

Facing a Refugee Crisis: Restricted Immigration in the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Canada and Australia in the 1930s.

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Comparative History Master Thesis
Utrecht University
August 2009

Acknowledgments

I would first like to thank my supervisors; Geraldien von Frijtag Drabbe Kunzel for her support and guidance throughout the process and Maarten Prak who has been extremely helpful and generous of his time, not only through the process of this thesis, but the entire academic year. I would also like to thank Ewout Frankema for his help with the general structure of this study, as well as his help with finding the necessary statistics. To my classmates and friends here in the Netherlands, I want to say thank you for making my year here one that I will never forget. And finally I would like to thank my family for their ongoing support and encouragement.

Katie Simanzik
August 10th, 2009

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Introduction

Migration has been a part of the human experience since the origins of our species. Since the creation of nation states, governments have tried to regulate entry into their territory. Immigration control, which is considered to be an important part of maintaining authority over a state's territory, is now a basic element of national sovereignty.¹ Defined as a state's efforts to "regulate and control entry into the national territory and to stipulate conditions of residence of persons seeking permanent settlement, temporary work or political asylum," migration policies have varied around the world and continue to evolve.² While some are pro-active and well planned, others are reactive and ad hoc. Some are extremely liberal while others are very restrictive.³ One of the interesting things about migration policy is that it finds itself at the intersection of domestic and international affairs.⁴ Policies can be determined by national needs and events or foreign ones, and always have effects on the domestic population and potential immigrants around the world.⁵

The purpose of migration or immigration policies has evolved beyond simply being able to maintain authority over a state's territory. It now also serves many economic functions such as overcoming labour scarcity or maintaining the population growth rate. Declining growth rates can be very costly to an economy by putting additional pressure on innovation and resources.⁶ Immigration has been used as a successful tool to maintain the necessary population increases when natural growth does not suffice. While it seems to be a simple solution, there is often opposition to immigration for several reasons. First, the positive effects of immigration are not evenly dispersed. The principal beneficiaries of immigration are employers in labour-intensive industries and those who are dependent on an unskilled workforce, and businesses that profit from population growth such as real estate and construction.⁷ Secondly, the immediate costs of immigration "fall disproportionately on the minority of the population competing with immigrants for scarce jobs, housing, schools and

¹ Rosenblum, "Immigration and US National Interests," 14.

² Freeman, "Migration Policy," 1145.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Teitelbaum, "Immigration, Refugees and Foreign Policy," 433.

⁶ Corbett, "Immigration and Economic Development," 361.

⁷ Freeman, "Modes of Immigration," 885.

government services.”⁸ And finally, the applicants available are not always the type of applicant of preference for the receiving state. Receiving countries often expect immigrants to eventually assimilate into the population but some ethnicities have been deemed less suitable for this and whose entry can arouse public opposition.⁹ Events in modern immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have repeatedly demonstrated that it is the situation of the receiving countries and their respective immigration policies, and not the sending countries, that are the major determinants of the volume of immigration.¹⁰ States exercise their sovereign rights to control their borders by creating immigration policies that fit their current economic, political and cultural situation. There are specific events in history which bring these policies to the forefront. One of these very events occurred in the 1930’s when massive amounts of Germans, under Hitler’s reign, attempted to flee their homeland in hopes of safety.

The refugee crisis began in 1933. From the moment Hitler assumed power, refugees began to flee Germany.¹¹ The threat to Jews was immediately obvious with the April boycott of Jewish businesses and the push to de-Judaize the arts, the civil service and education.¹² From the very start of Hitler’s reign, Jews felt threatened and many made the decision to leave Germany in the first few months. German Jews were not the only group persecuted by the Nazi party. While Jews made up the great majority, democrats, socialists, pacifists, academic, journalists, homosexuals, catholic priests and protestant pastors made up fifteen percent of the refugees.¹³ Of the 59 300 refugees who fled Germany by the end of 1933, 51 065 were Jewish and 8 235 were not.¹⁴

It is clear that as the 1930s progressed and the situation for the Jews in Germany deteriorated, Western countries such as the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Canada and Australia failed to act on the issue of refugees. These five countries all became increasingly restrictive in allowing German refugees to enter their countries throughout the period. This was by no means a unique response as was demonstrated at the Evian Conference on the Jewish Refugee Problem in 1938.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Jayaraman, “Inclusion and Exclusion,” 135.

¹⁰ Corbett, “Immigration and Economic Development,” 361.

¹¹ Burgess, “France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933,” 203.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Almost all of the 32 countries present, including these five, expressed the sentiment that they had reached their saturation for refugees by this point.

The events and results of the Evian Conference are very illustrative of the larger situation, especially in that year. At the time of the conference, France was the only country that had been taking in refugees. As a country that shared a border with Germany, France was forced to deal with the thousands of refugees who appeared at their border.

At the Evian Conference, France described the immigration laws of the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada among others, as selfish.¹⁵ In particular, the French delegation singled out the United States, who had organized the conference, claiming that they not only had the financial resources necessary to run any agreed upon “resettlement operation, but it had an obligation to begin the project immediately, out of guilt for its past aloofness to European refugee problems.”¹⁶

For the most part, the conference was simply an opportunity for the 32 countries present to voice their sympathies for the Jews while at the same time claiming that they did not have the capacity to help them in any way. By the end of the conference, only two proposals had been agreed upon: “(1) an inter-governmental committee of representatives from governments and private refugee organizations must be established to coordinate matters of relief and resettlement, and (2) an effort must be made to transform the Latin American/Caribbean states into refugee havens.”¹⁷

In the end, these agreements had little to no effect. Few countries were interested in the inter-governmental committee, and thus its existence was futile. Also, the Latin American and Caribbean states, much like the rest of the world, resisted the idea of becoming refugee havens and were no more welcoming of refugees than any other country.¹⁸ The Evian Conference appears to have acted as a ‘face-saving’ measure to appear as though the individual states were doing something about the situation while in reality it was used to come to a silent agreement between the states that nothing was going to be done.

This paper will be a discussion of why states held such restrictionist immigration policies and why they were so unwilling to offer aid or asylum to the

¹⁵ Maga, “Closing the Door: The French Government and Refugee Policy,” 437.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 438.

German-Jewish refugees in the 1930s. How can we account for this apathetic response from almost all countries since the beginning of the crisis in 1933? Why was France the only country to allow entry to refugees at the onset of the crisis? By looking at four sets of variables, we will try to determine the causation of such a response.

Most often, analyses of migration concentrate on the conditions in the receiving states. This paper will be no different. It is clear that there are 'good' times for immigration when it comes to the economy in which migration is tolerated or encouraged by the government as well as the general population, and also 'bad' times when immigration can become the focus of anxieties regarding unemployment and immigrants become scapegoats for conditions they had no part in causing.¹⁹

The period being discussed in this paper is the interwar period between 1920 and 1940. During this period and until the 1960s, with the exception of the Second World War, the immigration flows were of modest size, were regulated by the laws of the receiving states, and mainly flowed from Europe to North America or colonial outposts.²⁰

In order to understand the situation thoroughly, this study will take into consideration the context in which the crisis occurred. A huge part of this context was the Great Depression that began in 1929 and had countries reeling by 1933 when the refugee crisis occurred. The Great Depression was a remarkable event that completely shaped the interwar period and will be carefully taken into consideration throughout the study.

Currently there are four types of international migration: legal permanent migration, legal temporary migration, illegal or undocumented migration, and refugee flows (including asylum).²¹ Unfortunately, in the period we are looking at, these categories were not as clearly defined and separated. Ideally, we would be looking solely at refugee intake, but many countries did not have a special process set up for refugees at this point in time. While they may have been given some assistance due to their situation, often there was little or no infrastructure set up to deal with refugees apart from the regular immigration system.

¹⁹ Freeman, "Modes of Immigration," 886.

²⁰ Teitelbaum, "Immigration, Refugees and Foreign Policy," 431. The term modest is justified by the relative volumes when compared to the period immediately preceding. From 1850 to 1920 some 55 million Europeans emigrated: 36 million went to the USA, 4 million to Canada and 10 million in South America. Corbett, "Immigration and Economic Development," 360.

²¹ Teitelbaum, "Immigration, Refugees and Foreign Policy," 429.

Comparative History

This paper employs a comparative approach, following the methodology of comparative history. Comparative history allows a discussion of events from a systematic perspective and allows careful consideration of the various causes involved in events and larger phenomena. Comparative history not only allows us to closely examine the possible causes, but offers tools to determine which of these causes is or are most significant. Some factors may initially appear significant, but by comparing their occurrence in various cases, one can determine if they are necessary or sufficient causes.

There are two main approaches that are often employed in history: the case study approach and the variable oriented approach. The case study approach offers a more general comparison but can accommodate the complex details of each individual case. This is ideal when the number of case studies is small. The variable oriented approach often uses many cases and uses statistics to examine certain variables and their relation to a given outcome. Charles Ragin's comparative method, detailed in his book *The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*, offers a compromise where case studies can be examined in terms of the specific variables that have been selected by determining whether or not each variable is present in each case. This allows the individual histories and the human element to play a role without becoming burdened by superfluous details.

The comparative methodology is a means to reduce the complexities of causation. Rather than adding additional causal explanations to the debate, this paper will determine which factors are the most significant. There are certain sacrifices made by employing Ragin's comparative method. Events and phenomena must be simplified in order to make them comparable and thus some details are lost. Often, conditions occur in varying degrees but in this method one must determine whether they exist or not, using a black and white approach. Unfortunately, this does not always reflect reality exactly, but these sacrifices are necessary in order to be able to make comparisons. Despite these disadvantages, the method is a great tool for determining causality.

This analysis will focus on the causation of the restrictionist immigration laws, between 1933 and 1938 with emphasis on the initial reactions to the German Jewish refugee crisis. The reason we will focus on the period before 1938 is that by 1938 all

of the cases had the same outcome. However, prior to 1938, we have four cases with one outcome and one case with the opposite outcome. This will make for a more rewarding comparison.

This paper will take a very systematic approach to causal analysis. Five cases have been selected for this comparison and four main sets of variables will be examined. In each of the sets of variables, we will look at specific, measurable conditions and determine whether they exist or not in each case. If a specific condition does exist, it will be scored as a 1, if it does not, it will be scores as a 0. These scores will be compiled into a results matrix so that the variables can easily be compared across the five cases. The conditions have been defined in a positive manner, so that the presence of a variable does not refer to the absence of a factor. In the conclusion of the paper, a comparative analysis will be done with these scores to determine the true causation of these restrictionist immigration policies.

Case and Variable Selection

The five cases that have been chosen for this study are the United Kingdom, France, the United States of America, Canada and Australia. These five cases offer a variety of histories to be compared. Two of the cases are European while the other three are from the New World, allowing us to discuss the differences between older and much younger countries. Of course, this had a distinct effect on their immigration history and policy, which will be demonstrated in the historical section.

England and France were chosen as the European cases for this study. They were both important world powers and had strong reputations within Europe, both politically and economically. Despite the damages of the First World War, these countries were still seen as opportune places to go when fleeing persecution. France also had a strong history of humanitarianism and asylum which attracted refugees to it, in the hopes that they would be treated with goodwill. The proximity of these two European countries to Germany also meant that it was much easier for refugees to reach the border, especially the borders of France where refugees could travel to over land and without previously having the proper paperwork for international travel. In comparison, the New World countries had large oceans separating them from the

refugees, which allowed them the luxury of not having to deal with people who simply arrived at their border, pleading for entry.

The New World countries in this study, the United States, Canada and Australia share many common cultural elements, including being traditional countries of immigration.²² They share a similar history as major countries of immigration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.²³ Immigration was an integral part of their founding and history as nations and continues to play a major role in their development.²⁴ Despite the geographic distance between Germany and these countries, all three have been countries of preference for immigrants from many countries in Europe and elsewhere.²⁵ The high demands for international immigration in the 1930s affected all of these countries and despite immense distances, the New World countries also received an abundance of applications.

In trying to determine the causes for the harsh restrictionist policies regarding immigration in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia and the somewhat more accommodating policies of France, this paper will first look at the immigration trends that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s from the perspective of the receiving countries. While push factors from sending countries do determine the type of immigrants applying, each of these countries received sufficient and diverse applications for settlement, and so a lack of applicants was not a contributing factors to the changes in immigration that occur during this period. The trends observed can be accounted for by the increasingly restrictionist immigration policies in each of the countries.

Furthermore, sufficient data is not available on the numbers and types of applicants for settlement in these countries in this period. We will therefore not be discussing the ‘pull factors’ or incentives that would make one country more desirable over another during the refugee crisis. Most refugees had little preference of which country they could find asylum in, especially between the five cases in this study. For these same reasons, geographical distance from the sending countries will not be discussed in detail. Proximity to Germany as the origin of the refugees would be relevant in a study of why European states received more applications for entry than

²² Simon, *The Economic Consequences of Immigration*, 10.

²³ Jupp, “Immigration, the War on Terror , and the British Commonwealth,” 189.

²⁴ Freeman, “Modes of Immigration,” 887.

²⁵ Freeman, “Migration Policy,” 1145.

New World ones, but this issue will not be discussed in this paper. The assumption has been made that despite these differences, the five countries being discussed all received many more applications than they could approve. It is then only logical to look at the reasons and causes for restricting entry, rather than the reasons for which these countries were in demand. Proximity to Germany did have an effect on the number of refugees arriving at the border, but it had limited effects on the long-term immigration policies created by the national governments.

The analysis will begin by examining the changes in immigration levels in these countries that occurred after onset of the Great Depression. These changes, along with the actual policies themselves, will act as the outcomes for which we will try to determine the causes. We will then look at the possible factors responsible for these changes and determine their importance. The factors can be divided into four groups: historical, political, cultural and economic. Geographic factors are noticeably absent from this list. This is not to say that geographic factors are not important, but rather that they have an indirect effect on the outcome. As previously mentioned, geographic location on the planet is irrelevant to this study due to the high demands put on all of these countries for immigration. However, the climate and size of these countries will be accounted for. Three of these countries share the characteristic of being very large landmasses and the relevant issue to this topic is the need to populate this land. Due to their individual histories, the time in which this land was filled may fall before, during or after the period of study. Because it is closely related to a country's past experience with immigration and immigration policy, the need to populate the land is included in the historical factors. As far as climate is concerned, the severe weather conditions of this period are included under economic factors due to their direct effect on agricultural productivity. The lack of direct influence on immigration has allowed for the separation of these factors in this way.

The historical factors comprise mainly of the individual immigration histories of these countries. Important elements such as when immigration was high, what made it necessary and any trends that were occurring will be taken into consideration. It will be determined if and when immigration policies began to become restrictionist and when the need to populate the land was fulfilled.

The political factors look at the current political situation in the interwar period for each case. This interwar period of depression was unstable for many countries and so the stability of the government and its leadership will be examined.

We will also look at the political climate and policies taken on by the governments, the countries' international relationships and their responses to other international events in this period.

The cultural factors are a discussion of the xenophobic tendencies of the general public and how they responded to immigrations and the topic of immigration. This section will also examine the role that the domestic immigrant community played, and determine whether they were encouraging and facilitating or opposed to welcoming more immigrants and refugees.


Finally, the economic factors will be examined. These factors are perhaps some of the most convincing reasons for the restrictive trends and will be looked at in detail. First, we will examine the state of the domestic economies and major changes that had occurred. More specifically, we will look at unemployment rates and the gross domestic product as well as climatic effects on agricultural productivity.

It is important to note that these divisions are somewhat arbitrary. There are no clear separations between the groups that the variables have been assembled into. Many of them had causes or effects that fall into other categories and many of them were interrelated. For instance, the pre-depression immigration policy, while classified under historical factors, is clearly the product of political, cultural and economic needs. But because it reflects needs that may no longer be in existence, it has been classified as a historical factor. Despite the lack of clear separation, divisions of some kind must be made and we have done our best to keep those variables that were most closely related together. Furthermore, we realize that not all of these variables held the same weight. Nor did the individual variables hold a consistent weight over time. As the context changes, different variables become more and less important, and this is what we will try to decipher in our analysis of the variables.

1. Outcomes


The first problem that needs to be addressed is the issue of available statistics. Annual entry numbers of immigration were recorded for four of the five cases. The statistics for the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia have been included in Figure 1. The same statistics for France are unavailable, which is unfortunate because France is the one case that allowed the entry of refugees in this period. There is some statistical data and that will later be used to try to create an image of immigration to France as clearly as possible, given the data.

Figure 1. Immigration, 1920-1940



Sources: B. R. Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania, 1750-1993*, *International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-1993*, *International Historical Statistics: The Americas, 1750-1993*.

Figure 2. Immigration as a Percentage of Total Population



Sources: Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania, 1750-1993*, *International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-1993*, *International Historical Statistics: The Americas, 1750-1993*, and Maddison, “Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2006 AD.”

The first figure (Figure 1) uses absolute entry numbers. This graph describes the increases and decreases in total numbers of immigrants who entered the country each year. With the United States having a population that was more than double the size of the next largest population, it is of little surprise that the United States government also allowed the highest number of immigrants to enter the country throughout the 1920s. Although there were several severe drops in immigration to the United States in the early 1920s, these can be traced to two very specific events: the introduction of the Emergency Quota Act in 1921 and the Immigration Act of 1924. Canada also experienced two slight dips in immigration in the same years. Their severity was much lower than the trend in the United States but can not be explained by legislation but perhaps by spillover effects from the American policies. When looking at the period just prior to the stock market crash of 1929, it is interesting to note that both the United States’ and Australia’s immigration numbers had begun to fall prior to the occurrence of the crash. However, Canada’s numbers did not begin to fall until 1929 and even then did so only slightly and the United Kingdom’s entry numbers did not begin to fall until 1933.

Each of the four countries had their lowest intake years at different times. Australia was first in 1931 followed by the United States in 1933. Unsurprisingly, when considering its delayed onset of decrease, Canada was third in reaching its

lowest intake in 1935. The United Kingdom continued to decrease its numbers until, and likely into, the Second World War.²⁶ Before the Second World War would again close international borders and majorly hamper immigration, only the United States demonstrated a significant increase in immigration. Despite this increase, the United States only allowed one third of its 1929 levels to enter in 1939.

Figure 2 offers a different image. This graph describes the trends in immigration in relation to population levels. These numbers were obtained by dividing the number of immigrants entering each year by the population to get a per capita comparison. In this graph, we see that Canada had the highest immigration levels in relation to its population of the four countries, followed by Australia, then the United States, leaving the United Kingdom with the lowest percentage. Much like its absolute numbers, the United Kingdom experienced the least change and had the lowest rates throughout the 1920s, remaining below 0.2%. In contrast, Canada's rate reached a high of 1.65% in 1928, right before the beginning of the Great Depression.

As the only country into which refugees could enter, the case of France is especially interesting and requires a detailed examination. France's geography required different policies for dealing with immigration compared to the other four countries in this study. The United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia all have bodies of water separating them from continental Europe which was, in this case, the source of the refugees. In contrast, France's borders were extremely difficult to protect, especially with the high traffic of non-immigrants crossing the border.²⁷ Because of this, it was much easier for refugees to make their way to or through the border, unlike the other countries where they could simply be denied passage on a ship.

Before the First World War, France was the second most important country in Europe following Germany when it came to accepting immigrants, but it became the most important during the interwar period.²⁸ Almost 2 million immigrants came to France in the 1920s.²⁹ This meant an average of 200 000 immigrants per year, and an average rate of immigration of around 0.5% of the total population. It is extremely unlikely that the rates would remain constant throughout the decade but because of the lack of data, we must work with averages. In total immigration, an average of 200 000

²⁶ Statistics are missing for the United Kingdom for the years 1939-1945.

²⁷ Verbunt, "France," 131.

²⁸ Bade, *Migration in European History*, 193.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 194.

immigrants per year would be higher than all of the countries except for the United States in the 1920s. In terms of immigration as a percentage of total population, with an average of 0.5%, France would fall below Canada and Australia but above United States and the United Kingdom.

It has been argued by Bade and Noiriel that three quarters of the population growth in the interwar period can be attributed to immigration.³⁰ The absolute increase in population between 1920 and 1939 was 2.9 million, three quarters of which would be around 2.2 million. This cannot be assumed to be the total number of immigrants to enter France in the interwar period because it equates population increase with immigration entry, while in reality not every immigrant or foreign worker remained in France. Those who left would have to have been replaced by other immigrants in order to maintain the population growth that is demonstrated during this period, so it is clear that actual immigration must have been much higher. The actual degree to which it would be higher will remain unknown until either actual entry statistics are found, or emigration statistics or rates can be calculated. There is also some data on the total number of foreigners in France. In 1914, this was recorded at 1.2 million foreigners, which was approximately 3% of the total population. This increased to 4% in 1921 with 1.4 million and jumped to almost 7% with between 2.7 and 3 million in 1931.³¹

The French government was initially very liberal in its response to the refugee crisis.³² By May of 1933, only four months into Hitler's first term as chancellor of Germany, France had admitted 25 000 of the almost 60 000 refugees who had left Germany.³³ At nearly half of the total and four times as many as any other country, France took on a disproportionate level of responsibility in regard to the refugee crisis. Highly debated within the French government, this type of response continued intermittently for the next five years often motivated by the moral concept that rejecting the refugees would put the French at the same level as the refugee making nations.³⁴ This did not mean that refugees had an easy time getting into France and settling into life there. Immigrants had to take many bureaucratic steps including

³⁰ Ibid., Noiriel, *Population, Immigration et Identité nationale en France*, 53.

³¹ DeLey, "French Immigration Policy since May 1981," 198, Maga, "Closing the Door: The French Government and Refugee Policy, 1933-1939," 426, Noiriel, *Population, Immigration et Identité Nationale en France*, 61.

³² Burgess, "France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933," 203.

³³ Ibid., 219.

³⁴ Maga, "Closing the Door: The French Government and Refugee Policy," 435.

obtaining an entry visa, a passport, a residence permit and a work permit and they often ran into police and administrative officials who were intolerant and unsympathetic to their situation.³⁵

As the crisis continued, the French began to push for an international redistribution of refugees.³⁶ They saw the international cooperation during the Russian and Armenian refugee crises as a precedent and felt that the international community should take on this crisis as well.³⁷ The fact that there was a League of Nations High Commissioner to deal with the issue as well as the lack of cooperation from other countries pushed France towards excusing itself from any further responsibility in the crisis. The final straw was a survey of the Jewish refugee problem commissioned by the French government following Kristallnacht in November of 1938, which reported that 30 000 German and Austrian Jews had entered the country illegally.³⁸ By 1938, France's immigration policies had experienced an irreversible trend towards restriction.³⁹

Despite its eventual turn to restrictionism, why was France so liberal in its initial response in 1933 when all other countries were not? The following four chapters will examine variables that may be able to explain such a difference in initial reaction.

³⁵ Burgess, "France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933," 205.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 223.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 220.

³⁸ Maga, "Closing the Door: The French Government and Refugee Policy," 439.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 411.

2. Immigration History

The first causal variable to be discussed will be the individual immigration histories of each of the five countries. The history of the demand for immigration and the policies put in place are important factors that created the situation in which these countries found themselves in the 1930s.

There are clear differences between the immigration histories of the United Kingdom and France, when compared to the United States, Canada and Australia. The United Kingdom and France were established long before the countries of the New World and thus experienced immigration differently. Much like other European states, their modern experience with mass immigration occurred when they were already fully developed states.⁴⁰ In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they were not concerned with populating their land in order to maintain sovereignty like the New World states were.

All three of the New World countries have a history of major immigration. Despite the settler and native populations already present, each of them had vast acres of land that were vacant and needed to be filled in order to maintain national sovereignty and security. With 9.6, 9.9 and 7.6 million square kilometers respectively, the United States, Canada and Australia were dealing with areas much larger than any of the Western European states.⁴¹ This is not to say that they were willing to take any or all applications for immigration. All three had restrictionist policies that included exclusion of non-Europeans, and a preference for British immigrants.⁴² It was not until the mid to late twentieth century that these discriminatory restrictions have been replaced by policies that were more accepting of ethnic minorities.⁴³

The United Kingdom

The British Isles have experienced the entry of newcomers since the beginning of their recorded history.⁴⁴ People have gone to Britain for many reasons; some saw

⁴⁰ Freeman, "Modes of Immigration," 889.

⁴¹ Hawkins, *Critical Years in Immigration*, XV.

⁴² Jayaraman, "Inclusion and Exclusion," 136.

⁴³ Jupp, "Immigration, the War on Terror , and the British Commonwealth," 189.

⁴⁴ Holmes, "Immigration to Britain" 16.

opportunity there and short term plans became permanent, while others saw it as a refuge from harm. Leading the industrial revolution made Britain very attractive to immigrants and its demand for workers facilitated their integration. This was especially true for Irish immigrants who arrived in large numbers to fill the necessary employment positions. Capitalists from throughout Europe were also interested in the potential they saw in Britain during the Industrial Revolution. However, immigration never reached the levels that the United States would reach and the United Kingdom has had many periods of net emigration, especially in the past 100 years.⁴⁵

Britain experienced several different waves of immigration throughout the late nineteenth century. In the second half of the nineteenth century there had been large waves of Irish and German immigration, but in the 1890s a wave of Russo-Polish immigrants occurred and replaced the Germans as the largest minority in Britain.⁴⁶ Despite these influxes, this period experienced net emigration with Britain losing 1 950 000 people between 1871 and 1911.⁴⁷ This seemingly large loss of population had little effect on the labour market as natural population growth in this period was nine times the number of people lost through emigration, which prevented the United Kingdom from having to actively attract and encourage immigration.⁴⁸

British colonial policy had a significant effect on immigration to the United Kingdom. In the eighteenth century, there was a steady increase of non-white people in Britain which led to the beginning of racial discrimination against foreign immigrants. Black and Asian seamen were arriving in Britain, with many becoming destitute as they were unable to sail ships leaving Britain. The issue continued, and so the government began deporting foreigners who were impoverished. By the mid-twentieth century, all alien seamen were forced to report to police, even those who were British subjects.⁴⁹ The government did not want these foreigners taking 'British jobs' and so they wanted to have full control over all foreigners while they were in Britain. This continued to play an important role in the motivation for immigration regulations in the United Kingdom.

In fact, British immigration policy seems to have been motivated by two separate forces. The initial motivator was keeping immigrants away from jobs that

⁴⁵ Ibid. Britain had a net emigration for the last 100 years in average of each decade between 1885 and 1985.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 17.

⁴⁷ Ashworth, *An Economic History of England*, 191.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Gordon, *Policing Immigration: Britain's Internal Controls*, 8.

could go to British citizens. This was used as a criticism, not only against seamen from throughout the empire, but also Chinese immigrants and Jewish immigrants from Russian and Eastern Europe who arrived in Britain in the late nineteenth century.⁵⁰ Measures were put in place to reduce the perceived social and economic costs of immigration on native unemployment and curtail social unrest. Later, British immigration policy became increasingly driven by public hostility towards the immigration of visible minorities.⁵¹ As the empire expanded, and more and more people around the world became British subjects, Britain had to focus on keeping these subjects (and former subjects) from entering and settling in Britain.⁵² By the late nineteenth century, Britain did have a reputation as a haven for the oppressed, but at this same time, domestic uncertainty about the advantages of this was increasing and the British were reluctant to maintain this reputation.⁵³

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the British government put in place a number of important acts that held huge consequences for immigration. The Aliens Act of 1905 began controlling entry by restricting the entry of aliens to authorized ports.⁵⁴ These ports were staffed by immigration officers who had the right to refuse entry to anyone they deemed undesirable. Those who appeared to be unlikely to be able to support themselves and their family, or those who were likely to become a public cost could be immediately denied. Because Britain's geography favours the type of system that focuses on strict checks at the border, this act was very effective.⁵⁵ The Act also stated that Aliens could be deported if they were convicted, or if they became destitute or wanted for an extraditable crime within the first 12 months.⁵⁶

On the first day of the First World War, the British parliament quickly pushed through another act regarding immigration. The Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 allowed the government to make orders to "prohibit or restrict the entry and departure of aliens, to deport them, to require them to live in specified areas, or to order them to comply with regulations about registering with the police."⁵⁷ This Act was responsible for the internment of 32 000 aliens during the war and the deportation of 28 744.⁵⁸

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*, 104.

⁵² Ibid., 100.

⁵³ Ibid., 16.

⁵⁴ Gordon, *Policing Immigration: Britain's Internal Controls*, 8.

⁵⁵ Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*, 135.

⁵⁶ Gordon, *Policing Immigration: Britain's Internal Controls*, 8.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 8-9.

⁵⁸ Holmes, "The Myth of Fairness," 43.

The Restriction Act was meant to be a temporary measure but at the end of the war the act was not revoked as planned. Instead, it was renewed every year until 1971 and the parliament continued to pass more regulations on immigration.⁵⁹ Another act was added in 1919 to strengthen the power that the state had over aliens once they were in the country and in 1920 the Aliens Order gave immigration officials increased power over those who evaded immigration control. Not having submitted yourself for investigation as an immigrant was grounds for deportation within the first month of arrival.⁶⁰ Any alien who was deemed to be not 'conductive to the public good' could also be deported under this order.⁶¹

It is clear that following the end of the First World War, Britain was no longer a haven for those under duress. The measures put in place successfully restricted entry and made settling very difficult for immigrants, especially refugees. The United Kingdom did not have any major need for immigrants for labour or population growth, and should a need arise, the British government had the measures in place to ensure that everything would happen under close watch and on their accord.

France

In the nineteenth century France experienced a demographic transition and its population stagnated from the mid-nineteenth century until the end of the Second World War. In one hundred years, France's population had only grown from 36 million in 1836 to 39 million in 1936.⁶² The falling birth rate had significant implications on economic growth as well as things such as the potential of the military, and also meant that the country was aging faster than those around it.⁶³ This demographic problem meant that immigration was required for growth from the mid-nineteenth century.⁶⁴ As a result of this problem persisting for so long, France received the most immigration in the nineteenth century of any European state.⁶⁵ Prior to the First World War, many of the foreign workers came from bordering and nearby

⁵⁹ Gordon, *Policing Immigration: Britain's Internal Controls*, 9.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁶² Dormois, *The French Economy in the Twentieth Century*, 2.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Burgess, "France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933," 213.

⁶⁵ Freeman, "Modes of Immigration," 889.

states such as Belgium, Spain and Italy.⁶⁶ These foreign workers, some of which had temporary ambitions but many remained in France, filled the gaps in labour both before and after the First World War.⁶⁷

France suffered greatly in the First World War and the number of casualties it endured in relation to its population was one of the highest.⁶⁸ Not only did this have immediate consequences for the population, but the gender imbalance it created caused the birth rates to decline further in the years that followed. The physical destruction caused by the war and the deaths of over a million men during it, meant that the post-war demand for labour became extremely high. France needed immigrants and refugees in order to not only reconstruct but also to expand the national industry.⁶⁹ In this period, refugees were very welcome regardless of whether the skills they possessed were appropriate for work in France. For example, when immigrants were needed for reconstruction in post-war France, many Russians were welcomed into France in the 1920s despite their aristocratic backgrounds and inexperience in hard labour.⁷⁰ However, this situation was not static. As the decade went on and France slowly recovered, the need for foreign workers was reduced.

In the late twenties, the French government began to put some measures in place to reduce the number of foreign workers residing in France. Employers were encouraged to terminate employment contracts, residence permits were not renewed for foreign workers who worked in the sectors where there were a high number of unemployed French workers and unemployed foreign workers were expelled from the country.⁷¹ These measures were not only put to use inconsistently, but the continuation of the open door policy greatly diminished their effects. However, they marked the beginning of restrictionist immigration policies in France. In the bureaucratic process, refugees were treated identically and had to go through the same process as foreign workers. Therefore when German refugees were trying to gain asylum in the 1930s in France, they were met with these exclusionary measures that had been in place for a few years already.⁷²

⁶⁶ Dormois, *The French Economy in the Twentieth Century*, 4.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁶⁹ Maga, "Closing the Door: The French Government and Refugee Policy," 425.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 426.

⁷¹ Burgess, "France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933," 213.

⁷² *Ibid.*

Despite this, immigration to France continued and it reached its peak in 1931 with 3 million foreign workers and their families settled in France.⁷³ In 1932, the French government began reversing the liberal measures that had allowed foreign workers to integrate into France so easily as an attempt to curb the effects of the depression that they had seen occur in other countries and could only imagine was looming towards them in the near future.⁷⁴ Despite this, France adhered to its humanitarian traditions throughout 1933 and allowed many refugees to enter.⁷⁵ They differentiated refugees from foreign workers because they believed that the exodus from Germany was temporary and that these refugees would soon be able to return home. As the crisis continued and France realized it was a permanent problem, they were becoming less comfortable with the idea of being a haven for refugees. Concerns also grew over the fact that France appeared to be the only haven, and that other countries saw France's humanitarianism as an excuse to not have to respond to the crisis themselves.

Events in the international community were partially responsible for this changing perspective. The newly formed League of Nations played an important role in the attitude of the French towards refugees. The league established two international accords regarding refugees: the first in 1922 in relation to the Russian refugees fleeing the Bolshevik revolution and the second in 1924 relating to Armenians from Turkey.⁷⁶ These two accords established new principles for the protection of refugees, but more importantly, they made refugees an international concern. The French interpreted this to mean that their national responsibility to house refugees was reduced and they would later use this as justification for the measures taken to restrict the entry of refugees from Nazism in the 1930s.

While these events began changing the perspective of the French government immediately, the policy changes it would eventually influence would not come into effect until 1938. Despite the divided opinions on the issue, France allowed the entry of refugees in 1933 when the exodus began.

⁷³ Dormois, *The French Economy in the Twentieth Century* 4.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Burgess, "France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933," 204.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 211.

The United States of America

The United States was the first of the New World countries to fully populate its land. The oldest of the three former colonies investigated in this thesis, it declared independence from Britain in 1776 and through the war of 1812 and other events, quickly realized the important role immigration would play in their country's history.

Early American history highlights the relationship between immigration, security and prosperity.⁷⁷ Labour scarcity was a predominant problem, and with America's inability to rectify the problem by natural population increase, immigration became the ideal solution. Realizing the necessity to settle the interior, the United States encouraged immigrants to come and start farms in the West with the 1862 Homestead Act.⁷⁸ This campaign was highly effective and the American frontier closed in 1890. With the land now settled, the security need for immigration had been filled and the emergence of labour saving technology was decreasing the need for labour. These two factors greatly reduced the advantages of having an open immigration policy in the United States. The term 'open' or 'easy' immigration policy did not mean that anyone and everyone was welcome to settle in the United States, but rather that there were no numerical limits in place. An immigrant still had to meet the qualitative standards required which were most often related to race, but also could be relate to profession or class.

In 1891 the first comprehensive immigration legislation was passed which allowed for the restriction of certain classes of people and allowed for the deportation of those entering the country illegally.⁷⁹ The Immigration Acts of 1903 and 1917 added to these lists of inadmissible aliens and reasons for deportation.⁸⁰ However, it was the Emergency Quota Act in 1921 and the Immigration Act of 1924 that had major effects on the number of immigrants allowed into the United States annually. The Emergency Quota Act which imposed an annual limit of 375 000 immigrants, was motivated by a fear of increasing Southern and Eastern European immigrants and influenced by the 'Red scare'.⁸¹ When the Emergency Quota Act expired in 1924 it was replaced by the Immigration Act of 1924 which established national-origin quotas

⁷⁷ Rosenblum, "Immigration and US National Interests," 16.

⁷⁸ Moch, *Moving Europeans: Migrations in Western Europe since 1650*, 152.

⁷⁹ "Evolution of Policy," 130.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Kimer, "Landmarks in U.S. Immigration Policy," 34.

in order to protect the ‘national character’ of the United States.⁸² This new quota system set the maximum at 2 percent of the number of people of any given nationality already living in the United States.⁸³ This ensured that the percentage of minorities in the United States would not increase in percentage, nor would one ethnic group become more dominant than they already were. These two quota acts were blatantly discriminatory against immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe as well as Asia on the basis that they were racially undesirable and difficult to assimilate.⁸⁴

By the 1930s, the United States had a very clear idea of who they wanted as immigrants and had no major need for immigration for labour of population purposes, as they had in the past. Their current immigration policies were restricted, limiting not only the kinds of immigrants, but also the total number of immigrants who could enter each year. These quotas had little leeway and there was no protocol to deal with emergencies such as a refugee crisis, and so in 1933 the United States’ restrictionist policy was maintained to keep refugees from entering.

Canada

Canada was the second of the three New World countries to become independent of the Great Britain with confederation occurring in 1867. It is of no surprise that this occurred immediately following the American Civil War as Canadian confederation was very much a decision made based on security concerns. After successfully preventing cessation of the south, it was feared that the Union army would turn around and “march right up to the North Pole.”⁸⁵ The threat of an invasion had surfaced much earlier and immigration was a major priority prior to confederation. In the War of 1812 the citizens of Upper and Lower Canada were only able to withstand the invasion by the Americans with the help of the French and the Native populations.⁸⁶ Following this war, the government encouraged immigration in order to prevent another invasion.⁸⁷

Between 1850 and 1920 there was a huge wave of immigration to Canada, but this was part of a larger trend of immigration to North America and it does not appear

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ “Evolution of Policy,” 130.

⁸⁴ Ngai, “A New Green Card Deal,” 8.

⁸⁵ Brendon, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire*, 83.

⁸⁶ Turner, *The War of 1812: The War that Both Sides Won*, 28.

⁸⁷ Eayrs, “‘A Low Dishonest Decade’: Aspects of Canadian External Policy,” 60.

that Canada had any specific attraction independent of the attraction of North America as a whole.⁸⁸ Once the American frontier closed in 1890, Canada claimed to be the ‘last best West’ and tried to entice British immigrants who would have headed to the United States to instead immigrate to Canada, where there was still land available. While this campaign itself was largely looked at as ineffective when compared to the Canadian government’s expectations, there was a substantial amount of immigration during this period. Between 1896 and 1914, 3 million immigrants arrived in Canada.⁸⁹ Immigrants were not only attracted by the economic prosperity of Canada at the turn of the century, they also played an important role in actualizing it.⁹⁰ Despite the immigrant contribution to the economy through their labour and businesses, Canadians were divided on the issue of mass immigration. Employers applauded the government’s promotion of immigration while the trade unions wanted restrictions put in place on the number of immigrants and nationalists wanted a more selective admissions process.⁹¹

The immigration acts that Canada passed in the early twentieth century were pleasing to the trade unions and nationalists as they focused on increasing the control over the entry of immigrants. The Immigration Act of 1906 still had components of older immigration acts that protected the safety and well being of immigrants on their journey to Canada but its main focus was giving the government the power to deal with undesirable immigrants.⁹² It included a list of people who were ‘undesirable’ including the insane, deaf, blind, epileptic, those with contagious diseases and those with a lack of morality such a pimps and prostitutes, among others.⁹³ This act also made provisions for the removal or any immigrant who, within two years of their arrival in Canada, became a public charge or an inmate of a jail or hospital. This act was followed by the Immigration Act of 1910 which formalized admission and deportation procedures as well as introduced the concept of domicile. Domicile was acquired after being a legal resident of Canada for three years. However, until this status had been attained, an immigrant could be deported for becoming a member of an undesirable class or by causing public riots or disturbances.⁹⁴

⁸⁸ McDougall, “Immigration into Canada, 1851-1920,” 166.

⁸⁹ Kelley, *The Making of a Mosaic*, 111.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 112.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 135.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 136.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 137.

Following the outbreak of the First World War, immigration levels to Canada would never again reach the numbers of the pre-war period. The war itself caused many international borders to close and immigration was severely reduced on a global scale and Canada was no exception.⁹⁵ There was a sharp increase after the war but the numbers lagged behind the pre-war levels was due in part to the fact that by 1920 the land that needed to be settled had been filled.⁹⁶ Although there was still some desire for settlers, the remaining land was remote and less attractive than the land that had been previously available.⁹⁷

By 1923 Canada had reached some level of economic stability and adopted a wider policy although it remained highly selective of potential immigrants. Within the twenties, the year with the highest intake was 1928 with 167 000 immigrants arriving in Canada.⁹⁸ These levels would not last long as the Great Depression hit the following year and immigration restrictions were put in place to limit the number of annual arrivals to a few thousand.⁹⁹ Issues of immigration had been put in the hands of the Cabinet, the executive branch of government, years earlier. This meant that when economic tides changed, the cabinet could easily change regulations to fit the reality of the situation. Economics became a primary determinant of immigration policies in the 1930s and the restrictive measures that were a result of it were widely supported.¹⁰⁰ In this case, it should be of no surprise that Canada did not open its borders to refugees in the 1930s. With economics trumping all other motivators, Canada did not feel the necessity to change the policies that had already been put in place, or at the very least, felt justified in leaving them unchanged.

Australia

Australia's immigration history begins with the deportation of convicted criminals from the United Kingdom between 1788 and 1850.¹⁰¹ In this period 144 815 convicts were transported to Australia while the free population of 191 010 barely outnumbered convicts.¹⁰² In 1850, gold was found in Australia and the population

⁹⁵ Moch, *Moving Europeans: Migrations in Western Europe since 1650*, 160.

⁹⁶ McNinnis, "Immigration and Emigration: Canada in the Late 19th Century," 503.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 504.

⁹⁸ Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-1993*, 95.

⁹⁹ McNinnis, "Immigration and Emigration: Canada in the Late 19th Century," 504.

¹⁰⁰ Kelley, *The Making of a Mosaic*, 16.

¹⁰¹ Jayaraman, "Inclusion and Exclusion," 139.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 140.

quickly tripled to 1.1 million within the decade.¹⁰³ At this point, there were no official regulations regarding immigration so there was no limit to the number of immigrants who could be lured by the possibility of gold.¹⁰⁴ The combination of a strong pull factor and unregulated immigration did not fail to have a substantial impact on population size and composition. In this period people of any heritage and origin could enter Australia but by the 1880s, Australians were quickly moving towards a more restrictionist attitude.¹⁰⁵

Australia was the last of the three New World countries in question to become a federation, which occurred in 1901. That same year, Australia adopted its first regulation on immigration which was entitled the Immigration Restriction Act 1901. As its name implies, this Act allowed the new country to restrict entry to immigrants who were seen as undesirable, a term that soon became almost synonymous with being non-white. This Act marks the beginning of the White Australia Policy.¹⁰⁶ There was overwhelming support for this Act and its exclusionary clauses from all political parties in Australia but they were also aware that blatant racially discriminatory policies would not please the British government.¹⁰⁷ This was the motivation for the dictation test, which applicants could be asked to complete in any given European language.¹⁰⁸ This appeared to be non-discriminatory on paper, but in reality immigration officials had the power to choose both who would be tested and in what language the test would be given, which made them fully capable of excluding any undesirable applicants. Furthermore, criminals, the physically and mentally disabled as well as those likely to need social welfare were also excluded by the Act and non-white people were only allowed to enter Australia on a temporary basis.¹⁰⁹

Despite these harsh restrictions, over 390 000 new settlers arrived in Australia between 1905 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.¹¹⁰ Like Canada, Australia participated in the Great War alongside Britain which reinforced both nationalism for their new country and their colonial loyalty.¹¹¹ This in turn reinforced Australia's preference for British immigrants which was reflected in the origins of

¹⁰³ Brendon, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire*, 72.

¹⁰⁴ Jayaraman, "Inclusion and Exclusion," 140.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 141.

¹⁰⁶ Ozdowski, "The Law, Immigration, and Human Rights," 538.

¹⁰⁷ Jayaraman, "Inclusion and Exclusion," 142.

¹⁰⁸ Ozdowski, "The Law, Immigration, and Human Rights," 538.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ Jayaraman, "Inclusion and Exclusion," 142.

¹¹¹ Burnley, *The Impact of Immigration of Australia*, 30.

immigrants in the years following the war. Of the 600 000 immigrants who came to Australia between 1919 and 1940, 63% were from the UK with and an additional 10% were from Ireland.¹¹²

Events in other countries also affected immigration to Australia. The Immigration Quota Acts of the United States in 1921 and 1924 caused a surge of Southern European immigration to Australia.¹¹³ The formerly Anglo-Celtic restrictions had been loosened to include other Europeans and therefore there was no cap on the number of southern European immigrants who would be granted entry.¹¹⁴ Also, the decline of major coal fields as well as the textile and heavy industries in the United Kingdom acted as strong push factors for British immigrants and many headed to Australia.¹¹⁵

Australia is the only country in this selection that had not filled its land to meet the standards it felt was necessary to guarantee defense by this period. In fact, it had still not met this criterion by the Second World War when Australia feared a possible invasion by the Japanese. This revived Australia's sentiments of 'populate or perish.'¹¹⁶ However, this need to populate the land would prove to be less significant when economic issues put pressure on the Australian economy, such as in the 1930s.

Evaluating the Historical Variables

By the 1930s, each of these five countries had extensive policies in place to regulate and oversee immigration. Most of these policies were quite restrictive in terms of who was eligible for entry, which allowed the countries to populate their countries with what they considered to be ideal immigrants and also kept a close watch on immigrants in their first few years in the receiving country.

In this period, the United Kingdom and France had no need for immigration in order to populate their territory as their countries had long been inhabited. With the American frontier closing in 1890 and Canada's 'last best West' filling up shortly after that it is unsurprising that the immigration policies of these two countries would become more restrictive. However, Australia still had vast areas of land that needed to

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid., 31.

¹¹⁴ Jayaraman, "Inclusion and Exclusion," 136.

¹¹⁵ Burnley, *The Impact of Immigration of Australia*, 31.

¹¹⁶ Ozdowski, "The Law, Immigration, and Human Rights," 535.

be settled. Despite this, the Australian government’s immigration policy remained restrictionist.

From the perspective of 1933, it is clear that the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia all had moved towards and had arrived at completely restrictionist policies. Although France was beginning to move in this direction, the policies in 1929 could still be considered open and would not yet prevent refugees from entering the country.

Table 1. Results Table: Historical Variables

	United Kingdom	France	United States	Canada	Australia
Open Immigration Policy	0	1	0	0	0
Fully Populated	1	1	1	1	0

3. Current Political Situation

The political situation leading up to the onset of the refugee crisis is important in understanding the changes to immigration that occurred in the early 1930s and the responses of the national governments to the refugee crisis. Stability on the part of the government, the general political climate, the country's international relationships and their roles in international relations are all important aspects that could be responsible for the trends in immigration that occurred as well as their reactions to the refugee crisis.

Leadership Stability

It has been claimed that the most enduring legacy of the First World War was the political and social instability it left behind.¹¹⁷ Resulting in more than just the rise of Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany, it had a profound effect on countries throughout the world.

David Lloyd George had been the British Prime Minister since 1916 and continued in power until the Liberal was beat out by Conservative Andrew Bonar Law in October of 1922. Law resigned due to health concerns in May of 1923 and was replaced by Stanley Baldwin who remained Prime Minister until early 1924 when he lost a vote of confidence. The Labour party then came into power with Ramsay MacDonald who would alternate with Baldwin for the leadership position several times more until 1937 when Neville Chamberlain replaced Baldwin after the abdication of Edward VIII. There were only five different leaders in twenty years, and despite the additional party changes, the British government was not overly unstable in the period immediately preceding the refugee crisis. Ramsey MacDonald was the prime minister from just before the October onset of the Great Depression, elected for the second time in May of 1929. While his party changed to national Labour in 1931, he remained in power until 1935, two years after the onset of the refugee crisis. This is enough consistency to remain on top of the refugee crisis and formulate an appropriate response. Unlike some governments the United Kingdom can not claim that government instability inhibited their ability to respond to the crisis.

¹¹⁷ Feinstein, *The European Economy Between the Wars*, 20.

Instability was a constant characteristic of the French government throughout the interwar period. There were only four Presidents of the French Republic: Independent Alexandre Millerand, Radicals Gaston Doumergue and Paul Doumer, and Albert Lebrun of the Alliance Démocratique. But in this same period, there were forty-two different governments based on changes to the position of President of the Council of Ministers.¹¹⁸ These Presidents of the Council and their respective ministries played a significant role in setting immigration and economic policy in general. The most notable Presidents of the Council were Édouard Daladier, Camille Chautemps, and Léon Blum. In terms of immigration policy, Daladier tried to overcome the instability by creating the Interministerial Commission for German Refugees in 1933.¹¹⁹ Daladier supported the restriction of immigration and had the commission meet in secret in order to avoid public reactions.¹²⁰ The commission accomplished extremely little and was abolished in 1936 by Blum, who supported refugee entry and attempted to speed up the bureaucratic process for German refugees to gain the necessary official documents to become employed.¹²¹ It is important to recognize that Blum was in fact Jewish which likely influenced his sympathies, however the national Assembly and the French public in general were highly divided, which restricted the measures he could take. When Daladier returned to power in 1938, he reversed the small advances made by Blum and closed the borders to German refugees.¹²² Despite the creation of the Interministerial Committee for German Refugees, power in France changed hands too often, and those involved had such varied opinions that it was extremely difficult for the government to take a long term perspective and no full policy or response to the crisis could be formulated.¹²³

In the United States, Woodrow Wilson led his country through the First World War and remained the head of state until 1921. He was then replaced by the Republican Warren Harding whose death in 1923 brought in fellow Republican Calvin Coolidge as his replacement. Herbert Hoover, another Republican, succeeded Coolidge in 1929 and remained in office until 1933. By 1930 Herbert Hoover's popularity was already falling due to the mounting economic woes and his apparent lack of success with improving the situation and he was eventually replaced by

¹¹⁸ Price, *A Concise History of France*, 232.

¹¹⁹ Burgess, "France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933," 204.

¹²⁰ Maga, "Closing the Door: The French Government and Refugee Policy," 429.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 433.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 435.

¹²³ Price, *A Concise History of France*, 232.

Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933.¹²⁴ Four presidents is certainly not a high turnover of power for a period spanning almost twenty years, and although both political parties were in power at some point during this period, there was no change in ruling party where we see changes to immigration levels. It is then likely that both parties held similar views on immigration and that the decisions made regarding immigration and the entry of refugees were based on factors outside of party policies.

In Canada the end of the First World War saw the end of the coalition government that had been in power.¹²⁵ Coalition leader Robert Borden retired in 1920 and was replaced by Conservative Arthur Meighan. Liberal leader William Lyon Mackenzie King was elected in 1921 but resigned after a political fiasco in 1926 and was replaced by former Prime Minister Meighan. King was elected back into office three months later and served as prime minister until 1930 when Conservative Richard Bennett was elected. Unhappy with Bennett's performance during the depression, the Canadian public elected King for a third time in 1935 and he held the position of Prime Minister until 1948. It appears that the 1920's were quite unstable, but the 1930's had only two Prime Ministers. Because immigration policy had been previously moved to the cabinet, immigration policies could easily and quickly changed, without going through parliament, to respond to changes to the economy or political situation.¹²⁶ For these reasons, Canada did not have any obstacles inhibiting their ability to carefully examine and respond to the refugee crisis.

Australia had many changes in leadership in this period. With six different leaders from four different parties, it is clear that the Australian public was constantly searching for new solutions to their problems. Billy Hughes was Prime Minister for most of the First World War in a coalition government between the Labour and Nationalist parties and was succeeded by Nationalist Stanley Bruce in 1923. James Scullin of the Labour Party was elected a week before the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and it wasn't long before the Australian public opted for someone better equipped to handle the situation. The Labour Party's traditional policies were ill-fitted for the economic situation of the early 1930s.¹²⁷ Joseph Lyons of the United Australia Party was elected in 1932 and was the longest in power of the leaders during this period. He acted as prime minister for over seven years before he was succeeded by

¹²⁴ Hamilton, "Herbert Hoover and the Great Drought of 1930," 850.

¹²⁵ McInnis, "Immigration and Emigration: Canada in the Late 19th Century," 510.

¹²⁶ Kelley, *The Making of a Mosaic*, 114.

¹²⁷ Partridge, "Depression and War, 1929-1950," 348-349.

Country Party leader Sir Earle Page who retained the position for only 20 days. Finally, Robert Menzies was elected in 1939 and led Australia into the Second World War. The leadership in Australia changed very often and the disastrous economic policies of Scullin and the Labour Party led to the election of Lyons in 1932, just prior to the refugee crisis. Lyons was left scrambling to deal with the economic crisis, and despite his long stay in office, the timing of his arrival was inopportune for him to lead a careful and in-depth response to the crisis.

France and Australia experienced many changes in leadership and appeared to have unstable governments throughout the period. In these cases, whether some parties were more pro-immigration than others appears to be irrelevant here as the high levels of instability would have made it difficult for any one government to successfully push through any legislation that would be highly debated. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada were hardly more unstable than what can be considered usual, and had the processes in place to be able to respond to the crisis.

Political Climate

The effects of the First World War were felt heavily by the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Canada and Australia. The costs and sacrifices made were very high, but the war also had a much less tangible effect: it pushed many of the countries involved towards some form of political isolationism in the post war years.¹²⁸

Following the Paris Peace Conference, the British government returned to their traditional policy of isolation from continental affairs.¹²⁹ The terms of the Versailles Treaty became less and less popular in Britain, especially after the proliferation of the theories in Keynes' book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, which was released in 1919.¹³⁰ The understanding that the conditions of the treaty would cripple Germany, and thereby the European economy as a whole, made the British question the legitimacy of the treaty. MacDonald and Baldwin, who alternated as prime minister throughout most of the 1920s and 1930s had quite different perspectives on the direction in which the United Kingdom should proceed following the armistice. MacDonald had a strong sense of utopian internationalism

¹²⁸ Greenwood, "Development in the Twenties," 288.

¹²⁹ Hutton, *Historical Dictionary of the Third Republic*, 436.

¹³⁰ Morgan, "The Twentieth Century," 536.

and idealism while Baldwin simply wanted domestic tranquility and peace.¹³¹ Baldwin's objectives were much more in-line with public sentiment and led to the latent and passive foreign policy that the United Kingdom held throughout the interwar period.¹³² From the beginning of the depression in 1929, the British government was conservative and encouraging of protectionism.¹³³ The depression put immense pressure on the Sterling, causing trade to suffer. The British government slowly moved away from free trade, putting an end to the 100 year tradition in 1932 with the Ottawa conference and its tariffs on trade outside the empire.¹³⁴ The weakness of the United Kingdom's economy was reflected in their withdrawal from a global economic role.¹³⁵

In France, the end of the war meant an immediate focus on reconstruction and recovery. It also meant that the deep divisions in politics, even within parties, would surface and cause major problems. Instability plagued the French government, with the average life of any given government being only six months.¹³⁶ This meant that extra effort was needed in internal politics to keep the government and country running. What were once simple government processes were now elaborate endeavors as France was so polarized that almost any policy, whether domestic or international, seemed to cause controversy.¹³⁷ Despite all this, France still had a strong external focus. The war had encouraged nationalist sentiments and the French felt strongly about the compensation they believed they deserved for the damage done by the war.¹³⁸ "Germany will pay," became a well-accepted slogan throughout France and its foreign policy revolved around securing the reparations of the Versailles treaty and encouraging separatist movements in the Rhineland.¹³⁹ In addition to this aggressive foreign policy, France also had a strong interest in its colonies, including those recently gained from defeated countries in the war.¹⁴⁰

¹³¹ Ibid., 537.

¹³² Ibid., 551.

¹³³ Rooth, *British Protectionism and the International Economy*, 69.

¹³⁴ Morgan, "The Twentieth Century," 547.

¹³⁵ Rooth, *British Protectionism and the International Economy*, 34.

¹³⁶ Price, *A Concise History of France*, 232.

¹³⁷ Haine, *The History of France*, 155.

¹³⁸ Price, *A Concise History of France*, 224.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 223, 225.

¹⁴⁰ Agulhon *The French Republic, 1879-1992*, 204, Haine, *The History of France*, 143.

Following the armistice of the First World War, the United States immediately retreated into an isolationist policy that continued throughout the twenties.¹⁴¹ There was a strong sense of xenophobia in the United States in this period. Woodrow Wilson's espionage and sedition acts of 1917 and 1919 targeted foreign language publications for any criticisms of U.S. policy and the newly formed Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested and deported hundreds of foreign born communists during the Palmer Raids of 1919-1921.¹⁴² These xenophobic events further supported the United States' isolationist tendencies. In the United States, the pro- and anti-immigration forces tend to reflect the state of the economy.¹⁴³ This was very apparent in the change from the priority placed on immigration during wartime shortages to the major resistance to any form of immigration once the depression set in.¹⁴⁴

Isolationism was Canada's the response to four years of war in Europe.¹⁴⁵ Exhausted from the war, Canada tried to ideologically distance itself from Europe. Politicians claimed that Canada was the place where life was thought about in terms of peace not war, and that Canadians had truly created a new way of life.¹⁴⁶ They also felt that the war demonstrated Europe's inability to run itself, while they were confident that North America could.¹⁴⁷ In order to escape contamination, they felt it would be in their own best interests to resort to an isolationist policy. Like the United States, there was also some fear of Bolshevism in Canada. They felt that Bolshevism had a basis "wherever Russians and Jews and other foreigners gather together," and so Canadians should avoid foreigners at all times.¹⁴⁸ In 1922, former Minister of Immigration Clifford Sifton assured the Canadian public that despite the "enormous numbers of people on the continent of Europe who want to come [to Canada]" there was no danger of the "bars being let down," and Canada allowing mass immigration.¹⁴⁹

In Australia the motivations for isolationism were slightly less pretentious. Australians simply had a strong desire to return to 'normalcy.'¹⁵⁰ They wanted to

¹⁴¹ Greenwood, "Development in the Twenties," 288.

¹⁴² Rosenblum, "Immigration and US National Interests," 16.

¹⁴³ Chiswick, "Introduction," 1.

¹⁴⁴ Rosenblum, "Immigration and US National Interests," 17.

¹⁴⁵ Eayrs, "A Low Dishonest Decade," 60.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 63.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 64.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ Greenwood, "Development in the Twenties," 288.

return to their pre-war lives and revisit the goals they had prior to the interruption in 1914. After the war, they were kept busy with the rehabilitation and resettlement of returning soldiers but also turned their emphasis to material exploitation and economic development.¹⁵¹ By 1929 Australia had lost almost all interest in world politics and focused on their domestic needs.¹⁵² More specifically, between 1932 and 1939 Australia was focused on its problems in external trade and the strengthening of defense.¹⁵³ The notion of ‘populate or perish’ was a strong one in the interwar period due to the continuing fear of ‘yellow peril’ despite the White Australia Policy.¹⁵⁴ The huge influx of immigration to Australia after the Second World War demonstrates the prevalence of this notion, and how it continued to influence their policies.¹⁵⁵

International Relationships: The Commonwealth

Another factor that shaped the political climate was the relationship that these states had with their colonial founder. It is clear that in this period, Canada and Australia both had a much stronger relationship with Britain than the United States and France. As young countries, Canada and Australia both became members of the British Commonwealth when it was created and continued to be heavily influenced by the United Kingdom’s policies. British policies such as their restriction on the entry of Jews in 1905 and the British Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 had a much stronger effect in these two future Commonwealth countries than it did in the United States.¹⁵⁶ Also, political events in the United Kingdom, such as the deadly rioting that occurred in Belfast in the early 1920’s created prejudices that quickly transferred to Canada and Australia.¹⁵⁷

The relatively shorter length of time since independence for Canada and Australia, when compared to the United States also meant that they were much more dependent on the United Kingdom for trade and security. The relationship between the United Kingdom and the members of the British Empire was actually one of interdependence. By the 1930s, British exports were suffering and the United Kingdom called the Ottawa Conference in 1932 to increase trade throughout the

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 287, 294.

¹⁵² Partridge, “Depression and War, 1929-1950,” 344.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 365.

¹⁵⁴ Burnley, *The Impact of Immigration on Australia*, 30.

¹⁵⁵ Laffer, “The Economics of Australian Immigration,” 362.

¹⁵⁶ Moch, *Moving Europeans: Migrations in Western Europe since 1650*, 161.

¹⁵⁷ Jupp, “Immigration, the War on Terror , and the British Commonwealth,” 194.

British Empire.¹⁵⁸ This conference solidified imperial preference and increased the shares of the former colonies in the British market, but also prohibited discrimination within the newly created Commonwealth.¹⁵⁹ This economic cooperation and interdependence made political agreement increasingly important which explains why Canada and Australia were so quick to agree with Britain on topics regarding immigration.

Conversely, France's relationship with the United Kingdom deteriorated after the war. The threat of German naval supremacy that had united them no longer existed and so the two countries no longer felt a need for close cooperation.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, the United Kingdom and France disagreed on the terms of the Versailles Treaty with the British wanting concessions for the Germans in order to preserve the European economy.¹⁶¹ This distance between the United Kingdom and France persisted until the late 1930s.¹⁶² Following the cooperation of the war effort, the United States, cloaked in isolationism also did not feel a need for close cooperation with the United Kingdom and so their relationship became more distanced as well.

While this Commonwealth relationship sheds some light on why these two former dominions would be more likely to react in a similar manner to the United Kingdom, it is not a completely exogenous factor as the United Kingdom is indeed one of the cases being examined. Nevertheless, the strong relationship between these countries assured the United Kingdom that other countries would support their decision and take a similar position, which would have impacted their decision making process and would decrease concern over international reaction.

Responses to International Events

Isolationism was further demonstrated through the reactions of these countries to international events, and their reactions to the newly formed League of Nations provide an excellent example.

Britain was one of the founding members of the League of Nations in 1919. At first it was the cabinet secretariat who dealt with the League of Nations, but after 1922

¹⁵⁸ Rooth, *British Protectionism and the International Economy*, 85. The Ottawa Conference is also referred to as the British Empire Economic Conference.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 238. The Commonwealth was officially established on 11 December, 1931.

¹⁶⁰ Hutton, *Historical Dictionary of the Third Republic*, 436.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 437.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 436.

it was the Foreign Office that was responsible for the relations with the League.¹⁶³ The British never had a permanent delegation in Geneva and Eden was the only minister ever appointed officially for League of Nation affairs, which he fulfilled from 1935 to 1938.¹⁶⁴ The United Kingdom made formal commitments to the League and its quest for collective security, but their enthusiasm was lackluster and there was often little effort made to support these commitments.¹⁶⁵

France left the Paris Peace conference delighted by the idea of the League of Nations and the security it promised.¹⁶⁶ The League's assurance of the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France also fortified French support for the League.¹⁶⁷ Unsurprisingly, the French Government agreed that collective security was important and that the League of Nations was an ideal way to achieve it.¹⁶⁸ The League of Nations also facilitated the Locarno Pact, in which the League, as well as Germany, recognized the eastern border of France and it was guaranteed by the British and the Italians.¹⁶⁹ It is clear that the League served many of France's interests and with their continual focus on foreign policy, it is no surprise that they were so supportive and involved in the League of Nations.

Being the brain child of Woodrow Wilson himself, one would expect the United States to fully support the League of Nations and play a significant role in its developing years. The last of his Fourteen Points, Wilson recommended an association of states that could be used as a system of international relations to preserve peace. However, the United States was already moving towards an isolationist policy and the U.S. Congress was unwilling to allow the United States to become a member of the League of Nations.¹⁷⁰ Despite being initiated by the American president, the United States did not join the League of Nations at this time.

Canada did in fact join the League of Nations, but William Lyon Mackenzie King largely neglected it.¹⁷¹ Tired from the war, King tried to minimize his role in the League of Nations, claiming that as Canadians, "we should not strive to overplay our

¹⁶³ Butler, *British Political Facts*, 461.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Morgan, "The Twentieth Century," 552.

¹⁶⁶ Agulhon, *The French Republic, 1879-1992*, 191.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Price, *A Concise History of France*, 225.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Wimer, "Woodrow Wilson's Plans to Enter the League of Nations through an Executive Agreement," 801.

¹⁷¹ Eayrs, "A Low Dishonest Decade," 67.

part.”¹⁷² Continuing under this ideology, Canada also ignored requests to contribute to relief for famines in Russia in 1922 and in Albania in 1924 and refused to sign the Geneva protocol in 1925.¹⁷³ Canada still felt a general distrust of Europe and this distrust manifested itself in their outright refusal to aid in any international issues.

Australians were approving of the idea of the League of Nations, not only because it appealed to Australian idealism, but also because it was advantageous to a smaller country like themselves to have a more orderly system of international relations.¹⁷⁴ Although they did join the League of Nations and were initially very encouraging of the idea, Australia’s attention quickly shifted to its own physical and social security.¹⁷⁵ Furthermore, once it got underway, Australians felt that the League failed to recognize their security needs and did not acknowledge the contribution they made during the war.¹⁷⁶ The Australian government was quickly disillusioned by the League of Nations and from that point on, only showed interest in external issues when they were significant to their own security.¹⁷⁷ Australia was also against the Geneva Protocol because of the remote possibility that immigration policy might become a question for international arbitration.¹⁷⁸ It was extremely important to the Australians that they maintain control over who was able to settle in their country.

Evaluating the Political Variables

The first political variable examined is the stability of the leadership in government throughout the period. The logic behind this is that a stable government would be capable of responding to the ongoing refugee crisis in a responsible way while an instable government would not only have to focus its resources internally, but also that there is likely to be little agreement within the government therefore making it more difficult to stage an appropriate response. The United Kingdom, the United States and Australia have all been scored a 1. This is due to their relative stability, especially in the period immediately preceding the refugee crisis. France and Australia have been awarded 0 due to their instability and constantly changing leadership.

¹⁷² Ibid., 68.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 64-65.

¹⁷⁴ Greenwood, “Development in the Twenties,” 288.

¹⁷⁵ Greenwood, “Australia at War, 1914-1919,” 284.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 284-285.

¹⁷⁷ Greenwood, “Development in the Twenties,” 288.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

The second variable is the political climate and degree of isolationism. Following the First World War, many countries were exhausted and held a strong desire to return to pre-war life. For many, this included focusing on domestic politics in order to ensure a strong recovery. The United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia all followed this pattern and retreated to protectionism and isolationism in the interwar period. France's need to reconstruct and repair did not prevent it from having an aggressive foreign policy and staying heavily involved in international affairs.

The third variable discussed is the international relationships. The Commonwealth is an important example of a political and economic alliance that came into effect during the interwar period. Canada and Australia were still very closely linked to the United Kingdom and remained under its political influence. This meant that once the United Kingdom took a restrictive stance on the refugee crisis, these two countries were likely to follow suit. Equally important was the United Kingdom's confidence that their decision would be supported by the members of the Commonwealth. This relationship reduced individual responsibility and allowed for a form of 'social loafing' in that each of the parties felt justified in doing nothing, because the others were doing the same. Therefore, the members of the Commonwealth (the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia) have scored a 1 because of this relationship while France and the United States have scored a 0 because they lack such a relationship that would diffuse responsibility in such a way.

Finally, the last variable is the country's response to international events. In this case, the creation of the League of Nations has been chosen to serve as the example. As a practical example of isolationism, this variable determines if the country was interested in other international issues in this period. Unsurprisingly, the results for this variable are the same as the one examining political climate. France was the only country to play an enthusiastic and ardent role in the League of Nations and therefore is the only country to be scored as a 1.

Table 2. Results Table: Economic Variables

	United Kingdom	France	United States	Canada	Australia
Stability of Government	1	0	1	1	0
Isolationist Policy	1	0	1	1	1

International Relationships (Commonwealth)	1	0	0	1	1
Response to International Events	0	1	0	0	0

4. Cultural Variables

The large majority of refugees in 1933 were German-Jewish. From the perspective of the receiving states, this had two disadvantages. Not only was anti-Semitism a long running prejudice, but the First World War created a separate dislike for the German people in general. All five countries in this study fought against the Germans in the First World War, with many casualties. The armistice did not immediately change the feelings that the citizens of these five countries had towards Germany and its people.¹⁷⁹

Because of their specific experiences with immigration, the populations of the New World countries had unique perspectives on foreigners. Because immigration was a fundamental part of their founding, and the large majority of their population can be traced to immigrants, the folklore surrounding immigration can often be a rich, historical memory.¹⁸⁰ It has been argued that in these countries the public generally has more confidence in their government when it comes to immigration because of its past experience and well-developed institutions.¹⁸¹ Gary Freeman argues that the timing of a country's first experience of mass immigration is a major determinant of the cultural response to immigration, therefore differentiating the United Kingdom, France and other European countries from the New World countries.¹⁸² But these cases do not seem to confirm these theories, as the situation was nearly the same in all five countries. Xenophobia was a reality that not only affected the newcomers who had already arrived in these countries, but also had an influence on politicians and the policies they created. The First World War, pre-existing anti-Semitism and the Great Depression all played important roles in the xenophobic attitudes of these countries' populations.

Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism

Throughout the history of the United Kingdom, the topic of immigration has generated both sympathy and antipathy from the general public.¹⁸³ Despite its reputation as a place of tolerance, the United Kingdom does have a history of racial

¹⁷⁹ Holland, *The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role*, 89.

¹⁸⁰ Freeman, "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States," 887.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 888.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ Holmes, "Immigration to Britain," 17.

violence.¹⁸⁴ This became especially apparent in the period between 1911 and 1919 when there were random attacks on black workers and seamen, Chinese laundries and Jewish businesses.¹⁸⁵

Anti-Semitism existed in the United Kingdom far before the refugee crisis. The Tsarist Pogroms in Russia prompted a significant migration of Russian Jews to the United Kingdom between 1880 and 1914.¹⁸⁶ Russian Jews were not forced to enlist in the armed forces during the First World War which caused resentment and violence.¹⁸⁷ Jews were also treated as scapegoats during a national railway strike when the public responded to an increase in rents and truck arrangements, made by a very small number of Jewish capitalists, by inciting widespread riots and attacks on Jewish businesses of all kinds, whether they were responsible or related to the issue or not.¹⁸⁸ This is a clear example of when the actions of a small group were transposed onto the entire ethnic group, who then had to deal with the consequences.

Germany became an official enemy of the United Kingdom with the outbreak of the First World War. This had an obvious and immediate effect on the British perceptions of Germans. The sinking of the passenger liner, the Lusitania, by German torpedoes in 1915, further solidified this and reinforced the British image of Germans as barbarians. This anti-German sentiment by the public continued throughout the war and into the interwar period.¹⁸⁹

The interwar period was one of few periods in modern history when the United Kingdom had a net immigration rate.¹⁹⁰ However, the pre-existing sentiments did not disappear and foreigners were generally unwelcome. The British found political and economic reasons to excuse their xenophobia and desire to close the borders to foreigners. Each ethnic group suffered from specific prejudices: the Chinese broke strikes, Jews were exploitative middlemen, Russian Jews were cowards, the Germans were barbarians, and coloured seamen were a threat to the labour market.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁴ Holmes, "The Myth of Fairness," 41.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 42, 44.

¹⁸⁶ Layton-Henry, "Great Britain," 90.

¹⁸⁷ Holmes, "The Myth of Fairness," 44.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁹⁰ Layton-Henry, "Great Britain," 89.

¹⁹¹ Holmes, "The Myth of Fairness," 42.

France's war effort required additional labour from the colonies and over a half a million foreigners came to work in France's factories and farms between 1914 and 1918.¹⁹² Despite the essential role they played during the war, the presence of so many foreigners brought up questions about the desirability of having such a large foreign population.¹⁹³ The 300 000 non-white foreign workers in this group were treated differently from their European peers; the only group controlled by what the French called 'encadrement' or regimentation, which meant living in official barracks that have been said to resemble prisoner of war camps.¹⁹⁴ Following this experience in the First World War, the French government focused on recruiting white, European immigrants almost exclusively.¹⁹⁵

France held its "Colonial Exhibition" in 1931, affording French citizens an opportunity to take a worldwide tour of the colonies culturally, without ever leaving mainland France.¹⁹⁶ Rather than a true celebration of the various cultures, the exhibition was meant to aid in keeping the French people loyal to the colonial idea as well as proving itself as an imperial power.¹⁹⁷ The French government saw the colonies as an economic asset and bulwark, a source of labour and a reservoir of military goods.¹⁹⁸ This treatment of colonial cultures is a typical example of how the French felt towards foreigners. Despite France's racially varied Empire, the French did not see all races equally.

The public was initially sympathetic towards the German-Jewish refugees, but this dissipated as they realized that it would be a permanent problem.¹⁹⁹ Similar to the concerns of other countries, Daladier was concerned that a large German Jewish population could cause an anti-Semitic backlash, as well as strengthen the political right who had accused the French government of being manipulated by Jewish money.²⁰⁰

Despite the fact that anti-Semitism and xenophobia were not explicit parts of the programme of the fascist right in France, the Faisceau, these attitudes were

¹⁹² Stovall, "National Identities and Shifting Imperial Frontiers," 55.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 52.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 55-56.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 59.

¹⁹⁶ Furlough, "Une Leçon des Choses," 441.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 442, 472.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 442.

¹⁹⁹ Burgess, "France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933," 204.

²⁰⁰ Maga, "Closing the Door," 430.

abundant among their members and leaders.²⁰¹ The Faisceau was keen to exclude what they saw as undesirables, including Jews and non-white foreigners.²⁰² This fascist party was able to convince many French people that the Jews had infiltrated the power structure of the country and were poisoning France.²⁰³ Anti-Semitism had been an issue in French politics before. The Dreyfus Affair, in which a Jewish military officer was wrongly charged with treason, occurred at the end of the nineteenth century and had largely divided the French public.²⁰⁴

By mid-1933, when the people of France realized they were the only country helping the refugees, they began resenting the aloofness of other countries and were becoming less sympathetic²⁰⁵. In 1934, the Stavisky affair, the conviction of a naturalized Ukrainian Jew for fraudulent financial activity, led to further anti-Semitism, especially by the far right.²⁰⁶ They believed that this further proved that Jews could never really be French.²⁰⁷

On the whole, the American public was very resistant to increased immigration.²⁰⁸ Racial hierarchy had been scientifically proven to many Americans by people such as Samuel George Morton, who was America's most famous anthropologist in the late nineteenth century. His study of skulls, later proven to be completely flawed and biased, reinforced racist instincts scientifically.²⁰⁹ The white supremacist group, the Ku Klux Klan also experienced a revival in the interwar period, preaching racism, anti-Semitism and nativism throughout the United States, but concentrated in the American South.²¹⁰

The United States and the other New World countries were harder hit by unemployment than their European counterparts. The higher unemployment numbers caused an increased fear of introducing new workers into an already troubled job market.²¹¹ Americans living in fear of losing their job, or desperately trying to find one, were highly unlikely to support increased competition. They often felt that recent

²⁰¹ Kalman, "Reconsidering Fascist Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia in 1920s France," 346.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid., 346-347.

²⁰⁴ Kalman, "Reconsidering Fascist Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia in 1920s France," 347-348.

²⁰⁵ Burgess, "France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933," 219.

²⁰⁶ Price, *A Concise History of France*, 237.

²⁰⁷ Kalman, "Reconsidering Fascist Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia in 1920s France," 348.

²⁰⁸ Breitman, *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry*, 3.

²⁰⁹ Menand, "Morton, Agassiz, and the Origins of Scientific Racism," 111.

²¹⁰ Bade, *Migration in European History*, 188.

²¹¹ Breitman, *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry*, 3.

immigrants were responsible for the current problems and became more and more intolerant of foreigners.

Roosevelt's outward humanitarian actions, such as the calling of the Evian Conference, concerned many Americans who felt that he was being unrealistic.²¹² The public felt that he was forgetting that indeed a third of Americans were currently unemployed, ill fed, ill clothed and ill housed.²¹³ Americans felt that the priority should be the care of the American public, not those of other countries, and became strongly opposed to foreigners.

Concerns in Canada were similar to those in other countries. As a bilingual and immigrant country, Canadians were apprehensive of their society becoming less homogenous than it already was.²¹⁴ Many groups within Canadian society had more specific and personal grievances. French Canadians were concerned about increased immigration because only a small percentage of immigrants spoke French and they worried that their language and political weight was being diluted.²¹⁵ Organized workers in various unions disliked increasing the number of foreigners because they felt that they competed unfairly with Canadian workers and were used to break strikes.²¹⁶ Even law enforcement officials expressed that they believed that increased immigration would increase crime.²¹⁷

The First World War had a significant effect on the way that Canadians viewed foreigners and Germans in particular. Many Canadians of German descent were Mennonites and pacifists, who did not support the war. Other Canadians saw this as a lack of loyalty towards Canada and the British Empire. Canadians did not want to be associated with the enemy forces to the point where an Ontario manufacturing town with a particularly strong German community, named Berlin, was renamed during the war. The name chosen to replace Berlin was Kitchener, after a British war hero who had recently passed away. The statue of the Kaiser Wilhelm II which had stood for years in the central park was thrown into the lake as the town tried to dissociate itself from Germany. Furthermore, in what appears to be a precedent of the

²¹² Although Roosevelt initiated the Evian Conference on the Jewish refugee problem and appeared to want to help, it was clear in the conference that he and his government were unwilling to contribute much to an active solution.

²¹³ Kampmark, "'Spying for Hitler,'" 7.

²¹⁴ Kelley, *The Making of a Mosaic*, 116.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 116.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 135.

Japanese internment that occurring in Canada during the Second World War, over 9000 individuals of alien enemy birth were incarcerated during the First World War.²¹⁸ The sentiments behind these actions did not disappear after the war and continued to shape the views of Canadians towards Germans.

When economic conditions began to rapidly deteriorate in the early 1930s, Canadians became more and more supportive of restrictive immigration measures.²¹⁹ Canadians widely supported the exclusion of the Jews and there was little outcry made on their behalf. Canadians justified this response with economic reasoning; the entry Jews would increase competition for already scarce employment opportunities. But it also had very much to do with the ideological, cultural and racial values held by the Canadian public, which would later support the Japanese internment on the same basis.²²⁰ In reference to Jewish refugees, the Canadian government refused to allow “special humanitarian classification for the entry of refugees and to make a distinction between them and ordinary immigrants.”²²¹ This demonstrates the lack of sympathy for the Jewish refugees and their specific situation.

As the 1930s continued, there were cases of violence between Jewish and non-Jewish workers in Toronto’s textile industry. Jewish and non-Jewish trade unions operated separately due in part to the language barrier, with many recent Jewish immigrants unable to speak English.²²² This created tension between Jewish workers and the rest of the workers which made it much more difficult to overcome the prejudices that caused unemployed members of trade unions to attack and beat leaders of the Jewish trade unions.²²³

Australia experienced many of the same issues. Australians were concerned that a continued influx of immigrants, especially of one particular group, would challenge their core values.²²⁴ Similar to occurrences in Canada, but in much greater numbers, Australia also renamed cities that had German names. Many cities and towns were given more anglicized or aboriginal names, with some being named after events and battles of the First World War.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 15.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid., 17.

²²¹ Kampmark, “Spying for Hitler,” 13.

²²² Frager, “Mixing with People on Spadina,” 142.

²²³ Ibid., 142, 153.

²²⁴ Kampmark, “Spying for Hitler,” 2.

Australia had Jewish political leaders and military officials so it can not be said that anti-Semitism was completely institutionalized. However, Australia had a unique way of dividing Jewish people into what they considered good and bad Jews. Most Australian Jews were English or anglicized and were therefore less visible and more assimilable. On the other hand, German or Eastern European Jews were seen as inassimilable. Australian newspapers and journals often brought the concerns of inassimilability into public discourse, focusing on the solidarity that Jews had towards each other and their religion, and not the country they lived in.²²⁵ Once the crisis began, the loyalty of Jewish refugees was constantly being questioned and some even saw the fact that they were unwanted in Germany as a reason for suspicion.²²⁶

An issue that also existed in the other cases was the fear of importing racial problems. Australia claimed to have no such issues and worried that allowing the entry to Jews in large numbers would create stronger anti-Semitism that would also affect the Australian Jews and could possibly incite violence.²²⁷ Another similar issue is that of job competition. With the highest unemployment rates in the world in the 1930s, Australians also were concerned about the economic effects of allowing refugee entry, namely that refugees would take Australian jobs.²²⁸

Role of the Local Jewish Community

None of the five countries had a local Jewish community that was able to persuade their government to aid the German Jewish refugees in any way. In France, the local Jewish population had the added responsibility of looking out for the German Jewish refugees, something that was not an issue in the other four countries because there were no refugees who were able to enter. In France, the immediate welfare and material assistance to Jewish refugees was left to private and community organizations.²²⁹ These were funded mainly by French Jewish groups but also included donations from the general public. Despite their pleas for funding and aid from the government, the French Jewish groups were turned down. They could not raise enough money to help with the immediate settlement of all of the refugees. The French Jewish organizations also took the possibility of agricultural settlement for

²²⁵ Ibid., 6.

²²⁶ Ibid., 5,8.

²²⁷ Ibid., 13.

²²⁸ Ibid., 16.

²²⁹ Burgess, "France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933," 222.

German Jewish refugees very seriously, nonetheless, the plans were made extremely complicated and eventually cancelled by the French government.²³⁰ There were too few members of the community who were willing to make the necessary sacrifices to help.

There are several reasons why so few were willing to come forward to help, and these same issues apply to all five cases. The main issue was the concern that an increased Jewish population would create an anti-Semitic backlash, which was a concern also shared by politicians at the time. Jews living in these countries, many of whom already suffered the effects of the anti-Semitism that existed in their societies, did not want to make the situation more difficult and possibly dangerous for themselves and their families. This meant that surprisingly few were willing to fight and protest on behalf of the German Jewish refugees. In addition to their concerns over the issues that would be caused by the arrival of a large group of Jews, they were also concerned about what the protests themselves would cost them. In many cases they were not interested in making themselves a more visible minority. In fact, Australian Jews, concerned about the safety of more recently arrived Jews and possibly themselves, urged German Jews to try to become non-visible as a minority. They encouraged them to only speak English in public and to not draw attention to themselves.²³¹ While there are numerous records of attempts made by small and committed groups such as the Jewish trade unions in Toronto, Canada, these efforts are largely seen as uncommon.²³² The local Jewish population understood the anti-Semitic society they lived in and the state of the economy and many were not willing to put themselves at risk.

Evaluating the Cultural factors

It is evident that xenophobia was present in all five cases. If this study were expanded to include more cases, it is likely that a very high percent of them would prove to be xenophobic in this time period. Despite being founded on immigration, the New World countries had not accepted equality for all races. In what are some of the most proudly multicultural countries today, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and racial segregation were huge parts of everyday culture in these countries.

²³⁰ Ibid., 225.

²³¹ Kampmark, "Spying for Hitler," 11.

²³² Frager, "Mixing with People on Spadina," 154.

While some of the reasoning is difficult to comprehend today, some are completely understandable. One such example is the fear of job displacement. People often see the number of jobs available as fixed (not taking into account the entrepreneurial endeavors and increased markets caused by immigrants) so they see immigrants as competitors for jobs, often with the advantage of accepting lower wages.²³³ The possibility of losing one's job at any time can be alarming and the consequences of it occurring during a depression could be catastrophic. Because this was the most direct effect that immigration would be likely to have on an individual, it is logical that they would take such a stance on foreigners.

None of the countries had a local Jewish community who was able to make a difference in the political realm. The small numbers within the support groups was due in part to the anti-Semitism that already existed in these countries, and many individuals did not feel that the personal costs of calling for the aid for the German-Jewish refugees and their arrival in large numbers were worth the risk.

While the situation for foreigners was arguably better in each of these countries than during the Pogroms in Russia or in Nazi Germany, it is clear that a strong sense of xenophobia existed in each of them. With Germanophobia and anti-Semitism being especially strong elements, it was clear that the general public of each of these countries was not enthusiastic about allowing the entry of German-Jewish refugees.

Table 3. Results Table: Cultural Variables

	United Kingdom	France	United States	Canada	Australia
Xenophobia	1	1	1	1	1
Role of the Jewish Community	0	0	0	0	0

²³³ Simon, *The Economic Consequences of Immigration*, 213.

5. Economic Factors

The Great Depression was an economic event that influenced all aspects of life in the 1930s. It is very probable that economic factors such as domestic economies, unemployment rates, climate (related to agricultural productivity) and GDP per capita played an important role in determining the immigration trends that occurred in this period.

National Economies in the 1920s

In the interwar period the economies of each of these countries were not only interrelated to each other, but to the international economy as a whole. None the less, we will discuss the state of the economy during the 1920s in each of the countries.

Unemployment was high in Britain throughout the 1920s, averaging 7.7% between 1920 and 1929, and was especially concentrated in Wales, Manchester and the North East.²³⁴ By 1924, British exports were doing poorly compared to their own exports in 1913, as well as compared to the rest of Europe and the rest of the world at that time.²³⁵ Britain had returned the Pound Sterling to the Gold Standard in 1925, which made British exports very expensive to the world market.²³⁶ The United Kingdom's inability to get their exports up to pre-war levels contributed to their high levels of unemployment during the 1920s.²³⁷ On a whole, the 1920s are generally seen as a 'lost decade' for the United Kingdom, in terms of economic growth.²³⁸ This lack of growth was reflected in the United Kingdom's withdrawal from its global economic role.²³⁹

France position as an exporter also declined following the First World War. The destruction of the war had diminished its output potential and despite its prestige as a great power, France went into decline.²⁴⁰ The chronic monetary instability that had plagued France since 1918 culminated in the collapse of the franc in July of

²³⁴ Kindleberger, *The World in Depression*, 42.

²³⁵ Holland, *The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role*, 111.

²³⁶ Rooth, *British Protectionism and the International Economy*, 70.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 33.

²³⁸ Kindleberger, *The World in Depression*, 42.

²³⁹ Rooth, *British Protectionism and the International Economy*, 34.

²⁴⁰ Hehn, *A Low Dishonest Decade*, 402.

1926.²⁴¹ It was then that economic conditions really began to deteriorate and there was a spike in industrial unemployment in 1927.²⁴² This spike caused a lot of attention to be focused on the number of foreign workers in France and possible solutions involving their removal. With the exception of 1927, unemployment remained low throughout most of the 1920s in France, with industrial unemployment averaging 3.8% between 1921 and 1929. Despite falling prices, France believed that it was highly unlikely that they would experience serious unemployment. They felt protected by both the 1.5 million foreign workers in France as well as having what they believed to be an ideal balance between agriculture and industry.²⁴³

The United States has a history of correlating its immigration policies directly to its economic needs. This was demonstrated during the First World War which served as an economic disruption and caused the economic benefits of an open immigration policy to be diminished.²⁴⁴ However during the First World War, there were very specific shortages of agricultural workers and the U.S. Department of Labour responded to these shortages by suspending the head tax and literacy requirement for agricultural workers.²⁴⁵ Shortly after the war was over, the United States adopted a quota system that put a maximum on the number of immigrants who were granted entry each year. This meant that in addition to the qualitative standards that an immigrant had to meet, they also had to make it before the quota was filled, adding another step to the struggle to move to America.

Following the armistice on 11 November, 1919, Canada had to find a way to re-absorb over a half million veterans from overseas. Their re-settlement into Canadian society created a demand for consumer goods, which in turn caused inflation, but it also prevented Canada from having immediate unemployment issues.²⁴⁶ The end of war-production led to a slight slump in the latter part of 1920 but by 1923 the economy had recovered and production was on the rise.²⁴⁷

During the war, Australia's exports had been in excess of their imports but this was reversed in 1921.²⁴⁸ In addition to this, the prices of exports were falling and

²⁴¹ Jackson, *The Politics of Depression in France*, 9-10.

²⁴² Burgess, "France and the German Refugee Crisis of 1933," 212.

²⁴³ Jackson, *The Politics of Depression in France*, 29.

²⁴⁴ Rosenblum, "Immigration and US National Interests," 16.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁴⁶ McInnis, "Immigration and Emigration: Canada in the Late 19th Century," 495.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁸ Greenwood, "Development in the Twenties," 295.

combined, these two things led Australia to run a deficit budget.²⁴⁹ The disruption of international trade during and following the First World War was very serious for Australia because it was so reliant on distant export markets.²⁵⁰ As a primary-producing market, Australia was debilitated by the increase difficulty of getting its exports to markets.²⁵¹ Between 1919 and 1929, Australia's overseas debt increased by 225 million pounds and the increase had been most rapid in the 4 years before 1929.²⁵² The protectionist tariffs put in place under the isolationist policy also negatively affected external trade. The rigidity of prices and the internal costs of the tariffs were major contributors to the declining economy.²⁵³

When the stock market crashed in October of 1929, all five economies were considerably affected. People lost faith in the financial system and many lost their jobs. Work camps had to be created to keep the thousands of unemployed busy and fed. Politicians were slow to admit the existence of an economic depression, especially in Australia.²⁵⁴ No government was fully prepared for the deep economic depression that had begun.

²⁴⁹ Partridge, "Depression and War, 1929-1950," 346.

²⁵⁰ Meredith, *Australia in the Global Economy*, 77.

²⁵¹ Ibid.


²⁵² Partridge, "Depression and War, 1929-1950," 346.

²⁵³ Greenwood, "Development in the Twenties," 312, Partridge, "Depression and War, 1929-1950," 346.

²⁵⁴ Partridge, "Depression and War, 1929-1950," 349.


Unemployment Rates

Figure 3. Unemployment Rates in Industry



Source: Eichengreen, *Interwar Unemployment in International Perspective*, 6.

Figure 4. Unemployment as a Percentage of Total Workforce



Sources:

The United Kingdom: Feinstein, *Statistical Tables*, p. 126.

France: Maddison, *Economic Growth in the West*, 220.

The United States: Darby, "Three-and-a-Half Million U.S. Employees Have Been Mislaid," 8, and Zagorsky, "Was Depression Era Unemployment Really Less in Canada than the U.S.?" 126.

Canada: Gower, "A Note on Canadian Unemployment since 1921," and Zagorsky, 126.

Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Year Book Australia* (Editions from 1920-1940).

Statistics on unemployment in this period are riddled with problems. The term ‘unemployment’ itself was a relatively new one in 1920. The concept had only emerged in the late nineteenth century in advanced economies when the Long Depression hit in the 1870s.²⁵⁵ Prior to this period, unemployment was seen as an individual problem, not a societal one, and was often blamed on personal character flaws such as laziness or incompetence, or ethnic faults. The noun ‘unemployment’ only appeared for the first time in 1888 and so the collection of unemployment statistics was uncommon and haphazard at best during the early twentieth century.²⁵⁶ Because France was less industrialized than the other countries in this study, it took another generation for joblessness to be seen as a social problem and thus their recording of these statistics is even less comprehensive than the others.²⁵⁷ Many of the statistics that do exist are based on the number of people registering for unemployment benefits and others are extrapolated from later data, using the information available for that time period.

Two groups of statistics will be used to discuss unemployment in the interwar period. The first is the ‘Unemployment Rates in Industry’ (Figure 3) that have been gathered by Barry Eichengreen and Tim Hatton. While they admit that their statistics are imperfect, they have tried to gather them from consistent sources: trade union and unemployment figures in each country. Much of their statistics came from Galenson and Zellner’s earlier study in 1957, but some changes have been made and France, among others have been added.²⁵⁸ The second graph (Figure 4) includes more recent statistics that have been corrected to reflect the overall unemployment during the period. National and official sources have been used to obtain the most accurate data available. Data was only available for France in the census years and so points have only been included every five years. This is unfortunate as it does not allow us to see what went on between 1931 and 1936, presumably when France’s unemployment rates were highest. While the specific data from these dates are the most accurate, Eichengreen and Hatton’s statistics portray a fuller and more accurate image the changes in unemployment in France.

²⁵⁵ Dormois, *The French Economy in the Twentieth Century*, 96.

²⁵⁶ Feinstein, *The European Economy Between the Wars*, 10.

²⁵⁷ Dormois, *The French Economy in the Twentieth Century*, 96.

²⁵⁸ For these original statistics and calculations made to create France’s figures see Galenson and Zellner, "International Comparison of Unemployment Rates" In *The Measurement and Behavior of Unemployment*.

A marked difference between these two graphs is the data for the United States. Eichengreen and Hatton's statistics cite Stanley Lebergott's 1957 article "Annual Estimates of Unemployment in the United States, 1900-1954" as their source for the United States data. Lebergott's data had already been corrected by 1976 when Darby made further corrections to the number of emergency workers participating in government programs who were categorized as unemployed in order to keep tabs on the number of jobs that needed to be created.²⁵⁹ Because of this, we understand Darby's data to be more accurate. It is now generally believed that Australia endured the highest unemployment rates.

Despite the problems with the data, unemployment rates are a very important aspect of the depression and played a significant role in determining immigration policy. Unemployment is often remembered as the distinctive and deepest felt effect of the depression.²⁶⁰ One event that all of the data agrees on is the huge jump in unemployment following the stock market crash of 1929. As previously mentioned, it is likely that Australia experienced the highest unemployment rate, reaching a peak of almost 30% of the total workforce in 1932. However, it is important to note that Australia, along with the United Kingdom, had some of the highest unemployment rates throughout the 1920s. Britain's high unemployment was unevenly dispersed geographically. For instance, in 1932 unemployment rose to 36.5% in Wales while reaching only 13.5 % in London.²⁶¹ Australia's unemployment rates remain the highest of all five countries until 1936 when it dipped below Canada.

The United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia all experienced sharp increases in unemployment between 1929 and 1932. The United Kingdom, the United States and Australia reached their peak unemployment rates in 1932 at 15.2%, 22.5% and 29% respectively while Canada's rate of increase slowed down after 1931 and reached its peak in 1933 at 20%. With France's industrial unemployment reaching its peak in 1932, it is possible that its total unemployment also peaked at this time, although likely at a lower figure than the 15.4 % experienced in industry given that the rate in 1931 was only 2.1%. Despite Eichengreen's statistics on industrial unemployment, many believe the true maximum of total unemployment occurred in

²⁵⁹ Darby, "Three-and-a-Half Million U.S. Employees Have Been Misled," 1.

²⁶⁰ Feinstein, *The European Economy Between the Wars*, 10.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 134.

February of 1935 and was slightly over 1 million unemployed.²⁶² Others believe that the 1 million mark had been met earlier, in January of 1933.²⁶³ Regardless of when this occurred, it is important to remember that while 1 million may sound high, this would mean a maximum of 2.6% of the general population.²⁶⁴ There appears to be little information to confirm Eichengreen's high rates.

There are several explanations for why France's unemployment levels would be so low. Reconstruction after the First World War had created a lot of work and brought in many foreign workers. As unemployment began to rise, these workers were expelled from the country, protecting the native population. In addition to the foreigners leaving the country, many French people who lost their jobs returned to rural areas to farm and thus were not considered among the unemployed.²⁶⁵ Furthermore, France did not have to impose deflationary policies in order to protect its gold reserves and compulsory conscription eased youth unemployment.²⁶⁶ It is estimated that at least 1.3 million jobs disappeared because of the depression.²⁶⁷

After these peaks in unemployment, the rates began to drop quickly in most cases. According to the statistics on unemployment of the total workforce, rates for all of the countries, save France, were almost identical in 1937, ranging between 7.8 and 9.3%. Furthermore, the three New World countries had only a range of 0.3%. After 1937 the rates increased once again but began to decline almost immediately again in 1938 and 1939 with the advent of the Second World War. It is important to note that by 1940, the United States and Canada had not even approached their pre-depression levels of unemployment. By 1940, only the United Kingdom's rate was lower than they had been in 1920.

These unemployment rates are very significant to immigration because they have a direct effect. For the most part, immigration was welcomed when labour was needed but both the government and public of each of these countries were extremely reluctant to have more people unemployed and competing for scarce work when rates were already so high. Furthermore, governments did not want to have to pay for welfare or provide work camps for additional people.

²⁶² Jackson, *The Politics of Depression in France*, 29.

²⁶³ Maga, "Closing the Door: The French Government and Refugee Policy," 428.

²⁶⁴ Jackson, *The Politics of Depression in France*, 30.

²⁶⁵ Dormois, *The French Economy in the Twentieth Century*, 97.

²⁶⁶ Feinstein, *The European Economy Between the Wars*, 135.

²⁶⁷ Dormois, *The French Economy in the Twentieth Century*, 97.

Agricultural Productivity: Climate

Agricultural productivity, much like every aspect of economic life, fell victim to the depression in the 1930s. France's agricultural sector was its first to be affected and was also the hardest hit.²⁶⁸ The twenty years between the two world wars were generally unprofitable for British farmers.²⁶⁹ All five countries suffered from the fifty percent drop in world prices for staples, with primary-producing countries like Australia being hit particularly hard.²⁷⁰ This drastic drop in prices was due overexpansion of production during and after the First World War.²⁷¹ Trade barriers put up by protectionist governments further hurt agricultural productivity. Despite all of these hardships, these countries did not suffer the effects of exogenous factors that the United States and Canada did.

Both Canada and the United States suffered severe droughts in the 1930s which had negative effects on the agricultural sector and further exacerbated the effects of the depression. For the most part, droughts are defined by their impact on society.²⁷² Their meteorological and atmospheric causes make them a completely exogenous factor.²⁷³ The relevance of their effect is their direct impact on agricultural productivity and indirect impact on the economy.

In the decade between 1930 and 1939 over half of the years were considered drought stricken in Canada.²⁷⁴ The extreme heat, water deficits and dust storms in the southern prairies created what was to be called the 'dust bowl' and would eventually threaten the survival of the area as a viable economic community.²⁷⁵ Coincidentally occurring at the same time at the onset of the depression, Canadian crops failed in 1929, 1930 and 1931. To add to the damage, in 1932 the falling price of grain could not cover the harvesting costs, and in 1933 grasshopper infestations completely devastated the land.²⁷⁶ Similar problems continued to plague the agricultural sector until 1938.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 104.

²⁶⁹ Perren, *Agriculture in Depression*, 41.

²⁷⁰ Meredith, *Australia in the Global Economy*, 77.

²⁷¹ Temin, *Lessons from the Great Depression*, 55.

²⁷² Namias, "Severe Drought and Recent History," 697.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Nkendirim, "Comparison between the Droughts of the 1930s and the 1980," 2434.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 2434.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 2435,

Of course these droughts were not confined by the 49th parallel. The entire period from 1930 to 1940 was also extremely dry in the United States.²⁷⁷ While the nation was still reeling from the shock of the stock market crash, the first great drought hit in 1930, brutally affecting 30 states.²⁷⁸ The national yield per acre in 1930 was already down 8.9 percent from the previous decade's average and the worst was yet to come.²⁷⁹ The dust bowl of the mid-thirties dwarfed the severity and duration of the drought of 1930. In addition to the increased food prices, there was a major crisis in the supply of animal feed.²⁸⁰

The United Kingdom, France and Australia did not suffer any similar agricultural hardships in this period that exacerbated the problems of the Depression. The distance between North America and Europe or Australia makes it quite logical that they would not be suffering from the same atmospheric patterns. This compounding of economic and ecological problems made it extremely difficult for North American farmers to survive during the depression. Because they were affected directly by both the economic effects of the depression and the effects of the drought, their ability to overcome these difficulties was greatly reduced. The drought had severe repercussions on agricultural productivity and on the general economies of Canada and the United States.

²⁷⁷ Skaggs, "Drought in the United States, 1931-1940," 402.


²⁷⁸ Hamilton, "Herbert Hoover and the Great Drought of 1930," 851.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 852.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

GDP per Capita

Figure 5. GDP per Capita



Source: Maddison, "Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2006 AD."

The effects of the Great Depression are reflected in the changes in gross domestic product per capita. The drops in GDP per capita in the early 1930s are significant.

The trends in the New World countries are quite similar, with those of Canada and the United States being almost identical. Their graphs are almost parallel, with both experiencing the beginning of the downfall between 1928 and 1929, their lowest GDP per capita in the decade occurring in 1933, and the United States' GDP dropping by 31% while Canada's dropped by 35%. The graph of Australia's GDP follows a similar shape but it occurs slightly earlier with a slow decline beginning in 1926, falling much faster by 1929 but hitting its low point in 1931, after which it begins to recover at the same rate that Canada and the United States would recover at after 1933. Australia's drop in GDP was less severe than both the United States and Canada, falling only 21%.

The GDPs of the United Kingdom and France experienced similar changes to each other. Both GDPs begin to decline in 1929 with the United Kingdom stagnating between 1931 and 1932 then promptly began its recovery and France beginning to recover in 1932 as well. The United Kingdom's GDP dropped only 6% while France's dropped 16%. These drops are significantly smaller than the major drops that occurred in Canada and the United States. Unfortunately for France, recovery was not easy and the period of growth immediately following the decline was short-lived, with

France's GDP experienced a mild drop between 1933 and 1935. France is the only country of the five to experience further interruptions to growth before 1937.

The differences in absolute changes in GDP between these countries are large enough to change the order of who was the leader in GDP. Despite the United States' lead in GDP by \$1389 over the next highest, the United Kingdom in 1929, by 1933 it had fallen behind both the United Kingdom and Australia. Not only is this due to the fact that the United States had the highest drop, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the 1929 figure, but also because of the late point at which the United States' GDP begins to recover. However, by the outbreak of the Second World War, the United States is again the leader in GDP.

Compared to the New World countries, the changes to GDP in the European countries are much less severe, but a similar pattern is still recognizable. Unsurprisingly, all five countries experienced a drop in GDP between 1929 and 1931, and the average length of that drop was 3.8 years with each case ranging between 2 and 5 years.

In general, the GDP growth rates for this period were lower than the periods preceding or following. The growth rate of Europe's GDP fell to 0.9% between 1913 and 1950, while it had been 1.4% from 1890 to 1913, and was followed by a growth rate of 4% from 1950 to 1973. The United States' growth rates were 2% from 1890 to 1913, 1.4% from 1913 to 1950, and 2.9% from 1950 to 1973. Canada's growth rates for the same periods were, 2.8%, 1.4% and 2.9%.²⁸¹ In retrospect, one can see that this period is between two major wars that disrupt international economies. Even within this slow period, there are marked changes within it. The period in which the depression falls is significant because it affects the severity of it. Had similar shocks occurred during a larger period of rapid growth, the economies may have been able to withstand more and would be less likely to be disrupted so severely. A period of rapid growth would also have allowed for a quicker recovery from these shocks.

The shape of the graph of Gross Domestic Product (Figure 5) during this period looks very similar to the inverse of the unemployment graph, or rather the employment rates. With so many members of society unemployed, it makes sense that the capacity of the countries to produce would also fall. While it cannot be claimed that GDP per capita is in any way an exogenous factors, it still play a role in

²⁸¹ Feinstein, *The European Economy between the Wars*, 9 and Maddison, *Monitoring the World Economy*, 104-111, 180-187.

causation, or rather exacerbation. When unemployment rises, GDP per capita decreases which means that there is less money to invest back into the economy and industries in an effort to create jobs or stimulate the economy. This further complicates the problem and makes it increasingly difficult for a country to lift itself out of this cycle as time goes on.

Evaluating the Economic Variables

The first variable we looked at in this chapter was unemployment. It is clear that unemployment is extremely high for most of these countries throughout the 1930s. The one exception is France, who took much longer to be affected by the Great Depression and thus could curb unemployment until the mid-to-late 1930s. Because of this, France has been scored a 1 because its unemployment rates are not high enough in 1933 to inhibit immigration or refugee entry, or in more positive terms, the employment rate is high enough to allow immigration. The rest of the cases have scored a 0 because their unemployment rates discourage entry of any foreigners.

The second variable in this chapter is climate and its effect on agricultural productivity. The United States and Canada have been scored as a 0 due to the exogenous and debilitating droughts they experienced. While the United Kingdom, France and Australia experienced agricultural hardships as well, these difficulties were a reflection of the battered economies and not another factor causing it. It is by pure chance that North America experienced these meteorological events at this time and geographical distance kept the European and Australian countries from experiencing it.

The third variable is gross domestic product. If we compare the statistics specifically from 1929 and 1933, the result is that only Canada and the United States have severe drops in GDP, at 33% and 31% respectively. In this same period, the United Kingdom had dropped by 4%, France by 10% and Australia by 8%. These three countries had also already begun recovering by 1933. All of these drops can be considered severe and had harsh repercussions on every aspect of life in these countries. But there is also a clear difference between losing one tenth of your GDP and one third. The exceptional drops in Canada and the United States were completely debilitating, resulting in a society that could barely cope with the loss of income. For this reason, the United States and Canada have been scored as 0 while the United Kingdom, France and Australia have been scored as 1.

Table 4. Results Table: Economic Variables

	United Kingdom	France	United States	Canada	Australia
Employment	0	1	0	0	0
Climate	1	1	0	0	1
GDP	1	1	0	0	1

Conclusion

Table 5. Compiled Results Table: All Variables

	United Kingdom	France	United States	Canada	Australia
Open Immigration Policy	0	1	0	0	0
Fully Populated	1	1	1	1	0
Stability of Government	1	0	1	1	0
Isolationist policy	1	0	1	1	1
International Agreements (Commonwealth)	1	0	0	1	1
International events (League of Nations)	0	1	0	0	0
Xenophobia	1	1	1	1	1
Role of local community	0	0	0	0	0
Employment	0	1	0	0	0
GDP per Capita	1	1	0	0	1
Climate	1	1	0	0	1
Outcome: Restriction of Entry	1	0	1	1	1

Table 5 is a compilation of all of the results that have been determined in each of the individual chapters. As depicted in this table, there are four variables where the four countries with restricted immigration have the same score and the one country that allowed entry has the opposite score. This is the case with pre-depression immigration policy, isolationist foreign policy, response to international events such as the creation of the League of Nations, and employment levels. France has scored a 1 in each of these cases except isolationist policy, while the other four have scored a 0 except for isolationist policy. Because each of these variables demonstrates a clear and direct relationship with the outcome, they are an important focus of each of their sections.

Analysis of Historical Factors

Within the historical factors, four of the cases (the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia) all had restrictionist policies in place by the time the Great Depression. France, the only case with the outcome of allowed entry, is also the only case where the immigration policy was open before the Great Depression and the refugee crisis. This is significant as it argues that the underlying causes for the uncommonly open borders in the period leading up to the depression (when compared to other states) continued to play a role in determining policy. The main underlying cause of this policy was the weak demographics of France in the shadow of the First World War, in terms of both population growth and labour requirements. By 1929 and even in 1933, this was still a concern in France. The other four countries did not have these same needs as their demographics were stronger and their needs for labour were either being met or they experienced a surplus of labour. This demonstrates the strong continuity in immigration policy that occurred in France. Despite changes to the economic climate, France's other concerns overrode any changes that would have been made.

In reference to the domestic security and need to populate uninhabited land, Australia was the only country for whom this was a concern in the interwar period. Despite this need, Australia's borders were closed to immigrants and refugees, thus demonstrating that this factor was not very significant in immigration policy in this period and that other factors such as the state of the economy, were determined to be of more importance by decision makers at the time. The fear of invasion was still an issue in this period and continued even in the period following the Second World War, so there are two possible explanations for this. The first would be that political relationships, such as being a dominion of the United Kingdom and later as a member of the commonwealth, and the recent victories of the countries in these alliances in the First World War comforted Australia and allowed the Australian government to feel more secure about the support they would receive in the case of an invasion. The second and more plausible explanation is that the severe economic deterioration trumped all other factors. Australia experienced some of the highest unemployment rates throughout the period and had lost 21% of its GDP per capita by 1931. It is logical to think that despite their security needs, and perhaps also taking some comfort in their strong political relationships, that the economy would be the priority in this

period and Australia did not feel that they could take on a larger population when they did not have enough work for those already there.

Analysis of Political Factors

Of the four political variables, France does not experience two of the variables when all of the other cases do. While all four cases with negative outcomes follow isolationist foreign policies in the interwar period, France does not. Similarly, France is the only country to play an active and enthusiastic role in the League of Nations. As previously mentioned, these two variables are correlated and a country's level of activity and their perspective on the League of Nations can be seen as a practical example of the foreign policy that they were practising. For this reason, it is unsurprising that the results for both of these variables would be the same with France having an active foreign policy and participating enthusiastically in the Leagues of Nations, while the other four countries practised isolationism both in theory and in practice. Despite France's active role in the international community, it cannot be said that its participation was completely altruistic. Much of the motivation for an aggressive foreign policy and support of the League of Nations came from national security issues and gains that could be made. France was interested in collective security, but this may have been galvanized by the destruction it had recently experienced through the lack of it. France was also very interested in making sure the Versailles Treaty was upheld, which was of course necessary for them to receive their reparations. Because of these logical and justified, but not necessarily benevolent, reasons it is difficult to translate these actions to more humanitarian issues such as the refugee crisis. While France had a history of humanitarianism, these recent examples did not necessarily support this reputation of benevolence. It is not an example where France had intervened in international affairs from which they had nothing to gain, and suggests that France may have had some vested interest in allowing refugees into the country and that this is not a wholly independent motivator and variable.

A surprising aspect of the political factors is that only France and Australia experienced overly unstable governments during the interwar period and especially immediately preceding the onset of the refugee crisis. It has been assumed in this study that an unstable government would be less likely to allow the entry of refugees due to

the increased resources being used to try to stabilize the government, but also that there would be less consensus in these governments and it would be more difficult to pass a controversial commitment to allowing entry to refugees when the governments were constantly changing. This assumption has been proven wrong by all of the cases except Australia. Australia suffered from instability and failed to open its doors to refugees while the other four cases had the opposite of what this theory assumes. France also experienced instability, and to a higher degree than Australia, but France did allow the entry of refugees. Likewise, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada all had relatively stable governments but did not open their doors. This unexpected result does not prove that this theory works in the reverse of what was predicted, due not only to the rogue case of Australia, but also the lack of a logical explanation of why this would be. However, it does suggest that this variable had little to no significance in the causation of restrictionist immigration policies.

The final comment to be made on the political factors is the fact that all of the countries with negative outcomes, save the United States, were members of the commonwealth and had close political ties to each other. As was previously mentioned, this variable was included in order to examine how these close ties and mutual support would affect decision making. It appears that for the three countries involved in the Commonwealth (the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia) this relationship worked as predicted in that these countries were not afraid to ignore such a crisis because of domestic needs because they knew that the other states would do the same. However, the United States reacted in this same way, and yet was not a member of the Commonwealth and had in fact distanced itself from the United Kingdom and other countries in general immediately after the First World War. Before concluding that this case disproves the role of the Commonwealth in the decision making process, one must remember that the United States emerged from the First World War as the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world.²⁸² The United States did not need the guaranteed support of other nations in the same way that smaller and less power countries like Canada and Australia did. Simply because the most powerful nation did not require these relationships to make a bold statement, does not mean that it had no effect on those in the commonwealth.

²⁸² Venzon, *The United States in the First World War*, 243.

While the Commonwealth was a very important relationship in international relations in this period, it would also be worth investigating each of these countries specific political and economic relations with Germany in the years leading up to the refugee crisis. Strong political or economic ties to Germany could have had a significant effect on a countries response to the crisis and an examination of these relationships could provide further insight into the responses of these five countries.

Analysis of Cultural Factors

All five countries have been awarded a 1 for the presence of xenophobia and 0 for the successful role of Jewish advocacy groups. Because all five cases were given the same score for each of the variables and yet had different outcomes, we can discard these variables from the causality of restrictionist immigration policies. The logical assumption that xenophobia in the general population would make a national government less likely to permit immigration or the entry of refugees has been proven wrong by the case of France. Despite the xenophobia and more specifically anti-Semitism that existed there, France opened its borders to refugees during the first years of the crisis. Although, one could argue that the presence of xenophobia combined with other factors to make open immigration less desirable, the results of this study clearly state that this variable was not sufficient to cause such a result, and in fact, did not prevent the opposite result from occurring. This is very significant as it disproves what we are inclined to think naturally: that xenophobia causes restrictive policy. In fact, it agrees with Richard Breitman and Alan Kraut's claim that the influence of anti-Semitism and xenophobia has been overestimated in the general discourse.²⁸³ The variable examining the role of the local Jewish community works in the same way. The lack of support from the established Jewish community would assumingly lead to the refusal of entry but despite the lack of support in France, entry was awarded. Why would a country where there is rampant intolerance of other races and little support from the local community allow foreign immigration in a period such as the Great Depression? The answer is that there were other, more significant factors that provoked the opening of the border. What those factors are can be found in the other variables examined in this study.

²⁸³ Breitman, *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry*, 3.

Analysis of Economic Factors

When looking at the economic factors as a whole, one notices that within the four negative cases, all experience high unemployment, but two also experience a milder drop in GDP and an early start to recovery along with no exogenous climatic complications, while the other two experience severe drops in GDP per capita and devastating droughts. Because two of the negative cases experience the presence of these variables while the other two do not, it appears that the presence or absence of these two variables is less significant than the presence of high unemployment. Within the economic factors, it is the unemployment rate that determines whether a country defines itself economically able to accept refugees and immigrants in this period.

All five countries experienced severe drops in GDP per capita between 1929 and 1933, with Canada and the United States suffering much more, losing almost a third of their 1929 GDPs per capita. While the United Kingdom, France and Australia remained at or under a 10% decrease, these developed countries expected their GDP to grow every year and stagnation let alone any drop in GDP can be a severe blow to the economy. By 1933, these same three countries had already begun their recovery, making it seem as though their capacity to receive immigrants and refugees would also be increasing, but the results show that this did not seem to have any impact as France took on refugees while the United Kingdom and Australia did not.

The fact that within these economic factors, there are no cases where only one of these two 'less significant' variables (GDP and climate) is present is also interesting. The lack of different combinations of variables present allows for the thought that these two variables may be correlated. The nature of these two variables lends itself to this theory quite well as it would make sense that droughts, and the decrease in agricultural productivity they cause, would contribute to the falling GDP per capita. The six to ten year length of the droughts would also contribute to the delay in recovery of these countries. Droughts are not easily recovered from, there is nothing that can be done to stop or shorten them and there is very little a country can do to ameliorate the situation while a drought continues. It must be noted that this correlation only works in one direction, as there are many reasons why a country could experience catastrophic drops in GDP and a late recovery that do not include atmospheric events. For this reason, one can only argue that climatic problems like

droughts *can* lead to increased drops in GDP and a delayed recovery, but not the other way around.

Final Conclusions

Through this analysis of the variables, it has been determined that the existence of a restrictive immigration history and policy prior to the great depression, an isolationist foreign policy, and high levels of unemployment are the three most likely and significant factors that will cause the restriction of entry to immigrants and refugees.

There is a significant drawback to having several of the factors that are consistent with the results in all cases is that because of the lack of variety, one cannot determine specifically which are the necessary factors and if there are any that are sufficient alone. For example, it could have been just an isolationist foreign policy and high unemployment that are sufficient to cause a restrictionist policy and that the existence of historical restriction in all the cases was just a coincidence. Without a case that has only some of these factors and yet the same outcome, we cannot quantitatively prove which of these three most significant factors are necessary or if indeed all three are. This, however, does not stop one from drawing further conclusions from the qualitative information available.

It appears the unemployment levels are really the most important factor in the response to the refugee crisis in 1933. While unemployment can not be defined as an exogenous factor, it is the variable that has the least dependant relationship on the other variables. For instance, past immigration policy is a reflection of past economic and political contexts, and so past policies can reflect past experiences in unemployment. While employment and labour needs are often reflected in immigration policy, past immigration policy was not the major cause of unemployment in this situation. Often, the general public believes that immigration causes unemployment but this is rarely the case. In the case of France, high levels of employment (relative to the other countries) in 1933 and their past unrestrictive immigration policy were both a result of the same ongoing issue: weak demographics. The same weak demographics that had required labour before the depression (and thus called for open immigration) were also responsible for the relatively low levels of unemployment during the depression. Hypothetically, if a country were to have a restrictionist immigration policy before the depression but for some reason, have a

large need for labour during it, the history of a restrictionist policy would not be sufficient to stop it from opening its borders to foreign labour. Rather the past immigration history is an indicator of larger trends that are occurring in the country in regards to immigration.

The relationship between unemployment and foreign policy is slightly less clear cut. Isolationist policy was also a reflection of the First World War and the political and economic disruption it caused. After the armistice, countries concerned themselves with their own well being and made the transition to a peace-time economy a priority. This kind of foreign policy made countries even more likely to concern themselves with the issue of unemployment. On the other hand, issues such as the massive jump in unemployment rates during the Great Depression caused countries to become more isolationistic and prevented them from resuming an active foreign policy earlier, because of the need to deal with their domestic issues. Furthermore, in the analysis of the political factors it was determined that France did not refrain from an Isolationist policy for altruistic reasons and its participation in international affairs was dependant on personal issues of security and economics. Because its activity was largely tied to vested interests, it is difficult to translate its participation in the League of Nations into a greater awareness and altruism for events in the international community.

Thus it appears again that unemployment is likely the most significant factors in causing restrictionist immigration policy and refusing the entry of refugees. However, more cases, and possibly other contexts or crises must be studied to be able to determine whether unemployment levels alone are sufficient to cause such an outcome on their own.

Since the refugee crisis of the 1930s, there have been many developments in how refugee situations are treated by the United Nations and the world. The United Nations created the UNHCR, or the UN refugee agency to govern issues regarding refugees and after the Second World War they held the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which defined the rights of refugees and the responsibilities of nations. While there have since been large influxes of refugee movement, there has not been a comparable case. First of all, many of the cases have occurred in developing countries where people did not have the means to bring themselves to the border of another country or buy a ticket on a ship or plane. More recent cases have required intervention and aid to get the refugees out of the country

and so there is no similar example of people trying to leave the country on their own financial means only to have all requests denied and to be turned away. Secondly, Western society has not since experienced an economic crisis like the Great Depression. Until Western society again experiences the unemployment levels of the Great Depression, it will be difficult to test the sufficiency of unemployment as a causal factor and how effective the new institutions regarding refugees are.

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