale farmer interests. Ironically therefore, despite MVIWATA generally being recognized as the voice of Tanzania's small-scale farmers, it is a voice which has not been readily audible outside of the confines of the organization. As long as no legitimate challenge has been posed in the name of small-scale producers, other powerful actors will be free to adopt the symbol of small-scale producer needs as a means to legitimize their own claims to land based resources.

We argue therefore that the success of the conservation and modernization frames can be traced to a number of levels. At the grass roots level they have shown the ability to rally support, however unjustified, by promising a better future for the rural poor. At the institutional level they have avoided stepping on toes by leaving power configurations unchallenged. In addition to this they have grounded their agenda's in reference to the global concerns of climate change and food security. The international corporate and institutional support of the green revolution and green economy at the international level, further reveal the extent in which these frames are inherently top down. The social justice frames, particularly the small-scale farmer frame, have however not been able to produce a coherent counter narrative to these dominant frames, with their aims appearing implicitly in the fragmented and narrow campaigns of their CSO counterparts. As argued by Polletta & Kai Ho (2006) strong frames have shown to be able to compensate for a lack of intuitional access by inspiring extra-institutional mobilization. Communicating such a counter narrative could serve to mobilize the grass roots as a source of power outside of formal institutions. Frame theorists, have pointed to the fact that frames can be strategically extended to include the interests of new constituents (Snow et al, 1986). Articulating a narrative that goes beyond injustice alone constitutes such a frame extension strategy, by serving to proactively mobilize citizens not (yet) directly experiencing injustices or land loss. By providing a coherent vision of the future social justice frames will also be able to compete with imageries offered by those CSO's, leaders and investors currently signing local communities onto CBNRM projects and SAGCOT.

7: DISCUSSION

Conflicts relating to land and resource in Tanzania come in many shapes and sizes, of which largescale land acquisitions by foreign investors is but one. Despite these various manifestations land control regimes share a number of commonalities. Loss of local control, a lack of accountability measures, elite accumulation and an active support by the Tanzanian government are just some of the aspects which characterize land control in its various manifestations. There can be no doubt that the control and distribution of land and resources constitutes one of the most heated contemporary debates within the public and political discourse. The gravity of this matter has been mirrored by the extent of civil society's engagement within this context. Far from being passive witnesses to these processes, numerous Tanzanian CSO's have demonstrated an active involvement in influencing land control in Tanzania. RBO's, DO's, conservation organizations, and PSLO's represent such civil society organizations (either as individual organization or networks) involved in strategies aimed at influencing land control. Recent years have also witnessed the establishment of a number of highly professionalized MSF's which have provided additional platforms for CSO's to collectively engage in such strategies.

The arena of civil society

A particularly salient characteristic of CSO's engaged in issues of land control however is the highly divergent interests and agenda's they represent. This is illustrated by the four frames, each serving to advocate for the control of land and land based resources by certain actors. The common characteristic of these divergent frames is that each legitimizes a specific land control arrangement in reference to the interests of small-scale producers. There can be no doubt that those CSO's advocating the conservation and modernization frames have seen their effort translate into significantly more influence then the proponents of the pastoralist and small-scale farmer frame. The two most dramatic trends in land control, conservation and agricultural modernization under SAGCOT, are evidence of this. The fact that these processes have been stimulated by the government, against a backdrop of increasing conflicts and small-holder tenure insecurity, lays bare an impatient prioritization of (short term) capital accumulation over social equitability. Time and time again such land control changes have not delivered their promised benefits to those losing control and access, while those minorities gaining control and access have repeatedly been shown to benefit substantially. With the current institutional deficiencies and power balances as they are, there is nothing to suggest that the pending wave of REDD and SAGCOT investments will not simply result in an acceleration of elite accumulation and small-holder dispossession. In addition to civil society representing an arena with divergent agenda's therefore, some CSO's can in fact be seen as agents of land grabbing.

By emphasizing social justice issues the RBO's and DO's adopting the pastoralist and small-scale farmers frames stand, in varying degrees, in opposition to the modernization and conservation frames. Their framing puts small-holder land rights at the forefront and criticizes the seemingly impersonal forces behind the green economy and the green revolution as vehicles for elite accumulation. These organizations have been engaged in a variety of strategies aimed at curbing small-holder dispossession. Behind the seeming unity of these shared frames however is a great degree of fragmentation. The general coordination and cooperation between these essentially like minded CSO's in terms of joint strategies and information sharing is therefore low. One particular salient determinant for CSO's abilities to engage in strategies however is their ability to mobilize financial resources. As a result the agency of individual RBO'S and DO's is greatly dependent on limited and fluctuating donor funds. Such funding insecurities also serves to instigate counterproductive incentives such as competition and secrecy, thus hampering the agency of the broader movement. The current squeeze on funding from Western donors, the rise of 'new' donors and increasing basket funding, offer little hope for a more stable funding environment for these critical CSO's.

The most significant blockade to enhancing the influence of the pastoralist and small-scale farmer frame however is the central government itself. It's generally authoritarian and unaccountable tendencies has made gaining access for these critical CSO's extremely difficult and susceptible to a great deal of arbitrariness. The current political competition appears to have further compounded the hostility of the sitting government towards critical CSO's. Even in those cases where an audience has been granted, tangible outcomes have been lacking. This stands in strong contrast to the access and actual influence enjoyed by proponents of the conservation and modernization frame. This lack of access is therefore not the result of a general government closedness towards civil society as a whole, but of the power government leaders have to cherry pick CSO's in accordance with their own agendas. Although it may come as little surprise that CSO's criticizing current power configurations have experienced the most difficulty in influencing the government, it does pose fundamental questions about the ability of civil society to advance the interests of the powerless through formal political engagement alone. The presence of a vibrant civil society engaged in social justice issues should therefore not be taken unproblematically as evidence of increasing social justice in practice. The lack of means to secure social justice in the practice of land control, is most strikingly evident by the fact that land control changes appear irreversible. The porous legal system and the

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recentralization of administrative powers (either through re-categorization of land or centrally controlled protected area's) make it all but impossible to bring land back under village control once it has been taken. Despite land control changes routinely being associated with injustice, corruption and unmet promises therefore, 'righting the wrongs' of land control changes appears to be all but impossible.

From civil society to social movements

The research findings highlight the fact that the 'problem' of land control in Tanzania is a problem of powerlessness of small-scale producers and their representatives, together with an unwillingness and/or inability of those in power to safeguard small-scale producers interests. Social movements, at least in theory, provide a means to counter these power balances (Bebbington et al, 2010). Determining the extent of social movements in Tanzania ican be done in several ways. In terms of formal networks and coalitions advancing the interests of small-holder land rights, the TALA, MVIWATA and Katiba movement essentially fit the definition of social movements. At a broader level proponents of the pastoralist and small-scale farmer frame can also be defined as social movements actors due to their sustained attempts at advancing small-holder land rights. The general lack of awareness and empowerment at the grass-roots level however suggests a problematic link between the formal and grass-roots level. While empowerment strategies are obviously restricted by the availability of funds, it is unclear what the level of priority is given by RBO's and DO's to grass-roots mobilization over other strategies, such as policy analysis and government lobbying, activities most commonly associated with NGO's. Additionally, while recognized as the most effective strategy, grass roots mobilization was also recognized as the most prone to hostility from political elites. Challenging the legitimacy of formal institutions, by circumventing them through extra-institutional mobilization, is obviously a greater threat to sitting elites then those strategies which are neatly regulated and monitored by them. While proponent of the pastoralist frame appear more inclined to seek such political confrontation, this appears to be less the case for proponents of the small-scale farmer frame, particularly those cross-over's with the modernization frame which identify themselves primarily as development partners of the government. In this sense, the current state of many RBO's and DO' in Tanzanian civil society represents more of a vibrant and professionalized NGO sector then social movements engaged in mobilizing popular counter powers. As the research findings suggest however, it is precisely the absence of these counter powers which enable the perpetuation of exploitative land control regimes in the first place. What is needed therefore are coordinated and sustained campaigns of grass-roots mobilization.

Narratives and counter narratives

The power of discourse is often disregarded by development professionals who are generally more inclined towards policy and the distribution of material resources. What is particularly evident based on the research findings however is the extent in which land control regimes are accompanied by a particular logic which legitimizes them. Modernization and conservation frames represent a logic which is based on the primacy of global concerns and the assumption that small-holder land users are incapable of dealing with them, thus legitimizing the restructuring of land control. Not only does this logic leave exploitative power balances untouched, in serves to portray the elite capture of land based wealth as serving the greater good. Small-holder dispossession is therefore a fundamental characteristic of the dominant land control regimes in Tanzania. The logic of the pastoralist and small-scale farmer frames on the other hand are based on social justice which prioritizes the smallscale producer control over land and land based wealth. These divergent frames serve to highlight the extent in which struggles over resources are also struggles over meaning. Despite the eloquent criticisms of the conservation and modernization frame however, the small-scale farmer and pastoralist narratives are largely reactive and lacking in alternatives. This is again reflective of the specialist focus of their CSO proponents. The power of coherent narratives has been addressed frames theorists and more recently within the context of land grab debate. The argument has been made particularly poignantly by Walker stating that:

'A counter-narrative approach recognizes that an effective challenge to flawed and power-laden 'received wisdom' not only depends on debunking science, but also requires penetrating and disrupting the flow of old, comfortable, convenient stories that circulate among environmental and development professionals, and replacing them with 'counter-narratives which better fit the claims of a different set of stakeholders; preferably, counter-narratives with equally attractive slogans and labels.' (2006, p.386)

This statement highlights the need for small-scale producer representatives to go further than specialist and reactive strategies and work on developing a counter narrative for these dominant trends of dispossession. Such a narrative would offer an alternative vision of small-scale producers, environmentalism and agrarian change which prioritizes their access and control over land. As such however, these alternatives are lacking. This underscores Bebbington et al's observation of social movements that:

'To the extent that they elaborate alternatives they do so only for their specific issues. That they do this reflects the specialist nature of movement support organisations (...). Systemic alternatives that

deliver proposals for rethinking the relationships between production and consumption are conspicuous by their absence' (2010, p.1321).

The problem of land control is therefore not only a problem of powerful interests dismissing alternative development pathways, as suggested by Borras & Franco (2010), but of an absence of such alternatives to begin with (at least in the case of Tanzania). Formulating and communicating such alternatives could serve to strengthen mobilizations against the dominant conservation and modernization frames in Tanzania. Actively framing the vision of a shared future between pastoralists and small-scale farmers could also serve to bridge the increasing divide between both producer groups. Finally, such an alternative could also serve to inform international debates on the ideological bankruptcy of neo-liberal globalization and the inherent contradictions of the green economy with the legitimacy of an 'insider's perspective'. As long as such alternatives offering a clear vision of the future of small-holder land users in Tanzania are left wanting, other powerful actors will be free to continue adopting the symbol of small-holder interests as a means to legitimize adverse land control regimes.

7.1 CONCLUSION

Land control in Tanzania has many manifestation involving a variety of stakeholders and institutional arrangements. Nonetheless, these manifestations share the general characteristics of occurring within power imbalances and bringing conflict and dissatisfaction to small-holders. Civil society has proven to be an active component in both the facilitation and contestation of various control grabs in partnership with the government. The modernization and conservation frames advocated by various CSO's represent the two most significant trends of small-holder dispossession throughout Tanzania. Their influence can be traced back to their ability both to reaffirm existing power balances and to serve them through the generation of massive short term revenues. It is only by reference to the powerful interests behind these frames that we can explain how practices so routinely associated with conflict and discontent are persistently upheld under the guise of win-win scenarios. The pastoralist and small-holder farmer frames on the other hand represent those CSO's which criticize and resist these land control processes in the name of social justice. The political nature of their struggle has however seen their agency pale in comparison to the two dominant frames.

The research findings suggest the need for increased coordination among social justice organizations together with a strategic reassertion towards extra-institutional mobilization, particularly through the grass roots level. Additionally there is a need for these CSO's to engage in the formulation of a alternative and long term vision so as not restricting themselves to reactive critiques of the dominant

development trajectory only. Despite these additions that social movements can (theoretically) make to advancing land rights, recognizing the very real restriction imposed by resource deficiencies, internal fragmentation and political oppression highlights the need to refrain from romanticizing movements as de-facto agents of change. Realistically speaking, it is simply too much to ask of these CSO's for them to single handedly resist the global support, corporate weight and government authoritarianism behind conservation and modernization frames.

7.2 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The primary aim of this research was to contribute to generating new insights as to how to bridge the divide between critical theory and practice within the context of small-holder dispossession. It is quite obvious that the formal solutions offered to curb such processes are by no means satisfactory and only serve to legitimize the institutions which make them possible in the first place. Dispossession is driven by power balances, any strategies intended to pursue social justice must therefore be aimed at countering these imbalances. There is much need for critical theorists to operationalize their eloquent critiques in a manner which serve to inform processes of 'real world' change, as opposed to engaging in abstraction for abstractions sake only. Aside from this general call for a intellectual reassertion towards action research, there is a need for specific research into the following areas.

- CSO grass roots linkages. The exact relationship between the organizational counterparts of social movements and the grassroots is something of a uncharted territory within the context of mobilization and land control. This is not only the case for Tanzania but SSA in general. There is much need to gain insight into the current level of priority given to such processes over 'participation' strategies through formal political channels and the factors which determine this. There is also a need to research which mechanism CSO's adopt to inform themselves of the needs at the grassroots.
- Linkages between domestic and international movements. International movements and platforms such as La Via Campensina have recognized that the dispossession associated with the green economy and green revolution signify a structural, not incidental, threat to social justice. This level has been actively engaged in developing social justice counter narrative with the potential for real world application such as food sovereignty and agro-ecology (McKeon, 2013). This research could however not find such coherent counter narratives in Tanzanian civil society. As such further research is required into how these domestic-

international linkages might be strengthened to unify and mobilize counter powers in the face of systematic dispossession.

Trans-local impacts of dispossession. Despite not being its primary focus, this research did serve to reveal the severity of trans-local impacts in the form of conflicts between land users resulting from processes of dispossession. This is an 'impact dimension' which has thus far received little attention in the land grab debate. The majority of empirical research into land grabbing has been geographically fixed and based on before-after snapshots of land control changes. There is much need to gain more insight into these more fluid and long term processes. The simmering social unrest which is growing in Tanzania reveal that such 'impact chains' (Zoomers & van Westen, 2011) reach much further then the direct and quantifiable livelihood losses of former land users alone.

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ANNEX 1: INTERVIEW CODES USED FOR IN-TEXT CITATIONS

Respondent code	Date of interview
CON1 (Conservation Organization 1)	04-04-2013
DO1 (Development Organization 1)	21-02-2013
D02 (Development Organization 2)	21-02-2013
D03 (Development Organization 3)	12-04-2013
DO4 (Development Organization 4)	05-04-2013
DO5 (Development Organization 5)	12-03-2013
D06 (Development Organizations 6)	08-03-2013
MSF1 (Multi-Stakeholder Forum 1)	28-03-2013
MSF2 (Multi-Stakeholder Forum 2)	10-04-2013
PSLO1: (Private Sector Lobby Organization 1)	07-03-2013
RBO1 (Rights Based Organization 1)	28-03-2013
RBO2 (Rights Based Organization 2)	25-03-2013
RBO3 (Rights Based Organization 3)	21-04-2013
RBO4 (Rights Based Organization 4)	08-04-2013
RBO5 (Rights Based Organization 5)	12-03-2013
RBO6 (Rights Based Organization 6)	13-03-2013
RBO7 (Rights Based Organization 7)	13-03-2013
RBO8 (Rights Based Organization 8)	24-02-2013
Uni1 (University 1)	27-03-2013
Uni2 (University 2)	13-03-2013

ANNEX 2: RESPONDENT ORGANIZATIONS

(Amount of respondents interviewed in brackets)

AWF (African Wildlife Foundation Tanzania)
 (1)

2. ACT (Agricultural Council of Tanzania) (1)

3. ANSAF (Agricultural Non State Actors Forum) (1)

4. CORDS (Community Resource Development) (2)

5. Farmers Pride (1)

6. FAO Tanzania (2)

7. HAKIARDHI (Land Rights Research and Resource Institute) (1)

8. HAKIKAZI Catalyst (1)

9. IPI (Ilkisongo Pastoralist initiative) (1)

10. LHRC (Legal Human Rights Centre Arusha)
 (2)

11. LEAT (Lawyers Environmental Action Team) (2)

12. MVIWATA Arusha (3)

13. MVIWATA Morogoro (2)

14. MVIWATA Moshi (2)

15. Oxfam Tanzania (1)

16. PINGO's Forum (Pastoralist Indigenous NGO's forum) (2)

17. PELUM Tanzania (1)

18. Policy Forum (1)

19. SNV Arusha (1)

20. SNV Dar Es Salaam (Coordinator of Agrihub Northern Tanzania) (1)

21. Sokoine University of Agriculture -Department of agricultural engineering and land planning (1)

22. Sokoine University of Agriculture - Institute of development studies (1)

23. TANGO (Tanzanian Association of NGO's)(1)

24. TABEF (Tanzanian Bio-Energy Forum) (1)

25. TIC (Tanzanian Investment Centre) (1)

26. TNBC (Tanzanian National Business Centre) (1)

27. TNRF (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum) (1)

28. TAPHGO (Tanzania Pastoralist and Hunter Gatherer Organization) (1)

29. TPSF (Tanzania Private Sector Foundation)(1)

30. TRIAS Tanzania (2)

31. U-CRT (Ujamaa Community Resource Team) (1)

32. University of Dar Es Salaam - Institute of development studies (1)

 University of Dar Es Salaam – Institute of Resource Assessment (1)

34. WLAC (Women's Legal Aid Centre) (1)

35. WWF (World Wildlife Fund Tanzania (1)

ANNEX 3: INTERVIEW TOPICS

Mandate

Strategies

Coalitions/allies

Strengths

weaknesses/hindrances

Access to local/central government

Current state of civil society

'Problem' of land

'Solution' to land problem

Future of land rights and development in Tanzania