

Ethiopia's Renaissance: The Rise of a Fallen Hegemon
*A constructivist approach to the determinants of the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Party's foreign policy (2002-2018)*



M.A. Thesis International Relations in Historical Perspective
Utrecht University

Name: Netsanet Gubena
Student number: 4074300
Supervisor: Dr. Frank Gerits

Submission date: 17-06-2019
E-mail: n.b.gubena@uu.nl
Word Count: 19,306

Table of Contents

Abstract	5
Introduction	6
Chapter 1 – Theoretical Framework	12
1.1. The Limits of Rationalist IR Theories	12
1.2 The Power of the Individual	16
1.3 Fluid Identities	19
1.4 Perceptions of International Society.....	23
1.5 Conclusion.....	28
Chapter 2 – The EPRDF’s Foreign Strategy: Presenting Discontinuity as Continuity.....	28
2.1 Resuscitating a Regional Power: Laying the Foundations for Ethiopia’s Renaissance	29
2.2 Ethiopia’s Renaissance: Restoring regional primacy through regional integration	33
2.3 Conclusion.....	34
Chapter 3 – Democratization as a means of survival: who survives?	35
3.1 What’s in a Word? Interpreting the EPRDF’s Vision on Democracy and Development.....	36
3.2. Good Versus Evil: The EPRDF’s Framing of Democracy and Development as a National Security Interest and its Dealings with Opposition	39
3.3 Conclusion.....	42
Chapter 4 – Ethiopian Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa.....	43
4.1. Ethiopia’s Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations in Africa	43
4.3 IGAD: The Weakest Link With the Most Potential	45
4.4 A Seat at the Table: Ethiopia’s non-permanent membership to the Security Council.....	47
4.3. Conclusion.....	50
Conclusion	51
Bibliography	54
Primary sources	54
Secondary sources	55

Abstract

International relations is often described as field of study created in the West, by the West, and for the West. This is evidenced by the prominence of Western centric rationalist IR theories combined with an underrepresentation of African experiences in IR scholarship. This thesis sought to determine whether or not the EPRDF tried to establish Ethiopia as a hegemon in the Horn of Africa between the years 2002-2018. This was done with an approach that would allow for the presentation of African experiences without reducing them to fit Western conceptualizations of (international) political life. The narrow theoretical demarcations of rationalist IR theories obscure important factors which determine Ethiopia's interest formation process, like the role of identity and internal state dynamics. Ethiopia's foreign policy interests and international conduct aligned with rationalist notions. Despite this overlap, it was argued that social constructivism, as opposed to rationalism, is a more appropriate framework for the study of African IR. This thesis examined the role of ideas on the level of the individual, the state and international society; ideas revolving around power, hierarchy, authority, and exceptionalism, specific to Ethiopia. These ideas accounted for the primacy of state survival, preservation of power, maintenance of a status quo in the Horn of Africa, and international legitimacy in the interest formation process of Ethiopia's foreign policy and Ethiopia's international conduct. While the EPRDF attempted to establish Ethiopia as a hegemon in the Horn of Africa, it was argued that it was more appropriate to speak of Ethiopia as a regional power resorting to various strategies, among which hegemonic, to pursue its interest.

Introduction

In 2007, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (1995-2012) proclaimed Ethiopia's Renaissance during a speech on the 20th anniversary of the Dergue's downfall and the establishment of a new democratic order in 1991. He defined Ethiopia's Renaissance as 'the rise of Ethiopia to the height of the ancient civilization of our forefathers.'¹ The phrase became prevalent throughout Ethiopia's development agenda. The Grand Ethiopian Millennium Dam was renamed to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, policy papers were presented as 'a vehicle for Ethiopia's renaissance' and referred to the government's plans and actions as 'a journey towards Ethiopia's Renaissance.'² Additionally, the phrase became prevalent throughout Ethiopian Society. Establishments like hotels, taxi's, phone companies, restaurants and mall are named after its Amharic translation: *Hidase*. The phrase resonated with society.

Restoring Ethiopia's former glory became an important driver of Ethiopia's foreign policy. The Ethiopian Government expressed that Ethiopia's development depends, amongst other things, on its ability to shape international affairs, which required deepening its international integration.³ In June 2016, Ethiopia was elected to serve as a non-permanent member to the United Nations Security Council in 2017 and 2018 and this should not be seen as an isolated event. In 2018, Ethiopia concluded its second term in a row in the United Nations Human Rights Council and Ethiopia's former Minister of Health, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tedros Adhanom, was elected to serve as the World Health Organization's new Director General. Its increased presence in multilateral decision-making bodies corresponds with the government's ambition to improve its integration in the international system.

Ethiopia, owing to its size and centrality in the region, historically held the most power in the region relative to the other states in the Horn of Africa. The region has dealt with colonialism, famine, civil wars, inter-state conflict, religious extremism, piracy, and poverty. Finding itself in a perpetual cycle of volatility, it became dependent on foreign assistance and prone to external influence and super power competition. With its new foreign policy, which was released in 2002, Ethiopia planned to gear its efforts towards stabilizing the region and enhancing its resilience.

¹ Habtamu Alebachew, 'Ethiopia's Renaissance: Quest for conceptual and definitional parcels' (version 03-01-2013), <http://www.meleszenawi.com/ethiopias-renaissance-quest-for-conceptual-and-definitional-parcels/> (15-06-2019).

² Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, National Planning Commission, 'Growth and Transformation Plan II (2015/2016 – 2019/2020)', May 2016, 2. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Government Communication Affairs Office (GCAO), 'Ethiopia's Foreign Policy and its Achievements', April 2012, 42.

³ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Information, 'Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy' (FANSPS) (2002), 22.

The academic debate on Ethiopia's foreign policy discusses Ethiopia's strategies, its status in the region, and its objectives in relation to the region and continent: the factors determining Ethiopia's foreign policy goal setting and foreign conduct. Some authors define Ethiopia's foreign policy as realist or argue that the realist paradigm provides insightful perspectives. Medhane Tadesse for example argues that 'successive Ethiopian regimes followed a 'Metternichean realpolitik' and describes Ethiopia is a 'status quo power' pursuing 'internal peace and a balance of power in the region.'⁴ However, in trying to make sense of Ethiopia's regional influence, he explains Ethiopia's competition for regional hegemony with Egypt as historical, structural, cultural and political. He ascribes Ethiopia's advantageous place in international relations to the country's 'collective memory, historical narrative and diplomatic potential.'⁵ In other words, he explains Ethiopia's objectives as realist driven, but points to factors which, within the realist paradigm would not be considered a determining factor in Ethiopia's foreign policy interests.

Jason Warner, who looked at the utilization of African regional and sub-regional organizations by member states, acknowledges that they pursue neo-liberal and constructivist collective action. But is more often the case that states, among which Ethiopia, approach them 'in deeply realist ways' leveraging them to pursue their own national interest.⁶ Furthermore, realism is said to offer 'sundry insights into the nature of African' foreign policy.⁷ There are two connected observations in the historiography that could support this stance. First, the foreign policies of successive Ethiopian governments, despite differing ideological orientations, remained largely the same with respect to the centrality of state survival.⁸ In other words, Ethiopia's international engagement remained unchanged because the anarchic structure that defines the international system determines the national interest, which for

⁴ Medhane Tadesse, 'Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence', in: Gérard Prunier en Éloi Ficquet, eds. *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia. Monarchy, Revolution, and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi*, (London 2015), 333-356, there 333.

⁵ Medhane, Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence, 346.

⁶ Jason Warner, 'Multilateral Machinations: The Strategic Utility of African International Organizations in the Pursuit of National Security Interests in West Africa and the Greater Horn (Doctoral Dissertation African, Cambridge 2016), 11.

⁷ Jason Warner, Multilateral Machinations, 11.

⁸ Medhane, Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence, 333. Michal Woldemariam, Regional Powers, Great Power Allies, and International Institutions: The Case of Ethiopia in: Jason Warner and Tim Shaw, eds. *African Policies in International Institutions* (New York 2018), 371-388, there 372. Edmond J. Keller, 'The Politics of State Survival: Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Foreign Policy', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 489 (1987), 76-87. Fantu Cheru, 'Navigating a "multi-polar" world: Ethiopia's Foreign Policy towards "old" and "new" development partners, paper presented at conference Ethiopia's International Relations: The Foreign Policy Making and Determinants of an Emerging Giant, 14-01-2014, 1-43, there 5.

Ethiopia was state survival. And second, Ethiopia's foreign policy is described as geared towards maintaining a status quo and balance of power, which are both considered an important means to ensure state survival within the rationalist paradigm.⁹

Warner aims to renew the focus on 'the long eschewed' realist paradigm to study African IR. Even though he states to be aware of the 'Great Debates' with respect to the suitability of IR theories to analyze African IR, he withdraws himself from this debate. His intent is to demonstrate that African states exhibit various kinds of strategies, 'rather than to militate for the appropriateness of just one paradigm's exclusive applicability.'¹⁰ Despite, his awareness of this 'Great Debate' he considers it appropriate to refocus realism, a paradigm which stands out for its exclusive inapplicability in the African context. Moreover, he does not touch on any of the assumptions underlying realism before arguing for its appropriateness. Paradoxically, like Medhane, he relies on constructivist explanations in his analysis that renders his support for realism a bit redundant. He recognizes the centrality of internal concerns in Ethiopia's foreign policies, but forgoes on explaining the appropriateness of realism, despite this contradiction.

There are also authors who argue that successive governments held quite distinct foreign policies, but these conclusions are generally based on the determinants of the foreign policy as formulated in policy papers and ignore continuities such as Ethiopia's policies regarding international organizations, the role of patron-client relationships in Ethiopia's foreign alignment, and the relationship between personal power interests and foreign policy objectives.¹¹ Also, with respect to determinants, the phrase is open to different interpretations. Determinants can be understood as formal reasons brought forward to explain a decision, but it can also be understood as reasons that are not visible on the immediate surface.

Ethiopia's location in the Horn of Africa renders it with a degree of vulnerability. Surrounded by Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya's 'porous borders' Ethiopia is at risk of being more affected by regional instability compared to the other countries with less instable neighbors.¹² In light of this Warner argues that Ethiopia pursues hegemony to guarantee state survival.¹³ The idea of Ethiopian hegemony in the Horn of Africa, however, is

⁹ Ruth Iyob, 'Regional Hegemony, Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31 (1993) 2, 257-276, there 261.

¹⁰ Warner, *Multilateral Machinations*, 28-29.

¹¹ Negera Gudeta Adula, 'The determinants of Ethiopian foreign policy under consecutive Regimes: Appraisal of Military and EPRDF Government determinants of Ethiopian foreign policy' *International Journal of Political Science and Development*, 6 (2018) 7, 192-199.

¹² Berouk Mesfin, 'Ethiopia's Role and Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa', *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 6 (2012) 1/2, 87-113, there 90.

¹³ Warner, *Multilateral Machinations*, 205.

quite contested in the academic literature. Christopher Clapham assumes Ethiopia's hegemonic status in the region. He refers to Ethiopia's hegemony in the context of the Horn of Africa's regional dynamics, rather than as an objective to be pursued or maintained through foreign policy.¹⁴ Similarly, Michal Woldemariam, asserts that 'the maintenance of Ethiopia's regional hegemony' has been central to Ethiopia's foreign policy in the post-1991 years.¹⁵ Warner describes the EPRDF as 'hegemony seeking' and trying to establish a 'benign regional hegemony' in the Horn of Africa.¹⁶ Sandra Le Gouriellec agrees that the EPRDF is pursuing a 'benign regional hegemony' in the Horn of Africa and that it likes to think of itself as a hegemon, but argues that the strategies it resorts to undermine this ambition, referring to Ethiopia as an 'imperfect hegemon.'¹⁷ Others argue that Ethiopia, because of its location and size, has the potential to be a hegemon but is not in a position to do so for a number of reasons. Jeffrey Hurst attributes this to poverty and internal divisions.¹⁸ Medhane claims that Ethiopia could have been the most influential country in the Horn of Africa exercising a 'stabilizing and hegemonic role', were it not for the country's under-development and sense of insecurity.¹⁹ Here, Medhane jumps from influential to hegemony as if the two were the same, but they are not. Most influential is relative to the other states, and he does not identify which country, then, is the most influential. Ethiopia can be the most influential without being a hegemon. Also, throughout his text he provides examples demonstrating how Ethiopia was 'in a unique position of influence' during the civil war in Sudan, how it played a leading role in the Somali peace process and referred to Ethiopia as the key actor in IGAD.²⁰ The different positions described demonstrates that scholars agree that Ethiopia's influence in the Horn of Africa is not negligible but there seems to be no consensus on how to capture this influence using the appropriate academic jargon.

The objective of this thesis is twofold. The first objective is to determine if Ethiopia attempted to establish itself as a regional hegemon in the Horn of Africa. While this might seem counterintuitive, given the historiography in the previous paragraph, the answer can go either way. It will do so by identifying the ideas which shaped its foreign policy and how the

¹⁴ Christopher Clapham, *The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay*, (London, 2017), 179.

¹⁵ Michal, *Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence*, 372.

¹⁶ Warner, *Multilateral Machinations*, 211.

¹⁷ Sonia Le Gouriellec, *Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy: Ethiopia, an 'imperfect hegemon' in the Horn of Africa*, *International Affairs* 94 (2018) 5, 1059 – 1075, 1062.

¹⁸ Jeffrey Herbst, 'Western and African peacekeepers: motives and opportunities', J.W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, eds, *Africa in world politics: the African State system in flux* (Westview 2000), 308-328, there 314-316.

¹⁹ Medhane, *Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence*, 333.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 342. *Ibid*, 352.

rationale behind the foreign policy was framed. The main question that will guide this thesis is: What does the narrative on the EPRDF's self-proclaimed Ethiopian Renaissance tell us about how Ethiopia envisions its position vis-à-vis states in the Horn of Africa? The second objective is to create space in IR scholarship for the study of African IR. This will be done by moving away from the more prominent IR approaches like neorealism and neoliberalism. It is the author's contention that their prominence has not benefited IR scholarship in explaining African foreign conduct, because African dynamics are often irreconcilable with the assumptions that underlie rationalist approaches. This will be discussed in the following chapter, but for now it is perhaps appropriate to briefly mention the reservations regarding this issue. Rationalist conceptualizations of international politics and its corresponding assumptions are assumed to be universal and fixed. This is while they are, in fact, local, as they are shaped by historical and contextual factors, and subject to change. This is, however, often ignored.²¹ The static nature of these approaches obscures relevant matters, like the role of internal dynamics, identity, ideas, beliefs, and values, to understand the why's and how's of African IR. In this particular context the aim is to capture the intricacies of Ethiopia's political history, which is complex to say the very least, to reveal what ideas determined the interest formation process of the EPRDF's foreign policies.

This endeavor is relevant to the academic debate for a number of reasons. Ethiopia is considered a legitimate actor internationally, despite its bad track record of human rights violations. It has not created any obstacles for Ethiopia in improving its international integration and increase its influence. Explaining this requires a different approach which does not solely focus on material capabilities as a determinant for influence. Recent years have also been marked by a shift in the global balance of power, which is also becoming more fragmented. Moreover, the study of Africa remains underrepresented in mainstream IR, and where it is represented it is often explained on the basis of inappropriate analytical frameworks. Scholars may fulfill advisory roles for governments developing policies. It is, therefore, important that approaches to African IR are more inclusive to yield adequate conclusions. It is often forgotten that the social sciences, and the humanities even more, are a human endeavor. The assumed objectivity and universality of rationalist approaches is rarely scrutinized, while they are in themselves based on subjective interpretations of a socially constructed world. This thesis acknowledges this, and it is equally important that this view gains more recognition in

²¹Patrick Chabal, *Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling* (London/New York 2009), 173-179.

IR scholarship – or any field for that matter. Academia’s intrinsic worth makes it all the more fitting to reflect and scrutinize our own methods of inquiry.

This thesis draws from international relations theory, primary source analysis, and secondary sources to answer the main research question. Specifically, it will draw from social constructivism, which will figure as a lens to interpret the primary sources. Constructivism allows for a broader scope of analysis as it is not accompanied by the same theoretical rigidity associated with rationalist approaches. Hence, it will account for a more comprehensive understanding of the interest formation process of the Ethiopian government. The temporal scope of this thesis is 2002-2018. The EPRDF authored and released its Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) in 2002 opening up ‘a new chapter in the history’ of the country and Ethiopia concluded its non-permanent membership to the United Nations Security Council in 2018.²² The primary sources used for the analysis are available online and in English and comprise policy papers and press releases from the Ethiopian government and interviews with Ethiopian government officials.

The first step towards answering the research question begins with developing a constructivist framework in the first chapter. This chapter will additionally serve to further elaborate on the shortcomings of rationalist approaches for African IR. The second chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the FANSPS to determine Ethiopia’s primary objectives driving this new strategy, whilst also focusing on the framing of its rationale. Based on those findings, the third chapter will interrogate the EPRDF’s vision of democracy and development and question the extent to which they can be attained in Ethiopia. As chapter two will show, democracy and development are presented by the EPRDF as the bedrock of Ethiopia’s foreign policy and explains its centrality in chapter three. The fourth, and final chapter, will take a closer look at Ethiopia’s contributions to peace and security in the Horn of Africa through its contribution to peacekeeping operations, and IGAD and UN Security Council Membership. Throughout these three chapters, due attention will be given to contrasting rationalist and constructivist explanations. The conclusion will summarize the main findings and answer the main question, whilst highlighting the constructivist interpretation of Ethiopia’s foreign policy objectives. It will additionally reflect on this thesis and make suggestions for further research.

²² Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, ‘FANSPS’, 3.

Chapter 1 -- Theoretical Framework

As mentioned in the introduction, the aim of this research project is to determine whether or not the EPRDF pursued regional primacy in the Horn of Africa by uncovering ideas underlying Ethiopia's foreign policies. Therefore, this chapter serves to establish a framework for the analysis of Ethiopia's international politics by drawing from social constructivism. On a fundamental level there is not much of a difference with respect to the concepts that are used for the analysis. The state, power, identity, resource distribution, ideology, and governance are all defining elements of political life. The crucial difference, however, lies in the way these concepts are understood, expressed, and valued, and how, if at all, they shape the interest formation process of a state. The following section will begin with a general overview and critique of rationalist IR theories, after which a constructivist approach for the analysis of Ethiopia's international politics will be developed. Historical developments on the level of the individual, the state and international society to determine which ideas determine Ethiopia's international conduct. Each section will additionally address how rationalist IR theories would seek to explain these developments and argue why constructivist approaches are better suited for the study of Ethiopian IR.

1.1. The Limits of Rationalist IR Theories

In Kenneth Waltz's influential work *Theory of International Politics*, the international system is described as anarchical due to the absence of one central authority overseeing the international conduct of states. This absence is said to account for an international system reminiscent of Hobbes' state of nature: where personal survival is the primary interest and everyone fends for themselves, an atmosphere of distrust is bound to occur. Following this line of reasoning, state survival can only be attained through maximizing power at the cost of another state's power. As a result, states are sucked into a continuous zero-sum power struggle. This power struggle among self-interested states, who are considered the main actor in world politics, is the defining characteristic of international relations according to Waltz.²³ A state's national interest is fixed and exogenous from social interaction, meaning that a state's national interest does not change, regardless of local or international dynamics.²⁴

²³ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Massachusetts 1979).

²⁴ Christian Reus-Smit, 'Constructivism', in: Scott Burchill et al, eds. *Theories of International Relations* (New York 2005), 188-211, there 199.

The assumptions underlying neoliberalism are similar to that of neorealism: international anarchy shapes state behavior, the state is the principle actor and the state is self-interested., Neoliberalists, nevertheless, reach a different conclusion about the potential for sustained international cooperation. Robert Keohane developed a theory of international cooperation in *After Hegemony*, in which he sought to explain **why** and how international cooperation under anarchy emerges and is sustained. Political and economic interaction between states leads to interdependence, which in turn leads to shared interests. However, in the absence of a central authority, shared interests are an insufficient incentive for self-interested states to abide by agreements. Through the establishment of international institutions, international regimes are created in binding member states by rules and agreements to hold them accountable.²⁵ Why states consider it to be in their self-interest to engage in international cooperation in the first place is a question this particular theory does not answer nor seeks to answers.²⁶ It is assumed that this engagement is prompted by material concerns. Additionally, since neoliberalists, like neorealists, treat state interests as fixed and exogenous, there is no way to account for the interest formation of states. Therefore, without empirically excluding other factors with an ability to influence interest formation, it can be argued that rationalist theories seek to explain state behavior based on an incomplete data set.

Rationalist IR-theories assume protection from external aggression to be the primary interest, which is attained through maximizing international power or engaging in international cooperation. Rationalist IR theories were developed in the West, by Western academics and based on Western international politics. The international conduct of Western states is shaped by historical developments specific to that region. For example: processes of state formation which account for well-organized states, industrialization, the primacy of capitalism, and colonialism, which led to a major power imbalance between the Global North and South.²⁷ The way concepts central to the study of IR are understood, which precede theoretical assumptions, are local but treated as if they were universal.²⁸ A problem then arises when these frameworks are applied to states where governments face internal aggression in the form of domestic struggles for power among competing groups with the potential to turn into violent conflict. In this scenario, a state's international conduct could be motivated through the prioritization of internal threats over external threats. It is, therefore, important that a theoretical approach to

²⁵ Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton 1984).

²⁶ Christian Reus Smit, 'Constructivism', 192.

²⁷ Chabal, *The Politics of Suffering and Smiling*, 179.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 174.

African IR allows for the inclusion of internal dynamics to account for the interest formation process. Neither neorealism nor neoliberalism allow for the inclusion of internal dynamics as a determinant in a state's international conduct, nor does it allow for the study of interest formation. This means that when internal aggression trumps external aggression in a state's international conduct, there is no way to demonstrate this when following a rationalist logic, which might yield incorrect conclusions. This is not to say that the definition of state's national interest – state survival and accumulation of economic and military power – lacks merit. Constructivism does not completely rule out material concerns as a factor in decision making, but rather argues that material concerns play a role insofar the political agent consider these material factors to be of value.²⁹ Moreover, a theoretical approach for studying international politics must be able to explain the process of interest formation before determining what a state's interest is.

Employing an African approach to international relations creates obstacles because it generally implies a trajectory of historical events which Ethiopia did not necessarily experience, which revolves around colonialism and anti-colonialist struggles. And even though Ethiopia was occupied by Italy from 1935 until 1941, Ethiopia is not a newly independent state nor is it haunted by colonialism's legacy. For this particular topic, it is important that an African approach to IR does not solely rely on anti-colonial struggles and takes into account the diversity of histories on the continent. While it is undeniable that Ethiopia experienced and continues to experience problems similar to that of other African states like civil war, poverty and famine, these problems were not a result of colonial subjugation. Rather, they were a result of intra-regional dynamics specific to the Horn of Africa, and are as, Clapham argues, homegrown.³⁰

This complication is illustrated in Thomas Kwasi Tieku's discussion of theoretical approaches to IR, and specifically the idea of hegemony in Africa. He asserts that Africa knows no regional hegemons because not one African state has sufficient power 'to set, maintain and enforce regime rules.'³¹ '[M]ore importantly', colonial experiences and Cold War politics on the continent resulted in a 'resentment against powerful states.'³² The pursuit of hegemony is said to contradict Pan-African ideals which form basis of Africans' states interaction with one

²⁹ Ian Hurd, 'Constructivism', in: Christian Reus Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds. *The Oxford Handbook International Relations* (Oxford, 2008), 298-316, there 301.

³⁰ Christopher Clapham, *The Horn of Africa*, 2.

³¹ Thomas Kwasi Tieku, 'Theoretical approaches to Africa's international relations', in: Tim Murithi, eds. *The Routledge Handbook of Africa's International Relations* (New York, 2014), 11-20, there 13.

³² Tieku, 'Theoretical approaches to Africa's international relations', 13.

another.³³ The historiography demonstrated that the opposite is true; Ethiopia is often characterized as either a hegemon or as a state pursuing hegemony in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, he substantiates his argument by drawing from the continent's experience with colonialism and Cold War politics, but in the case of Ethiopia both factors do not apply.

Following a rationalist line of reasoning, hegemony equals domination, is a state's end goal, and requires economic and military power. Sonia Le Gouriellec challenges this understanding of hegemony, arguing for the crucial role of consent in the successful exercise of hegemony; hegemony acquired through predatory practices cannot be called as such.³⁴ She acknowledges that Ethiopia possesses the 'realist attributes of a hegemon' but argues that it is an 'imperfect hegemon' because it lacks the neoliberal and Gramscian attributes of a hegemon.³⁵ In her much needed effort to create space for African experiences in IR scholarship, however, Le Gouriellec draws from Western centric theoretical approaches to substantiate her argument, and the theory of hegemonic stability in particular; a theory which argues that relative stability requires a hegemon and was developed observing British and American hegemony.³⁶ Additionally, Gramsci observed the element of consent in advanced capitalist societies where internal political dynamics and national redistributions policies were consolidated. As of now, there are no advanced capitalist societies in Africa. If Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony relies on context specific elements, to what extent are we to look at hegemony in Africa through this lens? Additionally, if one is to argue that consent is a prerequisite for the successful exercise of hegemony, the concept of consent should be critically evaluated as well: what counts as consent when it involves a subordinate's consent? How do inter-personal relations in different contexts shape how consent is understood?

Sandra Destradi rightfully argues that the academic debate on hegemony in IR literature is complicated due to the 'extreme conceptual confusion' surrounding 'empire', 'hegemony', and leadership' as well as hegemony's conflation with imperialism and leadership.³⁷ In her work, Destradi proposes to place various strategies used by regional powers on a continuum reaching from imperial to leading. She argues that hegemonic power can be exercised through varying means and regional powers may resort to different types of hegemonic strategies depending on

³³ Ibid, 13.

³⁴ Le Gouriellec, 'Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy: Ethiopia, an 'imperfect hegemon' in the Horn of Africa', *International Affairs* 94 (2018) 5, 1059-1075, 1062.

³⁵ Le Gouriellec, 'Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy', 1063.

³⁶ Ibid, 1062.

³⁷ Sandra Destradi, 'Regional Powers and their strategies: empire, hegemony, and leadership', *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010) 4, 903-930, there 909.

the objective that is to be reached and the type of relationship between the regional power and the neighboring state.³⁸ Contrary to Le Gouriellec, she does not apply the various theoretical conceptualizations of hegemony to a state to determine whether or not that state can be qualified as hegemon, whether it be perfect or imperfect. Instead, she clarifies, combines and integrates the different approaches to broaden the conceptualization of regional powers.³⁹

Following Destradi's definition, this research project considers Ethiopia to be a regional power in the Horn of Africa as well as in the rest of the continent.⁴⁰ Its status as a regional power has not remained constant over time, but Ethiopia has managed to determine the trajectory of developments in Africa and the Horn of Africa through the use of combination of imperial, leading, and hard, intermediate and soft hegemonic strategies.⁴¹

1.2 The Power of the Individual

It is impossible to look at Ethiopian history without looking its leaders. The degree to which the country, its government and policies are dominated by them was high. Ethiopia's leaders personify the Ethiopian state. Emperor Menelik, Emperor Haile Selassie, Chairman Mengistu Hailemariam, and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi all 'shaped twentieth century Ethiopia' and determined the course of the country.⁴² To illustrate the role of individual agency in state conduct, this section will discuss Ethiopian leaders to demonstrate the role of ideas in interest formation.

The role of the individual in constructivist thinking pertains to the assumption that when thinking of agency in international relations, we ought to think of humans with 'political consequential capacities as moral agents.'⁴³ According to constructivist scholar Christian Reus-Smit, humans are able to influence political decision making and the political agent's behavior can be understood through understanding the values, beliefs, and ideas, which shape the political agent's identity.⁴⁴ This contrasts with the state-centric structuralist point of view

³⁸ Destradi, 'Regional Powers and their strategies', 919.

³⁹ Ibid, 929.

⁴⁰ "A regional power is a state which belongs to a region, disposes of superior power capabilities, and exercises an influence on regional neighbour" Ibid, 929.

⁴¹ Ibid 926-927.

⁴² Gérard Prunier, 'The Meles Zenawi Era: From Revolutionary Marxism to State Developmentalism', in: Gérard Prunier and Éloi Ficquet, eds. *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia. Monarchy, Revolution, and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi*, (London 2015), 415-438, there 415.

⁴³ Christian Reus-Smit, Reading History Through Constructivist Eyes, *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 37(2008)2, 395 – 414, there 398.

⁴⁴ Reus-Smit, 'Reading History Through Constructivist Eyes', 404-406.

underlying rationalist theories which argue that social structures determine state behavior.⁴⁵ This deterministic logic of rationalist thinking renders a severe constraint on human agency. Instead, the ideas and social structures in which identities and interests occur and evolve are ‘mutually constituted.’⁴⁶ This means that there is a continuous interaction between social structures and the political agent’s identity, accounting for the existence and of each.

The Kebre Negast traces the heritage of Ethiopia’s emperors to King Solomon, which has endowed them with divine legitimacy. The national epic ‘glorifies a particular monarchical line and tradition (...) indelibly associates Ethiopia with the Judeo-Christian tradition (...) and sought to arouse patriotic feelings of uniqueness, to glorify Ethiopia, and to provide a proud identity.’⁴⁷ After Ethiopia’s Golden Age, the Solomonic monarchy weakened and its ‘credibility, power, and authority’ reached its lowest point in the eighteenth century.⁴⁸ Despite this weakening, the dynasty’s legitimacy and the notion of exceptionalism it accounted for never diminished. Before Emperor Tewodros restored the Solomonic crown in 1855, the 18th century ‘northern peasantry was continually reminded of Ethiopia’s earlier greatness and exhorted to work towards its renaissance.’⁴⁹ The extent to which Ethiopia’s achievements were measured against the country’s past shifted the emperors’ attention to the past, as opposed to the present and future. Ethiopian leaders actively pursued the restoration of Ethiopia’s former glory, etched in the collective memory, demonstrating the importance of the Ethiopian Empire and Solomonic rule.

With the UN enforced federalization of Eritrea in 1952, Haile Selassie secured access to Eritrea’s ports on the Red Sea and control over a communication station of strategic importance to the United States. From a strategic perspective, a federal union with Eritrea made sense, since this would increase American interest in Ethiopia, but it does not explain why the emperor fully stripped Eritrea of its autonomy.

Power, on the domestic level, was not considered something to be shared. Haile Selassie’s efforts to keep the development of democratic ideas at bay in Ethiopia would be undermined if Eritrea maintained its elected parliament. And in that sense, an autonomous Eritrea

⁴⁵ Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Social Constructivism in *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, (Oxford, 2006), 162.

⁴⁶ Reus-Smit, *Reading History Through Constructivist Eyes*, 400.

⁴⁷ Harold G. Marcus, *A History of Ethiopia* (Berkeley, 2002), 19.

⁴⁸ Shiferaw Bekele, ‘Monarchical Restoration and Territorial Expansion: The Ethiopian State in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century’, in: Gérard Prunier and Éloi Ficquet, eds. *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia: Monarchy, Revolution and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi* 159-182, there 160/

⁴⁹ Marcus, *A History of Ethiopia*, xvii.

represented an internal threat to his own power. The continued existence of the Imperial Government required an Eritrea fully incorporated under imperial control and stripped of its autonomy.

Authority in Ethiopian society is, according to Clapham, expressed through ‘a mania for control on the part of those in authority’ making it nearly impossible to ‘tolerate levels of autonomy.’⁵⁰ Adding that ‘[a]ny deviation from subordination is correspondingly akin to rebellion.’⁵¹ Power, an ‘old Abyssinian obsession’, has to be absolute and in imperial hands. The 1955 constitution, spelt out Haile Selassie’s power as follows: ‘By virtue of his imperial blood (...) the person of the Emperor is sacred (...) His power indisputable.’⁵²

This example demonstrates how views relating to power, which developed in the context of specific conditions, shaped Haile Selassie’s move to annex Eritrea. A rationalist explanation does not take Ethiopia’s historical context and internal dynamics into account, nor does it account for the emperor’s identity and ideas he held about leadership, power, but also about himself in relation to Ethiopia, Africa and the World. As a result, a rationalist explanation of these events would be too simplistic and one dimensional, as it would seek to explain the annexation solely in material terms. The aforementioned, however, demonstrates how ideas relating to power, the Kebra Negast, and Haile Selassie’s status as emperor, King of Kings, elect of God, shaped his behavior. Additionally, an Eritrea fully incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire corresponded with Ethiopia’s imperial mission preservation of territorial integrity.⁵³

Exercising absolute power, as an idea, continued to determine the country’s governance after imperial rule. While his successors no longer claimed divine authority, their mandate was still regarded ‘as coming from heaven.’⁵⁴ The emergence of Mengistu Hailemariam as the Dergue’s strongman re-established the normal Ethiopian structure of autocratic rule. Like the emperor in his time, the history of the Ethiopian revolution became greatly linked to Mengistu’s personality, which left a notable mark on the revolutionary process. He reached ‘a pinnacle of power that hardly any Ethiopian ruler had enjoyed before.’⁵⁵ Bahru partly ascribes his rise to power to the ‘deep-seated authoritarian traditions of the country which was more conducive to the emergence of a strong man than the collective leadership’ initially aspired by

⁵⁰ Clapham, *The Horn of Africa*, 11.

⁵¹ Ibid, 11.

⁵² Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia: 1885-1991* (Athens, 2001), 206.

⁵³ Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System*, (Cambridge, 1996),

⁵⁴ Gérard Prunier quoted in Alex de Waal, *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power* (Cambridge, 2015), 150.

⁵⁵ Bahru, *A History of Modern Ethiopia*, 249.

the Dergue.⁵⁶ But also to the man he was. He possessed a ‘special ability to size up situations and persons, dissimulate his true intentions, and more than ordinary oratorical skills.’⁵⁷ Meles, as well, is described as a ‘supreme tactician’ and someone who you do not want to cross.⁵⁸ And also as a man who ‘left a strong imprint on his time, probably the strongest one on Ethiopia since Emperor Menelik’ This demonstrates the interchange between social structure and identity. The structure facilitated his rise to power, but the rise to power also required a very distinct personality. While Ethiopians are a people to be governed, it is not just anyone, that can govern Ethiopians.⁵⁹ A ruler is to be respected and feared, not popularly chosen.

1.3 Fluid Identities

Rationalist approaches for employing state centric methods rooted in Western conceptualizations of political life.⁶⁰ In an attempt to analyse the behaviour of states in the ‘international system’, rationalist approaches assume the universality of concepts. In Africa: Politics of Suffering and Smiling, Patrick Chabal argues that ‘all concepts are historically and contextually generated and, therefore, bounded by the historical circumstances in which they appear.’⁶¹ This indicates the locality, as opposed to the universality of concepts. Consequently, this raises the question regarding the applicability of these approaches in African contexts where concepts central to political life emerged under different circumstances and are understood, valued, and expressed differently.

This is most prominently the case with the state. The state is central to the study of international relations and remains the ‘unproblematic starting point of analysis’ – most notably within rationalist approaches.⁶² Kevin Dunn argues that scholars as well as policy makers assume that the difference in internal characteristics lie at the heart of non-Western states dealing with corruption, civil wars, poverty and famine in Africa. This assumption has led Western states to conclude that there is something inherently wrong with African states which prevented the Western state to fully materialize or for development aid to yield desired results.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 248-249

⁵⁷ Ibid 249.

⁵⁸ Prunier, ‘The Meles Zenawi Era’, 428.

⁵⁹ Clapham, The Horn of Africa,

⁶⁰ Kevin C. Dunn, ‘MadLib #32: ‘The (*Blank*) African State: Rethinking the Sovereign State in International Relations Theory’ in: Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw, eds. *Africa’s Challenge to IR Theory* (New York, 2001), 46-63. Chabal, The Politics of Suffering and Smiling, 175.

⁶¹ Patrick Chabal, The Politics of Suffering and Smiling, 177.

⁶² Kevin C. Dunn, ‘MadLib #32: ‘The (*Blank*) African State’, 46.

Hence, states dealing with the aforementioned problems are characterized as failed or collapsed.⁶³ He argues that '[w]hat needs to be recognized is that the African state is not failing as much is our understanding of the state' which does not fit African realities.⁶⁴ Citizenship, territorial integrity, and monopoly on the means of violence are considered prerequisites for statehood, and he argues that this renders a particular interpretation of events, but also disqualifies the majority of African states as a state.

To allow for a more nuanced debate, he proposes to consider the state as a discursive construction. The state exists because people engage in acts and processes that reify the idea of the state i.e. the discourse is what makes the state exist. By approaching the state as a product of discourse, and thereby making the state a more fluid concept, it is no longer a static concept. Accordingly, this approach allows for the intricate nature of states to be taken into account.

Another example concerns Medhane's description of Ethiopian foreign policy as historically 'based on Westphalian principles' like sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security.⁶⁵ While it is true that they became the overriding principles of Ethiopian foreign policy, his statement, knowingly or unknowingly, characterizes these principles as either universal or foreign to Africa. The historical development of Ethiopia demonstrates these principles and their primacy emerged under circumstances specific to that region and time.

Understanding the 'home grown' dynamics in the Horn of Africa, he argues, requires understanding 'the power of landscape' on the social and political development of the region.⁶⁶ The 'dramatic differences in land forms' led to 'different modes of livelihood.'⁶⁷ Arable farming in the 'northern highlands' for instance, allowed for the emergence of a 'feudal-like society' where hierarchy 'became the guiding principle of highland society' and shaped day to day life and interactions.⁶⁸ Additionally, territoriality became an important expression of identity for the Ethiopian highlanders.⁶⁹ This contrasts with the Somali, found in the 'lowland periphery' of the Horn of Africa.⁷⁰ Their mode of livelihood, pastoralism, gave way to social

⁶³ Dunn, 'MadLib #32: The (*Blank*) African State', 47 – 49.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 49.

⁶⁵ Medhane, Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence, 333.

⁶⁶ Clapham, *The Horn of Africa*, 2-7.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 7.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 8.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 10.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 15.

and political structures characterized by egalitarian principles. Lacking a fixed territory, territorial identities were all but relevant to the Somali.⁷¹

Clapham's account illustrates how the social and political structures deriving from the geomorphic features in the Horn of Africa are significantly different and help explain why and how the people in the Highland Core relate to territoriality while the pastoralist Somali did not. Territoriality, in this particular context, is not a universal concept but rather a product born out of specific conditions to tend to a society's needs. Moreover, he argues that the geomorphological features 'have historically created the power structures to which the peoples of the peripheries have been (...) subordinated.'⁷² As explained before, there is no acknowledgement of the locality of concepts in the rationalist paradigm. But understanding these dynamics help explain the historical tensions with the ethnic Somali living in the Ogaden, in Eastern Ethiopia, as well as Ethiopia's key role in containing Islamist extremism in America's Global War on Terror.

With respect to state identity, a body of literature demonstrates the fluidity of Ethiopian identity; an identity shaped and sustained by Europeans, Africans, and Ethiopians.⁷³ It is this fluid identity of Ethiopia which allowed for Ethiopia's identity to be interpreted in varying ways, and even conflicting ways from time to time.

During the 12th century, tales about a 'remote and fabulous wealthy country in the East' ruled by the devout Christian Prestor John came to dominate the imagination of European traders. Described as a 'peaceful, crimeless and untied' realm '[f]ull of exotic people and bizarre animals' and as '[f]ar away geographically and yet so close religiously.'⁷⁴ Teshale Tibebu describes this as 'the romantic image' in his work in which he identifies perceptions of Western Ethiopianist scholarship and their corresponding images of Ethiopia. Other examples include 'the isolation image' which perceives Ethiopia as impregnable, and ascribes Ethiopia's defeat of the Italians at Adwa in 'extra-human terms' and 'the "Adwa complex" image' which led to the myth of Ethiopians as 'Black Caucasians' to explain Ethiopia's victory within the parameters of European superiority.⁷⁵ Messay Kebede similarly argues that the existence of

⁷¹ Ibid, 15.

⁷² Ibid, 9.

⁷³ Daniel E. Alemu, Re-imagining the Horn, *African Renaissance* 4 (2007) 1, 55-64, there 57.

⁷⁴ Marcus, *A History of Ethiopia*, 12.

⁷⁵ Teshale Tibebu, 'Ethiopia: The "Anomaly" and "Paradox" of Africa' *Journal of Black Studies* 26 (1996) 4, 414-430, there 414-419.

civilization during Aksumite rule⁷⁶ was explained in a way complementary to the Eurocentric worldview which assumed the inferiority of the Black race.⁷⁷ To remove this threat it was thus ascribed to the presence of Semitic settlers from South Arabia who enslaved and civilized the local population.⁷⁸ This de-Africanization of Ethiopia was, according to both Teshale and Messay a systemic occurrence Western scholarship.⁷⁹ Additionally Ethiopia has been paradoxically described as a country that is ‘in rather than of Africa.’⁸⁰ But despite Ethiopia’s systematic de-Africanization ‘the Pan African image’ glorified Ethiopia:

‘Whereas Western scholars predicated on the non-African status of Ethiopia, Africans have taken Ethiopia as the most beloved of their possessions, as the jewel and pride of Africa – indeed, of people of African descent. As opposed to the Western image of Ethiopia, the pan-African construction of Ethiopian identity not only includes Ethiopia as part of Africa but made Ethiopia the quintessence of Africa. Ethiopia became the concentrated expression of Africa. Ethiopia carried the burden and suffering that was Africa. Ethiopia symbolized the hope and pride of Africa.’⁸¹

The Adwa victory evidenced the possibility of Black resistance to White domination to be considered on an equal footing with the European powers and as a state ‘to be reckoned with.’⁸² However, instead of falling victim to European colonialism, Clapham argues that Ethiopia contributed to exacerbating the future struggle of colonized peoples in the Horn of Africa: ‘[the] Ethiopian state...was every bit as expansive in its ambitions as the European colonial empire-builders.’⁸³ This came to expression through what he terms ‘internal colonialism’⁸⁴ and is also known as ‘Abyssinian colonialism.’⁸⁵ Ethiopia’s defeat of the Italians, he argues, led to the continued existence and independence of the Ethiopian state as well as a highly fragmented

⁷⁶ The Aksumite Empire ruled from c.100 AD until c. 960 AD and their control spanned what is now known as Eritrea and the Tigray region in the north of Ethiopia.

⁷⁷ Messay Kebede, ‘Eurocentrism and Ethiopian Historiography: Deconstructing Semitization’ *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 1 (2003) 1, 1-19, there 5.

⁷⁸ Messay Kebede, ‘Eurocentrism and Ethiopian Historiography’, 5.

⁷⁹ Messay Kebede, ‘Eurocentrism and Ethiopian Historiography’. Teshale, Ethiopia: The "Anomaly" and "Paradox", 414.

⁸⁰ Teshale, ‘Ethiopia: The "Anomaly" and "Paradox"’, 414.

⁸¹ Ibid, 425-426.

⁸² Bahru, *A History of Modern Ethiopia*,

⁸³ Clapham, *The Horn of Africa*, 13.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 33.

⁸⁵ Izabela Orlowska, ‘Forging a nation: the Ethiopian millenium celebration and the multiethnic state’, *Nations and Nationalism* 19 (2013) 2, 296 – 316, there 309.

nature of European colonies.⁸⁶ In this sense, Ethiopia decided the fate of the people in the Horn owing. This development in itself set Ethiopia apart from the rest of the region, as it was able to avert colonial subjugation and determine the course of the rest of the region. It is also in this sense that the Horn differs from the rest of the continent, where the ‘conquest of an indigenous power carried with it the premise of inequality.’⁸⁷ Meaning that in European colonies, all Africans were equally inferior to their European conquerors, whereas in the Horn, internal colonialism resulted in ideas about the superiority of one indigenous culture over other indigenous cultures. Apart from the consequences it had for Ethiopia’s position in the region and the world, the Adwa victory became the backbone of Ethiopians’ deep sense of national pride.

Ethiopia, despite its lack of economic and military capabilities, decisively influenced decision making in accordance with its own national interests in its bilateral relations, regional and continental affairs, and multilateral settings. It can be argued that the palatability of Ethiopian identity is one of the contributing factors. Identity is a very fluid concept, and one finds out how fluid when trying to determine the identity of the Ethiopian state. The Ethiopian state identity is shaped by different factors. These were on the one hand determined by context specific ideas about power, territoriality, and hierarchy. The personalities and prestige of Ethiopian leaders, the Adwa victory, the fact that it was never colonized, that it was ruled by emperor’s whose power derived from God, affected how the country was viewed by Europeans and Black Africans. The intricacies of Ethiopian history allow for the appropriation of the country’s identity to fit diverging agenda’s and narratives. Ethiopia, as a state, enjoyed an exceptional status but considered itself exceptional as well. In constructivist thought this is considered a non-material structure and influences ideas about how to act and what strategies an actor can imagine in reaching their goal.⁸⁸ The exceptionality that accompanies Ethiopia’s state identity is carefully preserved and utilized, which will be further elaborated on in the next section.

1.4 Perceptions of International Society

To rationalists, there is no such thing as international society, but rather an international system of states. States are reduced to entities with possessing nothing but capabilities to focus on the

⁸⁶ Clapham, *The Horn of Africa*, 34.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 31.

⁸⁸ Christian Reus Smit, ‘Constructivism’, 198.

ways these material capabilities within the anarchic international system enable or constrain states from taking certain actions.⁸⁹ As a result, states are solely concerned with accruing economic and military power. Constructivism does not reject the idea of material concerns, but rather the primacy of material concerns in determining a state's national interest. To the extent that structures determine the behavior of political agents, normative, ideational, material and structures are all considered to be equally important. With respect to the former two structures, Reus argues that they shape identity and interest through 'imagination, communication and restraint.' The previous sections argued that an important element of Ethiopia's state identity is the idea of exceptionalism. personal interests and beliefs of Ethiopian leaders became engrained in the country's foreign policy, due to the intertwining of internal dynamics and personal interests into the country's foreign policy.

The Adwa victory catapulted Ethiopia on the international stage. It was the first African member to join the League of Nations, but Ethiopia ended up falling victim to Western interests. He also successfully manipulated states to its own benefit. Haile Selassie, at the time Ras Tafari Mekonnen (1916-1930), pursued Ethiopia's admission to protect its territorial integrity under the umbrella of collective security and to open the country up to an increasingly powerful state: the United States.⁹⁰ This allowed him to establish ties with the only major power outside of Europe without colonial ambitions in Africa. This was a matter of state survival; the Tripartite Agreement⁹¹ presented a threat to Ethiopia and the would be emperor lacked the financial and military capabilities to safeguard Ethiopia's territorial integrity.⁹² Haile Selassie, Mengistu, and Meles all relied on foreign aid, most notably through patron-client relationships, with respectively the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United States as well as China to protect state survival.⁹³

Haile Selassie continued to pursue collective security to ensure Ethiopia's survival and became one of the founding members of the United Nations in 1946. Despite the League's

⁸⁹ Jack Donnelly, 'Realism', in: Scott Burchill et al, eds. *Theories of International Relations* (New York 2005), 188-211, there 29-35.

⁹⁰ Marcus, *A History of Ethiopia*, 120-121.

⁹¹ The Tripartite Agreement was signed in 1906 by Great Britain, France, and Italy when Emperor Melenik II grew ill. The agreement defined the legal framework for the regulation of Great Britain, France, and Italy's interests if the status quo in Ethiopia were to be disturbed by Menelik's death for example.

⁹² Marcus, *A History of Ethiopia*, 120. Haile Selassie Gebre Selassie, *The Role of the Foreign Element in the Making and Breaking up of Local Polities in the Horn of Africa: The Formation and Transformation of the Ethiopian State* (Amsterdam 1972) 131.

⁹³ Netsanet Gubena, *Continuïteit in de buitenlandse politiek van Ethiopië 1930 – 2016* (Thesis Liberal Arts and Sciences/History of International Relations, Utrecht 2016), 11.

refusal to support Ethiopia's battle against Italy after the invasion in 1935, Haile Selassie contributed troops to the Korean War in 1951 as a sign of reverence to the UN's collective security ideals and as a means of leverage in Ethiopia's bilateral dealings with the United States. Supported by the Americans, Haile Selassie was able to pursue its geopolitical ambitions in the Horn of Africa through the UN. Realists are quite skeptical of international organizations and argue that they are only beneficial insofar as states can serve their own interest. It is difficult to conceive the emperor's value of this ideal as not self-serving. Additionally, it fits with Haile Selassie's pursuit for international recognition which he also attained for his modernization efforts in Ethiopia, and his role in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity in 1963.

In order for Ethiopia to be considered a credible advocate and spokesperson for the African continent during decolonization, Haile Selassie had to present itself as the appropriate middle man between Africa and the West. Where before, Ethiopians insisted on their distinctness as Habesha, the emperor now made sure to express Ethiopia's Africanness based on a shared heritage, shared marginalization in world politics, and by demonstrating his unwavering support for the struggle of African states under colonial rule. In this role, Ethiopia benefitted from the prestige of its emperor who possessed 'his own anti-colonial credentials in the struggle against Italian fascism, with a status that distinguished him from the competition of primacy between nationalist leaders such as Nasser, Nkrumah, Nyerere, Sekou Touré or Senghor.'⁹⁴ The imperial government succeeded in placing itself diplomatically at the head of the emerging groups of independent African states. Which is interesting, because: 'Ethiopia, in so many ways the least African of the African states (...) became the major spokesperson for Africa.'⁹⁵ What explains Haile Selassie's embrace of the Pan-African ideals in which unity and solidarity form the foundation of this philosophy?

The previous section discussed how the preservation of the imperial government became intertwined with Ethiopia's foreign policy, and Fikru asserts that Ethiopia's Pan-African thrust was born out of a 'shrewd sense of national interest.'⁹⁶ Following Egypt's independence in 1952, Nasser's popularity had increased among Arabs and Africans. His charisma and the flourishing Pan-Arabism aroused Somali irredentism in the Ogaden and secessionist sentiments among the Muslim Eritreans. Nasser's exclusion of Ethiopia from the Nile water

⁹⁴ Clapham, *The Horn of Africa*, 40.

⁹⁵ Robert Hess quoted in Fikru Gebrekidan, 'From Adwa to OAU and the Politics of Pan-Africanism, 1896-1963', *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, 6 (2012) 1/2, 71 – 86, there 71.

⁹⁶ Fikru, *From Adwa to OAU*, 80.

talks between Egypt and Sudan, which formed the basis for two major bilateral agreements, 'left Ethiopia isolated and feeling less at ease.'⁹⁷ The imperial government, then, attempted to neutralize Nasser by expanding Ethiopia's sphere of influence across Africa. With the help of a two-pronged approach, Ethiopia would insert itself into the Pan-African circle and place the emperor 'at the helm of the collective struggle.'⁹⁸ If this indeed explains Haile Selassie's motives, it seems like a rather calculated move to protect his personal and regional interests.⁹⁹ Fikru explains that Aklilu's strategy resembled 'the nineteenth-century aspiration of Yohannes and Menelik' in the sense that both emperors resorted to positive diplomacy to neutralize a neighbor it perceived as a threat by invoking a pan-regional consciousness, to quell hostilities along its borders, only now the strategy applied to an entire continent.¹⁰⁰ A more simple view argues that Haile Selassie was drawn to the 'glamour of international diplomacy' and mostly concerned with pursuing international prestige, removing himself from domestic affairs more and more. He solidified his status as a benevolent father in international diplomacy which proved particularly useful for his role in the establishment of the OAU.¹⁰¹ These are two, somewhat, contrasting views, but do complement each other. The main difference lies in the fact that Fikru presents Haile Selassie as a strategically and diplomatically skilled man pursuing a status quo in the region, while Bahru's depiction of the emperor is of a man who lost touch with his own country.

Acting as the middleman between the Africa and the World has been a role bestowed upon Ethiopia's leaders it seems. When Meles took on his role of Prime Minister of Ethiopia, he developed relations with the likes of Tony Blair, Bill Clinton, Bill Gates and Joseph Stiglitz. Meles represented Africa at global events, like the G8, G-20, and climate change summits. He is regularly praised by scholars for his ability 'to charm the international community.'¹⁰² With his 'supreme skill' he is said to have played the international community 'and make it dance to his music.'¹⁰³ He is referred to as a 'master player of the diplomatic game' in international and African affairs. And these skills are reflected in his passionate response to Senegal's objection on the location of the headquarters of the AU. In his statement, Meles equated the objection

⁹⁷ Ibid, 80.

⁹⁸ The two-pronged approach consisted of a continental and global approach.

⁹⁹ Fikru, *From Adwa to OAU*, 80.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 80.

¹⁰¹ Bahru, *A History of Modern Ethiopia*, 203.

¹⁰² Prunier, 'The Meles Zenawi Era', 435.

¹⁰³ Jan Abbink, 'Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and its Aftermath', *African Affairs* 105 (2006) 419, 173-199, there 177.

with questioning Ethiopia's long-standing commitment to African independence and liberation. He argued that 'Ethiopia's commitment ha[d] not varied with governments' citing Haile Selassie's training of Nelson Mandela and Mengistu's support to Mugabe during his fight against Rhodesia, while at the same time distancing himself from the emperor ideologically and the colonel personally.¹⁰⁴ He also emphasized that Ethiopians 'could not but understand the meaning of African unity as Ethiopia laid on the table of the Europeans during the League of Nations' adding that 'we know what happened then.'¹⁰⁵ Meles created a gap by placing Ethiopia above the other member states by implying that significant changes on the continent occurred because of Ethiopia's unconditional support to African independence. But he then bridged that gap by stressing their shared experience with foreign occupation. But more importantly, he attempted to present a pattern in which it can only logically follow that raising doubts about Ethiopia's commitment to Africa is unmerited.¹⁰⁶ In this specific scenario, the location of the headquarters is a tangible expression of Ethiopia's identity as a spokesperson for Africa – a role which adds to Ethiopia's international legitimacy and its diplomatic weight in the region and as a chapter four will show, a role which allowed Ethiopia to pursue its foreign policy objectives from 2002 onwards.

The developments discussed above demonstrate that the perception of international society is shaped by its history of tensions and conflicts with neighboring countries and cooperation with foreign powers, Ethiopian leaders' and the idea of Ethiopian exceptionalism. These perceptions in turn account for particular interests. Recalling the idea that normative and ideational structure shape the realm of possibilities, and hence, what the actor can imagine, Meles statement showed that it was precisely because of Haile Selassie's and Mengistu's help, combined with the headquarters located in Addis, that allowed him to make such a bold statement.

Within rationalist paradigms Ethiopia's international conduct would be explained as a result of international anarchy, egoism, and state survival. And, it is true that the survival of the Ethiopian state has always been central to Ethiopia's foreign conduct. However, to contrast with rationalist beliefs, it is important to realize that the primacy of state survival was born out of specific historical developments, which are not accounted for in rationalist thought. It, therefore, rejects the claim that the egoistic nature of state behavior is inherently and

¹⁰⁴ PM Meles Speech in Togo Lomi - 1991E.C <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o9aHxYbWAoc> published 21-08-2019, accessed 17-06-2019.

¹⁰⁵ PM Meles Speech in Togo Lomi.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

unconditionally present. The EPRDF's foreign policy in the immediate post 1991 years was actually predicated on the notion of nurturing good neighborly relations with the other Horn countries – also because the EPRDF prioritized restructuring the Ethiopian state at the time. It was not until the EPRDF felt that surrounding states were taking advantage of this prioritization, that it felt prompted to ramp up its defensive measures in the region.¹⁰⁷

1.5 Conclusion

There are four major ideas which determined the interest formation process in Ethiopian foreign policy: ensuring state survival, maintaining preservation of power, maintaining a status quo in the Horn of Africa, and attaining international legitimacy. These ideas are inextricably linked in their perception and have sustained each other over time. By contrasting rationalist and constructivist explanations, this chapter also attempted to show why social constructivism is more appropriate for the study of Ethiopian IR, despite the overlap with some rationalist assumptions like self-interest and state survival. Regardless of the overlap, rationalism remains an approach modeled after Western IR, and therefore obscures elements which are of relevance to determine the interest formation process.

Chapter 2 – The EPRDF's Foreign Strategy: Presenting Discontinuity as Continuity

Since this thesis is concerned with how EPRDF perceives its position vis-à-vis the other Horn of Africa states, this chapter will begin with the analysis of the EPRDF foreign policy since 2002 by looking at the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS). Even though the FANSPS was not been updated since its release, the value of this source lies in its foundational aspect. The FANSPS is meant to signify a turning point for the country and everything that was done – in terms of policy - and written after its release was done so in the same spirit. In the previous chapter, a constructivist framework was set out which ascribes the individual a degree of agency in shaping Ethiopia's foreign policy and argued for the primacy of preservation of power, state survival, maintaining a status quo, and international legitimacy in the interest formation process. The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, determine what narrative the EPRDF adopts to frame its reasoning behind the foreign policy objectives. Second, determine to what extent the aforementioned ideas are reflected in EPRDF's foreign

¹⁰⁷ Medhane, *Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence*, 336-337.

policy objectives. Finally, it will look at the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as Ethiopia's developmental project and determine what strategies it used to quell resistance from Egypt.

2.1 Resuscitating a Regional Power: Laying the Foundations for Ethiopia's Renaissance

This FANSPS represents a moment of crisis and the EPRDF's attempt to make sure this will not go unnoticed by its readers is evident. One only need to quickly scan the FANSPS to notice the rhetoric used by the EPRDF to frame Ethiopia as a state on the verge of breakdown.¹⁰⁸ Throughout the FANSPS the EPRDF made it a case to stress the severity of Ethiopia's situation which found 'itself in a state of abject poverty and backwardness.'¹⁰⁹ Without development and democratization the country could slide into 'chaos and disintegration', 'disaster and dismemberment', and at the end of the spectrum, 'bloodshed and destruction.'¹¹⁰ By advocating for 'a fundamental change of attitude regarding the essence of foreign relations and national security' the Government placed Ethiopia's 'internal challenges' and its 'vulnerability to threats' at the basis of its foreign strategy and national security.¹¹¹

The above demonstrates that the primary objectives is state survival. In rationalist thought, state survival is understood as protecting the state from external aggression and is achieved by accruing power. The above, however, demonstrates that the existence of the state is, in the eyes of the EPRDF, also threatened by forces emanating from within its own borders. It furthermore demonstrates that the perceived threats surrounding Ethiopia's state borders pushed the EPRDF to give it a central place in its foreign policy. The EPRDF resorted to a failed state narrative in this white paper, which according to Le Gouriellec is a type of discourse by which the party legitimizes its course of action to the public.¹¹² She argues that '[f]rom a Weberian perspective, this legitimization conditions the acceptance by individuals of, and therefore their submission to the state.'¹¹³

In its attempt to trace the roots of Ethiopia's problems, the EPRDF identifies three sources. The first source is the foreign policy pursued by the former governments of Ethiopia. They failed to take the interests of the Ethiopian people into account and was geared towards meeting the expectations and demands of external actors. The needs of society, the Government argues, requires a sound assessment of the impact of 'internal problems and vulnerabilities' on national

¹⁰⁸ Ministry of Information, 'FANSPS', 2.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 2.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 23.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 3.

¹¹² Le Gouriellec, Ethiopia, an 'imperfect hegemon', 1074.

¹¹³ Ibid, 1074.

security and state survival, and cannot be seen through the eyes of external actors.¹¹⁴ The reason this specific element is brought forward is to convey to its readers that, in part, Ethiopia's problems were inherited from its former rulers and was not so much a result of their own wrongdoing. This is important, because it reveals an attempt to exonerate the EPRDF from its responsibility for the country's situation, even though at the time, the EPRDF had been in power for well over ten years. Additionally, the EPRDF is claiming that when it comes to Ethiopia's problems, they are the ones to judge the nature of and the solution to the internal problems it faces. It communicates a desire to solve internal crises with an approach that takes the multi-ethnic make up and cultural elements of Ethiopia into account. But this can also be interpreted as a message to external actors to refrain from meddling in its internal affairs, a sentiment which, as the next chapter will show, both Meles and his successor Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn held.

The national security interest is defined as 'the interest of the people – no more, no less.'¹¹⁵ Through its emphasis on democracy and 'people-centered rapid development' the EPRDF found an important vehicle by which it can justify its policies and actions. The party has framed itself as a guardian that will pursue international relations only insofar, they benefit society. The EPRDF, however, failed to, or purposely chose not to elaborate on its vision of democracy and development. Based on this particular primary source it remains unclear how this vision differs or might contrast with how democracy and development are understood in the West, namely liberal and inclusive. This could be interpreted as a strategic move; after all, this approach gives the EPRDF the freedom to interpret democratization and development on its own terms – even if this goes against fundamental rights and liberties. Thus, if a specific element of democracy or development is not implemented or respected because it does not serve the Government's interests – or goes against it for that matter, it becomes all the more difficult to hold the Government accountable. The EPRDF's emphasis on democratic progress and how it pursued democratization will be further discussed in chapter three.

The second source is instability in the Horn of Africa which 'has spoilt the image of [the] sub-region' and significantly diminished opportunities to attract investors.¹¹⁶ Harboring religious extremists and anti-peace forces, or simply not wanting Ethiopia to progress, neighboring countries are framed as potential threats to Ethiopia's stability. Their determination to undermine Ethiopia's democratization and development efforts should 'not

¹¹⁴ Ministry of Information, 'FANSPS', 2.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 7.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 76.

be underestimated.’¹¹⁷ Historically, Ethiopian leaders have been taunted by this idea of being surrounded by enemies, which is known as the Gragn Syndrome. Its continued perception of threats around its border has impacted Ethiopia’s foreign policies and strategies, and still does. The EPRDF argues that Ethiopia has shed its ‘siege mentality’ and bases its interest formation on ‘appropriate studies.’¹¹⁸ But the level of polemics to which it resorts in the discussion of the regional dimensions where it accuses Eritrea of ‘chauvinism’, ‘adventurism’, and ‘illegal economic activity’ shows a conscious effort to discredit Eritrea.¹¹⁹ Ethiopia deliberately used its diplomatic influence to familiarize the international community with, what according the Medhane, the EPRDF labelled ‘Asmara’s destabilization strategy.’¹²⁰

The EPRDF claims it can play a special and prominent role in transforming the Horn of Africa ‘from an arena of turmoil into one of cooperative development and peace.’¹²¹ Democratization and development will not only improve Ethiopia’s image but will also ‘have a positive impact on the region and bring about its transformation.’¹²² It becomes clear from this primary source that stabilizing the Horn is considered an important prerequisite for Ethiopia’s economic development. This partly explains the EPRDF’s preparedness to create new avenues to promote economic regional integration. One of those avenues is its ‘significant electric power potential’ and is raised repeatedly as an incentive for neighboring countries bordering to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to provide Ethiopia additional access to its ports. As a landlocked country, Ethiopia’s economic development relies on safe access to ports.¹²³ This ambition most notably came to expression in the development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD): a hydropower dam on the Blue Nile with the potential to promote regional integration. as well as tensions or conflict between the upper riparian state Ethiopia and the downstream states Sudan and Egypt. The GERD, as a regional hegemonic project and ‘the epitome of the Ethiopian developmental state’ will be further discussed in the next section of this chapter.¹²⁴

The final source the EPRDF points to is globalization. The Government is critical of the global distribution of wealth and power, which, from their perspective, accounts for unfair ‘laws and procedures’ since they are the ‘result of negotiations between [...] countries that

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 76.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 2.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 65-68

¹²⁰ Medhane, ‘Making Sense of Ethiopia’s Regional Influence’ 345.

¹²¹ Ministry of Information, ‘FANSPS’, 98

¹²² Ibid, 61.

¹²³ Ibid, 59

¹²⁴ Clapham, *The Horn of Africa*, 185.

established the system as a whole.¹²⁵ By placing Ethiopia on the outer margins of the international society as a country with ‘no much weight’ and limited ‘power to influence the nature of the system’ the EPRDF framed Ethiopia’s problems as the outcome of international processes that were, again, out of their control.¹²⁶ To gain more control over these processes, the new strategy will ‘effectively integrate’ Ethiopia into the international system with increased bargaining power. This in turn will allow Ethiopia to increase its participation in the process of globalization.¹²⁷ The international system requires change, and the EPRDF gives the impression it has only now come to realize that the system cannot be changed from the outside. The goal is therefore to change it from the inside. The discussion of Ethiopia’s conduct in international society and how it has increased and used its international influence will be continued in chapter four. By pointing to globalization as an impeding factor, the EPRDF adopted a similar narrative like other African leaders who promoted the African Renaissance. Meles played a prominent role in the establishment of the AU’s New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Ian Taylor and Philip Nel argue that the NEPAD grew so much traction because it aligned with ‘the neo liberal discourse’ and pushed the blame for Africa’s marginalization in the world economy ‘on to the mystical notion’ that is globalization.¹²⁸ Adeoye O. Akinola described it as ‘talking from the South, governing from the West.’¹²⁹ Despite Meles being at the forefront of the NEPAD, the EPRDF’s strategy for development, as the next chapter will show, does not rely on neorealist policies.

The above focused on the sources the EPRDF identified as the cause for the country’s state at the time. Le Gouriellec, presented which perceptions of threats the EPRDF considers vital to address. She describes this as a ‘three concentric circles’ centered on Addis Ababa: internal threats, immediate neighbors, and a ‘wider group of countries’, which she identified as Egypt and the Gulf States.¹³⁰ The relationship between the outer two circles has to do with Egypt’s indirect attempts to destabilize the region, which is framed as ‘fanning the flames’ and ‘aggravating conflicts’ to serve its own interests.¹³¹ Her reading of the primary source differs, especially with respect to the third aspect (globalization versus Egypt and Arabs states). The

¹²⁵ Ministry of Information, ‘FANSPS’, 21.

¹²⁶ Ibid, 21.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 20.

¹²⁸ Ian Taylor and Philip Nel, ‘New Africa’, globalization, and the confines of elite reformism: ‘Getting the rhetoric right’, getting the strategy right *Third World Quarterly* 23 (2002) 1, 163 – 180, there 164.

¹²⁹ Adeyo O. Akinola and Nompumelelo Ndawonde, NEPAD: Talking from the South, Governing from the West, *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies – Multi-, Inter-, and Transdisciplinarity*, 11 (2016) 2, 38-51, there 38.

¹³⁰ Le Gouriellec, ‘Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy’, 1070.

¹³¹ FANSPS, 120.

sources identified above, each have a corresponding threat, as well as a corresponding strategy. Moreover, the EPRDF's argues that its tandem pursuit of democracy and development is embedded in the 'framework of globalization' which establishes a more direct relation with democracy and development, and peace and stability in the region.

The FANSPS's main objectives are realizing democracy and development, stabilizing the Horn, and improving Ethiopia's international integration, which combined serve the overall goal of ensuring state survival. The EPRDF framed its rationale using a failed state narrative, which gives it more freedom to justify evasive measures in the name of state survival. Constructivism does not reject the idea of state survival as the primary interest but does reject the idea of conceptualizing state survival as a fixed and one-dimensional interest. It seeks to understand why state survival is a primary interest in the first place. What becomes clear from this section is that internal challenges, instability in the region and foreign actors are perceived as threats to the survival of the state. This means that there a number of factors that account for this interest, among which, internal challenges. The extent to which the EPRDF reasons from economic concerns, is evidenced by its strong emphasis on development. The remainder of this chapter will discuss Ethiopia's effort to stabilize the region through the promotion of regional integration. Moreover, it will serve to determine to what extent promoting regional integration is a bid to establish Ethiopia's regional primacy.

2.2 Ethiopia's Renaissance: Restoring regional primacy through regional integration

The previous paragraph mentioned the EPRDF's perception of threats in the region which range from efforts to undermine the democratic progress in Ethiopia to a poor overall image of the region. Due to the conflicts in the Horn of Africa and overall distrust among the individual countries were not able to pursue economic regional integration. In accordance with the notion 'what is good for Ethiopia is good for the region' Ethiopia will share the fruits of its labor and promote regional integration.¹³² This ambition rests heavily on the development of the GERD: a 'three mile long, 164-foot-high dam' which 'will feed Africa's largest hydroelectric power plant.'¹³³ The dam is situated on the Blue Nile which carries 97% of Egypt's fresh water supply. Sudan additionally relies heavily on the Nile's water for agriculture. The political implications were significant, mostly with respect to Egypt.

¹³² Le Gouriellec, 'Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy', 1070.

¹³³ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance, sponsored section in Foreign Affairs, May-June 2002, 1 – 13, there 1.

The Nile has historically been a source of contention between the two countries and the GERD will give Ethiopia control to regulate the flow of water to Egypt. The previous chapter mentioned Ethiopia's exclusion from Nile river talks between Sudan and Egypt. Its decision to pursue the development of the dam can be interpreted as a power grab as it shifts diplomatic power from Sudan and Egypt to Ethiopia.¹³⁴ Strategic concerns on both sides, which go back several hundreds of years, are a 'major feature' which shape Egypt's and Ethiopia's position regarding this issue.¹³⁵ Here, ideas which have been shaped by the historical strategic concerns have led to both countries to perceive each other as fighting over the same resources.

In a 2010 interview with Al Jazeera, Meles stated that 'Egypt will not be able to stop building dams on the Nile.'¹³⁶ He knew of 'people in Egypt' who still hold 'old fashioned ideas (...) based on the assumption that the Nile water belongs to Egypt' and the belief that upper riparian states, such as Ethiopia, are not capable of using the Nile waters due to instability and poverty. At the time Egypt attempted to bloc international financing for the development of the Blue Nile basin waters.¹³⁷ Meles asserted that Ethiopia is, in fact, capable of acquiring the funds, adding, that the completion of the dam does not depend on money from international institutions nor Western donors, but is dependent on the country's own capacity.¹³⁸ According to Medhane, Ethiopia's move 'in the face of Egyptian opposition' point to the country's 'pivotal role in highly critical issues.'¹³⁹ Recalling the approach to hegemonic strategies that was introduced in the previous chapter, Ethiopia's strategies towards Egypt in the earlier years of the GERD can be interpreted as hard-hegemony. Additionally, by becoming a major electricity supplier in the region, countries in the Horn will become increasingly dependent on Ethiopia, since levels of energy production in the neighboring countries are incredibly low. The project, in isolation, can be characterized as soft hegemony and the dynamics following could allow Ethiopia to 'reassert its sphere of influence' in the region.

2.3 Conclusion

In the FANSPS the EPRDF argued that the situation the country found itself in was a result of policies pursued by previous governments, instability in the region and globalization. The

¹³⁴ Le Gouriellec, 'Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy', 1070. Clapham, *The Horn of Africa*, 184.

¹³⁵ Medhane, 'Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence' 352.

¹³⁶ Al Jazeera, 'Al Jazeera, Talk to Jazeera: Meles Zenawi' 23-05-2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9S83SVAumsQ> consulted on 17-06-2019.

¹³⁷ Medhane, 'Making sense of Ethiopia's regional influence', 352.

¹³⁸ Al Jazeera, 'Al Jazeera, Talk to Jazeera: Meles Zenawi'.

¹³⁹ Medhane, 'Making sense of Ethiopia's regional influence' 354.

EPRDF resorts to a narrative in which it absolved itself from blame for the situation of the country. The FANSPS's main objectives are realizing democracy and development, stabilizing the Horn, and improving Ethiopia's international integration, which combined serve the overall goal of ensuring state survival. The FANSPS makes use of a failed state narrative

With respect to the GERD as a regional integration project, it was demonstrated that Ethiopia, depending on the country, resorted to a variety of strategies like hard hegemony and soft hegemony to acquire support from riparian countries support on the development of the dam.

By contrasting rationalist and constructivist approaches it was demonstrated that, despite some overlap with rationalist assumptions, constructivism actually seeks to understand why state survival in this particular case is given primacy.

Chapter 3 – Democratization as a means of survival: who survives?

This chapter will serve to determine how the reader is to interpret the EPRDF's vision of democracy by analyzing policy papers as well as the EPRDF's response to people criticizing its democratic policies. Specifically, it will determine how the EPRDF's attempted to reconcile its democratization efforts with existing conceptions of hierarchy, power, and ideology present in Ethiopia. This will be done on the basis of the contents of the GTP but will in larger part rely on the actions of the EPRDF following the much contested 2005 parliamentary elections. The GTP is a five-year national development plan in which the EPRDF details its objectives for that period in areas like governance, infrastructure, finance, and health. Since this chapter is concerned with the EPRDF's democratization objectives, the only chapters analyzed are the chapters in which democratic governance is discussed. It will contrast rationalist and constructivist explanations with respect to the role of internal affairs in the interest formation process of Ethiopia's foreign policy and demonstrate the theoretical limitations of rationalist approaches in the analysis of Ethiopia's international relations. The findings in this chapter will contribute to answering the main question by determining how the EPRDF's emphasis on democracy in the FANSPS and its actions with respect to democratization relate to its status vis-à-vis the other countries in the Horn of Africa.

3.1 What's in a Word? Interpreting the EPRDF's Vision on Democracy and Development

The need to democratize is considered imperative, so much so, that it was classified as a national security interest. Promoting democracy, the EPRDF argued, will increase the population's resilience and allow them to withstand malicious efforts from neighboring countries seeking to benefit from Ethiopia's internal vulnerability and destabilize the country. Following Le Gouriellec's three concentric circles centered on Addis Ababa it is here where the relationship between the two inner circles becomes apparent. The relative force of the second circle decreases or increases, depending on the strength of the first circle, and vice versa.

In the first GTP, which covers the period 2010 – 2015, democracy is said to play a 'key role in ensuring rapid and sustainable development.'¹⁴⁰ This will for instance be attained by enhancing the justice sector's independence, transparency, and accountability to ensure rule of law standards are met. It mentions the importance of the freedom of the press and freedom of information. But also, of creating awareness about democratic culture and human rights, transparency, and enhancing the media infrastructure.

In the discussion of its objectives, the EPRDF identified and addressed some of the weaknesses which slowed the democratization process. The proposed solutions, however, are not put forward because of their intrinsic value but rather are linked to the government's economic objectives for the country. Strengthening the justice sector for example will 'contribute to establishing a stable and developmental state' and improving quality of the media will 'facilitate the national consensus building process' as opposed to creating a platform for freedom of expression.¹⁴¹ Another thing that stands out is that even though freedom of the press is mentioned and that improving the country's media infrastructure will allow for the dissemination of information to rural areas, no reference is made to ensuring the independence of the media.¹⁴²

The second GTP, which covers the period 2015 – 2020, presents four elements through which the EPRDF aims to promote democracy: strengthening public participation, national consensus, strengthening the multi-party system by creating a conducive environment, and enhancing capacity of the media.¹⁴³ The public are the key players and direct participation of

¹⁴⁰ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, National Planning Commission, 'Growth and Transformation Plan I (GTP I) (2010/11-2014/15)', .

¹⁴¹ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 'GTP I', 110.

¹⁴² Ibid, 104-105.

¹⁴³ Ibid, 2.

the public is said to have been widely promoted. Due attention was given to capacity building of institutions and enhancing the participation of women and youth. ‘Charities’ contributing to the country’s development will operate their activities in accordance with the existing ‘charities and societies law.’¹⁴⁴ Significant gains were made with respect to the national consensus in areas like the key provisions of the constitution and the fight against poverty. The government’s efforts to strengthen multi-party politics is substantiated by pointing to the conducive environment for civil society and their right to assembly. Additionally, a ‘legal system’ was put in place which enabled the participation of ‘all legal political parties in the political system.’¹⁴⁵ With respect to the media, the GTP commends its role in strengthening the democratic system and in ‘deepening the national consensus on major agendas of national significance.’¹⁴⁶ While it is not explicitly mentioned, the relationship between the media and the government’s objectives

Based on the above, it can be argued that the EPRDF has highlighted areas which are considered important elements of democratic societies. Abbink, however, considers this to be a formal facade, through which the EPRDF aims to appease the donor community and that a focus on these formal aspects leads to an underestimation of the authoritarian patrimonialized system in place.¹⁴⁷ It is against this background that the ambitions of the EPRDF with respect to building a democratic system in Ethiopia should be viewed and assessed as the aforementioned system limits the levels of democratic reform that can be achieved.. By insisting on a personal vision of democracy, the EPRDF on the one hand has ‘tuned in to the donor discourse of (...) democratization’¹⁴⁸ reflecting a commitment to the promotion of democratic values, whilst simultaneously keeping the discretion to pursue democratization in way that it sees fit. This is already visible in the GTP where the EPRDF highlighted elements of democracy which resonate with donor community expectations without committing itself to obligations that goes against its interests, namely state survival and preservation of power. This does not mean that the social structure in place determines democratic progress of the country. Social structures are subject to change, because of their continuous interaction with actors.

In the FANSPS, democracy is rarely mentioned in isolation, but rather appears together with development. This reflects Meles’ personal views on how to achieve development in Ethiopia. In his preliminary dissertation draft he argued that the ‘neo-liberal paradigm is a dead end, is

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 53.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 53.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid 54.

¹⁴⁷ Abbink, ‘Discomfiture of Democracy?’ 177.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 177.

incapable of bringing about the African renaissance, and that a fundamental shift in paradigm is required to bring about the African renaissance' for which he proposed 'democratic developmentalism.'¹⁴⁹ Within this particular paradigm, democracy and development are to be pursued in tandem, because, according to the EPRDF, this will account for a more equitable and inclusive development.¹⁵⁰

Promoting democratic developmentalism, and thereby emphasizing both, gives the impression that both stand on equal footing and this sentiment is reflected in the GTP II: 'Building the democratic system is equally important as advancing the development agenda of the country.'¹⁵¹ During an interview with Al-Jazeera, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn (2012 – 2018) asserted that pursuing democracy in Ethiopia is not so much a choice, but rather 'an existential issue.' Several authors, however, disagree with this assertion, arguing that economic development was, in fact, prioritized over building a democratic system. Medhane for instance argued that economic development has been 'the single most important focus of Ethiopian foreign policy.'¹⁵² Similarly Prunier argued that Meles 'doubtlessly considered' economic development more important 'than his commitment to democracy.'¹⁵³ Ethiopia's true problem was economic and he considered democracy 'a rich man's toy.'¹⁵⁴ Abbink, also states that democratization was not as important as it was made out to be.¹⁵⁵ Ethiopia's promotion of democracy was mainly geared towards the realization of its developmental objectives. While the GTP presents it as objectives to be pursued in tandem, scholars agree that democracy was, in fact, not the existential issue it was made out to be. The narrative adopted was in part necessitated by the fact that democratization is an important prerequisite for international legitimacy and to attract donor funding.

Authoritarian patrimonialism, as a system, is one of those elements that has been engrained in the state and societal structure. It reinforces existing ideas actors hold regarding power and has prevented the political institutionalization of democracy.¹⁵⁶ Ethiopia's has a historical heritage of 'authoritarianism, elite rule, and patronage which is marked by 'old modes and techniques of control.' Moreover, the 'ideology of power as a commodity possessed by a new

¹⁴⁹ Meles Zenawi, 'African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings' (Excerpt dissertation Economy n.p. and n.d) 36.

¹⁵⁰ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 'FANSPS', 8.

¹⁵¹ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 'GTP II', 52.

¹⁵² Medhane, 'Making sense of Ethiopia's regional influence', 348.

¹⁵³ Prunier, 'The Meles Zenawi Era', 432.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 431.

¹⁵⁵ Abbink, 'Discomfiture of Democracy?' 177.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 177.

elite at the centre' continued to determine the country's political culture.¹⁵⁷ Despite the presence of written documents explaining objectives and achievements with respect to democratization, the EPRDF's conception of democracy became most apparent through its actions towards opposition, government critics, and international non-governmental organizations after the contested elections in 2005, which will be further discussed in the next section.

3.2. Good Versus Evil: The EPRDF's Framing of Democracy and Development as a National Security Interest and its Dealings with Opposition

Framing democracy as a national security interest is not without consequences. It accords a government the discretion to justify measures in the name of state survival. As the remainder of this section will demonstrate, the EPRDF acted on this discretion to preserve its power.

Hopes were high in the run up to the 2005 elections. Debates between the dominant party and opposition took place, and campaigns were widespread, even in the countryside. These hopes, however, turned grim when the opposition claimed to have won, but were denied their victory. During the aftermath a period of violence and instability ensued. Dozens of people were killed, tens of thousands of protesters and alleged opponents arrested, and civil society organizations suppressed. Abbink argues that this setback can be explained with reference to the nature of the elite rule, Ethiopian political tradition, the weaknesses of civil society, and the lack of a countervailing middle class in Ethiopia. The events that occurred during the aftermath illustrated prevalence of existing structures and ideas in Ethiopian politics.¹⁵⁸

Ensuring stability in Ethiopia and preventing the country to disintegrate translated to curtailments on free speech and access to information, a measure which undermined the governments objectives to increase political participation and enhance media capacity. While improvements were made, Ignio Gagliardone found that the EPRDF developed 'one of the most restrictive systems for the regulation of media.'¹⁵⁹ Measures went as far as preventing opposition from using mobile phones and internet as tools to challenge the regime but also making sure that the media transmitted information conforming to EPRDF's development and image building objectives.¹⁶⁰ However, the EPRDF resorted to more drastic measures, like the adoption of the 2009 anti-terrorism proclamation which was used to silence opposition and

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, 177.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, 183.

¹⁵⁹ Ignio Gagliardone, 'New Media and the Developmental State in Ethiopia', *African Affairs* 113 (2014) 451, 279-299, 292.

¹⁶⁰ Gagliardone, 'New Media in Ethiopia', 283.

government critics. Those who tried to exercise their right to freedom of expression found themselves charged with allegations of terrorism like the Zone 9 bloggers.¹⁶¹ In a 2015 interview with Al Jazeera, Hailemariam was pressed on the high numbers of journalists that had been jailed on terrorist charges. In his response, he attempted to discredit the journalists by repeatedly stating that they ‘are not journalists’ and that the anti-terrorism proclamation is not ‘a disguise’ to suppress free speech.¹⁶² In a similar fashion, both Meles and Hailemariam sought to discredit those nongovernmental organizations who criticized the state of democracy and lack of freedom in the country. With respect to Human Rights Watch, Meles stated that they reported allegations without evidence which ‘by some magic wand’ were transformed into facts.’¹⁶³ In response to the allegations brought forward by Human Rights Watch, Meles downplayed them as ‘one of the latest fabrications.’¹⁶⁴ Hailemariam said that Ethiopia has ‘always been in contradiction with the Human Rights Watch report.’¹⁶⁵ He added that he views this as ‘a new liberal prescription’ and that Ethiopia finds itself continuously subjected to criticism, because it does not follow ‘the new liberal paradigm and prescription they are giving’ them.¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s reporting on the lack of political space and participation was similarly rejected, referring to the foundation as ‘geared towards (...) Western attitude and values.’¹⁶⁷ The overarching argument reflects the sentiment expressed in the FANSPS, which is that Ethiopians are the ones to judge its internal affairs, and that Ethiopia does not intend to compromise its national interests to appease foreign actors. This was evidenced by the 2009 Charities and Societies proclamation which prohibits international nongovernmental organizations from organizing activities on human rights, democratic rights, equality, justice, children’s rights, rights of the disabled, conflict resolution, and justice and law. The only organizations allowed to cover these topics are local organizations, but are not permitted to receive more than 10% international funding and employ non-Ethiopians.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶¹ The Zone 9 bloggers are a collective consisting of bloggers and journalists who were arrested and charged with terrorism in July 2014. They operate a blog in Amharic and focus their writing on good governance, social justice, human rights, corruption. The bloggers were released in June and October 2015.

¹⁶² Al Jazeera, ‘Al Jazeera, Talk to Jazeera: Meles Zenawi’

¹⁶³ Al Jazeera, ‘Al Jazeera, Talk to Jazeera: Meles Zenawi’. Al Jazeera, Hailemariam Desalegn: Democracy ‘not only an election’ | Talk to Al Jazeera, 22-May-2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VwimUr2C7mY&t=974s> consulted on 17-06-2019

¹⁶⁴ Al Jazeera, ‘Al Jazeera, Talk to Jazeera: Meles Zenawi’

¹⁶⁵ Al Jazeera, ‘Al Jazeera Hailemariam Desalegn’.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Kendra E Dupuy, James Ron & Aseem Prakash, Who survived? ‘Ethiopia’s regulatory crackdown on foreign-funded NGOs’, *Review of International Political Economy*, 22 (2015) 2, 419-456, there 426.

Despite the government's heavy crackdown on opposition members, limited progress on democratization, the country being led by a vanguard party and the fact that privatization on the surface was a paradox, Ethiopia remained the largest beneficiary of international assistance in Africa, which allowed it to pursue the country's economic development.¹⁶⁹

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the EPRDF constructed a narrative in which it demonstrates high levels of commitment to realize the democratization through its efforts to promote public participation and creating space for opposition. The efforts resulting from this commitment, however, occur in a structure where ideas about hierarchy, authority, and power, limited the extent to which these democratic ideals could be fully upheld. The actions of the EPRDF, like abusing the law to silence dissent, using software to block websites it considered 'hostile propaganda', and shutting down 13 out of 19 independent newspapers, but also statements made by government officials, demonstrate that the way democracy is understood by Ethiopian officials is influenced by the aforementioned ideas, but also party interests, and prevented the idea of 'loyal opposition' to take root.¹⁷⁰

Prunier acknowledges that Ethiopia's governance was autocratic, and that democracy was not promoted enough. At the same time, he questions the donor community's expectations of democratic reforms, which in his view, were too high in the aftermath of the Dergue's rule. This stands in contrast with Abbink's point of view who draws from aspects like 'ethnic/kinship networks, local conceptions and psychologies of power, the role of ideology, and (informal) business interests' to explain why the democratic process failed and claims that, for various reasons, the ruling party was simply not able to envisage or allow a division of power.¹⁷¹

Political opposition and government criticism are both directed at the ruling party and its policies. However, by framing them as actors who seek to incite violence, sow division, threaten the democratization process and bring about destruction i.e. as a threat to the national security of Ethiopia, the EPRDF tied the preservation of power of its own party to the survival of the Ethiopian state. Moreover, the EPRDF's pursuit of democratization should not be seen as an attempt to adopt liberal democratic ideals. It should be seen against the background of a country characterized by an 'age-old Abyssinian culture of hierarchy and submission' with a

¹⁶⁹ Medhane, 'Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence', 350.

¹⁷⁰ Abbink, 'Discomfutures of Democracy', 197.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 197.

leadership that was ‘deeply influenced by Marxism and Leninist “democratic centralism.”’¹⁷² Abbink rightfully notes that, especially under the rule of Meles, the EPRDF advocated a ‘revolutionary democracy’ and not a liberal democracy.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter sought to understand the EPRDF’s vision of democracy and how it attempted to reconcile this with existing ideas about power, hierarchy and ideology. To pursue the country’s democratization the EPRDF stated its ambition to make significant improvements to the judiciary system, the media, the multi-party system, and promote public participation. Democracy is presented as a prerequisite for economic development, and to this end it claimed to pursue both objectives in tandem. It was, however, also demonstrated that the importance of realizing democracy was mostly reflected in speech, and not so much in action. And when it was reflected in speech, the democratic objective was presented as a means to an end – economic development – rather than an end in itself.

Reconciling democratic values with the authoritarian patrimonial system proved quite the challenge. The EPRDF attempted to reconcile democratic values with Ethiopian values insofar as it did not threaten the ruling party’s power. The framing of democracy as a national security interest allowed it to employ measures against those voices it perceived to undermine the country’s democratization. It did so, by resorting to excessive measures like censorship and imprisonment. However, it must also be noted that democracy in the Ethiopian context should not be understood as a liberal democracy. The prime ministers’ statements above reveal that it was the liberal paradigm to which they both objected. Finally, it also argued that the importance of the constructivist thinking in the analysis of African IR lies, amongst other things, in its inclusion of internal political dynamics as well as its emphasis on the influence of ideas in interest formation process. The relationship between the internal political dynamics in Ethiopia’s handling of regional affairs will be further elaborated on in the next chapter where Ethiopia’s role as a facilitator of peace in the region will be discussed.

¹⁷² René Lefort, ‘The Ethiopian Economy: The Developmental State Vs. The Free Market’, in: Gérard Prunier and Éloi Ficquet, eds. *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia. Monarchy, Revolution, and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi*, (London 2015), 357-394, there 360.

Chapter 4 – Ethiopian Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa

This chapter will look at Ethiopia's contribution to peace and security in the Horn of Africa in the context of the and the Intergovernmental Organization of Development, and its contribution to peace keeping operations. This chapter will determine if, how and why Ethiopia attempted to use its international influence to determine the course of developments in the Horn of Africa. It will additionally determine what ideas and beliefs prompted this conduct. It will contribute to answering the main question by demonstrating the role Ethiopia attributes itself it itself vis-à-vis the other Horn of Africa countries. Like the previous chapters it will continue to contrast rationalist and constructivist explanations and demonstrate the limits of rationalist approaches in studying non-Western IR.

The previous chapters demonstrated the primacy of ideas in Ethiopia's foreign policy and the fourth, and final, chapter will demonstrate how these ideas translated to Ethiopia's conduct in the areas of peace and security. Chapter one discussed the EPRDF's objective to realize peace and stability in Ethiopia as well as the wider region and argued this to be a prerequisite for Ethiopia to pursue its development objectives. Within the constructivist framework set out at the beginning of this thesis it was argued that Ethiopia's international conduct is shaped by a perpetuated perception of threats in its immediate surroundings and ideas about its place in international society. It is often said that Ethiopia is held captive by its own history, and this sentiment applies to its perception of threats in the region.

4.1. Ethiopia's Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

Ethiopia's first contribution to peacekeeping operations dates back to the 1951 Korean War. Ethiopia was, and still is, the UN's largest troop contributing country with over 8000 troops deployed in three UN missions in Sudan and South Sudan. From a rationalist perspective, Ethiopia's troop contribution is explained as protecting the state from external threats

Scott Firsing argues that the reasons to contribute troops differ depending on the state's economic and military capabilities, specifically looking at incentives for developing countries. Additionally, he argues that when following a realist line of thought countries do not contribute to peace and security for the cause itself, but rather to further their own national interest, which in rationalist terms is protection from external aggression.¹⁷³ Through its contribution to peacekeeping missions, Ethiopia tried to create stability around its borders

¹⁷³ Scott Firsing, 'Thinking through the role of Africa's militaries in peacekeeping: the cases of Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Rwanda', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 21 (2014) 1, 45-67, there 48.

to mitigate the likelihood of instability from crossing over to Ethiopia. There were, however, also political considerations that need to be taken into account.

In the first chapter, where the constructivist framework was set out, it was argued that Ethiopia's foreign policy is, in part, driven by the need for international recognition. The way this is interpreted by the EPRDF reaches further than being seen as a legitimate international actor. It is interpreted as prestige and generating praise for its efforts. Moreover, it fits in a pattern to re-establish and maintain a positive image to generate political returns. The large number of troops deployed by the Ethiopian state who 'have won respect, trust, and love among' African, is said to 'have helped the nation win popularity and full recognition of the global community. Ethiopia received international acclaim for its peacekeeping efforts in the region, which helped Ethiopia's election to the Security Council.¹⁷⁴ It reinforced the notion that solutions for the region's problems requires the contribution of and cooperation with Africans. And it increased Ethiopia's credibility as a regional peace broker.

Ethiopia's motives are clearly tied to the national security interest, but the EPRDF is also working meticulously in upholding Ethiopia's longstanding image of father figure. 'The Ethiopian peace keeping troops have won respect, trust and love among the peoples of African countries.' By tying the development of the region, and thereby creating the required conditions for lasting stability, to its almost altruistic willingness to help, is reminiscent of Meles's speech at the OAU where he emphasized Haile Selassie's and Mengistu's critical role in African independence, mentioned in the first chapter.

The objective is twofold, on the one hand there is the 'rationalist' interest of mitigating external threats. On the other hand, there is the interest of international legitimacy which is better explained in constructivist terms. In the Ethiopian context international legitimacy resembles praise, which in turn determined how the Ethiopian Government went about to attain this. In an effort to draw the attention away from the country's internal turmoil, it becomes apparent just how important positive image building became. Speaking of a 'tarnished image' and 'politically insignificant', Ethiopia, through its efforts, had now become 'an influential nation in the world' and 'one of the most politically stable countries in Africa.'¹⁷⁵ It lauds itself for its prominent role in strengthening IGAD, adhering to its principle of non-interference, and for striving 'to lend its hand' to change the unfavorable

¹⁷⁴ Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Ethiopia becomes a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council' 01-07-2016, <https://web.archive.org/web/20170412171329/http://www.mfa.gov.et/-/ethiopia-becomes-a-non-permanent-member-of-the-un-security-council-> consulted on 17-06-2019.

¹⁷⁵ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 'Ethiopia's and its Achievements', 12.

political climate in neighboring countries.¹⁷⁶ With respect to peacekeeping operations, Ethiopia presented itself as cooperative and working towards a common held goal in the region, peace and security, whilst simultaneously pursuing its own interests, which fits the leader-initiated hegemonic strategy.

4.3 IGAD: The Weakest Link With the Most Potential

IGAD a crucial element in Ethiopia's ambition to promote regional integration, peace and prosperity in the region. IGAD is also an organization with weak institutional structures which have rendered it vulnerable to abuse.¹⁷⁷ Redie additionally attributes IGAD's weakness 'Ethiopia's domination of the organization.'¹⁷⁸ In the FANSPS, the Ethiopian Government agrees with respect to IGAD weakness, but attributes this to a lack of resources, a lack of 'same level of concern for the development of the organization' on the part of other members states, and 'the main cause', relationships between member states, particularly between Eritrea and other IGAD countries.¹⁷⁹ Kenya and Uganda's prioritize the East African Community over IGAD. But this actually created a vacuum for Ethiopia to use the formal structures of IGAD to project power and pursue its own national interest. Ethiopia's role in IGAD is contested by member states, but that is because it is 'perceived by neighbors as attempts to create a "Trojan Horse" for Ethiopian interests.'¹⁸⁰

This observation corresponds with rationalist notions that international institutions are merely a tool to further a state's personal interest. Ethiopia's primary interest is to protect itself from external aggression by increasing its relative power vis-à-vis the other states. However, this perception of threats in the region is greatly shaped by a longstanding belief that Ethiopia is surrounded by enemies with hostile intentions. Medhane argues that Ethiopia is not so much concerned with 'conquering or dominating the region' as it is with 'ensuring its security along its borders and reasserting its influence.'¹⁸¹ Security, however, is a feeling and therefore subjective. What security means in the Ethiopian context, a country surrounded by enemies, is determined by the extent to which it is able to neutralize threats complementary to its own vision. And it did so with strategies equivalent to empire.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 12.

¹⁷⁷ Redie Bereketeab, 'The Intergovernmental Authority on Development: Internal Culture on Foreign Policymaking and Sources of Weaknesses', in: Jason Warner and Tim Shaw, eds. *African Policies in International Institutions* (New York 2018), 113-125, there 114.

¹⁷⁸ Redie, 'The Intergovernmental Authority on Development', 114.

¹⁷⁹ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 'FANSPS', 105.

¹⁸⁰ Le Gouriellec, 'Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy', 1066.

¹⁸¹ Medhane, 'Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence', 355.

In December 2006 Ethiopia unilaterally invaded Somalia after the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) captured Mogadishu. Its invasion exacerbated the situation in Somalia, producing chaos and a humanitarian crisis.¹⁸² In a 2007 Al Jazeera interview, Meles stated that Ethiopia was ‘forced by circumstances to send troops’ citing the ‘explicit request’ of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and provocations of ‘repeated declarations of jihad’ against Ethiopia by ICU.¹⁸³ He framed it as defensive measure against a possible terrorist attacks, and hence as external aggression. But there were other, more pressing, reasons that explain Ethiopia’s concern, which relate to the country’s internal dynamics.

The Ethiopian Government claimed that the ‘empty dream of the so-called “Greater Somalia”, an expansionist policy’ has been discredited by Somali and considered its chances of revival slim.¹⁸⁴ But Somali claims to the Ogaden region were never entirely abandoned and the political marginalization of ethnic Somali in Ethiopia provided fertile ground for possible conflict. Additionally, a possible influx of Somali refugees, risked upsetting ethnic balances.¹⁸⁵ This show that there were other, more pressing, concerns regarding the unrest in Somalia. After Ethiopia invaded Somalia, Ethiopia used its leverage in IGAD to retroactively authorize the invasion.¹⁸⁶ Additionally, it is said that because Ethiopia’s disproportionate amount of influence, IGAD supported the Ethiopia backed TFG, which is referred to as a ‘pawn’ of Ethiopia.

Ethiopia’s vision of peace and stability is shaped by its own perception of threats. With respect to Somalia, it was shaped by the contentious border issue with Somalia and the idea of a Greater Somalia, which ultimately led to the Ogaden war in 1977. Security, then, means a friendly Somalia that will maintain the status quo and not arouse Somali irredentism nor ethnic unrest among the Somali living in Ethiopia, or a Somalia that is not in the capacity arouse anything. It follows that it is important to be mindful of how the EPRDF envisions peace and security, since it determined Ethiopia’s course of action, which in this case could be described as imperial.

¹⁸² Bjørn Møller, *The Somali Conflict, The Role of External Actors*. Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009, 4-33, there, 17.

¹⁸³ Al Jazeera, ‘Talk to Jazeera – Meles Zenawi – 22 Nov 07 – Part 2’ 03-12-2007 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mD0EifXNXZU&t=449s> consulted on 16-06-2019

¹⁸⁴ FANSPS, 73-78.

¹⁸⁵ Møller, *The Somali Conflict*, 20.

¹⁸⁶ Redie, 122.

4.4 A Seat at the Table: Ethiopia's non-permanent membership to the Security Council

On 28 June 2016 Ethiopia was elected to serve as a non-permanent member to the UNSC during 2017-2018 term. With respect to its non-permanent membership to the UNSC, which is considered to be one of the most powerful international decision-making bodies in the world and shapes the course of inter-state relations and peace and stability, Ethiopia was to bring African solutions for African problems in the Security Council. And this is important, because out of the current fifteen peacekeeping operations, seven are taking place in Africa of which three in the Horn of Africa. This membership gives Ethiopia 'a strong voice' and more influence to regulate UN operations dealing with instability along its borders.

Despite Ethiopia's founding role in the establishment of the UN, Ethiopia only recently concluded its third non-permanent membership, a sentiment reiterated by the government in both speech and writing. A press statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcing the 'important achievement' stated that Ethiopia was 'of course' one of the founding fathers of the UN and 'contributed considerably to the drawing up of the principles of the United Nations Charter.'¹⁸⁷ The election provided a clear indication of 'Ethiopia's increasing reputation' as 'a major pillar' in the African 'peace and security architecture.'¹⁸⁸ Similarly, during a press conference regarding Ethiopia's September 2017 Security Council Presidency, Ethiopia's permanent representative to the UN, Tekeda Alemu, said that despite its aforementioned role it was only now that Ethiopia was welcomed back to serve its third term in the Security Council, emphasizing the country's 70 year-long membership since the organization's establishment.¹⁸⁹ He added that 'it is with that sense of satisfaction and (...) responsibility we assume the obligation' and 'take our membership with the council extremely seriously.'¹⁹⁰ The sense of satisfaction referred to by Tekeda can be explained by a number of factors.

A non-permanent membership to the Security Council is coveted by every country that is not one of the Permanent Five for varying reasons. The political advantages for filling this seat differ from country to country, depending on their international status and wealth. Looking through a constructivist lens, the symbolic meaning of Ethiopia's a non-permanent

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ United Nations, 'Tekadu Alemu (Ethiopia) on new Security Council Presidency – Press Conference (1-09-2017)', <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bptq4ey8My8&t=868s> Consulted on 26 May 2019.

¹⁹⁰ United Nations, 'Tekadu Alemu'.

membership, is determined by its own ‘historical vision’ in global and regional diplomacy.¹⁹¹ Within the sphere of multilateralism, a notion of ‘greatness’ is etched in Ethiopia’s collective memory. Following Ethiopia’s diminished presence in the UN after 1991, Ethiopia’s efforts to deepen its integration within the organization should, in part, be seen against this particular background. It is a step towards ‘restoring Ethiopia’s former glory’ and hence Ethiopia’s Renaissance.¹⁹² There are, also, other reasons that explain the importance, for which the EPRDF’s democratization and development objectives will prove insightful.

With respect to development, Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland found a strong positive link between a developing country’s non-permanent membership to the UNSC and its participation in IMF and World Bank programs, including a reduction in the amount of conditions incorporated into the projects. Despite this ‘positive’ link, they also found that IMF loans and World Bank financing were used to buy non-permanent members’ votes.¹⁹³ In terms of domestic conduct, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, found that a two-year membership to the UNSC undermines the political development and economic growth of a state. Compared to non-member states, rotating member states showed decreasing levels of economic growth, increased restrictions on the press and less democracy.¹⁹⁴ They concluded that UNSC membership is accompanied by monetary benefits and international prestige, but do not contribute to the country’s development agenda. They do not elaborate on the details of the negative relation but do claim that UNSC membership provides easy access to money – relaxed conditions and unmerited granting. The negative relation between Security Council membership and development is a matter of interpretation, because Ethiopia’s economy exhibited double digit growth between the years 2006 and 2016, and continued to grow during its membership, but less. There were also widespread demonstrations in Ethiopia during its membership, which led the Ethiopian Government to declare a state of emergency when Hailemariam resigned as prime minister in February 2018 – five months after the previous ten-month long state of emergency was lifted. While this is not proof of causality, there are grounds to argue for a

¹⁹¹ Warner, *Multilateral Machinations*, 239.

¹⁹² Anonymous senior diplomat quoted in Warner, *Multilateral Machinations*, 239.

¹⁹³ Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland, ‘Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council’ *European Economic Review*, 53 (2009) 7, 742-757, there 742. Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland, ‘Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the influence World Bank decisions?’ *Journal of Development Economics*, 88 (2009) 1, 1-18, there 6.

¹⁹⁴ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Alastair Smith, ‘The pernicious consequences of membership’ *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54 (2010) 5, 667-686, there 676.

correlation; it suggests that the political and economic objectives – international prestige and financial benefits – override the democratic rights and civil liberties of its people. At the same time, it can be argued that, based on the argumentation from the previous chapter, that this is how the Government knew to contain social unrest.

In 2015, Hailemariam, during his 70th UN General Assembly address stressed the need for ‘comprehensive reform of the United Nations, and of the Security Council in particular.’¹⁹⁵ This should account for Africa’s ‘full representation’ in the decision-making body following the dramatic shift in ‘geopolitical and economic realities.’¹⁹⁶ Security Council reform is high on Africa’s agenda, and figured as ‘a central element’ in Ethiopia’s membership.¹⁹⁷ Additionally, UN documents show that the majority of UN member states support an increased African presence in the Security Council.¹⁹⁸ If a permanent seat were to ever open up for the African block, Ethiopia would have to compete with countries like Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt. But Ethiopia seemed determined to demonstrate its suitability for the job

This most notably came to expression in Ethiopia’s push for improved cooperation between the UN Security and the AU Peace and Security Council. Here, Ethiopia drew from its status as a bridge between Africa and the World to improve relations and cooperation between the UN and African regional and sub-regional organizations. It was already argued that the palatability of Ethiopian identity renders the country with a high degree of international legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of Western and non-Western countries. This status is shaped by Ethiopia’s role in the establishment of the UN and OAU, as host country to the AU, but also by the personalities of Ethiopian leaders.

A permanent Security Council membership would give Ethiopia a unique position in the world and would reinforce Ethiopia’s exceptionalism. It would potentially give Ethiopia the power to veto resolutions concerning issues related to the Horn of Africa, giving it more control over the direction of regional developments in the areas of peace and security. Hence, increased bargaining power would allow Ethiopia to influence precisely those regional matters it perceives as a threat to its survival.

¹⁹⁵ Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Ethiopia becomes a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council,

¹⁹⁶ Ibid

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ United Nations, Co-Chairs Intergovernmental Negotiations, Revised Elements of Commonality and Issues for Further Consideration: On the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, 07-06-2019, 1 – 9, there 3.

4.3. Conclusion

This chapter sought to determine if, how and why Ethiopia attempted to take up a leading role in the region by looking at Ethiopia's contribution to peacekeeping efforts, and its membership with IGAD and the UN Security Council. It demonstrated that each aspect serves a different purpose, whilst being tied to the national interest. Through its contribution to peacekeeping operations Ethiopia was able to further its own interest in stabilizing the region and win international acclaim for its efforts. IGAD's institutional weakness allowed Ethiopia to resort to an imperial strategy, which later became hard hegemonic, after IGAD's retroactive authorization. With the help of the constructivist approach, it was shown, that EPRDF's perception of risks to the state survival, were highly influenced by contentious border issues regarding the Somali in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. This undoubtedly influenced how the EPRDF envisioned peace and stability around its borders, because in this case the threat is within the country. In its pursuit for improving the country's international integration, Ethiopia's membership to the UN Security Council proved quite significant. A membership provides material and immaterial benefits, like development aid and prestige, and it could also prove beneficial for a possible non-permanent membership. Its membership has allowed it to stand at the forefront of strengthening cooperation between the UN and African regional and sub regional, reinforcing its status as the appropriate middleman between Africa and the World.

Conclusion

This thesis attempted to determine if the EPRDF was attempting to establish itself as regional hegemon in the Horn of Africa and was guided by the question: What does the narrative on the EPRDF's self-proclaimed Ethiopian Renaissance tell us about how Ethiopia envisions its position vis-à-vis states in the Horn of Africa? This thesis additionally attempted to scrutinize prominent IR theories, neorealism and neoliberalism. Both theories are central to IR scholarship. This is evidenced by the fact that new IR students are often immediately familiarized with these approaches and their main contributors. Its perceived importance perpetuates its prominence, and hence its widespread acceptance as an appropriate tool for the study of world politics. While they might be appropriate tools to study the international behavior of states for which they were designed, these approaches lack the conceptual freedom to adequately analyze the international relations of non-Western states. Its theoretical demarcations obscure quite crucial aspects which determine the interest formation process. To allow for the inclusion of these aspects, a theoretical framework was set out to determine what social aspects, like beliefs, values, and norms, shaped Ethiopia's foreign policy on the level of the individual, state, and international society. It was then shown that personal beliefs, in the Ethiopian context, were quite important in determining foreign policy interests and strategies. Apart from Ethiopia's unique history, Ethiopia is also unique in the sense that it has a very fluid identity as was evidenced by the literature. Its identity has been interpreted in various ways, and sometimes conflictual ways. However, Ethiopia has been able to benefit from this identity, as it was considered a credible international actor in the eyes of the West as well as non-Western countries.

Throughout its discussion it contrasted rationalist and constructivist interpretations. What became apparent is, is that Ethiopia's national interests showed overlap with rationalist assumptions. There are four interrelated ideas which determine Ethiopia's foreign policy interests: state survival, preservation of political power, maintaining a status quo, and international legitimacy. They are interests, but more importantly, they are ideas which have been given value by political agents. The value ascribed to them were determined by a range of factors like history, ideas revolving around status, and the way power is conceptualized in Ethiopian society. What this thesis additionally showed is that different strategies were followed to pursue state survival, maintaining a status quo, and international legitimacy. Some strategies are more legitimate than others, but to pursue strategies that run counter to

internationally accepted norms, Ethiopia needs international legitimacy, which it can only get through legitimate means like superpower alignment and peacekeeping.

The second chapter demonstrated that Ethiopia's foreign policy objectives were realizing democracy and development, stability in the Horn of Africa, and improved international integration, to ensure state survival. It resorted to a failed state narrative and presented democracy and development as a matter of life and death. By framing Ethiopia's situation, the way, it did, the EPRDF was able to create conditions to legitimize controversial measures. With respect to the Horn of Africa, the EPRDF claimed it would be able to play a special and prominent role in transforming the region. Moreover, The Ethiopian people were given a central place in the FANSPS, but the third chapter showed, that in terms of democracy, they were not as central as it presented them to be.

It was argued in the third chapter, that with its foreign policy strategy, the FANSPS, it had shifted the focus from external to internal concerns. It claimed to have modeled its foreign policy around the pursuit of democracy and development. Within the realist paradigm, there is a strict dichotomy between the national and international realm, and it is maintained that there is no relationship between the two. But as the first chapter showed, all three levels of analysis, are highly intertwined, especially with respect to Ethiopia, where its leaders were almost equivalent to a human embodiment of the country.

Going back to the internal dynamics of the country, the third chapter attempted to determine to what extent the EPRDF was able to reconcile the country's democratization process with existing values about power. The EPRDF was committed to democratize in rhetoric, but as it turned out, it was only able to do so in action insofar it did not undermine its own power position. It was argued that by framing democracy and development as national security interest, and subsequently framing political opposition and government critics as threats to the survival of the state, the EPRDF tied its own preservation of power to the survival of the state. This most notably became apparent through the drastic measures it resorted to in the aftermath of the 2005 election.

The fourth chapter looked at Ethiopia in peacekeeping operations, IGAD and the UN Security Council. The value that is attached to them and the purpose they fulfil differs. With respect to peacekeeping operations, Ethiopia's objectives are twofold, it serves the purpose of stabilizing the region, but it also generated international acclaim and promoted Ethiopia's image as peace facilitator in the region. IGAD's weaknesses, rendered it a pawn to be used by Ethiopia to further its own interest. The country's history with Somalia and the Ogaden, influenced the way the EPRDF perceived threats in the region, and explained Ethiopia's

leveraging of IGAD to further its own interest, and that it is concerned with creating peace and stability that corresponds with the EPRDF's vision. With respect to Ethiopia's UN Security Council membership, the country's prior history with the UN, made this membership of symbolic value. It, did indeed, serve its national interest by having more leverage in matters relating to peace and security in the Horn. Moreover, if Ethiopia were to ever gain a permanent membership to the UN Security Council, this would most notably reinforce its exceptional status.

Based on the EPRDF's efforts to take up a leading role in driving the region's development and stability it can be argued that EPRDF's pursuit entailed re-establishing a former hegemonic status. However, this would solely be from their own perspective. This thesis contained ample discussion about the prevalence of ideas revolving around power, hierarchy, and influence, in Ethiopian society, and the notion of Ethiopian exceptionalism. This not only shapes the EPRDF's interests, but it also shapes how the EPRDF's views Ethiopia's role in the region.

To answer the research question: Ethiopia sees itself as appointed country to stabilize the region. Ethiopia's success depends on stability in the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia is also the only country in the Horn with the potential to stabilize region. It can be argued that it holds a very particular type of view of stability in the region, one which does not offset its own interest, namely, maintaining a status quo. Moreover, it is drawing from its exceptional status in the region, Africa and the world, to determine the course of events in the region. Hence, while the interest of maintaining a status quo can be ascribed to realism, it would be fitting attempt to first deconstruct what factors shape how this interest is interpreted.

The findings of this thesis were limited by language barriers. The primary sources that were used were all in English, despite the authors emphasis on locality. Amharic sources would prove a much better insight into Government framing, rhetoric. English sources, like the interviews used in this thesis for example, are meant for a very specific audience, and that might mean that, Meles and Hailemariam, expressed themselves differently than they would have if they were interviewed by an Ethiopian news station. This is also the case with Additionally, this thesis employed a broad scope, which created challenges to go into detail or discuss certain topics. For a next study, focusing more one level of analysis, without excluding the other two, and focusing on one organization or one case, would provide more insight into localizing and tracking concepts, to better demonstrate the mutually constituted relationship between structures, and identities and interest.

Bibliography

Primary sources

Al Jazeera, 'Talk to Jazeera – Meles Zenawi – 22 Nov 07 – Part 2' 03-12-2007
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mD0EifXNXZU&t=449s> consulted on 16-06-2019

Al Jazeera, 'Al Jazeera, Talk to Jazeera: Meles Zenawi' 23-05-2010,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9S83SVAumsQ> consulted on 17-06-2019

Al Jazeera, Hailemariam Desalegn: Democracy 'not only an election' | Talk to Al Jazeera, 22-May-2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VwimUr2C7mY&t=974s> consulted on 17-06-2019

Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Ethiopia becomes a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council' 01-07-2016,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170412171329/http://www.mfa.gov.et/-/ethiopia-becomes-a-non-permanent-member-of-the-un-security-council-> consulted on 17-06-2019.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance, sponsored section in Foreign Affairs, May-June 2002, 1 – 13.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Government Communication Affairs Office (GCAO), 'Ethiopia's Foreign Policy and its Achievements', April 2012.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Information, Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (2002).

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, National Planning Commission, 'Growth and Transformation Plan II (2015/2016 – 2019/2020)', (May 2016).

Habtam Alemachew, 'Ethiopia's Renaissance: Quest for conceptual and definitional parcels' (version 03-01-2013), <http://www.meleszenawi.com/ethiopias-renaissance-quest-for-conceptual-and-definitional-parcels/> (15-06-2019).

PM Meles Speech in Togo Lomi - 1991E.C
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o9aHxYbWAoc> 21-08-2019, accessed 17-06-2019.

United Nations, Co-Chairs Intergovernmental Negotiations, Revised Elements of Commonality and Issues for Further Consideration: On the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, 07-06-2019, 1-9.

World Bank Group, World Bank in Ethiopia
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview> last updated 12-04-2019, accessed on 15-06-2017.

Secondary sources

Abbink, Jan, 'Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and its Aftermath', *African Affairs* 105 (2006) 419, 173-199.

Akinola, Adeyo O. and Nompumelelo Ndawonde, NEPAD: Talking from the South, Governing from the West, *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies – Multi-, Inter-, and Transdisciplinarity*, 11 (2016) 2, 38-51.

Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia: 1885-1991* (Athens, 2001).

Berouk Mesfin, 'Ethiopia's Role and Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa', *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 6 (2012) ½, 87-113.

Chabal, Patrick, *Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling* (London/New York 2009).

Daniel E. Alemu, Re-imagining the Horn, *African Renaissance*, 4(2007)1, 55-64.

Fantu Cheru, 'Navigating a "multi-polar" world: Ethiopia's Foreign Policy towards "old" and "new" development partners, paper presented at conference Ethiopia's International Relations: The Foreign Policy Making and Determinants of an Emerging Giant (14-01-2014) 1-43.

Clapham, Christopher *Africa and the International System*, (Cambridge, 1996).

Dupuy, Kendra E, James Ron & Aseem Prakash, 'Who survived? Ethiopia's regulatory crackdown on foreign-funded NGOs', *Review of International Political Economy*, 22 (2015) 2, 419-456.

Scott Firsing, 'Thinking through the role of Africa's militaries in peacekeeping: the cases of Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Rwanda', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 21 (2014) 1, 45-67.

Haile Selassie Gebre Selassie, *The Role of the Foreign Element in the Making and Breaking up of Local Polities in the Horn of Africa: The Formation and Transformation of the Ethiopian State* (Amsterdam 1972).

Messay Kebede, 'Eurocentrism and Ethiopian Historiography: Deconstructing Semitization' *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, 1 (2003) 1, 1-19.

Dunn, Kevin C., 'MadLib #32: 'The (Blank) African State: Rethinking the Sovereign State in International Relations Theory' in: Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw, eds. *Africa's Challenge to IR Theory* (New York, 2001), 46-63. Chabal, *The Politics of Suffering and Smiling*, 175.

Gagliardone, Iginio, 'New Media and the Developmental State in Ethiopia', *African Affairs* 113 (2014) 451, 279-299.

Herbst, Jeffrey, 'Western and African peacekeepers: motives and opportunities', J.W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, eds, *Africa in world politics: the African State system in flux* (Westview 2000), 308-328.

Hurd, Ian, 'Constructivism', eds. Christian Reus Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds. *The Oxford Handbook International Relations* (Oxford, 2008), 298-316.

Keller, Edmond J., 'The Politics of State Survival: Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Foreign Policy', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 489 (1987), 76-87.

Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton 1984).

Le Gourrielec, Sonia, *Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy: Ethiopia, an 'imperfect hegemon' in the Horn of Africa*, *International Affairs* 94 (2018) 5, 1059-1075.

Lefort, René. 'The Ethiopian Economy: The Developmental State Vs. The Free Market', in: Gérard Prunier and Éloi Ficquet, eds. *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia. Monarchy, Revolution, and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi*, (London 2015), 357-394, there 360.

Medhane Tadesse, 'Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence', in: Gérard Prunier and Éloi Ficquet, eds. *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia. Monarchy, Revolution, and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi*, (London 2015), 333-356.

Meles Zenawi, 'African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings' (Excerpt dissertation Economy n.p. en n.d)

Michal Woldemariam, 'Regional Powers, Great Power Allies, and International Institutions: The Case of Ethiopia', in: Jason Warner and Tim Shaw, eds. *African Policies in International Institutions* (New York 2018), 371-388.

Møller, Bjørn, *The Somali Conflict, The Role of External Actors*. Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009, 4-33.

Negera Gudeta Adula, 'The determinants of Ethiopian foreign policy under consecutive Regimes: Appraisal of Military and EPRDF Government determinants of Ethiopian foreign policy' *International Journal of Political Science and Development*, 6 (2018) 7, 192-199.

Izabela Orlowska, 'Forging a nation: the Ethiopian millenium celebration and the multiethnic state', *Nations and Nationalism* 19 (2013) 2, 296-316.

Prunier, Gérard 'The Meles Zenawi Era: From Revolutionary Marxism to State Developmentalism', in: Gérard Prunier and Éloi Ficquet, eds. *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia. Monarchy, Revolution, and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi*, (London 2015), 415-438.

Ruth Iyob, 'Regional Hegemony, Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31 (1993) 2, 257-276.

Shiferaw Bekele, 'Monarchical Restoration and Territorial Expansion: The Ethiopian State in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century', in: Gérard Prunier and Éloi Ficquet, eds. *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia: Monarchy, Revolution and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi* 159 – 182.

Reus-Smit, Christian, 'Constructivism', in: Scott Burchill et al, eds. *Theories of International Relations* (New York 2005), 188-211, 192.

Reus-Smit, Christian, *Reading History Through Constructivist Eyes*, *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 37(2008)2, 395- 414, there 398.

Taylor, Ian and Philip Nel, 'New Africa', globalization, and the confines of elite reformism: 'Getting the rhetoric right', getting the strategy right *Third World Quarterly* 23 (2002) 1, 163-180.

Teshale Tibebe, 'Ethiopia: The "Anomaly" and "Paradox" of Africa', *Journal of Black Studies*, 26 (1996) 4, 414-430.

Kwasi Tieku, Thomas, 'Theoretical approaches to Africa's international relations', in: Tim Murithi, eds. *The Routledge Handbook of Africa's International Relations* (New York, 2014).

Waal, Alex de *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Bussiness of Power* (Cambride, 2015).

Waltz, Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics*, (Massachusetts 1979).

Warner, Jason, 'Multilateral Machinations: The Strategic Utility of African International Organizations in the Pursuit of National Security Interests in West Africa and the Greater Horn (Doctoral Dissertation African, Cambridge 2016).